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Party Governance and Party Democracy

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Festschrift to Kaare Strøm

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Preface

This book reviews and adds to the literature on party governance and party democracy. It is dedicated to Prof. Kaare Strøm, who has made many important contributions to the study of party democracy and governance, for his 60th birthday.

While completing a book project should be an occasion of unfettered delight, this time it was overshadowed by Hanne Marthe Narud tragically passing away before she could see the book completed. We greatly miss her.

Thanks to Theresa Kernecker for her great help at the copy-editing stage.

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Chapter 1
Party Governance and Party Democracy

Wolfgang C. Müller and Hanne Marthe Narud

Abstract This chapter introduces the concepts of party democracy and party government. First, it outlines which roles have been ascribed to political parties in the extant literature, focusing on the externally directed behavior of parties in the main areas where political competition plays out. It then highlights the contributions of the individual chapters of this volume that address how political parties perform within the existing institutional frameworks, and describes how they each contribute to an analytical and empirical understanding of party democracy and party government in today's democracies. Last, it presents the central advances in research on party government in the contributions of Kaare Strøm.

Keywords Party democracy · Party functions · Party governance · Party government · Party research

1.1 Party Democracy

Modern democracy is "unthinkable save in terms of political parties," as Schattschneider (1942: 1) aptly expressed it. His powerful statement was foreshadowed and echoed by similar formulations from other masters of modern political science. According to Bryce (1921: 119), "parties are inevitable. No free large country has been without them. No one has shown how representative government could be worked without them." In a similar vein, Kelsen (1929) stated "Modern democracy is founded entirely on political parties; the greater the

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application of the democratic principle the more important the parties" (cited from Sartori 1987: 148). This was echoed by Finer ([1931] 1946: 397) and Friedrich (1941: 294). In the words of the latter, "parties are, it is now generally agreed, indispensable features of democracy." Friedrich's claim for universal acceptance of the role ascribed to political parties was probably ahead of its time. Indeed, the works cited here all date from a time when, in many countries now considered as belonging to the heartland of democracy, political parties had been suppressed and liberal democracy abolished. Even great thinkers such as Ostrogorski (1907: II, 712–717) and Schmitt (1923: 25) viewed political parties as the problem rather than the solution of democratic delegation. Things have changed fundamentally since then.

Political parties nowadays are generally considered as the only workable mechanism to ensure that the institutions of democracy can work in practice in the modern state. Let us refer to two modern voices to exemplify that. In Robertson's (1976: 1) words, "To talk, today, about democracy, is to talk about a system of competing political parties." According to Sartori (1976: 27–29), "those parties that are parts (in the plural[1]) have found their essential *raison d'être* and their non-replaceable role in implementing representative and responsive government." Political parties are certainly no *panacea*; rather, they are the least imperfect mechanism we know to make the institutions of democracy work.

While there is general agreement about the indispensability of parties in modern democracy, the literature contains very different sets of relevant expectations about their actual roles. They begin with minimal definitions such as party leaders' engaging in a "competitive struggle for the people's vote" (Schumpeter 1943: 269, 277) that, in turn, allows the voter to choose those who will govern them. At the other end of the range, we find catalogs of specific activities and functions that parties are expected to perform. King (1969: 120–140), for instance, identifies six core functions political parties perform: The first is *structuring the vote*. Running in elections is the minimal definition of a political party. Katz (1980: 1) has probably best explained this function: "Without parties to structure the campaign, to provide continuity from one election to the next, and to provide links among candidates in different localities and for different offices, the resulting elections are unlikely to be meaningful, even if they are technically free." Thus, parties provide for a "simplification of the alternatives" (Schattschneider 1942: 50); they "organize the chaotic public will" (Neumann 1956: 397), or as Ware (1987: 58) has put it, "in a world of competition between individual candidates the voter would have little chance of sorting out the multitude of proposals being advanced."

The second of King's functions is *integration and mobilization*, meaning the tying-in of people and giving them a trusted voice in the world of politics. The third function is the recruitment of political leaders, from national executives to—in a fully fledged party democracy—local or functional representatives. Next comes the *organization of government*, meaning the organization within political

[1] This is meant to exclude one-party regimes.

institutions and thereby the assumption of control over the layers of government. Take the "efficient secret" of British politics, as identified by Bagehot (1873, see also Cox 1987)—the control of both the executive and legislative branches of government by the majority party—as an example of the latter. Indeed, allowing for the fusion of institutionally divided government powers is key to the role of political parties in the democratic chain running from voters to policy making. Party *policy formation*, King's fifth function, implies that the direction and contents of public policy have the imprint of the party or parties in government (i.e., pay tribute to their ideologies and policy preferences) and that the holding of public office by party representatives is the precondition for party influence over public policy (Ranney 1962). The final function parties are associated with in King's seminal article is *interest aggregation*. While this role is more marginal in his analysis, others have seen it as one of the core tasks major political parties must perform (Ware 1987). Other authors have provided us with shorter or longer catalogs of differently labeled and organized party functions (e.g., von Beyme 1985: 362–363; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000), which, however, in substantive terms largely overlap with the ones presented here.

The very idea of party democracy is that political parties are the vehicle that bridges the gap between voters and government. The party functions listed above are largely designed to identify what parties need to do to ensure that the (majority of) citizens approve of government policy. Indeed, substantive representation—living under laws of the choosing of the majority of citizens—is the democratic ideal (Dahl 1989: 88), and party government is a means to that end.

An alternative, more open-ended and less prescriptive way to address political parties is to describe and analyze their behavior in terms of actors and arenas. In his framework for analysis, Key (1964) famously parceled the concept of political party in three interrelated dimensions, of "faces": (1) the party in the electorate, meaning the voters that rally behind a party in elections, (2) the party as an extra-parliamentary organization, meaning the mass organization, party headquarters, and campaign organization, (3) the party in government, comprised of the party representatives in public office—executive and legislative—and the party structures that tie these office holders.

Since the 1980s, "crisis" and "decline" have made their way in the academic discussion of parties (for a review see Daalder 1992; Poguntke and Scarrow 1996). Certainly, it is not individual parties (that were always exposed to such dangers) but the political party as a type of organization that is associated with such dismal development. Accordingly, political parties collectively are considered to be less able to perform the functions identified above. For instance, elections would be less structured by political parties but rather the personalities of leaders, lifelong party identification and electoral loyalty would vanish, and policy formation and interest aggregation would be delegated to corporatist structures, national and international bureaucracies, and independent institutions and markets. Some of the relevant debates here do not bother to address political parties per se but focus on the democratic state (traditionally controlled by parties) and its greatly diminished capacity for steering economic and societal developments.

Party decline and decay can also be described within Key's framework. Individual electoral parties would then be unable to establish stable, long-term voter alignments, and the party system would show high levels of volatility and high birth and death rates of political parties. Party mass organizations would shrink and permanent party headquarter staff would be replaced by professionals hired on a short-term basis and ready to work for (almost) any political entrepreneur.

A wealth of literature has indeed observed the phenomena listed here or at least developments in these directions. Yet in their multi-nation study, Dalton et al. (2011) show in that political parties continue to structure elections, mobilize voters and function as ideological signpost for them, dominate the government formation, and produce policy outputs that are largely in line with the ideological orientation reflected in government party composition. They conclude that "political parties remain as central as they ever were to the effective operation of modern democracy." This study draws mainly on survey data collected within the confines of the comparative study of electoral systems (CSES) project. Relying on a few robust indicators, it provides a bird's-eye view that gives us a solid baseline to evaluate the role of political parties in modern democracies. In short, parties remain of crucial importance in each link of the democratic chain. The developments described and analyzed in the literature thus may indicate more change than decline. Clearly, no particular political party model is going to last, while political parties, as a viable but evolving mechanism, may still flourish.

Still, political parties seem weaker, or—to phrase it differently—less dominant, today than they once were. Regardless whether we interpret the developments as change or decline, the relevance of the different "faces" of political parties and the different functions of parties is not equally affected. Of all their functions, political parties in Western Europe have best been able to preserve that of organizing government (Müller and Strøm 2004; Strøm and Svåsand 1997: 453). While it is easy to see that parties compete with social movements in mobilizing voters, that personalities attract voters more than anonymous organizations, ideologies, and ancient labels, and that parties leave it to other actors to actually formulate policies, it is hard to see individual political institutions making decisions and even more so to coordinate between them without the ordering force of political parties. In short, governing is the parties' least dispensable function. Therefore, Strøm (2000: 182) has identified the parties in government as the *since qua non* of modern parties. It is the role of political parties in organizing government and its relations to other aspects of party politics to which the present book is devoted.

1.2 Contribution to the Study of Party Government

Given the centrality of political parties in modern democracies, most research on these systems either directly addresses their internal functioning and activities or asks research questions, the answers of which are critical for assessing the role of political parties. As political science has moved from describing institutions to the

thorough analysis of behavior within these institutions and the interactions between them, more work now speaks to this question. The inevitable consequences of the maturing and institutionalization of the discipline of political science in many countries include the forming of subfields and specialized research communities. At the same time, the number of democracies has vastly increased since the 1980s and although not each attempt at democratization was eventually successful, more and more heterogeneous systems with some form of party competition exist than ever before. As a consequence, the literature addressing the large issues of party democracy spreads over many research fields and has become difficult for individual students of party democracy and party governance to master.

The underlying trends are not unique to the study of party politics. The discipline has responded with increased efforts at reviewing its fields of study and publishing books and articles with that purpose in mind. In recent years, several renowned publishers have begun publishing series of handbooks that review larger fields of study. Another such effort is the *Annual Review of Political Science*, a yearbook with a diverse set of review articles ranging over the entire discipline in each volume. The present volume steers a middle course by reviewing and advancing a subfield of party research. In doing so, it departs from the idea that the unique contribution of political parties to the working of democracy is their role in organizing government. Consequently, the main focus is not on the internal functioning of political parties or the role of political parties in structuring and organizing elections, but rather the legislative and the governmental arenas. Clearly, these are interrelated with the electoral and internal arenas. Several chapters explicitly address these mutual relations.

The chapters in this book differ in scope. While some address broad topics and extensive literature, some themes are more specialized and the relevant literature smaller. Depending on such factors, the chapters devote more or less space to reviewing the literature relative to advancing new ideas and presenting results from original research. In reviewing the literature, the chapters extract important substantive results and highlight the role of political parties as governing organizations. The discussion of the literature also aims at identifying achievements and limitations of the extant research and from there suggest promising avenues and issues for further research. Yet, the chapters addressing more specialized topics typically do not confine themselves to reviewing the literature. As it would often not be possible to build the chapters' arguments on what can be extracted from the extant research, the authors introduce new data and analyses to the study of parties in their governing roles.

Four chapters address the party in government most directly. Benjamin Nyblade reviews one of the most advanced fields in comparative politics, research into government formation. His contribution shows that this research area displays an accumulation—from the early study of the 1950s and early 1960s to the present—and mutual acceptance of very different research strategies that unfortunately are uncommon in political science. The chapter focuses on the diverse nature of the actors involved in government formation, various forms of uncertainty that impact on this process, and the bargaining environment, in particular political institutions.

It highlights the gains from a dynamic understanding of government formation, as exemplified by the choice between a greater share of payoffs now (in a stable cabinet considered less stable) against a smaller share of more durable payoffs (in a government that a priori would be considered more stable).

The Chap. 2 devoted to parties in executive office by Torbjörn Bergman, Alejandro Ecker, and Wolfgang C. Müller is devoted to the challenges and solutions the internal organization of government poses to the cabinet parties. They formulate three specific challenges to which parties should be able to respond both from a normative perspective and to foster their own prospects for reelection. The chapter then reviews what we know from the extant research on the internal organization of government under single-party majority and minority rule and coalition government both with and without the backing of a parliamentary majority from the cabinet parties. The chapter shows which mechanisms are in place and discusses whether and how they help the government parties in meeting the challenges.

Next, Thomas Saalfeld turns to government stability and duration. This research area very early has settled on a relatively small set of explanations and much of its considerable progress has related to technical advances and combining these explanations in a parsimonious framework. While there are many important contributions to the field, non-specialists often may have difficulties to understand the precise nature of their advance. One of the few truly pathbreaking contributions is Lupia and Strøm's (1995) strategic model of cabinet termination—leading to either early elections or cabinet replacement in a sitting parliament—or renegotiation of the existing coalition. Saalfeld's review focuses on the contributions that, like Lupia and Strøm's, introduce new perspectives on the study of government duration, but he remains particularly concerned with that of Lupia and Strøm. Despite the generally recognized importance of this theoretical contribution, most of its propositions have remained waiting for empirical testing. Saalfeld shows how this gap in research can be narrowed with the help of existing datasets and carries out such a test on data from 28 European democracies for the entire post-war period. His work confirms some of the strategic predictions of the Lupia–Strøm model.

G. Bingham Powell relates the institutions of government and party behavior to the electoral arena. He begins by outlining the normative expectations vested in elections and the problems that might arise at this stage of the democratic chain. The ideal of electoral responsiveness—as a shortcut for preference responsiveness—comes in two versions: majoritarianism and proportionality, resting on different institutional foundations. The chapter then asks whether electorally responsive elections result in government policies that reflect the voters' preferences reviewing the work on policy congruence between voters and government. While Powell finds majoritarian and proportional systems to be very similar in their long-term effects, he also stresses the importance of short-term congruence that is more likely under PR institutions. Once policy congruence is replaced by sensitivity to sanctions as ideal, however, the picture is reversed. As both are important to the quality of democracy, the "sweet spot" that responds to both

concerns is normatively desirable and might be constituted by low-magnitude PR systems. The chapter concludes by explaining why democratic elections—indispensible as they are—must remain an imperfect mechanism to achieve the democratic ideal.

Three chapters address political parties in the legislative arena. Rudy B. Andeweg's contribution proceeds from the understanding that political opposition—that is providing alternatives in terms of government office teams and policies—is indispensable to vital democracy. His review of the comparative government literature identifies several constellations where the lines of division between government and opposition are blurred in the parliamentary arena. The contribution raises normative concerns that emerge from such blurring.

While most aspects of party politics have seen considerable academic attention, as argued above often up to a point where it is extremely costly for it the non-specialist to keep pace with the research front, parliamentary party organization is a relatively neglected field. On the one hand, this is astonishing, as under the rule of law parliament in most instances is the ultimate decision maker and high levels of party unity in parliamentary voting and behavior owe much to the diligent organization at the party level. Two contributions address parliamentary parties from different perspectives. Knut Heidar places parliamentary party groups in the democratic chain both within institutions and political parties with the help of the principal–agent approach. The chapter identifies five basic patterns that emerge from the party system and institutional configurations at the system level.

In the second contribution on parliamentary parties, Simon Hug turns to the research field of parliamentary voting studies. It has seen early structuring by a few landmark studies, but then experienced slow progress limited to a few countries. Quite simply, in most countries, both the data and the incentive for studying parliamentary voting were lacking. The use of electronic voting in many parliaments has removed much of the first obstacle, and consequently, the field has seen greatly increased attention in recent years. Hug's comprehensive review of extant research shows the important progress parliamentary voting studies have taken recently. Yet, there is always the danger that when a child gets a hammer, it will discover that everything needs pounding. While roll-call votes are unique in providing individual-level data on a crucial stage of the political decision-making process, not all inferences that have been made from the analyses of these data can be made without making important qualifications. Hug's contribution identifies the contextual factors that need to be incorporated into the analysis to maximize returns.

The chapter by Karin Dyrstad and Ola Listhaug relates parliament to the electoral arena. Given the dominance of political parties over parliament, this provides a perspective on how citizens evaluate party government more generally, distinct from the current majority and government. Applying a long-term view of European parliaments from the earliest measurement of confidence in parliaments to the present, they describe and explain developments. Descriptively, they show that parliaments in the mature democracies of Western Europe have faired much better than their counterparts in the new democracies of post-Communist states. Analytically, they show that the variation in political institutions such as electoral

systems and regime types have less effect on levels of trust than policy performance and hence the outcomes produced by government. Drystad and Listhaug also compare trust in parliaments with that in other political institutions and private actors.

In Chap. 10, Oddbjørn Knutsen addresses the classic topic of social structural determinants of party choice. While the relationship of factors such as class and gender party alignments to the parties' governing function is more indirect, the presence or absence of such ties is nevertheless important for performing it. Long-term linkages known to the political parties provide them with clear representative and policy-making tasks. Living up to such expectations, in turn, reinforces the linkages. Such behavior should result in overall higher levels of trust in institutions and decision makers, but it should also contribute to transparency and rationality of the political process. Knutsen addresses classic class variables, gender, religious affiliations, and new divisions running through the large middle class and their development over time. He arrives at the conclusion that these changes have caused strategic policy change and the spatial repositioning of political parties.

While several chapters address how political parties perform within the existing institutional frameworks, one more chapter looks at the role of political parties in building and adapting these institutions. Shane Martin and Bjørn Erik Rasch address the role of political parties in constitutional change. Obviously, constitutional politics is a highly political matter and particularly relevant for party government. Yet, with a few notable exceptions, until now it has largely remained the province of constitutional lawyers. The authors present a theoretical model of party behavior in constitution making, review the institutional constraints on constitutional change in place in Europe and other established democracies, and provide anecdotal evidence of constitutional amendment processes highlighting the relevance of their approach.

The final two chapters address the major issue of party development. Some of the most influential studies in party research have applied a developmental perspective and the use of bold contrasting models. Think of Kirchheimer (1966) and Katz and Mair (1995) who projected contemporary party changes further into the future and built powerful models of new types of political parties. In her contribution, Nicole Bolleyer contrasts the experience of long-standing political parties with new (and often viable) additions to the party system. This contrast allows her to challenge the idea that some features of the parties we have known for many decades are really features of parties *sui generis*. In short, party rooting in the electorate and much of mass organizations are dispensable features of old-fashioned parties, though some organizational institutionalization to provide leadership renewal is essential. At the same time, she arrives at the conclusion that political parties are still the best-suited providers of governance. The parties "movement to the state" (Katz and Mair 2009) then perhaps are not to be bemoaned but accepted as inevitable even more so as it is embedded in a broad trend of different voluntary organizations going through similar developments. As Bolleyer argues, political parties might then be less *sui generis* in their development than often assumed.

We have already mentioned that the third wave of democracy has greatly increased the number of systems that allow for democratic competition, as has the number of parties. In his contribution, Lars Svåsand looks at political parties in new democracies and asks whether our conceptual apparatus developed in long-standing democracies is adequate to come to grips with these systems and organizations, and what the similarities and differences are between political parties in both types of systems. Going through the relevant research, the author finds that the differences are overwhelming. For instance, he shows that concepts derived from the Western experience would take a very different meaning if applied one-to-one in the new context and that the classic categories of typologies mostly would remain empty if applied to the parties of new democracies.

1.3 Kaare Strøm and the Study of Party Government

In advancing the agenda laid out here, the book speaks to the career-long research theme of Professor Kaare Strøm. The editors and authors want to present this book to him on the occasion of his 60th birthday. The book has not been planned as a typical Festschrift that gives preference to accommodating the thematic interests of a set of individuals selected on the basis of their relationship to the jubilarian. Rather, the editors have selected a theme that relates to his research concern and have then recruited a set of authors on the basis of their expertise to contribute a specific chapter to a structure that aims at addressing multiple dimensions of political parties as governing organizations. While not all authors have a personal relationship with Professor Strøm as co-authors or departmental colleagues, all share admiration for his work. The book thus is planned to fill a gap in the literature.

Throughout his career, Kaare Strøm has advanced the study of political parties in many ways. Most of this research is related to political parties as organizers of democratic government. Among the wealth of his contributions to this broad research field, we would like to single out four more specialized topics to which Kaare Strøm, alone and in collaboration with others, has made particularly significant contributions. In introducing these topics, we proceed in chronological order. Naturally, our brief discussion of each of the themes cannot do justice to the finer detail of his various contributions. We also limit our discussion to what we consider the most significant contributions. We hasten to add that the diligent student of these topics will find valuable ideas and results also in Strøm's other publications devoted to the relevant issue.

The first theme is minority cabinets. Studying a topic that for a long time had been considered obscure or pathologic—signaling crisis or decay—is perhaps an unlikely candidate to raise the attention and win the admiration of the discipline. Yet, this is exactly what his articles and the book (originally his Stanford dissertation) on minority cabinets did (Strøm 1984, 1986, 1990a). This work showed that minority cabinets are the outcome of rational party strategies and can be expected under conditions specified in his work. Specifically, they may be the

optimal outcome when policy and electoral concerns weigh-in considerably and the institutions of government make a strategy of exercising policy influence from the opposition benches viable.

The work on minority cabinets has already revealed the fact that party goals are more complex than assumed in the classics of the modern study of coalition governments (Riker 1962; Axelrod 1970; de Swaan 1973) but still predictable. The triad of vote-seeking, office-seeking, and policy-seeking party goals and the conditions that make political parties to opt for one of them in situations where they cannot be achieved simultaneously is what we consider his second major contribution to the study of political parties. Strøm's (1990b) conceptual article and joint work with one of the editors (Müller and Strøm 1999) showed that the complexity of decision making by political parties in case of goal conflicts can be systematically addressed and can provide important insights into the nature of political parties.

Coalition governments have prominently figured in both the work on minority cabinets and party goals; they are the main topic in another line of research. An article by Strøm et al. (1994) gave a forceful impulse to the systematic study of the role political institutions exercise in coalition politics. Strøm's work on a failed attempt at government formation in Norway highlights the relevance of these considerations in an exemplary case study (Strøm 1994). We have already mentioned the important work by Lupia and Strøm (1995) when introducing the chapter by Thomas Saalfeld. In joint work with the co-editor of this volume and several of its contributors, Kaare Strøm has then made a powerful contribution to the emerging study of what happens between coalition formation and termination (Müller and Strøm 2000, Strøm et al. 2008). These studies were among the first—and certainly the most comprehensive—to provide systematic insights into coalition governance. One of the innovations is the introduction of a life cycle approach.

This work on government coalitions goes together with a major attempt of the same group of scholars to provide new conceptual insights into the institutions of parliamentary government with the help of the principal–agent approach and a massive collection of institutional data. A first conceptual mapping (Bergman et al. 2000) was followed by a major study comprising all Western European democracies that applies this framework systematically (Strøm et al. 2003). In more specialized work with Steven Swindle Strøm provided what is still the state of the art on parliamentary dissolution (Strøm and Swindle 2002), while he explored the role of non-party actors in top executive office in joint work with Octavio Amorim Neto (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006). Kaare Strøm continued and further deepened the study of political delegation and accountability in joint work with Torbjörn Bergman in the context of the five Nordic countries. In these studies, the authors identify a trend toward Madisonian democracy in some of the heartland countries of parliamentary government (Bergman and Strøm 2011).

In recent work, Kaare Strøm has considerably expanded the geographical and thematic scope of his studies. He is now engaged in a major project on the important question of how democracy and peace can be maintained in post-conflict societies (Oberg and Strøm 2007). Predictably, political parties and institutions

loom large in this enterprise that, we are sure, will take similar importance as his research on established democracies reviewed here in exemplary rather than comprehensive form.

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Chapter 2
Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies

Benjamin Nyblade

Abstract In parliamentary democracies, governments are based on bargains among politicians and parties. These bargains, both implicit and explicit, have profound implications not only for who gets into government, but how they govern, how long they endure, and how voters respond. This chapter examines the development and testing of bargaining models of government formation, following its evolution from simple abstract models that rest on strong assumptions to examine more nuanced and complex models of government formation. It focuses in particular on recent theoretical and empirical developments that aim to better capturing the diverse nature of the actors involved in government formation and their various goals, as well as better specify the nature and variation in bargaining processes and bargaining context.

Keywords Government formation · Coalition government · Parliamentary democracy

2.1 Introduction

Whether one relies on the classic definition of politics as 'Who gets what, when and how' (Lasswell 1958) or more recent versions such as 'the process through which individual and groups reach agreement on a course of common, or collective, action—even as they disagree on the intended goals of that action' (Kernell et al. 2010), the issue of who enters government is one of the central concerns of political scientists. As such, it is unsurprising that both the study of the determinants of regime types—the rules by which governments are formed—and

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the study of government formation itself are among the most developed and also vibrant areas of study in the comparative study of politics. Understanding what influences which political actors take charge of government is a fundamental and timeless question for political scientists.

Indeed, the question of what determines which political actors form government is such a large and fundamental question that any brief work that seeks to review it in its entirety is likely doomed to failure before beginning. Thus, although there are many parallels to the work discussed here in scholarship that considers coalitions and government formation in non-democracies (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2008; Magaloni 2008) and in presidential democracies (e.g., Altman 2000; Cheibub et al. 2004; Amorim-Neto 2006; Amorim-Neto and Strøm 2006), this chapter focuses on the question of the determinants of formation of governments in parliamentary democracies.

In parliamentary democracies, bargaining among parties and politicians is central to understanding government formation. Governments are formed based on bargains among politicians and parties over policy and the benefits of office, bargains which are made in the shadow of past and future elections. These bargains, both implicit and explicit, have profound implications not only for who gets into government, but how they govern (Bergman and Müller, in this volume), how long they endure (Saalfeld, in this volume), and how voters respond (Powell, in this volume). This chapter examines the development and testing of this bargaining approach to government formation, following its evolution from simple abstract models that rest on strong assumptions to examine more nuanced and complex models of government formation. It focuses in particular on recent theoretical and empirical developments that focus on better capturing (1) the diverse nature of the actors involved in government formation and their various goals, (2) the various forms of uncertainty that may complicate government formation, and (3) the decision rules, political institutions, and other aspects of the broader bargaining environment that may play a decisive role in government formation.

The study of government formation is one in which scholars have been quite self-conscious about building on previous scholarship and simultaneously seeking to incrementally develop theoretic and empirical improvements, and there have been a number of reviews that cover similar terrain published over the last fifteen years (Laver 1998; Diermeier 2006; Strøm and Nyblade 2007; Müller 2009). As such, the space devoted here to reviewing well-trod ground is minimized in favor of critically assessing lines of research, presenting recent scholarship that has yet to be included in other reviews, and highlighting avenues for future research.

2.2 History of the Field

The study of government formation has been one of the most consistently active topics in the study of comparative politics over the past forty years, and one in which incremental progress, theoretically, methodologically, and empirically, has

been most clear. Generally, scholars in the study of coalition government have been conscious of not simply 'reinventing the wheel.' When adopting new theoretic approaches or empirical methods, scholars have consciously and conscientiously referenced and built on the work that has come before them.

The theoretical antecedents of the contemporary study of government formation are perhaps most prominently tied to more general early theories of bargaining theory and coalition formation such as can be found in classics of game theory and decision theory such as von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) and Shapley and Shubik (1954). Most early instances of scholarship that explicitly considered government (coalition) formation in light of bargaining theory in the 1960s and 1970s focused on understanding coalition formation as a fixed-sum game in which the benefits of coalition formation were divided among those who entered office. The most prominent early political application of a game-theoretic bargaining logic to political coalition formation was in the work of Riker (1962). Riker brought into political science von Neumann and Morgenstern's theoretic argument suggesting that in equilibrium, minimal winning coalitions (MWCs) should form and even argued that among *minimal* winning coalitions (coalitions in which all parties were necessary to be winning), the *minimum* winning coalition (the smallest majority coalition) should form. A similar informal argument can be found in Gamson's (1961) argument that the 'cheapest winning coalition' should be likely to form.

Direct application of bargaining models that incorporated only concerns about the distribution of office benefits to understanding government formation in parliamentary democracies found some support (Dodd 1976), but overall scholarship suggested they were inadequate quite early on (e.g., Browne 1973; Taylor and Laver 1973; De Swaan 1973; Franklin and Mackie 1984), suggesting the importance of including factors beyond the distribution of office benefits in theories of government formation. Quite specific predictions, such as Riker's argument about minimum winning coalitions forming, were found to be extremely inaccurate when applied to government formation in parliamentary democracies. Even predictions that allowed for a larger number of outcomes, such as the prediction that minimal winning coalitions form, were found to be successful at best roughly 50 % of the time. Crucially, both surplus majority coalitions, in which some parties did not contribute to the majority status of the government in parliament, and minority governments, in which the government did not control a majority of seats in parliament, occurred with great regularity and were difficult to explain with existing office-based models of government formation. While the literature had developed ad hoc explanations for many of these outcomes, it was not until the 1980s that more systematic attempts to explain minority governments (e.g., Strøm 1984, 1990a; Laver and Shepsle 1993) and surplus governments (Strøm 1990a; Laver and Schofield 1990) came to prominence.

Much of this latter work built on earlier recognition of the inadequacies of purely office-based theories of government formation. Scholars, particularly starting in the 1970s, began to build theories of government formation more explicitly centered on the ideological dispositions and policy preferences of parties. De Swaan (1973) is largely credited as developing the first theory of

government formation in which policy considerations are dominant, although policy considerations had previously been incorporated in part in works by Axelrod (1970) and Leisersen (1966) among others. In moving away from office-based theories of government formation, De Swaan was crucially questioning the dominant (yet often implicit) conception of the nature of the bargaining game that underpinned theories of government formation. Previous office-based theories modeled government formation as a fixed-sum game, treating government formation as bargaining over a prize that could be readily divided among those who won office in whatever manner they saw fit. De Swaan, however, focused on government formation not as a one-shot prize to be divided among the winners, but as the key step in bargaining over the policy positions that government would take once in office. Thus, even if a coalition between the far-left party and far-right party might be minimum winning (in Riker's terminology) and thus allow for the 'optimal' division of office benefits, if parties primarily care about the policies that are made while in government, such a coalition may no longer make sense.

