International Perspectives on Social Policy, Administration, and Practice

John W. Murphy

Community-Based Interventions

Philosophy and Action

Springer

International Perspectives on Social Policy, Administration, and Practice

Series Editors

Sheying Chen
Jason L. Powell

For further volumes:
http://www.springer.com/series/007

John W. Murphy

Community-Based Interventions

Philosophy and Action

Springer

John W. Murphy
Department of Sociology
University of Miami
Coral Gables
USA

ISBN 978-1-4899-8019-9 ISBN 978-1-4899-8020-5 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4899-8020-5
Springer New York Heidelberg Dordrecht London

Library of Congress Control Number: 2013954677

Printed on acid-free paper

Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

Preface

In the field of social service delivery, the term community-based is very popular nowadays. Nonetheless, the idea that interventions should have a grassroots orientation is not new. Since the passage of the Community Mental Health Act (1963) in the USA, along with similar proposals and supportive political movements in other parts of the world, services should be decentralized and persons should be evaluated and treated in their respective communities. The basic premise of this change is that social interventions will be attuned to the aims of those who use these programs and, thus, be sustainable in the long-run.

A key assumption of this book, however, is that most of these programs have not, and will not, become community-based. Although these projects may be located in communities, and possibly adopt the appropriate rhetoric, their ties to local persons will be weak. The reason for this failure is straightforward: that is, these interventions are not guided by a philosophical position that is consistent with becoming truly community-based. The policies and practices that are vital to becoming community-based will not be undertaken.

However, once this shift in philosophy is made, practically every facet of service delivery must be rethought. New perspectives on methodology, leadership, and community organizations, for example, must be proposed and adopted. Fundamental to these changes is that community members must be actively involved in and control every aspect of an intervention. Without the integration of these persons into the core of all interventions, these programs should not be considered community-based.

In this book, the reader is provided with some history, philosophy, and examples of community projects, in order to illustrate the various dimensions of a community-based intervention. As part of this reorientation, new language and novel ways of thinking about communities and social planning are introduced. In fact, some of these concepts and descriptives may seem odd at first. The point, however, is to think outside of the usual ways in which social interventions are conceptualized, implemented, and evaluated.

However, this community-based strategy does not represent simply a new philosophy. A political side is also present. Simply put, through community-based initiatives persons should not only obtain more relevant services but gain control of

their lives. In this way, the malaise that currently plagues society, whereby persons feel alienated from their basic institutions, can be reversed. The political thrust of community-based projects, in other words, is to promote the autonomy of communities.

Given the recent improvements in social theory, and the links established between this philosophy and practice, the development of community-based projects on a wide scale is not difficult to imagine. The prospect of communities planning and monitoring their health care, for example, is not fictional any longer. The hope is that this book can contribute in a small way to the realization of this end. Once persons begin to control their communities, they may begin to expand their goals and envision a society where everyone participates in the planning of institutions and is treated with dignity. Hence, community-based projects may be able to promote the alternative, and more humane, world that many protestors around the globe believe is necessary to improve the lives of everyone, but especially those who are poor.

Contents

1	**Introduction**	1
2	**Philosophy and Community-Based Interventions**	17
3	**The Dimensions of a Community**	31
4	**Community-Based Organizations**	47
5	**A New Epidemiology**	63
6	**Research in a Community**	77
7	**The Conceptual Flow of a Community-Based Project**	93
8	**Leadership from Below: A New Community Dynamic**	111
9	**Social Interventions and Justice**	127
10	**Conclusion**	145
Name Index		161
Subject Index		167

Chapter 1
Introduction

Introduction

As Max Weber (1978) described some time ago, the modern world has become almost thoroughly rationalized. His point is that due to the dominance of science and mathematics, social life has been transformed into a monotonous routine. In this regard, workplaces, schools, and other organizations are standardized, regulated, and thus very predictable. The spread of bureaucracy exemplifies this trend (Weber 1978, pp. 954–1006). While the operation of these institutions is certainly refined, with the production of many goods and services, something seems to be wrong.

Weber (1978) claims that as spontaneity has been subdued and often labeled as disruptive, persons are bored. Except when confronted by spectacles or increasingly sensational news accounts, everyday life seems to offer little excitement. As part of this trend, institutions appear to be operating according to their own logic. In current parlance, organizations are imagined to be autonomous. For this reason, some critics contend that a "credibility gap" plagues modern societies (Mickunas and Murphy 2011).

At least two themes are central to this description. The first is that organizations do not meet the needs of their constituents. Persons want health care, for example, but arcane economic principles are invoked to explain why this desire is not reasonable, and somehow would plunge society into bankruptcy. The result is that increasing numbers of persons are left uninsured, or with minimal coverage.

The second is that a clear, but irrational, message is conveyed to the citizenry. That is, persons must understand that key institutions should be beyond their control. They may have created these organizations, but these entities do not necessarily respond to the aims of their creators; their operation is simply beyond the comprehension of average persons. Accordingly, an intelligent individual learns how to adapt to this situation and, perhaps through nefarious means, tries to manipulate the social system whenever possible. As a result, persons jettison their idealism and imagination, and learn to be pragmatic and seek personal advantages. The result is that social life becomes increasingly hostile and difficult.

In more political terms popularized initially by Karl Marx (1973, pp. 111–112), persons are alienated. On the one hand, they begin to feel powerless and may with-

J. W. Murphy, *Community-Based Interventions*, International Perspectives on Social Policy, Administration, and Practice, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4899-8020-5_1,

draw from the life of institutions. As part of this process, they begin to repeat the old saw that their input is unimportant and any effort irrelevant (Seeman 1959). Cynicism thus becomes normative, with those who reject this response labeled as unrealistic and possibly maladjusted.

Nonetheless, this alienation is not simply psychological and an awful illusion. In fact, institutions have become increasingly abstract and their operation difficult to penetrate; in many respects, they resemble a labyrinth. "Catch-22" is the phrase that is used often to characterize this situation (Heller 1999). In point of fact, persons are not very effective, for example, at getting modern corporations or governments to respect the desires of individuals or communities. Who these entities actually serve remains a mystery, in the minds of most citizens. Indeed, most persons believe that their destinies are a product of fate or luck, rather than personal control or initiative (Bandura 1997).

Challenge to Alienation

Of course, this trend has not gone unchallenged. In effect, the desire to become community-based represents a response to correct this situation (Perkins et al. 2004). The basic idea is that this alienation can be reversed and a sense of community can be restored. Central to this redirection is the proposition that persons can control their destiny through participation. Through the exercise of political will and the associated skills, persons can retrieve their institutions and gain control of their lives. In some circles, the term *praxis* is introduced to describe how persons can change themselves and their surroundings, so that their lives improve and alienation abates. Through "collective *praxis*" the destiny of a society can be altered (Sartre 1979, pp. 505–524).

At various places around the world, including the USA, the notion of planning "from below" is gaining some currency. A basic fact to this shift in strategy is that in the past social development originated from "above," or from political elites, technocrats, or other experts (Gray 2002). In many cases, an entire class of detached professionals has emerged to assess the needs of communities and formulate all remedies. As should be noted, this orientation is both a product of and reinforces the alienation of persons from their institutions (Midgley 1981).

In many respects, this approach has been disastrous. Interventions are created that are irrelevant, and sometimes harmful, while communities become dependent and fail to develop their own aptitudes (Midgley 1981). The goal of planning from below, accordingly, is to promote pertinent interventions and the autonomy of communities. The reduction of alienation is thus an important by-product of becoming community-based. A political agenda is clearly a part of this strategy.

The general theme is that the community should be elevated in importance. After all, these groups are thought by most persons to be supportive and the cornerstone of humane societies (Etzioni 2007). The *gemeinschaft* is almost mythical! A new solidarity—sharing life and destiny—is desired that can repair the currently frag-

mented and inhospitable world. In some political circles, the phrase "another world is possible" is employed to convey this sentiment. The resurrection of community, in other words, is imagined to be the antidote to many of today's most pressing social problems. The current focus on civil society is a vital part of this trend.

If persons viewed themselves to be part of a community, for example, discrimination should abate (Dussel 2008). In a real community, after all, persons treat one another with respect and recognize that their fates are united. Additionally, in such a context, health disparities and racial hostilities should disappear, due to the presence of social solidarity. Those who are part of a community would not tolerate the marginalization of other members and the maladies that result from such mistreatment. In many ways, many societies are at a crucial juncture, whereby the growing gap between the rich and poor is tolerated along with the related problems or a real alternative is pursued.

Equally important is the idea that human services are improved when they are integrated into a community (Brydon-Miller et al. 2003). When these projects become part of the biographies of persons, in other words, the resulting interventions meet their needs. Persons respond positively when practitioners pay attention to their personal and collective stories, thereby increasing the relevance of any intervention. In this sense, communities begin to gain control of their health and other institutions. New directions thus appear to be feasible.

New Social Imagery

In many ways, becoming community-based is founded on a new ethic. Simply put, persons are viewed to be tied together inextricably—and thus share a space and destiny—and thus should act in concert (Wiesenfeld 1996). Rather than seeing themselves as fundamentally independent, and thus only reluctantly associated, they should initiate any action from their communal base. In this way, social cohesion is promoted along with relevant and productive interventions.

Among those who debate regularly these social issues, themes such as civil society and popular control have become very important. Basic to these ideas is the notion of citizen power. Behind all the usual abstractions is a simple fact—human, collective action is at the root of every institution. Despite the pervasiveness of alienation, and persons' "misperception" of their dominance, institutions are not basically autonomous but the product of human intelligence and effort (Bourdieu 1980, p. 140).

Calling for the recognition of civil society, accordingly, marks the desire of persons to control their creations and, possibly, give modern society a new orientation (Lerner et al. 2000). In this context, resurrecting communities implies a lot more than simply making social planning more inclusive and reducing methodological or procedural errors, although such improvements are certainly valuable. The point, instead, is to enable persons to shape their respective futures. In addition to resolv-

ing logistical issues, communities may begin to assert themselves more effectively, in order to create a more commodious world.

The operative principle at this juncture is participation. However, this involvement extends beyond simply asking community members periodically for input, or eventually to interpret some research findings. Such consultation does not constitute participation from a community-based perspective. In community-based planning, participation goes to the core of a project. Such projects, as described by Maritza Montero (2002), are truly grounded, since they emanate from collective initiative. They are based on knowledge, for example, that is created and sustained through local action. As a result, these endeavors are not likely to become antagonistic to their creators and thus irrelevant or repressive.

Indeed, as a result of fostering the direct involvement local persons in every phase of a social project, they begin to support and trust one another (Lasker and Weiss 2003). Stated simply, they come together as a community, once they begin to experience the interrelation of events and persons. As studies on service-learning document, for example, participation in community projects has far reaching impact, as students become aware of social problems and the changes that are necessary to correct these issues (Rhoads 1997). A central finding is that such a transformation encourages an increase in social responsibility.

As part of this growth, persons begin to realize that they are important in developing effective social policies. They begin to understand, for example, that they have the skills required to undertake projects of any size, and thus gain the confidence necessary to become self-directed. In fact, there is no better cure for alienation than this sort of participation. Through this involvement in designing and implementing interventions persons become committed to their projects and build relevant and thus solid and lasting institutions.

In this sense, as Stuart Hampshire (1989, p. 59) writes, persons begin to recognize the "false fixity" of institutions. Through participation and reflection, they begin to appreciate that institutional arrangements are not established in stone. In fact, reflection is essential to this exercise of imagination and the related freedom. Additionally, through these processes, persons can bring about new identities and relationships. The social world is thus open for change and a new future (Harvey 2007).

Beyond Empowerment

The issue that often arises at this point is empowerment. Participation, in short, empowers persons to take control of their communities and futures (Maton 2008). Empowerment, in this sense, is thought to be a vital element of community-based planning and the elimination of alienation. Through their involvement in a project, local persons are thought to acquire some control over their affairs and achieve a sense of efficacy (Rappaport 1984). The so-called vital capacity of a community is increased to promote desired programs and outcomes.

However, in many ways, the traditional treatment of this issue is quite paternalistic. Simply put, due to their participation in a project, persons move to a new level of existence. In other words, they are transformed and acquire a trait, namely power, that was absent before community-based planning was initiated. Through various means, this new characteristic is bestowed on the members of a community and internalized. However, this term is vague and often used without much serious reflection.

Those who want to become community-based in their work should be wary of this portrayal. Even though planners may be well-intentioned, the key point is that neither persons nor communities are ever empowered. Although their skills or efforts may have been overlooked or blocked in the past, due to inappropriate policies or practices, persons are never empowered by anyone. Indeed, externalizing abilities or initiatives in this manner only creates dependency, which is antithetical to the philosophy behind community-based interventions. Persons and communities, simply stated, are always the source of inspiration and change! Accordingly, community-based planning is not a missionary activity, whereby an outsider brings enlightenment to unfortunate persons.

What a community-based strategy does, in this sense, is unleash the power that persons were unable to exercise in the past; community-based projects nurture rather than build their skills and desires (Prilleltensky 2005). These desires are considered to be productive, as persons define themselves and their destines, unencumbered by institutions that may be irrelevant or stifling. Empowerment, therefore, represents the ability of communities to articulate their own perspectives and bring these realities to fruition. The basic principle is that communities learn to assess and cure themselves, while in the past they were, at best, merely consulted by politicians and other experts. As Cottrell states (1983), these groups attain a sense of "community competence," whereby they identify and solve their problems through concerted action.

Crucial to these community-based undertakings is the formulation of new definitions, for example, of health, illness, remedy, and cure (Riger 2001). In the past, various typologies were applied to communities to assess their needs or problems, because these schemes were assumed to reflect seasoned judgments on these issues. Now, with the focus on communities, and the way in which they define these issues, any norms should be related closely to how these persons organize their daily lives. How they define their identities and the actions of others, for example, should provide the framework for community evaluations and other projects.

What emerges gradually from this community-based strategy is the insight that communities are not simply places but realities. A community is organized around the values, beliefs, and commitments of a group of persons (Wiesenfeld 1996). A community, accordingly, is not merely an empirical but an existential phenomenon. For example, rather than a spatial location, a community emerges from the confluence of a variety of experiences (McMillan and Chavis 1986). What persons consider to be normal or deviant, for example, is the result of how communities construct their respective realities. Furthermore, access to these different "reference

groups" holds the key to developing an appropriate and effective social intervention (Reynolds 1987, pp. 79–80).

In this regard, becoming community-based does not mean simply that planners acquire a new focus. Rather than the society-at-large, or the so-called social system, the emphasis is something narrower. Likewise, community-based planners do not merely work through communities, as a logical step to increase the ease of implementing a project. Both of these typical scenarios overlook an essential point: communities do not exist sui generis. That is, communities are not neatly circumscribed but rather embody how their members define themselves, their possibilities, and their relationships (Puddifoot 1995). Penetrating this reality is not necessarily captured adequately by suggesting that projects must include communities in order to be relevant or effective. Such a description is too facile and manipulative from the perspective of a community-based philosophy.

Based on the writing of Melvin Pollner (1987), communities are organized around a mode of rationality he refers to as "mundane reasoning." Every community, in other words, is based on a set of recipes for defining and dealing with a range of issues such as health and illness. Becoming community-based, accordingly, requires that these conceptual schemes begin to guide planning activities. How persons seek treatment or respond to interventions, for example, depends on their definitions of sickness and the prospects for cure. In this regard, communities construct and enact their realities.

In this regard, communities are neither settings, targets, nor resources (McLeroy et. al. 2003). These designations are typical. From a community-based perspective, on the other hand, communities are agents; they create their realities and act on these perspectives. Accordingly, this action is the focus of attention. The notion of empowerment may thus have some relevance, if persons gain control over the interventions in their communities. Nonetheless, what is important is true participation, rather than feelings, perceptions, or making the proper adjustments to programs—the traditional indications of empowerment.

A New Philosophy

What is crucial to understand is that this community-based orientation is predicated on an entirely new philosophy. Instead of simply a change in methodology or technique, a new approach to conceptualizing knowledge and social order come into play. In other words, a significant shift is made in viewing social existence, or in this case a community's reality.

Some of the fundamental elements of this philosophy are anti-dualism, holism, respect for "otherness," and "joint action" as the basis of social order. These themes pervade the discussions provided in this book. Central to this philosophy, however, is that knowledge and community order are grounded in participation (McNeely 1999). The result is that knowledge acquisition, activism, and social change are intertwined. As opposed to a disinterested or value-free endeavor, the world is engaged and (re)defined through community-based planning.

Community-based planners, in this regard, appreciate that through engagement, knowledge is both created by community members and conceptualized by those who create and implement interventions. Such involvement or mediation is not an impediment to the discovery of facts or a distraction, but holds the key to encountering a community's reality. There is no pretense, therefore, on the part of community-based planners to be objective in the traditional sense (Murray and Poland 2006). Engagement, in fact, precludes the possibility of taking such a neutral posture.

Activism is thus always a crucial part of community-based planning, since any stance taken by planners is always interested. Due to the challenge to neutrality posed by participation, there is no "God's eye view" on the social world. The key question is what constitutes a relevant position. How can activism, in other words, be directed to foster a community's various commitments? Initiating a situationally relevant action thus becomes the important issue.

What readers might notice at this point is that philosophy is very important when trying to grasp the nature of a community-based intervention. Indeed, philosophy is critical! Some truly difficult issues must be investigated as part of becoming community-based (Lefley 1988). What may appear to be a completely practical and straightforward activity has an incredibly sophisticated pedigree. Additionally, understanding this philosophy can help clarify many issues, when an intervention begins to lose focus due to unexpected problems.

A community-based strategy, for example, is not grounded in the usual empiricism that guides most planning (Smith 1987). In such a philosophy, empirical social indicators—such as race, quality of housing, or unemployment rate—are often used as a proxy for a community. However, when this maneuver is made, a community is treated very superficially, while a problem is explained in terms of a response to environmental, sociocultural, or other objective indicators. The principle shortcoming of this methodology, at least from a community-based perspective, is that participation is not taken into account. In other words, how persons engage their reality is overlooked, along with their biographies. Indeed, biography is symbolic and created rather than simply empirical.

The Importance of Participation

Due to the centrality of participation, projects are initiated that are consistent with the reality constructed by a community. As should be appreciated, participation does not signal merely involvement; participation, instead, relates more to reality construction (Harris 2010). Communities, in short, actively identity their needs and invent appropriate solutions. In this sense, community-based interventions emerge from the reality that has been, and continues to be, constructed and enacted by the members of a community. In this regard, Orlando Fals Borda (1988, p. 93) declares that community-based interventions are based on an engaged epistemology, or a "people's science."

In the parlance of social planning, this involvement of a community allows for the generation of a set of so-called "best practices" with respect to social develop-

ment. What should be noted is that these options are neither universally logical nor culled from standard cases or examples. Rather than ideal, some practices have been tried and subsequently valued and elevated in importance. These strategies, accordingly, have proven to be effective and supported by the members of a community. In this very limited sense, these practices are considered to be the best.

In this regard, at the heart of a community-based strategy is epistemological control. That is, the knowledge base that is constructed by a community guides the development of all practices, including those that go beyond the collection of data. There are managerial and ethical issues, for example, that are unique when they emerge from this source of information. However, most important is that every aspect of a community-based project is shaped by this infusion of local knowledge.

Every facet of a community, in other words, has a biography (Berger and Luckmann 1990, p. 63). Suggested by this idea is that facts and values are constantly reworked by persons, and that these changes are part of any claims about valid knowledge. What a community identifies as a deleterious or unhealthy situation, for example, carries the imprint of the contrasting interpretations that are part of establishing that this condition is factual. Instead of empirical indicators, participation directs the focus of planning to so-called popular experience. These experiences, accordingly, provide the key to understanding the desired direction of a community.

In terms of contemporary planning, community-based projects are sustainable because of this recognition of biography. These interventions will likely continue because they reflect how persons define themselves and their problems, and thus such projects are relevant and rewarding. On a more practical note, community members will support even mundane projects, such as painting a building or erecting a fence, because these activities entail the fulfillment of their plans. The point is that attraction is not necessarily found in the gravity of a project but the connection with a community's biography.

Community-building is a complex component of any community-based project. However, completing tasks and acquiring skills, for example, represent the surface of any real community-based project. On the other hand, without a proper context, an intervention will never be sustained or succeed. For this reason, community-based projects do not simply solve problems but foster the "well-being" of communities (Prilleltensky 2005). In addition to addressing pressing issues, community-based interventions establish the conditions necessary for ordinary persons to direct a project. Allowing indigenous leaders to emerge, along with mastering certain skills, is a vital component of this new orientation. There is no better way to building a community, accordingly, then by fostering participation whereby skills can be put into practice, refined, and improved (Shediac-Rizkallah and Bone 1998). In truth, rather than building a community, these persons are encouraged to express themselves in a planning process that is community-based.

Often those who focus on community development in this manner begin to refer to these groups as having assets; community members, accordingly, are described as resources (Kretzmann and McKnight 1996). Although more flattering than the deficit model, whereby communities, especially those that are poor, are viewed as broken, this approach is not necessarily dynamic. Treating communities as if they consist of an array of assets misses a central point of a community-based

orientation. That is, communities do not simply have traits but invent themselves through human action, or participation. Having a positive view of communities, in short, is not the same as recognizing and incorporating this creative aspect into the planning process.

This difference is crucial to community-based planning. Adopting a positive view of a community does not necessarily mean that these persons will be the centerpiece of a project. They may simply not be abused or overlooked. Community-based initiatives, on the other hand, encourage the participation of community members in every aspect of a project (Leung et al. 2004). The general principle is that this participation provides an intervention with a proper direction and legitimacy. Simply because planners have a positive outlook does not signal a profound change in orientation—a community may be nothing but the "silent partner" in a project (Callaghan 2009).

In this respect, ownership is not the same as control. In some planning circles, a sign of a community-based project is ownership! A community may often have to assume ownership of a failing project. This situation, however, may be the result of a lack of true participation in the early stages of an intervention. Communities should not be expected to own parts or even all of a project, unless control brought about through participation is a vital part of this bargain.

In order to unleash this inventiveness, community-based planners are expected to democratize the process of developing, implementing, and evaluating interventions. In fact, this decentralization is also at the heart of the community-building process (Arnstein 1969). If pervasive participation is going to be inaugurated successfully, democratization is vital. What is most important is to move beyond simply "buy-in" to allow persons to create an intervention; in fact, assumed by buy-in is that a project already exists and needs supporters. This new planning, to use a popular phrase, begins to represent "popular science," based on local expertise and guidance (Rahman 1985).

Democratization of Culture

The basic task of democratization is to remove any impediments that may stifle the full participation of community members in a project (Windel and Cibulka 1981). In this case, democratization has a much broader meaning that is typically the case. The focus, simply put, is not voting and debate. Indeed, these activities do not necessarily guarantee that all persons are included in any discussion, or that diverse viewpoints receive a fair hearing.

A catchy term that is used nowadays to describe this openness is social entrepreneurship. The aim of this process, similar to community-based planning, is to enlarge the pool of those who participate in development activities. Readers, however, should not be confused. There are important differences between these approaches. One of the most important differences pertains to this issue of democratization. Most often, social entrepreneurs are treated as if they constitute a special class of persons, and thus their input is especially sought. Likewise, medical personnel are

characterized often as possessing knowledge and skills more valuable than any other participant (Onyett 2003, pp. 179–180). The participation of these persons, due to their unique qualities, is presumed to make the difference between a successful and unsuccessful project. What is created, accordingly, is a narrow enterprise instead of an open and democratic culture.

The emphasis of a community-project, instead, is on the democratization of culture (Hardina 2006). What this process entails is the creation of a domain where various knowledge bases are placed on an equal footing. Furthermore, a range of acceptable topics or proposals is not established beforehand, thereby restricting a discussion. The point is to promote the introduction of diverse viewpoints, even those that may be viewed traditionally as unworkable, before options are winnowed through debate. In the parlance of contemporary political philosophy, the aim is to challenge hegemony—the imposition of particular and likely irrelevant perspectives—so that viewpoints may proliferate (Laclau and Mouffe 1985).

In a similar vein, certain persons, and their opinions, are not elevated automatically over others. Elitism and discrimination such as racism or ageism are unacceptable. Obviously the issue of power comes into play at this juncture. In other words, particular classes of persons must not be able to monopolize the agenda, due to their education or position. A community-based strategy will falter unless every segment of a community has the opportunity to shape the discussion. Moreover, a community cannot be considered self-directed if this tenet is compromised (Cahill 2007).

A community-based project rests on inclusion, both in terms of persons and ideas, and the creation of a public or popular realm appropriate for uninhibited discussion (Fine 1997). However, most of these projects deal with poor persons, who are often dismissed as irrelevant to the planning process. Also, as long as they are assumed to represent a dearth of high quality information, planning cannot be thought of as truly participatory. Prejudices must be addressed, for example, that portray certain persons as unintelligent or unmotivated, so that participation is widespread and ideas that were formerly unknown may receive serious attention. Planning can thus begin to reflect a community.

A community that is self-directed has the right to enact the reality that is created by its members, provided that these persons give direction to all plans. Traditional options—norms or expectations—must be deprived of their usual seigniorial status that would impede the creation of new programs. Novel health care proposals, for example, may be considered improbable according to the old paradigm. In a new context or reality, however, these possibilities may be very workable. In this regard, reality is democratized.

This sort of democratization goes far beyond the notion of partnership that is used regularly to characterize the relationship between community members and planners, when local input becomes an important issue (Fraser 2005). Likewise, advocacy falls short of the principle that sustains the association between community-based planners and communities. Neither of these processes is comprehensive enough to describe adequately how community members are joined, and how they are linked to community-based planners.

The issue at this moment is how social order is conceptualized. Presupposed by democratization is that community members, along with planners when they enter the picture, are united on the basis of solidarity (Barnes et al. 2003). Most important is that community-based planners are also a part of the community in question, even though they might not reside in that location. In this regard, planners should not be viewed to be part of an elite class (Byrne 2005).

The larger question is what constitutes a community? As noted earlier, a community reflects experiential ties and the associated participation (MacQueen et.al. 2001). In community-based planning, all experts exhibit the requisite solidarity, and thus are expected to behave like any other community member. Specifically, they support their fellow members and solicit their opinions, and are committed to the betterment of the community. In this way, community-based planning is a communal affair that encourages true collaboration and the co-generation of projects. However, in reality, any experts have subordinate roles with respect to the participation of community members.

Planning, accordingly, may now include social indicators, but within the context of a broad range of participants. Any discussion of a community's problems, for example, extends beyond a perusal of the so-called objective features of this neighborhood. The problem with the usual scenario is that the meaning of these indicators is fixed, or tied to empirical properties, with additional sources of corroboration merely included in the planning process (Land 1971). The only advance made with this sort of limited partnership is that more persons are invited to confirm the standard effects of these environmental or cultural elements. This manner of collaboration with health experts or government officials, in other words, does not necessarily promote any awareness of how communities are produced and maintained by their members.

When enmeshed within the biographies that constitute a community, on the other hand, social indicators are understood to be constructed and thus interpreted in a variety of ways. The indication that something is problematic, such as an unhealthy environment, is a matter of interpretation and perspective, with further decisions related to the appropriateness of an intervention based on these initial constructions and further elaboration. Clearly, the issue of democratization is very important in this undertaking, since these interpretations and their accompanying logics should be contested by all community members, with interventions emerging from this process.

The solidarity that binds persons together, including community-based planners with a community, is more profound that a periodic partnership. Solidarity, for example, includes experiences, commitments, and responsibility, whereas a partnership may involve merely sporadic contacts and official displays camaraderie. Likewise, solidarity is predicated on understanding how a community has been constructed in various ways, interpersonally and historically, thereby providing insight into the definitions of any problems and their likely solutions. Anyone who shares this solidarity is able to gain a real understanding of a community's needs and hopes.

Conclusion

As should be noted, this community-based orientation is part of a much larger project. A salient clue to this general realignment is provided by the call to resurrect civil society (Ehrenberg 1999). Many persons, on both the Right and the Left, believe that communities must regain their integrity. Particularly important is that these groups gain control of the resources necessary for them to govern themselves and, thereby, establish relevant institutions such as health care. Nonetheless, this approach is not necessarily compatible with the recent neoliberal view of communities as simply bounded, self-contained units that struggle at the marketplace for recognition (Harvey 2005). This portrayal ignores the ability of persons to control their communities and the resources required for them to be truly self-directed.

Community-based planning, accordingly, is not simply a subset of large-scale growth. When this is the case, a community is not autonomous but constrained by social or systemic forces that are presumed to be valid and promote the well-being of everyone. What is good for the community, accordingly, will eventually trickle down from any broader social gains that might be achieved. Focusing on the community, in other words, is merely a piecemeal strategy to move larger social institutions forward.

In this new orientation, instead, communities establish their realities and not some overriding system. Actually, the point is to liberate these persons from such abstractions that are often irrelevant and the source of alienation (Baker and Brownson 1998). Communities are thus able to manage themselves and engage other locales in constructive and egalitarian ways. The culmination of elevating civil society in this manner is supposed to be the creation of a new social image, one where persons are free and self-directed. Instead of fitting into abstract institutions, the political side of community-based planning is to establish a new vision of political life, with more responsive institutions. Community-based planning, in this regard, is a step in the process of developing a truly democratic society.

In many ways, community-based planning offers a new position on morality. The traditional theories focus on what the individual should do, and at best others are only indirectly considered. These positions are thus fundamentally atomistic and designed to coax persons, who have no real commitment to one another, to recognize the legitimate presence of others. A community-based perspective, on the other hand, starts from a very different moral position: that is, persons are always in the presence of others and thus share a common fate. In other words, humans live a communal existence that is central to the philosophy and practice of community-based planning. Planning, in this sense, is expected to enhance this solidarity through participation in the overall creation of social projects.

Planners must take special care to insure that this participation does not inadvertently turn into a vehicle of control. But how could this happen? Through this process planners and community members will be working together very closely. Without establishing the proper relationship based on openness and true involvement, many persons in a community might find this closeness intimidating. What

starts out as a good idea, accordingly, becomes problematic. Hence, the proper conditions for real participation must be established.

This is the time when many planners begin to use the term " fidelity" to describe the trajectory of a project (Mowbray et al. 2003). Projects exhibit this trait when they fulfill the aims of a specific intervention. Planners should be aware that these goals are often formulated inadvertently as a program model—based on the judgments of experts, grant applications, prior research—and are very abstract and not closely related to a community. In community-based planning fidelity is important, but only to the extent that a project is faithful to the desires and ambitions of a community.

Many projects are identified nowadays as community-based. Some of these interventions are even located in communities, while others are focused on these neighborhoods. Nonetheless, without the guidance of a proper philosophy, these programs will never become community-based. Readers must grasp that becoming community-based represents a dramatic philosophical shift with respect to the status of knowledge, who controls this information, and how interventions are designed and used. Without insight into these and related theoretical issues, the importance of becoming community-based will be missed.

References

Arnstein, S. R. (1969). A ladder of citizen participation. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, *35*(4), 216–224.

Baker, E. A., & Brownson, C. A. (1998). Defining characteristics of community-based health promotion programs. *Journal of Public Health Management Practices*, *4*(2), 1–9.

Bandura, A. (1997). *Self-efficacy: The exercise of control*. NY: W.H. Freeman.

Barnes, M., Newman, J., Knops, A., & Sullivan, H. (2003). Constituting the 'public' in public participation. *Public Administration*, *81*(2), 379–399.

Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1990). *The social construction of reality*. NY: Anchor Books.

Bourdieu, P. (1980). *The logic of practice*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Brydon-Miller, M., Greenwood, D., & Maguire, P. (2003). Why action research? *Action Research*, *1*(1), 9–28.

Byrne, D. (2005). Complexity, configurations, and classes. *Theory, Culture, and Society*, *22*(5), 95–111.

Cahill, C. (2007). Afterword: Well positioned? *Environment and Planning*, *39*(12), 2861–2865.

Callaghan, K. A. (2009). Social entrepreneurship. Congreso Internacional de Innovación y Emprendimiento, Universidad EAN, Oct. 23, Bogotá, Colombia.

Cottrell, L. S. (1983). The competent community. In R. Warren & L. Lyon (Eds), *New Perspectives on the American Community* (pp. 401–412). Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Dussel, E. (2008). *Ethics and community*. Eugene: Wipf and Stock.

Ehrenberg, J. (1999). *Civil society: The critical history of an idea*. NY: NYU Press.

Etzioni, A. (2007). The community deficit. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, *45*(1), 23–42.

Fals Borda, O. (1988). *Knowledge and people's power*. NY: New Horizons Press.

Fine, R. (1997). Civil society theory, enlightenment and critique, and democratization. *Democratization*, *4*(1), 7–28.

Fraser, H. (2005). Four different approaches to community participation. *Community Development Journal*, *40*(3), 286–300.

Gray, M. (2002). Developmental social work: A 'strengths' praxis for social development. *Social Development Issues*, *21*(1), 4–14.
Hampshire, S. (1989). *Innocence and experience*. London: Penguin.
Hardina, D. (2006). Strategies for citizen participation and empowerment in non-profit, community-based organizations. *Community Development*, *37*(4), 4–17.
Harris, S. R. (2010). *What is constructionism*? Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Harvey, D. (2005). *A brief history of neoliberalism*. NY: Oxford University Press.
Harvey, J. (2007). Moral solidarity and empathetic understanding: The moral value and scope of the relationship. *Journal of Social Philosophy*, *38*(1), 22–37.
Heller, J. (1999). *Catch-22*. NY: Simon and Schuster.
Kretzmann, J., & McKnight, J. P. (1996). Asset-based community development. *National Civic Review*, *85*(4), 23–29.
Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C. (1985). *Hegemony and socialist strategy*. London: Verso.
Land, K. C. (1971). On the definition of social indicators. *The American Sociologist*, *6*(4), 322–325.
Lasker, R. D., & Weiss, E. S (2003). Broadening participation in community problem solving: A multidisciplinary model to support collaborative practice and research. *Journal of Urban Health*, *80*(1), 14–48.
Lefley, H. P. (1988). Linked changes in mental health service delivery and psychiatric education. *Psychiatric Quarterly*, *59*(2), 121–139.
Lerner, R. M., Fisher, C. B., & Weinberg, R. A. (2000). Toward a science for and of the people: Promoting civil society through the application of developmental science. *Child Development*, *71*(1), 11–20.
Leung, M. W., Yen, I. H., & Minkler, M. (2004). Community-based participatory research: A promising approach for increasing epidemiology's relevance in the 21st century. *International Journal of Epidemiology*, *33*(3), 499–506.
MacQueen, K. M., McLellan, E., Metzger, D. S., Kegeles, S., Strauss, R. P., Scotti, R., Blanchard, L., & Trotter III, R. T. (2001). What is community? An evidence-based definition for participatory public health. *American Journal of Public Health*, *91*(12), 1929–1937.
Marx, K. (1973). *The economic and philosophic manuscripts of 1844*. NY: International Publishers.
Maton, K. I. (2008). Empowering community settings: Agents of individual development, community betterment, and positive social change. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, *41*(1–2), 4–21.
McLeroy, K. R., Norton, B. L., Kegler, M. C., Burdine, J. N., & Sumaya, C. V. (2003). Community-based interventions. *American Journal of Public Health*, *93*(4), 529–533.
McMillan D. W., & Chavis, D. M. (1986). Sense of community: A definition and theory. *Journal of Community Psychology*, *14*(1), 6–23.
McNeely, J. (1999). Community building. *Journal of Community Psychology*, *27*(6), 741–750.
Mickunas, A., & Murphy, J. (2011). *Filling the credibility gap*. NY: Nova Science Publishers.
Midgley, J. (1981). *Professional imperialism*. London: Heinemann.
Montero, M. (2002). On the construction of reality and truth. Towards an epistemology of community social psychology. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, *30*(4), 571–584.
Mowbray, C. T., Holter, M. C., Teague, G. B., & Bybee, D. (2003). Fidelity criteria: Development, measurement, and validation. *American Journal of Evaluation*, *24*(3), 315–340.
Murray, M., & Ploand, B. (2006). Health psychology and social action. *Journal of Health Psychology*, *11*(3), 379–384.
Onyett, S. (2003). *Teamworking in mental health*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Perkins, D. D., Crim, B., Silberman, P. A., & Brown B. B. (2004). Community development as a response to community-level adversity: Ecological theory and strengths-based polity. In K. I. Maton, C. J. Schellenbach, B. L. Leadbeater, & A. L. Solarz (Eds), *Investing in children, youth, families, and communities: Strengths-based research and policy* (pp. 321–340). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Pollner, M. (1987). *Mundane reason*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Prilleltensky, I. (2005). Promoting well-being: Time for a paradigm shift in health and human services. *Scandinavian Journal of Public Health*, *33*, 53–60.
Puddifoot, J. W. (1995). Dimensions of community identity. *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology*, *5*(5), 357–370.
Rahman, M. A. (1985). Theory and practice of participatory action research. In O. Fals Borda (ed), *The Challenge of Social Change,* (pp. 107–132). Beverly-Hills: Sage.
Rappaport, J. (1984). Studies in empowerment: Introduction to the issue. *Prevention In Human Services*, *3*(2), 1–7.
Reynolds, L. T. (1987). *Interactionism: Exposition and critique*. Dix Hills: General Hall.
Rhoads, R. A. (1997). *Community service and higher learning*. NY: SUNY Press.
Riger, S. (2001). Transforming community psychology. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, *29*(1), 69–81.
Sartre, J. P. (1979). *Critique of dialectical reason*. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.
Seeman, M. (1959). On the meaning of alienation. *American Sociological Review*, *24*(6): 783–791.
Shediac-Rizkallah, M. C., & Bone, L. R. (1998). Planning for the sustainability of community-based health programs: Conceptual frameworks and future directions for research, practice and policy. *Health and Education Research*, *13*(1), 87–108.
Smith, D. (1987). The limits of positivism in social work research. *British Journal of Social Work*, *17*(4), 401–416.
Weber, M. (1978). *Economy and society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Wiesenfeld, E. (1996). The concept of 'we': A community social psychology math? *Journal of Community Psychology*, *24*(4), 337–345.
Windel, C., & Cibulka, J. G. (1981). A framework for understanding participation in community mental health services. *Community Mental Health Journal*, *17*(1), 4–18.

Chapter 2
Philosophy and Community-Based Interventions

Introduction

As part of the rebellion of the 1960s, various movements throughout the world tried to reassess the status of the insane and others who might need assistance. The point was for these persons to have the right to a fulfilling life, untrammeled by unresponsive political institutions and other imperious organizations. In the USA, for example, President Kennedy signed into law the Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act in 1963. As a result, the nature of health planning was supposed to be transformed dramatically by this "bold new approach" to dealing with human services (Sharfstein 2000). In time, this sort of re-orientation took place in various countries throughout the world.

This outlook built on and supported additional modalities of action research that called for local involvement in conducting studies and creating interventions, along with a critique of mainstream institutions. As a result, the community was elevated in importance, in addition to the revolutionary element of participation. To many persons, this change was shocking but consistent with a trend in many areas to open the society to novel ideas and encourage change.

Prior to the inauguration of this statute, services were provided mostly by professionals in large institutions. The insane, for example, were treated in asylums removed from the mainstream society. As Erving Goffman documented in his book *Asylums* (1962), these organizations were bureaucratic and generally inhumane. But other, more private facilities were not much better. The problem with this general approach is that patients were rarely discharged from these institutions. Critics began to refer to this method of care as "warehousing" (Paulson 2012, p. 10).

A key critique of this style of treatment, as discussed initially by Barton (1966) and later by Wing and Brown (1970), is that patients begin to adapt to their surroundings and are reluctant to leave. They develop what these authors called "institutional neurosis." In other words, they internalize the norms of these organizations to the extent that they cannot function on the outside. And given little more than custodial care, these persons never really improve. In the end, treatment amounts to little more than patient management and long-term control.

J. W. Murphy, *Community-Based Interventions,* International Perspectives on Social Policy, Administration, and Practice, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4899-8020-5_2,

Experts such as psychologists and psychiatrists were in charge of this treatment regimen. They made all clinical judgments and prescribed the drugs that were the hallmark of this confinement (Grob 1994). The patients, on the other hand, were kept on the periphery of this process. In fact, any complaints or denials they may voice were often viewed as signs of their illness. A set of procedures existed—referred by Goffman (1962, p. 140) as the "betrayal funnel"—whereby patients were gradually stripped of their past identities, severed from their communities, and eventually isolated. Any rights these persons may have had were simply lost in a maze of diagnoses and bureaucratic regulations.

By focusing on participation, more humane treatment was expected. In order to move away from these crippling institutions, persons were supposed to be treated in the "least restrictive environment" (Scharfstein 2000). What this phrase conveyed is a dramatic shift in orientation—patients and their communities should become the focus of attention. Interventions, in this regard, should become community-based and responsive to persons in need.

In some states, this grand move to "de-institutionalize" the insane resulted in the discharge of up to 75% of these patients to neighborhood community mental health centers, where they would be treated in a more friendly and supportive environment (Rochefort 1993). Only those who are dangerous to themselves or others would remain in hospitals. This release was viewed by many critics as a triumph over ignorance and mistreatment, although some retrenchment was witnessed during the 1980s on this front.

In addition to this practical change, elevating the community in this way announced the on-set of a new philosophy (Rochefort 1984). Particularly important is that community standards would provide the guidelines for defining illness and cure. Contrary to the past, for example, insanity would not be treated simply as a biological but a cultural issue. In this regard, some writers called for the abandonment of the so-called medical model altogether, while more moderate voices argued that such illness should be viewed to be a result of "problems in living" (Szasz 1961, p. 296). Madness was, thus, thought to be a truly social phenomenon.

The basic idea is that community members invent and enforce the standards of normalcy; this process, as Lefley (1990) suggests, is symbolic. Furthermore, how persons are labeled within the context of a community plays a large role in their identification as problematic and the success of any treatment. At times, this process of labeling was referred to as the application of the dominant signifiers, or symbols, to differentiate between those who are ill and normal. But in daily life, these labels are not necessarily so official, but they operate similarly and distinguish persons.

Knowing how these categories operate is crucial to making a sound clinical decision. The participation of clients is expected, accordingly, in the creation of treatment plans, while community members direct the operation of the service centers that are constructed (Grenblatt and Norman 1983). In this way, community knowledge serves as the basis for making diagnoses and developing treatment options. With these agencies grounded in their respective communities, the delivery of services should improve.

Consistent with this change, the role of experts was tempered in the treatment process. The social competence of an individual, for example, was judged in terms

of a community's norms rather than the distinctions imposed by professional diagnostic nomenclature. Additionally, treatment teams were enacted that are comprised of non-medical personnel, such as social workers and various "cultural brokers" from the community who could place a patient's behavior in the proper context (Lefley and Bestman 1991). Abstract or standardized diagnostic procedures were thought to misrepresent the behavior of most persons, although nowadays this critique is almost forgotten with widespread use of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) and other similar devices, drugs, and medical personnel in clinical assessment and treatment.

The assumption is that diagnoses, and thus treatment, would improve when undertaken within the context of a community. Insanity, or faulty reasoning, would be recognized to be a local determination based on indigenous definitions and relevant behavioral expectations. An appropriate and successful intervention, accordingly, would be specified by the logic operative in a community. Rather than a biological or moral issue, a remedy is guided by a community's needs and daily practices (Rochefort 1994).

What is suggested by this emphasis on daily practices is that communities are works in process, rather than easily linked to empirical traits or standard mores. Specifically important is that these groups are dynamic and have unique biographies. Their norms, accordingly, grow from their adaptation to events and their aspirations. The cultures that are invented and considered to be legitimate embody the collective memories and futures of a community.

Any assessments, accordingly, should not be objective in the traditional sense. That is, standards that are cultural-free, and thus transcend interpretation, should not be used to judge behavior because they are touted to be objective. All evaluations and interventions, instead, must be made within the context deployed by citizen participation (De Hoyos 1989). What is commonly viewed to be objective misses regularly the community and overlooks the daily practices that establish norms. How persons are judged, accordingly, should reflect the reality that is experienced over time in a community.

Community-based interventions, therefore, should be culturally sensitive rather than routine. And because patients are no longer judged by outsiders, who base their decisions often on criteria that are standardized but irrelevant, these assessments should thus be pertinent, accurate, and humane (Rissmiller and Rismiller 2006). And because persons are classified by relevant protocol, treatment is not intrusive. In a way, communities begin to judge and cure themselves, since pathology is no longer an abstract and faulty determination, imposed on a community in a manner that only professionals can accurately decipher and remediate.

Overcoming Dualism

Linking participation to the formation of the realities in communities challenges a principle that has been central to traditional Western philosophy. In fact, this proposal is sometimes referred to as providing the foundation for a "first philosophy"

that is all-encompassing (Levinas 1969). Throughout the history of this philosophical tradition the aim has been the discovery of a reality that is immune to situational contingencies; a reality has been sought that transcends everyday experiences and is pure. The belief is that this strategy provides knowledge, morality, and social institutions with a sound and universal justification.

Plato proposed the existence of eternal ideas or forms, medial philosophers had God, and more modern writers have relied on science to generate facts divorced from perspective (Zeitlin 1993). Although very different on the surface, each proposition has a similar core. That is, real insight is derived from sources that exceed the quotidian world. Those who seek true enlightenment must jettison their comfortable biases and seek a higher, more trustworthy vision.

Since around 1600, this way of conceptualizing knowledge and order has been referred to as Cartesianism, or simply dualism (Bordo 1987). Two themes are especially important at this juncture: (1) real knowledge exceeds daily experience, but (2) persons have the ability to gain access to this information. Indeed, getting access to truth and morality depends on the success of this endeavor. Thomas Nagel (1986), for example, calls this special outlook that has been coveted as the view from "nowhere," which allows persons to view knowledge without the influence of interpretation or perspective.

In order to think profoundly, and receive the requisite enlightenment, philosophers have had to overcome their weaknesses and irrational tendencies. Since the time of Descartes critical reflection had to assume a particular form—indeed, the mind had to be separated from the world. In more modern terms, the influence of subjectivity has to be overcome, so that the objective features of reality can be known. Subjectivity, stated simply, is murky and fraught with uncertainty.

In this scenario, the human element introduces error into the search for valid knowledge. And unless truth or morality is going to remain out of reach, the unreliability of human judgments has to be reduced. A maneuver has to be made, in other words, that places knowledge beyond perspective, emotion, or any other human foible (Cassel 1991). As modern positivists are fond of saying, values must not be allowed to obscure facts. A way must be available that allows planners to merely describe the social world and report the results.

In earlier times, philosophers tried to flee from the contaminating influence of their bodies through study, mediation, or mendicant practices. An ascetic life, for example, calms the soul and fosters proper reflection. The body, in this case, represents all of the faults and limitations associated with human existence (Carlson 1975). The body is weak, prone to lapses, and is dirty. When trapped within this unsavory vessel, persons are unable to achieve one of their highest ambitions, that is, the discovery of pristine knowledge about themselves and the world. Traditional philosophy encourages this sort of escape to foster personal realization and moral good.

With the on-set of science, subjectivity was attacked in less esoteric terms. Specifically, the scientific method was developed for guiding the pursuit of knowledge, divorced from the influence of biases and other similar distractions (Starr 1982). Because this methodology is standardized, transparent, and based on reason, the influence of subjectivity is believed to be minimized. Scientists simply follow a set of uniform, stepwise instructions that verify knowledge claims, without the influ-

ence of interpretation or their personal agendas. Once persons are trained properly in experimental logic, and the related research protocol and statistical procedures, objective facts can be revealed.

In traditional social planning, this dualism is manifested in several ways. For example, experts are thought to be the most reliable sources of information, because they are professionals who eschew any attachment to political ideologies or other sources of distortion. For the most part, they are trained to serve the public, rather than act in prejudicial ways. The planning process, in this regard, is able to become evidence-based and acquires a sound reputation.

A vital part of their professional training is a focus on measurement. In order to insure that their decisions are based in fact, experts rely on rigorous, value-free methodologies to gather data. The DSM format, for example, generates assessments by adhering to logical steps and refined classifications that culminate in the accurate diagnosis of patients (Kirk 1992). Hence no interpretation is thought to be needed to render a clinical judgment. On the other hand, the use of social indicators—empirical features of a community, such as crime rates or racial composition—is assumed to promote rational decisions about the likely presence of specific social problems in a particular locale, since these features are readily observable (Land 1983). In both examples, the goal is objectivity untainted by personal or collective demands.

