Chapter 7
Beyond Ethnic Intolerance: Traces and Benefits of Ethnic Diversity in Post-War Bosnia-Herzegovina

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In 1994, Hudson, Sekulic and Massey published a set of intriguing findings in *The American Journal of Sociology* concerning research conducted in Yugoslavia in 1989 and 1990. Examining a representative sample of 13,422 adults from all parts of the former Yugoslavia, they found that residents of Bosnia-Herzegovina expressed high tolerance towards members of other ethnic groups, with the highest levels of intergroup tolerance among all former Yugoslavian republics. However, 3 years later, the most violent conflict in Europe since World War II broke out in that region. Nearly 4 years of civil war undermined the relationships among citizens, deeply dividing people on the basis of their ethnic membership. Today, Bosnia displays a complex reality of divisions among ethnic groups. The city of Mostar exemplifies this reality. This town was built on two sides of a river, which became the boundary between the Croats and Bosniaks after the war. A report from the International Crisis Group (2003) describes a town entirely split in two on an ethnic basis, including separate drinking water sources, electricity and telephone companies, postal systems, ambulance services, hospitals, fire departments, railway and bus companies and public-works enterprises.

Many explanations have been provided for the ethnic violence and, eventually, segregation in this region. In this chapter, rather than focusing on why it happened, we take into account the effects of what happened on exposed individuals. The war drastically altered the ethnic distribution and the equilibrium between groups. Thus, we propose an empirical overview of what remains of the pre-war spirit of tolerance and people's capacity to integrate the ethnic differences that once characterised Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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In the first section, the main socio-psychological theories on group interaction are briefly discussed. In the following sections, TRACES data regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina are presented and discussed. Particular attention is given to ethnic heterogeneity and its positive or negative effects on inter-group attitudes. Finally, based on our findings, we present several considerations concerning the promotion of tolerance and the reconstruction of multi-cultural communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Conflict and Cooperation Among Groups Post-War Bosnia-Herzegovina

Analysing the causes of ethnic conflict, several sociological studies have underlined that ethnic heterogeneity is often associated with the diffusion of antagonistic attitudes and negative sentiments against ethnic out-groups (Coser 1956; Coenders 2001). Moreover, Hibbs (1973) and Canning and Fay (1993) showed that ethnically fractionalised countries are more politically unstable than more homogeneous countries. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) suggested that the presence of many different ethnic and linguistic groups is significantly associated with greater corruption because bureaucrats may favour members of their own group. In turn, problematic governance affects—or is at least linked to—economic growth and productivity, with the result that heterogeneous countries have lower growth rates and worse policies (Easterly and Levine 1997). For example, in research using aggregate data from 66 countries, Mauro (1995) found that ethnic fractionalisation was negatively correlated with institutional efficiency, political stability, bureaucratic efficiency and corruption. Thus, as these data suggest, heterogeneous countries seem to be more problematic from an administrative and political viewpoint.

According to Aghion et al. (2002), democracy is affected by the presence of high heterogeneity within a country. Indeed, in ethnically fractionalised societies, one group often imposes restrictions on the political liberty of the other groups. According to these authors, in homogeneous societies, democratic rule is easier because ethnic conflicts are less intense. Similarly, Vanhanen (1999) stated that social conflict is more widespread in countries in which people are divided into separate ethnic, racial, national, linguistic, tribal and religious groups.

However, other scholars disagree with such a pessimistic perspective on the effect of heterogeneity within a society. For instance, Collier and Hoeffler's (2004) model of civil conflict qualifies the assumption that heterogeneity *per se* decreases the risk of civil wars. According to this model, heterogeneity becomes a risk factor only when combined with limited economic conditions (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Blimes 2006; Collier et al. 2005). Otherwise, in regions in which two or several ethnic groups are similarly distributed, institutions typically provide official support for inter-group contact (Massey et al. 1999). As discussed in greater detail by Sekulic in Chap. 3 of this book, the inter-group contact theory (ICT) (Allport 1954) stresses that one way to encourage more positive attitudes among groups is to increase contact among the

members of the groups (Amir 1969; Cook 1984; Pettigrew 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp 2000; Dovidio et al. 2003). Thus, under specific circumstances, heterogeneity might play a positive role in reducing prejudices and increasing tolerance. More specifically, Allport (1954) assumed that whereas conflicting goals lead to the development of inter-group hostility, superordinate goals—unattainable by one group without the help of the other groups—may reduce inter-group intolerance and prejudice.

