Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 60

Sarah J. Gervais *Editor*

Objectification and (De)Humanization

60th Nebraska Symposium on Motivation

Springer

Nebraska Symposium on Motivation

Volume 60

Series Editor
Debra A. Hope, Lincoln, NE, USA

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ISSN 0146-7875
ISBN 978-1-4614-6958-2 ISBN 978-1-4614-6959-9 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-6959-9
Springer New York Heidelberg Dordrecht London

Library of Congress Control Number: 2013938174

Printed on acid-free paper

Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

Preface

We are proud to offer this volume in celebration of the 60th Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. The volume editor is Sarah Gervais, who coordinated the symposium that lead to this volume including selecting and inviting the contributors. My thanks to Prof. Gervais and the contributors for an outstanding series of papers on dehumanization and objectification. This lively and timely volume examines ranges from theory to application with implications for public policy, mental health, and social justice.

This Symposium series is supported by funds provided by the Chancellor of the University of Nebraska–Lincoln, Harvey Perlman, and by funds given in memory of Professor Harry K. Wolfe to the University of Nebraska Foundation by the late Professor Cora L. Friedline. We are extremely grateful for the Chancellor's generous support of the Symposium series and for the University of Nebraska Foundation's support via the Friedline bequest. This symposium volume, like those in the recent past, is dedicated to the memory of Professor Wolfe, who brought psychology to the University of Nebraska. After studying with Professor Wilhelm Wundt in Germany, Professor Wolfe returned to this, his native state, to establish the first undergraduate laboratory in psychology in the nation. As a student at Nebraska, Professor Friedline studied psychology under Professor Wolfe.

Debra A. Hope

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Toward a Unified Theory of Objectification and Dehumanization

Sarah J. Gervais, Philippe Bernard, Olivier Klein and Jill Allen

Abstract Objectification and dehumanization represent motivational conundrums because they are phenomena in which people are seen in ways that are fundamentally inaccurate; seeing people as objects, as animals, or not as people. The purpose of the 60th Nebraska Symposium on Motivation was to examine the motivational underpinnings of objectification and dehumanization of the self and others. To provide an overall context for this volume, we first provide classic conceptualizations of objectification and dehumanization and speculate about relations between the two. We then introduce a unified theory of objectification and dehumanization within the global versus local processing model (GLOMO) and provide initial supporting evidence. Finally, we introduce the chapters in this volume, which provide additional significant and novel motivational perspectives on objectification and dehumanization.

Objectification and dehumanization represent peculiar motivational conundrums. Despite the importance of accuracy motivation in person perception (Harackiewicz and DePaulo 1982; Kelley 1967; Swann 1984), objectification and dehumanization are phenomena in which people are perceived in ways that are fundamentally inaccurate. When we objectify, for example, we treat "as an object what is really not an object, what is, in fact, a human being" (Nussbaum 1999, p. 218). Dehumanization involves a similar disregard for reality, in which we see and treat people not as human.

Understanding the motives underlying this biased perception of people as objects and less than human was the primary aim of the 60th Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. This consideration appears to be timely with regard to the historical trajectory of both (a) the Symposium and (b) the scholarship in the areas of objectification and dehumanization. Person perception and attribution have long been of interest to motivation symposium contributors (Brehm 1962; Festinger 1954; Heider

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S. J. Gervais (ed.), *Objectification and (De)Humanization*,
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 60, DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-6959-9_1,

1960; Kelley 1967; Newcomb 1953; Osgood 1957) and chapters on topics closely related to objectification and dehumanization such as objectified body image in women (Rodin et al. 1984) and dehumanized perception of aborigines (Jahoda 1989) have been extraordinarily influential—widely cited and regarded as seminal papers in their respective areas. Despite the important linkages and implications of these contributions, no symposium has specifically focused on objectification and dehumanization. Likewise, psychologists have traditionally studied closely related phenomena, such as racial and ethnic conflict and violence (Allport 1954; Azzi 1998), categorization and stereotyping (Tajfel 1981), and gendered bodies (Henley 1977), but theory and research in the specific areas of objectification and dehumanization is of a relatively recent vintage (Fredrickson and Roberts 1997; Leyens et al. 2001, 2003).

Thus, the 60th Nebraska Symposium on Motivation focused on objectification and dehumanization. Toward that end, the contributors of this volume have provided some of the most influential and provocative perspectives on objectification and dehumanization of the self and others. To contextualize these considerations, we first provide classic conceptualizations of objectification and dehumanization and speculate about relations between the two. We then introduce a unified theory of objectification and dehumanization within the global versus local processing model (GLOMO) and provide initial supporting evidence. Finally, we introduce the chapters in this volume, which provide additional significant and novel motivational perspectives on these phenomena.

Classic Perspectives

Objectification

Scholars across many disciplines have argued that people are sometimes seen and treated as objects. This process is called objectification and occurs when people are treated as things instead of people. Specifically, when a person's body parts or functions are separated from the person, reduced to the status of instruments, or regarded as capable of representing the entire person, he or (most often) she is said to be objectified (Bartky 1990; Fredrickson and Roberts 1997; Gruenfeld et al. 2008; MacKinnon 1987; Nussbaum 1995, 1999). For example, economists and philosophers have argued that in capitalism, employers objectify their employees, reducing their employees to their work qualities (Marx 1964). To the employer, the sum of the employees corresponds to their capacity to get the job done. Likewise, in medicine, physicians may objectify a patient, reducing their patients to their symptoms (Barnard 2001; Foucault 1989).

Sexual Objectification

Of greatest familiarity and empirical examination, scholars have noted that women are sexually objectified in many contexts resulting in significant consequences

(Bartky 1990; Code 1995; Fredrickson and Roberts 1997; LeMoncheck 1985; McKinley and Hyde 1996; Nussbaum 1999). Although the origins of these considerations are in critiques of pornography (Dworkin 1981; MacKinnon 1987, 1989, 2006), more recent inquiries represent sexual objectification as a specific type of appearance-focus concentrated on sexual body parts that also emerges during everyday interactions. According to objectification theory, when sexually objectified, a woman's sexual body parts or functions are separated from her person for the use of another. Sexual objectification may be represented on a continuum with more blatant acts and violence, such as assault, exploitation, and trafficking falling on one end and more subtle and covert acts, such as objectifying gazes, inappropriate sexual innuendo, and appearance compliments falling at the other end. Representing a form of body reduction (Langton 2009), sexual objectification emerges when people focus on women's appearances, bodies, sexual body parts, or sexual functions more than their faces and other non-observable attributes, such as thoughts, feelings, and desires (e.g., Loughnan et al. 2010; Vaes et al. 2011, see also Archer et al. 1983).

Self-Objectification

Despite its general name, objectification theory (Fredrickson and Roberts 1997, see also McKinley and Hyde 1996) was developed for the specific purpose of elucidating the adverse psychological consequences for women living in a society in which they are treated as things rather than people. It suggests that one important consequence of sexual objectification is that women learn to be their first surveyors—not only do they experience sexual objectification from others, but they also persistently objectify themselves. When women self-objectify, they internalize an observer's perspective of their bodies and regard their appearance as more important to their self-concept than their other attributes (e.g., physical health, emotions, cognitions; Bartky 1990; Berger 1972; de Beauvoir 1952; Fredrickson and Roberts 1997; McKinley 1998, 2006; McKinley and Hyde 1996). Through sexual objectification experiences in the media and interpersonal interactions, girls and women learn that it is adaptive to focus on their appearance more than their other attributes. For example, previous research has shown that women (vs. men) consider their observable physical appearance attributes (e.g., body measurements) as more central to their self-concept compared to less observable physical competence characteristics (e.g., strength; Noll and Fredrickson 1998) and persistently think about how they look (McKinley and Hyde 1996). A multitude of negative consequences are posited to result from objectification experiences through the self-objectification process, including appearance anxiety, body surveillance, body shame, and a diminished capacity for peak motivational states. These intermediary consequences set the stage for psychological disorders that disproportionately affect women, including unipolar depression, eating disorders, and sexual dysfunction (see Calogero et al. 2011; Moradi and Huang 2008, for reviews). Although psychologists have

primarily focused on self-objectification for women, like objectification more generally, it can be conceptualized more broadly with any objectified individuals adopting other people's perspectives of themselves (Fanon 1967; Marx 1964). To illustrate, the worker may reduce himself to his work-related capabilities, adopting the objectifying gaze of his employer. The medical patient may focus only on her physical symptoms seeing herself through the eyes of the physician. However, most theory (Fredrickson and Roberts 1997) and empirical work (Moradi and Huang 2008) has focused on gender-related self-objectification due to sexual objectification experiences.

Dehumanization

When dehumanized, people are seen and treated similarly to non-humans. For example, when African Americans are represented as apes (Goff et al. 2008), fashion models morphed into beer bottles (Earp and Jhally 2010), or people with disabilities likened to parasites (O'Brien 2003), they are treated as animals or objects rather than people. Dehumanization also emerges in more subtle ways, with people seeing or treating others as not *completely* human (Leyens et al. 2003, see also Haslam 2006). When human attributes, such as morality, self-control, or emotions are attributed to some, but not others, those people who are denied such attributes are said to be dehumanized, despite the fact that they may still be more human than animals or objects. Dehumanization has primarily been considered within the context of intergroup relations, rather than gender (Haslam 2006; Leyens et al. 2003). Like objectification, dehumanization also has been of interest to scholars across several disciplines, but has only recently gained traction within psychology.

Infra-Humanization

Leyens and colleagues (e.g., Leyens et al. 2001, 2003; Vaes et al. 2003) have theorized that a variant of dehumanization involves seeing outgroups as less human than ingroups. Through this process of infra-humanization, an outgroup is regarded as not quite human. Research in this tradition has primarily focused on emotions and reveals that people similarly attribute primary emotions (e.g., fear, anger) to people from their ingroups and outgroups, but tend to attribute more secondary emotions (e.g., embarrassment) to their ingroups than outgroups. In many ways, this manifestation of infra-humanization is akin to likening outgroups to animals, given that both humans and animals experience primary emotions, but only humans experience secondary emotions. Importantly, these differences emerge explicitly (Leyens et al. 2003) and implicitly (Paladino et al. 2002).

Humanness

Building on this seminal work, Haslam (2006; see also Haslam et al. 2013) introduced an elaborated model of dehumanization, which distinguishes between two types of dehumanization—the denial of human nature and the denial of human uniqueness. Haslam has argued and found that dehumanization is multidimensional; people engage in animalistic dehumanization, denying others human uniqueness attributes (e.g., civility, refinement, moral sensibility, rationality, and maturity). When denied human uniqueness, people are regarded as amoral, irrational, childlike, and unable to control themselves. People also engage in mechanistic dehumanization and deny others human nature attributes (e.g., emotional responsiveness, interpersonal warmth, cognitive openness, agency, and depth). When denied human nature, people are regarded as inert, cold, rigid, passive, fungibile, and lacking depth.

Relations Between Objectification and Dehumanization

As the above review shows, the concepts of objectification and dehumanization are closely related. Objectification and dehumanization in the context of gender and pornography illustrates this notion. When a woman is completely reduced to her sexual body parts and functions through pornography (e.g., through the act of creating pornography when the camera lens focuses only on her sexual body parts, as well as the resulting pornographic media), she is denied personhood. Indeed some scholars have conceptualized objectification and specific aspects of dehumanization as identical (Haslam 2006; mechanistic dehumanization). Yet, when one is likened to an animal (e.g., animalistic dehumanization, denying human uniqueness), one is not necessarily objectified. For example, denying someone secondary emotions is dehumanizing, but does not necessarily involve a reduction of people to their parts or likening them to objects. In a similar vein, there may be instances when people are objectified or reduced to their sexual body parts, but not necessarily dehumanized. For example, sexual objectification is theorized and regarded as a central aspect of many sexual and romantic encounters; both partners may mutually reduce themselves and the other to their sexual body parts and functions, but not necessarily deny either person humanity (LeMoncheck 1985; Nussbaum 1999).

In sum, on the surface, the concepts of objectification and dehumanization appear relatively straightforward; likening someone to an object represents objectification and seeing or treating someone as not (completely) human represents dehumanization. Consequently, early work in both of these traditions has treated objectification and dehumanization in somewhat one-dimensional ways; objectification was conceptualized as a specific focus on the appearances, the bodies, the sexual body parts, or the sexual functions of women (Calogero 2013; Goldenberg 2013; Moradi 2013). Similarly, dehumanization was conceptualized as a mode of

appraisal that emerges in intergroup relations, particularly in the context of racial and ethnic outgroups, in which someone is regarded as less than human through the denial of secondary emotions. Yet, more recent considerations of both objectification and dehumanization have incorporated these classic perspectives with novel theoretical positions and current empirical findings to propose much broader and more nuanced notions of these phenomena. For example, researchers have documented that objectification and dehumanization occur outside of the context of gender and racial/ethnic relations, respectively (Fiske 2013; Haslam et al. 2013).

Researchers have also recently theorized that both objectification and dehumanization may be multidimensional. Just as there are many characteristics that differentiate objects from people (Ostrom 1984), people may be objectified in varied ways with distinct consequences. For example, Nussbaum (1999) suggested that objects and tools are regarded as instruments, inert, lacking self-determination, fungible, or interchangeable with similar objects, and violable. They are also denied autonomy and subjectivity. When objectified, one, many, or all of these characteristics may be attributed to people in varying degrees, resulting in objectification experiences that are quantitatively different (e.g., mild vs. severe), but also qualitatively different (e.g., seeing factory workers as interchangeable with other factory workers vs. reducing a woman to her sexual functions in pornography).

Like objectification, there also appears to be different types and degrees of dehumanization. Although infra-humanization scholars theorized on seeing people as less than human more generally, they specifically focused on secondary emotions in empirical studies (Leyens et al. 2003). Haslam (2006) extended this notion to consider the varied ways that someone may be denied humanness and has been able to theoretically and empirically differentiate between denying uniquely human and human nature attributes. These two types of human denial also stem from somewhat different antecedents (e.g., distinct contexts, various groups) and result in somewhat different consequences (e.g., application of negative emotions vs. indifferent emotions).

Finally, although dehumanization and objectification are closely related, the specific association requires further conceptual and empirical investigation. While objectification and dehumanization often occur in tandem (e.g., mechanistic dehumanization) with objectification contributing to dehumanization and vice versa, objectification may occur without concomitant dehumanization (e.g., during a romantic interlude when both partners are focused on the other's sexual functions, but still see their partner as human) and dehumanization may occur without corresponding objectification (e.g., when African Americans are likened to apes in the case of animalistic dehumanization, Haslam 2006). Thus, objectification and dehumanization may be considered as two overlapping Venn diagrams with some situations representing both objectification and dehumanization, whereas other situations represent objectification or dehumanization only (see a, b, c in Fig. 1). Some scholars do not differentiate between objectification and dehumanization (Bartky 1990, see d in Fig. 1) and thus regard the Venn circles as completely overlapping. Other scholars argue that objectification is completely subsumed within dehumanization with the objectification circle falling within the dehumanization circle (e.g., mechanistic dehumanization, Haslam 2006, see b in Fig. 1). Still



Fig. 1 Theorized relations between objectification and dehumanization

others argue that though they are related, some experiences represent objectification only while others represent dehumanization only (see c in Fig. 1).

Current Perspectives

In the spirit of elaborating and extending these classic perspectives, this volume presents contemporary motivational frameworks on objectification and dehumanization. This consideration reveals extraordinary diversity in conceptualizations, types, targets motivations, and consequences of objectification and dehumanization. We begin by suggesting that objectification stems from local appraisals of people and introduce a unified conceptualization of objectification and subsequent dehumanization based on our own work. We then provide an overview of additional motivational perspectives on these issues offered by leading scholars at the 60th Nebraska Symposium on Motivation.

A Unified Conceptualization of Objectification and Dehumanization

We suggest that at a basic level, objectification involves a local (vs. global) appraisal of a person. That is, when people objectify others, they focus on their local parts rather than global attributes. When people sexually objectify a woman,

for example, they separate some part of the woman (e.g., her appearance, body, sexual body parts, or sexual functions) from her entire person. Most researchers, including those examining objectification of both others (Heflick and Goldenberg 2009; Strelan and Hargreaves 2005) and the self (Fredrickson et al. 1998; Noll and Fredrickson 1998) have focused on reducing women to their appearance attributes. When women are reduced to their appearance, this contributes to negative social perceptions of others (Heflick and Goldenberg 2009; Heflick et al. 2011) and women themselves (Moradi and Huang 2008).

Yet, women may be further reduced to specific appearance-based parts of themselves in the eyes of others. Theorists and researchers, for example, have further argued that women may not only be reduced to their appearance, but also reduced specifically to their bodies (Langton 2009). That is, although appearance-focus has many negative consequences for women, objectification can manifest in a perhaps more insidious, narrowed focus that goes beyond a mere appearance-focus to a form of body reduction (e.g., Loughnan et al. 2010; Vaes et al. 2011, see also Archer et al. 1983).

Finally, our own work has shown that women may be further locally appraised and reduced beyond a general body focus to their local sexual body parts specifically. That is, women sometimes are reduced from their appearances and entire bodies to their sexual body parts (Bernard et al. 2012, 2013a, b; Gervais et al. 2011a, 2012, 2013). Behaviors thought to manifest from this local appraisal of women, for example the objectifying gaze characterized as more attention to sexual body parts (e.g., women's breasts) than other body parts (e.g., women's faces), have negative consequences for women (Gervais et al. 2011b; Saguy et al. 2010).

In the remainder of this section, we briefly outline this unified theory of objectification with a focus on global versus local processing in person perception. We review empirical research suggesting the role of local appraisal in objectification may manifest during different stages of person perception (Brewer 1988; Fiske and Neuberg 1990; Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000). Finally, we introduce critical next steps for research.

Objectification, Person Perception, and the Global Versus Local Processing Model

People can view the same event, person, or thing in multiple ways. Using an example from photography to illustrate this point, people can use a telephoto lens and zoom in on the specific parts of another person or people can adopt a wide angle lens and focus on the entire person. This involves adopting different processing styles when seeing or thinking about stimuli in our environments. A global processing style involves focusing on the Gestalt, whereas a local processing style involves focusing on the constituent parts (Förster and Dannenberg 2010). The global precedence effect refers to the well-established finding that

people generally focus on the Gestalt of a stimulus before focusing on its details; that is, perceivers usually attend to the whole, global structure instead of the local parts. In a classic demonstration of this effect, Navon (1977) showed people large, global letters comprised of small, local letters and found that people more quickly responded to a subsequent letter that matched the global letter compared to the local letter. Yet, people also sometimes adopt local processing styles and the distinction between global and local processing underlies many psychological processes and has important consequences in several domains (Förster 2012, for review, e.g., Derryberry and Reed 1998; Förster and Higgins 2005; Förster et al. 2008; Gasper and Clore 2002; Mogg et al. 1990).

We have suggested and found preliminary evidence for the notion that people adopt a local appraisal of women, including focusing on their appearances, bodies, or sexual body parts and functions, rather than a global appraisal of women, focusing on women as entire people (Bernard et al. 2012; Gervais et al. 2012). Although not tested specifically within the context of sexual objectification, this idea and related research is consistent with previous work showing links between sex and local processing more generally (Förster 2010). To illustrate, when participants imagined either a one-night stand with no love involved (sex prime) or a walk with a romantic partner with no lust involved (love prime), the sex prime enhanced local processing and the love prime enhanced global processing. Furthermore, the elicited processing supported or impaired subsequent task performance with sex primes impairing memory for faces (Förster 2010), facilitating analytic thinking (and hindering creative thinking, Förster et al. 2010), and increasing the likelihood of participants differentiating dimensions about their partners (e.g., whether they were creative, intelligent, attractive, etc.; Förster et al. 2010).

Based on our conceptualization of objectification as a local appraisal of women, we suggest that the global precedence effect may be diminished when people are objectified—through narrowed attention and recognition processes, categorization, impression formation, and behaviors (Brewer 1988; Fiske and Neuberg 1990; Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000). During initial person perception (Zarate and Smith 1990), people may adopt a local focus on women, attending to and recognizing their bodies and sexual body parts more than their entire bodies. Local categorization may occur when within group similarities and between group differences are accentuated (Tajfel 1981) with women regarded as interchangeable with other women with similar bodies or sexual body parts. Local impression formation may also emerge (Ashmore and Del Boca 1981; Brewer 1988; Fiske and Neuberg 1990), with sexual object attributes (e.g., passivity) activated and applied and human attributes (e.g., thoughts and feelings) inhibited. Finally, objectifying attitudes and behaviors such as the objectifying gaze may manifest from a local appraisal of women. These effects may occur sequentially. For example, attention to women's sexual body parts may provide the foundation for viewing women with the same body parts as interchangeable with one another. Yet, in some cases, these effects also may be bidirectional or cyclical. For example, viewing a woman as fungible with another woman based on her sexual features may provide the foundation for subsequently attending to her sexual body parts only.

Local Attention and Recognition of Women's Bodies

Research in cognitive psychology shows that global and local processing can contribute to our understanding of person recognition (i.e., recognition of bodies and faces) and object recognition (Reed et al. 2006; Seitz 2002; Tanaka and Farah 1993). Although there is still some debate among cognitive researchers (see Tarr 2013), global processing tends to underlie person recognition; to recognize faces and bodies, people use information regarding the specific body parts (e.g., eyes, arms), but also require information regarding the relations and configurations between the parts. Local processing tends to underlie object recognition; people can often recognize objects (e.g., houses) based on information about the specific parts (e.g., doors, windows) without requiring information regarding the spatial relations among stimulus parts (see Maurer et al. 2002, for review).

Integrating findings on differences between person and object recognition and the notion that people may locally appraise women through reduction to their sexual body parts, we proposed that perceivers may sometimes recognize women's sexual body parts in ways that resemble local object recognition instead of global person recognition. In an initial study examining attention to women's sexual body parts, Gervais et al. (2013) asked participants to adopt a local focus on women's appearance or a more global focus on women's personality (Heflick and Goldenberg 2009), as they viewed women with exaggerated sexual body parts (e.g., hourglass figures with larger breasts and narrow waists), average sexual body parts, or attenuated sexual body parts (e.g., tubular figures). Consistent with the notion that women are reduced to their sexual body parts, Gervais et al. (2013) found that under appearance-focus and particularly for women with exaggerated sexual body parts, people gazed more at women's chests and waists and less at their faces, by dwelling for longer times on these body parts and returning attention to these parts over time. This provides initial evidence that when people are asked to adopt a narrowed, local focus on women (focusing on their appearance), they subsequently attend to their sexual body parts.

Extending the notion of a local appraisal of women's bodies to recognition, one robust indicator of global processing from cognitive psychology is the inversion effect. Inverted stimuli are more difficult to recognize than upright stimuli (Yin 1969) presumably because inversion disrupts global processing; it is more difficult to use spatial information about the relation between different parts when a stimulus is inverted. Global processing underlies person recognition (i.e., the recognition of faces, the recognition of body postures) and thus, people have more difficulty recognizing inverted people compared to upright people (e.g., Reed et al. 2003, 2006). Because inversion does not disrupt local processing and local processing underlies object recognition, however, inversion does not interfere with the recognition of objects; people are able to equally recognize upright and inverted objects.

We suggested that sexualized men may be subject to the inversion effect with upright men recognized better than inverted men, as in classic research on person recognition (Bernard et al. 2012). However, if women's bodies are appraised

locally and visually reduced to their sexual body parts during initial person perception, as we have suggested, then sexualized women should not be subject to the inversion effect. That is, if women are reduced to their sexual body parts, then inversion, which allows for local, but not global processing, should not disrupt the recognition of women's bodies. To initially consider this possibility, we showed photographs of upright sexualized men and women (e.g., wearing revealing underwear and sexualized expressions) and examined subsequent recognition of upright and inverted men and women. Consistent with our hypothesis, upright and inverted women were recognized similarly, indicating that women's bodies were recognized even when global information was absent and only local information was present. However, the classic inversion effect emerged for sexualized men, with upright men recognized better than inverted men, indicating that global information was required for male body recognition. The findings from this study are consistent with the notion that women are appraised locally and reduced to their body parts, but it remains unclear whether this effect can be explained by local processing of women's bodies more generally or the recognition of sexual body parts specifically as we have suggested (Gervais et al. 2012).

To consider whether women's bodies are reduced specifically to their sexual body parts, we examined whether people would recognize women's (vs. men's) sexual body parts in isolation without requiring the spatial information about relations among the sexual body parts provided by the context of the entire body (similar to object recognition, Gervais et al. 2012). Specifically, we hypothesized that women's sexual body parts would be recognized similarly regardless of whether they were presented in the context of entire bodies or in isolation (whole body recognition = body part recognition), whereas men's sexual body parts would be recognized better when they were presented in the context of entire bodies, rather than in isolation (whole body recognition > body part recognition). To test hypotheses, participants viewed photographs of men and women followed by photographs of slightly modified sexual body parts presented in the context of the entire body allowing for global, whole recognition or in isolation allowing for local, parts recognition only. Consistent with hypotheses, women's sexual body part recognition was equal to (and sometimes better than) women's whole body recognition. In effect, people reduced women to their sexual body parts by recognizing their body parts similar to object recognition (Tanaka and Farah 1993). Men's whole bodies were recognized better than men's sexual body parts, similar to person recognition. This effect emerges for sexualized and non-sexualized men and women, suggesting that people not only adopt a local perspective of women who are sexualized and highly attractive (e.g., models, Bernard et al. 2013a), but also on those who are not sexualized and are average in attractiveness (e.g., everyday women, Gervais et al. 2012).

Importantly, providing the first direct evidence that local processing underlies the recognition of women's sexual body parts during initial person perception, we (Gervais et al. 2012) reasoned that if local processing underlies the sexual objectification of women's bodies, then supporting or interfering with such processing should affect recognition. Consistent with this rationale, women's sexual body

parts were recognized better than women's entire bodies under local processing objectives, but this effect was tempered under global processing objectives (Gervais et al. 2012, Experiment 2). Like the inversion effect, this effect appears to be specific to women, with men's entire bodies recognized better than men's body parts, regardless of whether local or global processing objectives are introduced.

Local Objectified Categorization

A local appraisal of women might also manifest in category-based person perception. One example of category-based processing is the notion of fungibility or seeing someone as interchangeable with similar others (Haslam 2006; Nussbaum 1999). That is, in the eyes of perceivers, when a person is reduced to a set of sexualized body parts or functions they become sexually fungible (interchangeable with women with similar sexual body parts or functions, Gervais et al. 2011a). In pornographic media, for example, one centerfold may be interchangeable with another centerfold with similar sexual body parts, regardless of facial features, skills, abilities, personality features, and preferences. To empirically examine this possibility, we modified the "who said what" paradigm (Taylor et al. 1978) to examine whether women are interchangeable with other women with similar sexual body parts (Gervais et al. 2011a). Participants initially saw photographs of men and women with average or exaggerated sexual body parts (e.g., larger chests, narrower waists). In a surprise recognition task, participants were then asked to match the bodies to the faces of the original men and women. Women were indeed sexually fungible; participants made more recognition errors when matching women's faces back to their bodies, but this effect was qualified by type of sexual body parts (exaggerated or average); participants confused the face-body pairing for women with large chests and narrow waists with other women with similar features, but not women with average chests and waists. Interestingly, men with exaggerated (vs. average) sexual body parts were also fungible, although they were still perceived as more powerful than women.

Local Impression Formation and Subsequent Behaviors

Research from our lab suggests that people adopt a local appraisal of women during initial person perception, including attention, recognition, and categorization of women's bodies. Additional research is needed to further examine the other stages of the model, including local objectified attribute activation and application during impression formation and local objectified attitudes and behaviors. Although there is no direct empirical support applying GLOMO to objectified impression formation (cf., Förster et al. 2008, on GLOMO applied to social judgments more generally), existing objectification research can be reinterpreted

through our model. Appearance-focus (Heflick and Goldenberg 2009), body reduction (Loughnan et al. 2010; Gray et al. 2011), and sexualization (Vaes et al. 2011) have all been shown to cause object and animal attribute activation and human attribute inhibition. For example, Heflick and his colleagues found that famous women (e.g., Sarah Palin and Angelina Jolie; Heflick and Goldenberg 2009) as well as unfamiliar women (Heflick et al. 2011) were regarded as less warm and less competent when participants focused on their appearance rather than as an entire person. Considered through our local (vs. global) framework of objectification, appearance-focus may narrow attention to a very specific part of a woman, rather than the entire woman. Similarly, Loughnan et al. (2010) found similar effects when women's bodies only (vs. women's bodies and faces together) were presented to participants. Consistent with our general proposition, this work can be interpreted as showing that narrowing people's attention to women's bodies (vs. both faces and bodies) contributes to objectified and dehumanized social perception. As well, Vaes et al. (2011) have shown that characteristics associated with objects and animals are activated when women are presented in a sexualized manner (see also Cikara et al. 2010). Sexualizing the body may naturally draw people's attention to those sexual body parts, and the resulting dehumanization that emerges is consistent with the notion that a local appraisal of women's bodies (a focus on sexual body parts) contributes to objectified impression formation. One might speculate that dehumanization may be an important mechanism through which initial local appraisals (e.g., a focus on a woman's body without a concomitant focus on her feelings and desires) cause subsequent adverse objectifying behaviors (e.g., the objectifying gaze, harassment).

Critical Next Steps for Research

In summary, we have suggested that objectification may manifest in a local appraisal of women during person perception and dehumanization may mediate the relation between local appraisals and adverse social perceptions and behaviors. Our work provides direct evidence for this during initial person perception stages, including attention (Gervais et al. 2013), recognition (Bernard et al. 2012, 2013a; Gervais et al. 2012), and categorization (Gervais et al. 2011a) of women's bodies. Indirect evidence for other stages of the model, including local objectified impression formation (Cikara et al. 2010; Heflick and Goldenberg 2009; Heflick et al. 2011; Loughnan et al. 2010; Vaes et al. 2011) and objectified attitudes and behaviors (Rudman and Mescher 2012) comes from our reinterpretation of published research. Future research is needed to further examine when and why women are objectified during these different stages, to examine the relations between these different stages (e.g., does initial objectified attention provide the foundation for objectified impression formation and related behaviors or is the relation bidirectional), and to provide additional evidence of the specific role—both moderating (Gervais et al. 2012) and meditating—of global and local processing.

Considered through the GLOMO model, one might speculate that a host of target and perceiver features (both state and trait) that are associated with global and local processing more generally (not necessarily sexual objectification specifically) may cause sexual objectification of women. Recognizing women as sexual objects may be related to psychological distance (Liberman et al. 2007). Research in the area of construal level theory (e.g., Liberman and Trope 2008), for example, shows that socially distant people are perceived in more global, or abstract ways (Liberman and Förster 2009), which is consistent with theory suggesting that dehumanization is associated with vertical distance (for mechanistic dehumanization) or horizontal distance (for animalistic dehumanization) between perpetrators and targets (Haslam 2006). Likewise, sexual objectification may be related to self-regulatory focus (Higgins 1997). Research in the area of prevention focus, for example, suggests that prevention focus leads to narrowed, detailed-focused attention and memory (Förster and Higgins 2005) and thus, may also contribute to a local appraisal of women as sexual objects. Finally, threat, which causes a local appraisal to threatening stimuli, may serve to promote objectified perceptions of women.

From our perspective, exploring the role of culture in sexual objectification is a particularly intriguing avenue for further exploring these effects. Beauty standards and the representation of women's bodies vary across cultures. Indeed in their original formulation of objectification theory, Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) situated this phenomenon within a particular context—Western cultures, where women are frequently and pervasively objectified in the media and interactions. Cultures not only vary in the content of cultural representations of women they hold, but cultures also impact the cognitive processes people use to appraise their environments. In an influential program of research, Nisbett and colleagues (Nisbett and Masuda 2003) suggested that Easterners were more likely to adopt holistic processing styles compared to Westerners, who tend to adopt analytic processing styles. These styles approximate global and local processing and may represent important cultural attributes that contribute to objectified and dehumanized perceptions of women. Furthermore, over the course of history, deeply embedded philosophical differences in the ways people from these cultures appraised the world, as well as geographical differences (Miyamoto et al. 2006), have impacted people's preferred cognitive styles. Given this reality, an open question concerns whether and how culture may modulate the way people appraise female bodies. For example, to the extent that Easterners adopt a global processing style, they may exhibit higher performance in the recognition of all whole bodies—both men *and women*. The opportunity to address this interplay between different representations of women and processing styles used to appraise women between cultures suggests that including culture is a critical direction for future research.

A related question pertains to the cultural membership of targets of objectification. In much of our research, targets have been scantily clad, thin, and white (representing Western cultural ideals of beauty). People may adapt their processing styles to the cultural membership of the target, which is revealed through physical features. By highlighting or concealing sexual body parts (e.g., via self-sexualization, Allen and Gervais 2012), for example, clothing may also modulate the processing styles

people employ to appraise women. Such an approach importantly considers the interactions between perpetrators and targets of sexual objectification. Thus, clothing may be used by women as a form of identity performance (Klein et al. 2007) to modulate the processing styles of perpetrators. Whether, how, why, and with what consequences women can actively influence the ways their bodies are appraised by others remains a largely unexplored question (Allen and Gervais 2012).

A local appraisal of women may also be closely linked to self-objectification with a local appraisal of one's own body serving as an antecedent for related mental health consequences (Fredrickson and Roberts 1997), as well as a local appraisal of other women. For example, women themselves may adopt a local appraisal of their own bodies, attending to, recognizing, and categorizing their bodies in an objectified manner. As a result, stereotypes of sex objects may be activated and applied through selective self-stereotyping. These processes may set the stage for subsequent adverse attitudes and behaviors, including distracting cognitions and negative emotions, as well as depression, eating disorders, and sexual dysfunction (Fredrickson and Roberts 1997). They may also manifest in sexually objectifying self-presentation, such as self-sexualization (Allen and Gervais 2012; Liss et al. 2011). Providing initial evidence for the link between a local appraisal of the self and other women, Bernard et al. (2013a) found that self-objectification was associated with entire body recognition, with people, especially women, who reported more objectified self-concepts engaging in less whole-body recognition. Additionally, Allen et al. (2013) found that power, which has been linked to global processing (Keltner et al. 2003; Förster 2010), tempered the effects of objectification on women, whereas powerlessness, which has been linked to local processing, exacerbated the negative effects of women recipients of objectification, contributing to restrained eating. Considered through the current framework, global processing may be an antidote to objectified self-perceptions and related consequences.

In summary, we have presented the novel framework of a unified objectification and dehumanization theory, as well as initial empirical evidence from our labs and others supporting this framework. In the remainder of the chapter, we briefly introduce the complementary perspectives on humanness, stereotype content, self-objectification, terror management, system justification, anthropomorphism, and discrimination, of the invited contributors to the 60th Nebraska Symposium on Motivation.

Overview of Invited Perspectives

Humanness

Haslam et al. (2013) present a psychology of humanness and provide empirical support in this tradition. In an effort to understand how people may be dehumanized, they begin by introducing their notion of "humanness." In particular, Haslam and his colleagues argue that the notion of humanness is multidimensional with

two different notions of humanness—human nature and human uniqueness. They then provide a model of humanness denial and articulate the implications of their model. Supporting this model, Haslam et al. provide empirical work suggesting that people are sometimes perceived as animal-like, whereas others are sometimes perceived as machine- or object-like, resulting in different consequences (e.g., stereotyping, social exclusion). They also provide two interesting examples that complement their model, including perceptions of animals that are sources of meat for people and objectification as a dehumanization-like process.

Mixed Model of Stereotype Content

Next, approaching this topic from a theoretically distinct, but related approach, Fiske (2013) considers dehumanization through the lens of her widely influential mixed model of stereotype content. Specifically, she argues that like person perception more generally, recognizing or denying humanness varies along the universal dimensions of warmth and competence. That is, upon meeting another person or another group, people seek to understand the intentions of the other (i.e., warmth) and the ability for the other to act on those intentions (i.e., competence). Crossing these two dimensions, Fiske identifies four unique quadrants that characterize perceptions of different groups and individuals, depending on whether they are regarded as high in warmth and high in competence, high in warmth and low in competence, low in warmth and high in competence, or low in warmth and low in competence. These dimensions result in a predictable matrix of thoughts, emotions, and behaviors. Fiske then provides empirical evidence that the most dehumanized groups (low in both warmth and competence) elicit disgust and avoidance. She also provides evidence for mixed reactions to those groups who are high on one dimension and low on the other, with groups disliked for appearing cold, but competent, eliciting envy and Schadenfreude (i.e., pleasure from other's misfortunes). Regarding the other mixed groups who are seen as warm, but incompetent, they are pitied and helped. Finally, Fiske argues that humanization occurs for ingroup members who are regarded as both warm and competent.

Terror Management

Building and elaborating on Haslam et al. (2013) and Fiske's (2013) models of the content (thoughts, emotions, and behaviors) of dehumanization (and to a lesser extent objectification), Goldenberg (2013) and Calogero (2013) adopt classic social psychological theories, that do not stem directly from research on objectification or dehumanization, to understand when and why people objectify others and themselves. Goldenberg (2013) first adopts terror management theory as a

lens through which to understand when and why people objectify themselves and others. Specifically, Goldenberg reviews classic philosophical theorizing on self-objectification and presents the latest empirical research on objectification of others. She suggests that objectification involves rendering women as literal objects and considers perspectives that support and dispute this position. She then provides an existential perspective on when and why self-objectification and other-objectification occurs. Placing the physical body squarely in the center of her analysis, she considers the unique capabilities of women's bodies to menstruate, lactate, and bear children as a basis for existential threats to themselves and others. According to Goldenberg, these threats provide the foundation of subsequent self- and other-objectification as people manage the terror associated with mortality threats of the corporeal body.

System Justification

Offering a distinct, but equally intriguing perspective and focusing primarily on self-objectification, Calogero (2013) adopts system justification theory to understand why and with what consequences women self-objectify. Calogero first offers a classic account of objectification theory, focusing primarily on the construct of self-objectification and its consequences. She then provides an account of another classic social psychological approach—system justification theory—with a specific focus on why and with what consequences disadvantaged group members justify a system that oppresses them. Providing a novel integration of these two theories, Calogero then offers a titillating consideration of self-objectification through a system justification lens. She reviews recent work in this tradition that directly or indirectly supports this integrative framework. Calogero's novel consideration provides a broader perspective of self-objectification and its consequences; she not only focuses on the mental health consequences originally articulated by objectification theory, but she also considers the system-level implications for collective action and social change.

Anthropomorphism

Epley et al. (2013) provide a refreshing counter perspective on these topics, stemming from their consideration of when and why people sometime treat non-human agents as people through anthropomorphism, specifically motivated mind perception. Epley and his colleagues explain some of the psychological processes that guide anthropomorphism of several different types of non-human agents, including nature, pets, computers, and gods. They argue that these processes are guided by the same motivational forces that underlie mind perception of people. Specifically, arguing that motivation guides attention, Epley et al. suggest that

(a) motives to explain and understand behavior and (b) motives for social connection drive mind perception in both human and non-human agents. They also speculate about how these same processes may be related to dehumanization, which they define as failing to attribute mind to a person.

A Pantheoretical Framework

Finally, Moradi (2013) integrates each of these perspectives and provides a novel, pantheoretical framework of discrimination, objectification, and dehumanization from the target's perspective. She notes that objectification and dehumanization have long been known to underlie extreme and blatant forms of violence, but have more recently been shown to manifest in everyday interactions as well. Although classic psychological work in the area of objectification has focused on the target's perspective (e.g., objectification theory specifically focuses on women's experiences with objectification), recent work has also adopted the perpetrator's perspective. Returning the conversation to the target's perspective, including a focus on the consequences for recipients, communities, and societies that are dehumanized or objectified, Moradi transforms the objects of dehumanization and objectification to subjects. She integrates theory and research on the target's experiences of everyday discrimination, including stereotyping, stigmatization, marginalization, prejudice, and discrimination based on a target's minority status. She then integrates stress and coping frameworks, minority stress theory, and objectification theory, identifying the similarities and differences in these perspectives, and providing a pantheoretical theory of dehumanization, based on her integration of these traditions as well as the perspectives of the authors from this volume.

Concluding Thoughts

Identifying the motivational triggers and consequences of objectification and dehumanization is a challenging, but worthwhile endeavor. In this chapter, we provided classic perspectives on objectification and dehumanization from psychology, but also other social science disciplines (e.g., philosophy, feminist theory, anthropology). Next, we offered the initial makings of a unified theory of objectification and dehumanization based on our own work. Finally, we summarized some of the most influential contemporary perspectives on objectification and dehumanization from the current prominent scholars in the field. We hope you enjoy reading more about these perspectives in the subsequent chapters of this volume. We also hope these considerations have piqued your interest and will motivate you to consider the other chapters in this volume, as well as engage in exciting new inquiries into the areas of motivation, objectification, and dehumanization.