In moving toward a greater focus on policy concerns, scholars began to bring in the literature on spatial modeling of politics and policy, most prominently introduced to political science in Downs (1957), who in turn drew on classic work by Black (1958) among others. This line of work highlights that when preferences can be reliably arrayed along a single dimension, the actor at the median position has particularly strong bargaining power. At the extreme, classic 'pure' policy-seeking models could predict that the median party in parliament should form government by itself, regardless of majority or minority status. The party's power should both be stable and it should be able to implement policies consistent with its ideal point. The positions such a party proposed could not be defeated in parliamentary votes, as there would exist no parliamentary majority that would ever prefer the status quo to that party's ideal point, assuming sincere voting by all actors.

However, like extreme office-seeking models of government formation, a pure policy-seeking approach to understanding government formation runs into both theoretical challenges and flies in the face of the empirical record. At the theoretic level, just as it seems limiting to imagine that government formation is simply bargaining over a fixed-sum pie of office 'goodies,' it is hard to imagine that bargaining over government formation excludes the consideration of the office benefits that do exist. Even remaining within a policy-centric approach to modeling government formation, it has generally been recognized that in spatial models of policy-making, it is frequently important to move beyond the simple unidimensional approach to politics. Politics in most parliamentary democracies are not simply about a single dominant cleavage, and the predictions about the privileged position of a median party weaken or entirely disappear as one incorporates additional policy dimensions (e.g., McKelvey 1976; Schofield 1978).

A prominent attempt to move policy-seeking theories of government formation to multiple dimensions is the portfolio allocation–based approach of Laver and Shepsle (1990a, 1994, 1996; see also Austen-Smith and Banks 1990). This approach incorporates the underlying logic of structure-induced equilibrium in spatial models (e.g., Shepsle 1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1981) to government

formation by effectively limiting the policy choices possible in bargaining over government formation to those of the ideal parties across the entirely separate dimensions. Thus, a coalition government will be formed when a stable bargain may be struck by placing one party in charge of one portfolio (and assuming that the party will implement its preferred policies on that policy dimension) and a different party in charge of a different portfolio. While this approach does not guarantee a clear prediction about government formation—for some configurations of seats and preferences there will be no equilibrium government—it represents the most prominent attempt to develop multidimensional spatial models in theories of government formation. However, the strong assumptions underlying this approach have been extensively criticized and the empirical performance of the model has been questioned (e.g., Warwick 1996; Dunleavy and Bastow 2001; Lupia and Strøm 2008). A range of alternative models incorporating both office and policy concerns also rose to prominence, for example, van Roozendaal (1990), Crombez (1996), Sened (1996) and Debus (2008), models that collectively tended to suggest that when the distribution of policy preferences and parliamentary seat shares concentrated bargaining power in the hands of a single-actor, minority governments were more likely to form, whereas MWCs and surplus majority governments were more likely to form in situations in which bargaining power was more widely distributed.

Alternatively, scholars who have emphasized policy concerns have focused not simply on the importance of median parties (or their multidimensional analogs), but on the possible role of policy distance and contiguity among political parties. At times, this has been incorporated together with office-seeking theories, as in Axelrod's (1970) suggestion of the appeal of the minimum connected winning coalition (MCWC). Budge and Keman (1990) pulled together many earlier arguments highlighting how certain parties (e.g., 'anti-system' parties) may not be plausible candidates for government formation because they hold positions too extreme for other parties to be able to work with them. This latter approach has been elaborated and extended more systematically by Warwick's work on policy horizons (Warwick 2000, 2005, 2006). However, accurately identifying the real policy horizons of parties is empirically quite challenging—indeed, one can imagine strategic incentives for parties to misrepresent their policy horizons, and it is not clear to what extent past policy horizons can or should accurately predict future policy horizons. At best, the approach primarily serves to rule a subset of potential governments out, rather than understand the government that actually does form.

Overall, despite the limitations of pure policy-seeking theories, empirical tests of government formation have consistently found that median parties, particularly median parties that are not quite small, are privileged when it comes to government formation (Martin and Stevenson 2001). Furthermore, typically governments that are compact ideologically are more likely to form than alternatives which are less compact. Overall, purely policy-based theories typically outperform purely office-based theories when compared head to head, although relatively few scholars at this point would suggest that exclusively focusing on one or the other is the way forward in studying government formation.

From early on in the study of government formation, scholars have suggested incorporating both policy and office concerns in theories and empirical studies (e.g., Leisersen 1966; Axelrod 1970). By the 1980s and 1990s, this approach was firmly established (e.g., Budge and Laver 1986; Laver and Schofield 1990; Strøm et al.1994). Conceiving of parties and politicians as having complex motivations creates both theoretic and empirical challenges. Theoretically, how do we know or understand when parties will trade off one goal for another? Empirically, is it possible to operationalize and assess the (potentially varying) importance of the motives of parties?

The most prominent attempt to theorize how parties manage their multiple motivations comes from Strøm 1990b, a work which was further refined along with the collaboration of a prominent group of scholars providing further theoretic development through careful empirical work focusing on 'tough' situations in which parties are forced to trade off among their multiple goals (Müller and Strøm 1998). Strøm's 'behavioral theory' focuses on how parties not only trade off policy versus office considerations at times—being willing to give up office perks for policy, or vice versa, but on how parties incorporate dynamic considerations, and may also give up on current policy gains or office benefits in order to ensure the garner of more votes, and thus have greater potential for office or policy benefits in the future. While not exclusively focused on questions of government formation, work focused on understanding the preferences and motives of parties remains crucial for understanding government formation, as almost all approaches to understanding government formation have treated parties as acting instrumentally when bargaining over government formation.

This line of work also highlights a more general development in the literature since the 1980s to incorporate considerations beyond simply policy positions and office benefits in theorizing and empirical studies of government formation. This has gone hand in hand, not entirely coincidentally, with the move from cooperative game-theoretic models to non-cooperative game-theoretic models. While cooperative game-theoretic models of coalition formation could be structured based solely on party attributes, using the seat shares and policy preferences of political parties, moving to non-cooperative models required greater specification of (and/or stronger assumptions about) the bargaining environment and bargaining procedures that government formation entailed. Baron (1989) is seen as the first direct application of non-cooperative bargaining theory to the formation of coalitions, applying the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model of legislative bargaining to coalition formation. Baron's work over the subsequent twenty years has continued to be among the most influential in modeling coalition formation from a non-cooperative perspective (e.g., Baron 1991, 1993, 1998, Baron and Diermeier 2001). In adapting to non-cooperative approaches to understanding bargaining, scholars were forced to grapple with questions of the extent to which, for example, bargaining over coalition formation was similar to the assumptions built into basic non-cooperative bargaining models such as Rubinstein's (1982) classic alternating offers model. Consideration of the relative 'patience' of parties in the bargaining process, as well as the recognition procedures for which actors could make

proposals for government formation and in what order these proposals would be made became more of a consideration, as these factors were seen as crucial in the relevant scholarship on non-cooperative bargaining games (e.g., Diermeier and Merlo 2004). The implications of most non-cooperative bargaining models for the existence of a 'formateur advantage' has recently led to a healthy empirical and methodological debate about whether the empirical record of coalition government matches the underlying theories (e.g., Warwick and Druckman 2001; Ansolabehere et al. 2005; Carroll and Cox 2007), contra Gamson's Law, named for the empirical regularity noted in Gamson (1961) of proportional allocation of cabinet portfolios among coalition government members.

In moving to greater specification of the bargaining procedures and environment in understanding government formation, many scholars brought in consideration of various factors in the 1980s through the present that were largely absent in previous works, even though antecedents could readily be traced to work such as Adrian and Press (1968) which highlighted the importance of transaction costs in coalition formation. Franklin and Mackie (1983) suggested that historical context and familiarity of parties in working together might play an important role. Crucial to Strøm's (1984, 1990a) account of minority government formation is placing government formation in a broader legislative and electoral context. Similarly, Luebbert's (1984) influential work highlights how leaders bargaining over government formation do so in the shadow of the influence of their party's mass membership and the broader electoral context. Formal and empirical work attempting to incorporate electoral competition in a policy space as the key feature in understanding the dynamics of coalition formation is central to Schofield's work in this field in the 1990s (most prominently Schofield 1993 and 1997). The work of Mershon (1996, 2002) highlights how the broader political context influences drop and how parties perceive and attempt to influence the costs and benefits of government membership. A number of scholars came to emphasize the potential importance of a range of legislative and executive rules that either directly govern coalition formation or indirectly influence coalition formation, including a wide range of constitutional rules (e.g., Diermeier et al. 2003, 2006), and in particular bicameralism (Druckman and Thies 2002; Druckman et al. 2005; Diermeier et al. 2007). The influence of wide range of political institutions have been argued to be particularly influential on the type of government formed (minority, minimal winning, or surplus majority), for example, Bergman (1993), Carrubba and Volden (2000), Jungar (2000), and Volden and Carruba (2004).

This trend in the 1990s toward emphasizing the broader context within which coalition formation occurs has continued in the early twenty-first century as well, for example, in the work of Golder (2006a, b), who highlights how electoral coalitions influence government formation, and articles such as those previously mentioned by Diermeier et al. (2003, 2006, 2007), which highlight how variation in fundamental constitutional institutions, as well as expectations concerning government durability may fundamentally influence coalition formation. Books such as the two recent edited volumes by Strøm et al. (2003, 2008) have emphasized the broader political context within which government and coalition

formation occurs, and how all stages of the 'democratic life cycle' in parliamentary democracies, including government formation (Mitchell and Nyblade 2008), are influenced by a wide range of institutional, contextual, and electoral factors, along with more conventional office-seeking and policy-seeking motives generally ascribed to parties. These works highlight how recent scholarship has continued this trend of emphasizing the importance of understanding government formation as bargaining in a broader electoral and political context, rather than treating government formation as an isolated, one-shot game.

Overall, studies of government formation over the past 50 years have seen a gradual evolution from simple cooperative game-theoretic roots and studies primarily focused on how parties' office and policy motivations drive coalition bargains, to studies that have incorporated a richer 'objective function' for parties and more detail about the institutional, contextual, and dynamic factors that influence bargaining over government formation.

2.3 Major Lines of Research

There are many potential ways of dividing and characterizing the major lines of research in government formation. For example, one could divide the literature into works that are primarily about theory development, works aimed at theory testing, and work whose primary contribution is empirical description. One can make finer distinctions within these categories—for example, one can divide theories into those that use formal game-theoretic models and those that do not and divide empirical work by use of quantitative or qualitative data, or empirical work that seeks to test a specific hypothesis versus providing a broader assessment of government formation more generally (for a valuable review of the literature using this approach to dividing the literature, see Müller 2009). However, rather than divide work by how much they pursue these complementary objectives, in this section I provide an alternative approach that illustrates the diversity and unity of the field in a different perspective. I suggest that it may be particularly useful to understand the literature in terms of how it understands (1) the actors involved in bargaining over government formation and (2) characterizes the nature of the bargaining 'game.'

Almost all theories of government formation treat (unitary) parties as the relevant actors. While there have been notable exceptions (Laver and Shepsle 1990b; Strøm 1994; Druckman 1996), most scholars rely on the assumption of parties as unitary actors and defend it in similar logic to that laid out by Laver and Schofield (1990), who comment that 'There can be no doubt that parties are not unitary actors for many of the purposes for which political scientists may be interested in them. For the purposes of coalition theory, however, this assumption turns out to be not quite as serious as it appears at first sight. This is because European political parties are, by and large, well disciplined.'

Although there has been general unity in the extent to which parties are the actors focused on in systemic theorizing about and empirical studies of government formation, there has been much less unity in the characterizing parties' goals. As discussed in the previous section, scholars have primarily varied in the extent to which they emphasize office versus policy goals in their work, with a relatively smaller share of scholars considering vote-seeking or other goals that parties may prioritize as well. This may be in part because these other goals are perhaps more instrumental in nature. For example, vote-seeking behavior by parties is generally seen as a means to greater (future) policy influence and/or office benefits (e.g., Strøm 1990a). However, to the extent that parties are willing to trade off on policy or office goals today in favor of votes or other goals, even if those other goals are simply proxies for intertemporal trade-offs on future policy or office benefits, theories, and empirical studies that focus only on current policy and office benefits for parties are necessarily underspecified.

Temporal dynamics are important not only for better understanding the actors involved in bargaining over government formation, but matter crucially in how the bargaining game is conceptualized by scholars. While there has been a fair amount of variation in the goals ascribed to parties in studies of government formation, there has been even greater variation in the characterization of the process of government formation and the nature of the potential payoffs parties receive from forming government.

Perhaps, the simplest way —and one that is not necessarily too simplistic for some cases at least—is to think of government formation as bargaining over a single fixed pie of office benefits, as exemplified by the logic laid out in Riker (1962). A competing, but ultimately similar approach, is to conceive of government formation as being about bargaining over a single instance of policy choice (whether unidimensional or multidimensional). Although the analytic challenges in building office and policy-based models of government formation may be different, one can group theories of government formation that ultimately rest on 'single-shot' bargaining perspectives over policy and/or office together as having, on one dimension at least, a common understanding of the bargaining environment.

More challenging, both theoretically and for empirical testing are approaches to understanding government formation in a dynamic framework. That is to say, government formation is not about choosing policy or dividing office just at one point in time, but setting up government in the shadow of the future and in a manner that may be influenced by the past. Indeed, one of the most important steps scholars have made in the literature in recent decades, which further complicates specification of theoretic models and empirical testing, is insisting that government formation is not simply a single-shot bargaining game with one-time policy, office, and/or vote payoffs. Central to the work of Diermeier and Merlo (2000) and Diermeier et al. (2002, 2003), for example, is that the expected durability of governments vary, and parties may thus trade off their share of government against the government's likely durability. For example, a party may choose between having a greater share of the pie in less durability minority government, versus

having a smaller share of the pie in a more durable majority or surplus majority government. This suggests that government formation and durability may be inextricably linked, thus complicating attempts to study the two independently. Other recent scholarship has also emphasized the importance of temporal dynamics in government formation, which both complicates and enriches our understanding of the nature of bargaining over government formation, and is discussed further in the following section.

All in all, the attention placed on various aspects of actors' motivations, as well as the characterization of the nature and consequences of bargaining over government formation, provides the key delineations among research in government formation, and, as suggested below, provides a template for understanding recent developments in the field and areas for potential future development.

2.4 Recent Research Frontiers

We can roughly divide the recent research frontiers into scholarship that seeks to better understand the actors involved in government formation (their identity, preferences, and motivations) and those that seek to better understand the nature of the bargaining process. Overall, we can identify a broad trend to move toward theoretical approaches and empirical testing that highlight the complex motivations of actors involved in bargaining over coalition formation, and a trend toward studying government formation beyond its traditional focus on Western Europe, and emphasizing the importance of understanding the broader context in which bargaining over government formation occurs, in particular scholarship has highlighted how the history of government formation, the electoral environmental, institutional rules, and specific procedures for government formation may influence coalition formation.

The reliance on unitary political parties as the key actors in theorizing about, and empirically studying coalition formation remains the predominant perspective in the cross-national literature on government formation. While qualitative work on specific governments that format has always considered these factors, efforts to highlight the importance of intra-party politics remain in a comparative and systematic fashion remain largely under-studied. However, recent work has pushed on this envelope. Perhaps most prominently, Giannetti and Benoit (2008) is an edited volume that brought together a series of high-quality contributions that addressed this issue, hopefully setting the table for future work. Notable related empirical work on the influence of intra-party politics on coalition formation includes Bäck (2008), which focused on intra-party political influences on coalition formation in local governments in Sweden, and Pedersen (2010), which focused on how intra-party politics affect the coalition behavior of Danish political parties. More recently, Meyer (2012) builds on a principal-agent framework approach to understanding political parties and parliamentary democracy, presenting a model which suggests that the influence of intra-party politics on the bargaining power of

parties may be more complex than previously assumed, with party disunity strengthening the hands of parties in certain cases. Given that it is not parties as a whole who bargain over government formation, but representatives of those parties, adopting a principal-agent approach to understanding leaders/representatives and the agency relations they have with their backbench and broader party organization seems like a fruitful avenue for future research in this vein.

A larger portion of the recent literature on coalition formation has pushed toward a better understanding how the goals of the parties involved in government formation vary and influence outcomes. Notable in this vein includes Indriðason (2005) and Pedersen (2012). Indriðason focuses on the relative importance of patronage for Icelandic political parties, suggesting that this may explain the prevalence of minimal winning coalitions in Iceland. Pederson suggests that party goals are influenced by a range of party-specific factors including size, organization, and ideological preferences. While the bulk of theories has treated parties homogenously in terms of the goals they seek, work in this area suggests that much more can and should be done to assess party goals and preferences and incorporate that into the study of government formation.

Another strand of the literature has expanded the focus on what parties get out being in government, beyond simply government membership. In particular, this research has focused on what influences cabinet portfolio allocation, which was primarily focused on questions regarding Gamson's Law until recent years, new data and empirical methods have allowed for more systematic exploration of other aspects of portfolio allocation (e.g., Bäck et al. 2011). Another line of work perhaps more closely in line with previous work on the role of the formateur in coalition politics (e.g., Bäck and Dumont 2008) focuses on what determines the party of the most important portfolio, the prime minister (Glasgow et al. 2011).

Perhaps the most radical departure from the standard approach to understanding the nature and role of the actors in government formation may be the recent article by Golder et al. (2012). This article presents a 'zero-intelligence' model of government formation in which there is an incumbent government, all governments must have majority parliamentary support, and there are three or more parties that care about office and policy. This structure alone, even with parties presenting random (i.e., non-strategic) proposals for government formation, ensures a distribution of outcomes across portfolio allocation, government types, and bargaining delays that match fairly closely what is seen in the real world. The authors are not suggesting that actors involved in government formation are not strategic, but rather that the basic underlying institutional foundation of parliamentary government may be sufficient to lead to much of the observed variation in government formation in parliamentary democracies. This article suggests that scholars in the literature may have placed too much emphasis on strategic interaction and not given enough due to the influence of the basic underlying structure that may drive political outcomes.

While Golder et al. (2012) may be unusual in its emphasis on the explanatory power of fundamental structural factors, other recent work has also emphasized the importance of better understanding the bargaining process by which government

formation occurs and the contexts within which it operates. Perhaps, the single greatest emphasis in recent years has been on the electoral environment within which coalition formation occurs. Given that government membership may incur electoral costs (Rose and Mackie 1983; Narud and Valen 2008), it should not be seen as surprising that electoral context matters for government formation. A series of recent work emphasizes the importance of (pre-)electoral coalitions on government formation (Golder 2006a, b; Debus 2009), other scholars have highlighted how electoral fortunes in prior elections may influence government formation (Mattila and Raunio 2004). Although the literature only indirectly touches on government formation, recent work has emphasized that voters' behavior often anticipates the possibilities of coalition formation (Blais et al. 2006; Kedar 2005, 2009; Bargsted and Kedar 2009), and an even larger literature has continued previous investigations as to when and how coalition government influences policy-making (perhaps most notably Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006).

However, it is not only the electoral context that matters for government formation. History matters as well. Tavits (2008) finds some evidence that when coalitions break down due to conflict between parties, subsequent coalitions between those parties are less likely, although there is less consistent evidence as to whether parties involved in a conflict that brings own government are seen as less coalitionable in the eyes of parties that were not part of that particular government. Along a similar vein, Martin and Stevenson (2010) find that there is a significant incumbency advantage in coalition formation, but only if the parties in government have not had serious conflict or lost electoral votes. This conditional incumbency advantage is greatly enhanced when rules which privileges the incumbent government in coalition bargaining are in place.

Overall, greater sensitivity toward the importance of history, context, and variation in the bargaining process has driven changes in the empirical methodology scholars have used in studying government formation cross-nationally. Worries about lack of sensitivity to context in quantitative work in large part have driven a greater degree of theoretically informed qualitative work on government formation (e.g., Andeweg et al. 2011) and calls for carefully integrating qualitative and quantitative research (Bäck and Dumont 2007).

Greater sensitivity to the importance of history and context has led some scholars to note that importance of the cases of government formation being studied. As Grofman (1989) highlighted, the results of research on government formation and termination have been quite sensitive to the samples being studied. This led to improved efforts to collaboratively develop impressive datasets on coalition government in Western Europe (Müller and Strøm 2000) and even more broadly (Woldendorp et al. 2000), and a substantial increase in scholars studying coalition government beyond its traditional confines of national-level governments in Western Europe. Scholars have increasingly turned to other levels of government, particularly sub-national government formation (Downs 1998; Bäck 2003), and with the rise of a more democratic Eastern Europe, scholars have turned to studying government formation in both Eastern and Western Europe (Tavits 2008; Golder and Conrad 2010), and comparable datasets have been made available for

scholars to use in the study of government formation and parliamentary democracy all across Europe (Andersson and Ersson 2012).

In addition to expanding the scope of quantitative data being used in studies of government formation, scholars have also gradually adapted the quantitative methods the use, to try to better account for the importance of context and strategic behavior on the part of the actors involved. Scholarship on government formation evolved in the twentieth century from reliance on basic descriptive statistics and some basic multivariate regression. Martin and Stevenson (2001) marked a shift in the government formation literature to using a conditional logistic regression framework, making it among the most highly cited works on government formation in recent years. However, while Martin and Stevenson (2001) noted the reliance of the conditional logit on the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption, suggesting that empirically this did not seem to be a worry in their data, given the belief in strategic actors involved in government formation, the assumption was troubling. Indeed, recent work has suggested that in fact, the reliance of conditional logits on the IIA assumption is indeed problematic empirically for the study of government formation (Glasgow et al. 2012). This leads to Glasgow et al. to advocate the use of mixed logits in the context of better understanding government formation, a methodological choice that is, however, not without its own limitations and challenges.

2.5 Conclusion

Although many scholars have emphasized certain chronic weaknesses in their assessments of the state of scholarship on coalition government (e.g., Andeweg 2011; De Winter and Dumont 2006), there seems to be a general sense that recent work in the study of government formation has pushed the literature forward theoretically, methodologically and empirically, although there remains much work to be done. The literature seems to be developing primarily in a 'normal science' manner, with incremental changes in emphasis and direction. We have not seen major paradigm shifts, and even with the greater emphasis on the complexity of actors' goals and the relevance of history and a wider range of factors in the bargaining environment, it is apparent that the classic single-shot bargaining models of government formation that rely on purely policy- or office-seeking goals are fairly direct antecedents of current work in the field.

In many ways, the progress we have seen in the study of government formation is a tribute to both the power and limitations of the key approaches developed early on in understanding government formation. Simple perspectives on the policy- and office-seeking goals of parties are both clearly important for understanding government formation and yet are insufficient for explaining the richness of the empirical record for government formation. Government formation is then, in many ways, a microcosm for much of political science—certain basic theories can provide a fair amount of leverage in understanding general patterns and overall

dynamics, but moving beyond the basic theories provides both a richer understanding of the empirical record and helps us more systematically address the limitations of parsimonious theorizing.

However, rather than (for the most part) focus on strident debate from extreme positions or competing paradigms, most scholarship on government formation has recognized the complementarities of competing perspectives and tried to progress through gradual development of theory and empirical work. This is something that is not universal across the field of political science, and something that is a tribute to the scholars who have contributed to this literature in the past, and something we can hope will continue as the scholarship continues into the future.

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Chapter 3
How Parties Govern: Political Parties and the Internal Organization of Government

Torbjörn Bergman, Alejandro Ecker and Wolfgang C. Müller

Abstract Party competition is a constitutive component of modern democracies. While indispensable, the division of parliament into competing political parties at the same time creates challenges for these parties. Specifically, the challenges are providing stable government, arriving at government decisions, and making these decisions part and parcel of a coherent and effective government policy. The literature has identified a myriad of mechanisms that government parties devise to master these challenges. For instance, single-party majority governments can use powerful explicit remedies of internal coordination such as electoral manifestos and strong leaders who unite the "number one" positions of the party (party leader) and government (Prime Minister). Single-party minority governments, in turn, may either exploit their pivotal position in the legislature or resort to parliamentary support arrangements. Finally, coalition governments often rely on political institutions as coordination mechanisms or conceive tailor-made means and mechanisms of coalition governance. The literature has identified these mechanisms, outlined *how* they function, and tried to define the conditions that make the resorting to these mechanisms more likely. Measures of the actual effects of such mechanisms and their optimal configuration constitute the research front.

Keywords Political parties · Party government · Conflicting ambitions · Coalition governments

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3.1 Introduction: Parties and Party Government

Modern democratic theory has named political parties as indispensable for democracy. In modern states, parties structure elections and provide mass electorates with meaningful choices in terms of programs and teams of leaders. Running in elections and aiming for government office are core defining characteristics of political parties. Parties also allow for political participation in between elections and thus for influencing the choices they provide for voters (Kelsen 1929; Sartori 1987; Ware 1987). However, political parties do not emerge from the idea of organizing democracy but from the desire to make or influence authoritative (government) decisions according to their values (Burke 1774; Sjöblom 1968). Providing democracy then is a by-product of the parties' struggle for power (Schumpeter 1942).

Simplifying reality, we can understand government power resting on the parliamentary majority. This majority itself is the product of delegation processes from voters to political parties and individual representatives and, if required, post-electoral coalition or alliance formation. The reality of parliamentary democracy is that most of government power is further delegated to the cabinet (Strøm et al. 2008). This is the focus of the present chapter. The ultimate goal of individual parties requires some form of participation in government. If political parties value government participation because of its office benefits, then remaining in government—to occupy the cherished positions as long as possible—is the imperative. If political parties value government participation because of the policy-making power it brings, the imperative is remaining in office to influence government policy over an extended period of time. Whatever their motives, once in government, political parties—as enduring organizations (Aldrich 1995; Müller 2000)—should be concerned with providing good government and pleasing the voters. This requires mastering three challenges.

The first challenge is to provide *stable government*. Once a cabinet has taken office, it should remain there until the end of its term (or close enough to that date). We can add that the government should remain in office without going through periods of brinkmanship or cabinet crisis that signal weakness to citizens and markets. Yet, as Sartori (1997: 113) has noted, "governments can be both long lived and impotent." Cabinet survival thus is a necessary though not sufficient condition for providing government (Sartori 1997: 111–114). The second challenge thus is not just to survive in office but to actually govern: to *make decisions*. Not falling victim to political immobility requires government agreement on the substance of collective decisions or, at least, agreement on delegating decision rights to individual government parties or ministers. The third challenge rests in the *quality* of these decisions. In systems of democratic accountability, the citizens do not simply satisfy themselves by the government appearing stable and active, but expect that its policy is beneficial for the country and/or themselves. In other words, incumbents are expected to provide *good government*. Pleasing the voters or winning their acceptance for inconvenient but necessary government measures

then becomes the imperative of the day. Clearly, what is beneficial for individuals or the country at large will, to great extent, lay in the eye of the beholder; different interests and philosophies provide different answers. Yet, most will agree that government policy should be more than a number of individual measures, but should also provide a coherent program.

In this chapter, we ask how political parties organize the internal working of government and what we can infer from the literature regarding how different types of cabinets meet the challenges identified above. Clearly, governments work in a complex environment and typically have to face many challenges that result from external demands, encounters with other powerful players, and the vagaries of life. We leave all these factors aside and concentrate on those that the governments have the greatest chance of influencing by designing their internal organization and processes. Thus, the greatest problem is differing kinds of ambitions. Clearly, without individual or group ambition neither the desired nor the undesired aspects of government would emerge. Its detrimental effects on governments may be contained or exacerbated by the external factors mentioned above. While we put these aside, our discussion proceeds from the assumption that the very makeup of governments as single party or coalition, majority, or minority poses different challenges and therefore requires different solutions for the internal organization of government. We review what the literature has gathered about these challenges and solutions, thereby identifying gaps and promising research questions.

The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, we briefly identify the potential problems that governments face and that can be addressed by means of internal organization. We then move on and see how different types of government may be affected by these problems and how they can protect themselves from these problems to ensure stability, effectiveness, and policy coherence.

3.2 Conflicting Ambitions as a Problem of Governing

Making productive use of conflicting ambition, as understood by Madison (1788) and Schumpeter (1942), lies at the heart of modern democracy. In the post-war period, conflicting ambition has been mostly seen as productive when it occurs between government and opposition. However, the views have become more mixed when conflicting ambitions structure relations between institutions in systems of divided government (before the background of the recent history of the US). In addition, weakness or decay has always been the dominant interpretation when such conflicting ambitions have influenced the internal life of cabinets in parliamentary systems.