Some of this issue is thought to be addressed by making planning a high-tech enterprise. The introduction of technology, referred to by Jacques Ellul (1964) as "technē," is thought to curb human error. For example, computers never have bad days and, and without a major glitch are thought to generate reliable results. Quantitative procedures serve a similar function, due to their universal nature. By transforming knowledge claims into mathematical language, accurate descriptions are thought to be possible without bias.

As should be noted, introducing participation is anathema to this trend. Within the context of dualism, this activity interjects error into judgments and other facets of planning. Additionally, including non-professionals in the planning process threatens the rationality of any intervention. These persons, after all, do not have the proper training and respond in unpredictable ways to social issues. How can facts be gathered within such a contaminated framework?

What community-based planners must wrestle with is a thorny philosophical issue, particularly the legitimacy of dualism. Contemporary writers argue, for example, that knowledge is never severed from subjectivity, or the human presence, and thus facts are always tied to one perspective or another (Lyotard 1984). Facts are conceptualized by someone, defined in one way or another, and organized for a particular purpose. The result, as Habermas (1971) writes, is that facts are a product of "human interests." Facts, as will be discussed additionally later, are never pure but emerge from various claims, reflect a standpoint, and are easily disputed. Issues related to health, accordingly, are "nestled within the whole gamut of socio-medical relationships" (Prior 1993, p. 1).

Does this rejection of dualism, and the accompanying version of objectivity, mean that reliable knowledge is a myth? Without dualism knowledge does not disappear, but certainly is not autonomous, or divorced from the persons or groups that interpret and take a position on this information. True or false information, accord-

ingly, depends on context, communication, agreement, and other social considerations (Scott 1989). For this reason, those who abandon dualism rely on dialogue to establish the conditions of reliable knowledge. Grasping the importance of perspective, in this sense, is critical to appreciating how knowledge becomes relevant and factual. Dialogue, in other words, opens the door to understanding how facts, such as health or illness, are interpreted within the reality of a particular community, and thus how certain symptoms come to be recognized as serious and warrant further investigation.

Social Order and Community

The acceptance of realism, however, sustains the traditional rendition of the community. Realists accept that the realm of the social constitutes a unique and transcendent reality. As Emile Durkheim (1983, p. 85) once said, who epitomized this trend, the social realm exists *sui generis*. In other words, social reality is external to persons and constrains their actions. Clearly dualism is operative. A community, accordingly, should be treated as an objective fact that defies interpretation, but still represents persons, their collective memory, and future responses to events.

The thrust of this theoretical maneuver is twofold. On the one hand, the social is autonomous and able to control persons. Realists such as Durkheim, along with more modern writers such as Talcott Persons, are worried about disorder and the breakdown of society (Stark 1963). Social institutions, accordingly, are granted the status necessary to constrain human action and preserve order. The reality of these organizations is not contested but merely internalized in varying degrees.

Additionally, when couched in realism, the social constitutes a phenomenon that is available for study. A community, for example, is viewed as having objective features, disconnected from human intentions, which can be systematically investigated (Glynn 1986). With the proper skills and patience, planners can discover the laws of social life and formulate the proper correctives for any problem. Social interventions, in this sense, can be refined and directed to the exact place where they will have the most impact. Explanations of behavior, furthermore, can be attributed to the influence of these institutional or environmental features, thereby providing a clear target for interventions.

In terms of actual social planning, realism has been manifested in two interesting ways. The first relates to describing communities in structural terms. Structural metaphors—such as system, network, or framework—have been used regularly to characterize communities (Glynn 1986). The result is that these groups are portrayed as substantial; for example, they have boundaries, density, and entry points. Communities are not simply a hodgepodge of persons but are organized, and thus the impact of interventions can be calculated and measured. In this regard, communities constitute a separate reality that should not be reduced to the interaction between persons or their collective sentiments.

The second outgrowth of realism is related to the first. Specifically, communities are often treated as synonymous with certain objective properties, such as ethnic traits, geographical or political boundaries, or environmental properties (Sampson et al. 2002). Sometimes even a shared culture and tradition are included in these definitions, along with references to patterns of interaction or unifying symbols. Nonetheless, these traits are external to persons and do not reflect their in-put; symbols, in this case, are standardized and linked to cultural contingencies that are ignored. Where a community begins or ends, accordingly, is often a territorial determination, perhaps linked to a road or bridge that is easy to identify.

The behavior that is expected in these places, additionally, is associated with these obtrusive features. Crime is likely to occur in a crowded neighborhood that has buildings that are not regularly maintained. In fact, during the 1980s the concept of "broken windows" gained some notoriety among planners and politicians (Wilson and Kelling 1982). These broken panes of glass serve to indicate that a neighborhood is on the decline and that a host of pathologies is present. The sad nature of these communities is evident to anyone who has the requisite training and can draw the necessary connections between these objective properties.

As should be noted, realism enables planners to conceptualize communities in terms that are assumed to be objective and readily observable. These places, therefore, can be studied in a scientific or rigorous manner, thereby establishing the relationships that exist between, for example, socio-economic status, neighborhood control, or poverty and crime. As empirical indicators, poverty and crime can be precisely operationalized. Furthermore, with these variables equated with objective traits, their associations can be specified and analyzed with statistical sophistication and precision.

The problem with realism, and the associated focus on empirical or objective traits, is that the human element is ignored, or diminished in importance (Heineman 1981). For example, statistical relationships can be established between crime rates and certain geographic areas, in an attempt to identify the sources of certain offences. Such associations, in fact, are not difficult to specify. Nonetheless, this approach provides little insight into the actual character of a community. How persons define crime, respond to these events, or assess the level of safety in their neighborhoods are not a part of this analysis. How a community is actually experienced, therefore, remains unknown. Accordingly, why any associations are present between crime and a certain neighborhood is mostly conjecture based on theory.

Critics of realism declare any plans that reflect this philosophy are purely speculative. For example, given the presence of particular social indicators, motives are imputed to the inhabitants of communities to explain their behavior. In the absence of economic resources and opportunities in poor neighborhoods, crime is expected and believed to be almost inevitable. But the actual process of engaging in crime—such as the decision-making and the influence of social bonds—is unrelated to these speculations (Melossi 1985). How an intervention should proceed, accordingly, is a matter of guesswork. After all, how persons conduct and interpret their lives is not revealed by social indicators.

What realists overlook is the intimate connection between how persons interpret reality and their actions. In the work of Lazarus and Folkman (1984), for example, perception is shown to be related to stress. Simply stated, whether or not a condition is stressful depends on how this situation is perceived. The identification and treatment of a host of other illness, however, do not escape this association (Trostle 2005). In this regard, Aldwin (1994, p. 22) argues that persons appraise situations before they act.

The point of this research is that conceptual schemes and the related personal or collective orientations affect the impact of social conditions on behavior. Persons, as discussed by Aldwin (1994, p. 22), are "nested" in their environments, and thus frame situations and are affected by a host of cultural elements. How they act, accordingly, reflect these preferences. But because of dualism, this association between cognition and behavior is downplayed by realists. Realists, in this sense, dismiss the relevance of participation in the formation of behavioral patterns, along with the contrasting viewpoints present in any social context. In effect, persons are portrayed to be caught in a web of situational, empirical factors that can be invoked to explain behavior or support certain types of interventions.

Participation and Construction

The focus on participation announces a move away from dualism. Through their actions persons influence reality; in other words, reality and the human presence are intertwined. The philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1968, pp. 130–155) has called this confluence the "chiasm," where the differentiation between subjectivity and objectivity vanishes. The basic idea is that reality is no longer autonomous but connected intimately to human intervention. How persons act carves up or organizes social reality in one way or another. This confluence of subjectivity and objectivity culminates in a thoroughly interpretive process of perception.

The rejection of dualism has profound implications for both philosophy and social planning. Particularly noteworthy is that a community cannot be treated as an objective referent in the Cartesian sense, delineated along purely empirical lines (Cohen 1985). This communal reality, instead, is mediated completely by personal and collective existence and, thus, has a symbolic character. In more contemporary terms, the search for any mode of knowledge is shaped by interpretation. The result of this new philosophical position is that facts are viewed always from one perspective or another, and within a community from many vantage points.

A dramatic shift in understanding language has played a large role in this rejection of dualism. In the past, language was believed mostly to represent reality. Specifically, humans were believed to have the unique ability to highlight various aspects of the social world when they speak. In this sense, language is merely a tool that helps persons to distinguish elements in their environment. Nonetheless, the objective nature of social life is not compromised by these speech acts—they simply illustrate the divisions or demarcations that are never questioned.

More recently writers have argued that language is a creative force, rather than a tool. While adhering to the later views of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958, p. 17), they contend that language is expressive and shapes reality. For this reason, language is described as a "game" that can be played in any number of ways. Accordingly, how language is enacted has a lot to do with how everything is perceived and assessed. Language, in this sense, is a vehicle for participation in reality that transforms communities into something primarily symbolic and interpretive. This so-called "linguistic turn" shifts the attention away from mimicry to production, that is, the invention of social norms and other standards (Lyotard 1984).

As contemporary writers like to say, the reality of any community is "constructed." The essential point, in community-based planning, is that facts, truth, and moral standards, for example, are embedded in a social context created by human action (Gergen 1999). Facts are not obtrusive, as in the case of social indicators, but are subject to interpretation and regularly given new meanings. In fact, these alleged objective referents gain their significance in terms of how they are conceptualized and used. Most important at this juncture is that persons respond to how events are interpreted rather than their empirical or objective character. Facts and their interpretation are not separate! Dualism is, thus, passé in the context of community-based planning.

Community-based planners such as Fals Borda (1988) argue that this emphasis on participation announces the onset of a "participatory epistemology." He contends that this non-dualistic viewpoint is grounded in the work of Paul Feyerabend and some quantum physicists. Others write that this novel position reflects the orientation of Foucault and Wittgenstein (Wicks et al. 2008). In any case, the general theme is that knowledge is a product of human action.

Clearly a new status is given to the social world by constructionists. Indeed, they declare that rather than strictly empirical, reality has meaning (Gubrium and Holstein 1997). A community, in other words, has a biography that embodies the interaction and desires of its members. As a result, the significance of social indicators is indeterminate, or implicated in the definitions and conceptual schemes used to describe and organize events and behaviors. Interpretation, in this sense, is context-bound and fluid, and can always be revamped.

Houses may be old and in need of repair, with some having broken windows, but whether these properties are indicative of social decline is a matter of interpretation. And even if decline is the case, the rationale for this erosion is relevant. Accordingly, the biography of a community is important to know, in order to grasp how the members understand this trend and plan to respond. And whether this empirical condition will lead to crime depends, for example, on how these persons interpret their lives and the prospects for improvement. Social indicators, in this sense, have meaning that is never obvious but part of the shifting collective vision of a community.

Some contemporary critics contend that a new label is needed to describe the social world, such as the reality of a community, subsequent to the dismissal of dualism. They believe that this example of social existence should be treated as a "life-world" (*lebenswelt*) (Schutz and Luckmann 1973, pp. 59–60). This term has

been used widely by phenomenologists to describe communities and other facets of social life. With the use of this suggestive term they are trying to say that the world is alive with meaning, rather than comprised of moribund or static empirical indicators. In other words, social existence is an outgrowth of definitions and commitments, along with related practices, that culminate in a world of meaning.

These writers are not trying to suggest, however, that communities have a single vision, similar to the position taken by realists. In fact, each community may consist of several worlds of meaning that are woven together to form a patchwork. The thrust of community-based planning, accordingly, is to make all plans sensitive to the different frames of reference that may be present (Parry et al. 2001). After all, a behavior that may be considered deviant in one of these contexts may have a very different meaning in another. Likewise, the nature of an appropriate intervention may change from one to the other. How the reality of a community is constructed by the various participants in this process, rather than any empirical features, provides insight into the meaning that inspires persons to behave in a particular way.

With respect to this elevation of meaning in importance, Alfred Schutz (1962, pp. 53–54) makes a distinction that is vital to community-based planning. These planners should pay attention to the "primary concepts" used by persons to organize their everyday lives, as opposed to the "secondary" ones introduced by professionals to explain behavior. At the core of his argument is that experts tend not to trust the testimonials of the persons that they study. Accordingly, social scientists rework these stories, using scientific language and empirical descriptives, in order to generate more reliable portrayals of social life. The problem is that these secondary explanations often mask the original intentions of community members. The primary concepts, in terms of this typology, reveal the recipes that persons employ daily to make sense of their lives and the behavior of others.

Because meaning lacks the firm anchor supplied by empirical indicators, persons must act as if they are thrown into the world without a set destiny. As a result, to paraphrase Jean Paul Sartre (1964), they are condemned to supply their lives with meaning and purpose. For this reason, meaning is crucial but indeterminate and always available for reinterpretation; meaning, in other words, is living. But when any change occurs, a new reality may enter the scene. Community-based planners, accordingly, must be attuned to these transformations, if planning is ever going to meet the needs of communities.

Joint Action and Community

Without the support of dualism, social order, and thus the community, must be conceptualized anew. In the past, social order was portrayed to be similar to a body, machine, or a system. All of these images are consistent with the goal of realism—that is, insure that order is preserved. In each example, society is thought to represent an overriding collection of rules, networks, or institutions. Because of this exalted status, persons confront and are constrained by an ominous societal organization.

But subsequent to the challenge posed to dualism, this outlook has lost credibility. With all knowledge influenced by participation and the accompanying interpretation, a universal base is unavailable to unite persons. Simply stated, a foundation unsullied by interpretation is difficult to invoke to sustain a community. This theoretical maneuver is simply difficult to justify given the pervasiveness of interpretation.

Instead of constraining persons, order must emerge through human action. Norms and behavioral expectations, for example, no longer confront persons but reflect various personal and collective decisions. From the perspective of realism, this conclusion is frightening. In the absence of an autonomous set of norms, the only result can be a cacophony of competing claims. Furthermore, with no impartial arbiter of these positions, chaos is inevitable. In this uncertain situation, the greatest fear of realists can be easily realized: A community loses any sense of solidarity and becomes a war of opinions, with little coordination.

Nonetheless, because of the recent challenge to realism, the nature of communities must be rethought. As might be expected, these groups are also constructed through participation. For example, the members establish the identity, any parameters, the rules, and the basic culture of a community. Rather than simply adjusting to standards, persons invent themselves and their associations. A community, in other words, is an on-going construction, brought to fruition through the exercise of *praxis*, or human action. In this regard, communities are a convention.

The resulting communal reality, accordingly, is the product of a particular mode of solidarity or cooperation. Some writers refer to this effort as "joint action" (Blumer 1969, p. 17). Similarly, according to Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984, pp. 11–14), a community exists at the nexus of the various language games that are operative. In other words, a community represents a confluence of interpretations that becomes stabilized over time, thereby providing this group with coherence and longevity.

A community-based planner has to be sensitive to this process and become attuned to how a community's identity and patterns of interaction are constructed and maintained. After all, a community is now more than a place or collection of traits, but a collective project that recollects actions, memories, and ambitions. These dimensions of communal life, accordingly, are tied to how these persons relate to one another and try to make sense of their situation.

A community, in this sense, can be characterized as a multiplicity of "life-worlds." In fact, communities are often comprised of many, and often conflicting, interpretive domains. These different biographies may reflect contrasting interpretations of a group's history and future. Who is encouraged to emerge as leaders, for example, may vary greatly, based on where a person resides in this patchwork of realities. But although the life-world that is in play in one domain may be unique, this interpretative reality may, in very subtle ways, influence the broader identity of a community. A community, in this regard, emerges at the nexus of persons to form a multi-valiant but coherent picture of communal existence.

Conclusion

The central message of this chapter is that community-based work is guided by an important philosophical maneuver. Specifically, dualism and the accompanying realism are deemed to be outmoded. Due to the elevation of participation in importance, the reality of any community is a result of human action. Understanding this shift in orientation will help practitioners to solve any problems that may arise when they begin to design, implement, or evaluate an intervention.

Planners may scoff at first that philosophy is so important in such practical endeavors. Nonetheless, projects will never become community-based unless dualism is overcome and communities are understood to be constructed. As a result of rejecting dualism, interventions that are community-based must be attuned to the lifeworlds of persons, rather than simply reflect a change in scale (Reid 2001). When this shift in philosophy is not appreciated, community-based work is often thought to entail merely a new focus rather than the need to rethink the nature of social reality and how to enter this domain.

But contrary to what realists may claim, constructionism does not obscure a community because objectivity is rejected. Although norms and cultural standards may become more elusive, due to the vagaries of interpretation, the reality of a community is not thoroughly occluded (De Hoyos 1989). Instead, the dimensions and practices that constitute everyday life in a community can be revealed to those who grasp the biography of this group. Introducing participation in this way into the search for valid knowledge is not a distraction, due to the inclusion of interpretation, but allows the experiences of persons to come to light.

Why is this advice so important? Simply put, the reality of a community is created and sustained through participation. Opting to engage in community-based planning, therefore, is not merely a nice idea but the only way to acquire accurate knowledge and formulate interventions. To ignore how a community emerges through interaction, at the nexus of interpretations, obscures the meanings that are created by these persons and guide their lives (Gergen 1999). But only by gaining access to the experience of solidarity that constitutes a community can the behavioral expectations of this group be known. This conclusion cannot be truly appreciated without understanding the philosophy involved in making this claim.

References

Aldwin, C. M. (1994). *Stress, coping, and development: An integrative perspective*. New York: Guilford.

Barton, R. (1966). *Institutional neurosis*. Bristol: Wright.

Blumer, H. (1969). *Symbolic interaction: Perspective and method*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Bordo, S. (1987). *The flight of objectivity*. Albany: SUNY Press.

Carlson, R. J. (1975). *The end of medicine*. New York: Wiley.

Cassel, E. (1991). *The nature of suffering and the goals of medicine*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Cohen, A. P. (1985). *The symbolic construction of community*. London: Routledge.
De Hoyos, G. (1989). Person-in-environment: A tri-level practice model. *Social Casework, 70*(3), 131–138.
Durkheim, E. (1983). *Pragmatism and sociology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ellul, J. (1964). *The technological society*. New York: Random House.
Fals Borda, O. (1988). *Knowledge and people's power*. New York: New Horizons.
Gergen, K. (1999). *An invitation to social construction*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Glynn, T. J. (1986). Neighborhood and sense of community. *Journal of Community Psychology, 14*(4), 341–352.
Goffman, E. (1962). *Asylums*. Chicago: Aldine.
Greenblatt, M., & Norman, M. (1983). Deinstitutionalization: Health consequences for the mentally ill. *Annual Review of Public Health, 4,* 131–134.
Grob, G. N. (1994). *The mad among us: A history of the care of America's mentally ill*. New York: The Free Press.
Gubrium, J. F., & Holstein, J. A. (1997). *The new language of qualitative method*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Habermas, J. (1971). *Knowledge and human interests*. Boston: Beacon.
Heineman, M. B. (1981). The obsolete scientific imperative in social work research. *Social Service Review, 55*(3), 371–397.
Kirk, S. A. (1992). *The selling of DSM*. New York: deGruyter.
Land, K. C. (1983). Social indicators. *Annual Review of Sociology, 9,* 1–26.
Lazarus, R. S., & Folkman, S. (1984). *Stress, appraisal, and coping*. New York: Springer.
Lefley, H. P. (1990). Culture and chronic illness. *Hospital and Community Psychiatry, 41*(3), 277–286.
Lefley, H. P., & Bestman, E. W. (1991). Public-academic linkages for culturally sensitive community mental health. *Community Mental Health Journal, 27*(6), 473–448.
Levinas, E. (1969). *Totality and infinity*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.
Lyotard, J.-F. (1984). *The postmodern condition*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Melossi, D. (1985). Overcoming the crisis in critical criminology: Toward a grounded labeling theory. *Criminology, 23*(2), 193–208.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1968). *The visible and the invisible*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Nagel, T. (1986). *The view from nowhere*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Parry, O., Gnich, W., & Platt, S. (2001). Principles in practice: Reflections on a 'postpositivist' approach to evaluation research. *Health Education Research, 16*(2), 215–226.
Paulson, G. (2012). *Closing the asylums*. Jefferson: McFarland.
Prior, L. (1993). *The social organization of mental illness*. Newbury Park: Sage.
Reid, W. J. (2001). The role of science in social work: The perennial debate. *Journal of Social Work, 1*(3), 273–293.
Rissmiller, D. J., & Rissmiller, J. H. (2006). Evolution of the antipsychiatry movement into mental health consumerism. *Psychiatric Services, 57*(6), 863–866.
Rochefort, D. A. (1984). Origins of the "Third Psychiatric Revolution": The Community Mental Health Centers Act of 1963. *Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law, 9*(1), 1–30.
Rochefort, D. A. (1993). *From poorhouses to homelessness*. Westport: Auburn House.
Sampson, R. J., Morenoff, J. D., & Gannow-Rowley, T. (2002). Assessing neighborhood effects: Social processes and new directions in research. *Annual Review of Sociology, 28,* 443–478.
Sartre, J. P. (1964). *Being and nothingness*. New York: Random House.
Scharfstein, S. (2000). Whatever happened to community mental health. *Psychiatric Services, 51*(5), 616–620.
Schutz, A. (1962). *Collected papers* (Vol. 1). The Hague: Nijhoff.
Schutz, A., & Luckmann, T. (1973). *The structures of the life-world*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Scott, D. (1989). Meaning construction and social work practice. *Social Service Review, 63*(1), 39–51.
Stark, W. (1963). *The fundamental forms of social thought*. New York: Fordham University Press.
Starr, P. (1982). *The social transformation of American medicine*. New York: Basic Books.
Szasz, T. (1961). *The myth of mental illness*. New York: Harper and Row.
Trostle, J. A. (2005). *Epidemiology and Culture*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Wicks, P. G., Reason, P., & Bradbury, H. (2008). Living inquiry: Personal, political and philosophical groundings for action research practice. In P. Reason & H. Bradbury (Eds.), *The Sage handbook of action research* (pp. 15-30). Los Angeles: Sage.
Wilson, J. Q., & Kelling, G. L. (1982). Broken windows. *The Atlantic Monthly, 249*(3), 29–38.
Wing, J., & Brown, G. (1970). *Institutionalism and schizophrenia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wittgenstein, L. (1958). *The blue and brown books*. New York: Harper and Row.
Zeitlin, I. M. (1993). *Plato's vision*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Chapter 3
The Dimensions of a Community

Introduction

In the previous chapter, the point was emphasized that realism is passé in community-based planning. As a result, a community emerges from action and should not be identified with obtrusive, empirical traits. Although this claim is true, the process of conceptualizing and locating a community is complex. Human action is central but a host of issues is involved.

Conceptualizing a community, for example, includes the recognition of others, criteria for inclusion, a knowledge base, and boundaries. These elements are determined through participation, since a uniform reality is difficult to justify in the absence of realism (Campbell and Murray 2004). In the end, a community emerges through joint action that establishes a foundation for further decisions, or constructions. This base, however, does not necessarily represent an all-encompassing reality, with exact and objective parameters.

Through human intervention the appearance is created that a community is something substantial. In the absence of an obtrusive referent, a domain of inclusion is created and reinforced. Possibilities are narrowed and behavioral expectations outlined. Over time, simply put, certain values and commitments are accepted as normative, at least until additional interpretations are considered to be valid. In this sense, a particular rendition of *Communitas* is operative—that is, persons are bound together by commitments instead of external features (Esposito 2010, pp. 6–7). Most important is that any social reality, or construction, must be confirmed by the members of a community to have any legitimacy.

But a mode of realism has dominated how persons often think about communities. This particular rendition is commonly referred to as empiricism (Houston 2005). Like realists in general, empiricists contend that reliable knowledge is divorced from interpretation. Any influence of subjectivity is presumed to undermine the acquisition of accurate information. Communities, therefore, must have an identity that is compatible with the elimination of this source of uncertainty or their study and survival are considered to be suspect. The human presence is, thus, a liability in the search for knowledge or the development of a community.

J. W. Murphy, *Community-Based Interventions*, International Perspectives on Social Policy, Administration, and Practice, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4899-8020-5_3,

The Legacy of Empiricism

Empiricists wanted originally to make philosophy less speculative and, thus, a more reliable source of wisdom. Their central problem, accordingly, was how to pursue knowledge divorced from the effects of subjectivity (Hughes and Sharrock 1990, pp. 24–41). How could a knower acquire information and escape from the influence of interpretation? Any compromise on this issue would harm the status of philosophy. After all, philosophers have been viewed traditionally as having access to truths and moral insights unavailable to the general public.

In order to solve this problem, empiricists made two classic maneuvers. The first pertained to the image of the mind. As almost any student knows, the mind came to be known as a *tabula rasa*, or blank state. The mind, in other words, does not have an orientation or organize information in any way, but simply reflects the empirical character of the world. There is no bias, therefore, in the process of describing reality. The social world, for example, is simply recounted according to this portrayal of the mind.

This neutralization of the mind is only half of the formula introduced by empiricists. The other or second side of this issue is the status of knowledge. Consistent with the theme of neutrality, knowledge is conceived to be sense data. Knowledge, in other words, is equated with physical properties that can be recorded easily by the mind. Colors, for example, are the product of light waves that are translated into electronic pulsations that are conveyed to the brain. These sensations are physical and unrelated to culture or any other contextual limitations. The impressions that are deposited in the mind, accordingly, are thought to provide an uncontaminated account of the external world.

But how has this philosophy been a part of social planning, particularly with respect to identifying communities? In this regard, as noted earlier, social indicator analysis is very important. Communities are associated with certain physical properties—so-called empirical data—that are touted to be unobtrusive and objective (Kazi 2003). This information, therefore, represents an unbiased description of the social world that does not require interpretation to be understood. These sense data tell a story that is not distorted by personal or collective sentiments. Because social indicators are empirical "instruments," sometimes referred to as "non-subjective tools", they are assumed to be a reliable source of knowledge about a community (Astleithner et al. 2004).

Typically, communities have been associated with racial or ethnic traits, economic status, or geographic location (Mittelart and Mittelart 1998, pp. 21). The so-called Black community, for example, is not often subject to debate, since this color is thought to be obvious. Likewise, bridges and roads are physical elements that provide sound referents to circumscribe a community. Although a precinct map may be a political invention, all boundaries are treated regularly as natural.

A community, therefore, can be understood to follow certain physical boundaries, or extend to the limits of specific demographic traits. A particular neighborhood, accordingly, can be defined neatly and provided with a reliable, and easily

confirmable, identity. Indeed, these data reflect a reality that is empirical rather than speculative. Streets and other landmarks have a physical presence that any inquisitive person can verify! In this way, a community can be treated as a space or territory where some group resides or regularly patrols.

But sometimes culture, tradition, and interaction are included in definitions supported by empiricism (McMillan and Chavis 1986). Some critics might think that the inclusion of these considerations compromises the objectivity that is sought. In the end, however, these features are externalized and defined in empirical terms. Interaction, for example, is often equated with patterns of behavior, while tradition is something that a community inherits. As a result, these potentially subjective elements are divorced from human action and treated as substantial, non-constructed forces.

When subjectivity is introduced, communities are often thought to be "imagined" (Anderson 1991). With this maneuver, persons are presumed to participate in establishing their communities. After all, imagination is a human trait. The problem is that a community acquires a very abstract image. Along these lines, there is a tendency to homogenize these ethereal places. In this sense, imagination does not necessarily capture the actual creation and maintenance of a community by real persons.

At other times, social capital is thought to capture the character of a community (Sampson 2012). The problem is that these social networks—interaction patterns and connections—do not necessarily have much to say about commitment and association. In fact, James Coleman (1988) declares that social capital is embedded in already existing institutional relations and closed or stable social settings. In this sense, social capital does not necessarily encourage invention but adaptation. Additionally, patterns of interaction may be a sign of some sort of bond, but the experience of solidarity is not the same as empirical links.

Other attempts to be more sensitive to the human element have resulted in the desire to "map" communities (Kuyek 1990). In this case, persons are asked about their interaction patterns and the geographic context of their associations. These persons' experiences of community, however, are reduced to sociograms and environmental details. What is missing is how they define their relationships, conflicts in viewpoints, and modes of confluence. In other words, the interpersonal intricacies of establishing a community are missing.

As mentioned earlier, when communities are conceptualized in such physical terms, they can be easily studied. Specifying a sampling frame, for example, is a relatively straightforward operation, since all boundaries are clearly marked. Likewise, the impact of certain environmental or social factors can be clearly envisioned—objective lines of impact can be outlined. With both behavior and a community associated with empirical indices, the prevalence of crime in a particular location becomes relatively easy to visualize. Neighborhoods with specific empirical traits, accordingly, become linked readily to various problems. Due to their objective character, these empirical links appear to be obvious to any reasonable onlooker.

But as with empiricism in general, the human element is seriously distorted by social indicator analysis and the usual descriptive statistics (Scott 1989). Following from the desire to remove bias, and obtain a pristine picture of knowledge, subjectivity is redefined as the ability to trace or mimic these empirical factors. The problem is that sense data lack coherence and meaning. Without an active mind that intervenes in reality, in order to organize and contextualize this information, sense data have little to say. In fact, sense data are made to appear as if they have no connection to subjectivity, so that they are unbiased.

Associating a community with census tracts or population traits, for example, does not provide much insight into the history, desires, or values of this group. In this regard, simply pinpointing poverty levels ignores how persons define their prospects and will likely interpret a lack of resources; any response to this absence of resources, accordingly, remains speculative without more intimate information about a person or group. Reducing a community to empirical properties and statistical associations overlooks how persons intervene, or participate, in shaping their realities.

But focusing on the interpretive connections between people or events is thought by empiricists to encourage bias and, thus, error. Accordingly, planners who are guided by empiricism believe that clear descriptions are provided by social indicators, while the experiences of persons are clouded by emotion and other human foibles. The failure of empiricism, however, is that communities are treated very abstractly, as if these groups are merely places or composites of traits. The grand fault of empiricism is to ignore the activity of the mind or, in this context, the lives that persons forge as part of a collective existence.

Construction of a Community

What empiricists ignore, in general, is the element of participation that is central to community-based planning. Their desire to overcome bias culminates in them dismissing the importance of human action. They contend the ability to reflect reality precisely is all that is necessary to acquire reliable information. In fact, human intervention is an impediment to this end.

Nevertheless, many contemporary critics argue that the chances of jettisoning participation are nil. Instead, they contend that a fundamental connection exists between human action and reality (Dean and Fenby 1989). In terms currently used by philosophers, reality is thought to be mediated thoroughly by the human presence; without the organizational capacity of a knower, reality has no coherence or significance. As a result, the dream of empiricists to obtain an objective picture of knowledge can never be achieved. All knowledge, simply put, is tainted by perspective and the related contingencies, and the community is no exception.

As is discussed in Chap. 2, the dualism presupposed by empiricism is considered to be defunct. Through the exercise of language, persons intervene in the world and create a body of meanings (Winch 1990). A community, accordingly, is never

simply encountered but shaped by the definitions that persons enact to give meaning to their lives and all associations. A community, in other words, must emerge from and be preserved through human effort. Without the abstract foundations supported by dualism, there is no other option.

For this reason, contemporary scholars refer to communities as constructed, similar to every other facet of social existence (Wiesenfeld 1996). Through their participation, persons begin to modify their realities and recognize their attachment to other persons. To rely on social indicators or other empirical features to envision a community ignores the activity whereby they define their connections to others and establish the rules of interaction. Furthermore, the definitions that shape the boundaries and inclusion are deemed to be irrelevant.

What occurs, in effect, is that a range of possibilities is narrowed through human action, so that a communal association can emerge (Luhmann 1995). Implied by this participation is that social existence can be constructed in any number of ways. And due to this intervention, the parameters of a community, for example, do not have inherent limitations, but are conceptualized and reinforced by the members. A communal order can be preserved, however, only if certain interpretations or constructions of social life are loosely accepted, at least until further notice. In this sense, a community should never be considered a completed project.

During this interpretive process the identity, norms, and boundaries of a community are specified. As phenomenologists like to say, a specific "stock of knowledge" is created and accepted as containing important information about a range of issues, such as sickness, health, and likely cures (Berger and Luckmann 1967, pp. 39–42). On the other hand, unacceptable modes of understanding and behavior are identified and rejected. But from a constructionist's perspective, the separation between these realms is porous. At any time, and possibly without the proper notification, this distinction between these options can be altered. When such a shift occurs, the nature of a community is changed. Something that was normative can become outmoded and dismissed.

In view of community-based planning, these groups are assumed to have "paramount realities," rather than objective features. This idea is borrowed from phenomenology, particularly the work of Alfred Schutz (1962, pp. 229–234). The point is that communities can define themselves in various ways, and that the so-called dominant reality can change. And sometimes, competing interpretations may be present. Nonetheless, any paramount reality is a construction that serves to organize a community, only until another interpretation of this communal order gains legitimacy.

This paramount construction provides the general context for understanding behavior and events. In a manner of speaking, the resulting expectations may be considered to be objective, since the interpretations that support this outlook have come to dominate a community. Although these norms may not be accepted by everyone, the need for compliance is understood. At no time, however, should this reality be treated as autonomous in the manner intended by empiricists and other realists. A paramount reality simply provides some insight into how norms come to be accepted, and sometimes thought of as natural, even though they may easily

be contested and viewed suspiciously by many members of a community. But in the end, the accepted view of health or other behavior in a community depends on the "interests, priorities, and perceptions" of the persons who are considered to be members (Roy and Sharma 1986).

At this juncture, however, only the general character of a community has been addressed. Indeed, only the meaning of a community's reality has been exposed to human action and construction—that is, the "mundane rationality" that is operative in a community has been revealed (Pollner 1987). But another issue must be discussed when participation is elevated in importance and a paramount reality must be shared by persons. Without the imperatives derived from realism, how is the solidarity that unites a community created? How can persons coordinate themselves and begin to exhibit a sense of reciprocity?

Solidarity and Order

Realists rely on dualism when trying to explain the origin of social order. They begin, for example, by assuming that persons are similar to atoms and basically cut off from one another (Stark 1963). As a result, social order has to be imposed by an external force that is able to regulate these disparate individuals. Order is thus autonomous and instilled by a universal mechanism that binds persons together. A community, therefore, is often associated with abstract traits or themes, even myths about the past. The West Side and Little Italy are common designations that capture this abstract, almost ethereal sense of community.

But with dualism abandoned by community-based planners, a community is no longer an abstraction but must emerge through participation. In this sense, the first step is to abandon the outmoded idea that persons are similar to atoms. As a host of a contemporary social philosopher's note, on the contrary, persons always exist in the midst of others—an individual's existence is clearly personal and simultaneously collective (Dussel 2008). An atomistic starting point is surely dubious, given that persons are never severed from others, even when solitude is sought. Even in this example of escape, persons are fleeing from others who are always present, and, in many ways can never elude their script responsibilities.

The realist claims that persons are primarily atoms, who must be forced to acknowledge others, are defied by experience. Clearly individuals are open to others and share a common space or world. Nonetheless, their respective existences must be coordinated without the aid of a universal foundation (Bauman 1993). Indeed, the abstract image of an ominous collective existence loses credibility after the demise of dualism, since everything is situated and contingent. Rather than organized by universal norms, the collective or community arises through a process of mutual, or inter-subjective, construction and can assume many forms.

Through participation, persons construct their own realities, and at the same time establish a common identity or sense of community. In other words, because persons

share a world, and are available to others, intimate associations can be established. Through a process of give and take—referred to by some writers as a "conversation of gestures"—whereby persons learn how others construct their realities, bonds can be established that reflect this mutual understanding (Mead 1974, pp. 240). Persons can reach agreements that specify mutually relevant commitments and how interaction should proceed, until new arrangements are imagined and created.

A community should not be reduced to a place or a composite of objective indicators. What such a portrayal misses are the tacit and overt associations that constitute the solidarity at the root of a community (Hunter and Riger 1986). Through this activity an identity is formed that includes, for example, multiple histories, cultural practices, rules for inclusion, and parameters. To borrow from Robert Park (1952, p. 47), a community represents a "mosaic of little worlds." Therefore, from a community-based perspective a community is comprised of a set of commitments, that is, a collectively constructed reality, which differentiates some persons from others. Without a doubt, some persons are part of a particular community and others are not.

In contrast to the realist position, a community is not an overarching principle or image that subsumes its members (Levinas 1998). Although a common identity is real, and influences behavior, the solidarity that exists is formed through very concrete encounters. To even talk about a community identity, in fact, may easily begin to misrepresent how this order is constructed and reassessed on a daily basis. A community, in this sense, is a multivalent and fluid affair which, for the most part, is never thoroughly settled. As described by Melucci (1996, p. 71), a collective identity cannot be divorced from the interaction of members, including the conflict, and the accompanying generation of meaning that is constantly reworked.

Sometimes communities, despite of this fluidity, are identified with a "common" base of knowledge. Perhaps a consensus is reached about some affair or history? Nonetheless, common is not quite an accurate descriptive in this case. Given the ubiquity of participation, knowledge is never simply held in common. In a much more complex way, different perspectives must be understood and reconciled, so that a cohesive identity might be achieved (Taylor 1989). Perspectives must be exchanged among persons, correctly interpreted, prioritized, and treated as part of a common outlook, before a community can be envisioned to exist. Perhaps "information flow" captures better the process whereby a sense of community is established (Hunter and Riger 1986).

Although when perceived from afar, communities may appear to be seamless, the actual bonds are very different. Norms are constantly being contested and redefined, while expectations and demands are reexamined. Whether or not a project is thought to be feasible may depend on the reality that is currently in place. Likewise, who is accepted into a community may reflect a change in disposition and motives. At the end of the day, the reality of a community is elastic, but available to those who are committed to this particular collective identity. Young (2000, p. 221) tries to capture this sense uncertainty, and yet togetherness, with her phrase "differentiated solidarity." Her point is that inclusion does not necessarily

require that different viewpoints be erased. Quite the opposite is the case: These viewpoints interpenetrate one another, thereby creating a variegated image of a community.

So, the question becomes: What is a community? A community is not necessarily singular—consisting of clearly defined aspects, places, or operations—but includes various perspectives that are often questioned but recognized. A sort of mutual awareness is present, accordingly, that represents a confederation more than a consensus. A community, argues Martin Buber (1965, p. 106), is based on a "living mutual relation," whereby the interpenetration of experiences constitutes a social world. A community, in this sense, is a collective creation with plenty of variation, which reflects a commitment to a particular identity until other arrangements are constructed and confirmed. Gar Alperovitz's (2013, p. 145) phrase "pluralist commonwealth" is very suggestive in this context.

A community is enacted between persons, and exists in their hopes, history, interaction, and projected future (Lingis 1994). This identity is very real, but at the same time difficult to pinpoint. In reality, a community is a place of sorts. But this "place", for example, consists of memories, relationships, won and lost arguments, and ambitions and practices (Ríos et al. 2012). The actual space has little to do with this construction of a place.

In this sense, as phenomenologists claim, a community is "taken-for-granted" (Berger and Luckmann 1967, pp. 54–56). In everyday practice, in other words, a variety of perspectives are woven together and sustained long enough to constitute an identity. Although boundaries are constructed and porous, the members know who belongs and who does not. And at least until further notice, these parameters are assumed to be valid and knowable by everyone involved.

As a writer like Alphonso Lingis (1994) suggests, a community exists between persons that have nothing in common. But, of course, a community consists of certain ties. What Lingis means is that there are no foundationalist or universal properties that are at the root of a community. There is no biological connection, group mind, or invisible body that holds this group together. A community, instead, emerges from certain commitments and the inclusion of various perspectives that are given credence, at least for a period of time. Belonging is an experience and a sense of allegiance (Furman 1998). What is held in common is the openness to these often competing viewpoints and the associated construction of acceptable behaviors.

The Complexity of a Community

In many ways, as noted earlier, a community represents a domain of commitment. This claim was confirmed by a recent project undertaken in Ecuador. In official documents, this specific community was organized spatially as a grid, with a clearly demarcated center and periphery. In fact, on a city map this location has a very well

defined outline. But when working with this community, the elastic nature of this group began to appear (White 1997).

The first realization of this issue was that this community consisted of several neighborhoods and competing realities. Nonetheless, the general identity of these persons is that they are poor and marginal; they take pride, however, in their desire to work and improve their lives. In this sense, this *barrio* is bound together by a general history and some common experiences. Nonetheless, within this domain, separated by perhaps 200 yards, different values and realities emerged in terms of health problems and other issues. For example, one part of this community, close to the city's garbage dump, had different priorities with respect to health care. Additionally, perception of problems changed often following a small shift from one spatial location to another. Melvin Pollner (1975) claims that this change in outlooks represents what he calls "reality disjunctures," whereby coherence is maintained in the face of different viewpoints.

Although this community is 1 square mile in size, distance across this domain was not considered to be uniform. Some parts of this community, for example, were viewed to be more remote than others. Many persons, in fact, seldom visited these other areas and thought of them as foreign, even though these places are not spatially distant. The realities in these marginal domains were perceived to be mysterious in some ways, and possibly dangerous. Furthermore, the residents in these areas were not necessarily treated as members of the overall community and readily embraced. Similarly, persons from these estranged areas expressed that they did not feel that they were included in the community, although they wanted to be recognized as a component.

Membership in this community, accordingly, did not automatically follow spatial boundaries. Within the official parameters, degrees of marginality were witnessed. Some persons were also identified as members who resided outside of these geographic limits. In this regard, a commitment to the community seems to override proximity regularly as a measure of membership. Again, the desire to participate was a vital element (Chavis and Newbrough 1986).

When trying to rally support for this project—the construction of a community health center—these considerations had to be taken into account. During the process of establishing the community supervisory board, for example, issues surrounding membership constantly arose. In this case, family ties often qualified persons as members, even when these relatives resided elsewhere. Viewing the community in strictly spatial terms would have been a serious mistake. After all, some of the leaders in this community lived outside of the official geographic boundaries. On the other hand, some persons who needed services, and lived in this neighborhood, were often marginalized and disenfranchised.

In actual practice, this community resembled a life-world, whereby social order is constructed along the lines established by various beliefs and commitments (Schutz and Luckmann 1973). The recognition of boundaries, for example, depended more on values and perspective than location. Additionally, proximity had a lot to do with perceptions of distance and inclusion. What seems to be most

important is how persons defined boundaries, problems, and relationships. How a person responded to certain segments of this community determined the status of that person! A community, in this regard, is very porous and constantly redefined. Danger and membership were a matter of perception, more than objective characteristics of persons or the environment.

Trying to organize this community advisory board proved to be a challenge. Overcoming the negative perceptions and criticisms of some members of the marginal areas was not always easy, while interpretations of distance had a lot to do with whether persons were invited to participate in community sponsored events. But building this health center was a collective activity. Finding the community, however, was not a simple matter.

What planners must begin to appreciate, if their work is to be considered community-based, is that communities are not necessarily centered but baroque (Holahan and Wilcox 1977). Indeed, there may be several centers. New social imagery, in this regard, may go a long way to foster the development of community-based interventions. In many respects, from a community-based perspective, a community is "paradoxical"—a reality is present that is not necessarily imposing and very diverse. Togetherness is, thus, possible without the usual demands for uniformity and constraint, all leading to a neatly circumscribed group. This new rendition could be best characterized as a "community of difference" (Furman 1998).

The body, network, zones, and system, the standard social analogies used to describe the social world, are all centered—that is, they presuppose a central control mechanism. Their general message is that order cannot be maintained without a consensus or a more stringent mode of compliance. The ties that bind a community together, however, defy this uniformity; these associations tolerate a lot of variation and resistance. In actuality, a community is a confluence of different realities that is held together by commitments to others. Jean Gebser (1985, p. 544) once described this condition by declaring that the center can be found anywhere.

In this sense, a community should be thought of as "de-centered," or similar to a matrix (Kelly 1987). Other images that have been proposed include the quilt, salad bar, and montage. The point in each example is that various cultural or normative differences can be sutured together at their edges to form a coherent whole. Viewing social order in this manner will disabuse planners from trying to find "the community"; accordingly, while using Charles Taylor's (1988) phrase, they are encouraged to recognize the various "moral topologies" that constitute a community. Given the variegated reality that is often in place, any uniform or abstract designation is truly misplaced. Whether or not certain points of view are part of a community is a process that is (re)negotiated constantly and subject to new interpretations.

Entering a Community

Often the task of locating a community is described to involve identifying appropriate "leverage points or targets of entry" (Solomon 1980). This endeavor may entail contacting key persons, institutions, or political networks, for example, which are

thought to extend deeply into the community in question. In Latin America, for example, the Catholic Church is presumed to provide this entrée, while the churches in the Black community in the USA are thought to operate in a similar manner.

The problem with this account stems from the metaphors that are used. Again in contrast to realism, communities do not consist of a series of entry points, reminiscent of a network. A community is not a target! Such a description is simply too graphic and misrepresents how entry is actually gained to a community. Additionally, in many cases neither so-called key informants nor official institutions are integrated into their surrounding communities; these persons may have official connections but very loose ties to their target communities. In the community in Ecuador, for example, the Catholic Church had a weak presence and the main service provider, a large NGO, was viewed to be distant and ineffective by many community members.

Communities, therefore, should not be viewed as having doors that, if opened, lead automatically to important networks. Instead, the process of inclusion should be viewed as an ever expanding attempt at dialogue. As a result of recognizing multiple histories, plural realities, and contested norms and regions, appropriate overtures can be made to a community's members to participate in planning activities. As should be noted, a different metaphor is adopted: communication rather than contact (van Ruler 2004).

In the example of Ecuador, various methods were adopted to engage the community in dialogue. A survey was used several times that required the researchers go door to door as part of initiating a needs assessment. This activity was facilitated by training persons in the community—mostly women and youth—to conduct interviews. This strategy resulted in the community being understood fairly well, as discussions evolved that provided many valuable insights (Minkler and Wallerstein 2011). Additionally, the members of the community came to know the planners, thereby promoting the solidarity that was necessary to create and implement the health project.

Community-building, in this example, consisted of efforts to encourage widespread participation and the expression of ideas. Because they did not have an office, the planners were in the community regularly to meet with members of the community. The thrust of a community-based project, in this regard, is to fade into a community and, in many ways, become invisible. Additionally, the point was made constantly at meetings that building the health center is the responsibility of the community. Setting agendas, formulating plans, and assessing outcomes were thus directed by community members.

But as should be remembered, from a community-perspective communities are never built by planners. There is never an attempt to construct a community that is monolithic or even dispersed. The general principle is to allow community members to exhibit their talents and ambitions, and to forge themselves into a project. Although advice may be provided by planners, their input is never treated as sacrosanct but is subject to critique and accepted when relevant to the group.

Throughout this process in Ecuador, one theme was emphasized: solidarity. At practically every meeting, the idea was presented that a community project cannot survive without solidarity. Everyone who is part of a community-based project, in other words, supports and becomes engaged in the fate of the community

(Nelson et al. 2001). In the end, the capacities of this community were not necessarily built but enhanced. The opportunities were made available, in other words, for these people to reconfirm their connections and hone their skills.

As might be imagined, a lot of training was required for community members to assume these roles. Several women in the community, who were originally trained as health promoters, assumed the leading role in this process, along with a local social worker who was assigned to the area. In the end, these key persons proved to be valuable, but they were not the pillars of traditional institutions. They were simply everyday persons who took the necessary interest in this undertaking. Their involvement in the community, however, gave legitimacy to the project and helped to expand the dialogue (Fainstein 2000). Additionally, their knowledge bases served to guide the development of the project, so that this intervention would meet the needs of this community.

But consistent with a community-based methodology, this training was not simply didactic (Wallerstein and Bernstein 1994). The persons who were trained were actively involved in this process and, thereby, improved their skills through practice, while offering criticisms when necessary. These community members took the lead by providing insightful observations and a supportive learning environment. Often they criticized one another, in a constructive way, so that everyone would learn more and continue to advance.

Political officials, such as the mayor, were also important at every stage of building the health center. Likewise, some local doctors offered some important advice, with respect to obtaining medical supplies and fitting this project into the national health plan. Nonetheless, their involvement was always mediated by the community members. At all times, a "bottom-up" style of operation was maintained (Wallerstein 1992). At any meeting with these experts, the input from the community was the centerpiece. In fact, any attempt to circumvent this group would have been disastrous; any political gain, in this regard, would have been lost in the long run, unless the entire community advanced.

The operative principle at this juncture is "communicative competence" (Habermas 1970). Communication, accordingly, is not merely aimed to put planners in contact with community members, or promote some sense of cultural awareness, but rather foster mutual understanding. In more specific terms, the goal of communication should be to enable persons to enter the realities of others; communication, accordingly, helps planners to enter the life-world (or life-worlds) of a community. When conceived in this manner, communication becomes a dialogue, rather than simply a means to make a connection or convey information. Communication is the activity that supplies the solidarity that is required to unite persons and support a community.