History and everyday experience highlight that heterogeneity within a culture may lead to positive contacts and reduce prejudice in some situations, but may increase prejudice in others. Some people may consider contact with an out-group member as a threat to their identity and wealth (Blalock 1967), whereas others may view it as an opportunity and an advantage. Furthermore, different sources of heterogeneity might produce different outcomes. For example, Alesina et al. (2003) indicated that ethnolinguistic heterogeneity has a stronger impact than religious diversity on economic success in terms of economic growth, quality of policies and quality of institutions.

Other studies have distinguished between different dimensions of heterogeneity within a country and their linkage with social conflict. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) suggested that heterogeneity is composed of two dimensions, fractionalisation and polarisation. The first dimension considers the number of groups into which a society is divided; a greater number of groups are associated with a greater level of fragmentation in the country. By contrast, polarisation indicates whether there are two main groups that oppose one another in a country. According to Reynal-Querol (2002), violent conflicts are more likely in polarised situations, in which one group views the other in terms of antagonism and threats, and may attempt to prevail over the other group.

Thus, heterogeneity does not have a monotonic relationship with the risk of violent conflict. Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) showed that violent conflicts (i.e., civil war) and heterogeneity follow a parabolic relationship, as highly heterogeneous societies can have a probability of civil wars that is even lower than that of homogenous societies. Both low and high levels of heterogeneity are linked to a low probability of a country falling into a civil conflict, whereas societies with medium levels of fractionalisation seem to be the most unstable.

Kalyvas and Sambanis (2005) argued that in the specific case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, ethnic heterogeneity is irrelevant. Their findings show that fractionalisation is not directly related to the outbreak of collective violence. They placed an emphasis on factors such as poverty, unemployment and support from the diaspora. In support of this hypothesis, Kalyvas and Sambanis found that the ethnicisation of violence in Bosnia rapidly increased once the war began. In addition, Ringdal et al. (2008) showed that residence in a more heterogeneous area prior to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina helped victims to recover from war-related distress. Therefore, the issue is not whether heterogeneity *per se* was and is "good" or "bad" in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but *which conditions* cause diversity to lead to constructive inter-group relations, increase tolerance and reduce prejudice. Some explanations have been suggested by studies in the field of social psychology on social identity and ethnic identification.

Ethnic Identification and Anomie

According to Herbert Kelman (1999, pp. 582–583):

> one thing that can be readily inferred from a half century of social-psychological theory and research on intergroup contact (Pettigrew 1998) is that contact *per se* does not preclude or reduce violent intergroup conflict. The potentially positive effects of contact depend on the nature of that contact. [...] [The conditions identified by Allport] are lacking in the contacts between identity groups that are engaged in a protracted, deep-rooted conflict (such as the two conflicting communities in Northern Ireland); or, insofar as these conditions have prevailed in the past (as they did in Yugoslavia under Tito's leadership), they evaporate when new leaders exploit ethnic divisions to consolidate their own power.

In the specific context of Bosnia-Herzegovina, ethnic diversity did not represent an inoculation against ethnic intolerance. The former tolerance was overcome by social beliefs that were made salient by political elites to legitimise aggression among the three sides of the Bosnian conflict (Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks). Social identity theory (SIT) indicates that people have attitudes and beliefs about the nature of intergroup relations that regulate the permeability of group boundaries (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Ellemers 1993). When the exclusiveness of group membership is made salient, boundaries are more likely to be perceived as impermeable, thus enhancing inter-group intolerance. In particular, prejudice, discrimination and negative stereotyping can be products of inter-group distinctiveness within a context of identity threat (Hornsey and Hogg 2000). According to SIT, group identities fulfill a need for positive identity, but can also increase inter-group hostility when such an identity is threatened. On the one hand, group identification reduces people's sense of social disorientation, but on the other hand, it might lead individuals from different groups to conflict.

