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War, Community, and Social Change

Collective Experiences in the Former Yugoslavia

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Acknowledgments

TRACES (the *Transition to Adulthood and collective Experiences Survey*) is a scientific research programme that is intended to compile information on the collective experiences of young adults from the 1990s until the present day. TRACES was developed in two phases. In the first phase, which was financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF fund No 101412-103664; Dario Spini, main applicant; Rene Levy, co-applicant), different exploratory analyses were undertaken to prepare the main TRACES study. These analyses were partially a continuation of the research programme on human rights as social representation, directed by Willem Doise (Doise 2002; Spini and Doise 2005), and they included analyses of the data from the *People on War* survey (Greenberg Research Inc. 1999) conducted during and following a collaboration with the *International Committee of the Red Cross* (Elcheroth 2006; Spini et al. 2008). On this basis, a pilot study in four countries from the former Yugoslavia was conducted in December 2004 in collaboration with Dino Djipa and his team from *PRISM Research* in Sarajevo (see Spini et al. 2011). All of these studies clearly indicated that attitudes towards rights were related to contextual factors that include both temporal dimensions (e.g., life trajectories and historical time) and collective dimensions (e.g., collective experiences and collective vulnerability) and that both types of dimensions should be innovatively incorporated into our theories and methods.

As a consequence, a new application was submitted to the Swiss National Science Foundation, which, on the basis of this preparatory work, chose to finance the main TRACES study (SNF fund No 10012-109623; Dario Spini, main applicant; Guy Elcheroth, project coordinator) described in this book. Rachel Fasel, who had already worked on the pilot phase of the TRACES project, was hired as a research assistant for this process and participated actively in all project developments, notably including the development of the maps using geographic information systems (see Annex 2 of Chap. 1). Christophe Hunziker also provided helpful assistance during the process of developing these maps. We should also mention the support provided by Rene Levy and Jean-Marie Le Goff, the co-applicants for this second round of SNF funding. On this basis, the main survey was designed and prepared, again in close collaboration with PRISM and especially with Dino Djipa and Marina Franic-Kadic, who advised us in determining the details of our procedures and who

organised the general logistics of the process. Marina Franic-Kadic was the PRISM project leader for TRACES and provided first-hand documentation of the fieldwork for the study's overall methodological report (Spini et al. 2011).

Moreover, as a result of new collaborations developed as part of the Scientific Co-operation between Eastern Europe and Switzerland (SCOPES, SNF fund No 100012-109623, Prof. Dario Spini, main applicant; Guy Elcheroth, project coordinator), we were able to further develop the project together with Prof. Dinka Corkalo Biruski (University of Zagreb, Croatia), Prof. Vera Cubela Adoric (University of Zadar, Croatia), and Profs. Gordana Jovanovic and Mirjana Vasovic (University of Belgrade), who were also co-applicants in this SCOPES project. This collaboration resulted in the integration and development of new research perspectives and led to a more thoughtful analysis of the contextual factors involved in our research.

We must also underline the role of our colleagues from the University of Lausanne. Jean-Marie Le Goff has been very helpful in designing the life calendars. We are indebted to the *Centre for Life Course and Life Styles Studies* (PaVie Center, Universities of Lausanne and Geneva) and to the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research LIVES for their financial assistance during the project's starting and final phase respectively. We must thank Tatiana Marcacci for her continuous support with all administrative questions. Within the PaVie Center, we have benefited from the thoughtful advice and support of our colleagues Prof. Dominique Joye, Prof. Eric Widmer, Jacques-Antoine Gauthier, and Francesco Giudici. Finally, we would like to thank our colleagues Prof. Thomas David, Prof Alain Clemence and Prof. Willem Doise for their advice and support during the course of this project. At a more advanced stage, Profs. Daniel Bar-Tal, Sabina Cehajic, and Dusko Sekulic further enriched the project's international network with their experience and expertise, as reflected in their more theoretically oriented contributions to the present book.

This book is not a research text intended for researchers only. The scholars who were involved in the making of this book are committed to conducting research that is relevant to society, and our work together has generated a dialogue with individuals from the media as well as the political and humanitarian arenas. This dialogue has supplemented our academic work with direct, on-the-ground experience and attention to practical issues. This willingness to discuss applied and contextualised issues publicly was visible in the diverse public lectures and exhibition activities that were financed by the *Anthropos* fund at the University of Lausanne and co-ordinated with a great deal of commitment by Sabina Rondic first, and then by Anne-Romaine Favre Zuppinger. Some participants in these dialogues were also willing to write down their thoughts as privileged witnesses of the processes in which we were interested: Svetlana Broz, Ivana Macek, and Florence Hartmann. Their texts are presented here as *Voices*.

Finally, we would like to express our gratitude to all of the participants who devoted their time to reporting their experiences and expressing their opinions via TRACES. We dedicate this book to them: all of the people from the countries from the former Yugoslavia who survived the wars and the rapid social changes in the region and who were willing to share lessons on how communities can possibly face, resist or overcome collective violence.

Contents

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Part I
Introduction

Chapter 1
Towards a Community Approach of the Aftermath of War in the Former Yugoslavia: Collective Experiences, Social Practices, and Representations

Dario Spini, Guy Elcheroth and Rachel Fasel

By the end of the last century, people in the former Yugoslavia were forced to confront massive destruction and extreme violence that occurred in different regions between 1991 and 2001.[1] The breakdown of the Yugoslavian federal state and the brutal violence that accompanied it generated changes in the economic, political, and familial spheres as well as in the social fabric of everyday life. Dramatic social changes heavily influenced individual life trajectories, and traces of these changes remain visible 20 years after the most tragic events. One symbol of these scars is Mostar, which is a city in Bosnia-Herzegovina that was heavily targeted and destroyed, as were other cities that previously had integrated communities such as Sarajevo, Srebrenica, and Vukovar. Let us consider three different episodes that occurred in Mostar in the critical period between 1990 and 2006 as a preliminary illustration of the main issues that will be addressed in this book.

Most people who have commented on this violence and these crimes have emphasised that the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina constituted an "ethnic war". However, as we will argue in this book, this statement was likely truer after the war than before the war. Ethnic groups for many people were emphasised as membership categories and were not central reference groups (Hyman 1942) in daily life before the war (see Chap. 3 by Sekulic). These groups became shared realities as outcomes of the nationalist propaganda and organised political violence (Elcheroth and Spini 2011). The vast majority of people were forced to endure violence and to position themselves

[1] For a short description of the political events that occurred during this period, see Appendix 1, Table 1.4.

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within a particular ethnic group, often abruptly, as illustrated by this account of an episode that occurred in Mostar on the 13 June 1993:

> Two men knocked at the door of Zlatko Hrvic in the middle of the night and checked for his identity. If he was recognized as a Bosniak he would be taken by force to a camp, if he was identified as a Croat, he would be left in his home. His name and birthplace directed him to the second destiny, even if he could have been identified as a Bosniak. This night, he describes, was the worst of his life. (Broz 2005, p. 157)

This account illustrates how the political violence that occurred so abruptly in the former Yugoslavia cannot be described as a simple and clear instance of intergroup ethnic conflict. For many (if not most) inhabitants of these regions, clear identification with a particular ethnicity was the result of political violence rather than the cause. The systematic nationalistic propaganda and the targeted violence for which the strategic goal was to separate or destroy communities on the basis of their imposed ethnic identity were unfortunately successful in many parts of the countries that emerged from the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. Today, many communities are separated on the basis of their religion or ethnic identity. This book will explore how social or community identities are now perceived by people and how intergroup relationships have crystallised since these collective experiences of massive violence.

A second outcome of the rapid and violent collective societal changes in the region was an additional structural change in the population: the creation of generational historical gaps (Mannheim 1990). When political violence is so substantial that the elements that shape community life (e.g. norms, spaces, and practices) have been systematically destroyed or transformed, collective memories, social experiences and practices may be completely different from one generation to another, as expressed by an inhabitant of Mostar in December 2001:

> My generation, 1965–1975, was worse off than any other generation. The largest proportion of those killed and forced to flee were from that generation. The younger ones, who were 10 to 13 years old when the war broke out, tend to go to the other side in large numbers. They don't know how it used to be, and they are satisfied with how things are now. We, the older ones, when we remember what it used to be like and compare it with what it's like now, the only thing we can do is cry. Never again will Mostar be as it used to be and have the spirit it used to have, because less than 20 per cent of the old crowd have remained in Mostar on both sides. (Corkalo et al. 2004, p. 154)

This excerpt indicates not only that political violence has been directed at ethnic groups, but that within these groups, there are also collective experiences structured by generational divisions (and by gender). Of particular interest is the generation composed of adolescents and young adults, who became "worse off" at the moment when their adult social identities were supposed to crystallise because people of their age were likely to become soldiers or to be targeted as victims of violence (in particular, a large number of young women were raped or were targets of violence). People in this age group lost or were forced to delay many opportunities to launch the adult lives that they wished to live.

Finally, our book will be concerned with matters of justice within and across communities in today's international community. The extreme political violence that was experienced by many communities in the former Yugoslavia disrupts the foundations

of society, increases the risk of non-conformity, and therefore has deep effects on normative social representations and social practices. Normative social representations (Doise 2002; Spini and Doise 2005) are generated from social interactions and communication: "While interacting with each other, individuals know that their fate will be affected by this interaction, at least in certain domains, to a certain extent, and at a certain cost" (Spini and Doise 2005, p. 21). Normative social representations are anchored in social practices and interpersonal or intergroup relationships (Doise 1993).

In the aftermath of political violence, there are two primary types of social representations. First, communities can transform the ethos of conflict into mistrust and thus generate shared representations of collective victimisation and out-group guilt. Second, people can seek to develop a political framework that will allow them to live separately from their former enemy and create new political entities, especially nations. Both types of social representations imply that relationships and past violence are interpreted based on the classic in-group (good or better)/out-group (bad or worse; the enemy) distinction, in addition to the values and content associated with those categories (Bar-Tal 2007; Worchel 1999). However, the dangers of a normless vacuum and the need for protection against future political violence can also lead to claims to restore justice and trust within and across communities and to punish war criminals. These two paths are not mutually exclusive, and the process is necessarily complex. The context and the involvement of individuals and groups in the violence, in addition to the collective memory, national or community institutions, and the actions of the international community, play key roles on the road to peace, reconstruction, or reconciliation, as indicated by Bar-Tal and Cehajic-Clancy (Chap. 8).

Let us consider another episode related by the Centre for Peace in the Balkans, which occurred in Mostar on 11 December 2005, after the arrest of Ante Gotovina, a suspected war criminal at that time:

> About 200 Bosnian Croats took to the streets of Mostar Sunday in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina in a show of support for recently arrested Croatian war crimes suspect general Ante Gotovina. The peaceful demonstrations were organized by Bosnian Croat associations of war veterans. 'This is a peaceful gathering in support of general Gotovina. We are sure he will finally prove the real truth about the war in Croatia once he appears before The Hague Tribunal,' Stjepan Matic of the Mostar War Veterans association said. Gotovina's supporters gathered in smaller numbers in several Croat-dominated towns in Herzegovina and central Bosnia. No incidents were reported.

Depending on partisanship and involvement in the collective experience of violence as well as on the more general climate within and across communities, the perception of justice and human rights can vary widely. In most situations, there are moral or legal norms that may be contradictory. What is deemed right depends largely on the climate of a community. This statement is particularly true for international law and principles if they are opposed to partisan moralities. When are universal rights legitimate in post-war contexts? The climates and collective experiences that favour or hinder the acceptance or refusal of universal rights are not yet well understood, although research has recently begun to focus on these collective processes (Abramowitz 2005; Elcheroth 2006; Spini et al. 2008).

The variety of experiences of victimisation (e.g. forced migration, poverty, and armed violence) in recent years renders the former Yugoslavia a unique context in which to examine the effects of collective experience on normative social representation and practices. In particular, we are interested in studying how political violence and economic difficulties may simultaneously reinforce the negative attitudes of individuals towards other groups and strengthen calls for the need to respect basic human rights (see Voice 2 by Broz, Voice 3 by Hartmann, and Chap. 14 by Elcheroth and Spini). Given this duality, this book examines three new topics in analysing the aftermath of war in the former Yugoslavia: (1) social identity and intergroup relations (Reicher 1996; Tajfel 1984), (2) the life course and collective experiences of the 1968–1974 cohort (Elder 1974/1999; Sapin et al. 2007; Settersten Jr 2003), and (3) normative social representations and collective practices (Doise et al. 1993; Elcheroth et al. 2011).

Using these complementary approaches will enable us to examine the aftermath of war and political violence in an innovative and interdisciplinary manner. This original combination will also allow us to report empirical evidence originating from and concerning a particularly neglected actor in theories on conflict and post-conflict periods: the people. Giving voice to the people is one central contribution of social psychology or sociology in comparison with the more institutional analyses that are characteristic of political or historical science. This chapter is divided into four sections. First, we present an original theoretical perspective on how people and communities strove to cope with the aftermath of violent conflict by adapting their social practices and redefining their worldviews. We show how a community perspective complements previous theories regarding "ethnic" conflict: those focused on primordialism, elite mobilisation, and security dilemmas. Second, we describe how societal changes have different effects on different cohorts or generations. Third, we describe the Transition to Adulthood and Collective Experiences Survey (TRACES), a unique new dataset. This survey has two main components: (1) life event calendar data that were collected from a general sample of people across the former Yugoslavia and (2) extensive data on political attitudes and social worldviews from members of the 1968–1974 birth cohort, whose entrance to adulthood (a crucial phase in the socialisation of individuals) occurred during the main war periods (i.e. they were 16–22 years old in 1990). Most of the empirical chapters in this book present analyses of this survey, which was conducted within an interdisciplinary and international network composed of social psychologists, sociologists, social demographers, and historians. Finally, we will briefly describe each chapter and the organisation of the book.

Between Elite- and Mass-Level Approaches to Ethnic Identity and War: Collective Experiences as the Linchpin of Social Reality

In the scholarly work on the causes and consequences of war in the former Yugoslavia, two opposing paradigmatic perspectives are frequently explored. These two perspectives render the case of the former Yugoslavia as exemplary of the

wider theoretical debate in which primordialist theories conceive of ethnic identities as an intrinsic motivating force, whereas mobilisation theories emphasise how these identities are strategically manipulated to serve the interests of particular elite groups. This dichotomy is connected to two more general dualities: realist versus constructivist approaches to ethnic identity and bottom-up versus top-down approaches to mass mobilisation. In this section, we suggest that both types of dualities may sometimes hinder our understanding of the dynamics that lead to ethnic violence and its burdensome legacy for community life more than they help it. As a result, we advocate a third perspective that focuses on how ethnic identity comes to function as a structuring principle for collective experience and shared practices.

Realism: Ethnic Identities Are Hard Facts

As Sekulic notes (Chap. 3), primordialist theories are more prominent outside rather than inside academia, which can be read as a statement on either their external influence or their internal weakness. These theories typically emphasise the major role of bottom-up dynamics and collective emotions such as ancient hatred or resentment between different ethnic groups (e.g. amongst Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats, or Muslim Bosniaks; Kaplan 1994; Petersen 2002). As Sekulic et al. (2006) have noted, similar ways of thinking are shared by many experts and non-experts who are obsessed with understanding the motives that supposedly lead the masses to engage in furious violence against "ethnic others". Such approaches not only take for granted the existence and boundaries of ethnic groups, but also appear to assume that an inherent motivational force rooted in the bonds of ancestry makes people almost naturally prepared to endure great sacrifices or to exercise great cruelty for the sake of their ethnic in-groups.

Security dilemma theorists (Kaufman 1996a, b; Posen 1993) do not hold similarly strong assumptions regarding the intrinsic motivational force of ethnicity. Rather, such scholars contend that people's pursuit of security compels them to care about the position of their respective groups, especially during periods of societal turbulence and fragile national structures. Security dilemmas can begin when a state does not provide security to ethnic groups (whether based on religion, nationality, or language) and the groups then attempt to provide security themselves (Posen 1993). A security dilemma requires that "the fears of extinction be mutual—that actions taken by one side to avert extinction be seen by the other side as threatening extinction for themselves" (Kaufman 1996a, p. 109).

However, there is one important commonality between the primordialist and security dilemma approaches to ethnic violence: both approaches position ethnic affiliations as a fixed background for their analyses. As Kaufmann (1996b, p. 141) states, "Different identity categories imply their own membership rules (. . .) Ethnic identities are hardest, since they depend on language, culture, and religion, which are hard to change, as well as parentage, which no one can change". In this sense, both approaches assume a realist perspective regarding ethnicity: ethnic identity is considered a hard fact that is difficult to alter and unnecessary to question.

However, this simple vision of clearly opposed and internally homogenous groups engaged in cycles of violence in which the members of each community strongly identify with the struggle of "their" ethnic group does not account for the much more diverse and less straightforward realities of some conflicts. As highlighted by Broz's (Voice 1) and Macek's (Voice 2) contributions to this book, prompt and unproblematic acceptance of ethnic violence may have been the exception rather than the rule amongst ordinary Bosnians when war and genocidal violence erupted in their country (see also Elcheroth and Spini 2011; Gagnon 2004). Moreover, realist approaches to ethnic identity do not inform our understanding how ethnic communities are both activated and actively transformed by collective violence with long-term consequences.

Constructivism: Ethnic Identities Are Arbitrary and Malleable

Contrary to realist approaches to ethnic identity, constructivist approaches view ethnic identities as fluid, changeable, and often actively contested. From such perspectives, most of the emphasis of the analysis is on the strategic aim of collectively framing ethnic membership and boundaries in a given manner than on individual motives to endorse a given ethnic affiliation. Consequently, elite and mass interests are not assumed to converge, nor are the interests of different ethnic groups assumed to be intrinsically divergent; ethnic conflict and violence can serve elite interests beyond ethnic boundaries and can contradict the interests of the masses on all sides. For example, Gagnon (2004) has shown how ethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia assisted both Serb and Croat elites in maintaining privilege and power despite the massive political, ideological, and economic crises of the early 1990s, although this violence delayed popular goals of social progress and political reforms. Thus, elite mobilisation theories explain the origins of mass violence by emphasising power structures and top-down processes that extend from influential elites who strive for political power to the manipulated masses. This perspective suggests that leaders such as Milosevic or Tudjman played major roles in the development of nationalist propaganda and political violence in the former Yugoslavia (Hartmann 2002).

However, it is insufficient to consider only elite activities in explaining *how* ethnic identities are constructed, maintained, reshaped, and effectively mobilised for political purposes during and after political violence (Elcheroth and Spini 2011). We must also consider relevant social practices, including marital choice, residential arrangements, and community solidarity, if we want to understand how average people (as opposed to the most committed individuals) experience "ethnic identity" as a meaningful reality. We must examine complex systems of shared understanding, beliefs, and values (i.e. social representations) to understand how mutual expectations become self-fulfilling prophecies.

In this sense, the prevailing conflation of the "constructivist" and "elite" approaches appears unfortunate. It is equally important to analyse what leads a critical mass of people to lend sufficient credit to these constructions to enable them to effectively influence collective behaviour. Elite mobilisation and mass support are

complementary. Identity entrepreneurs must secure support amongst the masses to cement their interpretation of identity, and the masses require leaders who are ready to enact a version of collective identity that resonates with the people's collective experience and shared understanding of social reality.

Towards a Process Approach: How Do Ethnic Identities Become Real?

All of the different contributions in this book clarify that ethnic identities are not necessarily either hard facts or arbitrary and malleable: strikingly, they can be both. Most of the authors of this book converge in documenting how the significance of ethnic identities changed dramatically during the war period. Sekulic's chapter (Chap. 3) demonstrates that pre-existent interethnic prejudice or hostility is an implausible explanation for the outbreak of this violence. However, according to this book, across former Yugoslavian post-war communities, ethnic identity does function as a deeply constraining and structuring principle of social reality that cannot easily be dismissed (see Chap. 8 by Bar-Tal and Cehajic-Clancy). Thus, the more relevant question becomes the following: under which circumstances and by which processes can such malleable and arbitrary things as ethnic identities become "hard" social facts—hard to ignore and hard to change?

An interesting facet of security dilemma theory (Kaufmann 1996) is the suggestion that ethnic identity is not primarily a problem of subjective identification. The treatment that a person is likely to receive from others depending on how they view his or her ethnic identity is of significantly more pragmatic importance in the context of violent conflict than the private feelings of this person regarding his or her own identity. In this sense, people's markers of ethnic identity can become strong predictors of actual behaviour, and ethnicity can become clearly defined. However, unlike in realist approaches to ethnic conflict, we must understand such clarity as a contingent development rather than as a universal given. Frequently, before a given conception of ethnic identity can have *real consequences*, many people must *assume* that this identity is already perceived by relevant others and that it will orient their behaviour towards ethnic in-groups and out-groups. Thus, the starting point of this book lies in the aspiration to document and analyse how social representations and social practices are reshaped by collective violence in the context of ethnic or nationalistic discourse. What are the effects of political violence on people's lives, and what are the effects of collectively experienced victimisation on societal norms, attitudes, and collective beliefs? In this process, we will emphasise that mass violence plays both de-structuring and re-structuring roles in manifold psychosocial processes and in social life within and between communities.

Our combined top-down and bottom-up approach illuminates how most people in the former Yugoslavia had to endure and cope individually and collectively with wartime and with various types of dramatic societal change while also distancing themselves from, resisting and sometimes overcoming the logic of ethnic rivalry,

violence, and segregation (see Voice 1 by Macek and Voice 2 by Broz). This approach enables us to depart from the perspectives that depict most people in the former Yugoslavia as either blind followers of ethnic war entrepreneurs or as intrinsically attracted to violence by deep-rooted intraethnic loyalties and interethnic animosities. We argue that the majority of people in any conflict, either individually or collectively, are active agents embedded in collective dynamics that create specific contexts with their own logic and consequences.

Life Courses in Social Contexts: Collective Experience and the Formative Years of Generations

The collapse of the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s also generated dramatic societal changes for the former unified federal communist state, which had featured a unique structure that included relatively autonomous political entities (the latter of which became newly independent states). Although the political transition unfolded without bloodshed in some cases, the process sometimes involved mass killings, systematic ethnic cleansing, and actions that eventually resulted in the displacement of 3 million people from their homes (Gagnon 2004). The socialisation of different cohorts or generations in these different political and economic environments heavily influenced the social representation of justice (see Chap. 12 by Fasel and Spini and Chap. 14 by Elcheroth and Spini) and perceptions of other ethnic groups (see Chap. 9 by Corkalo Biruski and Penic and Chap. 11 by Penic, Corkalo Biruski, and Elcheroth). Today, such ethnic communities are most often divided, especially in the cities that were targeted by ethnic cleansing and systematic crimes such as Mostar, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, and Vukovar (see Ajdukovic and Corkalo Biruski 2008; Elcheroth and Spini 2011, and Chap. 7 by Morselli and Passini).

Examining another critical period of history, the great economic depression of the 1930s, Elder (1974/1999) has shown the major influence of collective events (the depression itself as well as enlistment in the army and service during World War II and the Korean war) on the life trajectories of the youngest cohorts transitioning to adulthood during that period. There is clearly a "before" and an "after" in such circumstances, each of which is marked by changes in the manner in which people live individually or collectively. However, as illustrated by the short quotation from an interview at the beginning of this chapter, different cohorts had different experiences during the social and political changes in the former Yugoslavia. Young adults had to attempt to appropriately position themselves during the conflicts and had no or little ideological or identity-based orientation before the conflicts, when Tito's socialist regime was in power and peaceful relations were the norm. How did these social and political changes affect the life course of these cohorts?

Life course experiences are related to time and location (Settersten Jr 1999). People from different regions of the former Yugoslavia have had varied experiences depending on where they lived and when. The tragic events have not affected all of the regions of the former Yugoslavia and all of the newly established communities within these regions with the same intensity. Wars, similar to other collective

experiences, are marked by events that occur in a given period of time and that individuals encounter at a certain age. Living in 1993 in Ljubljana, a relatively safe and wealthy city, or in Mostar, a city devastated by war and by economic difficulties, meant living in different worlds—and the same is true today. Geography generated different sets of opportunities and constraints for individuals, most notably young adults, on different levels (e.g. in terms of economics, material possessions, security, and freedom; Shanahan 2000).

Such contextual structural constraints have a major influence on life trajectories (see the discussion of marriage choices in Chap. 4 by Le Goff and Giudici and the discussion of migration trajectories in Chap. 5 by Gauthier and Widmer). These constraints also influence attitudes towards important societal issues and affect well-being. Adolescence and young adulthood are critical periods in which social identities crystallise around life decisions that often have long-term consequences (e.g. decisions regarding marriage, insertion in the labour market, and ideology; Erikson 1968; McAdams 1993; Schuman and Scott 1989; Scott 2000). The collective memory of an entire generation is affected when individuals enter adulthood when their nation, community, and family life are threatened or destroyed; when the levels of economic and political insecurity are high; and when their material security and social identity are threatened (Elder 1974/1999; Ellwood 1982). What, then, are the consequences of wartime on the life trajectories, social attitudes, beliefs, and well-being of young adults who need opportunities and plans for the future (Shanahan 2000)? How do these young adults develop the individual and social resources that they need to overcome massive collective violence and economic difficulties? Some regions of the former Yugoslavia such as Macedonia were already experiencing economic difficulties; in such cases, do war events actually generate different life courses and change forms of social representation other than economic exclusion? To what extent are basic assumptions regarding society, other people and communities, or justice shattered by violent collective events?

Once we seriously consider the notion of collective experience as a major explanation for political and moral attitudes, this consideration raises a number of fascinating methodological challenges that have not yet been definitively addressed by social scientists. A major issue is the need to define the boundaries of the specific social context in which a single event is likely to be relevant (i.e. to contribute to the shaping of collective experience for a particular community). For example, if we view *national* indicators as predictors of political attitudes, then we implicitly assume that in any location within one country: (1) all other events within the same country contribute *equally* to the shaping of collective experience at that location and (2) all events that occur outside of the country's boundaries do not contribute *at all* to this process. In other words, we implicitly assume a *dichotomous* relationship between social context and collective experience: a given event is located either inside or outside of the relevant context.

Clearly, this assumption is unrealistic for many social phenomena. The circulation of knowledge pertaining to war events does not stop at national boundaries, nor does the circulation of collective beliefs or values. Furthermore, as the case of the

former Yugoslavia vividly illustrates, national boundaries are neither static nor necessarily consensual. For these reasons, we have turned our attention to concepts and methods that allow us to identify a *continuous* rather than a dichotomous relationship between events and social contexts. Rather than wondering whether an event should be considered depending on its location (because it is located within or outside of the relevant context), we ask *how much* an event should be considered given its location.

In previous applications developed by human geographers (e.g. Fotheringham et al. 2002), location has generally been understood literally as a set of coordinates within a physical space, whereas our approach to collective experience extends the use of spatially weighted context data by considering other types of "locations" that are relevant to the structuring of social reality and by incorporating them into multilevel modelling (see Elcheroth et al. 2013, for a comprehensive introduction to this novel methodological approach). Meters are not the only unit of measurement that can be used to describe the distance between two individuals (or communities). Alternatively, social proximity can be expressed as a function of the relative positions within social networks, within institutional structures, or within "imagined communities", which are reflexive social entities composed of individuals who share some attributes that are relevant to their identities (for two applications of spatially weighted context data to collective war experiences, see Chap. 11 by Penic, Corkalo Biruski, and Elcheroth and Chap. 14 by Elcheroth and Spini).

TRACES: A Multilevel Survey Used to Identify Individual and Collective Dynamics

The aim of articulating individual and collective dynamics provoked by exposure to war and societal transformation might appear ambitious in some regards. Even those who tend to find this theoretical objective compelling may still be discouraged by the requirements posed by the data collection and analysis for such a project. However, the research that is reported in this book represents a collective effort to overcome some of these data-related limitations in on the study of political violence in the former Yugoslavia and its effects on communities. In 2006, we began to generate a new, unique data set that was intended to open new avenues to social scientists seeking to examine collective experience in the former Yugoslavia: the Transition to Adulthood and Collective Experiences Survey (TRACES) (Spini et al. 2011).

This survey has two main components: first, life event calendar data that were collected from a general sample of people across all of the former Yugoslavia and, second, extensive data on the political attitudes and social worldviews of the members of the 1968–1974 birth cohort, who entered adulthood during the recent war period. Most of the empirical chapters in this book present analyses of this survey, which was conducted within an interdisciplinary network that was primarily composed of social psychologists, sociologists, and social demographers.

Traces of Wars

To address our primary question, we implemented a large-scale survey between May and June 2006 and conducted complementary interviews in Kosovo and Serbia in December 2006 (for a detailed description, see Spini et al. 2011). This data collection process yielded responses from two samples: the general adult and cohort samples[2]. The general adult sample is composed of individuals who were randomly selected from across the entire former Yugoslavia and were born in 1981 or earlier. The members of this sample completed a questionnaire that included biographical questions and two life course calendars: one calendar covering the period from 1990 (before the beginning of the wars) to 2006 (the year of data collection) and one calendar covering each person's transition to adulthood (the period from 15 to 30 years of age). The two calendars covered different types of events. The first calendar contained events related to war, political, or economic victimisation (e.g. being wounded; experiencing property damage; carrying or using a weapon; being homeless, unemployed, or discriminated against). The other calendar included markers of the transition to adulthood (e.g. education, labour market participation, relationships, and parenthood). Each person's residential trajectory was also recorded in both calendars. The cohort sample included was only the 1968–1974 cohorts because this selection enabled us to obtain more information on the individuals who had transitioned to adulthood during the 1990s. In most cases, this second sample (which was largely nested within the general sample) completed the same initial questionnaire as the general sample as well as an additional questionnaire that included attitudinal questions and various standardised instruments.

Both samples were generated using a random sampling strategy stratified in 80 areas covering the entire former Yugoslavian territory. These areas were defined according to state boundaries, regional or historical subdivisions within state boundaries, and the boundaries of different political entities (i.e. the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ Republika Srpska; Serbia Proper/Montenegro/Vojvodina/Kosovo). The numbers of inhabitants in particular areas were also considered to ensure that they did not vary dramatically, especially within one political entity; such variation was allowed only in the six urban areas whose population was more numerous. For the general sample, 50 individual respondents were selected from each of the 80 areas (which yielded an expected total sample of 4,000); for the cohort sample, 30 respondents were selected for each area (for an expected total sample of 2,400). Table 1.1 provides the final net sample size for each TRACES field team (corresponding to the political entities of the former Yugoslavia that we have considered as the basis for our study and divided into smaller areas). The total size of the general sample is 3,795, and the cohort sample includes 2,254 individuals. The two samples partially

[2] The data are available at the Swiss Foundation for Research in Social Sciences: http://forsdata.unil.ch.

Table 1.1 Population size, number of survey areas and net sample sizes by field team in 2006

Field team	2006 population	Survey areas	General sample	Cohort sample
Bosnia-Herzegovina	3,880,648	16	746	454
Croatia	4,437,460	17	850	468
FYR Macedonia	2,022,547	12	546	326
Serbia and Montenegro	7,498,001	19	876	511
Slovenia	1,964,036	8	406	234
Kosovo	2,601,121	8	551	261
Total	23,023,831	80	3,975	2,254

Demographical data came from the last population census as provided by the statistical office of the concerned country (or the subdivision of the country) when available, otherwise, we relied on most recent official population estimates

overlap, with 625 individual respondents included in both samples, because 15.7 % of the members of the general sample were born between 1968 and 1974 and were also willing to complete the longer version of the survey questionnaire.

Collective Victimisation Across Areas

The wars in the former Yugoslavia varied in intensity in different zones. If Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Kosovo (labelled as Serbia in Table 1.2, although the collective experiences of these territories must be distinguished from one another; see Appendix 1; Table 1.4) have been heavily influenced by these armed conflicts, then Macedonia and Slovenia have been spared by comparison (see Table 1.2). The case of Serbia, which has actively participated in the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo, which NATO bombed and which has hosted many refugees, is somewhat distinct. Macedonia was one of the poorest regions in the former Yugoslavia, whereas Croatia and Slovenia were the wealthiest, as indicated by the human development index (HDI) worldwide rankings (see Table 1.2); in fact, Slovenia was amongst the wealthiest nations in the world, Croatia occupied a more moderate position in the rankings, and the ranks of the other countries were between 65th and 76th.

The two following figures display the war and socio-economic victimisation indicators that were computed using the TRACES general sample (see Appendix 2 for a description of how these indicators and their weights were calculated and how the maps were generated). Figure 1.1 displays the risk of war victimisation weighted by geographical proximity, which was determined by following a procedure described by Elcheroth et al. (2013). A darker colour indicates a greater number of victims of war. The risk of war victimisation appears to be significantly greater near war zones. For example, the human consequences of the Kosovo war were largely limited to the borders of Kosovo. A different situation is apparent for the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which the risk of victimisation appears to have extended from the centre to all of the surrounding areas, even crossing national borders.

Table 1.2 Comparative situation of the countries on socioeconomic, conflict and insecurity-induced movement, and war indicators (2006/2007)

Countries	GDP[a]	Socioeconomic indicators		Insecurity, conflict, and war indicators	
		HDI[b]	HDI[b] worldwide rank	Stock of international refugees by country of origin[c]	Intensity level of conflicts and wars[d]
Slovenia	24.784	0.924	29	100	Minor
Croatia	16.093	0.867	45	100,400	War
Montenegro	9.022	0.828	65	600	As Serbia
Serbia (incl. Kosovo)	8.996	0.821	67	165,600	War
FYR Macedonia	7.949	0.813	72	8,100	Minor
Bosnia-Herzegovina	6.618	0.807	76	78,300	War

[a] *GDP* Gross domestic product per capita in purchasing power parity terms, 2006 values (constant 2005 international $) (World Bank 2011)
[b] *HDI* Human development index, 2006 values (United Nations Development Programme 2009)
[c] 2007 values (United Nations Development Programme 2009)
[d] 1991–2001. According to the classification of the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo/Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen 2009); *war* at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year, *minor* between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year

The map depicting the risk of social and economic deprivation (e.g. homelessness, unemployment), similarly weighted by geographical distance (Fig. 1.2), shows a lower effect of the localisation of war events. This result confirms the disparities between the northern and western parts of the former Yugoslavia and its southern and eastern regions. The level of risk was lowest in the northern part of the former Yugoslavia (Slovenia) and increased closer to the south, with the maximum level in FYR Macedonia and some higher levels in zones affected by war.

As shown in Elcheroth and Spini's contribution to this book (Chap. 14), this picture changes greatly when subjective indicators of proximity (e.g. identification) or geographical distances are used as weights.

Experiences of Victimisation by Cohorts

As previously stated, one means of examining the influence of collective events on the young adults who experienced the collapse of the former Yugoslavia involves comparing this specific cohort to others (Chap. 4 by Le Goff and Giudici and Chap. 5 by Gauthier and Widmer). In Table 1.3, we report the frequency of war victimisation for four cohorts defined a priori by their birth years: 1918–1950, 1951–1967, 1968–1974, and 1975–1981.

Table 1.3 presents the design-weighted cumulative indices of victimisation experiences that were collected from the life calendars covering the period from 1990 to 2006. These indicators were calculated based on the entire database, which includes



Fig. 1.1 Indicator of risk of war traumatisation weighted by geographical proximity across 80 areas

Fig. 1.2 Indicator of risk of social and economic deprivation weighted by geographical proximity across 80 areas

Table 1.3 Design-weighted war victimisation indicators by cohorts

	Cohorts				
	Age in 1990 (just before war events) to 2006 (data collection)				
	1918–1950 40–72 56–88	1951–1967 23–39 39–55	1968–1974 16–22 32–38	1975–1981 9–15 25–31	F(33,971)
War victim	0.68[a]	0.63[a]	0.81[b]	0.82[b]	8.65***
Negative events	1.54[a]	1.80[b]	2.05[c]	1.97[b,c]	20.03***
Combatant	0.14[a]	0.27[b]	0.34[b]	0.10[a]	54.66***
N	999	1,738	1,250	1,722	

Scheffe's post-hoc contrasts at $p < 0.05$
[a,b,c] Significance in the contrast between means
*** $p < 0.001$

the cohort and the general sample. Different types of war victimisation have been reported, in addition to social and political exclusion as well as participation in combat. War victimisation includes six war-related events: being forced to leave one's home, being imprisoned, having a member of one's family killed, being wounded, having one's property damaged, and having one's house looted. The negative event index includes eight experiences: a lack of resources, homelessness, unemployment, a lack of significant relationships, being treated as unimportant, being discriminated against, not being allowed to express one's opinions, and being threatened. The two indicators for combat are carrying a weapon and using a weapon.

The results generally confirm that the 1968–1974 cohorts were particularly victimised during the war years, as they have the highest means for the three reported indicators. The 1968–1974 cohorts were victimised the most, more so than the older generations. Only the youngest cohorts exhibit similar levels of war victimisation. The index for social and political exclusion indicates even more dramatically that the 1968–1974 cohort experienced extreme difficulties, as these participants exhibit the highest level of social and political exclusion, especially compared with the results for the older (1918–1950) cohorts. The younger cohorts and the 1951–1967 cohorts exhibit intermediate levels of social and political exclusion. Finally, young adults and middle-aged adults were often combatants; only the youngest and oldest cohorts were less likely to have served as soldiers. In the violence in the former Yugoslavia, as in most conflicts, men ($m = 0.44$) participated in combat much more than women ($m = 0.04$; $t\ (2167.21) = 20.39$; $p < 0.001$). In other words, 97.8 % of women and 74.8 % of men did not carry or use weapons. There is also substantial variation across regions, with the males in Slovenia being the least engaged in combat (9.4 %) and those in Bosnia and Herzegovina the most likely to have been soldiers (45.1 %). Overall, these results validate a posteriori our focus on the 1968–1974 cohort as a group that was particularly targeted during the wars.

Organisation and Content of the Book

To address the different issues raised in this introduction, the next chapter presents an historical overview of the period of interest. In this chapter, Tvrtko Jakovina describes the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia, a story that has previously been related by different analysts (Gagnon 2004; Hartmann 2002; Ramet 1999; Wilmer 2002). However, Tvrtko Jakovina succeeds in providing a fresh outlook by presenting an inside perspective on this period. His access to the personal archives of Josip Vrhovec, Budimir Loncar, and Milka Planinc and his interviews with the latter two individuals provide essential insight. Jakovina's account will certainly assist readers in understanding the political context that led to the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia.

The remainder of this book is organised in two main parts. In the first part, after an illuminating chapter by Dusko Sekulic on how the contact hypothesis should be reinterpreted in view of the former Yugoslavia case and the available survey data (Chap. 3), three chapters that present findings from the TRACES survey are devoted to social practices and their relationship to collective violence. These social practices are migration (Chap. 5 by Gauthier and Widmer), the transition to marriage (Chap. 4 by Le Goff and Giudici), and contact and interactions between ethnic groups (Chap. 7 by Morselli and Passini).

The second part begins with an introductory theoretical chapter by Daniel Bar-Tal and Sabina Cehajic-Clancy on the theoretical frameworks for understanding collective victimisation and the paths to social reconstruction (Chap. 8). In this second part, the findings focus on the effects of collective victimisation on social representation, including beliefs regarding collective guilt (Chap. 9 by Corkalo Biruski and Penic), out-group blame and the logic of mobilisation (Chap. 11 by Penic, Corkalo Biruski, and Elcheroth), well-being and beliefs regarding justice in the world (Chap. 12 by Fasel and Spini), and public reactions to human rights violations (Chap. 14 by Elcheroth and Spini).

Moreover, three inserts give voice to three privileged observers who provide new insight into the primary focus of this text based on their first-hand experience with different types of struggles: the moral struggle to resist the logic of ethnic violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Voice 1, by Broz), the daily struggle for survival during the siege of Sarajevo (Voice 2, by Macek), and the political struggle over the prosecution of crimes at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Voice 3, by Hartmann). These insider perspectives extend the theoretical and empirical chapters based on TRACES data and help to validate the main arguments and orientation of this book. The concluding chapter by Elcheroth, Corkalo Biruski, and Spini summarises the main lessons learnt from the different contributions and discusses implications for our understanding of violent ethnicisation and for future studies of collective trauma in the social sciences.

Appendix 1

Table 1.4 Historical milestones in the conflicts during the war period (between 1991 and 2001). (Sources: Garde (2000), Silber and Litte (1997), and Wilmer (2002))

25 June 1991	Declarations of independence of Slovenia and Croatia, followed by the intervention of the federal army
7 July 1991	End of the "ten-day war" in Slovenia; escalation of conflict in Croatia
8 September 1991	Referendum endorsing independence from Yugoslavia in Macedonia
3 January 1992	Ceasefire in Croatia, international recognition of Croatia and deployment of the UNPROFOR. Armed conflict continues intermittently on a lesser scale
29 February 1992	Referendum on independence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, followed by the start of the war
29 June 1992	Blue Helmets from the UN are sent to Sarajevo
25 May 1993	UN resolution to create the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
1 March 1994	Washington agreement between Croats and Muslims, which ends the triangular war
11 July 1995	Fall of Srebrenica; massacres targeting the Muslim population
August 1995	"Operation Storm" Krajina recaptured by the Croatian army; mass exodus of the Serbian population
September 1995	Bombing of the Serbian positions by NATO forces
12 November 1995	Erdut agreement signed; the war in Croatia formally ends
14 December 1995	The Dayton agreement is signed in Paris, which marks the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina
March–June 1999	The war in Kosovo reaches its greatest intensity (expulsion of a large part of the Albanian population and NATO bombings in Serbia and Montenegro), followed by the installation of a UN government
February–August 2001	Combat between governmental forces and Albanian rebels in Macedonia

Appendix 2

Methodological Notes

TRACES Maps

The maps of the former Yugoslavia that are included in this book were generated using ArcGIS 9.3 software. An ad hoc geo-referenced map with 80 polygons for the 80 areas was created for use in the TRACES procedures. The sources that were used to draw the area boundaries were the most recent information provided by the statistical office of each country or by the authority in charge of the country at the time of the survey (e.g. the United Nations in Kosovo).The first basis for the TRACES geo-referenced map was the ESRI 2002 map of Europe, shape file "Level 1 Province Areas". The former Yugoslavia was extracted from this European map. On this map, subdivisions were drawn only for Slovenia, Croatia, and the FYROM. For these three countries and based on the TRACES areas, polygons were merged together, were divided into several entities, or remained as is. The second source that

was used to create the TRACES map was JPEG images of the maps of the remaining countries and their subdivisions, which were downloaded from the statistical office or administrative office of each country[3] (except for Croatia, for which the PRISM Research Institute's JPEG map was used). These images were imported into ArcGIS and geo-referenced based on a number of ground control points (identifiable points on both the image and the geo-referenced map, e.g. edges or border junctions). These images were used to draw and digitalise the borders on the map as they were defined for the TRACES process.

Created as a patchwork, this new digitalised map was a useful tool during three different stages of the project. First, the map provided visual assistance during the process of recording the residential trajectories indicated in the life calendars during the fieldwork. Second, the map facilitated the calculation of geographical distances between areas as necessary to compute the collective indicators (see the next section). Third, the map enabled us to visualise the data within the proper contexts.

Computation of Collective Experiences Indicators

Indicators of collective experiences at the level of individual areas were computed using the TRACES general sample. The life calendars (which recorded the residential trajectories for individuals and the victimisation events that they experienced during each quarter from 1990 to 2006) were used to address the challenges raised by the spatial and temporal location of the events; each event could be attributed to a particular geographic area based on the quarter in which it occurred. An individual-quarter database was generated. Unweighted indicators of the temporalised risk of war trauma and of social and economic deprivation were computed for each survey area. The risk within an area was defined as the ratio of the estimated number of events in the population (i.e. the design-weighted frequency of individual-quarter units corresponding to the occurrence of an event) to the estimated total number of individual-quarter units in the population (i.e. the design-weighted sample size of individual-quarter units). The final unweighted indicators were the sum of the risks during each quarter from 1990 to 2006. The following events were used to calculate the indicator for the risk of war victimisation: being forced to leave one's home; being imprisoned, kidnapped or taken hostage; having a member of one's family killed; experiencing property damage; being wounded in the fighting; and having one's house looted. In the analysis of the risk of social and economic deprivation, two types of events were considered: self-reported poverty, which was defined as a lack of resources necessary to assure basic needs during at least two consecutive quarters (i.e. 6 months) and/or unemployment during at least four consecutive quarters (i.e. 12 months).

[3] The websites of the following offices were consulted in January 2006: the Central Bureau of Statistics, Republic of Croatia; the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; the Statistical Office of Kosovo; the State Statistical Office, Republic of Macedonia; the Statistical Office of the Republic of Montenegro; the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia; and the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia.

The unweighted estimates for war victimisation and social and economic deprivation within each specific survey area should be regarded with caution because they are based on survey responses from approximately 50 respondents only and the margins of error are therefore far beyond what is required for meaningful inferences at the population level. These limitations are amongst the reasons that spatially weighted indicators were generated. Indeed, one advantage of weighting is that this method reduces the margin of error by ensuring that the results for each area depend not only on the 50 individuals, but also on the values for neighbouring areas for a particular dimension. Drawing on previous work in the field of social geography, we used a general proximity function that enabled us to weight the effect of an event as a decreasing function of (social) distance (for more details regarding this methodological strategy, see Elcheroth et al. 2013). A series of proximity matrices for the 80 survey areas were computed based on various definitions of social distance while also considering dimensions such as geographical distance, institutional boundaries, and common group identification. Different types of spatially weighed indicators will be described in Chaps. 9 and 11.

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Chapter 2
Collective Experiences and Collective Memories: Writing the History of Crisis, Wars, and the "Balkanisation of Yugoslavia"

Tvrtko Jakovina

Damage Beyond Repair: The Crisis of the 1980s in the Yugoslav Federation

"At first I have to apologise to all of you, comrades, since I haven't consulted informally with anyone, not even Veselin Djuranovic, who was in a similar situation as I am today. But I did it on purpose; I wanted to take the decision alone. I have decided to resign" ("Stenografske beleske sa sastanka . . ." 1985).[1] These shocking but unpretentious words, spoken by the first female Yugoslav prime minister (the first to become the premier of any socialist country) on 11 April 1985, were dramatic but certainly not unique. As she stated, her predecessor, Montenegrin politician Djuranovic, who was then a member of the Presidency of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY, the collective authority that had succeeded the late president Josip Broz Tito in 1980), had attempted to do the same. The public was not informed about either of these events, although some information was leaked. Milka Planinc, a Croatian politician, was convinced that the strategy being used to stabilise the Yugoslav economy "can not work".

Yugoslavia lacked a proper development programme. The responsibilities of different federal institutions were unclear. Planinc's government was unable to fulfil its basic constitutional duties, and she was prepared to make a declaration and to "sign it publicly, [have it printed] in capital letters in newspapers". However, if the SIV (Savezno izvrsno vijece), the Federal Executive Council (as the government was called), was not fulfilling its duties, then the same could apply to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), the Yugoslav Assembly. For 2 years, Planinc had attempted to explain the problem to the federal government. The meeting of the

[1] Milka Planinc was president of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia (1972–1982) and president of the Federal Executive Council (1982–1986).

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Presidency of the LCY that occurred on the day before she attempted to resign had finally convinced her that "we cannot even understand each other, let alone agree on something".

"Milka Planinc may be joking" was the initial, rather innocent reaction of General Nikola Ljubicic, a Serbian representative within the Presidency. She was not joking, although her colleagues in the highest political body of Yugoslavia had managed to persuade her not to go public—not to persist in resigning. In the middle of difficult negotiations with global financial institutions regarding Yugoslavia's foreign debt, Planinc's resignation would only have shown how deep the problems in Yugoslavia were, hindered the nation's attempts to fight inflation, and negatively influenced society as a whole. Therefore, for political reasons, Planinc's resignation was not accepted. Everyone in the highest political bodies appeared to understand the problems of the Yugoslav Federation. However, change was nearly impossible. When President Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) was alive, he had exercised the authority to coordinate different federal bodies and to rule this complex country, but without him, voluntarism and chaos prevailed.

Josip Vrhovec, a Croatian member of the Yugoslav Presidency and a politician who, despite his many connections with Milka Planinc, was not her best friend, had agreed with his compatriot that "things were not going well". In his opinion, Planinc's resignation was simply a sign of the "crisis which lasts": "We are acting as if we have been paralysed, as if hypnotised by a cobra, not being able to react (. . .) We are in deep crisis of ideas, we have total confusion on the ideological front", continued Vrhovec.[2] No one is doing anything to prevent this "flood of destruction, flood of bourgeois mentality, flood of anticommunism".

Milka Planinc remained in office. However, her last year at the highest level of Yugoslav government was even less successful than the previous 2 years. Inflation was again increasing. Although the country's growth in 1985 was intended to be as high as 4 %, its BDP grew by only 0.5 % ("Izvestaj o ostvarivanju . . ." 1986). Exports were supposed to grow by 10.3 %, but they increased by only 2.6 %. Industrial production grew only 4.7 % in 1986. Exports to western markets fell by 4 % in 1985, and imports rose by 6.3 %. The inflation rate at the end of 1984 was between 52 % (according to Yugoslav sources) and 80 % (according to American sources). The unemployment rate, at 15 %, was the highest in Europe. By all accounts, the Yugoslav economy was in a terrible state (Berend 2001; Colic and Kovac 1985).

The country was undergoing the same process as other communist countries of Eastern Europe. Its structural crisis was deep. Yugoslavia was insolvent, as were Poland and Bulgaria. However, Yugoslavia's economic issues were more rapidly transforming into (inter)national political issues. Although the International Monetary Fund forced the federal government to reduce the autonomy of the republics in an attempt to improve the nation's effectiveness, this goal would not be fulfilled (Priestland 2010; Berend 2001). Although Yugoslavia was nominally a federation

[2] Josip Vrhovec was the editor in chief of the daily *Vjesnik*; the secretary and president of the Central Committee, League of Communists of Croatia; the Federal Secretary of Foreign Relations (1978–1982); and a Croatian member of the Presidency of Yugoslavia (1984–1988).

of six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and Macedonia) and two autonomous regions (Vojvodina and Kosovo), the country was in effect functioning as a confederation in many respects. According to an American analysis conducted in January 1983, the republics were "increasingly protectionist and isolated from each other in pursuing local interests ... ignoring national economies of scale and ultimate profitability ..." (NIE 2006).

Only a year after Tito's death, Albanian students had gone on strike in 1981. They demanded better living conditions, a solution to the problem of unemployment, and the status of an independent republic for Kosovo; some participants even called for unification with Albania. The Socialist Autonomous Province (SAP) of Kosovo soon became the focal point of the Yugoslav crisis. Mahmut Bakalli, who had been the leader of Kosovo for more than a decade, was replaced (along with others from the "Gjakova group") by Azem Vllasi, a former Yugoslav youth leader. Although Vllasi forcefully quelled the Albanian protests, he was not willing to compromise on the previously settled matter of Kosovo's independence within Yugoslavia.

Since 1981, Serbian propaganda had accused Albanians of seven sins: counter-revolution, nationalism, separatism, irredentism, secessionism, terrorism, ethnophobia, and Greater Albanian ambitions (Horvat 1988; Malcolm 1998; Pavlovic 2010; Petrovic 1996). Serbs and Montenegrens from Kosovo were rapidly leaving the poorest region of the country and moving to Serbia proper, either because they were seeking better working conditions or because they felt that they were being pressured to leave (Pavlovic 2010; Petrovic and Blagojevic 1989).[3]

The attempt to redefine the composition of Yugoslavia, especially when it originated from the largest republic, was increasingly threatening the already unstable structure of the federation. Other republics, especially the rather quiet Croatia and Macedonia and much more active Slovenia, opposed these efforts. Bosnia and Herzegovina, with increasing self-assurance, viewed all of this activity as an opportunity to emphasise its own importance. Presenting itself as "Yugoslavia in Small", with three nations living together in supposed tranquillity, it was evolving from one of the least visible republics to the most important (Andjelic 2003). If Yugoslavia was based on "brotherhood and unity", then BH, as it was known, was the exemplar of these qualities. The solution to Yugoslavia's national problems was apparently to strengthen its orthodoxy.[4]

The federal government of Yugoslavia had always been primarily a department of economic affairs. Since Tito's death, the Federal Secretariat of Foreign Relations and that of the People's Defence, which was previously connected with the Office of the President, became de facto independent. To a considerable extent, the same independence applied to the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs. For years, culture and

[3] Between 1981 and 1987, more than 20,000 Serbs and Montenegrins departed from Kosovo. The percentage of the population that was composed of Albanians, which had the highest birth rate in Europe, increased from 69 to 77 % in only 33 years.

[4] Despite popular belief, Bosnia and Herzegovina society was not as mixed as sometimes thought. The percentage of mixed marriages, for example, was 12 %, which is no larger than in other parts of Yugoslavia and is actually smaller than in Vojvodina or certain parts of Croatia (Bugarel 2004).

education were exclusively the responsibility of the federal units. Each republic had its own government, including executive councils for matters that included finances, defence, and even foreign relations. In 1978, for example, Croatia and Slovenia decided to join the Alps-Adriatic Working Community with Bavaria and some Italian, Austrian, and Hungarian provinces. The move was sharply criticised, especially in the late 1980s, as an attempt to resurrect Austria-Hungary, divide Yugoslavia, and, above all, heighten the division between sections of Yugoslavia (Jakovina 2006).

In May 1986, another Croat, Branko Mikulic, the strong man of Bosnia and Herzegovina, became the new first minister of Yugoslavia. Mikulic had gained federal prominence as the chief organiser of the Winter Olympic Games in 1984. The capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the only socialist city ever to host the Olympic Games, with the exception of Moscow in 1980. Stubborn and much more conservative, Mikulic was less inclined to advocate the establishment of a market economy in Yugoslavia or to countenance liberal economic ideals. Therefore, inflation, which was already sharply rising, further increased to 170 % (Duric and Rajic 1988). Mikulic was not the first prime minister who had offered his resignation, but he was the first whose resignation (in March 1989) was actually accepted.

Even if the government wished to halt certain negative trends, the country lacked the authority to implement the necessary policies, and the economic decline that occurred became a catalyst for all of the other negative tendencies in Yugoslav society. However, the lack of central political authority had also generated positive trends. For instance, the media became extremely open. Some journalists became liberal, and some became openly nationalistic, but the change was apparent. Movies and new books addressed issues that were previously considered taboo. The frequent inability of the republics to agree on who should be appointed to the highest political positions had sometimes created opportunity for professionals to be appointed.

The Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslavenska narodna armija (JNA)) often claimed to be the third largest in Europe. American sources regarded it as "perhaps the only truly integrated national institution in the country", although they were aware of how "many of the non-Serb nationalities" did not have a positive relationship with the military (NIE 2006). In 1985, the JNA officer corps included 57 % Serbs, although Serbs represented only 36.30 % of the overall population of Yugoslavia. Croats in the military were underrepresented by 7.23 %; only 12.51 % of the officers were Croats, although Croats constituted 19.74 % of the population (Marijan 2008). The demographics of the secret police were similar. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, the proportion of Serbian secret agents was almost double the proportion of Serbian citizens in that republic (nearly 67 %). Croats constituted slightly more than 9 % and Muslims less than 24 % (Radelic 2006). National inequality was less visible in the highest echelon of the military. Nevertheless, the JNA was certainly the most politicised of all European armies, including the Red Army of the USSR.

The growing differences between the Yugoslav republics, which had always been present and visible but had sometimes been masked or suppressed by Tito's authority, were beginning to surface. The communist ideology and governmental structures were unable or unwilling to suppress nationalism. Nevertheless, the most open expressions of national hatred remained suppressed (Todorova 2010; Judt 2007). In the

1980s, however, even this limitation would change. "Brotherhood and unity" was one of the major foundations of the country, in addition to its socialist self-management and non-aligned foreign policy. All of these principles had been abandoned by the mid-1980s.