Communicative competence, in this way, leads to cultural competence. Planners are thus able to navigate a locale and enter a community. After all, the mixture of experiences, definitions, expectations, discourses, and relationships that constitute a community is far more complicated but more inviting than entry points, networks, or communication channels. But by learning how to interpret reality adequately, cultural competence and, thus, entry to a community can be achieved.

What can be Studied or Learned?

Now the central question is: What can be learned about a community? Due to the emphasis placed on construction, and the changing associations at the base of social order, the image could be created easily that a community is chaotic. With norms always undergoing negotiation, and boundaries somewhat elusive, are communities substantial enough to be approached in a systematic manner?

These questions are important, since planners want their work to be founded on evidence and viewed to be helpful. The discovery of facts and rules is a goal of this activity. But despite the focus on participation and construction, communities have lasting realities. This paramount viewpoint, or mixture of outlooks, is not necessarily ephemeral simply because objective parameters are missing. Indeed, the norms in a community exhibit remarkable continuity, although they are regularly stretched and redefined to fit different circumstances.

As sedimented interpretations, the paramount realities are available for examination. These "recipes" for addressing various issues can be encountered, by anyone who gains entry to a community and is documented (Berger and Luckmann 1967, pp. 61–62). In effect, these rules for making sound decisions and interacting successfully, for example, represent narratives that unite persons. And while these stories are constructions, they constitute a substantial reality, influence behavior, and can be studied. Every community has these narratives about the past, probable success, and personal and collective well-being, even places that appear to be outside of the mainstream of society. In many ways, the term story seems to capture how life is lived.

If a planner is careful, these paramount rules can be treated as if they are objective, because they are generally known (Schutz 1962, pp. 229–234). Additionally, their impact is real for those who are members of a particular community, or try to enter this domain. These rules inspire or evoke specific behaviors, once certain constructions are enforced and reality and internalized. Violations of boundaries and membership criteria, for example, have consequences for everyone.

Community-based planners should never forget, however, that all realities have a biography. But contrary to realism, the use of this term does not signal that communities simply change and have a history. Of course, this description is accurate but much more is involved.

Basic to this idea of biography is that all constructions have continuity and exhibit degrees of stability (Berger and Luckmann 1967). Furthermore, this history is not predetermined. Past interpretations may influence the realities that are considered to be possible in the future, while future expectations may alter perceptions of the past. All persons and communities weave these stories about themselves, but such narratives are contingent and open-ended. The history contained in a biography, therefore, represents a gradual accumulation of information deemed to be real. This pool of information is not objective in the traditional or Cartesian sense, but still pervades and provides coherence to communities.

Conclusion

While the traditional belief in objectivity is passé in the context of community-based planning, the study and planning of communities are entirely possible. In fact, community-based planners believe that planning can be more effective than ever. Nonetheless, due to the influence of realism, the standard strategies and methodologies are thought to be outmoded. Simply trying to unearth empirical evidence is not considered to be very productive.

Establishing a community, accordingly, involves a process of self-identification. Nonetheless, this activity is not characterized correctly if a community is thought to emerge simply from allegiance or assimilation to certain external or empirical referents. Even though the identity of a community is the focus of both cases, the element of construction is missing. Self-identification, accordingly, should be understood to be shaped by interpretation, whereby persons carve up the social world and negotiate the boundaries of inclusion. Communities, in this sense, are "self-referential"; that is, they are created and reinforced by their members (Luhmann 1995).

Community projects, therefore, do not necessarily have a uniform trajectory. Like any biography, communities construct their respective narratives in various ways. Agendas and time frames, for example, may vary greatly. How long a project will take to complete will depend on how a community views the process of growth. In Ecuador, for example, the community's time table differed greatly from the original expectations of the planners. Learning to "grow together"—tuning in with a community's time line—is something that community based planners must master (Schutz 1962, p. 220).

Biographies, in this sense, make unexpected twists and turns and are indeterminate. Although there may be a general flow to a community-based project, as is discussed in Chap. 7, the nature and tempo of the various phases depends on the intricacies of the biography at hand. The usual logic of planning, therefore, makes sense but is contingent on how the narrative of a community is deployed. For example, the link between community entrée, typically the first stage of planning, and the identification of needs is mediated by a lot of reflection. How these stages are connected may vary. Clearly, planners and communities becoming attuned to one another, as Schutz (1964, pp. 158–178) states, is crucial to understanding correctly the direction, intensity, and rate of development of a project.

Community-based planners, accordingly, are not enamored of the usual promises linked to realism about value-free inquiry and the collection of objective data. What this new strategy must accomplish, instead, is engage the realities present in a community, so that a biographically informed description of this group is revealed (Finlay 2009). And in order to accomplish this aim, a lot more must be discussed than the standard issues related to becoming evidence-based and attuned to the empirical features of a community.

References

Alperovitz, G. (2013). *What then must we do?* White River Junction: Chelsea Green.

Astleithner, F., Hamedinger, A., Holman, N., & Ryden, Y. (2004). Institutions and indicators-the discourse about indicators in the context of sustainability. *Journal of Housing and Built Environment*, *19*(1), 7–24.

Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined communities*. London: Verso.

Bauman, Z. (1993). *Postmodern ethics*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1967). *The social construction of reality*. Garden City: Doubleday.

Buber, M. (1965). *The knowledge of man*. New York: Harper and Row.

Campbell, C., & Murray, M. (2004). Community health psychology: Promoting analysis and action for social change. *Journal of Health Psychology*, *9*(2), 187–195.

Chavis, D. M., & Newbrough, J. R. (1986). The meaning of 'community' in social psychology. *Journal of Community Psychology*, *14*(4), 335–340.

Coleman, J. S. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. *American Journal of Sociology*, *94*, 95–120.

Dean, R. G., & Fenby, B. L. (1989). Exploring epistemologies: Social work action as a reflection of philosophical assumptions. *Journal of Social Work Education*, *25*(1), 46–54.

Dussel, E. (2008). *Ethics and community*. Eugene: Wipf & Stock.

Esposito, R. (2010). *Communitas*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Fainstein, S. S. (2000). New directions in planning theory. *Urban Affairs Review*, *35*(4), 451–478.

Finlay, L. (2009). Debating phenomenological research methods. *Phenomenology and Practice*, *3*(1), 6–25.

Furman, G. C. (1998). Postmodernism and community in schools: Unraveling the paradox. *Educational Administration Quarterly*, *34*(3), 298–328.

Gebser, J. (1985). *The ever-present origin*. Athens: Ohio University Press.

Habermas, J. (1970). Towards a theory of communicative competence. *Inquiry*, *13*(1-4), 360–375.

Holahan, C. J., & Wilcox, B. L. (1977). Ecological strategies in community psychology: A case study. *Journal of Community Psychology*, *5*(4), 423–433.

Houston, S. (2005). Philosophy, theory and method in social work: Challenging empiricism's claim on evidence-based practice. *Journal of Social Work*, *5*(1), 7–20.

Hughes, J., & Sharrock, W. (1990). *The philosophy of social research*. New York: Longman.

Hunter, A., & Riger, S. (1986). The meaning of community in community mental health. *Journal of Community Psychology*, *14*(1), 55–71.

Kazi, M. (2003). Realist evaluation for practice. *British Journal of Social Work*, *33*(6), 803–818.

Kelly, J. G. (1987). An ecological paradigm: Defining mental health consultation as a preventive service. *Prevention in Human Services*, *4*(3-4), 1–36.

Kuyek, J. N. (1990). *Fighting for hope: Organizing to realize our dreams*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.

Levinas, E. (1998). *Entre nous*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Lingis, A. (1994). *The community of those who have nothing in common*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Luhmann, N. (1995). *Social systems*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

McMillan, D. W., & Chavis, D. M. (1986). Sense of community: A definition and theory. *Journal of Community Psychology*, *14*(1), 6–23.

Mead, G. H. (1974). *Mind, self, and society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Melucci, A. (1996). *Challenging codes: Collective action in the information age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Minkler, M., & Wallerstein, N. (2011). *Community-based participatory research for health: From process to outcome*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Mittelart, A., & Mittelart, M. (1998). *Theories of communication*. Thousand Oakes: Sage.

Nelson, G., Prilleltensky, I., & MacGillivary, H. (2001). Building value-based partnerships: Toward solidarity with oppressed groups. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, *29*(5), 649–677.

Park, R. E. (1952). *Human communities*. Glencoe: Free Press.

Pollner, M. (1975). The very coinage of your brain: The anatomy of reality disjunctures. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, *5*(3), 411–430.

Pollner, M. (1987). *Mundane reasoning*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Ríos, M., Vásquez, L., & Miranda, L. (Eds.). (2012). *Diálogos: Placemaking in Latino communities*. New York: Routledge.

Roy, S., & Sharma, B. B. L. (1986). Community participation in primary health care. *Health and population*, *9*(4), 165–191.

Sampson, R. J. (2012). *Great American city*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Schutz, A. (1962). *Collected Papers* (Vol. 1). The Hague: Nijhoff.

Schutz, A. (1964). *Collected papers* (Vol. 2). The Hague: Nijhoff.

Schutz, A., & Luckmann, T. (1973). *The structures of the life-world*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Scott, D. (1989). Meaning construction and social work practice. *Social service review*, *63*(1), 39–51.

Solomon, G. (1980). The rural human service delivery system: Entry issues. *Journal of Rural Community Psychology*, *1*(2), 1–15.

Stark, W. (1963). *Fundamental forms of social thought*. New York: Fordham University Press.

Taylor, C. (1988). The moral topography of the self. In S. B. Messer, L. A. Sass, & R. L. Woolfork (Eds.), *Hermeneutics and psychological theory* (pp. 298–320). New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Taylor, C. (1989). *The sources of the self*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

van Ruler, B. (2004). The communication grid: An introductory model of four communication strategies. *Public Relations Review*, *30*(2), 123–143.

Wallerstein, N. (1992). Powerlessness, empowerment, and health: Implications for health promotion. *American Journal of Health Promotion*, *6*(3), 197–205.

Wallerstein, N., & Bernstein, E. (1994). Introduction to community empowerment, participatory education, and health. *Health Education Quarterly*, *21*(3), 141–148.

White, S. (1997). Beyond retroduction?—Hermeneutics, reflexivity, and social work practice. *British Journal of Social Work*, *27*(5), 739–753.

Wiesenfeld, E. (1996). The concept of 'we': A community social psychology myth. *Journal of Community Psychology*, *24*(4), 337–345.

Winch, P. (1990). *The idea of a social science and its relation to philosophy*. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.

Young, I. M. (2000). *Inclusion and democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 4
Community-Based Organizations

Introduction

Every facet of planning and executing a social project is a collective effort, at least from a community-based perspective. After all, participation does not refer to a collection of isolates. Consequently, issues related to the life inside of organizations must be rethought in view of this principle. The crucial question thus becomes: What is a community-based organization? In general, and consistent with this philosophy, community-based organizations are predicated on participation and enable communities to deal with their problems. True enough! But these organizations have unique characteristics.

Early on, during the 1960s, community mental health centers were expected to be organized differently than hospitals. About the same time, community clinics arose and challenged the traditional conception of health-care delivery. Most recently some NGOs have offered alternative models of service delivery and community relations. Each one of these examples, furthermore, was supposed to be accompanied by a new style of organization. The problem is that despite good intentions these organizations are not very different from those in the past (Smith et al. 2005). In fact, they all have a traditional division of labor, administration, and portrayal of social networks. Additionally, the community remains on the periphery of these programs.

In broad terms, the point of these organizations is to avoid bureaucracy. Such organizations are considered to be too big and cumbersome, and removed from their surrounding communities. Moreover, certain pathologies are associated with bureaucracies, such as blind conformity and a lack of critical reflection (Perrow 1979, pp. 1–57). These organizations, therefore, are considered to be incompatible with the overall philosophy of community-based interventions, whereby emphasis is placed on widespread inclusion and the accompanying proliferation of ideas.

In terms of their structure, however, these emerging organizations do not stray far from the traditional mold. Little thought is given, for example, to alternative management philosophies or organizational arrangements (Drucker 1990). Although the phrase community-based is applied to these agencies, their basic

J. W. Murphy, *Community-Based Interventions,* International Perspectives on Social Policy, Administration, and Practice, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4899-8020-5_4,

form does not deviate much from typical bureaucracies. As a result, the proper organizational context is not created for these programs to engage their surrounding communities.

Nonetheless, a style of organization does exist that is compatible with the thrust of a community-based philosophy. In general, these organizations are referred to as "post-bureaucratic." Accordingly, they support greater adaptation and innovation, along with more participation and the dissemination of information (Heckscherer and Donnellon 1994). However, as supporters of critical management studies note, the success of these institutions depends on the "denaturalization" of the traditional models of organizational life. In other words, the usual penchant for hierarchy and a rigid division of labor must be rejected (Fournier and Grey 2000).

Community-based organizations are not simply informal due to their absence of hierarchy and a strict division of labor. This label, in fact, is often used to diminish the importance and impact of an organization. A community-based health intervention, like the one in Ecuador, is substantial and has an important presence in a neighborhood. In this regard, a community-based organization is certainly not rigid, but forceful and integrated into a community.

The aim of this chapter, accordingly, is to discuss the implications of management philosophy and social imagery for the operation of organizations. A key issue is that community-based organizations should have traits that foster participation, and thus the aims of communities, without dominating the social landscape. These organizations should be a vital part of communities, due to the emphasis that is placed on participation. In fact, they gain legitimacy by confirming the reality constructed by a community and operating within these confines. Accordingly, similar to other aspects of community-based planning, these organizations fade into the community!

Traditional Organizations

Consistent with the pervasive dualism, realism is central to conceptualizing traditional models of organizations. As with other applications of this philosophy, metaphors such as structures and networks are adopted to describe the basic form of these organizations (Burrell and Morgan 1979). Given the focus on control by realists, the institutions that persons confront daily must be substantial and able to withstand any threat. Deprived of this imposing stature, organizations cannot perform their vital task of maintaining order. If these institutions are not thought to be objective and overwhelming, their ability to appear forceful is easily compromised.

Community-based organizations have not been exempt from this trend. For example, most of these organizations have a traditional organizational chart on their walls. These institutions, accordingly, are arranged with an explicit line of authority and well-defined spans of control (Sandfort 2004). This hierarchy ensures that coordination is precise and responsibility is easily identified. In this regard, an environment is created where administrative tasks follow explicit rules and logic.

In terms of their daily operation, these organizations are divided into departments that are structured according to professional standards. Clinical practices are separate from billing operations, for example, with each guided by unique principles of accreditation. As a result, coordination is achieved by the imposition of increasingly higher levels of authority. While at the apex of this pyramid, the director of these organizations is often a fairly powerful figure.

Many community agencies are plagued by the same problems that haunt all bureaucracies (Brodkin 2006). A very explicit division of labor is present, along with the accompanying internal squabbles and fragmentation of work. Persons are thus reluctant to step outside of their domains of expertise and acquire new skills, while communication between different departments is often strained. As coordination becomes a significant problem, these organizations tend to have an internal focus and weak connections to their community.

Due to this need for regulation, explicit boundaries limit both internal and external communication. The only way that coordination can be maintained is through the institution of more rules and the concentrated exercise of authority. Also, as time passes, these organizations become increasingly centralized and self-consumed. Their maintenance becomes the focus of much of their attention.

Both the NGOs in Ecuador and many community health centers in the USA, for example, have had to deal with this issue. Instead of spending time in communities, the directors of these programs talk mostly to one another or funding sources, and devote most of their energy to resolving personnel issues or fulfilling bureaucratic requirements (Sosin 1990). Forays into the service community, accordingly, occur when there is a lull in administrative demands. As a result, these contacts are often a matter of organizational convenience and appear to be contrived, rather than based on community need. On the other hand, representatives of these agencies show up in communities when they are under pressure to meet some deadline or when their supervisors are in the area, but communities can detect the insincerity of these visits.

These agencies tend to work through rather than with communities. In this sense, there is some collaboration, but interaction is specified mostly by administrative requirements (Perry and Perry 1978). Their original funding proposals, for example, often mandate certain types of collaboration with a community. Any demands that might be expressed by this community are thus addressed within these very restricted parameters. In many facts of their operation, these organizations are not user friendly and are community-based mostly on paper.

When community members begin to make requests to these agencies, their actions are viewed as unpredictable and, possibly, disruptive. The administrators of these agencies, accordingly, try to channel and control this behavior. Emergency meetings are often called to assess how these issues can be addressed within the prevailing service plan of the organization. As an administrative tactic, these organizations learn to control rather than respond to their environments; they learn how to monitor and maintain their boundaries and restrict access by communities and other outsiders (Rein 1972). However, such demeanor on the part of a community agency tends to generate many disgruntled citizens. In fact, community members expect that their needs or complaints will be addressed rather than effectively managed. Public relations practices, in this sense, are a poor substitute for community engagement.

Realist Management Philosophy

Management theory has an important role to play in organizations. In many ways, this body of principles outlines the purpose that an agency has in society, along with the potential of employees. For example, Frederick Herzberg (1973, pp. 35–36) argues that modern organizations are guided by the myth of the "fallen man." The basic idea is that persons, similar to the story in the Bible, have fallen from grace, are driven by their impulses, and thus must be controlled. In sum, they have lost touch with reason, are feeble, and should not be trusted.

In organizations, this perspective has been manifested in several important ways. In general, the belief has been that persons are lazy and avoid work. As a result, schemes have to be invented that entice them to focus on their jobs and perform their tasks adequately. For the most part, the assumption has been that employees will not work in the absence of credible threats. Therefore, rewards and punishments have been the cornerstone of most management strategies.

This trend began with Frederick Taylor's efforts to organize the workforce at Midvale Steel in Philadelphia in the late 1800s. Consistent with Herzberg's assessment, he based his management style on the so-called "rabble hypothesis." Key to this position is that most workers are unreliable and must be told what to do at every phase of the production process (Perrow 1979, pp. 63–68). Administrators, however, are exempt from this thesis and are entrusted to operate organizations. General employees, therefore, are socialized to accept direction, follow rules, and conform to routines. Without this leadership exhibited by managers, an organization would grind to a halt.

Although Taylor's "scientific management" is considered nowadays to be passé in some circles, the general orientation can be found in most organizations. Despite some talk about humanizing the work process, the focus of management is overwhelmingly on control (Guillén 1994). Order at the workplace represents a fine balance that must be maintained between the demands imposed by tasks and the possible distractions associated with the human element. The result is an organization that begins to resemble a closed system, with the flow of information and interaction very limited. Employees may be consulted periodically, but their input is controlled by managers who decide whether this information is worthwhile.

The result of this orientation is that organizations become administrative systems. Participation, accordingly, is channeled in ways that do not disrupt the work routine. Some practices may be introduced to improve job satisfaction, such as special rewards or privileges, but the fundamental design of tasks is seldom appreciably altered. These palliatives, in effect, are mostly psychological. In the end, the image is retained that the work organization should impose demands, with little room to negotiate these requirements.

As should be noted, this outlook is incompatible with truly community-based organizations. A serious problem is that these traditional organizations are self-contained systems, since strict lines of authority and boundaries are maintained (Manning 1982). As a result, these organizations are clearly demarcated from their

environments. Any ambiguity on this front would render these organizations porous and unable to sustain their coherence. The logic is that any fuzziness, either internally or on the periphery, would jeopardize the identity and tasks of any organization.

Because of this rigid character, these organizations do not invite input from outside sources, unless this information is closely regulated. Their equilibrium, in fact, depends on avoiding spontaneity or irregularity (Etzioni 1964). In more practical terms, communities are treated as unstable environments that must be filtered before they are encountered. Therefore, any contact must be closely monitored and controlled.

But how does this philosophy operate in everyday affairs? When advice is sought from a community, for example, only the professional strata are treated as a source of reliable information. With regard to selecting a board of directors, or community advisory group, a similar strategy is followed. A group of hand-picked persons, who have fairly predictable opinions, is asked to serve in this capacity. The obvious result of these strategies is to preserve the status quo, or stabilize the organization, while creating a façade of community involvement.

However, the aim of a community-based organization is to promote the flow of information through participation (Maton 2008). Community members are thought to benefit from any knowledge that is emitted from such an organization, but only if they are integral to this process. On the other side, in community-based planning these persons are expected to shape any intervention, including the accompanying organizations. In order for these exchanges to occur, a new management philosophy is needed that does not stress the maintenance of organizational boundaries and control.

Organizational Self-management

An alternative exists to the realist inspired management philosophy just discussed. The emphasis of this new approach is employee participation in the design of tasks and the overall operation of the organization (Rothschield and Whitt 1986). For this reason, this philosophy is referred to generally as "self-management." This strategy, furthermore, is more compatible with community-based philosophy than traditional management theory.

The basic theme of self-management is to abandon the hierarchy found in most organizations. In this regard, any agency that adopts this management strategy is expected to be decentralized and emphasize local control (Polcin 1990). Through a variety of techniques, such as job rotation and widespread training, knowledge and skills are dispersed throughout an organization. As a result, persons at all levels can participate meaningfully in designing their jobs and giving direction to an organization. As hierarchy begins to dissolve, the control of the organization is no longer centralized (Manz and Sims 1980).

A common description at this point is that self-managed organizations operate from the bottom-up. In some ways, this description is misleading. In fact,

such organizations are better described as flat. Leadership, for example, is spread throughout an organization, and may actually change depending on the task at hand (Van Wart 2003). As persons become familiar with all of the operations of an agency, their skills and potential influence expand. Soon an organization is perceived to be an ongoing construction that begins to have a variegated biography. That is, this organization carries the imprint of employees and reflects their contributions. Such organizations, like the communities they serve, are often referred to as "self-referential"—that is, these organizations embody the exigencies of their members and tasks (Cooper and Burrell 1988).

Especially important to note is that self-managed organizations do not merely "enable" employees, a conclusion that is vogue and often involves little more than encouragement or praise, but gives them little control of key operations (Laverack 2005). Their participation, therefore, is not ancillary to more important organizational requirements or administrative demands. In a truly self-managed organization, employees take command of the resources, information, and other factors required to function. Furthermore, a type of "emergent coordination" occurs, whereby these persons learn how to regulate themselves and pursue a common course of action.

Various writers have flirted with this alternative vision of organizations (Guillén 1994). During the 1920s, for example, the members of the so-called Human Relations School adopted the position that every workplace constitutes a social system. Accordingly, the structures and barriers encouraged by Taylor's philosophy were thought to destroy this human element, and in the 1960s, a group of critics known as humanistic psychologists—McGregor, Herzberg, and Maslow—began to stress the human side of management.

The problem is that these challenges to Taylorism and the image of the fallen man are too narrow. To borrow from Maslow, persons are now expected to strive for "self-actualization" in organizations. As a result of this stress on personal development, the social side of an organization is downplayed. For example, how persons can be motivated to cooperate and work together in an inclusive environment is not important to these writers. They are more concerned with enhancing personal attitudes and values than rethinking the nature of organizations. In some ways, individual actualization can be tolerated as long as the traditional form of the organization is not called into question, particularly administrative control.

However, the success of self-management depends on the acceptance of a new image of organizations. Community-based social agencies must be porous and contingent, and thereby foster collective action, without losing their identity. In this way, these organizations can merge with communities and reinforce solidarity. The work of Karl Weick comes close to fulfilling the needs of community-based organizations.

While challenging Taylor's structural imagery, Weick (1976) declares that organizations are based on communication. In other words, organizations are constructed through the participation of their members. Through a process he calls the "double-interact," persons make sense of one another's constructions and gradually coordinate their actions. Organizations, therefore, are "loosely-coupled" constructions that

hang together sufficiently to appear substantial. Similar to the process of constructing a community, the experiences of persons mesh gradually to form an organization.

Weick's key idea is that organizations are processes rather than founded on structures such as roles and boundaries. Specifically, organizations are the relationships that are enacted between employees on an ongoing basis. These associations, however, are not simple. For example, according to Weick's description, persons act, receive criticism, and modify their initial behavior. Through this double-interact, a sense of reciprocity is established that represents the organization. Since these associations are dynamic, they are open to a variety of influences. An organization, in this sense, is sufficiently flexible to accept a variety of input, without inviting disorder.

What this change in imagery announces is that organizations are open systems. They are thus porous and invite participation from both inside and outside of their boundaries (Sandfort and Bloomberg 2012). Through this participation, a certain level of stability is achieved that reflects the needs of those who participate in an organization. To use a term that has become popular, these organizations are responsive to their creators. Additionally, they look outward. Only under perverse conditions, usually linked to alienation and insufficient participation, do these organizations dominate their members or environments and become unresponsive to community members.

A Community-Based Organization

This shift in management theory, along with a general change in philosophy, sets the stage for the development of community-based organizations. Due to the fact that self-managed organizations are nonhierarchical and porous, many aspects of traditional service agencies have to be rethought in view of these principles. As mentioned earlier, in many ways these new organizations are expected to disappear into the community.

The general philosophy that supports community-based organizations is consistent with McGregor's (1960) "Theory Y." These institutions, simply put, have a democratic management style and a close relationship to their environment. As opposed to "Theory X," where participation is diminished and persons do not like their roles, organizations based on Theory Y operate on the simple principle that given the proper conditions work can be rewarding and individuals will assume responsibility for their tasks.

These organizations, accordingly, encourage self-direction, are supportive and informative, and provide guidance. In the end, accordingly, persons are expected to give direction to these organizations, and thus their planning is based on this goal. Every step in their development is thus designed to enhance participation, facilitate flexibility, and integrate a project into a community. Henry Jenkins (2009) writes that these organizations have a "participatory culture." In participatory organizations persons are collaborative, assume everyone is creative and interested, share information, and promote mutual growth. The point is that these organizations are thoroughly inclusive and immerse in their communities.

Placement

Since the 1960s in the USA, persons were supposed to be treated in their communities. Finding the proper locale, accordingly, became very important when constructing a community agency, such as a health center. As might be expected, most discussions revolved around the definition of a community. The concept used to settle this issue was the "catchment area." Although at time these areas could be quite large, up to 200,000 persons, they became synonymous with the community (Segal and Baumohl 1981).

This concept was not used in Ecuador to define a service area. Planners, instead, had to rely on maps designed by local authorities. These plans outlined, in general terms, the boundaries of various neighborhoods that could include up to 1,000 persons. Most of these communities, however, are not necessarily organized in special terms; in fact, they resemble "invasion barrios"—whereby persons enter an area and build houses willy-nilly on available plots—and do not have an officially defined center and boundaries (Wiesenfeld 1998). Nonetheless, most local NGOs and other local planners relied on these official designations to guide interventions.

The problem with both of these strategies is that they treat a community as a place. Finding a proper site for an agency thus depends on identifying the appropriate space, presumably at the center of a community. Since communities are now understood to constitute a life-world, and organizations are expected to engage these persons, this outlook is not especially helpful. Planners, instead, should be more concerned with how the dimension known as a community is used by persons, especially if they hope to become community-based.

In other words, how do persons construct this "space"? Is there a center, and where is this position in terms of a community's experiences. Perhaps, the members delineate this domain by walking, visiting friends, or disposing of garbage. Even space, which many persons take for granted as objective, is altered by the participation of persons. The point is that the prime location for a community organization is not necessarily a geographical determination. How these persons "measure" this domain, with respect to their intentions and behaviors, is more important than official or objective spatial determinations. In this regard, the real layout of a community does not necessarily conform to the physical features of a particular location.

Staff Identification

Most traditional planners in the USA and elsewhere recognize that the staff members of a service agency should resemble the persons who are served, in order to improve accessibility (Wu and Windle 1980). Accordingly, community members are expected typically to staff these agencies, sit on the board of directors, and give guidance through regularly convened meetings. The basic idea is that these representatives know the persons they serve, their problems, and the interventions that are acceptable. Such insight is thought to improve any project.

However, most often the criteria used to select these persons are quite superficial. That is, their selection is based, for example, on whether their physical appearance resembles those who are served, ethnic heritage, or visibility in the community. While sometimes these traits may indicate that a bond exists between these persons and a community, often they do not. The question then becomes: Who understands the values and beliefs of a community? Indeed, these so-called "key informants" often mischaracterize the needs of the communities they are supposed to represent (Murphy and Pilotta 1987). Objective features, again, fail in this regard.

This question is much more difficult to answer than by merely identifying persons who appear to be tied to a community. Now the attempt must be made to identity those who understand how a community has been constructed. Clearly at this juncture dialogue becomes important. Through meetings, discussions, or interviews, for example, care must be taken to ensure that potential staff persons are in tune with how a community's members define, prioritize, and remedy their problems. Now the focus is community-based knowledge rather than traits.

What these staff persons are expected to exhibit is "multicultural competence" (Constantine and Sue 2005). That is, they should acquire a corpus of knowledge about a community, reflect on their possible biases, and reframe experiences in light of the various realities present in this domain. Their immersion in a particular community is assumed to provide them with this sort of ability. In Ecuador, the health promoters represented a variety of perspectives and labored to have their views corroborated by the members of the community at public meetings and other forums.

Often this critical understanding is mistaken for empathy. However, the issue is not whether the staff of an agency can relate personally to those who are served. More important is that they grasp the reality, or multiple realities of a community, and understand how persons make decisions, why they act in certain ways, and how they define important aspects of their lives. The success of an intervention depends on these persons having this awareness.

Division of Labor

Another important change relates to the division of labor in community-based organizations. For the most part, official job descriptions and titles do not exist. Different degrees of expertise may be present in specific areas, but the goal is to have everyone learn a variety of skills through job rotation, training, and other methods. Indeed, skills, knowledge, and personnel are expected to flow throughout a community-based organization.

On a daily basis staff members must respond quickly to a variety of community needs. As a result, they must be able to shift tasks and learn new ones in a short time. In these organizations routines are unusual, and thus the ability to adapt and learn is crucial. A person who insists on performing one task, or using a single skill, will have minimal utility in a community-based organization.

Leadership provides a specific example of the fluidity that is needed (Block 2009, p. 14). Traditionally leaders have been viewed as unique persons who possess special skills. In a community-based organization, on the other hand, everyone is expected to be a leader and share their skills, so that various persons can emerge at different times to give advice or direct a particular task. A single leader would be a liability by dominating an organization and inhibiting the necessary adjustments.

The reality is that true community-based organizations are not very large, and do not have the resources to support an elaborate division of labor. In terms of organizational philosophy, a rigorous division of labor is dysfunctional: the narrow focus that is engendered is problematic. In order to deal effectively with a community a broad knowledge base is needed, along with the desire to acquire more knowledge and skills. A holistic vision is required, in other words, to function adequately in a community-based organization, since resources are sparse and persons must be willing to extend themselves. In this regard, there is no hierarchy based on what are believed to be natural propensities; instead, there are only desires and opportunities that should be fulfilled through an organization that consists basically of action.

Along with the elimination of a division of labor, staff members should not be treated as if they are merely employees. This advice is particularly cogent when these persons are volunteers (Yanay and Yanay 2008). Nonetheless, employees are simply told what to do, and are expected to complete satisfactorily their assigned tasks. In a community-based organization, on the other hand, the willingness of persons to participate should not be overlooked. After all, these community members often join a project because of their ideals and desire to change their surroundings. A rigid division of labor tends to transform these persons into hired hands and dampen their enthusiasm.

Persons in community-based organizations, moreover, do not feel necessarily rewarded by climbing an administrative ladder (Wymer et al. 1996). Indeed, such bureaucratic behavior tends to be viewed often as an abstraction and demeaning. These persons derive great satisfaction from their work, engaging the community, and becoming more adept at creating interventions. Their motivation is thus not always satisfied by the so-called reward structure that operates in traditional organizations. Instead, they want enriching experiences and relationships, combined with feelings that they have improved the quality of life in a community.

On paper, a division of labor often sounds promising, since the required specialization is often thought to lead to efficiency. In a community context, however, the reverse is achieved—inefficiency! Too many persons are needed that do very little. A community-based orientation requires that each member of a project have a wide range of skills and be willing to share this knowledge for the betterment of one another and a community.

In the health clinic in Ecuador, the aim was to develop a collective orientation. Medical doctors and lay health promoters, for example, were expected to function as equals in carrying out a coordinated health plan. Typical status differentials were downplayed. Additionally, every encounter with a patient was designed to be a learning experience for all of these parties. The point was to enhance the role of the health promoters, along with the community members in general. After all, the goal is to

have these persons control and deliver all health services. The plan, eventually, is to have the health promoters function as a "comité de salud"—a health committee—that outlines the social and cultural context where medical doctors are expected to work.

Skill Development

Once the proper staff is assembled for a community-based organization, these persons often need some training. This process of education is different from the usual approach. At the root of this training is a very positive attitude toward learners. These persons, in short, are not treated as "blank slates" that are simply infused with information. After all, they have knowledge about the history of their community, insights into the causes of various problems, and familiarity with prior interventions. This body of knowledge is very important and should be part of the learning dialogue.

Often the writings of Paulo Freire (1993) are introduced at this juncture of discussions about community-based training. In this context, he is identified as attempting to democratize education and encouraging persons to become involved in their communities. Through active participation in this education, they begin to appreciate their respective knowledge bases and the collective nature of information. The aim of learning is thus to awaken persons to their skills and possibilities, particularly with respect to instigating social change.

Education is a two-way process. The community members, in this regard, provide the context for learning to proceed (Riger 2001). Any theories or models that are introduced are shaped by this framework to deal with the pressing issues in a community. Some critics refer to this style of learning as "popular education" (Torres Carillo 2008). Their use of this term signals that education is not abstract but grounded in a specific social reality—the world of a community. Hence, persons begin to control how they are educated.

Along with this shift in general orientation is a new view with respect to who should be educated. In the past, predicated on a mode of essentialism, often particular segments of an organization are identified for additional education (Gilroy 1993). These persons are thought to have the characteristics necessary to promote learning and benefit from this special training, and subsequent to this enrichment are expected to become the experts and leaders in an organization.

This methodology is inconsistent with a community-based philosophy, and often reflects certain prejudices about who can learn and grow from an education. In a real community-based organization, everyone has the opportunity for additional training and is expected to share this information with others. The central theme of this strategy is that extending education to everyone democratizes an organization or community.

Through this education, persons can begin to control their environment. However, another facet of this approach to learning is important at this juncture. That is, the educator should vanish. In terms of pedagogical theory, this viewpoint is called the "training of trainers" model (Ehrlich et al. 1981).

The key principle of this thesis is that educators disseminate their knowledge throughout a community, and thereby prevent anyone from monopolizing the learning process. All knowledge is left in a community or organization, and thus the educators leave but the ability to educate remains. Accordingly, a community keeps the knowledge necessary to deal with any issue and becomes autonomous. Education thus fosters independence and the dignity of community members.

In Ecuador, medical doctors helped to organize the training received by the health promoters. The input of these professionals was important. However, their views were challenged constantly by community members, and the curriculum was revised throughout this process. Furthermore, based on their experiences, community members were expected to make additional changes and give these doctors direction about the nature of problems and the best ways to deal with these issues in future training sessions.

Central to this education model is that trainers are not simply depositing expert knowledge into a community. When this is the case, average persons might not believe that they have the right or the ability to use or modify this information. This knowledge, instead, should be viewed as potentially created by anyone who has the resources. In terms of this change in perspective, community members can gain the confidence and skills necessary to possess, critique, and expand the knowledge imparted by trainers. After all, this knowledge is not beyond their capacity to master.

In this sense, the training of trainers approach is very different from forming a partnership with learners (Freire 1993). In a partnership, persons are often simply consulted and some information is deposited in a community. Subsequently, the experts depart and leave a community dependent on their return. In truly community-based learning, the information is left in a community, so that these persons can continue to resolve issues and have the skills necessary to pursue additional learning. Additionally, any mystique surrounding the knowledge contributed by trainers is challenged. In this regard, a community-based educator strives to become unneeded.

Role of Professionals

Although the goal is to move community-based organizations away from hierarchy and the related bureaucracy, professionals often have a role in these agencies. Medical doctors, for example, are often needed to organize teaching materials when providing training in health care. These professionals are also needed to verify treatment for purposes of accountability. Nonetheless, care must be taken to ensure that these professionals do not dominate service delivery or the planning process.

Particularly important is that these experts must begin to adapt to the flat nature of community-based organizations (Thompson and Bass 1984). Various strategies can be adopted, such as the Delbecq and charrette techniques, to prevent these persons from monopolizing discussions, due to their advanced education or assertiveness (Delbecq and Van de Ven 1971; Elliott 2010, pp. 96–100). Procedures can be established, for example, that limit the amount of time any person can speak, while ensuring that all ideas are voiced and openly and fairly discussed. In both cases,

the fundamental point is that such involvement diffuses confrontations and allows participants to become committed to any plans.

Additionally, all work can be organized into teams, whereby everyone has to sign off before a course of action is taken (Schofield and Amodeo 1999). In the field of community mental health, for example, multidisciplinary treatment plans were enacted. The motive behind this change is to generate a variety of input on any case, rather than focus mostly on medical data. Since culture is elevated in importance in a community-based philosophy, the opinions of social workers and family members are actively sought when evaluating a client.

Clearly professionals have a role to play in community-based organizations. Their contributions can certainly enrich any discussion but they are not the focus of attention. The key is to ensure that these discussions are dialogues, and that medical opinions, for example, do not overwhelm all other input. All relevant sources of information must be included—as specified by a community—if an issue is going to be assessed properly. As a dialogue, these discussions must be inclusive, invite a variety of opinions, and deal with community issues in their own terms; a dialogue, in this sense, reinforces all of the participants and recognizes the worth of their views.

Politics of the Organization

Clearly there is a political side to self-managed organizations. Rather than regulated by structural or abstract imperatives, these organizations should reflect the will of a community. Community-based projects, additionally, are bound together by moral convictions, ideals, and particular commitments (Tippet and Kluvers 2009). The persons who create these organizations are often motivated by the work in question, the various relationships involved, and the goals to be achieved. Clearly these sorts of motivations entail an interpersonal dimension that is rife with politics.

Since these organizations are loosely-coupled, or based on interaction, their stability is achieved through ongoing dialogue. As mentioned earlier, they are "self-referential" (Cooper and Burrell 1988). With respect to politics, this denomination means that boundaries are regularly reviewed and altered to accommodate new input. This entire process, however, entails a dialogue among persons that is free and open. As a consequence, these organizations are not self-contained but permeable and integrated into their surroundings.

Through the "spill-over effect" that accompanies dialogue, the environment of a community-based organization is changed (Neves 2012). In other words, the philosophy of these agencies spills over into a community and spreads the democratic spirit that pervades a community-based intervention. Along with staff persons, for example, the overall skills of a community are improved by this dissemination of elements, thereby increasing the sustainability of a project and the ability of these persons to become self-directed.

However, some critics claim that this community-based philosophy, and the related organizations, is insufficiently radical to promote real community change.

Specifically, the question of power is not addressed. In many ways, however, this philosophy does challenge the dominance of powerful groups in communities, without specifying a radical agenda (McTaggart 1991). Although these special interests may invade certain projects, the focus on social construction and dialogue implies that any barriers to participation are subject to critique and change. In this sense, the usual sources of legitimacy for social and cultural domination are attacked.

After all, an important aspect of the community-based philosophy is to spawn self-reflection and widespread participation on the part of the citizenry. Rather than contemplation, reflection encourages action that removes barriers and thus leads to community autonomy. Democratization, in this sense, has no tolerance for barriers to participation and other misuses of power. When this sort of activism begins to imbue a community, the stage is set for change. The big question, of course, is whether the enthusiasm can be maintained that promotes participation and keeps the dialogue open in a community.

What is certain, however, is that the intended product of this reflection is not passivity in the face of power (Miller 1994). Once persons understand that organizations, along with communities, are a product of dialogue and construction, an alternative message is clear. Specifically, every facet of social reality, including power, is both maintained and altered by participation and therefore can be remade. The spill-over effect, in this regard, is quite politically charged but unpredictable. Whether increased inclusion and democracy are the outcome depends on the choices persons make, although the focus on dialogue and participation encourage this direction.

Conclusion

The community is not simply the focus of community-based organizations. Stated differently, their focus is not merely the more efficient delivery of services, although this outcome is anticipated. These agencies, instead, engage communities with values that stress participation (Riger 1989). Also, through the spill-over effect, the open and democratic character of these organizations reinforces the participatory ethos of the community-based philosophy.

These organizations represent what some writers call “liminal” spaces (Watkins and Schulman 2008, pp. 135–137). In this liminal condition, roles and duties begin to overlap, thereby generating supportive relationships that are comforting as well as inspiring. With this support, persons can extend themselves, acquire new skills, entertain bold ideas, and act in novel ways. The flexibility that is needed to deal with communities is thus enhanced. These projects, in a manner of speaking, represent a sense of *comunitas*—a togetherness that elevates and reinforces everyone.

These community-based organizations challenge the traditional theories that reproduce the fears, both in terms of organizations and communities, about participation leading to uncertainty. The usual claim that a loosely-coupled organization will be chaotic and inefficient is brushed aside. A decentered and porous organization, instead, is illustrated to be responsive to a community and an effective provider of social services. To use a phrase adopted by Onyett (2003, p. 166), these organiza-

tions rest on "authority from below," and thus have a purpose and direction that are socially relevant.

In this regard, this new organizational design slips into a community with a new message. In addition to fixing problems, community-based organizations strive to create a new spirit of solidarity. These organizations provide a sense of "participatory safety", whereby persons feel free to express a range of ideas (Onyett 2003, p. 197). Central to this trend is the idea that persons can work together to create socially responsive organizations and a new future. Through participation, communities can unite to become self-sustaining. Community-based organizations convey this theme through their basic philosophy and everyday practices. In this sense, organizational design extends beyond internal issues and influences the nature of a community.

References

Block, P. (2009). *Community: The structure of belonging*. New York: Berrett-Koehler.

Brodkin, E. Z. (2006). Bureaucracy redux: Management reformism and the welfare state. *Journal of Public Administration*, *17*(1), 1–17.

Burrell, G., & Morgan, G. (1979). *Sociological paradigms and organizational analysis*. London: Heinemann.

Constantine, M. G., & Sue, D. W. (Eds.) (2005). *Strategies for building multicultural competence*. Hoboken: Wiley.

Cooper, R., & Burrell, G. (1988). Modernism, postmodernism and organizational analysis: An introduction. *Organizational Studies*, *9*(1), 91–112.

Delbecq, A. L., & Van de Ven, A. H. (1971). A group process model for problem identification and program planning. *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, *4*(7), 466–492.

Drucker, P. F. (1990). *Managing the non-profit organization*. New York: Harper/Collins.

Ehrlich, R. P., D'Augelli, A. R., & Conter, K. R. (1981). Evaluation of a community-based system for training natural helpers: Effects of verbal helping skills. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, *9*(3), 321–337.

Elliott, B. (2010). *Constructing community*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Etzioni, A. (1964). *Modern organizations*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Fournier, V., & Grey, C. (2000). At the critical moment: Conditions and prospects for critical management studies. *Human Relations*, *53*(1), 7–32.

Freire, P. (1993). *Pedagogy of the oppressed*. New York: Continuum.

Gilroy, P. (1993). *Black Atlantic*. London: Verso.

Guillén, M. F. (1994). *Models of management*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Heckscherer, C., & Donnellon, A. (Eds.) (1994). *The post-bureaucratic organization: New perspectives on organizational change*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Herzberg, F. (1973). *Work and the nature of man*. New York: New American Library.

Jenkins, H. (2009). *Confronting the challenges of participatory culture: Media education in the 21st century*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Laverack, G. (2005). *Public health*. UK: Pelgrave.

Manning, P. K. (1982). Organizational work: Structuration of environments. *British Journal of Social Work*, *33*(1), 118–134.

Manz, C. C., & Sims, H. P., Jr. (1980). Self-management as a substitute for leadership: A social learning perspective. *The Academy of Management Review*, *5*(3), 361–367.

Maton, K. I. (2008). Empowering community settings: Agents of individual development, community betterment, and positive social change. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, *41*(1–2), 4–21.

McGregor, D. (1960). *The human side of enterprise*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
McTaggart, R. (1991). Principles of participatory action research. *Adult Education Quarterly*, *41*(3), 168–187.
Miller, N. (1994). Participatory action research: Principles, politics, and possibilities. *New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education*, *63*, 69–80.
Murphy, J. W., & Pilotta, J. J. (1987). Research note: Identifying 'at risk' persons in community-based research. *Sociology of Health and Illness*, *9*(1), 62–75.
Neves, P. (2012). Organizational cynicism: Spillover effects on supervisor-subordinate relationships and performance. *The Leadership Quarterly*, *23*(5), 965–976.
Onyett, S. (2003). *Teamworking in mental health*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Perrow, C. (1979). *Complex organizations*. Glenview: Scott, Foresman, and Company.
Perry, R. W., & Perry, P. P. (1978). A community action organization under stress. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, *9*(6), 519–529.
Polcin, D. L. (1990). Administrative planning in community mental health. *Community Mental Health Journal*, *26*(2), 181–192.
Rein, M. (1972). Decentralization and citizen participation in social services. *Public Administration Review*, *32*, 687–700.
Riger, S. (1989). The politics of community intervention. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, *17*(3), 379–383.
Riger, S. (2001). Transforming community psychology. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, *29*(1), 69–81.
Rothschield, J., & Whitt, J. A. (1986). *The cooperative workplace*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Sandfort, J. (2004). Why is service integration so difficult to achieve? *Focus*, *23*(2), 35–39.
Sandfort, J. R., & Bloomberg, L. (2012). In commons: Supporting community-based leadership. *Community Development*, *43*(1), 12–30.
Schofield, R. F., & Amodeo, M. (1999). Interdisciplinary teams in health care and human service settings. *Health and Social Work*, *24*(3), 210–219.
Segal, S. P., & Baumohl, J. (1981). Social work practice in community mental health. *Social Work*, *26*(1), 16–24.
Smith, M. B., Graham, Y. J., & Guttmacher, S. (2005). *Community-based organizations*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Sosin, M. R. (1990). Decentralizing the social service system: A reassessment. *Social Service Review*, *64*(4), 617–636.
Thompson, J. W., & Bass, R. D. (1984). Changing staffing patterns in community mental health centers. *Hospital and Community Psychiatry*, *35*(11), 1107–1114.
Tippet, J., & Kluvers, R. (2009). Employee rewards and motivation in non profit organizations: Case study from Australia. *International Journal of Business Management*, *4*(3), 7–14.
Torres Carillo, A. (2008). *La Educación Popular*. Bogotá: ARFO Editores e Impresores.
Van Wart, M. (2003). Public-sector leadership theory: An assessment. *Public Administration Review*, *63*(2), 214–228.
Watkins, M., & Schulman, H. (2008). *Toward psychologies of liberation*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Weick, K. E. (1976). Educational organizations as loosely coupled systems. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, *21*(1), 1–19.
Wiesenfeld, E. (1998). Entre la Invasión y la consolidación de Barrios: Análisis Psicosocial de la Resistencia al Desalojo. *Estudios de Psicología*, *3*(1), 33–51.
Wu, I.-H., & Windle, C. (1980). Ethnic specificity in the relative minority use and staffing of community mental health centers. *Community Mental Health Journal*, *16*(2), 156–168.
Wymer, W., Riccken, G., & Yavas, U. (1996). Determinants of volunteerism: A cross-disciplinary review and research agenda. *Journal of Non-profit and Public Sector Marketing*, *4*(4), 3–26.
Yanay, G. V., & Yanay, N. (2008). The decline of motivation? *Non-profit Management and Leadership*, *19*(1), 65–78.

Chapter 5
A New Epidemiology

Introduction

Epidemiology has been a regular part of traditional social planning. In this case, the general idea is to determine the level of a problem in certain geographical or social region. Calculations are often made, for example, of the incidence and spread of a disease (Friedman 1994). Typically, these estimations are based on the presence of various empirical referents, particularly, certain demographic and environmental factors. But following the advent of a community-based philosophy, this mode of social assessment is no longer thought to be adequate.

The field of public health has not been exempt from this trend. But many analysts believe that these modes of assessment are abstract and reductionistic (Susser 2004). For example, communities are treated as if they represent clusters of socioeconomic traits. Furthermore, certain cultural features and psychological propensities, such as motivation or possibly moral character, are linked to the empirical characteristics of an environment. This abstract model is used to predict the onset, distribution, and impact of a problem. The notion that a community is more than a place, circumscribed by empirical indices, is not given serious consideration.