This point is a bit controversial, especially if applied to inter-ethnic relations and ethnically heterogeneous contexts. According to SIT, we could expect people who identify with a group to experience a low sense of *anomie*—described as a sense of normlessness due to cultural pluralism and rapid social changes (Huschka and Mau 2006; McClosky and Schaar 1965; Seeman 1991; Srole 1956). This phenomenon occurs because as people's identification with their group increases, social norms and social order become more salient, and consequently, the sense of normlessness decreases. However, little empirical research has been conducted on the relationship between group identification and anomie, and the findings are contradictory. For instance, in contrast with the SIT hypothesis, Blank (2003) found that anomie was slightly positively correlated with national identification among Eastern and Western Germans. Moreover, if anomie decreases with group identification, we might also expect a negative correlation between anomie and intolerance, to the extent that intolerance is likely to increase with identification. However, results from Sexton (1983) and Gibson (1992) showed that those who are high in anomie tend to be *more* intolerant and dogmatic. This finding may be explained in terms of threat perception. People experience anomie as a consequence of rapid social change, which may also be perceived as a threat to individual identity and may therefore increase intolerance

towards out-groups, to the extent that they are perceived as the cause of such social disorder.

On the basis of these statements, we formulate two hypotheses. First, according to ICT and Collier and Hoeffler's model, we expect that heterogeneous contexts influence attitudes towards out-groups and society, enhancing tolerance and reducing the sense of anomie and discouragement concerning society. Nevertheless, according to SIT, we expect that identification with one's own ethnic group plays a fundamental role in the regulation of social relations. That is, group identification may interact with inter-group contacts and moderate their constructive effects, especially in areas in which people directly experience ethnic violence and in which ethnicity is a salient feature of everyday life, as was the case in Bosnia.

For these purposes, we draw a two-level design. Multilevel models decompose the variance of a dependent variable into two levels. The first level considers the variance between individuals, and the second level assumes that a portion of variance depends on individuals' affiliations with certain groups or contexts. Beyond the explanatory contribution of independent variables—both at the individual and the contextual levels—over the dependent variable, multilevel models allow us to compute and statistically verify whether certain relationships between dependent and independent variables change from one context to another (statistically, this change is represented by the random variation of slopes in a regression equation). That is, there may be a positive relationship between dependent and independent variables in some contexts and a negative relationship in other contexts.

Ethnic Heterogeneity in Bosnia-Herzegovina Before and After the War

Pre-war Bosnia-Herzegovina was characterised by the coexistence of different ethnic groups. The Bosnian population was divided into three major ethnic groups (Muslims, Croats, Serbs), a number of smaller groups and a substantial number of people who did not identify themselves in ethnic terms, but considered themselves in the more inclusive category of Yugoslavs. Figure 7.1 displays the proportions of the main ethnic groups in each of the TRACES survey areas, which mainly correspond to the official division by cantons. Data were taken from the national census conducted immediately before the beginning of the war in 1991; they show a clear picture of the population distribution in Bosnia before the war.

Several patterns of heterogeneity were present in pre-war Bosnia. These patterns included an equal distribution of Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs (i.e., fractionalisation), a greater prevalence of one group over the others (i.e., tendency toward homogeneity), and a similar distribution of two main groups (i.e., polarisation).

As a consequence of the Dayton Agreement in 1995, which ratified the end of the war, the ethnic distribution in Bosnia was completely reorganised. The Dayton Agreement officialised the division of the population on an ethnic basis. Bosnia-Herzegovina was divided into two main political entities: Republika Srpska (RS),



Fig. 7.1 Proportions of the population in each TRACES survey area. (Data source: 1991 population census)

with a Serbian majority, and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (FBiH), with local Croat or Bosniak majorities. Thus, the heterogeneity that had characterised the country in the past was substantially altered. The exact distribution of the ethnic groups in each of the Bosnian cantons is currently unknown because no census has been conducted since 1991. Figure 7.2 shows the division of the three main ethnic groups based on the 2003 official population estimates.[1]

This picture greatly differs from the pre-war situation shown in Fig. 7.1. Indeed, the areas are more homogeneous in Bosnia, especially in RS. Patterns are more diversified in the FBiH, except in an area in central Bosnia (CB1), where the population is divided into one major group (Croat or Muslim) and some minorities. The Brcko district[2]—which has been merged with some FBiH municipalities in the north of the SR territories in the TRACES survey—maintains a high level of heterogeneity that is similar to the pre-war situation.