Macedonia de frutas[5]: The Division and Politicisation of "Yugoslav" Historiography During the 1980s

At the meeting of the Yugoslav historians in Skopje in 1982, the participants decided to analyse high school history textbooks from all of the republics and autonomous regions. This research was to be the basis for the next meeting's debate on "Togetherness on the Yugoslav soil from the early 19th century to 1918" (Roksandic 1986). Each of the Yugoslav federal units had a different school curriculum, different textbook authors, and even different textbook prices. The results of the analysis were astonishing. In high school textbooks covering the period from the early nineteenth century to 1918 in units dealing with the history of the South Slavs, 392 names were identified. Only six names (1.5 % of the total) were mentioned in all eight textbooks (Napoleon Bonaparte, Serbian princes Milos and Mihailo Obrenovic and Karadorde, a Serbian social-democrat named Dimitrije Tucovic and a Slovenian poet named France Preseren).

The situation was similar for high school textbooks that addressed the twentieth century. Of 448 names, only 14 (3.1 %) were mentioned in all eight textbooks (Tito, Hitler, Stalin, Benitto Mussolini, Winston Churchill, King Alexander Karadjordjevic, Chetnik leader Draza Mihailovic and politicians Vladko Macek, Ivan Subasic and Dragisa Cvetkovic). In Croatian textbooks, Josip Broz Tito was mentioned 205 times, whereas in Kosovar books, Tito was mentioned only 33 times (Budak 2004). Nearly 80 % of the individuals mentioned were politicians. Even more astonishing, in textbooks covering the "long 19th century", 264 people (close to 63 %) were mentioned in only one textbook. All of these findings indicated how ethnocentric and republic-oriented the historiography of the Yugoslav federal units was (Roksandic 1986).

Clearly, influential historical controversies existed even when, from an outside perspective, these conflicts did not appear to have caused the divisions in Yugoslavia. The especially important disagreements were related to the twentieth-century historical events and personalities that constituted the contemporary political discourse. Newspapers frequently addressed different historical topics. Beginning in the mid-1980s, especially in Serbia, an entire range of writers, poets, dissidents and sources of "critical intelligence", as they were known, discussed and reinterpreted issues that had previously been considered taboo. The Cetnik forces from Second World War, which were originally viewed as Nazi collaborators, began to be portrayed as

[5] The name of a mixed fruit salad in some Latin countries, this term reflects the complex national composition of Ottoman Macedonia. See also Todorova (2006).

royalist antifascists (Jovic 2003). The Goli Otok prison, where Tito shipped his Stalinist opponents after the Yugoslav split with Stalin in 1948, became an increasingly popular subject of novels. The Serbian poet Antonije Isakovic openly called for a "reevaluation of Tito's role".

Croatian party circles reacted to this flow of "deviating" ideas by organising series of meetings that culminated in 1984 with the preparation of the "White Book", an internal document by the Croatian Central Committee Centre for information and propaganda (Jovic 2003; Bijela Knjiga 2010). The "White Book" named nearly 200 intellectuals who had been identified as "ideologically problematic". Nearly 180 of them were from Serbia, which caused a stir in Belgrade (Cosic 2002). The main question there was whether the Serbian developments were the responsibility of their Croatian comrades. Relations between the two republics did not improve after the publication of this internal document.

The most influential Serbian dissident, the "father of the nation" Dobrica Cosic, described the "White Book" in his diary as a "Stalinist-nationalist" attack that was intended to establish "Bolshevik-Croatian order in culture". However, Cosic admitted that Serbia was a hotbed of "anti-Titoist and democratic opposition" in Yugoslavia (Cosic 2002). Meanwhile, Croatia was perceived as ideologically rigid in Slovenia. Stipe Suvar, who had organised the entire operation, was perceived as a real "sectarian", an advocate of views that were similar to those of "Andrej Zhdanov", "witch hunter". His actions were described as constituting an "ideological battle in Orwell's year 1984" by former Slovenian top politician Stane Kavcic. "What is going on in Croatia?" asked Kavcic. Slovene concluded that Croatian politicians were afraid of democratisation (Kavcic 1988). It is true that "Croatians were much more conservative and less visible and vocal after the 1971 Croatian Spring". However, they were also deeply devoted to the Titoist concept of self-management and the federal constitution of 1974, which extended rights to the republics. Slovenes and Croats wanted to preserve the level of federalisation that had been achieved by the constitution, whereas the Serbs were seeking reform.

In February of 1986, the United States of America extradited war criminal Andrija Artukovic to Yugoslavia. Artukovic was the minister of the interior in the fascist, puppet independent state of Croatia. Completely senile, Artukovic was unaware of the events that occurred during the trial proceedings in the Zagreb District Court. One of his three lawyers was Srda Popovic, who subsequently became a famous Serbian dissident. The lawyer stated that while he was shaving in his hotel one morning, he realised that Artukovic, who was half blind and ill, was likely having trouble understanding the Serbian language. Therefore, the next day, he began his interrogation with the following question: "Excuse me, do you know who I am?" "Of course I do", Artukovic replied, "you are my prosecutor". "And where are we now?" continued Popovic. "In Leskovac", answered Artukovic (Srda Popovic, January 13, 2003, personal communication). Leskovac, a small town in Serbia, was the city where Artukovic had been detained nearly 50 years before his Zagreb trial.

In 1958, during the first unsuccessful campaign to extradite Artukovic to Yugoslavia, the state secretary for foreign relations at the time, a Serbian politician named Koca Popovic, informed George Kennan, the US ambassador in Belgrade,

that the entire issue was "marginal" in his opinion. The famous US diplomat agreed. The last thing that the Yugoslavs needed was their own "Eichmann Case", he thought (Jakovina 2002). Nearly 25 years later, the trial was organised and had an even more electrifying effect: it contributed to reviving old animosities, opened old wounds, and taught a history lesson to the new generations. The case was not primarily about punishing a war criminal, although Artukovic was eventually condemned to death. Unfortunately, there was little interest in the objective history lesson. For many people, Artukovic was to serve as further "proof" of the genocidal nature of the Croats, which was continually mentioned in various Belgrade circles (Ramet 2002). Therefore, a *Committee for the collection of sources on genocide against Serbs and other nations in the Second World War*[6] was formed (Cosic 2002).

In a country in which the number of victims in Second World War was inflated to cause its sacrifices to appear larger, it was then becoming one more argument that proved the genocidal nature of Yugoslavia's political enemies, generating new polemics. The supposed number of victims at the Croatian Ustasa Jasenovac concentration camp rose from the original estimate of 46,000 victims in 1946 to 600,000 or 700,000 victims. The latter numbers were repeated in Vladimir Dedijer's books in the mid-1980s and then continued to rise. Velimir Terzic claimed that there were "more than a million" victims. Dragoljub Zivojinovic similarly referred to "more than a million Orthodox" individuals who had supposedly died in wartime Croatia alone. Finally, in 1990, Radomir Bulatovic claimed that in Jasenovac alone, 1,110,929 people had been killed.[7]

In 1986, the book on the "Case of Milos Zanko" was published in Belgrade with the goal of politically rehabilitating the Croatian politician who had been removed in 1970. Zanko, who was accused of being a centralist, remained in Belgrade after his forced retirement. His possible rehabilitation was viewed as an attack on all Croatian politicians, including both the "national communists" (the leaders of the Croatian Spring) and those who had replaced the liberal politicians in late 1971. Both groups opposed the "unitarist" tendencies (Blecic and Dolenec 1986).

In September of 1986, a draft version of the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences was leaked to Belgrade via the daily *Večernje novosti*. The central Serbian intellectual institution regarded Serbs as prime victims of the communists and Tito, and it described the position of the Serbs in Croatia as the worst in history

[6] Odbor za prikupljanje građe o genocidu nad srpskim i drugim narodima u Drugom svetskom ratu (in Serbian).

[7] In 2005, the number of Jasenovac concentration camp victims who had been fully identified with names and histories, if incomplete, was established at 80,022 people. Overall, the number of Serbs killed in the so-called Independent State of Croatia (approximately the combination of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) during the war was approximately 330,000 (Goldstein 2008). The overall demographical losses in Yugoslavia during Second World War—including those killed and unborn children—was 1,027 million people. At the time when the inflation spree began, no one was interested in these arguments. There were many taboo subjects in Yugoslav history; however, many topics were politicised, and even when certain issues were addressed using seemingly logical arguments with good intentions, these debates eventually proved to be merely another component of the political strife.

(Lampe 2006; Ramet 2002).[8] The poor economic position of Serbia was attributed to the "coalition between Slovenes and Croats", which was pure fiction (Kavcic 1988). The constitution of 1974, it was claimed, had weakened Serbia and was a product of two non-Serbs: the Slovenian politician Edvard Kardelj and the omnipotent Croatian Josip Broz Tito. Although the Serbs in Croatia and in Kosovo were a majority in the party and police forces, the intellectual arguments emphasised how Serbs were discriminated against both politically and culturally. While victorious at war, the Serbs were losing their battles during peacetime. Especially problematic, it was argued, was the position of Serbs on Kosovo (Jovic 2003; Grupa autora 2008). The memorandum had an electrifying, negative effect on the entire country. Although the Serbian leadership initially condemned the non-paper, the new communist leader Slobodan Milosevic, who had succeeded Ivan Stambolic on 14 December 1987, shared all of the views expressed by the central national institution (Judt 2007). Serbia was a victim, the truth needed to be proclaimed, and changes were necessary. The other Yugoslav academies (of which there was one in each republican capital city) did not publish anything similar.

In June 1988, the "Committee for the defence of freedom of thought and expression" in Belgrade published a "Proposal for the free and critical evaluation of the historical role of Josip Broz Tito" ("Predlog za slobodno i kriticko . . ." 1988).[9] Tito, unlike Mao Zedong, Hitler, or Churchill, they rightly claimed, was still not "put in the objective historical context". Ideological mythology, the cult of personality, party taboos, bureaucratic subjectivism, primitive rituals and the "ideology of functionaries" continued to inhibit the social sciences. However, "free critical reinterpretation of the historical role" of Tito would be necessary for researchers to understand the problems in Yugoslavia: "Therefore, it would be necessary to see what is the cause and where the beginning of the current social crisis is visible in the catastrophic economical situation, national and social antagonisms, the monopolistic rule of the bureaucratic oligarchy, the lack of any real political democracy and responsibility, frightening ethnic and economical migration, the country's huge debt, unemployment and inflation, the social misery and hopelessness of huge chunks of society, failed investments and economical crime, ever larger scientific and technological slowdowns" ("Predlog za slobodno i kriticko . . ." 1988). Despite decades of de-Stalinisation after 1948, "no democratic, productive and civilised society" was created in Yugoslavia. The topic of Goli Otok, "one of the darkest camps in modern Europe", remained a taboo. The "proposal" mentioned political repression and the existence of a "permanent civil war"; it criticised the cost of Tito's travels and his

[8] For example, individuals such as Radovan Samardzic, Dobrica Cosic, Ljuba Tadic, and Mihajlo Markovic.

[9] The first two signers were Mića Popović and Tanasije Mladenović, but among the 19 co-signers were some of the most prominent intellectual allies of Slobodan Milošević as well as some of his critics and those who regarded him as too weak. For example, Dobrica Ćosić, Vojislav Koštunica, Kosta Čavoški, Matija Bećković, Ljubomir Tadić, Gojko Nikolis, Borislav Mihajlović Mihiz, Mladen Srbinović, Andrija Gams, Zagorka Golubovic, Ivan Janković, Neca Jovanov, Dragoslav Mihailović, and Radovan Samardžić all signed the document.

ambitious foreign policy for Yugoslavia as well as his obsession with Yugoslavia's "world-historical role" ("Predlog za slobodno i kriticko . . ." 1988).

Many of the issues discussed in the document were common sense by that time, repeating what was already visible to the Serbian media and the public. The proposal directly violated the "Tito Law" of 1984, which had regulated the writings about Tito's role in the history of Yugoslavia (Petrovic 2007). What was problematic for the other Yugoslavs, however, was the timing of the document, the people who had generated the idea and its specific emphasis on Serbian issues. Was Tito employing a "weak Serbia—strong Yugoslavia" model? What would be the effects of asymmetrical federalism and of the creation of two autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina within Serbia? The Serbs believed that Tito's fear of "suppressive unitarianism and centralism" directly led to the "systematic, allowed, undisrupted" policy of Albanisation within Kosovo. To criticise Tito from this perspective amounted to advocating a reduction in republican rights and reemphasising the centre (i.e. the Serbian component of the federation). To criticise Tito was to question Yugoslavia itself: to criticise the organisation of the country with a clear, unitarist sense of how to reorganise the federation. Few non-Serbs approved of this approach. Even if the demands for the historical reinterpretation of the Marshal of Yugoslavia were honest, they were influenced to such a great degree by everyday political problems that no open debate was possible (Bilandzic 2006). The "Proposal for the free and critical evaluation of the historical role of Josip Broz Tito" expressed ideas that were similar to those in the "Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences". This document challenged the interpretation of the history of both World Wars, of socialist Yugoslavia, Serbian democratic traditions, Tito's role, the 1974 Constitution[10] and Yugoslav foreign policy. No part of the foundation on which Yugoslavia rested was spared, and the loss of common symbols thus continued.

Yugoslav historiography was politicised and divided in the same fashion, which often reflected divisions in the political sphere, and it became an excellent tool for intensifying divisions rather than encouraging reconciliation. Historiography also reflected divisions in other spheres of society. Yugoslavia was a federal state, but the key to its survival or dissolution would be the republics, especially the three most important republics. More openness within society created more unsolved issues, and the twentieth-century debates were too great for historiography to resolve. Yugoslavia was at a crossroads, and major trends were being initiated in Belgrade. Events had the potential to either destroy everything or entirely change the old country. The most crucial dilemma was the question of whether a Yugoslavia with a Serbian majority was preferable to dissolution of the federation. Although other republics and the Serbs were fundamentally loyal to Yugoslavia, the old models were no longer working, and no one knew how to form new models that might be acceptable to all.

[10] The Yugoslav constitution of 1974 (which was the longest constitution in the world at the time) was viewed as the product of an anti-Serb conspiracy in Belgrade circles, but was regarded as a positive guarantee of the national rights of many other republics, especially the most prosperous (Bilandžić 2006).

Missed Opportunities and Turning Points (1988–1992): From the Yugoslav Crisis to the Wars of Yugoslav Succession

Michael Gorbachev's visit to Yugoslavia in March 1988 and the signing of a joint communique that stated unconditional respect for "the principles of equality and non-interference . . . for the independence of parties and socialist countries to define, for themselves, the path of their own development" was a clear signal of major political change in Moscow. What had occurred in Belgrade and on the Brijuni Islands was far more than simply another change or improvement in the relations between the two countries (Kramer 2005). If any exclusive, heretic, peculiar and special Yugoslav position remained within the communist pariah, then that special role was dissipating. Eastern Europe was undergoing dramatic changes.

There were also changes on the other side of the continent. The Yugoslavs were aware of the increasing attempts of the members of the European Economic Community to foster good relations. Members of the Presidency of Yugoslavia were informed in early February 1988 by the Federal Secretary of Foreign Relations, Budimir Loncar, that the development of the common market by the Western countries was generating special challenges for Yugoslav companies. With regard to technological development, Yugoslavia was dangerously behind the West. Therefore, some members of the Presidency believed that it would be desirable for Yugoslavia to join EURECA, for example, as it was unrealistic for Yugoslavia to pursue full EEC membership (Zapisnik sa 202. sednice Predsednistva SFRJ 1988). However, even that opportunity was missed (Kavcic 1988). As in previous cases, Yugoslavia turned its attention to the Third World.

The members of the Movement of the Non-Aligned chose Yugoslavia as the host of the ninth conference and, hence, the presiding member of the movement from 1989 to 1992. This situation was an opportunity for Belgrade to remain in focus and on the international scene for the next 3 years. During that period, the country might have had an impetus to mobilise all of its "positive forces" because of its awareness of Belgrade's responsibilities. However, the plan to use the Non-Aligned to remain visible on the international scene appeared to work only for the diplomats themselves, not for the country as a whole. Budimir Loncar, the last Yugoslav Federal Secretary of Foreign Relations, was the representative of the Non-Aligned and the last statesmen to speak with Saddam Hussein before Desert Storm One (at the end of December 1990). In contrast, the country as a whole did not use this opportunity on the world stage to address its issues. The country's public image was defined by its internal strife, which was intensifying (Jakovina 2007b).

The host of the ninth summit of the Non-Aligned, which was held in Belgrade in early September 1989, was Janez Drnovsek, the head of the Presidency. Drnovsek was a Slovenian politician who had been elected to the highest position in Yugoslavia among several candidates. He was not the "preferred" candidate of the Slovenian League of Communists, which was a clear sign of the rapid changes occurring. By that time, Yugoslavia was already divided in many respects. The communist leaderships in Slovenia and Croatia had already decided to allow free elections (Hudelist

1999; Duka 2005; Bilandzic 2006). In late 1989, the Croatian Sabor (parliament) had legalised the registration of non-communist parties. However, the Serbian party leadership did not yet follow suit; thus, Yugoslavia became a fully politically asymmetrical state. Other federal institutions, such as the Socialist Youth of the republics and provinces, had not been able to organise the Youth Relay and the celebration of Josip Broz Tito's birthday (Youth Day) since 1987. This gathering was the only truly federal event of the Union of the Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Writers Association had also fallen apart two years earlier in 1985 (Goldstein 2008).

Meanwhile, the economic crisis was worsening—in 1989, the annual inflation rate reached 1240 %—and there was a deep crisis of leadership across all institutions (Judt 2007). By that time, Serbia, the largest republic, was already in charge of both autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, whose leaders were demoted. Those individuals who were loyal to the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic were also in charge in Montenegro. Thus, Serbia was able, for example, to control four out of eight votes in the Federal Presidency. As a result, the 14th emergency Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, held on 20 January 1990 in Belgrade, was a dramatic affair, with an atmosphere that was far from "comradely".

Representatives of six republics and two autonomous regions gathered together with members of the national communist organisations and the party organisation that represented the officer core of the Yugoslav People's Army. All of these actors were members of the central government, the Yugoslav party structure, and they could not agree on the crucial issues. At one moment, the head of the Slovenian Communists, Ciril Ribicic, asked his delegates to leave the building. Ivica Racan, head of the Croatian League of Communists, gave similar instructions to his followers (Ramet and Soberg 2008). The Congress of the LCY was dissolved in a change that was intended to be temporary, but ultimately became permanent.

With the end of the Cold War approaching, the outer belt that was keeping Yugoslavia together was also dissolving. The USA, which was crucial for the well-being of Yugoslavia in many respects, was then less interested in preserving the special position of Belgrade, as the new (and last) American ambassador Warren Zimmerman clearly stated. Other regional players were rapidly becoming more open, more dynamic, and more eager to improve their human rights records and thus become more interesting to Washington. Moscow was no longer threatening the Eastern Europeans. Yugoslavia was becoming merely a "normal" Eastern European country (Kovacevic 2007).

The first democratic multiparty elections in the former Yugoslavia were held in Slovenia on 8 April 1990. Those in Croatia occurred a few weeks later. Serbia remained under the strong rule of Slobodan Milosevic despite the elections that were finally organised in December 1990. Serbian nationalism, combined with pro-Yugoslav rhetoric, was sufficiently persuasive for many years. Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were behind the events that occurred. The two junior republics were afraid of the Greater Serbia that Milosevic was attempting to create, but they remained more conservative than Croatia and Slovenia. Montenegro, with its newly installed leadership under Milosevic (likely the youngest in the world, as Prime Minister Milo Dukanovic was 29 years old, and President Momir Bulatovic was only 34 years old), was blindly following Serbia.

As in many circumstances throughout history and as has occurred frequently in the twentieth century in the Balkans, the larger powers were unable to control the situation (Glenny 1999). When the crisis erupted, the American administration, which had been elated by the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, remained inactive. "Will you try to explain to me again what it is all about", President George Bush would ask when his national security advisor, General Brent Scowcroft, attempted to tell him something about the Yugoslav crisis or suggest an air intervention ("Neki stavovi . . ." 1990). Scowcroft had served in Belgrade from 1959 to 1961 as an assistant Air Force Attache.[11]

Although Yugoslavia was primarily a European problem, the European powers were unable to intercede in any valuable capacity. Thus, there were high expectations for the visit of US Secretary of State James Baker, who came to Belgrade on June 21, 1991, to speak with all of the actors in the Yugoslav crisis (with the exception of the Serbian representative within the Federal Presidency, who was preventing the Croatian Stipe Mesic from becoming a new federal president as scheduled). As the secretary of state wrote in his memoirs, the day which he spent in Belgrade was one of the most depressing days in his entire career. The Yugoslav leaders appeared to him like "sleepwalkers" who completely failed to heed warnings.[12]

Whether they were young or old and whether they were members of the Communist party or dissidents, the presidents of the republics were quickly becoming the only leaders with the power to determine the destiny of Yugoslavia. The litter power that the federal institutions had was rapidly evaporating. This process was eagerly supported by the republican leaders. Therefore, by the summer of 1990, Yugoslavia was already more of a confederation, although it remained a country to many people in Yugoslavia and to even more abroad.

Then, in December of 1990, 88 % of the Slovenian electorate voted in favour of an independent Slovenia on a referendum. Subsequently, Croatia held its referendum in May of 1991. Both republics proclaimed independence on the same day, 25 June 1991. However, although the new countries had mutually recognised one another, the decision to change the border signs in Slovenia sparked a brief war between the territorial forces of Slovenia and the JNA. The conflict, which endured for several days, resulted in full Slovenian independence. The federal army agreed to evacuate the territory of the westernmost Yugoslav republic.

The new Croatian constitution, which was adopted on 22 December 1990, was modelled after the French constitution and gave significant powers to the president, fulfilling the goals of Franjo Tuđman and his authoritarian party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ in Croatian). The HDZ assumed many of the practices of

[11] Budimir Lončar was the Yugoslav ambassador to Indonesia, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States (1979–1984) and was the last Federal Secretary of Foreign Relations (1988–1992).

[12] As Budimir Lončar, the Federal Secretary of Foreign Relations, subsequently explained, Baker's visit was viewed differently by major actors. Ante Marković had concluded that America strongly supported the unity of Yugoslavia. "Having said that, he had turned to me and said: 'Isn't that so, Leko'. Lončar was not that convinced. America was against secession, but also against the use of force." (Budimir Lončar, March 18, 2006, personal communication).

the LCC (the League of Communists of Croatia), including penetrating all of the state institutions and rarely seeking the most suitable and qualified candidates unless they were members of the party (Lukic 2008) The Croatian Serbs, who were largely inspired by Belgrade, but were also frightened by the tactless and sometimes openly provocative moves of the new political elite, turned to Serbia for assistance and for a means of preserving their unity (Cosic 2002). The Serbs in Croatia were geographically divided: most of them lived in cities in which they were a minority, although they constituted the majority in the poorest, hilliest parts of Krajina. In those areas, blockades of roads and railway tracks had begun, and these actions culminated in the proclamation of the autonomy of the Serbian districts of Croatia during the summer of 1990.

These events led to the first serious armed conflict in Yugoslavia. When the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) decided to "ease" the tension by de facto preventing Croatian police from re-taking territory that had declined to recognise the elected government, Croatia, which was still part of Yugoslavia, became de facto partially occupied. Non-Serbs were expelled from these areas. The JNA became part of the plan to realise Greater Serbia; Slobodan Milosevic was a master at marketing his political plan to those who shared the ideas of the Chetniks in Second World War, those who were fighting for the ideal of Greater Serbia and those who believed in socialist Yugoslavia. He even appealed to members of the international community who actually believed his Yugo-talk despite the facts. The JNA was rapidly becoming the Serbian army, which was one of the reasons that many non-Serbs deserted or otherwise left the military. The process accelerated after the summer of 1991 and the defeat of the JNA in Slovenia (Goldstein 2008; Lukic 2008).

Finally, in December 1991, Germany announced its intention to recognise Croatia and Slovenia along with the other members of the EEC. The two states were officially recognised by the majority of European countries on 19 January 1992. By that time, both of the republics of the de jure Yugoslavia were actually fully independent. Croatia was embroiled in a war that was serious but less bloody than the war that had erupted in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992 and lasted until 1995. The mass killings of the Croats in Vukovar, where several hundred individuals were killed, seemed almost minor in comparison with the destiny of the Bosniaks in Srebrenica, where the largest genocide since Second World War was committed by the Bosnian Serb troops under General Ratko Mladic.[13]

The Dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Balkanisation of Collective Memory

During the final years of Tito's socialist or republican Yugoslavia, the entire foundation of the country was weakened or even fully disappeared. The brotherhood and unity between the Yugoslav nations and nationalities were non-existent. Tito's legacy was openly questioned, and the Non-Alignment movement, which had always been

[13] Indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal in former Yugoslavia in The Hague, General Mladić was finally arrested and brought to the Court in 2011 after years of hiding in Serbia.

sharply criticised in some circles, was now fully (and likely unfairly) discredited. Socialist self-management, as the Yugoslav version of socialism was known, had essentially been abolished. No new values (except for nationalism and religiosity) had replaced the ideas that had officially been in place.

The new nationalism had at least one commonality with the socialist period. Yugoslavs shared a feeling of superiority or at least uniqueness. The special position of Yugoslavia as "a country in between two worlds" ("East for the West and West for the East") had existed during the Cold War. However, this distinction was no longer valid. In view of the bloody conflict in Southeast Europe and the dramatic changes in Central Europe, all of this rhetoric suddenly seemed ironic.

As a result, historiography, which is always more likely to generate good patriots than critical thinkers, continued to serve as a platform for justifying, explaining and demonstrating the real or imagined continuity of the actual history of the region with desirable historical facts. In Croatia, the most notorious period in this regard was the 1990s, when it was necessary to characterise any Yugoslav state as a prison for the Croats. An independent Croatian state became the highest priority and the ultimate endpoint of all historical narratives (Jakovina 2007a). It was believed that the creation of any state, even the so-called Independent State of Croatia, needed to be positive.

The Croatian textbooks not only were strongly anti-Yugoslav (which may have been unsurprising in view of the war), but also described everything that had occurred in relation to the Croats from 1918 to 1991 as one long line of tragic events. The first textbook that was used for the highest grade in elementary school and published in the new Croatia in 1992 was by an older author who had published his first textbook in 1971. Ustasa's war crimes were still mentioned, but the number of sentences dedicated to those crimes was now minimal; out of seven pages on the Independent State of Croatia, nine lines addressed war crimes, and the killing of Jews, Serbs and Roma was mentioned in only one sentence. In contrast, an entire page was dedicated to the partisan crimes of 1945. The Ustasa crimes were described in a chapter titled "The Ustasa Regime" with an elaborate description of state institutions, the partisan war crimes were described in a chapter titled "The Crimes in Bleiburg and the Way of the Cross of the Croats" (Koren 2007).

The situation in Serbia was described in a similarly confusing manner. Units that had discussed other Yugoslav nations were omitted, but the partisan fights during the Second World War continued to be glorified, in addition to an idealised description of the previously demonised Chetniks. The drama of civil war and the Chetnik war crimes were omitted. Tito became known as Josip Broz, and this change was significant because Tito's political enemies and emigres were also making this change. Tito was being cited much less frequently, and the descriptions of the Chetniks became more numerous. Because Serbian textbooks were now mentioning the military mistakes of the partisans but fully omitting Tito's foreign policy successes, the first history textbooks in Serbia marginalised Tito even more than those in Croatia did (Najbar-Agicic 2006). Serbia was gradually rehabilitating Draza Mihailovic, the

Chetnik leader who had been in power during the Second World War. All of this activity was typical of the nationalistic regime of the ex-communist Slobodan Milosevic (Stojanovic 2008).

While Croatian textbooks had largely politicised the Second World War by the late 1990s and has increasingly done so in the twenty-first century, the most recent generation of textbooks in Serbia further with their own revision of history. Since 2005, the textbooks that have been used in Serbia have mentioned "two resistance movements" when describing the Chetniks and the partisans to create the impression that both had the same goal. The Chetniks became the "good guys", and correspondingly, Chetnik veterans were given financial benefits. This shift deepened the divisions within the states in which Chetniks were primarily remembered for their crimes against civilians and people of other nationalities (primarily Croats and Bosniaks).

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, unlike the Croats and Serbs, who were following their own Croatian and Serbian programmes in 1990, the Bosniaks initially had to forge their national identity: they ceased to be Muslims first and foremost and instead became Bosniaks. The Macedonians underwent a similar process: they decided to adopt the legendary ancient figure of Alexander the Macedonian as the father of their nation. The fact that Macedonians were Slavs, whereas Alexander was certainly not Slavic (although he may not have been fully Hellenic either), was never reasonably explained. As in other spheres, old wisdom was invalidated with little explanation.

Yugoslavia had undergone a process of de facto dissolution since the early 1980s. The trends that had brought the country to an end were not halted or reversed after its final dissolution. Without the Cold War and the Soviet threat to Europe, Yugoslavia rapidly became small, poor and peripheral, with many challenging internal problems. Everything was politicised. History was often abused as a tool in political strife, even after each of the Yugoslav republics and one autonomous region had finally gained independence. The political elites were only partially transformed after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Many individuals who had cooperated and communicated with one another Yugoslavia became bitter enemies but remained powerful.[14] The Yugoslav elites lacked the knowledge or will to prevent the impending catastrophe; the new elites were more eager to continue with communist practices cloaked in nationalistic sentiments than to democratise their societies. The way history was taught shows that a lack of democracy was not new in the former Yugoslavia; regrettably, there was no attempt to improve this situation once the region had stabilised. Fear of democracy and of individuals who could think and ask questions appeared to pose a problem for many years. The Balkan Peninsula became balkanised, although this process has not yet been completed.[15]

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[14] Franjo Tuđman and Veljko Kadijević, the last Yugoslav minister of defence, had been colleagues in the Yugoslav General Staff of the Armed Forces. In Slovenia, the same politicians remained in charge until the twenty-first century, and in Montenegro, they remain in power today.

[15] In many respects, however, changes are occurring in some countries. After all, the Balkans are not only a part of Europe; they are also a central and integral part of the Old Continent, and their problems are not entirely different from those of other European countries.

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Part II
War and the Violent Experience of Community: How Ethnic Boundaries Became Part of Social Reality

Chapter 3
Ethnic Intolerance as a Product Rather than a Cause of War: Revisiting the State of the Art

Dusko Sekulic

The Myth of Ethnic Hatred

Among the most popular interpretations of the dissolution of Yugoslavia is the theory of "ethnic hatred". This theory assumes that the breakup and accompanying war were the result of deeply embedded mistrust and hatred between the different ethnonational communities that lived together in Yugoslavia. In this view, Yugoslavia is seen as an "artificial creation"—a cage imposed on its inhabitants, who took the first opportunity to eliminate it. In the political parlance of that orientation, Yugoslavia was called "Versailles Yugoslavia", implying that it was artificially created at the negotiating table after the end of World War I.[1] The peculiar pattern of diffusion of this theory should be emphasised. It was widespread among journalists, popular writers and politicians but less present in academic circles and among professional researchers. One of the main proponents of this theory was Robert Kaplan (1993), who considered the peoples of the Balkans unusually wild and predisposed to violence. For him, the Balkans were even the source of Nazi hatred: "Nazism, for instance, can claim Balkan origins. Among the flophouses of Vienna, a breeding ground of ethnic resentments close to the southern Slavic world, Hitler learned how to hate so

[1] The problem with this interpretation is that Yugoslavia was created in 1918 and the Versailles conference began in 1919. It is impossible for a later event to influence an earlier one. Clearly, Yugoslavism was an ideological force that was already in operation in the nineteenth century and that culminated in the creation of the Yugoslav state (Djilas 1993). However, that Yugoslavia was not "artificially" created does not mean that it had universal support or that it was created democratically. In that sense, it is possible to find the seeds of Yugoslavia's destruction in the elite policies that created it (see Banac 1984; Ramet 2006, especially Chap. 2).

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infectiously". Kaplan was inspired by another author, Rebecca West (1964),[2] whose earlier accounts of her travels through Yugoslavia can be described as a specific form of "Orientalism", in that she depicted herself as surrounded by strange and bloodthirsty people. Kaplan sees ethnic hatred as deep-seated and the Balkans as the seed of all European evils:

> Twentieth-century history came from the Balkans. Here men have been isolated by poverty and ethnic rivalry, dooming them to hate. The politics has been reduced to the level of near anarchy that from time to time in history has flowed up the Danube into central Europe.

The negativity of the published reviews[3] of these books was inversely proportional to the books' influence in the public arena. The theory of ethnic hatred was accepted and promulgated by many politicians, including then-US President Bill Clinton. His vice-president, Al Gore (1995), characterised the situation as ". . . a tragedy that has been unfolding for a long time, some would say 500 years." John Major, speaking in the House of Commons on 23 June 1993, explained the disintegration as the result of the lid on ancient hatreds being lifted after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

There are many problems with the "ancient hatred" theory. Ramet (2005) provides a compelling enumeration of its flaws. Here, I will simply summarise the core of her critiques. First, as we know from Clifford Geertz (1964), linguistic choices are important; ideology is based on the symbolic power of words. The word "ancient" communicates that ethnic hatred has a long history. However, the important question remains: what does the term "ancient" truly mean? If we conventionally take that "ancient" signifies the period before the fall of Rome in 476, then Serbs and Croats were not even in the Balkans during "ancient" times. How, then, is it possible to describe their hatred as "ancient"?

To paraphrase Ramet (2004), it does not make sense to assume that relations among peoples of the Yugoslav area were marked by an inherent hostility that would make them different from, for example, relations between Germans and French. As Noel Malcolm (1994) stated in his book on Bosnia:

> . . . the political history of late twentieth-century Bosnia has not been determined by what happened in the thirteenth or eighteenth centuries. Commentators who like to give some hastily-assembled historical authority to their writings can always pick out a few bloody episodes from the past and say: 'It was ever thus'. One could perform the same exercise with, for instance, the history of France, picking out the religious wars of the sixteenth century, the barbarity of the St Bartholomew's Day massacre, the frequent regional rebellions, the Fronde, the brutal treatment of the Huguenots in 1685, the appalling violence of mass-murder which followed the French Revolution, the instability of nineteenth-century politics, even the whole history of collaboration and resistance in the second world war. But if a number of foreign-backed politicians and military commanders began bombarding Paris with heavy

[2] Kaplan writes, "My guide was a deceased woman whose living thoughts I found more passionate and exacting than any male writer's could be. I would rather have lost my passport and money than my heavily thumbed and annotated copy of *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*" (Kaplan 1993, p. 8).

[3] One of the reviewers of Kaplan's book wrote, ". . . unintimidated by his ignorance of local languages and history, he has cobbled together *Balkan Ghosts*, a dreadful mix of unfounded generalizations, misinformation, outdated sources, personal prejudices and bad writing" (Cooper 1993, p. 592).

> artillery tomorrow, we would not sit back and say that it was just inevitable consequence of 'ancient French hatreds'. (Malcolm 1994)

Because the use of the term "ancient" creates the illusion that ethnic hatreds have persisted over a long history, it also suggests that they are so deeply ingrained that they cannot be changed. They can be suppressed, or, in Major's words, the "lid" can be put on them, but nothing else can be done. In this manner, the notion that ethnic hatreds are "ancient" distracts the reader from examining the relevant evidence and the conduct of contemporary actors.

What explains the popularity of that "theory"? As is usually the case, the popularity of the theory does not depend on its explanatory power, but on its capacity to satisfy the ideological needs of important constituencies or publics. We can detect two important constituencies whose interests are reflected in ethnic hatred theory. First, the protagonists: nationalist leaders and followers like to see their actions as inevitable or as a reflection of some historical necessity. For example, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman explained that Serbs and Croats belong to two different civilisations (Croats to the West and Serbs to the East, being similar to Turks and Albanians) and therefore, regardless of a common language and other similarities, they cannot live in the same state (Voirst 1991). The second constituency consisted of leaders of Western countries: they could justify their inaction by the notion that nothing could be done because the Balkan people's behaviours are motivated by deeply ingrained hatred. If a conflict had been developing for 500 years, then any intervention would be a waste of resources.

This explanation is also satisfactory to the Western public because it plays on supposed differences between the "wild Balkan people" and the "civilised" West. The atrocities and bloody events sustain the image of the wild Balkans as very different from civilised Europe. This image of difference is functional in erecting a wall between the "civilised world" and the "rest of the world". If the Balkan people are so different and wild, the feeling of moral obligation to intervene to help stop atrocities is diminished as compared with a situation in which the Balkan people were perceived as "equally civilised".

War and Ethnic Intolerance: A Temporal Comparison

Let us now turn to the empirical verification (or rejection) of "ethnic hatred theory". From the standpoint of empirical science, two types of indicators can be used: behaviour and attitudes. I will concentrate on attitudes, but I should first say a few words about behaviour. If "ancient hatred" theory were correct, then we could expect that regardless of the authoritarian (or totalitarian) nature of the Yugoslav regime, the supposed "suppressed animosities" would find a way to explode. If we look at India, for example, we can see that in spite of central government policies of Hindu-Muslim coexistence and accommodation, there are periodic outbursts of "communal" violence. In addition, clashes between the Han Chinese and Uighurs in China's Xinjiang province are an example of persistent ethnic tension under an authoritarian regime.

These examples illustrate that if intense animosities exist, governments (whether democratic, as in India, or authoritarian, as in China) cannot prevent periodic outbursts of violence. Obviously, I leave aside the question of whether Hindu-Muslim animosities in India or Han-Uighur animosities in China are truly "ancient". What is important for the argument is simply that governments are not in a position to prevent inter-ethnic violence if the underlying animosity is sufficiently strong. However, there were no such outbursts in the former socialist Yugoslavia, with the exception of Kosovo.

In the absence of violent events, it is difficult to justify the argument that the government suppressed "ancient hatreds". That said, I do not deny the ideological importance of the "national question" for party policies or the presence of nationalism as an ideology and worldview. What is noticeable is the absence of "hate crimes" and of inter-ethnic conflict at the level of villages or cities. If inter-ethnic tensions eventually rose, it was more the result of a top-down spread of inter-republican party conflict than it was a spontaneous outburst of ethnic violence.[4] To conclude, nothing in the behaviour of national groups in the former Yugoslavia (with the exception of Kosovo) indicated that suppressed animosity was waiting to explode.

The second set of indicators involves attitudes. In the relatively open climate of the former socialist Yugoslavia, beginning in the 1980s, a large number of surveys asked questions about ethno-national relations and about beliefs and attitudes (see Sekulic et al. 2004, for an overview). "Ancient hatred" theory would predict the presence of high intolerance, nationalism, or ethnic exclusivism *before* the outbreak of the wars accompanying the dissolution of Yugoslavia. However, one of the main findings of our research is that the rise of ethnic intolerance (or exclusivism) actually *followed* the outbreak of war in the former Yugoslavia.

To take the example of Croatia, average intolerance across four questions[5] (on a scale ranging from 1 to 5, where 5 means highest intolerance) was 2.86 in 1985, 2.78 in 1989, 3.45 in 1996, and 3.11 in 2003 (Sekulic et al. 2006). For the whole of the former Yugoslavia (without Slovenia, which was not included in the 2003 study), the picture is the same. Simkus and Listhaug (2008) constructed a similar scale of five items.[6] They used a dataset from the Consortium of the Sociological Institutes for 1989/1990 and compared it with their own data from the South European Social Surveys. Results for ethnic groups by country at the two time points are shown in Fig. 3.1.

[4] Similarly, rising Serbian-Croatian tensions in Croatia in 1971 were already the result of party policies rather than their cause, according to Bilandzic (1999).

[5] The four items were: (1) Among nations, it is possible to create cooperation but not full trust; (2) A man can feel completely safe only when the majority belongs to his nationality; (3) Without a leader, a nation is like a man without a head; and (4) Nationally mixed marriages are necessarily more unstable than others.

[6] Three items on mixed marriages, feelings of safety among co-nationals, and the possibility of trust and cooperation are the same as mentioned in the previous footnote. The two different items are: (a) Nationality should be a main factor in choosing a spouse; and (b) It is best that villages, towns, and cities be composed of only one nationality.



Fig. 3.1 Means for the Exclusionism Scale by country or region and ethnic group in 1990 and 2004. (Source: Simkus and Listhaug (2008))

The main conclusion is that ethnic intolerance increased in Croatia and in most other parts of the former Yugoslavia after the war. The exceptions, as Simkus and Listhaug (2008) conclude, are the communities in which intolerance was already very high in 1990, notably in Macedonia and in Kosovo. I would add that within this overall pattern, several other explanatory variables are hidden. It appears that the increase is strongest in the areas where the violence was most intense: Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The comparison between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Vojvodina is telling. Before the war, these were the most tolerant places in the former Yugoslavia. However, after the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina became one of the most *in*tolerant places, whereas Vojvodina remained among the most tolerant places. The only plausible explanation for this difference is that Bosnia and Herzegovina was the theatre of the worst inter-ethnic violence and atrocities, to which the events in Vojvodina cannot be compared. When we analyse the difference between ethnic groups *within* Vojvodina, we can also reach some interesting conclusions. Namely, the greatest increase in intolerance is observed among Croats (1.9–2.5). No change can be detected among Serbs, and only a subtle change can be detected among Hungarians (2.2–2.3). This pattern is partially explainable by the different recent histories of these groups within the region. Although Vojvodina was not a theatre of war, an ethnic threat was present in the region. During the 1990s, between 50,000 and 100,000 Hungarians and about 45,000 Croats were driven from their homes in the area, according to Ramet (2002). This experience appears to have increased ethnic exclusionism among Croats (but not Hungarians). Comparatively, the Serbian majority, who were not exposed to similar threats, did not change their attitudes. Similarly, if we look at Serbia proper, which was the only part of Yugoslavia without inter-ethnic violence on its own territory,[7] we can see that the levels of exclusionism did not change. The same holds for Serbs in Vojvodina, but not for the local minorities. Although no open war took place in the territory of Vojvodina, the surrounding and direct threats to minorities by extremists increased their intolerance.

[7] Actually, the war was waged from the air by NATO, but there were no ground operations conducted by members of other ethno-national communities.

Finally, in Montenegro, the internal Serbian-Montenegrin conflict and external violence across the Croatian border appear to have exercised a detrimental influence on ethnic tolerance among the Serb minority.

These variations in the increase of exclusionist attitudes in the post-war period are very difficult to reconcile with the ethnic hatred theory. One prediction that could be derived from the theory is an increase in exclusivist attitudes as the result of the removal of political pressure. In the socialist period, which was characterised by the "brotherhood and unity" ideology, there was political pressure against expressing nationally intolerant attitudes. With the fall of the communist parties, this pressure disappeared, and people could express their "real" attitudes after the political transition. If this explanation were true, we would expect a uniform rise in "suppressed" intolerant attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. However, this was clearly not the case.

The variations in the increases in exclusionary attitudes also preclude another explanation. It could be argued that after the fall of communism and the rise of nationalist parties (or the transformation of the former communist parties into nationalist parties, as in Serbia and Montenegro), social pressure turned in the opposite direction, towards *more* ethnic exclusivism propagated by the mass media (see Thompson 1999). However, in Serbia, the media were (at least) as vitriolic as they were in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but exclusivist attitudes did not rise in Serbia. It is clear that neither the disappearance of old political pressure nor the appearance of a new kind of media propaganda can explain the observed changes.

The most meaningful explanation refers to the war events themselves and a feeling of threat that was unevenly distributed among different nationalities in different territories of the former Yugoslavia. Collective experiences of violence and threat created an increase in exclusionary attitudes. The largest relative increase in intolerance happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where exclusionary attitudes reached levels as high as in Kosovo and Macedonia. The level of exclusionary attitudes in Kosovo and Macedonia did not change substantially, but remained extremely high.

At first glance, it could be argued that Kosovo and Macedonia provide positive evidence for ethnic hatred theory because intolerant attitudes were already high there in 1990. However, in Kosovo, ethnic clashes had already occurred *before* 1990, whereas Macedonia had witnessed important demographic change (an argument to which I will turn later). The wave of unrest and demonstrations began in Kosovo as early as 1981, when the region became an arena of rising interethnic conflict and confrontations (Bilandzic 1985). Whereas, for the other parts of the former Yugoslavia, the 1990–2004 comparison can be treated as a comparison between the situations before and after violent conflict, for Kosovo, 1990 was already the "after" point. The higher intolerance observed in Kosovo in 1990 can thus be interpreted as the result of earlier concrete unrest.

From the foregoing, we can draw two main conclusions:

1. Exclusionary attitudes were not high before armed conflict, so the outbreak of violence itself cannot be explained by these attitudes. However, exclusionary attitudes rose after the violence as its consequence. The causal arrow does not go from intolerance to violence, but from violence to intolerance.

2. Explanations of the rise in exclusionary attitudes that point to decreased pressure not to express such attitudes as a consequence of the demise of socialism are not corroborated. The highly variable increase in exclusionary attitudes is more meaningfully explained by the various events that occurred across different parts of the former Yugoslavia than by the rather uniform ascendance of nationalist parties to power and the diffusion of their exclusivist propaganda.

Theoretical Approaches to Ethnic Intolerance and Heterogeneity

Thus far, I have discussed various explanations of the short-term changes in exclusionist attitudes from the end of the former Yugoslavia to the post-war period. Now, I will address the issue of how to explain cross-sectional and probably more deeply ingrained variations in exclusionism and tolerance that predated the events of the 1990s. I will attempt to find a theoretical framework that explains this variation.

Contact Hypothesis

Gordon Allport's contact hypothesis claims that under specific circumstances, contact between the members of different groups will reduce prejudice.[8] Allport (1954) formulated his hypothesis as a counter-position to the assimilationist paradigm that prevailed in ethnic studies during his time. For example, one proponent of assimilation theory, Robert Ezra Park (1914), stated that contact among racially and ethnically different groups passes through four stages. In the first stage, groups come in contact through migration. In the second stage, groups engage in competition, which is often accompanied by conflict. This competition occurs within the framework of laws and customs and is restrained by them. In the third stage, accommodation emerges. Park asserted that even within an oppressive system such as slavery, intimate and personal relations among groups develop and temper the most sinister aspects of the system. One indicator of accommodation during slavery in the southern USA was, according to Park, that the number of slaves granted freedom increased steadily despite legislation and customs that did not support such a practice.[9] Eventually, in Park's fourth stage, assimilation occurs and differences between groups are erased.

Although Park recognised variations in the speed of assimilation between groups—for example, African immigrants assimilated more slowly than European immigrants did—he was vague about explaining such differences. His main argument was that the process of assimilation is progressive and irreversible. We can

[8] Allport formulated this theory in his famous book, *The Nature of Prejudice* (1954). The first formulations of the contact hypothesis in modern sociology were made in 1947; however, by Robin Williams in *Reduction of Intergroup Tension* and by Watson in *Action for Unity*.

[9] One might argue that Park's "third stage" anticipates Allport's contact hypothesis.

conclude that his theory reflected the popular belief in America at the time that over several generations, group boundaries will break down and society will become homogenous.

Allport's hypothesis is directed against this "linear" assimilationist assumption, or, to use his words, against the "peaceful progression" of assimilation, which he dismisses as a universal law. He argues that some groups do not assimilate (he cites Jews) and some groups do not accommodate such as African Americans (in the terminology of his time, "Negro stock"). He also warns that the assimilation process is not irreversible, citing the destiny of highly assimilated German Jews as the most obvious example. Allport states that "whether or not the law of peaceful progression will hold seems to depend on the *nature of the contact* that is established" (Allport 1954, p. 251). Allport further analyses the conditions in which contact will or will not decrease prejudice. The main preconditions for contact to reduce previously existing prejudices are: (a) contact must be between persons of equal social status; (b) prejudice reduction through contact requires an active goal-oriented effort (common goal); (c) attainment of the common goals must be an interdependent effort involving intergroup cooperation without group competition; and (d) prejudice reduction through contact requires the support of authorities, laws, and customs.

Although Allport is often quoted in the literature as the creator of the contact hypothesis, we can see from this brief analysis that the originality of his contributions was more in elaborating the precise conditions in which contact reduces prejudices than in the formulation of the hypothesis as such. Instead of creating the hypothesis, Allport placed limits on its scope. The hypothesis already existed; it had been formulated by Robin M. Williams in 1947. Allport also quotes Lee and Humphrey's (1943) work on race riots. However, Allport was not satisfied with the simplicity of the hypothesis and the lack of specified validity conditions. Not all contact leads towards reduced prejudice, just as assimilation is not the preordained outcome of the interaction between any migrant group and its host society.

The general implication of the contact hypothesis is that under certain conditions, contact between "different" groups reduces the initial amount of prejudice. The consequence of this hypothesis is that in a closed homogenous society with limited contact with "outsiders", prejudice will be high. Conversely, in an open and heterogeneous society, prejudice will be low.

Threat Hypothesis

A decade later, Hubert Blalock (1967) formulated his threat theory based on the idea that discrimination and prejudice increase with the proportion of minorities in a society. Chapter 5 of his seminal book is titled "Minority Percentage and Discrimination". In addition, Blalock distinguishes between two key factors that increase with rising minority percentages—competition and power threat. Without elaborating the details of Blalock's theory, we can concentrate here on the contradictory predictions that derive from Blalock and Allport.

Allport's theory is formulated at the micro level and deals with contact between individuals. To expand its logic to the macro level, we would predict that when the proportion of minorities increases, opportunities for inter-individual majority-minority contacts increase as well. As a consequence, if the preconditions specified earlier are satisfied, prejudice should decrease. Blalock's theory is formulated on the macro level and specifies different sociopsychological processes (feeling of threat, competition) that lead to increased prejudice. Blalock ignores increased contact opportunities and concentrates on perceived competition and power threat. Thus, he derives the opposite prediction: an increased minority proportion will lead to increased prejudice.

Empirical Findings

Allport's and Blalock's theories have inspired a large number of empirical studies. Most often, these empirical studies were formulated within the framework of *one* of these two theories and ignored the perspective of the other. I will now concentrate on what empirical data tell us with regard to the contradictory predictions of these two theories.

After providing a comprehensive summary of the history of tests of Allport's contact hypothesis, Forbes (1997) concludes that the direction of findings depends on the type of research design and, critically, the unit of analysis. Research on the level of interpersonal interactions overwhelmingly supports the contact hypothesis. It has been regularly found in surveys, observations, and experiments that people who have friends who are minorities are less prejudiced compared with those who do not have such friends and who lack contact or experience with minorities.

This type of research often leaves open one important issue: the question of causal direction. Do contacts decrease prejudice, or are less prejudiced people more willing to have contact with minority group members? When this question is addressed explicitly using endogenous switching regression models (extracting the effect of close interracial friendship on selected racial attitude variables while accounting for possible selectivity bias), the conclusion still holds; thus, the observed association between interracial contact and racial attitudes is not an artefact of an unobserved selection process (Powers and Eillson 1995). Although there is a general propensity to avoid various groups, which reduces the amount of contact, contact still has an independent positive effect on the reduction of prejudice. The same conclusion has been reached with data from the USA (Wilson 1996) and Europe (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995).

According to Forbes, results such as these, which confirm Allport's contact hypothesis, are obtained on the micro level, when interpersonal contact is directly observed or induced by the researcher in laboratory or quasi-experimental studies. When we move from the interpersonal level to studies of larger territories or even whole countries, however, the results are mixed. For example, studies of neighbourhood integration projects in South Africa (Bauman 1992) revealed no significant

correlation between the ethnic composition of respondents' workplaces and their attitudes towards Afrikaners among a national sample of "coloured" people. Among Afrikaners, contrary to the contact hypothesis, there were significantly *more* negative attitudes towards "Coloureds" among employees of organisations in which the majority of employees were Black or Asian. Thus, the situation of working together produced negative rather than positive attitudes. Another example, from the USA, concerns interracial housing. It also indicates a more complex picture than is assumed by the contact hypothesis. The study measured the attitudes of Black and White housewives in three housing projects in Lexington, Kentucky (Ford 1973). The data supported the contact hypothesis for White housewives, but not for Black housewives. Black housewives living in segregated settlements showed *less* prejudice than those in integrated projects, and the longer they lived in integrated projects, the greater their antipathy towards Whites became.

These two examples, which were selected from the large body of published research testing the contact hypothesis on an intermediate (meso) level, complicate the relation between contact and prejudice. Of course, it is always possible to explain contradictory findings by claiming that some of the necessary preconditions for the "positive" effect of contact are not met. However, as Pettigrew (1971) notes, if all negative results can be "explained away" by ad hoc conditions, we do not have a predictive theory but only a set of post-hoc explanations.

Finally, we can consider research designs that correlate different levels of ethnic heterogeneity in regions, cities, or states with the ethnic tolerance of their populations. Here, Allport meets Blalock, because Blalock's theory is directly formulated in terms of "proportionality", as explained above. It is important to stress that the social and psychological mechanisms on which Allport and Blalock concentrate are different. For Blalock, what counts are personal perceptions of threat, which are created by rising proportions of the minority. For Allport, what is important is the nature of interpersonal contact. From Allport's perspective, mere increased numbers without contact or contacts of the "wrong" type are not relevant for prejudice.

Extensive empirical findings from the USA clearly indicate that prejudices, segregationist voting, and discriminatory behaviour are greater in places (cities, states, and territories) where the percentage of Blacks is greater. Olszak (1992) examined newspaper reports of ethnic collective actions in 77 US cities between 1887 and 1914 and found that conflict is highly dependent on the growth of immigration. Similarly, anti-busing protests were most frequent in areas where racial segregation was breaking down. Increased interracial exposure in schools and neighbourhoods triggers racial and ethnic conflict (Olszak et al. 1994). A comprehensive study of 12 European countries conducted by Quillian (1995) indicates that perceived percentage of non-EEC immigrants (in EEC countries) and economic conditions are the strongest predictors of racial and anti-immigrant prejudices. In a more recent study, Semyonov et al. (2006) arrived at similar conclusions using four waves (1988–2000) of the Eurobarometer surveys for 12 European countries between 1988 and 2000 to obtain comprehensive information on attitudes towards foreigners. Their findings are in accordance with Blalock's theory: anti-foreigner sentiment tends to be higher in places with a proportionately larger foreign population and less economic prosperity.

On the basis of these analyses, we can see that in the large majority of studies based on proportions, Blalock's theory is confirmed and, by implication, Allport's theory is disconfirmed. However, when experimental and small group studies are conducted, Allport's contact theory is generally confirmed.

How can we explain the fact that different types of research designs produce different results? One plausible interpretation is that in the proportional research, some of the fundamental requirements for contact to reduce prejudice formulated by Allport are not satisfied. For example, in all studies that deal with European immigrants, one can argue that immigrants are generally of much lower status than the host population. Contact between the educated European population and unskilled immigrants does not fulfil the requirement that groups be of equal status, which is one of the key prerequisites formulated by Allport.

Alternatively, Forbes (1997) has argued that seemingly contradictory findings across levels of analysis should be expected and can be interpreted based on theory. Forbes admits that, on the individual level, contact produces positive effects, although he argues that these effects are more closely related to the reduction of underlying cultural differences than they are to prejudice reduction per se. However, at the societal level, processes of mutual cultural assimilation between the individuals who are most directly involved with one another ironically trigger the hostility of a significant portion of majority members, and hence increase overall intolerance. Namely, members of the majority group who are ardent believers that the culture, habits, and customs of their group represent the best, the truth, and the sacred will find contact with outsiders threatening to their fundamental values and beliefs. They will try to keep members of the out-group in a subordinate position and to decrease contact opportunities. These more conservative people can become even more hostile towards outsiders when they perceive that other majority group members have friendly contact with the out-group. When only a small fraction of the dominant group is in a position to have contact with minorities, such contacts can paradoxically produce greater overall intolerance, because they provoke negative reactions among the many majority group members who avoid such contacts.