Conflicting ambitions of individual politicians or groups such as factions or political parties can undermine the capacity of cabinets to master the three challenges of governing identified above. Competition for office and/or policy conflict can bring down or greatly destabilize governments. Such conflicts can express themselves in cabinet inability to make decisions, resulting in legislative and

administrative stalemate. Backbench revolts in parliament or the party organization turning against cabinet members may be even less comforting alternatives when deciding to agree, disagree, or do nothing. Yet, delayed decisions are often more costly than suboptimal ones that are made in haste (the error against which ancient wisdom wanted to protect the rulers). There is no guarantee that a decision that took a long time to make is the right one, especially as the situation may have changed already (e.g., because of market reactions to political immobility). Also the decision may be what is called a "bad compromise." A compromise then is not the "happy medium" between two extremes. It is rather only a half-hearted attempt to do the right thing, or an inconsistent package of individual measures that result from conflicting ambitions, goals, and ideas about the effects of policy instruments.

3.3 Single-Party Majority Government: The Ideal of Party Government?

Much of the literature on parliamentary democracy has traditionally focused on political systems that are dominated by majority parties alternating in government. Here, one predetermined breaking point—party lines running through the cabinet—is absent, along with one structural weakness: the lack of a majority in parliament. Yet, conflicting personal or factional ambition may still exist and bring down or obstruct government. A party typically is comprised of more individuals who feel destined for high office than there are slots to fill. Only one can be Prime Minister, and the number of senior cabinet and parliamentary positions is also limited. Replacing incumbents in their party and public offices thus is required to fulfill these personal office ambitions. Such ambitions may often be disguised as or closely linked to policy concerns. Indeed, there may be genuine disagreement within government parties about government policy. From the perspective of intra-party groups or wings, the government team's performance in office may simply be disappointing. The fear that cabinet members "go native" and subscribe to the common wisdoms of their departments rather than acting on the basis of party ideology or program has haunted British parties for a long time. The idea of opportunistic or incapable ministers has been captured in many ways, from concepts such as "administrative government" (Rose 1969, 1974) to the popular TV series *Yes, Minister* (Lynn and Jay 1981). From the government's perspective, intra-party challenges on policy grounds are often based on illusion of what actually can be done. "Going native" and "illusion" are thus two sides of the same coin. The important question here is whether and how such conflicts can be contained.

The archetypical form of single-party government is the Westminster system as it first evolved in Britain and then was exported to many of its former colonies. In this system, single-party majority governments rely on a number of means that help containing such ambition. The first such means are electoral manifestos. From the perspective of mandate theories of representation, party election programs are

crucial in presenting the electorate alternative policy platforms, which parties promise to implement if they are elected to government (McDonald and Budge 2005; Przeworski et al. 1999). In this context, electoral manifestos are generally conceived as "contracts" *between* parties and voters (Ray 2007). Yet, electoral manifestos may also be conceived as "contracts" *within* parties binding the individual cabinet members. Being endorsed by the party leadership and often also by the party congress, they are the most authoritative and comprehensive collective policy statement produced by political parties (Budge 2001). As such, election manifestos are crucial means to tame conflicting personal or factional ambitions and thus contain conflicts within the cabinet.

Ideally, the institution of the shadow cabinet is another means to coordinate within a party and to form a team of politicians united by a common understanding of what an incoming government will do. Politicians who have stood together in parliamentary battles against the outgoing government are less likely to risk bringing down government by emphasizing conflicting personal or factional ambitions once in cabinet office themselves.

The third mechanism to contain conflicting ambitions in the traditional Westminster model is strong leadership within the top executive body. The authority of the Prime Minister as head of government is closely related to leadership predominance within the party. In fact, the personal union of the Prime Minister and the party leader of the government party have given rise to the notion of "prime ministerial government" (Crossman 1963, 1972). The extent of unified authority in the hands of the Prime Minister is further boosted by the increasing personalization of politics. As political parties rally around their party leader and legislative elections become leadership contests, the Prime Minister is able to present himself or herself as the winner of the electoral contest (McAllister 2007).

Complementing these manifest means of containing individual ambitions, single-party majority governments likewise rely on several more latent mechanisms. The first such mechanism is the overarching ideology to which both cabinet members and members of parliament are committed. Thus, regardless of conflicting individual or factional ambitions within the governing party, the common ideological framework should provide a readily available blueprint for cabinet decisions to be taken.

In a similar vein, single-party majority governments are tied together by the prevalent reelection incentive. Rather than damaging reelection chances by agitating against the party leadership, even cabinet members with strong incentives to pursue a personal agenda may opt to toe the party line and unite behind what they consider a deficient party leadership in order to maintain a united front against the opposition. This is likely to be advantageous for both the party as a whole and the individual cabinet member, given that the party itself is likely to turn against those responsible for intra-party turmoil, thus ultimately harming rather than boosting an individual's political career.

Yet, even these strong mechanisms and incentives do not always work. Both individual politicians' and parties' rationales lead to conflicting personal or factional ambitions resurfacing under specific circumstances. An example of such an

instance is an individual politician considering it to be his or her last chance to reach a top position in the executive. In this context, he or she may be inclined to prioritize his or her personal interests over the collective interest of the party as whole, thus leading to intra-party conflict. In a similar vein, a party's conviction that the incumbent Prime Minister has become an electoral liability and that change is its only chance to cling to power should create a collective incentive to replace the head of government.

These conflicts have often brought the majority party on the brink of government collapse in Westminster systems around the world. One prominent example of such instances was the conflict in the Thatcher government between the Prime Minister and Michael Heseltine. This drama included a forced ministerial resignation and an open challenge in leadership. It eventually led to the ousting of Margret Thatcher by the Conservative Party, which ultimately secured the party an additional office term under John Major. A more recent example is the unseating of Kevin Rudd as Prime Minister and leader of the Australian Labor Party by Julia Gillard, followed by an unsuccessful attempt of the former to take back the party leadership. Similar to the British case, replacing Rudd was key for Labor Party's containment of electoral losses and maintaining government office.

Yet, political parties in single-party governments are often not determined enough to get rid of a Prime Minister who is likely to lose an election, either because there is no viable alternative candidate or because the electoral prospects are unlikely to attract such a candidate. At the same time, they often fall short of addressing the actual problems of governing and are haunted by attrition and corruption, corroborating Lord Acton's dictum where "Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely." Indeed, it is the centralization of power that makes single-party majority governments strong, which prevents timely rejuvenation. Think, for instance, of the Spanish Socialists under Felipe González, or the British Conservatives under John Major. Both were increasingly affected by the voters' impression that the government was struggling with corruption (the famous "sleaze" incidents in the latter case).

Most empirical research on how single-party majority governments ensure a coherent and effective government policy is based upon the classical embodiment of Westminster democracy in the United Kingdom. As Rose (1969, 1974) insightfully argues, holding executive office is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for governing. Rather, party government, that is, partisan control over government policy, depends on the winning party having identifiable policies and the organizational, institutional, and personnel capacity to carry these out (Mair 2008: 223). To the extent that government parties lack these characteristics, a single-party majority government may degenerate into an administrative government, whereby "civil servants not only maintain routine services of government, but also try to formulate new policies" (Rose 1969: 418). Yet, the empirical picture indicates that the "partyness of government" (Katz 1986) in the British case as well as in other systems built on the Westminster model such as Canada,

New Zealand, and Australia is relatively high. In continental Europe, on the other hand, the conditions for the maintenance of party government are being subject to a severe challenge (Mair 2008). At the same time, scholars emphasize that party–government relation is a reciprocal process, wherein parties are likewise shaped by government participation. Thus, the fusion of the government party and the executive realm in the context of party government may erode their *raison d'être* (Blondel and Cotta 1996, 2000).

Yet, another strand in the empirical literature on how single-party majority governments ensure a coherent and effective government policy emphasizes prime ministerial government. This literature focuses on the power distribution within the cabinet, that is, the extent of Prime Minister's prerogative powers and extracts factors that shape a Prime Minister's capacities. Here, the empirical picture likewise indicates that Prime Ministerial government is an often-adopted mechanism by single-party governments in Westminster systems (Weller 1985).

While this literature is largely concerned with the mechanisms employed to contain conflicts within single-party majority governments, the patterns of backbench dissent in Westminster systems have likewise sparked considerable interest among scholars (Jackson 1968; Kam 2009; Norton 1978). Clearly, backbench dissent is inherent in single-party majority rule, and perfect unity is unlikely to be achieved during all periods and throughout all countries. However, as soon as a single-party majority government starts neglecting its partisan roots and dissent evolves into recurrent revolts and rebellions, it is the most endangering and challenging problem this type of government faces.

With the Westminster systems being at the core of most theoretical developments on single-party majority governments, it is little surprising to find that the empirical literature focuses almost exclusively on these countries. Yet, there is a series of non-Westminster countries that have likewise experienced long stints of single-party majority government such as Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Clearly, these countries seem like a natural starting point for further research on this type of government.

Despite its prominent place in the literature, single-party majority government is actually less common than all the attention, perhaps, would lead us to believe. Throughout Europe, only one out of ten cabinets has been of this kind. And as we show in Table 3.1, in numeric terms, the difference between the occurrence of single-party *majority* and single-party *minority* cabinets run counter to what could be expected—given the focus in the political science literature. More single-party cabinets were formed by political parties that did *not* represent a parliamentary majority. But perhaps, even more important for the historical record of European governments that almost two-thirds of all cabinets were formed by coalitions, that is, they were composed of two or more political parties. We address these types of government in the subsequent sections.

Table 3.1 The historical record of post-WWII cabinets in European parliamentary democracies through 2010

	Single-party cabinets		Coalition cabinets		Total (%)
	Majority (%)	Minority (%)	Majority (%)	Minority (%)	
Europe (27 countries)	71 (12)	119 (20)	330 (54)	90 (15)	610 (100)
Western Europe (17 countries)	64 (13)	100 (21)	261 (54)	59 (12)	484 (100)
Central and Eastern Europe (10 countries)	7 (6)	19 (15)	69 (55)	31 (25)	126 (100)

Source: The European Representative Democracy Data Archive (Andersson et al. 2012, available at www.erdda.se).

Note: The countries included in the study are the member states of the European Union, excluding Cyprus and Malta, but including two additional non-EU member states, Iceland and Norway. That is, the West European countries included are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The CEE members included in the study are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

3.4 Single-Party Minority Government: Can Weakness Turn into Strength?

While single-party *majority* government is often considered the ideal type of government, single-party *minority* governments have been conventionally portrayed as pathological phenomena, symptomatic for periods of political crisis. With the top executive body still resting in the hands of one single party, the lack of a complementary majority in parliament is generally seen as their inherent structural weakness. The work of Strøm (1984, 1985, 1986, 1990) spearheads a series of scholarly analyses that contest this conventional view and convey a more differentiated and positive picture of this type of government. While analyzing minority governments in general (i.e., both single party and coalitions), this literature finds that most minority governments are also single-party cabinets (Strøm 1990: 61; see also Table 3.1). In the following, we thus focus on single-party minority governments. With regard to the first of the three challenges identified above—providing *stable* government—the empirical record of single-party minority governments shows that it is a government's coalitional status (coalition versus single party) rather than its numerical status (majority versus minority) that is strongly correlated with government duration. In fact, the external constraints are likely to increase the extent of internal solidarity and cohesion. Thus, from the government's perspective, the main challenge is to build and secure viable legislative majorities in order to arrive at government decisions that are part and parcel of a coherent and effective government policy.

For this purpose, single-party minority governments have devised two alternative strategies: A first strategy is to simply exploit the party's pivotal position in

the legislature and play off the opposition parties against each other (Laver and Schofield 1990). This strategy is mostly adopted if parties compete along a single dimension, such as the socioeconomic dimension in Western Europe. In such a predominantly one-dimensional ideological space, the party including the median legislator is in a privileged position, as it is able to secure ad hoc support in the legislature by turning to the parties located either on its left or on its right (Huber 1996; Strøm 1994). At the same time, the party holding the median legislator is able to block any alternative government, while the opposition parties are too divided to bypass the party in the center of the policy space. Bearing in mind that the external threat is likely to increase single-party minority government's unity exploiting their pivotal position may potentially turn the inherent structural weakness of single-party minority rule into its strength.

Specifically, in the case of the Norwegian and Swedish Social Democrats, the deep split among the opposition parties, between the radical Left and the moderate-conservative Right, allowed the Social Democrats to search for and find support on an issue-by-issue basis with at least one party on the Left or on the Right (Bergman 2000; Narud and Strøm 2000). As long as the Social Democratic Party was large enough, the possibility of governing by forming alternating parliamentary policy alliances allowed them to stay in power and govern even though they lacked a majority of their own in parliament. Parliamentary procedures (powerful committees, etc.) that allow the opposition parties some influence over policy were also helpful (Strøm 1990).

A second approach often adopted by single-party minority governments in the context of multidimensional policy spaces is to secure support in the legislature by negotiating external support agreements. This phenomenon of minority governments being supported by opposition parties is known as the "majority government in disguise" (Strøm 1990: 19–21). While the existence of such cabinets is of obvious importance, it is also true that, historically, few minority governments rely on formal agreements with parties that remain outside of the government (Strøm 1990). But such "formal" minority governments do exist. They rely on 1) negotiated agreements of support with other parties to reach the majority threshold in parliament. Also, these agreements are both 2) comprehensive and explicit and 3) long-term binding. Substantive minority governments lack such agreements with explicit support parties.[1] In this context, it is also important to define a support party. A general definition of such a party is that it directly contributes to the existence of a minority government by its behavior, whether this behavior is to vote in favor or abstain in toleration of a government. A support party can exist regardless of whether a minority government is formal or substantive. It is likely that the support party will form a permanent legislative coalition with the single-party minority government. However, a support party can also bolster the

[1] The definition of "formal" minority governments is from Strøm (1990: 62, 95) who found that they are rare but have occurred in Denmark, Finland, France, Israel and Italy.

existence of a minority government that shows promiscuity in forming legislative alliances for policy decisions.

How does this work in practice? Aylott and Bergman (2011) as well as Bale and Bergman (2006) have analyzed cases where government parties have entered into formal contracts with some of the opposition parties and coined this as "parliamentarism by contract." This has occurred in places such as New Zealand and Sweden. To exemplify the Swedish case, the Social Democrats failed to win the median legislator in the parliamentary elections of 1998 and 2002. With the Greens being unprepared to exploit their control of that strategic position in 1998, a contract that cemented their place in a legislative coalition, but which left them out of the executive, was a satisfactory solution for them. By 2002, however, the party leadership had become set on office-seeking, yet failed to secure its goal, despite an ostensibly strong bargaining position. Again, they had to settle for a "contract" with the Social Democrats, who retained exclusive control over the executive.

The contract-based collaboration between the Social Democratic minority government in 1998, the Greens and the Left Party, was based on a promise to cooperate in five key areas of common interest: economy, employment, income, gender equality, and environmental progress. While no formal commitment for cooperation was given regarding all other issues, the parties involved stated that their intention was to work together for the full electoral period. After the 2002 elections, "contract parliamentarism" in Sweden was based on an even more detailed and developed policy program broadening the scope of cooperation with 121 specific issues located in 11 policy areas. In addition, cooperation was extended to the executive realm by setting up coordination offices and political advisory boards including representatives from all three parties (the Social Democrats and the two support parties). Yet, by the 2006 election and after eight years of formalized support status, the Greens had grown weary of this form of cooperation. The election was won by a center-right pre-electoral coalition that was continued as government coalition, the most common type of cabinet government. The case studies on the scope and extent of the contractual arrangement in Sweden and New Zealand lay the foundation for broader comparative studies on contract parliamentarism, which, however, remain on the discipline's agenda.

A second potential venue for further research is the timing and electoral context in which single-party minority governments assume office. In particular, we would expect former opposition parties to regard single-party minority rule as an improvement over the status quo ante and perhaps also as a stepping-stone to single-party majority rule. Here, prevalent incentives for short-term opportunistic behavior within the current governing party may still be present, but individuals and intra-party groups expecting to reap the benefits of majority rule in the near future may be more likely to toe the party line. Conversely, we would expect parties being deprived of their majority status and assuming office in the aftermath of single-party majority rule to interpret single-party minority rule as crisis and decay, which may give rise again to conflicting personal or factional ambition.

A third prevalent gap in the scholarly literature is the effect of the two alternative strategies adopted by single-party minority governments, that is, exploiting the party's pivotal position versus contract parliamentarism, on these governments' ability to implement coherent government policies. Clearly, the theoretical and empirical considerations outlined above would lead us to presume that minority governments based upon external support agreements will show a less coherent policy record, as they need to compromise on a series of policies in order to find a common ground with their cooperation partner. On the contrary, single-party governments relying on ad hoc majorities in the legislature should be able to implement their policy program with little if any changes to their original propositions (for a similar argument in the context of changing coalition partners, see Bawn 1999).

3.5 Coalition Government: From Divergent Preferences to a Coherent Government Policy?

Coalition government has been the most prevalent form of government in Europe during the post-war period, both in the traditional Western European democracies and the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (Laver and Schofield 1990; see also Table 3.1). As the vast majority of the scholarly literature focuses on majority coalitions, we similarly start our discussion with multiparty governments holding a parliamentary majority and then turn to minority coalitions below. Compared with single-party rule where managing *intra-party* conflict is paramount, multiparty governments are characterized by an additional layer of complexity and source of conflict: *party* divisions running through the cabinet. Consequently, the problems discussed above exist but in an aggravated form, specifically as many of those mechanisms originally designed to contain conflicts *within* parties exacerbate the potential of conflict *between* cabinet parties. For instance, parties forming a coalition cabinet will need to consolidate their often-conflicting electoral manifestos in order to come up with a government program that is coherent or at least acceptable to all government parties. At the same time, ideological differences may likewise increase the risk of inter-party conflict. It is certain that *intra-party* problems are likely to be far from absent. Rather, conflicting personal ambitions may be even more pronounced as executive offices become even scarcer and individual entrepreneurs may want to oust the party leadership and change coalition partners. Also, political parties coalescing into a top executive body with collective responsibility may struggle to retain their partisan identity and credibility while simultaneously providing efficient and coherent government policies. In sum, organizing the internal working of coalition governments in order to meet the three challenges outlined above requires carefully crafted mechanisms of coordination and conflict resolution.

Notwithstanding the additional layer of complexity in terms of potential inter-party conflict, the empirical record of coalition governments in providing *stable government* is quite impressive. While early accounts on cabinet duration emphasize the destabilizing effect of multiparty government (Sanders and Herman 1977; Taylor and Herman 1971), more recent empirical studies find little difference in government stability, mostly due to the prevalent incentives and discretionary power of single-party governments to strategically time legislative elections (Saalfeld 2008; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009; Strøm and Swindle 2002). Thus, to the extent that strategic considerations outweigh the inherent stability of single-party governments, the stalemate between coalition partners to agree upon early election calling may prima facie countervail the inherent instability of coalition governments. The main challenge of multiparty government is thus to reach collective decisions, in particular decisions that combine with a coherent policy [for the contrasting perspective of "ministerial government," see Laver and Shepsle (1996)].

For this purpose, coalition governments rely on a series of means and mechanisms of coalition governance that complement each other. A first such mean which has attracted considerable scholarly interest over the past decade or so is coalition agreements. These agreements, though being incomplete and non-enforceable contracts, set the agenda of the incoming government and thus reduce both the uncertainty and the conflict potential between coalition partners (Moury 2010; Timmermans 2006; Walgrave et al. 2006). To the extent that political parties bear the costs of drafting and implementing coalition agreements, they are readily available to coordinate policies and reach collective decisions. Complementing their *external* function, coalition agreements are likewise used to contain and reduce conflicts *within* coalition parties (Müller and Strøm 2008). As coalition parties commit ex ante to a specific policy program to be implemented over the course of the term, they seek to immunize themselves against defection and intra-party conflict.

Even though coalition agreements are designed to contain conflicting preferences between and within coalition parties, they hardly address the universe of potential conflicts throughout a coalition's lifetime. Rather, both internal and external shocks present governments with a myriad of unforeseen circumstances. Coalition parties therefore often resort to additional oversight mechanisms and conflict resolution arenas to further reduce agency loss and minimize the potential for lethal inter-party conflict. A first means of mutual control frequently employed are "watchdog" junior ministers (i.e., a junior minister of one cabinet party shadowing the full minister of another). Especially in the absence of alternative institutional checks such as second chambers and strong prime ministers, coalition parties are likely to monitor each other's ministers via "watchdogs," who deliver information from out the ministry (Müller and Strøm 2000; Thies 2001). Adding to these executive means of monitoring and mutual control, coalition parties may likewise resort to legislative oversight. In fact, parliamentary scrutiny has often proofed an effective means of intra-coalition monitoring (Martin and Vanberg 2004, 2005). Similarly, parties will strive to regulate and scrutinize ministerial

behavior by appointing chairs of legislative committees from rival government parties (Carroll and Cox 2012; Kim and Loewenberg 2005). Finally, political parties may devise and agree upon additional mechanisms to resolve conflicts within coalition governments. While their organizational structure and their personnel composition vary from "internal" over "mixed" to "external arenas," coalition governments devise and then resort to these arenas in order to settle inter-party conflicts that otherwise might potentially bring down the government (Andeweg and Timmermans 2008; Müller and Meyer 2010a, 2010b).

The empirical literature indicates that coalition governments intensively resort to means and mechanisms of monitoring and mutual control (Martin and Vanberg 2004, 2005; Müller and Strøm 2008; Verzichelli 2008). Yet, studying the extent and specific configuration of coalition governance requires careful consideration of both readily available existing institutions and the costs and benefits associated with devising and enforcing additional oversight mechanisms and conflicts resolution arenas. In fact, most elaborated means of mutual control are complements for alternative coalition governance mechanisms and already existing political institutions (Andeweg and Timmermans 2008; Carroll and Cox 2012; Thies 2001). Consequently, coalition parties are unlikely to select means of coalition governance in isolation. Rather, coalitions will choose mechanisms that complement each other. Thus, detailed policy agreements are more likely to be effective if "watchdog" junior ministers and powerful coalition committees supervise their implementation. At the same time, coalition parties will use existing institutions (such as powerful parliamentary committee systems) and design own control devices (such as informal arenas for conflict resolution) only in those instances in which they cannot draw on similar, pre-existing ones (Müller and Meyer 2010a, 2010b).

At the same time, parties' choice over specific means of mutual control will be heavily structured by the events leading up to government formation and the past behavior of other government parties as well as the shadow of the future. Consequently, it is crucial to study coalition governance against the background of all other phases of the democratic life cycle of coalition governments. Clearly, the process of government formation will influence the extent to which coalition parties resort to means of monitoring and mutual control. At the same time, parties will develop a collective memory and likewise adjust their choice of coalition governance mechanisms, depending on their coalition partners' past behavior (Müller et al. 2008).

How do mechanisms of coalition governance then help coalition parties master the challenges of government outlined above? The empirical record of coalition governments in Western Europe suggests that coalition agreements generally reduce conflict among coalition partners (Timmermans 2003, 2006) and are thus a key mechanism to provide stable government (Saalfeld 2008; Timmermans and Moury 2006). Yet, whether coalition agreements likewise prolong a coalition's lifetime in the different political, economic, and cultural contexts of Central and Eastern Europe, and other contexts still remains unstudied. In a similar vein, coalition governments devise a myriad of complementary mechanisms to manage conflict resolution and coordinate government policies (Andeweg and

Timmermans 2008). Turning to the challenges of actually governing and providing a coherent policy program, the key question is whether political parties actually enact the policies devised in coalition agreements. Based on the theoretical concept of a "pledge" (Royed 1996), a series of scholars have studied if and to what extent coalition governments actually act upon their joint policy program. Overall, the empirical record suggests that even though single-party (majority and minority) governments clearly outperform coalition governments, there is a considerably strong program-to-policy linkage in multiparty governments (Thomson et al. 2012). At the same time, little is known about the extent to which alternative structures of coalition governance such as complementary mechanisms of ex ante and ex post controls affect the fulfillment rates of coalition governments.

As mentioned above, minority coalitions have received only a fraction of the scholarly interest devoted to coalition governments with a parliamentary majority at their disposal. This is surprising insofar as the theoretical expectations regarding their mechanisms of coordination and mutual control are fundamentally different. On the one hand, the reduced expected benefits of devising means of coalition governance should make it less likely for minority coalitions to agree upon extensive coordination mechanisms as all policy decisions taken within the cabinet are likely to be scrutinized and further amended by the support parties (Müller and Strøm 2008). On the other hand, minority coalitions face a fundamentally different challenge than majority coalitions: Their main concern should be to prevent unilateral negotiations with (sections of) the opposition. This may require other (perhaps tighter) means of mutual control.

Overall, coalition governance is still largely uncharted territory in the extant literature. As mentioned above, scholars have collected information on and analyzed the determining factors of different coalition governance mechanisms. Yet, their actual mode of operation is largely treated as a black box with little insight into how they actually work (see, however, Miller and Müller 2010). In a similar vein, these mechanisms are largely studied in isolation from each other. Questions on whether alternative designs are functional equivalents, and how several mechanisms coalesce into a coherent architecture are still unanswered. Another question deserving further consideration is to what extent the discourse of political parties in coalition governments is a function of their need to tie in the party as a whole. Here, the pioneering study by Martin and Vanberg (2008) has laid the foundation for an emerging topic in coalition research. Clearly, testing the assumptions and hypothesized relationships directly using behavioral data rather than studying their observable implications is a worthwhile endeavor. Finally, while the agenda for studying how the different phases in the life cycle of coalition governments interact has been set (Strøm et al. 2008), it is far from being fully exploited. Here, the expectation is that the prehistory and the process of coalition bargaining impact the actual choice of coalition governance mechanisms. These mechanisms, in turn, are expected to influence the stability of coalition governments. Finally, the actual process of government termination should then influence the subsequent government formation process.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has addressed the internal organization of government by formulating three challenges that are common to most cabinets. Accordingly, we would first expect governments to remain in their office long enough to be in the position of getting work done. Secondly, governments should actually try to make decisions and devise policies. Thirdly, governments should try to act cohesively so that policies do not contradict but rather complement each other. In short, the whole (i.e., government policy) should be more than its parts (i.e., individual decisions or departmental policies). To the extent that actual governments meet these criteria, we can expect them to achieve their goals and to do so in an efficient way.

Although the chance of governing a country is the main prize in party politics, in practice, the job of actually doing it is a difficult one that often meets frustration. While there are many problems and obstacles, we have singled out conflicting ambition as the most severe one. It is also the one that may be most predictable for the politicians forming the government (after all, it is what they are most familiar with). Despite being a universal phenomenon, conflicting ambition takes different forms under different types of government. In this chapter, we have discussed how political parties try to cope with the problems resulting from conflicting ambition under three different types of government: single-party majority, single-party minority, and coalition governments. Interestingly, some instruments that may be helpful for containing ambition in parties governing alone can become problems under coalition governments.

In the bulk of the chapter, we have reviewed the literature to extract how the different types of government cope with different types of conflicting ambition, both intra-party and inter-party. In so doing, we have also identified gaps in the literature and suggested some avenues for promising new research.

The chapter first shows that the literature has not yet reached a comprehensive understanding of intra- and inter-party relations with regard to the coverage of government constellations, governance mechanisms, geographic areas, and periods. In terms of single-party majority cabinets, we know much about their inner workings in Westminster systems. At the same time, non-Westminster countries such as Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria seem like a natural starting point for further research on this type of government. Concerning single-party minority governments, the scholarly literature on contract parliamentarism calls for broader comparative studies on this subject. With regard to coalition governments, little is known about the actual mode of operation of coalition governance mechanisms. Generally, actual measurements of the effects of coordination mechanisms have not been fully developed.

In terms of the methods applied, the state of research leaves us with many lacunae, as most governance mechanisms have not been subject to a mix of methods including game-theoretical modeling. Moreover, the interaction between the individual mechanisms in the overall design of governance institutions and procedures has hardly been touched upon.

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Chapter 4
Economic Performance, Political Institutions and Cabinet Durability in 28 European Parliamentary Democracies, 1945–2011

Thomas Saalfeld

Abstract After reviewing the literature on cabinet terminations and demonstrating the progress from early explanations based on the structural attributes of cabinets and their political environment to increasingly sophisticated 'unified' models of strategic responses to exogenous shocks, this chapter will (a) discuss ways of using existing datasets to operationalize one of these unified models, Lupia and Strøm's influential model of strategic cabinet termination (focusing on the conditions of political institutions to influence the costs of governing under the impact of exogenous shocks such as economic crises); and (b) test a version of it empirically by using a competing-risk design and a new set of political and economic data covering 28 European democracies over a period of more than 60 years. It is found that strong increases in unemployment were particularly destructive for European cabinets, whereas the impact of inflation seems to be mitigated by political and strategic factors. Duration-dependent effects—unemployment increasing the risk of early elections towards the end of a parliamentary term and increasing the risk of non-electoral cabinet replacements at its beginning—are small but significant, corroborating some of the observable implications of the Lupia–Strøm model.