[1] Some areas were merged due to a lack of information on municipalities, which rendered it impossible to reconstruct some of the TRACES territorial divisions.

[2] The Brcko district remained under the administration of the International Community, in accordance with the Dayton Agreement. It was an "experimental" field of community reconstruction and multiethnic administration (Jeffrey 2006).



Fig. 7.2 Proportions of the population according to 2003 population estimates

Finally, Fig. 7.3 shows the descriptive relationship between the heterogeneity of Bosnian cantons measured with the ethno-linguistic fractionalisation index (ELF)[3] and the coefficient of risk of victimisation derived from the TRACES survey[4]. These findings highlight that more violence occurred in areas with higher levels of ethnic diversity.

War Experiences, Ethnic Heterogeneity and Ethnic Intolerance

Against this background, we considered a sample of 411 Bosnian citizens (47 % male; 53 % female, cohort 1968–1974) from the TRACES survey. The contextual level was specified as the areas in which people resided at the time of the survey.

[3] ELF was computed on the basis of 1991 census data. This index measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the whole population will be from different groups. The ELF index was created by Soviet scholars (Atlas Narodov Mira 1964) and was later popularised by Taylor and Hudson (1972). It is expressed by the formula: $ELF = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{N} q_i^2$ where q_i is the share of group i of a total of N groups.

[4] The unweighted indicator of risk of victimisation computed for each survey area is defined by the ratio between the estimated number of events (i.e., individual-quarter units corresponding to the occurrence of an event) in the population of an area by the estimated total number of individual-quarter units in that population.



Fig. 7.3 Linearity of the relationship between fractionalisation and risk of victimisation in the TRACES survey areas

At the individual level, tolerance was measured in two ways. The first measurement provides a general indicator of people's tolerance towards others. The index is based on responses to the Bogardus social distance scale (1925) questions, as follows: *Would you be willing to have [Albanians, Macedonians, Slovenians, Montenegrins, Hungarians, Roms, Bulgarian citizens, Albanian citizens, Russian citizens, EU citizens, US citizens] as inhabitants of your country/as next-door neighbours/in the same office/as close friends/as relatives/as a spouse?* An overall zero-to-one index (0 = high intolerance; 1 = high tolerance) was calculated using the mean scores for each out-group. Because the items of the scale refer to a number of groups that have a rather low salience in the inter-group relations in Bosnia, the index can be considered as a measure of individuals' *ideal of tolerance*, representing how much people value tolerance at an abstract level. The second index is based on the same questions but refers only to the three main Bosnian ethnic groups (Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks). This index can be considered as measure of *everyday tolerance* because it refers to the real contacts between groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The sense of social disorientation (*anomie*) was measured using McClosky and Schaar's (1965) scale[5], which refers to general discouragement about society and a passive acceptance of the *status quo*. Thus, low scores on this scale indicate some sense of agency and active attitudes, whereas high levels identify a sense of discouragement, social distrust and normlessness.

To measure the effects of ethnic identification and its interaction with heterogeneity, an index of individual ethnic identification was calculated as the mean response to the items *I see myself as a [ETHNIC MEMBERSHIP]; I am glad to be a [ETHNIC MEMBERSHIP]; I feel strong ties with [ETHNIC MEMBERSHIP]*.

Finally, we controlled for the effects of some war-related experiences. We considered the cumulative number of experiences of victimisation people experienced (e.g., personal damages, family member wounded or killed, imprisonment) and whether they were forced to move to another region as a consequence of the war. At the contextual level, regional heterogeneity was measured using the ethno-linguistic fractionalisation index (ELF) based on the 2003 population estimates.

The analysis revealed that 26 % of the total variance of anomie, 10 % of ideal tolerance and 9 % of everyday tolerance are attributed to the difference between areas. The results in Table 7.1 show that ethnic identification increases the levels of anomie. As people's identification with their own ethnic group increases, their sense of discouragement about their social context increases. Unexpectedly, the number of war-related experiences of victimisation has no impact on anomie. However, forced relocation has a rather important impact. Moving as a consequence of the war has the highest explanatory power at the individual level, although the p value is 0.06. Model A explains approximately 16 % of the variance at an individual level.