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The Psychology of Humanness

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Abstract This chapter explores the ways in which the concept of "humanness" illuminates a wide and fascinating variety of psychological phenomena. After introducing the concept—everyday understandings of what it is to be human—we present a model of the diverse ways in which humanness can be denied to people. According to this model people may be perceived as lacking uniquely human characteristics, and thus likened to animals, or as lacking human nature, and thus likened to inanimate objects. Both of these forms of dehumanization occur with varying degrees of subtlety, from the explicit uses of derogatory animal metaphors, to stereotypes that ascribe lesser humanness or simpler minds to particular groups, to nonconscious associations between certain humans and nonhumans. After reviewing research on dehumanization through the lens of our model we examine additional topics that the psychology of humanness clarifies, notably the perception of nonhuman animals and the objectification of women. Humanness emerges as a concept that runs an integrating thread through a variety of research literatures.

The choice of dehumanization and objectification as topics for the 60th Nebraska Symposium was an inspired one. Interest in these topics has increased steeply over the past decade and scientific advances have been made on many fronts. Research and theory on dehumanization had bubbled along since the 1960s, attracting the attention of major psychological thinkers such as Albert Bandura, Herbert Kelman, and Ervin Staub, but it is only in the new millennium that this work has taken flight. The trajectory of research on objectification is steeper still. Beginning with the classic work of Fredrickson and Roberts (1997), this line of research has risen sharply, especially in the past 5 years. It is an excellent time to take stock of these advances, as the Symposium allows us to do.

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S. J. Gervais (ed.), *Objectification and (De)Humanization*,
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 60, DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-6959-9_2,

One of the first observations to be made about upswings of interest in the psychology of dehumanization and objectification is that they are not unrelated. Although the origin of the former is in studies of intergroup violence, and the origin of the latter is in studies of the presentation and representation of self—two rather different domains—psychological thinking about dehumanization and objectification has increasingly revealed connections between them. At least some forms of objectification seem to involve perceiving another person as incompletely human, and at least some forms of dehumanization involve perceiving people as object-like. Some dehumanization researchers have begun to study objectification, and some objectification researchers have seen the relevance of dehumanization research to dimensions of their own work.

In this chapter we aim to set out our group's contributions to these rapidly growing and converging literatures. In focusing on our own research we do not mean to neglect the work of others, merely to lay out what we see as a coherent and distinctive perspective on the issues involved. This perspective has been developed through a wide-ranging program of work that is now about 9 years of age. Others will present their own perspectives, and have done so elsewhere in this volume.

Our chapter has six main sections. In the first section we present the idea of "humanness", which in some respects is the core concept in our approach. In particular, we argue that humanness—what it is to be human—is not a monolithic concept but has two quite different meanings that have implications for how we think about dehumanization and related phenomena. In the second section of the chapter, we draw out these implications and propose a model of humanness denials. This model puts forward two forms of these denials, corresponding to the two senses of humanness, but also recognizes other kinds of variation among humanness denials. This overarching model helps us to define which kinds of denial represent the arguably narrower concept of dehumanization.

The third and fourth sections of this chapter present our work on the two forms of humanness denial. The first, in which people are perceived as animal-like, is illustrated by work on perceptions of people living in traditional societies and indigenous people, perceptions of people from low social class backgrounds, and on the use of animal metaphors to refer to humans. The second form of humanness denial, in which people are perceived as machine- or object-like, is illustrated by our work on stereotypes of certain groups, self-perception, responses to social exclusion, and understandings of personal and group flaws.

The chapter's fifth and sixth sections address topics that depart in some respects from the preceding discussions of dehumanization, but that are related to them in interesting ways. First, we review studies that we have conducted on perceptions of animals that people use as sources of meat. These animals are shown to be denied human-like properties in a way that is at least analogous to the dehumanization of other people, and that denial appears to be both a cognitive and a motivated process. Finally, we turn to the concept of objectification and discuss how it might also be theorized to involve dehumanization-like processes.

Humanness

Any theory of dehumanization needs an account of what it is that dehumanized people are denied or seen as lacking. "De-humanization" implies that something is removed or lost in the process, presumably something to do with being human. Many early psychological accounts of dehumanization were surprisingly silent on what that might be. Some, like Opotow (1990) and Bandura (1999), conceptualized dehumanization primarily as an act of exclusion of persons from the human category, rather than as a denial of certain attributes to them. Others, like Bar-Tal (1989), saw it primarily as a matter of labeling, so that people were dehumanized when derogatory nonhuman terms were applied to them. Schwartz and Struch (1989) came closer to a substantive account of what the dehumanized are denied, positing that they are seen as lacking the prosocial values that "transcend [our] basic animal nature" (p.155), and Kelman (1976) came closer still, invoking a denial of "identity" and "community". Although these last two accounts give some content to what is withdrawn from the dehumanized, their accounts differ and both lack an empirical foundation.

A crucial step forward was made by the Belgian psychologist Jacques-Philippe Leyens. Around the turn of the century, Leyens discovered a subtle form of dehumanization after having first developed a working definition of "the human essence" on the strength of his empirical research. He and his colleagues conducted an informal survey of laypeople, who offered up three main attributes that distinguish humans from animals: intelligence, language, and refined emotions (*sentiments* in French). Focusing on the latter, so-called "secondary" emotions, which are understood to be uniquely human in contrast to the primary emotions that we share with other mammals, they inferred that if people tend to ascribe fewer secondary emotions to outgroup members than ingroup members then they are subtly denying the outgroup's humanity. Because uniquely human emotions may be positively (e.g., *joy*) or negatively valenced (e.g., *embarrassment*), rather than all being intrinsically desirable, this subtle denial of outgroup humanity could in principle occur independently of any negative evaluation of the outgroup (Demoulin et al. 2004). Finding support for this differential attribution of uniquely human emotions to ingroup and outgroup, the researchers dubbed their effect "infrahumanization".

Infrahumanization research is vitally important to recent work on dehumanization in several ways. First, its proponents recognized explicitly that their work needed a clearly specified understanding of human attributes, or what we will call "humanness". Second, they developed a simple way of assessing these attributes, generally by judgments of secondary emotions. In so doing, they made dehumanization-related phenomena empirically tractable for experimental social psychologists and distinguishable from attitudes and evaluations. Third, Leyens et al. assembled a large body of research on their phenomenon (Leyens et al. 2003), demonstrating its robustness across several intergroup contexts (e.g., Viki and Abrams 2003), its manifestations in ratings and implicit

associations (e.g., Paladino et al. 2002), and its implications for behavior (e.g., Vaes et al. 2003). Fourth, they showed that dehumanization has relatively mild and subtle forms that can be studied in everyday social perceptions, rather than always being an extreme phenomenon that can only be observed in torture chambers and killing fields.

Two Senses of Humanness

Infrahumanization theory inaugurated the modern study of dehumanization and related phenomena, and served as the point of departure for our group's work. That departure arose from a disagreement with the sufficiency of infrahumanization theory's account of humanness. This in turn was sparked by a serendipitous finding that called into question the assumption that humanness was a monolithic concept. Leyens had defined humanness as that which is unique to our species, in contrast to other animals, but when Haslam et al. (2004) asked people to judge which attributes were unique to humans and which were aspects of human nature, they selected entirely different characteristics. On this basis, and supported by many subsequent studies, Haslam proposed that the human-animal distinction—"human uniqueness"—was only one of two ways in which humanness might be defined. In two key early papers (Haslam 2006; Haslam et al. 2005) we argued that people also tend to conceptualize humanness in contrast to inanimate objects, such as machines and robots, and we put forward the concept of "human nature" as a way to capture that distinction.

The composition of the two senses of humanness was fleshed out in several studies. When people are asked how humans are distinguished from animals, we found that they tend to invoke attributes involving cognitive capacity, civility, and social refinement, consistent with the sorts of attributes that Leyens et al. obtained in their earlier work. However, when people are asked what characteristics are parts of our fundamental human nature, they invoke attributes involving positive and negative emotionality, vitality, flexibility, and warmth.

Research has now found substantial support for the distinctness of human uniqueness and human nature. Ratings of the extent to which traits reflect the two senses of humanness are typically uncorrelated. Traits that embody human uniqueness are seen as late to develop, as products of socialization and, perhaps as a result, likely to differ across cultures. Traits that embody human nature, in contrast, are seen as deep-seated ("essentialized"), prevalent within populations, cross-culturally universal, and emotion-related (Haslam et al. 2005). The two sets of characteristics differentiate humans from animals and robots, respectively (Haslam et al. 2008a, b), and the two senses of humanness also appear to be denied to human groups in different ways (Bain et al. 2009; Loughnan and Haslam 2007). Intriguingly, understandings of these two senses of humanness are highly convergent across cultures (Bain et al. 2012; Park et al. in press), although the cultural value accorded to each may differ. For example, Park et al. (in press),

established that judgments of the degree to which traits represented human nature or human uniqueness correlated about 0.7 across Australian, Japanese, and Korean samples. They also found that in every sample the traits believed to reflect human nature were those with relational (as distinct from individualist or collectivist) content, despite large differences between the respective cultures on these dimensions of self-construal.

Relation to Other Dimensions

Our two proposed dimensions of humanness have proven themselves to be fairly robust, and they may overlap with other pairs of dimensions that have been proposed in the social psychology literature. The well-known stereotype content model (SCM) dimensions of Warmth and Competence (Fiske 2013; Fiske et al. 2002), for example, have some resemblance to human nature and human uniqueness, respectively. Similarly, a recent model of mind perception (Gray et al. 2007) proposes two dimensions that map onto our humanness dimensions in comparable ways. The Experience dimension, composed of mental states such as emotions, appetites, desires, and sentience, resembles human nature, and like human nature it differentiates humans from robots. The Agency dimension, composed of mental capacities involving thought, self-control, morality, communication, and planning, resembles human uniqueness and similarly differentiates humans from animals.

Although the respective dimension sets plainly align to some extent, they also have important conceptual differences that make them mutually irreducible. The three pairs focus on different attributes, chiefly relate to different psychological domains, and serve different theoretical purposes. Whereas the SCM dimensions refer to traits, for example, the mind perception dimensions refer to mental states or capacities and the humanness dimensions to any psychological attributes. Similarly, whereas the SCM dimensions are tailored to capturing differences between stereotypes of human groups, the mind perception dimensions aim to capture differences between the kinds of minds ascribed to entities of all sorts, and the humanness dimensions are intended to capture differences between humans and nonhumans and to serve as a foundation for an account of dehumanization. Furthermore, whereas the SCM dimensions are strongly evaluative, with high Warmth and high Competence both positively valued, the mind perception and humanness dimensions are relatively neutral in content. This difference may be one reason why there is some evidence for the distinctness of the SCM and the humanness dimensions in capturing stereotype content (Haslam et al. 2008a, b).

We therefore believe that despite some overlap between the respective dimension pairs there is something importantly distinctive to the content and purpose of the humanness dimensions. It is therefore inappropriate and risky to treat the alternative dimension sets as synonymous or mutually translatable, despite their affinities. For example, the content of human uniqueness may overlap with competence, but cannot be reduced to that dimension's theme of positively valued

capability—it also reflects refinement, morality, and attributes that are negatively valued but understood as distinctively human (e.g., rudeness). In our view, the humanness dimensions have closer links to the mind perception dimensions, in large part because both frameworks explicitly contrast humans with nonhuman entities.

A Model of Dehumanization

Our humanness model (explicitly) and the mind perception framework (implicitly) both contrast humans with animals and robots, both represent these contrasts as independent, and both set out the psychological attributes that define each contrast. In short, they converge in showing that humanness can be defined in two distinct ways, in contrast to two distinct kinds of entities. This insight complicates the unitary picture of humanness that underpins infrahumanization theory. If there are two distinct forms of humanness then there should be two distinct ways in which humanness is denied to people, with the infrahumanization phenomenon exemplifying one of them. These dimension pairs therefore imply a dual model of dehumanization.

Haslam (2006) developed such a model, based deductively on the two senses of humanness that had emerged from his group's earlier research, and inductively on a broad review of social science literatures on dehumanization. He proposed that if humanness is defined in terms of certain attributes that contrast humans with particular kinds of nonhumans, then dehumanization can be said to occur when those attributes are denied to a person or group. If humanness in the sense of human uniqueness is involved, then the person or group is seen as lacking uniquely human qualities, and thus unintelligent, irrational, wild, amoral, unrefined, and coarse. Whether or not the link is made explicit, they are seen as relatively animal-like or bestial. Examples of this form of dehumanization are legion, ranging from subtle phenomena such as the basic infrahumanization effect through to blatantly derogatory likening of people to rats, apes, vermin, and so on. Dehumanization in this "animalistic" register is commonly discussed within the social sciences in connection with interethnic conflict, racial stereotypes, and to a lesser extent with misogynistic and pornographic images of women.

By contrast, if human nature is involved in an instance of dehumanization, then the person or group is denied those attributes that are seen as most essentially and typically human, whether or not they are unique to our species. They are therefore represented as lacking emotion, warmth, desire, and vitality, and accordingly perceived as cold, inert, passive, and rigid. Again, whether or not the link is made explicit, people viewed in this manner are seen as robotic or object-like: mere automatons or instruments. Examples of this kind of dehumanizing are also widespread in social scientific writings, but most often in relation to the baleful effects of technology, modernity, and industrialization. This more "mechanistic" form of dehumanization is especially prominent in social scientific discussions of modern medicine, which is seen as treating patients not as animals but as mindless bodies that are subject to standardized treatments that deny people their individuality, and

autonomy. It is also prominent in some discussions of objectification, which will be discussed at length later in this chapter.

In sum, Haslam's integrative model recognizes two distinct forms of dehumanization based on two distinct understandings of what it is to be human. These forms resonate with descriptions and analyses of dehumanization across several disciplines and hitherto unconnected research literatures. Human uniqueness-based dehumanization represents the other as animal-like and human nature-based dehumanization represent the other as machine- or object-like. Infrahumanization and the likening of people to animals or barbarians are paradigm cases of the former and likening people to soulless automatons, drones, or utilitarian instruments exemplifies the latter. In theory these variants correspond to dimensions rather than mutually exclusive categories. According to the model it is entirely possible for people to be dehumanized along both dimensions simultaneously, and full humanity involves the retention of both sense of humanness.

Varieties of Humanness Denial

The proposed animalistic and mechanistic forms of dehumanization are not the only relevant distinctions for making sense of the diverse ways in which humanness can be denied to others. Elsewhere (Haslam in press), one of us has proposed three distinctions that are important for mapping the range of humanness denials. In addition to the kinds of humanness denied (human uniqueness and human nature), there is the subtle or blatant nature of the denial and whether the denial is relative or absolute, in the sense described below. The three distinctions can be represented as a cube, following the example of the structure of abilities model of Nebraska's own J. P. Guilford (see Fig. 1).

With respect to subtlety and blatancy, instances of dehumanization vary in their overtness. At one end of this spectrum are cases where people are blatantly denied their humanity, either by an explicit exclusion from the human category or



Fig. 1 Cubic model of humanness denials with infrahumanization as an illustration (HU = human uniqueness, HN = human nature)

by the explicit use of a nonhuman label to describe them. These blatant forms of dehumanization are in some respects prototypical as they correspond to the best-known historical examples, such as the reference to Jews as vermin in Nazi propaganda, the representation of Africans as subhuman apes in colonial era "racial science," or the valuation of slaves as 3/5 of a person in ante-bellum America. At the other end of the spectrum are subtle phenomena where people are denied humanness in more covert ways, such as being ascribed fewer human attributes or being implicitly rather than explicitly associated with nonhumans. Infrahumanization is subtle in this sense, as the infrahumanized are not directly likened to animals and the infrahumanizer may not be aware of perceiving them as lesser humans.

With respect to the relative/absolute distinction, humanness can be denied to a target either in itself or only in comparison to another group. Absolute denials make direct claims about the deficient or absent humanity of a target, such as the perception that a person is an animal or that a group is composed of mindless barbarians, or they make a claim about their target that invokes an absolute standard rather than a comparison to another group. In contrast, relative denials involve comparative claims that one group is less human than another. The infrahumanization effect, for instance, is relative in this sense because it rests on the differential attribution of uniquely human emotions to outgroups in comparison with ingroups. An infrahumanized group in studies within this research tradition is seen as less human than another. Figure 1 therefore represents infrahumanization as one corner of the cube because it is a kind of humanness denial that involves human uniqueness, and is subtle and essentially relative.

These three distinctions yield eight kinds of humanness denial. Table 1 lays them out and briefly summarizes some illustrative studies that exemplify each kind. There are several important messages to be taken from this schema. First, humanness denials are highly varied in nature, and we should not expect a single theory to encompass them or a single empirical finding to be generalizable to them all. One of the benefits of the recent surge of interest in dehumanization is that it has provided an enriched and differentiated view of the phenomenon. Second, it is difficult to draw a sharp line between the forms of humanness denial that clearly qualify as instances of dehumanization and those that do not. Blatant and absolute forms may be prototypical examples of dehumanization, but they fall on a continuum with subtler and more relative examples which equally involve the perception of some people as less than fully human. Third, the distribution of research effort by social psychologists has been uneven over the eight varieties of humanness denial, and neglected cells in the cube cry out for greater scrutiny.

Human Uniqueness

The social psychology of the animal–human distinction, or human uniqueness, has not been a major focus of our group's research, although the distinction figures centrally in the theoretical model we have developed. The reason for this

Table 1 Eight possible forms of humanness denial with examples from the psychological literature

Humanness type	Absolute versus relative	Explicit versus subtle	Examples
Human uniqueness	Absolute	Explicit	*Essence*: "Xs are animals" *Example*: Perceived offensiveness of animal metaphors (Haslam et al. 2011); direct ratings of others as subhuman animals (Bandura et al. 1996); ratings of refugees as barbarians (Esses et al. 2008); rating of Native Americans as wild creatures (Castano and Giner-Sorolla 2006)
		Subtle	*Essence*: "Xs lack uniquely human attributes" or "Xs are implicitly associated with animals" *Example*: Low rating of Native Americans on uniquely human emotions (Castano and Giner-Sorolla 2006); demonstration of negative association between group stereotype and humanness (Vaes and Paladino 2010)
	Relative	Explicit	*Essence*: "Xs are animals compared to Ys" *Example*: Ratings of lack of humane values for refugees relative to citizens (Esses et al. 2008)
		Subtle	*Essence*: "Xs lack uniquely human attributes compared to Ys" or "Xs are implicitly associated with animals more than Ys" *Example*: Differential attribution of uniquely human attributes to outgroups vs ingroups (e.g., Hodson & Costello 2007; Leyens et al. 2003); differential implicit association of groups with animals (Goff et al. 2008; Viki et al. 2006)
Human nature	Absolute	Explicit	*Essence*: "Xs are objects" *Example*: Ratings of extent to which others are merely instruments for one's use (Gruenfeld et al. 2008)
		Subtle	*Essence*: "Xs lack human nature attributes" or "Xs are implicitly associated with objects" *Example*: Implicit association of women with objects (Rudman and Mescher 2012)
	Relative	Explicit	*Essence*: "Xs are objects compared to Ys" *Example*: Explicit denial of mind to objectified versus non-objectified targets (Loughnan et al. 2010b); direct ratings of self as treated as an object or instrument following social exclusion versus inclusion (Bastian and Haslam 2010)
		Subtle	*Essence*: Xs lack human nature attributes compared to Ys" or "Xs are implicitly associated with objects more than Ys" *Example*: Denial of human nature traits to women under appearance-focus condition (Heflick and Goldenberg 2009); the self-humanizing effect (Haslam et al. 2005); differential association of groups with human nature (Bain et al. 2009)

relative neglect is that the blatant or subtle likening of people to animals has been studied extensively by others. Infrahumanization researchers in particular have devoted their considerable research efforts to ways in which people reserve uniquely human characteristics, such as secondary emotions, to their ingroups. Although we have shown that certain groups are indeed associated with animals in the course of demonstrating the value of our model (e.g., Loughnan and Haslam 2007; Loughnan et al. 2009) this has never been our main preoccupation. Even so, we have attempted to make two novel contributions to the psychology of human uniqueness and animalistic forms of dehumanization. First, we have considered whether human uniqueness or the human-animal distinction might serve as a dimension of stereotype content, and tried to determine which social groups might be stereotyped in this manner. Second, we have begun to examine how the blatant likening of people to animals, through the use of animal metaphors, might shed a light on dehumanization.

Stereotypes

The strong relevance of stereotyping to dehumanization has been shown persuasively by Susan Fiske and colleagues (Fiske 2013), who have demonstrated that groups that are stereotyped in a particular way are especially prone to be dehumanized. Harris and Fiske (2006), for example, showed that people stereotyped as lacking both Warmth and Competence, the two dimensions of the stereotype content model (SCM), were most likely to fail to activate social cognition regions in the brains of perceivers (i.e., the mPFC). In particular, drug addicts and homeless people tended to elicit disgust, the emotion linked to the low-low quadrant of the SCM, and in a neuroimaging study they evoked less activation of defined mind attribution areas than social targets from other quadrants, instead activating regions associated with disgust (i.e., the insula).

This research establishes that group stereotypes promote or enable dehumanization, but they do not directly establish that some stereotypes are dehumanizing in themselves or that their content might be appropriately described in terms of humanness. In Harris and Fiske's (2006) work, for example, dehumanization was assessed as absence of mind attribution, and simply perceiving someone as cold and incompetent was conceptualized as a contributor to that dehumanization rather than as part of the phenomenon itself. Arguably the first step in that direction was taken by Vaes and Paladino (2010), who document that some stereotypes have content that can be captured by the concept of human uniqueness: some groups are perceived as having more uniquely human attributes than others in a way that is not entirely reducible to the SCM dimensions.

Our own work has tried to take this idea further, in some cases assessing stereotypes implicitly by examining nonconscious associations between groups and animals or uniquely human traits, and in other cases using standard trait rating tasks. We have taken the view that stereotyping certain groups as more animalistic

than others may be seen as dehumanizing in its own right, may not be completely accounted for by the SCM, and may tend to occur for particular kinds of groups. A working hypothesis is that groups perceived as being in some respects primitive, backward, or under-developed may be especially liable to animalistic stereotyping.

Our first studies addressing this hypothesis were motivated by Gustav Jahoda's (1999) work on "images of savages". Jahoda argued that colonial era images of colonized peoples, often baldly dehumanizing, racist, and infantilizing, continue to circulate in subtle, unconscious, or sanitized forms in the contemporary Western world. For example, he claimed that representations of noble and ignoble savages continue to organize our thinking about ethnicity. Our early studies (Saminaden et al. 2010) examined implicit associations between words denoting animals, children, and uniquely human traits on the one hand, and images of people from traditional societies—selected to be ethnically diverse and of equal age and attractiveness as comparison images of people from modern industrial societies—on the other. As expected, our participants associated traditional peoples with animals, children, and non-uniquely human traits. Moreover, participants did not hold more negative implicit attitudes towards them, implying that these animalistic perceptions were not merely side-effects of dislike.

In unpublished work we have obtained similar findings for stereotypes of indigenous people, using questionnaire methods. In a study by Sophie Barker (2010), for example, participants rated a large sample of personality traits on the extent to which they were characteristic of Aboriginal Australians, as well as the extent to which they were more characteristic of apes than human, more characteristic of children than adults, and the degree to which they indicated warmth and competence, the SCM dimensions. When the respective ratings were correlated across the sample of traits, the research found strong correlations between the ape-human and child–adult distinctions, on the one hand, and the Aboriginal stereotype on the other. It further showed that these associations were not reducible to the perceived warmth and competence of Aborigines. In effect, animality was a distinct component of this group that represented a judgment of primitiveness.

Jahoda (1999) proposed that his "images of savages" continued to cast a shadow over contemporary views of many groups besides "primitives". In particular, he suggested that the poor, the criminal, the mentally ill, "and even women" might also be represented, in part, as modern-day savages. In very recent and unpublished work we have found some support for the first of these claims in research on stereotypes of people from lower social classes. In a series of questionnaire studies, we have found that low-SES groups in the USA, the UK, and Australia are all stereotyped in a very similar way, and that stereotype overlaps considerably with the stereotype of apes. Concretely, people categorized as "white trash", "chavs", and "bogans"—derogatory class-based terms in the three societies—were perceived to differ from other people on the same traits that differentiated apes from humans. Follow-up work has shown that this association remains when the (low) perceived warmth and competence of low-SES groups is statistically controlled; that it is not specifically simian but can be replicated with traits that differentiate dogs or rats from humans; and that it can be replicated when

relatively neutral rather than derogatory slang terms are employed to refer to social classes (e.g., “lower-class people” or “middle-class people”).

Although this research is in its early days, it suggests that animality is indeed one component of the stereotype content of certain groups that is not reducible to the SCM. This is not to say that animality (or human uniqueness) deserves a place alongside the SCM as a third (or fourth) dimension or that it has equally broad applicability across diverse social groups. However, the findings to date do imply that certain groups are stereotyped as less developed or refined than others, and this is represented as a greater closeness to animals, as if on a phylogenetic scale. This phylogenetic backwardness may parallel a perceived ontogenetic backwardness, given the apparent associations of traditional and indigenous people with children and childish traits found in our studies. If this is the case, the animalistic perceptions of groups may be closely linked to ideas of development—evolutionary, individual, and societal—and maturity.

Animal Metaphors

Most research on the animalistic form of dehumanization, including studies of infrahumanization, assesses the phenomena in a subtle fashion. A target is said to be dehumanized or infrahumanized when it is ascribed relatively few uniquely human characteristics or when it is nonconsciously associated with animals. Although the most notorious historical examples of dehumanization involve much more blatant equations of people with animals, such direct linguistic dehumanizing expressions have received little attention from researchers. One partial exception is the work of Bar-Tal (1989), although his examples of dehumanizing discourse tended to be of supernatural rather than natural nonhumans (i.e., calling people “devils” or “satans” rather than “pigs”).

Despite this neglect by psychologists, the use of explicit animal metaphors to describe people is very widespread and has been occasionally studied by linguists and metaphor scholars. These metaphors convey diverse meanings and serve varying linguistic functions. In some cases they stand as totems for human groups, such as sporting teams, so that a person identifies with a team by referring to herself by the animal’s name. In other cases, animal metaphors offer a zoological shorthand for human traits (e.g., wise owls, timid mice, brave lions). Some metaphors are ethnonyms that target whole groups in more or less demeaning ways, whereas others are used to pass derogatory judgment on individuals on the basis of their perceived personal failings and peculiarities. Although some such metaphors are clearly offensive, many carry no negative or subtly demeaning connotations.

In an effort to investigate more direct or blatant form of dehumanization, Haslam et al. (2011) carried out the first systematic study of the psychological content of animal metaphors. They explored forty common metaphors and found that these implied a varied assortment of traits, both positive and negative, but with the most common themes being stupidity, lack of self-control, and

moral depravity. In addition to judging these implied traits, participants judged the offensiveness of the metaphor and several of its possible determinants. Offensiveness was strongly associated with two distinct metaphor properties: the taboo nature of the animal and the inferred dehumanizing intention of the speaker. Some of the most offensive metaphors invoked disgusting animals (e.g., leeches, rats, pigs) whereas others invoked animals that implied demeaning comparisons with humans (i.e., apes, dogs). A second experimental study further showed that variations in metaphor offensiveness were mediated by the extent to which uniquely human attributes were seen to be denied to the metaphor's target. By implication, animal metaphors vary widely but tend to convey negative information, and they are offensive in part due to their tendency to dehumanize their target.

Although these studies are preliminary and somewhat abstract, we believe they have several merits. Besides their originality in exploring the linguistic or discursive dimensions of dehumanization, they help to clarify the nature of animalistic dehumanization. First, they show that likening someone to an animal is not invariably dehumanizing in any obvious sense: using an animal metaphor to describe a person was often not seen as being offensive in the least or viewed as carrying negative (or even positive but bestial) trait ascriptions. Second, the findings point to a potentially important distinction between varieties of animalistic dehumanization. Although this has generally been understood as a singular phenomenon, even while being instantiated by different animals, it may take two forms based on revulsion and degradation, respectively. Likening people to disgusting animals, illustrated by Nazi representations of Jews as filthy vermin, exemplifies the former, whereas likening them to demeaning animals, illustrated by colonial representations of Africans as apes, exemplifies the latter. Although disgust has been the emotion most often tied to animalistic dehumanization, both through work grounded in the SCM (Harris and Fiske 2006) and in terror management theory (Goldenberg et al. 2009), condescension based on downward glances on the scale of nature (Brandt and Reyna 2011) may also be important and have different consequences.

Human Nature

Human uniqueness has been the favored twin in our working model of humanness (Haslam 2006). For many people it is the more intuitive sense of humanness, and research on its role in social perception commenced long before our own work, thanks to infrahumanization theory. Establishing the value of human nature as a second important sense of humanness has therefore been an important task for our group. We have found it to be involved in several intriguing phenomena which tend to be quite different from those in which human uniqueness features prominently. To date, human nature appears to play less of a role in the forms of dehumanization that have a clear intergroup dimension and perhaps more of a role in forms that are more interpersonal or relational in nature. Human nature is also

implicated in certain phenomena that are not directly related to dehumanization at all, such as the humanization of flaws, but that are briefly reviewed at the end of this section for the sake of completeness.

Stereotypes

The previous section of this chapter asserted that the stereotypes of some groups have animalistic content, especially those groups that are represented as primitive or backward. The human uniqueness dimension has a clear involvement in these stereotypes. Evidence of a comparable role for human nature in stereotype content has been harder to find. Although Loughnan and Haslam (2007) demonstrated associations between businesspeople and machines (positive) and human nature traits (negative), little subsequent research has been conducted. The one exception is a study by Bain et al. (2009), in which white Australian participants automatically associated East Asian faces with machine-related words and failed to associate them with human nature traits. East Asian participants displayed the more familiar complementary perception of Australians, failing to associate them with uniquely human traits. Deficient human nature may therefore be part of the stereotype of some groups, but as yet it is not clear how many groups this might represent or what such groups would have to share. It is conceivable that mechanistic stereotypes tend to be held about groups seen as cold and competent, although the extent to which competence and callousness are implicated, as the SCM would imply, as distinct from perceived unemotionality or rigidity, remains to be determined.

Self-Humanizing

In dehumanization as it is usually understood, people deny humanness to others on the basis of their group membership, reserving humanness for their ingroup. However it is also possible that people ascribe greater humanness to themselves as individuals than to the undifferentiated mass of others. There is now substantial evidence for this tendency to arrogate superior humanness to the self. Haslam et al. (2005) established the "self-humanizing" phenomenon for the first time, showing that people attribute traits representing human nature to themselves more than to the average person. This effect was consistently obtained across several methodologies, including direct and indirect comparisons of self and others, and it appeared to reflect in part the attribution of more emotional and essentialized traits to the self. Importantly, the attribution of greater human nature to the self was independent of the familiar tendency for people to attribute more desirable traits to the self (the "better-than-average" effect), and was unrelated to self-esteem, a well-known correlate of that effect. By implication, self-humanizing is not merely an alternative form of self-enhancement.

More recent research has continued to cement self-humanizing as a robust effect. Haslam and Bain (2007) showed that it was caused in part by egocentrism, and in part by the tendency to mentally represent others in a more abstract way than the self. Individuating the other reduced the effect, and people rated their (concrete) present self as more human than their (abstract) future self, but no more human than their (concrete) past self. Few studies have explored the source of individual differences in self-humanizing and their findings have been somewhat contradictory. Haslam and Bain (2007) found no association between self-humanizing and dispositional empathy, but Locke (2009) obtained a correlation between self-humanizing and narcissism, which would be expected to involve deficient empathy.

Further evidence for the robustness of the self-humanizing effect comes from cross-cultural research. Loughnan et al. (2010c) replicated the effect in six countries and found its magnitude to vary less than the better-than-average effect. In two of the countries (Japan and Germany), self-humanizing was the more substantial effect. Unpublished recent work by Joonha Park and colleagues indicates that self-humanizing can be shown in East Asia, where evidence of self-perception biases have historically been difficult to demonstrate, and that this bias can be found even when the self-enhancement bias is reversed (i.e., self-effacement) and when people compare themselves to actual friends and acquaintances rather than the standard "average person". It would appear that self-humanizing is meaningfully different from self-enhancement and perhaps even in some sense more basic, in the sense of being less cross-culturally malleable. One speculative interpretation of its robustness, combined with its apparent link to egocentrism and deficient empathy, is that self-humanizing is one manifestation of the problem of other minds: the view that the minds or experiences of others are in some sense less real than one's own. In essence, our "theory of mind" tends to apply to ourselves more than to other people.

Although the quantity of research on self-humanizing is still modest, it is intriguing in part because it implies a key role of humanness in self-perception as well as group perception, and in part because it relates to humanness as human nature, whereas most group-based dehumanization seems to implicate humanness as human uniqueness. In essence, most work on dehumanization implies that outgroup members are associated with animals, but research on self-humanizing indicates that others are associated with objects. Ingroup members are distanced from animals, but the self is distanced from automatons.

Social Exclusion

Most research on dehumanization has investigated the perspective of the perceiver who views others as less than human. However it is also interesting to ask what it feels like to be dehumanized, and what experiences give rise to that feeling (see Moradi 2013, for an extended analysis of the target's perspective on dehumanization and other forms of discriminatory treatment). To date this question has been

explicitly addressed by only two studies from our group, but from these studies it is clear that human nature is intimately involved as a key sense of humanness.

In the first study of this sort, Bastian and Haslam (2010) examined whether the experience of social rejection or ostracism led people to perceive themselves as having lost their humanity. Whether simply recalling an experience of social exclusion or being ostracized in an experimental game, participants rated themselves as lacking human nature traits relative to a social inclusion condition, a finding that may illuminate the well-established finding that ostracized individuals typically feel numb, affectless and disconnected rather than distressed. In addition to feeling less human themselves, excluded participants judged their excluder to be lacking human nature, and inferred that this excluder perceived them as less than human. These reciprocal forms of dehumanization make it possible for us to understand how treating others as less than human can generate vicious cycles of ill treatment.

In later work, Bastian and Haslam (2011) examined the sorts of interpersonal encounters that produce the experience of being dehumanized, and found that social exclusion was only one of several possibilities. Participants were asked to vividly imagine themselves in a series of vignettes that described varied ways of being maltreated by another person (e.g., being betrayed, exploited, humiliated, invalidated and condescended to). They then rated the extent to which they would have a variety of thoughts and feelings, and the degree to which they would have felt dehumanized on either human uniqueness or human nature traits by the other person. When participants felt that they had been denied uniquely human qualities they tended to imagine feeling ashamed, debased, and losing status. When they felt they had been denied human nature qualities, in contrast, they reported that they would feel numb, confused, angry, and sad. Similar findings were obtained when participants recalled personal experiences of the same kinds of maltreatment: perceived denials of human uniqueness were accompanied by shame and guilt and a subjective loss of status, whereas perceived denials of human nature led to numbing, anger, sadness, and a loss of clarity, meaning and identity.

Bastian's work is valuable in showing that dehumanization is not only pertinent to intergroup relations. Although much of the best work on the topic has examined intergroup conflicts and group stereotypes, some forms of dehumanization also occur in everyday interpersonal encounters that do not have a salient intergroup dimension. People may feel that their humanness has been denied or has gone unrecognized within their social relationships, and in such circumstances they commonly feel that it is their human nature that has been ignored or attenuated. This is perhaps not surprising, given evidence presented earlier that the core content of human nature is relational (Park et al. in press).

Human Nature and the Mitigation of Flaws

A final line of research that reveals the importance of human nature as a dimension of humanness is not directly related to dehumanization but worth mentioning

for the sake of completeness. This research suggests that people tend to humanize the flaws they acknowledge in themselves and in their groups, and do so by ascribing those imperfections to human nature. People's conceptions of human nature tend to be somewhat ambivalent, including both positive and negative properties, so negatively valenced characteristics vary in the extent to which they are seen as fundamentally or essentially human. This allows people to attribute more human failings to themselves than to others. Their conceptions of human nature also tend to be somewhat flexible, so the very same flaw tends to be seen as more central to human nature when ascribed to the self or the ingroup than when ascribed to others or the outgroup.

The most systematic work on this topic was conducted by Koval et al. (2012). In a series of studies they examined the mitigating role of human nature in perceptions of ingroup flaws. As predicted, people preferentially ascribed negative traits rated high in human nature to their ingroup relative to outgroups, and rated such traits higher in human nature when they were attributed to their ingroup than to outgroups. These findings were not explained by the relative (un)desirability of the traits and were not obtained for the other sense of humanness (human uniqueness). There was also no tendency to ascribe the ingroup's positive traits to human nature more than the outgroup's, indicating that the effect is specific to flaws. This specificity further implies that the "humanizing ingroup flaws" effect has a group-protective function, an inference that was supported by Koval et al.'s finding that this effect was stronger when ingroup identity was threatened. In sum, ascribing ingroup flaws to human nature is a way of mitigating them by seeing them as "only human".

In unpublished work, Koval has extended these ideas to perceptions of personal, as distinct from group, flaws. The findings of this work are entirely parallel. Individuals preferentially ascribe high human nature flaws to themselves but not to others, this tendency is not explained by a tendency to ascribe less undesirable flaws to the self, and individuals also tend to bias their conceptions of human nature to match the imperfections that they acknowledge in themselves. Why this might be is a matter for speculation, but several guesses can be made. Seeing our failings as aspects of human nature implies that they are typical and hence that we are not deviant. It also implies that the flaws are deep-seated—part of the human essence—and hence we cannot be considered blameworthy for possessing them. Flatly denying our flaws is the simplest way to protect our self-esteem, but when we must acknowledge the reality of our imperfections we can soften the blow by attributing them to human nature.

Perceptions of Animals

The preceding sections of this chapter examined different ways in which humanness may be denied or withheld from people. Analogous processes may be involved in perceptions of nonhuman beings as well. Nonhuman animals,

for example, may be denied some traits and mental capacities that they share with humans, even if they are perceived to have these traits and capacities to lesser degrees than people in the first place. Although it makes little sense to speak of the "dehumanization" of nonhuman animals, the attributes that constitute humanness can still be ascribed or denied beyond the boundaries of our species. This broadened application of the concept of humanness is especially well supported by the mind perception framework (Gray et al. 2007), which explicitly contrasts the kinds and degrees of mind that people attribute to animal, robot, and spiritual entities. Similarly, the anthropomorphism research of Epley et al. (2007) (see also Epley et al. 2013) explains how humanness can be promiscuously attributed to pets, gods, and mechanical gadgets. In these frameworks, humanness is a meaningful dimension for understanding how we perceive nonhumans.

The perception of animals is an especially important domain of study. Despite sharing many of our basic capacities—sentience, emotion, close attachments—animals are often treated in ways that would be unthinkable if our fellow human beings were put in their place. Many animals are used instrumentally as means to industrial or affectional ends, not to mention being killed and eaten. Behavior of this sort would seem to involve something akin to the forms of moral disengagement observed in war, genocide, and other arenas of inhumanity where the treatment of other humans is concerned. Of course, the lesser moral status of animals can be given a variety of more or less compelling justifications, but is it possible that people engage in a dehumanization-like mental processes when contemplating or participating in cruelty to animals?

A small but growing recent research literature, much of it produced by our group, suggests a positive answer to this question, especially where meat consumption is concerned. Loughnan et al. (2010a) showed that people induced to eat meat tended to withdraw moral concern from other animals and to deny them the capacity to suffer more than people induced to eat cashew nuts, implying that animals may be perceived as unworthy and unfeeling in order to justify the act of eating them. Bastian et al. (2012a) took this idea further, showing that animals perceived as edible tended to be ascribed less mind than those that are not. These authors also found evidence of a cognitive dissonance process underlying meat eating. For example, people reminded of the link between meat and animal suffering, and those anticipating having to eat meat, decreased the amount of mind they attributed to food animals. Bilewicz et al. (2011) obtained similar findings but framed them in terms of humanness rather than mind. They found that omnivores were less likely than vegetarians to ascribe uniquely human emotions to animals, and drew a sharper distinction between humans and animals. These results suggest that distancing animals from humans is a strategy meat-eaters employ for moral disengagement purposes. Whereas the preceding research indicates that the dehumanization of animals is motivated by selfish appetites, it may also have a more basic, cognitive component. Bratanova et al. (2011) showed that people denied highly unfamiliar animals (e.g., tree kangaroos) the capacity to suffer and moral standing when told that they were eaten by a distant, dissimilar group

(e.g., Papua New Guinean highlanders). This finding indicates that simply being categorized as a 'food animal' is sufficient to cause people to reduce attributions of mind.

Interestingly, the opposite process can also have beneficial social implications: emphasizing similarities between humans and other animals not only expands people's moral concern for animals, but may even increase our concern for marginalized human groups such as Muslims, immigrants, and indigenous people (Bastian et al. 2012b).