Keywords Government stability · Cabinet durability · Economic crises · Cabinet reshuffles · Election timing · Event-history analysis

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4.1 Introduction

The banking crisis of 2008/2009 and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis in the European Union have challenged the notion of responsible party government as a chain of delegation and accountability between voters and policy makers in some member states of the European Union (e.g. Armingeon and Baccaro 2012; Featherstone 2011) as elected national politicians had to bow to officials from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. Furthermore, in a number of countries, the crisis had a profound and destructive impact on political parties in government, increasing conflict within and between governing parties. In 2011/2012, governments in Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Spain resigned as a direct result of the crisis. However, anecdotal evidence also suggests that there is no necessary link between the performance of the economy and cabinet stability. In some countries, governments have remained firmly in control although they had to announce deeply unpopular austerity packages (e.g. in the UK). In other countries, governments may even have been stabilized by the electoral uncertainty, following economic shocks (e.g. the German cabinet Merkel I between 2005 and 2009, cf. Saalfeld 2010a). From a normative perspective, government stability (or instability) in the face of a crisis can be seen as an important indicator for both government strength (e.g. Lijphart 1999) in the face of a crisis and responsiveness to the majority in parliament (Linz 1990).

This chapter will start by providing a critical review of the accomplishments and most important lacunae in the study of coalition duration and durability, identifying the most important theoretical and empirical difficulties. In a second step, it will seek (a) to discuss ways of refining influential existing models of strategic government termination with a focus on the conditions for political institutions to influence the costs of governing under the impact of exogenous shocks such as economic crises; and (b) to test one particular model (Lupia and Strøm 1995) with a new set of political and economic data covering 28 parliamentary democracies between 1945 (or the firm establishment of a consolidated liberal democracy in the respective country) and 2011. It will be asked how economic performance influenced the risk of discretionary cabinet terminations, to which extent hard economic times affected the dynamics of cabinet survival and whether elements of the constitutional and partisan context served as 'shock absorbers' during the window of observation.

4.2 The Study of Cabinet Durability: A Very Brief Review

The earliest attempts at explaining variations in cabinet durations focused on the effects of so-called structural attributes of the relevant political systems, party systems and cabinets (for a brief summary and further references, see Saalfeld 2008). Despite the discovery of some important empirical regularities (e.g. the

higher survival chances of majority cabinets and minimal-winning coalitions or the lower survival chances of cabinets operating in fractionalized party systems with anti-system parties), work in the structural-attributes tradition can be criticized that its explanations typically 'reference government or parliamentary attributes whose values are fixed or set at the time a government takes office; none takes account of the (subsequent) events that actually bring governments down' (Warwick 1994: 8). Furthermore, some cabinet-specific structural attributes may not be as exogenous to the explanatory model as were initially assumed to be. For example, Diermeier and Merlo (2000) argue that minimal-winning coalitions may be chosen during coalition bargaining by players seeking a stable government, precisely because they promise to be more durable.

Advocates of the so-called 'random-events perspective' abandoned the search for structural explanations arguing that the vast majority of cabinets were terminated in response to unpredictable events such as deaths or ill health of prime ministers, scandals, dramatic downturns in the economy, sudden shifts in public opinion and the like (Frendreis et al. 1986: 621, 623). Strøm challenged this work from a theoretical vantage point taking issue with the assumption that the events causing cabinets to fall are exogenous and random. 'In reality', he asserts, 'such events… are frequently engineered, or at least affected, by players in the game (i.e. parties inside or outside the government)' (Strøm 1988: 929). The most powerful empirical critique follows from Warwick's (1994) work who found for a sample of West European cabinets that the hazard rate of discretionary cabinet terminations was not constant (i.e. random) at all, but tended to rise with cabinet age.

The first authors of the now dominant 'unified' models combined the causal reasoning of the structural-attributes approach with the stochastic environment suggested by random-events theorists. King et al. (1990) model was seminal in this context, because it made the hazard rate of cabinet survival a function of a range of covariates. While this unified perspective represented a major improvement in the application of statistical models used to analyse cabinet durability, it still did not go much beyond existing models in specifying the causal mechanisms that were thought to drive the dynamics of cabinet survival in the interval between cabinet formation and termination. Subsequently, however, Lupia and Strøm (1995) developed a potentially testable, dynamic game-theoretical model of discretionary coalition dissolutions accounting for the rising hazard rates of cabinet terminations towards the end of the constitutional inter-election period (CIEP) and emphasizing the importance of transaction costs in explaining these dynamics. This model combines strategic incentives arising from structural variables with explicit predictions about the consequences of random shocks subsequent to cabinet formation. It will be summarized in more detail below.

Despite its attractions, the Lupia–Strøm model has a number of shortcomings, some of which it shares with other models (for a review see Laver 2003). Some important variables are hard to observe in anything but case studies (e.g. the transaction costs as perceived by the players or renegotiations resulting from shifts of power within the coalition). This shortcoming cannot be addressed by the

present study, which is based on a relatively large number of cabinets. The model is also relatively unspecific about the nature of the exogenous shock that is required to bring down a cabinet. For the purposes of this contribution, it will be examined whether two different dimensions of economic performance—unemployment and inflation—have at least a similar effect on cabinet survival. The present study will also examine whether all bad economic news are equally damaging for all types of cabinets. Lupia and Strøm's model is again relatively general and does not deal with variations in political costs that different types of economic crises may have for different types of parties, depending on their ideological position or socio-demographic constituency. Therefore, it will be attempted to replicate some earlier findings by Warwick (1994), suggesting that such variations may exist. Moreover, the model has a strong focus on the risk of early elections. However, a considerable number of cabinet failures consist of non-electoral transfers of power ('cabinet replacements'). The present study seeks to make *some* headway in trying to address this issue, empirically by employing a competing-risk design.

4.3 Links Between Economic Performance and Cabinet Durability

The link between economic performance and cabinet durability is evidently complex and possibly circular, presenting serious problems for attempts at developing appropriate causal models. In game-theoretical explanations of coalition formation, cabinets should be formed in equilibrium—and they should last as long as this equilibrium persists. An exogenous shock (such as rapidly declining economic performance) may change the pay-offs that coalition participants expect in the immediate future and destroy the equilibrium. There are different views of the nature of the pay-offs party leaders are believed to be concerned about. Some authors assume that the number of cabinet positions acquired by the participants is a good approximation of the pay-offs played for in a coalition bargaining game (e.g. Riker 1962; Dodd 1976). Others model pay-offs and equilibria in terms of policy benefits (e.g. Laver and Shepsle 1996; Tsebelis 2002). Yet others have developed combined utility functions composed of both office and policy components (Sened 1996; Linhart and Pappi 2009). Traditionally, economic performance has been thought to influence the cost-benefit analysis of the parties in government, especially those in coalition governments: 'rising prices and increasing job insecurity may force coalition partners carefully to reassess the advantages of being part of government' (Robertson 1983a: 938). In empirical studies, economic performance was thus used as a predictor of cabinet durability (e.g. Robertson 1983a, b; Warwick 1994; Zimmermann 1987). Poor economic performance was expected to have a destabilizing effect on cabinets: 'Inflation and unemployment shorten the longevity of coalitional governments, in general'

(Robertson 1983b: 939), although some cabinet characteristics such as majority control of parliament or a cabinet's status as a minimal-winning coalition were thought to play a mitigating role (ibid.).

This orthodoxy can be challenged from a number of perspectives. Far from being political 'random' shocks, many exogenous events such as economic crises can be instrumentalized by politicians (Strøm 1988: 929). Many structural attributes of coalitions that have been found to serve as 'shock absorbers' in times of crisis, including properties such as majority or minimal-winning status, are not necessarily exogenous either, but may be simultaneously determined with cabinet duration (Diermeier 2006). Furthermore, cabinet duration may be influenced by economic circumstances, yet political risks such as cabinet instability, in turn, affect the performance of financial assets such as stocks, bonds and currencies (Bernhard and Leblang 2006). Finally, the intuition that good economic performance enhances cabinet stability, while poor economic performance results in instability, does not tally with recent research on endogenous election timing. In most operationalizations of cabinet stability, an early election is seen as a 'terminal event'. Favourable economic conditions may induce political leaders to trigger strategic parliamentary dissolutions, reducing cabinet stability as government leaders seek to 'surf' on a supportive wave of public opinion and choose a favourable time for early parliamentary elections (e.g. Kayser 2005; Smith 2004; Strøm and Swindle 2002).

There are at least three models of the interaction between actors and their strategies, institutions and exogenous economic shocks that have the potential to address these problems of causality, partially by providing more detail about exogenous factors and the mechanisms underpinning the players' choices. The *first* approach is Laver and Shepsle's portfolio allocation model (1996; 1998). In this model, cabinets are in equilibrium—and therefore likely to remain stable—'if the government portfolio with jurisdiction over each relevant policy dimension is allocated to the party with the median legislator on that dimension' (Laver and Shepsle 1996: 66), provided ministers are perfect agents of their parties and exploit their party's pivotal position on a particular issue dimension in parliament. A high level of ministerial autonomy in government is the key (exogenous) institutional assumption on which this model is based. Laver and Shepsle demonstrate in simulations that cabinets including the so-called dimension-by-dimension median legislator are particularly likely to be resilient and identify conditions in which 'strong parties' and 'very strong parties' may even form stable *minority* governments, depending on their size and ideological positions in crucial policy dimensions. Exogenous shocks such as economic crises may destroy such equilibrium conditions by contributing to splits in key parties, by causing new and important issue dimensions to emerge or by changing the parties' perceptions of each other in the inter-party bargaining process (Laver and Shepsle 1996: 197).

The *second* approach is Tsebelis' (2002) veto-player theory. Tsebelis offers an interesting way of modelling the impact of an exogenous shock. When the equilibrium prevailing at the time of cabinet formation gets perturbed through an

outside event such as an economic crisis, this may '… modify the position of the status quo in the outcome space even if the policy does not change. For example, when there is an oil crisis, the government budget (which could have been a perfect compromise at the time it was voted) appears completely inadequate because the price of energy increases dramatically. Such variations of outcomes (while policy remains constant) are additional sources of uncertainty. The uncertainty between policies and outcomes was dealt with at the time of the vote of the budget, but now the same policy produces very different outcomes than before' (Tsebelis 2002: 216). In line with the fundamental predictions of veto-player theory, it would be expected that the higher the number of partisan and institutional veto players and the greater the ideological distance between them, the more difficult will it be to change the policy status quo, the less likely will a shift in the status quo be 'manageable', the more likely will be increasing tensions within the coalition, and hence, the lower will be the survival chances of the cabinet. The exogenous variables here are institutions such as government agenda powers and the governing parties' policy preferences (cf. Saalfeld 2010b).

Both models are very elegant but present some difficulties as far as empirical tests are concerned. One of the main problems of veto-player theory is locating the policy status quo before or after an exogenous shock empirically. And electoral concerns, which are crucial for cabinet terminations through endogenous election timing, are hard to predict within the parameters of this model. The Laver–Shepsle model, by contrast, has been criticized of making unrealistic assumptions about the discretion of cabinet ministers (Warwick 1999). In both models, the dynamics of the process between cabinet formation and dissolution and the institutions shaping this process remain largely unaccounted for (Müller and Meyer 2011).

The *third* approach, Lupia and Strøm's (1995) model of the strategic timing of parliamentary elections, goes some way of capturing some of these dynamics as far as electoral institutions are concerned. It is based on a game played in a parliamentary system of government where simple legislative majorities have powers to (a) dismiss a government and (b) dissolve the chamber by calling elections at any time. The game starts with a pre-existing governing coalition, which is faced with an external event that changes previously held expectations about the outcome of a potential election. Facing such an event that affects politicians' abilities to achieve their electoral and legislative goals, coalition parties can play for three types of outcomes: '(1) coalition termination followed by a non-electoral reallocation of power (either reallocations between existing coalition members or reallocations involving a new set of coalition members); (2) coalition termination followed by parliamentary dissolution and new elections; and (3) no coalition termination (i.e. the governing cabinet coalition survives the crisis completely intact)' (Lupia and Strøm 1995: 648). Institutions matter in this model insofar they affect the costs of negotiations and electoral engineering (Lupia and Strøm 1995: 651).

In its simplest version, the game is played between two coalition parties (party *i* and party *j*) and one opposition (or 'out') party in two periods: Period 1

constitutes the present, in which parties take actions. Period 2 is some expected state in the future where parties realize the (uncertain) consequences of their Period 1 actions. In the model, a government party, say, party i derives utility $s_i + c_i \times g_i^j$ from its role in government in Period 1, where s_i represents that the value party i derives from its share of parliamentary seats in that period; c_i is the value that party i derives from the current coalition it is part of (expressed, perhaps, in the share of cabinet portfolios, the party holds within the Period 1 coalition); g_i^j represents the Period 1 value of coalition partner j to party i. This value could be the policy distance between parties i and j, or the transaction costs party i expects to face in its negotiations with party j.

A sufficiently important external event occurring in Period 1 may change the expected value of any of these parameters whose vector constitutes the Period 1 pay-off for party i in the coalition bargaining game (as well as the opportunity cost of terminating the current cabinet, see below). For example, favourable opinion polls or success in regional or local elections for party i could create incentives for that party to seek an early general election as it may expect increased values for s_i and c_i in a post-election Period 2. Since the other parties are also aware of this change in public opinion, however, party i may, alternatively, be able to extract a better 'deal' from its *current* coalition partner(s) without incurring the opportunity and transaction costs of an early election. At any rate, the external event provides *all* parties with information about what might happen to them if an election were to be held in Period 1 (in this illustration expressed as party i's expected post-election utility b_i). Because party i may face election-related *transaction costs* ($E_i \geq 0$), its expected post-election utility b_i (in Period 2) will be discounted by such costs ($b_i - E_i$). In addition, party i may also incur *opportunity costs* in a Period 1 election including the forfeiture of the policy-making opportunities made possible by holding valuable offices in Period 1. The relevant opportunity cost is the utility party i draws from its role in government in the remainder of Period 1 (Lupia and Strøm 1995: 654).

Although a number of variables such as negotiation-related transaction costs are irrelevant for single-party cabinets, some fundamental points about the temporal dynamics of the Lupia–Strøm model can be applied to the study of the strategic timing of early elections under single-party cabinets (Smith 2004) or to cross-national comparisons including single-party cabinets (Strøm and Swindle 2002). Unlike coalition cabinets, single-party *majority* cabinets do not face negotiation-related transaction costs with a coalition partner (although they may face intra-party negotiation costs, if there are powerful factions). Like coalition cabinets, however, the sensitivity of single-party cabinets to external events depends on the stage of the electoral cycle. Indeed, Strøm and Swindle (2002: 581–582) argue that single-party cabinets are more likely to be terminated strategically by early elections than coalition cabinets, because the leaders of single-party cabinets are less constrained in their decision to call such elections (and have more scope for

the manipulation of the timing of elections) than prime ministers leading coalition cabinets.[1]

Based on the premises briefly summarized above, Lupia and Strøm (1995: 655) predict that *coalition stability* 'is fostered by either a dearth of alternate utility-generating opportunities for potential coalition partners or factors that make party-specific negotiation costs or election costs high' (Lupia and Strøm 1995: 656). In particular,

1. *a dissolution of parliament* and an (early) election in Period 1 are most likely 'when there exist parties that (1) expect large benefits from an election, (2) face small election costs, (3) face large costs for negotiating nonelectoral transfers of power, (4) derive little value from the seats they currently control, and (5) derive little value from the other coalitions they could enter' (Lupia and Strøm 1995: 655);
2. by extension, *negotiated cabinet replacements* are most likely when there exist parties that (1) expect small benefits (or even losses) from an election, (2) face high election costs, (3) face small costs for negotiating non-electoral transfers of power, (4) derive a high value from the seats they currently control and (5) derive a high value from at least one other coalition they could enter;
3. there may be an 'interactive effect between *time elapsed since the last election* and whether the specific event will be critical. …if early elections mean that parties sacrifice greater policy-making opportunities and rent collection opportunities than later elections do, and if all else is constant, then as the parliamentary term approaches its upper bound, election-related opportunity costs should decrease. That is, all else constant, g_i^j should be relatively high early in a parliament's term, should decrease continually over that term, and should reach its minimum when parties have no other choice but to hold an election. If this relationship between g_i^j and time holds, then … an event that does not cause dissolution early in a parliament's term could do so later' (Lupia and Strøm 1995: 655–656).

There is currently no dataset specifically designed to test the Lupia–Strøm model in its entirety. Nevertheless, existing work and datasets provide opportunities to test some important observable implications of the model. In the following sections, such tests will be performed, posing new questions and identifying information that will have to be collected in the future for an appropriate test.

[1] Their empirical analyses in the same article, however, provide only limited support for this expectation. Single-party cabinets are terminated by early elections more frequently than multi-party cabinets, but the effect is not statistically significant at the five-percentage level ($t = -1.3042$).

4.3.1 The Cost of Early Elections

The most important lesson from Lupia and Strøm's model is that the utility of a party's parliamentary resources in Period 1, and opportunity cost of early elections, declines as the parliament approaches the end of its CIEP. One of the model's key assumptions is that governing parties care about their electoral fortunes in Period 2. Whether party leaders are modelled as 'vote seekers' or as 'office seekers', they are likely to be concerned with a 'negative incumbency effect' caused by bad economic news, that is, voters penalizing the government parties for poor performance at the next national election, mid-term election, regional election or by-election (in Europe, elections to the European Parliament could be added to the electoral opportunities of penalizing government parties).

Lupia and Strøm themselves are not particularly concerned with the specific nature of the shock when they are modelling the parties' expectations pertaining to elections. This is certainly one area that requires further study. Narud and Valen (2008) provide strong evidence for the pervasiveness of retrospective voter sanctions for poor economic performance. Although they found *no* case in their sample of 17 European democracies experiencing a positive average incumbency effect between 1945 and 1999 (Narud and Valen 2008: 379), there seems to be considerable variation in the severity of the punishment voters inflict on incumbents. Among many results, Narud and Valen found, *firstly*, that cabinets 'lose much more in poor economic times than they do when the economy is good'. *Secondly*, 'conservative parties are much more susceptible to inflation than leftist parties are to unemployment' (Narud and Valen 2008: 397). *Thirdly*, incumbents can reduce the penalty by manipulating the timing of the next election: 'incumbent vulnerability increases with time, and … cabinets benefit from early elections' (ibid.). *Finally*, not all parties are affected to the same extent. In particular, 'the party of the Minister of Finance is affected most severely by the macro-economic variables, particularly inflation', and the 'combination of a rightist [ideological] profile and inflation has a significant and negative impact upon the electoral result of the party of the Minister of Finance' (ibid., 398). In short, incumbent parties do not get electoral rewards for cabinet membership, but they might get punished less severely when their management of the economy is seen to have been successful, or if they can manipulate the timing of the election.

Studies of economic voting—which do not deal directly with cabinet terminations (for a recent comprehensive account, see Duch and Stevenson 2008)—focus on the voters' angle and tend to model voter responses to the perceived success of government parties' economic management. Government parties can be expected to be aware of this when taking decisions about strategic cabinet dissolutions. In Duch and Stevenson's model of voter choice, for example,

> economic growth depends … on the natural rate of economic growth plus unanticipated shocks. These shocks … consist of both an exogenous component and a component that depends on the incumbent party's competence (and is persistent over time). Consequently, rational voters can use retrospectively observed economic performance to infer the

> competence of incumbent politicians or parties (Duch and Stevenson 2008: 30; see also Alesina and Rosenthal 1995).

Exogenous shocks that might jeopardize incumbent parties' reputation for competency may lead to a reassessment of the value of their government participation in Period 1. As voters can only 'observe shocks to the macro-economy but cannot observe the mix of exogenous and competence components that comprise these shocks' (Duch and Stevenson 2008: 339), they have to rely on information arising from the institutional and political context of decision-making. This context is particularly relevant to the study of cabinet survival. Voters are more likely to use economic voting (i.e. they are more likely to take the state of the economy as a signal for the incumbent parties' economic competency), if economic policy making is concentrated in a single party, if elections are competitive in the sense that there are no major parties that are 'continually returned to government, election after election' and if the ratio of electorally accountable to non-electorally accountable decision-makers is high (Duch and Stevenson 2008: 340–342, verbatim quote p. 341). Thus, single-party cabinets, particularly in majoritarian systems, should be sensitive to changes in the macro-economic environment when making decisions about strategic cabinet terminations.

Politicians anticipating voter reactions in Period 2 may exploit opportunities to call an early election at a favourable time. Narud and Valen (2008) provide some evidence that this may be a successful strategy. Kayser (2005) models the trade-off between extending the current term and winning another and finds

> that the likelihood of opportunistic elections rises with exogenous economic performance, with longer maximum term lengths, with future electoral uncertainty, and with economic volatility but diminishes in the value of office-holding; manipulation increases with the maximum term length and with the value of office-holding but decreases with exogenous economic performance and with economic volatility. The model suggests that single-party governments should be highly opportunistic in calling elections and that countries that allow opportunistic election timing should experience less economically distortionary political intervention than their fixed-timing counterparts (Kayser 2005: 17).

The key point here is that a buoyant economy may *precipitate* the end of a cabinet (rather than delaying it as Robertson's conjecture above would suggest) as prime ministers—if the institutional rules and informal norms allow it—may be tempted to call for early elections to surf on the tide of public opinion. Bad economic news, by contrast, may prolong the life of government as incumbents may have incentives to wait as long as possible in the hope economic prospects (or the public's perception of their competency) will improve (this, may, for example, explain the long-lived cabinets Major II and Brown in the UK).

In addition, the attractiveness of calling early elections may be influenced by the different vulnerabilities that different parties may expect vis-à-vis key voter groups. This factor, too, remains implicit in the Lupia–Strøm framework, although it should be possible to capture it at least in part. In his empirical study, Warwick (1994: 75–83) found that cabinets including socialist parties are more likely to fall as a result of high levels of inflation, whereas non-socialist cabinets are more

vulnerable to high levels of unemployment. He does not offer a general explanation for this finding but conjectures that 'socialist governments do not terminate when their unemployment records fall behind the norm for governments of that type—presumably because of the favorable reputation they share on the issue—but they are at greater risk if their inflation performance is off the mark. For nonsocialist governments, the immunity pertains to inflation and the vulnerability to unemployment' (Warwick 1994: 92).

4.3.2 The Cost of Non-electoral Cabinet Replacements

The focus of Lupia and Strøm's (1995) model is on predicting strategic dissolutions of parliament and early elections. Implicitly, the model also spells out the conditions for non-electoral transfers of power: The opportunity cost of calling an early election is the highest immediately after elections, when cabinet parties have a full Period 1 to govern. Members of cabinets formed early in the life of a parliament should have little incentive to forgo the known benefits of a particular share of seats and positions around the cabinet table for an uncertain outcome of an early election. The uncertainty is likely to be heightened in times of bad economic news, for which the government—fairly or unfairly—may be held responsible. Thus, cabinets with a large remaining CIEP should be less inclined to dissolve parliament. If inter-party disagreements are strong (perhaps as the result of an economic crisis), such cabinets should be more likely to be terminated through non-electoral replacements rather than through early elections.

Models building on Riker's (1962) theory of coalitions provide a number of counter-intuitive predictions about the cost and risk of non-electoral cabinet replacements that resonate well with Lupia and Strøm's model. Robertson (1983b: 939), for example, predicts that minimum-winning and minority coalitions should be 'more susceptible to inflation and unemployment than are oversized coalitions'. In line with conventional models, he predicts, *firstly*, that minority coalitions 'are more susceptible to inflation and unemployment than minimum winning coalitions because they lack majority status … and are more likely to have disproportionate reward distributions due to their small size' (ibid.). However, in contradiction to conventional wisdom, he conjectures, *secondly*, that the minimum-winning coalitions should be *more* vulnerable to poor economic performance, because of the office costs faced by the larger coalition parties (see below). His *third* prediction also clashes with conventional wisdom: 'oversized coalitions' should be 'less significantly affected by inflation and unemployment because they enjoy easier bargaining among political parties and tend to be larger coalitions where payoff distributions approximate proportionality' (ibid.). Robertson's reasoning pinpoints some of the incentives that might be at work when players consider a cabinet replacement.

Robertson's intuition largely follows Riker's (1962) and Dodd's (1976) reasoning and is based on the assumption that governments primarily care about seats

around the cabinet table. He argues that minimum-winning coalitions jointly provide participating parties with higher and more stable office benefits than minority cabinets (which face the risk of being overturned by the opposition) and surplus majority cabinets (in which the cabinet seats are shared by more parties than are necessary to control a majority in parliament and where internal negotiation costs may be high) (Robertson 1983b: 935–936). However, for individual government parties, the value of being member of a minimum-winning coalition (c_i in Lupia and Strøm's terms) may not provide the optimal pay-off, because—empirically—such coalitions tend to favour smaller parties in the allocation of portfolios (for a recent confirmation of this long-established empirical regularity see Verzichelli 2008). Therefore, Robertson (1983b: 937) concludes from this observation:

> In smaller coalitions, larger parties, that is, parties controlling more seats in parliament than the other coalition members, tend to be underpaid in ministerial assignments, while small parties ordinarily benefit from overpayment. In large coalitions, portfolios are distributed more proportionally; that is, the number of ministerial assignments a party receives is directly proportional to the number of seats it contributes to the coalition's majority status.

This runs against predictions that could be derived from Riker's framework who did, however, concede that surplus coalitions may be in equilibrium, if actors are uncertain about the future (Riker 1962). This uncertainty, which is almost certainly increased in times of poor economic performance (Robertson 1983b: 939, footnote 1), may increase the transaction costs—and hence *reduce* the attractiveness—of non-electoral transfers of power: '… when political parties are uncertain about the motivations of their potential partners in government, or when the reliability of various parties is unclear, parties to a coalition tend to overcompensate and agree to a coalition larger than optimally desired' (Robertson 1983b: 936–937). He argues that '[w]hen information is clear and negotiation is unhindered by intractable personal or ideological differences between parties, a minimum-winning coalition, the optimal solution, is likely to emerge'. Under such circumstances, minimum-winning coalitions also 'tend to be the most durable of the coalition arrangements' (Robertson 1983b: 937). Oversized coalitions can be formed and are likely to be stable when the bargaining costs between the parties are low (e.g. when the parties are ideologically close enough to ensure a relatively high value of a particular coalition c_i to each of its partners), and the benefits of non-electoral transfers of power are uncertain due to the crisis and other factors such as electoral volatility (Robertson 1983b: 937). In sum, therefore, Robertson's argument is as follows:

> … though unconstrained bargaining conditions and the relative absence of uncertainty facilitate a minimum winning solution, the nature of the payoff schedule and the size of the coalition may actually undercut that optimality in certain coalition solutions. Paradoxically, although oversized coalitions are usually more short-lived than minimum winning coalitions, the tendency of their members to distribute payoffs proportionately serves as an important incentive to the parties to remain united in coalition while facing environmental

> adversity. Undersized coalitions seem in a clearly precarious position, regardless of additional considerations (Robertson 1983b: 937).

Other work in Political Economy sheds further light on the various cost coalition that partners may face in times of poor economic performance. Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006) argue that multi-party governments generate common pool resource problems incentivizing government parties to increase government spending. Some scholars found that multiple parties within ruling coalitions imply a greater number of veto players than single-party governments, which in turn leads to higher deficits, public debt or government spending (Hallerberg and von Hagen 1997; Franzese 2007; Tsebelis and Chang 2004). Others claim that the partisan fractionalization in coalitions fosters higher public spending (Kontopolous and Perotti 1999; Franzese 2002). Bejar et al. (2011) suggest that 'the short duration and short time horizon of coalition governments in office give incentives to leaders of governing coalitions to increase government expenditure' (Bejar et al. 2011: 202). While none of these studies deal explicitly with the impact of economic performance and economic crises on cabinet durability, they all imply a particular causal chain under the conditions of fiscal crises: Coalition governments are less likely to be able to curtail public spending than single-party governments and are more likely to fail as a result of internal disagreement.

Instead of a large number of hypotheses derived from the work cited above, Table 4.1 contains a number of theoretical expectations based on the reasoning above. These will be put to a test in the following sections.

4.4 Data, Methods and Research Design

The data on cabinet duration used in this chapter were extracted from the European Representative Democracy Data Archive (Andersson and Ersson 2012). The archive includes a dataset ('ERD dataset') with detailed information on 640 cabinets in 29 European democracies, covering the period between the end of the Second World War (1945) and the end of 2011. For the purposes of this chapter, the data for 28 parliamentary democracies with a confidence relationship between parliament and the government were used (a total of 631 cabinets). One presidential democracy, Cyprus, was dropped. The calculation of cabinet longevity in the ERD dataset is based on the following definition of the 'birth' and 'death' of a cabinet: A new cabinet was considered as being formed when the prime minister or cabinet is inaugurated by the head of state. If the constitution requires a formal vote of investiture, the date of the investiture was used. If none of these two events constitute the beginning of a cabinet under a country's constitution, the date of the general election was used. A cabinet was considered to be terminated, when the prime minister or the cabinet resigned formally (voluntarily or involuntarily) or when a general election was held. In some cases, the constitution requires the cabinet to resign on the date of a presidential election, which was also taken to be

Table 4.1 Predictions for the risks of early elections and non-electoral cabinet replacements

Covariate	Expected effect on		Author(s)
	Early election hazards	Replacement hazards	
Size of exogenous shock			
Unemployment rate	–	+	Kayser, Smith and Robertson
Inflation rate	–	+	Kayser, Smith and Robertson
Interaction time elapsed since cabinet formation x economic performance	–	+	Lupia and Strøm
Expected costs of early elections			
Days to the end of CIEP (at formation)	–	+	Lupia and Strøm
Average cabinet electoral volatility		+	Robertson
Coalition cabinet	–		Strøm and Swindle
Majority status	–	–	Robertson
PM dissolution powers	+	–	Strøm and Swindle
Interaction conservative cabinet x level of inflation	–	+	Warwick
Interaction socialist cabinet x unemployment	–	+	Warwick
Expected costs of cabinet replacement			
Minimal-winning coalition		+	Robertson
Oversized coalition		–	Robertson
Ideological preference range in cabinet (CMP points)		+	Robertson and Tsebelis
Number of parties in cabinet		+	Tsebelis
Semi-presidential system (president as veto player)		+	Tsebelis
Interaction conservative cabinet x level of inflation	–	+	Warwick
Interaction socialist cabinet x unemployment	–	+	Warwick

an event ending a cabinet. Further, terminating events include a change in party composition or a change of prime minister (Codebook for ERD—e and Notes on Coding Principles, Andersson and Ersson 2012).