In line with the ICT hypothesis, contextual heterogeneity in terms of ELF has a negative impact on the sense of anomie. The effects of ELF on anomie become even clearer in Model B, in which we test the variation of ethnic identification across the Bosnian areas and the interaction between ethnic identification and ELF (random part of the model). In this model, the magnitude of the main effect of ELF increases by approximately three-fold. Model B explains 32 % of the variance at the contextual level, bringing the total explained variance to 19 %, and confirms that heterogeneity decreases social disorientation.

On the other hand, Model B shows that ethnic identification changes significantly across the Bosnian areas. In addition, approximately 33 % of such variation is explained by the heterogeneity (ELF) of an area. That is, ELF predicts low scores of anomie only for those respondents who do not identify with their own ethnic group.

The interaction effect between ELF and ethnic identification can be explained in two ways. On the one hand, when heterogeneity is high, people who strongly identify with their group tend to have a higher sense of loss concerning social norms because

[5] Example items of the scale are as follows: *With everything so uncertain these days, it almost seems as though anything could happen; Everything changes so quickly these days that I often have trouble deciding which are the right rules to follow; People were better off in the old days when everyone knew just how he was expected to act; It seems to me that other people find it easier to decide what is right than I do.*

Table 7.1 Multilevel model for anomie, ideal tolerance, and tolerance towards Bosnian groups using ethno-linguistic fractionalisation (ELF) at the second level

	Anomie		Ideal tolerance		Everyday tolerance	
	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F
Fixed part	*Coeff. (S.E.)*	*Coeff. (S.E.)*	*Coeff. (S.E.)*	*Coeff. (S.E.)*	*Coeff. (S.E.)*	*Coeff. (S.E.)*
Level 1 (individual level)						
Intercept	4.870 (1.06)***	4.702 (1.056)***	0.933 (0.208)***	0.867 (0.032)***	0.959 (0.207)***	0.867 (0.199)***
Female	0.074 (0.071)	0.083 (0.101)	0.033 (0.023)	0.027 (0.025)	0.016 (0.029)	0.014 (0.025)
Age	−0.007 (0.027)	−0.009 (0.028)	−0.003 (0.005)	−0.001 (0.005)	−0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
Ethnic identification	0.131 (0.070)*	0.102 (0.051)*	−0.046 (0.014)**	−0.043 (0.015)**	−0.045 (0.013)**	−0.041 (0.013)**
Cumulative war experiences	−0.032 (0.031)	0.005 (0.037)	−0.001 (0.008)	0.003 (0.009)	−0.024 (.010)**	−0.019 (0.010)*
War-related move	0.337 (0.181)*	0.320 (0.175)*	0.014 (0.024)	0.003 (0.032)	0.010 (0.041)	0.003 (0.040)
Level 2 (canton level)						
ELF	−1.472 (0.448)**	−4.333 (1.153)**	−0.253 (0.097)**	−0.439 (0.462)	−0.194 (0.115)	−0.511 (0.368)
Ethnic identif. x ELF		0.533 (0.212)*		0.031 (0.094)		0.057 (.077)
Random part						
Between-individual variance (level 1)	1.063	0.941	0.064	0.057	0.080	0.075
Between-canton variance (level 2)	0.234***	1.430***	0.005***	0.042***	0.006**	0.022***
Between-canton variance of Ethnic identif		0.023***		0.002***		0.001***
Deviance	1214.820	1175.235	48.375	21.019	143.800	129.112

a $p < .07$; *$p < .05$; ***; $p < .001$

the other groups are perceived as threats to social stability (Blalock 1967). On the other hand, the declaration that one does not identify with one's own ethnic group has a particular meaning in the context of post-war Bosnia. A person who expresses low identification likely wishes to distance himself/herself from the ethnic divisions that legitimised the war. In this sense, people who declare a low identification with their ethnic group are also those who refuse the *status quo.* For these persons, living in a heterogeneous context is perceived as a social resource rather than a threat to social stability. That is, Bosnians who do not wish to identify with a particular ethnic group benefit the most from ethnic diversity and inter-group contact.

Individual ethnic identification also plays a pivotal role in predicting inter-group tolerance. Model C shows that, in line with the SIT hypothesis, as people's identification with their own group increases, their tolerance towards out-groups decreases. War-related experiences, gender and age do not add any significant explanatory contribution. At the contextual level, ELF predicts intolerance. As the fractionalisation of a context increases, the number of individuals with tolerant attitudes towards other groups decreases. The random slope model (Model D) shows that although the relationship between ethnic identification changes across the areas, this relationship is not linked to the heterogeneity of an area.