Objectification

Just as our group's work on dehumanization contributed to a body of literature that was already well advanced, our work on the topic of objectification stands on the shoulders of many influential previous studies. Most notably, Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) wrote a foundational paper suggesting that objectification plays an important, detrimental, and previously unacknowledged role in interpersonal and intrapersonal functioning. Their work developed from a 'self-objectification' standpoint: men sexually objectify women, seeing them as mere instruments to sexual ends, and as a result of internalizing this perception, women suffer a range of negative consequences.

This approach to the study of sexual objectification has proven highly fruitful. In a little over a decade it has yielded hundreds of studies exploring a range of intrapersonal and interpersonal consequences. It is now well established that women (and to a lesser extent men) self-objectify, and that this has a negative impact on their physical and mental health, body image, cognitive ability, task performance, eating behavior, sexual functioning, relationship satisfaction, and motor coordination (for an excellent recent review see Moradi and Huang 2008; Moradi 2013). Self-objectification effects emerge for women and men (Strelan and Hargreaves 2005), Caucasians and non-Caucasians (Hebl et al. 2004), and gay men and lesbian women (Kozak et al. 2009), although the effects are typically stronger in the former rather than the latter of each pair.

Self-objectification research has primarily focused on a woman's understanding of how she is perceived by another, and how this understanding influences self-perception, and consequently her health and wellbeing. In essence, this work examines what it means to be objectified from the perspective of the objectified. Our approach to objectification differs from this traditional perspective by focusing primarily on the perpetrator or perceiver rather than the victim or perceived. In essence, our research inverted the usual focus to examine what it means to be objectified from the perspective of the objectifier; it focused on what it means to objectify another person.

The simple answer to the question of what it means to objectify someone—"to see them as an object"—is rather vague, circular, and unsatisfying. The lack of a clear, shared definition of objectification has resulted in a growth of different

understandings within the field. Some have suggested that objectification is about focusing on the body rather than the person (Heflick and Goldenberg 2009) or focusing on certain, sexualized parts of the body (Latrofa and Vaes 2012). Other researchers have argued that it involves likening women to animals (Rudman and Mescher 2012; Vaes et al. 2011) or seeing the other as lacking human nature (Heflick and Goldenberg 2009) and being like a tool (Gruenfeld et al. 2008). Others still have argued that objectification is about a denial of mind, either absolutely (Loughnan et al. 2010b) or selectively (Gray et al. 2011). Yet others have suggested that it involves a mental fragmentation of a whole person into a collection of body parts (Bernard et al. 2012) or seeing people as interchangeable with others (Gervais et al. 2012). It may be well that these different components overlap and combine to present a complete picture of what it means to objectify another person. Our group has opted to focus primarily on the idea that objectification is a form of dehumanization which strips the target of their humanity, mind, and moral standing.

Objectification and Dehumanization

If we accept that objectification might involve a denial of humanity, which aspects of humanity might we expect to see denied? In the course of developing an integrative model of dehumanization, Haslam (2006) noted that objectification is typically associated with a loss of or disregard for an individual's emotions, autonomy, and liveliness: the person becomes a thing. Therefore, Haslam argued that objectification primarily involves a loss of human nature which reduces the target to an object.

Considerable evidence for this claim has emerged in recent years. In a landmark study, Heflick and Goldenberg (2009) demonstrated that focusing on a woman's body rather than her personality induces a perceived reduction of human nature. This effect held across two famous targets (i.e., Angelina Jolie, Sarah Palin). Recently, Rudman and Mescher (2012) adopted a correlational approach and replicated this effect at an implicit level. Using an IAT, they showed that men tend to implicitly associate women with tools and objects, indicating a tacit denial of human nature. Although it is increasingly established that objectification entails a loss of human nature, it also appears to undermine human uniqueness, making the objectified appear more animal-like. In a set of studies, Vaes et al. (Latrofa and Vaes 2012; Vaes et al. 2011) found that people have a tendency to implicitly associate sexualized women with animals. Further, this effect is amplified when they have engaged in sexualized surveillance of women (Latrofa and Vaes 2012). This finding has also been replicated at an implicit level by Rudman and Mescher (2012).

It appears that objectified women may be dehumanized in two senses. On one hand they are viewed as lacking human nature and being object-like, and on the other they are viewed as lacking human uniqueness and being animal-like. Interestingly, only the former effect has been demonstrated at both an explicit and implicit level, indicating that mechanistic dehumanization of the objectified may be relatively blatant and that animalistic dehumanization may be relatively subtle.

Objectification and Mind

The second major approach to studying other-objectification has been to focus on the attribution and denial of mental states. This denial of mind, or by extension humanity, is not specific to either dimension of humanness, but rather encompasses the idea that people fail to attribute or appreciate the subjective mental life of the objectified (Nussbaum 1999). From this perspective, objectification occurs when the sexualized target is *dementalized* or stripped of their mind.

Adopting a neuroimaging approach, Cikara et al. (2011) have shown that men—particularly hostile sexist men—display reduced activation of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), anterior cingulate, and temporal poles in the presence of sexualized female targets. These brain regions are typically associated with mental state attribution to social entities. The reduced activation in this area can imply that these men fail—at a basic neural level—to process sexualized women as mindful, social entities.

Our work has also explored the idea that objectified people are denied mind. The first of our studies sought to manipulate levels of objectification in two distinct ways; face-ism and sexualization (Loughnan et al. 2010b). Face-ism refers to the tendency to focus on the face relative to the body when depicting an individual. Men are typically displayed with higher levels of facial prominence (high face-ism), whereas women are typically displayed with low levels of facial prominence (low face-ism) (Archer et al. 1983). Sexualization was varied by depicting the target in either casual attire or a swimsuit. One major advantage of both face-ism and sexualization is that they can be equally applied to male and female targets and closely mirror the ways men and women are depicted in society. Regardless of whether the images were manipulated with face-ism or sexualization, increased body prominence was associated with reduced attribution of mind. Both male and female targets were denied experience and agency related mental states (cf. Gray et al. 2007). When asked to estimate the target's intelligence quotient (IQ), people attributed an average of ten fewer IQ points to sexualized targets versus fully dressed targets. Overall, sexualized targets were dementalized relative to non-sexualized targets.

Follow-up work in our lab has partially replicated these findings with female targets only. When depicted in provocative attire, females were attributed fewer agentic mental states relative to fully clothed targets, perceived as less capable of possessing thoughts and intentions. However, they were not denied the capacity for experience, viewed as similarly capable of experiencing sensations and emotions. Interestingly, targets included not only adult women but also girls with an average perceived age of 11 years, with the results holding irrespective of target age. These suggest that objectification is not only an issue of concern for sexually mature women.

The proceeding work indicates that the dehumanization of the objectified is relatively robust. Indeed, research has typically found few differences as the result of perceiver gender: both men and women objectify sexualized others (Bernard et al. 2012; Loughnan et al. 2010b; Vaes et al. 2011). In some recent

work we have started to explore whether this effect is also cross-culturally robust. Theories of objectification have proposed both basic, cognitive accounts of our tendency to objectify (Bernard et al. 2012; Gervais et al. 2012) and sociocultural explanations of sexual objectification (Aubrey 2006a, b, 2007). If the tendency to objectify is rooted in the way our cognitive system processes others or in deep, goal directed actions (e.g., the pursuit of sex, Vaes et al. 2011), then it might appear across cultures. By contrast, if objectification emerges from socialization practices, media environments, and social norms, then it may be more variables across cultures.

To explore the level of cultural variability in sexual objectification, our group recently conducted a study which contrasted four Western nations (i.e., Australia, Italy, the UK, and the USA) with three non-Western nations (i.e., India, Japan, and Pakistan) (Loughnan et al. 2012a, b). Consistent with prior research, we found that sexualized targets were denied mind and moral concern, and were disliked relative to non-sexualized targets, but only in Western nations. In non-Western nations these effects were either absent (mind, moral concern) or substantially weakened (dislike). It appears that sexual objectification is powerfully shaped by culture. Whether this cultural difference also emerges on implicit (Rudman and Mescher 2012; Vaes et al. 2011) or cognitive (Bernard et al. 2012; Gervais et al. 2012) measures will provide a strict test of the cultural relativity of sexual objectification.

Objectification and Moral Concern

Recent research has made considerable progress in exploring what it means to objectify others. The preceding two sections outlined evidence that objectification entails the withdrawal of humanity, whether measured as humanness or mind. It is now well established that moral status partially relies on the attribution of mind (Waytz et al. 2010) and humanness (Bastian et al. 2011). The denial of both aspects of humanity to the objectified suggests that they are viewed as less worthy of moral concern. Importantly, if the dehumanization of objectified people entails of diminution of moral concern, it may be consequential for how those people are treated and how we react to their mistreatment by others.

In some of our earlier work we demonstrated that objectification does result in the withdrawal of moral concern. Loughnan et al. (2010b) presented people with sexualized (vs. non-sexualized) images of men and women. We found that sexualized targets were ascribed lesser moral concern; people reported diminished concern regarding their wellbeing and reported less concern if they heard that the individual was exploited or harmed. Further, when presented with a hypothetical task involving the assignment of ‘pain tablets’ (cf. Gray and Wegner 2009), we found that people reported an increased willingness to assign pain to sexualized targets. Recent unpublished work has also obtained similar results employing both adult and child targets. When depicted in swimwear, both women and young girls were denied moral patiency (i.e., the capacity to be the recipient of moral and

immoral deeds; Gray and Wegner 2009). Specifically, participants perceived the bikini-clad targets to be less capable of experiencing pain, and indicated that they would not feel as bad for causing harm to them as they would to the fully clothed targets. Combined, these findings indicated that in addition to a general reduction in humanity, the objectified are deemed less worthy of moral concern.

Reporting less concern in general and assigning more pain tablets in a hypothetical task is an important first step in exploring the link between sexual objectification and mistreatment. However, despite these indicative results, there is a considerable gap between scale ratings and actual mistreatment. Recent research has started to close this gap by measuring the association between sexual objectification and direct physical aggression towards women (Ball et al. 2012). We asked participants to complete a short task with a female confederate while attending to either her physical appearance or her personality (cf. Heflick and Goldenberg 2009; Heflick et al. 2011). After receiving negative feedback from the confederate regarding a writing task, participants were asked to specify how long she should submerge her arm in ice-cold water. Participants had previously felt the water and knew the experience to be painful. Those who had focused on the confederate's appearance recommended a significantly longer time period for her to submerge her arm. This reflected a 39% increase in aggression compared with the control condition. This effect was not qualified by participant gender, with both men and women aggressing against a female confederate they had been led to objectify. It appears that people are prepared to act more aggressively toward sexually objectified women.

The research on pain and aggression has provided evidence that people are more willing to mistreat the objectified. In recent work we have turned to how objectification might alter the way we perceive women who have been mistreated by a third party. Loughnan et al. (2012a, b) presented participants with a sexualized or non-sexualized female target. They were then informed that after going on a date with a man and returning to his apartment, she was raped (i.e., an acquaintance rape, cf. Grubb and Harrower 2009). Participants then rated the mental states of the victim, the victim's degree of suffering, their moral concern for the victim, and the degree of blame due to the victim and the perpetrator. As might be expected based on our previous work, participants who viewed the provocatively dressed victim ascribed less mind to her, were less morally concerned for her, believed she suffered less, and blamed her more for being raped.

Conclusions

Although our research program began as a conceptual study of dehumanization, it has since ramified far and wide. In addition to developing and testing its account of dehumanization, we have explored self-perception processes, sexual objectification, perceptions of animals, the motivational dynamics of meat-eating, cultural variations in conceptions of human nature, and the use of human nature to

mitigate the failings of oneself and one's group. Although these topics might seem scattered and unfocused, we prefer to see their range as evidence of the generativity of the idea of "humanness". People's understandings of what it is to be human are intimately associated with how they think about themselves, other individuals, groups, and even nonhuman entities. The fact that their understandings are not unitary adds further richness to these associations, different senses of humanness being linked to different psychological phenomena. We are confident that further study of people's understandings and denials of humanness will shed new light on the social psychologist's path.

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Varieties of (De) Humanization: Divided by Competition and Status

Susan T. Fiske

Abstract Recognizing or denying another's humanity varies predictably along apparently universal dimensions of the other's perceived warmth (trustworthiness) and competence. New data reveal distinct neural and behavioral signatures of (de)humanizing responses to distinct kinds of ingroups and outgroups on these dimensions. The most dehumanized outgroups (low on both warmth and competence) elicit disgust and avoidance, devalued as literally worth-less. In contrast, groups disliked for seeming cold but respected for competence elicit envy and Schadenfreude. Reactions to pitied outgroups—disrespected for seeming incompetent, but apparently likable enough for seeming trustworthy and warm—focus on prescriptions for their behavior. The humanization of ingroup members, who are both liked and respected, reflects individuating processes in impression formation, not necessarily accurate but at least three-dimensionally human.

A popular twenty-first century t-shirt announces, "Hello. I am a person. What are you?" With globalization—immigration, collaboration, cyber-networks, intermarriage, multiculturalism—categorizing another person just got much more complicated. Although categorical biases are not gone, they are daily diluting, ambiguating, subtyping, contextualizing (Bodenhausen and Peery 2009). As categories multiply, subdivide, and recombine, individuation might seem likely (Swencionis and Fiske 2013). But more complicated categories also offer more opportunities for dehumanization. For example, when Italian Fascists encountered mixed-race people, they merely pitched them into an allegedly disgusting outgroup trash-bin (Durante et al. 2010). Which is it, then: Do multiple categories defy dehumanizing processes, or do they provide just another opportunity for bigotry? The answer is, "Both, and it depends."

Recognizing or denying another's humanity varies by degrees, along simple, predictable, and apparently universal dimensions. In making this argument, we are indebted to the storied Nebraska Symposium series and some of its previous

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S. J. Gervais (ed.), *Objectification and (De)Humanization*,
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 60, DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-6959-9_3,

contributors. As Donald Campbell (1965) noted, when nonspecialists in human motivation are invited, they must broaden the symposium by examining the relevance—however remote—of motivation to their own research. Our approach shares with Campbell the premise that people are motivated to protect their ingroup, thereby derogating outgroups. We argue that two dimensions adequately describe how they divide ingroup from a variety of outgroups: societal structures of interdependence (cooperative versus competitive) and status.

This chapter first provides background on how social cognition generally varies along these two predictable dimensions, then concentrates on evidence that outgroup dehumanization does too. Finally, as an antidote to the toxicity of dehumanization, the chapter turns to ingroup humanizing processes, exploring their what, who, why, how, and when, with a view to expanding people's view of who exactly counts as human.

Warmth and Competence in the Stereotype Content Model

Consistent with fundamental motives for survival, the Stereotype Content Model (SCM; Fiske et al. 2002, 2007) argues that other people in our environment offer unique survival opportunities and challenges decided by their intentions. People are autonomous agents, so their motivational relevance derives from how their goals mesh with our own goals. Thus, we first need to learn their intentions for good or ill. Does this person or group intend to cooperate or compete with me and my group? If cooperative, they are warm, trustworthy people. If competitive, not. The others' apparent warmth (trustworthiness, friendliness) stems from perceived interdependence (cooperation/competition), reflecting inferred good or bad intentions, respectively. Whether the other is an individual in a dark alley or a new immigrant group arriving at our borders, we need to know, like the sentry: "Halt, who goes there? Friend or foe?"

If intentions are key to survival, then we next want to know whether the others can act on their intentions. After all, if the others are incapable and ineffective, then their intentions matter less than if the others are capable and effective. Our judgment of their competence (capability) stems from perceiving the others' apparent status and prestige. Status apparently reflects the ability to enact intentions.

Evidence for the SCM

People's lay theories of groups' warmth and competence derive from their understanding of social structure. Interdependence, measured as control over both tangible and symbolic resources, predicts perceived warmth, measured as a combination of friendliness/sociability and morality/trustworthiness (Fiske et al. 2002; Kervyn et al. under review).

On the status-competence dimension, although less-than-obvious at first glance, the relationship between ascribed status (prestigious jobs, economic success) and perceived competence is robust and substantial. Meritocracy rules (people get what they deserve), the world over, according to people's reports (Cuddy et al. 2009; Durante et al. 2013).

The SCM structure-to-stereotypes pattern— status → competence and interdependence → warmth— fits into a chain of perceptions supported by both surveys (Cuddy et al. 2007; Fiske et al. 2002) and vignette experiments (Caprariello et al. 2009; Oldmeadow and Fiske 2007) (see Fig. 1). Together, the warmth x competence stereotypes predict emotional prejudices unique to each quadrant. Using survey responses to common societal groups, people report how society reacts to these groups, and subsequent data show that the reported societal responses also reflect individual reports in private.

Figure 2 shows the clusters from an American random sample survey. Starting in the high-warmth, high-competence quadrant, societal defaults, and reference groups (such as middle class, Christians, and Americans, ingroups for many respondents) elicit pride and admiration. They also receive both active help (protection) and passive help (association, going along).

Diagonally opposite the societal ingroups are the most extreme societal outgroups, allegedly low on both warmth and competence. These groups commonly include poor people (of any race), drug addicts, immigrants, and homeless people (who are three standard deviations from the overall mean, hence outside the cluster analysis). These groups reportedly elicit more disgust and contempt than any other quadrant, and they receive both active harm (attack) and passive harm (neglect). The contrast of extreme ingroups and outgroups has been a staple of intergroup relations research for decades.

What the SCM adds is ambivalence. Groups viewed as high warmth but low competence—such as older people and people with disabilities—elicit pity and sympathy. Benign as these emotions might seem, they reinforce the status hierarchy because pity is directed downward. The mixed behavioral tendencies reflect this ambivalence: active help and protection (help them cross the street) but neglect and ignoring (don't go for coffee afterwards). Many such groups are institutionalized, consistent with taking care of them but also isolating them.

The other type of ambivalence describes stereotypically high-competence but low-warmth groups, such as rich people (all over the world), and in the U.S.



Fig. 1 Stereotype content model (SCM) chain of perceptions



Fig. 2 Example SCM data, illustrating warmth and competence stereotypes, emotional prejudices, and discriminatory tendencies

currently, Asian and Jewish people. Elsewhere this quadrant likewise includes other outsider entrepreneurs. They elicit envy and jealousy, which communicate respect for their competence but resentment because they are not "one of us." They receive a volatile mix of passive association (shopping at their stores) and active harm (attack and fight, when the chips are down).

Generality of the SCM

Data from dozens of countries, across lab and field, many subgroups, and now, even computers, corporations, and creatures also array along warmth-x-competence space. Across 36 countries on six continents, in their native languages (Cuddy et al. 2009; Durante et al. 2013), pretest samples nominated their society's more salient 15–25 social groups, then the main sample rated them along dimensions of interdependence, status, warmth, and competence. The groups always spread out across the space, with interdependence predicting warmth and status predicting competence. Granted, cultures vary not just in the groups they name, but in the superiority of the ingroup (Asians are more modest; Cuddy et al. 2009), and in the relative usage of the ambivalent quadrants (more equal countries use them less; Durante et al. 2013). The SCM usefully describes the social geography in each instance.

SCM dimensions also fit historical descriptions of stereotypes. Italian Fascists depicted several racial and ethnic groups in their magazine "defending the race." Independent coding of the content spontaneously generated the SCM quadrants, with idealized Italians and Aryans, envied and resented English and Jews, as well as despised Black and mixed-race people (Durante et al. 2010). Closer to home, Princeton students have described 10 national and ethnic groups every 15–20 years since Katz and Braly's (1933) classic study. Modern judges coded the 80 paradigmatic adjectives by warmth and competence, producing a map of American stereotypes that works over time (Bergsieker et al. 2012).

Besides content analysis reproducing the warmth-x-competence space, multidimensional scaling of groups' paired similarity ratings also reproduces the space (Kervyn et al. under review). Likewise, comparisons to previous research-generated models suggest both compatibility and distinctiveness. Osgood's semantic differential dimensions (Osgood et al. 1957) feature evaluation and potency-activity in person perception, operating at a 45° angle to the SCM. Evaluation runs from low–low to high–high warmth and competence (it's good to be either one); potency-activity runs from a low of warm-but-incompetent groups to a high of cold-but-competent groups, suggesting threat (Kervyn et al. under review). Other social cognition models are even closer to the SCM: trait ratings (Rosenberg et al. 1968), self and other person perception (Peeters 2002; Wojciszke 1994, 2005), political candidate perception (Abelson et al. 1982), and gender roles (Abele 2003). Independent invention also confirms generality (see Fiske et al. 2007 for others). These two dimensions constitute a principle that deserves to be true.

Not only the intergroup (SCM) and the interpersonal (as just cited) levels, but also the subtype level seems to fit these two dimensions. SCM studies have mapped subtypes of women and men (Eckes 2002), gay men (Clausell and Fiske 2005), immigrants (Lee and Fiske 2006), and African Americans (Fiske et al. 2009). That the target possesses intentionality is key, as objects do not easily reproduce the space (Harris and Fiske 2008; Harris et al. 2007), but animal species do (Sevilliano and Fiske under review). Dogs, cats, and horses are warm and competent, like us, and we keep them; dirty/slimy or cold-blooded species (rats, mice, snakes, lizards, fish) are disgusting and we exterminate them; predators (lion, tiger, bear, leopard) are awesome and we respect them; whereas cows, pigs, ducks, rabbits, and hamsters are pitiful and some of us eat them. What's more, human organizations are seen as having intent and capability (Kervyn et al. 2012); corporations may not be people, but people comprise them, so we make sense of them the way we make sense of people. Companies can be all-American "us" (Johnson and Johnson, Campbell's, Hershey's), or they can be disgusting and contemptible (BP, AIG, Marlboro). They can also be enviable (Rolex, BMW, Porsche) or pitiful (USPS, VA, Amtrak). People react accordingly.

Generality over time, cultures, subgroups, organizations, and species suggests that "universal" is not too bold a reach for the SCM. Arguably, "universal" suggests "adaptive." If inferring others' intentions and effectiveness—warmth and competence—has survival value, then maybe we would have neural signatures for friends and foes, up and down the hierarchy.

Varieties of Dehumanization in Mind, Brain, and Behavior

Neuro-imaging and EMG data do reveal distinct neural and muscular signatures of responses to distinct kinds of ingroups and outgroups. Our lab team has been working our way around the SCM quadrants, tackling each one to discern its patterns in mind, brain, and behavior. But first, consider one study focused on the status-competence dimension because of its centrality in human social life (Fiske 2011). We will end this section by focusing on the other dimension, interdependence-warmth, a more optimistic view. Between these book-ends of the two dimensions, we visit each quadrant in turn.

The Trolley Study: Valuing People's Lives by Their Status

Focusing first on the status dimension, in one study (Cikara et al. 2010), we borrowed the trolley dilemma from experimental philosophy: Joe is standing on an overpass spanning a train track along which is speeding an out-of-control trolley, toward five people, who will be killed by it. Joe could push another bystander off the overpass, stopping the trolley and saving the five people, but killing the one person sacrificed. Assuming that he does this (and cannot jump himself), is this morally acceptable? People (80–90 %) overwhelmingly answer "no." This default—moral revulsion—is established in the relevant literature.

In our variant, we specified who was on the overpass and who was on the trolley track, creating all combinations of the SCM quadrants for the person sacrificed and the group of five saved. We first obtained and pretested 128 photos, 32 for each SCM quadrant (16 instances of each of two prototypic groups); each photo pretested as an instantly recognizable instance of its group (e.g., an American with a flag, a disabled person, a homeless person, a rich person). Students rated the acceptability of all combinations of sacrificing and saving, while having their brains scanned.

The results were stark; the ratings data reversed the default findings. People found it more acceptable to sacrifice one low-status (incompetent) person (69 %), regardless of who was on the tracks, or to save five high-status (competent) people (77 %), regardless of who was sacrificed. And they found it most acceptable (least unacceptable) to sacrifice one low–low (e.g., homeless) person to save five ingroup (e.g., generic American) people (84 %).

This interaction also manifested in a neural pattern characteristic of complex social decision making, implying that people did not make this moral trade-off automatically. In particular, the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is implicated in dispositional attribution (Harris et al. 2005), forming impressions of people versus objects (Mitchell et al. 2005), and meta-analyses of social cognition in neuroimaging studies (Amodio and Frith 2006; van Overwalle 2009). Here, the mPFC activated when people considered the most acceptable (least unacceptable) trade-off, sacrificing one member of the most extreme outgroups (a homeless person) to save five of the ingroup (Americans).

To us, this utilitarian approach to valuing people's lives seems both normal (insurance companies value people's lives by their future earnings) and shocking. In the abstract, most people find it morally unacceptable to trade-off a generic person's life even against five other generic people. But when the person sacrificed and the people saved become specific members of valued and devalued societal groups, participants reluctantly agree to the trade-off. In effect, they agree to lessen the worth of the person sacrificed, a form of dehumanization. But perhaps valuing the people saved solely in terms of their status is a form of super-humanization, some being more worthy than others. The next study supports the dehumanization interpretation.

Dehumanizing the Homeless: Disgust toward the Lowest of the Low

As previously described, the most dehumanized outgroups (low on both warmth and competence) elicit disgust and avoidance, devalued as literally worth-less. In Fig. 1, homeless people fall outside all the other human clusters, and drug addicts are not far behind. We wondered whether people spontaneously consider the minds of homeless and addicted people; failure to consider their minds would suggest treating them like objects, a clear form of dehumanization. Everyday observation suggests the plausibility of this, as pedestrians avoid eye contact and detour around people apparently homeless or drugged, perhaps for fear of contamination or involvement. Whatever the reason, people might not fully consider the other's mind. Both questionnaire data and neuro-imaging data bear on this issue.

We developed the SCM picture set (Harris and Fiske 2006), later used in the trolley study just noted. Lying in the MRI scanner, students viewed 48 photographs of individuals recognizably associated with stereotypic social groups (4 SCM quadrants × 2 groups each × 6 instances each). For each, they had to indicate whether the photograph made them feel pride, envy, pity, or disgust; the SCM-predicted emotions fit each quadrant as expected. Using the meta-analytic result that social cognition, especially mind perception, reliably activates the mPFC, we compared mPFC activation in the low–low quadrant with all the others. In contrast to the other three quadrants—two of which contain societal outgroups—the mPFC did not activate significantly above baseline to homeless people and drug addicts. The low–low quadrant's activation effect size was only about two-thirds of the other three, nonsignificant in this study.

Questionnaire data converged with the neuro-imaging data (Harris and Fiske 2011). People indicated on several measures that they had more difficulty attributing a mind and were less likely to interact with the pictured homeless and addicted people from this quadrant. They also rated them on a series of traits as less warm/familiar and less competent/autonomous than the other groups, consistent with their occupying the low–low SCM quadrant.

Together, these data suggest a variety of dehumanization based on disgust, which after all targets objects as well as people (not true for the other SCM

emotions, which mainly target people: pride, pity, envy). This disgusted dehumanization resembles Haslam's type that likens people to animals (Haslam et al. 2013); in particular, vermin also inhabit the low–low quadrant (Sevilliano and Fiske under review).

As discouraging as this dehumanized perception may be, we have found it to be malleable (Harris and Fiske 2007). In response to what we term the "soup kitchen manipulation," participants had to consider whether each individual would like a certain vegetable pictured immediately beforehand. The vegetable varied, and none were stereotypic of any social group. So simple a change in goal brought the mPFC back on line even for homeless and addicted people. Considering the others' preferences is the first step to considering their mind and rehumanizing them.

Resenting Investment Bankers: Schadenfreude Toward Envied Outgroups

Now we move to the first ambivalent outgroup cluster, envied groups disliked for seeming cold but respected for competence. People do not want to be them, but they would not mind having what they have (Fiske 2011; Smith and Kim 2007). Hence, envy is volatile; envied outgroups are competent and high status, so we need them and look up to them, going along to get along. But they seem cold, not "us," so they are resented. This resentment makes us less happy about their good fortune and less concerned about any mishaps that befall them. Malicious glee at someone else's misfortune is *Schadenfreude*; people smile when the mighty have fallen.

We aimed to bottle this phenomenon, having noted that people are most reluctant to report envy, out of all the SCM emotions. People do say they envy rich people and business people in suits, but less than they report major emotions in other quadrants. We wanted to go beyond self-reports, so we paired a new set of SCM pictures with pretested everyday events, good (ate a tasty sandwich) and bad (sat on chewing gum). People did typically report feeling good about all groups' good events, but less so for envied groups; likewise they did typically report feeling bad about all groups' bad events, but less so for envied groups (Cikara and Fiske 2012).

To get beyond self-reports, we attached electromyographic (EMG) electrodes to measure activity in participants' smile muscles (zygomaticus major). Indeed, people smiled more to good events than bad ones for all groups except the envied ones. For the rich and the business-suited, people smiled more to their bad event than their good ones. The smiles embodied malicious glee.

This might not seem to matter, except that reported Schadenfreude activates the brain's reward centers, which correlates with self-reported willingness to harm the envied other. In this case, the envied outgroup is a rival baseball team, and the outcomes are wins and losses, among avid Yankees and Boston Red Sox fans (Cikara et al. 2011a, b). Schadenfreude over an envied rivals' losses to a third-party team predicts real-world harm, suggesting that envy is consequential.

If they matter, then how malleable are envy and Schadenfreude? During the worst of the 2008 downturn, we primed participants with stories of a laid-off investment banker behaving in one of three unbanker-like (unenvied) ways: volunteering to do local businesses' bookkeeping (admirable), using the severance package to buy cocaine (disgusting), or commuting with an empty briefcase to Starbucks (pathetic). Primed participants did mitigate their Schadenfreude toward other suits who resembled investment bankers—but not toward all envied outgroups (other rich people), which we interpreted as a form of bounded empathy (Cikara and Fiske 2011a, b).

But is envious prejudice a form of dehumanization? Yes, it resembles Haslam and colleagues' (2013) automaton version of dehumanization, applied to businesspeople. Investment bankers, female professionals, Asians, and other efficient social groups sometimes appear stereotypically as cold and machinelike. This is the envious form of dehumanization for those viewed as competent but cold.

Pitying the Weak: Prescriptions for the Warm but Incompetent

Reactions to pitied outgroups include disrespect for seeming incompetent, but apparent liking enough for seeming trustworthy and warm. The presumed incompetence carries with it an obligation for the pitied to be nice or forfeit the observer's pity. Across an array of groups—people with disabilities, older people, and stereotypical women—other people express such pity and sympathy. But that pity is not entirely benign, as it depends on the pitied person remaining low status and incompetent, not high status, autonomous, and agentic. For example, older people who join the grey-panther activists forfeit pity and become obnoxious (Cuddy et al. 2005). Disability-rights activists might expect also to be seen as uncooperative and difficult, agentic but no longer nice. Subservient women who become feminists go from being warm-but-dumb to being smart-but-cold (Glick and Fiske 1996). Pity requires signing the contract to follow the higher status others' prescriptions to cooperate, defer, and obey, to avoid becoming uppity. What this array of groups share in common is apparent interdependence with outsiders (able-bodied people, younger people, and stereotypical men) charged to care-take them as helpless. The deal they cut is the pitied outgroups acknowledging the status of society's helpers and cooperating with them, not making trouble. Buying other people's prescriptions denies a person's agency and status, arguably one form of dehumanization. Consider three groups as case studies.

Able-bodied People's Prescriptions for People with Disabilities

People with disabilities fall in the pity cluster because they allegedly are high warmth ("on our side") but low competence ("below us"). However, they merit pity if and only if they adhere to prescriptions for their stereotypic role. Salient

among these prescriptions is that their misfortune not be their fault. Disabled people are penalized for fault, either if they caused the disability or if they neglect its prescribed treatment (Wu, Ames, Swencionis, and Fiske, in preparation). In 32 vignettes (e.g., fell off roof), combined with 32 pictures, disabled people were either at fault for causing it (e.g., recklessly ignored warnings), or not, and either at fault for sustaining it (neglect treatment), or not. Either kind of fault penalized people's ratings of the disabled person. In this sense, following others' advice is the prescription to be eligible for pity and a caring response in a lop-sided interdependence with able-bodied people. But the prescription also minimizes one's humanity because it removes one's agency to make autonomous choices.

Younger People's Prescriptions for Older People

More people are interdependent across generations than across disability status. Across the generations with the family, at work, and in society, each side has obligations, but here we focus on the prescriptions for older people (who come up as a stereotyped group more often than do young people). Stereotypes of older people as doddering but dear presuppose that they cooperate with younger people to minimize intergenerational tensions (North and Fiske 2013). Three primary domains of prescribed elder cooperation include appropriate succession (passing along resources such as jobs and wealth), sharing consumption (not using up social security or blocking the road), and identity boundaries (acting one's own age). Though doubtless there are others, these domains appear as independent factors in ageist attitude scales (North and Fiske in press-a). What's more, following or violating these prescriptions affects ratings of only older targets but not middle-aged or younger targets, and it is younger raters who react the most strongly (North and Fiske in press-b), consistent with the idea of intergenerational prescriptions. Ageist young people dehumanize old people by denying their agency: viewing them as having no right to their own resources, their share of joint resources, and invading youth identities. Power is all about controlling resources, and prescriptive stereotypes are one way to do this (Fiske 1993).

Stereotypic Men's Prescriptions for Stereotypic Women

Men and women share a more intimate interdependence than any other intergroup pair, and this intense interdependence especially inspires prescriptions (Fiske and Stevens 1993). Because men have higher societal status, they can demand adherence in return for providing resources (Glick and Fiske 1996). In particular, "benevolent" sexism (paternalistic sympathy, even pity) is reserved for women who adhere to stereotypical gender roles that benefit stereotypical men. Forfeit that protected position, and women become targets of hostile sexism, which sees

gender relations as competitive and certain women (e.g., feminists) as trying to control men.

Women who adhere to stereotypic gender roles give up personal agency and status, so this also is one form of dehumanization. We demonstrated this phenomenon by finding photographs of women, fully clothed and bikini-clad, standardized for posture, facial attractiveness, and facial expression (Cikara et al. 2011). People had to pair them with first-person verbs—(I) use, push, squeeze—or third-person verbs—(she/he) uses, pushes, squeezes. Men were faster to pair first-person verbs with bikini-clad women (implying the men's own agency) and third-person verbs with fully clothed women (implying her agency), compared with the reverse; women showed no such difference. This fits the idea that at least some men tend to deny agency to sexualized women.

We then added bikini-clad and fully clothed men to the mix, showing just the male/female, clothed/bikinied photographs to male participants while we scanned their brains and then tested their memory separately for the faces and bodies of people they had just seen. These men remembered both female bodies and bikini-clad bodies the best, but could not differentiate among the faces shown separately. Remembering a sexualized woman's body better than her face carries an element of dehumanization.

What's more, the men's social-cognition-sensitive mPFC activated less to the bikini-clad women, the higher the men scored on hostile sexism, consistent with the idea that sexual hostility correlates with dehumanizing (or at least dementalizing) sexualized women. The opposite pattern occurred for bikini-clad men: higher hostility toward women correlated with more mPFC activation (mentalizing?) of sexualized men. (Perhaps body social comparison—how did he get those abs—is more at play for hostile sexists.) In any case, a pattern of responses suggest that some men on some measures over-emphasize sexualized women's bodies, forget their faces, deny their agency, and ignore their minds. These responses fit a form of subordinated dehumanization, perhaps prescriptive: they should have only bodies and no faces, agency, or minds.

Interim Summary

The apparently universal social cognition dimensions of warmth and competence array social groups into recognizable clusters. One dimension, status-competence, reliably predicts people's valuations of others' lives in a hypothetical social dilemma that engages the medial prefrontal cortex, part of the social cognition network. More specific experiments compare in turn each quadrant to the other three, describing varieties of dehumanization: dehumanizing the homeless or drug addicted, via disgust toward the lowest of the low; resenting investment bankers, businesspeople, and rich people, via Schadenfreude toward envied outgroups; pitying the weak, via prescriptions for the warm but incompetent disabled, older, or sexualized female persons. We now turn to the fourth quadrant, society's ingroup.

Individuating the Ingroup

Around the world, indigenous people call themselves the humans, as opposed to those nonhuman Others. Understanding this in light of social adaptation, Donald Campbell's (1965) Nebraska Symposium chapter noted (pp. 310–311):

> an impressive consensus that outgroup threat to an ingroup increases ingroup solidarity… Consideration of the great competitive advantage of social life over solitary life leads to the expectation that biological and sociocultural evolution would have produced in both man [sic] and termite motivational dispositions furthering group life and reflecting its advantages, as in economy of cognition, division of labor, and mutual defense. In some respects at least, man [sic] should be regarded as basically a social animal, with individual dispositions reflecting this fact. Because the wisdom of evolution is retrospective, social motivations such as are found in ethnocentrism may be judged dysfunctional [sic] in a changed environment.

This remarkable analysis has aged well (apart from the generic masculine), noting ingroup social motivations for derogating outgroups and the advantages of humanizing ingroup members. This analysis goes beyond ethnocentrism, in our view, to include sexism, ageism, classism, and other divisions that serve inter-category interests. So, what about ingroup solidarity?

We are beginning to explore what might be termed hyper-humanization of ingroup members, who are both liked and respected. Focusing on the ingroup and its reference groups, Warmth and Competence R Us, the rest of the chapter focuses on concentrated humanization of the high–high cluster, examining the what, who, why, when, and how of humanizing the ingroup (for an extended analysis, see Swencionis and Fiske 2013).

What is Humanization? Beyond Not-Categorizing

Dehumanization has attracted much research and analysis, as this volume attests. Humanization, less so. The closest research investigates individuation as an alternative to categorization. All concur that individuation requires more effort than category-based processes, and the same holds for humanization versus dehumanization. Let us examine this premise.

As one example, the Continuum Model (Fiske and Neuberg 1990) holds that people's social-cognition default is automatic categorization, according to easily discerned categories such as gender, age, race, and class. Categories trigger associations to stereotypes, prejudices, and discrimination. But people are no fools: If the category is a poor fit, and if motivated and able, people will consider subtypes and even fully individuating processes. Attention to and interpretation of a person's attributes allow an individual impression, accurate or not, but at least an individual human. To anticipate, evidence supports these processes (Fiske et al. 1999; for related models, see Brewer 1988; Brewer and Feinstein 1999; Kunda and Thagard 1996). Individuating processes include attention (especially to inconsistent cues), dispositional inference, and attribute-based evaluations (see Fiske et al. 1999, for a review).

Who Humanizes (Individuates)?

Some people are spontaneously inclined to take the trouble to humanize others. Having individuation as part of one's self-concept predicts individuating processes (Fiske and von Hendy 1992). Being high on Person-, not Thing-Orientation (Graziano et al. 2011) marks people who are intrinsically interested in people, and women on average tend to score higher. People can orient to others for a variety of reasons all measured by the Interpersonal Orientation Scale, which emphasizes affiliation motives (Hill 1987). Of these motives, three seem self-centered—orienting to others for social comparison, emotional support, and approval—so unlikely to motivate meaningful humanization of the other. But the remaining affiliative motive, seeking positive stimulation, seems most likely to yield individuating processes: the motive is measured with items such as, "Just being around others and finding out about them is one of the most interesting things I can think of doing." And "One of the most enjoyable things I can think of that I like to do is just watching people and seeing what they are like."

Why Bother?

For someone who is not necessarily a people-person, why undertake the effort to individuate and humanize another? According to another classic Nebraska Symposium chapter, people analyze individuals' predispositions—that is, make attributions to individual personalities—in order to understand those others, in the service of prediction and control: "The [attribution] theory describes processes that operate as if the individual were motivated to attain a cognitive mastery of the causal structure of his [or her] environment" (Kelley 1967, p. 193). When interpersonal information falls below acceptable levels, people search for information.

Not just sheer amount of information, but its quality, matters. In Gestalt approaches described in yet another historic Nebraska symposium chapter (Heider 1960), people are motivated to achieve a "good figure" of perception, in the visual field, but also in their social impressions, for example, feeling balanced when agreeing with friends.

Also influenced by Gestalt approaches, Asch (1946) posited that people want to form coherent individual impressions, again because of seeking good form. He did not elaborate on the motives but asserted that people aim to find coherence.

While these might seem dry motivations, Fiske (2002) posits core social motives of both understanding/prediction and control, as two of the more social cognitive motives (self-enhancement and trusting others being more social affective ones, not as relevant here). But like all core motives, understanding and controlling operate in the service of an overarching belonging motive to fit in with one's ingroup. Good reason to bother humanizing/individuating one's ingroup members.

How Do People Humanize?

The processes of individuation—here taken as a necessary feature of seeing someone as fully human—mainly fit individual impression formation. In the Gestalt tradition, people interpret the meaning of trait terms to fit together into a coherent whole (Asch and Zukier 1984). For example, "cheerful" and "gloomy" become coherent under "moody." In Kelley's (1967) theory, people seek behavioral consistency, idiosyncratic behavior not widely shared (not linked to consensus), and a general response (not just one distinct to a particular target); together, these support an overall dispositional inference. People engage these processes to infer the dispositions underlying other people's intent (Jones and Davis 1965). In Heider's (1960) terms, all these processes reflect the goal of searching for invariants (consistency) across cues about the other person.