Ethnic Heterogeneity and Ethnic (In)Tolerance in Pre-War Yugoslavia

Now, I relate the foregoing discussion to our results from the former Yugoslavia. These results stem from a classical proportion study where ethnic heterogeneity in the former republics and autonomous provinces was correlated with ethnic tolerance (Hodson et al. 1994). The findings depicted in Table 3.1 reveal a clear aggregate-level relation: greater ethnic heterogeneity accompanies greater ethnic tolerance. Bosnia and Herzegovina was the most heterogeneous *and* the most tolerant context, followed (on both dimensions) by Vojvodina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, and finally Slovenia. There are also two outliers: as mentioned before, Macedonia and

Table 3.1 Average tolerance levels and ethnic heterogeneity of the republics of the former Yugoslavia in 1989. (Adapted from Hodson et al. 1994)

Republic or province	Mean ethnic tolerance[a]	Index of heterogeneity[b]
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.88	0.64
Vojvodina	3.88	0.61
Croatia	3.63	0.45
Montenegro	3.45	0.45
Serbia proper	3.28	0.27
Slovenia	2.67	0.19
Macedonia	2.53	0.41
Kosovo	1.71	0.39

[a] Ethnic tolerance ranges from 1 to 5 (maximal tolerance) on the tolerance scale, with 5 meaning maximum tolerance and 1 maximum intolerance

[b] The heterogeneity index ranges from "0" (all individuals are part of the same ethnic group) to "1" (equal distribution of individuals across ethnic groups)

Table 3.2 Tolerance of majority and minority group members in the republics/provinces of the former Yugoslavia in 1989

Republic/province	Majority	Tolerance	Main minority	Tolerance
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Bosniaks	3.88	Serbs	3.82
Vojvodina	Serbs	3.65	Hungarians	3.86
Croatia	Croats	3.60	Serbs	3.93
Montenegro	Montenegrins	3.32	Bosniaks/Muslims	3.40
Serbia	Serbs	3.24	Bosniaks/Muslims	3.39
Slovenia	Slovenes	2.71	Croats	3.33
Macedonia	Macedonians	2.61	Albanians	1.84
Kosovo	Albanians	1.79	Serbs	1.99

Kosovo were already the least tolerant places in Yugoslavia in 1989, even though they were more heterogeneous than Serbia and very similar to Montenegro and Croatia.

Analyses within republics/provinces showed that in most cases, the dominant majority is less tolerant than the minority (see Table 3.2). This was true for Serbs in Vojvodina, Croats in Croatia, Slovenians in Slovenia, and Albanians in Kosovo, with two additional cases pointing in the same direction, but not reaching statistical significance (Montenegrins in Montenegro and Serbs in Serbia). The only exceptions to this pattern were Bosnia and Herzegovina, with no substantial difference between Muslims and Serbs, and Macedonia, where the Albanian minority was even more intolerant than the Macedonian majority.

Strikingly, these results perfectly contradict. Blalock's ethnic threat theory and Forbes' mixed model because both models would predict a negative relation between heterogeneity and tolerance at the aggregate level that we considered in these analyses. Ironically, these results appear to be congruent with Allport's contact hypothesis at a level of analysis where the literature would expect the theory to be least applicable.

To make things even more puzzling, an additional pattern emerged when we changed the level of analysis in a subsequent study (Massey et al. 1999). In the previous study, the units of analysis were defined by political-administrative divisions.

We further divided the territory of each of these territorial units into *enclaves* (where the overall minority forms a local majority; for example, areas in Croatia where ethnic Serbs are in the majority) and the remaining territory (where the overall majority is also the local majority). As a consequence, it became apparent that the level of tolerance is generally lower within enclaves than within the remaining parts of the corresponding republic or province. Members of the minority ethnic group are less tolerant in the enclaves, where they constitute the majority, than elsewhere, where they represent a local (as well as national) minority. So far, contact theory can still account for these findings: people have statistically more opportunities for out-group contact when the "out-group" is more numerous where they live, that is, when their "in-group" is a local minority. However, the question remains: how can we account for the findings that both minority and majority members are, overall, less tolerant in the enclaves than their ethnic counterparts in the rest of the territory?[10]

To summarise, a twofold challenge arises. First, I need to explain why our results differ from those found in other aggregate-level studies (based on proportions). Second, I need to develop an explanation for why the heterogeneity-tolerance relation found in the majority of republics/provinces in the former Yugoslavia did not hold for Macedonia and Kosovo overall or for enclaves in other parts of the former Yugoslavia.

Did (Lack of) Cultural Distance or Demographic Change Play a Role?

In the previous section, I explained the "deviant" results for Kosovo and Macedonia by referring to the fact that, unlike other parts of Yugoslavia, ethnic clashes there started before 1990. We should also discuss an alternative interpretation of these findings that frames them in terms of cultural distance. In one recent study that directly confronted the contact and threat hypotheses, Dixon (2006) came to an intriguing conclusion. His findings suggest that, in the US context, the contact hypothesis holds for Whites' contact with Hispanics and Asians; after controlling all relevant variables, more contact opportunities decreased prejudice. However, the same conclusion did not hold for Black-White relationships. Higher proportions of Blacks within counties or metropolitan areas increased prejudice among Whites, and individual (superficial) contact with Blacks (unlike Hispanics or Asians) was not sufficient to decrease their prejudice.

[10] For example, in Croatia, the average tolerance level for Croats living outside of enclaves was 3.53 (on a scale of 1 = maximum intolerance to 5 = maximum tolerance). For Serbs living outside of enclaves (in Croatian-dominated territories), the figure was 3.67, which is statistically significantly higher. For Serbs living in enclaves (Serb-dominated territories in Croatia), the comparable figure was 3.36. That is statistically significantly lower compared to the average level for Serbs living outside of enclaves. Although it is not statistically significantly lower than the tolerance level of the Croats, this result points in the predicted direction of lower tolerance.

These outcomes are quite similar to the results of some Canadian surveys. For example, Kollin and Denny (1982) compared small geographical areas (census tracts with a median population of 5,333). Their findings showed increasingly positive mutual evaluations between French and English Canadians with increasing proportions of the respective other group. However, the opposite trend was shown regarding native Indians: the more numerous they were, the less favourably they were evaluated by members of other groups. The authors interpreted these results in accordance with the contact hypothesis because relations between French and English Canadians involved people of relatively equal status, whereas the native Indians living in the cities were of much lower status. However, native Indians were also more culturally distant from French and English Canadians than the latter two groups were from each other (see Mitchell 1968, or Ray 1983, for similar studies in the Australian context on culturally distant White and Aboriginal groups). Obviously, the fact that unequal social status and cultural distance are confounded here, as in Dixon's US study, leaves room for alternative interpretations and debate about the theoretical significance of these findings.

Despite this problem, let us take seriously the idea that contact can decrease prejudice more easily among more culturally similar groups and consider its implications for inter-ethnic relations in the former Yugoslavia. There are good reasons to argue that Albanians are the most culturally distinct group in the former Yugoslavia. They are religiously (Muslim) and linguistically (Albanian, a non-Slavic language) different from the rest of the population. Although Bosniaks are also religiously Muslim, they share a common language with their neighbours. Is "cultural distance" the reason that the low levels of tolerance in Kosovo and Macedonia did not fit into the pattern of the rest of Yugoslavia and, by the same token, that ethnic intolerance in the rest of Yugoslavia does not follow the same laws as anti-Black sentiment in the USA or anti-immigrant sentiment in the EU?

As a matter of fact, most ethnic groups across the former Yugoslavia—with the notable exception of Albanians—are culturally similar to each other. One could argue that Albanians are more distant from the rest of the Slavic population in the same way that native Indians in Canada, but not French Canadians were distant from English Canadians or that Blacks, but not Asians or Hispanics were distant from Whites in the USA. Is the pattern observed in the former Yugoslavia then a case in point for Forbes' (1997) argument that the contact hypothesis holds within "cultural boundaries", but not beyond them? According to Forbes:

> Intergroup conflict (. . .) may be a function not just of the level of contact between two ethnic or cultural groups but also of their cultural differences. No such conflict will develop if there are either no contacts between the groups or no differences between their cultures. There will be more conflict, at any given level of contact, where the cultural differences are greater. (Forbes 1997, pp. 148–149)

We must be aware that this explanation implies a threshold where cultural distance becomes large enough to reverse the relation between the local proportion of a minority group and intergroup tolerance or prejudice. At this point, I cannot offer a more elaborate basis for a theory of cultural difference than post-hoc interpretations

of the cases at hand. For example, the Albanian/Slav difference involves linguistic (Albanian is a non-Slavic language), religious (Muslim vs. Christian), and historical components (perception of a different origin) that have been further rendered salient by repeated Serbian-Albanian clashes. It may be the case that the combination of these elements produces what some might call a "deep cultural divide". In contrast, the Muslim-Christian divide in Bosnia and Herzegovina is less deep because it is tempered by linguistic similarity and an awareness of similar origins.[11]

There is no direct way to adjudicate between the "cultural" explanation and the explanation based on the fact that ethnic riots began earlier in Kosovo than in other areas of the former Yugoslavia. To provide a more reliable answer to this dilemma, we would need to examine a territory shared by culturally distant groups that have not experienced violent conflict. In that case, more negative attitudes could be attributed directly to cultural differences. Macedonia does not qualify as such an example because it borders Kosovo, so violence in that region contributed to permanently tense Macedonian-Albanian relations. One must also accept the possibility that there is no a priori reason why the social phenomena should have just one explanation. In other words, cultural differences and the post-conflict rise in negative attitudes could operate together as causal forces.

Let us now move from the explanation of the few "deviant" results *within* the former Yugoslavia to explaining the "deviant" nature of the overall results for Yugoslavia when compared with findings from other European countries (where an increased proportion of ethnic minorities means more negative attitudes towards them). The main answer could lie precisely in the fact that in the context of most (Western) European countries, ethnic minorities are mainly composed of *immigrant populations* whose numbers have increased in relatively recent times. In these contexts, the fact that "native" populations are confronted with recent immigration contributes to the perception of threat. In the Yugoslav case, however, we are not dealing with recent immigration, but with communities that have been living side by side for centuries. Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina are not "immigrants" from Croatia, and Serbs in Croatia are not "immigrants" from Serbia. Where there were recent immigrants (as in Slovenia) or a changing demographic balance (as in Kosovo or Macedonia), we can also observe high levels of intolerance.

One particular finding from the European studies provides additional credence to this conclusion. Semyonov et al. (2008) found that negative views of foreigners' impact on society are most pronounced either in countries where the proportion of foreigners is relatively small or in countries that have only recently begun hosting foreigners. Similar results were found in the USA. Whereas Brodburn et al. reported

[11] Conversely, in neighbouring Bulgaria, the Turkish/Bulgarian divide displays differences that are similar to the Albanian/Slavic divide in Kosovo and Macedonia. McIntosh et al. (1995) found that people living in mixed Bulgarian-Turkish communities in Bulgaria are more intolerant than people living in mixed (Romanian-Hungarian) communities in Romania. The authors interpret this finding as the result of the fact that Romanians still constitute the majority in the mixed communities, whereas Bulgarians are the minority in many mixed communities. An alternative interpretation would be that there is less tolerance between Bulgarians and Turks because the cultural divide that separates them is much deeper than the cultural divide between Romanians and Hungarians.

in 1971 that White respondents held the least favourable attitudes towards Blacks in neighbourhoods with either a high or *rapidly growing* proportion of Blacks. Olszak (1992) again concluded that ethnic animosities strongly depend on the growth of immigration. If that is the case, demographic change is a critical factor in determining ethnic animosity. In the Yugoslav case, overall, ethnic communities can look back on a long history of living side by side. The stability of ethnic proportions may therefore have contributed to majority-minority relationships that were in accordance with the contact hypothesis until the outbreak of war. Where cultural differences were large or where substantial demographic change was occurring, intolerance and animosity were already on the rise in 1990.

Conclusion

Multiple causal forces impact sentiments between ethnic communities and exert their influences over time. Stable ethnic heterogeneity allows ethnic tolerance, but short-term increases in ethnic heterogeneity work against it. The cultural distance between ethnic communities must also be considered because co-existence and contact have different effects on tolerance between culturally similar compared with dissimilar groups. All of these factors are likely to have contributed to the variations in the level of ethnic (in)tolerance across Yugoslav communities and regions at the eve of war. However, one critical point is that none of the factors that led to ethnic *intolerance* can explain where or why ethnic *violence* occurred during the following decade.

Conversely, violent conflict—whatever its causes and circumstances—had a profound detrimental impact on ethnic tolerance across post-war communities. Therefore, the findings and arguments reviewed in this chapter dismiss some widely used explanations of conflict in the former Yugoslavia based on "ethnic hatred" theory. Hopefully, they also help to explain why theories about relations between "ethnic" majority and minority communities that are grounded in Western European or American experience and research cannot be mechanically transposed to the realities of dynamics between communities in the former Yugoslavia.

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Chapter 4
The Demise of Mixed Marriage?

Ethnic Boundaries Between Families in Changing Societies

Jean-Marie Le Goff and Francesco Giudici

The literature on marriage before the recent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia presents an unexpected perspective on the demographic trends in this country. This literature is mainly focused on mixed marriages and often provides a number of details on rates according to nationality or partner's region of origin. At the beginning of the 1990s, articles on mixed marriages were even published in American newspapers, such as the Los Angeles Times and the Washington Post (Botev 1994). Today, this focus on inter-ethnic marriages appears surprisingly in light, for example, of the literature mentioned in Sekulic's introductory chapter on the "ancient hatred" among nationalities.

Demographers from the former Yugoslavia were interested in mixed marriages in part because these marriages were promoted by the communist state for several reasons. First, these marriages present opportunities for the partners' families to create contacts and alliances (Morokvasic-Muller 2004; Smits 2010). Second, mixed marriages give birth to mixed and acculturated children; thus, mixed marriages were believed to facilitate the amalgamation of different nationalities into a unique Yugoslav society in which everyone would be emancipated of his or her traditional culture. Thus, mixed marriages were considered in the former Yugoslavia as not only an indicator but also a *means* of promoting integration into the new society. Petrovic (1985, quoted by Mrdjen 1996) describes mixed marriages as "*a general Yugoslav process*".

In Kalmijn's (1998) theoretical view of mixed marriages, public valorisation and incentives, in addition to coercion or sanctions against mixed marriages which were observed during the 1990s conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (Morokvasic-Muller 2004), constitute only a first-level explanation of the changes in the rates of mixed

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marriages. According to Kalmijn, two other levels of explanations can be added, which are related to the structure of the marriage market and individual preferences concerning the ethnic background of a potential partner. The level of the marriage market regroups factors related to the demographic weight of each group in a region and the segmentation of the marriage market. As each ethnic group differs in size, the probability of meeting a potential partner of another ethnic group depends on the group's size. This probability is low for large groups but high for small groups (Blau 1977; Mrdjen 1996). However, other factors related to geographical repartition and segregation can affect the probability of contact[1] between partners. A large geographical distance, physical barriers (e.g., rivers or mountains between the locations of two groups) and a high degree of segregation in the distribution of nationalities in a local area will result in a low probability of contact between potential partners and a highly segmented marriage market. What, then, is the link between the opportunities for contact between persons belonging to two different nationalities and tolerances for inter-marriage? Similar to Sekulic's chapter, a high level of contact between two nationalities can be hypothesised to increase tolerance for inter-marriage in a context that promotes assimilation into a society. However, in a context in which nationalism and negative inter-dependence (Sherif 1966) among nationalities are exacerbated, as is now the case for almost every country of the former Yugoslavia, one can expect that high levels of contact between two nationalities decrease the acceptance of mixed marriage, especially if there were strong conflicts between the two nationalities during the 1990s.

The segmentation of the marriage market can have both geographical and cultural influences. Botev (1994) describes three different marriage patterns in the former Yugoslavia from 1960 to 1990, which are characterised by the specific timing of the marriage, gaps in the age of men and women and the proportions of persons who remain unmarried in a generation. According to the author, this distinction is rooted in the past, especially in relation to the influences of the ancient Austrian and Ottoman empires. Botev argues that the regions of the former Yugoslavia are situated along the Hajnal's line between St. Petersburg and Trieste, which divided the Western and Eastern European patterns of marriage from approximately the end of the Middle Ages to the beginning of the twentieth century (Hajnal 1965).

In Western Europe, a significant percentage of men and women from the same cohort remained unmarried, and people married later in life. Botev (1994) shows that this *Western pattern* of marriage was mainly observed in Slovenia at the time of the former Yugoslavia. The author calls the Eastern European pattern in which marriage occurred early in life and in which almost all the persons in a generation became married, the *traditional pattern* because it corresponds with the pattern mainly observed in the Balkans. This pattern is observed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia. However, Botev describes a third pattern of marriage in Kosovo and Montenegro. Following historical demographers (Smith 1981), he

[1] The notion of contact does not have the same meaning here as it does in Sekulic's chapter, where mixed marriage is considered one dimension of contact (see also Sekulic et al. 2006). In the present case, possibilities of contact in the marriage market between two potential partners are envisaged as the probabilities that two persons of different nationalities meet.

calls this pattern the *Mediterranean pattern* of marriage, which is characterised by a strong difference in the age at which men and women became married. For Botev (1994), different norms of marriage can create barriers in the marriage market. For example, men who belong to nationalities in which there is a norm of early marriage would have lower probabilities of marrying a woman from another nationality that has a norm of late marriage. Past investigations did not confirm this hypothesis regarding barriers in the marriage market caused by different marriage timings (Botev and Wagner 1993). However, this hypothesis becomes interesting if marriages are analysed according to not only to their tempo and quantum effects but also to their inter-relations with other life events. Scholars have shown that in Serbia, young couples continued to live with one partner's parents after becoming married because of the housing crisis (Tomanovic and Ignjatovic 2006). Furthermore, our previous analyses of TRACES data show that married couples frequently cohabitate with the one partner's parents in Kosovo and that these periods of living together as an enlarged family endure for a long period of time (Giudici et al. 2009).

Thus, we have developed three hypotheses concerning the level of acceptance of mixed marriages. The first hypothesis is related to the opportunities for contact between nationalities according to their demographic size and spatial relationships. The second hypothesis is related to the life-course-specific behaviours according to nationality and is referred to as cultural differences. The third is related to institutionalised effects, the encouragement of mixed marriages in the former Yugoslavia, the discouragement of mixed marriages after its collapse and the effects due to war. We sought to determine whether these three hypotheses compete or whether they are complementary.

We will develop empirical analyses in three different directions. First, we propose a review of the literature on mixed marriages in the former Yugoslavia and show the results of some studies on mixed unions since the year 2000. Second, we investigate the relationship between marriages and other life events that occur during the transition to adulthood using TRACES data from the 1990s, while accounting for nationalities. Finally, we analyse the links between a person's opportunities to meet someone of a different nationality and the tolerance of persons for inter-ethnic marriages.

Mixed Marriages in the Former Yugoslavia

As mentioned above, mixed marriages were facilitated by the institutions of the former Yugoslavia to integrate different nationalities into a unique society. Other historical changes also influenced the promotion of these marriages. For example, religious marriage was replaced by civil marriage in 1945. This act reduced the influence of religious authorities, which are generally against inter-religious marriage (Morokvasic-Muller 2004; Mrdjen 2000). In addition, people of different nationalities migrated to a same region, for example, Vojvodina, then increasing the frequency of contact between people from different nationalities or communities. Similarly, the

economic migration of men from the south to the north, especially to Slovenia, and urbanisation enabled the mixing of different groups. Hammel et al. (2010) show that segregation between nationalities, as measured at different geographical levels, decreased from 1961 to 1991 in most regions of the former Yugoslavia; thus, men and women belonging to different nationalities have become more likely to interact and, eventually, to marry. Mixed marriages represented only 1 in 11 marriages (8.6 %) in 1950, but 1 in 7 marriages (13.5 %) in 1990 (Mrdjen 1996). Based on the results presented by Petrovic (1985), Korac (2004) states the following:

> At the time of the 1981 census, the number of people in ethnically mixed marriages and from ethnically mixed background was greater than the number of Albanians, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Muslims and Slovenes. Approximately, two million of people out of twenty two million were either parents or children of ethnically mixed marriages. This group was outnumbered only by Croats and Serbs (p. 251).

However, several authors have questioned the "success" of mixed marriages in the former Yugoslavia (Botev 1994; Mrdjen 1996; Smits 2010). Regions with strong levels of ethnic heterogeneity did not have necessarily a higher level of mixed marriages. In 1991, the region with the highest rate of inter-ethnic marriages was Vojvodina (25 %), followed by three regions with rather high levels of cultural diversity: Croatia (18 %), Serbia (16 %) and Slovenia (16 %) (Mrdjen 1996). In Bosnia and Herzegovina however, despite of a particularly high national diversity, fewer than one in eight marriages were inter-ethnic (Mrdjen 1996). Interestingly, the evolution of mixed marriages from 1950 to 1990 even differed by region. The number of mixed marriages in Slovenia, Croatia, Vojvodina and Serbia increased constantly from 1950 to the early 1990s. After a phase of increasing frequency from 1950 to 1965, the rate of mixed marriages began to decrease after 1965 in Montenegro and Macedonia. In Kosovo, mixed marriages constantly decreased from 10 to 6 % from 1950 to 1990. Such observations indicate an increasing aversion to mixed marriage for several national groups despite the promotion of such marriages in the former communist Yugoslavia.

Morokvasic-Muller (2004) mentions that mixed marriages did not have the same meaning for each gender in the context of strong patriarchal societies. Throughout the former Yugoslavia, a mixed marriage was often composed of a man belonging to the local majority and a woman belonging to a local minority[2]. The only exception was Slovenia, where many women married immigrant men. Moreover, communities classified women by their marriages to a greater extent than it does for men. Therefore, women were often excluded by their communities of origin if they married a man from another community and were frequently considered to have been "gained" by the husband's group. Conversely, men engaged in mixed marriages generally maintained their social positions in their native groups. In the 1990s, many mixed couples moved from an area in which the husband belonged to a minority to areas in which the husband's origin group was demographically dominant. From this point of view, mixed marriages can also be seen as a potential source of tensions between

[2] Terms such as minority and majority are based on the relative size of the demographics. These terms are not related to a political or juridical definition.

Table 4.1 Proportion of mixed couples according to nationality and country from 2003–2004 (in %). (Source: South-East European Social Survey Program (Simkus 2007))

Country	Nationality of the respondant	Men		Women		*N*
		Born before 1968	Born in 1968 and after	Born before 1968	Born in 1968 and after	
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Croatian	10.8	11.5	11.7	3.8	522
	Bosniak-Muslim	1.9	0.0	2.0	0.9	1856
	Serb	2.9	0.0	1.8	2.7	1552
Montenegro	Montenegrin	15.9	7.7	12.3	6.3	400
	Serb	8.6	13.7	6.2	19.5	328
Croatia	Croatian	5.2	4.4	6.2	3.6	1558
Kosovo	Albanian	0.8	0.0	0.9	0.6	1511
Macedonia	Macedonian	3.4	5.0	2.1	2.0	967
	Albanian	1.8	1.6	2.3	0.0	712
Serbia	Serb	4.7	8.8	3.9	4.3	3153

nationalities instead of an element of "assimilation" within the former Yugoslav society.

Information on mixed marriages becomes sparse after 1989. There is a lack of statistics for several reasons related to war, the creation of new states, and the desuetude of the criterion of assimilation associated with inter-ethnic marriages. Mrdjen (2000) observes a general decrease in the number of mixed marriages for the year of 1990.

The data collected within the South-East European Social Survey Program (SESSP) from 2003 to 2004 on all the countries of the former Yugoslavia except Slovenia provide some information on mixed couples (Simkus 2007). The SESSP surveyed the nationalities of the respondent and the respondent's partner (married or unmarried), parents and even grandparents. We are interested in the proportion of mixed unions by country, sex and birth cohort. As we do not know when the unions were formed, the birth cohort is our unique temporal marker. Thus, two birth cohorts are delimited: (1) persons born before 1968, most of whom formed unions within the context of the institutions of the former Yugoslavia; and (2) those born since 1968, most of whom formed unions during the conflicts of the 1990s or after the collapse of Yugoslavia. We distinguish among Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia. In each of these regions, we only included nationalities represented by more than 300 individuals because small samples have problems of representativeness (Table 4.1). Hence, we cannot examine mixed marriages among minorities with small populations in a country, such as the Croats in Serbia or the Serbs in Croatia.

In each country and for each nationality examined in these analyses, the proportions of mixed couples are low. These low proportions for the older cohorts are the results of several processes during the 1990s, such as imposed separations and divorces, the persecution of one partner within mixed couples, or the emigration of couples to escape persecution (Morokvasic-Muller 2004). Furthermore, some

respondents might not have revealed their nationality. The proportions of mixed couples are especially low in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosniak-Muslim and Serbs), in Kosovo (Albanians) and in Macedonia (Albanians and Macedonians). In Montenegro, more Montenegrins born before 1968 live in mixed unions than those born in 1968 or after. The Serbs born since 1968 living in Serbia and Montenegro are more likely to be in mixed unions than those born earlier. The percentages of mixed marriages do not differ among the cohorts for the Croats living in Croatia.

To summarise, despite strong incentives from the institutions of the former Yugoslavia to establish mixed marriages, such marriages might not have diffused as strongly or uniformly as expected. A relatively low number of mixed marriages could indicate that the assimilation of the different nationalities into the Yugoslav society met some obstacles. This impression is reinforced by the analysis of the transmission of nationality to children. Mrdjen (1996) proposed that this transmission often followed a patrilinear pattern. Based on data from the 1991 census, the author showed that 55 % of the children of mixed marriages adopted the nationalities of their fathers, whereas only 26 % adopted the nationalities of their mothers. Only 12.7 % of the children of mixed couples declared themselves to be Yugoslavs in the census. Finally, 3.8 and 2.5 % adopted a nationality different from those of their parents and no nationality, respectively. Similar to the low number of mixed marriages, this last proportion indicates that the assimilation of the different nationalities into the Yugoslavian society was not effective.

Patterns of Marriage in the Former Yugoslavia

In this section, we use TRACES data to analyse differences in marriage patterns by ethnicity and cohort. In particular, we investigate the *prevalence* (i.e., the proportion of men and women married in a cohort) and the *timing* of marriage. In addition, we link marriage with other major life events such as: the formation of an autonomous household with a partner and the pregnancy and birth of the first child.

Following Hammel et al. (2010), we will not consider nationality or ethnicity to be absolute: "It is not identity but a statement about membership" (p. 1106). The key variable we used is the nationality *declared* in the 1991 census by each person interviewed in the survey[3]. We prefer this option over creating an artificial "ethnic" variable that mixes religion with language. For example, classifying all Catholic persons who speak a Serbo-Croatian language as Croats would exclude persons who declare themselves as not belonging to a religion or those who are capable of speaking several of the languages of the former Yugoslavia. Self-declared nationality should be considered with caution in the sense that the national identity can change over the

[3] A question on the nationality declared in the 1991 census was asked in the TRACES survey. In the case of a non-response, if the respondent did not remember the nationality that he or she had declared or if he or she boycotted the census, as was the case for many Albanians, another question on the nationality that the respondent considered to be his or her (at the time of the census) was asked and was used as a proxy for nationality.

life course. For example, a woman married to a man from another ethnic group may have adopted and/or declared the nationality of her husband. Moreover, definitions given by the census have also changed. For example, the term "Muslim" used in the 1991 census was replaced by the term "Bosniak" in the following census in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, one advantage of using the self-declared nationality is that we can consider the individuals who had declared themselves to be "Yugoslav" in 1991. According to Sekulic et al. (1994), these individuals include persons married to partners from other communities, children born from mixed couples, persons who belonged to the communist party, persons who belonged to ethnic minorities who did not want to declare their ethnical groups and people living in urban contexts in general.

We consider here, the changes in the timing of marriages across two "cohorts" of men and women: the members of the older cohort were born between 1945 and 1967 and the members of the younger cohort were born between 1968 and 1974. The former includes persons who were born, spent their childhoods and (for most) experienced their transitions to adulthood in the former Yugoslavia, whereas the latter cohort spent their childhoods in the former Yugoslavia but experienced most of their transitions to adulthood during and after the 1990s. To obtain a sufficient number of individuals for each cohort, gender and nationality declared in 1991, we selected the first cohort from the random sample of the TRACES data and the second cohort from the cohort sample. In both cohorts, individuals with missing data on the date of marriage and nationality declared in 1991 are excluded from the analysis. As indicated previously, the sample sizes for the demographic minorities in a region were often quite small. Thus, we decided to restrict the analysis to Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Albanians and Macedonians who were living in Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia, respectively, at the age of 15. The Montenegrins could not be considered because of their small sample size. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we distinguished among the Croats, Muslims[4] and Serbs. However, there were some problems with the sample size, especially that of the Croats. As we are interested in marriage timing and prevalence by gender and cohort, we used bootstrap methods[5] to estimate the median age at marriage and the proportion of married persons who were 38 and 31 years old for the first and second cohorts, respectively. The bootstrap methods allow us to estimate the standard errors of these two indicators (Tables 4.2–4.4).

In accordance with Botev's (1994) observations, Slovenian men born before 1967 marry at the lowest rate and at the most advanced age (Table 4.2). However, in contrast to Botev's results, late marriages are also exhibited by Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonians, while Serbs living in Serbia tend to marry earlier. The men from the other nationalities marry somewhat earlier and at a high rate. In the case of the women, the prevalence of marriage is always high, whereas its timing does

[4] We used the term "Muslims" rather than "Bosniaks" because the latter term did not exist in 1991.

[5] This method consists of drawing 10,000 subsamples from the TRACES data with replacement and computing the median and the prevalence for each subsample (Davison and Hinkley 1997). The final estimators are the mean of all estimations, and we dispose of the standard errors of these means.

Table 4.2 Median age and proportions of married persons at age 38 according to the country, nationality and gender in the cohort 1945–1967

		Men				Women			
Country	Nationality	*N*	Median age		Proportion married at 38	*N*	Median age		Proportion married at 38	
Slovenia	Slovenians	40	25.2	(1.041)	0.750 (0.065)	100	22.2	(0.606)	0.940	(0.023)
Croatia	Croats	111	24.9	(0.446)	0.928 (0.024)	141	22.0	(0.390)	0.978	(0.012)
Bosnia-Herzegovona	Croats	19	Not computed*		0.842 (0.083)	23	21.2	(0.825)	0.912	(0.0569)
	Muslims	45	23.9	(0.80)	0.932 (0.037)	77	21.0	(0.300)	0.947	(0.025)
	Serbs	48	25.5	(0.83)	0.958 (0.029)	48	22.2	(0.940)	0.936	(0.035)
Serbia	Serbs	66	26.0	(0.86)	0.802 (0.040)	107	22.9	(0.425)	0.897	(0.029)
Kosovo	Albanians	57	23.5	(0.487)	0.982 (0.011)	44	20.7	(0.923)	0.954	(0.031)
Macedonia	Macedonians	55	25.1	(0.7509)	0.963 (0.024)	115	21.3	(0.360)	0.965	(0.017)

Standards errors in parentheses
* less than 50 % became married

Table 4.3 Median age and proportions of married persons at age 31 according to the country, nationality and gender in the cohort 1968–1974

		Men				Women			
Country	Nationality	*N*	Median age		Proportion married at 31	*N*	Median age		Proportion married at 31	
Slovenia	Slovenians	83	Not computed		0.398 (0.053)	127	Not computed*		0.574	(0.043)
Croatia	Croats	205	26.9	(0.537)	0.736 (0.031)	185	23.9	(0.316)	0.756	(0.031)
Bosnia-Herzegovona	Croats	30	Not computed*		0.566 (0.089)	30	Not computed*		0.636	(0.012)
	Muslims	76	23.9	(0.794)	0.889 (0.047)	95	20.8	(0.516)	0.863	(0.350)
	Serbs	70	Not computed*		0.587 (0.059)	62	23.5	(1.16)	0.758	(0.055)
Serbs	Serbs	157	Not computed*		0.452 (0.039)	103	27.2	(0.842)	0.650	(0.047)
Kosovo	Albanians	115	25.3	(0.736)	0.800 (0.037)	120	22.8	(0.615)	0.841	(0.033)
Macedonia	Macedonians	112	25.1	(0.752)	0.928 (0.0349)	117	21.7	(0.614)	0.940	(0.021)

Standard errors in parentheses
* less than 50 % became married

Table 4.4 Median age and proportions of married persons aged 31 (cohort 1968–1974) or 38 (cohort 1945–1967) for the respondents who adopted the Yugoslav nationality

		Men			Women		
Cohort	*N*	Median age	Proportion married	*N*	Median age	Proportion married	
1945–1967	52	26.2 (1.205)	0.923 (0.037)	73	21.2 0.542	0.890	(0.036)
1968–1974	71	Not computed*	0.506 (0.059)	73	Not computed*	0.622	(0.046)

Standard errors in parentheses
* less than 50 % became married

not significantly differ across the national groups and regions. Gender differences in the median age of marriage are more significant for Albanians and Macedonians. At this stage, we do not observe Botev's three patterns in the marriage data, perhaps because our sub-samples are small.

The estimations for the respondents born after 1968 show that marriage was often delayed as a consequence of the violent conflicts and the economic crisis (Table 4.3). Contrary to the first cohort, many members of the second cohort married after the age of 30.[6] This trend is particularly pronounced for the Albanian women and men. However, even Slovenia, which had few conflicts and a less severe economic crisis than the other countries, exhibited delayed marriage and a low proportion of married persons. We will see that the marriage pattern in Slovenia corresponds to a different evolution in comparison with the rest of the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, the economic crisis and armed conflicts do not explain all of the observed effects, as marriage did not evolve substantially in the case of the Macedonians and Muslims. Finally, the variability in the timing of the transitions increased in the case of the second cohort.

The women of the first cohort who self-identified as Yugoslavs in 1991 married early, whereas the men married much later. In both cases, the prevalence of marriage was high. The proportions of married persons at the age of 31 are low for those persons born between 1968 and 1974. This finding could be related to the exclusion of those who identified themselves as Yugoslav instead of another nationality.

To describe the differences and changes in marriage patterns, we now focus on the relation between marriage and other life events, such as the foundation of an autonomous household together with a partner and the birth of the first child. To view these relationships, we present event-history graphs (Dubin et al. 2001) for the women who declared themselves as Macedonians, Slovenian, Serbian-Montenegrins and Albanians. An event-history graph is a sophisticated graph tracing the evolution of the proportion of men or women of a cohort who are still unmarried along the time period of the observation. The *x* axis represents age, whereas the *y* axis represents the proportion of persons who are not yet married. In our graphs, each line describes the event-history of a woman before her marriage, if she was married before she turned 38 years old if she belongs to the first cohort and before she reached 31 years old

[6] In some cases (Tables 4.2 and 4.3), it is not possible to compute a median age with bootstrap methods because in some subsamples, fewer than half of the persons were married.



Fig. 4.1 Life event graph depicting the marriages of Macedonian women. *White*: unmarried, childless, and not living with a partner, *light-grey*: living with a partner, *dark-grey*: pregnant with the first child, *black*: has already given birth to the first child, *dashed lines*: non-married

if she belongs to the second cohort. The white segments indicate the period during which the woman had no child and did not found a household with a partner; the light grey segments represent the period during which the woman cohabitated in an autonomous household with a partner without being married; the dark grey segments represent the period of the first pregnancy and a black segments begin at the birth of the first child, who was born out of wedlock. Hatched lines are drawn in the case of the persons who did not get married before turning 38 or 31 years old for the first and second cohorts, respectively.

Figure 4.1 represents the Macedonian women's marriage patterns. The first cohort presents a standardised marriage pattern; most women founded an autonomous household with a partner and rarely gave birth to their first child out of wedlock. In rare cases, the marriage occurred after the woman had already become pregnant. Unmarried persons are quite rare, and the average age at marriage is low, as already mentioned. The second cohort shows the same marriage pattern except that the proportion of unmarried women is slightly higher.

The foundation of a married household can be analysed by drawing a new life history graph in which the event of interest is the foundation of an autonomous household (Fig. 4.2). In this case, a light grey segment indicates that the woman is married but does not live in an autonomous household with her partner. For Macedonian women, the foundation of the autonomous household and marriage are co-integrated in the life course. Marriage is also the starting point for the foundation of the family. The marriage pattern in Macedonia presents a first model of union and family formation in the former Yugoslavia.



Fig. 4.2 Life event graphs depicting the foundation of an individual household with a partner for Macedonian women. *White*: unmarried, childless, and not living with a partner, *light-grey*: married, *dark-grey*: pregnant with the first child; *black*: has already given birth to the first child, *hatched lines*: did not found an individual household

The Slovenians present a second marriage pattern model that features a different evolution across cohorts (Fig. 4.3). In the oldest cohort, a household with the partner was often founded before the marriage. In other words, non-marital cohabitation was tolerated. Some couples were married after the birth of the first child, and a few women remained unmarried after the birth of their children. Out-of-wedlock births are largely diffused among the women of the youngest cohort. According to the council of Europe, the proportion of non-marital births represents 40 % of all the births at the beginning of the 2000s (Council of Europe 2006). Extra-marital unions became a standard of living, as has already been observed in several Western European countries, especially the neighbouring country of Austria. As a consequence, the prevalence of marriage decreases and becomes the lowest among all the nationalities for both men and women (Table 4.3).

We now analyse the foundation of an autonomous household for Albanian women (Fig. 4.4) and Serbs (Fig. 4.5). In both cases, we observe a third pattern of marriage in which weddings do not necessarily coincide with the foundation of a household with the partner. This pattern is particularly visible in the case of the Albanian women from the older cohort, who exhibit two main patterns of marriage: (1) co-occurring with the foundation of the household and (2) occurring without the foundation of an autonomous household. In this latter case, a wedding is quickly followed by the conception and birth of the first child; an autonomous household with a partner is rarely founded (Fig. 4.4). The two patterns are present in both cohorts, but for both men and women, the prevalence of marriage is slightly lower and the timing of the marriage is slightly earlier. In the third pattern, marriage occurs before the foundation of the household and may even occur without being followed by this event.



Fig. 4.3 Life event graphs depicting the marriages of Slovenian women. *White*: unmarried, childless, and not living with a partner, *light-grey*: living with a partner, *dark-grey*: pregnant with the first child, *black*: has already given birth to the first child, *hatched lines*: non-married



Fig. 4.4 Life event graphs depicting the foundation of an individual household with a partner for Albanian women. *White*: unmarried, childless and not living with a partner, *light-grey*: married, *dark-grey*: pregnant with the first child, *black*: birth of the first child, *dashed lines*: did not found an individual household

The Serbs present an intermediate pattern between the Macedonians and Albanians (Fig. 4.5). In the oldest cohort, several Serbian women married before founding their individual households. This finding confirms Tomanovic and Ignjatovic's (1996) observations. Some of these women gave birth to their first child before forming an autonomous household but almost always formed households



Fig. 4.5 Life event graphs depicting the foundation of an individual household with a partner for Serbian women. *White*: unmarried, childless and not living with a partner, *light-grey*: married, *dark-grey*: pregnant with the first child, *black*: has already given birth to the first child, *hatched lines*: did not found an individual household

at some point. The youngest cohort has a low rate of marriage before founding an autonomous household with a partner and a more standardised life course than the older cohort. However, a higher proportion of married women do not found an autonomous household, and several women in this group already had their first child.

The other nationalities (Croats, Muslims and Yugoslavs) of the two cohorts present marriage patterns that are in between the pattern observed for the Macedonians and that observed for the Serbs. Our analysis of marriage patterns is in accordance with Botev's observations (1994) even though we did not obtain the same results regarding the timing of marriage. Three models can be described. The first model is shared by a majority of the nationalities, including an important portion of the Albanians. In this model, marriage marks the beginning of the process of founding a family and coincides with or precedes the foundation of the household. The second pattern is presented by the Slovenians and is a model in which the beginning of cohabitation is the founding event. Marriage lost its original meaning for the youngest cohort, as observed in several Western countries. In the third model, the foundation of the autonomous household does not seem to be important to the process of family formation. Although the timing of marriage has been delayed for almost all the nationalities, the patterns became increasingly differentiated after the 1990s. These differences in marriage patterns can affect the number of mixed marriages. The cohabitation of young married couples with the parents of one partner, as observed in Kosovo and Serbia, can be incompatible with models of marriage in which it is co-integrated with the foundation of an autonomous household. In another respect, the development of cohabiting unions and disappearance of marriage for Slovenians can affect mixed unions if a potential partner belonging to another ethnic group is

reluctant to enter a cohabiting union as an alternative to marriage. As a whole, these results cannot be interpreted solely on the basis of culture. They could partially be interpreted as possible outputs of the periods of political and economic uncertainty, which characterised the period during and after the violent conflicts.

Distance to Mixed Marriage in Countries of the Former Yugoslavia

The TRACES survey asked men and women born between 1968 and 1974 how they felt about other nationalities. Would they accept these people as co-workers, close friends, relatives and marital partners? We consider this last item in relation to mixed marriages to investigate the individual acceptance of a potential partner of another nationality. As we use the TRACES survey, the context of this analysis is the context at the date of the survey (2006) (i.e., after the wars and the creation of new countries, when Montenegro is becoming independent and Kosovo is under UN administration).

We are especially interested in investigating whether men and women differ in their acceptance of marriage. In addition, we wish to determine whether there is a correlation between the acceptance of marriage to someone of another community and the closeness between national groups.

We consider the following nationalities: Serb, Croat, Bosniak (Muslim), Albanian, Macedonian, Slovenian, Montenegrin and Hungarian[7]. As in the last section, we account for the nationality declared in the 1991 census, including declarations of Yugoslav nationality. For each nationality declared in 1991, we estimated the proportion of people who declared that they had accepted a match with a partner of another nationality (the Muslim nationality, as declared in the 1991 census, was considered to be equivalent to the Bosniak nationality, as declared in the TRACES survey).

Figure 4.6 compares the men's and women's responses. The proportions of positive answers given by the men to the question of whether they would accept a match with a partner of another nationality are reported on the *x abscissa*, whereas the answers given by the women are reported on the *y ordinate*. The results show that the differences between men and women are small and that trends depend strongly on the nationality declared in 1991. The Albanians and, to a lesser extent, the Muslims are uninterested in the idea of a marriage with a partner of any other nationality. The Slovenians are more open to mixed marriages. The Montenegrins are the most open to the idea of marrying a partner of another nationality. The respondents of the other ethnic groups answer positively depending on the nationality of the potential partner. The Croats have a strong aversion to marrying Bosniaks, Albanians and Serbs but

[7] Questions on the possibility of intermarriage with a Rom, a Bulgarian, a citizen of Albania, a Russian or a citizen of the European Union or the USA were also asked. However, we exclude answers given for these nationalities to restrict ourselves to the more numerous nationalities present in the former Yugoslavia.



Fig. 4.6 Proportions of people who accept a mixed marriage according to the respondent's nationality and the nationality of the potential partner: men vs. women

are more open to marrying Slovenians and Hungarians. We suppose that these preferences can be related to common religion in the definition of the national identity. The Serbs are also averse to marrying Bosniaks, Albanians, and Croats but are open to marrying Montenegrins. This result is in accordance with the high proportion of Serbs who declared that they have a Macedonian partner in the SEESSP survey in 2003 (Table 4.1). The Macedonians present the greatest variability. They are reluctant to marry Albanians but are more open to marrying Serbs or Montenegrins. The respondents who declared themselves as Yugoslavs in the 1991 census also differ according to their nationality. They are less open to marrying Muslims or Albanians and are more open to marrying Serbs. This finding is in accordance with the fact that the persons who declared themselves as Yugoslavs were often communist Serbs (Sekulic et al. 1994).

These first results show a net segregation of the Albanian and Muslim communities. The people from these communities are reluctant to marry persons of other

nationalities, and the persons of other nationalities are reluctant to marry partners of one of these two nationalities. A weaker segregation process also operates between Catholic nationalities and orthodox nationalities. Albanians, Muslims, Slovenians and Macedonians do not differ by gender. Unlike Serbian and Montenegrin women, the Croatian women appear to be less reluctant to participate in mixed marriages. The "Yugoslav" women are more reluctant than the men to marry any of the nationalities other than the Serbs. However, the general result remains: the differences between the genders are smaller than the differences among the nationalities.

We are now interested in the links between the acceptance of mixed marriages and the opportunities to meet members of other groups, which we determine by estimating Bell's *exposure index* for each pair of nationalities (Bell 1954; Massey and Denton 1988; Reardon and Firebaugh 2002). The motivation behind using this index is to estimate the probability that a person of a given nationality living somewhere in the former Yugoslavia will randomly meet a person of another nationality. This index is computed based on the definition of sub-areas. In the present case, the sub-areas will be composed of each of the 80 regions that were defined for the sampling of the TRACES (Spini et al. 2010). The exposure index is computed by summing the product for each region of the proportion of individuals from nationality i living in a region on the population from nationality i living in the overall territory with the proportion of persons of nationality j living in this region on the overall population living in this region. Such an index can also be computed if $j = i$. In this case, the index represents the probability that an individual will meet someone of the same group in random conditions and is called the *isolation index* (Bell 1954). If this index reaches a value of 1, then persons of nationality i have no chance of being in contact with someone of another nationality. The complement then represents the probability that someone of group i will meet a person of any group. Bell's exposure indices between each pair of groups were computed based on the nationalities declared in the 1991 census.

Before showing the eventual relations between the exposure index and the proximity to a mixed marriage, we examine how the isolation index evolved between 1990 and 2006 for each nationality[8]. Did armed conflicts and the collapse of the former Yugoslavia result in increased isolation for each ethnic group? As we are using a sample and not exhaustive data, we used bootstrap techniques[9] to determine the confidence intervals of the isolation index for each of these two years. Comparing the years 1990 and 2006 shows that isolation increased significantly in the case of the Muslims (Table 4.5). However, it should be noted that the other groups, especially the Albanians, Slovenians, Croatians and Macedonians (i.e., more than 70 % of the sample), already presented a high isolation index before the conflicts occurred, which means that they already had fewer opportunities to be in contact with the other groups. The Serbians and Muslims were less isolated. The persons who identified

[8] The nationality considered is the nationality declared in 1991.

[9] We draw 10,000 subsamples with replacement and estimated in each of these subsamples the isolation index for each nationality. In each case, the isolation indices were estimated by accounting for the sample weights.

Table 4.5 Confidence intervals of the isolation index by nationality in 1991 and 2006 (TRACES data)

Declared nationality in 1991	1991	2006
Albanians	[0.8096–0.8703]	[0.8430–0.8919]
Croats	[0.7273–0.7836]	[0.7535–0.8077]
Macedonians	[0.7174–0.7936]	[0.7234–0.7966]
Montenegrins	[0.2582–0.4800]	[0.2585–0.4906]
Serbs	[0.5472–0.6162]	[0.5934–0.6610]
Slovenians	[0.8571–0.9159]	[0.8581–0.9154]
Muslims	[0.4673–0.5484]	[0.5980–0.6772]
Yugoslavs	[0.1839–0.2432]	[0.1904–0.2503]

as Yugoslavs had the highest probability of meeting someone of another nationality. However, this finding does not mean that the Yugoslavs are randomly distributed in the former Yugoslavia. They represent 8.1 % of the respondents from the TRACES study, while their isolation index reached 20 % in 1991 and 23 % in 2006.

These estimates are now confronted with the distance to mixed marriage at the individual level. As we did not observe strong differences between the genders, we will consider the distances to mixed marriage for both men and women. A Muslim nationality declared in 1991 is considered equivalent to the Bosniak nationality. Figure 4.7 presents the plots of the exposure indices on the *y ordinate* and the proportion of persons who would accept a marriage with a partner of another nationality on the *x abscissa* for each nationality declared in 1991. The graphs show a plurality of results. For example, the Albanians' strong aversion to mixed marriages corresponds to their low exposure indices to persons of other nationalities. The Muslims present a similar pattern except that the exposure indices to Croatians and Serbs approach 10 %. The Croatians, Serbs and Slovenians do not present any link between exposure and distance to mixed marriage. The exposure indices are always close to 0, whereas the proportion of interviewed persons who accept mixed marriages range from 30 to 70 % according to the nationality of the potential partner. The graph for the Macedonians shows a negative correlation between the exposure indices and acceptance of mixed marriages. The exposure is the highest with the Albanians, but the acceptance of marriages with partners of this nationality is close to zero. The Macedonians' exposure to the other nationalities is much lower than their exposure to the Albanians. The Macedonians' openness to marriage ranges from 20 % (Muslims) to almost 90 % (Serbs). In contrast with the Macedonians, the Montenegrins show a positive link between the two indices. The Montenegrins are highly exposed to Serbs and Muslims, while the distance to mixed marriage is the highest for these two nationalities. The Montenegrins are also often open to marrying a partner of another nationality despite their lower exposure to the persons of this nationality. A similar result can be found for the individuals who described themselves as Yugoslavs in the 1991 census. Their exposure index is the highest for the Serbs, and the self-described Yugoslavs mostly accept marriages with Serbs.

In conclusion, the results do not completely support the hypothesis of a correlation (either positive or negative) between exposure to other nationalities and openness



Fig. 4.7 Bell's exposure index vs. the proportion who accept a mixed marriage according to the respondent's nationality

to mixed marriage. For several nationalities, especially for the groups with a strong index of isolation (the Croats, Slovenians and Serbs), there is no correlation between these two indices. The Albanians, who are strongly isolated from the other nationalities, are reluctant to accept the idea of a marriage with someone of another nationality. A similar result can be observed for the Muslims. The Macedonians present a negative correlation, whereas the Montenegrins and those who identified themselves as Yugoslavs present a positive correlation between exposure and willingness to marry the members of other communities. Such differences between nationalities indicate that the acceptance or non-acceptance of mixed marriages does not solely depend on opportunities to contact other nationalities and interactions between nationalities according to their spatial repartition and exposure. In the next section, we attempt to synthesise all of our findings to analyse in greater detail the acceptance of mixed marriage in each region of the former Yugoslavia.

The Impact of Short-Term Conflicts and Long-Term History on the Frequency of Mixed Marriages

There was no unique marriage pattern at the time of the former Yugoslavia. There were, in fact, three different patterns of marriage and family formation: a "Slovenian" pattern in which a cohabiting union preceded the marriage; an "Albanian" pattern linked to enlarged families; and a "main" pattern in which the union formation is co-integrated with marriage or occurs a shortly thereafter. According to Botev (1994), these patterns reflect longstanding cleavages and influences, as the territory of the former Yugoslavia has been occupied by different empires throughout history. Differences between these historic patterns create barriers to mixed marriages despite their high promotion by the regime. Economic crisis, armed conflicts, the collapse of the former Yugoslavia and the creation of new countries with new institutions created new divergences in marriage patterns. However, the links between the opportunities to contact different nationalities and the acceptance of marriages with persons belonging to other groups have changed since these events. In 2006, a marriage with an Albanian or a Muslim was rejected by a majority of the people from the other nationalities, whereas the Albanians and Muslims were reluctant to marry partners from other communities. These results regarding the acceptance of marriage echo the low number of mixed marriages among Albanians and Muslims before the early 1990s (Mrdjen 1996). This finding reflects a division between Muslims and non-Muslims. This cleavage is so strong that the nationalities that are in high contact with Muslims generally do not accept mixed marriages with Muslims. For example, the Macedonians do not accept marriages with the Albanians in our study. In addition to the differences in religion and language, the marriage patterns are different between the Macedonians and the Albanians. The Macedonian men and women marry at a young age, and their marriages are co-integrated with the foundation of autonomous households. Our comparison between the cohorts shows that the economic crisis after the 1980s did not influence the age at marriage. Conversely, Albanians of the youngest cohort, especially men, married at a lower rate and later in life in response to the economic crisis and conflicts, whereas long periods of cohabitation with the parents of one partner were becoming increasingly common. These differences in marriage due to both cultural differences and economic or political circumstances appear to have created new barriers on the marriage market. Such a division is not so pronounced between Catholics and Orthodox: Croats were unlikely to accept marriages with Serb partners in 2006, whereas marriages between these two nationalities were frequent during the 1980s (Mrdjen 1996). In this case, Croats' reluctance to marry Serbs may be linked to the conflicts or perhaps the preceding time period, during which the nationalist ideologies became increasingly dominant. Mrdjen (1996, p. 106, n. 9) observed that the proportion of marriages among Croats and Serbs in which a Croat married a partner of another nationality decreased from 66 to 50 % between 1989 and 1990.

In contrast, Slovenes often accept marriages with partners of other nationalities. The conflicts were of low intensity in Slovenia, and the economic crisis was the weakest in this country. Mixed marriages are accepted, although it should also be noted

that marriage is losing its significance as the founding event of the family life course. Moreover, although uncommon before the 1990s (Mrdjen 1996), Slovenian mixed marriages differed from those in other regions in that Slovenian mixed marriages matched Slovenian women with men from other nationalities (Morokvasic-Muller 2004). In this case, despite strong cultural differences and perhaps because mixed marriages were infrequent before the 1990s, mixed marriages are well accepted.

A more surprising finding comes from the Montenegrins, who presented a high acceptance of mixed marriages in 2006. The SESSP results show that the number of Montenegrins who declared that they had Serb partners was one of the highest in 2003 (Table 4.1). This finding is in contrast with the fact that mixed marriages between these two nationalities decreased throughout the 1980s (Mrdjen 1996). The Serbs living in Montenegro present a high acceptance of marriages with Montenegrin partners. These contrasting results could be related to the process of independence in Montenegro, which started during the second half of the 1990s. According to Caspersen (2003), the division between the pro-independent and non-independent factions did not superpose with an ethnic cleavage. The pro-independent block had a pluri-ethnic basis, whereas many Montenegrins opposed independence from Yugoslavia. The author uses the expression of "ethnicity with a very fluid nature" (p. 115) while observing that some persons defined themselves as Montenegrin-Serbs[10] or Montenegrin-Yugoslav, which are the first examples of mixed national identities.

Thus, there is no unique relationship between the acceptance of mixed marriages and the level of contact among nationalities. The rate of intermarriage appears to be a mixture of dependencies related to the long-term influence of culture and the short-term impact of the political collapse of the former Yugoslavia. The degree of diversity among communities depends on the context of the new country, especially with respect to whether and how nationalism is promoted. In some cases, such as Montenegro, the long-term dependency vanishes, whereas in other cases, longstanding cleavages (e.g., the separation between Albanians and Macedonians) drive the acceptance of mixed marriage. In accordance with Sekulic (see Chap. 3), cultural similarities or dissimilarities are related to the level of tolerance, as measured by the acceptance of mixed marriages described in this study.

[10] EESP data indicate that 46.9 % of the subsample of interviewed persons in Montenegro ($N = 1417$) declared themselves Montenegrins, 29.5 % declared themselves Serbs, 3.6 % declared themselves Montenegrin-Serbs and 1 % declared themselves Serbian-Montenegrins. The remaining 19 % adopted other nationalities.

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Chapter 5
The Destruction of Multiethnic Locations: Markers of Identity and the Determinants of Residential Trajectories

Jacques-Antoine Gauthier and Eric D. Widmer

Modern conflicts have been associated with large numbers of relocated individuals (Schmeidl 1997). The Yugoslavian wars are no exception: they have been associated with systematic ethnic cleansing and dramatic relocations of civil populations.[1] It is of great importance to understand how collective threats, such as wars, affect individual lives. To understand migrations related to wars, we must not only measure the extent to which an ethnic minority group is a victim of discrimination and collective threats but also estimate the influence of such phenomena on the life experiences and life trajectories of the individuals belonging to these minority groups.[2] Individuals facing collective violence may remain where they used to live or be driven out. If they leave their original residence, they may relocate elsewhere permanently or return to their original residence during or after the conflict. They may need to move once or several times. The experience of war is peculiar in that it may have little long-term effect on some but significantly tilt the balance of life for others.

[1] Bonifazi and Mamolo (2004) state that three internal migration streams occurred within the former Yugoslavia during the nineties. According to their data, 287,000 Bosnians were displaced to Croatia in 1993, 349,000 Bosnians lived in Yugoslavia in 1992 and 299,000 individuals were forced to migrate from Croatia to Yugoslavia in 1999. In addition, during the same period, more than one million people from these regions applied for asylum in foreign industrialised countries. Note that the assessment of migrations during wartime varies greatly depending on the methodology used and the institutions in charge of the assessment.

[2] According to Parrillo (2006), a minority may be defined by its low access to social power (i.e., as a position on a hierarchical scale). However, other factors such as size (numerical minority), cultural (or physical) traits and group consciousness are also important.