The models for everyday tolerance (Models E and F) show evidence of a similar effect of ethnic identification. In this case, contextual heterogeneity is no longer significant. A small effect of the personal experiences of victimisation linked to war appears in these models. In the war-torn context of Bosnia, personal life history may have become a central aspect in judging the daily relationships with persons that are frequently categorised as members of a "perpetrator group". In other words, when considering tolerance under the lens of daily inter-group contact, individual experiences of victimisation and in-group attitudes are more relevant than the ethnic heterogeneity of the area of residence[6].

Reconstructing Tolerance? The Role of Recategorisation and Moral Inclusion

Overall, our findings seem to support the assumption that out-groups are more likely to be perceived as a threat by high ethnic identifiers (Esses et al. 1998; Riek et al. 2006; Stephan and Stephan 2000; Stephan and Renfro 2003). In Bosnia, former neighbours became potential enemies. This might explain the current finding that people who were directly affected by the war are less tolerant towards the other main ethnic groups of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, the results suggest that refusing to identify with a particular ethnic group in contemporary Bosnia mirrors a critical position towards the *status quo*. In fact, people who do not wish to identify with

[6] Equivalent results were obtained using polarisation (Reynal-Querol 2002) instead of fractionalisation to measure heterogeneity and controlling for the heterogeneity of the cantons in which people had resided during adolescence (Morselli and Passini 2009).

their own ethnic group have the greatest trust in society and social relations. These individuals are more likely to develop a sense of agency, refusing to passively accept social disintegration. By contrast, people who strongly identify with their group are more likely to feel confused in heterogeneous contexts and threatened by the co-presence of different ethnic groups.

Ethnic identification is, in fact, an important and critical topic in Bosnia-Herzegovina today. It was and remains emphasised at a symbolic level. For instance, it was only after the war that Bosnian Muslims began to define themselves as "Bosniaks", rather than "Muslims", underlining their ethnic, cultural and historical specificity. Before the conflict, many rural Muslims did not consider Bosniaks as a nation (Bringa 1995; Robinson et al. 2001).

In post-war Bosnia, political elites frequently use the ethnic issue as a means for achieving political differentiation. Many parties have a specific reference to their ethnic origin in their names, such as: Serbian Democratic Party—*Srpska demokratska stranka* (SDS), Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina—*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica* (HDZ), Croats Together—*Hrvatsko Zajednistvo*, and Bosnian–Herzegovinian Patriotic Party—*Bosanskohercegovacka Patriotska Stranka*. The elections in 2002 recorded a return to power of the three major nationalist parties (SDA—Boniak; HDZ—Croat; SDS—Serb). However, their power was mitigated in the elections in 2006, as they received "only" approximately 25 % of the vote of each ethnic group. The ethnic-based parties have a large impact at a symbolic level, developing proposals for the specific interests of their own group. For instance, the national parties of the Srpska Republic argued strongly for the integration of SR with Serbia rather than with Bosnia-Herzegovina until the political orientation of Serbia changed in 2003 (Roux 2004). The major Croatian party of the FBiH, the HDZ (Croat Democratic Community), advanced a proposal in March 2004 to untie the FBiH and divide Bosnia-Herzegovina into three main cantons (Serb, Croat and Bosniak). These agendas have the evident effect of reinforcing group membership and a sense of ethnic identification.

Furthermore, a general socio-economic condition of frailty adds to a tense and unstable situation. According to Scheepers et al. (2002), scarce socio-economic resources are conducive to high inter-group competition, and consequently, the rise of unemployment to 44 % in 2004 (Economic Commission for Europe 2004) may have played a central role in defining inter-group relations in post-conflict Bosnia.