Besides reconciling inconsistency to find coherence, impression formers show some other predictable patterns. When people go beyond categories, they attend to individual attributes such as traits (Fiske et al. 1987; Neuberg and Fiske 1987; Pavelchak 1989), integrating them into broader dispositional inferences (Erber and Fiske 1984; Ruscher and Fiske 1990). Impression formers mentalize the other person, that is, they infer mind and intent (Ames et al. 2011). These are the mind-perception processes that implicate the brain's mPFC (Ames and Fiske under review; Mitchell et al. 2005). Similar neural patterns occur in rehumanizing as in impression formation (Harris and Fiske 2007).

Although prediction and control motives imply accuracy, individuating (humanizing) processes are not necessarily accurate (Goodwin et al. 2002; Stevens and Fiske 2000). But the illusion of accuracy is what matters (Neuberg and Fiske 1987). When reality intervenes, such social prediction errors register neurally (Harris and Fiske 2010).

Some predictable errors and biases haunt individual impression formation. The most reliable is that impression formers accentuate the positive in impressions of individuals (Matlin and Stang 1978; Sears 1983).

As a result of positivity's prevalence, negative information stands out and is diagnostic, being rare. Hence, impression-formers especially weight negative information (Fiske 1980; Ito et al. 1998; Skowronski and Carlston 1989; Taylor 1991). For example, people attend to and weight negative information when they encounter it (Fiske 1980). They then communicate the positive and omit the negative in conveying their impressions (Bergsieker et al. 2012). But receivers are not deceived; omission implies the negativity, and people infer it accordingly (Kervyn et al. 2012a).

The implication of these basic impression formation processes (and there are many others; Fiske and Taylor 2013) is that seeing another person as fully human focuses on inferring a coherent predisposition in the form of perceived intentions, and often presumably positive ones, at least within the ingroup.

When Do People Humanize?

As implied by the idea that most people spontaneously humanize the ingroup, people individuate others on whom their outcomes depend, as social beings. Just as the opening bookend focused on one SCM dimension, status-competence, on the trolley track, the closing bookend on this exploration of SCM's (de)humanizing quadrants focuses on cooperation-warmth, the primary dimension. When people land on the same team, sharing goals, they attend to each other because their outcomes depend on each other. The individuating processes we uncovered fit well with half a century of intergroup contact research (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006), showing that shared goals are a crucial feature of individuating another person. What our lab contributes is how that process operates: Teammates attend specifically to stereotype-inconsistent information and make individuating dispositional inferences about it. Under outcome dependency, people engage a host of individuating processes (Erber and Fiske 1984; Dépret and Fiske 1999; Stevens and Fiske 2000).

Outcome dependency and individuation also registers neurally, as we discovered when we brought students into the lab to meet two partners, from a rival university. Both were expert in the job at hand, creating educational games for children, using colorful plastic wind-up toys. One partner expected to contribute positively to the joint task with the participant; the other partner expressed serious doubts, as this activity was outside her expertise. Crossing the expectancy manipulation was an outcome-dependency manipulation; the participant expected to meet both of them again, but with one to cooperate on the joint task for a nontrivial prize, and with the other to work independently (and noncompetitively) for an equivalent prize. Each partner brought her teaching evaluations, which were mixed, equal parts positive and negative, therefore consistent and inconsistent with the established expectancy. Participants viewed these evaluations while having their brains scanned. Consistent with past findings that interdependence focuses attention and dispositional inferences on expectancy-inconsistent information, we found selective mPFC activation to unexpected information about another on whom one depends (Ames and Fiske under review).

Why Worry about Humanization?

If we all deplore dehumanization—which we surely do, why else study it?—we ought to be acquainted with the alternative, humanization, warts, and all. Humanizing other people is no panacea; individuated impression formation is not necessarily accurate, fair, or complete. But it seems better than the alternative.

Finale

This chapter has aimed to elucidate some systematic patterns of humanization and dehumanization, drawing on two apparently fundamental dimensions of social cognition and group perception, warmth and competence. Each variety has unique features: predictable stereotypes, emotional prejudices, behavioral tendencies, and neural activations. And in exploring each variety, simple interventions can move observers from dehumanizing to humanizing processes, encouraging people to follow their better natures.

Acknowledgments The author would like to recognize her many collaborators' contributions to the research described here, as well as support from the Russell Sage Foundation.

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Immortal Objects: The Objectification of Women as Terror Management

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Abstract Philosophical theorizing, research on self-objectification, and the newest empirical research on the objectification of others converge to support the notion that the objectification of women entails rendering women, quite literally, as objects. This chapter begins with a review of this literature and then moves onto the question of why women are viewed as objects. The answer offered is informed by terror management theory, and suggests that the need to manage a fear of death creates a fundamental problem with the physical body, and such difficulties resonate especially in reaction to women's—menstruating, lactating, childbearing—bodies, and men's attraction to them. Evidence is presented to support this, and for the position that this situation plays a role in, not just expectations for women to be beautiful, but in the literal transformation of women into inanimate—immortal—objects.

Vacationing in Prague, just as I began writing, I walked past an array of posters for an exhibit at the Museum of Decorative Arts. The posters depicted beautiful women wearing beautiful clothing—or so I thought, until I looked more closely. As it turns out, the women were part real women/part mannequins. One woman's legs were substituted with the stand of a coat rack; a bit further down the street, a woman's head had been replaced with a decorative wooden ball. Such depictions of women are perhaps not even noteworthy, as their occurrence in the media is profuse. Women's bodies are used to sell products of all kinds—subliminally presented in the ice cubes of drinks; explicitly merged with beer bottles; often depicting just a body part, separated from the woman. In this chapter, I consider such treatment of women through an existential lens. In doing so, one feature comes into focus: in contrast to women's real bodies, objects, devoid of life, present little threat associated with mortality.

I begin by reviewing philosophical theorizing, research on self-objectification, and the newest empirical research on the objectification of others. These literatures

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S. J. Gervais (ed.), *Objectification and (De)Humanization*,
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 60, DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-6959-9_4,

converge to support the notion that the objectification of women entails rendering women, quite literally, as objects. I consider inconsistencies, and potential confounds, in an attempt to clarify the picture. Then, I move onto the question of why women are viewed as objects. While by no means discounting gender inequity and forces oriented toward maintaining this system, I suggest there is an additional existential factor at play. From the perspective of terror management theory, the need to manage a fear of death creates a fundamental problem with the physical body, and such difficulties resonate especially in reaction to women's—menstruating, lactating, childbearing—bodies, and men's attraction to them. This psychic situation may therefore play a role in, not just expectations for women to be beautiful, but in the literal transformation of women into inanimate—immortal—objects. In this light, I present theoretical and empirical support for the objectification of women as terror management.

Objectification: Something, Not Someone

Feminists and Philosophical Considerations of Objectification

Philosophical and feminist definitions of objectification (Kant 1785/1998; MacKinnon 1993; Dworkin 1997; Nussbaum 1995) converge on the notion that objectification involves stripping a person of their personhood. In the words of Martha Nussbaum, "objectification entails making into a thing, treating as a thing, something that is really not a thing (1995, p. 257)." Instrumentality, where a person is treated as a tool for another's purposes, is the main feature of Kant's, Dworkin's and MacKinnon's definitions. Nussbaum (1995) offers a broader conceptualization, identifying seven features involved in the notion of objectification: in addition to treating a person as a tool (instrumentality), they are treated as if they are lacking in autonomy and self-determination (denial of autonomy), as if they are lacking in agency and activity (inertness), as if they are inter-changeable with other objects (fungibility), as if they lack boundary-integrity, such that it is permissible to break them (violability), as if they can be owned (ownership), and as if their feelings and experiences need not be taken into account (denial of subjectivity). These conditions reflect the treatment of "something, not someone" (Dworkin 1997, p. 141).

Although, technically, these qualities can be directed toward any person, or persons, objectification has almost exclusively been used to describe a condition encountered by women. The treatment of women in pornography has been heralded to represent the quintessential objectification of women (e.g., involving, "sex between people and things, human beings and pieces of paper, real men and unreal women," MacKinnon 1993, p. 109; see also Dworkin 1997); however, the objectification of women is by no means limited to their pornographic representation. Objectification, rather, has been said to permeate the everyday life and experiences

of 'regular' women (Bartky 1990; Fredrickson and Roberts 1997), occurring with "endless variety and monotonous similarity" (Rubin 1975, as cited in Fredrickson and Roberts 1997). In particular, the emphasis on women's appearance and expectations for women to be beautiful provide the foundation for an association between women and their bodies, as if a woman's body is capable of representing her (e.g., Bartky 1990; Young 1990). In this vein, Langton (2009) recently suggested a revision to Nussbaum's list, adding three more features: a reduction to a body, or body parts; a focus on appearance; and silencing. Thus, the object in objectification refers not only to a thing, but a thing valued, and used by others, for (her) body.

The transformation of women into objects is committed not only by others, but "the woman herself often actively takes up her body as a mere thing" (Young 1990, p. 155). Women, themselves, commit to a "relentless self-surveillance" (Bartky 1990, p. 80), or self-objectification (Fredrickson and Roberts 1997), of their own bodies, conceiving of themselves as "an object destined for another" (de Beauvoir 1949/2011, p. 335). Women strive to attain an ideal female body that is not only expected to be perfectly beautiful, youthful, and slender, but also one that "must take up as little space as possible" (Bartky 1990, p. 73). Iris Marion Young (1990) concluded that "feminine existence experiences the body as a mere thing—a fragile thing, which must be picked up and coaxed into movement, a thing that exists as looked at and acted upon" (p. 150); thus women do not engage their full potential of their spatial capacity, they constrain their bodies movement, and, in turn, for example, "throw like a girl (cf. Young 1990)."

Objectification Theory in Psychology: Self-Objectification

In psychology, objectification theory (Fredrickson and Roberts 1997) builds on Bartky, Young, and others (e.g., de Beauvoir 1949/2011; Berger 1972) to offer testable predictions arising out of conditions where women are objectified and (presumably as a result) come to self-objectify. As would be expected, using the primary way that self-objectification has been measured in psychology—a self-report assessment of the relative importance of the appearance of one's body (e.g., physical attractiveness, firm/sculpted muscles) relative to its actual competence (e.g., strength, physical coordination) (Noll and Fredrickson 1998)—women consistently score higher than men (e.g., Fredrickson et al. 1998; Strelan and Hargreaves 2005). In addition, women, compared to men, have more memories from the perspective of an external observer (Huebner and Fredrickson 1999) and experience relatively less direct awareness of their internal physiological states, relying more on external cues (Roberts and Pennebaker 1995). Thus, consistent with the view that (self-) objectification involves taking on object-like properties, women, more so than men, seem to adopt a perspective on the self as one where they are expected to *just sit there, and look pretty*.

Not surprisingly, women's tendency to self-objectify is exacerbated by an explicit focus on their body's appearance. In what is widely referred to as the

swimsuit-sweater study (Fredrickson et al. 1998), women not only experienced increased body shame, but they restrained their eating, and performed more poorly on a math test when they were wearing a swimsuit compared to a sweater; men, in contrast, suffered none of these consequences. Experiments by Gervais et al. (2011b) and Quinn et al. (2006) showed, respectively, that the diminished math performance effects also occurred for women when they were gazed at by a male experimenter (but not for men gazed at by a female experimenter) and that other cognitive tasks (i.e., a Stroop task) were also diminished when women performed them in a swimsuit compared to a sweater. In addition, a recent study (Saguy et al. 2010) found that women talked less than men when they were led to believe they were interacting with a male partner and the male partner had directed his gaze at their body. Thus, when women's bodies were in focus they took on more passive, object-like qualities.

Also, some women self-objectify more than others, and this leads to predictable differences in behavior. Fredrickson and Harrison (2005) found that adolescent girls' level of self-objectification predicted less effective motor performance when throwing a ball (cf. Young 1990). Self-objectification has also been shown to be associated with negative views about women's own natural bodily functions, such as menstruation (Roberts 2004) and breastfeeding (Johnston-Robledo et al. 2007), and less assertiveness and interest in sex (Impett et al. 2006; Roberts and Gettman 2004). High self-objectifying women also partake less in gender-based social activism (Calogero 2013a, and priming self-objectification reduces intentions for social activism in the future, see also, Calogero 2013b). More generally, women who score higher in trait self-objectification report less feelings of competence (i.e., self-efficacy) and purposefulness (i.e., intrinsic motivation) (Gapinski et al. 2003), as—if an object could feel—an object might feel.

New Approach in Psychology: Objectification of Others

Until recently, research in psychology was almost exclusively limited to the study of self-objectification, and its consequences specifically, with virtually no empirical investigation into the process of objectifying others. In the last half of a decade, however, this has changed, and there has been a boom of empirical research on the objectification of women other than the self.

In line with the findings for self-objectification, empirical research examining objectified others supports the position that when others (usually women) are objectified they are stripped of key aspects of humanness. Much of this research focuses on agency (competence or "mind") and emotional experience (warmth and moral status), which from Nussbaum's perspective (1995), and a number of empirical frameworks in psychology (i.e., the contents of stereotypes, Fiske et al. 2002, see also, Fiske 2013; perceptions of mind, Gray et al. 2007; dimensions of humanness, Haslam et al. 2005; and even, dominance and nurturance in personality, Wiggins and Broughton 1991), are primary dimensions according to which people

are perceived to differ from objects. Thus, to the extent that a person is dehumanized, they should be perceived as diminished in these capacities. And indeed, outside the realm of objectification, research supports this assertion (e.g., Cuddy et al. 2007; Gray et al. 2007).

Extending this framework to objectification, Heflick et al. (2011) examined perceptions of competence, warmth, and morality as a function of whether participants were instructed to focus on a target person or the person's appearance. Across three experiments, women were presumed to have less of these qualities by men and women who were focused on their appearance. These findings were consistent among a diverse array of female targets, including Michelle Obama (First Lady of the United States), Robin Meade (CNN news anchor), and two unknown weather forecasters varying in attractiveness. In contrast, perceptions of men—President Barack Obama, Brian Willams (ABC news anchor), and unknown weather forecasters—were unaffected by the appearance focus manipulation.

Loughnan et al. (2010) provided additional evidence that objectification leads to dehumanization. In their first study they manipulated objectification by varying the amount of face relative to body of women wearing swimsuits in photographs. Women targets were denied mind (i.e., mental states) and moral status when they were objectified by a focus on their bodies. A second study showed these effects, along with perceptions of reduced competence and pain sensitivity, when women (and men, in this case) were depicted in a sexualized manner (i.e., women in bikinis and shirtless men; but see Gray et al. 2011, for contradictory findings).

Additional research by Cikara et al. (2011) examined attributions of agency as a function of men's sexist attitudes. Their research showed that, when viewing scantily clad women, men high in hostile sexism were more likely to associate them with first-person action verbs (e.g., use) compared to third person (e.g., uses), indicating a perception that sexualized women are the objects, not the agents, of action. Converging with this, men's sexism was associated with decreased activation of neural responses associated with mental state attribution (similar to when people view objects, Harris and Fiske 2006) in response to viewing images of sexualized women.

Gervais et al. (2011a) examined an additional quality of objects, or objectification: Nussbaum's notion that objectification involves the perception that targets are fungible, or interchangeable. The authors found that women, regardless of body type, were confused with similar others (in a body-face pairing task) by male and female perceivers, whereas for men, only those with bodies that resembled the cultural ideal were perceived as interchangeable. Similarly, Cikara et al. (2011) found that participants were better able to recognize the bodies, but not the faces, of sexualized women relative to clothed women, or sexualized or clothed men.

In addition to the research assessing qualities associated with humanness (e.g., agency and warmth), Heflick and Goldenberg (2009) assessed perceptions of humanness more directly. Participants were asked to judge personality traits as to how characteristic they were of Sarah Palin (the U.S. Republican vice-presidential candidate, at the time) or the actress Angelina Jolie. They then rated those same traits on how essential they were to human nature (qualities which distinguish

humans from objects, Loughnan and Haslam 2007; Loughnan et al. 2009). Following the paradigm used by Paladino and Vaes (2009), the within-person correlations were used to designate humanness attributed to the target. Results indicated that when participants were first instructed to write about Palin's or Jolie's appearance, the correlation between the typicality and the perceived humanness of the traits was significantly reduced compared to when they were prompted to write about the person. And, independent of the manipulation, the more participants wrote about Palin's or Jolie's appearance, the less they viewed them as evincing qualities that they perceived to characterize human nature.

Finally, a recent study by Bernard et al. (2012) demonstrated that sexualized women are recognized using cognitive processes similar to perceiving objects. The authors found that images of sexualized men were recognized more accurately when they were presented right side-up than when they were inverted, consistent with person-recognition in cognitive processing. In contrast, sexualized women were recognized equally well inverted as right-side up—as is the case with the perception of objects. Thus, even at a basic cognitive level, sexualized women are recognized as object rather than persons.

State of the Object: Inconsistencies, Uncertainties, and Questions of Interest

The work reviewed thus far converges on the notion that objectification involves the stripping of a person, most usually, a woman, of human qualities, rendering her more in the likeness of an object. This is true for women's perceptions of themselves, and for how people view other women. Before presenting the theoretical model, I note, however, some questions that remain, stemming from apparent inconsistencies in the literature.

Objectification and Dehumanization

Most conceptual and empirical treatment of objectification adheres to a framework in which humanization is threatened by an association with objects (cf. Nussbaum's definition: "a human being is regarded and/or treated as an object," 1995, p. 254), and not necessarily an association with animals. The work by Haslam et al. (e.g., Haslam 2006, 2007, see also, Haslam et al. 2013) clarifies this distinction. In short, they make the case that dehumanization means two things; that is, there are two different senses of humanness. Humanness can refer to what distinguishes humans from animals, and it can refer to what it is fundamental to human nature. It is when people are stripped of the latter that they are likened to machines, automata, or objects. And it is the latter, termed mechanistic dehumanization by Haslam (2006, in contrast to animalistic dehumanization), that is associated with objectification.

Clearly though, there are examples of women being associated with animals. This is especially true in pornographic representations of women (e.g., Adams 2004). Consistent with this, Vaes et al. (2011) showed that men and women associated sexualized women, and not sexualized men, with animal concepts (e.g., instinct, snout) more so than human concepts (e.g., culture, nose) in an implicit association task. For men, priming a sexual goal increased these tendencies. Explaining this seeming contradiction, Haslam et al. (2007) notes that "the two forms of dehumanization may sometimes co-occur—as in the simultaneous objectification and animalization of women in some pornography (p. 414);" but they maintain, objectification and animalization are distinct. Also consistent with this position, Rudman and Mescher (2012) found that although objectifying and animalizing women (using implicit association between women and objects, and women and animals, respectively) were each associated with men's rape proclivity, they were not significantly correlated.

I am not arguing that women, and especially sexualized women, are never dehumanized by being likened to animals—indeed, the position I will present (momentarily) draws on an assumption of such an association. But this is not objectification per se. On the basis of the theoretical and empirical literatures on objectification, I believe it is clear, objectification is dehumanizing in a mechanistic fashion (and it is in this manner that it can function to manage existential terror).

Objectification and Its Operationalization

Empirical research on objectification varies considerably in its operationalization. Relevant experiments have manipulated such conditions as: a focus on body versus face (Loughnan et al. 2010); amount of clothing worn, or sexualization (Cikara et al. 2010; Loughnan et al. 2010; Vaes et al. 2011); or a focus on appearance versus the person (Heflick and Goldenberg 2009; Heflick et al. 2011); and in research on self-objectification, focus on one's body or appearance is instigated, for example, by trying on a swimsuit (Fredrickson, Roberts et al. 1998). Critically, these manipulations are meant to induce a process of objectification, which can most appropriately be understood from the perspective of the perceiver, whether the perceiver is the same (as in self-objectification) or different than the target. The findings of Heflick and Goldenberg (2009) and Heflick et al. (2011) in which identical images were used with different instructions for what to focus on (i.e., appearance or the person) is consistent with this notion.

Relevant to this issue, Gray et al. (2011) stated "objectification, then, may not be objectification at all (p. 3)," to explain their findings that focusing on a person's body (compared to their mind) can increase attributions of "experience" (emotions and sensation) (in contrast to what others, e.g., Heflick et al. 2011; Loughnan et al. 2010, have found). I take issue with this statement. I suspect, rather, that the manipulations used to induce objectification may, in some instances, not induce objectification, or not solely objectification. Presenting a person in a sexualized

manner may induce objectification, but it may promote animalistic dehumanization as well. Moreover, simply increasing the salience of the body may make bodily sensations (e.g., experience of desire, pleasure) more accessible (especially to the extent that the manipulation highlights the sexuality of the target, see Gray et al. 2011), but this too may reflect a process distinct from objectification. Ultimately, objectification—perceiving a person as an object—must be measured to determine its occurrence.

Moreover, altering the presentation of a person's dress (or lack of) also poses the potential to induce negative perceptions (e.g., of diminished competence) that may be accounted for independent of objectification. For, a woman, or a man, who opts to pose for a picture in a swimsuit may be a different type of person than one who does not. To the extent that objectification refers to a process engaged by a perceiver, and accompanying perceptions, and not an actual change in the target, manipulations that alter the target may be especially susceptible to confounding objectification with alternative processes. As such, variability in findings should be interpreted with consideration of variable manipulations.

Objectification and Gender

Clearly, men can be objectified (e.g., Parent and Moradi 2011). But it is also clear, women are more often targets of objectification, and suffer more severe personal consequences as a result (cf. Fredrickson and Roberts 1997). In research examining perceptions of others, the majority of studies in which female targets have been compared to male targets have found effects specific to females (e.g., Bernard et al. 2012; Cikara et al. 2011; Heflick et al. 2011). There have been a few exceptions (e.g., Loughnan et al. 2010, Study 2; Gray et al. 2011), in all of which men's sexuality was accentuated with images of men wearing little clothing. As suggested above, such findings may reflect something phenomenologically distinct from objectification. When participants are instructed to merely focus on the appearance of men and women, women appear to be objectified, and men do not (Heflick et al. 2011).

In terms of who is doing the objectification (of others), the majority of research suggests both women and men are culprits. Even feminist depictions of objectification, in which male heterosexuality is at the core of female objectification, acknowledge that the perpetration of the objectification of women is not limited to men. Women objectify themselves; women objectify other women (e.g., Strelan and Hargreaves 2005; see Fredrickson and Roberts 1997). Although the majority of studies have found that men and women are alike in their tendencies to objectify women (e.g., Bernard et al. 2012; Heflick and Goldenberg 2009; Heflick et al. 2011; Loughnan et al. 2010), there are some findings of effects specific to men's reactions to women (men high in hostile sexism, Cikara et al. 2011). A reasonable interpretation is that both women and men objectify woman, but under some conditions men may be especially likely to do so.

Objectification and Its Scope

The term objectification, at its broadest, has been applied to any instrumental subjugation of a people by those with more power. For example, Karl Marx applied the term to workers under capitalism, and in Gruenfeld et al.'s (2008) experimental research, conditions of power were found to lead people to approach social targets on the basis of their usefulness to the perceiver. I do not dispute that these instances represent a form of objectification, but rather, along the lines of the majority of feminist, philosophical, and empirical treatment of the topic, and lay use of the term, I restrict my discussion to what is sometimes termed "sexual objectification" (though I do not believe it is necessarily *sexual*), or objectification that involves a reaction to a person's (most commonly, a woman's) body.

A Functional Understanding of Objectification (Terror Management)

I have thus far described a body of work wherein the objectification of a woman involves a reduction of her personhood, rendering her as an object. I now turn my attention from the question of what objectification entails to the question of why it occurs. To date, there has been remarkably little consideration of the function of objectification. The primary, indeed really the only, account of why women are objectified is offered by feminists scholars contending that women are objectified as a means to oppress them, and that males are the oppressors (Young 1990; de Beauvoir 1949/1989; Dworkin 1997; Mackinnon 1993; Wolf 1991). Wolf (1991) makes the specific case that the rigorous standards of beauty to which women are held function as a means to withhold power from women. From these perspectives, the objectification of women is engrained in patriarchal culture, and serves the ultimate function of subjugating women. I do not intend to take on this position, but merely suggest that it is incomplete. I do not mean to imply that objectification does not subjugate women (certainly it can and does), but rather, I suggest that there are additional factors at play.

For one, men are attracted to women. As such, it does not make sense that men would be generally motivated to derogate women, as might be the case with other out-groups. Construing women in a wholly negative light would, in this context, be injurious to men as well as women. Ambivalent sexism theory (Glick and Fiske 1996) accounts for seemingly positive attitudes toward women, in addition to negative ones, by suggesting that men need women, and thus, need to pacify them. But, as Goldenberg and Roberts (2004, 2010) argued, men don't simply need women; they *want* them. And thus "benevolence" toward women may be rooted in, not only a need to pacify women, but in men's need to pacify themselves.

Goldenberg and Roberts (2004, 2010) additionally argued that understanding the function of objectification also requires an explanation for why women

themselves so willingly commit to "relentless self-surveillance" (Bartky 1990, p. 80), or self-objectification (Fredrickson and Roberts 1997), of their own bodies, and why they objectify other women (e.g., Strelan and Hargreaves 2005). Sure there are clear interpersonal, even economic, benefits for women who attain a cultural ideal for appearance; but there are also intrapersonal, psychological, and economic consequences associated with the effort to attain such standards (e.g., Bordo 1993; Crocker and Park 2004; Fredrickson and Roberts 1997; Wolf 1991). Feminists accounts of self-objectification assume that women are essentially duped, viewing themselves as reflected by patriarchal culture (e.g., Bartky 1990), and Calogero and Jost (2011, see also, Calogero 2013b), more recently, took a similar position, arguing that self-objectification can serve a system justification (Jost and Banaji 1994) function. In short, they show that self-objectification amongst women is increased when women are exposed to sexist ideologies that incorporate benevolent messages about women's inferiority. But arguing that women are motivated to justify the system does not explain why a particular system emerged in the first place.

In short, assuming that men have power and want to keep it, and that women too are motivated to justify the current system despite its disservice to them, fails to consider two important factors. One, men are attracted to women, and this presumably influences the particular manifestation of oppression (i.e., objectification). And two, women may not be motivated to justify just any system, but a particular type of system—in which they are objectified.

A Terror Management Explanation

The question of why people objectify women can be informed, alternatively, by terror management theory. In short, this perspective suggests that objectification may stem, not from a motivation to devalue women, but rather to esteem them, at least with respect to their existential frailty. And women's own efforts may result not solely from efforts to conform to or justify the social system, but to protect themselves from existential concerns associated with mortality (or terror management).

The Terror. Terror management theory was derived from existentialism in philosophy (e.g., Kierkegaard 1849/1954), literature (e.g., Camus 1946), and psychology (e.g., Brown 1959; Fromm 1955; Rank 1930/1998), and most directly, from the writings of Ernest Becker. In synthesizing the views of these scholars, along with evolutionary and psychoanalytic insights, Becker (1973) came to the conclusion that members of the human species are wrought with a potentially terrifying existential dilemma. They want to live, are evolutionarily and psychologically geared toward survival, but yet are cognizant of the ineluctable and terrifying fact of their mortality. But alas, Becker went on to suggest that these same capabilities of the human mind that render individuals aware of death, in addition, provide the tools to deny it. Specifically, people invent, immerse themselves in, and cling to

the standards of value of, a symbolic, cultural, immortal conception of the world, and for themselves within it. By these means, people deny death.

Greenberg et al. (1986) developed terror management theory (TMT) to provide an empirical framework for testing Becker's ideas. One basic hypothesis of the theory suggests that if cultural beliefs and values function as a defense against the fear of death, priming thoughts about mortality should increase people's investment in these constructs. To test this, for example, in one study (Greenberg et al. 1995) participants were given the task of sifting sand out of black dye. The only way to do this was to pour the dye through a small piece of fabric, which for some participants was small American flag. After being reminded of their death (the mortality salience induction), participants in the American flag condition took longer to complete the task (and desecrate a cultural symbol) than those who had not been primed with thoughts of death. There was no effect of mortality salience for participants provided with a white cloth instead of a flag.

Mortality salience has been manipulated most commonly with two open-ended questions about one's own death followed by a delay and distraction (so that death thoughts are activated, but not conscious, at the time of the defense; Greenberg et al. 1994), but also with subliminal measures and more naturalistic occurrences (e.g., walking by a funeral home, Pyszczynski et al. 1996). The salience of mortality has also been contrasted with other aversive but non-death related control topics (e.g., exclusion, pain); effects have been shown to be produced in response to death specifically, and not other threatening events (e.g., Greenberg et al. 1995). Also supporting the specificity of the threat of (non-conscious) death thought, and the protective function of cultural beliefs, recent research has demonstrated that when people's beliefs are threatened, thoughts of death become more implicitly accessible (e.g., using a word-completion task, people are more likely to complete COFF_ _ as COFFIN than COFFEE, Schimel et al. 2007).

To be sure, there is a large body of work supporting terror management theory (see Solomon et al. 2004, for a review). In short, it converges to support the position that people have a deep-seated need to manage concerns about their mortality, and that they do so by investing in symbolic views of themselves and the world.

The Body. Terror management theory maintains that people manage concerns about mortality by immersing themselves into a symbolic, cultural world. But humans are not only symbolic beings; they are physical creatures as well. Herein lies the rub—a kink in the management of existential terror. The body, the "heart-pumping, breath-grasping body that once belonged to a fish and still carries the gill-marks to prove it (1973, p. 26)" in Becker's (albeit technically inaccurate) words, is the kink. Becker's sentimental protests against the shortcomings of the body, "the strangest and most repugnant way being that it aches and bleeds and will decay and die (Becker 1973, p. 26)," illustrates the basis of the body problem (see Goldenberg et al. 2000; Goldenberg 2012, for reviews).

Supporting the position that the body is a problem and that the threat is rooted in existential mortality concerns is a program of research showing, for example, that priming mortality increases disgust in response to the body (Goldenberg et al. 2001), negative reactions to the physical aspects of sex (Goldenberg et al. 1999,

2002), even distancing from basic sensory experiences, such as receiving a foot massage (Goldenberg et al. 2006). In some of this research effects were found specifically among individuals high in neuroticism (e.g., Goldenberg et al. 2006), presumably because increased negativity and instability makes high neurotics less secure in their symbolic bases of meaning. Studies have also found that making the physical aspects of sex or the body's disgusting aspects salient functions to increase the accessibility of death related thought (Cox et al. 2007b), also supporting the position that difficulties with these aspects of the human condition are rooted in concerns about death. Moreover, comparable effects are not found when people think about the symbolic aspects of body (i.e., sex in the context of love), attesting to the ameliorative function of symbolic meaning.

In some of the research on this topic, a manipulation is employed to cast attention to the association between the physical body and human creatureliness, the idea being that some physical aspects of the body, such as sex, can be construed in a more or less creaturely fashion, depending on the mindset (or personality, i.e., neuroticism). This so-called, human creatureliness manipulation, usually involves having participants read an essay that highlights the biological similarity between humans and animals (e.g., "…Whether you're talking about lizards, cows, horses, insects, or humans, we're all made up of the same basic biological products … skin, blood, organs, and bones…"), or an essay emphasizing human uniqueness (e.g., "… Humans have language and culture … art, music, and literature … live in an abstract world of the imagination …"). The former leads to an avoidance of the body in contrast to the latter and also relative to no essay manipulation (e.g., reduced breast exam duration, Goldenberg et al. 2008). Moreover, this manipulation interacts with mortality salience to create more negative reactions to the physical body (e.g., sex, independent of any effects of neuroticism, Goldenberg et al. 2002), depicting a threat associated with mortality, and the physicality of the body in the context of mortality.

And Women. Although the body in general is a problem from the perspective of terror management theory, some bodies—women's bodies—seem to be especially problematic. Women's bodies bear the brunt of the responsibility for reproduction (one of, if not *the*, most basic biological function of any creature). Both men and women can invest their time and care to provide for offspring, but the role of women's bodily investment is obligatory and costly in terms of resources (Trivers 1972). Women menstruate from puberty through menopause; they carry each fetus in their body for nine months, then experience labor and childbirth; and then (as if that were not enough) their body continues to provide for the baby with lactation. Indeed, women's physiological situation led Simone de Beauvoir to conclude that the female "is more enslaved to the species than the male is, her animality is more manifest" (1949/2011, p. 268). Not surprisingly, women are perceived by both men and women to be more associated with biology and nature than are men (Ortner 1974; Reynolds and Haslam 2011; see also, Vandello et al. 2008).

In addition to a long list of anthropological illustrations (see Goldenberg et al. 2013), research depicts negative reactions to the trio of women's reproductive bodily functions—menstruation, pregnancy, and lactation. Menstruation, and

the taboos surrounding it, provides the most obvious example. Ranging from physical isolation, to restricted activities, to purification or hygiene rituals, negative reactions are longstanding and universal. Contemporary Western attitudes, too, are unambiguously negative, and center mostly around concerns about cleanliness and concealment. Although pregnancy, and even breastfeeding, is, on the surface, more respected and valued, exposing either is often responded to with derision. From the current perspective, these womanly functions are threatening, and specifically on account of the implications for the threat of human creatureliness.

Empirical evidence converges with this position. Both men and women display disgust reactions towards even a new, unwrapped tampon, refusing to touch it to their lips when asked (Lee and Sasser-Coen 1996; Rozine et al. 1999). Moreover, in a study designed to test more implicit reactions to menstruation, Roberts, Goldenberg, Power, and Pyszczynski et al. (1996) found that when a woman seemingly inadvertently dropped a wrapped tampon from her bag she was viewed as less competent and liked less by both men and women compared to when she dropped an equally feminine, but not creaturely, hair clip. In the tampon condition, participants also physically distanced themselves from the woman by sitting farther away from her.

Pregnancy, too, should be a blatant reminder of women's creatureliness, and existential concerns should therefore exacerbate negative attitudes toward pregnancy. Supporting this hypothesis, in the first of two experiments, Goldenberg et al. (2007) primed human creatureliness with the essay highlighting the similarities between humans and animals and then examined reactions to one of two *Vanity Fair* magazine covers from the early 1990s: Demi Moore posing nude and pregnant, or just nude (well, wearing body paint). As hypothesized, priming creatureliness led to more negative reactions to the pregnant image but did not affect reactions to the one in which Moore was not pregnant. In a second study, priming creatureliness reduced perceptions of actor Gwyneth Paltrow's competence when participants viewed a photo of her fully clothed, and pregnant, but not when they viewed an almost identical image sans the pregnant belly. Thus, not only do concerns about creatureliness inspire negative reactions to a pregnant depiction, but a woman's competence is devalued under such conditions.

In a series of experiments, Cox et al. (2007a) also examined reactions to breastfeeding as a function of existential concerns. In two experiments, the salience of mortality enhanced negative reactions to breastfeeding. In the first, after being reminded of death, breastfeeding in public was rated as a more severe transgression; and, in the second, mortality salience led participants to dislike and sit further away from a woman they believed had just breastfed (compared to bottle-fed) her baby in private. A separate study demonstrated that people expressed increased negativity toward a picture of actor Pierce Brosnan with his wife breastfeeding their child, but not to a nearly identical image in which his wife was not breastfeeding, after being primed with the human creatureliness essay. In a final study, Cox et al. provided direct evidence that it is concerns about creatureliness (in response to breastfeeding) that pose a salient threat in the context of mortality salience. When mortality was primed and participants expected to interact with a

breastfeeding, but not a bottle-feeding, partner, they responded to a word fragment completion task with more creatureliness-related words (e.g., CREAT _ _ E with CREATURE rather than CREATIVE).

In addition to a threat posed by women's role in reproduction, women's bodies may pose an additional threat on account of their potential to provoke lust in men. Just as with pregnancy, menstruation, and breastfeeding, taboos and regulations surrounding women's sexuality are rampant worldwide (see Gilmore 2001; and also, Landau et al. 2006), and men, while rigorously pursuing mating opportunities, also experience anxiety over such inclinations (e.g., Barlow 1986). Landau et al. (2006) conducted a series of studies supporting the proposition that mortality concerns underlie men's ambivalence toward women who provoke sexual desire. The authors found that mortality reminders led men to minimize their attraction to women, and that this was the case specifically in response to seductive, compared to more wholesome (culturally sanctioned), women. In contrast, women's reactions to sexy men were unaffected by mortality salience. And moreover, priming men's lust in conjunction with mortality salience led men to respond with more negative, less sympathetic reactions to a woman who was purportedly aggressed against by a man (compared to a man aggressed against by a man).

Beauty as a Solution. Simone de Beauvoir wrote "In woman dressed and adorned, nature is present but under restraint" (1949/1989, p. 159). In collaboration with Tomi-Ann Roberts (Goldenberg and Roberts 2004, 2010), I have taken a similar position. We have theorized that the objectification, and self-objectification, of women can function as a means to strip women of their association with nature, which, from the perspective of terror management theory, should be threatening on account of the need to manage fears associated with death. Research helps to support this position.

First, in the Roberts et al. (2002) study where a woman dropped a tampon, male and female participants responded not only by devaluing and distancing from the particular female target, but also with a greater tendency to value physical appearance in women (relative to physical competence), adapting the self-objectifications scale developed by Noll and Fredrickson (1998) to perceptions of women in general.

Beyond this single study, research shows that women respond to mortality reminders with increased value placed on appearance and also with greater efforts to conform to specific standards for attractiveness. For example, mortality salience leads women to self-objectify (value appearance) using the Noll and Fredrickson measure (Grabe et al. 2005). In addition, priming thoughts of mortality has been found to lead women, but not men, to restrict their consumption of a nutritious, but fattening, snack food (Goldenberg et al. 2005). Likewise, women have been found to increase their tanning intentions, and decrease their intentions to use sunscreen, after mortality salience, especially when tanned skin is associated with women's attractiveness (Cox et al. 2009; Routledge et al. 2004).

Despite research showing that high self-objectifying women respond with more psychological consequences to being objectified (e.g., Fredrickson et al. 1998), a recent series of studies showed that when mortality is salient, high self-objectifiers actually respond more favorably to objectification. Goldenberg et al. (2011) found that

self-objectification (again, measured using Noll and Fredrickson's self-objectification questionnaire) predicted the degree to which women reported liking an objectifying image (the *Sports Illustrated Swimsuit Issue*) when mortality was salient; higher self-objectification was associated with greater liking. In contrast, in response to an image portraying a competent, non-objectified woman (*Sports Illustrated* with soccer player Mia Hamm on the cover), greater self-objectification was associated with decreased liking when mortality was salient. In a second study, self-objectification moderated women's self-esteem in response to receiving a compliment about their outfit in the midst of a (successful) performance task after a subliminal mortality prime. Building on this work, Morris et al. (in press) showed that, for high self-objectifying women, an objectifying image could even facilitate a less defensive reaction to a health appeal (cf., Sherman et al. 2000) in the context of a mortality reminder. Together, these studies provide direct evidence that objectification can provide protection against mortality concerns, at least among women committed to self-objectification as a defense.

The Next Step

Although I had previously made the argument that objectification of women can be understood a defense against mortality concerns (Goldenberg and Roberts 2004, 2010), empirical research had yet to connect all the pieces—until just recently. The model depicts squeamishness with the body's physicality that is exacerbated by the salience of mortality. This has been demonstrated, and specifically with respect to women's reproductive features (e.g., Cox et al. 2007a, b). However, the notion that objectification is a reaction to this threat, and specifically in the context of mortality concerns, has been less convincingly supported. Women do strive harder to attain societal standards for an attractive appearance, and value it more, when mortality is salient (e.g., Goldenberg et al. 2005). But, these studies do not connect objectification to creatureliness. The only study to directly connect women's creatureliness to their subsequent objectification is the tampon-drop study (Roberts et al. 2002); recall that men and women exposed to a tampon were more likely to endorse the importance of appearance over competence in women. But mortality was not primed in Roberts et al.

Arguing that objectification is a terror management response requires showing that mortality concerns, creatureliness, and objectification are all linked. I will present new findings that demonstrate this. This new research also takes the next step, and integrates the framework in which objectification can be understood as making into a thing that which is not a thing. Thus, although focusing on appearance may foster objectification in certain situations, objectification is not necessarily, or not only, a focus on appearance. Rather, to make the case that objectification functions as terror management, it is critical to implement measures that tap more directly into objectification in a more literal sense.