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Life-course research (Elder 1999) strongly emphasises on the individual experience of collective threats, such as economic crises or wars. Reconstructing residential trajectories in the former Yugoslavia helps us understand the impact of war on individuals' lives. How many people stayed, and how many left? How many of those who left returned? These simple questions are crucial to understanding ordinary citizens' experiences of the Yugoslavian wars. These questions raise the possibility that the experiences of war are varied. The aggregated statistics and the figures and discourses of the mass media strongly suggest that a uniform destiny exists among ethnic minorities facing collective threats. However, as social scientists, we should not take this uniformity for granted. Life-course research informs us that there is significant variability in the way major historical traumas, such as the Great Depression of the 1930's and World War II, were experienced (Elder 1999). In particular, the impacts of cohort, gender, and social class have been emphasised by past researchers. From the literature, we know that Jews in young adulthood, males, and individuals with higher levels of education were more likely to migrate from Nazi Germany than children, older adults, females, and individuals with lower educational levels (Evans 2005). The impact of social identity on the experience of collective threats is key to understanding the long-term effect of nationalist policies and acts of intimidation aimed at minorities.

However, the causal link between intergroup conflict and ethnic cleansing still needs to be better understood. If conflicts inevitably precede violence, then the Yugoslavian wars might have been caused by long-lasting ethnic rivalry. Conversely, one may argue that violence emerges as a consequence of new ideological discourses with respect to social identities by, for instance, exacerbating the groups' cultural distance due to religious affiliation and/or language. These discourses may create new social boundaries and escalate tensions to discriminate against and oppose social groups (see Sekulic, Chap. 3). This perspective is especially relevant, as the notion of ethnicity itself is highly malleable. At a given time, ethnicity may "form a mythical narrative for a community, encompassing the group's (idealised) past and its present, as well as its (promised) future" (Elcheroth and Spini 2011, p. 176). This feature underlines the extent to which specific fears and violence may be institutionalised to obtain power and territories through ethnic cleansing. In fact, it is only when we understand more precisely who was primarily affected by exile that we will be able to assess the long-term impact of the Yugoslavian conflict. This chapter does not propose a theory explaining why forced migrations occur in times of war nor does it hypothesise about which individual factors promote which trajectories. It quantitatively describes the distinct experiences of individuals living in specific times and places during the Yugoslavian wars and relates those experiences to classical sociological variables, such as cohort, sex, educational level, and of course, ethnicity.

Comparing Migration Trajectories in the Regions of the Former Yugoslavia

Quantitatively describing individual trajectories is not an easy task, and the ability to capture the occurrence, timing, ordering, and duration of the meaningful events that constitute life sequences requires a special methodology. Rather than attempting to describe the average life sequence in a given social context, contemporary social scientists emphasise on the diversity of life sequences and their anchoring in broader social contexts. For a long time, life histories rather than standardised interviews and quantitative methods were used to retrace life sequences because the quantity and complexity of information to be treated were simply too large to be of use in quantitative research. The development of optimal matching analysis (Abbott and Tsay 2000) has permitted scholars to build typologies of trajectories and thereby overcome the difficulties of standard distance measurements in the social sciences.[3] When applied to the residential trajectories of individuals living in the former Yugoslavia from 1990 to 2004, this technique defines seven regions characterised by the similarity of the residential trajectories of their inhabitants. Among these regions, we retain three, characterised by an overall high level of residential mobility and great similarities concerning the residential trajectories of their inhabitants (Table 5.1).[4] The data concerning residential mobility are collected retrospectively for the period from 1990 to 2004. The time unit is the quarter, and the geographical unit is given by 25 aggregations derived from the 121 original survey areas (80 areas within the former Yugoslavia plus countries outside of the former Yugoslavia) included in the TRACES project. Therefore, short-term and/or short-distance migrations that occurred within the 121 geographic units cannot be assessed by this questionnaire.

The first region is composed of Slavonia and Dalmatia, two parts from the former Croatian Republic contested between the Serbs and Croats because of a strong Serb minority. The migrations that occurred in this area are related to the first stage of the conflict (1990–1992), which is sometimes called the War of Croatia. Most of the fighting between Serbia and Croatia happened there, especially around the issue of Krajina. A second region comprises the areas included in the former Yugoslavian

[3] Optimal matching analysis (OMA) emerged in the 1990s and has become a main methodological innovation in the social sciences for finding patterns in life sequences from a quantitative perspective. OMA is based on the assumption that a succession of social statuses or events constitutes stories throughout the course of life that can be measured in a set of data. The usual measures of distance, such as the Euclidean distance, are ineffective for many types of sequential data if, for example, the lengths of these measures differ from one another. Therefore, multivariate statistical methods falling within the framework of dynamic programming procedures have been applied to the study of such data (Needleman and Wunsch 1970; Kruskal 1983). Since the 1980s, some social scientists (Abbott 1983; Abbott and Hrycak 1990; Erzberger and Prein 1997; Levy et al. 2006; Aisenbray and Fasang 2007; Gauthier 2007) have stressed the potential of such methods to address social science issues in which the problem is comparing chronological sequences of various types (e.g., residential, family or occupational statuses).

[4] To allow interregional comparisons, all of the computations made for the analyses presented in this chapter use the population and design weights specifically defined for the TRACES data.

Table 5.1 Aggregation levels of the regions of the former Yugoslavia considered in the analyses

Regions (clusters of geographic units)	Geographic units (sets of survey areas)	Area codes
Region 1 (case study): *Dalmatia and Slavonia*	Dalmatia	DA
	Slavonia	SV
Region 2 (case study): *Bosnia-Herzegovina*	Northern Bosnia	NB
	Eastern Bosnia	EB
	Eastern Herzegovina 1	EH1
	City of Sarajevo	SJ
	Western Bosnia	WB
	Western Herzegovina 1	WH1
	Central Bosnia	CB
	Brcko Posavki	BP1
Region 3 (case study): *Kosovo and surroundings*	Poloski	PO
	City of Pristina	PR
	Western Serbia	WS
	Mitrovicë (KO3)	MI
	Skopje	SK
	Eastern Serbia 5	ES5
	Albania	ALB
	Kosovo (without KO3)	KO
	Eastern Macedonia	EM
	Montenegro	MN

republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This region is related to another stage of the conflict, commonly called the Bosnian War (1992–1995). A third cluster is associated with the latest stage of the conflict, which happened in 1998–1999 and includes Kosovo together with its neighbouring areas across (South-Western) Serbia, Montenegro, (Northern) Macedonia and Albania.[5]

As these regions differed significantly in the patterns of observable residential trajectories, we chose to compute distinct analyses for each of them.[6] In each of the three regions, the analyses enabled us to uncover four types of trajectories (Table 5.2). Based on Table 5.2, one can infer that a majority of the trajectories in the three regions concern individuals who did not change their areas of residence during the overall

[5] In this last case, further investigation by cluster analysis revealed another division into two sides: (1) Serbia and (2) Montenegro, Kosovo, Eastern Macedonia, and Albania, which presented slightly different patterns. This distinction was disregarded in this chapter to keep a reasonable number of cases in each cluster.

[6] When analysing all of the individual trajectories from the three regions together, the optimal matching analysis produced unconvincing results. All of the stable trajectories (i.e., the trajectories that took place in one region only) made their own clusters, and mixed trajectories (with individuals spending some years in several regions) were gathered in meaningless "garbage" clusters. Splitting the analysis among the three regions described above allowed us to overcome this difficulty.

Table 5.2 Distribution of the types of residential trajectories according to varying contexts

Types of trajectories	Region under study				
	Slavonia and Dalmatia	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo	Total	*N*
Stability within the area	70 %	76 %	85 %	80 %	1,649
One-way	13 %	11 %	5 %	8 %	171
Back and forth	14 %	7 %	9 %	9 %	185
Cross-borders	3 %	6 %	1 %	3 %	64
Total	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %	2,069



Fig. 5.1 Return trajectories of people who spent at least one quarter in Western Bosnia-Herzegovina (15 %) between 1990 and 2004

study period (1990–2004).[7] A second type of trajectory (i.e., a one-way trajectory) is characterised by only one move across areas, mostly within the same region. A third type of trajectory similarly involves moving out of the region of origin. However, after spending several years elsewhere (usually in another area of the region or in a foreign country), the migrants move back to their areas of origin. A fourth type of trajectory is much less frequent and includes the trajectories that involve crossing the border of the region and resettling elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia.

The existence of the same types of trajectories across regions and their similar distributions suggest some communality in the migrations experienced by the individuals who settled in the three regions considered here. However, a closer look at the three regions taken shows that the resettlers differed from one another.

The methodology used in this chapter enables us to analyse the patterns of life trajectories at various levels of aggregation. For instance, Fig. 5.1 represents each individual as a line with different shades of grey or colours indicating distinct locations for each year between 1990 and 2004. The possibility of visualising the individual sequences of residence while keeping the overall pattern of sequences in sight is a great strength of this type of representation. The individuals in Fig. 5.1

[7] Short-term movements and/or movements within the region cannot be assessed with the TRACES questionnaire.

spent at least one quarter in Western Bosnia and Western Herzegovina. In this area, the back-and-forth trajectories present a timing that is in line with historical events, such as the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995 or the reinforcement of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Because of the sample size limitations, it is impossible to analyse each region independently. However, it makes sense to focus on the specific regions in more detailed analyses. We now analyse the life trajectories within each area.[8]

Residential Trajectories in Slavonia and Dalmatia

The analysis revealed that 76 % of the individuals who resided at one point or another in Slavonia or Dalmatia during the 14 years considered in this study have a stable trajectory, with no change in region. In all, 10 % experienced a one-way shift, and 11 % experienced a return (going back and forth between two regions); 3 % followed residential trajectories that we call "cross-border." We find 300 individuals (76 % of the sample of this area) who did not change regions in the period considered (i.e., they stayed either in Slavonia or Dalmatia for the whole period). Our analyses reveal that one-way trajectories mostly belonged to individuals who left Slavonia to move to Serbia, Zagreb or Istria. A few also moved to an international location rather early and came back to Dalmatia later. In every case, the moves happened early in the war (i.e., between 1990 and 1992). The people who moved twice are one of the three types. Some came from Bosnia and lived in Slavonia for approximately 3 years before returning. Most of the others left Slavonia for Zagreb or other countries between 1992 and 1995 and came back thereafter. A later migration occurred between 1998 and 2004. Most of these individuals lived in Dalmatia, relocated to Zagreb or Istria for a period of time and then returned to Dalmatia.

The regression analysis (Table 5.3) provides strong evidence that ethnicity played a major role during the Croatian war. The non-Catholics living in another region of the area during the first half of 1990 were much more likely to move out of their home region than the Catholics from Dalmatia and Slavonia (reference category). The importance of religious affiliation shows that the residential trajectories in this Slavonia-Dalmatia area were embedded into ethnic groups but that within the ethnic groups, all individuals had the same likelihood of experiencing a migration irrespective of their sex and birth cohorts. Only the individuals with high educational levels had a higher chance of experiencing either a one-way or a return trajectory. In this area, facing one or the other type of victimisation (economic, political and/or

[8] To provide a more detailed view of the migration patterns at a local level, we keep the different regions that each case study is specifically focused on distinct from one another.

Table 5.3 Predictors of migration trajectories in Dalmatia and Slavonia (Multinomial regressions)

	Stability ($N = 300$)	One-way ($N = 39$)	Return ($N = 44$)	Cross-borders ($N = 12$)
Sex (men = 1)	–	0.88	1.47	2.52
Cohort 1974–1991	–	7.35*	1.75	1.71
Cohort 1957–1973	–	2	0.43	1.72
Cohort 1942–1956	–	3.69	0.31	0.34
Cohort 1941 and before (ref.)	–	–	–	–
Education: low	–	0.08***	0.12***	0.25
Education: medium	–	0.23***	0.23***	0.31
Education: high (ref.)	–	–	–	
Religious practice: regular (ref.)	–	–	–	–
Religious practice: occasional	–	1.07	1.39	0.56
Religious practice: almost never	–	0.81	0.7	0.71
Non-Catholics from all regions	–	1.41	12.06***	5.68*
Catholics from SL, DA[a]	–	–	–	–
Catholics from all other regions	–	412.07***	105.13***	134.61***
War victimisation (yes = 1)		5.87	2.34**	3.85
Economic victimisation (yes = 1)		1.25	2.3	4,621.62[b]
Political victimisation (yes = 1)		2.3	1.11	4.56**

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

[a] Living in this area in the first trimester 1990

[b] All individuals of this group have been victimised

military) is not strongly associated with the migration patterns.[9] However, the individuals who were victims of war during the period of observation were more likely to move back and forth from their regions of origin, whereas cross-border trajectories appeared to be more frequent among those suffering from economic and political victimisation.

Residential Trajectories in the Bosnian Region

In the Bosnian region, approximately three out of four individuals did not move from one area to another during the 14 years considered in this study. A total of 11 % moved once, 8 % moved twice (i.e., back and forth), and another 7 % had cross-border trajectories. In this region, most of the one-way trajectories concern the individuals who lived first in Central Bosnia or Brcko Posavski and moved to Eastern Bosnia and Eastern Herzegovina in either 1992 or 1996. Another smaller group of resettlers moved to Northern Bosnia or Serbia. A few one-way trajectories concern individuals who fled to Slavonia and Dalmatia and never returned. The return trajectories are much more heterogeneous. A large number of trajectories concern individuals who

[9] We consider an individual to be victimised if he or she has faced at least one specific instance of victimisation during the period of observation. War, economic victimisation and political victimisation are assessed using questions w1 to w7, n1 to n4 and n5 to n8, respectively, of the TRACES calendar questionnaire.

left central Bosnia, Northern Bosnia, or Sarajevo to spend between 2 and 4 years living outside of the former Yugoslavia. They spent time abroad mostly between 1992 and 1995, during which time the Bosnian War occurred. Another temporary migration occurred from 1996 to 2003. These migrants temporarily left Western Bosnia to resettle in Northern Bosnia before moving back to Western Bosnia.

Most people living in Western Bosnia and Western Herzegovina who developed a back-and-forth trajectory moved out at approximately the same time. The emigration happened within a month before the fourth quarter of 1995, right after the Srebrenica massacre (July 1995), in which Serbian forces killed more than 8,000 Muslim Bosnians to chase Muslims from the area and ethnically cleanse the area (Vollen 2001). The massacre had some unintended consequences. The Orthodox Christians fled en masse from Western Bosnia immediately after the massacre, as the TRACES data show in Fig. 5.1, probably because they feared the retaliations of the Muslim Bosnians in the areas in which the Orthodox Christians were a minority. They returned to Western Bosnia early in 2000, probably when the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina provided some guarantees to Serb minorities.

Table 5.4 reveals that migrating during the period of observation is strongly associated with exposure to war and political victimisation in Bosnia. Under these conditions, men and those belonging to the 1957–1973 cohort (i.e., those who were between 25 and 35 years old at the outbreak of the Bosnian war) were much more likely to make a one-way trajectory. In comparison, the likelihood of returning was neither sex- nor age-specific. The back-and-forth movers were mostly Muslims from Sarajevo and Northern and Eastern Bosnia and the Orthodox Christians from Western and Central Bosnia. However, the Orthodox Christians were more likely to follow such a trajectory than the Muslims. The one-way residential trajectories concern the same ethnic groups, although their likelihood of experiencing such moves is, in the latter case, much higher than that of the reference category (Muslims from Western Bosnia, Western Herzegovina, or central Bosnia).

Residential Trajectories in Kosovo and Surroundings

According to the TRACES data, the percentage of resettlers was lower in the area constituted by the former republics of Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro than in the two previous areas. Approximately 87 % of the individuals who lived in the area in 1990 did not move, only 4 % permanently relocated, 8 % moved back and forth, and 1 % crossed the borders of the area to another part of the former Yugoslavia. Most of the changes occurred in the narrow time period from 1998–1999, during the Kosovo conflict. In the Serbian area, one-way trajectories were made by the individuals living in Kosovo who fled to Montenegro and the settlers of Western or Eastern Serbia who fled from Kosovo to Belgrade or to Eastern Serbia. The patterns of relocation were much more diverse and complex in this case than in the two other areas, although these relocations occurred within a much narrower time period. The individuals who made back-and-forth trajectories came overwhelmingly from Kosovo and spent a rather

Table 5.4 Predictors of migration trajectories in Bosnia (Multinomial regressions)

	Stability ($N = 585$)	One-way ($N = 89$)	Return ($N = 61$)	Cross-borders ($N = 57$)
Sex (men = 1)	–	2.01**	1.6	3.09***
Cohort 1974–1991	–	3.05*	1.53	1.49
Cohort 1957–1973	–	3.26**	2.41	1.78
Cohort 1942–1956	–	1.9	1.01	1.78
Cohort 1941 and before (ref.)	–	–	–	–
Education: low	–	0.96	2.54	2.04
Education: medium	–	0.55	1.57	1.13
Education: high (ref.)	–	–	–	–
Religious practice: regular (ref.)	–	–	–	–
Religious practice: occasional	–	0.94	0.97	1.08
Religious practice: almost never	–	0.65	1.1	0.51
Muslim from WB, WH1, CB, BP1[a]	–	–	–	–
Muslim from SJ, NB, EB, EH1	–	18.77***	6.46***	2.16
Orthodox from WB, WH1, CB, BP1	–	181.51***	12.79***	0
Orthodox from SJ, NB, EB, EH1	–	2.72	0.96	0.73
Orthodox from other regions	–	11.60***	11.71***	0
Roman Catholics from WB, WH1, CB, BP1	–	2.5	0.11	0.73
Roman Catholics from other regions (incl. SJ, NB, . . .)	–	94.42***	18.67***	21.49***
War victimisation (yes = 1)		11.30***	19.45***	4.69***
Economic victimisation (yes = 1)		1.45	0.61	0.92
Political victimisation (yes = 1)		3.42***	3.50***	1.64

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

[a] Living in this area in the first trimester 1990

short period of time spent outside of the former Yugoslavia. Less frequently, back-and-forth trajectories were made by the individuals who fled from Western Serbia to other parts of Serbia (Belgrade, Eastern Serbia) before returning to Western Serbia.

Table 5.5 shows that in this region, people who were victimised by the war and had higher levels of education were more likely to emigrate, whereas economic victimisation and political discrimination are not associated with a specific type of residential trajectory. Compared with the older cohorts, the younger cohorts tend to more frequently follow unstable, non-returning trajectories. Regular religious practice in this area is more characteristic of one-way movers. Compared with the Muslims from the other regions, the Muslims from Kosovo have a much lower chance of experiencing a one-way or a cross-border trajectory. The Orthodox Christians from Western Serbia were also more likely to experience a back-and-forth trajectory. In this regard, there is a strong similarity between the two populations during the conflict.

Table 5.5 Predictors of residential trajectories in Serbia, Macedonia and Kosovo (Multinomial regressions)

	Stability ($N = 1{,}007$)	One-way ($N = 44$)	Return ($N = 88$)	Cross-borders ($N = 17$)
Sex (men = 1)	–	1.16	0.63*	2.45
Cohort 1974–1991	–	3.53	0.66	1,354.65
Cohort 1957–1973	–	2.52	0.24***	2,109.06***
Cohort 1942–1956	–	1.02	0.35*	203.55
Cohort 1941 and before (ref.)	–	–	–	–
Education: low	–	0.34**	0.26***	0.45
Education: medium	–	0.62	0.50***	1.48
Education: high (ref.)	–	–	–	–
Religious practice: regular (ref.)	–	–	–	–
Religious practice: occasional	–	0.30***	1.36	0.42
Religious practice: almost never	–	0.53*	1.18	0.49
Muslim from MI, PR, KO[a]	–	0.03***	1.12	0.001**
Muslim from WS, CS, ES1-4	–	0.86	2.91	1.03
Muslim from other regions	–	–	–	–
Orthodox from MI, PR, KO	–	1.64	0.73	0[b]
Orthodox from WS, CS, ES1–4	–	1.61	4.82***	0.94
Orthodox from other regions	–	0.26***	0.53	0.53
Roman Catholics from any region	–	0.39	0.91	0.71
War victimisation (yes = 1)		4.52***	3.64***	1.72
Economic victimisation (yes = 1)		1.14	2.96*	4,493.11[c]
Political victimisation (yes = 1)		0.94	1.59*	3.60**

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

[a] Living in this area in the first trimester 1990

[b] No individual of this group belongs to this type

[c] All individuals of this group have been victimised

Overall Resettlements

What about the resettlements overall? Each of the former sections focused on a specific area, but it is necessary to consider how the various dimensions of the residential trajectories play out in general and to estimate the impacts of the three areas on the chances of developing each type of residential trajectory. Table 5.6 presents a multinomial regression linking the types of residential trajectories stemming from the three areas with the same set of predictors examined in the previous sections.

The results of Table 5.6 mostly confirm the findings of the previous sections while also revealing some regional specificities. Overall, being directly and personally victimised by war-related events is strongly associated with a temporary or permanent departure from the region of origin. Being a victim of war is the best overall predictor of residential trajectories. Economic distress and political victimisation are strongly associated with back-and-forth trajectories. One-way movers are usually men and individuals with a lower level of education and non-regular religious practices. Note that although the cohort effect is only partially significant, it globally underlines the

Table 5.6 Multinomial logistic regression on residential trajectories for the three areas under study

		Stability ($N = 1{,}892$)	One-way ($N = 172$)	Return ($N = 193$)	Cross-borders ($N = 86$)
Sex (men = 1)	$N = 967$	–	2.41***	1.05	1.39*
Cohort 1974–1991	$N = 705$	–	1.02	1.31	2.52**
Cohort 1957–1973	$N = 789$	–	1.26	0.57*	1.69
Cohort 1942–1956	$N = 406$	–	0.98	0.45**	1.46
Cohort 1941 and before (ref.)	$N = 158$	–	–	–	–
Education: low	$N = 498$	–	1.13	0.42***	0.53**
Education: medium	$N = 1{,}180$	–	0.83	0.43***	0.42***
Education: high (ref.)	$N = 388$	–	–	–	–
Religion = Muslim (ref.)	$N = 864$	–	–	–	–
Religion = Catholic orthodox	$N = 807$	–	1.18	1.43*	6.53***
Religion = Roman Catholic	$N = 398$	–	2.30**	0.81	7.44***
Religious practice: regular (ref.)	$N = 345$	–	–	–	–
Religious practice: occasional	$N = 843$	–	0.64	1.17	0.56***
Religious practice: almost never	$N = 880$	–	0.51**	1.17	0.59**
Residence 1990 = Serbia, Kosovo (ref.)	$N = 1{,}008$	–	–	–	–
Residence 1990 = Dalmatia, Slavonia	$N = 291$	–	0.86	4.52***	0.96
Residence 1990 = Bosnia, Herzegovina	$N = 679$	–	2.33***	1.48*	2.26
Residence 1990 = Other	$N = 181$	–	4.27***	5.41***	3.12***
War victimisation (yes = 1)	$N = 1{,}101$	–	2.67***	4.55***	5.32***
Economic victimisation (yes = 1)	$N = 1{,}803$	–	1.87	2.12**	2.15**
Political victimisation (yes = 1)	$N = 568$	–	1.68*	1.77***	1.37*

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

younger cohort's greater propensity to move. More importantly, Table 5.6 allows us to estimate the impact of the place of residence in 1990. Compared with the individuals living at that time in Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo, those living in Bosnia or Herzegovina are much more likely to permanently leave their regions of origin, whereas those settled in Dalmatia and Slavonia tend to return home.

Conclusion

Approximately one fifth to one third of the population of the three areas relocated temporarily or permanently to another geographical area. The larger cluster of trajectories was composed of stable trajectories, which raises the interesting point that in the Yugoslavian wars, most people actually stayed in the vicinity of the area in which they lived before the conflict. That is, they did not necessarily stay at their original location, but they stayed relatively close to this location. Of course, ethnic cleansing is, by definition, aimed at local minorities. Therefore, it is not surprising that relocators belong to minorities. In addition, if the percentages provided by the TRACES data are converted into the millions of individuals living in the three areas

during the nineties, the absolute numbers of individuals concerned are huge. These numbers are approximately of the same magnitude as the estimates provided by other studies (see, for instance, Blitz 2005; Tabeau and Bijak 2004; Bonifazi and Mamolo 2004; Ball et al. 2002). In addition, the use of quarters as the temporal units of measurement restricts the estimates to those individuals who crossed the boundaries of extended geographical regions for a prolonged period of time. Shorter-term migrations and those individuals who moved to safer villages or cities within the borders of the same area could not be accounted for in this study. Therefore, the total number of relocations due to the Yugoslavian wars is certainly higher.

In the three studied regions, we find a substantial impact of religious affiliations and almost no effect of religious practices. These results provide strong evidence that the Yugoslavian wars were not religious wars but wars based on a political instrumentation of ethnicity (Elcheroth and Spini 2011; Sekulic, this book). Religious practices only impacted on Muslims from Kosovo who returned to Kosovo after the war. Thus, the results explain why some individuals decided to return to their regions of origin. These results are important for understanding a person's fidelity to his or her area of origin rather than the dynamics of ethnic violence. This distinction between religious affiliation as structuring "departures" and religious practices as structuring "returns" suggests that the perceived categorisation of the self by the out-groups explains forced migration behaviour in circumstances characterised by immediate threats, whereas identity-relevant social practices direct more planned migration behaviour in the aftermath of the threat. Sociologists have underlined the importance of social networks and social capital in the organisation of migrations in which segments of communities relocate together (e.g., Portes 1998). From this participation in the community that promotes some course of action, such as a return to the country of origin. Had the country faced religious wars, the impact of religious practices on the forced migrations would have been much stronger.

Ethnicity was instrumentalised in various ways at various times. It is striking, although certainly self-evident for individuals who went through this historical period in the former Yugoslavia, that relocations of minorities happened in distinct times in the three regions, very much in connection with war events: 1990–1992 in Croatia, 1992 and 1996 in Bosnia (Bosnian war), and 1997–1998 in Serbia and Kosovo (Kosovo war). When focusing on a single region, such as Western Bosnia, it is apparent that the resettlement patterns responded to specific events in the area, such as the Srebrenica massacre. Overall, resettlements did not gradually develop from the bottom up while being nourished by "ancient hatreds" of the local populations. Rather, resettlements happened in specific places during narrow time periods. Resettlements were instrumentally designed by political and military rulers following their own agenda in relation to the military events, their strategic needs, international pressures and their involvement in the conflicts. These observations do not highlight a new historic phenomenon, but they shed some light on the ability of rulers to set up schemes supporting their nationalistic goals right in the middle of Europe at the turn of the twenty-first century. The strong correlations existing between the time and place in which the collective resettlements occurred and the strategic needs of the

conflict suggest that the political and military leaders fostered the polarisation between the communities as a complementary strategy to their fights in the battlefields (i.e., to achieve their political and strategic ends) (Wilmer 2002). Some similarities between these strategies and other notorious events in European history are beyond any doubt (Evans 2005).

Sex, education and cohorts also had an effect in some cases. Overall, highly educated young men were the first to leave and the least likely to return. Therefore, according to the TRACES data, the violent conflicts probably had a strong negative effect on the human capital available to those areas, especially Serbia, Macedonia, Kosovo, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, though less so in Bosnia. As in former European conflicts, cultural elites and young adults were the first to be threatened by wars and ethnic cleansing. At the same time, they were able to migrate more easily than any other group. Those push-and-pull factors may have posed a threat to the futures of the new countries that emerged from the former Yugoslavia.

There are many limitations to the results presented in this chapter. For instance, we did not consider every region of the former Yugoslavia, as the number of distinct regions to be included is large. Additional analyses should address this problem. However, one of the most serious empirical limitations concerns the data collection process. Our picture of residential movements is obviously incomplete and probably biased, as it only concerns the survivors of the conflict and/or the individuals who still lived in the territory of the former Yugoslavia in 2004 and could therefore be interviewed. The dead are silent in surveys such as the TRACES survey, and many who fled did not escape. A historical study based on archival data would certainly be a welcome addition.

Conversely, this chapter also showed that applying optimal matching techniques to residential trajectories is a promising path that should also enable social scientists to bring new information to historians and actors in the field. For example, these techniques may help researchers to discover where refugees are located. With their anchorage in historical time, these techniques can also aid in the interpretation of history by answering various questions (for example, who were the first to flee, and how many within a given community fled?). In countries such as the nations of ex-Yugoslavia, where official statistics could not be recorded during the wars, these techniques associated with the life calendars collected in the aftermath of collective events can also fill some holes in the migration statistics.

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Chapter 6
Compliance and Resistance to the Logic of Ethnic Conflict During the Siege of Sarajevo (*Invited voice*)

Ivana Macek

War in Sarajevo changed the importance and quality of existing ethno-national differences. Before, they were merely one aspect of identity, but during the war, ethno-national identities became central to the processes of making meaning and building society. What was once understood by many as diversity and often interpreted as an asset rather than a threat—as in the former Yugoslavian ideology of "brotherhood and unity" (*bratstvo i jedinstvo*)—transformed under the existential threat and mass violence into divisions: mistrust, bitterness and resentment, and, in the worst cases, perhaps also hatred and a craving for revenge.

During the siege of Sarajevo, I lived and conducted my anthropological fieldwork there for six months over five different periods. It took me a year of preparation before I found a fairly safe way to come into the town as well as a place to stay. During this time, I met two brothers who had fled from Sarajevo to Zagreb, and while we were in Zagreb, they used a map of Sarajevo to help me by pointing out the dangerous spots and giving me some practical advice necessary for survival during the war. The older brother knew these things especially well because he had volunteered to defend the town at the beginning of the siege in 1992, as did many other young Sarajevan men. Later on, when the military units were often sent outside of Sarajevo to other frontiers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, he left his unit for a police unit stationed in Sarajevo. He explained that outside of Sarajevo, one no longer knew who one was fighting for or what the purpose of the fighting was. In the beginning, he was angry that Chetniks, Serbian extremists, were trying to destroy his hometown. He wanted to fight the primitivism, to fight for Sarajevo as it was. But as the war went on, the division of Bosnians (and Sarajevans) into Muslims (later on Bosniaks), Serbs and Croats grew ever stronger. The politicians were openly and clearly nationalistic. The news of people killed, people fleeing, refugees entering the town, shelling and snipers shooting Sarajevans—all of that news planted fear and increased suspicion towards people belonging to other ethno-national groups. Who could be trusted? The siege of the town made living hard; food was running out, as was fuel. He did not want to fight for someone else's

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home. He was not sure if he wanted to fight for the Bosniak-dominated government of Sarajevo. It was hard to know what was right. He wanted to stay near his home to make sure he knew what was happening and to try to help as much as he could. After half a year or so, he decided that there was no future for him in a war-torn Bosnia, and another half-year later, he managed to escape. In Zagreb, he met up with his girlfriend, and one year later they were in Canada, starting their adult lives anew.

My analysis of materials from Sarajevo under siege showed that this change of attitude, and consequently of choices and actions, was common during the war. I have called the different perspectives that people could express and act on the *civilian*, *soldier* and *deserter* perspectives. The *civilian* perspective is characterised by a refusal to accept war and its violence. Violence is seen as a non-lawful act that should be punished by law, and the war is perceived as something distant, something that happens to others. To *civilians*, war often remains in the domain of fantasy and acquires the qualities of fiction rather than those of lived experience. The *soldier* perspective accepts war and treats it as a controlled, legally ordered period of time during which violence is justified and even encouraged. Aims, sides, rules and ethics are clear, which is why many have compared war to sport contests. The *deserter* perspective accepts war as a way of living but understands that sides are not clear cut and that rules are broken without existentially adequate punishment. The violence is generally not justified, and everyone is held responsible for his or her own ideas and actions.

What I found in Sarajevo was that all three of these perspectives coexisted. In different situations, people could express different perspectives, perhaps without even being aware that they were contradicting themselves. I noticed that the soldier perspective, in this case, a nationalistic rationale explaining and legitimising violence, was more common in public settings, when people did not know each other very well, as well as in the media and among politicians. The civilian perspective was more common in private, expressed as disbelief that the war was actually going on. A typical statement was: "We lived so well together, who needed all this?", or, as an old lady in the village where Tone Bringa did her pre-war fieldwork asks her during the anthropologist's visit to the village in 1993: "*A jesil' vidla ti našeg rahatluka* (Did you not see the good life that we had?)" The solider perspective could provide some comfort, albeit bitter, to alleviate this painful helplessness and loss of direction. Then again, most of the people were used to life in the war and had accepted it, even though they longed for nothing more than for the war to stop, and they made their choices in the situation. Some left; some stayed. "Everyone could leave", a young woman who chose to stay in Sarajevo told me. Half of the population stayed, and the other half left. Neither was a good choice. In 1995, a joke was told about what would happen if the siege was lifted: Well, the ones who were in Sarajevo during the war would pack and leave, and the ones who were outside would come back, and when they would meet halfway, both would say "Look at that idiot!" ("*Gle budale!*")

One of my first contacts in Sarajevo was a middle-aged woman who lived in one of the modern middle-class suburbs of Sarajevo. She had some friends who had fled to Sweden, and they needed her to fix some papers for them. When she met me, she was friendly, happy to help, and, as I realised later, probably happy for a new

relationship, someone to change the dreariness of everyday life in war. She was nice to me and very helpful, making contacts that I needed for my research, and during my subsequent stays in Sarajevo, we became friends. Her neighbours, whom I also befriended, told me that she was quite nationalistic, a Bosniak nationalist, but I could not see much of it. In my eyes, she was mostly realistic and conscious of both sides' responsibilities.

Her story shows the full impact that violence and fear of violence, both of which were often consolidated and supported by nationalistic propaganda, had on an urban, secularised society. When she was young, she married a Serb man. She came from a Muslim family, and she told me that her father never forgave her for that. In her eyes, her father was old fashioned. She did not care about her husband's nationality; she only cared about what kind of man he was. And he was a decent man, a good father to their two children, a man who would not even kill an animal, she said. But, when the nationalistic propaganda began in 1992, as a Serb, he felt threatened in Sarajevo. This was part of Serbian propaganda, but it was no doubt, for many, also a genuine feeling caused by this propaganda and, later on, by discriminatory drafting patterns.

Their relationship began to be strained. They disagreed about politics. When the war started, they also disagreed about whose fault it was (a point of conflict that still haunts both private and political life in Bosnia today). He was drafted, and because he refused to take up arms, he was assigned to the trench-digging units, the most exposed assignment one could get. He decided to leave, to flee to Grbavica, the Serb-held part of central Sarajevo. She was angry and frightened. Serbs who fled to the other side were considered Chetniks, Serbian extremists and killers who shot at Sarajevan civilians. Men, especially, were automatically condemned. She did not want to be called a Chetnik-woman (*Četnikuša*). She asked for a divorce. The judge granted her custody of their two young children.

Her husband was angry. The judge was also Muslim, and he argued that the decision was made on a national basis. But he stayed in Grbavica and sent them parcels with food, which they often shared with their neighbours. She sent him his best suit and some other belongings he needed. I know he did not shoot, she told me in 1995, because when they forced him to take a gun, he fled to Belgrade, where he still lives. He continued sending parcels, though less frequently. A year later, she decided to take her nearly 16-year-old son abroad because at the age of 16, boys were no longer allowed to leave because of military duty. Later on, she also took her daughter to the Netherlands, where her son was staying with some relatives who were also refugees. But she herself stayed in Sarajevo. "So that they have somewhere to return, so that I have somewhere where I have the right to be", she told me, and explained: "If I leave, my apartment will be taken, I will lose my work. If I come back, they could say 'where have you been all this time?"'

In the spring of 1996, when the Serbs were leaving Grbavica, this woman and I made a plan to visit Grbavica on the first day when only relatives of those who lived there were allowed to pass the former front-line. We were both curious, of course, but she also wanted to visit her husband's relative, an elderly lady who she knew was going to stay, to tell her that she need not be afraid of the Muslim troops coming in and the Muslim-dominated government taking control of this part of the town. I

witnessed many Sarajevans doing the same: visiting the former Serb-held parts of the town as soon as it was possible to visit a relative or a friend whom they had not seen during the entire siege to assure these dear people that they were still important and that the war did not destroy their relationship. Shortly after that, when a Serb-held part of the town was integrated and opened to everyone, visits were also made to see what it looked like on the other side and to feel the unbelievable feeling that it was no longer dangerous to walk these streets, where, only a few days before, lethal snipers had traced Sarajevans' steps through their sights.

I have tried to understand the complex and contradictory behaviour, feelings, and attitudes that I encountered during the war through the simultaneous coexistence of all three ways of perceiving the war. I have not only noted these three ways of perceiving the war in Sarajevans but also experienced them myself during my fieldwork in war, and I have noted them in texts written by journalists, diplomats and experts on the region. Thus, I conclude that anyone who comes into contact with war can use any of these perceptions in all of their complexity and ambiguity in accordance with his or her best judgment and with his or her needs in a certain situation.

The "nationalistic Bosniak" woman who so happily befriended a "Croat" anthropologist living in Sweden is the best example. Before the war, it was not important which nationality your friend or partner was, but the violence made it important. A young, nationally "mixed" couple who spent the whole war in Sarajevo, not hiding but serving in Muslim units, fled to the United States and now live in Florida because they, like many others, did not see a future for "mixed couples" in Sarajevo after the war. The war made everyone conscious of national identities because the violence was justified through the logic of national exclusiveness: it was carried out against a national "other" and in the name of a national "us". It took some time—around 6 months—for most of the people who were directly impacted by violence to realise that the violence had impacted everyone, regardless of nationality. This is a deserter insight. But at the same time, much of the violence was directed towards a certain national group, which confirmed the soldier stance.

The interesting point here is: Why did knowledge about nationalistic violence spread so quickly, and why did examples consistent with clear-cut explanations of the war—soldiers of one nationality were shooting at members of the other nation—circulate so easily? Conversely, why were people so quiet about all the cases in which friends and neighbours of different nationalities helped each other as best as they could? Why were all misdeeds committed against people of the *same* nationality, even relatives, kept hidden?

I can think of two possible answers. The first is our need to understand what is going on, especially if what is going on is a war, which is highly distressing to onlookers and lethal for those involved. The solder perspective puts some order into the chaos of information and emotions. It also makes it possible to act. Remaining in a state of shock, as we are when taking a civilian perspective, and not believing that violence is possible, is paralysing for the surrounding world (as it was in the Bosnian case—it took more than 3 years to put an end to the violence), but for those involved, it can be deadly. In a war, soldier thinking is needed much more than when at peace.

The second reason is probably that in more public, less private situations, the soldier perspective dominates. When people do not know someone, they advance the soldier perspective. The civilian perspective comes across as too naive and the deserter perspective as too risky. The same is true when people are asked about the situation in a more formal way—few would like to admit, "I do not get it, there is nothing to understand", or to claim, "the truth is relative". However, by the mid-1990s, all three contradictory stances coexisted within most Sarajevans: the sharp understanding, the disbelief and the insight about their own responsibility for the choices they had made and still make.

Chapter 7
Beyond Ethnic Intolerance: Traces and Benefits of Ethnic Diversity in Post-War Bosnia-Herzegovina

Davide Morselli and Stefano Passini

In 1994, Hudson, Sekulic and Massey published a set of intriguing findings in *The American Journal of Sociology* concerning research conducted in Yugoslavia in 1989 and 1990. Examining a representative sample of 13,422 adults from all parts of the former Yugoslavia, they found that residents of Bosnia-Herzegovina expressed high tolerance towards members of other ethnic groups, with the highest levels of intergroup tolerance among all former Yugoslavian republics. However, 3 years later, the most violent conflict in Europe since World War II broke out in that region. Nearly 4 years of civil war undermined the relationships among citizens, deeply dividing people on the basis of their ethnic membership. Today, Bosnia displays a complex reality of divisions among ethnic groups. The city of Mostar exemplifies this reality. This town was built on two sides of a river, which became the boundary between the Croats and Bosniaks after the war. A report from the International Crisis Group (2003) describes a town entirely split in two on an ethnic basis, including separate drinking water sources, electricity and telephone companies, postal systems, ambulance services, hospitals, fire departments, railway and bus companies and public-works enterprises.

Many explanations have been provided for the ethnic violence and, eventually, segregation in this region. In this chapter, rather than focusing on why it happened, we take into account the effects of what happened on exposed individuals. The war drastically altered the ethnic distribution and the equilibrium between groups. Thus, we propose an empirical overview of what remains of the pre-war spirit of tolerance and people's capacity to integrate the ethnic differences that once characterised Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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In the first section, the main socio-psychological theories on group interaction are briefly discussed. In the following sections, TRACES data regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina are presented and discussed. Particular attention is given to ethnic heterogeneity and its positive or negative effects on inter-group attitudes. Finally, based on our findings, we present several considerations concerning the promotion of tolerance and the reconstruction of multi-cultural communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Conflict and Cooperation Among Groups Post-War Bosnia-Herzegovina

Analysing the causes of ethnic conflict, several sociological studies have underlined that ethnic heterogeneity is often associated with the diffusion of antagonistic attitudes and negative sentiments against ethnic out-groups (Coser 1956; Coenders 2001). Moreover, Hibbs (1973) and Canning and Fay (1993) showed that ethnically fractionalised countries are more politically unstable than more homogeneous countries. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) suggested that the presence of many different ethnic and linguistic groups is significantly associated with greater corruption because bureaucrats may favour members of their own group. In turn, problematic governance affects—or is at least linked to—economic growth and productivity, with the result that heterogeneous countries have lower growth rates and worse policies (Easterly and Levine 1997). For example, in research using aggregate data from 66 countries, Mauro (1995) found that ethnic fractionalisation was negatively correlated with institutional efficiency, political stability, bureaucratic efficiency and corruption. Thus, as these data suggest, heterogeneous countries seem to be more problematic from an administrative and political viewpoint.

According to Aghion et al. (2002), democracy is affected by the presence of high heterogeneity within a country. Indeed, in ethnically fractionalised societies, one group often imposes restrictions on the political liberty of the other groups. According to these authors, in homogeneous societies, democratic rule is easier because ethnic conflicts are less intense. Similarly, Vanhanen (1999) stated that social conflict is more widespread in countries in which people are divided into separate ethnic, racial, national, linguistic, tribal and religious groups.

However, other scholars disagree with such a pessimistic perspective on the effect of heterogeneity within a society. For instance, Collier and Hoeffler's (2004) model of civil conflict qualifies the assumption that heterogeneity *per se* decreases the risk of civil wars. According to this model, heterogeneity becomes a risk factor only when combined with limited economic conditions (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Blimes 2006; Collier et al. 2005). Otherwise, in regions in which two or several ethnic groups are similarly distributed, institutions typically provide official support for inter-group contact (Massey et al. 1999). As discussed in greater detail by Sekulic in Chap. 3 of this book, the inter-group contact theory (ICT) (Allport 1954) stresses that one way to encourage more positive attitudes among groups is to increase contact among the

members of the groups (Amir 1969; Cook 1984; Pettigrew 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp 2000; Dovidio et al. 2003). Thus, under specific circumstances, heterogeneity might play a positive role in reducing prejudices and increasing tolerance. More specifically, Allport (1954) assumed that whereas conflicting goals lead to the development of inter-group hostility, superordinate goals—unattainable by one group without the help of the other groups—may reduce inter-group intolerance and prejudice.

History and everyday experience highlight that heterogeneity within a culture may lead to positive contacts and reduce prejudice in some situations, but may increase prejudice in others. Some people may consider contact with an out-group member as a threat to their identity and wealth (Blalock 1967), whereas others may view it as an opportunity and an advantage. Furthermore, different sources of heterogeneity might produce different outcomes. For example, Alesina et al. (2003) indicated that ethnolinguistic heterogeneity has a stronger impact than religious diversity on economic success in terms of economic growth, quality of policies and quality of institutions.

Other studies have distinguished between different dimensions of heterogeneity within a country and their linkage with social conflict. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) suggested that heterogeneity is composed of two dimensions, fractionalisation and polarisation. The first dimension considers the number of groups into which a society is divided; a greater number of groups are associated with a greater level of fragmentation in the country. By contrast, polarisation indicates whether there are two main groups that oppose one another in a country. According to Reynal-Querol (2002), violent conflicts are more likely in polarised situations, in which one group views the other in terms of antagonism and threats, and may attempt to prevail over the other group.

Thus, heterogeneity does not have a monotonic relationship with the risk of violent conflict. Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) showed that violent conflicts (i.e., civil war) and heterogeneity follow a parabolic relationship, as highly heterogeneous societies can have a probability of civil wars that is even lower than that of homogenous societies. Both low and high levels of heterogeneity are linked to a low probability of a country falling into a civil conflict, whereas societies with medium levels of fractionalisation seem to be the most unstable.

Kalyvas and Sambanis (2005) argued that in the specific case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, ethnic heterogeneity is irrelevant. Their findings show that fractionalisation is not directly related to the outbreak of collective violence. They placed an emphasis on factors such as poverty, unemployment and support from the diaspora. In support of this hypothesis, Kalyvas and Sambanis found that the ethnicisation of violence in Bosnia rapidly increased once the war began. In addition, Ringdal et al. (2008) showed that residence in a more heterogeneous area prior to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina helped victims to recover from war-related distress. Therefore, the issue is not whether heterogeneity *per se* was and is "good" or "bad" in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but *which conditions* cause diversity to lead to constructive inter-group relations, increase tolerance and reduce prejudice. Some explanations have been suggested by studies in the field of social psychology on social identity and ethnic identification.

Ethnic Identification and Anomie

According to Herbert Kelman (1999, pp. 582–583):

> one thing that can be readily inferred from a half century of social-psychological theory and research on intergroup contact (Pettigrew 1998) is that contact *per se* does not preclude or reduce violent intergroup conflict. The potentially positive effects of contact depend on the nature of that contact. [...] [The conditions identified by Allport] are lacking in the contacts between identity groups that are engaged in a protracted, deep-rooted conflict (such as the two conflicting communities in Northern Ireland); or, insofar as these conditions have prevailed in the past (as they did in Yugoslavia under Tito's leadership), they evaporate when new leaders exploit ethnic divisions to consolidate their own power.

In the specific context of Bosnia-Herzegovina, ethnic diversity did not represent an inoculation against ethnic intolerance. The former tolerance was overcome by social beliefs that were made salient by political elites to legitimise aggression among the three sides of the Bosnian conflict (Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks). Social identity theory (SIT) indicates that people have attitudes and beliefs about the nature of intergroup relations that regulate the permeability of group boundaries (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Ellemers 1993). When the exclusiveness of group membership is made salient, boundaries are more likely to be perceived as impermeable, thus enhancing inter-group intolerance. In particular, prejudice, discrimination and negative stereotyping can be products of inter-group distinctiveness within a context of identity threat (Hornsey and Hogg 2000). According to SIT, group identities fulfill a need for positive identity, but can also increase inter-group hostility when such an identity is threatened. On the one hand, group identification reduces people's sense of social disorientation, but on the other hand, it might lead individuals from different groups to conflict.

This point is a bit controversial, especially if applied to inter-ethnic relations and ethnically heterogeneous contexts. According to SIT, we could expect people who identify with a group to experience a low sense of *anomie*—described as a sense of normlessness due to cultural pluralism and rapid social changes (Huschka and Mau 2006; McClosky and Schaar 1965; Seeman 1991; Srole 1956). This phenomenon occurs because as people's identification with their group increases, social norms and social order become more salient, and consequently, the sense of normlessness decreases. However, little empirical research has been conducted on the relationship between group identification and anomie, and the findings are contradictory. For instance, in contrast with the SIT hypothesis, Blank (2003) found that anomie was slightly positively correlated with national identification among Eastern and Western Germans. Moreover, if anomie decreases with group identification, we might also expect a negative correlation between anomie and intolerance, to the extent that intolerance is likely to increase with identification. However, results from Sexton (1983) and Gibson (1992) showed that those who are high in anomie tend to be *more* intolerant and dogmatic. This finding may be explained in terms of threat perception. People experience anomie as a consequence of rapid social change, which may also be perceived as a threat to individual identity and may therefore increase intolerance

towards out-groups, to the extent that they are perceived as the cause of such social disorder.

On the basis of these statements, we formulate two hypotheses. First, according to ICT and Collier and Hoeffler's model, we expect that heterogeneous contexts influence attitudes towards out-groups and society, enhancing tolerance and reducing the sense of anomie and discouragement concerning society. Nevertheless, according to SIT, we expect that identification with one's own ethnic group plays a fundamental role in the regulation of social relations. That is, group identification may interact with inter-group contacts and moderate their constructive effects, especially in areas in which people directly experience ethnic violence and in which ethnicity is a salient feature of everyday life, as was the case in Bosnia.

For these purposes, we draw a two-level design. Multilevel models decompose the variance of a dependent variable into two levels. The first level considers the variance between individuals, and the second level assumes that a portion of variance depends on individuals' affiliations with certain groups or contexts. Beyond the explanatory contribution of independent variables—both at the individual and the contextual levels—over the dependent variable, multilevel models allow us to compute and statistically verify whether certain relationships between dependent and independent variables change from one context to another (statistically, this change is represented by the random variation of slopes in a regression equation). That is, there may be a positive relationship between dependent and independent variables in some contexts and a negative relationship in other contexts.

Ethnic Heterogeneity in Bosnia-Herzegovina Before and After the War

Pre-war Bosnia-Herzegovina was characterised by the coexistence of different ethnic groups. The Bosnian population was divided into three major ethnic groups (Muslims, Croats, Serbs), a number of smaller groups and a substantial number of people who did not identify themselves in ethnic terms, but considered themselves in the more inclusive category of Yugoslavs. Figure 7.1 displays the proportions of the main ethnic groups in each of the TRACES survey areas, which mainly correspond to the official division by cantons. Data were taken from the national census conducted immediately before the beginning of the war in 1991; they show a clear picture of the population distribution in Bosnia before the war.

Several patterns of heterogeneity were present in pre-war Bosnia. These patterns included an equal distribution of Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs (i.e., fractionalisation), a greater prevalence of one group over the others (i.e., tendency toward homogeneity), and a similar distribution of two main groups (i.e., polarisation).

As a consequence of the Dayton Agreement in 1995, which ratified the end of the war, the ethnic distribution in Bosnia was completely reorganised. The Dayton Agreement officialised the division of the population on an ethnic basis. Bosnia-Herzegovina was divided into two main political entities: Republika Srpska (RS),



Fig. 7.1 Proportions of the population in each TRACES survey area. (Data source: 1991 population census)

with a Serbian majority, and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (FBiH), with local Croat or Bosniak majorities. Thus, the heterogeneity that had characterised the country in the past was substantially altered. The exact distribution of the ethnic groups in each of the Bosnian cantons is currently unknown because no census has been conducted since 1991. Figure 7.2 shows the division of the three main ethnic groups based on the 2003 official population estimates.[1]

This picture greatly differs from the pre-war situation shown in Fig. 7.1. Indeed, the areas are more homogeneous in Bosnia, especially in RS. Patterns are more diversified in the FBiH, except in an area in central Bosnia (CB1), where the population is divided into one major group (Croat or Muslim) and some minorities. The Brcko district[2]—which has been merged with some FBiH municipalities in the north of the SR territories in the TRACES survey—maintains a high level of heterogeneity that is similar to the pre-war situation.

[1] Some areas were merged due to a lack of information on municipalities, which rendered it impossible to reconstruct some of the TRACES territorial divisions.

[2] The Brcko district remained under the administration of the International Community, in accordance with the Dayton Agreement. It was an "experimental" field of community reconstruction and multiethnic administration (Jeffrey 2006).



Fig. 7.2 Proportions of the population according to 2003 population estimates

Finally, Fig. 7.3 shows the descriptive relationship between the heterogeneity of Bosnian cantons measured with the ethno-linguistic fractionalisation index (ELF)[3] and the coefficient of risk of victimisation derived from the TRACES survey[4]. These findings highlight that more violence occurred in areas with higher levels of ethnic diversity.

War Experiences, Ethnic Heterogeneity and Ethnic Intolerance

Against this background, we considered a sample of 411 Bosnian citizens (47 % male; 53 % female, cohort 1968–1974) from the TRACES survey. The contextual level was specified as the areas in which people resided at the time of the survey.

[3] ELF was computed on the basis of 1991 census data. This index measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the whole population will be from different groups. The ELF index was created by Soviet scholars (Atlas Narodov Mira 1964) and was later popularised by Taylor and Hudson (1972). It is expressed by the formula: $ELF = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{N} q_i^2$ where q_i is the share of group i of a total of N groups.

[4] The unweighted indicator of risk of victimisation computed for each survey area is defined by the ratio between the estimated number of events (i.e., individual-quarter units corresponding to the occurrence of an event) in the population of an area by the estimated total number of individual-quarter units in that population.



Fig. 7.3 Linearity of the relationship between fractionalisation and risk of victimisation in the TRACES survey areas

At the individual level, tolerance was measured in two ways. The first measurement provides a general indicator of people's tolerance towards others. The index is based on responses to the Bogardus social distance scale (1925) questions, as follows: *Would you be willing to have [Albanians, Macedonians, Slovenians, Montenegrins, Hungarians, Roms, Bulgarian citizens, Albanian citizens, Russian citizens, EU citizens, US citizens] as inhabitants of your country/as next-door neighbours/in the same office/as close friends/as relatives/as a spouse?* An overall zero-to-one index (0 = high intolerance; 1 = high tolerance) was calculated using the mean scores for each out-group. Because the items of the scale refer to a number of groups that have a rather low salience in the inter-group relations in Bosnia, the index can be considered as a measure of individuals' *ideal of tolerance*, representing how much people value tolerance at an abstract level. The second index is based on the same questions but refers only to the three main Bosnian ethnic groups (Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks). This index can be considered as measure of *everyday tolerance* because it refers to the real contacts between groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The sense of social disorientation (*anomie*) was measured using McClosky and Schaar's (1965) scale[5], which refers to general discouragement about society and a passive acceptance of the *status quo*. Thus, low scores on this scale indicate some sense of agency and active attitudes, whereas high levels identify a sense of discouragement, social distrust and normlessness.

To measure the effects of ethnic identification and its interaction with heterogeneity, an index of individual ethnic identification was calculated as the mean response to the items *I see myself as a [ETHNIC MEMBERSHIP]; I am glad to be a [ETHNIC MEMBERSHIP]; I feel strong ties with [ETHNIC MEMBERSHIP]*.

Finally, we controlled for the effects of some war-related experiences. We considered the cumulative number of experiences of victimisation people experienced (e.g., personal damages, family member wounded or killed, imprisonment) and whether they were forced to move to another region as a consequence of the war. At the contextual level, regional heterogeneity was measured using the ethno-linguistic fractionalisation index (ELF) based on the 2003 population estimates.

The analysis revealed that 26 % of the total variance of anomie, 10 % of ideal tolerance and 9 % of everyday tolerance are attributed to the difference between areas. The results in Table 7.1 show that ethnic identification increases the levels of anomie. As people's identification with their own ethnic group increases, their sense of discouragement about their social context increases. Unexpectedly, the number of war-related experiences of victimisation has no impact on anomie. However, forced relocation has a rather important impact. Moving as a consequence of the war has the highest explanatory power at the individual level, although the p value is 0.06. Model A explains approximately 16 % of the variance at an individual level.

In line with the ICT hypothesis, contextual heterogeneity in terms of ELF has a negative impact on the sense of anomie. The effects of ELF on anomie become even clearer in Model B, in which we test the variation of ethnic identification across the Bosnian areas and the interaction between ethnic identification and ELF (random part of the model). In this model, the magnitude of the main effect of ELF increases by approximately three-fold. Model B explains 32 % of the variance at the contextual level, bringing the total explained variance to 19 %, and confirms that heterogeneity decreases social disorientation.

On the other hand, Model B shows that ethnic identification changes significantly across the Bosnian areas. In addition, approximately 33 % of such variation is explained by the heterogeneity (ELF) of an area. That is, ELF predicts low scores of anomie only for those respondents who do not identify with their own ethnic group.