To summarise, in line with social identity theory, the present results suggest that inter-group contacts can play a constructive function only to the extent that people are not overly tied to their own group. Identification represents a difficult boundary to overcome, especially if war-related traumatic events have increased the saliency of group membership. In this case, it is likely that (ethnic) out-groups are considered as a threat and that (ethnic) in-group membership is chronically salient. In contrast with SIT, the current findings suggest that in post-war Bosnia, identification is related to an increased sense of normlessness and social disorder. Under these conditions, ethnic heterogeneity does not represent a concrete resource for overcoming social disintegration. The results show that heterogeneity *per se* is neither good nor bad. Individual war-related experiences and group salience buffer the effect of heterogeneity. Thus,

reconciliation processes should account for the manner in which individuals shape their group membership.

Moral exclusion theory (Bandura 1990; Deutsch 1985; Lerner and Whitehead 1980; Opotow 1990, 2008; Passini 2010; Passini and Morselli 2009; Staub 1989) suggests that for a better understanding of multiethnic relationships, we must account for individuals' perceptions of their moral community. Individuals' moral values, beliefs and norms apply to the people they include within their scope of justice—defined as one's moral community. Moral exclusion is defined as excluding other individuals or groups from one's own moral community (Staub 1989), viewing them as lying beyond the boundary within which moral values and rules of justice and fairness apply. This exclusion captures the dynamics underlying destructive conflicts, whereas moral inclusion captures the dynamics of peace-building, with its emphasis on equality, justice and a concern for universal well-being (Opotow et al. 2005).

To enhance tolerance and to promote the coexistence of different ethnic groups, people may need to recategorise their ethnic and social identity to include others within their scope of justice. The categorisation of other ethnic group members as members of the same community helps people to reduce bias and hostility (Hornsey and Hogg 2000; Gaertner et al. 1994). Kelman (1999) suggests that the coexistence of different ethnic groups can be enhanced by the development of a superordinate identity that does not threaten the particularistic identity of any one group. Recategorisation into a superordinate category should highlight similarities among the groups and obscure the in-group–out-group boundary (Anastasio et al. 1997; Gaertner et al. 1994) without threatening groups' core characteristics. The emphasis on this superordinate category should preserve the salience of original group membership but minimise negative inter-group distinctiveness. Huo et al. (1996) suggested that identification with a superordinate group may not require one to relinquish strong ties to his/her sub-group. In this sense, developing a transcendent identity requires shaping each group's identity and extending the concept of citizenship in an inclusive manner.

In Kelman's (2006) opinion, the exclusiveness of group ethnicity is embedded in a pattern of negative interdependence between different identities that impede the development of a common identity. This negative inter-dependence of two identities derives from a perception of the other's identity as a direct threat to one's own identity, i.e., the assertion that one's own identity requires negating the identity of the other. One indicator of this negative inter-dependence is a systematic effort to delegitimise the other's movement, in extreme cases by placing it outside of the bounds of what the world community can tolerate, for example, by excluding the other from the moral community shared by all members of the human family.

The recategorisation and moral inclusion of others may promote the peaceful coexistence of different ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This finding may help to redefine the discourses on identity, ethnicity and violence in Bosnia because they reject a reductionist conception of identity and offer the possibility of a different understanding of ethnic identity (Bouris 2007; Campbell 1999). This result requires one to work at both a societal level, promoting tolerance as a part of general politics, and at an individual level, supporting the contact, experience and comprehension

of the other in everyday life. The familiarity of and the experience with the other may be enhanced through activities that involve more ethnic groups and that improve the understanding of the inter-dependence of each group with the other to build an inclusive sense of identity (that is, an identity that is common to all social groups, does not neglect specificities and is respectful of each of the individual ethnic identities).

In January 2004, the European Stability Initiative (ESI) presented a project that appeared to promote the enhancement of a superordinate category. ESI proposed a reorganisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, suppressing the division in two entities and restructuring the territory into 12 cantons. According to the initiative, this reorganisation should reinforce the central institutions and improve the efficiency of the vertical organisation of the state, which are both necessary for the possible inclusion of Bosnia in the EU (European Stability Initiative 2004). Furthermore, this project could help to increase the value to local specificities without suppressing them, similar to the model of the Swiss canton federation. The project was refused by the local Bosnian authorities and the main national parties, who considered it premature and potentially dangerous (Roux 2004). The possible solution of inter-group conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue to pose new questions and challenges in the study of group processes. Such studies must combine theoretical, empirical and normative issues about how to promote cooperation rather than conflicts between people of different groups and about the effects of everyday contacts on tolerance towards ethnic and cultural diversity.

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