With these goals in mind, Morris, Goldenberg and Heflick (2013) conducted two studies assessing literal objectification using the paradigm based on Paladino

and Vaes (2009) and implemented in Heflick and Goldenberg (2009). Recall that Heflick and Goldenberg had participants rate the degree that various attributes were characteristic of human nature after rating the extent that they were characteristic of a female target. Morris et al. (2013) instead had participants rate themselves in addition to the humanness of various traits. Because the denial of human nature ratings have been shown to reflect a likening to objects, or robots (e.g., Loughnan et al. 2009), the degree that the self ratings and human nature ratings were correlated was used as an indicator of literal self-objectification. Based on terror management theory, we hypothesized that women would construe their self as less human (and thus more like objects) when mortality had been primed and women's reproductive aspects had been made salient.

In a first study, participants were primed with an image of a pregnant woman compared to the same women dressed similarly and not pregnant. After viewing the pregnant image, mortality salience led women, but not men, to self-objectify by attributing less humanness to themselves. Priming mortality did not affect self-dehumanization (see also, Moradi 2013) as a response to the non-pregnant image. In a second study, female participants were run one at a time in the laboratory. After completing the mortality or control manipulation, a female experimenter interrupted the participant and asked if they had an extra tampon, or a pencil in the control condition. This menstruation prompt in conjunction with mortality salience again led to women to deny their own humanness.

Interestingly, in these studies we also assessed self-objectification using the traditional self-objectification measure (Noll and Fredrickson 1998). In only the pregnancy study was there a significant increase in the importance women placed on their appearance as a function of pregnancy and mortality. In the menstruation study the trend was in the same direction, but it was not significant. Even more provocative, the two indices of self-objectification were not correlated. There are a number of potential explanations for this; but, we are particularly intrigued by the idea that although a focus on appearance is often an antecedent of objectification, it is not objectification per se. And, so, while a focus on appearance may help ameliorate the threat posed by women's reproductive functions in the face of a mortality reminder, it also may not. Indeed, previous research has found that only women who place high value on their appearance respond favorably to appearance-oriented stimuli after mortality reminders (Goldenberg et al. 2011), and only for these women does such stimuli seem to ameliorate existential concerns (Morris et al. 2013). In contrast, being an object should have a general death-denying function independent of the value placed on appearance. Clearly, more research will be necessary to clarify the divergence of these two self-objectifying outcomes.

It follows that not only would women self-objectify by denying their own humanness when their reproductive aspects are highlighting in the context of salient death thoughts, but that others too would partake in this literal objectification of women. Research demonstrates that women are denied humanness when they are sexualized (e.g., Bernard et al. 2012; Loughnan et al. 2010), but a terror management framework implies that priming mortality should enhance this

further. Although not designed with this specific hypothesis in mind, previous findings by Landau et al. (2006) are consistent with such theorizing. Specifically, the authors found that not only did mortality reminders decrease men's self-reported sexual attraction to a sexualized, seductive woman, but when men were primed with mortality and asked to think about their own lust in response to women, they were more likely to condone an aggressive act against a woman. To the extent that men's lust is also an indicator of human corporeality (women's bodies to inspire it and men's bodies to respond to it) and to the extent that there are not moral sanctions against harming objects (Gray et al. 2007), this finding is suggestive of the possibility that women were viewed as objects in this study.

Just recently, we (Morris and Goldenberg 2013) obtained direct support for the hypothesis that women would be viewed in an object-like manner in response to mortality reminders and, as in Landau et al. (2006), men's lust. Participants were primed with lust and mortality, or control conditions, and subsequently shown multiple sets of three images. They were asked to select the image that was *least* like the other two, with the critical trials consisting of a man or woman, paired with an image of an animal and an image of an object. Results indicated that heterosexual men primed with mortality and lust increased the extent to which they associated women with objects, relative to how much they associated men with the same objects. Women's pairing were unaffected by the lust and mortality salience manipulations.

A second study took a more naturalistic approach. Participants were exposed to advertisements featuring sexualized women either merged with an object (e.g., a woman portrayed literally as part of a beer bottle) or not (e.g., the same advertisement photo-edited so that the woman and beer bottle were presented as separate). In line with Landau et al.'s (2006) finding, men reported less attraction to the sexy woman when she was not merged with the object. In contrast, when the woman was literally objectified, by being merged with the object, mortality salience led men to report greater attraction to the women. Again, women showed no comparable effects. Together, these findings provide the first direct evidence that, in the context of mortality concerns, men's sexual attraction to women's bodies poses a unique threat that may be managed, at least in part, through a literal association between women and objects.

Conclusion

Earliest philosophical and feminist considerations of objectification suggest that objectification can involve, not only a focus on women's bodies, but a literal transformation of women into objects. In psychology, research on objectification theory has documented a variety of consequences resulting from a focus on women's appearance by themselves or others. These consequences are generally consistent with the position that objectification involves turning women into things: women become more passive and inert, and use their minds less. Most recently, there has

been a boom of empirical social psychological research documenting the tendency for others to see women as objects when focus is on their appearance, or in many studies, when they are explicitly sexualized. I considered varying operationalizations (e.g., whether women are sexualized), and some inconsistencies in findings (e.g., whether findings are specific to women). Still, the results are for the most part consistent, and supportive of the position that objectifying women involves rendering women as objects.

But why are women objectified? The explanations that have been put forth rely on gender inequity and motivations to preserve it. These frameworks, while likely explaining part of the story, may not complete the picture. Such explanations do not account for men's attraction to women's bodies. And although they explain women's self-objectification by virtue of living in a patriarchal culture, and the motivation to justify the current system, they do not account for the conditions that would lead to objectification of women in the first place. In contrast, terror management theory can offer a framework for explaining why women are objectified and why they objectify themselves, and the conditions that should promote this.

From the perspective of terror management theory, the need to manage a fear of death creates a fundamental problem with the physical body, and such difficulties resonate especially in reaction to women's—menstruating, lactating, childbearing—bodies. In previous work, Goldenberg and Roberts (e.g. 2004) argued that concealing or transforming these aspects with rigorous attention paid to women's appearance can function to ameliorate this threat. But, in integrating philosophical theorizing and the latest social psychological research on objectification as dehumanization, I argued, this position can be taken further. The literal transformation of women into objects can offer a direct route to terror management—objects are not alive, and therefore cannot die. I concluded this chapter with the presentation of some brand new studies providing the first direct support for the objectification of woman as terror management. As would be predicted uniquely by terror management theory, priming mortality in conjunction with reminding women of their body's role in reproduction leads women, but not men, to deny their own humanness; and priming mortality in conjunction with men's lust toward women leads men, but not women, to associate women with objects, and prefer sexy women merged with, but not separated from, objects.

In sum, women are not only burdened with the human condition—mortality, and an awareness of it—but also the unique consequence of being objectified by others, and themselves, as a response. In light of evidence that objects are not granted the same moral considerations as people, or even animals (Gray et al. 2007), evidence that women are perceived as literal objects is especially disconcerting. For, although objects cannot die, they can most certainly be harmed. Women are harmed not only when they are discriminated against, or aggressed against, but they are harmed by the stamping out of their authentic, and awesome, human nature and potential. Understanding the lengths that humans go through to deny mortality, however, may offer some insights into how best to free women from their objectification.

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On Objects and Actions: Situating Self-Objectification in a System Justification Context

Rachel M. Calogero

Abstract Integrating objectification and system justification perspectives, this chapter offers a conception of self-objectification as a dominant cultural lens through which women come to view themselves that garners their compliance in the sexist status quo. This chapter begins with an overview of objectification theory (Fredrickson and Roberts 1997) and system justification theory (Jost and Banaji, 1994). Then, an integration of the two perspectives is presented that situates self-objectification in a system justification context, extending the scope of impact of self-objectification beyond the domains of body image and mental health. Empirical evidence is reviewed to demonstrate the direct and indirect ways that self-objectification works as a system-justifying device for many women. For example, as a self-perspective that increases in response to benevolently sexist ideology or as a potential obstacle to taking collective action on behalf of women, self-objectification functions as a motivational and ideological force that rationalizes and legitimizes a gender role hierarchy. This developing program of research attempts to deepen our understanding of self-objectification and the broader system-level implications of this self-perspective. The chapter concludes with a discussion of potential next steps and a call for continued scientific inquiry into the broader functions of self-objectification.

> Why can women know that this—life as we have known it—is not all, not enough, not ours, not just? Now, why don't all women?
>
> Catharine MacKinnon (1989, p. 115)

> The beauty practices that women engage in, and which men find so exciting, are those of political subordinates…The fact that some women say that they take pleasure in the practices is not inconsistent with their role in the subordination of women.
>
> Sheila Jeffreys (2005, p. 26–27)

The pervasive tendency to equate girls and women with their bodies within westernized cultural contexts has been linked to a suite of adverse outcomes for girls and women (American Psychological Association [APA] 2007; Fredrickson

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S. J. Gervais (ed.), *Objectification and (De)Humanization*,
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 60, DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-6959-9_5,

and Roberts, 1997; Moradi and Huang 2008). According to the United Nations (1995), a cultural practice is considered harmful to women if the practice: (1) is harmful to the health of girls and women, (2) arises from material power differences between the sexes, (3) is for the benefit of men, (4) creates stereotypes which thwart the opportunities of girls and women, and (5) is justified by tradition. Based on these criteria, I propose that self-objectification—and the system of sexual objectification that perpetuates it—limits the full potential of individual girls and women and constitutes a cultural practice that is harmful to them. The central aim of the present chapter is to describe an integrative social psychological framework that further articulates how this harm might be exacted.

This integrative framework draws on two main theoretical perspectives to situate self-objectification in a system justification context. This chapter begins with an overview of objectification theory (Fredrickson and Roberts 1997), with a focus on delineating the construct of self-objectification and the consequences associated with it. An overview of system justification theory (Jost and Banaji 1994) follows, with a focus on the motivation to justify the status quo and comply with it. Then, an integration of the two perspectives is presented that situates self-objectification in a system justification context. This developing program of research attempts to deepen our understanding of self-objectification and the broader system-level implications of this self-perspective. Throughout this section, empirical evidence is presented that provides direct and indirect support for this integrative framework. The chapter concludes with a discussion of potential next steps and a call for continued scientific inquiry into the broader functions of self-objectification.

Objectification Theory: An Overview

Sexual Objectification

Onesies for infant girls read: "Pretty like Mommy." Onesies for infant boys read: "Bikini Inspector." T-shirts for young girls read: "Future porn star." T-shirts for young boys read: "Lock up your daughters." T-shirts for adult women read: "Who needs brains when you have these?" T-shirts for adult men read: "Some call it stalking, I call it love." These clothing products are real and reflect a deeply entrenched cultural view of girls and women as sex objects in the service of boys and men. Although lay reactions to these t-shirts range from "funny" and "cute" to "harmless" and "just get it over it," the empirical evidence consistently demonstrates that the content of these messages is cause for concern. Scholars have documented that when sexually objectified, women are stripped of agency and competence (Cikara et al. 2011; Heflick and Goldenberg 2009), dehumanized (Loughnan et al. 2010), and more likely the targets of sexual aggression (Donnerstein and Hallam 1978; Lanis and Covell, 1995; Rudman and Borgida, 1995; Rudman and Mescher, 2012). At a basic cognitive level, both men and

women demonstrate a tendency to recognize and perceive sexualized women more as objects, whereas they perceive sexualized men more as persons (Bernard et al. 2012). Moreover, under objectifying conditions, women behave with less social agency (Bryant 1993; Calogero 2013b; Saguy et al. 2010), report more negative self-evaluations (Lavine et al. 1999; Tiggemann and Boundy 2008), and perform worse on concurrent cognitive tasks (Fredrickson et al. 1998; Gervais et al. 2011). This section provides a concrete definition of sexual objectification and a summary of the most common ways it is enacted in westernized cultural contexts.

To objectify is to make into and treat something that is not an object as an object—which can be used, manipulated, controlled, and known through its physical properties (Nussbaum 1995). A person is made into a sexual object when the objectification serves a sexual purpose or function. Sexual objectification is characterized by the following: "A person is sexually objectified when her sexual parts or sexual functions are separated out from the rest of her personality and reduced to the status of mere instruments or else regarded as if they were capable of representing her. In this definition, then, the prostitute would be a victim of sexual objectification, as would the *Playboy* bunny, the female breeder, and the bathing beauty" (Bartky 1990, p. 26). This fragmentation of women into collections of sexual parts and functions manifests in varying degrees of force from sexualized gazing and visual inspection to sexual violence and rape. Typical experiences and events that constitute sexual objectification include gazing or checking out women's bodies, whistling or honking at women, taking unsolicited photographs of women's bodies, sexual commentary directed toward women, sexual jokes, sexualized media imagery or pornography, sexual harassment, and sexual violence. Although some of these experiences are more common than others, their recurrence in the lives of women and men implies that both genders are reminded (even if only momentarily) that women are viewed as objects. These forms of sexual objectification do not occur under women's control and are often viewed as permissible (Brownmiller 1975; Henley 1977; MacKinnon 1989; World Health Organization 2005). Collectively, these experiences and practices constitute the "objectifying cultural milieu" in which girls and women are socialized.

Objectification theory starts from the well-established premise that cultural practices of sexually objectifying women are pervasive in westernized societies and create multiple opportunities for public attention to be drawn to the female body (Fredrickson and Roberts 1997). In most westernized societies, it is normative for women's bodies to be ogled, sexualized, commented on, harassed, and violated. As MacKinnon (1989) states, "All women live in sexual objectification the way fish live in water" (p. 149). Objectification theory organizes the different ways in which women's bodies are routinely sexually objectified more broadly into interpersonal encounters and media encounters, which are summarized below.

Interpersonal encounters include interactions with familiar others (e.g., family, friends, colleagues, employers, and acquaintances) or with strangers, and begin early in the socialization process. Female children, adolescent girls, and adult women report exposure to sexually degrading jokes, being sexually harassed, being called sexual names, having body parts ogled, and being the target

of unwanted sexual advances to a significantly greater degree than boys and men (Gardner 1980; Hill and Fischer 2008; Klonoff and Landrine 1995; Kozee et al. 2007; Macmillan et al. 2000; Moradi et al. 2005; Murnen and Smolak 2000; Puwar 2004; Swim et al. 2001). Media encounters include the depiction of women as primarily bodies and body parts in magazines, advertisements, TV programming, film, music lyrics and videos, and internet and social networking sites (for reviews, APA 2007; Calogero et al. 2011; Reichert and Carpenter 2004). A quick glance at the stable of magazine covers at the grocery counter confirms the extent of this form of sexual objectification.

In sum, the empirical evidence substantiates our everyday observations that girls and women are routinely targeted for sexually objectifying treatment in their day-to-day lives. A cultural climate where such intense and persistent scrutiny of the female body is accepted and reinforced does not exist without consequence for the girls and women who live in it. Indeed, the purpose of objectification theory was not to elucidate the causes of the sexual objectification of women, but rather to articulate a set of consequences for girls and women that may directly stem from it. In the next section, these consequences are described.

Self-Objectification

In the objectification theory framework, *self-objectification* is identified as the primary psychological consequence for girls and women of living in an objectifying cultural milieu (Fredrickson and Roberts 1997): "We posit that in a culture that objectifies the female body, whatever girls and women do, the potential always exists for their thoughts and actions to be interrupted by images of how their bodies appear" (p. 180). According to this theory, repetitive and systematic encounters of being sexually objectified encourage girls and women to adopt an observer's gaze, or third-person perspective, on their selves. This introjection of an objectifying gaze directs women to view their bodies primarily in terms of their value and attractiveness to others, rather than on their value and function for the self. Consistent with Kaschak's reasoning (Kaschak 1992), "The body becomes a product to be manipulated and exhibited to its best advantage rather than a living apparatus to be developed and experienced fully" (p. 112).

Self-objectification is described as a peculiar form of self-consciousness, whereby a person views the body as belonging "less to them and more to others" (Fredrickson and Roberts 1997, p. 193). The objectifying lens that women adopt and turn inward is not gender neutral. Gender undeniably acts as a pervasive organizer of culture, especially in cultures saturated with heterosexuality (Horney 1937; Henley 1977; Lerner 1983). Similarly, the sexually objectifying gaze is organized along gender lines.

> She has to survey everything she is and everything she does because how she appears to others, and ultimately how she appears to men, is of crucial importance for what is normally thought of as the success of her life…Men survey women before treating them.

> Consequently, how a woman appears to a man can determine how she will be treated. To acquire some control over this process, women must contain it and interiorize it (Berger 1972, p. 40).

Berger is one of several scholars who recognized that it is the culturally dominant heterosexist male gaze which women come to adopt as their own. "In contemporary patriarchal culture, a panoptical male connoisseur resides within the consciousness of most women: They stand perpetually before his gaze and under his judgment. Woman lives her body as seen by another, by an anonymous patriarchal Other" (Bartky 1990, p. 72).

It is useful at this point to address an often posed objection to this proposition that it is the male gaze specifically which is problematic. What about women who sexually objectify other women? Although there is little empirical research on this dynamic (Goldenberg 2013), objectification theory does not deny that women sexually objectify each other. What the theory does argue is that all women in westernized societies are socialized within the same patriarchal framework which measures women's value in relation to their fulfillment of the role of sex object for men. Therefore, all women learn what the standards for comparison and evaluation are when it comes to appearance. If women have adopted the objectifying male gaze as their own, it seems likely women would objectify each other (Strelan and Hargreaves 2005), since both men and women come to view women's bodies through the same lens. In short, women may be objectifying other women, but they do so through the eyes of men.

> We are often told that "women dress for other women." There is some truth in this: Who else but someone engaged in a project similar to my own can appreciate the panache with which I bring it off? But women know for whom this game is played: They know that a pretty young woman is likelier to become a flight attendant than a plain one and that a well-preserved older woman has a better chance of holding onto her husband than one who has "let herself go." (Bartky 1990, p. 72).

Although women do objectify other women, it is difficult to argue that the female gaze is a parallel practice to the male gaze because of the different power dynamics in place. Further, there is empirical evidence to demonstrate that the male gaze is a more insidious and significant contributor to women's self-objectification than the female gaze (Calogero 2004; Saguy et al. 2010).

Objectification theory proposes that women will vary in the degree to which they self-objectify, but most women will experience self-objectification in one of two forms. Many women will experience some degree of state self-objectification in situations where attention has been called to their bodies, such as receiving catcalls, catching someone staring at their breasts, or where their gender becomes a salient feature of the immediate social context. For some women, however, this objectified lens becomes engaged virtually all of the time, whether they find themselves in public or private settings. This more pervasive and chronic view of the self as an object is referred to as trait self-objectification. Whether engaged as trait or state, self-objectification is associated with a number of adverse consequences for women.

Consequences of Self-Objectification

In the objectification theory framework, self-objectification is the primary psychological mechanism that accounts for the link between women's experiences of sexual objectification at the cultural level and their bodily and subjective wellbeing at the individual level. Self-objectification kicks off a chain of psychological events that are known to occur at a disproportionately higher rate among girls and women. Although some of the proposed relationships within objectification theory require more research and clarification, considerable empirical support has been garnered for most of the propositions described below (Calogero et al. 2011; Moradi and Huang 2008; Tiggemann 2011; Tiggemann and Williams 2012).

Specifically, self-objectification creates more opportunities for girls and women to experience a particular collection of negative subjective outcomes, including body shame, appearance anxiety, disrupted attention or flow, and diminished awareness of internal bodily states (e.g., satiety, hunger, fatigue, and emotions). These subjective experiences serve as the intermediate variables that link self-objectification to three specific mental health outcomes, which include depressed mood (Grabe et al. 2007; Tiggemann and Kuring 2004), disordered eating (Calogero et al. 2005; Tylka and Hill 2004; Tylka and Sabik 2010), and sexual dysfunction (Calogero and Thompson 2009; Steer and Tiggemann 2008). Thus, self-objectification indirectly contributes to greater depression, eating disorders, and sexual dysfunction in women by generating recurrent shame and anxiety, disrupting attention that could be directed toward pleasurable and rewarding activities, and reducing sensitivity to internal bodily cues.

A considerable body of evidence has also linked self-objectification to a range of other negative intrapersonal and behavioral outcomes, well beyond those originally proposed by objectification theory. The following is a list (not exhaustive) of other consequences empirically associated with self-objectification: lower intrinsic motivation and self-efficacy (Gapinski et al. 2003); lower self-esteem (Choma et al. 2010); less life satisfaction (Mercurio and Landry 2008); diminished cognitive performance (Fredrickson et al. 1998; Gay and Castano 2010; Quinn et al. 2006); diminished physical performance (Fredrickson and Harrison 2005); more negative attitudes toward breastfeeding (Johnston-Robeldo et al. 2007a) and reproductive functioning (Johnston-Robledo et al. 2007b; Roberts 2004); greater fear and perceived risk of rape (Fairchild and Rudman 2008); greater hostility toward other women (Loya et al. 2006); more self-injury (Muehlenkamp et al. 2005); more substance abuse (Carr and Szymanski 2011; Harell et al. 2006); decreased use of sexual protection (Impett et al. 2006); more dysfunctional exercise (Strelan et al. 2003); and more support for cosmetic surgery (Calogero et al. 2010, 2013b).

In sum, self-objectification is defined as the adoption of a third-person perspective (i.e., male gaze) on the self, whereby girls and women come to place greater value on how they look to others rather than on how they feel or what their bodies can do (Fredrickson and Roberts 1997). This particular self-perspective manifests as a chronic 'policing' of the body (self-surveillance) to manage and control

appearance in anticipation of being evaluated by others. Self-objectification is unlikely to be consciously chosen, but it does reflect a certain degree of agency in navigating encounters of sexual objectification. This self-perspective allows women to anticipate, and thus exert some control over, how they will be viewed and treated by others and is not simply an indicator of narcissism, vanity, or body dissatisfaction. This chapter now turns to a brief overview of system justification theory before considering self-objectification within a system-justifying context.

System Justification Theory: An Overview

System Justification Motivation

System justification theory (Jost and Banaji 1994; Jost et al. 2004) attempts to explain why people are more likely to comply with the societal status quo instead of pushing for social change and progress. In this theory, systems can be concrete (e.g., families, institutions, organizations, and governments) or abstract (e.g., prescriptive gender stereotypes, political ideologies). In any of these types of systems, individuals and groups are hierarchically structured and situated in such a way as to differentiate them from each other on the basis of status, distribution of resources, power in decision making, and division of social roles (Blasi and Jost 2006). The theory posits that people are generally motivated (often nonconsciously) to defend, bolster, and rationalize the prevailing social, economic, and political systems that affect them—that is, to perceive the status quo as fair, legitimate, natural, and just (Jost and Burgess 2000; Jost et al. 2005, 2002). System justification is a motive that functions to satisfy epistemic, existential, and relational needs (Jost et al. 2008; Kay et al. 2008). In these ways, system justification acts as a palliative (at least in the short term), because it reduces anxiety, guilt, moral outrage, uncertainty, and makes people feel better about their place in society (Jost and Hunyady 2002; Kay et al. 2008; Napier and Jost 2008).

System-Justifying Contexts and Devices

Of course, not everyone defends every aspect of the status quo all the time, but they do tend to defend it more often than is actually warranted (Jost et al. 2004). The degree to which people are motivated to justify aspects of the system varies as a function of individual differences (e.g., Jost et al. 2003a; Jost and Hunyady 2005) and situational factors—namely under conditions of system threat, system dependence, system inescapability, and low personal control (Kay and Friesen 2011). Further, people are able to justify the systems to which they belong in a variety of ways (Bem and Bem 1970; Jost et al. 2002, 2008). Scholars have identified a number of culturally dominant ideologies and stereotypes that readily

provide people with the content necessary to rationalize the societal status quo, such as fair market ideology (Jost et al. 2003b), political conservatism (Jost et al. 2003c), social dominance orientation (Jost and Thompson 2000; Oldmeadow and Fiske 2007; Sidanius and Pratto 1999), denial of system failure (Feyinga et al. 2010), essentialist beliefs (Rangel and Keller 2011), meritocratic beliefs (Jost et al. 2003a; McCoy and Major 2007; O'Brien et al. 2009), victim-blaming attributions (Kay et al. 2005; Stahl et al. 2010), complementary stereotyping (Kay and Jost 2003), self-stereotyping (Laurin et al. 2011), benevolently sexist ideology (Glick and Fiske 2001; Jost and Kay 2005; Sibley et al. 2007), and committed relationship ideology (Day et al. 2011). Insofar, as the content of these beliefs and stereotypes legitimize inequities in the prevailing systems, the activation and endorsement of such content leads people to provide greater support for the way things are.

System Justification Sustains Disadvantage

One striking pattern observed in the system justification literature, and indeed what strikes at the very heart of system justification theory, is that the people who are most disadvantaged and disenfranchised by the societal status quo still provide support for it (Jost et al. 2003b). Although people will reject overtly prejudicial treatment, more subtle ideologies that justify group inequality (like those listed above) can affect the attitudes and behaviors of disadvantaged group members in ways that lead them to accept and maintain their disadvantaged status (Jost and Hunyady 2005). It is important to point out that lower status groups may not always support the status quo to a greater degree than higher status groups do. In fact, it is plausible that in some contexts, it would be the higher status groups who are more motivated to justify the system in order to maintain the advantages it affords them. However, it is when lower status groups provide any defense of a system that is clearly at odds with their interests and disadvantages them that presents the most intriguing psychological puzzle.

For the purpose of this chapter, let us take the justification of gender inequality as one example. Compared to men, women continue to earn less money, are underrepresented in government and decision-making positions, are significantly more often the victims of intimate partner violence and rape, have less access to education, complete the bulk of all domestic labor, and have fewer legal rights and protections overall—to date, no country has achieved full gender equality (United Nations 1995, 2000). Yet, on the whole, women are not expressing outrage over these inequities and injustices. Since these inequalities generally favor men's interests, it is not too surprising that men are less engaged in protest. But why not women?

From a system justification perspective, women may be more likely to support the gender status quo, because they are motivated to view the existing gender relations as fair, just, and inevitable (Jost and van der Toorn 2011). In particular,

research has demonstrated that exposure to complementary stereotypes is an especially potent way to rationalize social inequalities, including the imbalance between women and men (Calogero and Jost 2011; Jost and Kay 2005). Complementary stereotypes highlight the positive qualities and strengths of lower status groups relative to higher status groups and thereby create a more balanced view of the status quo. For example, people are more likely to rationalize inequalities when exposed to complementary stereotypes such as "poor but happy" and "rich but miserable" (Kay and Jost 2003). Pointing out the positive traits and characteristics enjoyed by the lower status group (and/or the negative traits attached to the higher status group) helps to rationalize the greater inequities produced by this imbalance in social standing and power. Complementary stereotypes for gender work similarly. For example, by reframing traditional gender roles and the division of labor within the family as a reflection of women's inherent strengths and men's inherent weaknesses, gender differences in society are legitimized (Glick and Fiske 2001; Jost and Kay 2005; Rudman and Glick 2008). Indeed, in a series of studies, Jost and Kay found that simply reminding people about prevalent sexist beliefs via these complementary (or benevolent) stereotypes increased women's (but not men's) support for the gender status quo and the social system as a whole.

Implications of System Justification for Social Change

In light of both the observational and empirical evidence, system justification theorists are not especially optimistic about social change—at least not yet (cf., Wakslak et al. 2007; Kay et al. 2002). Even when personal experience or scientific research provides clear evidence for the negative impact of an unequal social system, people continue to defend the way things are instead of demanding change (Jost and van der Toorn 2011). Insofar, as system justification helps to render disconcerting and uncomfortable social problems acceptable, system justification thwarts progress and true equality (Jost and Hunyady 2005). It is useful to highlight a few key examples of the ways in which system justification is enacted among lower status group members and the implications for social change.

In a sample of school-aged children who varied in social status in Bolivia (a country with one of the highest poverty rates in the world), it was the lower status Indigenous children who provided the greatest support for the existing government (run by a high status group member), and not the higher status Spanish children (Henry and Saul 2006). Specifically, in comparison with the higher status children, the lower status children believed that political dissent should be suppressed, the government adequately responds to the needs of the people, and they felt less alienated by the government. These findings highlight the deeply troubling entrenchment of system-justifying beliefs among the youngest members of a society: "Even in one of the poorest countries in the world, we see signs of greater support among the lower status indigenous children for the very governmental system that serves to maintain their lower status" (Henry and Saul 2006, p. 373).

System-justifying biases have also been identified among the evacuees of Katrina. In their analysis of Hurricane Katrina, Napier et al. (2006) explained that evacuees spread false claims of rampant violence in New Orleans in the aftermath of the hurricane in order to rationalize and justify their own government's failure to rescue them. By making internal attributions (as opposed to external attributions) for their unfortunate circumstances, the disadvantaged group was able to make right psychologically the social wrongs of the system by coming to believe they deserved to be left in these conditions—a system-justifying tendency known as the depressed entitlement effect (Major 1994). By blaming themselves, the evacuees restored legitimacy to the system, despite the costs of this misattributed accountability to the rebuilding and recovery efforts that would directly improve the lives of the individuals and groups involved.

The depressed entitlement effect has been conceptualized as an internalized sense of inferiority. The power of this effect has been observed most often among U.S. women. Specifically, women demonstrate a tendency to pay themselves less than men do for similar work (Blanton et al. 2001; Hogue and Yoder 2003; Jost 1997; Major et al. 1984; Major 1994). For example, in a simple thought-listing task, women paid themselves significantly less than men for their contributions, indicating that they judged their own work to be less valuable than the men did (Jost 1997). The depressed entitlement effect offers one explanation for the general lack of protest among women against the marked gender pay gap (American Association of University Women 2012) or their minority representation in government (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2012). In this case, it is not the system that favorably distributes wealth to men that women call into question. Instead, many women tend to endorse subtle system-justifying beliefs, such as "I deserve less" or "I don't value material rewards," which serve to justify and preserve the gross gender inequalities in pay and representation.

In sum, empirical evidence supports the main tenet of system justification theory: People tend to defend, bolster, and justify the status quo, even when it goes against their own interests and maintains their disadvantaged status. Drawing from this theoretical perspective and objectification theory, this chapter formulates an integrative framework whereby self-objectification is considered to be another route to system justification. This integrative perspective moves beyond prior research under the umbrella of objectification theory, broadening the scope of impact of self-objectification on women's lives and social justice.

Self-Objectification and System Justification: An Integrative Framework

As illustrated above, self-objectification is severely detrimental to women both individually and collectively—so why do they continue to invest in it? According to system justification theory, "members of disadvantaged groups not only pretend to accept their station in life, but actually do see themselves through the dominant

cultural lens" (Jost et al. 2002, p. 589; see also Allport 1954). Integrating objectification and system justification perspectives, this chapter offers a conception of self-objectification as a dominant cultural lens through which women come to view themselves that garners their compliance in the sexist status quo. As women are the most obviously disadvantaged within the gender status quo and objectifying cultural milieu, system justification theorists would argue that women have the most to justify and rationalize, and therefore they will often provide strong ideological support for it (Jost and Kay 2005; Jost et al. 2003c).

This integrative perspective conceives of sexual objectification as not merely the perpetration of individual acts or as simply "bad" for women (see Fischer et al. 2011), but as a system—a structured set of social arrangements that prescribe particular and interdependent roles and behaviors to men and women that reinforce the gender hierarchy. Women are positioned in specific ways in this system relative to men that reflect their subordinate and disadvantaged status. It is the prerogative of the male sex to observe, evaluate, and use the female body for their own purposes, and "…no woman can choose to opt out of this system" (Kaschak 1992, p. 68). Men are positioned to judge and evaluate women as decorative and sexual objects. Beyond a potentially more benign communication of sexual interest, when men sexually objectify women, they signal women's inferior and subordinate status. To position women as objects, as the targets of the evaluation, is less threatening to men and effectively disarms women (Henley 1977; Bartky 1990). This system of sexual objectification is seamlessly woven into the wider social landscape that women traverse every day.

Under these social conditions, women come to learn that their social value is highly dependent on the degree to which they complement and compliment men through their availability for sexual objectification. Whereas sexual objectification serves as an external indicator of women's subordinate status, the resultant self-objectification signals a deeply entrenched personal sense of inferiority in the absence of sexual objectification. Many girls and women come to experience male attention and approval as most rewarding to their self-esteem and conducive to social success compared to other pursuits (e.g., academic, vocational, and political). In these ways, self-objectification is considered to be a form of internalized social control:

> That is, socialization of subordinates in a dominant culture achieves a kind of colonization of the mind that ensures self-imposed powerlessness. So too socialization of girls and women in a sexually objectifying culture achieves self-objectification—a perspective on oneself as an object to be looked at and evaluated. (Roberts 2002, p. 326).

Consistent with these accounts, the integrative framework put forward here suggests that self-objectification in women is a self-perspective that is consonant with their own oppression. Self-objectification exacts serious costs to women's individual and collective wellbeing, yet reinforces the system of sexual objectification and the gender status quo by garnering women's support for it. When women self-objectify, they are motivated to uphold a system of gender relations that disproportionately privileges the interests of men and fosters gender inequality. Clearly,

though, the motivation to accept the system is in conflict with the motivation to maximize the interests of the self and group for women. System justification theory predicts that this internal conflict between the self, group, and system motives is associated with negative wellbeing (Jost et al. 2001; O'Brien and Major 2005). Indeed, the wide array of adverse outcomes associated with self-objectification described above supports this idea. In line with system justification theory, self-objectification is negatively associated with self-esteem (Mercurio and Landry 2008), positively associated with hostility toward other women (or low ingroup favoritism; Loya et al. 2006), and negatively associated with long-term psychological wellbeing as demonstrated by lower life satisfaction (Mercurio and Landry 2008) and increased mental health risks (Tiggemann 2011).

Self-Objectification: Power or Palliative?

Despite the negative consequences, some women report pleasure and feel a sense of power from being positively evaluated in sexually objectifying environments (Moffitt and Szymanski 2011). Research demonstrates that women who self-objectify report less negative mood (Fea and Brannon 2006; Tiggemann and Boundy 2008) as well as boosts to self-esteem and wellbeing (Breines et al. 2008; Goldenberg et al. 2011) when sexually objectified. Indeed, although women are more dependent on men for financial support and protection, men are more dependent on women in the realm of intimate and sexual relations, allowing women to wield some power in heterosexual relationships (Rudman and Glick 2008). Women who self-objectify are also more likely to report that they enjoy being sexually objectified (Liss et al. 2012) and engage in self-sexualizing behaviors (Notwatzki and Morry 2009). The following quote by a female executive at Sony Pictures to Ariel Levy during the preparation of Levy's book, *Female Chauvinist Pigs: Women and the Rise of Raunch Culture*, speaks directly to the well-established notion that physical attractiveness serves as social currency for women (Dellinger and Williams 1997; Eagly et al. 1991a; Unger 1979).

> My best mentors and teachers have always been men. Why? Because I have great legs, great tits, and a huge smile that God gave to me. Because I want to make my first million before the age of 35. So of course I am a female chauvinist pig. Do you think those male mentors wanted me telling them how to better their careers, marketing departments, increase demographics? Hell no. They wanted to play in my secret garden. But I applied the Chanel war paint, pried the door open with my Gucci heels, worked, struggled, and climbed the ladder. And made a difference!! And I did it all in a short Prada suit. (2005, p.102).

Clearly, some women feel quite powerful by "controlling" or "choosing" their sexualized appearance to capture the attention of men (Kipnis and Reader 1997; Levy 2005; Nowatzki and Morry 2009). Yet, there is reason to be skeptical of the empowerment veneer. First, the fact that some women report pleasure through their own bodily objectification is not surprising when we consider that the objectified lens through which they come to view themselves emphasizes their value

to men as sex object. When their appearance elicits attention and approval from men, many women view it as flattering or validating, and therefore advantageous to themselves and their ingroup (Saguy et al. 2009) and prefer to interact more with men who sexually objectified (Gervais et al. 2011). However, it is important to point out that even when women feel good about compliments on their appearance these effects seem to be short lived. Tiggemann and Boundy (2008) found that although negative mood decreased after an appearance compliment among high self-objectifying women, body shame increased. Counter to what we might intuit, Calogero et al. (2009) demonstrated that appearance compliments (which felt good to women, especially those related to weight and shape) still predicted higher body dissatisfaction and self-surveillance in women. Far from bolstering women's power, the relationship between self-objectification and disordered eating appears to be exacerbated for women who report that they enjoy sexualizing attention and treatment (Liss et al. 2011). Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that self-objectification might also constrain the physical strength and power of girls and women (Fredrickson and Harrison 2005; Young 1990).

Second, the fact that there are rewards built into the system of sexual objectification for women is well-known, insofar as women's social, economic, and legal outcomes hinge upon their physical appearance to a much greater degree than men's do (Bartky 1990; Fiske et al. 1991; Fredrickson and Roberts 1997; Jeffreys 2005; Wolf 1991). The desirability of these rewards make sexual and self-objectification more insidious and it is not surprising that women's beliefs and behaviors often support and reinforce the objectification of women. However, does compliance with the system and the garnering of rewards for doing so constitute empowerment? Does the fact that, women have to climb the ladder in Gucci heels reflect tangible power or mark them as different and serve as a decorative handicap? If women's outcomes are dependent on men's responses to their appearance and sexual appeal, then do women actually hold the power? One might argue that such outcome dependency on men does not empower women collectively, but rather creates insecure positions of power for some women and prevents other women from ever gaining access at all.

What self-objectification appears to do is help make the system more palatable for women (Jost 1995), especially under conditions of greater epistemic (Calogero and Jost 2011), existential (Goldenberg et al. 2011), and relational (Zurbriggen et al. 2011) stress. Investment in appearance as the means to self-worth and social status brings the self in line with the system, which motivates women to work harder in the service of that system.

It stands to reason that if women come to rely on their appearance for power and status, they would be less likely to challenge the status quo that produces those power arrangements, perhaps because they view the arrangements as fair and just. Ultimately, this investment does not elevate women's status relative to men in part, because the self-objectification remains in the service of a patriarchal system. Thus, although not good for women in the long run, self-objectification serves as a palliative in the short term by legitimizing and naturalizing women's lower social standing in the gender hierarchy.

Empirical Evidence for an Integrative Framework

Most of the prior research on self-objectification situates this self-perspective within the context of specific interpersonal or media encounters (Moradi 2013), but does not address the ideological concomitants of self-objectification or the possibility that self-objectification is part of a broader pattern of system-justifying beliefs and behavior. If self-objectification is another route to system justification, then self-objectification should be activated by broader situational antecedents that convey information about culturally prescribed gender roles and behaviors. Insofar as these cultural prescriptions and ideologies justify the status of gender relations in society and flatter women into conforming to traditional gender roles (Glick and Fiske 2001; Jackman 1994; Jost and Kay 2005), self-objectification should increase in response to those ideologies. Further, once in place, self-objectification may help to preserve the status quo by undermining social change. Investigating the direct link between self-objectification and collective action is a stronger test of objectification theory, insofar as it suggests that self-objectification does not stem merely from appearance evaluations, but that self-objectification is actually situated within a more extensive ideological network that perpetuates gender inequality (Bem and Bem 1970; Glick and Fiske 2001; Jost and Kay 2005). In this section, I describe a series of studies that begin to provide evidence for this theorizing.

Self-Objectification and Sexist Ideologies

Sexist ideologies have been causally related to the perpetuation and entrenchment of systemic gender inequality (Brandt 2011). Sexist ideology seems to exist in two main flavors. Hostile sexism refers to an openly antagonistic attitude toward women, whereas benevolent sexism refers to a subjectively positive orientation toward women that casts "women as wonderful but fragile creatures who ought to be protected and provided for by men" (Glick et al. 2004, p. 715; see also Eagly et al. 1991b). Both types of sexism convey information about the division of structural power between the sexes by portraying women as weaker than men and more suitable for traditional domestic roles. Although most people reject hostile forms of sexism (and prejudice more generally), women are less likely to recognize and challenge benevolent sexism as a form of sexism (Barreto and Ellmers 2005; Jackman 1994; Kilianski and Rudman 1998). Benevolent sexism emphasizes those domains and qualities where women have unique strengths and men depend on them (Glick & Fiske, 1996), thereby functioning as an ideology that legitimizes women's subordinate status (Jost and Hunyady 2002; Jost and Kay 2005). Thus, unlike hostile sexism, benevolent sexism is a subtle and insidious "sweet persuasion" (Jackman 1994) that disarms women and gains their compliance with the gender status quo (Glick et al. 2000; Glick and Fiske 2001).