Table 4.2 identifies the 28 European parliamentary democracies included in the present study and provides information on the mean absolute and relative cabinet duration in these countries for their respective window of observation. 'Absolute' duration is defined as the number of days elapsed between a cabinet's appointment and its termination based on the definitions above. 'Relative' duration is the quotient of this number and the number of days the cabinet could have potentially survived to the end of the CIEP. If the countries are ranked by their mean relative

Table 4.2 Absolute and relative cabinet duration in 28 European democracies, 1945–2011

Country	Period covered	Mean of absolute cabinet duration	Standard deviation	No. of cabinets	Mean of relative cabinet duration	Standard deviation	No. of cabinets
Austria	1945–2011	911.40	401.35	25	0.71	0.26	24
Belgium	1946–2011	544.28	519.28	40	0.45	0.36	40
Bulgaria	1990–2011	728.90	556.58	10	0.54	0.38	9
Czech Republic	1992–2011	605.18	462.64	11	0.61	0.37	10
Denmark	1945–2011	680.03	337.83	35	0.55	0.26	35
Estonia	1992–2011	536.42	296.45	12	0.58	0.36	12
Finland	1945–2011	457.36	415.36	50	0.53	0.34	50
France	1959–2011	660.52	466.76	29	0.58	0.29	28
Germany	1949–2011	762.66	505.48	29	0.65	0.37	28
Greece	1977–2011	822.07	517.38	15	0.62	0.36	14
Hungary	1990–2011	760.30	456.04	10	0.83	0.24	9
Iceland	1944–2011	747.34	487.06	32	0.61	0.35	31
Ireland	1944–2011	958.56	450.60	25	0.59	0.25	25
Italy	1945–2011	390.89	347.46	55	0.34	0.31	54
Latvia	1993–2011	323.58	179.44	19	0.43	0.31	18
Lithuania	1992–2011	559.58	431.16	12	0.58	0.40	11
Luxembourg	1945–2011	1239.47	652.71	19	0.86	0.24	18
Malta	1987–2011	1279.00	552.48	7	0.75	0.37	6
Netherlands	1945–2011	773.89	541.73	28	0.65	0.34	27
Norway	1945–2011	793.80	409.17	30	0.76	0.31	29
Poland	1991–2011	429.44	354.09	16	0.45	0.37	16
Portugal	1976–2011	629.58	530.17	19	0.50	0.34	19
Romania	1990–2011	446.94	275.95	17	0.53	0.36	16
Slovakia	1992–2011	686.30	593.49	10	0.59	0.37	10
Slovenia	1992–2011	614.25	408.32	12	0.74	0.27	12
Spain	1977–2011	1111.82	330.45	11	0.82	0.21	11
Sweden	1945–2011	829.97	434.47	29	0.82	0.29	28
UK	1945–2011	997.54	509.99	24	0.66	0.30	23
All 28		687.71	490.54	631	0.59	0.34	613

Source Calculated from Andersson and Ersson (2012). 'The European Representative Democracy Data Archive'. Main sponsor: Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (in 2007-0149:1-E). Principal investigator: Torbjörn Bergman (www.erdda.se)

cabinet duration, the average cabinet in Luxembourg exhibits the highest life expectancy surviving for approximately 86 % of its maximum feasible period, on average, between 1945 and 2011 (0.86). The most short-lived cabinets occurred in Italy with an average of 34 %. The standard deviations reported both for the absolute and for the relative mean durations suggest that there was considerable 'within-country' variation as well as clear cross-national differences.

In the following section, a number of survival models will be fitted to test the propositions formulated in Table 4.1. In each model, the dependent variable is the

conditional probability for a *discretionary* cabinet termination (rather than a technical termination, for example, due to a regular election) to occur at any particular point in time, given that the cabinet has survived up to that point ('hazard rate'). Changes in hazard rates are taken to indicate the presence of causal effects. The models presented in this chapter are specified as Cox proportional hazards model.

A key part of the statistical modelling strategy is the censoring of particular records. Event history models have always used censoring to deal with incomplete information about the start and/or end dates of records in a dataset. In this chapter, all cabinets were right-censored that were still in office on 30 November 2011, that is, cabinets whose 'lifetime' exceeded the window of observation in the ERD dataset. The record remains in the analysis but is treated as a case whose termination date is not known. In addition, theoretical censoring is employed to capture different risks of cabinet termination. Thus, the design is based on a latent survivor time approach where events other than those of theoretical interest are assumed to be randomly censored. *Firstly*, the records of all cabinets terminated for 'technical' reasons (e.g. termination as a result of a regular general election or the death of a Prime Minister) were right-censored, because they did not fail as a result of the players' choices. *Secondly*, theoretical censoring was used to distinguish between cabinets failing as a result of early elections on the one hand and cabinet replacements (non-electoral transfers of power) on the other hand. Lupia and Strøm (1995) provide strong theoretical reasons to assume that actors' incentives to terminate a cabinet through early elections may differ from those to terminate a cabinet through a non-electoral cabinet replacement. Diermeier and Stevenson (1999, 2000), Jäckle (2011), Saalfeld (2008) and Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009) show that 'early election hazards' and 'replacement hazards' differ in their dynamics. These findings inform the competing-risk design and the censoring strategy adopted here: When estimating the risk of early elections, the records of those cabinets terminated for technical reasons and those failing due to a non-electoral replacement were right-censored. In the models for non-electoral transfers of power, the records of cabinets terminated for technical reasons and those terminated through early elections were right-censored.

Early elections and cabinet replacements during the CIEP (without election) are not coded directly in the ERD dataset (e.g. as a separate dummy variable). For the purposes of this study, I used information derived from the CPD project (Bergman et al. 2005) for 17 countries between 1945 and 1999 and applied the same criteria to code all missing cabinet failure events in the ERD dataset.

For the multi-variate analyses, the sample of 631 cabinets was partitioned. Since time-varying data on economic performance have not been added to the dataset yet, it is hard to establish the mediating effect of political institutions and other political attributes in times of an economic shock. In the ERD dataset, economic performance is measured using the absolute level of unemployment and inflation at the time of (a) a cabinet's formation and (b) its termination. These data are essentially static and do not allow to capture changes such as a sudden decline in performance. Therefore, a different strategy was used: For each country, the

mean and standard deviation of the rate of unemployment and inflation were calculated for the decade in which the cabinet was formed. This makes it possible to compare the rate of unemployment and inflation at the time of a cabinet's termination with the players' and voters' general expectations during the relevant decade. For example, the unemployment rate of the cabinet Schröder I in Germany (1998–2002) was compared to the mean rate of unemployment in Germany during the 1990s, the decade when this cabinet was formed.

In the multi-variate models of early elections and non-electoral cabinet replacements, three models were fitted: The *first* model was fitted for all cabinets. The *second* model included only such cabinets that ended with either the rate of unemployment or the rate of inflation being above the mean for the relevant country during the decade the respective cabinet was formed. This should capture cross-national and diachronic differences in the actors' perceptions of the state of the economy. Cabinets with above-average rates of unemployment and inflation are considered to have suffered at least minor economic performance problems at the time of their dissolution. In the *third* model, the sample is restricted to cabinets whose level of unemployment or rate of inflation was at least one standard deviation above the mean of the decade the cabinet was formed in. For the purposes of this chapter, these cabinets are assumed to have suffered a severe crisis. This allows estimating the effect of political and other contextual variables on cabinet survival under different economic conditions.

4.5 The Bivariate Link Between Economic Performance and Cabinet Survival

The literature cited above predicts that economic performance should generally have some impact on the risk of discretionary cabinet terminations. In line with Robertson (1983a) and Warwick (1994), the rates of unemployment and inflation are used as key indicators to measure economic performance.[2]

The survival models in Table 4.3 constitute a first bivariate test of the intuition that poor economic performance should increase the risk of behavioural cabinet terminations. The table shows the estimates for bivariate Cox proportional hazards model for both indicators of economic performance: the rates of unemployment and inflation in the year of cabinet dissolution. All models in Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 allow for the possibility of country-specific unobserved heterogeneity by employing a shared frailty design. A shared frailty model allows to test for the existence of time-constant unobserved heterogeneity resulting from specific contextual factors in some or all of the 28 countries (for a general discussion of the problem see Grofman 1989). It is worth noting that country-specific 'frailties' are not estimated

[2] Time-varying covariates measuring the data at least annually will be added to the dataset shortly.

Table 4.3 Economic indicators as predictors of discretionary cabinet terminations in 28 European democracies, 1945–2011 (Cox proportional hazards model, country-specific frailties, hazard ratios and standard errors in parentheses)

	Model 1a	Model 2a
Covariate	Hazard ratio (standard error)	Hazard ratio (standard error)
Unemployment rate	1.000 (0.016)	
Inflation rate		1.004 (0.001) ***
Log-likelihood	−1703.989	−1791.143
Wald chi^2	0.00	22.03
N failing due to risk	308	322
Theta	0.438	0.421
Likelihood test of theta = 0	67.99 ***	80.95 ***

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 4.4 Bivariate test of the proportionality assumption using Schoenfeld residuals (28 European democracies, 1945–2011, country-specific frailties)

Covariate	rho	chi^2	df	Prob > chi^2
Unemployment rate	0.082	3.29	1	0.070
Inflation rate	0.141	6.5	1	0.011

Table 4.5 Economic indicators as predictors of discretionary cabinet terminations in 28 European democracies with corrections for duration dependence, 1945–2011 (modified Cox proportional hazards model, hazard ratios with standard errors in parentheses, country-specific frailties)

	Model 1b	Model 2b
Covariate	Hazard ratio (standard error)	Hazard ratio (standard error)
Unemployment	4.482 (0.381) ***	
Unemployment * duration	0.789 (0.011) ***	
Inflation		1.011 (0.006) *
Inflation * duration		0.998 (0.001)
Log-likelihood	−1483.376	−1790.379
Wald chi^2	312.74 ***	26.55 ***
N failing due to risk	308	322
Theta	0.361	0.426
Likelihood test of theta = 0	66.12 ***	81.20 ***

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

as fixed 'country effects'. Rather estimates of theta show whether the frailty component (i.e. possible differences in the frailty of different countries resulting from unobserved country-specific heterogeneity) is significantly different from zero. The highly significant theta values demonstrate the need to control for country-specific effects and highlight that the economic variables in the model do not completely capture all country-specific information.

The models fitted in Table 4.3 provide an ambivalent picture. If all cabinets are pooled to predict both main types of discretionary terminations in a design controlling for country-specific frailties, the rate of inflation has a significant effect on the risk of discretionary terminations. With each increase in inflation by one-percentage point, the risk increases by a factor of approximately 1.004 (Model 1a). The rate of unemployment, by contrast, does not seem to have any effect at all (Model 2a). However, the test results reported in Table 4.4 show that the influence of the covariates on the risk of discretionary cabinet terminations is not constant throughout the lifetime of a cabinet, violating a crucial assumption of the Cox proportional hazards model. The column rho in the table gives the Pearson's product–moment correlation between the scaled Schoenfeld residuals of the relevant covariate and a postulated smooth function Grambsch and Therneau (1994) use in their test for the non-proportionality of hazards. The column chi^2 gives the relevant test statistics; the column Prob > chi^2 gives the p values. For inflation, the correlation is significantly different from zero at the 5 % level, and for unemployment, this is the case at the ten-percentage level. The bias resulting from the duration dependence can be corrected by extending the Cox model and adding controls for the impact of relevant covariates. The most common correction is to interact the value of the time-constant covariate with the natural logarithm of analysis time. If these modifications are carried out (Table 4.5), both economic covariates show the expected (and statistically significant) destructive effect on discretionary cabinet terminations, at least in purely bivariate analyses. The risk of discretionary cabinet failures increases, if the rates of unemployment and inflation are high in relation to the mean of the decade of the cabinet's formation. The interaction variables are not only a technical corrective, and they are substantively interesting in the context of the Lupia–Strøm model. The larger the duration of a cabinet, the smaller is the destructive effect of unemployment and inflation. In the case of unemployment, this effect is statistically significant at the one-percentage level, lending some credence to the literature on strategic dissolutions: Longer-lived cabinets formed shortly after an election (those that have a long 'natural life expectancy') are less likely to fail than short-lived cabinets (i.e. predominantly those formed closer to the end of the CIEP). From this observation, we could infer that economic shocks are particularly destructive towards the end of the CIEP.

This interactive effect can be illustrated further in the plots of Schoenfeld residuals in Figs. 4.1 and 4.2. Lupia and Strøm's (1995) model implies that the destructive effect of poor economic performance should be stronger towards the end of the CIEP than at the beginning. Eyeball inspection of the lowess smooths in both figures generally corroborates this expectation, although the duration-dependent effect is quite small. Taken together with the test statistics reported in Table 4.4, they are nevertheless significant. The scaled Schoenfeld residuals for the two economic covariates in Figs. 4.1 and 4.2 demonstrate that the bivariate models overpredict the risk of behavioural terminations at the beginning and underpredict them towards the end of a parliamentary term. In sum, all these findings provide some, if weak, corroboration for Lupia and Strøm's proposition that the



Fig. 4.1 Scaled Schoenfeld residuals for the covariate unemployment and their Lowess Smooth in 28 European democracies, 1945–2011



Fig. 4.2 Scaled Schoenfeld residuals for the covariate inflation and their Lowess Smooth in 28 European democracies, 1945–2011

force of an exogenous shock increases with the duration of a cabinet and is particularly destructive at the later stages of longer-lasting cabinets.

4.6 Economic Performance, Structural Attributes and the Risk of Non-electoral Cabinet Replacements

One of the key questions of this chapter is whether political variables and institutions mitigate or exacerbate the effect of poor economic performance on cabinet survival. This question will be pursued in a multi-variate design. The multi-variate analyses differ from the bivariate ones above. Given the small number of cabinets facing severe economic conditions for each of the two main risks, the shared frailty design was dropped in the multi-variate tests. And rather than using all discretionary terminations, separate estimations are provided for the risk of early elections on the one hand and non-electoral cabinet replacements on the other hand. The covariates included in the models in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 allow tests of the predictions summarized in Table 4.1. The models include one control for being a post-communist country as cabinets in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe are generally more vulnerable to early termination than cabinets in other European countries (Grotz and Weber 2012).

Based on the mainstream literature in the field, unemployment and inflation rates should always increase the risk of *non-electoral cabinet replacements*. This effect should be particularly strong when economic performance is so poor that the levels of unemployment and inflation exceed the mean of the relevant decade in the relevant country considerably. And it should be even stronger for cabinets formed earlier in the parliamentary term when parties attach a higher value to the power they currently hold. Poor performance of the economy is likely to put pressure on governments to make costly economic policy adjustments. These tend to increase dissonance within the governing parties and between them. In addition, there may be incentives for government leaders to enlarge a coalition and share responsibility with some of the parliamentary opposition, ensuring the passage of necessary legislation in parliament and sharing the responsibility for unpopular policy decisions. The three models fitted in Table 4.6 confirm the expectations summarized above, at least for unemployment. High unemployment is a strong predictor for non-electoral cabinet replacements. And as expected, the hazard ratios increase as we move from Model 1 to Model 3 (in other words, as economic performance declines). The same cannot be said for the rate of inflation, however, which does not seem to have the same destructive power. This will have to be investigated further in the future using time-varying economic data. In the current model specification, it may be the result of the fact that inflation rates tend to change relatively slowly and by small margins.

The risk of a cabinet replacement should be the strongest at the beginning of the legislative term as coalitions and parties may face considerable internal dissonance (especially those cabinets affected by a severe crisis), but would face high opportunity costs if they called for an early election. The small but highly significant parameter estimate for the covariate ‘days to the end of the CIEP’ supports this proposition. The larger the number of days the cabinet has potentially left to govern, the higher is the risk of a non-electoral cabinet replacement. This is in line

Table 4.6 Predicting the risk of non-electoral cabinet replacements in 28 European democracies, 1945–2011 (extended Cox proportional hazards model, by severity of crisis)

Covariate	Model 1: all cabinets			Model 2: cabinets experiencing below-average performance			Model 3: cabinets suffering severe crisis		
	Hazard ratio	Standard error	$P > z$	Hazard ratio	Standard error	$P > z$	Hazard ratio	Standard error	$P > z$
Unemployment	6.198	0.782	***	7.598	1.232	***	8.411	2.677	***
Unemployment * in time	0.750	0.015	***	0.727	0.019	***	0.716	0.037	***
Inflation	1.021	0.018		1.025	0.019		1.053	0.048	
Inflation * in time	0.995	0.004		0.994	0.004		0.987	0.011	
Days to the end of CIEP	1.001	0.000	***	1.001	0.000	***	1.001	0.000	**
Average cabinet electoral volatility	1.009	0.022		0.980	0.027		0.933	0.053	
Majority cabinet	0.586	0.161	*	0.584	0.191	*	0.098	0.101	**
PM dissolution powers	0.646	0.144	*	0.640	0.159	*	0.715	0.363	
Conservative-led cabinet * unemployment	0.947	0.022	**	0.984	0.026		1.067	0.073	
Socialist-led cabinet * inflation	1.014	0.012		1.023	0.014	*	1.013	0.045	
Minimal-winning coalition	0.834	0.206		0.999	0.305		4.747	4.778	
Oversized coalition	1.374	0.437		1.425	0.557		5.959	6.230	*
Cabinet ideological preference range (CMP)	0.993	0.005		0.984	0.007	**	0.986	0.011	
Number of cabinet parties	1.476	0.144	***	1.599	0.196	***	1.647	0.338	**
Semi-presidential constitution	1.391	0.287		1.518	0.398		2.756	1.375	**
Post-communist state	1.468	0.374		2.108	0.606	***	3.332	2.009	**
Log-likelihood	−799.498			−533.23			−147.07		
LR chi^2	407.49	***		325.67	***		112.38	***	
N	488			357			140		
N failing due to risk	179			132			46		

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

with Lupia and Strøm's prediction that players will value the seats they have at the beginning of a legislative term more than towards its end. As expected in virtually all models (e.g. Robertson 1983b), cabinet majority status reduces the risk of cabinet replacements significantly. The role of transaction costs, another important variable in the Lupia–Strøm model, is confirmed by the parameter estimates for the number of parties in cabinet (which are considered to be a proxy for transaction costs here): A large number of parties in a coalition increase the risk of cabinet replacements strongly and significantly. Minimal-winning status, by contrast, does not have a statistically significant impact.

The effects summarized in the paragraph above can be observed across all three models in Table 4.6. In other words, they are significant predictors of cabinet replacements independent of the state of the economy. A comparison of the models should provide us with some further information on the role of economic performance. The first point to note is that none of the political and institutional covariates 'eliminates' the strong effect of high unemployment, whereas the significant effect of inflation on discretionary terminations found in the bivariate analyses (Table 4.5) seems to be mitigated by the variables added to the model.[3] The significant interaction between a conservative-led cabinet and unemployment observed for all cabinets (the interaction reduces the risk of a cabinet replacement) becomes statistically insignificant when governments encounter economic performance problems. Thus, relatively high levels of unemployment seem to affect both right-wing and left-wing cabinets alike. Being a post-communist state (a covariate which has been included as a control variable) increases the risk of cabinet replacements, if the economy is performing below average. Semi-presidentialism does not have a higher propensity for strategic cabinet replacements (triggered by the president) in general (as claimed in some of the literature, e.g. Shugart and Carey 1992: 121), even if the constitution allows the president to dismiss the government at will. The results reported in Table 4.6 are thus more in line with Schleiter and Morgan-Jones' (2009) findings, suggesting that semi-presidentialism does not increase the risk of non-electoral cabinet replacements. However, the covariate 'semi-presidentialism' significantly increases the risk of a cabinet replacement for cabinets experiencing a severely underperforming economy (Model 3). The same is true for oversized coalitions, whose risk of termination through cabinet replacements is significantly different from a hazard ratio of 1 only under conditions of severe underperformance. This finding sits ill with Robertson's expectations summarized above.

[3] The models reported here are not strictly comparable. The estimations in Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 are for the risk of all discretionary terminations (i.e. early elections as well as cabinet replacements) and based on a shared frailty design. Strictly comparable analyses (not reported here) lead to very similar results.

4.7 Economic Performance, Structural Attributes and the Risk of Early Elections

Poor economic performance and the need for drastic policy responses could (a) be expected to trigger not just cabinet replacements (see above), but also early elections. This has, for example, been the case in some countries cited in the introduction such as Greece or Ireland where governments were either discredited or sought a mandate for painful adjustments. Alternatively, (b) cabinets might be less likely to be terminated by early elections as governing parties could fear the risk of being blamed and punished by the voters. The three models in Table 4.7 are more in line with alternative (a). Yet, similar to the findings on cabinet replacements (Table 4.6), high levels of inflation are not nearly as destructive as high unemployment, except for socialist-led cabinets facing severe problems of economic performance (Model 3). The risk-increasing effect of unemployment remains fairly robust across the three models, which—based on the model specification used here—does not lend much support to the predictions generated by models based on strategic election timing and 'surfing' (e.g. Kayser 2005; Smith 2003; Strøm and Swindle 2002).

The parameter estimates in Table 4.7 also suggest that—as predicted by Strøm and Swindle (2002: 581–582)—single-party cabinets are more likely to be terminated by early elections than other types of cabinet, because their leaders in cabinet are less constrained in their decision to call such elections than the leaders of coalition cabinets. Similarly, if the prime minister has far-reaching dissolution powers, the risk of early elections increases, at least for those cabinets that do not face the most severe type of crisis (Model 3). One remarkable finding in the three models in Table 4.7 is that the predicted effects of a number of covariates seem to be confirmed for cabinets in relatively 'normal' times, but not for cabinets facing severe economic underperformance. This is also true for one very interesting result confirming a central element of the Lupia–Strøm model: The parameter estimate for the covariate 'time to the end of the CIEP' is inversely related to the risk of early elections: The longer this period, the lower is the risk of an early election—as opposed to an increased risk of a cabinet replacement (Table 4.6). However, this effect is not significant for periods of severe underperformance. Here, the length of the remainder of the CIEP is no longer a significant predictor, suggesting that party leaders may lose some of their strategic room for manoeuver under such conditions.

4.8 Conclusions

This chapter confirms once again that economic performance influences the durability of cabinets in parliamentary systems of government. While earlier work was based on various (and sometimes small) samples of Western European

Table 4.7 Predicting the risk of early elections in 28 European democracies, 1945–2011 (extended Cox proportional hazards model, by severity of crisis)

Covariate	Model 1: all cabinets			Model 2: cabinets experiencing below-average performance			Model 3: cabinets suffering severe crisis		
	Hazard ratio	Standard error	$P > z$	Hazard ratio	Standard error	$P > z$	Hazard ratio	Standard error	$P > z$
Unemployment	5.247	0.962	***	6.572	1.547	***	6.347	2.797	***
Unemployment * in time	0.785	0.022	***	0.758	0.027	***	0.775	0.048	***
Inflation	1.028	0.045		1.035	0.053		1.364	0.378	
Inflation * in time	0.993	0.010		0.991	0.012		0.962	0.038	
Days to the end of CIEP	0.999	0.000	***	0.999	0.000	*	1.000	0.001	
Average cabinet electoral volatility	0.969	0.032		1.016	0.044		1.096	0.103	
Coalition cabinet	0.416	0.109	***	0.454	0.138	***	0.821	0.486	
Majority cabinet	0.540	0.137	**	0.467	0.140	**	1.188	0.777	
PM dissolution powers	1.925	0.464	***	1.898	0.531	**	1.462	0.834	
Conservative-led cabinet * unemployment	1.047	0.039		1.077	0.046	*	1.049	0.084	
Socialist-led cabinet * inflation	1.063	0.027	**	1.048	0.032		1.143	0.072	**
Post-communist state	0.025	0.024	***	0.041	0.039	***	0.000	0.000	
Log-likelihood	−343.34			−227.10			−51.71		
LR chi^2	173.30	***		133.32	***		47.03	***	
N	512			373			149		
N failing due to risk	81			59			19		

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

countries (e.g. Robertson 1983a; Warwick 1994; Saalfeld 2008), the ERD dataset used here allows to corroborate these findings across a considerably larger and more diverse number of European countries with different constitutions, actor constellations and democratic traditions. Within the parameters of European politics, it provides something akin to a most different system design. The analyses presented here provide some support for the random-events perspective as far as the rate of unemployment is concerned: Cabinets facing relatively high levels of unemployment are far more likely to fail prematurely than other cabinets, irrespective of covariates capturing institutional, political or strategic influences. Inflation, by contrast, does not seem to have the same powerful effect (at least in the present design with time-constant covariates). This confirms that different types of economic shocks may cause different types of political costs and contribute to different patterns of cabinet dissolution. The analyses presented here do, however, lend some support to Lupia and Strøm's (1995) theoretical claim that exogenous events (such as poor economic performance) are likely to be more destructive towards the end of the constitutional inter-election period. As predicted, the likelihood of early elections increases as the end of the CIEP approaches. The finding that the risk of non-electoral cabinet replacements is the strongest if a cabinet is formed at the beginning of the CIEP is also compatible with this model as government parties have incentives to respond to crises by reshuffling the cabinet rather than going to the country, when they have a considerable time before facing the voters. These duration-dependent effects are small, but they are clearly discernible and statistical significant.

The analyses of competing risks of cabinet dissolution—non-electoral replacements and early elections—show that the rate of unemployment, in particular, is a politically powerful driver of all discretionary cabinet terminations. The present analyses have not yet uncovered the political mechanisms that might explain this effect. The addition of a number of covariates controlling for crucial elements of the constitutional and strategic context does not reduce the impact of unemployment on cabinet survival. While the destructive impact of high levels of unemployment on non-electoral cabinet replacements was to be expected on theoretical grounds, a similarly strong effect could be observed on the risk of early elections. This effect suggests that strategic election timing is generally not very successful when it comes to high levels of unemployment, which may be a more sensitive issue in electoral terms. To be sure, some political factors mitigate this process, but they do not 'eliminate' the strong and significant causal impact of unemployment on cabinet durability.

In more general terms, the Lupia–Strøm model has proved to be a useful way of modelling the effects of economic crises and structural factors in a unified strategic framework. In this sense, it is a very innovative contribution to the literature, despite some theoretical criticisms (Diermeier 2006). In empirical terms, renegotiations and subtle shifts in power within the cabinet resulting from external events remain difficult to observe, at least in large-N quantitative studies. Despite significant improvements in the availability of data (e.g. Andersson and Ersson

2012; Bergman et al. 2005; Grotz and Weber 2012; Jäckle 2011), further efforts are needed to construct valid and reliable indicators and to collect appropriate data.

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Chapter 5
Electoral Responsiveness, Party Government, and the Imperfect Performance of Democratic Elections

G. Bingham Powell

Abstract The chapter works from the premise that in a democracy, the laws are supposed to correspond to the "preferences and will" of the citizens and investigates whether, to what extent, and under which conditions we can expect elections to produce such outcomes. It begins by considering normative ideals of the electoral connection (majoritarianism vs. proportionality) and then turns to political institutions (electoral rules and constitutional design) and the outcomes they generate in terms of government composition, legislative outputs, and actual public policy. The chapter also discusses the sensitivity of decision-making structures to electoral sanctions. It concludes by highlighting differences in evaluating the results normatively from majoritarian and proportional visions of democracy and identifying empirical conditions that tend to make elections perform imperfectly.

Keywords Accountability · Majoritarianism · Proportionality · Responsiveness

5.1 What We Expect from Democratic Elections

In a democracy, the laws are supposed to correspond to the "preferences and will" of the citizens of the democracy. (The phrase is from Rehfeld 2009: 229, who refers to the specification of this relationship as "the central normative problem" of representative democracy.) The election of representatives is a substitute for small-scale direct democracy in which such correspondence would emerge naturally from citizens' personal participation in deliberation and policymaking. In large democracies, today most policymaking is made by representatives, who have the time and incentive to learn the nuances of complex issues, not through

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direct participation. Elections are supposed to be "responsive" in the sense of choosing representatives to reflect the desires of their constituents.

Of course, reflecting the desires of the constituents is not the only virtue in policymaking. On one hand, even the constituents themselves may wish their representatives to make policies on the basis of reflection and deliberation about their interests, not as a snapshot of momentary opinions. On the other hand, considerations of justice and equality, closely woven into the fabric of democracy itself, may sometimes conflict with constituent preferences. Still, when representatives act contrary to constituents' wishes, such deviation must be explicitly justified and understand as exceptional (Pitkin 1967: 163–164).