The so-called "new public health" arose against this strategy to design and implement more socially sensitive assessments and interventions (MacKain et al. 2003). Some critics contend that this approach can be traced to the Lalonde Report issued by Marc Lalonde, the minister of health in Canada during the early 1970s. In this document, the idea was broached that the medical model may have severe limitations, specifically with regard to prevention (Hunter 2007). Too much emphasis, in short, is devoted to the individual and disease. Accordingly, the focus should be on the "health field"—a more holistic and community-sensitive approach—thereby encouraging a more encompassing strategy to health assessment and the creation of interventions. In this so-called paradigm shift, the ideas of complexity and uncertainty rise in importance (McQueen 2007).

But for the most part, communities are still treated as natural sources of data, with little emphasis placed on how persons define their problems and possible remedies. The strength of the new public health, on the other hand, is that communities are viewed to be dynamic and intricate, with rich cultures and knowledge bases that

J. W. Murphy, *Community-Based Interventions,* International Perspectives on Social Policy, Administration, and Practice, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4899-8020-5_5,

influence perceptions of health, illness, and successful interventions. Planning, accordingly, is guided by an ecological perspective and is considered to be holistic.

In general, the thrust of this change is that communities are portrayed to be complex, and should be investigated more closely than is possible when the focus is on empirical indices. If communities consist of interlocking processes, and have a "life-course" or history, a broader perspective is needed to study adequately these groups (Tulchinshy and Varavikova 2010). Specifically important is that a community should not be identified solely with empirical and, thus, lifeless measures.

For this reason, the new public health is often associated with community-based planning (Frenk 1993). Nonetheless, this characterization may not be correct. Although the process and context are incorporated into the new orientation, how a community is constructed is ignored. Hence the biography of a neighborhood, along with the implied mores and proclivities, often remains hidden. But even when interpretation is recognized, this component does not necessarily have any significant impact on the social reality that is operative.

In order to become community-based, advocates of the new public health epidemiology must begin to appreciate the embedded nature of all social phenomena, including diseases and cures. With all behavior mediated by participation and socially constructed, reliable observations must emphasize more than the empirical qualities of persons and their environments. Effective interventions, therefore, depend on epidemiology becoming more attuned to the interpretive character of a community's reality.

Traditional Public Health

The guiding principle of the traditional model of public health is the identification of "high risk" populations (Schwartz et al. 1999). This task is accomplished by trying to specify the factors that have contributed to this condition. The rationale behind this strategy is to effectively channel interventions, while using resources in the most propitious manner possible. Standard empirical referents such as age, education level, income, and geographic location are invoked to calculate the likelihood that a problem will emerge in a specific population.

Associated with these empirical indicators are assumptions about both the presence of pathogens and the buffers, or "protective factors," necessary to forestall the onset of an illness (Lucas and Lloyd 2005, pp. 75–77). A neighborhood with a low level of education and high unemployment, for example, is considered to be problematic, or a high-risk location, due to the low quality of the buffers available.

In this example, the potential presence of a particular pathological agent is calculated against the likelihood of resistance or successful remediation. A poor neighborhood with few preventive buffers, such as education or stable families, is thought to have an unfavorable "risk ratio" (Kellehear and Sallnow 2012). Furthermore, these dire situations are where interventions should be directed.

Eventually a "cause-effect onset matrix" is established, along with probable outcomes of various interventions (Schwartz et al. 1999). In effect, an algorithm is introduced with certain values attached that have specific parameters. Following the introduction of a range of inputs, such as income levels, education, or quality of housing, comparisons can be made between communities. Profiles can be established that specify where social problems are likely to arise. A constellation of particular variables, weighted in a specific manner, can illustrate the location where an illness or crime may erupt.

Clearly this methodology represents the worst sort of number crunching. Variables are decontextualized and given exact identities, stripped of any social contingencies (Weed 1998). Without a context these data can be standardized to facilitate data processing, without any fear of being distorted. And once these clean data are available they are entered into an algorithm, which is equally abstract, and assigned a value. The end product is a statement of probability about the likelihood of an event occurring in a particular locale.

The imagery that supports this kind of analysis is very realistic. Terms such as barriers, structures, networks, and systems, for example, are used to describe communities. Additionally, diseases are imagined to travel along certain channels, through specific networks, and reach certain barriers. The implication is that the factors that influence the on-set of an illness are real and substantial, along with those that promote health. Epidemiology, in this sense, is dealing with facts and laws related to the causes, pathways, and inhibitors of illness.

In standard epidemiological assessments the principle of "natural causality" is thought to be operative (Susser and Susser 1996). That is, specific empirical elements are thought to foster, or cause, certain outcomes. The point, in this regard, is to discover these variables and their connections. And with the proper calculations, where an intervention should be directed can be clearly specified. This realistic imagery, moreover, facilitates the assumption that data are objective when they mimic these substantial facets of a community.

Furthermore, these linkages are most often described in biological terms. What could be more concrete than such a portrayal? Although biological descriptions are metaphorical, they portray the social world in very believable terms. Like a body or organism, a community can be described to respond in very natural ways to specific determinants. A living organism that is attacked by a pathogen, for example, will survive if this entity has sufficient resources to battle an invader. Indeed, most persons find this sort of portrayal to be entirely plausible. Additionally, they believe that a body operates according to natural and reliable rules. Once these rules are discovered, and the "disease vectors" are identified, intercepting the spread of a problem is possible.

But eventually these models become very streamlined and focused, or the advantages of this approach are lost. Parsimony is truly important. After all, if variables are allowed to proliferate and linkages expand, efficiency is compromised and concise connections are difficult to specify. What began as a tight description of relationships among variables becomes plagued by contingency and increasingly vague probabilities. What is the worth of these models if precision is lost?

Due to this mode of calculating risk, traditional epidemiology is often characterized as operating within a "black box" (Susser 2004). In this regard, only those elements that can be readily observed are introduced into an analysis. Furthermore, anything connected with subjectivity is thought to be fuzzy and unreliable. All determinations, therefore, are the result of inputs that are (re)arranged by mathematical models to generate outputs, or risk estimates.

Nonetheless, due to this parsimony, the resulting descriptions can easily begin to drift away from a community. These descriptions, in other words, can become increasingly abstract and mask the actual disease process. How barriers and networks are presumed to function in these models, for example, may begin to obscure the ways in which persons interpret and respond to events. Concreteness is thus substituted for accuracy. In scientific parlance, this outcome is referred to as "misplaced concreteness" (Whitehead 1967).

In essence, what occurs is that an examination of substance is equated with understanding. In other words, whatever can be readily measured becomes the focus of attention, while any other source of knowledge is ignored. The personal or collective experience of these so-called objective factors tend to fall into this latter category, because this dimension is thought to defy rigorous measurement. Within this framework, interpretation is envisioned to be elusive. At this juncture, theorizing about context is mostly irrelevant (Krieger 2011).

What is overlooked by this imagery is the actual interaction that constitutes and sustains a community. How persons relate to one another, and possibly facilitate or retard the disease process, is equated with the structural factors that are presumed to either transmit or inhibit the spread of a pathogen. But assumed by this perspective is that facts are empirical and awaiting discovery by those who are trained to ignore the subjective side of life. Within this empirical framework, this human property is thought to derail the search for the causes of illness.

Using terms such as impact and outcome tend to conceal how perception mediates social existence, even the onset of disease. The point of this critique lodged by community-based planners is that factors do not simply have impact on persons; certain conditions, likewise, do not necessarily produce particular outcomes. Persons are not this passive but engage their worlds and react to how events are constructed within a community.

But even within traditional epidemiology the attempt has been made to temper the prevailing determinism. Take, for example, the traditional "epidemiological triangle," which consists of hosts, agents, and environmental factors (Cwikel 2006, p. 7). The basic idea is that disease on-set involves a host who has an effect on this process. In this sense, the aim is to incorporate some sense of social context into the analysis of probability. The course of a disease, accordingly, is never certain, due to influence of this human element.

What should be noticed, in terms of this triangle, is how persons interact with their environment and one another. But in the end, the models adopted by the traditional public health provide concrete but socially uninformed descriptions of so-called "illness behavior." Causal statements are provided that specify the relationships between, for example, environmental degradation and illness, without giving

much attention to how persons perceive their environment, evaluate their health, or decide to pursue help. Although a human factor is present in this triangle, which could be treated as introducing interpretation and agency, an almost natural and mechanical link is presumed to exist between these three elements. The final product of this outlook is the formulation of a "web of causality" and a broad picture of exposure and disease on-set (Krieger 1994). But clearly, at no time is any serious attention directed to how persons construct their lives and social worlds.

The New Public Health

The aim of the new public health is to avoid the reductionism linked to traditional epidemiology. For this reason, an ecological strategy is adopted, sometimes known as "eco-epidemiology" (Baum 1990). The general critique of the traditional perspective is that parsimony in building models may improve clarity but is also misleading. In fact, the entire social world is overlooked. Specifically, a causal web of potential influences is substituted for biography and actual interaction. For example, within the web of causation time and place are ignored (Krieger 2011). Although social life is treated as a "dynamic state," the world that is constructed by communities is obscured.

Within an ecological framework, persons are understood to be part of a seamless web of influences, including physiology, culture, and the economy. Engel's (1977) well known call for a "bio-psycho-social" agenda is representative of this trend. The community mental health movement in the USA was guided by this principle and the elevation of culture, broadly defined, in importance when assessing persons and their environments.

Due to this ecological perspective, the isolation of risk factors is no longer the guiding principle in any judgment of need or remediation. Indeed, social indicator analysis, and the underlying empiricism, is thought to be myopic. Explanations of behavior are expected to be holistic and take into account how persons interact with others and their surroundings. Specifically important is that this interaction is believed to be nuanced, multivalent, enmeshed in a host of relationships and conditions, and is not entirely predictable.

The phrase that has been adopted to capture this sentiment is "person-in-environment" (De Hoyos 1989). In this sense, person and environment are not two separate variables. Instead, through participation, persons are understood to alter themselves and change their surroundings. This interaction should be the focus of attention, and is thought to provide novel insight into the conditions that influence behavior but elude causal thinking.

The point of this ecology, therefore, is to extend any investigation in at least two directions. At the individual level, persons are presumed to have a "life-course" and are approached in a holistic manner (Elder 1985). Instead of passing through developmental stages *ad seriatim*, accumulative effects are considered to be important. The on-set or resistance to disease, for example, should not be viewed as a unique

position in a causal chain. Persons, instead, perceive their pasts selectively, reinterpret events, and do not simply react to factors.

In this regard, the effects of life accumulate. The past, for example, is not simply a moment that precedes the present, as is the case in typical causal analyses, and merely a distant influence. Rather, because persons engage their lives, the past is carried forward through memory and deeds. Salient factors are, thus, selected to be part of a community's collective present and should be understood to influence their current behavior (Berkman and Kawachi 2000). This biography, accordingly, should be the cornerstone of any predictions about future behavior, rather than a vague reference to the past that may supply some context for these actions. In this sense, a person's or community's life is a selective construction and represents a cumulative process.

On the other hand, persons are envisioned to exist in an environment (Krieger 2001). As a direct challenge to dualism, a web of influences is presumed to be operating. Persons exist, for example, in a family, school system, and workplace. These factors, furthermore, interact with their inhabitants along with one another. Traditional causal imagery is thought to be too simplistic to capture this condition, since a myriad of interactions are occurring at any time at different levels. Furthermore, proximal and distal factors, for example, are not necessarily objective determinations—based on spatial or temporal location—but reflect how persons and communities organize their biographies.

This ecology, however, is not necessarily a system. This metaphor often conveys the idea that the components of a community are well integrated and stable. Causal connections can, thus, be imagined easily to be operative, since clear lines of influence are presumed to exist. What is missing from this portrayal is the dynamism suggested by the ecological metaphor. An environment may exist, but this context is not as rigidly organized and stable as a system.

Multiple descriptions and parallel interventions are required to address adequately any problems (Bronfenbrenner 1994). Any assessments and correctives must be focused, and sufficiently comprehensive, but textured and situationally sensitive. A person-in-environment strategy is vital at this juncture of inaugurating an intervention. The so-called target of these efforts is simply broader and more variegated than is presumed to be possible in traditional epidemiological investigations. An anti-drug intervention, for example, may be directed to various phases of a person's life, in addition to dealing with several factors in the present that are encouraging addiction. But as should be appreciated, the image of a target even downplays the complexity of social problems and their biographies.

This attempt to add breadth to epidemiological analysis has been both welcome and productive. Clearly, better analyses and effective interventions can be undertaken. For example, the introduction of a sociological dimension has had an effect on explaining both health disparities between ethnic groups and the promotion of well-being that has been illuminating (Barry 2005). The importance of personal and community history, among both academic and practitioners, is recognized nowadays with little fanfare. On many levels—mind–body and individual–society—holism is understood to produce better information and clinical practice.

Variables related to family life and the workplace are included in most explanations of disease on-set. Recognizing the importance of situational factors such as these seems to make sense to almost everyone. Nonetheless, the image is often conveyed that ecological models simply encourage the introduction of an ever increasing number of variables, in order to provide a comprehensive picture of a community. This increase is thought, in many cases, to lead to holism, thereby improving the quality of explanations. The question becomes, however, how are these variables conceptualized?

The obvious aim of this ecological holism, as indicated by Kelly (2006) and others, is to become attuned to social and cultural considerations, and perhaps gain some insight into their interaction. The problem is that ecology has not necessarily abandoned empiricism. As a result, process is mistaken for biography. Ecological models, in this sense, are comprehensive but deal with variables as if these factors represent the empirical features of a community. Standard variable analysis, simply put, is often merely expanded in these models.

Another consideration is that ecological models convey a sense of naturalism (Rotabi 2007). That is, like the physical environment, the social world appears to be integrated with all parts naturally related. The connections between elements appear to be almost "biotic" (Mattelart and Mattelart 1998, p. 21). The problem with this analogy is that social life is de-animated, or transformed into a myriad of objects that are connected by inviolable laws. A holism is present that ignores the original intent to treat humans in a more intimate way than in the past.

One example of this issue is the "fundamental cause" thesis proposed by Link and Phelan (1995). The original idea is to make a break from focusing primarily on biological determinants of health and illness. What they propose, instead, is that fundamental social issues, such as poverty, discrimination, and stressful life events, seem to be related constantly to health disparities. Such a finding is quite radical within a context dominated by biomedicine. Nonetheless, how these factors might be evaluated by a community is not given much attention, although Link and Phelan (1995) call for the use of an interpretive framework to improve epidemiological research. Identifying a foundational or deep structure in this manner can easily suggest that interpretation is irrelevant with regard to specifying the causes of behavior.

But as noted earlier in this and other chapters, biography is more than a process and, in fact, provides insight into another dimension of social existence. Instead of revealing merely a wider range of variable interaction, the focus of biography is construction and interpretation. What facts mean, or how they are interpreted and evaluated in everyday discourse, is the focus of biography, rather than the impact of an array of variables, even broadly understood. These meanings have a lot to do with how persons identify problems, respond to conditions, and seek remedies.

Community-Based Epidemiology

Because a community is not simply a place or a collection of empirical traits, but a collectively constituted reality, a new approach is needed to epidemiology. Neither processes nor social indicators are appropriate sources of information (Wallerstein et al. 2011). Everyday life in a community is much more complex than is revealed by typical epidemiological data, even when these variables are placed in an ecological context.

Due to the fact that communities are constructed or existential, biography becomes important; the tales these persons tell about themselves hold the key to understanding their constructed reality. Nonetheless, traditional empirical data should not be dismissed completely (U'Ren 2011). Knowing how many persons have been vaccinated in a community may be helpful to determine when or where an outbreak of a disease might be expected. Likewise, education level might provide some insight into the knowledge base persons have about a particular disease. At a general level, such empirical data are often useful with respect to gaining the attention of planners or government officials. Clearly economic deprivation and illness are related (Williams and Sternthal 2010)! But in terms of understanding the course of a disease, or how persons will react to health issues, a lot if vital information is missing.

Another important consideration at this juncture is that such empirical data are meaningful only within the very limited framework supplied by certain theories or interests. Outside of a conceptual environment, this information has little meaning or relevance. These empirical data should not be allowed to conceal the story told by a community about disease. Vaccinations provide a signal about disease on-set, for example, only when accompanied by a particular theoretical or conceptual context about how diseases spread. For this reason, community-based planners search for the relevant framework, and often competing frameworks that serve to identify pertinent information and problems. In this way, the proper meaning of disease can be obtained.

Because of the influence of participation, a community is pervaded by definitions, expectations, and perspectives. A disease does not spread through natural channels or networks—in a mechanistic manner—but is perceived and assessed before any problem is thought to exist. A disease, according to Aday and Anderson (1974), is mediated by a host of social considerations before any problems are identified. A disease does not simply arise as a response to environmental conditions, but is embedded in certain values and beliefs. When asked about their health, persons do not think in terms of proximal and distal causes of problems (Shy 1997). What they do, instead, is define health and illness in terms of how they organize their lives. How they perceive their situation, for example, has a lot to do with how they identify their health status.

For this reason, a community-based epidemiology does not involve merely a surface examination of a community, since definitions and commitments, for example, are not empirical and simply recorded. Gaining insight into a biography

requires more than periodic consultations with a community. Hence, the thrust of a community-based epidemiology is not to simply chart changes in behavior, but to determine the meaning of these actions. In epidemiological circles, the term "embodiment" is used to describe the relationship between a problem and a community's biography (Krieger 2011). How has the operative reasoning in a community, in other words, been constructed and enforced? Descriptions of the empirical features of a community will not provide any insight into this issue. For this reason Gareth Morgan (2005) declares that a community-based approach is guided by "perceptions, values, and belief systems."

In this sense, rather than merely described, community members provide access to how they construct their understanding of disease or cure. Although this point is explored further in the next chapter, an issue related to community-based methodology is important at this juncture. That is, intense collaboration is necessary between planners and a community, if the biographies of these persons are going to be adequately appreciated (Brown 1993). When persons are studied objectively the image is suggested that they are poked and probed in order to elicit responses. But this undertaking is successful only if these investigations are disinterested or free of values or passion.

Engaging a community is not a value-free endeavor but requires dialogue and commitment. In this regard, those who construct a reality will not necessarily share this knowledge with anyone, given the intimate nature of this exchange. A special sort of relationship is crucial to gaining access to this privileged information. After all, the biography of a person or group is a precious story that is often guarded.

Empirical data on health status, for example, are quite superficial when divorced from past experiences, perceived capabilities, and future expectations (Shehadeh 2010). Likewise, the likelihood of pursuing treatment is not merely a matter of having information on hand about disease on-set or progression, or even knowledge about sufficient resources, but relates to how health and illness are perceived and evaluated. Richard Zaner (1988) declares that health is one of the most existential issues that persons confront.

How social factors—such as resources, accessibility, and seriousness of a problem—are valued and prioritized contribute a lot to whether treatment will be sought (Andersen et.al. 2003). Placing variables in an algorithm, on the other hand, distorts how persons make decisions about their health. Rather than trying to optimize the rationality of their decisions, they base their actions on expectations that relate to collective memories, past experiences, and the perceived chances of success (Simon 1955). Direct involvement in a community, accordingly, helps to insure that epidemiological assessments are informed by the concepts and judgments used by persons to arrange their everyday affairs, including their health status. How persons make decisions about their health are brought alive in a manner that extends beyond probability.

The general point of community-based epidemiology is that health status has little meaning divorced from the biography of a community (Little 1998). Nonetheless, biography extends beyond holism. For example, the identification and spread of a disease does not represent a natural progression or a causal connection between

events, but includes definitions, value judgments, and a willingness to act. From a community-based perspective, how the on-set of a disease is likely to occur includes these and other existential considerations.

This personal or collective mediation is what community-based planners have in mind when they claim that a disease does not necessarily follow a well-trodden path. Here again, realist imagery is deceiving. Nonetheless, many persons tend to think of a path as a fairly routine and an unencumbered mode of transmission. But barriers to health, such as a lack of resources or transportation, are not necessarily natural or obvious but reflect judgments about seriousness, probable impact, and the choice of remedies at hand. How persons might respond to a health threat, stated simply, is not revealed by reviewing social or environmental indicators, even in a holistic manner.

The course of a disease, accordingly, is anything but routine. Planners should not be lulled into thinking that health care will be improved if the proper path to treatment is cleared, that is, the typical structural barriers are removed (Snowden and Yamada 2005). This task is not so simple! Even supplying the best resources may not be productive, if a community believes that poverty and the related diseases are merely a part of life and should be endured. And the fact that physicians are often perceived to be condescending and unsympathetic, and consulted as a last resort, cannot be divorced from how reality is constructed in a particular community. How treatment is perceived is important!

Every path to health care, so to speak, is potentially very unique. The job of a community-based planner, therefore, is to extend beyond causation to grasp the process of disease creation. The use of the phrase "disease creation" is intended to convey the idea that a disease does not occur until an issue is defined as problematic, and persons become motivated to deal with this phenomenon. Once these matters are settled, an entire disease context arises that identifies resources, accessibility, threat, and other relevant themes. A disease does not spread simply by diffusion along natural pathways. Such imagery overlooks how a community participates in this process.

A recent response to this omission has been the development of what Phil Brown (1997) and others call "popular epidemiology." The base of this strategy is that average citizens can bring to the attention of planners specific problems that have been overlooked by these experts. These local persons give needed direction to any epidemiological studies, due to their familiarity with the situation. As reported by Brown, this strategy has been helpful in correcting the effects of pollution related to environmental degradation in several cities. Consistent with a community-based philosophy, the idea is that these neighbors can help to guide and motivate properly professional epidemiologists.

But some criticisms have been directed at this approach that calls into question the community-based character of this methodology (Brown 1987). Two issues are particular important. The first relates to the relationship that is often established with experts. Critics claim that professional epidemiologists tend to dominate the investigations. And second, community members do not necessarily define the issues at hand, but merely point the experts in the proper direction. In this sense, biography is not necessarily at the core of popular epidemiology. Nonetheless, this strategy is consistent with the spirit of community-based planning, whereby a proj-

ect is given life and guided by a community. The problem is that guidance has, at times, been sporadic.

Conclusion

The new public health places a community within an ecological framework, while the construction of social issues is the focus of a community-based approach. In the end, two very different approaches to holism are at work. In the first, a broad causal matrix is sought, which is more inclusive than is the case with traditional epidemiology (Kelly 1966). A community-based epidemiology, on the other hand, emphasizes the perceptions of persons and the resulting biographies, rather than increasing the number of variables that are part of an assessment (Cornell 2006).

Basically, both the traditional and new public health are sustained by realism. The traits of a community—such as stressors and buffers—are treated as empirical referents. The need to clearly identify these and other variables is, thus, logical and expected. After all, whether or not a disease spreads depends on a unique composition of these factors. Discovering the proper connections between these elements is thought to be essential to preventing or limiting problems.

A very different picture of epidemiology is painted from a community-based perspective. The idea that some communities lack traits, such as important buffers, and are overwhelmed by stressors misses a lot about disease on-set and spread. Such a portrayal is simply too sterile to capture how a community reacts to perceived threats and constructs viable alternatives. In this regard, popular epidemiology strives to incorporate average persons into the activity of identifying problems and their solutions (Brown 1993). The idea is that community members are knowledgeable about these issues and are motivated to improve their surroundings.

The strengths and weaknesses of a community are not understood to be empirical determinations but rather are biographical. Environmental factors, for example, do not automatically lull persons into inactivity or determine how they will respond to threats. In fact, much of public health is predicated on changing culture and behavior (De Maio 2012). The thrust of community-based epidemiology, in this regard, is that how persons act shapes every aspect of their realities. Promoting change, therefore, has little to do with empirical determinates and more with the ability of persons to imagine and enact an alternative mode of existence.

Buffers, for example, should not be viewed as having natural properties within this new framework (Cwikel 2006). These characteristics, instead, are enmeshed within the reality of a community, possibly even a clash of realities. A buffer becomes effective due to various beliefs and the ability to act. Before an intervention can be planned successfully, these experiential mediators that pervade the spread of a disease must receive serious consideration. What constitutes a true and effective buffer can, thus, be appreciated.

Acknowledging these diverse knowledge bases is at the heart of a community-based epidemiology. But the question becomes: How are these sources of knowledge discovered and interpreted correctly? After all, the quality of a so-called buffer

depends on interpretation. The biography of a community, in other words, must be read accurately, or interventions will likely be misdirected. What must be remembered is that relevant information may be revealed in these biographies that is inconsistent with mainstream thinking. How planners read and judge the reasoning in these stories is very important. Inconsistency with traditional beliefs should not discredit automatically the narrative provided by a community.

Dismissing any findings as irrational *a priori* would be a serious misstep, at least from a community-based perspective. The reasoning exhibited may be unusual, or different from what is expected, but never lacks rationality or purpose. This unique form of "mundane reasoning," instead, has local relevance and informs the behavior of the community members, including their health status (Pollner 1987). This mode of reason is the appropriate base for policies and practices that are relevant to a community.

References

Aday, L. A., & Andersen, R. (1974). A framework for the study of access to medical care. *Health Services Research, 9*(3), 208–220.

Anderson, L. M., Scrimshaw, S. C., Fullilove, M., Fielding, T., Jonathan, E., Normand, J., & The Task Force on Preventive Services (2003). Culturally competent healthcare systems. *American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 24*(3), 68–79.

Barry, B. (2005). *Why social justice matters*. Cambridge: Polity.

Baum, F. (1990). The new public health: Force of change or reaction. *Health Promotion International, 5*(2), 145–150.

Berkman, L. F., & Kawachi, I. (2000). A historical framework for social epidemiology. In L. F. Berkman & I. Kawachi (Eds.), *Social epidemiology* (pp. 2–12). New York: Oxford University Press.

Bronfenbrenner, U. (1994). Ecological models of human development. *International Encyclopedia of Education, 3,* 1643–1647.

Brown, P. (1987). Popular epidemiology: Community response to toxic waste-induced disease in Woburn, Massachusetts. *Science, Technology, and Human Values, 12*(3/4), 78–85.

Brown, P. (1993). When the public knows better: Popular epidemiology. *Environment, 35*(8), 16–40.

Brown, P. (1997). Popular epidemiology revisited. *Current Sociology, 45*(3), 137–156.

Cornell, K. L. (2006). Person-in-situation: History, and new directions for social work practice. *Praxis, 6,* 50–57.

Cwikel, J. G. (2006). *Social epidemiology*. New York: Columbia University Press.

De Hoyos, G. (1989). Person-in-environment: A tri-level practice model. *Social Casework, 70*(3), 131–138.

De Maio, F. (2012). *Health and social theory*. London: Pelgrave Macmillan.

Elder, G. H. (1985). Perspectives on the life-course. In G. H. Elder (Ed.), *Life course dynamics* (pp. 23–49). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Engel, G. (1977). The need for a new medical model: A challenge to biomedicine. *Science, 196,* 129–136.

Frenk, J. (1993). The new public health. *Annual Review of Public Health,14,* 469–490.

Friedman, G. (1994). *Primer of epidemiology*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Hunter, D. (2007). Public health: Historical context and current agenda. In A. Scriven & S. Garman (Eds.), *Public health: Social context and action* (pp. 8–19). Berkshire: Open University Press.

Kellehear, A., & Sallnow, L. (2012). Public health and palliative care: An historical overview. In L. Sallnow, K. Suresh, & A. Kallehear (Eds.), *International perspectives of public health and palliative care* (pp. 1–12). London: Routledge.
Kelly, J. G. (1966). Ecological constraints on mental health services. *American Psychologist, 21*(6), 535–536.
Kelly, J. G. (2006). *Becoming ecological: An expedition into community psychology*. New York: Oxford.
Krieger, N. (1994). Epidemiology and the web of causation: Has anyone seen the spider? *Social Science and Medicine, 39*(7), 887–903.
Krieger, N. (2001). Theories for social epidemiology in the 21st century: An ecological perspective. *International Journal of Epidemiology, 20*(4), 668–677.
Krieger, N. (2011). *Epidemiology and the people's health*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Link, B. G., & Phelan, J. (1995). Social conditions as fundamental causes of disease. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 35*(extra issue), 80–94.
Little, M. (1998). Assignments of meaning in epidemiology. *Social Science in Medicine, 47*(9), 1135–1145.
Lucas, K., & Lloyd, B. (2005). *Health Promotion*. Thousand Oakes: Sage.
MacKain, S., Elliott, H., Busby, H., & Popay, J. (2003). Everywhere and nowhere: Locating and understanding the "new" public health. *Health and Place, 9*(3), 219–229.
Mattelart, A., & Mattelart, M. (1998). *Theories of communication*. Thousand Oakes: Sage.
McQueen, D. V. (2007). Critical issues in theory for health promotion. In D. V. McQueen & I. Kickbusch (Eds.), *Health and modernity: The role of theory in health promotion* (pp. 21–42). New York: Springer.
Morgan, G. (2005). Highlighting the importance of 'popular epidemiology'. *Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 59*, 254.
Pollner, M. (1987). *Mundane reason*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rotabi, K. S. (2007). Ecological theory from natural to social science or vive versa? A brief conceptual history for social work. *Advances in Social Work, 8*(1), 113–129.
Schwartz, S., Susser, E., & Susser, M. (1999). A future for epidemiology? *Annual Review of Public Health, 20*, 15–33.
Shehadeh, N. (2010). The ever evolving concept of new public health: Book review. *Californian Journal of Health Promotion, 8*(1), 82–87.
Shy, C. M. (1997). The failure of academic epidemiology: Witness for the prosecution. *American Journal of Epidemiology, 145*(6), 479–484.
Simon, H. A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69*(1), 99–118.
Snowden, L. R., & Yamada, A.-M. (2005). Cultural differences in access to care. *Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 1,* 143–166.
Susser, M., & Susser, E. (1996). Choosing a future for epidemiology: II. From black boxes to Chinese boxes and eco-epidemiology. *American Journal of Public Health, 86*(5), 674–677.
Susser, E. (2004). Eco-epidemiology: Thinking outside the black box. *Epidemiology, 15*(5), 519–520.
Tulchinshy, T. H., & Varavikova, E. A. (2010). What is the new public health? *Public Health Reviews, 32*(1), 25–53.
U'Ren, R. (2011). *Social perspective*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Wallerstein, N. B., Yen, I. H., & Syme, S. L. (2011). Integration of social epidemiology and community-engaged interventions to improve equity. *American Journal of Public Health, 101*(5), 822–830.
Weed, D. L. (1998). Beyond black box epidemiology. *American Journal of Public Health, 88*(1), 12–14.
Whitehead, A. N. (1967). *Science and the modern world*. New York: The Free Press.
Williams, D. R., & Sternthal, M. (2010). Understanding racial-ethnic disparities in health: Sociological contributions. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 15*(1), 15–27.
Zaner, R. (1988). *Ethics and the clinical encounter*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Chapter 6
Research in a Community

Introduction

As might be imagined, the critique of realism at the core of community-based planning extends to the study of communities. In fact, an entirely new methodology has emerged from the community-based philosophy. This novel style of conducting research, however, is part of an on-going debate in the social sciences; i.e., should social investigators and planners adopt the model advanced by the natural or cultural sciences? Nonetheless, in a crucial way, community-based research goes beyond both of these traditions.

This controversy is usually referred to as the *Natur-Geisteswissenschaften* debate (Hughes and Sharrock 1997, pp. 97–100). In less esoteric terminology, the point is argued that the natural and social sciences should employ different methodologies. A lot is at stake in this discussion, since each position conveys a very different image of human beings and society. In a manner of speaking, entirely different world-views accompany these perspectives that cannot be easily reconciled.

The *Natur*-position is associated with disciplines such as chemistry, biology, and physics. In each case, reality is resumed to be basically empirical and comprised of physical elements. The focus of this methodology, accordingly, is the acquisition of objective facts and, gradually, the formulation of general laws. This position, as should be noted, is consistent with realism, since the goal is to transcend the influence of interpretation and gather hard data.

On the other hand, the approach that is linked to the cultural or social sciences challenges realism. The central tenet of this position is that humans are not simply a part of nature, and thus should not be reduced to a composite of empirical properties. Indeed, persons are capable of acting and engaging their respective worlds. Due to their ability to express themselves, usually through language use, they can define their identities and surroundings. How they are studied, therefore, should reflect this activity of intervening in reality and creating meaningful lives.

Often this debate is characterized as a choice between quantitative and qualitative methodologies (Gubrium 2009). Clearly, the community-based approach should be seen as more compatible with the qualitative version, since the emphasis of this general philosophy is participation and the associated community biographies, while

J. W. Murphy, *Community-Based Interventions,* International Perspectives on Social Policy, Administration, and Practice, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4899-8020-5_6,

communities are viewed to be constructed rather than simply empirical sites. Indeed, participatory action research (PAR), the name given to the community-based methodology, has more in common with a methodology that focuses on interpretation rather than the so-called objective features of social life (McTaggert 1991).

However, participatory action research broadens the usual debate on this issue. In terms of methodology, the emphasis of both the *Natur* and *Geistes* positions is considered to be fairly narrow. Specifically, the debate is focused on the nature of knowledge and the best way to grasp this information. In addition to acquiring valid knowledge, however, participatory action research attempts to promote activism and community change. As Meredith Minkler (2005) states, the central elements of PAR are "participation, research and action." A new dimension is thus added to research that is ignored by quantitative research, and discussed minimally by those who advocate the qualitative position.

In order to understand fully this shift in orientation, a comparison of positivism, qualitative methods, and participation action research is fruitful. In this way, the unique maneuver made by PAR can be truly appreciated. Simply stated, the thrust of participatory action research is to improve planning by involving a community in every phase of a project (Miller 1994). Additionally, as a result of this process, these persons learn to become self-directed. Most researchers, both quantitative and qualitative, fail to see the relevance of this additional step.

In general, the aim of both positions is merely to generate data that perhaps, in the future,will be transformed by someone into social policies. Qualitative researchers, however, contend that their theory and method help to produce more locally sensitive and thus relevant information. But direct involvement in communities in eschewed by both groups, especially action that appears to be committed. Such engagement in both cases would go beyond the normal discussion of methodology and the production of useful knowledge.

Positivism and Realism

Positivists want to transform philosophy into a rigorous discipline. In order to accomplish this aim, all claims about knowledge have to be subjected to serious scrutiny (Bryant 1985). Specifically important is the elimination of metaphysics, or speculation about the origin of truth, morality, and other fundamental elements. In this regard, reliance on god, daemons, spirits, or abstract cosmic systems must be abandoned. Eventually, however, the human element will be viewed as interfering with the pursuit of valid knowledge.

All real knowledge should be verified by experience. What this reorientation meant at the time is that all claims should be subjected to the rigors of experimentation (Reid 1994). This strategy is based on the assumption that the scientific method is value-free and devoid of speculative factors. With values and other unverifiable factors left behind, the idea is that an unencumbered encounter with facts, or the brute empirical reality, is possible. All that is necessary is the discipline associated with the proper training and practice.

In more modern times, positivists hoped to overcome the influence of subjectivity, particularly the vagaries of language. For this reason, these theorists required that valid knowledge be conveyed through an "observational language" (Hesse 1970). A language had to be invented, in other words, that could serve as a conduit for knowledge, without contaminating this information. As might be suspected, mathematics was introduced for this purpose, since this discipline is divorced from any context and other limitations and capable of providing an exact description of reality. Through such precision, speculation and all other sources of distortion are removed from the process of acquiring knowledge.

With the emphasis on experimental design, the pursuit of knowledge is thought to be neutralized. After all, the logic of experimentation adheres to universal rules. And with the eventual addition of advanced statistics, along with the computer software, the image is created easily that research is free of judgments. Data are simply encountered and analyzed. Valid results are a product of a sound methodological design.

Similar to realism, positivism is founded on dualism; in general, without this principle the task of positivism could never be finalized. The fundamental principle is that all knowledge can be divorced from speculation, including the uncertainty associated with human consciousness (Hughes and Sharrock 1997, p. 28). By following certain technical procedures such as the rules of experimentation, values, perspectives, and other untestable factors can be abandoned. Once claims are subjected to the rigor of experimental protocol, unbiased statements can be made about reality.

The resulting data are considered to be free of any bias and treated as objective. Valid information is equated with empirical features of any phenomenon. These data await discovery, if persons can learn to push their subjectivity aside (Lake 1993). Methodology, in this sense, serves to blunt the effects of this human and unreliable consideration. However, lurking in the shadows of this entire scenario is the assumption that objective data can be severed from consciousness. Through certain methodological gambits, knowledge is not sullied by the whims of a knower.

Positivists simply gather and analyze data. Because these processes are operationalized in a very formal manner, based in procedural rigor and calculation, data collection and processing become very mechanistic. Data are treated as if they are simply lying about, like objective things, and scooped up by skilled researchers. By following step-wise rules, similar to those found in a cookbook, this entire process of gathering information is made to appear neutral, without any real human intervention.

A very ethereal picture is created of the social world. Researchers, stated simply, are disconnected from knowledge of any facet of their existence. Because of dualism, the image is readily internalized that these persons merely encounter the world; and given the proper training, they can jettison their biases and provide accurate descriptions of any aspect of reality. Any human influences—values or beliefs—are simply suppressed or denied. The search for knowledge becomes very formalistic and a matter of following methodological procedures.

When this philosophy is transferred to studying communities, the results are very predictable. That is, planners are expected to supply a neutral description of a community, so that accurate assessments can be made. Accordingly, features that appear to be the most objective are the focus of data collection (Austin 1983). As might be expected, social indicators arise in importance. These factors, due to their objective character, are presumed to affect persons in ways that can be easily observed and documented.

Consistent with the overall aim of positivism, the entire planning process becomes scientific. Standardized protocols are adhered to which are thought to generate sound data that can, through rigorous statistical analysis, identify problems and the appropriate nature of an intervention (Gilgun 2005). Consistent with this *modus operandi*, trained professionals are usually at the helm of any research or community project. After all, these persons have the requisite training and character that are thought to be vital to a social planner.

Qualitative Methodologies

Qualitative methodologies—advanced, for example, by phenomenology, ethnomethodology, or symbolic interactionism—represent a rebellion against the general orientation of positivism. Advocates of this alternative outlook believe that the physical and social sciences are different, particularly with respect to their respective foci of study (White 1997). Critics of quantitative social science argue that although humans have been linked to nature, they have a side that requires special attention. As opposed to rocks or trees, humans are capable of acting and shaping their world. Stated simply, they act!

Humans do not merely encounter the world, but intervene and construct their realities. Specifically important is that they have an active mind, as opposed to a blank slate, and possess the abilities of invention, imagination, and reflection. These capacities, accordingly, have a direct impact on how reality is perceived. For this reason, the scientific method is thought to overlook the creative capacity of human experience, because of the emphasis that is placed on empirical data and exact measurement.

Qualitative researchers have a completely different image of human beings than positivists (Berg 2001). Dualism, for example, is considered to be passé, since humans interpret and construct their lives. Therefore, everything that is known is mediated by the human presence; values and beliefs, accordingly, inundate facts; and rather than objective, reality is marked indelibly by humans.

Facts, accordingly, are not treated as things, or objects. As ethnomethodologists like to say, facts are "accomplishments" (Pollner 1991). Through the process of interpretation and interpersonal collaboration a particular interpretation or construction is given priority over others. This select interpretation, according to the phenomenologist Alfred Schutz (1962, pp. 229–234), becomes the "paramount" reality that is treated as objective, and recognized by all reasonable persons, until further notice.

All qualitatively oriented practitioners introduce a device that accounts for the ability of persons to act unique ways (Bauman 1978). Phenomenologists, for example, contend that the mind intervenes and shapes reality. As they write, consciousness is intentional. Marxists, on the other hand, declare that humans are capable of exhibiting *praxis,* while a host of writers maintain that language is a creative medium. According to each of these positions, humans have a capacity that is missing in nature and should be viewed as significant.

According to this orientation, social indicators do not exist. That is, data divorced from interpretation are simply a product of the intellectual scheme imposed by positivists. In actuality, such data are always enmeshed in culture and derive their meaning from this association (Cicourel 1964). Neither a house nor behavior have objective properties, for example, but are judged by persons to be valuable or appropriate. These phenomena, in short, have interpersonally constructed meaning that is tied to human action but is overlooked by positivists.

Standard social indicators, accordingly, do not necessarily influence persons in one way or another. Because these data are interpreted, and thus have social significance, they may have unique meaning in different communities; what is meant by a dilapidated house or deviance may vary greatly from place to place. In this sense, Herbert Blumer (1969, p. 15) writes that persons respond to meaning rather than facts. How a community views a particular indicator, for example, depends on the history of this locale and expectations. In other words, the empirical character of any social indicator is ancillary to how social life is interpreted. What is meant by illness, in short, does not have the same significance for everyone all of the time.

Even a researcher such as Robert Sampson (2012, pp. 124–135), who relies mostly on empirical features to identity communities, remarks that perceptions should not be ignored. In his research, a community, along with a host of other factors, is shown to be evaluated in terms of how persons view their surroundings. The reality of a community is not necessarily obtrusive but revealed gradually through the stories persons tell about themselves and their situations. A community thus has a character that eludes a simple summary. How persons define their place is an important consideration in any assessment of a community.

In this regard, the emphasis that positivists put on objectivity is believed to be short sighted. Qualitative researchers, accordingly, direct their attention to how persons comport themselves and create a meaningful environment. From a qualitative perspective, social reality represents a constellation of meanings that reflect human intentions and ambitions, which have an impact on validly claims about knowledge. How can this side of knowledge production be ignored, ask qualitative researchers, without compromising the integrity of information?

A qualitative methodology, therefore, is based on communication rather than the collection of data (Gubrium 2009). Through a variety of strategies a qualitative planner, for example, strives to gain epistemological entrée to a community. The point is to acquire access to the assumptions persons are making about reality, such as the nature of crime or illness, so that the meaning of these phenomena can be understood. These assumptions—referred to by Alvin Gouldner (1970, p. 46) as "domain assumptions"—provide the insight necessary to grasp how the reality

in a community is constructed. These reality assumptions, as they are sometimes called, describe how the social world should be understood, if accuracy is the aim of research. In short, human inventions organize the social realities of persons and groups, and thus serve to circumscribe meaningful information.

Given this need for such entrée, qualitative researchers contend that the search for objective facts is fruitless. Even fairly straightforward information, such as how many persons in a community have been vaccinated, does not tell a story divorced from interpretation. Such data have to be placed into the "stock of knowledge" created by a community, if vaccination rates are going to provide much information about how these persons think about their health or health care (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 39–40). For example, why has a specific inoculation rate persisted? To answer this question, communication is required. No matter what technique is used to acquire such information—questionnaire, interview, or participant observation—the point is to penetrate the biography of a community, as opposed to merely collecting data.

With respect to assessing the health risks in a community, for example, communication has proven to be very important. Leiss and Powell (2004, p. 30) have documented that experts and local persons tend to interpret risk very differently. The problem is that unless planners communicate effectively with a community's members, and grasp what they mean by risk, health interventions tend to be incorrect and thus irrelevant. While emphasizing the symbolic side of communication, these writers suggest that any interventions should begin with an exploration of how a community frames risk, particularly what they call the qualitative dimensions of this issue. According to these Authors, persons do not simply encounter but interpret risks. Values and perceptions are thus very important.

Qualitative researchers, as should be noted, are more closely related to the community-based philosophy than positivists. Those who opt for qualitative methods use their techniques to engage persons in dialogue, and grasp how the biography of a community has been created, rather than trying to provide value-free observations or descriptions. For the most part, however, professional researchers still direct this process (Heron and Reason 1997). Community members may be allowed to tell their stories in their own terms, but the interpretation of these expressions may still involve guesswork. That is, since most qualitative projects are designed and carried out primarily by the researchers—including taking notes, coding, and memo writing— and their knowledge of a community may be minimal, the proper context of any findings may never be grasped properly.

The issue at this point pertains to the relevance of persons in the research process. Within the framework prescribed by positivism, personal insights are treated as subjective and irrelevant. But in qualitative research the autonomy of those investigated is not necessarily guaranteed. For example, community members may be consulted, with the aim of engaging in dialogue, but their involvement is often on the periphery of a research project. In this regard, they are simply inserted into the process when the investigator feels the time is appropriate to acquire certain information.

In most qualitative investigations, professional researchers are in charge (Leitz and Zayas 2010). These persons set the agenda for a study and prepare all of the

protocol and instruments. The questions that are chosen, and how they are asked, is the task of the primary investigator. In this sense, the research context is already established long before the subjects enter a study. Therefore, their opinions may be solicited, but their role in a project is already truncated. The issues that they are asked to address, accordingly, may not be relevant or important.

As a result, the dialogue that occurs is limited. Key background information may be missing that is required for a correct interpretation of a person's stories. A conversation may occur, but the sentiments that are conveyed may be placed in an inappropriate framework. And while direct and sustained observations are sometimes made to establish a context, without the necessary history descriptions pass for interpretations. When these missteps are made, empirical information is used inadvertently as a proxy for biography. The question becomes, therefore, how can the proper conditions be established for true dialogue? What is required, from a community-based perspective, is a more fully participatory methodology.

Through participatory action research increased involvement is sought on the part of community members, so that the background or contextual information that is vital for dialogue to occur might be available (Avison et al. 1999). But there is more to community-based research than this epistemological question. Additionally, community-based planners seek to foster the self-direction of a community. If qualitative research only requires a passive relationship with those who are studied, how can community autonomy be fostered? The aim of community-based planning, after all, is not simply the collection of better data but the promotion of social change. This political dimension is not necessarily a part of qualitative research, despite the work of some of these investigators (Denzin 2003).

Participatory Action Research

The arrival of participatory action research is somewhat more complex than the onset of qualitative methods. Although the cultural relevance of knowledge is important to both strategies, PAR arose within the context of community activism and social strife (Fals Borda 1996). On one hand, Lewin's stress on action research was influential (McTaggert 1991); but during 1960s, particularly in Latin America, this methodology was tied to local struggles for inclusion and community self-determination (Montero 2000). And although the community mental health movement was very political in many respects, methodology was not necessarily tied to the turmoil over social exclusion, domination, and the ideological side of treatment.

The debate over methodology, in other words, began to extend beyond discussions of the nature of data or the appropriate techniques for acquiring this information. Nonetheless, the critique of dualism was still considered to be important. Advocates of participatory action research, while using Marxist terminology, argued that all knowledge is linked to *praxis*, or human action; others, however, associated knowledge to language use and interpretation. What is unique about PAR, however, is that grassroots organizing is touted to be crucial in order for this knowledge to be

recognized as legitimate (Rahman and Fals Borda 1991). Methodological questions are thus suddenly tied to political issues. Particularly noteworthy, communities that do not strive for political liberation are unable to invoke these local knowledge bases to describe their history or identity.

The basic idea, similar to qualitative studies, is that valid knowledge is tied to local customs, practices, and language use. In this regard, knowledge is constructed and thought to have a biography. In contrast to qualitative theory, and consistent with the politics of the period, this knowledge is believed to have been marginalized and repressed by powerful forces. Part of the human liberation process, particularly the fight for community rights, includes the resurrection of this knowledge—the abandonment of the "epistemology of distance" that extolled objectivity and discredited human action—so that persons can create a new future (Montero 2000).

In this sense, participatory action research was never conceived to be value-free. Without a doubt, promoting the autonomy of communities requires a shift in politics, in addition to the adoption of a new methodology. From a community-based perspective, researchers are never detached, due to their presence in the world and the fact that they always adhere to one perspective or another. What is most important, therefore, is the adoption of a relevant position. The framework of a community thus becomes the proper reference for knowledge.

At least initially, PAR and qualitative research seem to have a similar orientation. Both require that planners enter the world(s) created by the members of a community, if useful knowledge is going to be garnered. They both view the community to be a life-world that may consist of diverse perspectives. The practice of PAR, however, requires that those who have created a community participate in every phase of developing an investigation or intervention project (Rahman and Fals Borda 1996). In this way, those who know the community best provide the necessary entrée.

The assumption is that these persons have privileged access to the knowledge base of a community. They understand, for example, how this pool of information was constructed, and the values that support the paramount reality. In actual research practice, these persons help to identify the community, sources of valid information, appropriate research questions, and the proper interpretation of any findings (Israel et al. 1998). The members of a community, in other words, serve to guide the process of locating and using appropriate knowledge. They are active rather than passive participants in undertaking a research or other community project.