Across three experiments, my colleague and I (Calogero and Jost 2011) subtly primed sexist ideology in participants by having them read a short set of statements that varied in the type of sexist content they contained (*benevolently* sexist statements only, *hostile* sexist statements only, *complementary* sexist statements—a combination of hostile and benevolent items, or *no* sexist statements). This methodology followed the priming procedure employed by Jost and Kay (2005). In the first experiment, we examined whether exposure to these varying types of sexist ideology would impact self-objectification. We examined three specific objectification theory variables: trait self-objectification, self-surveillance, and body shame. Trait self-objectification was operationalized as the extent to which people value observable physical attributes (e.g., weight) over non-observable physical attributes (e.g., strength) and measured with the *Self-Objectification Questionnaire* (Noll and Fredrickson 1998). Self-surveillance was operationalized as the extent to which people engage in chronic body monitoring and self-policing of their appearance and measured with the Surveillance subscale of the *Objectified Body Consciousness Scale* (McKinley and Hyde 1996). Body shame was operationalized as the extent to which people feel bad and ashamed of their appearance when they perceive themselves to fall short of cultural appearance ideals and measured with the body shame subscale of the *Objectified Body Consciousness Scale* (McKinley and Hyde 1996). The findings demonstrated that when women and men were exposed to benevolent and complementary sexist stereotypes (compared to hostile or no stereotypes), only the women responded with increased shifts in self-surveillance and body shame. That is, only women self-objectified more in response to reminders about traditional feminine roles in the gender status quo. No significant differences were demonstrated for the trait self-objectification measure, which may have been due to the fact that this scale assesses a more entrenched self view that would be less susceptible to modification by a single exposure to subtle sexist cues.

In the second experiment, we replicated these effects for self-surveillance and body shame, and also demonstrated that exposure to legitimizing sexist ideology (i.e., benevolent and complementary sexism) led to increased appearance management among women only. For example, when asked what they planned to do over the next week, women were more likely to report behaviors related to dieting, tanning, and hair and nail grooming as part of their weekly intentions compared to men, but only under conditions of benevolent and complementary sexism. The relationship between exposure to sexist ideology and appearance management was mediated by self-surveillance and body shame. The results of this study further suggest that self-objectification processes and appearance management are situated within a wider ideological network that reinforces sexist prescriptions.

In the third experiment, we again replicated the effects for self-surveillance and body shame. In addition, we examined whether these effects were magnified for those women and men with greater epistemic needs. Specifically, we measured individual differences in the need for cognitive closure using the *Need for Cognitive Closure Scale* (Webster and Kruglanski 1994) as a potential moderator of the observed patterns between sexist ideology and self-objectification.

According to Kruglanski's (1989, 2006) lay epistemic theory, the need to avoid or attain cognitive closure is a fundamental motive that influences the way in which people interpret and respond to information in their social environments, and whether or not they tend to uphold the status quo (e.g., Jost et al.1999, 2003a). We demonstrated that the effects of sexist ideology on self-objectification were magnified for those women and men with a higher need for cognitive closure. Specifically, under conditions of benevolent and complementary sexism, women with a higher need for closure reported significantly more self-objectification compared to women with a lower need for closure, and all men. Interestingly, men with a higher need for closure reported significantly less self-objectification than men with a lower need for closure under conditions of complementary sexism. In line with system justification theory, we found that those participants with greater epistemic needs for certainty and structure responded the strongest to the legitimizing sexist content, either bringing themselves more in line with feminine norms (i.e., the women by self-objectifying) or distancing themselves from them (i.e., the men by not self-objectifying).

Independent research labs have corroborated these general patterns. For example, Shepherd et al. (2011) manipulated whether female participants witnessed a specific type of benevolently sexist act or not (i.e., male confederate offering and taking it upon himself to carry a heavy box for a female confederate). The particular phrase employed in this research, "I'll get that for you," communicates the chivalrous and paternalistic attitude entrenched in benevolently sexist ideology that women may find especially seductive (Cikara et al. 2009), although it simultaneously communicates and activates the threat of incompetence (Dardenne et al. 2007; Dumont et al. 2010). Indeed, Shepherd et al. found that women who witnessed an act of benevolent sexism reported higher levels of self-surveillance and body shame compared to women who did not.

Taken together, we have evidence for the idea that the lens of self-objectification can be activated with exposure to sexist ideology. Legitimizing sexist stereotypes effectively remind women of their complementary (and subordinate) status to men, painting a positive representation of women as the beloved object of men's protection and affections. It is under these conditions that self-objectification manifests, directing women's attention toward appearance and gendered self-perceptions and reinforcing the gender status quo.

Self-Objectification and Collective Action

Of particular interest in light of the integrative perspective put forward here is the possibility that self-objectification preserves the status quo by undermining women's motivation to engage in social action that would challenge gender inequalities. Research demonstrates that system-justifying beliefs, such as endorsement of social hierarchies as natural and desired, are linked to less support for women's rights (Pratto et al. 1994). Further, benevolently sexist ideologies have been linked

to women's acceptance of group-based gender inequalities (Glick and Fiske 2001; Jackman 1994) and they undermine women's collective action (Becker and Wright 2011). Building on this prior work and the findings of Calogero and Jost (2011), it was proposed that adopting an objectified view of the self may represent another way in which system-justifying beliefs interfere with taking the collective action necessary to improve social conditions and the social standing of women as a whole. Across two studies, I tested directly whether self-objectification would lead women to provide more ideological and behavioral support for the gender status quo (Calogero 2013b).

In the first study, a survey methodology was employed to test the proposed relationships. Similar to the studies described above, trait self-objectification was measured with the *Self-Objectification Questionnaire* (Noll and Fredrickson 1998). Gender-specific system justification was operationalized as support for the gender status quo and measured with the gender-specific *System Justification Scale* (Jost and Kay 2005). Collective action was operationalized as engagement in eight different acts of gender-based social activism over the last 6 months (Stake et al. 1994). Types of activism included: *discussed* issues related to gender equality with friends or colleagues in person or online (e.g., email, Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, etc.); *attended* meetings, conferences, or workshops on gender equality issues; *signed* a petition (in person or online) in support of women's rights and gender equality; *circulated* a petition (in person or online) related to a women's rights cause and/or gender equality; *handed out* flyers related to women's rights issues and gender equality; *attended* demonstrations, protests, or rallies related to women's rights and gender equality; *spent time working for* women's rights campaigns (e.g., fundraising); *acted as* a spokesperson for a particular gender equality issue.

In the second study, self-objectification was again tested in relation to the same set of variables. This time, however, self-objectification was manipulated instead of measured as an individual difference variable. State self-objectification was activated (or not) by randomly assigning women to write about a time when they had been sexually objectified or what they would do if they won the shopping voucher in the research study raffle (control group). The other modification in this study was that the women were asked about their intentions to engage in gender-based social activism over the next 6 months.

In both studies, self-objectification predicted stronger endorsement of the gender status quo and less gender-based social activism. Importantly, experimentally increasing self-objectification also led women to become more entrenched in the gender status quo and decreased intentions to get involved in actions that challenge gender inequities. In both studies, women's motivation to view the existing gender arrangements as fair and just fully explained the relationship between self-objectification and collective action. It appears that activism is disrupted, because women are more motivated to support the gender status quo (and thus less likely to challenge it) when they are more focused on how they look as opposed to how they feel or what they can do. This possibility is significant in light of the fact that collective action on behalf of the ingroup is perhaps the most effective way to bring about social change and social justice for the ingroup (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Wright et al. 1990).

When considering why this link between self-objectification and collective action might emerge, it is helpful to remember that self-objectification is a formative component of women's self-concepts (Fredrickson and Roberts 1997). Self-objectification might be conceived of as a specific variant of gender self-stereotyping, with the potential to assuage feelings of incompetence in one domain (e.g., political efficacy) by directing attention and energy toward a distinctly feminine domain in which women have "good prospects" (Steele 1997) as a basis for short- and long-term self-evaluation (Davies et al. 2002; Major et al. 1998; Nosek et al. 2002). Indeed, consistent with our research, Laurin et al. (2011) found that men and women engaged in more gender self-stereotyping (women rated themselves as more communal and men as more agentic) when faced with information about the unequal treatment of women compared to a control group. When these complementary self-perceptions were experimentally manipulated, women who believed they conformed to communal stereotypes reported greater satisfaction with the societal status quo than women who believed they conformed to agentic stereotypes. These findings further bolster the idea that the application of complementary gender stereotypes to the self increases perceptions of the system's legitimacy.

Some Next Steps

The data described above provide preliminary evidence for a motivational and ideological account of self-objectification derived from an integration of objectification theory and system justification theory. There are a variety of ways in which this integrative framework should be further tested. Along with several colleagues, I am investigating a number of mechanisms that are expected to work in concert with self-objectification to impact women's support for the status quo and social change. For example, we expect that endorsement of beauty ideologies (e.g., importance of beauty for women's success, effort in appearance is required of women, thinness equals success and respect for women) will moderate the impact of self-objectification on support for the gender status quo. Preliminary evidence does support this hypothesis: the relationship between self-objectification and gender-specific system justification is significantly stronger among women who highly endorse the idea of beauty as women's currency compared to those with low levels of such endorsement (Calogero et al. 2013a). For women who self-objectify, if they have also adopted the belief that beauty is critical for women's success, they seem especially motivated to support the current state of gender relations. We also aim to examine self-efficacy, perceived injustice, anger, social dominance orientation, and collective identity as potential mediators of the relationship between self-objectification and collective action among women, as demonstrated in other models of collective action (Becker and Wright 2011; van Zomeren et al. 2008).

It would also be important to investigate other contextual factors that might magnify or attenuate the link between self-objectification and collective action. For example, a recent experimental study (Calogero 2013) demonstrated that

women who received the "latest report on gender relations" describing the gender system as broken and chivalry as dead in American society were less likely to respond in self-objectifying ways (i.e., lower levels of self-surveillance, body shame, and appearance management) compared to women who received the "latest report on gender relations" describing chivalry as intact and still working in American society. Women also responded with more gender-based collective action in response to information about the broken gender system. Although a broken gender system would be interpreted as a threat to the status quo, and therefore should be more likely to evoke system-justifying responses (Jost et al. 2007), it is possible that framing change in the gender system as inevitable was sufficient to alter women's self-objectification (Kay and Friesen 2011). In particular, the notion that chivalry is dead suggests that male protection of the damsel in distress and the desired sex object may no longer operate as an effective exchange in the system of gender relations, and thus women may be more inclined to engage in collective action on their own behalf.

In addition, since exposure to widely available sexist ideologies and sexual objectification is at the crux of the argument as to why adopting a self-objectified perspective is system justifying, to fully contextualize the model researchers need to simultaneously test the relations among sexist ideology, self-objectification, and system-justifying motives and behaviors. In particular, this research should attempt to isolate which components of benevolently sexist ideology sanction the system and pacify lower status groups, thereby affecting social activism (e.g., paternalism, gender differentiation, and heterosexual intimacy). Other circumstances that make salient women's dependence on the system of gender relations and/or the perceived inescapability of that system may exacerbate the relationship between self-objectification and system justification and also merit investigation (Kay and Friesen 2011).

One of the most novel aspects of this program of research is what it suggests about ways to alter system-justifying behavior, at least among women. If a woman views and treats herself as an object to be acted upon, it is perhaps not surprising that she would engage in less social action. This self-objectified lens, then, becomes the target for intervention. We may be able to alter the particular lens through which lower status groups view themselves by disrupting their dependence on the system of sexual objectification that constructs and sustains that lens. Thus far, the research demonstrates that sanctioning women's subordinate status through legitimizing ideologies reduces their motivation to challenge the dominant social system. Yet, we also found evidence to suggest that social inequalities might be challenged if members of low status groups (e.g., women) believe they can no longer depend on higher status groups (e.g., men) for security and protection within the system. Drawing on this integrative perspective, my colleague and I (Calogero and Tylka 2013) look more closely at the system of sexual objectification and how to disrupt psychological and social support for it. This perspective suggests that it may not be sufficient to target women's individual body image and self-esteem or provide media literacy training, as most girls and women are already deeply entrenched in the gender system. This idea may

explain why some body image and/or self-esteem intervention programs fall short or produce the undesired effect of increasing women's appearance focus (e.g., Choma et al. 2007). Instead, we propose that delegitimizing the system of sexual objectification and the gender status quo is necessary to reduce women's reliance on it.

It is important to note that the research reported here in support of this integrative perspective has focused on the appearance investment component of self-objectification within a westernized societal context. Drawing from Nussbaum's (1995) framework on objectification, there are multiple ways for a woman to self-objectify. Future research should investigate whether self-objectification also encompasses the treatment of oneself as a tool for a specific end (instrumentality), as lacking in autonomy and self-determination (denial of autonomy), as lacking in agency and activity (inertness), as interchangeable with others of the same or different types (fungibility), as permissible to break, smash, or break into (violability), as something that is owned by another (ownership), and/or as something whose experience and feelings do not need to be considered (denial of subjectivity). All or some aspects of this broader phenomenological experience of self-objectification may be relevant to women's motivation to support the status quo and should be further investigated, especially across other cultures and subcultures where the objectification of women is pervasive and women's agency is directly thwarted (Crawford et al. 2009; Jeffreys 2005; Moradi 2010, 2011; Tiggemann et al. 2005; United Nations 1995).

In particular, the quality of reduced agency must be explored further in relation to self-objectification. Objects do not act, but clearly women do act under objectifying conditions. We know that self-objectification does reflect some degree of agency for women in the domain of appearance investment and management—although it potentially strips them of agency in other domains. It is useful to remember here that sexual objectification is not under women's control and often occurs within those public, mixed gender, and unstructured settings that women cannot easily opt out of (Fredrickson and Roberts 1997; Gardner 1980; Kaschak 1992). In theory, self-objectification operates as a psychological strategy that allows women to anticipate and exert some control over how they will be viewed and treated by others in these contexts. The question is: do women who self-objectify perceive themselves as more or less agentic? If so, in which domains do they experience reduced agency? Is political efficacy a particularly vulnerable domain in the context of self-objectification? Extensive research has documented the gender gap in political ambition and political participation, whereby women report lower levels of political efficacy and remain grossly underrepresented in every branch of government (Lawless and Fox 2010). In conjunction with a host of other barriers, it is plausible that reduced perceptions of political agency explain women's increased support for the status quo and decreased gender-based social activism under conditions of objectification. In contrast, perhaps women who are lower in self-objectification are less likely to view their appearance as a source of social power and currency, and thus are more motivated to seek social change and challenge gender inequities. Alternatively, women who do not self-objectify might

experience less of the positive veneer of the benevolent sexist status quo and thus are less motivated to defend it. The role of agency warrants more attention in self-objectification research.

Only selected objectification theory variables have been tested thus far in relation to the integrative perspective proposed here. Future investigations should include appearance anxiety, interoceptive awareness (i.e., awareness of internal sensations and inner life), and flow—not only body shame—to account for all four subjective experiences in relation to women's system justification. Internalization of the thin ideal (and other cultural appearance standards) is another important variable to include in future tests of this integrative framework, as this variable has been identified as another manifestation of self-objectification (e.g., Kozee et al. 2007; Moradi 2010, 2011).

Moreover, the homogenous samples of women represented in the research described for this integrative framework obviously limit the generalizability of these findings to young, White, college educated, heterosexual women who were also very likely able-bodied. Patterns of sexual and self-objectification in relation to other outcomes (e.g., disordered eating, depression) have been shown to vary by sexual orientation (Kozee and Tylka 2006; Martins et al. 2007), gender (Calogero 2009; Parent and Moradi 2011; Tiggemann and Kuring 2004), age (Augustus-Horvath and Tylka 2009; Tiggemann and Lynch 2001), and ethnicity (Buchanan et al. 2008; Harrison and Fredrickson 2003). It is necessary to examine the extent to which the link between self-objectification and system justification is observed in subgroups of women as well as other lower status groups, as these groups will vary in the extent to which they are disadvantaged by the gender status quo and the wider prevailing system. Clearly, an intersectional approach to this program of research is sorely needed (Moradi, this volume). Finally, the relationship between self-objectification, system justification, and gender-based social activism across the life span, and among non-university samples, also requires further examination. Since self-objectification has been found to decrease with age (McKinley 2006; Tiggemann and Lynch 2001), it is plausible that older women's motivations and behaviors around collective action are unrelated to self-objectification, although it is not clear at what age we would begin to observe this alternative pattern.

In sum, although a great deal of research has examined the effects of self-objectification on women's subjective health and mental performance (Calogero et al. 2011; Moradi and Huang 2008), this is the first program of work to examine how self-objectification affects women's support for the gender status quo and engagement in social action on behalf of women. This integrative framework locates the construct of self-objectification within a system justification context, extending the scope of impact beyond the domains of body image and mental health. Further research is needed to articulate how and when self-objectification impacts women's collective action and support for the status quo as well as what aspects of self-objectification drive this impact. An important direction for the next generation of objectification research would be to fully illuminate the extent to which self-objectification is a factor in maintaining gender inequality.

Conclusion

A growing body of evidence is demonstrating the direct and indirect ways that self-objectification works as a system-justifying device for many women. The integration of objectification and system justification theories locates self-objectification as a critical psychological event that bolsters women's support for the gender status quo and disrupts gender-based social activism, further cementing their disadvantaged status in the gender hierarchy. By situating self-objectification in a system justification context, this integrative framework takes to heart the idea that the personal is political. Given that self-objectification is a profound and nearly universal experience for girls and women at some point in their lives, the harm exacted will also be profound and far-reaching. On the basis of this proposed framework, further research is strongly encouraged to determine the utility of this motivational and ideological account of self-objectification for understanding women's lived experiences and the potential for social change.

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Motivated Mind Perception: Treating Pets as People and People as Animals

Nicholas Epley, Juliana Schroeder and Adam Waytz

Abstract Human beings have a sophisticated ability to reason about the minds of others, often referred to as using one's theory of mind or *mentalizing*. Just like any other cognitive ability, people engage in reasoning about other minds when it seems useful for achieving particular goals, but this ability remains disengaged otherwise. We suggest that understanding the factors that engage our ability to reason about the minds of others helps to explain anthropomorphism: cases in which people attribute minds to a wide range of nonhuman agents, including animals, mechanical and technological objects, and supernatural entities such as God. We suggest that engagement is guided by two basic motivations: (1) the motivation to explain and predict others' actions, and (2) the motivation to connect socially with others. When present, these motivational forces can lead people to attribute minds to almost any agent. When absent, the likelihood of attributing a mind to others, even other human beings, decreases. We suggest that understanding the factors that engage our theory of mind can help to explain the inverse process of dehumanization, and also why people might be indifferent to other people even when connecting to them would improve their momentary wellbeing.

Everyone needs someone to cling to, a source of support to ease anxiety when feeling upended and alone. For Julia Hill during such times, that source was Luna (Hill 2000). "Whenever I felt [anxious] during those first days, I'd just hug Luna, and I'd feel rooted." For a little over 2 years, Julia spent every waking and sleeping moment with Luna, caring for her, defending her, encouraging her, and fighting

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Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 60, DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-6959-9_6,

to save her life. Julia slept, ate, and bathed with Luna. She danced, prayed, and talked intimately with Luna. She risked her life repeatedly to save Luna. This deep connection enabled empathy between them. “If anything happened to her, I’d feel like it would be happening to me.” When Luna was cut, “I felt it cut through me as well.”

Unlike most people’s source of support, however, Luna is not a person. “She” is a 200-ft tall redwood tree living in the ancient coastal forests of California. For 738 straight days Julia Hill lived 180 ft off the ground in the tree’s enormous branches, through constant wind and occasionally life-threatening storms, trying to save Luna from loggers. For Julia, Luna was not only a living being, but a mindful being as well. After living in the tree for some time, for instance, Julia stopped wearing shoes. “I couldn’t stand the feeling of separation from the tree. With all that stuff between my foot and the branches, I couldn’t tell if what I was about to stand on was strong enough to hold me or if my foot was on the branch securely. I couldn’t feel Luna’s life force or take instruction from her about how to climb.” Julia wrote that when each neighboring tree was cut around her, “it makes this horrible scream before crashing into those trees near it.” She claimed to feel their pain. “Each time a chain saw cut through those trees, I felt it cut through me as well. It was like watching my family being killed. I wanted to stop the violence, I wanted to stop the pain, I wanted to stop the suffering.” When asked by a reporter if she had a boyfriend, Julia responded only half-jokingly, “Who needs a boyfriend? I have a tree.”

Julia anthropomorphized Luna, attributing a humanlike mind to a clearly nonhuman entity. She is not delusional, or a paranoid schizophrenic who attributes minds to everything. She is more deeply committed to a cause than most people will ever be, but she is not psychopathological. Instead, she possesses a perfectly functioning human mind equipped with exceptional social senses that enable her to reason about the minds of others. Typically, these senses are directed at other human beings, monitoring another person’s intentions or goals or emotions, assessing another person’s preferences, and remembering what others know and believe (Herrmann et al. 2007). This capacity to reason about the minds of others appears to be one of the human brain’s greatest strengths, enabling just the kind of social intelligence necessary to live successfully in enormous social groups (Humphrey 1976; Tomasello et al. 2005).

Under the right circumstances, however, this capacity also enables a person to attribute a humanlike mind to almost any entity, thereby anthropomorphizing it. Such anthropomorphism matters for social life for three major reasons (Epley and Waytz 2010; Waytz et al. 2010b). First, mindful agents come to be seen as moral agents worthy of empathic care and concern, deserving treatment that respects their capacity to suffer, to reason, and to have conscious experience (Gray et al. 2007). Mindless agents are objects that can be used as tools. Anthropomorphism may therefore be the foundation of animal ethics (Wantanabe 2007). Second, mindful agents can reason and think and therefore be held accountable for their actions. A “guilty mind”—one with the capacity for intent and foresight—is required to convict a person of any crime in most modern courts of law. In times

when people were more willing to attribute minds to their domesticated animals, it was routine to arrest animals accused of a crime and try them in a criminal court (Humphrey 2002). Anthropomorphized Gods are still frequently held responsible for everything from major weather events to minor successes and (especially) misfortunes (Gray and Wegner 2010). Third, mindful agents become sources of social surveillance, capable of thinking, and forming impressions of *us*. In one experiment, for instance, participants respond to surveys in a more socially desirable manner when taking them on anthropomorphized computers (Sproull et al. 1996). In others, participants behaved more ethically when reminded of a mindful God who could be watching them (Norenzayan and Shariff 2008).

In this chapter, we will explain some of the psychological processes that guide anthropomorphism, whether it is a tree or a pet or a computer or a God. We believe that these processes are guided by the same motivational forces that create engagement with the mind of another person, forces that make the mind of another agent relevant for one's current goals. Motivation guides attention, and we believe two motivations in particular make people attend to the minds of other agents: the motivation to explain another agent's behavior and the motivation to form a social connection with another agent. We also believe these motivational processes of engagement can help to explain the inverse process of dehumanization, whereby people fail to attribute a mind to another human being. Understanding the motivational triggers that lead people to think about the minds of others helps to explain when people are likely to represent others as human beings, and when people are likely to represent others as animals or objects. The same human being who could attribute a mind to a tree in one moment could also overlook the mind of another human being in the next moment.

Human Minds Everywhere?

Julia Hill's experience with Luna is extreme, but her ability to perceive a human-like mind in a nonhuman agent is not. The vast majority of people living on the planet today believe in one or more Gods who have thoughts and intentions and a wide range of mental capacities, from rage to love to omniscience. In one survey, 79% of computer owners reported having scolded their computer when it broke down, as if their mindless silicone chips could hear them (Luczak et al. 2003). It is not surprising, then, that General Motors (GM) became embroiled in controversy after airing a Super Bowl ad in which a robot, apparently failing to work up to GM's quality standards, became depressed and then rolled itself off of a bridge. The American Foundation for Suicide Prevention was outraged. The ad, they argued, "portrays suicide as a viable option when someone fails or loses their job," even though the main actor was a mindless machine (Waytz et al. 2010a). GM, in turn, now has more avenues available to defend itself given the U.S. Supreme Court's decision that corporations should be considered "persons" under the law, having attitudes and opinions and preferences that must be protected under the

right to free speech (Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission 2010). Even inanimate objects can become endowed with minds. When a bell in Mexico City's famous *Catedral Metropolitana* struck and killed a bell ringer in 1947, the parishioners sentenced it to be tied down for 50 years and stripped of its clapper as punishment (Waytz et al. 2010b). Humanlike minds seem to appear almost everywhere, from pets that seem loving and thoughtful to financial markets described as "anxious" one moment and "optimistic" the next to a universe that can occasionally appear to have a plan and purpose for one's life. Julia Hill is far from alone.

Being able to attribute a humanlike mind to others is a fundamental feature of human cognition. When this ability is applied to a nonhuman agent, whether it is a tree or a computer or a company, it creates what most people refer to as anthropomorphism. By definition, anthropomorphism is the "attribution of human characteristics to a God, animal, or object." If you ask philosophers (Dennett 1987; Locke 1997), lawyers (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948), or a randomly selected human being to define what "human characteristics" entail, they will tend to describe two basic capacities involving a mind. One is the ability to think—to reason, to choose, to deliberate, to strategize, to act on preferences. The other is the ability to feel—to suffer, to have inner conscious experiences like joy or shame or pride or guilt (Farah and Heberlein 2007; Gray et al. 2007; Haslam et al. 2013; Leyens et al. 2000; Waytz et al. 2010c). Anthropomorphizing an agent goes beyond outward appearances by attributing a thinking or feeling mind to it. This definition makes it clear that anthropomorphizing a nonhuman is not necessarily inaccurate (a dog, after all, may well have a very humanlike mind), even though the most obvious cases of anthropomorphism entail attributing a mind to something—even momentarily—that is unambiguously mindless.

Because anthropomorphism is observed so commonly, philosophers, sociologists, and psychologists have suggested that it is an automatic and possibly even universal phenomenon. Xenophanes, a sixth century B.C. Greek philosopher, noted how readily religious believers anthropomorphized their Gods, with Greek Gods having fair skin and light hair but African Gods having dark hair and dark skin, even joking, that if cows had Gods then they would imagine them to be cow-like. Xenophanes' main concern, however, was not imagining Gods in humanlike forms, but rather imagining Gods with humanlike minds that are prone to immorality. "Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the Gods all sorts of things which are matters of reproach and ensure among men: theft, adultery, and mutual deceit" (Lesher 1992, p. 23). Hume (1957) agreed, and then went even further: "There is a universal tendency among mankind to conceive all beings like themselves." Piaget (1929) believed anthropomorphism began almost immediately in a person's life: "From the very beginning of its development…the child endows things with human activity." This is still a popular belief among social scientists today. "Inevitably and automatically, we all anthropomorphize," writes anthropologist Stewart Guthrie (1993). Far from being extreme or unusual, anthropomorphism appears to be as common to human nature as breathing and bipedalism.

As popular as this conclusion may be among philosophers and psychologists and the parents overrun with their toddler's stuffed animal friends, we also

believe it is overstated. In particular, we believe this general conclusion overlooks the basic psychological processes that enable people to think about the mind of another agent, thereby missing critical moderators of this tendency in everyday life and exaggerating its frequency. Indeed, most research on anthropomorphism has investigated either its accuracy ("What are dogs *really* thinking?"; e.g., Horowitz 2009) or its consequences ("Does anthropomorphism explain religious belief?"; e.g., Bering 2006). A moment's reflection will make it clear that some people (and some cultures) anthropomorphize more than others (Medin and Atran 2004), some situations induce anthropomorphism more readily than others (Epley et al. 2008a, b; Waytz et al. 2010d), and some objects or animals are anthropomorphized easily, whereas others are not (Waytz et al., 2010c). Even thinking about the mind of another person is not necessarily an automatic or spontaneous process (Apperly et al. 2006). Tufts University, for instance, was apparently having such a problem with students failing to think automatically about the minds of others that they had to establish a policy banning students from having sex in their dorm rooms *while their roommate is present.* It is apparently easy to overlook the minds of others when your own mind is focused elsewhere. Considering the mind of another person requires at least some motivation and attentional resources. Lacking either the interest or ability to consider another person's mind produces a long list of self-centered biases in judgment (Barr and Keysar 2004; Epley 2008; Gilovich et al. 1999; Nickerson 1999).

Also notice that as easy as it is to find cases of rampant anthropomorphism, so too is it easy to find cases where people fail to recognize another human mind standing right before their eyes. On May 2, 1789, Standing Bear, a Native American from the Ponca Tribe of Nebraska, was standing right in front of a U.S. Appellate court judge trying to convince the U.S. Government to recognize him as a person, as a mindful human. Up to this point in history, the government had treated Native American as property—as thoughtless objects or unfeeling savages. Turning to the audience during his testimony, this illiterate and formally uneducated man held out his hand and channeled Shakespeare. "This hand is not the color of yours. But if I pierce it, I shall feel pain. If you pierce your hand, you also feel pain. The blood that will flow from mine will be the same color as yours. I am a man." (Dando-Collins 2004). This is neither an historical anomaly nor an unrepresentative anecdote. Outgroup members are consistently and reliably seen as having diminished mental capacities compared to ingroup members, particularly being less able to feel pain or to suffer (Goff et al. 2008; Xu et al. 2009) and less likely to experience secondary emotions such as shame, pride, guilt, or embarrassment (Demoulin et al. 2004; Gaunt et al. 2002; Leyens et al. 2000).

It is not just the enemy or the disadvantaged, however, who occasionally get treated as mindless. Aaron Rodgers, quarterback of the National Football League's Green Bay Packers, defended a teammate who lashed out at an abusive fan by noting that "fans sometimes forget we're human…we are people, and we have feelings." Ray Lewis, one of the most vicious players in the NFL, expressed the same sentiment about NFL owners after they proposed extending the already grueling 16-game season to 18 games. "[I know] the things that you have to go through

just to keep your body [functioning]. We're not automobiles. We're not machines. We're humans" (Feith 2011). Even those charged with treating people the most humanely, namely doctors, can fail to recognize the full capacity of another person's mind right before their eyes. Up until the early 1990s, it was routine practice for infants to be operated on in the United States without anesthesia to dull their pain. Doctors at that time believed infants were less able to feel pain than adults, thereby making anesthesia unnecessarily risky. "How often we used to be reassured by more senior physicians that newborn infants cannot feel pain," Dr. Mary Ellen Avery (1993) writes in the opening of *Pain in Neonates*. "Oh yes, they cry when restrained and during procedures, but 'that is different.'" If the tendency to attribute a mind to others is so automatic and inevitable, then why do people sometimes fail to attribute a mind to other people?

We believe that both bottom-up perceptual processes as well as top–down motivational processes cause people to anthropomorphize nonhuman agents. Elsewhere we have described how perceiving similarity in motion and morphology can make an agent that looks humanlike on the outside also be evaluated as more humanlike on the inside (Epley et al. 2007; see also Harrison and Hall, 2010). Objects with humanlike faces, for instance, are more readily anthropomorphized than those without such faces (Johnson 2003), and animals that move at a humanlike speed are judged to have more humanlike mental capacities than those who move much faster (e.g., a hummingbird) or much slower (e.g., a sloth) than humans (Morewedge et al. 2007). These perceptual mechanisms, however, require that people are already attending to the agent in question, making even these perceptual processes open to influence by the motivational forces that guide attention. These perceptual mechanisms also cannot explain the wider variety of cases where minds emerge apart from bodies or any other humanlike perceptual cues. It cannot explain why people might attribute minds to volatile financial markets or to weather events or to the design of a randomly evolving universe. It cannot explain why the vast majority of people find it so easy to imagine the mind of a God, or Gods, pulling nature's strings. It cannot explain why people occasionally curse their computers or cars, or why Julia Hill empathized with Luna's pain. Instead, these questions require understanding what motivates people to engage with the mind of another agent. In this chapter, we will describe recent research identifying important motivational moderators of anthropomorphism, show how these moderators may also help to explain the inverse processes of dehumanization, and highlight what we think are important consequences of this research for everyday life.

Anthropomorphism as Explanation

Fermilabs, located in suburban Chicago, owns a massive particle accelerator called the Tevatron. Before being decommissioned in 2011, it worked 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, for nearly 30 years. A team of engineers and physicists directed

the Tevatron, people who knew every inch and mechanical detail of the enormous machine. Todd Johnson, director of the Tevatron, noted that those who work on it "tend not to see the Tevatron as cold machinery. It has moods and character. They call it the Tev" (Spitzer 2011). Interestingly, Johnson did not suggest that the Tev always seems like it has moods and character, but that it does so only some of the time. "Everything goes like clockwork," he reported, "and all of a sudden you get a failure, and something else breaks, and then something else breaks, and it's hard not to apply anthropomorphic personality traits to the machine. You hear people say, 'Well, it's not really happy with us today.'" Why is it "hard not to apply anthropomorphic personality traits" only when the machine breaks? This description of the Tev does not sound like the automatic anthropomorphism suggested by Hume and Guthrie. Instead, it is only when the Tev breaks, when it does not work as it is supposed to, that the Tev gives a glimmer of mind. Mark Giorno, vice president of a company that builds robots for war, reports something similar. "You start to associate personalities with each of them. Their personality comes from, say, the steering being a little loose" (Singer 2009). Why does their personality not come from the steering working exactly as it was designed to work?

The reason, we believe, is because a mind is a set of concepts that provides an intivitive explanation of any independent action. When a robot moves exactly as it was programmed to move, completely predictably and expectedly, then nothing needs to be explained. The mindless robot moved as it was programmed to move—what Heider (1958) referred to as "impersonal causality." But when a robot starts to move in ways it was not programmed to move, seemingly on its own, then impersonal forces operating outside the agent are insufficient to explain behavior. Instead, something *inside* the agent seems necessary. Maybe moods, maybe personality, maybe a mind? As Heider explained (1958, p. 100), reasoning about an agent in terms of its mental states "ties together the cause-effect relations," allowing a person to provide an intuitive explanation for almost anything, from persons to toasters to Tevatrons. "What [anthropomorphic metaphors] all have in common," write Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 34), "is that they are extensions of ontological metaphors and that they allow us to make sense of phenomena in the world in human terms—terms that we can understand on the basis of our own motivations, goals, actions, and characteristics." This suggests that anthropomorphism should increase when people are motivated to explain another agent's behavior. A nonhuman agent may therefore be seen as mindless when lacking this motivation.

It is important to note that this basic motivation to explain and understand another's behavior has historically been taken for granted by psychologists studying social cognition. Indeed, Kelley (1967, p. 193) struggles to explain why his classic chapter on attribution theory was appropriate for the *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation*. The answer is existing research in social cognition implicitly assumes that person perceivers are motivated already to explain and understand another agent's behavior. At a baseline level, person perceivers are assumed to have what White (1959) referred to as effectance motivation—the motivation to be effective and competent social agents. "[Attribution] theory," Kelley explains,

describes processes that operate *as if* the individual were motivated to attain a cognitive mastery of the causal structure of the environment. Indeed, Heider explicitly assumes that "we try to make sense out of the manifold of proximal stimuli… This broad motivational assumption makes little difference in the development and application of the theory." We argue that this broad motivational assumption makes a significant difference, however, for whether or not people engage with the mind of another in the first place.

Consider your car. When your car starts up on a cold morning exactly as it is supposed to, then it is just cold steel. You are unlikely to pause for even a second to think about its inner workings. But when it fails to start, then drivers may find themselves cajoling and caressing and encouraging their "baby" to "wake up". In a survey of nearly 900 car owners, Morewedge (2006) asked car owners to report the extent to which their car seemed to have a mind, including beliefs, desires, and a personality. He also asked about their car's reliability—how often it needed unscheduled service, and how much it malfunctioned for unknown reasons. Consistent with these examples, he found a significant correlation between mind perception and malfunctioning. The less reliable people found their car to be, the more they reported that it seemed to have a mind. In a similar survey (Waytz et al. 2010a, b, c, d), two different samples of university undergraduates were asked how often they had problems with their computer. One sample was also asked how often their computer seemed to have "a mind of its own", whereas the other sample was asked the extent to which their "computer behaved as if it has its own beliefs and desires." In both samples, there was a significant correlation between malfunctioning and mind perception. The more often students reported having problems with their computer, the more it seemed to have a mind of its own or to have beliefs and desires.

So far, all of the examples in this section simply show that unexpected or unpredictable behavior is correlated with anthropomorphism. They do not show that unpredictable behavior *causes* anthropomorphism. These examples also tend to confound unpredictable behavior with negative behavior. You may curse your computer or cajole your car when it fails to start, or think that the Tev is not happy when it fails to operate as expected, not because the behavior is unexpected but rather because it is negative. Unexpected events are often negative events in everyday life, but these experiences can be disentangled experimentally.

In one experiment designed to do just that (Waytz et al. 2010d), participants visiting the Museum of Science and Industry in Chicago asked 10 yes or no questions to a robot named Asimo through a computer interface. Participants were allowed to ask any questions they wanted. Example questions could range from "does $9 \times 4 = 36$?", to "does my husband love me?", to "will the Cubs ever win the World Series?" Depending on experimental condition, Asimo responded either predictably or unpredictably. In the predictable-yes condition, Asimo responded "yes" to eight of the questions and "no" to two of the questions. In the predictable-no condition, Asimo responded "no" to eight of the questions and "yes" to two of the questions. And in the unpredictable condition, Asimo responded "yes" to five questions and "no" to five questions, in a random fashion. Participants then

reported how mindful Asimo seemed: the extent to which Asimo appeared to have a mind of its own, intentions, free will, consciousness, desires, beliefs, and the ability to experience emotions. Participants also reported how attractive, efficient, and strong they found Asimo to be, to measure the extent to which participants evaluated the predictable versus unpredictable behavior negatively. Results showed that Asimo seemed the most mindful when he behaved unpredictably, with no differences between the predictable-yes and predictable-no conditions. No significant differences emerged in any of the other measures, suggesting that anthropomorphism in this experiment stemmed from unpredictability rather than from negativity.

It is easy to imagine that results like these reflect ways of talking more than they do ways of thinking. That is, saying that your computer "has a mind of its own" is not the same as really *thinking* that your computer truly has beliefs and desires and emotions. The engineers that run the Tevatron know, at least explicitly, that the Tev does not really have moods; they are just speaking metaphorically. This is almost certainly true to some extent, but neuroimaging now allows psychologists to identify whether this is true to the *fullest* extent. The reason is that there are distinct neural regions that identify when people are thinking about their own and others' mental states. Perhaps the most reliable of these is the medial prefrontal cortex. Activity in this region can therefore be used to index the degree to which people anthropomorphize nonhuman agents (Castelli et al. 2002; Martin and Weisberg 2003). When a person cajoles her car to start on a cold winter morning or claims his computer has a mind of its own, is the mPFC active suggesting that people may be thinking quite literally about the mind of their car or computer?

To find out, participants in one experiment read descriptions of a variety of different gadgets (Waytz et al. 2010d). Some of these gadgets were described as being very unpredictable, whereas others were described as being very predictable. For instance, one of the gadgets was an alarm clock called "Clocky". This alarm clock has wheels on the side that spin when the user presses the alarm clock a second time, sending the alarm clock rolling around the room and requiring the snoozer to actually get up out of bed to shut it off. In the predictable description of Clocky, participants read that, "You can program Clocky so that when you press snooze, it runs away from you or you can program it so that when you press snooze, it will jump on top of you." In the unpredictable description, Clocky's behavior was described as being out of the user's control: "When you press snooze, Clocky either runs away from you, or it jumps on top of you." Outside the fMRI scanner, participants read descriptions of 32 different gadgets, half described as predictable and half as unpredictable. Inside the scanner, participants then evaluated the extent to which each gadget had "a mind of its own", as the measure of anthropomorphism. Consistent with our account, participants were more likely to report that the unpredictable gadgets had a mind of its own than the predictable gadgets. More important, subsequent analyses confirmed that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex was reliably more active when evaluating unpredictable versus predictable gadgets, and that differences in this neural activity predicted

differences in the extent to which participants anthropomorphized the gadgets. Reporting that one's computer has a mind of its own is not simply a way of speaking, but is a literal way of thinking.

The critical component of our account is that attributing a mind to a nonhuman agent is not purely automatic, but is rather triggered by distinct motivational states. Motivational explanations for behavior, such as our account of anthropomorphism, make three unique predictions that purely nonmotivational accounts do not make. First, motivational accounts predict that people who are especially motivated to explain and understand an agent's behavior should also be the ones most likely to anthropomorphize it, holding all else constant. One experiment (Epley et al. 2008) examined this prediction by first measuring participants' Desire for Control, an individual difference that serves as an indirect measure of people's motivation for mastery and understanding. Sample items from the scale include, "I like to get a good idea of what a job is all about before I begin," and "I enjoy having control over my own destiny." Participants then watched a short video of two dogs, one that moved slowly and predictably and another that moved quickly and unpredictably. Participants then reported their impressions of each of the dogs, as a measure of anthropomorphism. Participants reported the extent to which each dog was aware of its emotions, appeared to have conscious will, the extent to which it had a "personality," and also rated its similarity to other life forms on a scale ranging from 1 (bacteria) to 11 (human). The results, combined across these measures, showed that those high in desire for control were more likely to anthropomorphize than those low in desire for control, but only for the dog that behaved unpredictably. A humanlike mind emerged only in the dog that needed an explanation, and only among those who were particularly interested in having an explanation.