The interaction effect between ELF and ethnic identification can be explained in two ways. On the one hand, when heterogeneity is high, people who strongly identify with their group tend to have a higher sense of loss concerning social norms because

[5] Example items of the scale are as follows: *With everything so uncertain these days, it almost seems as though anything could happen; Everything changes so quickly these days that I often have trouble deciding which are the right rules to follow; People were better off in the old days when everyone knew just how he was expected to act; It seems to me that other people find it easier to decide what is right than I do.*

Table 7.1 Multilevel model for anomie, ideal tolerance, and tolerance towards Bosnian groups using ethno-linguistic fractionalisation (ELF) at the second level

	Anomie		Ideal tolerance		Everyday tolerance	
	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F
Fixed part	*Coeff. (S.E.)*	*Coeff. (S.E.)*	*Coeff. (S.E.)*	*Coeff. (S.E.)*	*Coeff. (S.E.)*	*Coeff. (S.E.)*
Level 1 (individual level)						
Intercept	4.870 (1.06)***	4.702 (1.056)***	0.933 (0.208)***	0.867 (0.032)***	0.959 (0.207)***	0.867 (0.199)***
Female	0.074 (0.071)	0.083 (0.101)	0.033 (0.023)	0.027 (0.025)	0.016 (0.029)	0.014 (0.025)
Age	−0.007 (0.027)	−0.009 (0.028)	−0.003 (0.005)	−0.001 (0.005)	−0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
Ethnic identification	0.131 (0.070)*	0.102 (0.051)*	−0.046 (0.014)**	−0.043 (0.015)**	−0.045 (0.013)**	−0.041 (0.013)**
Cumulative war experiences	−0.032 (0.031)	0.005 (0.037)	−0.001 (0.008)	0.003 (0.009)	−0.024 (.010)**	−0.019 (0.010)*
War-related move	0.337 (0.181)*	0.320 (0.175)*	0.014 (0.024)	0.003 (0.032)	0.010 (0.041)	0.003 (0.040)
Level 2 (canton level)						
ELF	−1.472 (0.448)**	−4.333 (1.153)**	−0.253 (0.097)**	−0.439 (0.462)	−0.194 (0.115)	−0.511 (0.368)
Ethnic identif. x ELF		0.533 (0.212)*		0.031 (0.094)		0.057 (.077)
Random part						
Between-individual variance (level 1)	1.063	0.941	0.064	0.057	0.080	0.075
Between-canton variance (level 2)	0.234***	1.430***	0.005***	0.042***	0.006**	0.022***
Between-canton variance of Ethnic identif		0.023***		0.002***		0.001***
Deviance	1214.820	1175.235	48.375	21.019	143.800	129.112

a $p < .07$; *$p < .05$; ***; $p < .001$

the other groups are perceived as threats to social stability (Blalock 1967). On the other hand, the declaration that one does not identify with one's own ethnic group has a particular meaning in the context of post-war Bosnia. A person who expresses low identification likely wishes to distance himself/herself from the ethnic divisions that legitimised the war. In this sense, people who declare a low identification with their ethnic group are also those who refuse the *status quo.* For these persons, living in a heterogeneous context is perceived as a social resource rather than a threat to social stability. That is, Bosnians who do not wish to identify with a particular ethnic group benefit the most from ethnic diversity and inter-group contact.

Individual ethnic identification also plays a pivotal role in predicting inter-group tolerance. Model C shows that, in line with the SIT hypothesis, as people's identification with their own group increases, their tolerance towards out-groups decreases. War-related experiences, gender and age do not add any significant explanatory contribution. At the contextual level, ELF predicts intolerance. As the fractionalisation of a context increases, the number of individuals with tolerant attitudes towards other groups decreases. The random slope model (Model D) shows that although the relationship between ethnic identification changes across the areas, this relationship is not linked to the heterogeneity of an area.

The models for everyday tolerance (Models E and F) show evidence of a similar effect of ethnic identification. In this case, contextual heterogeneity is no longer significant. A small effect of the personal experiences of victimisation linked to war appears in these models. In the war-torn context of Bosnia, personal life history may have become a central aspect in judging the daily relationships with persons that are frequently categorised as members of a "perpetrator group". In other words, when considering tolerance under the lens of daily inter-group contact, individual experiences of victimisation and in-group attitudes are more relevant than the ethnic heterogeneity of the area of residence[6].

Reconstructing Tolerance? The Role of Recategorisation and Moral Inclusion

Overall, our findings seem to support the assumption that out-groups are more likely to be perceived as a threat by high ethnic identifiers (Esses et al. 1998; Riek et al. 2006; Stephan and Stephan 2000; Stephan and Renfro 2003). In Bosnia, former neighbours became potential enemies. This might explain the current finding that people who were directly affected by the war are less tolerant towards the other main ethnic groups of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, the results suggest that refusing to identify with a particular ethnic group in contemporary Bosnia mirrors a critical position towards the *status quo*. In fact, people who do not wish to identify with

[6] Equivalent results were obtained using polarisation (Reynal-Querol 2002) instead of fractionalisation to measure heterogeneity and controlling for the heterogeneity of the cantons in which people had resided during adolescence (Morselli and Passini 2009).

their own ethnic group have the greatest trust in society and social relations. These individuals are more likely to develop a sense of agency, refusing to passively accept social disintegration. By contrast, people who strongly identify with their group are more likely to feel confused in heterogeneous contexts and threatened by the co-presence of different ethnic groups.

Ethnic identification is, in fact, an important and critical topic in Bosnia-Herzegovina today. It was and remains emphasised at a symbolic level. For instance, it was only after the war that Bosnian Muslims began to define themselves as "Bosniaks", rather than "Muslims", underlining their ethnic, cultural and historical specificity. Before the conflict, many rural Muslims did not consider Bosniaks as a nation (Bringa 1995; Robinson et al. 2001).

In post-war Bosnia, political elites frequently use the ethnic issue as a means for achieving political differentiation. Many parties have a specific reference to their ethnic origin in their names, such as: Serbian Democratic Party—*Srpska demokratska stranka* (SDS), Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina—*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica* (HDZ), Croats Together—*Hrvatsko Zajednistvo*, and Bosnian–Herzegovinian Patriotic Party—*Bosanskohercegovacka Patriotska Stranka*. The elections in 2002 recorded a return to power of the three major nationalist parties (SDA—Boniak; HDZ—Croat; SDS—Serb). However, their power was mitigated in the elections in 2006, as they received "only" approximately 25 % of the vote of each ethnic group. The ethnic-based parties have a large impact at a symbolic level, developing proposals for the specific interests of their own group. For instance, the national parties of the Srpska Republic argued strongly for the integration of SR with Serbia rather than with Bosnia-Herzegovina until the political orientation of Serbia changed in 2003 (Roux 2004). The major Croatian party of the FBiH, the HDZ (Croat Democratic Community), advanced a proposal in March 2004 to untie the FBiH and divide Bosnia-Herzegovina into three main cantons (Serb, Croat and Bosniak). These agendas have the evident effect of reinforcing group membership and a sense of ethnic identification.

Furthermore, a general socio-economic condition of frailty adds to a tense and unstable situation. According to Scheepers et al. (2002), scarce socio-economic resources are conducive to high inter-group competition, and consequently, the rise of unemployment to 44 % in 2004 (Economic Commission for Europe 2004) may have played a central role in defining inter-group relations in post-conflict Bosnia.

To summarise, in line with social identity theory, the present results suggest that inter-group contacts can play a constructive function only to the extent that people are not overly tied to their own group. Identification represents a difficult boundary to overcome, especially if war-related traumatic events have increased the saliency of group membership. In this case, it is likely that (ethnic) out-groups are considered as a threat and that (ethnic) in-group membership is chronically salient. In contrast with SIT, the current findings suggest that in post-war Bosnia, identification is related to an increased sense of normlessness and social disorder. Under these conditions, ethnic heterogeneity does not represent a concrete resource for overcoming social disintegration. The results show that heterogeneity *per se* is neither good nor bad. Individual war-related experiences and group salience buffer the effect of heterogeneity. Thus,

reconciliation processes should account for the manner in which individuals shape their group membership.

Moral exclusion theory (Bandura 1990; Deutsch 1985; Lerner and Whitehead 1980; Opotow 1990, 2008; Passini 2010; Passini and Morselli 2009; Staub 1989) suggests that for a better understanding of multiethnic relationships, we must account for individuals' perceptions of their moral community. Individuals' moral values, beliefs and norms apply to the people they include within their scope of justice—defined as one's moral community. Moral exclusion is defined as excluding other individuals or groups from one's own moral community (Staub 1989), viewing them as lying beyond the boundary within which moral values and rules of justice and fairness apply. This exclusion captures the dynamics underlying destructive conflicts, whereas moral inclusion captures the dynamics of peace-building, with its emphasis on equality, justice and a concern for universal well-being (Opotow et al. 2005).

To enhance tolerance and to promote the coexistence of different ethnic groups, people may need to recategorise their ethnic and social identity to include others within their scope of justice. The categorisation of other ethnic group members as members of the same community helps people to reduce bias and hostility (Hornsey and Hogg 2000; Gaertner et al. 1994). Kelman (1999) suggests that the coexistence of different ethnic groups can be enhanced by the development of a superordinate identity that does not threaten the particularistic identity of any one group. Recategorisation into a superordinate category should highlight similarities among the groups and obscure the in-group–out-group boundary (Anastasio et al. 1997; Gaertner et al. 1994) without threatening groups' core characteristics. The emphasis on this superordinate category should preserve the salience of original group membership but minimise negative inter-group distinctiveness. Huo et al. (1996) suggested that identification with a superordinate group may not require one to relinquish strong ties to his/her sub-group. In this sense, developing a transcendent identity requires shaping each group's identity and extending the concept of citizenship in an inclusive manner.

In Kelman's (2006) opinion, the exclusiveness of group ethnicity is embedded in a pattern of negative interdependence between different identities that impede the development of a common identity. This negative inter-dependence of two identities derives from a perception of the other's identity as a direct threat to one's own identity, i.e., the assertion that one's own identity requires negating the identity of the other. One indicator of this negative inter-dependence is a systematic effort to delegitimise the other's movement, in extreme cases by placing it outside of the bounds of what the world community can tolerate, for example, by excluding the other from the moral community shared by all members of the human family.

The recategorisation and moral inclusion of others may promote the peaceful coexistence of different ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This finding may help to redefine the discourses on identity, ethnicity and violence in Bosnia because they reject a reductionist conception of identity and offer the possibility of a different understanding of ethnic identity (Bouris 2007; Campbell 1999). This result requires one to work at both a societal level, promoting tolerance as a part of general politics, and at an individual level, supporting the contact, experience and comprehension

of the other in everyday life. The familiarity of and the experience with the other may be enhanced through activities that involve more ethnic groups and that improve the understanding of the inter-dependence of each group with the other to build an inclusive sense of identity (that is, an identity that is common to all social groups, does not neglect specificities and is respectful of each of the individual ethnic identities).

In January 2004, the European Stability Initiative (ESI) presented a project that appeared to promote the enhancement of a superordinate category. ESI proposed a reorganisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, suppressing the division in two entities and restructuring the territory into 12 cantons. According to the initiative, this reorganisation should reinforce the central institutions and improve the efficiency of the vertical organisation of the state, which are both necessary for the possible inclusion of Bosnia in the EU (European Stability Initiative 2004). Furthermore, this project could help to increase the value to local specificities without suppressing them, similar to the model of the Swiss canton federation. The project was refused by the local Bosnian authorities and the main national parties, who considered it premature and potentially dangerous (Roux 2004). The possible solution of inter-group conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue to pose new questions and challenges in the study of group processes. Such studies must combine theoretical, empirical and normative issues about how to promote cooperation rather than conflicts between people of different groups and about the effects of everyday contacts on tolerance towards ethnic and cultural diversity.

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Part III
Community and the Traumatising Experience of War: Collective Dimensions of Vulnerability and Resilience

Chapter 8
From Collective Victimhood to Social Reconciliation: Outlining a Conceptual Framework

Daniel Bar-Tal and Sabina Cehajic-Clancy

Various explanations can be given for the eruption of the violent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. In this chapter, we argue that from a socio-psychological perspective, many of these forces are based on a renewal of national identities, including a redefinition of national goals and collective images, which drew upon old collective memories and new threats. The process of regeneration of national identities was accompanied by their transformation from inclusive to exclusive identities. An *inclusive identity* has open boundaries and allows for easy departure from and entry into the group. A group with an inclusive identity can accommodate neighbouring identities, integrate them and live with them in cooperation and peace. In contrast, an *exclusive identity* elevates the own group above others, sharpens the differentiation between the in-groups and out-groups, and prevents people from crossing inter-group boundaries. In extreme cases, these processes are accompanied by an intense focus on the own group and its narrative. That is, people glorify their own group while delegitimizing other groups and viewing them as threats to the fulfilment of their own identity.

The inclusiveness and exclusiveness of a society is determined by the contents that accompany the meaning of collective identity (Ashmore et al. 2004; David and Bar-Tal 2009). These contents address the particular meaning of membership in the collective. Although some content categories, such as territory, symbols or collective memory, appear in many groups, the endowed meanings of these categories differ from one another and thus furnish the boundaries that differentiate nations from one another. Moreover, these contents have a determinative effect on the relationships that the collectives maintain with other groups (Andrews 2007). Some societies that intend to start a conflict imbue the contents of their collective identities with a deep sense of collective victimhood while delegitimizing their rivals. These identities are constructed within the framework of new expanding national goals.

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In this chapter, we concentrate on these contents that, in our view, play a major role in different conflicts. Specifically, we will focus on the vicious and violent conflict that erupted in Yugoslavia during the early 1990s. We propose that in the 1980s, especially with the ascendance of Milosevic in Serbia and Tudjman in Croatia, various political and societal changes occurred that had important effects not only on the collective identity of Serbs but also on the collective identities of the other ethnic groups in Yugoslavia. These changes laid a new emphasis on Serbian nationalism, collective memory and inter-group relations. Of special importance to the reconstruction of the more exclusive Serbian national identity was the theme of *collective victimhood*, which led to the emergence of new societal goals. In turn, both the theme of victimhood and the new goals were related to the delegitimization of other ethnic groups. These themes raised the threat perception, catalysing the eruption of violence. We will describe first how the redefinition of collective identity based on the contents of collective victimhood and delegitimization played a role in mobilising the rival forces. We will then describe their impacts during the war. Finally, we will outline a road to reconciliation that demands the elimination of these destructive contents. Reconciliation is necessary to the establishment of lasting and stable peaceful relations between the former rivals.

Mobilisation: Invoking the Past to Control the Present

The reconstruction of collective identity in Serbia led to the emergence of the threat perception. The perceived threat touched upon tangible and symbolic needs and goals (Stephan and Stephan 2000). These threats included threats to physical existence, resources, territory, identity, esteem, freedom, prestige and equality. The perceived threat provided the basis for the development of conflict-related goals (Cohen 1979). The goals provided the visions for each group in Yugoslavia and, at the same time, stigmatised a rival group as an obstacle to the achievement of these goals.

These processes served as tools for mobilising the masses. Mobilisation is the deliberate recruitment of a society's members to engage in conflict. Mobilisation can be seen as a type of persuasion process that aims to convince group members to join the conflict (Bar-Tal 2013). A basic precondition for mobilisation is that the individuals must greatly identify with their group and the proposed goals and accept the contents of the reconstructed collective identity of the ethnic group (Simon and Klandermans 2001). Moreover, individuals must not only identify with the group and accept the conflict-related goals but also approve of the actions that the group takes and be willing to perform some type of action on behalf of the group (Klandermans 1988). This process is executed through messages composed of beliefs that are relevant, are concrete, appeal to identity, are threatening and arouse strong emotions. Of special importance are the messages that attribute hostile motives and intentions to the other group (i.e., delegitimization) (Elcheroth and Spini 2011). Eventually, participation is needed because without the group members' participation, total devotion and readiness to sacrifice their lives, conflicts cannot evolve and gain strength. The

group members must express their support in various ways and join the activities, including military activities, needed to escalate the conflict and keep it alive (Staub and Bar-Tal 2003).

During the Tito era in Yugoslavia, the different ethnic and national groups successfully maintained generally cooperative relations because of force and/or reason. Some authors have argued that during this period, the divisive collective memories, the emotions and the myths that energise nations were in a dormant state or "kept on hold" (e.g., Kaplan 1994). In contrast, Sekulic et al. (2006) have shown that there were no clear clues that could have indicated the possible eruption of the vicious and violent conflict. There was no clear level of intolerance and hatred or behavioural evidence of tension or confrontations. However, the researchers also noted that "the absence of open suppression of ethnic hatred does not contradict the existence of collective memory as potential source of mobilization. ... To access these collective memories they must be activated and directed to the ethno-political goals, in most cases by extremist leaders or chauvinist elites who use their power to mobilize masses." (p. 801). We suggest that the reconstruction of the Serbian collective identity with the awakened collective memory provided a fertile ground for the eruption of the violent conflict. In this reconstruction, the awakening of a collective sense of victimhood, which has important implications for the direction of the actions taken by a national group, played a special role (Bar-Tal et al. 2009; Vollhardt 2012). Collective victimhood can be defined as a group mindset resulting from the perceived intent of another group to inflict harm on the collective. The harm also must be viewed as undeserved, unjust and immoral and one that the group was not able to prevent (Bar-Tal et al. 2009). The collective sense of victimhood has important effects on the way a society manages its inter-group relations and on its relationships with its rivals in times of conflict. In many cases, victimhood helps to feed the outbreak of the conflict and its continuation. Later, victimhood inhibits the peace process.

In the second half of the 1980s, the media cultivated the rise of Serbian nationalism through manipulative interpretations of past events, by creating myths and by encouraging extremism within the official Serbian Orthodox church and part of the intellectual elite. Of special importance to the disintegration of Yugoslavia was The Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Science. Published in 1986, this document legitimised the increased feelings of victimhood. Its main theme was that the process of decentralisation was leading to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and that Yugoslavia's constitutional structure discriminated against Serbs. Accordingly, Serbian propaganda portrayed the conflict as a fundamental question of Serbian rights (Bennett 1994; Thomas 1999; Gow 2003).

The commemoration of the 600th anniversary of the Turks' military victory over the Serbians at the Kosovo Battle on June 28, 1989 was an important event that facilitated the resurgence of an exclusively Serbian national identity (Glenny 1993). In a pivotal speech in Kosovo, which many believed to be a warning signal of the violence to come, Milosevic sent shockwaves through the other Yugoslav republics by communicating the following message: "Six centuries after the battle of Kosovo Polje, we are again engaged in battles and quarrels. There are not armed battles but the latter cannot be ruled out yet" (National Technical Information Service of the Department of Commerce of the U.S. 2009).

The Serbs' chosen trauma, the Battle of Kosovo, had been passed on from generation to generation and effectively kept alive, though the memory was dormant at times. The reactivation of the "psychological DNA of Kosovo" awakened the traumatised self-image of the Serbs' ancestors: never again would they allow such a defeat to occur (Volkan 1997). The story of the battle of Kosovo illustrates the various ways in which a chosen trauma can affect a group. Adopting a chosen trauma can enhance ethnic pride, reinforce a sense of victimisation and even spur a group to avenge its ancestors' defeats. Thus, a traumatic re-enactment and exploitation of old fears and hatreds in addition to the emphasis on the Serbs' victimisation in the past (Leatherman et al. 1999; Ross 2001) added to the redefinition of the national identity and national mobilisation that led to the violent conflict (Anzulovic 1999; Staub 2006).

Another crucial element that facilitated the mass mobilisation of the members of each ethnic group and fuelled the conflict was the indoctrination of an elaborate system of beliefs that propagated ideas concerning exclusive nationalism, victimhood, fears, threats and even the delegitimization of the other groups (Gagnon 2004; Ramet 1996). In particular, the mobilisation of the Serbian population through a systematic propaganda campaign enabled the conflict to evolve and spread rapidly. Milosevic's state-run Serbian media became a tool of war that systematically portrayed Serbs as under threat from the "Croatian Ustashe" (the Croatian fascists who were the allies of the Nazis in WWII) or "Islamic fundamentalists" (i.e., Bosnian Muslims) (MacDonald 2002; Malcom 1994). In fact, the hate campaign was directed against any opponents of a Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia and greatly facilitated the mobilisation of ordinary Serbs. Oberschal (2000) summarised these developments with the following observations:

> Yugoslavs experienced ethnic relations through two frames—a 'normal' frame and a 'crisis' frame. People processed both frames in their minds: in peaceful times the crisis frame was dormant and in crisis and war the normal frame was suppressed (p. 989).

Oberschal also noted:

> In the waning days of Communism, nationalists activated the crisis frame on ethnicity by playing on fears of ethnic annihilation and oppression in the mass media, in popular culture, in social movements, and in the election campaigns (pp. 998–999).

This observation indicates that old national elements of collective memory and other national credos do not disappear but are held, transmitted and lie dormant within families and other ethnic institutions. These elements are ready to be reawakened when needed by societal, political and cultural forces.

The new emphases on Serbian collective identity aroused feelings of threats among the various ethnic groups in Yugoslavia and accelerated the sharpening of their collective identity by constructing and reconstructing its contents, including new goals that were designed to meet the new challenges (Bennett 1994; Malcolm 1994). The other groups' nationalism had also been stirred by their respective political leaders. In particular, Serbian nationalism stimulated the resurgence of the Croatian nationalists, whose sentiments were exploited and manipulated by Franjo Tudjman in Croatia. Croatian nationalism was also insensitive to the fears and insecurities of Croatia's

Serbian population, which greatly assisted Serbia's efforts in exacerbating tensions amongst the Serbs throughout Yugoslavia. These developments caused the threats to national identities to spiral out of control and the violent conflict to erupt (Kelman 2006).

War: Framing the Present as a Validation of Past Narratives

When the conflict between Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats escalated in Croatia in June 1991, "both sides began to recall more acutely their centuries-old historical grievances, their suffering during World War II, their religious differences, the pain inflicted by the other" (Volkan 1997, p. 54). The carnage and ethnic cleansing in the following months and years was largely influenced by the shadows of the past. These traumatic memories included not only the Battle of Kosovo but also the traumatic events of World War II, when hundreds of thousands of Serbs were massacred and others were sent to concentration camps. A sense of past victimhood violently resurfaced (Ross 2001).

Once violence erupts, it immediately changes the nature of a conflict (Bar-Tal 2013), especially if harm is inflicted on civilians in addition to military forces. This harm violates the codes of moral behaviour, arouses strong emotional reactions, involves group members, delegitimizes the rival and escalates conflicts. Although individuals perform violent acts, collective violence is initiated and executed within a social system. That is, the social system rationalises and justifies the violence, mobilises the group members to perform it, trains the group members to perform violent acts and then glorifies them.

As a consequence, violence immediately provides concrete foundations for a sense of victimhood, distrust and fear. Of particular importance to the execution of violence, especially atrocities are the mechanisms of threat and delegitimization, which justify and rationalise moral misdeeds. Delegitimization excludes a rival group from the boundaries of the commonly accepted groups as a legitimate member worthy of basic civil and human rights and indicates that this group deserves inhumane treatment (Bar-Tal and Hammack 2012). This process assumes that only the delegitimized group raises threatening goals and executes violent, unacceptable acts. This perception leads the delegitimizing group to commit violence and atrocities because the in-group tries to avert danger by taking preventive actions and revenge for the past harm caused by the out-group. This process is reinforced by an accompanying sense of collective victimhood that is sometimes interpreted as a license to commit immoral and illegitimate acts (called moral entitlement). Groups with high sense of collective victimhood reason that the in-group is allowed to do everything within its power to prevent a trauma from ever happening again (Bar-Tal et al. 2009; Vollhardt 2012). Once delegitimization, threats, a sense of collective victimhood and violence emerge, the vicious cycles of conflict begin (Bandura 1999; Staub 2003). This repertoire leads to more violence, which, in turn, broadens and strengthens the repertoire.

Collective violence eventually led to a terrible legacy for the different groups throughout the former Yugoslavia. The single worst atrocity happened in July 1995 in Srebrenica, where approximately 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men, some as young as 7 years old, were systematically rounded-up and massacred by the Bosnian Serb forces. From April to June 1992, Sarajevo was placed under siege by the Bosnian Serb Army, which took control of 37 municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including Prijedor, Kozarac, Zvornik and Foca, while an additional 800 villages were attacked (Calic 2009). Concentration camps, such as Omarska, Karaterm and Manjaca, were created and used as a means of torture, intimidation and extermination. The Catholic churches and mosques that came under Serbian control were systematically destroyed, reflecting an intention to destroy collective identity (Calic 2009). In Croatia, the military forces under the leadership of Franjo Tudjman also conducted ethnic cleansing campaigns against the Serbs in Slavonia and the Krajina region of Croatia. One of the largest ethnic cleansing operations happened in the summer of 1995 in Croatia, where a large part of the Serb population (ca. 200,000) was expelled, and approximately 400 Serbs were killed. Croatian forces also committed serious human rights violations against the Bosniaks in Herzegovina and central Bosnia (Calic 2009). The dissolution of Yugoslavia also witnessed grave human rights violations, such as massive deportations and massacres of civilians in Kosovo. Given these terrible acts of immoral violence, one may ask the following question: how can groups address such a disruptive legacy to build a better future? The last section tries to answer this question by accounting for the events that followed the bloody carnage. The violence stopped, and an agreement was reached in Dayton in November 1995 and signed in Paris on December 14, 1995. Eventually, Yugoslavia disintegrated into seven states. Currently, the nations and states in this region face the challenge of determining how people should move beyond the formal ending of the conflict by establishing lasting and stable peace through reconciliation.

Reconciliation: Acknowledging a Disruptive Legacy to Prepare the Future

In the aftermath of a bloody war that reflected a history of long buried and uncovered conflict, nations and states must go through a long peace-building process to create a stable and lasting peace. *Stable and lasting peace* can be defined as consisting of the mutual recognition and acceptance of a supreme goal to maintain peaceful relations, which are characterised by full normalisation and cooperation in all possible domains of collective life that provide a secure co-existence (Bar-Tal 2013). The process of building a stable and lasting peace process does not stop with the achievement of a peaceful settlement to the conflict. In fact, in the last several decades, it has become evident that formal peace agreements fall far short of establishing genuinely peaceful relations between the former adversaries (e.g., Knox and Quirk 2000; Bar-Tal & Bennink 2004; Lederach 1997; Lipschutz 1998; Simpson 1997; Wilmer 1998). Achieving a stable and lasting peace requires both structural and psychological changes. The psychological changes include changes in not only

worldviews, feelings, beliefs, attitudes and behavioural intentions but also in societal, cultural and educational products, such as information in the mass media, ceremonies, leaders' speeches, books, films and school textbooks. Fundamentally, the new socio-psychological basis must be shared by the majority of a society's members and deeply penetrate the society's institutions, organisations and channels of communication (Asmal et al. 1997; Bar-Tal 2000; Kriesberg 1998; Lederach 1997). However, the repertoire that fed the conflict does not change overnight with the signing of a peace agreement. The peace-building process is long and does not occur unintentionally. Rather, the process also requires reciprocal, planned and active efforts to overcome obstacles and facilitate its solidification. One of the necessary conditions of peace is *reconciliation*. We will focus solely on this process.

Reconciliation pertains to the socio-psychological restructuring of the relations between past rivals that allows for the healing of past wounds caused by the conflict. To achieve this healing process, the parties must recognise and accept their crimes, freely discuss the past conflict and take responsibility for and correct past injustices and wrongdoings (Bar-Tal 2013). Thus, the reconciliation process builds new relationships that allow the parties to move beyond the experiences accumulated before and during the conflict. Reconciliation allows each party to form a new socio-psychological repertoire that can accommodate past grievances and contentions while constructing new views about the rival, the conflict and the collective self (Bar-Tal 2009). This new socio-psychological repertoire enables former rivals to build new relations as the foundations of a stable and lasting peace.

As the reconciliation process proceeds, there is wide agreement that a successful outcome requires the formation of a new shared outlook on the past. Once there is a shared and acknowledged perception of the past, both parties can take a significant step towards achieving reconciliation. As Hayner (1999) noted:

> Where fundamentally different versions or continued denials about such important and painful events still exist, reconciliation may be only superficial (p.373).

Reconciliation implies that both parties not only get to know but truly acknowledge what happened in the past (Asmal et al. 1997; Chirwa 1997; Gardner Feldman 1999; Hayes 1998; Hayner 1999; Lederach 1998; Norval 1998, 1999; Cehajic and Brown 2008). *Acknowledgement* of the past implies that the parties recognise that there are at least two narratives of the conflict (Hayner 1999; Kopstein 1997; Norval 1999; Salomon 2004). This factor is important to the reconciliation process because each party's collective memory of its own past underpins the continuation of the conflict and obstructs peacemaking (Bar-Tal 2007). Reconciliation necessitates changing these societal beliefs (i.e., collective memories) about the past by learning about the rival group's collective memory, admitting one's own past misdeeds and taking responsibility for the outbreak and maintenance of the conflict. Through the process of negotiating collective memories, where one's own past is critically revised and synchronised with that of the other group, a new narrative emerges (Asmal et al. 1997; Hayes 1998; Norval 1998). With time, this new historical account of events substitutes for the reigning collective memory.

However, overcoming the past often requires more than the establishment of a common collective memory. During the conflict, both parties accumulate many

grievances towards the other side. Years of violence leave deep scars, anger, grief, a sense of victimhood and the desire for revenge. These grievances must not only be known but also truly acknowledged by the rival society (Asmal et al. 1997; Kriesberg 1998; Lederach 1998; Norval 1999; Ross 1995; Wilmer 1998). Some researchers have gone a step further by asserting that the collective acknowledgement of the past is not enough to promote a reconciliation process. Instead, they argue that the reconciliation process should ultimately lead to collective healing and forgiveness of the adversary's misdeeds (Arthur 1999; Hayner 1999; Lederach 1998; Shriver 1995; Staub 2000; Cehajic et al. 2008).

According to this view, reconciliation consists of restoration and healing. It allows for the emergence of a common frame of reference that permits and encourages societies to acknowledge the past, confess former wrongs, relive the experiences under safe conditions, mourn the losses, validate the experienced pain and grief, receive empathy and support and restore broken relationships (Lederach 1998; Long and Brecke 2003; Minow 1998; Montville 1993; Staub 1998, 2000). This process creates a space in which forgiveness can be offered and accepted. The element of forgiveness as an outcome of reconciliation is important if one or both parties are attributed with responsibility for the outbreak or maintenance of the conflict and/or the misdeeds committed during the conflict (Auerbach 2004).

Thus, if the acknowledgement of responsibility for atrocities is a necessary prerequisite for sustainable inter-group reconciliation (e.g., Cohen 2001), we must determine which socio-psychological factors can instigate this process. Surprisingly, little empirical evidence is available on this subject. For example, an interview study conducted with Serbian adolescents regarding the Srebrenica massacre suggests that inter-group contact and the acknowledgement of out-groups are potentially significant positive predictors of the acknowledgement of the in-group's responsibility for the atrocity (Cehajic and Brown 2008). Recent findings have shown that Serb adolescents who had frequent and high-quality interactions with the members from other groups were more willing to publicly acknowledge their group's responsibility for the atrocities committed during the 1992–1995 war (Cehajic and Brown 2010). Such high-quality interactions facilitated acknowledgement through an increase in perspective-taking and a decrease in biased beliefs of competitive victimhood. These findings suggest that promoting positive inter-group experiences characterised by trust, cooperation and tolerance might lay the ground for greater acknowledgement and future reconciliation (MacDonald 2009). In addition to promoting positive *inter-group* experiences, recent experimental studies conducted in two different conflict contexts show that the promotion of positive *self*-experience increases both the acknowledgement and acceptance of in-group responsibility (Cehajic et al. 2011). By actively re-affirming some important and threat-unrelated aspects of the self, the participants showed a greater readiness to acknowledge the unwelcome knowledge of their group's violations of human rights.

In addition to promoting positive inter-group and personal experiences, we believe that the promotion of positive narratives of inter-ethnic tolerance and cooperation (i.e., positive propaganda) could help to facilitate reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia. Governmental and non-governmental representatives, including the media

and the education system, should induce and increase the frequency of every type of inter-ethnic cooperation while compelling the parties to impartially examine and acknowledge their own past and present behaviour.

In addition to the acknowledgement and acceptance of responsibility and the offering of forgiveness by all society members, other broader issues need to be addressed to achieve and sustain long-term peace and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia. Those issues include delivering justice to victims, improving the socio-economic conditions of displaced people and refugees, strengthening governmental institutions (i.e., increasing people's trust in the government) and economies, and undermining the actors, including political leaders, who still fuel exclusive and intolerant nationalism. These issues must be addressed within the local contexts, and the people of the former Yugoslavia bear the key responsibility of doing so. However, the international community, particularly the EU and the USA, cannot forget or minimise its role in providing a sustainable peace in the Balkans. The international community also plays a role in this important process by providing moral and economic support.

We end this chapter by suggesting that successful reconciliation requires commitment and decisive policies that are implemented with the help of the international community. By nature, the reconciliation process is long and requires the involvement of society's members, who need to reconstruct their views of rival societies, the past and the future. This process can begin and be executed in many different ways, but every method requires the ability to refer to past crimes and a collective sense of justice. The next chapters address these key issues.

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Chapter 9
Traumatised Selves: Does War Trauma Facilitate In-Group Bonding and Out-Group Distancing?

Dinka Corkalo Biruski and Sandra Penic

On an individual level, a traumatic experience prevents a victim from establishing or renewing a relationship with the perpetrator. Creating distance from the perpetrator is a functional reaction; by distancing herself/himself from the perpetrator, the victim begins the recovery process and avoids possible future harm. This is well documented in the trauma research on grossly offensive acts like sexual abuse, the recovery process for which emphasises the intra-personal process of forgiveness rather than the inter-personal process of reconciliation (Noll 2005). In the case of individual traumatic experience, it is possible to directly link personal traumatisation to the guilt of a perpetrator. However, this relationship is more complex for acts of mass violence and war; the responsibility for one's personal suffering and the suffering of one's group is often assigned not only to the individual perpetrators but also to the members of the whole group to which the perpetrators belong.

Research has shown that in the case of intergroup events such as group conflict, people feel group-based emotional reactions (Pennebaker et al. 1997; Branscombe and Doosje 2004). Collective guilt, which is based on the experience and/or perception that one's own group was or has perpetrated unjustified harmful actions against another group, is such an emotion. Feelings of collective guilt derive psychologically from our membership in various social groups (Branscombe and Doosje 2004), which explains why a person can feel collective guilt even though she/he is not responsible for the harm done by the in-group (Doosje et al. 1998). For this reason, philosopher Margaret Gilbert (2002) has called this kind of guilt *membership guilt*. Our membership in social groups has meaning, importance and value for us and influences our social identity (Tajfel 1981). Just as the victories and successes of our groups can be a source of personal pride and triumph (Cialdini et al. 1976),

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our group's defeats and misconduct can be a source of personal shame and/or guilt (Branscombe and Doosje 2004).

With the exception of German psychiatrist and philosopher Karl Jaspers' seminal work *The Question of German Guilt* (1947/2006), the issue of collective and individual responsibility for in-group misdeeds has rarely been addressed by modern psychology. Jaspers described moral guilt, in particular, as an internal process in which insight is followed by atonement and restoration. This process produces tangible results in the real world (p. 24). Contemporary psychologists make a similar assumption about the role of (collective) guilt. They believe that its function is to advance reparation, restore justice and facilitate reconciliation between groups (Brown and Cehajic 2008; Brown et al. 2008; Corkalo Biruski and Magoc 2009; Schmitt et al. 2004; Miron and Branscombe 2008). Some authors have questioned the usefulness of the concept of collective guilt in the context of post-war recovery (Clark 2008). However, our recent work (Corkalo Biruski and Magoc 2009) emphasises that experiencing collective guilt is a useful intra-psychological process of discomfort that motivates a perpetrator to "un-do" or alleviate the harm done to the other group. In contrast, *collectivisation of guilt* is a harmful societal tool that usually has a (hidden) ideological agenda.

However, just as it is possible to *accept* collective guilt without being individually responsible for the misdeeds committed against the members of another group, it is also possible to *assign* guilt, not only to those who actually caused the hurt but also to the whole group to which the perpetrator belongs (Brascombe and Doosje 2004). The sense of *we-ness* created by personalising the injury that was inflicted on in-group members causes individuals to blame not only the perpetrator but also the whole group to which the perpetrator belongs. Moreover, Lickel et al. (2006) have proposed that collective blame could play an important role in intergroup aggression by contributing to engagement in *vicarious retribution*. In vicarious retribution, an individual whose group member(s) suffered (but who was not personally harmed) takes revenge on a person belonging to the perpetrator group but who is not the individual perpetrator. Branscombe et al. (2004) distinguished collective guilt acceptance and collective guilt assignment conceptually by emphasising the difference between focusing on target group membership and target group actions. Focusing on the wrongdoings committed by one's own group towards others evokes a feeling of guilt acceptance. On the contrary, focusing on the injury caused to one's own group by an out-group (i.e., blaming the out-group) induces guilt assignment.

The process of collective guilt assignment, or collective blaming, is also the result of categorisation; by assigning individuals to the same group, we symbolically assign the *guilt of some* to the *guilt of all* (Broz, this volume). Those assigned to the group then become "guilty by association" (Doosje et al. 1998). In other words, out-group members are expected to feel guilty for what their in-groups have done (Branscombe et al. 2004). Through collective guilt assignment, the members of a victimised group can claim that all members of a perpetrating group should accept responsibility, recognise guilt and express remorse for the harm caused to the injured group (Wohl and Branscombe 2005; Wohl et al. 2006). As Lickel et al. (2004) have pointed out, there is no legal foundation on which to blame the whole group;

however, doing so is part of an "intuitive theory of morality" and is thus "a common feature of everyday justice" (p. 49). Psychologically, collective guilt assignment could be a mechanism for asserting the *moral superiority* of the victimised group. Collective guilt assignment emphasises the role of the perpetrator in the victimised group's suffering, highlights the wronged group's unjust suffering and suggests that the wronged group was morally in the right. Indeed, as suggested in a recent study by Sullivan et al. (2012), when one's in-group is blamed for wrongdoings towards others, the threat this accusation poses to the moral identity of the in-group can be alleviated by several strategies. One of these strategies is to "measure" which party suffered more. Through this process, the group that is (collectively) blamed for the suffering of others also claims its own victimhood, a phenomenon known as *collective victimhood* (Noor et al. 2008). Furthermore, by assigning guilt, a victim protects his/her own well-being and distances himself/herself (or his/her own group) from actively participating in the conflict and engaging in immoral actions. The competition between groups in conflict to assign victimhood and mutual blame is especially salient during intractable conflicts or those that are ideologically constructed as such. The wars in former Yugoslavia are some of the most recent example of such conflicts.

In the present research, we hypothesise that collective guilt assignment has an important mediating role in determining the relationship between war-related suffering and out-group attitudes.

Empirical evidence showing a (positive) link between the personal suffering caused by traumatic experiences and a negative attitude towards the out-group apparently responsible for the injury is not robust. While some research has shown a statistically significant correlation between traumatic experience and attitude towards the out-group, this correlation was not substantial, but rather weak. For example, Staub et al. (2005) found a correlation of -0.22 ($p < 0.01$) between trauma symptoms and orientation towards others, including a measure of readiness for reconciliation. However, there was no significant correlation between trauma symptoms and a change in orientation towards others at either of the points of time at which measurements were taken during an intervention aimed to facilitate trauma healing and reconciliation. Hewstone et al. (2004) also found that highly victimised persons in Northern Ireland were less inclined to forgive the out-group; the correlation between victimisation and forgiveness was negative, significant and low (-0.17) and appeared only in the Protestant sample. In a more recent study, also conducted in Northern Ireland, Myers et al. (2009) found a low (-0.10) correlation between victimhood and intergroup forgiveness. Our previous research (Biro et al. 2004) investigating the link between war-related stressful and traumatic experiences and readiness for reconciliation showed that personal injury alone was not a significant predictor of readiness for reconciliation. However, when personal harm occurred in the context of negative experiences with a conflicting ethnic group, war-related trauma did become a significant predictor of readiness for reconciliation. Further refinements of this complex relationship showed that stressful events experienced en masse were not predictors of readiness to reconcile with the out-group. Furthermore, traumatic experiences that included personal losses and threats to one's own life or to the lives of significant others prevented reconciliation (Corkalo Biruski and Ajdukovic 2009).

The relationship between traumatic experience and one's relationship to the perpetrating out-group is demonstrably more complex than expected. Therefore, another mechanism of intergroup relations, such as group-based emotions, could have a mediating role in the pattern of this relationship. We hypothesise that collective guilt attributions could have such a mediating role.

Other group mechanisms could also be relevant to post-conflict intergroup relations. One of the most prominent is the identification with a relevant in-group. As Tajfel (1981) and Tajfel and Turner (1986) pointed out nearly 30 years ago, the groups we are affiliated with are central to our social self; they are a source of pride and can also be a source of shame and guilt (Brascombe and Doosje 2004; Brown and Cehajic 2008; Brown et al. 2008; Lickel et al. 2004).

The value of the group to its individual members increases in time of threat. Group loyalty can even transcend one's mortal self (Stern 1995, 1996). According to Kelman (1997), a group can elicit self-sacrificing behaviours because it assures satisfaction of two basic needs: the need for self-protection and the need for self-transcendence. Self-categorisation and self-identification determine more than the relationship of an individual to his/her in-group; these processes are also fundamental to intergroup relations. Even in times of peaceful intergroup relations, group identification and other forms of group loyalty strongly influence attitudes and behaviours. Many studies have corroborated the importance of group belonging and social identification to intergroup relations, including the formation of prejudices (Reynolds and Turner 2001; Turner and Reynolds 2003; Duckitt 2003), discrimination (Mummendey and Otten 2003), and other forms of inter-goup attitudes and behaviours that have significant political consequences (Huddy 2003; Myers et al. 2009). In times of uncertainty and threats to the in-group, group identity becomes an even more salient and important determinant of intergroup relations. Indeed, contemporary theories of intergroup relations propose that threat to the in-group is a prevailing factor in intergroup distancing and out-group hostility (Worchel and Coutant 1997; Duckitt 2003; Stephan and Renfro 2003). For example, Noor et al. (2008) showed that competitive victimhood and a high level of in-group identification in two deeply divided societies, Northern Ireland and Chile, were negatively related to readiness to forgive the outgroup. Forgiveness and guilt assignment were also negatively related (Wohl and Branscombe 2004), leading one to expect guilt assignment and in-group identification to be positively correlated. Indeed, Reysen and Branscombe (2008) demonstrated a medium-sized positive correlation between identity measures (e.g., American identification and patriotism) and collective guilt assignment. However, they also showed that this relationship was mediated by another group-based phenomenon: belief in collective emotions. Wohl and Branscombe (2004) also demonstrated the importance of social categorisation to both forgiveness and collective guilt. Specifically, they showed that when in-group and out-group social identities were made salient, participants were less ready to forgive and more prone to assign collective guilt.

In the present study, we explore the level of traumatisation in two groups that were recently in conflict, investigate their perception of collective guilt and examine their present intergroup relations. We hypothesise a positive correlation between the level of traumatisation and intergroup attitudes, which were measured as social

distance towards the out-group. However, we expect this relation to be at least partially mediated by the level of collective guilt assignment and the strength of ethnic identification.

Method

Participants

Two samples from Croatia and Serbia, respectively, were included in the study. Of the participants, 411 self-identified as ethnic Croats from Croatia and 383 as Serbs from Serbia. Both samples were initially larger; there were originally 468 participants from Croatia and 511 from Serbia. In Croatia, 78 participants did not self-identify as Croats. In Serbia, 128 participants did not self-identify as Serbs. Because ethnic identification was a key variable in assessing the relevant dependent measures, these participants were excluded from the analyses. Participants were selected from two random samples of Croatian and Serbian adults born between 1968 and 1974. When war in Croatia began in 1991, these respondents were between 17 and 23 years old. The mean age in the Croatian sample was $M = 36.38$; $SD = 2.03$; in the Serbian sample, the mean age was $M = 36.07$; $SD = 1.96$. In the Croatian sample, 53.2 % were men and 46.8 % were women. In the Serbian sample, 55.1 % were men and 44.9 % were women. Most of the participants in both samples had completed high school (Croatia: 70.4 %; Serbia: 64.8 %). A university degree or higher had been earned by 19.9 % of the Croatian participants and by 30.5 % of the Serbian participants. Only a small proportion of the participants had not finished high school (Croatia: 9.7 %; Serbia: 4.7 %).[1]

Procedure

Participants were randomly selected using a random walk technique. A professional interviewer conducted the interviews, which lasted approximately 1 h per participant. A number of attitudinal measures were taken. In the present research, the following measures were relevant:

Cumulative war exposure evaluated whether participants had experienced eight war-related events with high traumatic potential, including expulsion from home,

[1] For more detailed comparative census data on the level of education in Croatia see: http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv_Eng/ljetopis/2008/PDF/05-bind.pdf. For Serbian statistics see: http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/axd/popis.htm. Although our participants were more educated than the general population, our previous analysis showed no differences in this cohort on relevant scores among participants with different levels of education (Penic and Corkalo Biruski 2009).

imprisonment, death of a family member and personal injury/wounding.[2] The result is reported as the sum of events experienced by the participant. A higher score indicates higher traumatic exposure.[3] Thus, we regarded this score as an indicator of one's experienced war trauma.

The *collective guilt scale* (Branscombe et al. 2004) included 15 items. Participants reported their responses on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The following three subscales were included in this scale: collective guilt acceptance (5 items), collective guilt assignment (5 items) and whole group accountability (5 items). In the present analysis, we have included a measure of collective guilt assignment. The results were reported as the mean of all of the item ratings, which ranged from 1 to 7.

The *ethnic identification scale* (Doosje et al. 1995) included four items that participants rated on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The result was reported as the sum of all of the item responses, with a higher result indicating stronger ethnic group identification.

The *nationalism scale* (Corkalo and Kamenov 1999, 2003; Corkalo Biruski and Ajdukovic 2012) included six items. Participants rated their responses on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The results were reported as the sum of all of the item ratings. Scores ranged from 6 to 30, with higher scores indicating a stronger sense of nationalism (i.e., stronger in-group glorification and a sense of the superiority of one's own group; cf. Roccas et al. 2006). Sample items included, for example, "Although my nation is not large, there are many more capable people in my nation than in others" and "Members of the same nation should always stick together."

Following the example of Bogardus (1933), the *social distance scale* measured the degree of intimacy an individual would allow between members of social outgroups. The scale consisted of the following six degrees of intimacy: would marry into the group, would accept as a relative, would accept as a close friend, would work in the same office, would accept as a next-door neighbour and would accept only as a citizen in my country. Participants were asked to indicate the degree to which they would be willing to accept members of the nine ethnic groups living in the former Yugoslav republics (Serbs/Croats, Bosniaks, Albanians, Macedonians, Slovenians,

[2] Experiences of combatantship were also included in the cumulative war exposure score. Although one could argue that there are differences between experiencing war trauma as a civilian and as a combatant, there is no doubt that active combatant experience has great traumatic potential (Keane et al. 2004) and that many victims of war, including refugees, either witness or personally experience combat-related events. This is true for many participants in the sample studied in our research, who were between 17 and 23 years old when the war started. Many measures of war-related trauma exposure follow similar logic (Norris and Hamblen 2004).

[3] The underlying assumption in adding the number of traumatic experiences is that stressful and traumatic events have a cumulative effect: the more traumatic experiences one has had, the greater is the risk to one's mental health. The same assumption is at the core of a number of scales that measure the impact of trauma (for example, Wolfe and Kimerling 1997; Norris and Hamblen 2004). Moreover, a study by Ajdukovic et al. (2007) showed that the simple sum of different traumatic categories of events people have experienced was the best predictor of their mental health status many years after the exposure.



Fig. 9.1 Percentage of participants exposed to war-related events

Montenegrins, Vojvodina Hungarians and Roma). The result was expressed as the highest degree of intimacy one was willing to accept with a member of a particular out-group. A higher score indicates greater social distance (i.e., a less positive attitude towards the out-group). In the present analysis, we focus solely on the relations between two groups that have recently been in conflict: Croats and Serbs.

Results

The percentages of people in both samples who were exposed to various traumatic events are shown in Fig. 9.1. In both samples, there was considerable exposure to a number of traumatic events, among which fighting, property damage, weapon use and expulsion were the most prominent. However, the Croatian cohort was exposed to a greater degree.

Figure 9.2 shows the sum of traumatic events to which the participants were exposed. Most of the participants were not exposed to traumatic experiences, but non-exposure was more frequent in the Serbian (75.2 %) than in the Croatian (51.6 %) sample. However, more participants in the Croatian sample experienced one or more traumatic events.

The descriptive results obtained from the cumulative war exposure, collective guilt assignment, ethnic identification and nationalism scales for both samples are shown in Table 9.1. The results show that Croats and Serbs differ significantly on all measures. The differences in war exposure, $t(792) = 5.90$; $p < 0.001$, showed that Croats reported experiencing greater exposure. The differences in collective guilt assignment, $t(781) = 3.83$; $p < 0.001$, showed that Croats assigned more collective guilt.



Fig. 9.2 Sum of war-related traumatic experiences in the Croatian and Serbian samples

Table 9.1 Descriptive results for cumulative war exposure, collective guilt assignment, nationalism and social distance towards the conflicting group

		N	M	SD	t
Cumulative war exposure	Croats	411	1.12	1.463	5.900**
	Serbs	383	0.56	1.187	
Collective guilt assignment	Croats	408	4.54	1.299	3.825**
	Serbs	375	4.15	1.524	
Ethnic identification	Croats	404	21.88	5.10	6.125**
	Serbs	372	19.34	6.41	
Nationalism	Croats	404	21.83	4.709	9.865**
	Serbs	349	18.24	5.277	
Social distance towards Croats	Croats	–	–	–	
	Serbs	360	1.98	2.279	
Social distance towards Serbs	Croats	408	3.82	2.459	
	Serbs	–	–	–	

**$p < 0.001$

The differences in ethnic identification, $t(751) = 6.12$; $p < 0.001$, showed stronger group identification among Croats. Nationalism also differed significantly between the two samples, $t(751) = 9.87$; $p < 0.001$; the Croats reported higher scores.

To explore the relationship between war exposure and intergroup attitudes (i.e., nationalism and social distance), Persons' coefficients of correlation were calculated. The resulting correlation matrix is shown in Table 9.2.

As Table 9.2 shows, there was a mild positive correlation between war exposure and nationalism in both samples, indicating that participants who experience greater exposure display more nationalistic attitudes. A similar, though stronger, pattern

Table 9.2 Correlations among war trauma, collective guilt assignment, nationalism and social distance in Croatian (*upright*) and Serbian (*italic*) samples

	Cumulative war exposure	Ethnic identification	Nationalism	Social distance towards the conflicting group
Collective guilt assignment	0.18**	0.33**	0.39**	0.28**
	*0.19***	*0.29***	*0.38***	*0.34***
Cumulative war exposure		0.17**	0.15**	0.20**
		0.20 ns	*0.11**	*0.21***
Ethnic identification			0.27**	0.33**
			*0.31***	*0.01 ns*
Nationalism				0.52**
				*0.41***

*$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$

of correlation was observed between war exposure and collective guilt assignment, indicating that those who have had a higher number of traumatic experiences are likely to assign more collective guilt. There was also a moderate positive correlation between nationalism and collective guilt assignment in both samples. All coefficients were of a similar size in both samples. However, there was a moderating effect of national context on the association between exposure and identification and between identification and social distance. In both cases, there was a positive association between these variables in the Croatian, but not in the Serbian, sample.

To test our prediction that collective guilt assignment and ethnic identification mediate the relationship between war exposure and the measures of intergroup attitudes (nationalism and social distance), we conducted a series of multiple mediation analyses modelled on Preacher and Hayes' (2004, 2007, 2008) two-part procedure. First, by assessing the total indirect effects, the study explored whether the mediators transmitted the effect of the predictor variable (X) to the criterion variable (Y). Second, by assessing the specific indirect effects associated with each mediator, we tested the individual mediator's hypothesis using a multiple mediator model (Preacher and Hayes 2008). The results of the mediation analysis are shown in Figs. 9.3 and 9.4.

As Fig. 9.3 shows, collective guilt assignment and ethnic identification completely mediated the effect (correlation) of cumulative war exposure on nationalism in the Croatian sample. In other words, after controlling for mediator effects, the direct effect of exposure on nationalism became non-significant. In addition, there was no difference in the contribution of these two mediators. A pair-wise contrast between the specific indirect effects of the two mediators revealed $C = 0.107$, $z = 1.589$ and $p = 0.11$. A Sobel test revealed a statistically significant total indirect effect ($z = 3.78$; $p < 0.001$) and specific indirect effects of collective guilt ($z = 3.185$; $p < 0.01$) and ethnic identification ($z = 2.284$; $p < 0.01$). In other words, in the Croatian sample, experiencing more war trauma boosted ethnic identity, and stronger ethnic identity led to increased nationalism. Similarly, experiencing more war trauma led to ascribing more collective guilt to the out-group, which also led to more intense nationalism.



Fig. 9.3 Mediation of war exposure on nationalism via collective guilt assignment and ethnic identification (un-standardised coefficients B). *Upright* numbers indicate Bs for the Croatian sample; *italic* numbers indicate Bs for the Serbian sample. Total effects are in *parentheses*, and direct effects are in *bold* (***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$)



Fig. 9.4 Mediation of war trauma on out-group distance via collective guilt assignment and ethnic identification (un-standardised coefficients). *Upright* numbers indicate Bs for the Croatian sample; *italic* numbers indicate Bs for the Serbian sample. Total effects are in *parentheses*, and direct effects are in *bold* (***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$)

In the Serbian sample, however, only collective guilt assignment fully mediated the effect of war exposure on nationalism. After controlling for mediator effects, the direct effect of war trauma on nationalism became non-significant. A Sobel test revealed a statistically significant total mediating effect ($z = 2.48$; $p < 0.01$) and a specific mediating effect of collective guilt ($z = 3.16$; $p < 0.001$). There was no significant mediating effect of ethnic identification ($z = 0.09$; $p = 0.92$). These results indicate that the (weak) relationship between trauma and nationalism in the Serbian sample is mediated solely through collective guilt assignment. More intensive exposure led to the assignment of more collective guilt, which led, in turn, to stronger nationalism.

A similar pattern of results held true for the relationship between war trauma and social distance towards the out-group with which the target group was in conflict (Fig. 9.4). In the Croatian sample, there was a partial mediating effect of both collective guilt and ethnic identification on the relationship between war exposure and social distance towards the Serbs. After controlling for the effects of the mediators, the direct effect of war trauma on out-group distance was weaker, but still significant. A Sobel test revealed a significant total mediating effect ($z = 3.68$; $p < 0.01$) and specific mediating effects of collective guilt ($z = 2.55$; $p < 0.01$) and ethnic identification ($z = 2.83$; $p < 0.01$). Both mediators contributed equally to this association. A pair-wise contrast between the specific indirect effects of the two mediators revealed

$C = -0.019$, $z = -0.59$ and $p = 0.55$. In summary, although collective guilt and ethnic identification did not fully account for the relationship between war trauma and attitudes towards the out-group, their roles should not be underestimated or neglected.

Unlike in the Croatian sample, in the Serbian sample, ethnic identification was not a mediator of the association between war trauma and attitudes towards the group in conflict (Croats) ($z = 0.176$; $p = 0.86$). Collective guilt proved to be a partial mediator. After controlling for the effect of collective guilt, the direct effect of war trauma on attitudes towards the out-group was still significant. In other words, war trauma did impact Serbian out-group attitudes, both directly and via collective guilt assignment.

Discussion

The present contribution has explored the relationship between war-related experiences and several indicators of the intergroup attitudes of groups that have recently been in conflict. The intergroup indicators used were nationalism and social distance towards a particular conflicting group. This study focused on the attitudes of Serbs towards Croats and of Croats towards Serbs. We assumed that the link between war trauma and measures of intergroup relations would be mediated by group-oriented processes, such as identification with one's own ethnic group, and by group-based emotions, such as collective guilt assignment.

The results revealed considerable war-related trauma exposure, especially in the Croatian sample (Figs. 9.1 and 9.2). Croats were significantly more exposed to war-related property damage, fighting and weapon use and looting. Because the 1991–1995 war took place on Croatian territory, these results were expected. No other differences in trauma exposure were found between the two samples, although all traumatic events were more frequent in the Croatian sample.

A significant difference was found in collective guilt assignment: Croats assigned more collective guilt. Notably, the scores in both samples for collective guilt assignment were slightly higher than the middle of the scale, indicating that both groups are inclined to assign collective guilt.