Sometimes the term "stakeholders" is used to characterize those who are influential in a community project. But this term does not typically capture accurately the role of these persons in a community-based intervention. For example, persons may be treated as stakeholders simply because they hold a particular position in a government organization or reside in a specific locale. Such stakeholders, however, do not necessarily define or control a project, nor do they often have strong ties to a community. Some of the persons who might be considered stakeholders because of their positions, in an NGO or local government, for example, might actually work against a particular community. Within the context of a community-based intervention, the term stakeholder must have a much broader meaning than is often the

case that includes creating relevant meaning, providing the appropriate biographical framework for an intervention, and directing a project.

But additionally, the goal of PAR is to make communities autonomous. Community members, accordingly, are entrusted to mobilize the use of all information (Ahmed et al. 2004). In the health project in Ecuador, a "health committee" was established that would work with physicians to provide the background necessary to identity properly any problems in the community. These persons, for example, were expected to visit each house in their community regularly to gather information, consult their neighbors about any pertinent issues, and determine how this input should be used. In this sense, this group transformed health status data into something meaningful.

Two points are particularly important at this time. The first is that community members know how to use information better than, for example, outside experts. These indigenous persons appreciate the nuances of any findings and can rally support for the interventions that would be most effective. They understand best the needs and priorities of their community. These persons, according to Brennan (1997, p. 259), express "civic virtue," because they have the ability to understand the variegated reality that is deployed by the members of a community.

The second issue pertains to the challenge that is posed to experts (Brydon-Miller 1997). A community will never be autonomous until dependency on outside sources is overcome. The critical reflection that is part of liberation is encouraged by community members taking control of all planning processes. Their consciousness, confidence, and abilities are raised, due to their increased responsibility for these activities. In effect, these local persons become the focus of any serious change efforts. In this sense, the aim of PAR is not only to foster appropriate development but the pursuit of community power.

The reflection that is promoted by this participation in community activities is thought by many philosophers to be essential to achieving personal or collective freedom. As persons reflect on their actions, they begin to appreciate the arbitrary nature of many demands. As a result, they become liberated from necessity and recognize their role in promoting change. At this juncture of many discussions about planning, the work of Paulo Freire (1972) is discussed. He is credited with popularizing the idea that persons can become more conscious of their repression through a participatory or community-based mode of education or planning. Through their participation in "cultural circles," for example, persons discuss issues and develop a critical consciousness through listening, learning, and reflection (Freire 1981). In general, participation tends to foster novel insights on the part of parsons.

As communities sought rights and recognition, many activists thought that research should be a part of this undertaking. With community members participating in the "naming" or interpretive process that reveals knowledge, specific social meaning is understood to be created but contingent and available for reconstruction (Freire 1972, p. 75). In this way, community members begin to appreciate how they create knowledge and can rethink a particular orientation and promote change. In other words, they begin to realize that they are not tied to a particular way of defining social reality and the accompanying institutions.

At times such participative research has been referred at "decolonizing" (Kovach 2009, p. 80–81). The point is that through the use of this strategy communities can extricate themselves from undesirable conditions. Through reflection they can begin to appreciate their unfortunate conditions, hone their skills, and imagine and construct alternatives. Additionally, a particular body of knowledge that has been overlooked, possibly suppressed, begins to surface. Also, insight is gained into how this knowledge has been marginalized. Hence their future is thus placed in their control and understood to be brought to fruition thought their efforts.

These critics scoff at the claim that research is value-free, and argue that this activity should play an important role in communities gaining their autonomy. In fact, from a community-based perspective, no studies are ever free of values, although many do a good job of concealing these influences. That is, certain assumptions and commitments are always operative. PAR, in this sense, combines the search for valid knowledge with community activism to promote the values of these persons. Community growth is a central element of PAR, due to the increased courage and expectations that are engendered through participation in research.

Practice and Research

An important aspect of this discussion is that participatory action research is not simply a new methodology but a practice. Of course, communities are not treated as objects, that is, a cluster to empirical elements (Israel et al. 1998). This shift in orientation is based on the realization that knowledge originates from *praxis*, the source of human creativity identified by Marx. In this regard, community-based researchers study the "social location" of issues (Watkins and Schulman 2008 pp. 278–280–). What this phrase indicates is a move beyond thinking about the community as empirical or static. The social location, accordingly, encompasses the past, current mores, and the future of a community, in other words, the biography that is operative. All information is thus placed within the interpretive framework of a community.

Beyond this concern for the quality of information, PAR is expected to motivate and activate communities. This methodology, in other words, has a political side. For both positivists and qualitative researchers, such a maneuver is not a part of methodology. Positivists believe that activism introduces bias into research, while qualitative studies are devoted mostly to producing more detailed observations as a result of consulting communities. Neither approach, accordingly, advances beyond the investigation of social life.

But in terms of PAR, communities are not merely examined but engaged and involved in a process of critical assessment and reflection (Miller et al. 2011). Through their direct participation in every phase of a project, these persons begin to reflect on the status of knowledge, their abilities and connection to others, and learn to appreciate how they construct their communities. As a result, they begin to envision their role in creating other possibilities and take control of their lives. In

contemporary parlance, they can begin to exhibit "ownership" of their communities; the members of a community possess and exercise their knowledge in ways that they consider to be productive (Merzel and D'Afflitti 2003).

In terms of actual participation, for example, even young persons can learn how to conduct interviews or focus groups. Additionally, community members can identify relevant data and discuss why this information is considered to be valuable. However, especially important is that these persons can provide the theory, or explanations, about why they believe certain events are connected, and thereby illustrate the appropriate focus of an evaluation.

In the project in Ecuador, community members were trained to conduct interviews and go house-to-house make assessments. In many ways, these persons mastered skills that are taught in graduate seminars. Additionally, they lead group discussions about their experiences gathering this information and took control of other processes such as providing further training, scheduling events, and raising funds. The general aim was that these persons assume control of the entire health project, while acquiring the ability to work with government officials at all levels.

PAR extends the debate over methodology beyond the nature of knowledge and research strategies. Now, methodology is tied closely to the creation of knowledge and the use of this information (Argyris and Schön 1989). Data, therefore, are no longer the focus of attention; with respect to PAR, a much broader context is introduced. Not only are the skills of a community improved, with respect to creating and managing projects, but also the use of these abilities to create meaningful lives is emphasized.

Methodology is thus transformed into a weapon to fight poverty or illness. Clearly better information can be brought to bear on a problem, since a community is close to the research process. However, beyond this procedural improvement, the methodology of PAR generates activism. In short, persons become the agents of their own improvement. And as a result, they may begin to shed their feelings of dependency and pursue their own goals. The phrase that is often the focus of attention at this point is the promotion of "people's power" (Fals Borda 1988). In this way, PAR is considered to be emancipatory.

How is the validity of data understood? Tying research to politics in this way, at least in the traditional models, would jeopardize the quality of data. In this case, however, validity extends beyond the standard technical criteria. Content or predictive validity, for example, rests on whether measures fulfill particular methodological requirements that are not necessarily tied to a community (Payne 1999, pp. 33–34). On the other hand, in community-based studies, validity has a particular epistemological standard—that is, the themes, concepts, and practices reflect the knowledge bases present in a community (Prilleltensky 2003). Therefore, having community members at the helm of an intervention only increases the validity of a project, due to the infusion of this vital knowledge.

These changes are not necessarily only at the individual level. Due to the emphasis on participation, and the accompanying collaboration, a sense of solidarity can also be engendered. Persons can begin to witness the benefits of working together. As they begin to share their lives, the collective nature of their problems becomes

increasingly apparent. As Mills (1959, p. 8) once said, through this interaction what were previously thought of as personal problems become social issues. Effective solutions are revealed to require cooperation that before may have been viewed as impossible.

The political message of PAR is that when communities act together positive change is possible. In fact, this theme is basic to PAR. After all, persons who are organized become a formidable force and can move their communities forward. Consistent with the standard axiom, knowledge is power within the context of community-based research (Foucault 1980). But perhaps more important is the awareness, on the part of communities, that information can be produced and used by marginalized persons to promote change. The clear message is that no-one should be excluded from this process, simply due to their lack of income or class standing.

PAR represents a new stage in the development of methodologies. Instead of viewed as a source of bias, the human element is the key to valid knowledge; direct human involvement in designing a study or project is an asset, rather than a liability. Personal and collective insight guide research and other projects, and there is no apology for this intrusion. Gathering accurate information and the promotion of communities, accordingly, are not viewed as antagonistic themes. The *praxis* that is at the root of knowledge generation is simply allowed to direct the implementation of this information in an appropriate manner in a community. Social development is thus demythologized; in fact, according to Meyer (2000), PAR is guided by a "democratic impulse" that has widespread impact.

In the end, argue Rahman and Fals Borda (1991), the use of this methodology deepens the democratic process. Through what he calls "authentic" participation and development, persons engage knowledge and other processes related, for example, to decision-making that have never been experienced. At least initially, these activities are thought to be beyond their capabilities or purview. Indeed, they may have internalized the opinions of outside experts that undermine their confidence. Through PAR, however, persons elevate themselves and their communities by learning the trade of self-governance. They learn how to participate effectively in and master the process of investigating themselves and inventing policies, and thus begin to control their environment.

The important term at this point is authentic participation (Fals Borda 1988). Indeed, often participation is illusory. Community members, for example, may be asked to participate within well-defined limits, or given responsibilities that are incidental to a project. Often the necessary training is unavailable, but perhaps worst of all participation may be used to merely monitor these persons. When participation is understood in these ways, community members often become frustrated, disillusioned, and withdraw from projects.

To use an older term that is part of the legacy of community-based research, community members can become "organic intellectuals," if participation is authentic (Gramsci 1971); that is, they are able to become the indigenous experts who are entrusted to train and guide others. In this sense, a methodology not only generates knowledge but disseminates expertise and builds the skill base of a community, while persons who have been deprived may begin to realize their

abilities and rights (McKnight 1995). These persons can thus break the cycle of dependency by acquiring the knowledge and abilities necessary to be autonomous. PAR, in this sense, teaches valuable political lessons about the benefits derived from participation.

Conclusion

Those who undertake research or planning in communities often make a crucial error. Specifically, they use traditional methodologies that are slightly changed and adapted to a community setting. Sampling strategies, for example, may be modified to reflect a local anomaly, or questionnaires translated into the native language of the respondents. Focus groups, accordingly, may be used so that a community is consulted in an in-depth manner. But in any honest attempt to become community-based these changes are insufficient.

To become community-based a boundary is crossed that is considered to be anathema to traditional methodology. In short, those who are studied guide an investigation or project (Fals Borda 1996). Usually, such a maneuver would be considered a major breach of protocol. Questions about value-freedom and validity are raised immediately, due to the involvement of these persons. After all, in typical projects those who are studied are expected to be observed in a dispassionate manner.

Dualism provides the rationale for this view of acquiring information. Professionals are trained sufficiently to cast aside the fears critics may have about bias or manipulation. These experts are presumed to have transcended personal interests and, thus, merely present findings. Due to their status, the integrity of research is seldom called into question, although methodological shortcomings may be sometimes raised.

This outlook of traditional methodology contributes to the inaction of communities. Persons who are not tainted by questionable motives or other modes of subjectivity, such detached intellectuals or technocrats, are entrusted to make changes, while communities are dismissed and sometimes humiliated during the planning process (Rahman 1985). Communities able to verify the knowledge used, in the form of an intervention, can initiate changes at their own pace and move in a favorable direction.

The usual distinction made at this juncture is that community-based researchers do not speak for but with communities (Watkins and Schulman 2008, p. 293). Although this description is interesting, and may represent an improvement over traditional methodologies, the idea is inaccurate. Specifically, in community-based research communities speak for themselves; there is not necessarily a compromise reached between these parties, for example, that enables a community to speak. A community's guidance of a project allows the narrative of these persons about health and illness, for example, to become prominent. Obviously there is nothing value-free about this process.

However, the philosophy that supports community-based planning and interventions treats claims about value-freedom as pure fantasy. Dualism is passé, because

human *praxis*, or in this case participation, is always operative (Fals Borda 1987). The task, therefore, is not to avoid engaging social reality but in the correct manner. In participatory action research, the point is to let the reality of a community emerge through dialogue. Over time, and through their authentic involvement in research or a project, the paramount reality created by the members of a community can be corroborated and correctly interpreted. Any attempt at distortion or manipulation will be detected through this process, including the erroneous application of any findings, due to the transparent nature of this undertaking. Indeed, this activity includes the persons who will suffer if this misbehavior is tolerated. Reliable information is thus within reach.

Those who champion the need for dualism have simply declared that such an outcome is impossible—the inclusion of subjectivity, according to this tradition, cannot produce reliable results or claims. But in everyday life the veracity of statements is confirmed, in the midst of competing interpretations, without the employment of absolute standards. The central factor is that persons look past their own views and try to take the perspectives of others into account (Fals Borda 1991). When this kind of participation is encouraged the results are very promising. The participation that is vital to PAR is designed to achieve this aim. Participatory action research, therefore, operates according to a simple principle: dialogue is possible and trustworthy information can be acquired when authentic participation is fostered.

Equally important is the political side of PAR. Not only is better information available, but also communities engage in critique and self-examination. How knowledge is used, accordingly, is elevated in importance. Those who have blocked a community's growth, for example, suddenly receive critical attention, along with policies or practices that may have been detrimental. As a result of authentic participation, PAR can be part of a long-term growth process that promotes community autonomy. Knowledge and action are thus united through participatory action research that goes far beyond the usual discussions of methodology.

In the end, persons are not passive in the research process. Particularly noteworthy is that they are not simply studied. Additionally, they are not pushed along by a project, subservient to experts, dominated by findings, or bombarded by policies. As community-members participate fully in a project, they have control over all of these aspects of research and policy making. In addition to providing an appropriate cognitive map of a project, any results are interpreted by a community and put into practice in a socially relevant way. Pertinent policies are thus thought to be well with reach by adopting this research orientation.

References

Ahmed, S. M., Beck, B., Maurana, C. A., & Newton, G. (2004). Overcoming barriers to effective community-based participatory research in US medical schools. *Education Health, 17*(2), 141–151.

Argyris, C., & Schön, D. A. (1989). Participatory action research and action science compared: A commentary. *American Behavioral Scientist, 32*(5), 612–623.

Austin, D. M. (1983). The Flexner myth and the history of social work. *Social Service Review, 57*(3), 357–377.

Avison, D., Lau, F., Myers, M., & Nielsen, P. A. (1999). Action research. *Communications of the ACM, 42*(1), 94–97.
Bauman, Z. (1978). *Hermeneutics and social science: Approaches to understanding*. London: Hutchinson.
Berg, B. L. (2001). *Qualitative methods for the social sciences*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1966). *The social construction of reality*. Garden City: Doubleday.
Blumer, H. (1969). *Symbolic interactionism: Perspective and method*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Brennan, G. (1997). Selection and the currency of reward. In R. E. Goodin (Ed.), *The Theory of Institutional Design* (pp. 256–276). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bryant, C. G. A. (1985). *Positivism in social theory and research*. NY: St. Martin's Press.
Brydon-Miller, M. (1997). Participatory action research: Psychology and social change. *Journal of Social Issues, 53*(4), 657–666.
Cicourel, A. V. (1964). *Method and measurement*. NY: The Free Press.
Denzin, N. K. (2003). *Performance ethnography: Critical pedagogy and the politics of culture*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Fals Borda, O. (1987). The application of participatory action research in Latin America. *International Sociology, 2*(4), 329–347.
Fals Borda, O. (1988). *Knowledge and people's power*. NY: New Horizons Press.
Fals Borda, O. (1991). Some basic ingredients. In O. Fals Borda & M.A. Rahman (Eds.), *Action and knowledge: Breaking the monopoly with participatory action research* (pp. 3–12). New York: The Apex Press.
Fals Borda, O. (1996). Power/knowledge and emancipation. *Systems Practice, 9*(2), 177–181.
Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/knowledge*. NY: Pantheon Books.
Freire, P. (1972). *Pedagogy of the oppressed*. NY: Continuum.
Freire, P. (1981). The people speak their word: Learning to read and write in São Tomé and Principe. *Harvard Educational Review, 51*(1), 27–30.
Gilgun, J. F. (2005). The four cornerstones of evidence-based practice in social work. *Research on Social Work Practice, 15*(1), 52–61.
Gouldner, A. (1970). *The coming crisis of western sociology*. NY: Basic Books.
Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections from the prison notebooks*. NY: International Publishers.
Gubrium, J. F. (2009). *Analyzing narrative reality*. Thousand Oakes: Sage.
Heron, J., & Reason, P. (1997). A participatory inquiry paradigm. *Qualitative Inquiry, 3*(3), 274–294.
Hesse, M. (1970). Is there and independent observation language? In R. G. Colodny (Ed.), *The nature and function of scientific theories* (pp. 35–77). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh.
Hughes, J., & Sharrock, W. (1997). *The philosophy of social research*. NY: Longman.
Israel, B. A., Schultz, A. J., Parker, E. A., & Becker, A. D. (1998). Review of community-based research: Assessing partnership approaches to improve public health. *Annual Review of Public Health, 19,* 173–202.
Kovach, M. (2009). *Indigenous methodologies: Characteristics, conversations, and context*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Lake, R. W. (1993). Planning and applied geography: Positivism, ethics, and geographic information systems. *Progress in Human Geography, 17*(3), 404–413.
Leiss, W., & Powell, D. A. (2004). *Mad cows and mother's milk: The perils of poor risk communication*. Montreal: McGill and Queen's University Press.
Leitz, C. A., & Zayas, L. E. (2010). Evaluating qualitative research for social work practitioners. *Advances in Social Work, 11*(2), 188–202.
McKnight, J. L. (1995). *The careless society and its counterfeits*. NY: Basic Books.
McTaggert, R. (1991). Principles for participatory action research. *Adult Education Quarterly, 41*(3), 168–187.
Merzel, C., & D'Afflitti, M. C. (2003). Reconsidering community-based health promotion: Promise, performance, and potential. *American Journal of Public Health, 93*(4), 557–574.
Meyer, J. (2000). Using qualitative methods in health related action research. *BMJ, 320,* 178–181.
Miller, N. (1994). Participatory action research: Principles, politics, and possibilities. *New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education, 63,* 69–80.

Miller, P. M., Brown, T., & Hopson, R. (2011). Cantering love, hope, and trust in the community: Transformative urban leadership informed by Paulo Freire. *Urban Education, 46*(5), 1078–1099.
Mills, C. W. (1959). *The sociological imagination*. NY: Oxford University Press.
Minkler, M. (2005). Community-based research partnerships: Challenges and opportunities. *Journal of Urban Health, 82*(2), 312.
Montero, M. (2000). Participation in participatory action research. *Annual Review of Critical Psychology, 2,* 131–143.
Payne, J. (1999). *Researching health needs*. Thousand Oakes: Sage.
Pollner, M. (1991). Left of ethnomethodology: The rise and decline of radical reflexivity. *American Sociological Review, 56*(3), 370–380.
Prilleltensky, I. (2003). Understanding, resisting, and overcoming repression: Toward a psychopolitical validity. *American Journal of Community Psychology, 31*(1/2), 195–201.
Rahman, M. A. (1985). Theory and practice of participatory action research. In O. Fals Borda (Ed.), *The challenge of social change* (pp. 107–132). Beverly Hills: Sage.
Rahman, M., & Fals-Borda, O. (1991). A self review of PAR. In O. Fals-Borda & M. A. Rahman (Eds.), *Action and knowledge: Breaking the monopoly with participatory action research* (pp. 24–36). NY: Apex Books.
Rahman, M., & Fals-Borda, O. (1996). La situación actual y las perspectivas De la investigación-acción participativa en el mundo. *Comunicación, 94,* 14–20.
Reid, W. J. (1994). The empirical practice movement. *Social Service Review, 68*(2), 165–184.
Sampson, R. J. (2012). *Great American city*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Watkins, M., & Schulman, H. (2008). *Toward psychologies of liberation*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
White, S. (1997). Beyond retroduction?—Hermeneutics, reflexivity, and social work Practice. *British Journal of Social Work, 27*(5), 739–753.

Chapter 7
The Conceptual Flow of a Community-Based Project

Introduction

The point of this chapter is to engage in what is often called a "gedankenexperiment" or thought experiment (Irvine 1991). The goal of this exercise is to provide a mental image of an activity to be undertaken, in this case the planning and implementation of a social intervention. Since these plans are imaginary or hypothetical, many options can be entertained; a wide variety of variations are possible. In a way, this mental game represents a simulation, but without the technological apparatus.

But this exercise should not provide recipes for planning. In fact, following the format supplied by a cookbook would violate the basic philosophy of community-based planning. Planning is not disorganized but also should not follow a strict regimen. Adhering to an a priori schedule would likely reify the planning process and hardly help a community.

For this reason, the term "conceptual flow" is used to perform this task. A community-based project, in other words, has certain components that are often connected in a particular manner. Nonetheless, these connections do not necessarily form a fixed system. Such a portrayal would be too narrow and confining. A flow is a better descriptive, since this image suggests the presence of contingencies and various alternatives.

The thrust of a thought experiment is to promote serious reflection on the key elements of any process. Critique and systematic variations are proposed. A community-based intervention, accordingly, is revealed to consist of a confluence of choices that carry a project to fruition (Patton 1997). Many shifts, deviations, and dead-ends are experienced. But this constellation of choices is sufficiently organized to guide a project.

For example, the first step relates to gaining entrée to a community, while the next usually involves identifying a problem or a need. The planners should see the logic in this sequence. After all, what a community wants is important and should initiate a project (Montero 1996)! On the other hand, these focal points are elusive. That is, each one represents a consideration that must be rethought in light of the philosophy that supports community-based planning, that is, the exercise of *praxis*

J. W. Murphy, *Community-Based Interventions,* International Perspectives on Social Policy, Administration, and Practice, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4899-8020-5_7,

throughout a project. In this sense, the biography of a community serves as the final arbiter of these considerations and how planning should proceed.

The temptation might be, however, to outline or prescribe the steps in organizing a project. In many discussions of planning, such a formula or template is provided, sometimes referred to as the "logic model" (Scarinci et.al. 2009). Those who aspire to engage in community-based planning are often led down the traditional and, likely, erroneous path of creating a project. Nonetheless, there is something logical about planning. Establishing a project makes little sense, for example, until the needs of a community are articulated and guide an intervention. But equally important is who defines knowledge and determines how this information should be used.

But of course, the question is: What is a community or a need? Reflection on these nodal points of this flow is important, if a project is to be considered community-based. How these initial issues are addressed has an impact on the following consideration, and so forth. A conceptual flow is thus established, whereby the planners can envision that program development is logical, but with each element contingent on further reflection.

Although community-based planning is not planning in the traditional sense—following well-established and exact guidelines—this activity is not necessarily haphazard (Minkler et al. 2003). A general flow is present, but with serious reflection at every key juncture. A project begins with the community, yet this group is not simply found or confronted. Likewise, the needs of a community are not merely absences that are simply discovered. Nonetheless, community-based interventions should be designed to fulfill the demands of communities. In this regard, an obvious connection exists between these two elements.

Consistent with the principles of community entrée and liberation, participation has a lot to do with filling in the logic of planning an intervention. This conceptual flow, accordingly, is not a priori in the usual sense but an ongoing construction. But a general orientation still exists—program development does flow in a particular direction.

To borrow from Herbert Blumer (1969, pp. 147–148), the conceptual flow that guides a community-based project is "sensitizing" in nature. What is important about this designation is that while the logic of planning lacks objective benchmarks, a project is provided with a "direction." General guidance is provided, instead of specific definitions and referents. But by working through the planning process and fostering the requisite participation, the specifics of this logic can be filled in gradually and accurately.

This sensitizing activity is made more specific through this process. Any vagueness, in other words, is clarified through community participation. Key elements, such as community or need, are corroborated and clarified as this movement intensifies. The reflection that haunts this logic, accordingly, reveals the need for the contextualization that provides clarity. The general flow of the planning process is brought into line with a community over time. In the end, critical reflection works to prevent the conceptual flow from masking or overlooking a community.

The problem that is being addressed with this notion of the conceptual flow is that a planner always begins somewhere—a cognitive map is always in operation, sometimes one that deviates from the community in question. Community-based planners, accordingly, must be experts in the sense suggested by Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus (1986, pp. 16–51). As opposed to so-called rational experts who strive to dominate and control a project, the persons envisioned by these authors are not dogmatic but flexible and know when certain rules should be abandoned and others adopted. Hence, they understand when their initial conceptions are irrelevant. Through a conceptual flow community-based experts have a logic that becomes grounded in a community through on-going reflection and participation.

Envisioning a Community

Clearly, a community-based project always begins with a community. Therefore, the first reflection will deal with this consideration. Thus far, the point has been stressed that the identity of a community is quite elusive. A community embodies a confluence of perspectives that stabilizes as a unique identity (Weisenfeld 1996). Therefore, if limited to empirical features a community will likely be overlooked. For this reason, social indicators have limited utility in understanding a community.

Communities are never found or discovered. Describing contact with a community as an encounter may be more revealing, but this association is never simply a meeting. In truth, communities are probably engaged. Nonetheless, this integration does not resemble a set of gear-wheels or anything else that is tightly knit. This process is not so precise or definitive.

This reflection, therefore, will focus on the act of engagement. What is important when attempting to enter into this dialogue with a community? Probably the most significant consideration, from the perspective of contemporary writers, is that this activity begins *in media res*, or in the "middle" of this process.

What this phrase means in this context is that dialogue never has a clear beginning. Both the planners and communities have a history or biography, along with a range of conceptual and other commitments. As writers such as Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975, p. 272) note, every dialogue begins with "prejudices." Specifically, various cultural and other positions have been staked out that orient a dialogue that must somehow be reconciled, if an understanding is going to be achieved.

Engagement is not an encounter; dialogue, accordingly, is not merely an exchange. And although every community-based project is supposed to be built from the bottom-up, in effect, there is no bottom. All that really exists is the possible interaction and, thus, an intersection of biographies. But there is no starting point for this process where everyone has a similar orientation.

A better way to conceptualize this process may be as a crossing of biographies. These respective perspectives, in fact, may clash initially. But gradually, through on-going interaction, the limits of the realities of both the planners and community members are revealed. When the influence of these initial preconceptions begins

to abate, the prospects for engagement begin to improve. Engagement, however, is neither contact nor enmeshment, but rather a type of mutual recognition. Not even reconciliation captures this event (Buber 1970).

Engagement may be better conceptualized as mutual confirmation. Instead of merely joining or reconciling disparate perspectives, the planners and communities begin to confirm one another. They interrogate their respective biographies in ways that enable them to appreciate how these stories may be misconstruing the perspectives of others. Engagement is thus more than meeting, but an interpretive process that fosters a subject-to-subject embrace (Levinas 1998). In this regard, engagement may not depict accurately how a community is entered. An embrace is much more delicate and nuanced than any process of engagement.

Clearly, this association is more profound than a partnership. That is, in this description dualism is still present. Two separate entities join forces or decide to merge their efforts. Nonetheless, due to this separation, their interests may begin to diverge. In a community-based project, on the other hand, all participants are members of the community where a study or project is undertaken and support one another. This understanding is crucial to the success of a community-based project: The planners and a community are not distinct, but are part of the unique reality where a project is inaugurated. A community-based project, in this sense, should not be seen as the outcome of an agreement reached among partners. Rather, engagement confirms the solidarity that unites persons, including the planners with communities.

Engagement as Communication

Engagement is communication. The next reflection, accordingly, is directed to exploring this issue. Nowadays such an examination may be especially important, since communication is such a widely used term. Everyone is thought to be communicating, for example, because they are in contact with one another through the use of the most advanced technology. Communication is thus possible with persons who are thousands of miles away with the move of a finger.

The key message of this trend is that communication consists mostly of contact between persons (Nelson 1980, pp. 10–12). A part of this connection is the exchange of information. Communication, therefore, is translated to involve meeting, perhaps through various means simultaneously. In community planning, these contacts may involve face-to-face discussions or public forums. The point of each method is to develop rapport between the planners and a community.

The resulting contacts are presumed to promote the exchange of vital data. Indeed, these exchanges are often characterized as providing the communication that is necessary for the planners and communities to coordinate their outlooks. The conclusion that many planners come to is that a plethora of communication channels should be opened with a community. In fact, the more the better!

The problem is that this policy is based on a very restricted view of communication. This rendition is referred to as the sender–receiver model (Fisk 1982). According to this portrayal, communication consists of sending a message to someone along a line. This exchange is thought to improve if noise or distortion is removed from a transmission. Typical remedies, for example, include trying to eliminate ambiguity or increase redundancy. What these solutions require in practical terms are more messages and ways of communicating. Along with phone calls or e-mail messages, for example, notes could be sent through the mail. Communicating with a community, therefore, should be organized around a variety of these and other methods that are more personal.

But from a community-based perspective, this model overlooks a crucial element. That is, persons do not merely internalize but create or construct information. Communication, accordingly, should not be viewed as merely a process of transmission and reception (van Ruler 2004). As might be expected, such an empirical characterization does not include interpretation and, thus, is problematic.

There is no doubt that communication is necessary to assess properly the needs of a community. Social indicators can be used for this purpose—empirical illustrations of need—but as noted in the earlier chapters, minimal insight is gained from this strategy. More communicative approaches are thus often adopted, such as community meetings, focus groups, and public presentations. The idea is that these methods are based on interpersonal contact and facilitate communication in ways that are impossible for empirical indicators.

But the sender–receiver model reduces communication to a technical matter. Specifically, increased contact is assumed to lead to the exchange of more information. Nonetheless, what is overlooked is how participation influences how information is viewed. If persons construct information, rather than simply respond to in-put, how can communication be conceptualized in a more profitable manner?

What should be remembered from the previous section is that social life always begins in the middle, including communication. Persons bring with them an interpretive background, or biography, that serves to filter and interpret all messages; messages are both selected and given meaning (Fainstein 2000). The trick to successful communication, therefore, is not merely the transmission of data but achieving mutual understanding. As Orlando Fals Borda (1988, p. 80) remarks on this issue, planners should become attuned to the “intentional language” of community members. In this way, what he calls a shared communication may be achieved.

Contact, in this sense, is merely a prelude to communication; open communication channels merely allow information to be conveyed. What is more important, at least from a community-based perspective, is that persons achieve a similar interpretation of a transmission. Real communication, accordingly, requires understanding how a message will be interpreted by a recipient (Fortune 1981). Once insight is gained into how messages are constructed by others, a real connection can be said to exist. In other words, access is available to the reality constructed though communication.

Community-based planners and communities, accordingly, need to go beyond opening communication channels in order to understand each other. This metaphor misrepresents this process. Rather, planners and communities are involved in a sort of dance when they are trying to communicate. They must keep maneuvering, in short, until they interpret each other correctly (Habermas 1990). Exactly when this end is reached is difficult to predict. Give and take continues until they believe they have reached each other, although the process of cross-checking messages never ends. Clearly this process is sloppy and uncertain, even after understanding is believed to have been reached.

From a community-based perspective, the sender–receiver model ignores the cultural side of communication. The notion of channels is very sterile. What is missing, in a practical sense, is how social class, power, ambition, and other factors influence how a biography is constructed, how messages are interpreted and, therefore, how mutual understanding occurs. Hence, instead of focusing on contact, a far better strategy may be to consider how different biographies may lead to clashes of interpretation and miscommunication. Indeed, elimination of this slippage between interpretations is vital to securing real communication.

Need and Aspiration

Most interventions are designed to provide some sort of service or a corrective for a problem. In this regard, typical planners believe that such projects should begin with a so-called needs assessment (Rossi et al. 1979, pp. 86–120). A community is thus canvassed using a variety of methodological techniques, in order to discover whether certain problems exist. The presence of these issues, such as drug use or mental illness, is thought to be indicative of needs. In other words, improvements are needed.

The thrust of this reflection, accordingly, is the status of a need. If a community exhibits health problems, these data may be used to justify the creation of a health center. With the proper qualifications and fit, such a project may fulfill the needs of this community. The logic at this juncture is that needs establish the criteria for guiding an intervention (Witkin and Altschuld 1995). Questionnaires, interviews, or focus groups, for example, are often used to identify these needs.

The problem, however, is the manner in which needs are regularly conceptualized (Thompson 1987). A community, in short, is thought to lack something. In this sense, needs are absences. A community in need is viewed to be deficient and unable to supply basic requirements. In a real way, a need represents deprivation. A community that has an abundance of illnesses, for example, has many health needs. Such a community lacks many of the dimensions that support health.

In order to modify this approach, “strengths analysis” has become quite popular in planning circles (Kretzmann and McKnight 1996). The idea is to focus on the positive and not simply the negative aspects of a community. The aim of this change is to foster community uplift and to suggest that even troubled neighborhoods have

resources and are not necessarily chaotic. Likewise, these communities are not automatically dependent by nature but can engage in self-help. The point is that all communities have strengths that are obscured by typical definitions of need (Carpenter 2009).

Clearly this change is welcome. Communities that have needs are not hopeless places where remedies are unlikely. Indeed, a foundation exists—such as viable institutions and motivated persons—that can be used to launch correctives. From a community-based perspective, however, further reflection must be directed to the concept of need. The problem is that even according to the strengths approach, communities are still thought to *have* or possess needs (Marcel 1949; Fromm 1979).

For quite some time, various writers have questioned the appropriateness of describing needs in this manner (Thompson 1987). When persons or communities are described as having needs, dualism seems to come into play. Needs, accordingly, are given the appearance of characteristics or traits. And with this maneuver, they are transformed easily into objective features. When this outcome occurs, certain properties can be thought of as basic or fundamental to the well-being of a community. Needs are not preferences or the result of choices, but are thought of as natural.

The aim of the needs assessment is to document the presence of these traits. For this reason, indicator analysis is often a part of a standard needs assessment (Witkin and Altschuld 1995). Certain empirical features, stated simply, are thought to illustrate the degree to which a need pervades a community. Establishing the degree of deprivation is assumed to be the outcome of a successful evaluation of need, and thus aids in the formulation of a proper corrective.

Documenting the various illnesses present in a community may be helpful, and even prompt further investigation, but no one simply has needs or, for that matter, any other trait (Marcel 1949). That is, needs are neither absences nor objective properties, but arise from definitions about an acceptable life. Desires, ambitions, and hopes, for example, play a large role in determining whether a community experiences a need. A need is not a lack but the result of a projection; a need does not represent depletion but the inability to fulfill certain aspirations. Something that is missing cannot be detected as an absence in a community's biography. In short, needs are not easily circumscribed.

As a result, in a community-based assessment, needs are not discovered or unearthed. As opposed to an empirical property, needs emerge from what individuals or communities believe is possible or can be achieved. A health need begins to arise, for example, when persons begin to recognize that a situation is abnormal or unacceptable and can be remedied. A need, in this regard, is enmeshed in a desire that is pursued. In other words, a need is tied closely to "expectation" (Onyett 2003, p. 14). What persons or communities believe is necessary but missing establishes the base-line for assessing need.

The recognition of needs, therefore, is a process of creation. No one has needs but creates these omissions that spawn action. A community-based needs assessment, accordingly, should focus on the interaction that brings certain unfulfilled

expectations to prominence, rather than traits that all communities are presumed to possess but some may lack. How communities invent themselves has everything to do with their perception of need.

Collaboration or Consultation

The key point throughout this book is that participation is central to a community-based intervention. A corollary to this principle is that community-based projects foster the agency of communities (Arnstein 1969). This reflection, accordingly, pertains to the subtleties of collaboration between a planner and community that are not often appreciated. The general idea, however, is that collaboration is not necessarily synonymous with a joint venture. The idea that a university or a nongovernmental organization (NGO) and a local service center might decide to work together, for example, does not lead automatically to real collaboration.

Nowadays, terms such as partnership, friendship, teamwork, bridge-building, and stakeholder are used to describe the association that is expected to exist between the planners and communities (Fraser 2005). The basic theme is that equity should prevail between the participants in a project. In the past, community members would be subject to the hierarchy imposed and marginalized by outside experts. The resulting exclusion was understood to be insulting, alienating, and detrimental to projects. As a result, authentic partnerships should be formed between those who are involved in a project, so that communities are not manipulated in this process (Windle and Cibulka 1981).

This change would both reduce the resentment on the part of a community and improve the planning process. But care must be taken to insure that consultation is not mistaken for collaboration. Particularly important is that a stakeholder is not necessarily a partner during a consultation. Many NGOs, for example, provide services and training to communities but little collaboration exists. Obligatory meetings and planning sessions are convened, with interaction that could hardly be called collaborative.

True collaboration requires the complete democratization of the planning process. Gray (1989) describes this activity as a "mutual search for information and solutions." Indeed, consultation does not even consider this principle. Nonetheless, in order for a project to be considered inclusive and truly collaborative, this democratization requires that all barriers to full participation be removed (Lasker and Weiss 2003). This attack on these impediments must occur on two levels: interpersonal and symbolic.

Most planners immediately recognize the first condition. That is, many of the communities where projects are undertaken are poor and have been marginalized. As a result, many of these persons lack the abilities and resources to form a real collaborative relationship with the planners. Care is taken to reach out to these persons and include them in meetings and other forums. The planners often devote a

significant amount of effort trying to be open, inviting, and encourage participation, even to the point of becoming paternalistic.

But even when these efforts are somewhat successful, another dimension of democratization is not regularly addressed. This facet refers to the symbolic exclusion that often persists after community members begin to attend meetings and respond to other invitations to participate in planning sessions. Due to past discrimination terrific biases may continue to exist with regard to these persons not being viewed as having the ability or desire to make important contributions to societal affairs. In some circles, this suppression is referred to as "symbolic violence" (Bourdieu 1990, pp. 84–85). Real democratization, therefore, requires that this condition be resolved so that valid knowledge and motivation are not limited to certain communities or segments of a community.

Often, the planners overlook this side of collaboration. Nonetheless, due to their continued stigmatization, certain communities may believe that their insights are unimportant, or simply lack the confidence to make public statements or enter into projects. The planners, on the other hand, may think that particular groups cannot articulate their problems or are unable to follow sophisticated instructions. The result of these assumptions is that symbolic barriers are erected to a full citizen participation in community projects (Cahill 2007).

In order for real collaboration to happen, the entire culture of a project must be democratized. Unless this change occurs, even the best of intentions can go awry. On the one hand, the agency of persons will not be facilitated, since their participation is considered to be suspect before their ideas are presented or discussed. On the other hand, due to intimidation, their participation may involve merely confirming the proposals of experts or local officials. In either case, collaboration is nothing more than consultation, whereby obligatory contacts are made with a community.

The second half of this issue, as should be noted, is not necessarily solved by introducing the Delphi or other techniques designed to foster input from marginalized persons (Linstone and Turoff 1975). These strategies try to insure that everyone gets to speak and offer an opinion at a community forum or meeting. However, the problem with symbolic violence is that certain segments of a community may be stigmatized to the extent that that their contributions are viewed to be inherently without any merit. They are either seen as untrustworthy or unskilled and, thus, their input is simply dismissed as unimportant. Acquiring their input, accordingly, does not mean that anyone will listen to what they have to say. Young (2000, pp. 53–57) refers to this outcome as "internal exclusion."

Those who work in communities usually understand half of this issue, that is, interaction patters must be altered so that avenues become available for community participation. The symbolic side, however, is more difficult to remedy. In this regard, community-based planners must be sensitive to the damage caused by past practices that have resulted in the erection of symbolic barriers. Care must be taken, for example, to insure that ideas are not dismissed because they originate from a particular segment of a community. Likewise, certain persons must not be discredited due to their history. In community-based planning, both of these sides of exclusion must be addressed to promote real collaboration.

Projects as Symbols

Following an assessment of need, a project is usually formulated and implemented. As part of a collaborative effort, this intervention should be integrated into a community (McLeroy et. al. 2003). But is integration the best way to describe this process, especially from a community-based perspective? This portrayal sounds very formal and mechanical, given the constructionist nature of a community. Is the point, for example, to find the proper niche or audience for a project in a community? Such a strategy does not sound very collaborative but tactical.

The proper integration of a project, accordingly, might simply involve the widespread dissemination of information about this undertaking (Leithwood and Montgomery 1980). Accordingly, a community is simply bombarded by messages through various media. How thoroughly a community has been saturated by these messages becomes an important issue. Nonetheless, the obvious question is whether a community is engaged through these tactics. But clearly the real diffusion of information is not necessarily based on this principle, since emphasis is placed on merely the dispersion of messages to certain targets. Simply disseminating information, in other words, does not necessarily result in community engagement.

A project, accordingly, should not be viewed as simply introduced into a community. Instead of an introduction, this activity is more like creating a presence. Indeed, community members must be attracted to a project; they must see the value and utility of such an intervention (Patton 1997). Any serious reflection, must move beyond the idea that a project is primarily a program of services, training, or other correctives that must be disseminated through a community. In this regard, a community-based planner realizes that a project is basically symbolic.

In the end, an intervention is not merely a program. This image is simply not sufficiently dynamic. Most important is that the interpretive dimension is missing. A program is not only planned, constructed, and implemented, but must interact with a community. A project, in other words, must become a part of the biography of this group.

What this advice suggests, stated simply, is that a project must enter into a successful dialogue with a community. A profitable way to conceptualize an intervention is to view a project as a mode of communication. After all, before any intervention becomes successful, such a project must send proper messages to a community and be receptive to counterproposals. In other words, a project must learn to interact competently.

In effect, a project is an entreaty and an announcement. Beyond an organization, regimen of treatment, or training curriculum, a program is an invitation. Thus, under what conditions are the members of a community likely to accept advice or help? Most likely these and other services will be adopted when sufficient rapport has been developed with these persons.

But often rapport is understood to be a vehicle used merely to gain visibility and acceptance for a program. Time and money are spent regularly, trying to convince a community that an intervention is available and appropriate. As a result, a project is

not treated as an expression that is part of the dialogue that builds rapport. Instead, an intervention is simply sold to a community through a variety of communicative techniques.

If understood as a mode of interaction, or symbolic, a project will have a better chance of bonding with a community. But in order to communicate effectively, like any attempt at real interaction, a program must convey the impression that the intended interlocutor is respected, has something important to say, and will be enriched by this discourse.

Jurgen Habermas (1970) refers to this pragmatic side of communication as "communicative competence." What he wants to suggest is that communication has a very important symbolic dimension. Those who can interact in a competent manner understand the logic that persons use to organize their daily lives. In this sense, communication is not simply a matter of seeking precision and clarity. Such technical considerations, according to Habermas, overlook that persons bestow meaning on their lives and surroundings. Anyone who hopes to communicate effectively to others must appreciate this background information, if a message is going to make sense and have any chance of acceptance.

A program, in this sense, is an interlocutor. Based on Habermas' advice, a project must use the proper language, exhibit sensitivity, and interpret signals in a relevant way, if communication is going to take place. Here, again, the sender–receiver model is defunct. As a result of thinking about an intervention as symbolic, a project can be viewed as a medium for interacting with a community, rather than merely a collection of services or other enticements. In other words, a project is a message that must be conveyed to a community with active participants in mind, who expect to be part of a real and productive discourse.

Objectives and Impact

Projects are expected to achieve some ends. After creating an intervention, what Patton (1997, pp. 147–175) calls the game of defining goals begins. In this regard, every project is presumed to have a purpose that can be clearly articulated. The general idea is that any behavior, even organizational actions, can be defined more or less precisely (Keating and Keating 1981) If a single goal is inadequate to capture the thrust of a project, multiple or a chain of goals can be proposed.

But the question is not whether one or more goals are better (Barlas and Yasarcan 2006). Likewise, the issue of relevant stakeholders does not necessarily capture the problem at this juncture. After all, definitions can be changed and relevant community members discovered to formulate appropriate goals. The focus of this reflection, instead, is whether projects have impact on persons. The problem is that this imagery conceals factors related to evaluation that are important to community-based planners.

From a community-based perspective, projects do not have impact. Stated simply, this sort of causal imagery obscures how the effects of an intervention are

mediated by a community's biography. Rather than trapped within a causal matrix—and capable of merely reacting to behavior or events—communities act, interpret, and select their responses to a project. Therefore, there is no impact, but instead a range of interpretations and judgments that may occur. The notion of impact suggests that the outcomes are unmediated by communities and almost natural but, certainly, merely reactive.

Community-based evaluations, accordingly, do not consist of merely assessing facts (Fetterman 1994). Consistent with the ubiquitous character of participation, evaluations are constructions like every other aspect of social existence. And in view of community-based philosophy, even the most rigorous measurements are basically conceptual. The issue, therefore, becomes: How are projects incorporated into the life of a community and judged? The potential of a project, accordingly, depends on the expectations of these persons. This constructed framework, in other words, filters the message of a project and determines whether an intervention has any value.

In this sense, impact is thoroughly pragmatic. Community-based planners, therefore, do not judge projects in terms of their impact, although their local influence is certainly important. The key difference for these planners is that impact suggests a passive relationship with a project. All interventions, nonetheless, are symbolic and enacted within a constructed reality, and thus all outcomes must be judged against how a community construes these projects (Cousins and Earl 1992). In a manner of speaking, projects do nothing; their presence and influence, in fact, are a product of community participation.

What community-based planners want to know is why a particular project was integrated into the biography of a community and others were not. Why did these persons accept the message of a particular project so that this intervention could have a modicum of success? These interpretive connections are especially important for understanding why a specific intervention is viewed to make sense and find support in a community. The focus on impact, in this regard, is simply too narrow to appreciate how an intervention functions to fulfill a need. These associations are found in the deep background of biography. Grasping this insight can lead to understanding why an intervention had some influence on a community. Put differently, why is a project compatible with the biography of a community? And as a result of this compatibility, why did a project produce certain results? Answering questions such as these extends beyond any empirical assessment of impact.

Program Evaluation

Once a project is fully operational, the next phase of planning consists usually of an evaluation. The purpose of this process is to provide sound evidence that an intervention is effective. In a manner of speaking, a "test" of a program's effectiveness is designed (Caro 1971). Evaluation instruments are constructed, data are collected

and analyzed, and feedback is provided. This assessment "system" serves to keep a project on track by offering correctives if problems are detected.

The so-called gold standard of this process is the implementation of an experimental design. But this level of assessment is seldom achieved (Rossi et al. 1979, pp. 183–194). Nonetheless, the alternatives are normally very empirical, with the intent of gathering data systematically. Methodological rigor and powerful statistical measures are often in force, in order to generate reliable findings.

Such rigor is deemed to be necessary, due to the significance of program evaluation. The results, in fact, are employed regularly to determine the fate of projects. Bias of any sort is unacceptable; any sloppiness in this regard is viewed as an attempt at manipulation in such a highly charged context. Therefore, objectivity is expected so that the success of an intervention can be determined.

As part of the ongoing methodological debate in the social sciences, some planners eschew this strategy (Patton 2002). What often occurs, accordingly, is that other, softer information is introduced to supplement these objective data. These so-called subjective insights are thought to be missing from empirical analyses and may aid in understanding the operation and effects of a project.

The argument at this juncture, however, is not that mixed-methods necessarily improve an evaluation. Community-based planners, instead, take this methodological reflection a step further. Their key point might well be: Findings do not exist! The fallout from this claim affects both quantitative and qualitative procedures but is very important to community-based planners.

What this declaration means, in effect, is that findings are produced and transformed into meaningful information. That is, findings do not exist in-themselves. For example, measurements are not neutral and merely reflect reality but conceptualize and portray the world in one way or another (Blalock 1984). Likewise, qualitative observations are always made from a perspective. In neither case is a value-free position available.

The general idea is that the entire evaluation process is a construction, influenced at every stage by judgments, interpretations, and other sources of prejudice (Pickering 1992). What this lack of objectivity means, in essence, is that data and any findings are manufactured rather than innocently discovered and displayed. For example, the identity, value, and range of applicability of data are intertwined with a host of cultural considerations. And like any cultural artifact, these elements are variable and constantly reinterpreted.

An important message associated with participatory action research (PAR) that may help to enlighten the evaluation process becomes relevant at this time. Simply put, data do not have any power! A community, on the other hand, has the ability to define data and use this input to manufacture facts that describe the influence of a program (Fals Borda 1988). Remember that participation guides PAR and the knowledge that is obtained. Evaluation, in this regard, does not consist simply of observation and the compilation of facts, but is really a discourse on the meaning and utility of this information.

A community-based planner, therefore, is not necessarily focused on the factual character of data. As might be expected, more important is the process whereby this information is constructed and made into valid evidence. How do communities, stated simply, define success or failure? This process provides insight into the judgments that are important to the perceived operation and success of a program, that is, the evidence of so-called impact. Community-based planners contend that this sort of background activity is crucial to making proper decisions about the future of an intervention. Whether or not an intervention is sustainable, for example, depends on how well a program is incorporated into the biography of a community.