For elections to serve the purposes of responsiveness, they must first meet the standards of democratic authorization. Democratic elections are acts of authorization, by which citizens choose representatives to be policymakers to act for them. The context of this act of authorization needs to meet certain standards of freedom of deliberation, adequate information, fairness of access and aggregation, acceptable choices, and so forth for the citizens, such that the authorization is meaningful and authentic. Moreover, the chosen representatives must have real policymaking power. Without meeting these standards, the elections cannot serve democratic purposes. (See the analysis of the "menu of manipulation" and the "chain of democratic choice" in Schedler 2002.) Elections that are in various ways manipulated to eliminate uncertainty and remove the autonomous effectiveness of citizens' choices exemplify democratic failure, not democratic responsiveness.

Given the freedom from manipulation, we also expect elections to be in some fashion "responsive" to the constituents as they connect citizens and policymakers. But exactly how do we know whether elections have been responsive? The simplest answer is that the election outcome should reflect the distribution of the *votes*, which are authorizing representatives to make policies on the citizens' behalf. (See the standard vote-seat representation studies in the tradition of Rae (1967) and Lijphart (1994) and also see the somewhat different approach in Hajnal 2009.) As more citizens vote for a given party or candidate, this party or candidate should be more likely to have influence in policymaking. It should have more seats in the legislature or more cabinet posts in the government, or whatever institutional resources help shape policy. When fewer citizens support a given party or candidate, its share of the policymaking resources should diminish.

As we shall see in a moment, there are alternative shapes that this responsiveness relationship can take, each supported by a different strand of democratic theory. But it should always be the case for democratic electoral responsiveness that elections connect more citizens with greater influence in policymaking. If gains for a party or candidate trigger intervention by the military, this is obviously a failure of electoral responsiveness. Less obviously, but still significantly, if a party or candidate that comes in first in the votes ends up with fewer policymaking resources than the second-place candidate, we may consider electoral responsiveness diminished (e.g., Strøm 1990: 73, on party votes and cabinet portfolios; Powell 2000, Chap. 6 on plurality losers).

One complexity in the vote-influence relationship concerns announced pre-election coalitions between parties or candidates. Two or more parties may announce that if they jointly win office they will govern together or jointly implement an explicit policy program (see Powell 2000 and Golder 2006). As the voters are informed that this connection between the parties has been formed, it seems appropriate then to treat these parties as a unit in assessing electoral responsiveness. (This will be especially important in a majoritarian vision of responsiveness, as explained below.)

The votes have great significance in democratic elections, as authentic expressions of the will of the electorate. Yet, correspondence between votes and representation in government has limitations as an indicator of responsiveness to constituents' preferences. Ideally, parties promise to carry out bundles of policies if elected; citizens vote for their preferred bundle; the vote distribution then reflects the preference distribution; parties are committed to make policies that correspond to these promises. This is the familiar "mandate" model of policy representation.

One problem lies in the less well-informed voter, who may have trouble in determining which party is closest to his or her preferences, casting capricious votes or being unduly influenced by irrelevant factors. Another difficulty lies in the complexity of citizen opinions across multiple issues. Most troubling, perhaps, is the fact that voters can only choose between alternatives that are offered in a given election, which they may convert into voting choices in various ways (additive, lexicographic) as permitted by the configuration of party choices available. If some popular alternatives, or important combinations of issue positions, are not being offered in the election, or if parties with similar positions split the votes, or if parties are ambiguous in promises, or if a party's candidates do not homogeneously stand for the same policies, or if none of the candidates seem trustworthy, then vote distributions may be misleading as conveyers of preference. Interactions between voter preferences, configurations of party offerings, and rules for aggregating votes into representation create potential for substantively non-responsive outcomes.

If the goal of democracy is to induce policymakers to do what citizens would like them to do, then simple connections between votes and officeholding can be misleading. Rather, we should measure citizens' preferences directly and compare them to the commitments (and, perhaps, the later actions) of policymakers. Responsiveness of elections to preferences could be more directly captured in this way. This approach, too, has its difficulties, particularly in depending on survey methodology to ascertain and aggregate citizens' preferences and in finding a reliable way to compare their preferences to the positions and actions of policymakers.

In the current essay, I approach *electoral* responsiveness as a hypothesis, or first cut approach, to *preference* responsiveness. I suggest that we first consider, as much of the literature does, electoral responsiveness as the connection between votes and officeholding. After investigating several normative ideals of this electoral connection, we shall then consider the theoretical and empirical conditions that lead from electoral responsiveness to preference responsiveness. Note that we are always interested in the role of elections in creating or inducing policymakers

to be responsive, not simply in correspondences that emerge by accident or through the benevolence of dictators (Pitkin 1967: 232–234).

5.2 What Kind of Democratic Electoral Responsiveness? The Alternative Visions of Majoritarianism and Proportionality

There are at least two major alternative visions of democratic electoral responsiveness. They seem to be connected with the desirability of concentrating or dispersing policymaking power in a democracy. They are both democratic in conceiving of responsiveness as the rewarding of electoral gains with increased officeholding or influence. But one of these envisions the ideal connection as majoritarian. In a two-party context as long as one party remains below the 50 % support threshold, it has no claim on office or influence. As soon as it crosses the threshold that marks support of 50 % of the electorate, it is entitled to assume complete control of policymaking. This ideal connection is shown by the solid line in Fig. 5.1. American research on electoral responsiveness has generally conceptualized responsiveness in this way, with a large boost in office victories concentrated around the 50 % threshold (Gelman and King 1994; Katz 1997). The power to make policies is concentrated in one party, which has received the support of a majority of voters.

On the other hand, European conceptions of electoral responsiveness have tended to focus on proportionality. In this ideal, policymaking authority is more dispersed. (More generally, see Lijphart 1984.) Crossing the 50 % threshold leads to only a marginal increase in officeholding probabilities or influence. As we see depicted in the dashed line in Fig. 5.1, 45 % of the votes should be associated with



Fig. 5.1 Two ideals of democratic responsiveness. *Source* Powell 2000

45 % of the government and 55 % of the votes should be associated with 55 % of the government. This concern with proportionality as the fair consequence of democratic elections was strongly articulated by John Stuart Mill in 1861 and the invention of the proportional representation family of election rules was designed to deal with the perceived unfairness of majoritarianism [Mill (1861) 1958: 102]. Although analyses of consequences of these rules have been primarily applied to vote-seat connections (as in Rae 1967 and Lijphart 1994), the increasing importance of the executive in modern policymaking directs attention to connections to government as well (Taylor and Lijphart 1985; Pinto-Duschinsky 1998; Powell 2000; Vowles 2004; Forestiere 2009).

5.3 Electoral and Governmental Institutions and Electoral Responsiveness

The depiction of alternative conceptions of democratic electoral responsiveness brings us to the institutions that shape these connections. In parliamentary systems, the legislature elects the government, so we shall begin with the electoral and policymaking rules in parliamentary systems.

Many of the parliamentary systems can be fairly easily characterized as primarily majoritarian or proportional in their electoral and legislative institutions. The majoritarian systems use single-member district election rules (of the plurality or majority kind) and typically have concentrated policymaking power in the primary legislative body. The proportional systems use some kind of multimember, PR election rules and have legislatures that provide substantial influence to opposition political parties. (There are, of course, many variations on PR election rules, such as the various thresholds for representation, and these interact with the number of parties and other contextual features, which are also in part shaped by them.) As Kaare Strøm has suggested, the legislative institutions, such as committee powers, can help us identify stronger opposition influence and relatively dispersed policymaking power (1990: 70–73) (see Powell 2000, Chap. 2).

The single-member district election rules commonly produce single-party (or, possibly, pre-election coalition) majority governments following directly from the election itself. The elections are, in Strøm's language, decisive for government formation (1990: 72–74). Because of concentrated executive-legislative power, these governments enjoy largely unchecked policymaking power. Most of the time, the plurality party or pre-election coalition forms the unchecked majority government, in a way that is "responsive" in the American or majoritarian sense. Although occasionally a splitting of the vote will bring victory to the runner-up party, a distinctively non-responsive result by all standards, this occurs relatively rarely (about 10 % of the time) although across many countries (Powell 2000). The flaw from a theoretical point of view is that very often these majority governments are created by the election rules for plurality parties winning 40 % or even less of the vote. Actual vote majorities are very unusual. But the structure of

the relationship corresponds to the solid, majoritarian line in Fig. 5.1, with the key threshold moved left.

On the other hand, the PR election rules typically lead to minority or multiparty governments that must also share at least some policymaking power in the legislature with the opposition parties. (See Strøm 1990, and Powell 2000 on opposition influence.) The plurality party in the legislature, which is usually the plurality vote winner, does tend to enjoy a greater share in cabinet governments than its proportion of the vote. This is because in most parliamentary systems, the government selection and final policymaking rules within the legislature are usually based on simple majorities. (In some countries, some issues, including changes in a constitution, may require super-majorities.) Minority governments, based on less than a majority of legislative seats, are particularly dependent on outside parties to endure and to pass legislation and budgets, dispersing policymaking power, more like the dashed line in Fig. 5.1. Taking account of opposition influence in policymaking through strong committees and other institutions further disperses power. In this sense, we can say that the institution-linked hypotheses about the type of electoral responsiveness relationship seem to work rather well. Each type of institution seems to be fairly successful in generating the kind of responsiveness posited for it normatively in Fig. 5.1.

A slightly different perspective on the responsiveness relationship is dynamic and retrospective. We can evaluate the responsiveness of elections in terms of the effect of the votes on the retention or eviction of incumbents. This feature may be said especially to distinguish democratic elections from authoritarian ones. In 153 legislative elections in parliamentary systems, the incumbents lost votes more often than not, and when the incumbents lost 5 % of the vote, they were completely replaced 49 % of the time (Powell 2000: 48). Authoritarian regimes are unlikely to allow such vote losses or to permit loss of power if they occur.

Here, again, we can take a majoritarian or proportional perspective. In the majoritarian perspective, we want voters to be able to retain the incumbents completely if a majority of voters approve of them, to replace the incumbents completely if a majority of voters disapprove. From the proportional perspective, the incumbents' influence should be enhanced proportionally if more voters support them, but reduced proportionally to the degree the voters turn against them.

The empirical evidence from parliamentary systems is, again, that the two types of systems work pretty much as normatively expected. In the majority systems, the fate of incumbent parties is pretty much an "all or nothing" situation, with the probability of retention closely tied to voter support. Incumbents who gain votes are almost always retained in office; those that lose votes tend to be replaced, although there is some "lumpiness" in the gross pattern, because incumbents may have varying margins from the last election. In the PR systems, lots of governments (about a third of them) change some, but not all, of the parties in the coalition, but the likelihood that the entire government will change decreases as the government gains votes increases as it loses votes. There are, of course, individual elections and, especially, individual party experiences that do not fit the general patterns. If the vote is split, the right way in a majoritarian country, a party

can lose votes and even its plurality status and still hold its legislative majority (New Zealand in 1981). Individual parties, or even whole governments, can lose support and still build a winning legislative coalition. But overall, the pattern holds quite strongly.

Presidential systems, of course, deliberately divorce executive and legislative institutions and elections. The presidency itself can be conceived as a majoritarian institution, as it is usually held by a single party that is the most influential actor in policymaking, especially in policy initiation. (However, legislative and administrative presidential powers vary greatly, as shown by Shugart and Carey 1992, Chap. 7–8.) However, the separate elections for the legislature very frequently result in "divided government," where one party or coalition controls the presidency and another controls the legislature, a circumstance that both requires and hinders accommodative bargaining. Divided government would be opposed by majoritarians, but favored by proportionalists.

Interestingly enough, most electoral responsiveness analyses in presidential systems seem to focus on the presidential election, rather than trying to take account of presidential and legislative outcomes simultaneously. However, there is a substantial literature on institutional arrangements, such as timing of elections—concurrence/non-concurrence—as well as aggregation rules, that affect the probability and consequences of divided government (Shugart and Carey 1992; Samuels and Hellwig 2008).

Even considering presidential electoral responsiveness in isolation, the presidential election rules can make a substantial difference. The most common distinction is between plurality and majority runoff presidential elections. Colomer reports that in Latin American presidential races 1945–2000, the elections under plurality rules resulted in the winner gaining a majority of votes in only 30 % of the elections (2001: 107). With complex intermediate institutions such as the American Electoral College the aggregation of votes may even result in the vote winner losing the election, as in the US election of 2000.

5.4 Electoral Responsiveness Itself as an Empirical Connection: Do Electorally Responsive Elections Result in Governments Producing Policies that Voters Want?

The concept of electoral responsiveness that involves simply the connection (static or dynamic) between votes and officeholding has both advantages and limitations in the context of democratic theory. On one hand, the vote has unique significance as the expression of citizen choice; it authorizes representatives who have the collective power to make public policies. Insofar as we think of democracy as any peaceful and equal involvement of citizens in policymaking, we may not be concerned with the quality of that involvement. Whether citizens exercise their votes irresponsibly, influenced by whims or candidate personality or misinformed

stereotypes, matters less than the fact of peaceful and equal participation, which replaces the various coercive, or unequal, or oligarchic alternatives. As long as the electoral outcomes are responsive in the sense(s) discussed above, connecting more votes with some greater representation in policymaking, that may suffice.

On the other hand, there is a powerful line of justification for democracy that resides in the degree to which democratic processes systematically induce substantive correspondence between the issue preferences of citizens and the policies made by their governments. In this line of thought, more than any other form of government we know, democracy should systematically induce the policymakers to do what citizens want them to do and avoid what the citizens dislike (Dahl 1989: 95). Democratic representation theory is thus a multistage theory that connects citizens' issue preferences to their voting choices and those voting outcomes to policymakers' commitments and actions. The stage of election responsiveness is a necessary part of this theory, but it is insufficient by itself, especially as it disregards the substantive content of responsiveness.

If citizens' votes and the aggregation rules of the election laws bring a plurality party to power in one country or one election and deprive it of office in another, it can matter a lot what substantive policies that party embodies. If all the parties offer unattractive policies, or if the plurality winner is created because more attractive parties split the vote, electoral responsiveness might not generate substantive responsiveness. If all the parties offer similar, attractive policies, it is not so important substantively which one comes to office. In the latter case, an apparent failure of electoral responsiveness, bringing a second-place vote winner to power may still result in preference responsiveness.

Rather than thinking of responsiveness to votes and responsiveness to preferences as two different approaches to the role of elections in democracy, it seems more useful to consider responsiveness to votes as one of the links in a theory of responsiveness to preferences. I leave it to the reader to decide whether one has a greater claim to an identity with democracy itself. Personally, I tend to feel that a theory of elections and democracy has to incorporate responsiveness to both votes and preferences. In order to articulate this, however, we must consider more fully the stages in a substantive theory of democratic representation.

A substantive theory begins with citizens' preferences. For elections to connect these preferences to the policymakers, the party system must offer attractive choices, with at least one party committed to policies embodying the preferences of most of the citizens. For majoritarians, this implies a party (or candidate) at the position of the median citizen, as in a one-dimensional space in which voters vote for the closest party that position can defeat any other and minimizes the number of citizens distant from the policy. (That the empirical world of policy preferences may often be multidimensional and not easily reduced to a single pair of choices places a complex burden on majoritarians in multiparty contexts.) For proportionalists, this implies multiple parties with most citizens having a fairly close party, reflecting the full diversity of citizen preferences whatever this might be. Full-blown theories of substantive representation thus imply theories of party competition specifying

factors that predict parties' campaign commitments. And the desirable distribution varies with the normative perspective, as it did in the vote authorization perspective.

Similarly, given the distribution of party commitments and the voter preferences, the voters should chose to vote for substantively proximate political parties (which we know empirically that they do not always do), *and* the rules of aggregation of votes should be responsive in the sense of accurately reflecting the votes into the legislative seats (or executive winner in presidential systems). This stage is similar to the electoral authorization responsiveness process, including the proportional and majoritarian differences, but the focus is on representing the desired distribution of citizens' preferences, captured by the party commitments, not the votes as such. Moreover, for parliamentary systems in which the legislature selects the executive, we need to add a theory of government formation with also a substantive dimension. Governments should be centered at the citizen median and either represent that median (majoritarian version) or reach out from it to include other major citizen positions (proportional version).

In considering the responsiveness of presidential elections, a key issue is whether the election winner could have defeated each of the other candidates individually. This is the outcome known as Condorcet winning, which is itself a majoritarian criterion. Insofar as the election is run only once, our assessment has to be based on surveys of voter preferences. (If we assume preferences are based on a single dimension, the median candidate is the only Condorcet winner, and some analyses focus on the median candidate, as determined by various measures of candidate position, such as expert surveys, which may be more generally available, as in Colomer 2001.)

The key distinction in the presidential election rules is, again, between plurality elections and majority runoffs. Theoretically, with multiple credible candidates, the plurality elections are more vulnerable to winning by candidates who are non-Condorcet winners (or even Condorcet losers). We can see this intuitively in the example of a three-party race in which two leftist candidates split the vote and elect a rightist candidate who would have been defeated if paired against either of them. Colomer's analysis of the experience of Latin American presidents seems to bear this out, with the median candidate much more likely to prevail in runoff elections (107). However, even with a majority runoff, a potential Condorcet winner can be eliminated on the first round, leading to an outcome that is less than ideally responsive on the second. (See the French 1995 election discussed by Colomer 2001: 95.) Thus, the majority (or high plurality threshold) runoff elections are more likely to produce outcomes that are relatively responsive to preferences.

It is interesting that both majoritarian and proportional visions lead to the normative standard that the government should be at the position of the citizen median, although they differ in whether the government should be concentrated at that position or building around it. There are fairly well-developed theories of party competition and government formation that lead to the empirical expectation that governments will be close to the citizen median under both majoritarian and proportional election rules. Majoritarian election rules (especially single-member district plurality) are expected to produce two-party systems (Duverger's Law),

and two-party competition is predicted by Downs to produce convergence of parties to the position of the median voter (Duverger 1954; Downs 1957; Cox 1997). (But see Ezrow (2008, 2010), who finds no systematic centrist tendencies in disproportional systems.) Two-party elections will produce legislative majorities that select governments of the larger party. Even with more than strictly two parties, these rules will often produce legislative majorities and governments based on them, as we saw in the electoral responsiveness discussion analysis above, focusing on the plurality party.

Proportional representation election rules will generally produce multiparty systems, depending on the social configuration and the thresholds (Duverger 1954; Cox 1997). Party competition will lead parties, in the most likely outcome, to spread across the spectrum as the voters are spread (Cox 1990, 1997, Chap. 12). (But see Calvo and Hellwig 2011.) Unless there are too many parties relative to the threshold, as happened in the low-information conditions of some of the early Eastern European elections, PR usually leads to accurate representation in the legislature of the parties above the threshold. If those parties represent the distribution of citizen preferences in appropriate weights, as will happen if the parties are disbursed and citizens vote for the closest party, then the parties in the legislature will reflect the citizen preference distribution. The position of the median legislative party should be close to the citizen median.

Elections in PR systems seldom produce single-party legislative majorities (Powell 2000; Mitchell and Nyblade 2008: 206), so theory of substantive representation in PR systems needs to include a theory of government formation in such situations. The process of government formation theoretically advantages the median legislative party (which is included in about 80 % of governments), thus tying the government to the citizen median (Laver and Schofield 1990: 113; Mitchell and Nyblade 2008: 210). (However, asymmetrical additions of other parties, especially the plurality party, when that is different from the median party, may systematically pull the government somewhat away from the median.)

In an analysis of the alternative paths to policy representation under majoritarian (strong) institutions and PR (permissive) institutions, Cox (1997: 237) argues that the advantage depends on possible coordination failures at electoral and government formation levels. Such failures are possible under either type of system. If "non-Duvergerian" (multiparty) results appear frequently in the majoritarian systems, they can perform "erratically" if the center candidates/parties fail to coordinate and their divisions allow extremist parties to win elections. These extremist parties can then form governments far from the median. Cox argues that election-level coordination failures in PR ("permissive") systems are less likely to distort the legislative balance. Yet, a second stage of government formation will still be needed and coordination could fail at that stage, leading to less centrist governments.

Because there are theoretically plausible paths to preference representation, as well as possibilities for coordination failure, under both majoritarian and proportional institutions, a lively empirical literature has emerged as to which approach is in fact more successful in generating ideological congruence between the median

citizen, the legislative median, and, especially, parliamentary governments. Studies in the 1980s and 1990s by Huber and Powell (1994), Powell and Vanberg (2000), Powell (2000), McDonald et al. (2004), and McDonald and Budge (2005) found that PR systems produced, on average, greater ideological congruence. (Also see Kim et al. 2010.) But these findings were challenged, using new measures of congruence and a later time period, by Blais and Bodet (2006) and Golder and Stramski (2010). Reanalyzing various methods and data, Powell (2009) replicated both sets of findings and argued that the difference depended on the time period of the study and the greater congruence in the majoritarian systems after the mid-1990s. This change seems to be caused, in turn, by declining party system polarization in the SMD systems.

Party system polarization has an interactive effect on ideological congruence. In conditions of low party system polarization, any electoral system seems to generate good congruence. Greater party system polarization makes good congruence less likely, and because of the key role of the plurality party, the effect is especially large in majoritarian systems (Kim et al. 2010; Powell 2011). From a theoretical point of view, the connection that is most problematic in the majoritarian systems is the Downsian theory of party competition that predicts party ideological convergence in the majoritarian systems with small numbers of parties. Sometimes this is true, but often it is not. When it is not and the parties are more polarized, congruence breaks down. In the PR systems, the theoretical paths hold very much as predicted, with very good vote-seat responsiveness creating quite good congruence between median voter and the median legislator; the process of government formation does lead governments to be more distant, on average, than the median legislator. Party system polarization is a problem, making it harder to form coalitions across the median, but overrepresentation of the largest party in the government coalitions in proportional systems does not undercut congruence as badly as the pure plurality governments in the majoritarian systems.

There remain several problems with ideological congruence analysis that have not been adequately explored. One concerns minority governments. As Strøm (1990) emphasized and explored, parliamentary governments in Western democracies have very frequently been minority governments—that is, the parties in the cabinet do not command a majority of seats in the legislature, relying on "outside" parties to pass legislation and budgets and to sustain them against votes of no confidence. These arrangements may either involve forming new "ad hoc" coalitions on different issues or consistent reliance on a particular partner. Analyses of government ideological congruence have typically treated these governments as like any other, but their dependence on others may mean that their real effective positions from a policy point of view may be rather different. Powell (2000) estimates "policymaker" congruence, as well as government congruence, giving more weight to opposition parties under minority governments; Carey and Hix (2011) use the position of the median legislative party rather than the government when estimating the distance of minority "governments" from the median voter. Obviously, neither solution is ideal nor do these take account of the circumstances and implications of legislative deadlock for median voters favoring change.

All these analyses of ideological congruence focus on the distance between the (estimated) ideological position of the median voter or median citizen and the ideological position of the government, usually taken immediately after the election. McDonald and Budge, however, argue that one should also take into account a longer time frame (2005: 130–135). (Also see, e.g., Forestiere 2009.) It may be the case that the PR systems generate more congruent governments after the average election than the majoritarian systems. But across a long series of elections, the greater majoritarian distances, sometimes to the left of the median voter and sometimes to the right, average out to a level of congruence more comparable to the PR systems. Moreover, they argue, as it takes substantial time for government policy commitments to result in altered policy outcomes, the majoritarian distortion in policy outcome is not as severe as the distortion in distance between median voter and government commitment (2005).

There is no doubt that the results from the longer time perspective are relevant to the congruence problem. Moreover, the improvement in average preference responsiveness in the long run in the majoritarian systems is reassuring for the justification of democracy itself. However, it seems clear that the election-by-election level of congruence (sometimes called distortion) is also relevant. Citizens may not take a longer time perspective; they may feel that democracy means more immediate citizen–government congruence. Moreover, not all citizens will still be around until the changing cycle of dominance evens the balance. Electoral and preference responsiveness analyses usually focus on the election as a unit for good reason.

McDonald and Budge's concern with the actions of policymakers, rather than just their electoral promises or perceived positions, is well-taken in its own right. While this is yet one stage further from electoral "responsiveness," it is the ultimate democratic promise. While substantive congruence between the positions of median voters and their perception of the position of the government may be valued in itself, voters expect politicians to keep their promises and are likely unhappy when they do not. (See Stokes 2001 on voters' reactions to presidents' policy reversals of campaign promises after Latin American elections in the 1980s and 1990s.) Because of the multitude of factors that shape real policy outcomes, it is difficult to estimate the effect of voter preferences, as transmitted through elections and parties, on those outcomes, let alone to determine the advantages of alternative institutional arrangements. One recent attempt is Kang and Powell (2010), who do find significant effects of the estimated median voter position on redistributive welfare spending in a multivariate error correction analysis. Interestingly, they find no significant advantage to the PR systems, despite the more accurate congruence of the ideological positions of the governments.[1] These growing efforts to explore congruence of actions as well as policy positions draw

[1] However, we do not know whether this absence of statistical difference in spending responsiveness is a consequence of the complexity of the statistical model, the time lags, the measurement issues, or differing sensitivity to anticipated sanctions as discussed below.

attention to the role of voters and elections in sanctioning officeholders who fail to behave as expected, which can put a slightly different perspective on the concept of responsiveness itself.

5.5 Alternative Concepts of Responsiveness: Sensitivity to Sanctions

In his subtle and interesting analysis of representation and democracy, Andrew Rehfeld uses "responsiveness" in a somewhat different way as a property of "representative decision makers" (2009: 222–223). He distinguishes the extent to which the decision makers are more or less responsive to electoral sanctions. Those less responsive to sanctions, making policies regardless of the threat of being thrown out of office, he calls "gyroscopic" (following Mansbridge 2003), responding to their own internal mechanisms. Those who are more responsive to sanctions, he calls "induced" policymakers.

As is widely understood, the threat of eviction from office in future elections can be an important inducement to officeholders to keep their promises and to anticipate what citizens may do in the next election. In a broad and general sense, democratic elections should always contain this possibility of holding officeholders accountable for their actions in office. However, as Mansbridge and Rehfeld point out, citizens may or may not prefer policymakers who are more sensitive to the next election than to their own internal gyroscope. Sometimes, they may want policymakers who are committed to a general theory of the public good or to the deeply felt policy directions for which they were elected (which may also be a mechanism of correspondence to voter opinion). Voters may be suspicious of those politicians who trim their promises to every shift in public opinion polls. At other times, the citizens may well want to exercise retribution against parties they perceive as having betrayed the public trust or having exhibited massive incompetence.

This concern with sensitivity to sanctions raises important issues. Both the Duverger-Downs theory of majoritarian convergence and concentrated policy-making power and its more permissive, reflective, proportionally oriented counterpart assume that the substantively congruent governments that they should generate will keep their election promises as best they can. But the temptations of political power are many and the pressures from the well-off and well-organized in the society are difficult to resist. The concentrated power of majoritarian governments facilitates open, unchecked abuse of the weak and the minorities. But the dispersed, shared power of coalition governments and inclusive institutions is often opaque, rather than transparent, facilitating hidden abuses of all kinds.

Without wishing further to complicate the concept of responsiveness itself, we need at least to take account of the role of sensitivity to electoral sanctions in our account of the role of electoral responsiveness in democracy. There is evidence that voters are more likely to hold governments accountable for poor policy outcomes, such as poor economic performance, where it is easier for them to assign

responsibility or read signals of incompetence. Voters may also hold governments more accountable for past performance when lower party system polarization makes voters less concerned about the future implications of substantive policy proposals (Hellwig 2010). The research on "economic voting" in parliamentary systems has grown rapidly in recent years and becomes increasingly sophisticated. (See the review and analysis in Duch and Stevenson 2008.) It seems possible that the conditions of clear responsibility that facilitate economic voting also make officeholders more sensitive to possible election sanctions. Incumbent officeholders may also be less sensitive to electoral sanctions when they can control the timing of elections, as they can in some parliamentary systems.

Recent comparative work on parliamentary and presidential systems suggests that for voters, the opportunity to use the electoral weapon directly against the chief executive, especially in concurrent executive and legislative elections, further facilitates economic voting (Hellwig and Samuels 2007). (Also see Hellwig 2010; Samuels 2004, and Stokes 2001.) It is possible, although only speculative at the moment, that this facilitation of electoral retribution makes policymakers more sensitive to the possibility of future sanctions.

The current common wisdom of electoral system design suggests a trade-off between responsiveness, to either votes or preferences, and accountability (sensitiveness to sanctions). However, recent work by Carey and Hix (2011) explores this representation-accountability frontier and argues for a "sweet spot," in low-magnitude PR systems, which would seem to facilitate both good (proportional) electoral responsiveness and relatively transparent coalition governments.

5.6 Why Democratic Elections Perform Imperfectly

Elections are essential in representative democracies. Yet, even if elections are free from constraint and manipulation, they are seldom free from criticism. The problems of responsiveness facilitate this unhappiness.