Past experience has shown that time and collective effort is required to come to terms with violent and morally unjustifiable group behaviours. Formerly belligerent groups tend to blame each other for atrocities. In addition, even when the atrocities of one's own group have been acknowledged, there is a tendency to see the deeds of the other group as worse and more inhuman (Tavris and Aronson 2007). To change this pattern of group justification and self-righteousness, a change in collective beliefs must occur, including a redefinition and reinterpretation of the past. All of the groups involved in a conflict must accept responsibility for their part in the conflict before a truthful and less embellished historical narrative can be created (Bar-Tal and Bennik 2004; Kelman 2008). Such a narrative is a prerequisite for more stable future intergroup relations. In the present research, formerly belligerent

groups readily assigned collective guilt, a pattern that has been seen in post-conflict settings for many years after the end of the conflict and especially when ethnic identities are being made salient (Wohl and Branscombe 2004). A similar pattern has been observed in the post-conflict setting of Vukovar, Croatia, specifically in a sample of young adults who were Croatian citizens of Croat and Serb origin (Corkalo Biruski and Magoc 2009). In this study, Croats also assigned more collective guilt and demonstrated a stronger ethnic identity. In the present study, the two samples differed on measures of nationalism and mutual social distance. Again, the Croats scored higher on both measures than did the Serbs. The distance expressed by the Croats towards the Serbs was significantly higher than the distance expressed by the Serbs towards the Croats. While many Serbs were willing to accept kinship relations with Croats, most Croats did not want any relationship with the Serbs closer than that of a co-worker. We found a similar difference between the Croats and Serbs in a study conducted in the city of Vukovar (Croatia). While the heavily victimised Croat group showed more distance towards the Serbs, the Serb citizens of Vukovar were willing to accept closer relationships with the Croats (Biro et al. 2004; Ajdukovic and Corkalo Biruski 2008; Corkalo Biruski and Ajdukovic 2009). Considering that the recent conflict took place in Croatia and that the Croats feel strongly that they were victimised in the war, their negative out-group attitudes and more intense nationalism are likely the consequence of their recent experiences.

The study's four core concepts—war exposure, ethnic identification, collective guilt assignment and intergroup attitudes—were significantly related in both samples, and the patterns of coefficients obtained corroborated our hypothesis regarding the possible mediating role of ethnic identification and collective guilt assignment in the relationship between war trauma and measures of intergroup attitudes. Two mediation analyses, one of war-related trauma on nationalism and the other of war-related trauma on social distance towards the conflicting group, were performed to investigate the possible mediating role of ethnic identification and collective guilt assignment. The results partially corroborated our initial hypothesis. In the Croatian sample, collective guilt assignment and ethnic identity completely mediated the effect (correlation) of war-related trauma on nationalism. After controlling for mediator effects, the direct effect of war trauma on nationalism became non-significant. In the Serbian sample, the relationship between trauma and nationalism was completely mediated by collective guilt assignment, but not by ethnic identification. In other words, for the Croats, traumatic experiences continue to influence ethnic identification and collective guilt assignment, which further increase nationalism. For the Serbs, traumatic experiences similarly influence collective guilt assignment (and thereby nationalism), but not ethnic identification. In the Croatian sample, traumatic experiences caused by war seem to shape their ethnic identity in an important way, though probably through the experience of collective victimisation and not via individual experience. The present research shows stronger traumatisation in the Croatian sample. This recent traumatisation is central to our participants' ethnic identity. However, ethnic identity is shaped not only through personal victimisation, but through a victimisation of *we-ness* (i.e., our in-group would be well-served by boosting collective identity). In our recent analysis of the same Croatian sample,

no difference in collective guilt assignment was observed between people who personally suffered traumatic experiences and those who did not (Penic and Corkalo Biruski 2009). In this study, we also hypothesised that the perception of in-group victimisation helped to shape a unanimous collective belief. Other authors have also discovered a strong link between collective traumatisation and in-group bonding and attachment (Gobodo-Madikizela 2008).

Partial mediating effects of both collective guilt and ethnic identification shaped the relationship between war trauma and out-group distance in the Croatian sample. After controlling for the mediator effects, the direct effect of war trauma on out-group distance towards Serbs was still significant. In the Serbian sample, however, ethnic identification did not mediate the association between war trauma and out-group attitudes. Collective guilt, however, proved to be a partial mediator. In other words, war trauma had an effect on out-group attitudes both directly and via collective guilt assignment.

The results of the present research indicate that war trauma can create a complex pattern of intergroup attitudes and emotions. While directly related to negative out-group attitudes, trauma was also indirectly related to them through its influence on the in-group's belief that the other group is responsible as a whole for the personal (and collective) harm caused. Ethnic identity seemed to play a different and asymmetrical role in shaping the out-group attitudes of groups with different levels of war-related traumatisation; this factor proved to be more influential among more traumatised groups. While strengthening victims' social identity could be an important step in the process of social recovery, the problem of how to boost this identity without incurring the negative consequences associated with strong in-group feeling is challenging. Future research should assess whether this sequence of trauma, identity and negative out-group attitudes is a specific but changeable post-conflict social defence mechanism or an easily predictable and more long-term consequence of conflicting intergroup relations.

Conclusions and Implications

The present research shows that the relationship between traumatic experiences and unfavourable out-group attitudes is more complex than expected. Although slightly different patterns between the Croatian and Serbian samples were observed in the strength of certain mediators, the importance of a specific group-based emotion (collective guilt assignment) was well-substantiated. The results show that this emotional response either partially or completely mediates the association between war-related traumatic experiences and out-group attitudes. These results could have important implications for the future intergroup relations of the antagonised groups and for the processes of social reconstruction.

Research has shown the importance of *collective guilt acceptance* in the processes of forgiveness, restitution and reconciliation between groups (Hewstone et al. 2004; Iyer et al. 2004; Nadler and Shnabel 2008; Wohl and Branscombe 2005). The first

step in this process is to acknowledge responsibility (Kelman 2008) for past wrongdoings, beginning a truth-telling process that could pave the road to a more peaceful coexistence and the ultimate reconciliation of the groups. Our results also showed the effects of the opposite behaviour, demonstrating that *collective guilt assignment* is related to greater social distance. It is therefore expected that reduced blaming (and accepting one's own share of guilt) could have the opposite effect on intergroup relations. In other words, collective guilt assignment prevents groups in conflict from developing more positive and amicable intergroup relations. When these processes occur in the context of serious mass traumatisation, in-group threat, and a strong sense of identity endangerment, collective guilt assignment almost certainly furthers ethnic distancing and prevents intergroup reconciliation. Our results convincingly indicate that group-based emotion, especially collective guilt assignment, mediates the relationship between war trauma experiences and out-group attitudes in a war-torn society. To constructively handle post-conflict processes, comprehensive psychosocial care for traumatised persons should be prioritised. This care should extend beyond the individual level so the traumatised "self" of the group could also be treated and healed. This is a necessary precondition for building a solid foundation for a peaceful society. During this process, individuals should confront the past and acknowledge the wrongdoings of their own group. In addition, the guilt of the out-group should be individualised. To successfully accomplish these steps, a firm determination to seek justice for victims and to ensure fair and timely trials for perpetrators is needed. As Weinstein and Stover (2004) pointed out:

> Individuals need some form of justice to acknowledge the wrongs done to them, just as societies need it to *establish boundaries* by which *individuals can be held responsible* for their behaviours toward their fellow citizens (p. 11).

Blaming whole groups will do little good; creating a "culture of blame" (Gobodo-Madikizela 2008) only increases the risk of instigating future intergroup aggression and perpetuating the cycle of violence (Lickel et al. 2006). The post-conflict societies of former Yugoslavia are only beginning these processes of confronting the past. This process requires time, effort, the societal consensus of its active citizens and an open agenda for the political elite who will govern the process and manage it responsibly.

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Chapter 10
When Nobody Stood Up and Everybody is Guilty: A Puzzle of Individual Responsibility and Collective Guilt (*Invited voice*)

Svetlana Broz

When war broke out in Yugoslavia in the early nineties, the only words spoken in conversations and read in newspapers every day in the country's capital city, Belgrade, described the evils of war. The city where I had grown up, where I had completed my medical studies and which I loved as a cosmopolitan, open city had turned into a beehive in which every individual bee was building, feeding and storing its own segment with hatred. The worldwide coverage of the war was black and white. Even my deaf, former friends participated in those unremittingly crude conversations, and I found that many relationships were founded on the question of whose contribution to evil was greater. I was surrounded by hatred, blame and evil.

Refusing to believe that nothing human existed amidst the madness of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I searched for the humanity behind the headlines. I started entering the war zones in January 1993. I first entered as a cardiologist to help at least one human being deprived of normal medical care because of the war.

While providing care for people of all three ethno-national backgrounds—Catholic Croats, Muslim Bosniaks, and Eastern Orthodox Christian Serbs—I felt their need to open their souls and talk without being questioned about their fates in the war. From their short, spontaneous confessions in the cardiology ward, I understood their need for truth, which, stemming from the places where grenades were actually falling, was surprisingly subtle and refined compared with Belgrade's and the world's simplistic, black-and-white pictures of the Bosnian war zone.

I listened to stories about people in Bosnia and Herzegovina who had the courage to stand up to crimes being committed against the innocent, even when they had no weapons to help them. These individuals served as genuine examples of the goodness, compassion, humanity and civil courage that continued to exist in these times of evil. They broke free from the identity of the *bystander*: the person who chooses to look away, ignore, and silently accept the suffering of others. Instead, these human beings provided compelling examples of what I call *upstanders*: people who stick to their moral convictions and norms and demonstrate great civil courage through their acts,

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even in a situation as horrific as the Bosnian war. My book, "Good People in an Evil Time", is a collection of first-hand testimonies from people who survived the war. It illustrates the ways in which anonymous people were upstanders.

Some people may dismiss these stories and believe that wartime examples of violent behaviour reveal far more about human nature. I disagree. We must pay careful attention to these stories because they hold up a mirror and demand that we reflect upon our own acts and behaviour. They clearly demonstrate the possibility of choice. When shared, these stories can encourage more people to stand up and speak out against evil and to act in accordance with their moral norms. The hundreds of interviews I have conducted and the tens of thousands of people with whom I have shared these stories of humanity have repeatedly confirmed this belief. Indeed, I have found that telling stories about upstanders' actions can have the very real and enduring effect of inspiring others to follow their examples.

Learning about upstanders and their motivations is not an easy, prescribed recipe to inspiring others to follow their examples. What defines the upstander cannot, for example, be captured in a few words. The upstander's reasons for acting righteously are often personal and will depend on the circumstances. Finding the motivations that may be generally shared among all upstanders must be addressed by psychologists, not cardiologists such as myself. However, we do not need to pin down the general, abstract motivations of upstanders to understand the function of these stories. These stories stir something within ourselves. They appeal, reach out and force us readers and listeners to contemplate our own values and actions.

Thus, the upstander actively confronts the choice of standing up against immorality and the degeneration of humanity or keeping quiet and accepting things the way they are, as bystanders do. In the words of Uwe Kitzinger (2006), the civil courage that characterises the upstander is the courage of the rebel: the capacity to resist by engaging in critical and independent thinking and the will to take part in life instead of being a silent observer.

When so many other people choose to compromise their morals to survive, the upstander's actions suggest that we must not allow ourselves to be debased by our circumstances. To retain our dignity, we must sometimes refuse to live life at any cost. Hannah Arendt once stated, "It is always possible to say YES or NO" (Arendt 1994, p. 321). Upstanders decide when to say "no" to evil.

Based on the anecdotal evidence I collected, I have found that upstanders are not extraordinary people; in fact, they are often anonymous individuals. Regardless of their differences in age, gender, literacy, religious affiliation, ethnic identity, and wartime roles, they were all brave enough to sacrifice their lives rather than commit to or be complicit in a crime. I had the opportunity to ask dozens of these people who showed civil courage and helped others during the war what motivated their behaviour and why they did not follow the majority (i.e., either silently observing or actively participating in crimes). Their precise answers varied, but many of them spoke of their parents and forefathers as exemplary role models and how they could not have acted differently. That is, they had to act in accordance with their high moral norms. This decision is not a predetermined one that transforms some into

upstanders; it is a choice. It is the choice to refuse to live life at any cost. It is the choice to retain dignity and to value humanity when surrounded by evil.

Unfortunately, too often we only learn about upstanders through the stories told by others. The essence of these stories is brought to life in the following testimonies.

A factory director from Central Bosnia testified as follows:

> Armed soldiers who were part of the Croatian Defense Council and men from paramilitary units took people, including me and my family, who were Muslim by nationality, from our apartments and houses and brought us to an elementary school that they had converted into a prison camp. After several days, they took forty of the prisoners, including my wife, our two five-year-old twin boys, and myself, and lined us up in a row. They then brought over a civilian, a man who was Croatian like they were. He was also my closest friend. They ordered him to choose a dozen of us from the lines and to decide how we would be killed. I was horrified; he knew all of us so well. Without a second thought, he turned to the armed murderers and said, 'You should be ashamed of yourselves! These people are innocent. Release them. Let them go home.' Then he turned to us and looking right into our eyes, said, 'I'm so sorry. This is all I can do. I know they will kill me tonight. I wish all of you the best.' The soldiers dragged him off somewhere and took us back to the prison camp. My best friend was right. The criminal soldiers, his own kind, killed him that night. We were luckier. After several months, we were saved through an exchange of prisoners. What I keep thinking about is: who has the right to speak of the collective guilt of any ethnic group?

A young man who was held in a prison camp in eastern Bosnia spoke of a local man, a house painter who had helped the Muslims survive the terror, killing and abuse at the hands of Serbian paramilitary and military units. The criminals who set up the camp at the elementary school brought in the housepainter and forced him to stand up before the 450 internees held in the gym. The criminals said, "This is what happens to Serbs who help Muslims." Right there in front of everyone, they shot the man in the head. He was killed by his own kind because he refused to accept what they were doing.

A fighter for the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Army who had defended Sarajevo during its three-year siege by the Republika Srpska Army described the reluctance of many soldiers to fight.

> The first years of the war, I spent several months defending Sarajevo in a trench that was only 50 meters from the Serbian army trenches. Between us was an unmined, level meadow. If someone had poked his head out on either side of the trench, he could have been killed. After several nights of listening to and watching the enemy trench, we heard a man's voice call out from the other side one morning that astonished us: 'Hey you guys, let's play a round of soccer on the meadow!'
>
> We figured this had to be some kind of trick, but they said, 'We don't want to shoot you. This is a pointless war, and we have decided to refuse to participate. If you are afraid, just say you won't shoot at us, and we'll come up out of our trench first.' And so they did. We played soccer with them every day. If someone had seen us at that time, they would have probably said we were insane. But in hindsight, it seems to me that we were more sane than most people. After two weeks of playing soccer instead of fighting, the enemy soldiers let us know that they'd be going home for a two-week furlough and that a new group of soldiers from some other part of Bosnia would be taking their place. The soldiers warned us to be careful. The new round of soldiers might not prefer soccer to fighting. 'Take care, because if you don't, who will we play soccer with two weeks from now when we get back!' they said.

> Off they went, and just as they had predicted, our boys couldn't even peek out of the trenches for the next two weeks because the new soldiers constantly fired at us.
> I was frequently wounded by shrapnel during the war, but I will never forget the group of enemy soldiers we played soccer with, twice a week, for almost a year. What I keep thinking about is: who has the right to speak of the collective guilt of any ethnic group?

A year after the Dayton Agreement was signed, I witnessed a conversation at a Sarajevo parking lot only 10 m from the site of a terrible massacre: a shell had been lobbed from Serbian positions into an impromptu soccer match. The shell murdered 16 and wounded 36 people who had been playing or watching a pick-up game during a lull in the fighting.

A friend of mine who was with me that day asked a man he did not know if he could borrow the man's tools for a moment so that he could fix something on my car. My car had a Belgrade licence plate. The man looked at the plates and said, "Now here is a Serb in need of repair whom I can actually help! I'll fix it for you." He went over and took care of the problem. We became friends, and he told us his story.

His apartment was in a neighbourhood that was surrounded by Serbian military units during the war, though he did not realise it at first. He was taken from his apartment in the middle of the day with his wife and two daughters, who were 8 months old and 2 years old, by unknown armed men in uniforms. In that same parking lot, he saw his neighbours and their families, all of whom were Muslims, waiting for something. The only person he recognised among the armed soldiers was a neighbour of his, a Serb, so he went over and asked the man, "Where are they taking us?"

"To Kula", his neighbour answered tersely.

Kula was a prison on the outskirts of Sarajevo, but next door to it was a restaurant of the same name. The poor man, who had no idea that the prison was being turned into a camp for Muslims, misunderstood completely and asked in an astonished voice, "Who could possibly be taking so many people out to dinner at that restaurant?"

"We're taking you to prison, not to dinner! Hush now. I'll try to help you later", his neighbour whispered.

The family spent all that day at the prison camp. During the night, his neighbour helped them slip out past the guard and brought the entire family, the mother with her hand over the baby's mouth so that she would not start crying, to the line of separation between the warring sides. He saved their lives.

When he finished telling me his story, I asked him whether he had been able to step forward and help a person such as myself, who was driving a car with a Belgrade licence plate, because he had kept that neighbour's goodness in mind. His answer was simple. "No, I've known for a long time that atrocities are individual. A whole nation can't be criminal."

For the first time in history, rape was classified as a war crime by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

A woman from northern Bosnia testified, "I was brought to a cellar by myself. Six soldiers came in that day, one by one. Each one locked the door from the inside and raped me. I did whatever I could to defend myself and screamed as loudly as I could. After the sixth man left, I sat there, miserable and in shock, when the seventh soldier

came in. He locked the door, came halfway across the room, and said something softly. I couldn't hear him. He came over toward me slowly and whispered, 'Scream, please scream. I can't do what they did, but if you don't scream like you did before, the men out there will kill me.'"

I believe that the notion of the "upstander" has universal value. As upstanders are found everywhere, their significance is universal. These types of stories about real, often anonymous people, whose selfless acts have influenced so many, make people everywhere and of all backgrounds aware that they too have choices in life. This awareness of choice enables one to stand up for the good.

For instance, a few years ago at a conference, I listened to a Palestinian psychologist explain why he had chosen to dedicate his life to work for the peaceful co-existence between Palestinians and Jews. As a young man, he was held in an Israeli military prison. He suffered for 3 days with several other prisoners in a cell with no water because the commanding officer had ordered the soldiers guarding them not to give them any water. On the fourth day, a soldier came into the cell. After checking that none of his superiors were watching, he pulled out a canteen and gave it to the prisoners without speaking a word. Several days later, the commanding officer beat the psychologist for refusing to sign a document written in a language he did not understand. After several blows, he heard the soldier guarding the office say, "Aren't you ashamed of yourself for hitting this man just because he wouldn't sign something he couldn't read? I would never sign if I were in his place."

A man who had lost most of his family during the Rwandan genocide and who had survived only because he was studying abroad at the time testified about the mother of one of the murderers. Every morning for 4 months, while her son (a Hutu) went off to kill members of the other group (Tutsi), she brought into her home the entire family of the witness's aunt. The murderer's mother fed them, looked after their needs and hid them, knowing that no one would look for members of the enemy group at her house. Every evening, when her son came back from his bloody work, she hid the family in the bush near her home, where they slept. That family is the only remnant of the man's large clan thanks to this woman who found a way to oppose the actions of her own son.

All wars everywhere in the world contain this often forgotten category of people: brave souls who have said "NO" in the face of a totalitarian regime, nationalist doctrines, ethnic cleansing, and persecution. Examples of goodness that know no ethnic, religious, racial, or political bounds are important documents of war, as they also represent an axis around which a healthy future can be constructed after the atrocities have halted. As a result, these stories have enormous social, cultural and religious value. The effects of an upstander's behaviour can also extend well beyond a single heroic act and across geographical boundaries, as the people who benefit from these acts may try to emulate them. In turn, as they tell their own stories, the cycle repeats itself.

In the last 7 years alone, I have worked with more than 100,000 students of the Western Balkans who have heard me lecture on kindness, moral norms and civil courage. When my students listen to and discuss these courageous acts with me, most of them seem to awaken from a deep sleep. They come to the lecture convinced

that they cannot change anything, that they are not important as individuals and that they have no influence over the society in which they live. They completely feel that they live on the margins of their worlds. They only dream of finishing their education and moving out of their countries. According to some social surveys, the vast majority of the youth wants to leave Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, having heard stories about those who demonstrated kindness and civil courage, the students suddenly wake up and want to become actively involved in the events around them. Loudly and clearly, they show that they can recognise negative authority figures, and they often confront them.

For example, after one lecture, students from Tuzla in Bosnia and Herzegovina were inspired to form a movement demanding the introduction of sex education—an important but neglected public health issue—into secondary schools. The students collected signatures, sent a petition to the conservative regional Minister of Education, announced their actions to the media and prepared for demonstrations in case their request is not met. The decision is pending. Throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, school directors who obstructed their students from attending my lecture on civil courage have been confronted afterwards by these students, who usually demanded an explanation for this limitation of their freedom. Examples of corruption and even paedophilia in schools have been openly named during public lectures at which the media was also present. Thus, these problems were finally brought into the public realm.

Given the energy of the youth, I believe that such education can induce a critical mass of responsible individuals to show civil courage and make the world a better place than it is today. By learning about examples of unselfish human kindness and of those who acted in accordance with their deepest moral norms, young people become aware of the choices in their own lives. They ask themselves whether they will remain bystanders to the world around them or whether they too will be *upstanders* for a better present and future.

Stories of goodness in the face of evil help to foster tolerance. Because of their intrinsic moral value and their strong educational importance, these stories deserve to be archived and cherished. Stories documented in the form of books, museums and other public spaces, which NGO GARIWO Sarajevo is working on, offer teachers in classrooms and elsewhere options to give both children and adults the chance to reflect upon individual and group responsibilities in the face of repressive regimes and their brutalities. Any place dedicated to civil courage can serve as a significant model for the implementation of restorative justice and the prevention of future conflicts. Stories of civil courage and kindness restore faith in humanity. They remind citizens that the seeds of goodness lie in each of us and that even if we have been unkind or unethical at one point, we may find the strength to turn this mistake around in the next moment. Goodness allows for the redemption of the individual and the collective self. It creates a sense of dignity and allows us to act from a more mature perspective than a stance of unmitigated blame.

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Chapter 11
Threatened Powers: When Blaming "the others" Grows out of Internal Instability and Protest

Sandra Penic, Dinka Corkalo Biruski and Guy Elcheroth

Armed conflict between the Croatian Army and Croatian Serb armed forces, aided significantly by the Yugoslav People's Army, took place from 1991 to 1995 in Croatian territory. During this period, several Croatian regions suffered tremendous destruction and losses. The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), which was the ruling party in Croatia both during the war and after the establishment of an independent state, experienced relatively stable voter support since 1990, such that the party was in power for 16 of the last 19 years. More then a decade after the war, relations between Croats and Serbs are slowly improving, but ethnic resentments remain high. According to Transition to Adulthood and Collective Experiences Survey (TRACES) data from 2006, we can estimate that only 54 % of Croat young adults are willing to live in the same country as Serbs. Research conducted in 2001 and 2007 in Vukovar— the city where some of the worst atrocities of the war took place, which is today a divided community—showed persistent negative interethnic attitudes and discriminatory tendencies. These attitudes were mostly expressed among the youngest respondents, who were socialised during the post-war period (Ajdukovic and Corkalo Biruski 2008).

As a result of the war, the economic infrastructure of Croatia sustained massive damage. From 1989 to 1993, GDP fell 40.5 % (Druzic 2007). After the collapse of SFR Yugoslavia, President Tudjman of the HDZ initiated a process of privatisation and denationalisation; however, this process was far from transparent (Grubisa 2005; Gregurek 2001; Cuckovic 2002). The process of privatisation in Croatia during the 1990s was nicknamed "the great Croatian privatisation robbery"

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(Petricevic 2000). The conversion of state capital into private capital was typically conducted in accordance with a criterion of "political suitability" (Grubisa 2005). Due to the great economic decline that resulted from both the war and criminal activities that occurred in the process of privatisation, Croatia had a high rate of unemployment during the 1990s. That factor caused Croatia to show slower growth as compared to other transitional countries in Eastern Europe (Moore and Vamvakidis 2008).

The slowest development occurred in the regions that were most heavily exposed to combat and mass killings. Furthermore, research on voting behaviour in Croatia after 2000 showed that persons from regions that were exposed to war atrocities in the early 1990s and that are currently characterised by the highest rates of social and economic deprivation, unemployment and poverty show the highest level of support for the incumbent political party (Cular 2003; Henjak 2005). It seems that in Croatia, people who face adverse living conditions and economic difficulties that were at least partially caused by war do not react to these conditions by criticising the regime or blaming the authorities. Instead, they react with resentment toward others on the basis of ethnic categorisation, i.e., by blaming "out-groups" that are collectively perceived as perpetrators of recent atrocities.

The main aim of this chapter is to put collective guilt into a political context. The central question is how out-group blame relates to in-group protest. Observing the case of Croatia, where it seems that people tend to blame "the other" rather than the authorities, even when they are subject to difficult living conditions more than a decade after the war, leads us to ask more specifically: Is out-group blame a way to suppress in-group protest?

In his analysis of the outbreak of war in Croatia and Serbia, Gagnon (2006) argued that HDZ conservatives used a strategy of ethnic conflict to *demobilise* popular demands for radical change (in the direction of liberalisation and democratisation) and to demographically restructure Croatia by constructing an image of Croat groupness that did not reflect the social realities of people in ethnically mixed communities. "The result was to homogenize political space, imposing an authoritarian, conservative political line as the 'correct' Croat position" (Gagnon 2006, 134). Franjo Tudjman and the HDZ ruled over Croatia for almost a decade. Their politics were marked by an ideology of extreme nationalism and authoritarianism (Cohen 1993; Sekulic 1992; 1997).

In this chapter, we pursue two main objectives. First, we aim to describe how strong internal homogenisation due to external threats and war victimisation on one hand and 10 years of a regime characterised by the marginalisation and silencing of political opponents and critics through the creation of "internal enemies" and "betrayers" (Uzelac 1998) on the other created a political climate of strong out-group blame and low in-group protest in Croatia. Second, we raise the question of whether the same story should be told for other parts of the former Yugoslavia as well. Does the situation in Croatia provide a narrative of post-war nationalism in the "Balkans" that reflects in a relevant way the events that took place in various regions in the former Yugoslavia?

A preliminary answer to this question is: maybe not. In Bosnia, where both war atrocities and economic difficulties were even more severe than in Croatia, Broz

(2005) reports a rather low desire for revenge among direct victims of war. Furthermore, according to the TRACES data, only 25.4 % of Croat respondents from Bosnia and Herzegovina agree with the statement, "Other groups have benefited at the expense of my group for generations". This is substantially lower than the 60.5 % of Croat respondents from Croatia who agreed with the same statement, although Croats in Bosnia were even more exposed to traumatising war events than were Croats from Croatia. Furthermore, among Macedonians from Macedonia, who experienced a considerably lower level of war trauma in comparison to both Croats from Croatia and Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina but who have been exposed to particularly high levels of poverty and unemployment, 77.5 % of the respondents agree with this statement. Strong collective guilt assignment to other groups among Macedonians from Macedonia, however, does not divert them from criticising the political regime in their country: When asked, "To what extent do you feel our system of government is the best possible system?", more than half of the respondents (55.2 %) chose the lowest level of agreement, "not at all". Similarly, almost 40 % of Croat respondents from Bosnia and Herzegovina chose this answer, whereas such expression of political dissent is much rarer in Croatia, where this answer is chosen by only 21.1 % of Croatian respondents. Therefore, the observed pattern of strong out-group blame but rather low regime criticism in Croatia may be an interesting exception rather than a prototypical pattern within the larger context of the former Yugoslavia.

Traditional approaches to out-group blame tend to stress the importance of past victimisation. At the individual level, psychological functions of collective guilt assignment among victims of war, such as distancing oneself from the perpetrator, have been identified (see Corkalo Biruski and Penic, Chapter 9). At the group level, the importance of societal narratives of collective victimisation as fuel for future hostilities has been highlighted (e.g., Bar-Tal and Cehajic-Clancy, Chapter 8 Staub and Bar-Tal 2003). Elements of collective identity that are rooted in past experiences of violence and conflict can become key factors in establishing cycles of violence between groups. Our preliminary observation that similar societal circumstances have apparently provoked different outcomes in different parts of the former Yugoslavia, however, forces us to discuss these processes from an explicitly contextualised perspective. Further, we aim to show that adverse societal circumstances can lay the ground for public mobilisation against out-groups even when those conditions are not a direct consequence of past victimisation by external enemies. In this manner, we aim to develop a non-deterministic view of the relation between past experiences and current out-group attitudes. We conceive of mobilisation against out-groups as a collective process that is facilitated by specific structural circumstances and that, in addition to serving psychological functions, serves social and political functions such as increasing in-group cohesion and diminishing political division. Therefore, in this chapter, we propose an analysis of the structural factors and political climates that can enhance out-group blame. In addition to examining these processes within the former Yugoslavia as a whole, we will focus part of our efforts on a more thorough analysis of political dynamics within the particular context of Croatia, where we expect to find evidence of mobilisation toward out-group blame as a strategy to deflect internal protest.

Economic Deprivation and Blaming "the Others"

Under what circumstances are people prone to resent other groups for past wrongdoings? As noted previously, collective guilt is typically studied in the context of past victimisation. Intergroup contexts researched in connection with collective guilt are past conflicts (e.g., colonial relations of the Dutch to the Indonesians, Doosje et al. 1998, experiment 2; relations of the Germans to the Jews and of Canadian Indians to the Caucasians, Wohl and Branscombe 2005; relations of Australian Caucasians to the Aborigines, McGarty and Bliuc 2004; Castano and Sorolla 2006; Halloran 2007; and American Indians to Caucasians, Castano and Sorolla 2006). Collective guilt is researched in the context of intractable intergroup conflicts (e.g., relations between Palestinians and Israelis, Roccas et al. 2004; Nadler and Liviatan 2004). Furthermore, collective guilt is also measured in the context of general (unjust) social divisions, e.g., men in relation to the submissive position of women (Schmitt et al. 2004).

In the present research, we assume that collective guilt assignment can also be elicited by difficult living conditions. Several social science theories relate intergroup antagonisms and violence to adverse economic conditions (Green et al. 1998). In sociology, intergroup hostility is frequently explained by economic and political competition (Olzak 1990). In psychology, a classical hypothesis linking intergroup antagonism to economic contraction is the frustration-aggression thesis formulated by Dollard et al. (1939) and elaborated by Miller (1941). This thesis was empirically tested in a classic paper by Hovland and Sears (1940), in which the authors argued that the frustrations attendant to economic downturns produce aggressive impulses that are directed at vulnerable targets. These authors found a negative statistical association between economic conditions and the frequency of Black lynchings in the southern states of the USA when analysing time series data from 1882 to 1930. This study stimulated much debate and critical revision of its original findings on both methodological and conceptual grounds. The nature and strength of the empirical relation found by Hovland and Sears has been questioned. Some studies have replicated the pattern (Olzak 1990), whereas others have failed to provide robust evidence of a link between economic performance and intolerant behaviour directed against out-group members (Green et al. 1998).

Overall, attempts to replicate Hovland and Sears' classic findings have produced a broad variety of empirical patterns. In our understanding, these differences should not be interpreted as contradictions. Rather, they inform us about the non-deterministic nature of the relation between economic conditions and intergroup relations. The fact that, in certain places and during specific periods, economic downturns have paved the way for hate crimes, whereas in other contexts similar circumstances do not provoke similar outcomes forces us to discuss the role of human agency—or, more precisely, of the power of collectives to transform social reality—in social and political processes that can lead from collective deprivation to specific forms of intergroup animosity.

Alternative interpretations of Hovland and Sears' findings include Blalock's "power threat hypothesis" (1967). According to this hypothesis, lynchings of southern Blacks were a mechanism for maintaining white supremacy in the social and economic institutions of southern society. A more contextualised interpretation comes from a political perspective in which explanations of this relation focus on the manipulative role played by political leaders who encourage out-group hostilities by playing upon economic resentment (Horowitz 1985). A similar argument has been proposed by Green et al. (1998, p. 89), who argued: "History suggests that political elites and organizations play a mediating role by attributing blame and fomenting public resentment toward minority groups in times of economic contraction." Following this line of thought, the present work starts with the assumption that adverse social and economic circumstances can lead to lower levels of public support for existing authorities and institutions and are therefore potentially threatening to the legitimacy and authority of elites and thus to their basis of power. We then aim to show how, in such circumstances, the construction of threatening out-groups and mobilisation toward blaming "the other" can be a powerful tool for demobilising, i.e., silencing and marginalising, political challengers to the status quo.

This argument does not imply, however, that we assume that such strategies of public demobilisation were inevitable. Elite groups might react in a variety of ways to growing popular dissatisfaction, including sudden ideological conversions by which they position themselves as the architects of popular anger rather than its target. Nor do attempts to demobilise in-group protest by mobilising out-group hatred necessarily achieve their purpose. Mobilisation tends to trigger counter-mobilisation, and political manipulation tends to provoke collective resistance. Therefore, we aim to contribute to a non-deterministic understanding of these processes by providing a contextualised analysis of structural factors and political climates that are likely to provide an impetus for elite groups to react to public protest either with a demobilisation strategy or to facilitate its "successful" implementation. The starting point for such an analysis is to ask when public protest is most likely to occur, i.e., under what circumstances elite groups must typically confront vanishing support for the established social order. Next, we have to address the issue of the relation between in-group protest and out-group blame to clarify why and when the latter might become a means to counter the former.

In the present work, we focus on a particular facet of collective living conditions. In line with Elcheroth and Spini (2007), we define societal circumstances as *system threatening* when they chronically undermine the legitimacy and stability of the established social and moral order. They have systematic and substantial negative consequences for the lives of community members and causes that are related to decisions made by other community members. Massive social and economic deprivation, defined as a systematic phenomenon of structural poverty or unemployment, is a good example of this category of chronic threat stemming from internal factors. A high rate of socially excluded residents within a country generates a climate of collective vulnerability, in particular because it contradicts fundamental psychological motives to live in a secure, just, and meaningful world and to feel connected to other people in a relevant way by enacting a shared identity

(Elcheroth 2006; Elcheroth and Spini, Chapter 14). Thus, high rates of social and economic deprivation represent a chronic threat to the established social and moral order, which typically provides a powerful impetus for mobilisation toward social change.

System Threat and Political Support

Several studies have explored the relation between system-threatening circumstances and support for political power holders. For example, Kramer (1971) found that when economic conditions worsened during the previous legislative period, the incumbent majority lost votes. Similarly, Kernell (1978), in a study of temporal fluctuations in US presidential popularity from Truman to Nixon, showed that changes in the social environment such as rising unemployment rates, inflation, or war fatalities are likely to produce relatively delayed but long-lasting detrimental effects on public support for the president. Considering a broader range of countries, Lewis-Beck (1990) found a consistent pattern: When economic conditions worsen, citizens are more likely to vote against incumbent parties. This relation has been confirmed across several Western democracies, including Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the USA, based on trends of voting behaviour from World War II onwards (Lewis-Beck 1990). The cognitive and affective evaluation of collective economic performance has a significant impact on voting, whereas retrospective evaluations of personal economic circumstances generally fail to display similar effects. Overall, these results provide robust evidence that economic downturns have systematic detrimental effects on political support.

In-Group Protest and Out-Group Blame

Finally, what is the relation between out-group blame and in-group protest? Personality-driven theories such as the traditional approaches to political conservatism or authoritarianism (Adorno et al. 1950) generally assume an antagonistic relation between hostile attitudes toward out-group members and critical attitudes toward in-group leaders or institutions. Numerous studies have stressed that individuals who are more devoted to authorities and dominant in-group ideologies also tend to show stronger tendencies toward derogation of out-group members (Jost et al. 2003; Harmon-Jones et al. 1996; McGregor et al. 2001).

A mechanistic reading of these findings would lead to the assumption that when in-group protest increases, out-group blame diminishes, and vice versa. As an alternative, we suggest in this work that there are specific circumstances that can lead *simultaneously* to enhanced in-group protest and out-group blame. Societal conditions of system threat can sometimes lead to both regime criticism *and* out-group blame. Unfavourable living conditions and systematic violations of social and economic rights can create a climate of deprivation and uncertainty. Such chronically

threatening societal factors can provide, on one hand, an opportunity for activists to mobilise the public toward domestic reforms. On the other hand, these dynamics create a threat to the legitimacy and authority of existing political elites and thus to their basis of power. In such circumstances, the construction of threatening out-groups can become a powerful tool for demobilising, i.e., silencing and marginalising, political challengers to the status quo.

Depending on the relative success of a multiplicity of political attempts to mobilise the public, societal circumstances of system threat can be conducive to variable collective outcomes. Therefore, in this chapter, we aim to contribute to the understanding of these dynamics by focusing on the following question: Does rising out-group blame necessarily lead to lower in-group protest and higher political homogeneity? If not, when does a trend toward out-group blame creates a more polarised rather than monolithic public?

In summary, two basic assumptions underlying our approach to political mobilisation and ethnic resentment in the context of transitional societies can be emphasised. First, difficult material living conditions among the masses and a high risk of social and economic deprivation regularly change the odds in favour of those who strive to mobilise the public toward domestic reforms. Second, a recent past of large-scale ethnicised violence, like that which occurred in major parts of the former Yugoslavia, makes the public vulnerable to narratives that collectively blame "others", who are categorised in ethnic terms. The conjunction of both factors makes former Yugoslavian post-war societies a privileged field for studying how elite groups sometimes use out-group blame to demobilise public dissent. Our overall hypothesis is that even though precise outcomes of increased system threat can vary from one context to another, they reflect either diminished public support for political authorities or a successful demobilisation strategy.

Evidently, the latter case is of particular interest for the present problem. We therefore focus part of our efforts on a closer analysis of political dynamics within the new Croatian nation-state, where, on the basis of relevant background knowledge, we expect to find empirical evidence for "successful" demobilisation. In a second step, however, we aim to encompass the broader context and to clarify what type of collective outcome prevails in the entire region of the former Yugoslavia. In this manner, the situation in Croatia is situated in a larger framework, and interpretations of observed particularities in collective climates can draw on the country's specific structural context and political strategies among its elites.

Methodological Approach and Indicators

The analyses were performed on the TRACES cohort dataset (see Spini et al., Chapter 1). In the first part of the analyses, we focused on the particular case of Croatia, so these analyses were performed separately on the Croatian subsample, which consists of 468 participants. In the second part of the analyses, to determine whether we can generalise findings from Croatia to other parts of the former Yugoslavia, we performed similar analyses on the overall cohort sample

of the former Yugoslavia, which consists of 2,254 participants. Data were analysed with multiple linear multilevel analysis (Hox 2002) using HLM6 statistical software (Raudenbush et al. 2004). This technique offers the advantage of the simultaneous examination of contextual-level and individual-level predictors (see also Elcheroth and Spini, Chapter 14). Individual-level predictors in this research include three types of personal experiences: First, a person is considered as a *victim of war* if he/she has experienced at least one of the following events: expulsion, imprisonment, family member killed, property damage, wounding or being looted. Second, a person is considered as a *combatant* if he/she reported carrying or using a weapon during combat. Finally, a person is considered as a *victim of social-economic deprivation* if she/he has experienced either unemployment or poverty since 1990. Furthermore, we included a measure of *ethnic identification* assessed with the ethnic identification scale developed by Doosje et al. (1995). Individual-level predictors were complemented by the sociodemographic variables *sex* and *level of education*.

In addition to these individual-level indicators, two types of contextual-level predictors were used in the following analyses: *risk of social-economic deprivation* (risk of unemployment and poverty during the 1990–2006 period) and *risk of war victimisation* (risk of being forced to leave one's home or of losing a relative as a consequence of war during the 1990–2006 period). Both of these indicators were measured at the level of *survey areas*: the territory of the former Yugoslavia was divided into 80 geographical areas. Croatian territory was divided into 17 survey areas that correspond to the 21 Croatian counties; the survey areas comprised either one county or two smaller ones. One condition for two counties to be clustered within the same area was that both belonged to the same historical geographical region (for more details, see Spini et al. 2007). Both of these contextual variables were weighted by social proximity on the basis of shared territorial space, i.e., the combination of common institutional boundaries and geographic proximity (for further detail, see Elcheroth and Spini, Chapter 14).

Finally, *out-group blame* was assessed by the collective guilt assignment scale of Branscombe et al. (2004), which includes five items. Typical items are, "It makes me upset that my group has been used to benefit other groups throughout history" and "I feel entitled to concessions for past wrongs that other groups have done to my group". *Political support* was assessed using the scale developed by Muller et al. (1982). This scale includes seven items, e.g., "To what extent do you have respect for the political institutions in this country?" and "To what extent do you feel you should support our system of government?"

Findings

System Threat, Electoral Support and Out-Group Blame in Croatia

Table 11.1 shows the correlation coefficients between political support, out-group blame, risk of war victimisation and risk of social-economic deprivation across 17 Croatian regions. Results show a very high correlation between risk of war

Table 11.1 Correlations between regional indicators in Croatia (Spearman's Rho)

Indicators	1	2	3	4
Risk of war victimization	–	0.97**	0.50*	0.56*
Risk of social-economic deprivation	–	–	0.55*	0.53*
Collective guilt assignment	–	–	–	0.49*
Political support	–	–	–	–

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$

victimisation and social-economic deprivation at the regional level. Furthermore, they indicate that risk of social-economic deprivation *positively* correlates with *both* collective guilt assignment and political support. Finally, there is a significant positive correlation between aggregated political support and collective guilt assignment. To examine the stability of this relation across all 17 Croatian regions, we performed a multilevel analysis. Results show that there is *no* significant random effect of collective guilt assignment ($\sigma = 0.14$; *ns*), i.e., that there are no significant regional variations in the effect of collective guilt assignment on political support. In all Croatian regions, the relation between out-group blame and political support is *positive*.

In the following analyses, we examine the potential mediating role of electoral support for political parties in the relation between system threat and out-group blame in Croatia. Electoral support is defined as the percentages of votes for the most popular left- (Social Democratic Party; *Socijaldemokratska partija*, SDP) and right-oriented (HDZ) political parties in Croatia based on the results of parliamentary elections held in 2007. Previous parliamentary elections were held in 2003. A comparison of the results of parliamentary elections in 2003 and 2007 across ten election units in Croatia showed high consistency for both SDP (Spearman's Rho coefficient of correlation between two waves of voting of 0.92, $p < 0.01$) and HDZ (Spearman's Rho = 0.90, $p < 0.01$). To test the assumption that political party popularity had a mediating effect on the relation between the risk of social-economic deprivation and out-group blame, we performed a multilevel analysis using a procedure described by Krull and MacKinnon (2001). This procedure is appropriate for models that include a contextual-level predictor (risk of social-economic deprivation), a contextual-level mediator (popularity of political parties) and an individual-level outcome variable (collective guilt assignment).

This mediational analysis was performed only for the popularity of the left-oriented political party (SDP). Namely, the regional-level correlation between risk of social-economic deprivation and popularity of the right-oriented political party (HDZ) was too high (Spearman's rho = 0.72, $p < 0.01$) to test this model without causing a problem of multicollinearity.

Results of this analysis are shown in Table 11.2 and Fig. 11.1. They reveal a full mediating effect of the popularity of SDP on the relation between risk of social-economic deprivation and collective guilt assignment: the previously significant effect of risk of social-economic deprivation (Table 11.2, model 1) becomes non-significant after controlling for the popularity of SDP (Table 11.2, model 2). The significance of the indirect effect is just below the threshold according to a Sobel test (Table 11.2), which

Table 11.2 Effects of regional-level risk of social-economic deprivation and popularity of left-oriented party on collective guilt assignment in Croatia, while controlling for individual level effects of social-economic deprivation and personal exposure to war events, ethnic identification, education and sex

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	SE	B	SE
Intercept	2.80***	0.34	2.72***	0.33
Victim of social-economic deprivation	−0.20	0.12	−0.18	0.12
Victim of war	0.10	0.14	0.09	0.14
Combatant	−0.05	0.15	−0.06	0.15
Sex	−0.34*	0.13	−0.37**	0.13
Level of education	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.06
Ethnic identification	0.33***	0.05	0.33***	0.05
Risk of social-economic deprivation	0.22*	0.09	0.09	0.09
Popularity of SDP	–	–	−0.23*	0.08
Model enhancement (1)	$\chi^2(1) = 5.4$**		$\chi^2(1) = 6.2$**	
Explained contextual variance (2)	$\Delta\sigma^2 = 40.5\,\%$		$\Delta\sigma^2 = 81.8\,\%$	
			Sobel test: $z = 1.95$, $p < 0.06$	
			Goodman test: $z = 2.02$, $p < 0.05$	

(1) Deviance reduction compared to the corresponding model without social-economic deprivation rate as an explanatory variable, *(2)* Regional-level part of the intercept variance that is explained by social-economic deprivation rates and popularity of SDP
* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$



Fig. 11.1 Mediating effect of popularity of SDP in the relationship between risk of social-economic deprivation and collective guilt assignment in Croatia (total effect appears in parenthesis)

might be related to the small sample size (17 regions in Croatia), while Goodman's test shows a significant indirect effect of the popularity of SDP (Table 11.2). Results indicate that a higher risk of social-economic deprivation leads to lower popularity for the left-oriented party, which in turn leads to a higher level of out-group blame.

Predictors of Out-Group Blame Across the Former Yugoslavia

The effects of regional-level risk of social-economic deprivation on out-group blame were tested simultaneously with the effects of six individual-level variables (two types of personal victimisation: experience of social-economic deprivation and

Table 11.3 Effects of regional-level risk of social-economic deprivation and war victimisation on collective guilt assignment in former Yugoslavia, while controlling for relevant individual level effects

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	SE	B	SE
Intercept	2.86***	0.21	2.86***	0.21
Victim of social-economic deprivation	−0.01	0.08	−0.01	0.08
Victim of war	0.27***	0.04	0.26**	0.09
Combatant	0.14	0.09	0.14	0.09
Level of education	−0.02	0.03	−0.02	0.03
Sex	−0.12	0.07	−0.12	0.07
Ethnic identification	0.28***	0.03	0.28***	0.03
Risk of war victimization	–	–	0.03	0.06
Risk of social-economic deprivation	0.18***	0.04	0.18***	0.04
Model enhancement (1)	$\chi^2(1) = 14.7$**		$\chi^2(1) = 13.1$**	
Explained variance (2)	$\Delta\sigma^2 = 21.5\,\%$		$\Delta\sigma^2 = 20.0\,\%$	

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

traumatising war events; experience of direct participation in combat; two sociodemographic variables: sex and level of education; and level of ethnic identification) using multiple linear multi-level analysis.

The outcomes (Table 11.3) show that, on the individual level, victims of war, men and persons who express higher ethnic identification show a stronger tendency to assign collective guilt to out-groups. Level of education, experience of social-economic deprivation and direct participation in combat, however, do not significantly predict out-group blame.

Adding the contextual-level variable of risk of social-economic deprivation to the model significantly enhances its fit with the empirical data (Table 11.3, model 1). The effect of contextual-level risk of social-economic deprivation displays a pattern in which social-economic deprivation leads to out-group blame. The higher the risk of social-economic deprivation within a region, the more its inhabitants assign collective guilt to ethnic out-groups. This effect of risk of social-economic deprivation is observed when controlling for the corresponding individual-level relation (i.e., for the effect of social-economic deprivation as a personal experience).

Additional analyses have been carried out to verify that risk of social-economic deprivation contributes to the explanation of out-group blame even when the effect of risk of war victimisation is partialed out. Results show that the risk of social-economic deprivation significantly diminishes the deviance of the model that uses collective guilt assignment as an outcome variable and includes the effect of war victimisation (Table 11.3, model 2).

Furthermore, results show that, on the contextual level, risk of war victimisation is a non-significant predictor of out-group blame. Even in the model that includes only the risk of war victimisation (while controlling for individual-level explanatory variables), this contextual-level variable does not significantly contribute to the explanation of the outcome variable ($\chi^2(1) = 2.36$, *ns*). The observed relation is caused mostly by data from Bosnia, where we find the highest level of war victimisation but

Table 11.4 Effects of regional-level risk of social-economic deprivation and war victimisation on political support in the former Yugoslavia, while controlling for relevant individual-level effects

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	SE	B	SE
Intercept	2.49***	0.20	2.49***	0.20
Victim of social-economic deprivation	−0.25***	0.07	−0.25***	0.07
Victim of war	−0.07	0.10	−0.07	0.10
Combatant	0.07	0.09	0.07	0.09
Level of education	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
Sex	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.06
Ethnic identification	0.11***	0.03	0.11***	0.03
Risk of war victimization	–	–	0.03	0.06
Risk of social-economic deprivation	−0.17***	0.04	−0.17***	0.04
Model enhancement	$\chi^2(1) = 8.6$**		$\chi^2(1) = 8.6$**	
Explained variance	$\Delta\sigma^2 = 21.6\,\%$		$\Delta\sigma^2 = 20.0\,\%$	

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

low levels of collective guilt assignment. When Bosnia is removed from the sample, the effect of risk of war victimisation on collective guilt assignment becomes significant and positive ($B = 0.39$, $SE = 0.09$, $p < 0.01$). Even in that case, however, the risk of social-economic deprivation remains a significant predictor of collective guilt assignment when war victimisation is controlled ($B = 0.17$, $SE = 0.04$, $p < 0.01$), and adding this variable to the nested model that includes only individual-level explanatory variables and risk of war victimisation significantly enhances the fit of the model, $\chi^2(1) = 15.13$, $p < 0.01$.

These results indicate that regional variations in blaming ethnic out-groups for past suffering are related more systematically to chronic structural threatening factors than to past war victimisation.

Predictors of Political Support Across the Former Yugoslavia

Similar analyses were performed for political support as an outcome variable. Results of these analyses are shown in Table 11.4.

The results show that persons without an experience of social-economic deprivation and those who express stronger ethnic identification show a higher level of political support. Sex, level of education and personal exposure to war events are non-significant predictors of political support.

Regional-level effects of risk of social-economic deprivation are fully consistent with our predictions: The higher the risk of social-economic deprivation within a region, the lower the level of political support of its inhabitants. This effect of risk of social-economic deprivation is observed while controlling for the corresponding individual-level relation (i.e., for the effect of social-economic deprivation as a personal experience). Furthermore, the same effect is observed while controlling for the effect of risk of war victimisation (Table 11.4, model 2).

Table 11.5 Moderation of the effect of the collective guilt assignment on political support outcome in former Yugoslavia

	Model 1	
	B	SE
Intercept	2.56***	0.20
Victim of social-economic deprivation	−0.22**	0.06
Victim of war	−0.08	0.09
Combatant	0.08	0.09
Sex	0.08	0.06
Education	0.03	0.03
Ethnic identification	0.09**	0.03
Collective guilt assignment[a]	0.05(*)	0.02
Risk of social-economic deprivation	−0.18**	0.04
Collective guilt assignment x Risk of social-economic deprivation	−0.05**	0.02
Model enhancement	$\chi^2(1) = 7.5$**	
Explained variance	$\Delta\sigma^2 = 24.8\,\%$	

In all models, presented in Table 11.2–11.5, all predictor variables are non-centered. The present model was also tested with the collective guilt assignment centered around the group mean, following suggestion by Enders and Tofighi (2007) that the group centering is preferable for examining cross-level interactions. Both models, with non-centered and group-centered predictor, give the same results.
(*) $p < 0.06$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Risk of Social-Economic Deprivation as a Moderator of the Relation Between Political Support and Out-Group Blame

To test for a potential moderating effect of risk of social-economic deprivation on the relation between political support and collective guilt assignment, we performed an additional multi-level analysis that includes cross-level interactions. With this analysis, we tried to show that, first, there are significant regional variations in the effect of collective guilt assignment on political support and, second, that a significant portion of these variations can be explained by the risk of social-economic deprivation. Results of the analysis are shown in Table 11.5. They indicate that, contrary to what we observed in Croatia, there are strong variations between regions (random effects) in the effect of out-group blame on political support ($\sigma = 0.97$; $p < 0.01$). Furthermore, they show that a significant part of these variations can be explained by the risk of social-economic deprivation. The sign of the interaction indicates the following pattern of the moderating effect: In the case of low risk of social-economic deprivation, there is a positive relation between collective guilt assignment and political support. In the case of high risk of social-economic deprivation, however, the same relation is close to zero. In other words, the more social-economic deprivation is a prevalent experience, the more out-group blame becomes dissociated from political support.

Discussion

Results in Croatia show that regional levels of social and economic deprivation are strongly connected to direct consequences of ethnicised war. The regions that were more exposed to war atrocities have the highest level of social and economic deprivation. This result is consistent with other studies. For example, according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Quality of Life report, the regions with a lower quality of life correspond roughly to the war-affected regions. These are roughly the same regions that have a higher percentage of socially excluded people (Japec and Sucur 2007). Furthermore, our results indicate that in Croatia, higher regional levels of social and economic deprivation lead to stronger out-group blame but *not* to increased internal protest. Contrary to the rather robust evidence shown elsewhere of a detrimental effect of system-threatening circumstances on support for political power holders (Lewis-Beck 1990; Kramer 1971; Kernell 1978), results in Croatia show a *positive* correlation between regional-level risk of social and economic deprivation and political support. Moreover, they indicate a stable antagonistic relation between out-group blame and in-group protest across *all* Croatian regions. This pattern of results is in line with an assumption of the prevalence of a collective climate characterised by high levels of out-group blame and low levels of in-group protest. Finally, our findings in Croatia further emphasise on the mediating role of political party popularity in the relation between societal system threat and out-group blame. Higher levels of social and economic deprivation lead to lower popularity for the main left-oriented (opposition) party, which in turn leads to higher levels of out-group blame.

Contrary to our findings in Croatia but in accordance with our expectations, the results showed that, overall, political support is lowest in those regions of the former Yugoslavia that have been exposed to the highest level of social and economic deprivation. As we noted earlier, this negative relation between system-threatening circumstances and support for political power holders has been confirmed in many studies. Regarding the antecedents of collective guilt, results for the former Yugoslavia show that the highest levels of collective guilt assignment to other groups can be found in the most deprived regions. This effect explains the residual variance in collective guilt assignment at the regional level. It appears as an irreducible contextual effect when relevant individual-level variations are partialed out, in particular, the individual-level effect of social and economic deprivation as a personal experience. This finding even holds when regional differences in actual war victimisation are partialed out. Thus, the finding complements traditional perspectives on out-group blame, which tend to stress on the importance of past victimisation: adverse living conditions, even when they are not a direct consequence of past victimisation, can give rise to blaming "the others". Past war victimisation was a significant predictor only on the individual level. On the regional level, past victimisation was a significant predictor only after excluding Bosnia from the sample. Interestingly, in this area of the former Yugoslavia, which experienced more war atrocities than any other region, blaming of out-groups is only moderate in comparison with other

areas. This finding further emphasises on the importance of a contextual approach to studying this phenomenon.

Furthermore, research outcomes display an important cross-level interaction. Contrary to the personality-driven theory of authoritarianism (Adorno et al. 1950), which assumes an antagonistic relation between out-group blame and in-group protest, the individual-level relation between political support and out-group blame varies significantly between contexts. In regions with low social and economic deprivation rates, a traditional pattern is replicated: people either criticise domestic authorities *or* resent out-groups. With increasing social and economic deprivation rates, however, these two dimensions of political attitudes become increasingly unrelated. We interpret this outcome as an indicator of higher levels of multi-targeted blame (directed toward in-group leaders *and* collective out-groups) in conditions of system threat, which might contribute to highly volatile political climates. This finding challenges the notion that there is something particular about certain *individuals* that would make them obedient toward leaders and resentful toward out-groups.

Gagnon (2006), in his analysis of the outbreak of war in the former Yugoslavia, examines the role of political elites. Gagnon argues that in the societal conditions of system threat at the end of the 1980s, mobilisation against ethnic out-groups was used to demobilise people from challengers to the status quo:

> The goal of this strategy was to silence, marginalize, and demobilize challengers and their supporters in order to create political homogeneity at home. This in turn enabled conservatives to maintain control of existing structures of power, as well as to reposition themselves by converting state-owned property into privately held wealth, the basis of power in a new system of a liberal economy. (Gagnon 2006, 15)

Our findings suggest that, a decade after the war, a more frequent consequence of system threat in the former Yugoslavia than demobilisation is a political climate where most people tend to blame in-group authorities *and* out-group members simultaneously for an aversive collective situation. This finding can be understood as the by-product of a demobilisation strategy that affected public mood without achieving its main purpose: many people tend to blame out-groups, but this does not divert them from criticising their own authorities. In other words, the antagonistic relation between out-group blame and in-group protest is suspended. This outcome reflects a climate of combined in-group protest and out-group blame where the world looks threatening but there is no clear enemy to target. Such conditions of multi-targeted blame, which simultaneously enhance mobilisation, counter-mobilisation and collective resistance, can be an impetus for rapid social changes. In such a political climate, there is potential for mobilisation, but its direction remains undetermined.