Instead of the quality of data, the power of an evaluation resides with a community. Community-based planners, therefore, are concerned with how the entire evaluation process is produced or negotiated among community members. For example, how data become valid and, thus, paramount while other are designated to be irrelevant is an outgrowth of community action. Issues such as these are the focus of attention because they reveal the logic that sustains a project and how this reasoning is created and put into practice by a community. This rationale, furthermore, goes to the heart of why a project is thought to work or fail. In this sense, data say nothing without the interpretation provided by a community.

Sustainability

Since the late 1980s, the term sustainability has had widespread visibility. Every intervention, accordingly, should strive to be sustainable (Estes 1993). Programs are often evaluated in terms of whether they attain this goal. Interventions that are judged to be unsustainable are dismissed regularly as too expensive and, in the long-term, possibly destructive.

Although human and social aspects have been identified, sustainability refers usually to the biosphere and the economy (Seghezzo 2009). In this sense, emphasis is placed on cost, size, efficiency, and resource depletion. Measures of cost/effectiveness are constructed regularly to measure the viability of a project. In the end, the question becomes whether a project is worth the cost.

This focus, however, has been considered to be quite narrow among some critics. After all, neither nature nor the economy exists in a vacuum. In this regard, issues such as human and social capital were introduced to widen the formula to determine sustainability. In this sense, holism is thought to be desirable (Mosher 2010). What role do human factors, such as personal traits and social networks, play in supporting the “carrying capacity” of the broader environmental system? The assumption is that these human elements facilitate the coordination and improve the efficiency of any process. For example, human training and education can certainly increase productivity and an awareness of the implications of development. Hence including these social considerations in discussions about sustainability eventually came to be viewed as vital.

Nonetheless, aside from a few references to decentralized decision-making, most discussions of sustainability overlook an issue that is important to community-based planners. What carries a project forward, in their opinion, is community support. Although adequate funds and other resources are helpful, community participation and control result in sustained effort and commitment. If community members perceive themselves to be an essential part of a project, their commitment is almost interminable. Their continued enthusiasm, however, depends on real or authentic involvement, rather than simply operating on the periphery of a project.

This type of so-called buy-in was illustrated a long time ago in the field of small group research (Blumberg 1969). More recently, many management philosophies are based on these original investigations. As a result, participation is tied closely to worker motivation (Likert 1961). The fundamental discovery is that this involvement stimulates interest in and support for projects. When persons have responsibility for interventions, and believe that they will grow from their involvement, their commitment is sustained over the long-haul. They continue to make suggestions and work hard to improve a project, even when difficulties arise.

To many persons, community participation might sound like a nice idea, especially in a democratic society. This principle may even be morally appealing. But even the most cynical of persons should recognize the economic gains that result from participation, especially in an era when almost everyone is worried about the costs of social programs. Stated simply, community-based projects save money, due to improved efficiency and effectiveness (Alperovitz 2013).

Through participatory action research, for example, a community learns a variety of skills and becomes the key component of a project (Leung et al. 2004). This skill development accomplishes two important aims. First, projects become more efficient because the human element is improved. And second, this involvement spawns interest and long-term commitment. A project, therefore, has gained on two levels that result in the effective use of resources. Indeed, waste and inefficiency are not tolerated by those who believe that they own a project.

Furthermore, due to the emphasis placed on participation, community-based projects reflect the needs of communities. In this sense, communities get the programs that they want. As a result, these programs are used and not abandoned shortly after their construction. Hence, additional money does not have to be spent to replace an original mistake.

Community-based planners reflect on an aspect of sustainability that does not often receive adequate attention. That is, community control leads to extended commitments, both in terms of skill development and the use of resources (Pigg 2002). From a community-based perspective, in general, sustainability is not a technical matter, related solely, for example, to sufficient resources or funds. At the root of this issue, instead, are the values and commitments necessary to initiate and continue a particular relevant course of action. Although this point may seem obvious, community-based planners press this issue.

Conclusion

Similar to traditional approaches to planning, a community-based strategy adheres to a particular logic. Planning, in this sense, is strategic and tries to provide an overall picture of an intervention. Each step, however, is accompanied by reflection that brings a program close to a community.

Often, increased accountability is touted to result from this relationship. Most of the time, however, the focus of this idea is the authorities and only indirectly communities. For example, programs must be accountable to funders or tax payers. From a community-based orientation this usual focus is misplaced.

In community-based planning accountability is certainly important. Nonetheless, the usual emphasis is changed. Instead of authorities, communities become more accountable to themselves. Through participation, they engage in the action and reflection necessary to control a project, and begin to envision the progress made to achieving their goals. All resources, in this sense, are identified properly and used effectively when they are integrated into this collective vision. What could be more indicative of accountability, ask community-based planners, than a community monitoring its movement toward a clearly constructed and widely understood goal?

In this regard, community-based projects represent an ongoing exchange between participation and refection. While borrowing from traditional evaluation manuals, this process could be referred to as a planning cycle (Rossi et al. 1979, p. 58). And although program design and evaluation are involved, this process is more authentic than systematic. As a result, in community-based research this cycle is referred to as the "acting cycle" (MacDonald 2012).

Within the context of this new planning cycle, the term authentic has a specific meaning. Based on existential philosophy and altered somewhat by the work of Fals Borda (1988, pp. 88–89), authentic refers to the self-development that follows from fully examined and constructed choices. Through reflection, persons realize that reality embodies their actions; there is no destiny or purpose other than what they make. Their actions, including their language and other modalities of *praxis*, shape their world and future. Authentic participation, in this regard, allows persons to remove the barriers that might place limits on the direction they might desire to give a project.

An authentic intervention, accordingly, adheres to a plan, but one that communities invent. Consequently, care must be taken to insure that the content and flow of an intervention are attuned to the reality constructed by these persons. The unusual mixture of participation and reflection, referred to by Minkler (2005) as a "cyclical process of fact finding, action, and reflection," is concocted for this purpose. But in order to encourage authenticity, this reflection is grounded in the unfettered participation that is at the core of a community-based philosophy (Tsang 2007). As a result, the illusions supported by dualism—e.g., objectivity and realism—are exposed as illusory, and thus persons are able to act in the ways they find meaningful. An intervention that unfolds in this way can become community-based due to the authentic direction supplied by a community.

References

Alperovitz, G. (2013). *What then must we do*? White River Junction: Chelsea Green.

Arnstein, S. R. (1969). A ladder of participation. *Journal of the American Planning Asociation, 35*(4), 216–224.

Barlas, Y., & Yasarcan, H. (2006). Goal setting, evaluation, learning, and revision: A dynamic modeling approach. *Evaluation and Program Planning, 29*(1), 79–87.

Blalock, H. M. (1984). *Basic dilemmas in the social sciences*. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Blumberg, P. (1969). *Industrial democracy: The sociology of participation*. New York: Schocken.

Blumer, H. (1969). *Symbolic interactionism: Perspective and method*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Bourdieu, P. (1990). *In other words*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Buber, M. (1970). *I and thou*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Cahill, C. (2007). Afterword. *Environment and Planning, 39*(12), 2861–2865.

Caro, F. G. (1971). Issues in the evaluation of social programs. *Review of Educational Research, 41*(2), 87–114.

Carpenter, M. (2009). The capabilities approach and critical social policy: Lessons from the majority world? *Critical Social Policy, 29*(3), 351–373.

Cousins, J. B., & Earl, L. M. (1992). The case for participatory evaluation. *Educational Evaluation and Polity Analysis, 14*(4), 397–418.

Dreyfus, H. L., & Dreyfus, S. E. (1986). *Mind over machine*. New York: The Free Press.

Estes, R. J. (1993). Toward sustainable development: From theory to praxis. *Social Development Issues, 15*(3), 1–29.

Fainstein, S. S. (2000). New directions in planning theory. *Urban Affairs Review, 35*(4), 451–478.

Fals Borda, O. (1988). *Knowledge and people's power*. New York: New Horizons.

Fetterman, D. M. (1994). Empowerment evaluation. *American Journal of Evaluation, 15*(1), 1–15.

Fisk, J. (1982). *Introduction to communication studies*. London: Routledge.

Fortune, A. E. (1981). Communication processes in social work practice. *Social Service Review, 55*(1), 93–128.

Fraser, H. (2005). Four different approaches to community participation. *Community Development Journal, 40*(3), 286–300.

Fromm, E. (1979) *To have or to be*. London: Abacus.

Gadamer, H.-G. (1975). *Truth and method*. London: Sheed and Ward.

Gray, B. (1989). *Collaborating: Finding common ground for multi-party problems*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Habermas, J. (1970). Towards a theory of communicative competence. *Inquiry, 13*(1-4), 360–375.

Habermas, J. (1990). *Moral consciousness and communicative action*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Irvine, A. D. (1991). Thought experiments in scientific reasoning. In T. Horowitz & G. J. Massey (Eds.), *Thought experiments in science and philosophy* (pp. 149–165). Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Keating, B. P., & Keating, M. O. (1981). Goal setting and efficiency in social service agencies. *Long Range Planning, 14*(1), 40–48.

Kretzmann, J., & McKnight, J. P. (1996). Asset-based community development. *National Civic Review, 85*(4), 23–29.

Lasker, R. D., & Weiss, E. S. (2003). Broadening participation in community problem solving: A multidisciplinary model to support collaborative practice and research. *Journal of Urban Health, 80*(1), 14–48.

Leithwood, K. A., & Montgomery, D. J. (1980). Evaluating program implementation. *Evaluation Review, 4*(2), 193–214.

Leung, M. W., Yen, I. H., & Minkler, M. (2004). Community-based participatory research: A promising approach for increasing epidemiology's relevance in the 21st century. *International Journal of Epidemiology, 33*(3), 499–506.

Levinas, E. (1998). *Entre nous*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Likert, R. (1961). *New patterns of management*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Linstone, H. A., & Turoff, M. (1975). *The delphi method: Techniques and application*. Reading: Addison-Wesley.
MacDonald, C. (2012). Understanding participatory action research: A qualitative research methodology option. *Canadian Journal of Action Research, 13*(2), 34–50.
Marcel, G. (1949). *Being and having.* London: Dacre Press.
McLeroy, K. R., Norton, B. L., Kegler, M. C., Burdine, J. N., Sumaya, C. V. (2003). Community-based interventions. *American Journal of Public Health, 90*(4), 529–533.
Minkler, M. (2005). Community-based research partnerships: Challenges and opportunities. *Journal of Urban Health, 82*(2), 3–12.
Minkler, M., Blackwell, A. G., Thompson, M., & Tamir, H. (2003). Community-based participatory research: Implications for public health funding. *American Journal of Public Health, 93*(8), 1210–1213.
Montero, M. (1996). Parallel lives: Community psychology in Latin America and the United States. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, *24*(5), 689–605.
Mosher, C. R. (2010). A wholistic paradigm for sustainability: Are social workers experts or partners *Critical Social Work, 11*(3), 102–121.
Nelson, J. C. (1980). *Communication theory and social work practice*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Onyett, S. (2003). *Teamworking in mental health*. Hampshire: Palgrave.
Patton, M. Q. (1997). *Utilization-focused evaluation*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Patton, M. Q. (2002). *Qualitative research and evaluation methods*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Pickering, A. (1992). *Science as a practice and a culture*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Pigg, K. E. (2002). Three faces of empowerment: Expanding the theory of empowerment in community development. *Journal of the Community Development Society, 33*(1), 107–124.
Rossi, P. H., Freeman, H. E., & Wright, S. R. (1979). *Evaluation: A systematic approach*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Scarinci, I. C., Johnson, R. E., Hardy, C., Marron, J., & Partridge, E. E. (2009). Planning and Implementation of a participatory evaluation strategy: A viable approach in the evaluation of community-based participatory programs assessing cancer disparities. *Evaluation and Program Planning, 32*(3), 221–228.
Seghezzo, L. (2009). The five dimensions of sustainability. *Environmental Politics, 18*(4), 539–556.
Thompson, G. (1987). *Needs*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Tsang, N. M. (2007). Reflection as dialogue. *British Journal of Social Work, 37*(4), 681–694.
van Ruler, B. (2004). The communication grid: An introduction of a model of four communication strategies. *Public Relations Review, 30*(2), 123–143.
Windle, C., & Cibulka, J. G. (1981). A framework for understanding participation in community mental health services. *Community Mental Health Journal, 17*(1), 4–18.
Weisenfeld, E. (1996). The concept of "we": A community social psychology myth? *Journal of Community Psychology, 28*(4), 337–345.
Witkin, B. R., & Altschuld, J. W. (1995). *Planning and conducting needs assessments*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Young, I. M. (2000). *Inclusion and democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 8
Leadership from Below: A New Community Dynamic

Introduction

An important theme nowadays is that communities are seeking autonomy or self-determination. Due to the popularity of multiculturalism, for example, communities do not want to live in the shadows cast by other groups. Communities want to advance their own agendas, and have policies enacted that make sense locally (Young 2000). Everyone expects to participate fully, accordingly, in the formation and operation of key institutions and cultural practices. Also, the favoritism and exclusion of the past is no longer tolerated by most communities, as they strive for recognition and self-expression (Kymlicka 1995).

Therefore, planners operate in a fairly new but dynamic situation. Accordingly, a tough question relates to the issue of leadership. One the one hand, various critics argue that communities must be empowered and better organized. In fact, poorer communities are thought to be in special need of leadership training (Wilson 2009). The idea is that select persons can be identified that have the energy, insight, and ability to lift a community out of poverty and establish a program of sustained growth. After all, some critics claim that persons or groups that are well organized can make the financial system responsive to their needs.

But many communities are becoming suspicious of outside interventions, and thus are attracted to community-based programs. Their desire to be self-sufficient seems to contradict the usual view of leadership. How can leadership be taught without violating the principle of community autonomy? Indeed, presupposed by training is that communities lack the skills to be self-directed and must look to outside experts to remedy this situation. The issue is whether or not leadership should be viewed to be indigenous and who, within communities, should be considered to be leaders.

Furthermore, some communities are beginning to wonder whether associating leadership with a cabal of special persons is a good idea. Such an approach to leadership, according to some commentators, is inconsistent with the democratic organization of a society, and will likely stifle the initiative and autonomy of a community (Etzioni 1995). After all, in a democracy, a wide range of persons is supposed to supply guidance, and not simply a small cadre of political or economic elites or

J. W. Murphy, *Community-Based Interventions,* International Perspectives on Social Policy, Administration, and Practice, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4899-8020-5_8,

technical experts. In this regard, how can leadership be brought into line with desire for autonomy?

Civil society has become an important element in conceptualizing leadership anew (Baker 1998). As a result of reinvigorating this facet of society, the claim is that widespread participation can be encouraged and the traditional conception of leadership abandoned. Years of complacency will be reversed, along with the domination of special interests. The key issue is whether or not leadership is inconsistent with this more collective view of a community. In a truly communal setting should traditional leadership be encouraged, or must this idea be completely rethought?

Community-based planners must work within this new context. In many ways they are expected to promote broader, more inclusive views of leadership (Turner and Shera 2005). Because of the philosophy that sustains community-based planning, combined with the desires of many communities, leadership has to be reconsidered within the framework of entirely new social relations, where participation is the centerpiece of social existence. As a result, leadership should be decentered and possibly shared.

Without a doubt, leadership is an important issue to community-based planners. But they face a unique challenge. That is, although leadership is part of inspiring and directing a community, leaders must be both organic and unobtrusive. As the Zapatistas like to say, leaders learn to lead by following! In other words, these persons are expected to be effective but are not given special positions; they have some impact, but are basically unobtrusive. In effect, this leadership vanishes as communities recuperate or "regenerate" their ability to be self-directed (McKnight 1995). Community-based leaders become effective by becoming truly part of the group.

As might be expected, community-based leadership is certainly different from that of the past. In point of fact, some scholars have declared that communities have entered the era of "postheroic" leadership—leaders are neither special persons nor hail from unique social classes (Crevani et al. 2007). Although leaders have a function, their legitimacy emerges from unusual places. Without the introduction of a hierarchy, for example, leaders help communities to identify and organize themselves. The usual stable relationship between leader and follower is eclipsed in community-based practice by a more fluid outlook.

In effect, a type of "emergent coordination" arises (Block 2009, p. 86). Leaders disappear, in this sense, because they do not merely represent but are the community. In a unique manner, these persons emerge from civil society and proceed to redirect this community base, so that a particular project can come to fruition. In addition, through this activity there is no further need for leaders. The traditional task of encouraging leaders to rise above the rest is deemed obsolete. A key issue, however, is whether leadership jeopardizes the effectiveness of group life and action (Solansky 2008). After all, this process is associated typically with select persons and their ability to control a group.

The Rise of Civil Society

During the past 15 years or so, the term civil society has risen to prominence in an attempt to explain the current political and cultural situation (Foley and Edwards 1996). But this idea has a long heritage and, like most political concepts, can be traced back to the early Greeks. More recently, however, civil society is viewed to be the source of grassroots politics, resistance movements, and alternative economic arrangements. Furthermore, this theme has played a significant role in rethinking the nature of the community and leadership.

The debate surrounding the identity of civil society can be divided into two parts, labeled simply civil society I and II (Kaldor 2003). As will be revealed, the politics of each side are very different. The focus of civil society I is basically adaptation and advancement, while II has a more radical thrust. Particularly revealing is that rendition number two has been called "antipolitics."

The definition of civil society I identifies the family, neighborhood clubs, and interest groups to be indicative of this sphere. The history of this version includes writers such as Tocqueville, Locke, and more recently, Robert Putnam. In general, these groups are classified as voluntary or informal associations that provide a buffer against the intrusion of the state into social life (Foley and Edwards 1996). In addition, involvement in these groups is thought to provide socialization, instill civic virtues, and offer opportunities for assimilation and social mobility. In this sense, civil society I fosters the adaptation of persons to the prevailing institutions.

In more concrete terms, Putnam (2000) argues that these groups provide the "social capital" necessary for social advancement. In other words, access to important networks is provided by these associations that may lead to an initial job or other important contacts. Through these connections trust and bonds are established that enable persons to gain experience and demonstrate their skills. A writer such as Habermas (1996) suggests that civil society is a vehicle to launch persons into the public sphere. Indeed, those who take advantage of civil society have a competitive edge in their attempt to enter the larger social system.

Critics of this rendition argue that these so-called horizontal associations do not necessarily provide members with the means to control their lives (Arato and Cohen 1995). In fact, the point of civil society I is to provide access to powerful institutions that are beyond their control. And because these informal groups exist within a more dominant system, they lack power and are not self-regulating. In other words, they represent what some writers describe as micro places that can, at best, propitiate this larger sphere for recognition (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). According to this arrangement, civil society is in no position to demand anything from the larger society, but can simply encourage assimilation.

The basic premise of social capital theory is that persons do not control their institutions but must find a way to enter these organizations. If they know the right people and exhibit the proper demeanor, they might be allowed to participate in the prevailing institutions (Bourdieu 1986). But the wager they must make is precarious—they are asking for entry with no guarantee of acceptance. In this way, the

social capital thesis is a game of probabilities. The gatekeepers who determine access do not reside in civil society, and may change the requirement for acceptance at any time. Accumulating the correct social capital is thus a matter of guesswork.

According to this scenario, communities are not viewed very favorably. As part of civil society, these groups are thought to be insubstantial and lack direction. In reality, they are a simply a means to cope with the stress and other problems associated with the larger society, while offering some opportunities for adjustment. Any role for leadership at the community level, accordingly, is severely truncated. Those who are recognized to be leaders try simply to escape from this lowly station and find a position in more powerful institutions where their skills will be rewarded. Community involvement is solely a step in a process of gradual advancement that may or may not be recognized by authorities.

Implied by this skewed relationship to more formal groups is a hierarchy of authority. In this sense, persons who are involved in the informal associations of civil society learn how to acquire special skills, or make the necessary contacts to enter leadership roles. The reality is that civil society provides merely the means whereby persons can petition authority and possibly learn how to lead. The privilege of leadership, according to civil society I, is not dispersed throughout society but dispensed by certain gatekeepers. Providing entry to the sphere where leadership is really exercised is one of the tasks of civil society; as a result, any actions taken in civil society are merely a rehearsal for the larger stage offered by the dominant institutions.

Civil society II has a different history and orientation (Kaldor 2003). This version emerged during the 1980s as part of the "redemocratization" movement in Latin America and the rebellion against the tyranny in Eastern Europe (Foley and Edwards 1996). One of the most visible politicians who advocated for this position was Václav Havel, the former president of the Czech Republic. In the context of the post-Soviet Era, political theorists of various stripes saw civil society as a vehicle to create more inclusive and participatory societies, where average persons would no longer be alienated from key institutions. Civil society, as Havel (1984) described, represents a "politics of people," divorced from the usual authorities who have their own agendas.

Within this context, the point of civil society is to replace the institutions of modernity with more grounded or community-relevant organizations. Particularly important is the move away from centralized and, thus, abstract institutions, in order to attack alienation and political repression. At times, this shift has been labeled "antipolitical" because the intent is to challenge authoritarianism and standardized planning (Ferguson 1994). The focus of civil society, accordingly, represents the elevation of collective agency and freedom in importance.

The thrust of civil society II is that communities can be self-administered, thereby undermining the need for the standard political parties and other restrictive organizations. While influenced by communitarianism, this version of civil society embodies collective action that establishes open and dynamic associations, free of hierarchies and other modes of domination. Inspired somewhat by critical Marxism (Arato and Cohen 1995), civil society is the "free association" of persons in a truly

democratic manner, without any of the usual intermediate institutions. Persons, simply put, begin to act in concert for the benefit of everyone.

In this sense, as Marxists are fond of saying, the state "withers away," along with other supplementary means for securing order; consistent with a community-based philosophy, dualism is passé and order is coterminus with human action. Rather than a subcomponent of a more encompassing system, civil society is where order originates. This realm, in other words, represents a communitarian ideal—social order is something created or constructed rather than confronted. That is, persons are able to organize themselves into meaningful organizations, thereby preserving the integrity and diversity of communal life (Lerner et al. 2000).

Hence, communities are no longer a subset of some larger institutions but constitute society. The agency of these persons, accordingly, outlines the agenda for planning. Instead of an intermediary or catalyst, as in civil society I, communities constitute the basic social fabric and supply legitimacy to all organizations. To paraphrase Ralph Dahrendorf (1996), civil society is created and sustained by self-organizing groups and the locus of all power; civil society, accordingly, is not divorced from political society, but where all institutions are created and enacted. Now persons and their communities are in a position to take a society in any number of directions through their actions.

Basically, two versions of the "public" are available with these two perspectives on civil society (Habermas 1974). In terms of civil society I, the public is abstract, often associated with the state. On the other hand, and consistent with civil society II, the public refers to direct collaboration and involvement in the development of the collective good. The second is more concrete and in the spirit and practice of community-based planning. That is, persons embody the social sphere and are responsible for the future. Human action is not a residual to a more important, impersonal sphere. Instead, interpersonal solidarity is treated as essential to social existence, whereby persons invent together a community where everyone is respected.

But in addition to the status of communities, leadership is changed by this new view of civil society. The decentralization associated with this shift in understanding order suggests that leadership is not a property of one class of persons but flows throughout a society. Rather than hierarchical, leadership is communal; rather than a special trait, leadership represents the opportunity to act in this capacity. In this regard, communities create the possibilities of moving in one direction or another, while encouraging a "collective command" whereby any member of a community can arise as a leader (Block 2009, p. 90). In this way, leadership is a shared property that is brought to fruition through collective definitions and actions.

The leadership linked to civil society II is clearly more compatible with community-based planning. Different views on motivation and socialization, for example, will likely be witnessed (Solansky 2008). But in order to appreciate the change announced by this modality of civil society, a brief review of the traditional theories of leadership is necessary (Van Wart 2012). What is most important at this point, however, is that alternative realities can emerge from civil society that challenge the usual centered view of leadership. With respect to fostering community-based planning, leaders must be understood in an entirely new way.

Changes in Leadership Theory

Various writers have argued that there are several "eras of leadership theory" (Van Wart 2012, p. 15). Nonetheless, despite this broad history, theories of leadership can be divided into four categories. Each one has a unique focus, with specific social implications. Over the years, however, a specific thread has united these diverse approaches to understanding leadership—that is, leaders are special persons! In other words, leaders behave "heroically" in many ways that average persons cannot imagine, and thus fulfill their destiny.

The first approach can be classified as trait theories. Reminiscent of Thomas Carlyle, leaders are touted to be "great men," even heroes (Northous 2004, pp. 13–31). These persons are born to be leaders. They have drive and ambition, for example, that lifts them above other persons. Due to their basic constitution, there is little doubt that they are destined to be great and are merely fulfilling a larger plan.

Charismatic leaders, who are often very inspirational, are part of this tradition. As Max Weber (1978, pp. 1111–1157) described, these individuals are perceived to have a special calling that moves them into the spotlight. Their greatness, however, is not guaranteed, since charisma can be manifested in various ways. Some persons with charisma, in fact, can become quite deviant. Nonetheless, one outcome is great leadership.

Critics argue that this approach to conceptualizing leadership is quite speculative (Wright 1996). These traits are vague and can often become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Furthermore, such an outlook can easily become quite exclusionary, and the basis for discrimination—those who do not have the gift of leadership can be disparaged. But instead of trying to guess who has these predispositions, other theories maintained that the focus should be the actual performance of persons. These explanations of leadership might be called skill theories.

The emphasis of these theories is actual behavior, rather than speculation about the essential nature of successful persons. Simply put, leaders exhibit specific talents and capabilities that illustrate their uniqueness. Some persons may be better at organizing tasks, while others deal effectively with the various needs of persons. But both groups demonstrate skills that demand special attention and recognition. Through their behavior, in other words, these persons are exalted. Nonetheless, the question remains: what is the source of this unique behavior? Of course, the answer may be as simple as special persons can express themselves in memorable ways.

Both trait and skill positions, however, deal with leadership in isolation from the social environment. Context theorists, the next or third viewpoint, argue that the important role the situation plays in generating leadership is overlooked by these two positions.

There are two types of context theories, situational and contingency (Northous 2004, pp. 53–87). Those who emphasize the situation contend that successful leaders have the ability to adapt effectively to a range of conditions. Contingency theorists, on the other hand, believe that leadership emerges from a proper fit between the person and the situation. But in general, these perspectives are intended to move

away from personalistic accounts of leadership. By illustrating the importance of the surrounding environment, these writers want to broaden the discussion of leadership. Without a proper context, they argue, leaders may never emerge.

A fourth group of writers, labeled generally as interactional, propose that the other approaches do not really appreciate the complexity of leadership (Hatch et al. 2006). Leaders, according to this viewpoint, have an interpersonal style that produces high quality relationships. For example, they use language effectively and are able to convey clear and emotive messages to persons. As a result, they make persons feel comfortable and inspire loyalty, and thus establish lasting relationships. And due to these associations, these individuals are able to exercise influence in organizations and in public.

Although these four theories are somewhat different, from a community-based perspective they have a common core. Specifically, they are "essentialistic" and treat leaders as if they have inherent abilities (Gilroy 1993, p. 32). Obviously, the trait and skill theories rest on this principle. But even the more contextual theories assume that leaders have a unique disposition to deal with persons or situations. The contextual and interactional theories, although trying to de-emphasize personal traits, merely add a social dimension to the usual predispositions that sustain leadership. In the end, all of these positions on leadership classify leaders as basically different from other persons and capable of making unique contributions to social life.

Clearly, this entire paradigm on leadership reflects a model that emphasizes personal assets. This sort of essentialism can be found throughout the Western philosophical tradition, whether the focus is Plato or the Medieval period. The basic idea is that the social position of persons is thought to need justification. The usual tactic, accordingly, has been to argue all persons possess fundamental characteristics that propel them on different trajectories. Those who are leaders, accordingly, have an unequivocal claim to their positions.

A community-based outlook, on the other hand, is very different, due to the emphasis placed on participation and the challenge to dualism. Essentialism, therefore, is replaced by social construction and the argument that persons make themselves, only now in the context of others (Crevani et al. 2007). As a result, leaders are not thought to be special, even when they exhibit extraordinary behavior. Whether or not they emerge as leaders depends on the social action of a community of persons, rather than personal traits. All traits, in other words, are mediated by collective *praxis* and are understood and valued in view of this action.

New Leadership

What must be addressed is whether or not leadership is consistent with community-based planning. Does leadership, simply put, contravene the spirit of communal life? After all, the presumption in traditional theory is that not everyone can become a leader. Leaders constitute a special class of persons, who are expected to issue orders or mandates and exercise control of an organization or community.

Such elitism in this community context is problematic, specifically with the rise of civil society II in importance. Therefore, in community-based planning this "unitary command," which focuses on unique persons, is replaced by a much more inclusive strategy (Block 2009). From the perspective of a community-based philosophy, leadership does not require domination!

To be sure, communities must coordinate their affairs, so that information and other resources are not scattered about or misused. Direction, in other words, is needed. The challenge facing communities, accordingly, is to conceptualize leadership in a new and nonauthoritarian ways. While not dominating communities, leaders must inspire confidence, facilitate discussion, and illustrate how resources can be allocated effectively to solve problems. How these issues are addressed, moreover, is crucial to the success of community-based planning. In short, cooperation is necessary.

The central point is that community-based leadership promotes the eventual self-organization of a community (Hardina 2006). What is novel about this approach is that leaders enable persons to impose limits on themselves and act as a group. In other words, leaders help to create relationships that reinforce the participants rather than the goals of some abstract organization. Instead of acting from a position of domination, leaders encourage productive relationships between themselves and others in a community. Leaders, in this sense, move a community in unison; everyone moves as a unit to fulfill collective ambitions.

This position is similar to the community "animator" identified by Freire (1970, p. 45). In contrast to the traditional leader, the animator cocreates and through this collaboration encourages inspiration and confidence. The support is thus generated that is necessary for everyone to feel capable of acting with authority and in tandem with others. In this regard, a community-based leader is different from a "coordinator." Those who coordinate often operate within a traditional hierarchical structure and merely serve to assign or allocate tasks. Likewise, coordinators do not necessarily provide direction to or motivate a group.

In the context of a community-based philosophy, the purpose of leadership is to entice persons to act as a community. This outcome is accomplished, accordingly, in the absence of a regulatory center. Indeed, community-based leaders operate within a very fluid environment, where roles are constantly renegotiated. Diverse viewpoints are thus integrated, while leadership may shift depending on how a task or situation is defined. This leadership is described sometimes as emergent. Rather than managing a task or persons, these new leaders bridge different perspectives and foster a confluence of ideas and participants.

Leaders are thus immersed in a community, and understand the various voices that constitute this group. A key principle is that everyone is thought to be capable of leading. Because they all understand how problems are defined, and the nature of appropriate solutions, persons emerge as leaders when they are needed (Rein 1972). For example, some persons with particular skills may be asked to join a specific planning discussion, while other members of the community may volunteer to apply some of the knowledge they recently acquired. Nonetheless, this process is not

closed off to anyone but is defined by everyone. In effect, "organizing, directing, and monitoring functions" are presumed to flow from the entire group (Manz and Sims 1987).

Drath and Paulus (1994) contend that leadership arises from persons making commitments to one another, as well as from mutual demands. Their point is that leadership is a so-called nested phenomenon, related to how persons define and respond to one another. In this sense, persons are in a position to act in a myriad of ways and take a community in a variety of directions. All members have this ability to frame or reframe situations and determine who can best address these conditions (Ospina and Sorenson 2006). For example, what is the nature of an issue and what responses are deemed relevant? Based on how these elements are interpreted, leadership can emerge in very different ways.

Contrary to the traditional theories of leadership, essentialism is unimportant. Due to the value placed on construction identities are constantly remade, and thus are not foundational, with different ways of emerging (Rothschild and Whitt 1986). Therefore, no one is trapped within a specific identity, with limited prospects for leadership. Rather than heroes, for example, leaders emerge through support and are asked to contribute their skills; in fact, everyone is encouraged to contribute to the growth of a community. Rather than mythical qualities or inherent traits, interest and motivation spawn leadership (Van Wart 2003). Leadership is thus an on-going process that is often defined anew, and emerges throughout a community.

Likewise, the paths to leadership are difficult to identify beforehand. In the traditional models, certain training, education, or placements are thought to result in propitious placements (Manz and Sims 1987). These tracks are well-known and coveted. Within a community-based outlook, on the other hand, leadership can emerge from anywhere. A situation is promoted that encourages widespread participation, so that all persons can express their ideas and discover their talents. In this sense, leaders are not only endogenous but they also emerge unfiltered by traditional practices and gatekeepers.

Leaders, accordingly, are not imperious but offer plausible solutions to problems. In this regard, community-based leaders do not use their position to advance a particular agenda or give legitimacy to a perspective. The point, instead, is to promote discussions through the expansion and recognition of input from all the members of a community. A final decision is based on the best ideas, which anyone can advance. By following this approach, new and interesting connections can be made between proposals, thereby utilizing everyone's talents.

Leaders, accordingly, do not attempt to consolidate their authority and protect their position; there is no aim to become part of a directorate. Quite to the contrary, community-based leadership represents a centrifugal force—leaders and skills are dispersed throughout a community. Leadership is constantly expanding and, in a manner of speaking, becomes "molecular" and pervades a community (Guattari 1984). In this sense, leadership is not simply decentralized—which can leave traditional lines of authority in tact—but is thoroughly diffused and constantly recreated. Leadership is thus presumed to be everywhere!

But contrary to traditional context theories of leadership, circumstances do not determine which persons will become leaders (Northous 2004, pp. 53–73). The rationale for this conclusion is quite simple: persons construct their situations and negotiate their positions constantly. The person who intervenes to move a project forward, accordingly, is not thrust into a leadership role by the particular features of a context. All of these decisions, instead, reflect the direct participation of a community. As community members diagnose a situation, various persons, at different times, may become prominent and lead an intervention.

Every aspect of leadership, in other words, is socially constructed. For example, the traits that are recognized to be important are the product of collective decisions and not inherently indicative of leadership. Likewise, when certain characteristics, and the associated behaviors, are thought to be necessary, these facets of leadership are also defined and accepted by a community. In this sense, a community's goals and strategies establish the context for identifying specific traits as linked to leadership, along with when and how they should be put into practice (Polcin 1990).

There is a unique culture that surrounds community-based projects. These persons are on a mission to improve the world, tempered by a concern for everyone involved. The more unique skills that are allowed to emerge throughout an intervention the better! The focus, however, is the collaboration necessary to solve problems and promote group learning.

Leadership is thus not necessarily bad but tenuous, at least from a community-based perspective. As persons become interested in a project, and are identified as offering a particular skill at the appropriate time, their contributions are made in various ways. Leadership, therefore, may be best characterized as a kaleidoscope, with different combinations of persons arising to meet the various needs of a project. Peter Block (2009, p 86), for example, refers to this outlook as "relational leadership," since leaders emerge with respect to competing perceptions of needs and traits. The result is not a hierarchy but a lateral conception of order.

Socially Mediated Leadership

To borrow from Karl Polanyi (1975), a "great transformation" seems to be on the horizon with respect to understanding community-based leadership. Particularly important is the break with the essentialism that underpins traditional theories. In the usual portrayals, leaders are almost destined to fill key positions in projects. Indeed, they are thought to have either a basic constitution to lead, or the inherent abilities to engage their environments in productive ways. In either case, leaders are fundamentally different from other, less endowed persons.

A community-based approach, on the other hand, might be referred to as socially mediated leadership. Persons, in other words, engage in self-reflection, consult others, and negotiate their roles in a project. Through encouragement from their neighbors, for example, some persons may transform a latent interest into overt action and a prominent position in a project. At other times, due to perhaps group criticism,

these same persons may shift their attention and undertake another task. As should be noticed, leaders emerge from a matrix of interaction that specifies their various identities and behaviors, rather than predetermined in any way.

Similar to what Simone de Beauvoir (2010) said about women, leaders are not born but made. For example, persons may construct themselves in ways that are beneficial to a project, or their neighbors support their growing involvement in some activity. Either way, those who emerge to lead a project, or at a particular stage, interact with others in a variety of ways that culminates in their actions coming to be recognized as contributing significantly to a particular task. Furthermore, definitions, beliefs, and other modes of participation mediate this entire process, and thus leaders do not exist *sui generis*, but are brought into existence through collective effort.

What is interesting about this change in outlook is that everyone can lead; no one is precluded a priori from this possibility. In the language of organizations, a shift is made from a vertical to a horizontal view of leadership (Lune 2010, pp. 123–124). Those who hope to undertake a project in a community-based manner must recognize this change, or projects will be dominated by a few persons and tend to flounder as the interest of others wanes. The point is to appreciate that cooperation and flexibility do not necessarily jeopardize leadership; leadership is not necessarily blurred by this uncertainty. In fact, persons are more likely to extend themselves, and become leaders and promote a project, when they are involved in continued and transparent interaction.

In general, although there are no simple formulas, leaders in community-based projects do not view others as their adversaries. An environment is constructed, accordingly, that emphasizes the dignity of all community members and mutual support. The idea is that these persons confirm one another, so that they can find their respective voices in a project. The result is a loose confederation of persons, a sort of safety net that encourages everyone to take the initial, and often unknown, steps to participate in the formulation of a community intervention.

This perspective has been referred to as the "communal management" of a project (Negri 2008, p. 38). In terms of community-based theory, leadership does not consist of unique individuals who confront a group that needs to be led. Leadership, instead, is a completely socially mediated or holistic activity, grounded in the principle of making collectively viable decisions. In this sense, a new ethic is operative, with an emerging sensibility that does not tolerate the standard divisions between persons, such as leaders and members.

But those who engage in community-based planning should recognize that not only individuals but also communities learn to lead. The difference is that communities share and, thus, unite their talents. As a result of mutual support, for example, persons appreciate one another, in addition to sharing experiences, strategies, and the outcomes of any project. In many ways, leadership is a by-product of their participation in a project, rather than the result of a management scheme that antedates this collective action.

Along the way, widespread leadership is reinforced by encouraging, for example, mutual aid, risk taking, and continuous reflection. Mistakes are thus used to

foster learning, thereby reducing any fears about participation. The aim, of course, is to facilitate the transference of information and skills throughout a community, in addition to encouraging action. In the end, community-based leadership is all about collective action (Mondros and Wilson 1994).

But what is the relevance of advocacy within this new context of leadership? The key issue is whether or not leaders are advocates of a community. The answer is yes and no. On the one hand, leaders give voice to a community—they act with others to provide this group with a vision and direction. On the other, unlike leadership in general, community-based advocacy neither speaks for nor defends a community. Such dualism, in short, is no longer operative. Within the framework of community-based leadership, advocacy is a collective practice. A community initiates a process of self-definition and self-promotion.

In this sense, leaders do not direct a community. Their skills, instead, are deposited in a community, where they are nurtured and continue to be disseminated. Through leadership a community grows, or becomes self-managed, without special leaders. At this juncture, the term self-management carries the same connotations as when this idea is applied to organizations (Holmqvist and Maravelias 2011). That is, persons begin to administer themselves and make their respective contributions to achieve this end. Everyone is thus encouraged to lead, when their skills are identified and recognized as necessary.

Conclusion

Leadership is expected traditionally to help communities develop. Community-based planning is no exception to this theme. The key difference, however, is that now a community learns how to lead. With this form of leadership, communities become less dependent on outside elements and become self-managed. At the core of community-based leadership is the recognition of a wide range of skills, the development of these talents throughout a community, and the creation of the opportunities for everyone to exhibit their abilities.

In a sense, community-based leadership resides in a state of uncertainty. In a project or organization that is traditionally conceived, this condition would be eschewed as unproductive or wasteful. In the context of a community-based intervention the opposite is the case, since leaders can emerge and react quickly to unexpected events. Such organizations are porous and can become united easily with communities. Community-based leadership is thus uncanny with respect to how leaders can change to meet new challenges and inspire all persons to grow.

Some theorists who are attempting to become community-based summarize this approach by arguing that true leaders listen to and take directions from the citizenry. In contemporary terms, what they are describing is “servant leadership.” With this idea, Greenleaf (1996) elevates in importance some particular traits of good leaders, such as empathy, interpersonal sensitivity, and support. Leadership, nonetheless, is

still a stand-alone trait linked to particular individuals who want to improve their performance as leaders.

Community-based leadership advances beyond this form of leadership to become a collective movement (Fals-Borda 1988). A community project moves as a result of collective action, and is not simply inspired or pulled forward by unique leaders. Even when special traits are exhibited by persons, these abilities are enacted through a collaborative process. The identification, selection, and implementation of these characteristics, for example, occur through community deliberation. For this reason, communities are understood to lead. Stated simply, they define and support the talents and skills to be put into action.

In some circles, this rendition of leadership is referred to as "ubiquitous" (Cloke and Goldsmith 2002, pp. 171–179). The imagery that these critics use to characterize the position of a leader is the web or lattice. Their point is that leadership in democratic groups is organic, that is, depends on the situation, the persons involved, and the decisions to be made. Consistent with civil society II, leadership is everywhere; a challenge is posed, accordingly, to understanding leaders to reside at either the center or periphery of a group. Leaders can emerge, instead, at any time and place.

This new leadership is based on ideas, activities, and practices—rather than idealized persons or positions—that all persons can exhibit. Leadership relates more to what persons do than who they are. There are no scripts but only the need to act in one way or another that is negotiated as a community. Who arises to the occasion is a collective decision.

Leadership is thus a process that emerges through social interaction. Identifying particular leaders, and even giving these persons special training, has little to do with promoting community-based leadership. A community moves forward, instead, only when collective action is emphasized, that is, when a community learns to interact in ways that allows persons to experiment, motivate one another, and benefit collectively from any gains. Collective action, therefore, is the centerpiece of community-based leadership that promotes the autonomy of communities.

References

Arato, A., & Cohen, J. (1995). *Civil society and political theory*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Baker, G. (1998). Civil society and democracy: The gap between theory and possibility. *Politics, 18*(2), 81–87.

Block, P. (2009). *Community: The structure of belonging*. New York: Berrett-Koehler.

Bourdieu, P. (1986). Forms of capital. In J. G. Richardson (Ed.) *Handbook of theory and research for the sociology of education* (pp. 241–258). Westport: Greenwood.

Cloke, K., & Goldsmith, J. (2002). *The end of management and the rise of organizational democracy*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Crevani, L., Lindgren, M., & Packendorff, J. (2007). Shared leadership: A postheroic perspective leadership as a collective construction. *International Journal of Leadership Studies, 3*(1), 40–67.

Dahrendorf, R. (1996). Economic opportunity, civil society, and political liberty. *Development and Change, 27*(12), 229–249.

De Beauvoir, S. (2010). *The second sex*. New York: Knopf.
Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1987). *A thousand plateaus*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Drath, W. H., & Paulus, C. J. (1994). *Making common sense: Leadership as meaning-making in a community of practice*. Greensboro: Center for Creative Leadership.
Etzioni, A. (1995). *New communitarian thought*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
Fals - Borda, O. (1988). *Knowledge and people's power*. New York: New Horizons.
Ferguson, J. (1994). *The anti-planning machine*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Foley, M. W., & Edwards, B. (1996). The paradox of civil society. *Journal of Democracy, 7*(3), 38–52.
Freire, P. (1970). *Pedagogy of the oppressed*. New York: Continuum.
Gilroy, P. (1993). *The Black Atlantic*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Greenleaf, R. K. (1996). *On becoming a servant-leader*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Guattari, F. (1984). *Molecular revolution*. New York: Penguin.
Habermas, J. (1974). The public sphere: An encyclopedia article. *New German Critique, 3*(4), 49–55.
Habermas, J. (1996). *Between facts and norms*. Cambridge: Polity.
Hardina, D. (2006). Strategies for citizen participation and empowerment in non-profit, community-based organizations. *Community Development, 34*(4), 1–17.
Hatch, M. J., Kostera, M., & Kózmínski, A. (2006). The three faces of leadership. *Organizational Dynamics, 35*(1), 49–68.
Havel, V. (1984). Politics and consciousness. *Salisbury Review, 3*(2), 31–37.
Holmqvist, M., & Maravelias, C. (2011). *Managing healthy organizations: Worksite health promotion and the new self-management paradigm*. New York: Routledge.
Kaldor, M. (2003). Civil society and accountability. *Journal of Human Development, 4*(1), 5–27.
Kymlicka, W. (1995). *Multicultural citizenship: A liberal theory of minority rights*. Oxford: Clarendon.
Lerner, R. M., Fisher, C. B., & Weinberg, R. A. (2000). Toward a science for and of the people: Promoting civil society through applications of developmental science. *Child Development, 71*(1), 11–20.
Lune, H. (2010). *Understanding organizations*. Cambridge: Polity.
Manz, C. C., & Sims, H. P. (1987). Leading workers to lead themselves: The external leadership of self-managed work teams. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 32*(1), 106–129.
McKnight, J. L. (1995). *The careless society and its counterfeits*. New York: Basic Books.
Mondros, J. B., & Wilson, S. M. (1994). *Organizing for power and empowerment*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Negri, A. (2008). *Goodby Mr. socialism*. New York: Seven Stories.
Northous, P. G. (2004). *Leadership: Theory and practice*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Ospina, S., & Sorenson, G. L. J. (2006). A constructionist lens on leadership. In G. R. Goethals & G. L. J. Sorenson (Eds.), *The quest for a general theory of leadership* (pp. 188–204). Cheltenham: Elgar.
Polanyi, K. (1975). *The great transformation*. New York: Octagon.
Polcin, D. L. (1990). Administrative planning in community mental health. *Community Mental Health Journal, 26*(2), 181–192.
Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and retrieval of American community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Rein, M. (1972). Decentralization and citizen participation in social services. *Public Administration Review, 32*(6), 687–700.
Rothschild, J., & Whitt, A. (1986). *The cooperative workplace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Solansky, S. T. (2008). Leadership style and team processes in self-managed teams. *Journal of Leadership and Organizational Studies, 14*(4), 332–341.
Turner, L., & Shera, W. (2005). Empowerment of human service workers. *Administration in Social Work, 29*(3), 79–94.

Van Wart, M. (2003). Public-sector leadership theory: An assessment. *Public Administration Review*, *63*(2), 214–228.
Van Wart, M. (2012). *Community leadership*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.
Weber, M. (1978). *Economy and society* (Vol. 1). Berkeley: University of California Press.
Wilson, W. J. (2009). *More than just race: Being black and poor in the inner city*. New York: W.W. Norton.
Wright, P. L. (1996). *Managerial leadership*. London: Routledge.
Young, I. M. (2000). *Inclusion and democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 9
Social Interventions and Justice

Introduction

An important aspect of the community-based philosophy is the issue of justice. This theme was first relevant during the 1960s, when communities were demanding to be treated with dignity. Both around the world and in the USA, demonstrations erupted against the war in Vietnam and many types of discrimination. More recently, however, the topic of justice arose within the context of globalization (Nussbaum 2004). Many of the protests against this economic and cultural trend have had the retrieval of justice as their key principle.

The charge of these movements is that globalization has created a situation where justice has little value. As a result of certain economic policies, the social world seems to be a very hostile and unequal place. For example, vital institutions appear to cater mostly to the rich, while the gap between this class and the rest, in most societies, is expanding (Smart 2003). The basic organizations of society are beyond the control of most persons. And as mentioned in the Introduction to this book, a credibility gap is prevalent that fosters cynicism and withdrawal.

Many communities are caught in the midst of this process and are beginning to deteriorate. And similar to the 1960s, these groups are seeking dignity and some control over their lives (Piven and Cloward 1979). But a new wrinkle has appeared in this argument. The proponents of change contend that the usual response to this condition is insufficient. That is, the standard forms of charity are considered to be demeaning and ineffective, since this reaction is mostly personal and emotional, with few, if any, obligations. Indeed, charity represents acts of kindness that often require little more than expressions of concern about the condition of many unfortunate persons. In this regard, universal benevolence is deemed to be sufficient to solve the ills related, for example, to poverty or the absence of health care (Tronto 1993).