Even if we limit our concept of responsiveness to the correspondence between distributions or changes in votes and distributions or changes in government, there are difficulties. There are empirical difficulties. (See the literature reviewed in Powell 2004.) A "party" may mean different things to voters in different regions. Different geographic distributions of votes have different implications under alternative election rules. "Too many" political parties relative to the election threshold can distort vote representation under any set of rules. Single-member district election rules are especially sensitive to the distribution of votes and number of parties. PR systems seldom elect majorities, creating dependence on legislative rules (usually favoring majorities) and legislative bargaining to complete the link to policymakers.

Beyond these empirical difficulties, which creative and context-sensitive institutional design can help alleviate, there is the tension between the alternative

normative visions of majoritarianism and proportionalism. Should the winners of a majority or plurality of votes be given unchecked policymaking power or only the largest share? Should the second-place finishers get nothing or a proportional (second largest) share? No magic of institutional design can resolve this fundamental normative difference, which also shapes the relative evaluations of democratic performance by voters for the winners and losers (Anderson and Gillroy 1997). The institutions associated with each vision perform relatively well by one standard, but not by the other.

Moreover, thoughtful analysts of the role of elections in democratic responsiveness seldom want to stop with the vote-policymaker connection alone. For, if the value of electoral responsiveness to votes lies in part in votes as indicators of citizens' preferences, then there are many ways in which that indication can go astray. The theories that connect preferences and policies through electoral vote responsiveness depend on the behavior of voters and on the commitments of political parties. From this point of view, the majoritarian and proportional visions are in part hypotheses about the roles of voter choice, party competition, vote aggregation, and legislative behavior in government formation. Successfully connecting citizen preferences to government commitments can go astray when any of the theorized linking connections break down. The empirical research suggests that the majoritarian connections are especially vulnerable to party system polarization, although both approaches have their vulnerabilities and can on occasion produce governments distant from the median voter. As observers analyze the congruence failures in their own system, the imperfections of elections in systematically inducing congruence will emerge repeatedly.

Producing governments connected to the median voter through electoral responsiveness and preference congruence is a significant achievement for democratic representation. Yet, this framing itself seems incomplete without integrating the potential sanctioning role of elections that encourages policymakers to fulfill their commitments. It is not only logically incomplete, but is tangled with the majoritarian leanings of accountability theory. Carey and Hix's exploration of the "accountability-representation frontier" and their focus on a "sweet spot" in institutional design that optimizes government closeness and small, transparent coalitions is an effort to take this into account. However, connecting citizen preferences and implemented policies, or changes in each, is empirically challenging and political science has yet far to go here. It seems clear that there are circumstances when other factors, such as changing needs and resources as the economy fluctuates, dominate public policy and obscure the role of citizens' long-term preferences. Again, there are plenty of occasions when elections will seem to perform imperfectly in every system.

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Chapter 6
Parties in Parliament: The Blurring of Opposition

Rudy B. Andeweg

Abstract The existence and activity of Political Opposition is indispensable in democratic systems of government. This chapter argues that the vital democratic functions of opposition (informing the voters and providing an alternative) are confined to the electoral arena. In the parliamentary arena, however, the distinction between government and opposition is blurred when opposition parties support the government, when governing parties oppose the government, when opposition parties provide structural support to a minority government, and when the government anticipates an opposition majority in another institution of government. As long as this blurring of opposition in the parliamentary arena goes unnoticed by the voters, opposition parties may still fulfill their democratic duties in the electoral arena, albeit in a hypocritical way. However, in recent years, government and opposition are growing so indistinct in the parliamentary arena that increasingly voters may find that they are no longer offered a meaningful choice within the system.

Keywords Parliament · Opposition · Bereichsopposition · Pseudo-opposition · Divided government · Cartel parties · Modes of executive-legislative relations

6.1 Introduction

> 'It was said by a close observer of Parliamentary institutions that "When the Government of the day and the Opposition of the day take the same side, one can be almost sure that some great wrong is at hand"' (Russell 1912: 250).

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The interactions between parties in government and parties in opposition make up an important part of inter-party relations in general. These interactions are rather understudied. As von Beyme complained some years ago, 'There is no truly comparative work on parliamentary oppositions' (von Beyme 1987: 45). The literature on this topic consists primarily of country-specific studies, sometimes brought together in edited volumes (Dahl 1966a; Oberreuter 1975; Kolinsky 1987; Helms 2008a). The lack of truly comparative work also translates into a lack of theorizing about the government–opposition dynamics, with Dahl's contributions (1966a, b) to his own edited volume still providing the point of departure for the relatively few exceptions. This chapter seeks to add to that small body of literature by pointing out that political parties interact with each other in a number of nested games, or in different arenas: elections, parliament, government, and these at different levels of government. Most notably, the interactions between opposition parties and governing parties in the electoral and parliamentary arenas are often very different. Increasingly, it would seem that the distinction between government and opposition gets blurred in the parliamentary arena, while voters are still supposed to attribute accountability in the electoral arena.

6.2 Opposition in Two Arenas

The existence of opposition is widely acknowledged as a crucial ingredient of representative democracy: 'democracy is an ideology of opposition as much as it is one of government' (I. Shapiro, quoted in Helms 2008a: 6) and 'one is inclined to regard the existence of an opposition party as very nearly the most distinctive characteristic of democracy' (Dahl 1966b: xviii). Yet, it is also a puzzling, almost unnatural, ingredient. To say that political parties seek power comes close to a tautology. There are exceptions to prove the rule, but generally parties want to maximize their hold on power, be it for its own sake, or as a means to affect public policy (Strøm and Müller 1999). Once in power, the rights of parties that are not in government are bound to be regarded as a nuisance, if not worse. If parties in power would think that they could get away with it, they would surely crush or at least constrain opposition. 'The system of managing the major political conflicts of a society by allowing one or more opposition parties to compete with the governing parties for votes in elections and in parliament is then (…) one of the greatest and most unexpected discoveries that man has ever stumbled onto' (Dahl 1966b: xvii–xviii).

The importance of opposition for representative democracy follows from definitions of democracy such as the one famously offered by Schumpeter: 'that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote' (Schumpeter 1950: 269). It is a minimal definition of the role of the people, but for them to fulfill their task, they need two things: information and an alternative. A government without opposition leaves the voters without a choice and without a monitor to inform them of the government's failures. In a democracy, the

opposition's task is to scrutinize and criticize the government's actions and to represent a credible alternative government (Helms 2008b: 9). This emphasis on parliamentary opposition in democratic theory has been criticized on two grounds. For some, it is too narrow a view of opposition. Since Dahl's 1966 volume on *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, the relative lack of attention to extraparliamentary opposition in the literature has been lamented (e.g., Blondel 1997; Brack and Weinblum 2011), but while other social groups and institutions such as the media and the judiciary may monitor the government equally well compared to opposition parties, they are less likely to provide an alternative government. For others, the importance of competition, and hence opposition, is overestimated in Schumpeterian definitions of democracy. In consociational or consensus democracy, for example, power is not so much contested, but shared (Lijphart 1977; Andeweg 2000), and the existence of opposition parties is not a vital part. For many, originally including Lijphart himself, however, the absence of competition and opposition is a weakness of consociational democracy, tolerable only because otherwise democracy could not survive in deeply divided societies: 'If one regards the presence of a strong opposition as an essential ingredient of democracy, consociational democracy is by definition less democratic than the British government-versus-opposition pattern (…). Under the unfavorable circumstances of segmental cleavages, consociational democracy, though far from the abstract ideal, is the best kind of democracy that can realistically be expected' (Lijphart 1977: 47–48). Although Lijphart (1999) later adopted a less defensive tone, the emphasis on parliamentary opposition in democratic theory seems justified.

Dahl (1966c) identified 'six important ways' in which parliamentary opposition may vary: concentration, competitiveness, distinctiveness, goals, strategy, and site for the interaction between government and opposition. Blondel (1997) has grouped some of Dahl's variables together to construct a two-dimensional typology of opposition: its cohesiveness and its distance from the government. A cohesive opposition forms a united and distinctive bloc against the government. At the other end of this dimension stands a diffuse opposition, divided into two or more groups that are as distinct from each other as they are from the government. Distance from the government also forms a dimension, ranging from limited disagreements on specific matters to outright rejection of the political regime. Implicit in such a typology is a normative preference for a cohesive opposition that disagrees with the government's policies, but does not reject the political system as such. If the opposition undermines the legitimacy of the entire regime, the stability of the democracy is at risk. If the opposition is not cohesive, it may unite temporarily to bring down the government, but it is unlikely to present a single alternative in the following elections, especially in multipolar party systems. This may eventually lead to a Weimar-like cabinet instability, also endangering democracy's stability (it is precisely to prevent such a scenario that the constructive vote of no confidence was invented). It is not difficult to recognize a Westminster-style 'Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition' as the preferred type of opposition in a democracy.

The reasoning behind the normative importance of opposition, and the preference for a cohesive and responsible opposition, provide a one-sided view of opposition. It sees opposition exclusively in its function for the voters: to provide them with information and an alternative for the incumbent government. The parliamentary arena is thus subordinate to the electoral arena: It is merely a forum from which to influence the next election; it is not an arena to influence public policy. Hence, in the words of a nineteenth century British politician, 'The duty of an Opposition [is] very simple… to oppose everything, and propose nothing' (cited in Norton 2008: 238). In this way, the normative perspective on opposition sees opposition parties as office seeking and vote seeking, but not policy seeking. To the extent that opposition parties are also policy seeking, they apparently sit on their hands in parliament and wait until it is their turn to govern. It is an empirical question whether opposition parties content themselves with cultivating their distinctiveness from the government, or actively contribute to policy making. Dahl recognized that patterns of opposition could be different in the electoral and parliamentary arenas, for example in the United States, with strictly competitive relations in the electoral arena, but partly cooperative relations in parliament, at least at the time of his writing (Dahl 1966c: 336–338). The distinction between the electoral and parliamentary arenas also is featured prominently in Strøm's explanation of the formation of minority governments. He draws attention to the fact that '(…) even opposition parties can enjoy some policy influence in most parliamentary democracies. Thus, the role of the opposition is not simply to criticize and present an alternative government, functions that have been emphasized in descriptions of the Westminster model of government. (…) We should therefore think of the policy influence of the various parties in and out of government as a matter of degree' (Strøm 1990: 42). In some countries, parliament offers opposition parties many opportunities to influence public policy (for example, through the structure of the committee system), while parliamentary influence for the opposition is minimal elsewhere. And in some political systems, through a combination of the party system and electoral system, the election outcome determines the composition of the government to a great extent, while electoral decisiveness is low in other systems. Strøm's argument is that a combination of high electoral decisiveness and high parliamentary influence for opposition parties makes minority government more likely, but his two-dimensional typology (Strøm 1990: 90) may also serve to illustrate different opposition strategies: where electoral decisiveness is high and opposition influence in parliament is low, we find the Westminster pattern of using parliament only as a platform to fight the next election. But opposition strategies are different in the other combinations. Where electoral decisiveness is low and parliamentary influence is high, for example, opposition parties may largely ignore their 'democratic duties' of monitoring and presenting an alternative and invest in the legislative process in parliament instead. From an opposition point of view, the combination of low electoral decisiveness and low opposition influence in parliament offers the most dismal prospects: This cell in the typology is aptly labeled 'captive opposition.'

However, to the extent that elections are at least moderately effective and opposition parties have at least *some* opportunities to influence policy making in parliament, they face a trade-off. Participating in the policy-making process in parliament involves more than saying 'no' to every government proposal and thus brings the risk of losing distinctiveness in the eyes of the voter. According to Strøm, 'Parties in opposition have to do their work away from the centers of public attention, because opportunities are more available and compromises less embarrassing to the government' (Strøm 1990: 43), but primarily, we might add, to avoid that working together with governing parties in parliamentary policy making is noticed by the electorate. The trade-off that opposition parties have to face between immediate policy seeking in the parliamentary arena and vote seeking in the electoral arena is not only affected by the institutional architecture of the political system. Party characteristics also play a role. Steinack (2011), for example, contrasts the strategies of two Bavarian opposition parties. Among other factors, a simple variable such as the size of the parliamentary group (more representatives allowing for the specialization needed to be influential in committees) helps explain why the SPD could seek to influence policy making in parliament while the Greens used parliament primarily to advertise their distinctiveness from the ruling CSU.

However, in this chapter, I shall not focus on such institutional and party differences affecting the choice of opposition strategy in the two arenas. Instead, I focus on similarities across parties and institutional contexts. It is the thesis of the remainder of this chapter that in many countries, several developments in the parliamentary arena, and even in the governmental arena, are blurring the distinction between governing parties and opposition parties, and eroding the democratic function of the opposition.

6.3 Opposition Parties Supporting the Government

In most parliaments, we find 'co-government' devices in which the opposition cooperates with the government in the procedural running of parliament (Helms 2004), but co-government seems to extend into the substance of policy making as well. It is striking how exceptional it seems to be that opposition parties actually oppose government proposals in parliament (von Beyme 1987: 41). We lack a systematic and comparative analysis of the voting behavior of opposition parties, but a pattern of cooperation on legislation has been reported for countries as diverse as Spain (Mujica and Sanchez-Cuenca 2006), Italy (Giuliani 2008) and Austria (Helms 2008b: 15), Germany, the Scandinavian countries, and Latin America (Norton 2008: 241). For the Netherlands, Visscher (1994) studied the fate of some 3,000 bills that were discussed in parliament between 1963 and 1986. The government had introduced all but a few of these proposals, yet, surprisingly, the opposition parties usually supported them when it came to the final vote. When in opposition, the liberal conservatives (VVD) opposed only 8 % of all government

bills, and for Labour (PvdA) the percentage is not much higher; 12 %. Even the most oppositional of all opposition parties, the Communist party, voted against no more than 16 % of all government proposals (Visscher 1994: 375–376). Several explanations can be suggested for this absence of opposition in parliament. The Dutch constitution, for example, has no provision that bills die at the end of a parliamentary term. As a consequence, by the time a bill comes to a vote, one or more parties who had been in government when the bill was introduced may find themselves on the opposition benches. In such cases, it is hardly credible for a party to vote against a bill that it had introduced, simply because it is now in opposition. However, the number of such cases should not be overestimated, and moreover, it merely rephrases the puzzle: Why do previous opposition parties not withdraw the bills that were introduced by parties currently in opposition? Another explanation would see the support from opposition parties as a symptom of Dutch consociationalism: The practice of elite cooperation within oversized coalitions is apparently extended even further into seeking consensus with opposition parties. However, only the first years of the period studied by Visscher—1963–1986—belong to the era of consociational democracy. In fact, it includes years of fierce polarization (1970–1982) when parties of the left sought to transform the Dutch system in a majoritarian direction. Moreover, a more recent analysis of all votes in the Dutch Lower House between June 2002 and February 2003 shows that the governing parties supported 94 % of all legislative proposals, which was hardly more than the 91 % of all bills that were supported by the opposition parties (personal communication from Simon Otjes).

But the biggest blow to these two country-specific explanations is the fact that very similar patterns have been reported for the UK—an adversarial rather than a consociational system, in which bills do die. Van Mechelen and Rose (1986) analyzed the parliamentary process of 2,399 bills approved by the House of Commons between 1945 and 1983. 'From a perspective of four decades, the most important point to emphasize is that legislation in the House of Commons is normally consensual. Even in a period of massive rhetorical confrontation between the Conservative and Labour parties from 1979 to 1983, 61 % of new government legislation went through without a division on principle, and as much as 78 % in the session leading up to the 1983 general election' (Van Mechelen and Rose 1986: 58). And even when the opposition called for a formal vote on a bill, it did not massively vote against it: 'Given that the opposition normally has more than 250 MPs, it is specially noteworthy that only three percent of Acts of Parliament are opposed by more than 250 MPs' (Van Mechelen and Rose 1986: 59). It may well be that the opposition is willing to support governmental proposals because they have been able to influence and amend them prior to the plenary vote. Visscher shows that in the Netherlands, the government will often change its proposal as a result of deliberations during the committee stage; it did not oppose 68 % of all opposition amendments and even adopted 7 % of them (Visscher 1994: 261). In the UK, opposition influence supposedly takes place even further 'away from the centers of public attention': 'In order to avoid conflict in the Commons, government ministers prefer to make most of their bills so agreeable to

all affected that not even the Opposition, with a tactical parliamentary incentive to oppose, can vote against' (Van Mechelen and Rose 1986: 59). But such an explanation merely begs the question: why would governing parties, with a secure parliamentary majority, anticipate or adopt opposition parties' suggestions?

An alternative explanation draws attention to the fact that government versus opposition is but one of several 'modes of executive–legislative relations' (King 1976; Andeweg and Nijzink 1995). Next to this 'opposition mode,' for example, MPs and ministers may also operate in a 'cross-party mode' where they cooperate with MPs and/or ministers from other parties on issues of common interest. In the Dutch parliament, for example, MPs specialize in a particular policy area, often on the basis of their background or previous occupation. According to surveys of Dutch MPs, about 80 % agree that, as their party's specialists, the parliamentary party allows them considerable freedom of maneuver in Parliamentary Committees. They use this freedom to work together in committees in a less partisan atmosphere. An agreement between policy specialists may carry over into the much more partisan plenary sessions because other MPs take their voting cues from their party's specialist.

In the British case, the cross-party mode has also been identified, but its influence is likely to be more indirect. After all, legislation is dealt with in Standing Committees where evidence of a bipartisan spirit is hard to find. But party discipline is more relaxed in the Select Committees and absent in the rapidly growing number of all-party groups (groups of MPs from all parties with a common interest) in the UK Parliament, covering subjects as diverse as AIDS, child and youth crime, compassion in dying, environment, equalities, genocide prevention, obesity, prison health, solvent abuse, tourism, and war crime (Norton 2008: 241).

Obviously, this cross-party mode can only operate for proposals that are not highly charged ideologically. Van Mechelen and Rose report that (…) defense and international affairs show a very high degree of consensus. This reflects recognition of common British interests vis-à-vis other countries. The high degree of consensus in agricultural legislation emphasizes the privileged position of farm pressure groups in all parties (…) The most divisive issues between the parties concern housing and local government, where party interests are particularly engaged (59; also see von Beyme 1987: 41). The mixture of more ideological proposals and more technocratic proposals (or between position issues and valence issues) is thus likely to affect the degree of opposition party support for government proposals. Van Mechelen and Rose study legislation up to 1983 and Visscher's data extend to 1986, but it seems highly unlikely that opposition party support has declined since then. After all, political parties have become less distinctive. The social cleavages that structured the party systems of most Western democracies have eroded, and political parties no longer represent well-organized social groups. And it may not be 'the end of ideology,' but the great ideological battles of the past are over, leaving parties to attract voters more on the basis of administrative competence than programmatic profile. It is telling that of the countries for which recent data on parliamentary cooperation between government

and opposition are available, we see a decline only in Belgium, where mobilization along the linguistic divide overrides the growing similarity between parties in other policy areas (Andeweg et al. 2008: 100).

6.4 Governing Parties Opposing the Government

While opposition parties support government proposals, we also see governing parties oppose them. It is exceptional for a party with ministers in government to declare itself to be formally in opposition (See Church and Vatter 2009 for an example), but informally opposition by governing parties seems to occur more frequently. Obviously such opposition is rare in single-party government, although King's 'intra-party mode' of executive–legislative relations points to the possibility of a backbench revolt against the governing party's ministers. It is difficult to distinguish this mode from individual MPs, or a party faction, refusing to toe the party line: opposition by the parliamentary party as such against its own prime minister would signal the end of the government. The situation is different in coalition governments. Here, the relations between ministers of one governing party and MPs of another governing party are described by King (1976) as an 'inter-party mode' of executive–legislative relations, and by Andeweg and Nijzink (1995) as the 'intra-coalition mode.' That such relations can involve active opposition has been noted first for countries with an all-party government or a grand coalition. For Switzerland, Kerr argues that the inclusion of all parties in government has not prevented some governing parties from opposing proposals in parliament, in particular when issues are highly salient and touching upon ideological differences (Kerr 1978).

In Austria, such opposition takes the form of *Bereichsopposition,* where a governing party opposes the policies of ministers belonging to the other governing party: 'The administration of every department is under constant attack from the party press, the parliamentary group, and organizational spokesmen of the coalition partner' (Engelmann 1966: 271–272; Müller 1993). Some of this *Bereichsopposition* takes place out of sight within the corridors of power of the coalition, but it is also practiced in parliament, where the coalition parties employ it as a strategy to mark their own position for the benefit of their voters. '(…) If a party has to agree to a compromise particularly distasteful to its clientele, it will be allowed to make enough parliamentary and extraparliamentary noises to convince its clientele of the intensity of its reluctance' (Kirchheimer 1957: 139). This may take the form of asking critical parliamentary questions of the coalition partner's ministers, of teaming up with parties outside the coalition to launch a parliamentary inquiry into a scandal in a policy area dominated by the coalition partner, and it may even include introducing private member bills presenting alternative policies. Often, the coalition agreement does not rule out the introduction of such a bill, but it does not allow coalition parties to join the opposition in parliamentary votes. So many of these proposals never come to a vote, symptomatic of the fact

that *Bereichsopposition* is not intended to jeopardize the coalition (Andeweg et al. 2008: 100–103).

Holzhacker discovered such intra-coalition opposition in the Netherlands with regard to scrutiny of EU decision making. According to one of the MPs interviewed, '(…) the tendency is to be more critical towards the ministers of the other coalition partners than towards our own ministers. This is done to preserve the party interest … the heaviest tensions and contradictions exist between the biggest coalition partners, especially between the PvdA and the VVD. This struggle is partly fought in parliament and partly fought in the government' (quoted in Holzhacker 2002: 473). Similar practices can be observed in other countries, with junior ministers of one party appointed to act as 'a spy of one party implanted in a ministry administered by the other party' (Engelmann 1966: 270; also see Thies 2001), or, more visibly, with the chair of parliamentary committees being held by an MP from a governing party that has not appointed the minister in the department that is scrutinized by the committee (Carroll and Cox 2012).

Kirchheimer saw *Bereichsopposition* as filling the gap created by the 'waning of oppositions' that he famously predicted: 'It presents a limited survival and revival of the opposition concept at a time when opposition ideologies (…) are becoming downgraded to the role of relatively meaningless etiquettes and advertisement slogans within the framework of interest representation' (Kirchheimer 1957: 156). Lijphart saw it as evidence that opposition does exist in consociational democracies (Lijphart 1977: 48). However, for many voters, the paradox of support by opposition parties and opposition by governing parties is likely to contribute to a blurring of the distinction between government and opposition.

The incentives for *Bereichsopposition* are bigger the more a party's distinct identity is obscured by the nature of the coalition. Helms regards what he calls 'sectoral opposition' as a consequence of grand coalitions or surplus majority coalitions (2008b: 10), but in addition to unusually large coalitions, we may also think of coalitions that are not 'minimal connected winning' or otherwise ideologically compact as threats to a governing party's identity. Peter Mair has repeatedly drawn attention to the rise of coalition 'promiscuity' (first in Mair 1995: 49), the increasing occurrence of unusual or at least innovative combinations of parties: 'rainbow coalitions' in Belgium and Finland, 'purple coalitions' in the Netherlands, etc. To the extent that such a trend exists, it is likely to contribute to the blurring of opposition.

6.5 Pseudo-Opposition

A special case of such an unusual combination is when one or more political parties form a minority government that is assured of a parliamentary majority by the permanent support of one or more parties outside the government. It has long been recognized that the category of 'minority government' actually contains two very different types: There are 'true' minority governments that are not guaranteed

support by a parliamentary majority and must persuade one or more opposition parties to support a specific proposal. The government may well find that support among different opposition parties for different measures. It is a form of support that I discussed in the section on 'opposition parties supporting the government.' But there are also 'pseudo' minority governments, in which the government strikes a deal with one or more opposition parties which receive concessions in return for permanent support: It may be a minority government, but de facto it is a majority coalition. And the parties that do not join the government but agree to lend it consistent support are pseudo-opposition parties; their ambiguous status itself blurs the distinction between government and opposition. Some pseudo-opposition parties are still close to real opposition parties. For example, in Austria, in 1970, the SPÖ formed a minority government under Chancellor Kreisky with the support of the opposition party FPÖ. The FPÖ did so only because of Kreisky's promise of electoral reform. Shortly after the reform had been approved, early elections were called in 1971 (Müller 2011). The support agreement was short lived and only implicit. On the other extreme, some pseudo-opposition parties are almost indistinguishable from real governing parties. For example, in New Zealand, in 2005, Labour formed a minority government with structural support from two parties: United Future and New Zealand First (Bale and Bergman 2006). The agreement consisted of joint policy positions on a range of issues and consultation procedures on other issues. In addition, the leaders of the two pseudo-opposition parties were appointed to ministerial positions outside the cabinet. Most support agreements between minority governments and pseudo-opposition parties fall in-between, with joint policy positions on a wide range of issues (but rarely on all), complemented by consultation procedures on other issues. For example, in the Netherlands, from 2010 to 2012, conservative liberals and Christian Democrats formed a minority coalition with structural support from the populist Freedom Party. In a separate written agreement, the governing parties and the Freedom Party spelled out the concessions to the Freedom Party—primarily with regard to immigration—in return for the Freedom Party's support of the government's austerity measures. Weekly consultations between the Freedom Party's leader and the prime minister were intended to prevent conflicts on other issues from destabilizing the government, but on several other issues, for example on foreign policy, the Freedom Party continued to act as a true opposition party and the government had to find ad hoc allies as a true minority government.

Because of such variation, there is no agreement on the frequency with which pseudo-opposition occurs. Herman and Pope estimated that 58 % of all minority governments in 12 European countries between 1945 and 1971 were supported by a majority coalition in parliament (Herman and Pope 1973: 194). Strøm, however, looked at 125 minority governments in 15 countries between 1945 and 1987, and found that only 11 % were supported by a majority coalition in parliament. If the majority criterion was dropped, the percentage of minority governments having support agreements with one or more parties outside the government is slightly higher (Strøm 1990: 62). There are no recent figures about the occurrence of pseudo-opposition, but it seems likely that the numbers have gone up rather than

down. Bale and Bergman (2006) suggest that 'European politics provides plenty of contemporary examples' (424) and argue that in Sweden and New Zealand at least, 'this can be something more than a historical coincidence' (425), or even a 'trend' (437). Indeed, countries accustomed to 'true' minority government such as Norway and Denmark have recently become acquainted with the phenomenon of 'pseudo-opposition,' and countries usually governed by majority governments, such as New Zealand and the Netherlands, have recently witnessed the formation of minority governments supported by pseudo-opposition parties. There are two reasons why pseudo-opposition is likely to become more widespread. First, the costs of governing have steadily increased. The election results in 17 European countries show that in the 1940s and 1950s nearly half of all incumbent governments were rewarded in the elections; in the 1960s and 1970s, this dropped to just over a third; and in the 1980s and 1990s, only one in five governments escaped electoral punishment (Narud and Valen 2008). Given the growing electoral risks of government participation, parties may becoming less eager to join the government, and they may come to see pseudo-opposition as a way of 'having your cake and eating it too': of gaining influence over government policy without being held accountable by the voters. Second, many countries have seen a rise of right-wing populist parties in recent years. Often, they are regarded as pariah parties and excluded from government participation. But as these parties grow in size while the political center erodes, it becomes more and more difficult—and less and less attractive—to form a government without them. Giving such parties pseudo-opposition status, as happened in Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and New Zealand, allows the established parties to claim that they are not governing with the populists, and allows the populist parties to prove that they are *koalitionsfähig* (fit for coalition participation) in order to be seen as *regierungsfähig* (fit for government participation) in future (Bale and Bergman 2006: 447).

6.6 Divided Government

A fourth manifestation of the blurring of opposition is divided government. That term originated in the US literature on executive–legislative relations to describe a situation in which the president is facing a majority of the other party in at least one of the chambers of Congress (e.g., Mayhew 1991). That definition can also be applied to semi-presidential systems, where the term 'divided government' is even more appropriate than in the United States, given the fact that both the presidential majority and the parliamentary majority actually take part in government in the form of 'cohabitation.' Laver and Shepsle (1991) have extended the concept to include minority governments in parliamentary systems, but in such systems we can also find a more institutional manifestation: where the government commands a majority in one chamber of a bicameral legislature, but not in the other (Elgie 2001). Divided government would not lead to a blurring of the distinction between government and opposition if it would result in gridlock. However, the curious

thing is that such an impasse rarely occurs when different executive or legislative institutions are controlled by different parties or coalitions of parties. Most studies find little or no difference in legislative output between a government that controls a majority in all relevant institutions and divided government. Manow and Burkhart (2007) suggest that the solution to this puzzle lies in the law of anticipated reactions: The government anticipates the opposition's veto potential under divided government and either refrains from introducing controversial proposals or waters them down to make them acceptable to the opposition. Thus, the distinction between government and opposition disappears: the two form an 'informal grand coalition' (Sturm 2001: 181) to avoid paralysis.