In one part of the former Yugoslavia, however, we did find a pattern of successful demobilisation—in Croatia. This pattern of results in Croatia can be explained by two particularities of the Croatian context: first, by the conflation of war victimisation and social and economic deprivation, and second, by characteristics of the political context in Croatia during the 1990s, which were shaped by the rule of President Tudjman of the HDZ. Making threats and identifying enemies were important elements in the mobilisation of HDZ's supporters. It is important to emphasise that

threats were very real during the early 1990s—one third of the total Croatian territory was occupied from 1991 to 1995, and the suffering of the population was immense. As ethnic tensions and warfare gradually subsided, HDZ began to lose its support (Sekulic 2001).

According to Sekulic (2001), the basic principle of HDZ's victory and its ten-year rule over Croatia was integral nationalism, which Sekulić defines as "an ideology in which all activities within a society, ranging from individual aspirations to every group activity, have to be subordinated to the nation, its politics and the goals defined at the national level" (2001, 57). In that ideology, state and nation are not means to an end but the highest goal in and of themselves (Sekulic 2001). Such an ideology is evident in the statements of Franjo Tudjman, who described an independent Croatia as "the historical tendency of the Croatian nation", "the nine centuries long dream", and "the thousand year long dream of the Croatian nation" (Uzelac 1998). The characteristic of such nationalism is, as Sekulic emphasises, a hostile disposition toward the principles of liberalism and pluralism, which are perceived as factors that divide the nation in an artificial way. As Culic noted, the founding documents of HDZ do not even mention a multi-party system (Culic 1999, p. 16).

Political opponents and critics of government actions were used to be labelled as "internal enemies" during the 1990s. Viktor Ivancic, a former editor of the *Feral Tribune* (an independent weekly newspaper) and the winner of the 1997 International Press Freedom award, wrote the following (2000, p. 149): "The category of political opposition has been expelled from public and political lives, and replaced by the label of internal enemies, accompanied by witch-hunts and brutal showdowns". Uzelac (1998, p. 456) points out: "(In this manner), internal enemies are created, and they are not just opponents of Franjo Tudjman and his politics, but rather direct opponents of the Croatian national interest, national state and above all, opponents of the Croatian nation itself".

Since 2000, Croatian politics has experienced gradual moderation and democratic consolidation. Although recent governments (after 2000) have abandoned the political authoritarianism and nationalism of the Tudjman era, one of the main problems that remains is that social representations did not follow the democratic turn of the political discourse (Zakosek 2007). Social distance toward Serbs remains very high and stable; according to a series of studies conducted in Croatia during the 1990s (Siber 1997) using a measure of social distance (Bogardus 1925), about half of the respondents in 1992, 1995 and 1997 were reluctant to live in the same country as Serbs. As noted earlier, according to TRACES data, in 2006 only 54 % of respondents from the cohort sample were willing to live in the same country as Serbs. Furthermore, TRACES data show that social distance is asymmetrical—in Serbia, 80.6 % of Serbian respondents accept living in the same country with Croats.

In research on party preferences in the parliamentary elections held in 2003, Dragan Bagic (2007) found that, among 13 analysed attitudes, only three significantly explained part of the variance in party preferences. The most predictive attitude was related to co-operation with International Criminal Tribunal for the former

Yugoslavia (ICTY).[1] In several studies about the economic determinants of voting behaviour in Croatian elections, results consistently showed that economic issues do not have a significant effect on party preference. Further, there is substantial evidence that support for a particular party is still based on factors that were relevant at the time the multi-party system was created: attitudes toward history and religion, the role of tradition and the definition of national identity (see Siber 1998; Zakosek 1998; Zakosek and Cular 2004; Cular 2003; Henjak 2005). This may be the most striking effect of the demobilisation strategy: a political climate has been created in which issues related to living conditions are overshadowed by narratives of past aggression and suffering that invoke feelings of national loyalty or betrayal. In this manner, an entire generation has remained in a sustained atmosphere of salient external threat. This political climate might have provided a cover for the conversion of elites and the maintenance of power that took place during the transition to the post-war period (Gagnon 2006, Sekulic et al. 2004).

The main aim of this chapter has been to put collective guilt assignment into a political context. As noted earlier, traditional approaches to out-group blame tend to stress the importance of past victimisation. In this research, we have shown that past victimisation on both the individual and collective levels contributes to the explanation of collective guilt assignment. However, this is not the only, or even the most important, determinant. In line with previous findings (Kramer 1971; Kernell 1978; Lewis-Beck 1990), we assumed that societal circumstances of system threat enhance in-group protest. Our findings for the sample that encompasses the entire former Yugoslavia are fully consistent with that assumption. As in-group protest can be threatening to the legitimacy and authority of elites, the construction of threatening out-groups and mobilisation toward out-group blame can be a powerful tool for demobilising, i.e., silencing and marginalising, political challengers (see Green et al. 1998). In the case of Croatia, we indeed found a pattern of demobilisation that was characterised by strong out-group blame and low in-group protest. Our best guess is that the structural particularities of the Croatian context—first, strong and recent war victimisation followed by economic difficulties and, second, political processes of nation-building during the 1990s—contributed to the development of a political climate of strong out-group blame and low in-group protest in Croatia. For other parts of the former Yugoslavia, however, a more frequent consequence of system threat is a political climate in which many people tend to blame both out-group and in-group authorities simultaneously. Thus, results in the former Yugoslavia show that the relation between out-group blame and in-group protest depends on societal characteristics and that the antagonistic relation between the two, which has notably been assumed under authoritarian personality theory, can be suspended under specific structural and political circumstances.

[1] The other two were attitudes toward abortion and homosexual marriage. (Bagic 2007)

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Chapter 12
Shattered Beliefs: How to Cope When the World Is not a Just Place?

Rachel Fasel and Dario Spini

Eight hundred and eight victims of war, 458 victims of discrimination and 1,786 victims of social exclusion since 1990. This is the picture that developed when we gathered data about the life events of 2,254 young adults in ex-Yugoslavia in 2006. How can people in this young cohort go on with their lives when their transition to adulthood was shaken by wars, conflicts and economic precariousness? One answer provided by social psychology takes into account the beneficial roles of shared beliefs, values and basic assumptions.

The idea that people develop a set of assumptions about themselves and the world is an element of many theories. Janoff-Bulman (1992) calls them *fundamental assumptions*; Epstein (1973) calls them *personal theories of reality.* The *benevolence of the world* and the belief that the *world is meaningful* are examples of these basic assumptions. Taylor and Brown (1988) discuss *positive illusions* about the self, the world and the future. According to these authors, these beliefs or illusions play an important role in maintaining a sense of well-being, even though they entail a distortion of reality. They exercise an adaptive function, particularly when people are confronted with difficulties. They provide a theoretical framework that guides people and helps them to interpret new information.

The need for justice that Lerner (1965, 1980) theorised through the *belief in a just world* (BJW) is part of our belief system. The experiment that launched the just world paradigm was published in 1966 by Lerner and Simons. They created a situation in which an innocent victim was suffering due to electric shocks. The observers, who knew that the suffering would continue and could do nothing to prevent it, rejected and devalued the innocent victim. According to the authors, the innocent victim was threatening to the observers' idea that the world is a just place, i.e. the idea that

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people generally get what they deserve and deserve what they get. Rejection and devaluation were explained as cognitive strategies to restore the need people have for justice.

In a review of the literature on BJW research published in the 1990s, Furnham (2003) takes a relatively new stance by examining the positive side of the belief. Earlier research mainly focused on its negative aspects, such as blaming victims to restore just world beliefs (for earlier reviews, see Lerner and Miller 1978; Furnham and Procter 1989). Furnham's stance highlights the benefits of the BJW and considers it as a personal resource or coping mechanism. In the definition provided by Lerner and Miller (1978), the adaptive functions of the BJW were underlined: "The belief that the world is just enables the individual to confront his physical and social environment as though they were stable and orderly. Without such a belief it would be difficult for the individual to commit himself to the pursuit of long-range goals or even to the socially regulated behavior of day-to-day life" (pp. 1030–1031). These positive benefits explain why people are so reluctant to give up their beliefs even if the reality with which they are confronted runs counter to these beliefs. Lerner's book title, "The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion" (1980), perfectly captures the core of this belief; it is essential for most people's sense of security and sanity, although it is objectively false.

Dalbert (2001) considers BJW a personal resource or coping strategy that is healthy for both victims and non-victims, albeit through different mechanisms. For non-victims, it operates as a buffer against daily hassles, preserving well-being. For victims of an unjust fate, BJW may be threatened. Victims who strongly believe in a just world will develop coping strategies to preserve their beliefs (such as cognitively assimilating the unfairness or claiming compensation) and thereby maintain their sanity. Thus, BJW and well-being are positively correlated in different ways for non-victims and victims.

Experimental studies have shown that people who strongly believe in a just world cope better than low believers when facing stress or angry feelings; in an arithmetic task, people with strong just world beliefs reported less subjective stress and had physiological responses more in line with a reaction to a challenging than a threatening activity (Tomaka and Blasovich 1994). Following an angry mood induction, individuals with strong BJW reported less angry feelings and less of a decrease in self-esteem than low believers (Dalbert 2002). BJW is thus presented as a personal resource that buffers against daily hassles because high believers cope better.

Outside the research laboratory, Bonanno et al. (2002) also showed that high believers coped better when confronted with a critical life event; high believers were more resilient than low believers 6 and 18 months after their spouses' deaths (the BJW measure was administered several years before the death of the spouse). However, the pattern of results is not always the same. Only the personal BJW (for the distinction between general and personal beliefs in a just world, see Dalbert 1999; Lipkus et al. 1996) had a buffering effect on mental health among victims of the 2002 flood disaster in Germany (Otto et al. 2006). No correlation was found between general BJW and mental health dimensions such as anxiety, depression or

general psychological distress for people faced with this critical life event, signifying that no adaptive relation was found for general BJW.

The possible moderating effect of BJW on the negative impact of pain intensity and disability on psychological distress was tested by McParland and Knussen (2010) in a chronic pain support group sample. Results showed no direct relation between BJW and those three variables. When interaction terms were entered, the negative effect of pain intensity on distress remained significant only for lower believers. The negative effect of disability on distress was also moderated by BJW in the sense that this negative effect was stronger for low believers than for high believers. These results indicate that BJW may play an important positive role in coping with chronic pain.

Based on the available literature, Dalbert (2001) concludes that "Overall, the BJW exhibited an adaptive relation with mental health, the personal BJW more so than the general BJW, and more so in victim samples than in nonvictim samples" (pp. 94). However, in several studies comparing victim and non-victim samples and in studies of people confronted with situations with the potential to cause different levels of stress, the results do not reveal clear evidence of a stronger relation between BJW and mental health for victims. In Dalbert (1998), positive correlations are reported between life satisfaction and BJW for three sub-samples of women: students (non-victims), unemployed workers and mothers of disabled children (victims). The relation was stronger for victims than for non-victims. However, this interaction effect diminished when controlling for mood level.

In a sample of police officers, Brown and Grower (1998) compared the effects of low and high levels of stress exposure (in the officers' real working situation) on psychological distress and tested possible mediating variables. At both levels of stress exposure, higher social support or higher BJW decreased psychological distress. However, opposite trends were found for social support and BJW depending on stress level. In the low stress exposure situation, the combination of low social support and high BJW was more likely to buffer psychological distress than the opposite combination (high social support with low BJW). In the high stress exposure situation, the opposite pattern was identified. When exposure to the stressor increased, the reality that the police officers faced at work did not appear as controllable. In such a situation, BJW might be challenged, and its buffering effect can disappear.

These research results present support for the existence of a positive link between BJW and well-being. However, the buffering effect of BJW in with the face of stress, negative affect, or pain is neither clear nor consistent. By taking advantage of the Transition to Adulthood and Collective Experiences Survey (TRACES) dataset, we can test the role that BJW plays in the relation between life satisfaction and victimisation in a context of collective vulnerability (Elcheroth 2007).

Dalbert (2001, 2002) defends the idea that BJW is a resource that remains stable across time and situations (see also Schneider et al. 1987; Dalbert and Schneider 1995)[1]. However, very few studies have focused on victims themselves and their

[1] More recent research has identified variations of BJW for victimised people, but these studies focus on the *personal BJW*, which means how much people consider that the world is just for

reactions towards victimisation (Furnham 2003; Hafer and Begue 2005). Previous results from the TRACES pilot study (Fasel 2007; Fasel and Spini 2010) indicated that the stability and protective functions of BJW are undermined in contexts in which collective victimisation events have been experienced. Indeed, results showed that the BJW of young adults ($N = 598$) residing in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Slovenia systematically varied. People who were victimised exhibited lower support for BJW than non-victims in the two less economically favourable contexts. In BiH, war victims had lower scores of BJW than non-victims. In Macedonia, the same pattern was observed for victims of political and socio-economic exclusion. A deleterious effect of cumulative negative events on BJW was also identified. Victimisation was linked with lower life satisfaction in every country. BJW was positively linked to life satisfaction with the same strength for victims and non-victims (except for a tendentious interaction effect in Macedonia indicating that the positive link between BJW and life satisfaction was stronger for those who were not victims of war than for war victims). In Macedonia and BiH, the deleterious effect of victimisation on life satisfaction was completely and partially mediated by BJW, respectively. Thus, the decrease in life satisfaction was explained by the decline in BJW, which was positively related to well-being.

With the TRACES cohort sample, we had a great opportunity to reproduce the pilot analyses and delve deeper into these problems with a very large sample covering all of the countries of the former Yugoslavia ($N = 2{,}254$). The recent conflicts, wars and economic difficulties in this part of the world created a particularly tense environment, in which individuals were strongly victimised. Considering the results of the pilot study, we hypothesise that BJW is negatively influenced by negative events faced by individuals, especially when such events accumulate and when they are embedded in collective events such as war or political and economic breakdown, and subsequently, we hypothesise that the undermining of BJW will lead to a decrease in well-being. Thus, we will test the limits of the support for BJW. As Lerner (1980) states, the response to victimisation is the extreme test of the BJW. TRACES is not an experimental situation. It involves people who faced harsh realities in shattered environments. Can people still believe in a just world in the aftermath of war and conflict, after experiencing very harsh difficulties? How does this experience impact their well-being? These questions are answered in the extreme test we undertake. All analyses reported in this chapter use the TRACES cohort sample, including individuals from all countries in ex-Yugoslavian territory.

Portrait of Victimisation

Table 12.1 presents percentages of individuals in the sample who were recorded as having lived through different victimisation experiences from 1990 to 2006. Three

themselves as opposed to in general (see Cubela Adoric 2004; Cubela Adoric and Kvartuc 2007; Dalbert and Stoeber 2006; Dzuka and Dalbert 2007; Otto and Dalbert 2005).

Table 12.1 Rates of individuals who lived though different victimisation experiences between 1990 and 2006 by country cohort sample and mean level of victimisation accumulation ($N = 2{,}254$)

Victimisation experiences	Country[a]						
	Slovenia	Croatia	BiH	Serbia-Montenegro	Kosovo	Macedonia	Total
Socio-economic exclusion[b]	46 %	71 %	**92** %	78 %	**89** %	**94** %	80 %
Unemployed	35 %	54 %	**76** %	57 %	**69** %	**85** %	63 %
Lacking of resources	15 %	30 %	**63** %	**56** %	**55** %	**72** %	48 %
Lacking of significant persons	9 %	**37** %	**44** %	**34** %	**44** %	26 %	32 %
Homelessness	1 %	8 %	**27** %	7 %	**48** %	3 %	16 %
War[b]	5 %	**37** %	**62** %	15 %	**88** %	12 %	36 %
Forced to leave home	3 %	15 %	**45** %	11 %	**82** %	10 %	28 %
Damage to property	2 %	**27** %	**41** %	7 %	**69** %	3 %	25 %
House looted	3 %	11 %	**34** %	4 %	**74** %	2 %	21 %
Member of family killed	1 %	4 %	**18** %	3 %	**10** %	2 %	6 %
Wounded	1 %	5 %	**16** %	2 %	**6** %	0 %	5 %
Imprisoned	0 %	2 %	**6** %	2 %	**8** %	1 %	3 %
Political exclusion[b]	6 %	13 %	19 %	**23** %	**52** %	16 %	21 %
Not allowed to express an opinion	1 %	7 %	11 %	**15** %	**35** %	7 %	13 %
Treated arbitrarily	3 %	7 %	8 %	**12** %	**33** %	4 %	11 %
Threatened	1 %	8 %	9 %	**12** %	**24** %	9 %	10 %
Discriminated	2 %	6 %	6 %	8 %	**23** %	5 %	9 %
Victim[c]	50 %	76 %	**96** %	82 %	**99** %	**95** %	84 %
Victimisation accumulation	0.78	2.22	**4.03**	2.30	**5.72**	2.30	2.87

Bold percentages are higher than percentages in the total sample
BiH Bosnia-Herzegovina
[a]For country samples, ns are respectively, 234, 468, 454, 511, 261 and 326
[b]Rates of individuals who experienced at least one of the following victimisation experiences
[c]Rates of individuals who lived through at least one victimisation experience

kinds of negative events have been recorded: (a) *socio-economic exclusion*, (b) *war victimisation* and (c) *political exclusion*. During this troubled historical period, 84 % of the young adults in the cohort sample fell victim to at least one of these negative events whereas half of the Slovenian sample was spared from these experiences, more than three-quarters of Croatian individuals and nearly all participants from the other three countries were victimised.

a. From the total sample, 80 % lived through at least one socio-economic exclusion event. The most frequent event was *being unemployed* (63 %), followed by *lack of*



Fig. 12.1 Carroll diagram showing intersections of socio-economic, war and political victimisation and the rates by country in every case (rates of total cohort sample in *bold* characters, cases including less than 5 % of a sample are represented as *empty zones* (. .))

resources and *lack of contact with significant persons*. *Being homeless* was relatively less frequent (16 %). The countries where young adults were most affected by these kinds of events are Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia.

b. Victimisations due to war are recorded for 36 % of individuals of the total cohort sample, mostly in the Kosovo sample (88 %), followed by Bosnia-Herzegovina (62 %) and Croatia (37 %). Between 21 and 28 % of individuals of the total sample were *forced to leave home* or had *damage to property* or their *house looted*. These kinds of events occurred more often for Bosnia-Herzegovinan participants (between 34 and 45 %) and even more so for Kosovars (between 69 and 82 %). Events such as having a *member of family killed* or being *wounded* or *imprisoned* occurred relatively less frequently (between 3 and 6 % of the total sample) and were also more frequent in the Bosnia-Herzegovina (between 6 and 18 %) and Kosovo samples (between 6 and 10 %).

c. Victimisation due to political exclusion involved one fifth of the total sample. The Kosovo sample shows the highest rate of these kinds of events; between 23 and 35 % of this sample was *not allowed to express themselves*, *treated arbitrarily*, *threatened*, or *discriminated against*. The Serbia and Montenegro sample presents the second highest rate of these kinds of events. By and large, the Slovenia sample shows the lowest rates of every kind of victimisation compared to the other countries; it shows almost no victimisation due to war or political exclusion.

Treating these events separately only captures one part of the picture. The Carroll diagram presented in Fig. 12.1 shows the intertwining of the three kinds of events for the total sample and by country. The diagram is made of eight squares that represent every logical combination possible among the three kinds of victimisation: being a socio-economic victim or not, being a war victim or not, being a political victim or not. When the square is darker, the number of different kinds of victimisation is higher. The rates show the distribution of every possible combination in every country sample (the distribution of the total sample is in bold characters). The first important feature to note is that there are three empty zones; the combination of being a victim of war and/or political exclusion but not a victim of socio-economic exclusion applies to less than 5 % of individuals for every country sample (war victimisation alone applies to 3 % of the total sample; political victimisation alone, 1 %; war and political victimisations, 1 %). In other words, most victims of war and political exclusion are also victims of socio-economic exclusion. Non-victims are very few: 16 % of the total sample. Furthermore, in the total sample, more than one third of war victims were also victims of political exclusion, and more than half of the victims of political exclusion were also victims of war. The four squares in the middle represent socio-economic victims.

The main differences between each country and the total sample are as follows. In the Slovenia sample, the squares including war or political victimisation are empty. The highest rates are in the non-victims square (50 %) and the victims of only socio-economic events square (38 %). Croatia's distribution is very similar to the total sample. The main difference is a slightly lower percentage of only socio-economic victims (34 %), which results in slightly more non-victims than the total sample (24 %). In the Bosnia-Herzegovina sample, there are almost no non-victims. There are also fewer victims of only socio-economic exclusion. This distribution is observed because this country had more war victims combined with socio-economic and/or political problems. In Serbia-Montenegro, there are fewer war victims than in the total sample but more victims of only the socio-economic problems (51 %). In Kosovo, the highest percentage is in the darkest square, which represents the combination of all three kinds of victimisation (41 %), and in the area combining war and economic difficulties. Few Kosovars can be identified as non-victims. In the Macedonia sample, the highest rate is in the socio-economic area only (70 %). Squares involving war victimisation are relatively less populated, if at all.

Another way to understand the intertwining of these negative events is to take into account the total number of each kind of event that each individual had to face. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to compare the total number of socio-economic events that occurred for people who reported the four combinations in the centre of the Carroll diagram (including socio-economic victims). Results showed significant differences for the four countries where war victimisation was relatively high and where more than 5 % of the sample experienced the three kinds of negative experiences: Croatia, $F\ (3, 324) = 6.84$, $p < 0.001$; Bosnia-Herzegovina, $F\ (3, 414) = 24.59$, $p < 0.001$; Serbia-Montenegro, $F\ (3, 394) = 24.46$, $p < 0.001$ and Kosovo, $F\ (3, 226) = 10.52$, $p < 0.001$ (analyses were not possible in Slovenia due to insufficient sample sizes in some cells). Scheffe's post-hoc tests revealed

that for each country the group that was the victim of only socio-economic exclusion always reported significantly ($p < 0.05$) fewer socio-economic events than the group that experienced socio-economic, war and political victimisation. People who experienced socio-economic and war victimisation or socio-economic and political victimisation reported a number of victimisation events between these two extremes. The same tendency can be shown for number of war events; participants who experienced socio-economic, war and political victimisations registered more war events than those who experienced socio-economic and war events but no political exclusion.

Different kinds of indicators can be taken into account when testing the effects of victimisation: dichotomous variables (e.g. Elcheroth and Spini 2009, this volume) or cumulative scores (see Hewstone et al. 2004; Poulin and Cohen Silver 2008). The purpose of this chapter is to test the limits of the BJW and its impact on well-being when victimisation increases. As seen previously in the TRACES cohort data, rates of victimisation differ between countries, individuals experienced different numbers of events and different kinds of victimisation are intertwined. Thus, an indicator that takes into account the accumulation of all negative events and that is meaningful for every country in the framework was computed and used for the analyses.

Measures

Victimisation accumulation is the total of all negative events an individual person went through from 1990 until 2006 due to socio-economic exclusion, war, or political exclusion (see Table 12.1). This indicator may theoretically vary from 0 (no victimisation) to 14 (the person lived through all 14 negative events in the framework).

The mean score of victimisation accumulation differs significantly by country, $F(5,\ 2232) = 169.24$, $p < 0.001$; $R^2 = 0.237$. Scheffe's test ($p < 0.05$) revealed four subsets. The highest mean score of victimisation accumulation by country is 5.72 for Kosovo, followed by BiH, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia and Croatia. Slovenia has the lowest score, with less than one episode of victimisation per individual on average.

BJW was measured with the Dalbert, Montada and Schmitt scale (1987). Subjects answered seven items (for instance, "I believe that, by and large, people get what they deserve"; "I think basically the world is a just place") on a 6-point Likert scale that ranges from one ("I do not agree at all") to six ("I completely agree"). Internal score reliability was adequate; Cronbach's alpha per country varied from 0.688 (Slovenia) to 0.796 (Kosovo) and equalled 0.770 for the total sample.

Well-being was assessed by the *satisfaction with life scale* (Diener et al. 1985). It represents the cognitive dimension of well-being, which is more stable than actual well-being (e.g. because of mood states or depressive symptoms) and is more strongly correlated with BJW (see Dalbert 1998; Diener 1984). It is a five-item scale scored on a 7-point Likert scale that ranges from "strongly disagree" to "very strongly agree". The higher the score, the more the individual is satisfied with her/his life in

general. The measure achieved high internal reliability (Cronbach's alpha) ranging from 0.875 (Macedonia) to 0.907 (Kosovo) for individual countries and 0.898 for the total sample.

Mean satisfaction with life (F (5, 2236) = 49.80, $p < 0.001$; $R^2 = 0.100$) and BJW (F (5, 2174) = 52.46, $p < 0.001$; $R^2 = 0.108$) levels varied significantly by country. According to Scheffe's test ($p < 0.05$), Slovenia, Kosovo and Croatia have higher mean levels on both indicators than the three other countries. Slovenia has the highest mean level of life satisfaction ($M = 4.67$), and Kosovo has the highest mean level of BJW ($M = 4.21$). Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro and BiH have the lowest mean levels of life satisfaction ($Ms = 3.66$, 3.49 and 3.35, respectively) and are not significantly different from each other. Macedonia has the lowest mean BJW ($M = 3.10$) among all countries tested.

Results

The same pattern of correlations can be observed throughout all countries. Satisfaction with life and BJW are always positively correlated ($p < 0.01$). Pearson's correlations range from 0.30 (BiH) to 0.58 (Kosovo). Victimisation accumulation is always correlated with lower satisfaction with life ($p < 0.01$) and lower BJW ($p < 0.05$). Thus, victimisation accumulation is indeed negatively associated with both life satisfaction and just world beliefs. Only one exception is found for the relation between victimisation accumulation and BJW: in BiH, the negative coefficient failed to reach significance ($r = -0.07$; $p = 0.13$, *ns*).

Regression Analyses: Moderation, Mediation or Independence?

The following analyses will test the possible effect of BJW on the negative impact of victimisation accumulation on life satisfaction. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted for every country, with satisfaction with life as the dependant variable. At step one, victimisation accumulation was entered into the analyses. As seen previously with the correlations, in every country, people with higher levels of victimisation are less satisfied with their lives. At the second step, BJW was introduced. For every country, the introduction of the BJW variable diminished the negative impact that victimisation had on life satisfaction in the previous step. This negative impact even became non-significant in BiH and in Kosovo.

Taking into account the negative link that was underlined previously between victimisation accumulation and life satisfaction, these results present a mediation effect of BJW (Baron and Kenny 1986; Brauer 2000; Sobel 1982). Sobel tests indicated that the decrease in the victimisation accumulation effect

due to BJW is significant in every country and almost significant in Slovenia: $Z_{Croatia} = -2.71$, $p < 0.01$; $Z_{Macedonia} = -2.20$, $p < 0.05$; $Z_{Kosovo} = -3.42$, $p = .001$; $Z_{Serbia\ and\ Montenegro} = -2.15$, $p < 0.05$; $Z_{Slovenia} = -1.92$, $p = 0.055$.

This pattern of results is thus replicated in every country except BiH. Recurrently, the deleterious effect of victimisation accumulation on satisfaction with life is partially, if not totally, explained through the decrease of just world beliefs that are positively correlated with life satisfaction. This mediation model is illustrated in Fig. 12.2 with regression coefficients for every country.

At the third step of the regression analysis, interaction terms were introduced (victimisation accumulation $\times$ BJW) to determine if the relation between victimisation accumulation and life satisfaction depends on the strength of BJW. The interaction term was significant for Slovenia and Kosovo only, which means that no interaction was observed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro. In these contexts, the relation between BJW and satisfaction with life is always positive and has the same strength independent of the level of victimisation that was experienced. This finding means that BJW and thus life satisfaction decrease to the same degree when victimisation increases for both high- and low-victimised people. When controlling for their level of victimisation, the more people believe that the world is a just place, the more satisfied they are with their lives.

When introducing interaction terms (victimisation accumulation $\times$ BJW) in Slovenia and Kosovo, two strikingly opposite patterns emerged. For Slovenia, the interaction term is negative ($\beta = -0.162$; $p = 0.53$), indicating that when victimisation increases, the relation between BJW and satisfaction with life decreases. In Kosovo, the interaction term is positive ($\beta = 0.064$; $p < 0.05$), meaning that escalation of victimisation episodes increases the positive relation between BJW and satisfaction with life.

To examine the moderating role of BJW in Slovenia and Kosovo in greater detail, satisfaction with life was tested at two levels of BJW and two levels of victimisation using median splits. In Slovenia, the analysis compares individuals with no victimisation episodes reported ($N = 117$; victimisation accumulation score $= 0$) to individuals with victimisation accumulation scores ranging from one to seven ($N = 115$; $M = 1.57$). In Kosovo, the lower victimisation group includes people with a victimisation level from zero (only three persons) to five ($N = 125$; $M = 3.34$). For the higher victimisation group, the scores range from 6 to 12 ($N = 133$; $M = 7.93$).

Fig. 12.3 reports mean levels of satisfaction with life for both victimisation groups, split into low- and high-BJW sub-groups for each country. In Slovenia, mean satisfaction with life levels of low believers do not vary significantly regardless of whether they belong to the no-victimisation group ($M = 4.34$) or the victimisation group ($M = 4.37$); $F\ (1, 107) = 0.018$, *ns*. On the contrary, within the high believers group, those who were victimised exhibit a lower level of satisfaction with life ($M = 5.20$) than their non-victim counterparts ($M = 4.58$); $F\ (1, 121) = 10.31$, $p < 0.01$). In the no-victimisation situation, high believers are more satisfied than low believers ($F\ (1, 115) = 16.64$, $p < 0.001$), while in the victimisation situation, no differences are observed; $F\ (1, 113 = 0.915$, *ns*).



Fig. 12.2 Mediation model explaining part of the negative effect of victimisation accumulation on life satisfaction by a decrease in belief in a just world (BJW) (unstandardised B coefficients are reported for every country sample. Total effect is in *parentheses*. *$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$)



Fig. 12.3 Life satisfaction as a function of BJW and mean victimisation level in Slovenia and Kosovo

In Kosovo, for low believers only, the satisfaction with life is lower for the most victimised individuals ($M = 3.31$) than for those who were victimised relatively less ($M = 3.96$); F (1, 121 = 6.86, $p = 0.01$). The satisfaction with life remains the same for high believers ($Ms = 4.81$; 4.95) whatever the intensity of the victimisation; F (1, 133) = 0.54, *ns*). People high in BJW exhibit more satisfaction with life than low believers at both victimisation levels (for low victimisation, F (1,123) = 14.89, $p < 0.001$; for high victimisation, F (1,131) = 56.37, $p < 0.001$).

Discussion

Research on life satisfaction has recently reached some conclusions concerning both what influences it and to what degree it is a stable characteristic of individuals across time and cultures (Inglehart and Klingemann 2000; Suh et al. 1996). In response to the idea that life satisfaction is a stable and genetically determined personality trait (Costa et al. 1987; Diener et al. 1992; Ebstein et al. 1996; Lykken and Tellegen 1996; Stubbe et al. 2005), Inglehart and Klingemann (2000) demonstrated that there are important cross-cultural differences. Their analyses of 64 countries from the World Value Survey notably show that changes in the political situation are strongly related to the mean level of well-being across countries. Concerning the countries of the former Yugoslavia, results from interviews in 1995 indicate that their rankings in mean satisfaction are relatively low, especially compared to other countries on the European continent. Among 70 samples (65 countries) from different parts of the world that were included in their paper, Slovenia ranked 44th, Croatia (1995) ranked 46th, Yugoslavia (1996) ranked 54th, Macedonia (1996) ranked 55th and Bosnia (1997) ranked 56th in terms of the percentage of people who declared that they were satisfied with life. In summary, the countries of the former Yugoslavia are amongst those European countries with the lowest mean levels of well-being.

Previous analyses of mean country-level life satisfaction have emphasised the roles of macro-level and genetic factors at the individual level. In this chapter, we have explored an alternative psychosocial explanation of individual levels of life satisfaction, including life course experiences and BJW. Results of regression analyses including negative life experiences indicated that living in a depressed economic and political environment did have important and enduring negative effects (war events took place about 10 years before the interviews for many respondents) on individual life satisfaction and core beliefs, such as the BJW.

Previous research suggests that life experiences (especially negative ones) usually have only short-term effects because individuals normally overcome them in the long run (see Suh et al. 1996). We believe that these conclusions are insufficient when collective traumas related to war experiences are considered. The victimisation experiences that many people experienced in the former Yugoslavia and their accumulation have nothing in common with negative life events reported in other studies. For example, negative events in Suh, Diener and Fujita's study are "had a difficult time deciding on career or life goals", "long-term (at least 3 months) romantic relationship ended" and "gained weight (at least 10 pounds)". Undoubtedly, most negative events that were recorded in TRACES are more intense and traumatic than these, which we believe to be one reason why they show long-term cumulative effects on both life satisfaction and BJW. This argument is concurrent with our findings: victimisation had a strong and systematic negative effect on both satisfaction with life and the general BJW. The only exception was in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where there was no negative effect of accumulated victimisation on BJW. To be more precise, additional analyses showed that such an effect *was* observable in Republika Srpska but not in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the second entity of the federal

state. Further analyses are needed to establish a more thorough explanation of these findings.

This chapter does not only propose an innovative way of relating life experiences to macro-economic and political processes; it also indicates that these life experiences are part of dynamic psychosocial processes. The mediation models showed that the negative effects of victimisation accumulation on well-being are mediated by a decrease in BJW, which is positively linked with well-being. Notably, BJW is always positively linked with satisfaction with life. When controlling for the level of victimisation, BJW is still positively linked with well-being with the same strength in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro.

However, we wished to discuss further the relation between the general BJW and life satisfaction for two countries where we observed moderation effects between the BJW and the accumulation of victimisation experiences: Slovenia and Kosovo. The moderation analyses revealed contrasting effects in Slovenia and in Kosovo, two nationalities that are, respectively, the least and most victimised in the TRACES sample. Concerning Slovenia, we must remember that this is a country where strong victimisation is relatively uncommon. The results presented in this chapter indicate that for Slovenians who have a strong BJW, there is a strong effect of victimisation, whereas there is no effect of victimisation for people who believe relatively less in a just world. This result seems paradoxical at first sight; however, it seems to show that, in a relatively wealthy and preserved context, people who have a relatively strong BJW and who are victimised may feel that what has happened to them cannot be attributed to their social environment, which they perceive to be fair. Therefore, their reaction may be to blame themselves for what has happened to them in order to preserve their BJW—even though some research shows that this is not always a functional and healthy reaction towards victimisation (see Janoff-Buhlman 1992; Montada 1998).

In Kosovo, where the experiences of victimisation were the most frequent among the population, we find a totally different moderation of the effects of victimisation on life satisfaction. In this context, we found an interactive buffer effect (Wheaton 1985) of the BJW. The negative impact of victimisation accumulation on well-being is reduced for those exhibiting higher levels of BJW compared to the low believers. When BJW is low in a context of massive victimisation, personal victimisation has a stronger impact on life satisfaction. Inversely, when people are capable of maintaining their BJW in a context in which experiences of victimisation are systematic, this belief protects them and enables them to retain a relatively high level of life satisfaction even when victimisation increases. One possible explanation for the two opposite patterns may be found in the different strategies for preserving the BJW specified by Lerner (1980). When victimisation becomes a nearly ubiquitous phenomenon, as in Kosovo, people may come to believe in *ultimate justice*: even if a situation is unjust at present, justice will be re-established sooner or later (sometimes only after a person's lifetime). Belief in ultimate justice is associated with positive impressions of the victim, whereas *belief in immanent justice* (the tendency to perceive justice in the events that have already occurred) is more associated with devaluation of the victim and ascription of responsibility (Maes 1998). When an absence of negative

life events is the norm, as in Slovenia, the belief in immanent justice is perhaps more salient, and blaming or derogating the victim, even oneself, may be the dominant response, be it adaptive or not. Future analyses should specify how BJW might be associated with religious systems of beliefs that could be very important locally.

These moderating effects call for more complex analyses of the relations between collective and individual processes. This chapter presents strong evidence that victimisation experiences have deleterious effects on both life satisfaction and BJW. The mediation effects of the beliefs on the relation between victimisation and individual life satisfaction are also well established. However, the moderating effect, in the two extreme contexts, of BJW on the relation between victimisation accumulation and life satisfaction, require a multilevel perspective. Contexts in which collective experiences of victimisation have taken place may be the theatre of an articulation between individual and collective processes (Bar-Tal et al. 2009; Elcheroth and Spini, Chap. 14 in this book; Spini et al. 2008). If future analyses confirm this provisory conclusion, it may have important implications. The belief that the world is just, indeed, functions as a mediator between experiences of victimisation and life satisfaction. However, this belief is affected by collective traumatic experiences and it appears to function differently in the background of relatively low or high levels of collective victimisation.

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Chapter 13
A Slipping Memory: Can the International Criminal Tribunal be a Bulwark Against Oblivion? (*Invited voice*)

Florence Hartmann

I was born in a nice, peaceful Paris neighbourhood and raised with the strong belief that racial laws and wars would never recur on European soil. My generation was told that the lessons learned from the past would make it easier for the international community to prevent or stop the senseless killing and suffering of innocent civilians all over the world. Later, I shared university classes with Argentinean, Chilean and Uruguayan political refugees and came to understand that there was still a long road to travel before one could hope that the next century would be more humane than the last. While Tiananmen and soon after, the fall of the Berlin wall left me with ambivalent feelings, I witnessed in the heart of Europe a country being torn apart by politicians fiercely determined to reassert their historical claims and to use ethnic-based propaganda to defeat further economic and political liberalisation. When the war started breaking out in the spring of 1991, people were still dubious that anything more than armed incidents could happen in Europe. Thus, my experienced chief editors decided that their young correspondent in the former Yugoslavia could single-handedly cover Slovenia's proclamation of independence ceremony. They would certainly have rushed onto a plane themselves if they had known that they would have been able to author front page articles for *Le Monde* on the first war in Europe since World War II (WWII).

The war spread into Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and later into Kosovo. Targeted groups were expelled from their homes, and many were mistreated, killed, robbed, raped, or had their houses set on fire and their identity papers confiscated. Orders stipulated that no more than 3–5 % of the minority ethnicity should be permitted to remain in the coveted territories. There were "racial laws" in effect during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia as well as crimes against humanity and genocide. Although this war occurred on European soil, where generations of politicians were imbued with the Nuremberg legacy, the well-documented warning signs were not recognised.

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The legacy of Nuremburg had not encouraged great powers to act with sufficient speed and determination to prevent further evil and rescue the endangered populations. The international community reacted primarily in response to global public opinion about the abhorrence of mass killings and memories of the horrors of the Second World War; it promised the victims, via the voice of Madeleine Albright at the UN Security Council in New York, that their "agony, sacrifice and hope for justice have not been forgotten" and " to those who committed those heinous crimes (. . .): war criminals will be prosecuted and justice will be rendered" (after Resolution 827 establishing the The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was passed, on 25 May 1993). The ICTY, the first international criminal court since Nuremberg and Tokyo, was established in May 1993, mostly to deflect criticism that the major powers were not doing enough to halt the bloodshed. It was also under international public scrutiny that the ICTY, which Richard Holbrooke deemed a *public relation device* (see Hartmann 2007, p. 22) and which had not been given a budget to investigate war crimes, survived and issued its first indictments in late 1994.

The ICTY and its twin court for Rwanda, which have convicted dozens of top perpetrators, were the first of a series of courts—international, hybrid and domestic—that are holding accountable those who committed the worst atrocities. On the grounds that some crimes are so heinous that any country has a right to prosecute them, a number of national judges and prosecutors, such as Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzon, have used the idea of "universal jurisdiction" to investigate foreign leaders for crimes committed abroad, particularly if they might otherwise escape accountability.

The world has sent the message loud and clear: there is no hiding place for war criminals, and future perpetrators should know their guilt will never expire. However, current news headlines remind us that genocide and widespread, systematic crimes against humanity have been, and continue to be, a stain on human existence in all corners of the world. The application of criminal law to the conduct of governments and their agents will, over time, reduce the commission of heinous war crimes. For every Slobodan Milosevic or Radovan Karadzic who is put on trial, another homicidal head of state will realise that there are personal consequences for breaching international criminal standards. However, it is too early to assert that leaders and foot soldiers are sufficiently concerned about the danger of international prosecution to refrain from committing additional offences.

The more consistently international prosecutions happen, the more meaningful their deterrence effect is likely to become. But international criminal courts are situated at the intersection between two often contradicting logics—law and politics—that involve conflicts and trade-offs that can either strengthen or undermine the courts' credibility. This situation increases the volatility of international prosecutions, nowhere more visibly than in cases involving high-ranking defendants where choices are often made at the expense of justice. In general, too much emphasis on sovereign interests of states and the protection of national interests undermines the spread of universal values in the international community, preventing more openness in the same way that international justice may help or hinder international diplomacy.

Moreover, the deterrence function of international justice is seriously affected by selectiveness (only a small number of the multiple participants in war crimes are held accountable) and by credible democracies that allow the rule of law to be flouted under the excuse of extraordinary circumstances.

After nations have been torn apart by conflict, legal proceedings help to reestablish the rule of law. It was important to see former leaders, such as Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia or Jean Kambanda of Rwanda, stripped of their arrogance and trappings of power at a time when many of their victims were alive to witness justice. However, trials, whether international or domestic, are not likely to help foster reconciliation on their own. It was not the Nuremberg tribunal that led Germans to face their history. At the time, the trial was not very popular in Germany. It took education, social change and time before a new generation of Germans was able to look more honestly at the past. The tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has also been widely resented at home. Mass crimes require popular support, whether this support is active involvement or passive complicity such as accepting government agendas promoting hatred, dehumanisation and destruction of the enemy group; these views do not change overnight. Victimised groups may feel relieved at the verdicts of international or local tribunals, but, at least in the short run, such trials are unlikely to cause major changes of heart in the countries for which they are created.

ICTY is not viewed as satisfactory by anybody in the former Yugoslavia, though the dissatisfaction is phrased in differing ways. Victimised groups agree that had it not been for the ICTY, there would have been no accused, no trials and no convictions. Courts establish factual records, such as Nuremberg's 22-volume trial transcript, that help to counter the denials of those who would rather believe that the unthinkable did not happen in their own backyards. The Hague tribunal played a crucial and constructive role in bringing to public knowledge the horrors that occurred, but it has clearly not met local societies' expectations. Its very restrictive mandate—to try some of those who were most responsible—has prevented any complete settling of accounts of the post-Yugoslavian wars of the 1990s, without which divided communities in the Former Yugoslavia will not start building an indisputable, common historical record aimed at helping the whole region to come to terms with its recent history. The ICTY trials have established that the mass violence was state-sponsored violence rather than spontaneous violence motivated by genuine inter-ethnic hatred. This distinction is of utmost importance to helping to shape how future generations assess the Balkan wars of the 1990s. It is pivotal to understanding that the different communities in the region can live together, provided that the rule of law is reestablished, rather than separate permanently to live in homogeneous ethnic states that would further rely on discriminatory policies to preserve their homogeneity. These findings are crucial for the affected societies to engage in the process of reconciliation.

Although state-sponsored violence was established, no state has been legally held to account thus far. According to Mark Drumbl (2005), "the deliberate choice by international criminal justice institutions to selectively blame a handful of individuals. . . leads to a retributive shortfall, insofar as only a few people receive their just deserts while many powerful states and organizations avoid accountability". The victims therefore feel deprived of the whole truth and of their right to seek compensation for

the damages incurred, while the states are allowed to escape responsibility. Instead of fostering reconciliation, this outcome helps to generate denial in the exonerated states. Any misguided attempt at manufacturing a history of the conflict, even if aimed at eluding the most conflicting issues to satisfy every community in the region, is conducive to future instability. Justice need not be diverted from its original tasks, which include clarifying and establishing indisputable historical truths about the war and those responsible for its crimes; to do otherwise weakens the legitimacy of its judgements in the eyes of concerned communities.

In Serbia, for instance, the very controversial judgement issued in 2007 by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the dispute between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, which cleared Serbia of direct involvement in the 1995 Srebrenica genocide, has since not only prevented open and cross-border discussion on the darkest chapter of the 1990s wars but has also strengthened Serbia's relativisation of its role in the Bosnian war, which has since become a state policy. Milosevic's premature death, which ended his trial inconclusively, a year prior to the ICJ judgement had already been used for the same purpose. Most recently, the ICTY prosecutors have shaped their last remaining cases against Serbia's state officials (Stanisic, Simatovic and Perisic) in such a way that their trials do not re-open the issue of Serbia's involvement in the Srebrenica genocide.[1] Reconciliation without truth is a false illusion. Distorted or truncated narratives are more likely to delay a particularly difficult and painful reconciliation process in a region where the war spread to several states and where there are as many historical truths about the war as there are ethnic communities.

As a result, justice is viewed by both the victims and perpetrators as an instrument of political pressure that does not advance their legitimate rights. Within the perpetrating groups, elites have systematically distorted and manipulated ICTY messages, and the media has celebrated suspected and even convicted war criminals as heroes. Thus, the ICTY trials did not serve to educate a new generation. The ICTY has not succeeded in building social confidence or the legitimacy that is required to help local societies to accept the necessity of coping with their bloody past.

International criminal law's impact must certainly be understood in a broader context and in the long run. Formal justice mechanisms alone cannot suffice as reconstructive and stabilising factors in still-fragile states. They need to act in conjunction with other mechanisms within the post-conflict society. Only comprehensive institutionalisation and socialisation with the local society can help the Court's most valuable heritage to find its way into the local public sphere so that it can be inscribed into collective memory. The ICTY trials showed potential to impact transition efforts in Serbian society, the most hostile group towards The Hague Court, whenever they could find local facilitators for transmitting factual records and developing

[1] Sentenced to 27 years in prison in 2011 for aiding and abetting crimes against civilians in Sarajevo and Srebrenica, Perisic was acquitted on appeal in February 2013 on the ground that there was no evidence that the logistic, material, personnel and other support he provided to the neighbouring Serb armies in Bosnia and Croatia as the head of the army of Serbia and Montenegro was 'specifically directed' at the commission of crimes. This controversial verdict was perceived as exonerating Serbia's leadership for the killing in Bosnia.

awareness in the reluctant community. When, in May and June 2001, Serbia's first post-Milosevic Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjic, broke the silence and confronted the nation with the horrific reality of the mass graves unveiled in the outskirts of Belgrade, where the remains of near to a thousand of Kosovo Albanians murdered during the 1999 war had been transferred in a huge cover-up operation, Serbian society was shocked. Several weeks later, Milosevic was handed over to The Hague as a common criminal with the approval of Serbian society. However, when the Serbian media started enthusiastically reporting every time he exposed the allegedly anti-Serbian aims of the ICTY and of the international community, Milosevic's old propaganda regained its audience, and his war crimes trial eventually resurrected him politically.

It takes time for the beneficial effects of trials to be realised. The negative effects that appear in the short term are inconclusive. All perpetrator groups try to turn away from their past, and increasingly nationalist narratives are usually counter-phenomena to the arising awareness that inescapably unveils the depths to which one's own group of human beings sank. Thus, compromising on the truth while the process is underway may seriously hamper new generations' capacities to distance themselves from their parents' past.

In the former Yugoslavia, and especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, many other factors are delaying the social changes that help create an environment in which a whole nation can engage in openly discussing the darkest chapter of its history. Although in 1993 the international community tasked the ICTY to "effectively redress the crimes" (in the UN Security Council Resolution 823 from 1993), a court, merely by its trials, can neither bring back victims to their pre-war homes nor undo the results of the ethnic cleansing campaigns. However, the Tribunal has indeed exposed the records and actions of those who shared the intent to forcibly remove targeted groups and to kill and persecute members of these groups, thereby committing crimes against humanity or even genocide as a means to produce fundamental demographic changes in a multi-ethnic population such that new homogenous entities can be created. It has thus reaffirmed the unlawful character of such practices and of their results, which should have been redressed through political means.

However, the international community failed to activate the instrument at its disposal. The policy of returning those who were forcibly removed from their territories, provided for by the Dayton Peace Accords (Annex 7), was not implemented in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Instead, major powers have adopted a policy of neutralising the potential impacts of the international Tribunal. They made no effort to prevent the results of the very egregious policy for which people were convicted at the ICTY from becoming permanent, while an increasing number of western diplomats suggested that the reality on the ground should be accepted. Over 15 years after the end of the war, perpetrator groups are still engaged in consolidating their war goals in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They glorify their horrendous past as lawful and legitimate and teach their children that the legalisation of the results of ethnic cleansing was their nation's greatest victory in the recent past and that their vital national interest is to preserve it. The ICTY trials cannot operate efficiently in a society that is still at war by other means; neither can they help Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has suffered the most from the war, to become a functioning state.

Retributive justice, whether international or domestic, cannot help to affect change in local societies if the very crimes that are punished in the courtrooms are at the same time rewarded in the field. It does not even contribute effectively to re-establishing the rule of law while the acquisition and holding of territory by the commission of egregious crimes during the war are legalised, and the post-conflict consolidation of the ethnically pure entities implies further discriminatory measures and other violations of human rights. Despite efforts to restore dignity and preserve the memory of the victims, justice can neither redress nor prevent further stigmatisation of the victims in their own country. Such a situation generates serious and very likely long-lasting instability. The ambivalence of the international community that supports both the Tribunal and the perpetrators' claims only contributes to increasing the sense of injustice among the victims. However, injustice is also resented by those who have been convicted and stigmatised as war criminals for practices that have paid off and for which they are celebrated back home as heroes. What are the lessons that can be learned and from which new generations will benefit?

Peace and justice should go hand in hand; so too should reconciliation and truth. However, when peace means injustice in the long term, truth becomes irrelevant, and new tensions inevitably arise, preventing social changes and eventually disturbing the peace. When the wrong lessons from the past have been learned, it is difficult to prevent crimes from happening again. Once again, the warning signs twinkle, and the smell of violence again hangs in the air without capturing Europe's attention.

The Balkans have always been Europe's weak spot. There is therefore an urgent need for Europe to understand what has gone wrong since the end of the war: Was the region given the right means to engage in a true transition and the real opportunity to apply the very critical lessons that were learned before the European Union could emerge from WWII? Was justice given a chance for further reconciliation? By allowing the strategic objectives set out on the eve of the war to be pursued after the conflict, by tolerating state-building primarily based on exclusionary doctrines rather than on political and legal equality of all individuals, Europe and its international partners have betrayed the very values of civilisation that they were called upon to defend.

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Chapter 14
Beyond Collective Denial: Public Reactions to Human Rights Violations and the Struggle over the Moral Continuity of Communities

Guy Elcheroth and Dario Spini

In the summer of 1991, Croatia entered into a devastating war, whose frontlines crossed neighbourhoods, workplaces, friendships, and families. In culturally mixed regions throughout Slavonia and Dalmatia, collective violence created a sinister new social landscape in which people were drafted, attacked, killed, or expelled on the basis of their ethnic affiliation—which means, because they were categorised *by others* as a Croat or a Serb. At the peak of this war, during the second half of 1991, several thousand people succumbed to violent deaths, and hundreds of thousands had to evacuate their homes (FIRST, online). One year after the start of hostilities in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina entered into the most deadly war to take place in Europe since 1945. Again, political violence disrupted communities along ethnic divides. At the end of 1995, the country had suffered more than one hundred thousand war-related fatalities, which is only a minimal estimate registered by Tabeau and Bijak (2005), and had about two million temporary refugees or internally displaced individuals, representing approximately half of the overall population. The country was torn by systematic experiences of rape, mistreatment of war prisoners, and arbitrary imprisonment of civilians in camps under unbearable conditions (Wilmer 2002; Silber and Little 1997). The eventual signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995 did not bring a permanent end to severe human rights abuses in the area of the former Yugoslavia. Ethnic violence and mass expulsions reached another peak during the spring of 1999 in Kosovo and then resurfaced, although on a more limited scale, in Macedonia when armed conflict broke out between the Macedonian army and Albanian rebels in 2001.

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Once the concentration camps, systematic rape, and mass killings during the early Bosnian war were exposed by foreign journalists, there was increasing public pressure on the international community not to leave such acts unpunished. The UN Security Council's response to these expectations has resulted in a notable singularity of the former Yugoslavian wars. In 1993, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established and given jurisdiction over all severe violations of international humanitarian law that have occurred since 1991 in the area. This was the first time that an international tribunal was created *during* an armed conflict. Its far-reaching objectives are spelled out in Security Council Resolutions 808 and 827. The latter stipulates that the tribunal is expected to put an end to the crimes, "bring justice to the persons who are responsible for them", and "contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace". The first annual report of the ICTY, published in 1994, proposed an ambitious reading of the tribunal's role in achieving these ends, arguing notably: that

> (. . .) the Tribunal will contribute to the peace process by creating conditions rendering a return to normality less difficult. How could one hope to restore the rule of law and the development of stable, constructive and healthy relations among ethnic groups, within or between independent States, if the culprits are allowed to go unpunished? Those who have suffered, directly or indirectly, from their crimes are unlikely to forgive or set aside their deep resentment. (. . .) The role of the Tribunal cannot be overemphasized. Far from being a vehicle for revenge, it is a tool for promoting reconciliation and restoring true peace. If responsibility for the appalling crimes perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia is not attributed to individuals, then whole ethnic and religious groups will be held accountable for these crimes and branded as criminal. (. . .) The history of the region clearly shows that clinging to feelings of "collective responsibility" easily degenerates into resentment, hatred and frustration and inevitably leads to further violence and new crimes. (p. 12)

This statement reflects a clear conception of the political and social functions of prosecuting and judging war crimes. Justice is not only to be pursued as an end in itself. Prosecution is essential because impunity undermines the peace process; it fuels a desire for revenge within populations exposed to appalling crimes, which, in the absence of clear responsibilities for the crimes, will eventually be directed against entire communities. By investigating the crimes impartially and holding the perpetrators accountable, the ICTY aims to overcome what are understood to be historical cycles of violence.

With the benefit of hindsight, critics of the ICTY have pointed out disillusionment and public cynicism resulting from the ways in which enthusiasts might previously have overstretched the scope of the tribunal, notably when "healing psychological wounds" has been advocated as a "secondary goal of many who supported the establishment of the tribunal" (Fletcher and Weinstein 2004, p. 36). In contrast to these hopes and expectations, victims of war crimes expressed highly ambivalent feelings towards the ICTY. In a study conducted by Biro et al. (2004), one victim offered the following emblematic statement: "I have nothing out of this belated justice" (p. 200). Less anecdotally, the authors failed to find a systematic statistical relationship between the personal experience of war trauma and attitudes towards the ICTY among a probability sample of residents of Prijedor, Mostar, and Vukovar, three major theatres of the Croatian and Bosnian wars. Outcomes from a consultation of legal professionals in Bosnia suggest that international efforts to promote spill-over

effects from the ICTY to strengthen domestic jurisdictions are often perceived as patronising, stigmatising, or ignorant of local structures and might therefore, ultimately be counterproductive (Fletcher and Weinstein 2004). Both studies further suggest that the strength of the original message that all crimes will be prosecuted impartially is considerably weakened by the fact that, in all likelihood, the potential responsibility of political leaders from outside of the former Yugoslavia is not open to investigation. In a similar vein, accounts from within the ICTY further raise the intriguing question of whether Western leaders traded "peace against impunity" when brokering the Dayton Agreement or used their political influence to prevent the details regarding the Western powers' failure to prevent a predictable massacre in Srebrenica from becoming public during the proceedings (Hartmann 2007).