Although, in the 1960s, the theme of liberation was tied to community-based interventions, many of these programs were divorced from this ideal. Many services, accordingly, were designed merely to help persons cope better with their problems. While more fundamental changes may have been desired, most interventions were guided by the desire to make life more tolerable in communities. Despite more radi-

J. W. Murphy, *Community-Based Interventions,* International Perspectives on Social Policy, Administration, and Practice, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4899-8020-5_9,

cal intentions, many of the community-based health or welfare programs did not really raise the issue of justice. Persons were merely equipped better to deal with the effects of institutional arrangements that brought about unemployment or deficits in learning (Piven and Cloward 1979). Not much attention was given to more far-reaching proposals that would require a significant amount of social change. Exceptions to this trend, of course, were the criticisms lodged by some Leftists, who had little impact in policy circles.

Current social critiques claim that communities are under assault by globalization, and that local politics and planning are necessary to combat this scourge (Harvey 2005). And by focusing on justice, the assumption is that the degradation and alienation experienced nowadays by communities can be reversed, but only with proposals that offer significant alternatives. In fact, many communities have adopted the idea of justice as their guiding theme. Without justice, they claim, there can be no peace and prosperity.

Those who want to undertake community-based interventions are caught in an interesting debate that is not often appreciated fully by service providers. In other words, how can interventions be organized that do not take the form of charity, whereby persons in need are merely given a helping hand (Marullo and Edwards 2000)? Although such projects may be well-intentioned and in fact save some lives, in today's climate they may be viewed by communities as encouraging little more than dependency. Simply put, communities learn merely to adjust successfully to unacceptable circumstances. They may learn to purify their water, for example, instead of demanding the elimination of pollution and a healthy environment.

Those who work in the area of community-based planning, accordingly, are expected to promote justice through their projects. The question becomes, therefore, how can community programs move beyond charity, so that the necessary changes are possible that promote self-direction? In this regard, there is a so-called deep structure that operates in the field of human or social service that must be addressed if projects are going to offer more than palliatives (Ivey and Collins 2003). To be specific, the social and cultural barriers to justice—"structural or institutional practices"—that may have been ingrained must be uprooted (Marullo and Edwards 2000).

Seeking justice, accordingly, is crucial to becoming truly community-based. Even at the level of knowledge creation and acquisition, in addition to the focus on participation, the community-based philosophy suggests that the current social situation is constructed and contingent. The changes demanded by justice are thought to be entirely possible, since no reality is immune to critique and a possible dismissal. A new culture of justice, therefore, is entirely possible.

Similar to the earlier discussion of organizations, at the base of most traditional social projects is an unfortunate scenario known as the "fallen man" (Herzberg 1973, pp. 35–36). According to this application of the fable, humans have fallen from grace and must learn to live on their own. But because they are seriously flawed according to this account, they have little direction, few skills, and need help to survive. When undertaken within this context, projects are remedial; all interventions merely help persons deal with these adverse conditions. Any services are characterized as merely gifts or handouts.

The result is that projects constitute charity. That is, out of kindness and other humanitarian motives, communities are offered assistance by those lucky enough to have received some enlightenment and extra resources (Gil 1998). Those who are judged to deserve this help and have not contributed to their dire condition through unwise decisions or questionable behavior are provided with limited assistance. At no time, however, are these unfortunate persons expected to have an active role in the planning process. After all, they have lost their ability to act in productive ways. Without outside interventions, conditions would not improve and their lives would be marginally productive.

Likewise, the basic conditions of social existence are not questioned. Because of the decrepit nature of most persons, such a critique would only result in disorder. Any controls that are in place must be respected, or the society will dissolve into conflict. Here again, the individual is the only viable focus of attention, with charity as the primary solution to any problem.

But justice requires that a break be made from this entire outlook (Buettner-Schmidt and Lobo 2012). A community-based philosophy, as noted throughout this book, cannot be enacted unless this image of humans is abandoned. In this regard, justice requires more than assistance—through participation, communities are expected to become autonomous (Fals Borda 1988, pp. 86–87). But in the story of the fallen man this outcome is unlikely. In many ways, communities are both helpless and hapless, according to the scenario sketched by Herzberg. Nonetheless, according to a community-based philosophy, communities cannot be retrieved without justice and the related ability to control their futures.

But the pursuit of justice often requires radical change. Institutions that cause harm to persons must be attacked and replaced with more commodious organizations. For example, practices that are overtly violent or policies that create incredibly skewed distributions of goods or services must be seriously examined and challenged. In other words, any general message that undermines the dignity of persons and justifies their marginalization must be replaced with a more inclusive perspective. However, the message of cruelty can take many forms not necessarily associated with openly destructive acts, e.g., economic or bureaucratic violence, which must be addressed before justice is possible (Collins 1974).

The World of Globalization

Globalization has been defined in various ways, such as the compression of time and space, but the most recent and dominant manifestation focuses on the market. The name given to this version is neo-liberalism, which gained popularity at the beginning of the 1980s (Harvey 2005). According to this economic philosophy, the market is the centerpiece of any rational and productive society. In fact, every facet of society is thought to be improved by the discipline imposed by this device. At the marketplace, successful persons learn to make wise decisions and pursue their chosen ends with diligence without any interference from extraneous sources that would restrict their freedom.

In addition to the economy, culture is also changed by the market. Individuals, for example, are portrayed as atoms who have no significant connections to other persons. Charles Lemert (2006) calls this rendition the "new individualism," because persons not only strive to meet their needs but restrict their connections with others. Indeed, they are competitors who strive to accumulate scarce resources and see little benefit in collaboration. The result is social fragmentation, little solidarity, and a generally inhospitable environment.

In this sense, neo-liberalism is underpinned by Neo-Darwinian outlook (Harvey 2005, pp. 20–23). As a result of competition, persons fulfill their destinies. Those who possess real potential are successful, while the rest find their appropriate niche. In the end, however, persons begin to grow apart, with the rich and poor beginning to occupy very different class positions. These outcomes are justified because persons are thought to have unique basic dispositions that are revealed through competition, which might be altered only at the margins by effort and some luck.

In many ways, this perspective parallels the thesis described by Herzberg (1973, pp. 35–36). Persons are thrown into the world in both cases and condemned to survive in a hostile situation. Some are able to suppress or ameliorate their corrupt character at least long enough to find a modicum of success. But because of the harsh nature of the environment, everyone needs help to survive in the long term. At the end of the day, even those who are successful have problems, although they have the resources to engage in prevention or seek remedies. Their obligation to others is minimal, due to the competitive nature of market-driven societies.

Those who are poor, however, are dependent on social interventions to survive. But due to the logic that emanates from the market, these persons are not often perceived to be worthy of this investment (Murphy and Callaghan 2009). Services are thus offered begrudgingly, with little input from those who are in need. But in order to alleviate the suffering of these persons, charity is offered in the form of social programs. Although regularly stigmatized, these interventions try to mitigate problems and avert social disruption. Those who merit investment—by exhibiting the proper attitude and motivation and being considered as "Good Citizens"—are provided with minimal relief, but certainly have no right to demand any involvement in planning or significant social change (Rose 2000).

The problem with this scenario is that this general trend is never questioned. Persons simply adjust to the economic and other conditions imposed by globalization. A person's social position, in effect, is the product of basic endowment, while the marketplace simply allows this potential to be realized. Those who support neo-liberalism, accordingly, do not view the resulting social stratification as sinister (Young 2011, p. 13). Some persons are merely prepared better to compete at the marketplace or find the time or resources to make some minor improvements to their abilities. The misery of the rest is systematically controlled.

Within this framework, justice is defined in a very narrow way. An outcome is considered to be just that grants everyone their due rewards. In other words, a form of distributive justice is in operation (Miller 1999). But what is basic to this mode of justice? In the example of neo-liberalism, poor persons receive what they deserve.

After all, they are in this undesirable condition due to their inability to compete at the marketplace. Because their general comportment is incompatible with success in this domain, they are condemned to poverty. In short, they make dumb decisions or adopt a wasteful lifestyle. In other words, they have fulfilled their destiny!

Minimal dignity is granted to persons in this scenario, especially those who need services. But because everyone is thought to be human, no-one should suffer unduly. Even those persons with limited ability and improper behavior deserve some relief. This is the juncture where charity becomes the last resort. For those who have failed, a safety net is available to soften their fall.

Community-based planners, on the other hand, are committed to a much more radical position on justice (Gostin and Powers 2006). They contend that the sort of distributive justice associated with neo-liberalism does not portray persons or interventions in a very positive manner. At best, persons are helped to cope with unsavory conditions. In this sense, they are thought to be treated in a humane and somewhat dignified way, although the support that they receive is minimal.

From a community-based perspective this view of justice is severely truncated (Barry 2005). Questions are not asked, for example, about the nature of the economic system that regularly generates a class of poor persons. Accordingly, all that is offered are programs to ameliorate misery. A reassessment of institutional factors is not a part of this call for justice. Extensive interventions, indeed, might be problematic if the aim is to control persons, justify behavioral outcomes, and channel misery. In fact, distributive justice tries to rationalize outcomes rather than rethink the system of distribution. On the other hand, a community-based philosophy opts for a much more profound model that deals with "systems-oriented" issues (Fondacaro and Weinberg 2002).

Within the context of distributive justice, a lot of attention is directed to fairness (Capeheart and Milovanovic 2007, pp. 29–44). The key issue is whether a specific behavior is judged accurately and given the appropriate reward. Such an approach, however, indicates a type of passivity and the application of the prevailing standards in an honest and objective manner. Whether the ability of persons to act is constrained by economic or cultural barriers is not an issue. Fairness, in this sense, is blind to any constraints on action and, in effect, serves as a distraction to more radical proposals.

According to the tenets of distributive justice, different outcomes are expected (Miller 1999). After all, persons exhibit different talents and behaviors. The problem with this assessment, at least from a community-based perspective, is that persons are presumed to act alone, and any differences in outcomes are attributed to personal traits. But due to the holism of community-based planners, they recognize that behavioral performance is affected by other persons and groups (McTaggert 1991). And if a just evaluation is going to be made of a situation, a broader vision is necessary. Specifically, how behavior is influenced by other individuals and organizations must be taken into account. Social arrangements that might systematically depreciate certain persons or segments of society must be examined critically and called into question.

Development and Liberation

From a community-based perspective, charity is not the best way to cure social ills. After all, this activity is voluntary and provides only momentary relief. But within the framework of neo-liberal globalization, an additional strategy is offered. In many circles of planners, this approach is known as developmentalism (Packenham 1992). The basic idea is that targeted investment, in the form of training and services, can improve the prospects of a poor, underdeveloped community. According to this thesis, personal or collective growth is impending if the proper policies are enacted.

The assumption is that if development is retarded, then the introduction of social projects can move a community along the path to improvement. Remedies for poverty are available if interventions are properly planned. Most important to recall, within the context of neo-liberalism, is that not all communities have the same potential for development. Interventions, accordingly, must have the proper focus. Consistent with this theory of the market, locations that are likely to respond rapidly to interventions are the usual sites of projects.

But as a result of these limited programs of intervention, growth is presumed to spread to other areas of a society. Eventually even the worst communities will begin to advance, due to the "spill over" from these targeted projects (De Maio 2012). For example, a sewer system may be extended further than originally planned into a poor community, or a health center placed in a better location may begin to attract persons from outside of this locale. And the diseases that may be halted in these initial locations, due to these interventions, will likely have positive impact in other sectors. The point is that these select investments, albeit indirectly, begin to improve the lives of everyone.

Community-based planners, however, do not have a very positive opinion of developmentalism (Watkins and Shulman 2008, pp. 35–37). This approach is thought to be deficient in at least three ways. First, growth is haphazard; the expected spillover is not guaranteed. Second, communities are not involved in the planning process; most plans are hatched by outside experts. And third, there is often no long-term planning; after all, communities do not have control over their futures and are at the whim of policy trends.

In general, community-based planners view developmentalism to be quite naïve, specifically, that targeted investments are going to flow freely among communities and raise the quality of life for everyone is unlikely. Particularly important is that these planners understand that barriers to advancement may be entrenched—so-called structural and organizational factors—and are not going to simply fade away (Fraser and Honneth 2003). Due to these fundamental conditions growth may remain concentrated, thereby leaving marginal communities mostly untouched. For example, because of particular economic interests, any benefits may remain in only one segment of a community. In this sense, growth is not something natural that spreads throughout a community without any impediments but the largess of the elites.

Community-based planners, accordingly, opt for a different approach. As noted earlier, they choose liberation. In this debate with developmentalism, liberation conveys the message that interventions in themselves may be insufficient to remedy a community's problems. Therefore, these planners emphasize that barriers to development must be identified and consciously attacked (Holahan and Wilcox 1977). Such impediments may assume, for example, the form of economic exploitation, sexism, racism, and other modes of intentional marginalization. These practices, furthermore, can be implemented both symbolically and institutionally, so that they appear to be almost natural and expected and beyond the pale of any intervention.

Community-based planners believe that correctives that deal with everyday stress and hardships are worthwhile, even though a wider social change is not necessarily the immediate focus. Emphasizing development, in other words, is not entirely wrongheaded, since some relief may be possible. Trying to spread knowledge among poor communities about the benefits of boiling water or vaccinations, for example, may reap some rewards. But for long-term progress, community-based planners believe that a more radical outlook is necessary (Laverick 2005, p. 3). The point is to move beyond thinking that knowledge or the effects of services will simply spread throughout a society in the absence of significant social change. For without a doubt, the introduction of services into a system that is biased against a particular segment of society will not rectify any imbalances.

The aim of liberation, therefore, is to free persons from disruptive or harmful conditions (Nelson and Prilleltensky 2005). In more sociological terms, the search for the underlying rationale of problems is emphasized, instead of dealing merely with the results. The elimination of institutional and, thus, foundational sources of problems is elevated in importance. Significantly important is that these barriers are accepted often as part of the everyday operation of a society but work against the interests of particular communities. Sexism or racism, for example, may be so embedded in social life that this discrimination appears to be almost second nature. And often even the very subtle issues that are associated with these beliefs can create great disparities in health care and other facets of daily existence. Indeed, a person's zip code may tell a lot about the likelihood of someone surviving a heart attack!

Liberation, for example, may involve the rearrangement of resources, or a significant challenge to current policies or institutional practices (Nelson and Prilleltensky 2005). While learning to cope with difficulties operates on one level, liberation calls for a drastic reorientation, a new vision. Community-based planners, in this regard, talk about growth and a new reality that includes self-direction and solidarity. In other words, a new community is envisioned, where everyone is freed from constraints that restrict dignity to certain classes of persons. Instead of merely learning to deal with the health issues related to the location of a garbage dump, for example, new plans might be proposed related to waste disposal (Marullo and Edwards 2000). What is called environmental racism may be addressed! A community may thus begin to have some control over its health. The point is that thinking the unthinkable is essential to liberation. In this regard, community-based planners "think big!"

Communities Demand Dignity

The term dignity has been used a lot thus far in this discussion (Commissiong 2012). But what does dignity mean? In the past, dignity has been tied to cosmic principles and natural laws. Persons deserve to be treated with dignity, for example, because they are all children of God or possess a similar and exalted human nature. Either way, human beings have a special character and should be treated with respect. All persons should thus receive dignified treatment by governments and other institutions.

In the current context, however, dignity is tied to Kant's (2002) maxim. Specifically, persons should not be treated as a means but ends in themselves. In other words, they should not be in the service of a project but the origin of any proposal. All persons, according to Kant, should be viewed as autonomous agents who have the ability to reflect critically and establish for themselves a meaningful existence. This autonomy, accordingly, should never be subordinate to the goals of other persons or institutions. Only autonomous individuals have dignity.

In fact, for Kant, this self-direction is considered to be indicative of maturity. Persons who achieve this state are considered to be rational and dignified. For example, they do not slavishly follow the dictates issued by authorities, nor do they submit unquestioningly to religious or other teachings. Thus, they are free thinkers and do not fall into the trap of dogmatism. As a result, these persons are righteous and in control of their lives. In this sense, they are capable of fully developing their humanity. Every person, in this sense, can engage in serious reflection and deserves to be treated with dignity (Berger 1983).

This version of dignity is much more socially grounded now than in the past; there is no reference made, for example, to either cosmic themes or natural principles. The rejection of dualism in contemporary philosophy undermines both of these options. As a result, dignity is entirely a worldly phenomenon (Dussel 1985). Dignity is enacted, or not, in social relationships in terms of economic or health practices. A community-based approach to planning, accordingly, deals with dignity at the social and cultural levels due to the emphasis that is placed on participation and self-determination (Baker and Brownson 1998). Instead of merely hoping that this cosmic theme is somehow realized, persons must begin to act toward one another in ways that bring about dignified lives. Institutions must be designed, accordingly, such that they do not diminish the lives of any groups or persons. In this way, a community-based ethic is worldly.

But this version is different in a significant way from the Kantian position. That is, persons are not understood to be atoms with self-proclaimed uniqueness and inalienable rights. Indeed, such isolation would be devastating. For example, the language of human rights often culminates in a culture of selfishness and personal advancement; rights pertain simply to individuals. Nonetheless, people live in a society. For this reason, justice is tied directly to dignity, since persons always pursue their aims with others—in these associations is where dignity is both realized and subverted. How these relationships may jeopardize dignity is thus important in a community-based planning.

As should be noted, charity is anathema to this outlook. Rather than being taught to seek liberation from the conditions of poverty, persons are shown the best ways to avoid or cope with this condition. Because they remain trapped by the causes of this affliction, they are deprived of dignity. What many communities are demanding, instead, is self-expression, space for serious reflection, and the right to pursue their aims unfettered by interpersonal or institutional impediments. In more concrete terms, what they want is unqualified inclusion in all key social institutions. Striving for this sort of equality is not necessarily a part of charity.

When offered charity, persons are not in a position to negotiate their options. As the saying goes, beggars cannot be choosers. As a result, their participation in any remedy is very limited. The result is that these interventions are often inappropriate, and persons must make the best of ill-conceived programs. But even if services happen to be appropriate, they are provided as a gift. Accordingly, persons do not often feel grateful for the help that they receive, because they are made to feel indebted and unworthy of these handouts.

Equally important is that charity is offered to a particular recipient (Fondacaro and Weinberg 2002). As a result, the broader context is ignored. Economic relations, for example, that may impoverish a large part of the population are not necessarily answered by this process. These economic relationships are treated as if they constitute an inviolable system that is presumed to be legitimate. Persons are thought to be controlled by these broad social institutions and encouraged to adapt.

But to be treated with dignity, in the Kantian sense, communities should not be placed in such a position of dependency. They should not be directed by planners or abandoned to their social or cultural system. Through reflection, discussion, and participation, a community can avoid manipulation and not be at the whims of the authorities or dominated by their political or cultural surroundings. And as they demand increasing involvement in community life and planning activities, their stature begins to increase in every way, never again to be a passive recipient of the services that all persons deserve.

Despite the good intentions, acts of charity regularly overlook the needs of communities, leave intact the policies and organizations that are offensive, and perpetuate poverty and other problems. As a result, charitable programs are now viewed by many recipients as promoting injustice, since the root cause of any problem is never addressed (Marullo and Edwards 2000). But often planners do not understand why their interventions are rejected as insulting and, perhaps, harmful. After all, the aim of these projects is to provide assistance. How could such an admirable motive be questionable?

At the root of justice is the reflection necessary to avoid insulting a community with good intentions (Craig 2002). With justice in mind, community-based planners are more attuned to how their honorable intentions, at least initially, may have little or nothing to do with providing a community with relief. In this regard, a concern with justice helps planners to focus on the larger changes that will make a difference in the life of a community (Finn and Jacobsen 2003).

Justice, in this sense, is a radicalizing agent that moves community-based interventions beyond charity and often supporting, unknowingly, situations that rob

communities of their dignity. The thrust of justice is to broaden a critique or intervention to include more than individuals, and thus to address institutional relationships that undermine systematically the efforts of select persons or communities. In this way, persons can gain the autonomy to live freely and with purpose.

A Utopian Vision

Similar to dignity, justice has had many meanings (Capeheart and Milovanovic 2007). There is a cosmic version, whereby persons find their proper place in a grand scheme. In this sense, justice promotes ethereal balance and harmony. On the other hand, distributive justice occurs when persons receive their true rewards. With respect to the current critique of globalization and the absence of dignity, justice is realized concretely but still contributes to the utopian vision of many protesters. Remember that their idea is the creation of alternative world, where dignity for everyone prevails. In short, another world is possible! In this regard, justice is often political—whereby the distribution of resources must be criticized and possibly rethought.

In this discussion, those who promote the cause of justice strive to address the conditions that erode equality (List 2011). Whereas charity teaches adaptation, justice advances the autonomy of persons and communities. Hence the vision that accompanies charity is too narrow to build another world. In this respect, justice is utopian (Jacoby 2005, pp. x-xvi). Justice, in many ways, chases the impossible, and tries to make real the ideals that in the past may have been treated as mere fantasy.

What justice demands is the development of the conditions that lead to a new social harmony. In this sense, the solutions to problems are not directed merely to individuals but the institutional associations that perpetuate inequality and the accompanying social ills (Fals Borda 1996). Interventions, accordingly, should be transformational, rather than simply focused on rehabilitation.

The aim is to liberate persons from the fundamental reasons for their distress, instead of treating merely the symptoms. Medicines may be given to a community, for example, to deal with malaria or dengue. But the bigger picture may involve the creation of network of health promoters who have access to knowledge bases and interventions to deal with a wide range of issues. Going further, this strategy may involve becoming part a national health care system that focuses on the general improvement of communities. In Ecuador, steps similar to these were taken.

This point is where issues related to the exercise of power enter the discussion. The questions that become apparent, for example, are: Who established these exclusionary practices? Furthermore, how can these barriers be eliminated? In this sense, community-based planners attempt to address the conditions that prevent communities from exercising their talents and desires. But as will be discussed in the next chapter, it is most important to illustrate the limited or contingent nature of claims about power and reveal other alternatives. In this way, communities can begin to pursue their own aims.

Interventions that are based on justice, accordingly, provide persons with the abilities and confidence to become autonomous. For example, if communities challenge their current exclusion from the prevailing health care system, they may gain easy access to the medicines that are needed, in addition to learning how to avoid problems and treat themselves. In fact, the majority of the problems that they will likely encounter can be remedied by ordinary persons through their efforts at prevention and access to a few simple medicines. In many ways, the ideology of the prevailing health care system that emphasizes profit obscures this insight.

But this step is only the first of many to gain autonomy. As a part of authentic discussions related to health, a community may begin to recognize the need for a new health system, one that serves everyone equally. Accordingly, these persons may believe eventually that everyone deserves social services as a basic right, so that their full humanity may be realized. Rather than a luxury granted to only special classes of persons, health care could be viewed as a necessity, if a society is going to be viewed as truly humane and productive.

The point is that the drive for justice is unrelenting. Every aspect of social life is subject to critique, even the usual sacred cows such as traditional practices and institutional mores. Community-based planners, accordingly, believe that serious institutional change is needed to improve the fate of many communities. Amartya Sen (1999), in this regard, writes that appropriate planning elevates the basic "capabilities" of persons so that they can reinvent themselves and create a more commodious social environment. In other words, they acquire the skills and insight that allow them to pursue their desired actions and outcomes.

Those who peruse justice contend that human dignity will not be realized until the proper social conditions are created (Barry 2005, p. 24). Desiring justice, therefore, is a long-term effort that often requires political and collective action. Working to end health disparities, for example, requires a systemic change and citizens who have an alternative vision. Questions must be raised about a better way of distributing resources so that particular communities do not remain marginalized.

With justice guiding the development of social programs, the entire nature of these interventions is changed. Services should no longer arrive through well-intentioned but sporadic acts but through social responsibility. Instead of generosity, interventions should be motivated by care (O'Boyle 1991). All persons, in other words, should be viewed as deserving the resources necessary in order for them to reach their full humanity (Prilleltensky 2000). The level of health care that everyone can experience, based on the available personnel or technology, should become the norm. What persons are capable of generating or producing, in other words, should be available for the use of everyone, without any disparities. This sort of harmony is the goal of a just community.

In this regard, a key facet of community-based planning is fostering a discussion of a just community. A community's members, accordingly, may begin to view their plight in a broader institutional and political context and appreciate the effort and change that are required to create a new solidarity. Eliminating barriers to true communion, whereby persons free one another from their problems—that is, via mutual care—is the guiding theme of a community based on dignity. Hence justice en-

courages the deliberate organization of a community, so that solidarity is preserved and the humanity of every member is encouraged. In many ways, overcoming any breach of communion is at the heart of community-based planning.

In this way, community-based planning is a utopian endeavor (Jacoby 2005, pp. xv). Planners and community members are asked to envision a reality that, at this time, may appear to be impossible to achieve. The present world, in other words, does not always blind persons to other, more humane possibilities. In many respects, community-based planning is a venture into the unknown, or a realm of untested possibilities. Žižek (2012) calls this process "dreaming dangerously." Persons are asked to design programs, for example, that may have never been tried, based on philosophies that, in the past, have been dismissed as non-sense. But community-based planners realize that a new future can be brought about only by such adventure and imagination.

Community and Morality

In the world envisioned by neo-liberals, the formation of a community is mostly a tactical matter (Harvey 2005, pp. 64–66). In this sense, communities do not differ much from standard interest groups. That is, they exist to secure some advantage. As a result, there is not much internal solidarity or external commitment. Associations are superficial and ephemeral.

As noted earlier, neo-liberalism focuses on the individual. And in order to compete effectively at the marketplace, persons must be as free as possible from interpersonal ties. After all, emotion clouds decisions and leads to errors of judgment; tight bonds limit choices and restrict movement. Most relationships, outside of the family, are purely tactical and designed to promote personal advancement. For example, persons use networks to gain social capital in order to further their careers.

The question then becomes, how is a society held together with everyone jockeying for position? Here is where the theory of classic liberals, such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, enters the picture (Nussbaum 2004). Their viewpoint is referred to commonly as contract theory. The general idea is that persons forge a contact between one another, so that specific rules are recognized by everyone. These norms, accordingly, provide the guidelines for competition and the basis for a loosely associated community.

The problem with this thesis is that persons are primarily adversaries and do not have any real mutual obligations. In other words, they do not care for one another. Any personal problems that might arise, however, cannot be ignored, since these issues may jeopardize the social contract. Widespread poverty or illness, for example, may gradually destroy the social fabric.

Again, it is here that charity enters the picture. Through the efforts of religion and, possibly, education, some persons can be convinced that a few interventions are justified to preserve the social fabric (Leiby 1984). Nonetheless, help is voluntary and does not require any real commitment on the part of anyone (List 2011). As

a result, interventions are often haphazard and do not reflect any moral obligation, since there is no real connection between anyone in this process.

But even when these projects are more systemic, as in the form of government programs, a sense of community or moral commitment is not necessarily operative. Citizens may agree grudgingly that some persons may deserve limited assistance, and that a small portion of their taxes should be channeled in this direction. Nonetheless, most tax payers are skeptical of these programs and think poorly of the persons who are served. Any sense of community is, thus, missing. Many donors, for example, are simply fulfilling their duty as citizens, while supporters of programs that are faith-based have more lofty ideas. In both cases, however, changes are not demanded that would create a more dignified social order.

Community-based planners, accordingly, do not view persons to be related through a contract (Prilleltensky and Gonick 1996). When predicated on this framework, service programs do not reflect care but a calculation about the cost of preserving society. Therefore, these planners begin from a different and, what they believe to be, more fundamental outlook. In fact, Leonardo Boff (2001, p. 77) identifies this principle as a cosmic pact. While not necessarily a return to Greek mythology, the use of the term cosmic suggests that solidarity is a basic condition of social existence. Indeed, fundamental to personal existence is a sense of plurality, whereby persons are always in the presence of others. Stated another way, persons are not "autarkic," that is, closed off fundamentally from others (Peperzak 2013, p. 26).

What these critics recognize is that prior to the formation of a contract, persons are already associated; the ability to enter into a contract suggests that persons are in contact with one another (Dussel 2008). But by introducing a contract, this formidable connection is obscured. That is, persons are only related technically and under certain conditions. Their obligations are minimal and only indirectly related to the suffering of actual persons. Indeed, persons are required to react to needs only under the conditions that are specified by the contract, and otherwise are permitted to ignore their neighbors. An actual petition from another person for help, accordingly, carries little weight, although at times some persons may act outside of their contractual obligations and offer aid. But such direct responses are not required and represent charity. After all, contracts are made among persons who are basically estranged from one another.

But prior to this process of formalizing relationships, persons are united. They encounter one another, share a common space, and have a similar fate. Remember that a community, at least from a community-based perspective, is not contractual but reflects a confluence of experiences that are recognized as a communal biography. In fact, persons construct this story together. For this reason, Emmanuel Levinas (1969, p. 251) declares that ethics precedes ontology. In other words, persons exist together and exhibit relationships long before elaborate schemes, such as contracts and laws, are established to insure the survival of social order. As many current writers in Latin America declare, all persons are part of a broad-based, multi-valiant human community that antedates any contractual relationship (Boff 2001, pp. 85–87).

In this regard, Jean-Luc Nancy (2000, pp. 28–41) uses terms such as "singular plural" and "co-existence" to describe this social condition. His point is that persons are basically social beings, although this idea goes beyond the standard ancient Greek understanding that they enjoy company and can benefit from cooperation. What he means, along with writers such as Levinas and Boff, is that others are never left behind, that is, persons have never been atoms that are connected only haphazardly. The offer of aid, accordingly, is not altruism but an expectation of a human association that can never truly be abridged. As a consequence of this connection, a sense of obligation is present; persons recognize that the well-being of each member of this community is in the hands of others.

At the heart of this community is care (Dussel 2008). After all, the members of a true community protect and encourage one another, and do not tolerate the equivocation over obligations that may accompany the institution of a contract. As Buber (1957, p. 102) states, they exhibit a "living reciprocity" to one another. As a result, interventions in such a community are not a product of charity but expected. Such an obligation, furthermore, is accepted willingly, since service programs are presumed to support the common will. No longer are those who need help perceived as merely outliers, who are fundamentally deviant in some way, but must be dealt with because of a contractual stipulation.

With the rejection of the contract thesis, a new basis for social solidarity is established that is more extensive than before (Serrano-Caldera 1993). As opposed to the fallen man thesis, persons are not desolate, lost, and in need of a contract to bind them together in order to avert chaos. Likewise, in terms of the more modern neo-liberal version of this theme, grounded in the new individualism, persons are not atoms who are joined only tactically. Instead, they share existence and are available to support one another, based on the principle of community survival and the implied mutual aid.

The basic idea is that because persons exist together—as Levinas (1998) describes, they literally face one another daily—mutual assistance is only logical. Any barriers to this help, even if they are institutionalized and sanctioned through a contract, are illegitimate. In a true community, these obstacles violate the basic bonds between persons and must be eliminated. In the context of this new solidarity, pursuing justice is thus expected. After all, the basic message of this social imagery is that cooperation is not an anomaly. Those who reside in a community see the wisdom of such behavior, since only by acting together will they prosper in the long term.

A fundamental part of community-based interventions, and this new version of morality, is that the existence of persons is basically intersubjective. Any interventions should thus originate from this basic association and reflect the care that is expected from this relationship. Furthermore, in this community everyone has dignity, if all barriers to preserving this basic solidarity are eliminated. But in terms of this communal association, justice is not an abstract ideal but central to everyday reality. Persons are expected to act with their neighbors in mind, since their association can never be abridged. Even the illusions created by the notion of a contract can-

not obliterate the link between persons, although this association can be seriously distorted and weakened.

In policy circles, this new viewpoint on morality is referred to as "cosmopolitanism" (Maffettone and Rathore 2012). This community-based version, however, is less heteronomous than the traditional case. Decisions are made about how to act on face-to-face differences that are experienced—different realities and related behavioral options—rather than ethereal images or abstract social goals. In this regard, morality is "corporeal" (Dussel 2013). The result is interpersonal sensitivity and a real attunement to others instead of a commitment to an imperious system of rules that obscures this montage of outlooks. Any obligations are thus associative rather than vertical and reflect interpersonal solidarity.

In this form of cosmopolitanism, persons are situated and positioned relative to others. In this regard, others inform all decisions and actions, so that a confluence of perspectives is encouraged. All legitimate actions are, thus, associative and communitarian. A moral order is established on the basis of this relationship that should not dissolve into the free-for-all of personal pursuits envisioned by neo-liberals. Due to this connection, such a transition would not make sense.

On the other hand, this association is not the product of biology or religious mythology—everyone is part of a similar species or human family—or some other ethereal cause. Such a connection would be too rigid and likely require assimilation to some universal standard. The cosmopolitanism envisioned by community-based planners, instead, is predicated on the recognition and inclusion of different perspectives, with each one given respect and the right to play an important role in any decision. The cosmopolis, in this case, is broad because the focus is on the disparate experiences that bind both persons and communities together, but without an abstract core.

Conclusion

Community-based planners have no illusions about the changes that are needed to improve the most poor communities (Fals Borda 1988, pp. 85–97). In order for these persons to live dignified lives, planning must involve far more than the usual piecemeal improvements. Often the traditional institutional relationships must be challenged and replaced by more commodious associations.

For this reason, these planners invoke the vocabulary of justice to accomplish this aim. Change is thus cast in moral terms, and the unrelenting quest for real social solidarity that, in fact, is closer at hand than most persons recognize. The pursuit of justice does not rest until the conditions necessary for dignity to be achieved have been established. The problem with Kant's maxim, however, is that he focuses primarily on the individual, although the basic message of personal autonomy is helpful. Despite this shortcoming on the part of Kent, his version poses challenges to a neo-liberal system that diminishes social relations and allows certain social classes to dominate the others.

Although inspired by the Kantian position, community-based planners formulate a unique position to address the issue of justice. Specifically, they talk about a basic association between persons that has been obscured by neo-liberalism and other trends, such as contract theory (Wiesenfeld 1996). All interventions, they contend, should take place within this dimension of solidarity. A new world can thus be imagined as divorced from charity and based on care. Within this framework, interventions are not a gift but the expected response from community members who support one another.

From the vantage point of a community, the pursuit of justice is important is the following ways with respect to promoting change: (1) all persons are valuable; (2) their contributions are sought; (3) the barriers to widespread participation should be eliminated; and (4) any obstacles to realizing their ambitions must be attacked and abolished. As a result, moral unity is not simply an idealistic wish since the steps that are necessary to promote dignity for everyone are clear.

A just community is well within reach, given the fundamental connection between persons. An intervention based on justice, accordingly, labors to retrieve this association. Although a community may need assistance, due to unforeseen circumstances or past exploitation and marginalization, the mutual support is available that leads to collective autonomy. Through the widespread participation that characterizes community-based projects, the attempt is made to resurrect this solidarity.

Community-based projects not only encourage community members to act in concert but also to exhibit care for one another (Riger 2001). The interpersonal connections that Levinas describes as basic to social existence may have been obscured but can be retrieved to guide an intervention. Community-based planning, therefore, rests on solidarity that is more profound than any formal or institutional attempts that may occur much later to secure order. At the root of a community-based intervention, therefore, is the moral principle of mutual responsibility that community members express toward one another.

Central to community-based planning, however, is that all changes are made with respect to others rather than abstract rules. After all, as Levinas (1998) notes, abstract rules draw attention away from others and often result in the imposition of irrelevant standards. The face of others, on the other hand, invites sensitivity, collaboration, and relevant decisions.

In fact, the entire community-based philosophy makes no sense in the absence of this moral principle. Specifically, community members are committed to one another and understand the wisdom of mutual aid and try to battle the conflict encouraged by recent trends such as globalization and other viewpoints that separate persons. Community-based planers, accordingly, attempt to establish the conditions whereby this morality can be exercised. Seeking justice is thus unavoidable in true community-based projects, due to the emphasis placed on collective action and solidarity.

References

Baker, E., & Brownson, C. A. (1998). Defining characteristics of community-based health promotion programs. *Journal of Public Health Management Practice, 4*(2), 1–9.

Barry, B. (2005). *Why social justice matters*. Cambridge: Polity.

Berger, P. L. (1983). On the obsolescence of the concept of honour. In S. Hauerwas & A. MacIntyre (Eds.), *Revisions: Changing perspectives in moral philosophy* (pp. 172–181). Norte Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Boff, L. (2001). *Ética Planetaria desde el Sur*. Madrid: Editorial Trotta.

Buber, M. (1957). *Pointing the way*. New York: Harper and Row.

Buettner-Schmidt, K., & Lobo, M. L. (2012). Social justice: A concept analysis. *Journal of Advanced Nursing, 68*(4), 948–958.

Capeheart, L., & Milovanovic, D. (2007). *Social justice*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Collins, R. (1974). Three faces of cruelty: Towards a comparative sociology of violence. *Theory and Society, 1*(4), 415–440.

Commissiong, A. B. (2012). *Cosmopolitanism in modernity: Human dignity in a global age*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Craig, G. (2002). Poverty, social work, and social justice. *British Journal of Social Work, 32*(6), 669–682.

De Maio, F. (2012). *Health and social theory*. London: Palgrave.

Dussel, E. (1985). *Philosophy of liberation*. New York: Orbis Books.

Dussel, E. (2008). *Ethics and community*. Eugene: Wipf and Stock.

Dussel, E. (2013). *Ethics of liberation: In the age of globalization and exclusion*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Fals Borda, O. (1988). *Knowledge and people's power*. New York: New Horizons.

Fals Borda, O. (1996). Power/knowledge and emancipation. *Systems Practice, 9*(2), 177–181.

Finn, J. L., & Jacobsen, M. (2003). *Just practice*. Peosta: Eddie Bowers.

Fondacaro, M. R., & Weinberg, D. (2002). Concepts of social justice in community psychology: Toward a social ecological epistemology. *American Journal of Community Psychology, 30*(4), 473–492.

Fraser, N., & Honneth, A. (2003). *Social justice*. London: Verso.

Gil, D. G. (1998). *Confronting injustice and oppression*. New York: Columbia University.

Gostin, L. O., & Powers, M. (2006). What does social justice require for the public's health? Public health ethics and policy imperatives. *Health Affairs, 25*(4), 1053–1060.

Harvey, D. (2005). *A brief history of neo-liberalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Herzberg, F. (1973). *Work and the nature of man*. New York: The New American Library.

Holahan, C. J., & Wilcox, B. L. (1977). Ecological strategies in community psychology: A case study. *Journal of Community Psychology, 5*(4), 423–433.

Ivey, A. E., & Collins, N. M. (2003). Social justice: A long-term challenge for counseling psychology. *The Counseling Psychologist, 31*(3), 290–298.

Jacoby, R. (2005). *Picture imperfect: Utopian thought for an anti-utopian age*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Kant, I. (2002). *Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Laverick, G. (2005). *Public health*. London: Palgrave.

Leiby, J. (1984). Charity organizations reconsidered. *Social Service Review, 58*(4), 523–538.

Lemert, C. (2006). *The new individualism: The emotional costs of globalization*. London: Routledge.

Levinas, E. (1969). *Totality and Infinity*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

Levinas, E. (1998). *Entre nous*. New York: Columbia University Press.

List, J. M. (2011). Beyond charity-social justice in health care. *Virtual Mentor, 13*(8), 565–568.

Maffettone, S., & Rathore, A. S. (2012). *Global justice: Critical perspectives*. London: Routledge.

Marullo, S., & Edwards, B. (2000). From charity to justice: The potential of university-community collaboration for social change. *American Behavioral Scientist, 43*(5), 895–912.
McTaggert, R. (1991). Principles for participatory action research. *Adult Education Quarterly, 41*(3), 168–187.
Miller, D. (1999). *Principles of social justice*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Murphy, J. W., & Callaghan, K. A. (2009). Economic culture and service delivery. *Journal of Social Work in Disability and Rehabilitation, 8*(2), 57–64.
Nancy, J.-L. (2000). *Being singular plural*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Nelson and Prilleltensky (eds.) (2005). *Community psychology: In the pursuit of liberation and well-being*. London: Palgrave.
Nussbaum, M. (2004). Beyond the social contract: Capabilities and global justice. *Oxford Development Studies, 32*(1), 3–18.
O'Boyle, E. J. (1991). On justice and charity. *Review of Social Economy, 49*(4), 578–595.
Packenham, R. A. (1992). *The dependency movement: Scholarship and politics in development studies*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Peperzak, A. T. (2013). *Trust*. New York: Fordham University Press.
Piven, F. F., & Cloward, R. A. (1979). *Poor people's movements*. New York: Vintage Books.
Prilleltensky, I., & Gonick, L. (1996). Polities change, oppression remains: On the psychology and politics of oppression. *Political Psychology, 17*(1), 127–148.
Prilleltensky, I. (2000). Bridging agency, theory, and action: Critical links in critical psychology. In T. Sloan (Ed.), *Critical psychology: Voices for change* (pp. 67–81). London: MacMillan.
Riger, S. (2001). Transforming community psychology. *American Journal of Community Psychology, 29*(1), 69–81.
Rose, N. (2000). Government and control. *British Journal of Criminology, 40*(2), 321–339.
Sen, A. (1999). *Development as freedom*. New York: Knopf.
Serrano-Caldera, A. (1993). *La Unidad y la Diversidad*. Managua: Editorial San Rafael.
Smart, B. (2003). *Economy, culture, and society: A critique of neo-liberalism*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
Tronto, J. C. (1993). *Moral boundaries: A political argument for an ethic of care*. London: Routledge.
Watkins, M., & Shulman, H. (2008). *Toward psychologies of liberation*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Wiesenfeld, E. (1996). The concept of 'we': A community social psychology myth? *Journal of Community Psychology, 24*(4), 337–345.
Young, I. M. (2011). *Responsibility for justice*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Žižek, S. (2012). *The year of dreaming dangerously*. London: Verso.

Chapter 10
Conclusion

Introduction

To say that the world has changed is almost a cliché. Nonetheless, this claim is true. But remember that the world is no longer thought to be merely a geographical place or collection of traits. There is no doubt that the economy has become more unstable, and technology has altered every sphere is life. At the root of these changes, however, is something more profound that dramatically alters how social existence and planning should be viewed. Something interesting has occurred in terms of how communities come into being and are sustained.

Planning, for example, should not be thought of as helping communities, or managing or spreading development. Indeed, with respect to traditional views on this subject, the new word "anti-planning" may be a more appropriate term (Steinberg 1994). After all, community-based planning is not guidance or support, but an attempt to unleash communities. As Amartya Sen (1999) remarks, planning should represent "freedom." Rather than initiated or undertaken by a particular group of professionals or experts, such planning represents communities becoming self-organized, defining themselves, and pursing their goals. For this reason, Ulrich Beck (1997, p. 157) coined the term "sub-politics" to describe this approach, since the aim is to decentralize or "disperse" decision-making and avoid conventional top-down methodologies.

For this reason, community-based planning is the new moniker. This position announces a break with realism. The term that is used often nowadays is "de-linking" (Amin 1990). The basic idea is that persons do not confront the world; the world, accordingly, is not a domain where planning is enacted. Due to various theoretical breakthroughs, such dualism is considered to be passé. Therefore, planning is not an operation that merely involves communities, sometimes described as working through these groups to promote their well-being.

Because of the rejection of dualism, the world is an expanse of experience. Communities, accordingly, are not objects that receive treatments and other supports. As noted throughout this book, these groups are constructed and constitute various and often competing realities. To refer to planning as a task, job, or undertaking betrays the intimacy that now exists between persons and their creations. Persons

J. W. Murphy, *Community-Based Interventions,* International Perspectives on Social Policy, Administration, and Practice, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4899-8020-5_10,

are no longer in the world, since the implied separation has collapsed. Instead, as noted in an earlier discussion of epidemiology, persons and communities should be thought of as embodied, whereby their actions shape their identities and create social worlds (Zaner 1964). With this break from dualism and the accompanying realism, the nature of the world has changed appreciably.

Without dualism, persons are thrown into the midst of existence. There is no zero-point that can serve as an objective referent or anchor (Barthes 1970, p. 16). Persons and communities, therefore, have no other choice but to create a meaningful existence. Part of this fate is planning; to paraphrase Sartre, persons are condemned to make sense and give direction to their existence. Giving life purpose, in the context of a community-based orientation, is synonymous with planning. In this regard, planning is not enacted but lived. Only when persons are alienated and not in a position to create their lives, does planning appear to be an imposition. But in many ways, this alienation is endemic to the modern condition.

Due to the collapse of dualism, persons have little choice but to begin planning from the ground-up. That is, there is no possible escape to an objective domain that can serve as the anchor of knowledge and order. As a result, understanding relevant knowledge and the reality of a community must be based on the experiences of persons enacted through their participation in constructing social life. Pertinent facts are found in the biography of a group of persons, while a community represents a confluence of these biographies. Hence, all relevant planning should take into account how these stories reveal the various, often competing realities in a community. Ignoring this realm of interpretation, or transforming this domain into a plethora of social indicators can, thus, easily result in misconstruing the conditions of a community.

Planning and Theory

The problem is that, in many respects, the practice of planning has not kept abreast of theory. But community-based planning is an attempt to close this gap. From the perspective of community-based philosophy, communities recognize their "thrownness" into the world, with no official guideposts present, and summon their abilities to create a meaningful destiny (Heidegger 1962, pp. 320–321). Keen attention is paid in the planning process not only to the history of a community but to the outcomes desired by these persons. Past exclusion and future aims, as in any biography, are integral to rational and appropriate plans. And given that persons must construct their destinies—this creative tendency pervades social existence—all reasonable plans should be attuned to this activity.

This shift to communities, however, is not linked to the neoliberal trend to eliminate the welfare state. The self-contained communities envisioned by neoliberals, in fact, have little in common with the proposals advanced by community-based planners (Harvey 2005). These planners do not isolate communities but try to unite them into a collective movement, designed to be the locus of economic and cultural

control. This new focus on communities, in other words, is connected with the collective management of all social institutions and community affairs. Clearly neoliberals have a very different agenda in mind, with their emphasis on the market and competition.

Persons are clamoring to participate, in truly meaningful ways, in the overall development of society. In theory, there is no longer any justification for their marginalization; indeed, they are no longer confronting a social system that can dictate the roles of persons and communities. As evidenced by the rise in ethnic pride and the new social movements designed to promote inclusion at all levels of society, many persons are no longer willing to accept subservience to unfair and discriminatory institutions! Such compliance is negated by the demands, insights, and novel plans expressed by communities. In this regard, these groups expect dignity.

In fact, "hybrid" is the term that is used nowadays to characterize the resulting social reality (Canclini 1995). Because fewer persons are willing to accept second-class citizenship, demands for inclusion proliferate. Multi-culturalism, for example, has become the norm, whereby communities challenge their marginalization by any mode of domination (Glazer 1997). Any attempt to impose a "mono-culture", including narrowly defined politics and prospects for growth, can expect to meet resistance (Kramer 2003). In many respects, a radical pluralism has emerged in civil society, with communities demanding a situation where everyone is on equal footing. In this way, their dignity is a priority.

Utopian Imagery

Accompanying this trend is the new social imagery. Communities, for example, are not perceived to be entities but a nexus of realities—referred to by Max Weber (1978, pp. 26–28) as "sociation"—based on the competing imaginations that pervade civil society. Communities are, thus, real but elusive. This new connection, however, does not abandon morality. The key difference from traditional theory is that impersonal principles are not invoked to provide the so-called cement to secure order. Due to the emphasis placed on participation, a community represents a confluence of actions that come to be accepted, as least for a while, as supplying the parameters of a collective identity.

Imposing abstract institutions may absolve persons from having to care for one another, since their actions are considered to be ancillary to these organizations. In other words, within the realist framework, persons are not the locus of morality but the higher-order elements that bind them together. Accordingly, morality does not originate from communities, with persons coordinating their affairs to secure a particular destiny. In this sense, persons do not concentrate on one another but the institutional demands that insure cooperation. Civic bonding, as Martin Buber (1958, pp. 48–51) discusses, is not necessary for persons to act as a community, since their coordination is out of their hands.

From a community-based perspective morality emerges from between persons and, in reality, such action is presupposed by the creation of laws and other institutions. Furthermore, this source of morality is substantial enough to unite persons into dignified relationships. As they begin to view themselves as sharing a common space, the logic of mutual accommodation becomes apparent, while cooperation looks obvious. In this sense, the collective sentiment that neoliberals find so appalling is not inherently foreign to the human condition (Harvey 2005, pp. 64–66). In fact, the bond between persons is obscured only under certain, unfortunate conditions, as when the ideology of internecine economic and other modes of rivalry is so overwhelming that persons are blinded to their fundamental association.

This recognition of community, however, does not represent an attempt to resurrect an idyllic past, a lost paradise. Such nostalgia would dwell on outmoded practices and, for the most part, be irrelevant. The point, instead, is that persons exist together long before measures of control are thought of and instituted; contrary to the position of Hobbes or Locke, a sort of pre-society exists where persons are oriented toward one another. Recognizing and building on this association is what community-based planners are expected to accomplish.