Second, motivational accounts predict that increasing motivation should increase the associated behavior. If people eat food because they are motivated by hunger, then making people hungry should increase eating. If anthropomorphism is triggered by the motivation to explain an agent's behavior, then increasing that motivation should increase anthropomorphism. Consistent with this possibility, participants in one experiment evaluated a robot after watching six brief videos of it in action (Waytz et al. 2010d). Some participants were motivated to explain the agent's behavior by asking them to predict what the robot would do after the end of each video and then paying them $1 for each correct prediction. The other participants were not motivated in this way. All participants then evaluated the robot's mental capacities: the extent to which they believed the robot had a mind of its own, intentions, desires, was conscious, and could experience emotions. Consistent with our motivational account, those incentivized to explain the robot's behavior also anthropomorphized it significantly more than those who were not incentivized.

Finally, motivational accounts predict that engaging in a motivated behavior should satisfy the motivational state. If people eat food when they are motivated by hunger, then making people eat should satisfy their hunger. If people anthropomorphize nonhuman agents partly because they are motivated to explain the agent's behavior, then not only should this motivation increase anthropomorphism,

but asking people to anthropomorphize should also provide satisfying explanation. To test this possibility, participants in one experiment watched videos of four different agents (a dog, robot, alarm clock, and geometric shapes). Participants were asked to describe two of these videos anthropomorphically and two objectively (based on random assignment). For those they were asked to describe anthropomorphically, participants were told to "think about it in the same way you would about other people… and to treat it as if it had humanlike traits, emotions, and intentions." For those they were to describe objectively, they were asked to "remain detached and think only about the observable behaviors it is performing and think about it as you might think about any other unfamiliar gadget… Watch its behavior closely and try to remain objective." Participants did as they were told, writing either anthropomorphic or objective descriptions of each agent they saw. When finished, participants reported how much they felt they were able to predict the agent's behavior in the future, as an indication of a satisfying explanation (White 1959).

Consistent with our motivational account, people reported feeling better able to predict the behavior of the agents they anthropomorphized compared to those they were asked to treat objectively. Heider and Simmel suggested this possibility for anthropomorphism many years before these data when describing their classic video of geometric shapes moving around a hinged box that quickly take on a mental life of their own:

> As long as the pattern of events shown in the film is perceived in terms of movements as such, it presents a chaos of juxtaposed items. When, however, the geometrical figures assume personal characteristics, so that their movements are perceived in terms of motives and sentiments, a unified structure appears… But motives and sentiments are psychological entities… They are "mentalistic concepts", so-called intervening variables that bring order into the array of behavior mediating them.
>
> (Heider and Simmel 1944, pp. 31–32).

Without the language of mind, explanations of behavior provide no sense of understanding (even if the sense is, objectively speaking, illusory). Donald Hebb (1946) described a similar experience trying to avoid anthropomorphizing the chimpanzees in his care at the Yerkes Primate Laboratory:

> A thoroughgoing attempt to avoid anthropomorphic description in the study of temperament was made over a two-year period at the Yerkes laboratories. All that resulted was an almost endless series of specific acts in which no order or meaning could be found. On the other hand, by the use of frankly anthropomorphic concepts of emotion and attitude one could quickly and easily describe the peculiarities of individual animals… Whatever the anthropomorphic terminology may seem to imply about conscious states in chimpanzee, it provides an intelligible and practical guide to behavior (p. 88).

Even psychological science went through a period during the 1940s and 1950s when behaviorists disavowed all mentalistic language as subjective nonsense, insisting on describing behavior only in terms of its observable qualities. Human beings were, in essence, stripped of their minds altogether. Behaviorism ultimately failed to take over psychology not only because underlying cognitive processes really *do* matter for understanding behavior (Baumeister et al. 2011), but also

because behaviorism never really provided an explanation of behavior that any kind of psychologist would find satisfying (Chomsky 1957).

We believe the results reviewed in this section make two important points. First, people tend to attribute minds to other agents when they are in search of explanations, and tend to overlook the minds of others when nothing needs explaining. When your car, or cat, or particle accelerator works in a perfectly predictable fashion, it seems mindless. But when something unexpected happens, then a mind may emerge as a suitable explanation, producing anthropomorphism. The same happens with humans. The factory worker who does the same thing over and over and over becomes mindlessly predictable. The boss who views employees as a means to reaching another goal rather than an end to be explained in themselves views their employees as mindless objects (Gruenfeld et al. 2008). And doctors who are charged with explaining disease and physical disorders can find themselves quite unintentionally overlooking the minds of their patients (Haque and Waytz 2012). Second, anthropomorphic explanations are satisfying only when other explanations are unavailable. The language of mental states is an intuitive explanation for the behavior of almost any agent, but as more about an agent is learned, the tendency to use these default explanations should decrease as well. Hume was on to this when he argued that anthropomorphism stems from human being's "absolute ignorance of causes" (1757/1957, p. xix). Indeed, research demonstrates that rural children anthropomorphize nonhuman animals *less* than do urban children, presumably because rural children have more direct contact, experience, and knowledge of these animals than do urban children (Medin and Atran 2004). Anthropomorphism may be triggered by the need to explain behavior, but it is certainly not the only explanation that can be triggered.

Anthropomorphism as Connection

The motive to explain behavior may partly explain anthropomorphism, but it is a terrible explanation for Julia Hill's anthropomorphic sense of Luna. Redwood trees sway in the breeze, but mostly they just stand there. They do not walk or talk. They do not move on their own. There is no event calling out for explanation, and no reason to suspect that Julia is pathologically driven by a motivation to understand or comprehend her universe in a way that would lead her to explain behavior that others do not observe.

There is also no perceptual trigger that would lead a person to think of the mind in a tree, no cues that this behemoth is in some way similar to a person or to the self. There is no humanlike face or humanlike motion. Trees are not lifeless, but they move so slowly that their behavior is detectable only through time-lapsed photography. Julia Hill's sense that she was receiving instructions from Luna, was hearing her inner voice, was feeling her suffering, did not come from any obvious physical feature of the tree itself. It came from something else.

Like any complicated phenomenon, attributing a mind to another agent is multiply determined. Another agent's mind matters not only for explaining the other agent's behavior, but also for forming a deep social connection with the other agent. To see this, think about trying to form a connection with someone on a first date. You start by being extremely sensitive to how you are coming across to the other person. You choose your clothes carefully to convey just the right kind of impression, and watch your words even more carefully to make sure you do not convey the wrong impression. You try to keep track of your date's preferences and interests, trying to ferret out the person's true attitudes and beliefs to see if you are a match made in heaven or hell. This guessing game requires a great deal of perspective taking, trying to put yourself in the other person's shoes, trying to get beyond surface appearances, and trying to think carefully about the other person's mind. Connecting with others requires mentalizing. This suggests that the motive to connect with others, or simply having a more approach oriented motivation toward others, may be an important motivational determinant of attributing a mind to another agent, whether it is a person or not. Luna became a mindful agent for Julia Hill because of a tight social connection, one that led her to recognize a mind in this tree that everyone else who was more disconnected would never recognize.

Several pieces of evidence suggest that a motivation to connect with others can increase anthropomorphism. First, some animals are more readily anthropomorphized than others. Just after a major earthquake struck Japan in 2011, for instance, a picture of a Panda Bear hugging the leg of a zookeeper made its way around the Internet. Ostensibly, this Panda was scared after an earthquake and was cuddling with its keeper for comfort. Notice how easy it is to make this inference about the mind of a panda. It is cute, cuddly, and exactly the kind of animal a person would naturally move close to. It is easy for such an approachable and likeable animal to seem mindful (even if the animal itself is actually reclusive and aggressive, like a real Panda Bear). In fact, biologists believe that the domestication of dogs was driven by "anthropomorphic selection" of traits that best enabled people to recognize a mind in their pet (Serpell 2003). The big eyes and baby-faced features of domestic dogs are much more approachable and socially engaging than the narrow eyes and long faces of their wolf ancestors.

But what if you saw a rat clinging to its zookeeper? Would you be as likely to believe it was scared after an earthquake? Probably not, and it is not simply because a rat's brain is smaller. Cuteness prompts social engagement, and may therefore lead to anthropomorphism, whereas ugliness prompts social disengagement and avoidance (see Sherman and Haidt 2011 for a review). In one intriguing experiment, participants looked at a picture of cute baby animals or of their less-cute adult equivalents (Sherman and Chandler 2012). Participants then evaluated four easily anthropomorphized gadgets (such as Clocky, described earlier). Participants reported that they would be more likely to anthropomorphize each gadget (specifically, to give it a name, to refer to it as "he" or "she" rather than "it", and to talk to it) after looking at the cute baby animals than after looking at the adult animals. Although this study did not measure the attribution of mental states directly, it provides some evidence that the approach-oriented motivation

that most people feel from seeing cute animals might prime anthropomorphic thinking, such that it then extends to other targets as well.

More direct evidence for a link between the motivation to connect with others and anthropomorphism comes from a study investigating perceptions of other humanlike minds. In these experiments, participants reported their impressions of the mental capacities of a very likeable or unlikeable person. Results demonstrated that the likeable person was rated as being more mindful than the unlikeable person (e.g., as having more complete feelings, being more capable of experiencing pleasure and pain, being more able to engage in a great deal of thought; Kozak et al. 2006). Neuroimaging evidence also demonstrates that regions of the brain that are reliably active when reasoning about the mental states of others are more active when people think about close others than when people think about more distant others (Krienen et al. 2010). This is surely part of the reason why ingroup members are rated as having consistently stronger mental capacities, such as the capacity to experience secondary emotions like love or joy or shame or guilt, than are outgroup members (Leyens et al. 2000). Minds emerge as others become more closely connected to one's own mind.

This importance of connection, it appears, even extends to our cars. In a survey described earlier in this chapter, people were asked to report the extent to which their cars seemed to have a "mind of its own" or to have its own "beliefs and desires" (Morewedge 2006). Earlier we reported that people rated their car as more mindful when it behaved less reliably or expectedly. But the strongest predictor of anthropomorphism in this survey was how much people reported liking their car. The more people liked their car, the more they perceived it to have a mind of its own.

The strongest evidence for the role of approach-oriented *motivation* in anthropomorphism, however, comes from experiments that either measure or manipulate people's motivation to connect with others directly. For instance, people in one survey completed a short measure of loneliness, and then rank ordered a list of 14 different traits that could be used to describe their pet (or a pet they knew well), from those that best described their pet to those that least described their pet. This list included three anthropomorphic traits related to providing social connection (thoughtful, considerate, and supportive), three anthropomorphic traits unrelated to providing social connection (embarrassable, creative, devious, and jealous), and seven nonanthropomorphic traits that are simply behavioral descriptions (aggressive, agile, active, energetic, fearful, lethargic, and muscular). Results demonstrated a small, albeit statistically significant, correlation between loneliness and the average rank of the supportive anthropomorphic traits, $r\ (167) = -0.18$. Loneliness was unrelated to rankings of the other traits.

A more recent test of this hypothesis by independent researchers (McConnell et al. 2011) using a more self-selected sample of pet owners (those recruited online for a "personality and pet evaluation" survey), also included a large number of additional questionnaires and assessed the correlation between loneliness and the *ratings* (rather than *rankings*) of the extent to which anthropomorphic traits describe a person's own pet on scales ranging from 1 (not at all true) to 9

(completely true). This survey found a slightly smaller (and statistically nonsignificant) relationship between loneliness and the scale ratings of anthropomorphic traits, $r = 0.12$, with a similar sample size. These authors also found a slightly stronger (and statistically significant) relationship between depression, another measure related to social wellbeing, and the extent to which people anthropomorphized their pets, $r = 0.19$. We think these results suggest that the relationship between loneliness and the tendency to anthropomorphize one's pet is likely to be weak, but weakly positive. Notice that pets are complicated targets of evaluation because much is already known about them, and so reflexive inferences (such as anthropomorphism) are likely to be minimized (Epley et al. 2007; Medin and Atran 2004). Notice also that if pets actually do provide significant social support because people treat them as humanlike companions, then anthropomorphizing one's pet should also reduce people's feelings of loneliness. Indeed, a survey of 1,000 pet owners revealed that 50% view their pet to be as much a part of the family as any other person in the household, with 25% even reporting that their pet is a "better listener than their spouse." Consistent with this, McConnell et al. (2011) found that thinking of a person's pet provided just as much of a psychological buffer to the pain of being socially rejected as thinking about one's best (human) friend. Another experiment reported that participants who were ostracized by another human being did not experience the same distress if they were in the presence of a dog than when they were alone (Aydin et al. 2012).

A better test of the relationship between approach oriented motivation and anthropomorphism would examine unfamiliar targets that do not provide any actual social support. We know of two experiments that have used such targets. In one survey, participants evaluated four different gadgets (such as Clocky) and then reported the extent to which each seemed to: have a mind of its own, have intentions, have free will, and experience emotions. Results demonstrated a significant, and large ($r = 0.53$, $n = 20$), relationship between loneliness and the average amount of mind attributed to these gadgets (Epley et al. 2008a). In another survey (Waytz et al. 2012), participants looked at images of celestial bodies taken from the Hubble telescope. For each one, participants again reported the extent to which each seemed to have a mind. And again, the more lonely people were, the more they anthropomorphized these objects in the universe ($r = 0.51$, $n = 28$).

These correlational findings suggest that the motivation to connect with others may increase anthropomorphism, but they obviously cannot provide evidence for this particular causal relationship. Equally plausible is that anthropomorphizing pets or gadgets or the universe makes people disconnected from other people. Demonstrating a causal link between the motivation to connect with others and subsequent anthropomorphism would require manipulating people's motivation to connect and then measuring anthropomorphism.

In one test following this design (Epley et al. 2008a), participants in one condition were induced to feel lonely by watching a short clip from the movie *Cast Away* in which the main protagonist (Tom Hanks) finds himself utterly alone on a deserted island. In another condition, participants were made to feel fearful by

watching a scary scene from the movie *Silence of the Lambs.* In a third condition, people watched a neutral clip taken from the movie *Major League*, a clip in which the main protagonists were neither afraid nor alone. In all cases, participants were asked to put themselves in the main protagonist's shoes and try to experience the emotions that he or she was feeling. After watching these clips, participants then evaluated a pet that they either owned or knew well, again rank ordering 14 traits from those that best described their pet to those that least described their pet. Those made to feel lonely were more likely to describe their pet using supportive anthropomorphic traits than whose made to feel afraid or those in the control condition. As an additional measure related to anthropomorphism, these participants also reported the extent to which they believed in a variety of supernatural agents, including God, the devil, and angels. One prominent theory of religion is that these agents are themselves the product of anthropomorphizing natural events (Guthrie 1993), one that is a byproduct of people's ability to reason about the minds of others (Bering 2006; Atran and Norenzayan 2004). Consistent with this account, this experiment also found that those induced to feel lonely also reported a stronger belief in these religious agents than those in the fear or control conditions (see also Aydin et al. 2010; Epley et al. 2008, Exp. 2; Gebauer and Maio 2012).

Altogether, we believe these results demonstrate that the motivation to connect with others enables anthropomorphism, and that we are more likely to attribute a mind to agents to which we are closely connected than those with which we are disconnected. These attempts to humanize nonhuman agents by giving them a mind appears to be satisfying, although it is not entirely clear based on the existing research whether the social support people derive from their pets or their connections to religious agents come from their anthropomorphic qualities in particular. What is clear at this time, we believe, is that minds emerge in others as people attempt to get close to others, regardless of whether "others" are people, pets, or—in the case of Julia Hill—a particularly large tree.

From Motivated Anthropomorphism to Unmotivated Person Perception

The scientific study of anthropomorphism has always existed at the fringes of psychological science. For some researchers, the main concern is not understanding the psychological processes that trigger and guide anthropomorphism, but rather whether it is accurate or not. This requires studying the minds of animals or Gods or machines, and so the problem is shifted to animal behaviorists or theologians or computer scientists. For other researchers, anthropomorphism seems more silly than serious, an exercise in talking with metaphors or failing to outgrow childish ways of thinking. But for most relevant researchers, psychology is about the interactions between those who have a psyche—that is, between human beings in their everyday social lives. How people think about non people is not a central topic.

And so the study of anthropomorphism is the kind of topic within psychology that gets discussed in the hallways of major conferences rather than in the main meeting rooms.

In some ways, this is as it should be. It is interesting to know whether our pets are capable of the kind of thinking we attribute to them (Horowitz 2009), and anthropomorphism is sometimes just a way of speaking that diminishes as people get older. There are also more pressing matters for psychologists to attend to than whether an alarm clock seems to have a mind of its own or why a woman might think she is receiving instructions from a tree. Psychology, particularly social psychology, should always be firmly focused on human social interaction, because it is what ordinary perceivers care the most about.

We think, however, it is time to bring research on anthropomorphism out of the hallways and into the meeting rooms, because its careful study tells us a great deal about how people think about other people. In particular, we think it tells us a great deal about why people sometimes fail to attribute minds to other people (dehumanization), why some people seem particularly unable to reason about the minds of others (such as individuals with autism spectrum disorders), and why most people are actually less social than they should be for their own wellbeing.

Dehumanization. Anthropomorphism, we believe, is guided by the basic mechanisms that govern engagement with the minds of others. When other minds matter, either because they need to be explained or they are desired sources of social connection, then a person may employ their capacity to reason about the minds of others. When other minds are irrelevant—there is no motivation to explain or connect with the minds of others—then this capacity may not be employed. Reasoning about the minds of others is not a default state. It requires some motivation to engage with the minds of others. Instead of being an automatic process employed nearly universally, it is a tool that people must be motivated to use.

The motivated nature of mind attribution is often overlooked in research involving other people, because the presence of mind in others is generally assumed. However, the inverse process of anthropomorphism when evaluating other people is dehumanization—failing to attribute humanlike mental capacities to other people, and therefore evaluating (or treating) them as relatively mindless animals or objects. Historically, dehumanization has been considered to be a product of antipathy. The Nazis dehumanized the Jews, the Hutus dehumanized the Tutsis, and whites in the United States have dehumanized blacks presumably out of hatred and prejudice. Research on anthropomorphism, however, suggests that a different mechanism may also be at work in some of these cases. Instead of antipathy, dehumanization may result from apathy—indifference to the minds of others. As George Bernard Shaw (1901) pointed out, "the worst sin towards our fellow creatures is not to hate them, but to be indifferent to them. That's the essence of inhumanity." Might being indifferent to the minds of other people lead to dehumanization of those people, which could in turn generate some of the hatred and dislike commonly observed in cases of dehumanization?

Several findings are consistent with this account. Being in a position of power, for instance, enables freedom to pursue one's own goals and a diminished need

to rely on others. Those in positions of high power are therefore less attentive to other people than are those in low positions of power (Fiske 1993). When powerful people do need others to achieve their goals, they appear more likely to objectify them as instrumental tools needed to achieve one's own goals than people who are in low positions of power. (Gruenfeld et al. 2008). Such objectification does not come from some deep-seeded hatred of the powerless by the powerful, but rather from indifference to the full complement of mental attributes that make other people fully human.

High social status yields similar results, with those who think they are of high social status being more indifferent (less compassionate) to the suffering of others than those who think they are of low social status (Van Kleef et al. 2009). Again, being at the top of the social hierarchy need not make people hate those who are lower on the social hierarchy to produce these results. It could come from in diference to the minds of others. In one experiment, those high in social status were less able to recognize another person's emotion from a photograph than those who were relatively low in social status (Kraus et al. 2010).

Most directly relevant to this hypothesis, one series of experiments suggests that satisfying people's motivation to connect with other people can actually increase the tendency to dehumanize more distant others (Waytz and Epley 2012). In one experiment, participants who wrote about someone they felt closely connected to were more likely to dehumanize outgroup members (in particular, to see them as having weaker mental capacities) than those who wrote about someone to whom they were not connected. These outgroups spanned the spectrum of social evalvations (Harris and Fiske 2006), including groups high and low in warmth (e.g., middle class Americans vs. drug addicts) as well as those high and low in competence (e.g., rich people vs. disabled people). No differences in liking for these groups emerged, demonstrating that dehumanization can emerge without disliking. In another experiment, participants reported their impressions of terrorist detainees while sitting on opposite sides of a room with one's friend or with a stranger. Those who arrived at the lab and participated with a friend should feel more socially connected than those who arrived and participated with a stranger. Consistent with our hypothesis, those in a room with a friend also dehumanized the mental capacities of these detainees more than those who participated with a stranger, and as a result was also more willing to endorse the use of harsh interrogation tactics on these detainees. A more recent study suggested that merely being reminded of close social connections by using one's cell phone or viewing an image of the cell phone decreased prosocial behavior toward strangers, also suggesting that social connection can increase dehumanization (Abraham et al. 2012; see also Bastian and Haslam 2010). Being part of a tightly connected group is good for a person's own health and happiness, but it may not be good for enabling them to connect with the minds of more distant others.

At this point, there is not enough evidence to say whether apathy—the lack of motivation to connect with other minds—plays a bigger or smaller causal role in cases of dehumanization than antipathy—an outright hatred or dislike of other mind. However, we think psychologists would do well to remember a version of

"Hanlon's Law:" never attribute to malice that which can be attributed to stupidity. The objectification of women or the dehumanization of outgroups or the animalistic tendencies attributed to those who are distant from one's own mind may result from the lack of motivation to think more carefully about the minds of others rather than from explicit prejudice toward these others.

Atypical social cognition. The modal course of human development has children learning about the minds of others from the very instant they are born, or at least as early as mothers will allow their infants to be studied by psychologists. In these early moments, infants will orient toward their mother's voice (DeCasper and Fifer 1980), imitate another person's behavior (Meltzoff and Moore 1977), and will look preferentially at human faces (Sherrod 1979). This early social motivation provides the input necessary to develop an understanding of how other minds work, and enables the social capacities that eventually allow people to reason in sophisticated detail about the minds of others. Not all infants, however, follow this modal path. Some adults, namely those diagnosed with autism, seem to lack these most basic social skills. The dominant view among psychologists over the last 20 years has been that those diagnosed with autism lack the fundamental ability to reason about other minds. In particular, they lack the neural module that allows people to theorize about how other minds work (Baron-Cohen 1995).

This view is changing. In particular, research now suggests that the social deficits observed in autism may stem from a lack of motivation to connect with the minds of others rather than from an inherent inability to do so (Chevallier et al. 2012a, b). Those diagnosed with autism, from infancy, seem relatively indifferent to other people compared to normally developing infants. Within the first year of age, those later diagnosed with autism show diminished sensitivity to hearing their own name, are more socially distant, and exhibit less eye contact (Jones et al. 2008; Osterling et al. 2002). As they age, those later diagnosed with autism do not look at other people in social scenes as normally developing children do but instead look at background objects (Riby and Hancock 2008; see also Klin et al. 2002). As adults, those with autism do not seem to experience either the pains or pleasures—key elements of any motivational system—of connecting with others. Those with autism do not behave more desirably when in the presence of others, suggesting diminished interest in managing their impressions in the eyes of others (Chevallier et al. 2012b; Izuma et al. 2011). Those with autism typically report having no friends (Howlin et al. 2004), but do not report the pain of feeling lonely as do normally developed adults (Chamberlain et al. 2007). Most important, motivating those with autism to perform better on social tasks does increase their performance, consistent with a deficit in the motivation to reason about others rather than an inability to do so (for a review see Chevallier et al. 2012a).

This view of diminished social motivation rather than diminished social ability is also consistent with some findings from the social psychological literature involving normally developed adults. For instance, women tend to reason somewhat more accurately about the minds of others than do men, a gender difference that is pronounced enough among those with autism that Baron Cohen has referred to the autism as a case of the "extreme male brain" (2002). However, gender

differences in performance on social cognitive tasks between men and women are often relatively small (Ickes 2003), and some seem to be produced by differences in motivation rather than differences in actual ability (Graham and Ickes 1997). When men are more motivated to reason about the minds of others, then gender differences are reduced (if not eliminated; Hall and Schmid-Mast 2008; Ickes et al. 2000). Men and women may not differ as much in their ability to reason about the minds of others as they do in their interest in doing so.

We think this emerging view of autism may call for a reinterpretation of some existing evidence in the psychological literature. Most relevant to anthropomorphism, one well-known lesion study described a patient with amygdala damage who seemed to exhibit good social functioning but did not anthropomorphize the classic Heider and Simmel (1944) video of geometric shapes. Heberlein and Adolphs (2004) interpreted this deficit as stemming from an inability to process emotional information. However, the amygdala does not seem to be involved with emotional processes as much as it is a marker for motivational relevance in the brain, one that identifies stimuli that deserve attention and those that do not (Cunningham and Brosch 2012). Instead of an inability to process emotions, we think this lesion patient lacked the motivational trigger necessary to care about explaining the shapes in the first place. Indeed, those diagnosed with autism also show differences in amygdala responses to social stimuli, a finding again consistent with a lack of motivation to attend to social stimuli rather than an inability to do so. As any parent of a poor-performing high school student will attest, it is good to remember that differences in performance may not reflect differences in ability but rather differences in interest and effort.

Personal wellbeing. Normally developed adults do not have autism, but they sometimes act like they might. Although Aristotle argued "man is by nature a social animal," it is not at all uncommon for people to come in close contact with strangers and completely ignore each other. Every day in waiting rooms and coffee shops, walking on sidewalks or standing on street corners, sitting on planes and trains, people can be mere inches from another person and treat that person as they would a lampshade.

As social as human beings seem to be, and as much as people's ability to connect with the minds of others enables both happiness and health (Diener and Seligman 2002), people can at times seem completely unmotivated to use their unique social skills. In the modern world, the human motivation to consume food seems miscalibrated in a way that pushes people toward consuming too much. In the modern world, where most social interactions are relatively safe and opportunities to interact with outgroups is widespread, is the human motivation to connect with others biased toward "consuming" too little? The experiences of ignoring others in waiting rooms or on planes is not all that much different from the social indifference observed among those diagnosed with autism, and is an everyday form of indifference toward others. Would people be happier if they were more motivated to actually use their ability to reason about others' minds? If all of us became just a little bit more socially motivated than we already are?

Consider three sets of experiments that look at the consequences of increasing social motivation. In one, participants were asked to act extroverted or introverted. In both a 2-week diary study and in a 1-hour laboratory discussion group spanning, participants were happier being extroverted than introverted (Fleeson et al. 2002).

In another (Epley and Schroeder 2012), commuters in Chicago traveling on trains and in busses were assigned randomly to one of three conditions. In one condition, participants were asked to be more social: to try to connect with a person sitting next to them on their ride. In the second condition, participants were asked to be less social: to keep to themselves and "enjoy your solitude". In the third, participants were asked to do whatever they normally do. Both on the trains and on the busses, those asked to connect with the person sitting next to them reported having a more pleasant commute and were in a better mood than those asked to "enjoy their solitude". Interestingly, there was also no reported difference between conditions in how productive people reported their commute to be. Connecting with a stranger is more pleasant than sitting alone, but no less productive. If connecting with others makes people happier and healthier, then why do people not connect? Additional experiments provided the answer: Because people in these contexts appear to believe that connecting with others will be unpleasant. When commuters from the same populations were asked to predict how they would feel in each of these conditions, they consistently predicted having the least pleasant, least positive, and least productive commute when they tried to connect with another person. Evolution can give people the social tools that enable happiness and health, but it may not set them at the optimal level of motivation in modern life to use them.

Conclusion

Few would argue that you can have mental experiences without a brain, which means that no amount of arguing would convince most people that a tree is capable of giving instructions, screaming in pain, or suffering when cut. Those who might argue otherwise can sound crazy or delusional, as people who might be suffering from some kind of psychological disorder or stuck in some infantile stage of development. We have tried in this chapter to take such extreme cases of anthropomorphism—cases when a person attributes a mind to a nonhuman agent—and describe the perfectly normal processes that might explain it.

We have argued that this phenomenon is guided by the same psychological processes that enable people to reason about the minds of other persons, and that those processes are guided at their most fundamental levels by two basic human motivations—the motivation to explain or understand another's behavior and the motivation to form a social connection with another agent. Far from being an automatic psychological process, attributing a mind to another agent first requires engagement with that agent, a reason to care about the mind of that agent, and a

reason to think about the inner mind of that agent. Lacking this motivation, we believe, is also central to instances of dehumanization in which people fail to recognize the mind of another out of apathy, gives insight into specific social cognitive disorders (such as autism), and can lead people to subtly treat others as objects in their everyday lives in ways that diminish one's own happiness. Understanding how specific motivations guide the inferences people make about the inner lives of others helps to explain the most fundamental divide in all of social life—the differences between *us* and *them*.

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Discrimination, Objectification, and Dehumanization: Toward a Pantheoretical Framework

Bonnie Moradi

Abstract In this chapter, I have called for greater attention to targets' experiences in theory and research on dehumanization. I have also argued that what we know from theory and research on targets' experiences of stigma and discrimination can inform how we pursue the understanding of targets' experiences of dehumanization. To this end, I have emphasized the utility of attention to the intersectionality of minority statuses in shaping discrimination experiences. I have also described theoretical frameworks grounded in different populations' experiences—including theories of discrimination as stressful life events or daily hassles, minority stress frameworks, and objectification theory—and offered examples of integrating these frameworks as a way to attend to intersectionality. As well, I have noted parallels between the areas of convergence across discrimination theories and emerging findings regarding the consequences of dehumanization for targets. Finally, I have described the broad outlines of a pantheoretical framework that reflects areas of convergence and complementary integration across the discrimination and dehumanization literatures. My hope is that this framework will encourage further attention to the potential distinctions between internalization and cognizance of discrimination, exploration of their potentially distinctive intermediary consequences, and consideration of a broader range of outcomes beyond individual health and well-being indicators, and including individual and collective social activism. I also hope that readers will contribute to the critical evaluation and refinement of this pantheoretical framework with continued attention to the intersectionality that characterizes people's identities and experiences of discrimination.

I am grateful to Esther Tebbe for her assistance in preparing this manuscript.

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S. J. Gervais (ed.), *Objectification and (De)Humanization*,
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 60, DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-6959-9_7,

Discrimination, Objectification, and Dehumanization: Toward a Pantheoretical Framework

There is a long tradition of conceptualizing instances of severe prejudice and intergroup conflict—for example, the eradication of Native Americans, slavery, and the holocaust—as manifestations of dehumanization (see Haslam 2013; Haslam et al. 2013). Such events are thought to be anchored in dehumanizing perceptions of the targets and to also further perpetuate these dehumanizing perceptions. An important contribution of the 2012 Nebraska Symposium is to expand conceptualizations of dehumanization beyond these most severe and prototypic examples, connecting dehumanization with broader manifestations of prejudice and sexual objectification. More specifically, the work of the presenters in this symposium illustrates that the denial of human characteristics to others may occur in everyday contexts and may reflect not only antipathy, but also mundane apathy or lack of motivation to understand or connect with another person (Epley et al. 2013); that dehumanization is manifested subtly in individuals' perceptions of targets of prejudice, particularly those targets perceived to be low in both warmth and competence (Fiske 2013); that dehumanization can take mechanistic or animalistic forms and vary in degrees of subtlety (Haslam 2013; Haslam et al. 2013); that mechanizing dehumanization of women—or objectification—may serve a terror management function (Goldenberg 2013); and that self-objectification in women may be both promoted by exposure to sexism and also function to maintain sexist system justifying beliefs and impede social change activism (Calogero 2013). Thus, one important thread across the contributions to this symposium is that dehumanization can encompass a range of everyday motivations, functions, and manifestations beyond the most severe prototypic examples.

Beyond Targets as Objects in the Dehumanization Process

In addition to delineating the scope of dehumanization to include everyday manifestations, the contributions to this symposium reveal another noteworthy point: that much of what we know about everyday manifestations of dehumanization focuses on how, why, and when people dehumanize others. Efforts to understand perpetrators and contexts of dehumanization have clear theoretical and practical value, for instance in informing interventions designed to reduce dehumanization. However, understanding the targets' perspective is critical as well. Indeed, interest in understanding dehumanization is often grounded in the reasoning that it has meaningful consequences for targets, communities, and societies, and these are worthy areas of investigation. As well, targets can offer insight on the content and manifestations of dehumanization (e.g., subtle, systemic) that are not readily evident to perpetrators or observers, but are nevertheless consequential for targets.

Thus, an important direction that emerges from this symposium is the need to understand experiences of dehumanization from the targets' perspective.

In a striking parallel, Swim and Stangor (1998) identified a similar need in the literature on prejudice a decade and a half ago; they released their edited volume *Prejudice: The Target's Perspective* to address this need. At that time, Swim and Stangor (1998) observed that social psychological theory and research on prejudice tended to focus on topics such as the content of prejudice, motivational processes underlying prejudice, factors that can promote or reduce prejudice, and characteristics of those who hold prejudicial attitudes. This range of topics shaped a body of literature (with some notable exceptions within and outside of social psychology; e.g., Crocker and Major 1989; Dion 1975; Klonoff and Landrine 1995) in which the targets' perspective was rendered nearly invisible.

We may be at a similar juncture in the literature on dehumanization, although within this broader literature, objectification theory research on sexual objectification and its consequences is a notable example of attending to targets' experiences. My aim is to encourage a broadening of theory and research that attends to targets not only as objects of dehumanization but also as subjects in dehumanization processes. To this end, I will draw from the literature on targets' experiences of everyday discrimination, arguing that such experiences represent a specific manifestation of dehumanization. I suggest, therefore, that what we know about experiences of discrimination and their consequences from the targets' perspective can be connected with our understanding of the consequences of dehumanization for targets. I also want to note that the range of experiences that I am describing as discrimination is referred to in the literature with a variety of terms, including experiences of stereotyping, stigma, prejudice, and discrimination. This variation in terminology will become evident as I discuss some of this literature; but, for the sake of parsimony, I will use the term discrimination to encompass a broad range of everyday exposure to stereotyping, stigma, prejudice, marginalization, and discrimination based on targets' minority statuses.

Dehumanization Manifested as Discrimination

As discussed by Haslam et al. (2013) and Epley et al. (2013), dehumanization and humanization processes can occur in a variety of contexts and in relation to a variety of targets; thus, dehumanization is not synonymous with discrimination. However, discrimination can be conceptualized as a specific manifestation of dehumanization. Indeed, there is evidence that perceivers' self-reports, basic cognitive processes, and neural responses reflect dehumanizing objectification of some targets of discrimination, including sexualized women (e.g., Bernard et al. 2012; Cikara et al. 2011; Vaes et al. 2011) as well as groups stigmatized as having low warmth and low competence (e.g., Harris and Fiske 2006; Vaes and Paladino 2010).

The connection between discrimination and dehumanization was drawn previously by Leyens et al. (2000) in their description of the concept of infrahumanization. Leyens et al. (2000) described infrahumanization as the relative dehumanization of one person or group in relation to another; that is, viewing one person or group as less human than another person or group. Articulating the connection between discrimination and dehumanization, Leyens et al. (2000) argued that "placing people in the others category, or discriminating against them, results in denying them one or several of the typically human characteristics…The people in these groups are others; they are radically different from 'us,' and as such, they lack typically human characteristics and, therefore, are considered infrahumans" (p. 187). Leyens et al. (2000) further argued that discrimination is grounded in viewing some groups as having a different and less human essence than others. Thus, Leyens et al. (2000) connected essentialist views of group differences (whether such views are rooted in perceived biological, cultural, or other group differences) with infrahumanization of some groups, which can be manifested as discrimination against members of those groups.

The framework outlined by Haslam (2006, 2013) locates Leyens et al.'s (2000) concept of infrahumanization within a broader scope of dehumanization. Specifically, Haslam (2006, 2013) identifies human nature and human uniqueness as two dimensions along which dehumanization can occur. Human nature encompasses those characteristics that distinguish humans from objects, including for instance, emotional responsiveness, agency, and individuality. Human uniqueness encompasses those characteristics that distinguish humans from other species, including for instance, civility, morality, and rationality. As such, dehumanization can occur along these two dimensions, reflecting human nature denial or mechanistic dehumanization, and human uniqueness denial or animalistic dehumanization. Although much research has been devoted to demonstrating the distinctiveness of human nature and human uniqueness dimensions (for reviews see Haslam, 2006; 2013), Haslam (2013) noted that these two dimensions of dehumanization are not mutually exclusive. An important example of the co-occurrence of mechanistic and animalistic dehumanization is reflected in representations of women as both inanimate objects and as animals in pornography, advertisement, and other media. Haslam (2013) further delineated the potential for dehumanization to vary along a continuum of subtle and implicit to blatant and explicit manifestations as well as along a continuum of relative dehumanization (i.e., less human than some reference group) to absolute dehumanization (i.e., not human at all). Thus, Haslam's (2013) framework suggests that dehumanization can occur along human nature and human uniqueness dimensions, across a subtle to explicit continuum, and across a relative to absolute continuum (see Fig. 1 in Haslam et al. 2013). Haslam (2013) locates Leyens et al.'s (2000) concept of discrimination as infrahumanization within the subtle relative animalistic dehumanization anchors of this framework.

Thinking more broadly, we can also identify discrimination experiences that exemplify various other locations in Haslam's (2013) framework of dehumanization. For example, hate crimes, rape, and other forms of violent discrimination fall closer to the explicit and absolute end of Haslam's (2013) continua and can

reflect both human nature and human uniqueness denial. Legal and public policy discourses such as "defense of marriage" and "defending the borders" may range across the subtle-explicit continuum and typically involve casting outgroups (i.e., sexual minority people and immigrant people) as less deserving of the human uniqueness-related rights and privileges that are afforded to ingroups. Racist, sexist, homophobic, and other verbal slurs also can capture various locations in Haslam's (2006, 2013) framework. For example the "B" word used against women reflects an explicit, absolute, and animalistic dehumanization of women. The term "anchor baby" used to describe the perception that some immigrants have babies in the U.S. to secure a path to permanent residence and citizenship reflects an explicit, absolute mechanistic dehumanization of the target babies.

Many publicized instances of discrimination exemplify dehumanization as well. Some such events over the past few years include protests against the television program All-American Muslim arguing that the program was too humanizing of Muslim Americans and did not do enough to portray this community as a danger to American values (Esposito 2011). Another example is a racially stereotypic ice cream flavor (vanilla and fortune cookies) called "Taste the Lin-Sanity" which was used to represent Jeremy Lin, a New York Knicks basketball player who is of Taiwanese descent; the ice cream company later apologized for and pulled this flavor (Rocheleau 2012). A third example is reflected in the controversial comments made by Rush Limbaugh who called Sandra Fluke (a Georgetown University Law student who spoke before a House committee about insurance coverage for contraception), a slut and prostitute and suggested that she should post videos of her sexual encounters on the internet to be watched by those paying for her insurance coverage (Mirkinson 2012). These examples illustrate that discriminatory sentiments and acts can be rooted in and reinforce perceptions that reduce the humanity of targets: Muslim American people reduced to threats to American values, a basketball player reduced to a fortune cookie, a woman speaking on the issue of contraception reduced to a sex object owned by others and used for their consumption.

Consequences of Discrimination for Targets

The notion that dehumanization can be manifested as discrimination against groups or individuals suggests that theory and research on the consequences of discrimination can inform efforts to attend to targets' experiences of dehumanization. To this end, I will provide brief overviews of three sets of frameworks that outline the consequences of discrimination for the targets: stress and coping frameworks, minority stress theory, and objectification theory. I have selected these particular frameworks because they originate from the experiences of different populations of focus. These frameworks also vary in the extent to which they detail intervening processes that translate discrimination experiences into adverse outcomes for targets. I will present these frameworks in order of their increasing delineation of intervening processes, from frameworks that are least

focused on the intervening processes to frameworks that give greater attention to such processes. Attention to intervening processes that outline how discrimination experiences are translated into adverse outcomes can inform interventions for interrupting the translation of discrimination into adverse outcomes as a complement to interventions designed to reduce discrimination itself. Thus, collectively, these frameworks can facilitate consideration of the experiences of a variety of populations and can identify increasing levels of nuance in intervening processes, which in turn, can inform interventions for ameliorating potential adverse consequences of discrimination for targets. It is important to note that these frameworks are exemplars and do not reflect a comprehensive review; in fact, these frameworks themselves are integrative and build on the work of many prior scholars.

The first set of frameworks, which may be better described as numerous threads of population-specific literatures, reflects those that conceptualize discrimination experiences as stressful events with consequences that parallel those of stressful life events or daily hassles. A notable example of such frameworks is Clarke et al. (1999) biopsychosocial model focusing on racism as a stressor for African American/Black populations. This framework suggests that perceived racism, like other perceived stressors, may elicit psychological and physiological stress responses such as anger, fear, compromised immune system, and release of stress hormones. General or racism-specific coping responses may mitigate such psychological and physiological stress responses, or fail to do so. The psychological and physiological stress responses, in turn, can give rise to health problems.