Taken together, these different points of criticism point to a broader issue that tends to resurface regularly when rights, conceived to be universal, are enforced on the ground among communities that have experienced massive violations of their rights (Eisgruber and Sajo 2005). Is justice rendered for the sake of local communities and their needs, or is a semblance of justice imposed by arrogant powers on locals who are passive at best and hostile at worst? Inviting practitioners and researchers to engage openly with this sensitive issue, Marks (2005) has proposed that the way in which international justice can contribute to the strengthening of local human rights cultures should be critically scrutinised according to three principles: (1) Principle of authenticity: Do formally recognised human rights respond to actual needs, concerns, and suffering within those populations to whom the rights apply? (2) Principle of legitimacy: Do human rights provide relevant criteria that intervene in the evaluation of the legitimacy of established leaders and regimes? and (3) Principle of effectivity: Does the definition of formal rights affect social relations in a way that facilitates the actual implementation of these rights? These principles served as a starting point for our own engagement with the issues of whether human rights cultures exist in the former Yugoslavia and how the ICTY does, or potentially can, contribute to a profitable framework for such a culture to develop.

Before specifying the concrete research questions that have directed our investigations, what might appear as a peculiarity of our own approach to the problem of human rights violations should be mentioned. Indisputably, what major parts of the populations of Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo had to endure during the respective war periods can only be qualified as tragically outstanding instances of human rights violations. Hence, it does not come as a surprise that when "former Yugoslavia" and "human rights violations" are associated, war atrocities are typically implied. However, our own perspective on human rights violations is more comprehensive. We have deliberately opted for studying former Yugoslavian populations' experiences not only from the angle of what makes them unique within the larger context of contemporary European societies. We also aim to articulate these highly salient, largely stigmatised, and institutionally sanctioned instances of human rights violations with a much quieter, more insidious, and particularly frequent kind of human rights violations. We do not want to bracket out structural or chronic human rights violations for which dilution of responsibility is ubiquitous and for which the notion that perpetrators can be identified and should be prosecuted is seemingly a utopian

concept, or at least a concept alien to mainstream Western-liberal-capitalist understandings of the world: social and economic rights. These rights include principles that were solemnly declared in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, most notably that "everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment" (article 23.1). No less ambitious, article 25.1 of the same declaration further states that "everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control". Comparing public reactions to widespread violations of this category of weakly institutionalised human rights to reactions to violations of rights that are at the forefront of the creation of new international legislation and jurisdictions for the prosecution of severe abuses—as wartime human rights have always been (Dinstein 1984)—offers a privileged avenue for understanding how new institutions generate new opportunities for the public expression of moral outrage.

Given the immense relevance of these issues for one of the main challenges facing the international community in the early twenty-first century and the highly controversial nature of the debate, the current shortage of empirical evidence on the determinants of local public support for international justice and conversely, the impact of international justice on local communities are rather surprising. With the work summarised in this chapter, we intend to make a contribution to filling this knowledge gap in the context of former Yugoslavian post-war societies.

Our findings are based on a representative survey conducted among residents of the former Yugoslavia who were young adults at the time of the armed conflict. We chose this population because collective experiences during this stage of life are likely to generate long-lasting imprints on moral and political worldviews (Schuman and Scott 1989). This population allows us to address a set of issues: First, *who* among those who were directly or indirectly exposed to such violations supports prosecution of severe human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia? Second, *why* do people lend their support to international jurisdictions, i.e. what psychological motives underlie such expressions of support? Third, in what sense can public support for *legal* prosecution of human rights violations be conceived as a specific type of social behaviour that is determined by factors other than alternative forms of public expression of moral outrage Fourth, do international institutions provide an *impetus for wider social change* within shattered communities, facilitating the emergence of an overall human rights culture that encompasses different domains of social life?

A Theoretical Model of Collective Vulnerability and Public Reactions to Human Rights Violations

In previous work (Doise et al. 1999; Elcheroth 2006, 2007; Elcheroth and Spini 2007, 2009; Spini et al. 2008; Spini and Doise 2005), we have gradually developed a general model of public reactions to human rights violations. It can be argued that any relevant

psychosocial theory of human behaviour should address the challenge of articulating the specifics of a particular social context with a set of assumptions or claims about patterns of human motives and interactions that can be generalised to a certain extent (see also Norenzayan and Heine 2005). The epistemological requirement to put theories into context without adopting a radically relativistic standpoint—which, in its last conclusion, would imply that there is no common ground for explanations of (collective) human behaviour across different societal contexts—is particularly salient when we engage with normative principles that claim universality, as human rights do. Our key concept for reconciling psychological universals with public dynamics that are eminently tied to unique social and political settings—namely, *collective vulnerability*— is deliberately double-faced. On one hand, we propose that *awareness of human vulnerability is the key driving force behind the development of any normative framework*; on the other hand, neither the personal relevance of a sense of vulnerability nor the identification of concrete avenues for containing existential threats can be separated from the ways in which individual persons experience social reality *as members of a set of collectives*. To be more specific and systematic, five key tenets of the theoretical approach that we advocate can be summarised as follows:

First, we conceive public reactions to human rights violations as an *irreducibly collective phenomenon*. In general terms, this means that the impact of collective experiences on social representations is more than the sum of individual reactions to the corresponding personal experiences. At a micro level, knowledge about relevant others experiencing events similar to one's own experiences changes the significance of these events. Thus, at an aggregate level within communities that are highly exposed to human rights violations, a virtually infinite number of social interactions contributes to a complex outcome that is qualitatively different from the ways in which individuals would react to the same type of event in isolation. In particular, as Ajdukovic (2004) has pointed out, collective violence tends to disrupt communities by undermining specific forms of social capital, including "trust, accepted norms, and the connectedness that increase the community's efficiency because it facilitates collective actions" (p. 123, see also Erikson 1976; Putnam 1993). Conversely, existing forms and structures of social bonds constrain and direct the responses that a community as a whole can develop in the face of aversive or threatening circumstances.

Second, what makes other people's experiences relevant to us is the *recognition of a common identity*. It is only to the extent to which we identify a similarity of affiliation that potentially indicates a commonality of fate that a harm done to someone else informs us about our own vulnerability. Further, if we perceive a common identity, we are more likely to assume shared values, aspirations, and interpretations of the world, which are all preconditions to our capacity to act efficiently as a collective, i.e. to transform social reality (notably, in the face of existential threats).

Third, because social groups are the source of a number of critical functions for the individual—as Reicher and Haslam (2006) have convincingly argued, they are the basis for support, esteem, purpose, agency, and power—people are highly sensitive to the threat that the groups with which they identify could cease to exist. Such an unfortunate outcome does occur when the individuals composing the group physically disappear or when there are external impediments that prevent group members

from meeting or interacting. Social groups also cease to exist when the critical values, norms, and practices that define their common identity become meaningless or obsolete. As a consequence, when faced with the prospect of life in a world of strong moral ambiguity and subsequent erosion of social bonds, people are generally and genuinely *motivated to commit themselves to clarifying the norms* that are common to and constitutive of those collectives that are relevant to their identity.

Fourth, especially in times of collective upheavals or rapid social change, (normative) social representations are rarely organised as monolithic templates that prescribe unchallenged interpretations of social reality. Frequently, they are organised as *structured debates*, i.e. large-scale dialogues where arguments are framed in response to those who hold opposing views and in line with related ideas of those who hold similar views. Within such dialogues, a limited number of underlying beliefs are more central that others; they act as *organising principles* of the debate and assign a clearly identifiable stance to those who embrace them (see Doise et al. 1993). When it comes to the issue of legitimate responses to human rights violations, we anticipate that rival conceptions of accountability and agency function as such organising principles.

This "intuition" is actually grounded in previous observations. When we carried out thematic analyses of focus groups organised by the International Committee of the Red Cross in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 3 years after open armed conflict had come to an end there, we indeed found major dialectical tension that organised moral debates within each of the three main ethnic communities (Spini et al. 2005). On one hand, participants from all communities frequently argued that, in times of war, it is an absolute necessity to preserve fundamental values of their community and that the requirement to remain human implies that even atrocities committed by enemies cannot be answered by similar atrocities. On the other hand, this moral argument was typically made problematic by expressions of fatalist conceptions of war; in the midst of a spiral of violence, norms would become inapplicable and thus practically irrelevant. In our understanding, such a symbolic opposition reflects the antagonistic nature of core normative pressures that are at work within communities that have been massively affected by human rights violations (see also Stover and Weinstein 2004). Strong motives for removing sources of collective stigmatisation—by emphasising the constraining power of circumstances as determinants of unbearable outcomes rather than human agency—oppose equally strong motives for reaffirming core values and norms, and hence, for clarifying responsibility for past crimes and eventually stigmatising and punishing the perpetrators.

Fifth, we need to take into account *institutional frameworks* within which interpretations of the social environment are shared, debated, and translated into politically relevant behaviour. We assume that collective beliefs and norms do not just passively reflect past experiences but that they express collectively constructed projects that are grounded in a community's common understanding of what can realistically be achieved together. In this sense, the establishment of an international court creates new opportunities for reacting to human rights violations and thereby changes the significance of human rights as commonly enacted norms. In more general terms, institutions change the practical-experiential significance of norms and values that

are constitutive of group identities by creating new behavioural options for group members to act according to shared values or react to norm violations. Within this perspective, the capacity to reshape social reality by institutionalising specific normative principles thus becomes a central aspect of human agency.

As Opotow (2001) has argued, *cultures of impunity* all too often freeze constructive psychosocial dynamics within post-war societies. Policies promoting formal or *de facto* amnesties may plunge entire communities into a state of *chronic anomie*, a state in which confidence that there is still a mutual commitment to basic norms is too weak to guarantee that ordinary social interactions can take place to keep the society viable (Rosler et al. 2009). Conversely, Gely and Sanchez-Mazas (2006) have stressed the potential mobilising function of human rights when they are legally enforced. Contrary to human rights as mere moral principles, human rights translated into formal regulations and institutions can open concrete avenues for action to restore a sense of justice. In a similar vein, we have suggested that the social functions of prosecuting war crimes— notably, the containment of a paralysing and even dangerous state of collective anomie—intermingle with the individual psychological functions of supporting these prosecutions (Elcheroth and Spini 2009). By lending their support to the prosecution of human rights violations, people take part in the public reaffirmation of fundamental normative principles and hence, highlight a personal capacity to contribute to the construction of a (less un-)just world. On the basis of this framework, it is possible to understand both the psychological bases of increased public support for the prosecution of human rights breaches within communities confronted with massive violations of highly institutionalised rights, such as war crimes, and why a similar dynamic is less likely to be observed in communities experiencing violations of rights that lack a similar degree of institutionalisation, such as social and economic rights. In circumstances where systematic transgressions have jeopardised shared assumptions about the fairness and meaningfulness of the surrounding social world, expressing outrage in the face of injustice is not yet sufficient to restore a fundamental and psychologically functional belief that justice can prevail; people must also perceive the presence of a concrete avenue for legitimate institutional responses.

Finally, we propose that *experiences of collective vulnerability can be facilitative of subsequent social change*, especially when institutional frameworks for collective reactions exist. What is desirable in the eyes of the public is constrained by what has been experienced as feasible. Once a community has integrated the notion that violations of certain types of human rights *can* legally be prosecuted, the sentiment that other types of human rights violations *should* be dealt with by courts may appear as well. As a consequence, the high societal salience of international institutional reactions to human rights violations is likely to make formal procedures for dealing with other types of human rights violations more easily conceivable and acceptable, even in fields in which these procedures are currently marginal or non-existent at the international level, such as social and economic rights (e.g. the right to a decent standard of living or the right to work) and judicial rights (e.g. the right to a fair trial or the right to the presumption of innocence).

Study Description

The analyses were carried out on the TRACES cohort database (described extensively by Spini et al. 2007; see also Spini et al., this volume). The database includes random samples of about 30 respondents born between 1968 and 1974 and residing in 80 different survey areas covering the whole territory of the former Yugoslavia ($N = 2{,}254$). The main indicators of public reactions to human rights violations are based on closed-format survey responses related to concrete cases of violations. Three different types of violations inspired by real situations that have been recognised as violations by international courts were presented to the respondents in the form of short vignettes.

The first vignette is based on a case of violations of judicial rights, as judged by the European Court of Human Rights; the second, on a concrete case of violations of social and economic rights, as judged by the European Committee of Social Rights; and the third presents severe violations of International Humanitarian Law, as judged by the ICTY. Each vignette includes a short summary of the main reprehensible facts as well as a reference to arguments of both the defendants and plaintiffs. Details that would allow recognising the specific context of the violation were not mentioned explicitly, and respondents were not informed that real court records have inspired the cases.

After the presentation of each vignette, respondents were asked to answer a series of eight items with highly similar wordings across the three vignettes. The first four items invited the respondents to position themselves on a continuum ranging from condemnation to justification of the violation (e.g. "Even if such events are undesirable/tragic, one has to accept them as ordinary consequences of difficult times/war", reversed item), whereas the last four items referred to the legitimacy of international jurisdictions to intervene and prosecute the violation (e.g. "The best place to establish whether a wrong is done in such a situation is an international court").

On the basis of these responses, indicators of *support for legal prosecution of human rights violations* were computed using a procedure similar to that of Elcheroth and Spini (2009). In the first step, we *multiplied* the mean score across the four items of condemnation of violations by the mean score across the four items expressing acceptance of international jurisdictions, separately for each of the three vignettes. Individual respondents thus scored high on this indicator if they strongly condemned a given violation while *simultaneously* accepting the principle that these violations should be established and possibly sanctioned by formal, judicial international institutions. Similarly, three separate indicators for *moral condemnation of human rights violations* were computed by multiplying the mean score across the four items of condemnation of violations by the *reverse* of the mean score across the four items expressing acceptance of the legitimacy of international institutions. Finally, two general scales of legal and moral reactions to human rights violations were created by computing mean scores across the three separate indicators.

To grasp public conceptions of war morality, we had previously developed a system of relevant survey items (Spini et al. 2005). An initial set of statements, each referring to one of the two antagonistic conceptions of morality and accountability in the context of war, were created on the basis of thematic analysis of 12 focus groups carried out in December 1998 among the three major ethnic communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The precise wordings of these items summarise a concrete argument developed by one participant. When necessary, the statement was reframed in more general terms, which made it possible to identify with the statement from multiple perspectives (e.g. references to a particular religious community or regional background were removed). Next, this initial list of items was presented to Croatian students in Zadar and Serbian students in Belgrade. Their ratings allowed for selecting a narrower list of items and for obtaining two final subscales composed of six items each. The first expresses the normative claim that fundamental values and dignity need to be preserved (e.g. "Ill treatment of prisoners cannot be justified because soldiers holding enemy combatants must preserve their own dignity, whatever the enemy's behaviour might be"), whereas the second reflects adherence to the fatalist conception that the nature of war renders normative principles inapplicable (e.g. "When the war begins, one side's atrocities lead automatically to worse atrocities in return from the other side").

These indicators were completed with survey items on *collective guilt acceptance* developed by Branscombe et al. (2004) and a classic *anomie* scale created by McClosky and Schaar (1965).

In addition to these individual-level indicators, two types of contextual variables were used at the level of survey areas. The first reflects the *risk of war victimisation* (e.g. of being forced to leave one's home or of losing a close relative as a consequence of war) and the second the *risk of socio-economic deprivation* (including poverty and unemployment) during the 1990–2006 period. Both indicators are based on survey data collected among a parallel random sample of the overall adult population across the 80 survey areas. Elcheroth et al. (2013) describe in detail the methodological strategy used for the computation of these contextual variables. A core aspect of this strategy lies in the operationalisation of social contexts as continuous social spaces. Instead of a traditional dichotomous definition of contextual boundaries (i.e. all events that take place within a given context contribute equally to the shaping of collective experiences within this context, whereas all events that take place outside of contextual boundaries do not contribute at all), we have defined the impact of an event on the shaping of collective experiences within a particular survey area as a continuous function of the social proximity between the location of the event and the location of the survey area.

Various definitions of social proximity have been used. In the present work, detailed outcomes are mainly reported for multilevel analyses using contextual indicators of risk that have been weighted by social proximity on the basis of a *common identification*. For these indicators, concrete events were given greater weight if they occurred in an area that was characterised by strong self-reported identification of its inhabitants with a common political entity in 1990 either at the level of the Yugoslav Federation as a whole or at the level of the respective republics or provinces, as



Fig. 14.1 Simulation of the impact of traumatising war events across 80 areas of the former Yugoslavia based on the assumption that common identification brings remote events subjectively closer (darker shades indicate stronger impact)

recorded in that year's *Yugoslav Public Opinion Studies*. Furthermore, to empirically test if common identification, rather than another source of social interdependency and influence, is the relevant factor, alternative indicators were constructed. We computed three additional indicators of social proximity based on (1) commonalities in the ethnic composition of the population before the outbreak of war (using regional rates of self-declared ethnic-national affiliation); (2) shared territorial space, i.e. the combination of common institutional boundaries and geographic proximity; and (3) shared mobility space, combining mobility opportunities created by the transportation infrastructures and actual migration practices as recorded in the TRACES data for the overall adult sample.

Findings

Reconstructing the Subjective Impact of Human Rights Violations on Local Populations

Figure 14.1 displays a modified version of Fig. 1.1 from the introductory chapter (Chap. 1). Whereas in the previous depiction of descriptive statistics, regionalised risks of traumatising war events were projected onto a map of the former Yugoslavia, here, a key parameter of our explanatory model has been introduced: the strength of common identification among populations living in different areas based on self-reported data from 1990. Under this form of representation, an area can be considered to have been strongly affected by traumatising war events even if few or no such events



Fig. 14.2 Simulation of the relative salience of traumatising war events as compared to socio-economic deprivation based on the assumption that common identification brings remote events subjectively closer (darker shades indicate higher salience)

took place within its physical boundaries. The precondition is that such events affected populations that are included in a common, subjective community. Given that people in Slovenia and Kosovo did not strongly identify with Yugoslavia as a whole, collective experiences are largely determined here by what happened within the boundaries of Slovenia or Kosovo only. As a consequence, the symbolic consequences of war for both populations are clearly unique, albeit in opposite ways. Whereas the Slovenian population was symbolically "shielded" against war events that occurred outside the boundaries of the psychologically relevant community, the concentration of such events within Kosovo became even more salient due to the strong "self-centred" focus of its population. By contrast, given that populations of all other areas shared a relatively strong common identification with Yugoslavia as a whole, the war events that occurred in Bosnia and Croatia had a partially shared impact across all of these populations, as reflected by an alleviation of regional differences in Fig. 14.1.

Figure 14.2 expresses the *relative* salience of the impact of traumatising war events as opposed to exposure to violations of social and economic rights, i.e. collective experiences of poverty or unemployment. Compared to Fig. 14.1, this representation conserves the symbolic "isolation" of Kosovo, with a very high salience of war events, but it also introduces a new dimension. Given that poverty and employment were a much more prevalent experience in the southeastern parts of the region than in the North-West, a reversed North-South divide emerges for the relative salience of traumatising war events. Especially in Serbia and Macedonia, war events were not the most salient human rights violations. The opposite is true for Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia, where a low impact of war events was combined with an even lower impact of poverty and unemployment.

Table 14.1 Multilevel determinants of public support for legal prosecution and moral condemnation of human rights violations

	Support for legal reactions		Moral condemnation	
	B	SE	B	SE
Intercept	13.00***	1.10	16.09***	1.00
Individual-level explanatory variables				
Victim of war	− 0.28 *ns*	0.41	0.48 *ns*	0.37
Victim of socio-economic deprivation	0.93*	0.39	0.00 *ns*	0.35
Woman	− 0.70*	0.35	0.85**	0.32
Combatant	− 1.49**	0.46	1.13**	0.41
Sense of anomie	0.33*	0.17	0.47**	0.15
Collective guilt acceptance	0.42**	0.12	− 0.80***	0.10
Preserve own dignity and values	1.52***	0.15	0.39**	0.13
Fatalist conception of war	− 0.58***	0.15	0.32*	0.13
Contextual-level explanatory variables				
Collective experiences of war trauma	1.01***	0.26	− 1.63***	0.25
Collective experiences of socio-economic deprivation	− 1.19***	0.25	1.54***	0.25
Model enhancement	20.2 (2)***		37.65 (2)***	
Explained contextual variance	28.7 %		43.8 %	

Note: *B*=Unstandardised partial regression coefficient; *SE*=Standard error; Significance levels are indicated as follows:
*** ($p < .001$), ** ($p < .01$), * ($p < .05$), *ns* ($p > .05$)

Investigating the Individual-Level and Contextual-Level Determinants of Public Reactions to Human Rights Violations

In the next step, we tested how contextual-level factors related to collective experiences of traumatising war events and socio-economic deprivation articulate individual-level variables and give rise to specific outcomes in terms of public support for both legal prosecution of human rights violations and moral condemnation. Table 14.1 displays the results of multilevel analyses, which allow for separating two sources of cross-contextual variations in public opinion. First, such differences can occur as a consequence of different compositions of the corresponding populations. For example, former combatants express lower levels of support for prosecution than non-combatants. As a consequence, by simple deduction, one would expect a population including many former combatants, on average, to be less supportive of prosecution than a population that includes only a few former combatants. Second, variations across contexts can occur as a consequence of different moral climates within the respective populations as a whole; in other words, they cannot be explained adequately by simply summing up differences in particular attributes of their individual members. Because it allows for statistically controlling potential individual-level sources of aggregate variations, multilevel modelling is a useful tool for precisely studying these *net* contextual-level differences.

Beyond this methodological asset, the test of individual-level effects provides valuable insights into beliefs and representations underlying different types of reactions to human rights violations. As shown in Table 14.1, we find that a sense of anomie and the desire to preserve fundamental values are positively related to both moral condemnation of human rights violations and support for their legal prosecution. These two psychological states thus appear to be the common driving forces behind a commitment to both types of expressions of moral outrage rather than the personal experience of traumatising war events: victims of war do not express significantly more moral outrage than those who were exposed only indirectly to such crimes. As expected, opposite representations of accountability and human agency appear to separate supporters of the two different forms of moral outrage; whereas those who embrace a fatalist conception of war behaviour show higher levels of moral condemnation, they offer less support for legal prosecution of human rights violations. Conversely, the acceptance of in-group responsibility and guilt is negatively related to moral condemnation and positively related to support for legal prosecution.

Finally, and most importantly, testing the simultaneous effects of collective exposure to traumatising war events, on one hand, and to socio-economic deprivation, i.e. poverty and unemployment, on the other (in both cases, as mediated by a sense of common identification), permits interpretations in terms of the *relative* salience of these two types of collective experiences, as illustrated earlier (Fig. 14.2). The observed symmetric findings allow for a clear-cut interpretation: when violations of highly institutionalised norms (i.e. war crimes) are most salient, support for prosecution is the predominant reaction, whereas within populations exposed primarily to violations of weakly institutionalised norms (i.e. socio-economic deprivation), moral indignation prevails.

What Is the Tie of Collective Experience?

In further analyses, we intended to empirically verify whether common identification itself, rather than another confounded dimension of social interactions or interdependencies between regional populations accounts for the above-mentioned pattern. As illustrated by Fig. 14.3 (when compared to Fig. 14.1), a very different picture of collective war experiences indeed emerges when the same distribution of material events is "transformed" into indicators of subjective impact on the basis of different assumptions regarding what makes geographically remote events psychologically relevant. Here, geographic proximity and common institutional-political boundaries are considered as alternative elements that might "tie together" individual experiences within a collective. As a consequence, collective experiences of traumatising war events appear to be clustered within territorial entities, which can be ranked by decreasing concentrations of events within their boundaries; Bosnia (especially the Croat-Muslim Federation) stands out as a particularly strong theatre of violence, whereas Kosovo, Croatia, and Montenegro appear moderately impacted, and Serbia, Macedonia, and Slovenia appear as weakly impacted.



Fig. 14.3 Simulation of the impact of traumatising war events across 80 areas in the former Yugoslavia based on the alternative assumption that common territorial affiliation brings remote events subjectively closer (darker shades indicate stronger impact)

In further analyses, we compared the explanatory power of this alternative indicator of collective experiences directly to the explanatory power of the corresponding indicator that assumes that common identification, rather than common territory, is the tie of collective experience. Outcomes are clear: the previously mentioned effects of collective war experiences, weighted by common identification of public support for the prosecution of human rights violations, are faithfully reproduced, even when controlling for the effects of collective war experiences weighted by common territory (which does not contribute significantly to the explanation of public support for prosecution). Adding collective experiences weighted by common territory does not enhance the explanatory power of the model in any significant way (it only contributes to 0.4 % of the previously unexplained contextual variance). Similarly, two other models tested similar ethnic affiliation (i.e. similarities between regions in demographic distributions across the main ethno-national communities) and common mobility space (in terms of both mobility opportunities provided by the transportation network and actual migration practices) as two other alternative candidates for the critical dimension of social relations underlying collective experience. All three models lent consistent support to one conclusion: a *shared sense of identification* (to a territorial entity, which can be either a specific republic/province or Yugoslavia as a whole), rather than mere categorical attribution to an ethnic group or contact resulting from common mobility, is the tie of collective experience relevant to human rights violations that causes public reactions to these violations.

Table 14.2 Explanatory models of public support for legal prosecution of human rights violations: separate effects on reactions to three different types of human rights violations

	Judicial rights		Social rights		Humanitarian norms	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Intercept	12.61***	1.33	14.58***	1.37	12.33***	1.48
Individual-level variables						
Victim of war	0.03 *ns*	0.50	− 0.64 *ns*	0.52	− 0.35 *ns*	0.55
Victim of socio-economic deprivation	1.02*	0.48	0.11 *ns*	0.49	1.38**	0.52
Woman	− 0.56 *ns*	0.44	− 0.64 *ns*	0.45	− 0.78 *ns*	0.47
Combatant	− 1.04(*)	0.57	− 1.29*	0.58	− 2.17**	0.61
Sense of anomie	0.27 *ns*	0.21	0.52*	0.21	0.30 *ns*	0.22
Collective guilt acceptance	0.79***	0.14	0.30*	0.15	0.27(*)	0.16
Preserve own dignity and values	0.77***	0.18	0.80***	0.19	2.78***	0.20
Fatalist conception of war	− 0.27 *ns*	0.18	− 0.41*	0.18	− 1.09***	0.19
Contextual-level variables						
Collective experiences of war trauma	0.84**	0.27	0.51(*)	0.29	1.27**	0.37
Collective experiences of socio-economic deprivation	− 1.14***	0.26	− 0.65*	0.28	− 1.55***	0.37
Model enhancement	17.99 (2)***		5.30 (2)(*)		16.72 (2)***	
Explained contextual variance	31.7 %		10.1 %		23.9 %	

Note: *B*=Unstandardised partial regression coefficient; *SE*=Standard error; Significance levels are indicated as follows:
*** ($p < .001$), ** ($p < .01$), * ($p < .05$), *ns* ($p > .05$)

Are Public Reactions to Human Rights Violations, Grounded in Collective Experiences, Generalised to Other Fields of Human Rights?

In all analyses reported thus far, a mean indicator of public reactions to three different types of human rights violations (humanitarian, judicial, social and economic) has been used as the outcome variable. In a final set of analyses, we treated reactions to each type of violation separately. This approach allowed us to test for the existence of "*spill-over effects*", i.e. if patterns in public reactions to rights abuses are generalised from one field of human rights to another. Outcomes reported in Table 14.2 show that there is indeed such a general pattern. The most intuitive result is that public support for the prosecution of severe violations of humanitarian norms is strongest within

those collectives where precisely this type of collective experience prevails, i.e. those that have been most exposed to war crimes. Interestingly, the same populations tend to produce the same type of reactions, even when they are confronted with violations of social and economic rights (although the statistical relationship is slightly weaker in this case) or judicial rights. In other words, when the prevailing experience is collective exposure to violations of highly institutionalised rights (i.e. war crimes), it becomes highly likely that people will support the idea that human rights violations should be prosecuted by international institutions even if they occur in a field in which the appropriate type of institution is currently lacking. Conversely, precisely the opposite is true when exposure to violations of weakly institutionalised human rights (i.e. massive socio-economic deprivation) is the prevalent collective experience. In such circumstances, scepticism towards prosecution of rights violations is generalised across all three fields as well, encompassing even public reactions to war crimes.

Discussion

In previous work, we found a systematic pattern of relations between collective experiences of human rights violations and public reactions to human rights violations. In pioneering research, Doise et al. (1999) showed that the more severely human rights were violated within a country, the more strongly, on average, participants from the country endorsed a personal responsibility for contributing actively to the maintenance of human rights in their country. In a similar vein, across 14 communities recently involved in armed conflict, Elcheroth (2006) found a positive relationship between within-community rates of war victimisation and the probability that community members would express a legal conception of humanitarian norms, i.e. that they condemn violations of these norms while acknowledging their legal nature. The same pattern was obtained on a smaller scale in the first study that we conducted in the former Yugoslavian context (Elcheroth and Spini 2009). This set of studies led us to conclude that rather than a simple addition of individual efforts to cope with personal war trauma, enhanced popular support for the prosecution of human rights violations appears to be a collective reaction of the community as a whole when exposure to severe human rights violations becomes a systematic phenomenon. The present analyses of the TRACES dataset extend this line of research and shed new light on several facets of the complex processes through which collective reactions emerge within communities exposed to massive human rights violations. The empirical findings allow us to reaffirm and focus our proposed answers to the four questions raised in the introduction.

First, we wondered *who* (in the former Yugoslavia) supports prosecution of human rights violations by international jurisdictions. Although we have argued previously that reactions to human rights violations are irreducibly collective phenomena, the current outcomes clarify how we should define the nature and boundaries

of the collectives within which such reactions to massive human rights violations develop. These new findings provide a concrete illustration of the fruitfulness of the methodological approach consisting of the construction of indicators of collective experiences within "open-ended" social contexts, defined on the basis of varied definitions of social proximity. Detailed results have been presented for indicators of collective experiences based on one specific dimension of social relations: social proximity based on a sense of common identity. We were able to show empirically that, among a series of rival candidates, this construct proved to be the most apt for relating experiences of collective vulnerability due to war events or massive socio-economic deprivation to public reactions to human rights violations. In other words, when indicators of collective experiences were constructed using other definitions of social proximity, they became less predictive or even entirely unrelated to public reactions to human rights violations. This in itself constitutes an interesting finding that is consistent with the overall explanation that we have tried to develop within collective vulnerability theory. It also highlights the need for further discussion of the political-psychological significance of the act of communicating identification with a given territorial entity.

As Reicher (2004) has argued, identities are as much about becoming as they are about being. They reflect projects necessary to reach an expected or desired future state of the community. Typically, identities *become* social realities to the extent that people collectively declare their attachment to these identities and act on the basis of the assumption that the designated communities *are* real (see also Anderson's, 1983/2006, conception of nations as imagined communities). A similar performative dimension is absent from the alternative indicators of social interdependencies and influences used here. People do not automatically share an interest in a societal cause because they happen to share a territory or an ethnic category or because they physically encounter each other. Our findings suggest therefore, that (only) when human rights violations occurred within pre-existing *self-conscious communities of destiny* and tended to disrupt these communities, they compelled people towards creative efforts to imagine and enable new forms of collective agency.

Further, our findings highlight the importance of defining the impact of a particular type of human rights violation in terms of *relative* (rather than absolute) *salience*. Taken together, these observations lead us to suggest the following answer: public support for the prosecution of human rights violations is strongest in communities tied together by a common identity that have been massively exposed to violations of highly institutionalised human rights, i.e. war crimes, as long as these experiences are not overridden by massive violations of other types of human rights.

Second, we asked *why* people express moral outrage in the face of human rights violations, and particularly, why they lend their support to the prosecution of these violations. A first element of the answer can be deduced from the findings summarised in the previous paragraph: symbolic dynamics resulting in the prevalence of a typical way of reacting to human rights violations appear to be outcomes of normative debates within communities that are shaken and potentially mobilised by the perspective that systematic violations of some of their core values, norms, and practices may undermine their internal cohesion. Such an outlook is perceived as

a genuine threat precisely to the extent that community members share a common identity that is subjectively relevant to them. This point of view is further supported by the observation that, within particular contexts, those individual community members who have expressed the strongest unease about a perceived state of anomie and who have embraced the notion that fundamental values need to be preserved, even in extreme circumstances, were also the most likely to express moral outrage in the face of human rights violations.

Third, can public support for prosecution of human rights violations be understood as a specific type of social behaviour? The results presented in this work indeed provide further empirical support for the meaningfulness of the conceptual distinction between legal and moral conceptions of human rights, consistent with previous work (Elcheroth 2006; Elcheroth and Spini 2009). These distinct conceptions not only appear in different societal contexts and are shaped by the prevalence of violations of different types of human rights but they also express two opposite ways in which individuals position themselves within a debate involving two types of antagonistic, normative pressures that might be typical for societies confronted with systematic violations of human rights: removing potential sources of collective stigmatisation by denying accountability for atrocities versus reaffirming the validity of weakened norms by public acknowledgment and condemnation of such acts. Whereas support for legal procedures for dealing with human rights violations is grounded in the assumption that responsibility for transgressions can and must be clarified, moral condemnation only acknowledges the failure to comply with a moral ideal without identifying concrete options for how the community might collectively deal with this failure, and thus, for constructively overcoming the threat posed to its existence as a moral community (see also Gely and Sanchez-Mazas 2006; Opotow 2001).

Fourth, do international institutional frameworks provide an impetus for wider social change? Our findings are consistent with the assumption that the critical factor for determining the legal versus moral orientations of human rights conceptions is the *societal* salience of an institutional framework enabling the establishment and prosecution of crimes rather than its situational salience. In other words, the central issue appears to be how collective experiences of systematic violations of highly institutionalised human rights, such as severe war crimes, recontextualise normative social representations rather than how the evocation of a particular type of violation cognitively reframes individual responses, in particular, during the survey situation itself. As a matter of fact, we found consistent effects of collective experiences of human rights violations, relatively independent of whether respondents were asked to give their judgment about concrete cases of violations of humanitarian norms, social and economic rights, or judicial rights. An interesting corollary of these findings, which are in line with previous empirical evidence described by Elcheroth and Spini (2009), is that high societal salience of judicial reactions to human rights violations makes it easier to understand and accept legal procedures for dealing with human rights violations, even in fields in which these procedures are currently marginal or nonexistent. These outcomes illustrate how experiences of collective vulnerability can facilitate subsequent social change. However, just as hopes and expectations are generalised, so are scepticism and resignation. Our findings highlight that chronic

exposure to human rights violations, within a context where frameworks that would allow for institutional reactions are only weakly developed, consistently undermines public support for prosecution of violations, even in the case of war crimes.

Conclusion

There is a widespread and popular notion that justice should be delivered in the name and for the sake of victims. Policymakers who advocated the creation of new international jurisdictions such as the ICTY, and more recently, the International Criminal Court have more than once sought to mobilise public and political support by invoking the moral argument that the international community has to respond to victims' claims for justice. Expectations have been raised when wide-ranging social, political, and even psychological functions, such us promoting reconciliation, restoring peace, or "healing psychological wounds", have been put forward by enthusiasts of these institutions. With the present work, we aim to make an empirical contribution to the understanding of the complex relationship between concrete experiences of human rights violations and public support for the prosecution of crimes by international jurisdictions on the basis of a representative survey conducted across all parts of post-war former Yugoslavia. The outcomes of the present research yield some general lessons about the actual nature of those bottom-up claims for justice that so many use to assess the moral legitimacy or the political efficacy of international justice.

First, human rights claims are grounded in *collective* rather than individual *experience* of human rights violations. This does not mean that trials serve *no* psychological functions but that their psychological functions are derived from an individual's affiliation to a collective rather than from his/her idiosyncratic life experiences. Trials might not have the power to confer a sense of closure in the face of personal losses, but they can offer a valuable opportunity to face a situation of collective vulnerability. By supporting legal prosecution of grave crimes, people commit themselves to the containment of a social and moral climate that is characterised by a spreading sense of anomie and potential loss of social bonds. Such a climate is a potential problem as much for those who are exposed only indirectly to human rights violations as for those who have been affected directly.

Second, the vehicle for such collective experience underlying public reactions to human rights violations are (collectively) *imagined communities*. These communities do not *necessarily* observe the same boundaries as nation-states or ethnic groups. As a consequence, when we seek to grasp the nature of those subjective communities that underlie collective worldviews and collective behaviour, it can be misleading to rely on official or stereotypical definitions of group boundaries. The starting point of policies that take into account public claims appropriately should therefore be an informed understanding of the nature of psychologically relevant communities, which can only be based on critical scrutiny and empirical investigation rather than on unquestioned preconceptions.

Third, public concerns grounded in experiences of human rights violations are to be understood as a *system* rather than isolated events. Populations that are confronted on an everyday basis with continuous violations of social and economic rights are likely to be relatively unimpressed by trials during which more or less remote war crimes are being judged. In contrast, when such crimes represent the first concern within a collective tied together by a common sense of identity, then the legitimacy, in the eyes of the public, not only in stigmatising these acts but also in prosecuting those responsible for them is clearly perceptible. This observation points to the more general problem that even well-intended efforts at promoting human rights cultures in specific sectors of social organisation might be doomed to failure as long as they ignore a community's *prevailing* experience of rights abuses.

Fourth, once a community has experienced international justice as being capable of intervening in human rights issues that are at the heart of its concerns, the symbolic groundwork is laid for public calls for further institutionalisation of rights. Assessments regarding the prospects for public acceptance of international justice, particularly in local contexts, should therefore be based on knowledge about a community's previous experiences of collective vulnerability. If past collective experiences have been largely disconnected from existing international institutional frameworks, then the potential burden of a legacy of public resignation or demobilisation should not be underestimated. Conversely, when previous experiences of collective vulnerability are matched with the scope of existing jurisdictions, the public is left in a state of further expectation, which provides a potential opportunity for policymakers who aim to further the development of local frameworks for ensuring global rights.

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Chapter 15
Conclusion-War and Community: What Have We Learned About Their Relationship?

Guy Elcheroth, Dinka Corkalo Biruski and Dario Spini

The manifold findings and interpretations presented in this book allow us both to learn *about* collective experiences in the former Yugoslavia and to learn *from* these experiences. We began this book wondering how such malleable and arbitrary things as ethnic identities can become "hard" social facts. When history is being constantly rewritten and when current social realities determine what is remembered or forgotten even with regard to the relatively recent past, it is certainly important enough to document that ethnicity has not always been the overarching structuring principle of social reality in the part of Europe that we have come to know as the former Yugoslavia.

What is now taken for granted (at least by many external observers) is actually the outcome of a dramatic process through which social life was ethnicised during the 1990s. Several contributions to this book show how inextricably interwoven this process is with the collective trauma of three devastating wars, and converge on the conclusion suggesting that collective violence produced ethnic divides rather than vice versa. Paradoxically, in the former Yugoslavia, war revealed the importance of complex community affiliations while it simultaneously disrupted this complexity. It is striking how people's concrete experiences in war and its influence on their practices and beliefs were structured by their membership in various communities, and how, simultaneously, war completely redefined what it meant to be part of these communities.

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In this sense, the former Yugoslav case also invites us to more carefully consider the relationship among historical contexts, social practices, and collective identity as well as perhaps to re-imagine scientific approaches through which our understanding of these phenomena may be further enhanced. Therefore, in the reminder of this text, we will attempt to advance several concluding thoughts along three lines. First, we come back to the original question of how ethnic categories became social facts in the former Yugoslavia; then, we will attempt to summarise what we have learned about the collective dimensions of trauma more generally, which will finally lead us to abstract more general ideas regarding promising interdisciplinary approaches that could be used in the social sciences to develop our knowledge of (other) communities affected by war.

How Did Ethnic Categories Become Social Facts?

In Chap. 2, Jakovina describes how the conditions were set in the 1980s for the disruption of Yugoslav society during the 1990s. For the central state, the 1908s were a decade of decline, as both its internal authority and external influence lessened. Jakovina's chapter vividly illustrates that federal institutions lacked the resources and likely the political will to function efficiently. These institutions were unable to contain or compensate for the influence of a deep economic crisis that generated high unemployment and extreme inflation while exacerbating the disparities between the living conditions of the republics. Yugoslavia also simultaneously had to confront the loss of its geopolitical identity and diplomatic role in world politics.

The structural crisis was accompanied by an ideological crisis. Among the political elites and in the larger population, there was a deep sense of uncertainty regarding the core values and goals that were supposed to provide legitimacy and consistency to the social system. As the present became confusing and the future began to appear increasingly sombre, segments of the political and intellectual elites began to compensate the absence of a clear vision by revisiting the past. Before the process of ethnicisation affected people's lives concretely, it invaded their collective memories—or at least particular elite versions of the collective past. In 1986, the Artukovic case reopened wounds that had been created by the World War II massacres. In this context, the victims were recounted, and Tito's historic role (and historic guilt) was publicly reassessed. Concurrently, a narrative of Serb victimisation was formalised in the "Memorandum".

It is instructive to confront these elite controversies with the analysis of the overall population proposed by Sekulic in Chap. 3. Although ethnic resentment was a prominent motive within elite discourse during the 1980s, ethnic *tolerance* clearly remained the prevailing norm in the larger population by the end of the decade, especially in the most ethnically diverse locations. Except in Kosovo, there were no hate crimes or spontaneous outbreaks of urban violence in the former Yugoslavia before 1991. Representative survey responses showed that before the war, ethnic tolerance was the most valorised ideal in multi-ethnic Bosnia, Croatia, Vojvodina and

Montenegro. However, this pattern was entirely reversed in subsequent years; ethnic intolerance increased dramatically in the areas most affected by war. Sekulic also highlights that the observed trends cannot be explained as a function of democratisation (e.g. Slovenia's marked political transition did not lead more people to express ethnic intolerance) or media propaganda (e.g. in Serbia, state-controlled media were particularly aggressive towards ethnic out-groups, but failed to provoke a marked shift in public opinion). Ruling out alternative interpretations, Sekulic concludes that "the most meaningful explanation refers to the war events themselves and a feeling of threat that was unevenly distributed among different nationalities in different territories of the former Yugoslavia" (Chap. 3).

How did the experience of war accomplish what a decade of economic depression, institutional disintegration and mass propaganda had failed to do? The original research findings presented in Chaps. 4 through 7 provide concrete information regarding the reasons that wartime dilemmas and constraint practices left many people with a new sense that ethnic affiliations matter (and/or that you cannot always rely on trans-ethnic bonds). As Gauthier and Widmer's analysis (Chap. 5) shows, most people's "decisions" to leave the most war-affected regions in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo was directly related to their religious affiliation. However, the choice to leave everything behind to join a safer place was *not* determined by the actual importance of religious identity in people's lives. Those who left did not believe more strongly or practise their religion more frequently. Rather, these decisions were influenced by people's ties to particular religious categories that functioned as markers of ethnic identity and that made it possible to distinguish among Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats, Muslim Bosniaks and Albanians. These findings reveal that when most people encountered the dilemma to remain or to leave a war area, they acted *as if* religious identity were critical and assumed that those who might attack or protect them would rely on markers of religious identity to differentiate between foes and friends, even if their religion was not directly relevant to them in private.

Examining Bosnia-Herzegovina specifically, Morselli and Passini (Chap. 7) show the degree to which ethnic segregation now exists in locations that were much more diverse before the violence commenced. The authors also show that the diversity that remains is experienced in a way that has been affected by the heightened importance of ethnic identification. At least among those who were young adults during the war, the combination of high ethnic identification and exposure to ethnic diversity appears to have generated a sense of anomie, which means anxiety or disorientation regarding their social environment and the social norms that are prevalent in their communities.

The wars also generated separation and disorientation within the intimate sphere of love and marriage. In the first *voice* (Chap. 6), Macek relates the story of a woman from a Bosnian Muslim family who "did not care about her [Serb] husband's nationality" but later disagreed with him about the causes of the war. The woman became anxious about her husband's departure from Sarajevo during the siege to escape from the trench-digging units and eventually sought a divorce to avoid being called a "Chetnik woman" by her Sarajevan neighbours. LeGoff and Giudici's demographic analyses (presented in Chap. 4) provide a sense of how systematically partners from

different ethnic backgrounds have experienced similar destinies during the 1990s. Across Yugoslavia, one out of seven marriages was "mixed" in 1990 (and the norm of mixed marriage was actively supported by institutional policies), whereas most mixed unions had disappeared from the statistics by early 2000 as a combined consequence of three different processes that reflected three bad alternatives for mixed couples during the war period: separation, emigration, or "conversion" (i.e. the redefinition of the identity of one of the partners).

Thus, the overall picture presented by the first part of this book clearly contrasts with primordialist depictions of ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia (see Chap. 1 and the review of Elcheroth and Spini 2011). If preferential trust and solidarity among ethnic in-groups was the deeply ingrained, ancestral motivational force that primordialist explanations typically assume that it was, then it is unclear how the relevance of ethnicity to social behaviour could have changed so dramatically in such a short period of time. However, these contributions also lead to qualify theories that explain collective violence as an outcome of belligerent elites mobilising the masses through systematic propaganda. People did not suddenly become fearful or resentful towards their ethnically different neighbours or colleagues because they were *told* that these neighbours were dangerous or because they were reminded of past injustices. There was not a neat causal sequence of propaganda that would have caused many people to change their minds and hearts simultaneously and to therefore act based on their new emotions.

On the contrary, many people were led to make difficult choices in an ambiguous environment: they could leave their towns, their country, and sometimes even their families, or they could stay and comply with the logic of combat. In this process, these individuals changed the environment in which others made sense of their collective situation. As an increasing number of people were led to consider their own ethnicity (or how it could be perceived by others) in attempting to make appropriate decisions in chaotic situations, ethnic discourse began to sound plausible to those who observed what their friends and neighbours did as much as what the authorities told them. Once collective behaviour had created new social facts, old norms became obsolete, and new norms of ethnic separation began to stabilise and acquire prescriptive value.

The Collective Dimensions of Trauma

Nevertheless, the finding that propaganda alone is *insufficient* to account for the ethnicisation of social relations in the former Yugoslavia does not imply that the elite discourse invoking ethnic grievances was harmless. The most coherent interpretation of the evidence gathered in this book is that without related practices, ethnic discourse would not have "sounded plausible" on a wide scale. However, it also appears unlikely that without the interpretative grid promoted through mass communication, particular events or instances of individual behaviour would have been systematically

(over-) interpreted as ethnic provocation, aggression, or betrayal. These interpretations fuelled further escalation and eventually created the realities assumed in the discourse.

We have already alluded to the fact that the selective invocation of the past was central to ethnic discourse. Current behaviours were portrayed as dangerous because of their association with past atrocities, and current experiences were painted as unbearable because of their association with past trauma. Bar-Tal and Cehajic-Clancy argue (in Chap. 8) that in the decade before the war, collective memories were "re-activated" and redirected to construct a sense of collective victimhood. Through the conflation of events from a distant and thus abstract past, such as the fourteenth-century "battle of Kosovo", with more recent memories of World War II massacres and concentration camps, collective struggles and suffering within ethnic groups were depicted as long-entrenched realities. That the ethnic propaganda in the region relied heavily on understanding the present through the lenses of the past suggests two conclusions. First, past events can render communities more vulnerable to the extent that bellicose propaganda and invoked threats are likely to provoke vivid resonances in a large population. Second, the selective re-construction of trauma—through the manner in which a community draws on its past suffering—reveals political agency, divergent interests and the unequal capacity of different voices within a society to be heard.

While actively shaped historical *over*-consciousness within Yugoslavia prepared the path for ethnic violence, perhaps ironically, as Hartmann suggests her *voice* (Chap. 13), a *lack of* historical consciousness abroad may have further contributed to such violence to occur. Did excessive confidence in the belief that racial laws and wars would never re-surface on European soil lead many people to ignore the warning signs? Are the wrong lessons now being learned (again) from the war in the former Yugoslavia? Can trials assist us in remembering other lessons? As Bar-Tal and Cehajic-Clancy highlight, the wars in the former Yugoslavia were also part of a war on communities that targeted their sedimented memories. Religious communities as a whole were targeted, and identity symbols such as churches and mosques were destroyed. However, perhaps most importantly, these wars were also wars on *trans*-religious and multi-cultural communities. The ethnic cleansing and persecution were intended to erase the memory of affiliations across ethnic boundaries and to render such communities unimaginable in the future (for a similar argument, see Sorabij 1995).

Chapters 9–14 document how collective trauma in the former Yugoslavia transformed life stories and fuelled collective history. These chapters also document how particular community affiliations moderated the effects of war trauma. The reported findings first document the effects of trauma on directly exposed individuals. In Chap. 9, Corkalo Biruski and Penic show how experiential cleavages in the face of war trauma generate ideological divisions within new ethno-national communities between victims of war and the remaining population. Among the Croats and Serbs who were young adults during wartime, those who were direct victims of war attribute more blame to ethnic out-groups, are more overtly nationalistic, and are less willing to engage across ethnic boundaries compared with other members of their

generation. Exposure to traumatising war events not only affected the manner in which the members of this generation perceived their collective identity, but also influenced their sense of justice. Fasel and Spini's analyses (Chap. 12) show that across all parts of the former Yugoslavia, traumatising events affected people's well-being even more because they shattered their fundamental belief that the world is a place in which some rules of fairness apply. Intriguingly, in Kosovo, victims of war who still trust that the world is or has the potential to be a just place despite their extremely affected social environment, appear to be more resilient than those who do not share this stance. However, in Slovenia, where traumatic experiences are more isolated instances, strong levels of belief in a just world render the consequences of victimisation even worse.

A more complex picture emerges if we examine the aggregate consequences of trauma. Penic, Corkalo Biruski, and Elcheroth (Chap. 11) show that across the whole of the former Yugoslavia, current social and economic circumstances predict ethnic resentment more than the frequency of exposure to war events during the 1990s. In particular, the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina was strongly exposed to war events, but still displayed comparatively low levels of blame towards "ethnic others". Overall, the findings reveal highly volatile political climates in contexts that were affected by the atrocities of war or by the hardship of social and economic deprivation, in which public dissatisfaction can turn against the new national authorities or political institutions as easily as it can against external scapegoats or ethnic minorities. In the final empirical contribution, Elcheroth and Spini (Chap. 14) show that human rights claims are grounded in collective rather than individual experiences of human rights violations. These findings invite us to revisit the common notion that justice must be delivered for the sake of victims and to clarify how the popular demand for judicial truth originates in the motives of communities that are struggling to contain a lingering sense of anomie and not in those of individual victims of war, whose personal wounds cannot be healed by a trial. The findings also reveal a pattern that may initially appear anachronistic: people's attitudes towards human rights violations appeared to be less informed by what became of "their" ethno-national group during the war than by what occurred in the territorialised communities that were previously important to them (i.e. that were identified as relevant reference groups before the war).

There may be a more general lesson to be learnt here. If we want to understand how communities were affected *during* the war (and how they were violently redefined through war experiences), we must avoid being bounded by that which is taken for granted *after* the war. The new ethnic lens does not systematically enable us to analyse the reasons for the violence or to envision future scenarios in which communities could be revitalised beyond the ethnic dimensions to which they have been reduced by the violence. In this sense, it is problematic that many commonsense notions that are highlighted with good intentions as benchmarks in the process of acknowledgement and reconciliation conflate the *forged by war* categories with generic categories of action from before, during, and after the war. There is an intriguing lack of precision in calls for recognition and apology for one's "own" past misdeeds, calls that encourage people to take responsibility for crimes committed by their "own group", or calls for people to forgive and reconcile with the "other" group. Which

misdeeds are one's "own"? Who should take responsibility? Who should be forgiven for what? All of these questions point to two more fundamental questions that must be addressed before one can begin to discuss truth and reconciliation at a collective level: which collectives can negotiate their memories, and who can speak in whose name?

It is indeed bitterly ironic that many people who refused to adopt the perspective of "their" ethnic community during the war—like the brave individuals whose memory Broz keeps alive did, when they protected their ethnically different neighbours or colleagues against people with whom they shared a similar ethnic background (see her *voice* in Chap. 10)—are left no choice but to express themselves in the name of "their" ethnic community during the process of reconstruction. How can peaceful communities be reconstructed when group boundaries forged in blood are taken for granted as the starting point for that process? Should "acknowledging the past" not primarily mean acknowledging the violence that people endured to make them behave, think, and feel as members of ethnic groups before anything else? Should we not first of all honour the memory of those who challenged the boundaries drawn by the combat trenches, as the soccer-playing soldiers described by Broz literally did between the Sarajevan frontlines?

War, Community, and the Social Sciences

The insight that this book provides on events that eventually resulted in the creation of seven new nation-states on European soil during the last two decades provide a vivid contemporary illustration of Benedict Anderson's (1983) famous definition of nations as *imagined communities*. People form a community to the extent that a critical mass acts on the basis of the belief that the community is real; nations come into being when critical actors grant recognition to the normative stance that the community *ought to be* a nation. Defining nations as imagined communities changes our way of understanding national politics and our perspective on the relationship between the research traditions that are used to study them in the social sciences. One obvious implication of the concept is that there is always space for imagining different communities with different boundaries, values, or interests. Therefore, political struggles over the defining attributes of nations are the rule rather than the exception (see Reicher and Hopkins 2001). In other words, the means that can be used to fight political battles differ, ranging from the most discrete forms of flag-wavering "banal nationalism" (Billig 1995) to the most extreme forms of coercive nationalist violence. There is nothing natural or inevitable about ethnically defined national communities in particular (see Elcheroth and Spini 2011). If anything, the processes that are documented in this book invite us to imagine the surprise that someone living in the 1980s would have exhibited if he or she had been told that new national communities would materialise in such a short period of time. Once these communities have been de-naturalised, we can then ask *how* they came to be.

To explain how new communities are collectively "imagined"—not as vague thought experiments but as essential, binding realities—requires systematic inquiry into shared belief systems and their relationship with social practices that stabilise, disrupt, or even reverse these systems. If nations are imagined communities, then we need to reconsider the traditional division of labour between international relations theories and social psychological studies, where the former are expected to explain the rationale for national politics, and the latter are confined to epiphenomena such as national folklore or stereotypes. We actually need a social psychology that we can use to study how people unite or separate in their individual imaginations to form or undo the national communities of action that constitute the building blocks of international relations theories.

Of course, social psychological research on war and nationalism already exists if one considers the topics that are studied by many social psychologists. However, this research frequently focuses on observing psychological processes in convenience samples of populations (e.g. Western, young, middle class) that are not affected by war and then generalising the results to populations that have actually been affected by war (see Vollhard and Bilali 2008). The findings that are reported in this book suggest that processes, contents and contexts interact in such a manner that the task of extrapolating processes across different types of contents and contexts is deeply problematic. Let us recall two examples that were previously noted in this conclusion. First, the frequently reported finding that people's beliefs in a just world are not affected by their personal experiences of (unfair) victimisation could not be replicated when the form of victimisation was repeated war trauma. Even across the former Yugoslavia, the moderating effect of belief in a just world on the influence of victimisation on people's well-being was completely different between the least and most war- affected parts of the region (see Chap. 12). Second, the similarly frequently reported association between individuals who support internal authorities most strongly and those who tend to blame ethnic out-groups most vehemently has been reproduced only in the most economically developed parts of the former Yugoslavia, whereas in regions with high levels of social and economic deprivation, this association has not been found (see Chap. 11).

The approach underlying the research programme described in this book involved strategies that were the exact opposite of those of "mainstream" social psychology: we worked to study belief-formative processes in their specific societal contexts, including extreme contexts that are rarely examined by social psychologists, as we sought to clarify the relationship between contexts and processes. Through this method, we hoped to make a case for an approach to social psychology that prioritises collective experiences as the core of empirical inquiry (see also Bar-Tal 2004). Such an approach requires one to study how the collective is being defined, how experiences circulate, and how social practices are structured. Such goals necessarily require a social psychology that is *interdisciplinary* rather than subdisciplinary, i.e. which articulates different methodological traditions in the social sciences to document how shared beliefs are organised across time and space in a specific context (e.g. using geographically stratified samples and life event calendars) before attempting to identify generalisable features.

In the contemporary world, there is certainly no shortage of fragile states, separatist nationalism, violent rebellion, or fierce repression. If the findings that are reported in this book inspire some observers to think differently about the underlying logic of collective action or encourage some researchers to document the collective experiences associated with the violent disruption or redefinition of the communities they are studying, then this book will have achieved its main purpose.

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