Whether or not a community decides, for example, to repeat a previous institutional formation that may have supported conflict and alienation cannot be predicted. All that is assumed in a community-based philosophy is that a communal association is present and that moral incoherence is an artifact of history. Neoliberals, for example, obscure these relationships with their rhetoric about the primacy of individuals and market efficiency (Smart 2003, pp. 86–90). As a result, although persons exist and survive collectively, many are convinced that they are atoms with no social responsibility. Even so, when persons pursue their own aims, others do not disappear but simply fade momentarily into the background.

Given this fundamental connection between persons, planning should be thought of as a public good. As a result, collective projects should not rest on altruism, social affection, or other modes of sentimentalism. An emotional "We," for example, is not a prerequisite of community-based planning. The simple reality is that social existence is not a private affair, and thus the search for the causes of solidarity is redundant. In a manner of speaking, the communal character of life is organic, but not necessarily biological, and exists right in front of persons and is never repealed even when conflict arises (Mattelart and Mattelart 1998, p. 21). In fact, conflict is a testimonial to this collective condition; such interchanges both unite and differentiate persons. Nonetheless, under no condition is the communal association abridged that it guides the creation of community-based interventions.

A Communal Perspective on Interventions

In view of this imagery on morality, a new perspective on the nature of social programs accompanies community-based planning. Services are neither a gift nor a handout. Likewise, various tests should not put into place to determine whether

interventions are deserved. In short, community-based planners eschew all of the customary caveats that accompany charity. Charity is considered to be anathema to communal life.

In a real community, charity is irrelevant. In other words, assistance is considered to be a moral obligation. Persons are expected to aid others when their needs become evident (Levinas 2003). An appeal to individual responsibility should not cloud calls for help or temper the interventions that are necessary to rectify a situation. The point should not be lost that persons are not similar to atoms but lead a collective existence, and thus both problems and assistance exist must be dealt with in this communal context.

In essence, community-based planners recognize that persons live in a web of relationships. Whether they succeed or make stupid decisions that cause their downfall, these outcomes must be analyzed in terms of these associations (Young 2011, p. 18). Their rise or fall, simply put, never occurs alone. In this regard, personal responsibility is only one side of an explanation. Any community-based intervention, accordingly, is much more holistic and tries to understand how a problem is embedded in a host of relationships. In contemporary parlance, how persons are "positioned" in these associations is crucial to appreciating why they may have acted in one way or another or why some choices were made rather than others (Young 2011, pp. 54–56).

As should be noted, community-based planning poses a serious challenge to the current biomedical hegemony in service delivery. The focus is not on health professionals and their search for causes of illness, all based on high tech solutions to any problem. This formula is deemed to be too narrow, since the social context of health is downplayed.

Rather, emphasis is placed on local involvement, combined with prevention, education, and social change. Of course, identifying the causes of illness is important, but real remedies often require widespread changes that are not viewed to be a regular part of biomedicine. Although high tech interventions are often available, most often community-based solutions are successful—that is, changes in local practices linked to the dissemination of medical knowledge, cultural sensitivity, and community guidance are sufficient to improve the quality of social life (Smith-Nonini 2010).

Of course persons are responsible for their actions, but they do not act in isolation. For this reason, community-based planners seek justice. Hence they adopt broad strategies that attempt to address barriers to a dignified existence, both personal and institutional (Prilleltensky 2001). Through this process, communities engage in the reflection required to grasp the life-world of their members, thereby revealing the embedded nature of their actions. Such reflection goes beyond simply recall or rumination but involves a critical examination of assumptions and accompanying realities. Obstacles are challenged, while invention is encouraged.

In this sense, community members reinforce one another through various interventions, so that their objectives can be realized. In this regard, no one in a community is dismissed as unworthy of assistance and allowed to deteriorate into misery. Simply put, the group is improved, even through very personal interventions

because no one exists alone and eventually any benefit spreads throughout the collective. And despite what neoliberals claim, their theory cannot operate in this manner, due to the assumed atomism.

Community-based planning, however, is not merely an option, because persons have no alternative but to care for one another. Contrary to the views of neoliberals, problems do not arise in a vacuum. In many ways, this economic thesis has obscured the myriad of issues that can converge to create a personal or collective crisis that demands a widespread collective response. After all, as C. Wright Mills (1959, p. 7) recognizes, at the intersection of personal or collective biography and history is where both problems and solutions occur.

What has been overlooked recently in the debate about poverty and crime is this intersection of relationships that constitute the communal character of social existence. As a result, persons blame one another for any shortcomings and howl about the general decline in personal responsibility. The depressing description of persons "bowling alone" is used regularly to lament this loss of solidarity (Putnam 2000). Nonetheless, community-based planners do not engage in such futile recrimination. What they do, instead, is shift to a perspective that entails a much broader moral commitment consistent with the shared world created by persons in their communities.

As part of living in this cosmopolitan vision, persons evaluate how others are treated (Fine 2007). Thus, fairness plays a large role in this new public sphere. But going further, everyone expects a dignified existence, especially those who are becoming aware of past mistreatment. Nowadays social disparities are often openly discussed, along with policies and practices that seem to overlook these issues. Indeed, persons and communities around the world are disgruntled and clamoring for recognition and autonomy that are consistent with this new moral position. Their aim is the creation of a more commodious environment, where everyone is treated with respect.

Community Renewal

This repair of solidarity, as community-based planners claim, can only occur following a significant shift in attention (Etzioni 1999). More is needed, in other words, than simply the creation of a supportive environment or overtures to participation. What persons want, instead, is a more just society. As a result of their commitment, responsibility, and input, they hope to move forward and reestablish an ethical balance in the world.

Because community-based planners begin with the premise that persons share a common fate, this task is not necessarily daunting. There is no need for a consensus or the discovery of common values or universal interests in order for persons to recognize their connection and act in concert. Through participation in community projects, their capacity for exercising control and initiating change, while the logic of joint action becomes clear. What they learn is novel but obvious: Persons exist at the nexus of their actions (Wiesenfeld 1996). And as should be noted, thus far in

this book, the adoption of this viewpoint changes everything about social existence. Stated simply, any action implicates a range of others, and thus a collective assessment of policies and practices is necessary for an adequate evaluation.

What should be noted, however, is that this vision is not limited to specific neighborhoods or locales. In fact, at the root of community-based planning is a much more ambitious aim. The goal is to move toward a fully participatory and much more inclusive society, which is organized around the common good. At minimum, a redistribution of resources is necessary to achieve this ideal (Young 2011, p. 29). Many persons are excluded from participating fully in the formation of a truly communal existence because they lack education and specific skills and face many other institutionalized obstacles to their development. In this sense, they languish and never realize their abilities.

But community-based planners go beyond offering the standard correctives. Two points are particularly important at this juncture. The first is that communities should have control of all vital resources—their (re)distribution is a part of the participation that is at the root of this style of planning. And second, a mode of solidarity should be recognized that is not fleeting, or dependent on commonalities. Again, the moral principle that is operative, as Levinas (1998) recognized, is that the people's lives are inextricably intertwined. This connection may be obscured due to ideologies such as neoliberalism but informs both personal and communal growth. The question that might be asked, given the obvious collective character of social life, is how have so many persons been convinced that social existence is simply a collection of individuals? Clearly, everyday experience testifies to the error of this conclusion.

In many ways, the endgame of community-based planning is to abandon the prevailing institutions that obscure social solidarity. These current arrangements are thought to have diverted resources away from communities and distorted communal relations. The idea of a new world, in this sense, goes beyond simply supporting communities and encouraging their recognition. What communities need most is not sympathy or support but control of their destinies and the resources required for such self-determination. Dignity, in short, is not found in support or acceptance; dignity, in the manner suggested by Kant (2002), involves the ability of persons to construct themselves and their relationships. In view of Kant's position, support sounds very paternalistic.

The point, therefore, is to refashion society in general. Viewing institutions as human creations that are sustained by participation is necessary for this change to occur. After all, through planning the current, alienated institutions can be retrieved and altered to fulfill the demands of communities. For example, new economic relations can be established, along with a more socially responsive polity. Even health care can be viewed to be a right. And through community-based planning this creative spirit can be unleashed and illustrated to be indeterminate. A utopian ideal, in this sense, is revealed to be nothing more than a proposal that has been denied, rather than a dream that should be deferred or never pursued by reasonable persons.

In a manner of speaking, all realities are utopian, because they are created by persons out of uncertainty. Even a polity that is currently repressive was once

imaginary, although now this invention may seem intractable. Community-based planners are utopian, accordingly, because they deny permanency to any social creation. In this sense, planning always involves remaking the world, even if the decision is made merely to retain the present conditions. Because a construction is always unstable, human action is needed to reinforce even a reality that appears to be real and unchangeable. In other words, remaining the same requires a decision to take this course of action (Sartre 1994). Community-based planners, accordingly, recognize that change is not necessarily disruptive but simply a new direction.

Existential Character of Planning

Clearly planning must be rethought in light of the base of solidarity that fundamentally unites persons into a communal existence. For this reason, community-based planning is far more than an exercise due to the precarious nature of a constructed social reality. What planning entails is actually making or inventing a world, but not in just any way. Through planning, communities make themselves in a manner that makes sense and fulfills their purposes.

In this way, community-based planners are not relativists. That is, they do not believe any plan is appropriate, because the future is uncertain. Simply because every construction is contingent, persons do not lose the ability to judge development. In fact, without these judgments, planning would be meaningless, since one direction would be the same as any other. Again, planning is fundamentally existential.

What emerges from community-based planning, accordingly, is a meaningful project. Reflection and construction bring to fruition the new institutional arrangements, along with the correct practices, desired by a community (Estes 1993). But planning, in this sense, represents the momentary taming of desire, rather than something scientific or ultimately rational. In short, imagination is given direction and transformed into institutional practices that meet certain needs. In this way, needs are the projections that motivate a particular course of action.

An inherited option, or social reality, gives way to another invention or fabrication; one creation, in other words, is replaced by another "paramount reality" in a community-based project (Schutz 1962, pp. 229–234). In this regard, planning is imaginary by making real an option that cannot demand this status. Indeed, community-based planning often makes real a rendition of social existence that was formerly thought to be impossible. In effect, community-based planners encourage something that traditionalists would not likely consider, that is, communities should be allowed to dream (Appadurai 1996). A key ingredient of this mode of planning is enabling communities to experience the realization of their ability to invent a unique identity and future.

To achieve this aim, issues such as the absence of health care or drainage should be conceptualized anew. These problems, simply put, are contingent and do not carry the weight of necessity or inevitability. Contrary to what many poor

or marginalized communities may initially believe, problems such as these are not their lot in life and something to be simply endured. Community-based planning, accordingly, involves a style of reflection that leads to increased liberty, since persons are no longer thought to be trapped in their current situation (Prilleltensky et al. 2008). Problems are merely the result of mistakes or intentions that can be rectified by producing less alien institutional arrangements.

Planning is thus indeterminate, although persons are summoned to resurrect their basic solidarity and negotiate and enact a positive change. Clearly, community-based planning is not value-free but very political. Political in this sense means that a new agent of history has arisen. Perhaps for the first time, persons and communities that were once overlooked or dismissed are treated as the central actors in the process of change. Actors who were formerly marginal assume the responsibility for the creation of more commodious institutional arrangements and relevant futures.

Without a doubt, community-based planning defies the usual recipes and, as such, earns the label of anti-planning. These planners consult all of the traditionally wrong sources and challenge the usual logic. Simply put, they are not pragmatic, objective, or scientific, in the traditional sense, but believe that the impossible can be achieved. The sad fact is that many communities need the impossible, in order to secure a modicum of dignity. In the end, demanding the impossible becomes a reasonable proposition to community-based planners, when faced with the task of repairing a damaged community.

Dealing with Power

Recommending that persons act on the impossible appears to be very idealistic. But community-based planning is far from idealism (Dean and Fenby 1989). The impossible, for example, is not fantasy; the desires and wishes emphasized by these planners can cause problems to disappear. In fact, there is nothing mysterious about the change that community-based planners advocate. They begin in the world, where communities are positioned and work to bring about very tangible ends, goals that these groups believe to be feasible and hope to reach.

This mode of planning, accordingly, is demanding and complex, and grounded in the concerns of daily life. Obviously health care will not improve by merely waving a magic wand. In this regard, community-based planning is materialistic, since real social conditions and barriers, along with human action, are the focus of attention (Minkler 2005). Furthermore, arduous work and commitment are required to promote the growth of a community. Merely waiting or hoping for change is not a part of this outlook. Imagination is not disconnected from the world.

The focus of these change agents, however, is not simply the difficulties of overcoming the current conditions. Nonetheless, typical persons must begin to complete tasks that have been monopolized by outmoded institutions and authorities. Habits and skills must be exercised that may have been dormant to the extent that they

appear to be moribund or missing. In this sense, unresponsive institutions must be challenged, along with the behaviors and attitudes that often accompany these intransigent social arrangements. In this regard, the hegemony of dominant but irrelevant institutions must be subverted.

This point is where the issue of confronting power is raised usually in any discussion of community-based research and planning. The question becomes: How do marginalized communities overcome the negative influences that have contributed to and may benefit from the current and unfortunate conditions of these persons? In other words, how is power addressed? Particularly important is that community-based planning is not halcyon but replete with conflict. After all, change is the intended outcome. The thrust, however, is to neutralize the institutionalized barriers, along with the more subtle sources of exclusion and degradation, that prohibit communities from realizing their aims.

Traditionally, power is defined as the ability to get persons to undertake actions that they would not otherwise perform. Nonetheless, this portrayal is unduly narrow and overlooks the processes of legitimation and exclusion. What is missed by this definition, according to Rahman (1991), is who defines and controls this activity. In this sense, power relates to knowledge, that is, whose views are thought to be worthwhile and the range of perspectives that are considered to be rational and viable. Clearly the forms of knowledge that are deemed valuable and acceptable play a key role in who can speak and whose opinions are given credence.

Although not necessarily a panacea, community-based planning tries to expand the discussion of power. That is, due to the emphasis that is placed on anti-dualism and participation, power is thought to be cultural, symbolic, and expressive, with the end of intimidating, marginalizing, and dominating persons (Foucault 1980). In other words, power and the resulting domination must be created and enforced, since there is no absolute justification for the subordination of specific persons or groups. Indeed, power rests on the acceptance, and often the internalization, of particular claims about inferiority or a lack of skills or experience. Particular persons or groups are, thus, intentionally undermined.

But because of the biographical character of all social elements, even power, domination is not necessarily stable. As a consequence of this cultural base, the exercise of power requires that the illusion of stability be created. After all, persons would not be intimidated by flimsy demands. The image must be created, in other words, that discrimination and marginalization are entirely justified, and not simply predicated on partisan proposals or practices. In this sense, the desires of a marginalized community are rendered subordinate to claims that are touted to be necessary, and possibly the most rational option available (Bourdieu 1990, pp. 137–139). Every other possibility is cast in the shadow of this seigniorial position and discredited. Hence hegemony is legitimized.

One important contribution that community-based planning can make to this discussion is related to “reframing” the usual discussion on power and the related hegemony. Simply put, power is illustrated to be contingent, or based on certain beliefs and commitments. Like any dominant theme, the utility of power requires that a particular “paramount reality” be accepted (Schutz 1962, pp. 229–234). Of

course, such threat may be accompanied by force. But at the root of power is the creation of the illusion that a particular position is inviolable and likely permanent. Although a product of certain interests or participation, this bias is hidden behind a façade of neutrality and necessity.

This metaphysic of power operates on two important levels (Bourdieu 1990, pp. 134–139). On the personal level, persons are convinced that they have traits that prevent them from overcoming their current position and moving in a new direction. In this sense, their problems are simply part of their fate. On the second or social level, a similar mode of essentialism is operative. Specifically, the current social arrangements are portrayed to be structural and unlikely to change. Through the creation of these scenarios, communities are easily immobilized and constrained. Their dreams run into a reality that seems to be beyond their control, thereby stifling their ambitions.

Nonetheless, due to the emphasis that is placed on construction and the biographical character of any social element, community-based planners can reveal the illusory nature of any dominant claims. This critical reflection, however, does not necessarily bring about the collapse of power. Indeed, communities must become mobilized to defend their dreams. Nonetheless, this critical insight opens the prospects for change, since every manifestation of power is revealed to reflect particular interests, rather than a position that is beyond critique. After all, rather than an autonomous reality—which would never be vulnerable to attack—communities are shown to be simply confronting certain claims that are masquerading as necessary.

A Note on Change

The expectation is that community-based interventions lead to change. But within the context of participation, and the accompanying critique of realism, change must be conceptualized anew. Consistent with this general outlook is that change comes about through joint action, whereby the exercise of collective imagination spawns a new reality.

But in this situation imagination is not contrasted with reality, thereby limiting the scope of this activity (Appadurai 1996). Typically, imagination is opposed to an outlook that demands to be treated as real and universal. Imagination, thus, pales in comparison to this reality and is rendered docile. In this new framework, due to the absence of dualism and the elevation of participation in importance, imagination is understood to be the source of all realities, even the ones that are now deemed to be outmoded. Any reality is a product of human desire and effort, and thus basically an outgrowth of an imaginary vision.

Although this idea may seem obvious, change is not always conceptualized to be a product of imagination (Boudon 1986). In traditional theories, persons or groups are either pushed or pulled in one direction or another. In other words, change is either the product of structural shifts or historical trends. Either way, abstract forces are thought to be the source of change. Although persons are involved, they are simply the vehicles for the realization of these trends.

For example, the globalization that currently plagues many communities is described to be the outgrowth of long and short-term economic cycles (Friedman 1999). Due to this imagery, the message is that this movement is inevitable and any personal or collective resistance is futile. As a result of such a realistic portrayal, smart persons and societies recognize this movement and learn how to adapt. Any change in social life is presumed to be a legitimate product of these abstract forces.

But due to the emphasis placed on participation, such a perspective on change is outmoded. Specifically noteworthy is that persons never confront history, or any other reality, but a particular narrative that has been constructed about the past or future. With respect to the previous example, globalization is not an abstract force or an implacable barrier, but represents a particular story that is constructed about how effective economies must grow. The storyline that is offered, accordingly, can be challenged, rewritten, or abandoned altogether. Indeed, the need to adapt is merely one response among many. And the imagination that brought about the reality of globalization can take a turn and move humanity in another direction.

Persons and communities, therefore, are the new subjects of history. As suggested throughout this book, they make themselves and their futures. Any barriers, accordingly, are merely outmoded constructions, although these obstacles may appear to be ominous and harmful. Hence the new message is that change, in the end, emerges from the imagination of communities. Of course resistance may be present that, at times, may appear insurmountable, but through participation these detrimental realities can be overcome.

What might be taken initially to be a trite notion is actually quite profound—that is, change is truly in the hands of communities. Often the implications are quite startling when change is understood to be made and not simply realized. Many former obstacles are not so formidable once change is demythologized in this way. Fomenting change is now a matter of imagination, organization, and action, instead of luck or fortuitous events.

The Exercise of Praxis

Achieving dignity is not necessarily easy, since persons and communities must act in ways that challenge domination and preserve their uniqueness. To take this moral stance, for example, they must have the free use of their faculties and the resources required to pursue their aims. This authentic action, furthermore, defies coercion and dependency. Accordingly, in community-based planning persons reflect in ways that encourage the pursuit of self-direction (Fals Borda 1988, pp. 54–55). As a result, communities begin to recognize that they are the true origins of the goals they want to pursue, rather than unknown forces that hide beyond the patina of outmoded but necessary customs and institutions.

Communities illustrate to themselves, in other words, that they construct the options that can be realized through their actions. Through community-based planning, they understand the difference between acting and responding. Maybe

most important, however, is that persons begin to understand that responding denies them dignity, since their actions are neither critically reflective nor self-directed. Specific and unchallenged social conditions, in this case, restrict the agenda for any plans. In other words, persons never move beyond their current, undesirable conditions, since a response is dictated by the prevailing situations. No reinterpretation and departure from these circumstances is possible.

Community-based planning is in the service of another reality, where dignity is expected. The phrase "another world is possible" is far more than a motto for those who engage in this activity. Building another reality, instead, is the entire purpose of community-based planning, whereby the so-called people's power is raised in importance (Fals Borda 1988, p. 95). Without this aim, community-based planning could easily become simply another methodology or technique. But far more is at stake!

Community-based planning is a way to reverse years of neglect and degradation. In this new world where dignity is expected by everyone, a renewed sense of community is sought. A less alienated situation is imagined, where persons live a self-determined existence with others. If truth be told, this development is the ultimate aim of community-based planning.

Such planning, therefore, constitutes what Felix Guattari (1984, pp. 268–272) calls a "molecular" activity. Specifically, these planners offer critical reflection and mini-acts of rebellion that might change the entire world, if they were carried out regularly on a broad scale. Fostering inspiration and resistance to abuse and marginalization, indeed, are elements that extend beyond the bailiwick of traditional planning. The prospect of communities organizing themselves suggests that persons can take control of their lives and create a world that they desire, without the aid of those in power who may not support such a maneuver.

These planners are trying to make the point that although large-scale change may be necessary to improve significantly the lives of persons, small projects can be initiated that are also beneficial. Waiting for a revolution or some other monumental curative and not taking advantage of opportunities to alleviate problems, only leaves persons in dire straits without any real prospects. Accordingly, community-based projects can offer persons some relief, while encouraging larger and more far-reaching interventions. As opposed to mere development, the point is to extend these small acts of resistance and invention!

Many activists, accordingly, are attracted to community-based planning because of this promise. In this sense, planning may make a real difference in the lives of persons, while hope for widespread improvement is rekindled. Manageable tasks can be completed, thus having some immediate influence on persons' lives, with the prospect of making larger changes. But change must start somewhere!

As persons and communities take control of their lives, the future begins to look different (Fals Borda 1987, p. 91). Acquiring dignity, for example, does not seem to be such an ominous task. Through their participation in projects, and as ideas begin to fly, new realities are not so far off. As Rappaport (1998) describes, as persons begin to share their ideas, new possibilities are likely to develop. Another world

begins to make sense, along with the necessary institutional changes. This transformation may start due to communities exercising their humanity through the development of community interventions designed to make their lives more meaningful. An escape route appears suddenly from a world without dignity. A vital message may begin to gain a significant following, that is, constant civic engagement grounded in imagination can result in significant change.

An alternative to the current alienation can come to light in these collective projects that looks feasible. As persons work together, a sense of pride can be reinforced; additionally, solidarity can be experienced anew that can be both comforting and inspiring. Furthermore, communities can gain the confidence necessary to engage in bolder acts of defiance. Why not expand these feelings and insights to the larger social arena? Broader demands may arise from these interventions, once the benefits of collective action become clear. As communities find themselves renewed through community-based projects, their freedom becomes more difficult to deny. Turing back the clock, in other words, is less likely. The idea is that such engagement is contagious to the extent that a new world can be imagined and created.

These community-based projects, however, are portrayed sometimes as marginal to society and incapable of provoking significant change. In one way, this criticism may be true, since many of these interventions are undertaken in communities that are currently on the periphery of society. But on the other hand, the skills that are imparted can be generalized easily into other, larger projects. In fact, the knowledge and abilities that are central to community-based initiatives are vital to the operation of democratic institutions. In this regard, there are no inherent limits to the influence of these interventions.

But in another way, community-based planning helps to restore the old adage that only persons can save themselves. If communities are disgusted with the current state of affairs—both economic and political—this shift in philosophy might facilitate the necessary changes. After all, the point is to create a situation where these persons can act and likely succeed. The spread of this outlook might promote the insight and confidence required for persons to seize the opportunity to create a new direction, establish less internecine social relationships, and demonstrate the efficacy of collectively created solutions to problems. Obviously, this reorientation would be no small accomplishment, but something certainly worth trying. Indeed, when persons create their own communities, the prospects of establishing a dignified life for everyone may improve.

References

Amin, S. (1990). *De-linking: Toward a polycentric world*. London: Zed Books.

Appadurai, A. (1996). *Modernity at large: Cultural dimensions of globalization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Barthes, R. (1970). *Writing degree zero*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Beck, U. (1997). *The reinvention of politics: Rethinking modernity in the global social order*. Cambridge: Polity.

Boudon, R. (1986). *Theories of social change*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1990). *In other words*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Buber, M. (1958). *I and thou*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
Canclini, N. G. (1995). *Hybrid cultures*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Dean, R. G., & Fenby, B. L. (1989). Exploring epistemologies: Social work action as a reflection of philosophical assumptions. *Journal of Social Work Education, 25*(1), 46–54.
Estes, R. J. (1993). Toward sustainable development: From theory to praxis. *Social Development Issues, 15*(3), 1–29.
Etzioni, A. (1999). *Civic repentance*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Fals Borda, O. (1987). The application of participatory action research in Latin America. *International Sociology, 2*(4), 329–347.
Fals Borda, O. (1988). *Knowledge and people's power*. New York: New Horizons.
Fine, R. (2007). *Cosmopolitanism*. London: Routledge.
Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/knowledge*. New York: Pantheon Books.
Friedman, T. L. (1999). *The lexus and the olive tree*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Glazer, N. (1997). *We are all multiculturalists now*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Guattari, F. (1984). *Molecular revolution*. Middlesex: Penguin.
Harvey, D. (2005). *A brief history of neo-liberalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1962). *Being and time*. New York: Harper and Row.
Kant, I. (2002). *Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Kramer, E. M. (Ed.). (2003). *The emerging monoculture*. New York: Praeger.
Levinas, E. (1998). *Entre nous*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Levinas, E. (2003). *Humanism of the other*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Mattelart, A., & Mattelart, M. (1998). *Theories of communication*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Mills, C. W. (1959). *Sociological imagination*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Minkler, M. (2005). Community-based research partnerships: Challenges and opportunities. *Journal of Urban Health, 82*(2), 3–12.
Prilleltensky, I. (2001). Value-based praxis in community psychology: Moving toward social justice and social action. *American Journal of Community Psychology, 29*(5), 747–778.
Prilleltensky, I., Prilleltensky, O., & Voorhees, C. (2008). Psychopolitical validity in the helping professions: Applications to research, interventions, case conceptualization, and therapy. In C. I. Cohen & S. Timimi (Eds.), *Liberation psychiatry* (pp. 106–130). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling alone*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Rahman, M. A. (1991). The theoretical standpoint of PAR. In O. Fals Borda & M. A. Rahman (Eds.), *Action and knowledge: Breaking the monopoly with participatory action research* (pp. 13–23). New York: Apex.
Rappaport, J. (1998). The art of social change: Community narratives as resources for individual and collective identity. In X. B. Arriaga & S. Oskamp (Eds.), *Addressing community problems: Psychological research and interventions* (pp. 225–246). London: Sage.
Sartre, J.-P. (1994). *Being and nothingness*. New York: Gramercy Books.
Schutz, A. (1962). *Collected papers* (Vol. 1). The Hague: Nijhoff.
Sen, A. (1999). *Development as freedom*. New York: Knopf.
Smart, B. (2003). *Economy, culture, and society: A sociological critique of neo-liberalism*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
Smith-Nonini, S. (2010). *Healing the political body*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
Steinberg, P. E. (1994). Territorial formation on the margin: Urban anti-planning in Brooklyn. *Political Geography, 13*(5), 461–476.
Weber, M. (1978). *Economy and society* (Vol. I). Berkeley: University of California Press.
Wiesenfeld, E. (1996). The concept of 'we': A community social psychology myth? *Journal of Community Psychology, 24*(4), 337–354.
Young, I. M. (2011). *Responsibility for justice*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Zaner, R. M. (1964). *The problem of embodiment*. The Hague: Nijhoff.

Name Index

A
Aday, L.A., 70
Ahmed, S.M., 85
Aldwin, C.M., 24
Alperovitz, G., 38, 107
Altschuld, J.W., 98, 99
Amin, S., 145
Amodeo, M., 59
Andersen, L.M., 71
Andersen, R., 70
Anderson, B., 33
Appadurai, A., 152, 155
Arato, A., 113–115
Argyris, C., 87
Arnstein, S.R., 9, 100
Astleithner, F., 32
Austin, D.M., 80
Avison, D., 83

B
Baker, E.A., 12, 134
Baker, G., 112
Bandura, A., 2
Barlas, Y., 103
Barnes, M., 11
Barry, B., 68, 131, 137
Barthes, R., 146
Barton, R., 17
Bass, R.D., 58, 59
Baum, F., 67
Bauman, Z., 36, 81
Baumohl, J., 54
Beck, U., 145
Berg, B.L., 80
Berger, P.L., 8, 35, 38, 43, 82, 134
Berkman, L.F., 68
Bernstein, E., 42
Bestman, E.W., 18, 19
Blalock, H.M., 105
Block, P., 56, 112, 115, 118, 120
Bloomberg, L., 53
Blumberg, P., 107
Blumer, H., 27, 81, 94
Boff, L., 139
Bone, L.R., 8
Bordo, S., 20
Boudon, R., 155
Bourdieu, P., 3, 101, 113, 114, 154, 155
Brennan, G., 85
Brodkin, E.Z., 49
Bronfenbrenner, U., 68
Brown, G., 17
Brown, P., 71–73
Brownson, C.A., 12, 134
Bryant, C.G.A., 78
Brydon-Miller, M., 3, 85
Buber, M., 38, 95, 96, 140, 147
Buettner-Schmidt, K., 129
Burrell, G., 48, 52, 59
Byrne, D., 11

C
Cahill, C., 10, 101
Callaghan, K.A., 9, 130
Campbell, C., 31
Canclini, N.G., 147
Capeheart, L., 131, 136
Carlson, R.J., 20
Caro, F.G., 104, 105
Carpenter, M., 98, 99
Cassel, E., 20
Chavis, D.M., 5, 6, 33, 39
Cibulka, J.G., 9, 100
Cicourel, A.V., 81
Cloke, K., 123
Cloward, R.A., 127, 128

J. W. Murphy, *Community-Based Interventions,* International Perspectives on Social Policy, Administration, and Practice, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4899-8020-5,

Cohen, A.P., 24
Cohen, J., 113–115
Coleman, J.S., 33
Collins, N.M., 128
Collins, R., 129
Commissiong, A.B., 134
Constantine, M.G., 55
Cooper, R., 52, 59
Cornell, K.L., 73
Cottrell, L.S., 5
Cousins, J.B., 104
Craig, G., 135
Crevani, L., 112, 117
Cwikel, J.G., 66, 73

D
D'Afflitti, M.C., 86, 87
Dahrendorf, R., 115
Dean, R.G., 34, 153
De Beauvoir, S., 121
De Hoyos, G., 19, 28, 67
Delbecq, A.L., 58, 59
Deleuze, G., 113
De Maio, F., 73, 132
Denzin, N.K., 83
Donnellon, A., 48
Drath, W.H., 119
Dreyfus, H.L., 95
Dreyfus, S.E., 95
Drucker, P.F., 47, 48
Durkheim, E., 22
Dussel, E.,3, 36, 134, 139–141

E
Earl, L.M., 104
Edwards, B., 113, 114, 128, 133, 135
Ehrenberg, J., 12
Ehrlich, R.P., 57
Elder, G.H., 67, 68
Elliott, B., 58, 59
Ellul, J., 21
Engel, G., 67
Esposito, R., 31
Estes, R.J., 106, 152
Etzioni, A., 2, 3, 51, 111, 112, 150

F
Fainstein, S.S., 42, 97
Fals Borda, O., 7, 25, 83, 84, 87–90, 97, 105, 108, 123, 129, 136, 141, 156–158
Fenby, B.L., 34, 153
Ferguson, J., 114
Fetterman, D.M., 104
Fine, R., 10, 150
Finlay, L., 44
Finn, J.L., 135
Fisk, J., 97
Foley, M.W., 113, 114
Folkman, S., 24
Fondacaro, M.R., 131, 135
Fortune, A.E., 97
Foucault, M., 88, 154
Fournier, V., 48
Fraser, H., 10, 100
Frazer, N., 132
Freire, P., 57, 58, 85, 118
Frenk, J., 64
Friedman, G., 63
Friedman, T.L., 156
Fromm, E., 99
Furman, G.C., 38, 40

G
Gadamer, H.-G., 95
Gebser, J., 40
Gergen, K., 25, 28
Gil, D.G., 129
Gilgun, J.F., 80
Gilroy, P., 57, 117
Glazer, N., 147
Glynn, T.J., 22
Goffman, E., 17, 18
Goldsmith, J., 123
Gonick, L., 139
Gostin, L.O., 131
Gouldner, A., 81, 82
Gramsci, A., 88, 89
Gray, B., 100
Gray, M., 2
Greenblatt, M., 18
Greenleaf, R.K., 122, 123
Grey, C., 48
Grob, G.N., 18
Guattari, F., 113, 119, 157
Gubrium, J.F., 25, 77, 81
Guillén, M.F., 50, 52

H
Habermas, J., 21, 42, 98, 103, 113, 115
Hampshire, S., 4
Hardina, D., 10, 118
Harris, S.R., 7
Harvey, D., 12, 128, 129, 130, 138, 146, 148
Harvey, J., 4
Hatch, M.J., 117
Havel, V., 114

Heckscherer, C., 48
Heidegger, M., 146
Heineman, M.B., 23
Heller, J., 2
Heron, J., 82
Herzberg, F., 50, 128, 130
Hesse, M., 79
Holahan, C.J., 40, 133
Holmqvist, M., 122
Holstein, J.A., 25
Honneth, A., 132
Houston, S., 31
Hughes, J., 32, 77, 79
Hunter, A., 37
Hunter, D., 63

I
Irvine, A.D., 93
Israel, B.A., 84, 86
Ivey, A.E., 128

J
Jacobsen, M., 135
Jacoby, R., 136, 138
Jenkins, H., 53

K
Kaldor, M., 113, 114
Kant, I., 134, 151
Kawachi, I., 68
Kazi, M., 32
Keating, B.P., 103
Keating, M.O., 103
Kellehear, A., 64
Kelling, G.L., 23
Kelly, J.G., 40, 69, 73
Kirk, S.A., 21
Kluvers, R., 59
Kovach, M., 86
Kramer, E.M., 147
Kretzmann, J., 8, 9, 98
Krieger, N., 66–68, 70, 71
Kuyek, J.N., 33
Kymlicka, W., 111

L
Laclau, E., 10
Lake, R.W., 79
Land, K.C., 11, 21
Lasker, R.D., 4, 100
Laverack, G., 52, 133
Lazarus, R.S., 24
Lefley, H.P., 7, 18, 19
Leiby, J., 138, 139
Leiss, W., 82
Leithwood, K.A., 102
Leitz, C.A., 82, 83
Lerner, R.M., 3, 4, 115
Leung, M.W., 9, 107
Levinas, E., 19, 20, 37, 96, 139, 140, 142, 149, 151
Likert, R., 107
Lingis, A., 38
Link, B.G., 69
Linstone, H.A., 101
List, J.M., 136, 138, 139
Little, M., 71, 72
Lloyd, B., 64
Lobo, M.L., 129
Lucas, K., 64
Luckmann, T., 8, 25, 26, 35, 38–40, 43, 82
Luhmann, N., 35, 44
Lune, H., 121
Lyotard, J.-F., 21, 25, 27

M
MacDonald, C., 108
MacQueen, K.M., 11
Maffettone, S., 141
Manning, P.K., 50, 51
Manz, C.C., 51, 118, 119
Maravelias, C., 122
Marullo, S., 128, 133, 135
Marx, K., 1, 2
Maton, K.I., 4, 51
Mattelart, A., 69, 148
Mattelart, M., 69, 148
McGregor, D., 52
McKnight, J.L., 88, 89, 112
McKnight, J.P., 8, 9, 98
McLeroy, K.R., 6, 102
McMillan, D.W., 5, 6, 33
McNeely, J., 6
McQueen, D.V., 63
McTaggert, R., 59, 60, 77, 78, 83, 131
Mead, G.H., 36, 37
Melossi, D., 23
Melucci, A., 37
Merleau-Ponty, M., 24
Merzel, C., 86, 87
Meyer, J., 88
Mickunas, A., 1
Midgley, J., 2
Miller, D., 130, 131
Miller, N., 60, 78
Miller, P.M., 86, 87
Mills, C.W., 87, 88, 150

Milovanovic, D., 131, 136
Minkler, M., 41, 94, 78, 108, 153
Mittelart, A., 32
Mittelart, M., 32
Mondros, J.B., 121, 122
Montero, M, 4, 83, 84, 93, 94
Montgomery, D.J., 102
Morgan, G., 48, 71
Mosher, C.R., 106
Mouffe, C., 10
Mowbray, C.T., 13
Murphy, J.W., 1, 55, 130
Murray, M., 7, 31

N
Nagel, T., 20
Nancy, J.-L., 140
Negri, A., 121
Nelson, G., 41, 42
Nelson, J.C., 96
Neves, P., 59
Norman, M., 18
Northous, P.G., 116, 117, 120
Nussbaum, M., 127, 138

O
O'Boyle, E.J., 137
Onyett, S., 10, 60, 61, 99
Ospina, S., 119

P
Packenham, R.A., 132
Park, R.E., 37
Parry, O., 26
Patton, M.Q., 93, 102, 103, 105
Paulson, G., 17
Paulus, C.J., 119
Payne, J., 87
Peperzak, A.T., 139
Perkins, D.D., 2
Perrow, C., 47, 50
Perry, P.P., 49
Perry, R.W., 49
Phelan, J., 69
Pickering, A., 105
Pigg, K.E., 107
Pilotta, J.J., 55
Piven, F.F., 127, 128
Ploand, B., 7
Polanyi, K., 120
Polcin, D.L., 51, 120
Pollner, M., 6, 36, 39, 74, 80, 81
Powell, D.A., 82
Powers, M., 131
Prilleltensky, I., 5, 8, 87, 137, 139, 149, 152, 153
Prior, L., 21
Puddifoot, J.W., 6
Putnam, R.D., 113, 150

R
Rahman, M., 9, 83, 84, 88, 89, 154
Rappaport, J., 4, 157, 158
Rathore, A.S., 141
Reason, P., 82
Reid, W.J., 28, 78
Rein, M., 49, 118, 119
Reynolds, L.T., 5, 6
Rhoads, R.A., 4
Riger, S., 5, 37, 57, 60, 142
Ríos, M., 38
Rissmiller, D.J., 19
Rissmiller, J.H., 19
Rochefort, D.A., 18, 19
Rose, N., 130
Rossi, P.H., 98, 105, 108
Rotabi, K.S., 69
Rothschield, J., 51, 119
Roy, S., 35, 36

S
Sallnow, L., 64
Sampson, R.J., 23, 33, 81
Sandfort, J.R., 48, 53
Sartre, J.P., 1, 2, 26, 151, 152
Scarinci, I.C., 94
Scharfstein, S., 18
Schofield, R.F., 59
Schön, D.A., 87
Schutz, A., 25, 26, 35, 39, 40, 43, 44, 80, 152, 154, 155
Schwartz, S., 64, 65
Scott, D., 21, 22, 34
Seeman, M., 1, 2
Segal, S.P., 54
Seghezzo, L., 106
Sen, A., 137, 145
Serrano-Caldera, A., 140
Sharma, B.B.L., 35, 36
Sharrock, W., 32, 77, 79
Shediac-Rizkallah, M.C., 8
Shehadeh, N., 71
Shera, W., 112
Shulman, H., 60, 86, 89, 132
Shy, C.M., 70
Simon, H.A., 71

Sims, H.P., 118, 119
Sims, H.P., Jr., 51
Smart, B., 127, 148
Smith, D., 7
Smith, M.B., 47
Smith-Nonini, S., 149
Snowden, L.R., 72
Solansky, S.T., 112, 115
Solomon, G., 40, 41
Sorenson, G.L.J., 119
Sosin, M.R., 49
Stark, W., 22, 36
Starr, P., 20, 21
Steinberg, P.E., 145
Sternthal, M., 70
Sue, D.W., 55
Susser, E., 63, 65, 66
Susser, M., 65
Szasz, T., 18

T
Taylor, C., 37, 40
Thompson, G., 98, 99
Thompson, J.W., 58, 59
Tippet, J., 59
Torres Carillo, A., 57
Tronto, J.C., 127
Trostle, J.A., 24
Tsang, N.M., 108
Tulchinshy, T.H., 64
Turner, L., 112
Turoff, M., 101

U
U'Ren, Richard, 70

V
Van de Ven, A.H., 58, 59
van Ruler, B., 41, 97
Van Wart, M., 51, 52, 115, 116, 119
Varavikova, E.A., 64

W
Wallerstein, N., 41, 42, 70
Watkins, M., 60, 86, 89, 132
Weber, M., 1, 116, 147
Weed, D.L., 65
Weick, K.E., 52, 53
Weinberg, D., 131, 135
Weiss, E.S., 4, 100
White, S., 38, 39, 80
Whitehead, A.N., 66
Whitt, J.A., 51, 119
Wicks, P.G., 25
Wiesenfeld, E., 3, 5, 6, 35, 54, 142, 150, 151
Wilcox, B.L., 40, 133
Williams, D.R., 70
Wilson, J.Q., 23
Wilson, S.M., 121, 122
Wilson, W.J., 111
Winch, P., 34, 35
Windel, C., 9
Windle, C., 54, 100
Wing, J., 17
Witkin, B.R., 98, 99
Wittgenstein, L., 25
Wright, P.L., 116
Wu, I.-H., 54
Wymer, W., 56

Y
Yamada, A.-M., 72
Yanay, G.V., 56
Yanay, N., 56
Yasarcan, H., 103
Young, I.M., 37, 38, 101, 111, 130, 149, 151

Z
Zaner, R.M., 71, 145, 146
Zayas, L.E., 82, 83
Zeitlin, I.M., 20
Žižek, S., 138

Subject Index

A
Accomplishments 80
Alienation 2, 4, 53, 114, 128, 146, 158
  challenges to 2
  elimination of 4
  pervasiveness of 3
  reduction of 2
  source of 12
Anti-dualism 6
Anti-planning 145, 153
Authentic participation 88, 90, 108

B
Behavioral patterns 24
Betrayal funnel 18
Bio-psycho-social strategy 67
Biotic 69
Black community 32
Blank slates 57
Bottom-up leadership 42, 51, 95
Broken windows 23
Buffers 73
Bureaucracy 1, 47, 58

C
Cartesian sense 24
Cartesianism 20
Cause-effect onset matrix 65
Chiasm 24
Civil society 3, 12, 112–115, 147
Cohesive identity 37
Collaboration 11, 49, 71, 80, 87, 100, 101, 115, 118, 120, 130
Collective decisions 27
Collective praxis 2
Comité de salud 57
Communal association 140, 148
Communal character 150
Communal existence 152
Communal management 121
Communal reality 24, 27
Communal relations 151
Communication 22, 41, 42, 49, 52, 81, 82, 96–98, 102, 103
Communicative competence 42, 103
Community
  resurrection of 3
Community biography 8, 99, 104, 106, 139
Community competence 5
Community construction 34
Community engagement 49, 102
Community entrée 44, 94
Community evaluations 5
Community mental health 59
Community mental health centers 18, 47
Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act, 1963 17
Community mental health movement 67, 83
Community projects 44
Community renewal 150
Community traits 73
Community-based approach 120, 134
Community-based epidemiology 70, 73
Community-based evaluations 104
Community-based initiatives 9
Community-based interventions 7, 19, 28, 59, 93, 100
Community-based leadership 122, 123
Community-based learning 58
Community-based organizations 48, 53, 56, 58, 59, 61
Community-based orientation 9, 12
Community-based perspective 72, 97, 103, 132, 148
Community-based philosophy 48, 57, 60, 72, 127, 129, 142

J. W. Murphy, *Community-Based Interventions,* International Perspectives on Social Policy, Administration, and Practice, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4899-8020-5,

Community-based planners 6, 9–11, 21, 25–27, 36, 43, 44, 72, 83, 98, 102, 105–107, 112, 132, 133, 137, 139, 149–153, 155
Community-based planning 9, 11–13, 26, 28, 31, 35, 48, 51, 73, 93, 117, 138, 142, 145, 148, 150, 152, 157
Community-based programs 111
Community-based project 5, 8–10, 41, 44, 59, 95, 96, 142, 152, 158
Community-based researchers 89
Community-based strategy 7, 8, 10
Community-building 8, 9, 41
Conceptual flow 93
Constructionism 28
Credibility gap 1
Crime 23
Cultural brokers 19
Culture democratization 9, 10
Cynicism 2

D
Decision-making 23
Decolonizing 86
De-institutionalize 18
Delbecq and charrette techniques 58
Democratic impulse 88
Democratization 9, 10, 60, 100, 101
  issues of 9, 11
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) 21
Division of labor 55
Domain assumptions 81
Dualism 19, 21, 22, 24–26, 28, 34, 36, 48, 68, 79, 80, 83, 89, 96, 99, 117, 122, 146, 155

E
Eco-epidemiology 67
Embodied morality 146
Embodiment 71
Emergent coordination 52, 112
Empiricism 7, 31–34, 67, 69
Empowerment 4–6
Epistemological entrée 81

F
Fundamental social issues 69

G
Globalization 127–130, 132, 136, 142, 156

H
Health field 63
Holism 6, 69, 71, 73, 106, 131
Human interests 21
Humanistic psychologists 52

I
Institutional neurosis 17
Intellectuals 89
Interventions 2
Invasion barrios 54

J
Justice 131, 135–137, 140–142, 149

K
Kantian maxim 134, 135, 142

L
Language 25
Leadership 56, 122, 123
Leadership decentralization 9, 115
Least restrictive environment 18
Liberation 84, 85, 94, 127, 133
Liminal space 60
Linguistic turn 25

M
Management theory 50
Misperception 3
Misplaced concreteness 66
Mono-culture 147
Moral topologies 40
Multicultural competence 55
Multiculturalism 111
Mundane rationality 36
Mundane reasoning 6

N
Natural causality 65
New epidemiology 63
New individualism 130
New leadership 117, 123
New philosophy 6, 18
New public health 63, 64, 67, 73
New social imagery 3, 40, 147
Non-subjective tools 32

O
Observational language 79
Organic intellectuals 88

P
Paradigm shift 63
Paramount reality 35, 36, 84, 90, 152, 154

Participation
importance of 7
Participative research 86
Participatory action research (PAR) 78, 83, 84, 86–88, 90, 105, 107
goals of 85
Participatory epistemology 25
Participatory organization 53
Participatory safety 61
Partnership 10
People's power 87, 157
People's science 7
Person-in-environment 67
Person-in-environment strategy 68
Planning 2, 3, 8–11, 17, 21, 26, 32, 44, 64, 85, 89, 93, 94, 96, 100, 101, 104, 108, 114, 115, 129, 132, 135, 141, 145, 146, 148, 151–154, 157
goals of 2
social 7, 24
Pluralist commonwealth 38
Politics of people 114
Popular education 57
Popular epidemiology 72, 73
Popular experience 8
Popular science 9
Positivism 78–80, 82
Post-bureaucratic 48
Post-heroic 112
Praxis 2, 81, 83, 86, 88, 90, 117
exercise of 27, 93, 156
modalities of 108
Pristine knowledge 20
Problems in living 18
Program evaluation 105
Protective factors 64
Public health 63, 66, 73
traditional model of 64
Public relations practices 49

Q
Qualitative methodologies 77, 80

R
Rabble hypothesis 50
Radical change 129
Radical intentions 128
Radical outlook 133
Radical pluralism 147
Radical proposals 131
Realism 22, 23, 48, 78
critics of 23
problems in 23
Re-democratization 114
Reference groups 5
Relational leadership 120
Reward structure 56

S
Sampling strategies 89
Self-actualization 52
Self-management 51, 52, 122
baisc theme of 51
Servant leadership 122
Service-learning document 4
Silent partner 9
Social capital 33
Social factors 71
Social indicator analysis 32, 34, 67
Social issues 3
Social life 1
Social order 22, 26
Social project 47
Social solidarity 3, 140, 141, 151
Social world 32, 40
Sociation 147
Spill-over effect 59, 60
Spontaneity 1
Stakeholders 84
Standard social analogies 40
Standard social indicators 81
Structural metaphors 22
Sub-politics 145
Sustainability 59, 106, 107
Symbolic violence 101

T
Taylor's scientific management 50
Theory X 53
Theory Y 53
Traditional epidemiology 66, 67, 73
Traditional leadership theory 112
Traditional management theory 51

V
Vital capacity 4

W
Warehousing 17
Well-being 8