Clark et al.'s (1999) framework, and other similar models, may be applicable across populations, but the bodies of research accompanying such frameworks tends to develop in population-specific pipelines, sometimes using population-specific language and measures (e.g., Lee and Anh 2012; Moradi and DeBlaere 2010; Pieterse et al. 2012). For example, the concept of race-related stress and the accompanying Index of Race-Related Stress (IRRS; Utsey and Ponterotto 1996) is used frequently with African American/Black populations. The concepts of daily racist events and daily sexist events and the accompanying Schedule of Racist Events (SRE; Landrine and Klonoff 1996) and Schedule of Sexist Events (SSE; Klonoff and Landrine 1995) are used frequently with African American/Black populations and with women, respectively. The discrimination experiences of sexual minority populations are captured by such language and measures as the Measure of Gay-Related Stress (MOGS; Lewis et al. 2001) and the Anti-Bisexual Experiences Scale (ABES; Brewster and Moradi 2010).

A parallel development is the language and framework of microagressions, which began with a focus on racial microaggressions and is being extended to gender and sexual orientation microaggressions (Sue et al. 2007). This literature describes the same phenomena as the aforementioned perceived discrimination literature, with the terminology of microaggressions intended to capture the everyday nature of these experiences. As well, separate diary studies conducted by Swim and her colleagues have documented the content, frequency, and immediate consequences of everyday racist events (Swim et al. 2003), heterosexist events (Swim et al. 2009), and sexist events (Swim et al. 1998, 2001).

Collectively, these parallel bodies of literature aim to capture targets' self-reported experiences of everyday heterosexism, racism, and sexism, with a focus on the frequency of discrimination events, the appraisal of their stressfulness, and sometimes coping-related factors including both general coping styles and minority identity-related factors such as positive or negative collective identity (e.g., Lee 2005; Fischer and Holz 2007; Szymanski 2009; Wei et al. 2010). As such, the primary aim of these literatures is to evaluate the link between perceived discrimination experiences and health-related outcomes. Pascoe and Richman's (2009) recent meta-analysis reflected much of this literature, yielding an average correlation of 0.20 between self-reported discrimination experiences and mental health; this was across various forms of discrimination (e.g., heterosexism, racism, sexism). Smaller effects emerged for physical health and health-related behaviors. Importantly, indicators of distress and well-being were collapsed in the overall mental health effect size and there is evidence that perceived discrimination is linked more robustly with indicators of distress than with indicators of well-being (e.g., Fischer and Holz 2007; Fischer and Shaw 1999; Lee 2003, 2005; Moradi and Hasan 2004; Moradi and Risco 2006; Moradi and Subich 2004; Utsey et al. 2000). Thus, 0.20 may be an underestimate of the link between discrimination experiences and indicators of psychological distress. Nevertheless, this literature on perceived discrimination suggests that such experiences are associated significantly with psychological distress. Some of this research also examines moderators and mediators of this link and elucidates responses to discrimination. In a recent example, Wei et al.'s (2010) identified five dimensions of targets' responses to discrimination: engaging in education and advocacy to reduce discrimination, resistance to and challenging of discrimination, internalizing self-blame, engaging in substance use, and detachment and disengagement.

The second set of frameworks in the present overview is rooted in sexual minority populations' (e.g., lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender) experiences of stigma, prejudice, and discrimination. The core of such frameworks is captured in Herek's (2009) delineation of sexual stigma toward non-heterosexual orientations, identities, and people at the contextual and individual levels. At the contextual level, Herek (2009) identified cultural heterosexism—that is, legal, religious, and other institutional norms that privilege heterosexuality over other sexual orientations. Prohibitions against same-sex marriage are a prime example of this. At the individual level, Herek (2009) outlined enacted, felt, and internalized stigma. Enacted stigma reflects discrimination events that can range from subtle (e.g., social distancing) to blatant and severe (e.g., hate crimes). Felt stigma is the expectation of the likelihood that enacted stigma will occur, as well as the efforts to avoid enacted stigma (notably, this concept is related to concepts of rejection sensitivity, Mendoza-Dentonet al. 2002; stigma consciousness, Pinel 1999; and stereotype threat, Steele 1997; Steele and Aronson 1995). An example is a same-sex couple's vigilance of the potential for harassment or violence and their avoidance of public intimacy to mitigate the likelihood of such events. Finally, internalized stigma is the acceptance of stigmatization into one's own value system and self-concept; that is, the internalization of homophobia and heterosexism.

Herek's (2009) concepts capture core constructs from earlier articulations of minority stress frameworks (e.g., Brooks 1981; Meyer 1995, 2003) that connected enacted, felt, and internalized stigma explicitly with mental health and health-related behaviors for sexual minority targets. Specifically, Meyer (2003) identified experiences of prejudice and discrimination, enacted stigma in Herek's language, as distal stressors. As proximal stressors, Meyer (1995, 2003) identified internalized homophobia as well as vigilance and expectation of stigmatization; these parallel internalized stigma and felt stigma in Herek's language, respectively. An additional proximal stressor identified in Meyer's (2003) framework is concealment of identity, that is, sexual minority individuals' ongoing experience of deciding if, when, and how to conceal or disclose their sexual identity to others. However, links of identity concealment or disclosure with health-related outcomes have been mixed, and some scholars have noted that in addition to its costs (for review, see Pachankis 2007), identity concealment may serve some pragmatic functions in managing heterosexist contexts (Balsam and Mohr 2007; Brewster and Moradi 2010; Chrobot-Mason et al. 2001; Herek and Garnets 2007; McCarn and Fassinger 1996; Oetjen and Rothblum 2000). Nevertheless, Meyer (2003) argued that the proximal and distal minority stressors work together to contribute to psychological symptomatology and health-risk behaviors among sexual minority populations.

Substantial support has been garnered for the posited relations of perceived discrimination (or enacted stigma), internalized homophobia (or internalized stigma), and expectation of stigmatization (or felt stigma) with health and health-related behaviors (e.g., Balsam and Mohr 2007; Brewster and Moradi 2010; Hatzenbuehler et al. 2008; Lewis et al. 2003; Newcomb and Mustanski 2010). Given its influence and continued promise, the minority stress framework was identified by the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies (2011) as a major conceptual perspective to drive the research agenda on sexual minority populations' health. Important extensions of this framework are emerging as well (e.g., Hatzenbeuhler 2009).

A third framework in the present overview is Fredrickson and Roberts' (1997) objectification theory which is rooted in women's experiences of gender role socialization and sexual objectification. Importantly, sexual objectification experiences are demonstrated to constitute a specific dimension or manifestation of sexist events (Swim et al. 1998), a finding that connects objectification theory with the broader literature on perceived sexist discrimination. Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) posited that gender role socialization and sexual objectification experiences encourage girls and women to treat themselves as objects to be looked upon and evaluated based upon bodily appearance. This internalization of an observer's perspective upon one's own body is called self-objectification and is manifested by habitual body surveillance. Self-objectification and manifest body surveillance can promote body shame when one fails to meet the (typically impossible) internalized or cultural appearance standard; increase anxiety about when and how one's body will be evaluated; reduce states of flow characterized by joy and peak motivation (Csikszentmihalyi 1982, 1990); and impede awareness of internal bodily states

such as hunger and physiological sexual arousal. This set of relations from gender role socialization and sexual objectification experiences to self-objectification and body surveillance, to greater body shame, greater anxiety, reduced flow, and lower internal bodily awareness, is posited to ultimately contribute to women's risk for depression, sexual dysfunction, and eating disorders (Fredrickson and Roberts 1997).

Objectification theory launched a proliferation of research and advancements in understanding women's experiences and mental health and this research has garnered substantial support for the tenets of the theory (for reviews see Moradi and Huang 2008; Moradi 2010). Importantly, while objectification theory was initially studied primarily with White heterosexual women, aspects of the theory have garnered some support as well as some qualification with other populations, including racial/ethnic minority women and men, sexual minority women and men, Deaf women, Muslim women, and heterosexual men (e.g., Engeln-Maddox et al. 2011; Hebl et al. 2004; Moradi and Rottenstein 2007; Parent and Moradi 2011; Tolaymat and Moradi 2011).

Theoretical Integration and Consideration of Intersectionality

As mentioned previously, the three sets of frameworks presented here—stress and coping frameworks, minority stress theory, and objectification theory—have tended to develop separately and largely in population-specific threads. However, careful consideration of the processes outlined in these frameworks reveals multiple points of overlap. For example, each of these frameworks highlights the potential deleterious consequences of contextual experiences such as heterosexism, racism, sexism (and its specific manifestation as sexual objectification). These frameworks also link experiences of discrimination with intermediary consequences such as internalization and vigilance or surveillance, and suggest that these intervening processes can promote subsequent symptomatology. There are also some areas of complementary integration across these frameworks, where more elaboration in one theory addresses potential gaps in another theory. For instance, Herek (2009) and Meyer (2003) both distinguish between the internalization of stigma into one's own value system (e.g., internalized stigma) and the omnipresent cognizance of potential stigmatization (e.g., felt stigma); this distinction may be collapsed in objectification theory's concepts of self-objectification and manifest body surveillance. By contrast, objectification theory offers greater nuance than minority stress theory in outlining potential intermediary intrapersonal consequences of internalized stigma—for instance, experiences of anxiety, shame, and impeded flow—that might promote mental health problems.

But, why might it be useful to attend to such areas of overlap and complementary integration? One obvious answer is theoretical parsimony. Acknowledging that different bodies of literature are describing similar concepts and processes

using different language may be efficient and also foster the possibility that these bodies of literature inform each other in fruitful and generative ways; one body of literature may reveal uncharacterized or understudied phenomenon in another body of literature and vice versa. Beyond theoretical parsimony and the benefits of cross-theory synergy, however, there is the issue of the texture of actual people's lives. Many people's experiences are not captured by single statuses that are the focus of many extant theories (e.g., ethnicity/race or gender or sexual orientation) but rather reflect the intersections of multiple statuses (e.g., ethnicity/race and gender and sexual orientation and…). For instance, when researchers are interested in the objectification experiences of African American sexual minority women, should they focus on African American identity and associated experiences of discrimination and apply race-related stress theory? Focus on lesbian identity and associated experiences of discrimination and apply minority stress theory? Focus on sexual objectification experiences and apply objectification theory? Theoretical integration is important for promoting systematic rather than ad hoc approaches to these areas of investigation. To elaborate on this point, I will digress to discuss conceptualizations of minority groups, minority statuses, and the notion of intersectionality, before returning to the issue of theoretical integration.

Minority Groups Lens and Intersectionality Lens

From a sociological perspective, minority and majority groups are defined in terms of the distribution of resources, power, and privilege, not in terms of numerical minority or majority (Healey 2012). Minority group members also share a differentiating characteristic—such as gender, race, language, or religion—relative to non-members (Healey 2012). For instance, women compose about half of the population, so are not a numeric minority, but they experience a systematic pattern of disadvantage and inequality, described as sexism. Additionally possible, but not necessary features of minority groups are that they form a self-conscious social unit, the minority status is ascribed at birth and/or difficult or impossible to change, and some minority groups (e.g., ethnic, racial, religious) tend to engage in intragroup marriage (Healey 2012). Thus, the "minority" part of the phrase "minority groups" is intended primarily to describe a pattern of societal disadvantage and inequality associated with a differentiating group characteristic.

The term "groups" in the phrase "minority groups" is also worth examining critically. First, minority or majority status exists across a variety of sociodemographic markers, including for example, ability status, gender, gender identity and presentation, ethnicity/race, religion, sexual orientation, and social class; and within each sociocultural context, each individual holds a majority or minority status along these dimensions. Second, and this may be an obvious but nevertheless important point to underscore, is that minority statuses are not mutually exclusive and many people hold multiple minority statuses (e.g., Asian American bisexual woman; African American Deaf man). Unfortunately, this reality is often

lost in much of the psychological literature which tends to take a minority groups perspective (e.g., comparing one minority "group" to another or to a majority "group").

In their conceptualization of this problem, Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach (2008) suggest that omnipresent androcentric, ethnocentric, and heterosexist ideologies work together to create lenses or biases that focus on prototypic members of racial/ethnic minority, sexual minority, and gender minority groups. For example, in research on racial/ethnic minority issues, the experiences of ethnic minority heterosexual men serve as the implicit reference point and the experiences of other groups (e.g., racial/ethnic minority heterosexual or sexual minority women) become invisible; in research on sexual minority issues, the experiences of White gay men serve as the implicit reference point and the experiences of other groups (e.g., racial/ethnic minority gay men, women, or bisexual people) become invisible; in research on gender and sexism, White heterosexual women serve as the implicit reference point and the experiences of other groups (e.g., White or racial/ethnic minority sexual minority women, or transgender individuals) become invisible. One example of these implicit prototypes is the tendency to omit description of samples' sexual orientation characteristics in research with racial/ethnic minority populations and to omit description of samples' racial/ethnic characteristics in research with sexual minority populations (e.g. Boehmer 2002; Greene 1994b; Moradi et al. 2010); this practice renders invisible the existence of people who hold both racial/ethnic and sexual minority statuses. Indeed, just as androcentric, ethnocentric, and heterosexist biases shaped the historical roots of psychology, Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach (2008) warn that contemporary research from an exclusively minority groups perspective may result in intersectional invisibility and a body of knowledge that is grounded implicitly in the experiences of group prototypes.

Thus, a minority groups lens alone presents some limitations. At a pragmatic level, if the minority groups lens is the only one employed, we are at risk of limiting the real-life generalizability of our knowledge to the implicit prototypes of each group. At a conceptual level, insular focus on single minority groups may result in missing areas of convergence—for instance, the possibility that heterosexism, racism, sexism, and other forms of discrimination all have the potential to be internalized by the targets and yield some parallel intrapersonal, interpersonal, and intergroup consequences. Nevertheless, a minority groups lens can also help to reveal experiences that might be uniquely salient for different groups. For instance, research on African American people's experiences of racism suggests experiences of being treated with suspicion and mistrust, for example, being followed at a store when shopping (e.g., IRRS item; Utsey and Ponterroto 1996) whereas research on bisexual people's experiences of anti-bisexual prejudice suggests experiences of being treated as sexually promiscuous (e.g., Brewster and Moradi 2010). Attention to such status-specific experiences can also inform exploration of how various experiences of discrimination work together in the lives of targets with multiple minority identities—for instance, different forms of discrimination might combine additively (e.g., racism and sexism as distinctive stressors

with unique links with distress; e.g., Beal 1970), might interact with one another (e.g., racism exacerbates the effects of sexism; Greene 1994a), or might form new unique manifestations shaped by the intersection of discriminations (e.g., "ethgender" discrimination or gendered racism; Essed 1991; Johnson-Bailey and Cervero 1996). Thus, attention to minority status-specific experiences as well as to intersections of minority statuses is needed to explore potential similarities and parallel processes across these experiences and to acknowledge that these experiences cooccur in many people's lives.

Theoretical Integration as a Tool for Redressing Intersectional Invisibility

As Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach's (2008) analysis suggests, intersectional invisibility can be difficult to identify when the prototypes are infused throughout a body of literature. However, critical integration of theoretical frameworks grounded in the experiences of different groups, such as the theories I have summarized thus far, may be a helpful approach to identifying and redressing intersectional invisibility. I will use two specific studies to illustrate this point. Both studies reflect an integration of minority status-specific and intersectionality lenses grounded in integration of some of the theoretical frameworks that I have summarized. Such theoretical integration in the first study expands the scope of construct definitions and in the second study results in the incorporation of additional constructs to accommodate intersectionality.

In the first illustrative study, Buchanan et al. (2008) examined some of the basic tenets of objectification theory with a sample of African American college women. These authors tested hypothesized relations among self-objectification, body surveillance, and body shame. Buchanan et al. (2008) integrated these aspects of objectification theory with findings from the literature on African American populations' experiences of racist discrimination which demonstrate that darker skin tone is associated with greater frequency of experiences of racism and with the deleterious correlates of such experiences (e.g., Klonoff and Landrine 2000). This theoretical integration served as explicit acknowledgment of the mutual influence of race and gender and racism and sexism in African American women's experiences of objectification. Accordingly, Buchanan et al. (2008) supplemented typically used operationalizations of body surveillance and body shame in the objectification theory literature with assessments of skin tone-specific surveillance and skin tone-specific dissatisfaction.

This expansion of construct definitions illustrates the earlier point that deeply embedded prototypes can be difficult to detect, but may become apparent when an intersectionality perspective is pursued. Specifically, within the objectification theory literature, the terms body surveillance and body shame are used when what is actually measured is surveillance and shame related particularly to body shape, size, and weight. In fact, skin tone has been excluded or coded as neutral

in valence (in contrast to coding body shape and size as negatively valenced) in at least one prior objectification theory study (Harrison and Fredrickson 2003). The fact that body shape, size, and weight-specific surveillance are not made explicit in the terminology used within the objectification theory literature may reflect (and reinforce) an implicit focus on White women as prototypic. That is, if our implicit focus is on White women's experiences, then body shape, size, and weight-specific surveillance and shame may be assumed to sufficiently capture the constructs' scope given the prominence of thinness-related factors in extant body image literature that is focused largely on White women (e.g., Cafri et al. 2005; Stice 2002). But, when this focus remains implicit, then body shape, size, and weight-specific surveillance and shame become synonymous with body surveillance and shame in terminology, construct definitions, and measures and the domain specificity and limits of the constructs (i.e., shape, size, weight) go unnamed. This practice creates the illusion of generic neutrality: we describe body shape, size, and weight-specific surveillance and shame as simply "body" surveillance and shame, which frames other aspects of body surveillance and shame (e.g., skin tone) as "special" or "group-specific" departures from this "regular" or "general" body surveillance and shame, when in fact, all of these aspects reflect grounding in the experiences of some particular group (e.g., White women or African American women). Buchanan et al.'s (2008) consideration of intersectionality, however, is an important reminder that body surveillance and body shame can involve many aspects of the body, including skin tone, eye shape, hair texture, and feminine or masculine gender presentation, which may be salient for a variety of women.

Indeed, in their study, Buchanan et al. (2008) found that skin tone surveillance was associated uniquely with both skin tone dissatisfaction and body shape/size shame beyond the roles of body shape/size surveillance and self-objectification. By contrast, body shape/size surveillance was associated uniquely only with body shame, and not with skin-tone dissatisfaction. Taken together, these results point to skin-tone surveillance, an aspect of body surveillance typically not captured in the objectification theory literature, as a factor that accounts for unique variance in African American women's experiences of body shame (both skin tone-specific and body shape/size-specific). As this example illustrates, integrating theory and research on racist discrimination with objectification theory can help to expand the scope of key constructs to reflect the intersectionality that characterizes people's lives. Such construct expansion is important for theory and research advancements, for extending the utility of theories to broader populations, and for informing interventions that attend to the nuances of people's experiences, in this case, reflected in the need to attend to intersections of body shape/size and skin tone surveillance and shame.

The second illustrative study reflects an integration of research on sexual minority men's experiences, aspects of minority stress theory, and objectification theory (Wiseman and Moradi 2010). In this study, we drew from theory and research suggesting that objectification of sexual minority men may have some parallels to the sexual objectification of women (e.g., high rates of body image problems among sexual minority men, sexually objectifying media depictions

targeting sexual minority men, pressures to attract men; Brand et al. 1992; Rohlinger 2002; Siever 1994). Based on this reasoning, we examined key aspects of objectification theory with a sample of sexual minority men. These included the relations of sexual objectification experiences, internalization of cultural standards of attractiveness, body surveillance, body shame, and disordered eating. In addition, drawing from research on sexual minority men's experiences (e.g., Beren 1997; Reilly and Rudd 2006) and from minority stress theory, we added internalized homophobia and recollections of childhood harassment for gender nonconformity (which can be thought of as a specific manifestation of heterosexist discrimination) within the objectification theory framework.

Path analysis of our cross-sectional data yielded significant direct and mediated relations consistent with the set of relations outlined in objectification theory from sexual objectification experiences, to internalization of cultural standards of attractiveness, to body surveillance, body shame, and eating disorder symptoms. Importantly, in addition to these relations grounded in objectification theory, we found that reports of childhood harassment for gender nonconformity yielded a pattern of direct and indirect relations that paralleled those of sexual objectification experiences. Specifically, recalled gender nonconformity harassment was associated directly with internalization of cultural standards of attractiveness, directly and indirectly with body surveillance, and indirectly with body shame and eating disorder symptoms. Finally, internalized homophobia was associated indirectly with eating disorder symptoms through the mediating role of body shame. While the cross-sectional nature of these data precludes causal interpretations, the observed relations were consistent with the theoretically predicted patterns and also demonstrate that, for sexual minority men, additional factors beyond sexual objectification experiences may be associated with key objectification theory constructs such as body surveillance, body shame, and their posited consequences. As this study illustrates, theoretical integration (in this case objectification theory and minority stress theory) and consideration of non-prototype populations' experiences (in this case, sexual minority men within the objectification theory literature) can reveal additional variables and relations that better capture an intersectionality lens and expand the utility of underlying theories with broader populations.

Taken together, the two studies described here demonstrate that theoretical integration can reveal additional manifestations of key constructs that may reflect an intersectionality perspective more completely; this is illustrated by Buchanan et al.'s (2008) research on skin tone surveillance and dissatisfaction. And, theoretical integration can point to additional variables and processes that can be added to expand theoretical breadth and to accommodate the experiences of broader populations; this is illustrated by Wiseman and Moradi's (2010) research integrating gender nonconformity harassment and internalized homophobia within the objectification theory framework.

In addition to expanding the scope of construct definitions and theoretical frameworks, taking an intersectionality perspective can facilitate the consideration of parallel processes and shared experiences associated with various minority statuses and forms of discrimination. Indeed, both of the illustrative studies pointed

to such parallels. For example, Buchanan et al.'s (2008) study suggested that skin tone surveillance and shame may function in some parallel ways as body shape/size surveillance and shame for African American college women; Wiseman and Moradi's (2010) study suggested that recalled harassment for childhood nonconformity may function in some parallel ways as sexual objectification experiences for sexual minority men. Thus, just as theoretical integration can facilitate an intersectionality perspective, an intersectionality perspective can facilitate theoretical integration. Such recursive attention to theoretical integration and intersectionality in the discrimination literature can inform theory and research on targets' experiences of dehumanization.

Connecting Consequences of Discrimination with Consequences of Dehumanization

I began this discussion by noting the need to consider targets' experiences in theory and research on dehumanization, suggesting that theory and research on targets' experiences of discrimination, enriched by theoretical integration and attention to intersectionality, can help to inform theory and research on targets' experiences of dehumanization. Here, I want to note that echoes from theory and research on the context and consequences of discrimination are already being found in the burgeoning research on the consequences of dehumanization for targets.

In a set of recent studies that helps to connect the broader literature on dehumanization with the literature on discrimination, Gruenfeld et al. (2008) examined the role of power in the tendency to objectifying others. These authors' conceptualized objectification as the instrumental treatment of others, or treating others as a tool for one's own purpose. This conceptualization has parallels to Haslam's (2006, 2013) concept of human nature denial or mechanistic dehumaniztion. In a series of six studies using different samples, manifestations of power, and contexts, Gruenfeld et al. (2008) demonstrated that conditions of power inequality can heighten the tendency of high power individuals to objectify low power individuals. For instance, MBA students' reports revealed a greater tendency to objectify subordinates than to objectify peers, and high power executives reported a greater tendency to objectify others than did MBA students. In another study, participants who were primed to recall a situation in which they had power over another individual objectified a peer more so than did participants who were primed to recall a situation in which they held low power status.

In another intriguing study, Gruenfeld et al. (2008) found that men assigned to a high power boss condition (versus subordinate) and primed with sexual words (versus neutral words) were more likely to want to work with a highly attractive woman (i.e., instrumental for sexual goals) than did men in the low power condition, suggesting that the interaction of high power and sexual priming can create a particularly potent context for sexual objectification of women. Although

not grounded specifically in concepts of discrimination, Gruenfeld et al.'s (2008) studies clearly suggest that contexts of power inequality can heighten objectifying dehumanization of low power targets. As described previously, minority status is by definition a condition characterized by lower access to resources, power, and privilege (Healey 2012). Thus, Gruenfeld et al.'s (2008) findings suggest that the sociocultural context of inequality that shapes minority and major statuses can promote objectifying dehumanization of minority status targets.

Shifting to research on the consequences of dehumanization for targets, a series of studies conducted by Bastian and Haslam (2010, 2011) connect such consequences with some of the consequences noted in the discrimination literature. Specifically, in one set of studies, Bastian and Haslam (2010) linked experiences of social exclusion with self-dehumanization and awareness of dehumanization. In these studies, social exclusion was induced using an essay priming task (Study 1) or cyberball game (Study 2) and participants in the social exclusion condition were compared with those in a social inclusion condition (as well as an everyday experience condition serving as a control in the essay writing manipulation). For the present discussion, the hypotheses of interest were that social exclusion should elicit self-dehumanization—that is, targets' viewing themselves as having fewer human characteristics—and also elicit meta-perceptions of dehumanization—that is, targets perceiving that they are viewed as less human by the ostracizers. These effects were expected particularly along human nature characteristics.

Indeed, as expected, subsequent to the experimental manipulation, participants in the social exclusion condition perceived themselves as having fewer human nature characteristics than did participants in the social inclusion or control conditions. Furthermore, relative to those in the social inclusion condition, participants in the social exclusion condition also perceived that the ostracizers viewed them as having less positive and more negative human nature traits. Thus, these studies revealed that social exclusion heightened targets' self-dehumanization and awareness or vigilance of being dehumanized. The self-dehumanization consequences found in these studies echo concepts of internalized stigma/homophobia from minority stress frameworks and concepts of internalization/self-objectification from objectification theory. The awareness of dehumanization consequences found in these studies echo concepts of felt stigma and vigilance/expectation of stigmatization from minority stress frameworks.

In a second set of studies, Bastian and Haslam (2011) investigated the cognitive and affective consequences of dehumanization for the targets. In these studies, participants were exposed to a number of vignettes depicting dehumanizing maltreatment that reflected human nature and human uniqueness denial (Study 1) or were instructed to recall an experience of maltreatment designed to mimic human nature denial or human uniqueness denial (Study 2). Across these two studies, participants' experiences of human nature denial—for instance, being treated as an object or a means to an end—were associated with deconstructive cognitive states (e.g., hard to think clearly, numbness) and with feelings of anger/sadness.

Participants' experiences of human uniqueness denial—for instance, being treated as incompetent, unintelligent, and uncivilized—were associated with aversive self-awareness (e.g., self-consciousness) and with feelings of shame/guilt. In these studies, deconstructive cognitive states echo the concepts of interrupted flow and reduced internal awareness from objectification theory. Aversive self-awareness echoes concepts of felt stigma and vigilance/expectation of stigma from minority stress frameworks, and the concept of body surveillance from objectification theory. The affective consequences identified in these studies overlap with body shame in objectification theory and with internalized stigma/homophobia from minority stress frameworks. In fact, shame and guilt are often conceptualized as aspects of or closely correlated with internalized homophobia (e.g., Moradi et al. 2009).

Thus, Bastian and Haslam's (2010, 2011) studies reveal that the consequences of dehumanization for targets—including self-dehumanization, awareness of dehumanization, deconstructive cognitive states, aversive self-awareness, anger and sadness, and shame and guilt—parallel many of the consequences of discrimination outlined across the discrimination theories summarized in this review. It is also noteworthy that experiences of social isolation as well as the list of maltreatments used to manipulate dehumanization in Bastian and Haslam's (2010, 2011) research (e.g., disrespect for identity, exploited, invalidated, treated with disgust, treated as immoral, treated with condescension) are characteristic of everyday manifestations of interpersonal discrimination. Indeed, these dehumanizing maltreatments parallel items from many of the measures of discrimination experiences noted earlier.

Gruenfeld et al.'s (2008) studies and Bastian and Haslam's (2010, 2011) research are examples of connections between the broader dehumanization literature and the discrimination literature. Taken together, these studies suggest that the context of sociocultural inequality that shapes minority and majority statuses might heighten the tendency for objectifying dehumanization of individuals with minority status, and that the operationalization of dehumanizing maltreatment and the observed consequences of such treatment for the targets parallel the content and consequences of discrimination experiences.

A Pantheoretical Framework

Informed by an intersectionality perspective, the connections drawn here among various theoretical frameworks within the discrimination literature along with the emerging findings regarding the consequences of dehumanization begin to give shape to a pantheoretical framework. As depicted in Fig. 1, such a pantheoretical framework reflects areas of convergence and complementary integration across the literatures reviewed here.



Fig. 1 Outline of a pantheoretical framework

Links of Discrimination with Internalization and Cognizance

The framework begins with the contextual experiences of discrimination captured in each of the previously summarized population-specific literatures; these include experiences shaped by heterosexism, racism, sexism, and other forms of discrimination. Next, integration of the discrimination frameworks and research on the consequences of dehumanization suggests a potentially useful distinction between the self-dehumanization and the meta-perceptions of dehumanization that may arise from exposure to discrimination experiences. The former reflects the internalization of discrimination or stigma into one's own values and self-concept and the latter reflects cognizance of the potential for discrimination and stigmatization. This distinction between internalization and cognizance is reflected in minority stress frameworks and in Bastian and Haslam's (2010) findings. Interestingly, a distinction between internalization and awareness of cultural ideals (i.e., cognizance) is also one that has been captured in the body image literature (e.g., Heinberg et al. 1995; Heinberg et al. 2008). But, given the centrality of the concept of self-objectification in objectification theory, research grounded in this framework has emphasized internalization and generally not included indicators of cognizance.

Extant research generally supports the positive associations of experiences of racist discrimination, sexist discrimination, and heterosexist discrimination with various indicators of the internalization of such experiences (e.g., Lehovat and Simoni 2011; Ramirez-Valles et al. 2010; Szymanski et al. 2009); but, a few studies have yielded nonsignificant associations between experiences of heterosexist discrimination and internalized homophobia (e.g., Kamen et al. 2011; Kuyper and Fokkema 2010) suggesting the need to identify moderators of this association. As well, relations between experiences of discrimination and indicators of cognizance or vigilance regarding discrimination tend to be consistently positive and stronger than those involving internalization (e.g., Brewster and Moradi 2010; Kuyper and

Fokkema 2010; Lewis et al. 2003; Mendoza-Denton et al. 2002; Pinel 1999). This pattern might reflect a potential recursive relation between cognizance and reporting of discrimination experiences. Thus, exposure to dehumanization manifested as discrimination may promote internalization, and to a stronger and more consistent degree may heighten cognizance of discrimination, and such cognizance may also heighten perception and reporting of discrimination.

Overlap and Distinctiveness of Internalized and Cognizance

Data from the minority stress and body image literatures regarding the association between internalization and cognizance of discrimination indicate that the correlation between these two dimensions is positive but not so high as to suggest construct redundancy. Studies grounded in the minority stress framework tend to report positive correlations, (*rs* in the 0.20 s), between indicators of internalized homophobia and indicators of expectations of stigma (e.g., Balsam and Mohr 2007; Hatzenbuehler et al. 2008; Kuyper and Fokkema 2010; Lewis et al. 2003). And, studies from the body image literature tend to report positive correlations (*rs* in the 0.30 s), between internalization and awareness of cultural ideals (e.g., Heinberg et al. 1995; Heinberg et al. 2008). The correlational nature of these studies precludes causal interpretations. But, conceptually, some level of awareness of stigma may be a precursor to internalization of that stigma, and such temporal precedence is consistent with the aforementioned more robust links of perceived discrimination with indicators of cognizance than with indicators of internalization. Nevertheless, a recursive process is also likely in that greater internalization may promote greater cognizance of stigma. Overall, internalization and associated surveillance would be expected to be linked positively, but not redundantly, with cognizance and associated surveillance.

This conceptually and empirically grounded distinction between internalization and cognizance may be important for capturing a broader range of vigilance and surveillance behaviors across populations with a variety of minority statuses. For instance, body surveillance that is rooted in the adoption of cultural appearance ideals as one's own may differ from body surveillance rooted in the legitimate fear of loss of privileges, exposure to harassment, or even violence if cultural appearance expectations are violated. A transgender individual may engage in body surveillance due to concern about harassment or violence for presenting in gender nonconforming ways. An African American man may engage in body surveillance as a way to mitigate being stereotyped as a threat. A Muslim woman wearing the hijab may engage in body surveillance on the one hand to monitor adherence to religious appearance standards of modesty and on the other hand to monitor the potential for anti-Muslim prejudice. For such individuals, cognizance-based surveillance might be salient even if underlying cultural norms or stigmas are not internalized.

Affective, Cognitive, and Physiological Responses and Mental Health

In turn, internalization-based surveillance and cognizance-based surveillance may have some distinctive and some parallel consequences. For example, internalization-based surveillance and cognizance-based surveillance may have distinctive implications regarding anxiety and shame. With regard to anxiety, Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) outlined appearance anxiety and safety anxiety as consequences of women's self-objectification. The former reflects anxiety about when and how one's appearance will be evaluated in relation to the cultural or internalized standards; the latter reflects anxiety about physical safety, including many women's experiences of omnipresent anxiety and precautionary behaviors regarding sexual assault. As such, appearance anxiety may be associated with both internalization-based surveillance and cognizance-based surveillance; but, the experience of safety anxiety does not require internalization of cultural standards or stigmas.

Similarly, body surveillance rooted in internalization may be uniquely associated with self-directed feelings of shame or guilt (i.e., internalizing negative affect) whereas body surveillance rooted in stigma cognizance may be uniquely associated with other-directed feelings of frustration or anger (e.g., toward prejudiced others, organizations, systems, cultures). In fact, state anger was shown to mediate the association between heightened cognizance of sexist discrimination and psychological distress (Fischer and Good 2004). This differential alignment of internalization with shame and cognizance with anger is consistent with literature that distinguishes between self-directed and other-directed anger; self-directed anger appears to be associated with shame, guilt, and internalizing attributions for negative events whereas other-directed anger appears to be more distinct from shame and guilt and associated with externalizing attributions, including attributions to discrimination (Ellsworth and Tong 2006; Hansen and Sassenberg 2006, 2011).

In contrast to potentially distinctive affective consequences of internalization and cognizance, there is evidence to suggest some parallel physiological stress responses and cognitive and performance implications. As outlined in objectification theory, the cognitive resources taken up by internalization-based surveillance may impede awareness of internal physiological states as well as concentration and flow. And, objectification theory research demonstrates that self-objectification heightening situations can impede cognitive task performance (for review see Moradi and Huang 2008) and may interact with individual differences in self-objectification to impede performance (e.g., Gay and Castano 2010). Bastian and Haslam's (2011) findings regarding the deconstructive cognitive states that can result from dehumanization suggest that impeded internal awareness may involve broader experiences of cognitive numbness beyond the physiologically focused numbness noted in objectification theory. Parallel to such consequences of internalization-based surveillance, research on stereotype threat suggests that cognizance of stigma and associated surveillance can promote physiological stress

responses, have cognitive costs, and impede task performance (e.g., Johns et al. 2008; Schmader et al. 2008; Steele 1997; Steele and Aronson 1995); research on status-based rejection sensitivity connects cognizance of stigma with broader indicators of academic functioning as well (Mendoza-Denton et al. 2002).

Given the intermediary affective, cognitive, and physiological implications of internalization and cognizance, it is not surprising that various indicators of internalization and cognizance are linked with adverse mental health and health-related behaviors. Indeed, a variety of adverse mental health indicators, such as body image problems, disorder eating, depressive symptoms, and overall psychological distress, have been linked with internalization and related surveillance in research informed by objectification theory and by minority stress theory (for reviews see Moradi and Huang 2008; Newcomb and Mustanski 2010). Similarly, depressive symptoms, overall psychological distress, and lower well-being have been linked with cognizance and related surveillance in research informed by minority stress theory and status-based rejection sensitivity (e.g., Balsam and Mohr 2007; Brewster and Moradi 2010; Lewis et al. 2003; Mendoza-Denton et al. 2002; Meyer 1995).

It is important to note, however, that when internalization and cognizance are considered together, typically in minority stress theory, sometimes one, the other, or both variables emerge as unique correlates of mental health criterion variables (e.g., Balsam and Mohr 2007; Brewster and Moradi 2010; Hatzenbuehler et al. 2008; Lewis et al. 2003). However, this mixed evidence of predictive distinctiveness for internalization and cognizance may be due in part to wide variability in how cognizance is conceptualized and operationalized in the minority stress literature, with studies operationalizing cognizance as concern about acceptance from others (e.g., Balsam and Mohr 2007), as the awareness of societal prejudice (e.g., Hatzenbuehler et al. 2008), or as the awareness of societal prejudice and its impact on oneself (e.g., Lewis et al. 2003). Thus, further convergence in construct definitions and operationalizations is needed along with longitudinal and experimental research to evaluate the distinctiveness and temporal precedence of internalization and cognizance in relation to criterion variables.

Educational, Vocational, and Societal Consequences

Integration of discrimination frameworks with some of the findings presented in this symposium helps us to expand our consideration of outcomes beyond typically considered indicators of individual affective, cognitive, physiological and mental health outcomes. Indeed, available research has connected various forms of discrimination experiences with educational and vocational outcomes such as job satisfaction and sense of academic efficacy (e.g., Brewster et al. 2012; Lambert et al. 2009; Waldo 1999; Yoder and McDonald 1998; Velez and Moradi 2012). Intermediate processes such as impeded flow or attention from objectification theory research, deconstructive cognitive states from Bastian and Haslam's (2011) research, and

the related bodies of literature on the consequences of stereotype threat and status-based rejection sensitivity (e.g., Mendoza-Denton et al. 2002; Schmader et al. 2008; Steele 1997; Steele and Aronson 1995) can inform delineation of intermediate performance consequences that may connect discrimination experiences with broader educational and vocational outcomes. Of course, the aforementioned affective and mental health correlates of discrimination, internalization, and cognizance may also be involved in shaping educational and vocational outcomes.

As well, Calogero's (2013) research linking self-objectification with system justification beliefs and reduced social activism suggests that beyond its role in impeding individual functioning, internalization may impede efforts toward optimal functioning at the collective or systems levels. These findings in conjunction with Calogero's (2013) finding that exposure to sexist attitudes also can promote self-objectification highlight a dangerous cycle: exposure to dehumanizing societal attitudes can promote self-dehumanization, and self-dehumanization may impede efforts to change dehumanizing social attitudes and systems.

Here, it is important to note the potential limitation and danger of focusing on individual-level intermediary process and outcomes of discrimination such as internalization. Such a focus may yield a body of theory, research, and interventions that focuses on the targets of discrimination as the points for change (e.g., how can targets resist internalization). Arming targets with strategies for self-protection in the context of discrimination is certainly a laudable aim. However, understanding how to change the discriminatory context itself is a necessary complement to such individual-level efforts. Attention to the context as a target for change raises the potential for another fruitful distinction between the implications of internalization and cognizance. Specifically, in addition to its aforementioned potential costs, cognizance of stigma and associated surveillance may differ from internalization in that cognizance may promote proactive strategies for confronting or preventing discrimination at the individual and collective levels.

As an example, within the feminist identity development literature, there is evidence linking revelation attitudes, which are reflective of an awareness of sexism, with greater psychological distress and lower well-being but also with greater commitment to social justice activism (e.g. Fischer and Good 2004; Yoder et al. 2011, 2012). Social activism and other forms of active coping, in turn, may reduce internalization and buffer the association between discrimination and psychological symptomatology (e.g., DeBlaere et al., (in press); Fairchild and Rudman 2008; Sabik and Tylka 2006). As such, it may be fruitful to expand the scope of the outcomes considered in discrimination and dehumanization research to include social activism aimed to promote system or collective well-being. It also seems important to distinguish factors and processes that can channel cognizance into internalization or into social activism. Such expansion of the conceptualizations of health and well-being outcomes is consistent with recent research and calls for considering manifestations of social justice consciousness and activism within broader frameworks of optimal functioning (e.g., Moradi 2012; Yoder et al. 2012). After all, individual and collective social activism is a key to ameliorating the context of dehumanizing discrimination.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have called for greater attention to targets' experiences in theory and research on dehumanization. I have also argued that what we know from theory and research on targets' experiences of discrimination can inform how we pursue the understanding of targets' experiences of dehumanization. To this end, I have emphasized the utility of attention to the intersectionality of minority statuses in shaping discrimination experiences. I have also described theoretical frameworks grounded in different populations' experiences and offered examples of integrating these frameworks as a way to attend to intersectionality. As well, I have noted parallels between the areas of convergence across discrimination theories and emerging findings regarding the consequences of dehumanization for targets. Finally, I have described the broad outlines of a pantheoretical framework that reflects areas of convergence and complementary integration across the discrimination and dehumanization literatures. My hope is that this framework will encourage further attention to the potential distinctions between internalization and cognizance of discrimination, exploration of their potentially distinctive intermediary consequences, and consideration of a broader range of outcomes beyond individual health and well-being indicators, and including individual and collective social activism. I also hope that readers will contribute to the critical evaluation and refinement of this pantheoretical framework with continued attention to the intersectionality that characterizes people's identities and experiences of discrimination.

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