The German case is particularly interesting because divided government there means that the government faces an opposition majority in the Bundesrat. Divided government caused by bicameralism is not exceptional, but the fact that the Bundesrat consists of the governments of the Länder is: it points to federalism as a cause of divided government in systems where subnational government and national government are intertwined, as they are in Germany. Friedrich (1966) has once argued that federalism and opposition mutually reinforce each other, but there is more evidence for von Beyme's 'old truism, that in federal systems oppositions are more prone to co-operation than to conflict' (von Beyme 1987: 38). Belgium provides another example, where federalization has caused the political parties to split. As a result, the same party leaders square off against each other in elections at different levels, most importantly in the federal and regional elections. After the elections, coalition governments must be formed at all levels. As long as it was possible to form 'congruent' coalitions at the different levels, the distinction between government and opposition transcended the levels of government. However, since the electoral cycles have been decoupled in 2003, such congruence has proved more difficult to achieve and the same party leaders that cooperate in government at one level, may oppose each other at the other level (Swenden 2002; Deschouwer 2009). This may be a schizophrenic experience for them, but for voters it cannot but blur the distinction between government and opposition.

Whether the institutional context is semi-presidentialism, bicameralism, or federalism, divided government is likely to occur more often because of partisan dealignment. When elections for different institutions do not coincide, electoral volatility may result in different outcomes and thus in divided government. When elections do coincide, split-ticket voting, even if it is not strategically intended, may also lead to different outcomes and divided government.

6.7 Trend and Consequences

In this chapter, I have argued that the vital democratic functions of opposition (informing the voters and providing an alternative) are confined to the electoral arena. In the parliamentary arena, however, the distinction between government and opposition is blurred when opposition parties support the government, when

governing parties oppose the government, when opposition parties provide structural support to a minority government, and when the government anticipates an opposition majority in another institution of government. As long as the blurring of opposition in the parliamentary arena goes unnoticed by the voters, the opposition may still fulfill its democratic duties in the electoral arena albeit in a rather hypocritical way. But the four forms of blurring are likely to grow in importance in future. As parties become less distinctive sociologically and ideologically, opposition parties will find themselves more often in agreement with government proposals; as party systems fragment, governing coalitions are likely to become more heterogeneous and governing parties will find it necessary more often to signal their distinctiveness through intra-coalition opposition; as the electoral costs of full government participation rise, it becomes more attractive for parties to support a minority government in return for policy concessions while formally staying in opposition; and as the growth of pariah parties continues, it becomes more difficult to exclude them from government, and allowing them to join not the government but the coalition is becoming a more likely compromise; and as partisan dealignment is not reversed, electoral volatility and/or ticket splitting are more likely to lead to divided government.

So far, the evidence in support of the theoretical distinction between opposition behavior in the two arenas is largely anecdotal. Neither studies that assume a neat division of labour between opposition parties and governing parties in both arenas nor this chapter's argument that the distinction is blurred in one of the two arenas, can point to systematic and comparative data on the actual parliamentary behavior of the two categories of parties. Only the analysis of such behavioral patterns will allow us to determine to what extent governing parties engage in intra-coalition opposition, how often minority governments have support arrangements with pseudo-opposition parties, etc. And only such behavioral patterns can reveal which institutional settings produce more blurring of opposition than others.

A second line of inquiry would be to gauge the extent to which, and the conditions under which, voters are aware of the incongruence between parties' behavior in the two arenas. If it is true, as this chapter suggests, that government and opposition will grow less distinct, it will become ever more difficult for political parties to keep their behavior in the parliamentary arena separated from their behavior in the electoral arena. If voters can no longer distinguish between government and opposition, they are likely to find that they are no longer offered a meaningful choice within the system, and they may well vote against the system. It is a scenario that has been put forward by several authors. Back in 1968, Arend Lijphart foresaw a transformation of hitherto consociational democracies into 'depoliticized democracies' (in his Dutch publications he used the label 'cartel democracies') (Lijphart 1968). He predicted that in those countries, the social cleavages would erode, resulting in a more homogeneous political culture, while the political elites would continue to cooperate rather than compete. He advocated that prudent elites should introduce some form of opposition clearly fearing the development of anti-system sentiments. Katz and Mair's cartel party thesis extends this line of argument to non-consociational countries (Katz and Mair 1995).

Political parties, they argue, are becoming more alike, less rooted in civil society, and more reliant on the resources of the state. In a dialectic development, they expect the emergence of a new form of political party that challenges the cartel of established parties. '(E)xperience suggests that one particular rallying cry, which seems common to many new parties and which seems particularly effective in mobilizing support (…) is their demand to "break the mould" of established politics' (Katz and Mair 1995: 24). And pointing to the emergence of right-wing populist parties in particular, they observe that 'Many of these parties appear to be gaining great mileage from their assumed capacity to break up what they often refer to as the "cozy" arrangements that exist between the established political alternatives' (Katz and Mair 1995: 24). Such a development bodes ill for democracy if the populist right constitutes an anti-system 'opposition of principle.' That seems unlikely, however, as the current populist parties seem keener to reform democracy than to abolish democracy. It is not unthinkable that the populist parties will infuse democracy with some form of real opposition, but, paradoxically, the rise of the populist right may also contribute further to the blurring of opposition as established parties seek to keep these challengers out of the center of power by resorting to ever more complex coalition combinations, sometimes even accepting the populist parties as structural support parties.

In the quote at the start of this chapter, George Russell, a British Liberal MP in the nineteenth century, refers to an occasional blurring of opposition causing a specific 'wrong': the bombardment of Alexandria in 1882. If the blurring of opposition becomes structural, however, more may be at stake than buildings in a far away city.

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Chapter 7
Parliamentary Party Groups: To Whom is the Midfield Accountable?

Knut Heidar

Abstract In multiparty parliamentary democracies, the parliamentary party groups (PPGs) relate to voters and the general public, to the party organization, and—particularly if in government—to government initiatives. Especially in countries with traditionally strong party organizations, like in the Nordic democracies, this puts the PPGs at the crossroad of three different streams of policy making. Modeling unitary parties consequently become a dubious undertaking. Weak party discipline in parliament may of course be an indication that the overall party unity is shaky. But also strong disciplined PPGs may act in ways that fragmentize overall party power. Moreover, it follows that not considering the crucial power of PPGs and the role they play in decision making may lead to inadequate maps of power structures. In this chapter, I will first explore the position attributed to PPGs in some recent works on parties and parliaments. Expanding on the work by Heidar and Koole, I explore the thesis that PPGs are underestimated in many works both on parties and on parliaments. The chapter provides a discussion of the implications of this relative neglect for both fields of research.

Keywords Parties · Democracy · Parliaments · Delegation

7.1 Introduction

Sir Bobby Charlton, the Manchester United and England captain who led his team to world championship in 1966, commanded the midfield with enormous attacking and

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defensive capabilities. Charlton became a legend in English and world football alike. Scoring goals and countering attacks mark the winner. At times, it may be the outstanding attacker or goalkeeper who turns the balance in close matches. In the long run, however, it is in the midfield that the game is decided—just as with the parliamentary party groups (PPGs) in parliamentary democracies. The "midfield" is not one player, but a collective. Sometimes it is brilliantly coordinated, but in other cases it may lack the personalities to lead and will fall apart under attack.

European democracies are, with few exceptions, organized as parliamentary party governments. What makes these regimes democratic, and what are the mechanisms that support or weaken a regime's democratic qualities? How do democracies vary in institutional arrangements and practices? What is the role of parties? These are of course central questions within mainstream political science. Recently, a new approach has been developed to analyze these questions based on the theory of delegation. The approach has been applied to the European democracies, and in particular pursued by a group of scholars—under the editorship of Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman—in the trilogy on coalition governments, delegation and accountability, and cabinets and coalition making in Western Europe (2000, 2003a and 2008). In this chapter, I take these books as the basic texts for what I will refer to as principal–agent (PA) analysis.

These scholars have modeled their empirical work on the PA approach, whereby the principal in democratic regimes, the voters, delegate decisions to their agents, whom they then hold accountable at the next election. Parties are central in this line of delegation, as voters usually elect party representatives; and, once elected, the representatives become part of PPGs. In this chapter, I look into the place and role of PPGs in parliamentary democracies, in general, and their place in the PA scheme in particular. I also discuss the advantages and limitations of the PA modeling and description of democracies, again as seen through the prism of PPGs.

7.2 The Study of Parliamentary Party Groups and the Multiple Rationalities of MPs

Parties are inherent to political representative assemblies, although they may differ widely in politics, cohesiveness, and organization. Groups or parties will emerge in parliaments in order to enhance the power of representatives and to offer some baseline predictability to policy making (Cox and McCubbins 1993). Parties can handle large amounts of information and facilitate efficiency within parliaments by means of an organized division of labor. Here, the words of Schattschneider come to mind: "the political parties created democracy and… modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the political parties" (Schattschneider 1942: 1). Ian Budge seconds this view "…It is simply unrealistic to think that democracy could function without groupings resembling political parties…" (Budge 1996: 175).

In democracies, parties are essential: They provide mechanisms for organizing governments, for accountability, for regime legitimacy, stability and efficiency, and for transparency. This makes them crucial to our understanding of how democracies work (Heidar and Koole 2000b: 4–5). Since the extension of suffrage in many European countries in the late nineteenth century, parliamentary groups have organized parties outside of parliament in order to mobilize voters at elections. As suffrage broadened, new parties were also first organized outside the parliamentary sphere. The PPGs of today emerged in the dual context of parliamentarism and universal suffrage. This story is a familiar one (Duverger 1954).

As a consequence, PPGs often have a split heritage—sometimes considered as the ultimate center, the party nucleus, although supported by external auxiliary organizations, networks and media connections; and sometimes considered as the parliamentary arm of the party, merely implementing predetermined party policies on behalf of the extra-parliamentary party organization (EPO[1]). This dual heritage creates a rich range of PPG types and practices. PPG operations are surrounded by networks and organized linkages to the party outside of parliament. Sometimes the party as a whole is identified by the "three faces of party"—the EPO, the party in the electorate, and the party in government (Key 1964)—although it is not always clear where the PPG belongs in this scheme. If needed the PPG could be placed as part of the party's face in the governing institutions. The PPGs, however, is not part of the government in the (European) parliamentary meaning, so the finer tunes on this must be based on relevant analytical needs.

Anyhow, it does follow that "the party" as a conceptual umbrella denotes a diverse set of structures and actors in which the least common denominator sometimes can be difficult to spot. The level of unity or party cohesion is a matter of empirical research. Parties may be fragmentized horizontally (party organization vs. party representatives in public office) or vertically (branches vs. county vs. national organization). Factionalization will also occur regularly within all sections, according to policies and ideological tendencies. Parties *are* about handling differences in order to give all a stronger influence over public policies. Laver and Shepsle remind us that, although parties usually enter government or stay in opposition as a whole, we "need a model of intraparty politics before we can develop a realistic model of interparty competition" (Laver and Shepsle 1999: 24). PPGs are part of the party as a whole, with a particular place in party decision-making processes, and they must be viewed in this light.

[1] In the following, I use the term EPO—extra-parliamentary party organization—to refer to the whole party organization outside of parliament and the government: the organizational leadership, the central committee, the external party secretariat, constituency-level parties and party branches, and the membership and activists.

7.2.1 Four PPG Research Questions

What exactly do PPGs do? The general goal of any PPG will be to maximize preferred policy outcome and to position the party for success at future elections. The practice will focus on coordinating the policies and actions of the party's representatives in parliament. In order to do so, the PPG needs an organized structure with a leadership and internal specialization. Parliaments usually organize their work in committees in which party policies are declared and parliamentary debates and votes are prepared. To gain influence and public exposure, the parties must assign to the various committees the MPs they see as best fit. Within the committees, these "party spokespersons" will be responsible for developing party policies on the basis of their party's election program. They will also need to anchor that policy in their PPG, occasionally also in the party organization at large, and in presenting the party's stand in the committee, in parliament, and to the general public. When possible, they will seek to work to exert maximum influence on forming short- and long-term majorities in parliament. The PPGs will also be equipped with structures and procedures to facilitate quick maneuvers based on a group majority. To facilitate group efficiency, the PPG needs resources to provide administrative service and political consultancy to its members, contact mechanisms to look after relations with outside party organs, relevant "external" actors (like government ministers), and "whips" to ensure voting cohesion.

Empirical research on PPGs has been guided by four main questions. First, what is the role and purpose of parties in democracies, and what are the alternatives? Second, how cohesive are PPGs in parliaments? Third, what is the power of PPGs? Are they supreme in relation to the EPO? Does the PPG leadership control its members? And fourth, how are PPGs organized so as to reap the benefits of division of labor and coordinated actions?

The literature offers numerous answers as to the question of the role of parties in democracies. Most are variations on the six basic tasks assigned to parties, as summarized by King many years ago (King 1969: 120): structuring the vote, integrating and mobilizing the mass public, recruiting political leaders, organizing the government, forming public policies, and aggregation of interests. Naturally, in practice, party achievements vary on all these tasks, and parties are not the only institutions relevant to them. Interest organizations, like trade unions, may, for example, mobilize the mass public, recruit political leaders, and aggregate interests. The basic message, however, is that parties are central in linking citizens to political decisions in democracies. The PPGs are both relevant and awkward in modeling the democratic linkage provided by parties in general as the MPs must balance their dual position as a representative of both their electors and of their party organization.

Nevertheless, we must ask: Are there alternatives to party democracy? It could well be argued that these party tasks are either not needed or could easily be taken over by some other institutions. Polsby (1983) offers a bleak view of politics without parties: elitist, market driven, and consultancy based, with feuding

institutional factions, a politics dominated by fashion, celebrities, and pseudo-politics. Strøm (2000a, b) investigates alternatives to party government by discussing Katz's three alternatives: neocorporatism, pluralist democracy, and referenda (Katz 1987). Strøm finds only pluralist democracy—in which elected representatives are directly accountable to their constituencies (a system closer to US politics)—an alternative to the parliamentary party systems of Europe (Strøm 2000b: 203). Also in pluralist democracies, however, one would expect the emergence of groups in parliament. That is how parties started, the PPGs came first.

A second line of research has looked into the voting unity and political cohesion of PPGs. This is the theme in Simon Hug's chapter in this book. Such unity varies from country to country. It tends to be fairly high in Northern Europe, and somewhat lower in Central/Eastern Europe and in the USA (Owens 2003; Sieberer 2003: 161). Also within different parties inside specific parliaments, there are variations (Jensen 2000; Skjæveland 2001). Many factors can contribute to explain voting unity, among them the party culture, the political homogeneity of the PPG, the parliamentary and electoral system and—not least—the disciplinary measures available to the PPG leadership (Özbudun 1970; Bowler et al. 1999; Jensen 2000; Hazan 2003). PPG unity is often considered central to the evaluation of the democratic process. However, Bowler et al. (1999) point out that this "hidden assumption" of unity has frequently been taken for granted and that empirical studies are few (see Carey 2009). Also, the ways in which the PPG makes its decisions are important: Is the priority given to a particular policy in the party program or through electoral pledges? Do PPG decisions emerge through internal party processes involving the party at the constituency level, the EPO leadership and (if relevant) the party in government? Similarly, when voting discipline is low, we must ask whether this is because the MPs pay more attention to their local voters and/or local-level party organization, or because they listen to interest groups, PACs or takes cues from intragroup leadership. In studies of PPGs and their position in the structures of linkage—alternatively the line of delegation—it is at any rate important to go behind the facade of unitary actors which often is achieved only after much internal debate.

The third question, about the autonomy and power of PPGs and MPs alike, is partly a question of how PPGs/MPs are situated institutionally within the parliament, and partly a question of internal organization and external linkages. Voting discipline and policy formation in PPGs are embedded in an organizational context. What disciplinary measures are available to the leadership (in PPGs, in the national organization, at the constituency level)? How is the process for policy making organized in parliaments, committees, and the PPGs? Are representatives of the external party involved in PPG decision making? In Heidar and Koole (2000b), we aimed at classifying the different types of PPGs and noted several dimensions for their differentiation: The level of group discipline, the resources controlled by the PPGs (not by the MPs individually), the autonomy of PPGs in relation to the external party, and (if relevant) to the party in government. From comparative accounts of PPGs in several European countries, we found a tendency

for them to shift in the direction of "parliamentary party complexes," whereby they control many of the resources needed for MPs to pursue political goals, at the same time as the voting discipline was high (Heidar and Koole 2000c). Perhaps, it is no great surprise that control and discipline should go together naturally. We also found a trend, although weaker, toward stronger influence or the EPO over the PPG (Heidar and Koole 2000c). On the other hand, a study based on a different approach, looking at the statuses of 16 Danish parties since the early 1950s, has argued that these relations have stayed roughly the same over the past 50 years (Pedersen 2010). The differences found at the outset (often based on ideology, party origin and age) have remained basically the same throughout the period.

Helms (2000) explores the various PPG–EPO relationships and identifies five basic patterns, modeled after the relationships found in the Great Britain (PPG dominance), France (EPO dominance), Germany (integrative party leadership), USA (functional autonomy), and Japan (factiocracy). From the literature, he finds that most West European countries belong to either the PPG dominance or the integrative party leadership types. Belgium, Austria (partly), and Italy (after regime change in the early 1990s), however, fall within the EPO dominance group (2000: 117). The US functional autonomy type seems to apply only to non-parliamentary democracies.

The fourth question, on organizational structures, is usually discussed in connection with the questions on cohesiveness and power. Important aspects include the general position of PPGs inside parliaments and their relationship to the overall party and their government fraction, their financing and staffing, and organizational structure in terms of leadership, decision-making structures, and hierarchic control: in short, how PPGs are controlled, what PPGs control, and by what means (Bowler et al. 1999; Heidar and Koole 2000a). We have noted the tendency toward parliamentary party complexes, but the comparative literature on this is scarce.

7.2.2 Varieties of Rationality Inside the PPGs

Rational action is the best action to reach specified goals, so it follows that a list of goals and goal hierarchies is essential for modeling MPs behavior. We find in the literature that "party cohesion" is sometimes treated as one rational objective for action, particularly by Sjöblom (1968) and Tsebelis (1990). In a widely acclaimed study of the US Congress, Fenno (1973) held that three main goals guide the behavior of the Congress members: reelection, political influence, and good public policies. Elaborating on this, Strøm has argued that MPs have four goals for their parliamentary work: re-selection, reelection, party office, and legislative office (Strøm 1997: 160). The outlet for rational action is bound by the institutional context and the division of labor within the PPGs. The internal division of labor is central to parliamentary impact and public exposure and is therefore essential for the realization of all the goals listed by Fenno and Strøm.

Mykkänen (2001) looked in a participant observation study of the Centre Party in the Finnish Parliament for the rational bases of the negotiated order within PPGs. He sought the contextually defined rationality guiding the PPG members. The aim was to explore the sources of PPG unity and stability and how this stability was embedded in mutual expectations. Rationality was seen as an organizing principle developed within the group as "part of the interpretative talk about the division of labor" (117). Mykkänen identified two main "interpretative rules" on which MPs had to rely: responsibility and trust (116). If the behavior of MPs could be seen as supporting responsibility and trust within the group, this action was made relevant to their common goal of group power. Maximizing responsibility and thrust was seen to support a stable division of labor within the PPG—and its power.

From my own studies of PPGs, based primarily on Norwegian and Nordic data, I have found that several such contextually defined rationalities could be explored further (Heidar 1995, 2000; Heidar and Koole 2000a). The premises are the following: MPs work with their party colleagues in order to implement the party program. They achieve re-selection from their constituency-level party organization. They serve their local party, their voters, and their own career interests by seeking power and positions of influence. The eight beliefs listed below identify separate goals that define the rational actions available to the individual MP. However, the rational action following one goal does not necessarily match the action based on another.

1. MPs believe they are morally obliged to pursue their party's policies, although this obligation is not necessarily equally strong for all policies in the party program.
2. MPs believe in a hierarchy of party policies, whereby some policies are more important to the party than others.
3. MPs believe it is their duty to support or challenge the government—sometimes behind the scenes, sometimes on center stage—in order to develop the best possible government policies as well as the best political positioning for their own party.
4. MPs believe they should give serious consideration to and follow up on the input provided by the national party organization, the constituency-level party group, and the local branches within their constituency.
5. MPs believe that they should listen to and evaluate the input from party-linked organized interests, personal networks and media that usually care for their traditional voter segments.
6. MPs believe it is their duty to consider the consequences of their actions for national democracy.
7. MPs believe that all party policy and individual actions should be taken with due consideration to their consequences for the next election, in terms of voter support and governing potential, and the forthcoming process of candidate nomination.

8. MPs believe that it is both possible and legitimate—with due consideration to all other beliefs—to pursue their individual career interests at the same time.

Parsimony is obviously a virtue in search for the operative goals defining rational actions. Such operative goals can also be based both on some notion of the "basic objectives" of the party and on the actors' conceptions of "role and purpose." The above beliefs and strategic considerations are nevertheless also part of the operative landscape surrounding MPs in party democracies. I do not claim that all are relevant at all times, that they are equally strong in all parliaments, or that all parliamentarians are guided by them. However, I do consider it useful to keep the relevant contextual rationalities in mind when modeling parliamentary party democracy.

7.3 PPGs as Principal and Agent

The PA scheme is a fairly recent approach to the study of democracy and parliamentary systems. The analytical scheme was originally developed by economists and has, among other things, been used to study the relationship between shareholders and management in large businesses. It has later been adopted by political scientists and applied to political control mechanisms over public administration and potential distortion of political goals in the chain of delegation within democracies. Initially, these studies focused mostly on the US political system, but they are certainly not inherently restricted to the US system (see, e.g., Moe 1984; Bendor and Moe 1985; Epstein and O'Halloran 1999).

In democratic delegation systems, the voters are the supreme principal. Through elections, they delegate responsibility for decision making to the representatives, their elected agents. Elections give the representatives a legitimate mandate to govern. Following up on the voters' mandate, the decisions taken by parliament are delegated from the representatives down the line, through a series of decision-making layers—with alternating principals and agents—until decisions are finally implemented through state bureaucracies. The mechanisms of "agency loss," hidden information and action as well as "moral hazard" have been dealt with in other chapters and so have the voters' ways to handle or contain these problems, before or after the election. No doubt the PA approach has its limitations. Delegation models "simplify and distort reality"—but they can also "help us shed light on modern democratic constitutions" (Strøm 2003: 59–61).

7.3.1 Parliamentary Party Groups in the Line of Delegation

Where and how do parties and PPGs in parliamentary democracies operate within this scheme? Voters elect representatives from party lists or with party labels. For

candidates to be elected and for elected MPs to have any chance whatsoever of keeping their promises, they must be part of a group that has sufficient electoral standing and voting power in parliament to deliver. Elected representatives join PPGs to pursue election promises inside parliaments. In Europe, political parties usually have election manifestos or party programs to which candidates pledge their loyalty. In some rare instances, a candidate may express a reservation to a particular party policy before nomination, usually on some moral or religious issue. In general, however, the party program serves as the basis for the electoral pledges made by candidates to voters, and this can be seen as the contract defining the mandate given by the voters to their elected agents. Voting discipline inside parliament is—as a basic rule—essential for PPGs to operate effectively. This means that the PPG must interpret the party program in formulating day-to-day policies, and that MPs at times must compromise—inside the PPG or among/between PPGs—in ways that support some pledges while sidelining others. In Strøm's 2003 chapter on "Parliamentary democracy and delegation," voters delegate to elected representatives, who in turn delegate to the prime minister, who delegates to cabinet ministers—who finally delegate to civil servants (2003: 65). Only MPs are chosen directly by the voters through an election: All other agents are appointed indirectly on the basis of the mandate given to the elected representatives. The chain of indirect delegation is made up of agents accountable to their principal, with all agents (apart from civil servants) acting as principals in the next link of delegation.

Voters can make parties accountable only when parties vote and act together in parliament. Only when their MPs vote and act together as one bloc can political parties make democratic delegation possible. The voters should know what they will be getting when they vote for a party list or a party candidate, and the parties should pursue their program and promises to the full. But, of course, no party program can cover all issues, and new issues are always arising. Moreover, the various party candidates will have their own understanding of the program; at the constituency level, the constituency parties will influence "their" representatives on issues where they may not have won the national party debate; and candidates themselves will be involved in a range of different political networks. In addition comes the influence from the party's government ministers and the external national party organization. With many issues, there will be an internal PPG process on how to interpret the mandate given by the voters—a process in which the principals, the voters, are not involved. Indirectly, of course, the voters will be present: How will they react to the decisions of the PPG and the particular role played by the individual MP? How will this affect their votes at the next election? However, party programs are not set in stone. Social and economic realities change. Parties are neither stable nor unitary, but are more like continuous decision-making machinery. The unitary party ideal may break up in the face of realities. This, of course, comes as no surprise to PA

[2] The other mechanism, "external constraints," works primarily through ex post accountability. That will not be discussed here.

analysis, as a central task is to analyze the distortion from principal to agent—what we have referred to as "agency loss."

Strøm et al. (2003b: 651) point to political parties as one mechanism by which democracies may contain agency problems in parliamentary democracies.[2] Parties not only present the voter with a program which gives a mandate for governing, but they also offer a mechanism by which successive PA relationships can be kept coherent and remain true to the electoral mandate. In order to discuss the role of parties in the scheme of delegation, we have to identify the different party actors, precisely because "the party" is not a unified actor. This will make things more complicated—but it is a necessary complication, given the role of PPGs in determining policy outcomes in parliamentary democracies.

Taking as their point of departure Key's distinction between the electoral, the organizational, and the governmental parties, Strøm et al. (2003a) argue that whereas the party in government is fundamental for citizen control and the electoral party is equally important, the organizational party is less so. By "the party in government," they include both party representatives in the cabinet and in parliament, that is, seen as the "party in public office." The organizational party may be important in screening candidates for election, etc., but it is not "essential to the core functions" of parties. The old "cadre parties," for example, managed without such external party organizations (2003: 654). Strong extra-parliamentary organizations may in fact reduce voter control, by making party representatives more responsive to party activists than to their voters (659). What, then, is implied by being "essential" to the core functions? Strong extra-parliamentary parties are not essential in the sense that democratic accountability can be established by parliamentary parties alone, that is, by PPGs creating election programs and organizing campaigns without involving a potential party organization outside of parliament. But many parliamentary democracies and many parties have an external organization that does actually play a significant and sometimes dominant role in formulating the party program.[3] In that case, we must ask: Does the external party organization act to increase or reduce agency loss—not to mention enhancing or detracting from democracy at large?

7.3.2 A Two-Track Delegation Model

Müller (2000) has argued that parties are the central mechanism for making the delegation and accountability work in practice. This is so because parties reduce transaction costs and solve collective action problems. The challenge, however, when integrating parties into the chain of delegation, is to specify who the party principal is and who the party agent is. In other words, is there an established and transparent party hierarchy which tells us who is in charge? And what is the

[3] The literature here is extensive, see, for example, McKenzie (1963) and Ware (1979).

relationship between the party hierarchy and the overall chain of delegation in parliamentary democracies?

Müller identifies a two-track delegation system: one "party track" inside the party organization, going from party activists to party officials to party leaders, and another "constitutional track" going from voters to (party) MPs to (party) cabinet ministers. Within the first "party democracy" track, the principals are the party activists, and the party leadership is the agent: In the latter, it is the voters who are the principals with the earlier-mentioned series of agents down the line: MPs, cabinet, bureaucrats. The tricky question is how to model the delegation process when the two tracks meet in the PPG. In the party track, the PPG is the agent of the party activists; in the constitutional track, it is the agent of the voters. In part, this can be discussed as an empirical question: Who decides—the party activists or the voters? More interesting is the theoretical discussion: How these interconnected tracks should be analyzed within a "democracy as delegation" perspective? Should the extra-parliamentary party leadership be seen as the agent of the party activists, and the PPG the agent of the EPO leadership? Or should the parliamentary group be seen as controlling the EPO, making it the agent of the PPG? The way this is modeled—and operates —will influence how parties are fitted into the scheme of delegation, and how they may facilitate or reduce voter accountability or the mechanisms that can bring about or contain agency loss. Müller (2000: 317) argues that the relationship between the "party organization and the party in public office has remained underspecified." This is no problem if we can assume that the party as a whole—with the EPO, at the constituency level, and the PPG—is a unified, homogeneous entity. But, as the history and practice of European parties have shown, this is rarely the case. Of course, there has to be some minimum degree of political unity—otherwise, they would not present themselves to the voters as one party. But disagreements about concrete policies and the ideological issues are legion within the world of political parties.

Then, it is a question of how the party can keep its deal with the voters. The assumption is that it is the party—with its program and candidates—that is up for election by the voters. In other words, the electoral contract is between the voters and the party, not between the voters and the individual candidates. It is consequently the job of the party to contain agency losses by controlling the PPG and its MPs. Parties develop election programs, screen candidates, they follow the work of their MPs in parliament, and can discipline them through institutional and organizational measures. It is in the party interest to handle the agency losses stemming from problems of "leisure shrinking," "dissent shrinking," and "sabotage" (Müller 2000: 323–329).

In the real world, of course, the strength of parties in terms of controlling the chain of delegation will vary. We know also that many parties have organized strong links between PPGs and EPOs. There are frequent overlaps in personnel, and regular contact, often institutionalized by the EPO being formally represented in the PPGs. Some parties have (or have had) a practice that allows the EPO leadership to determines PPG policy positions. To varying degrees, there are also controls and disciplinary measures on individual MPs. The PPGs control their

committee assignment, the job as party spokespersons, the distribution of administrative resources and debate visibility, not to mention the possibilities for renomination and in the extreme case party expulsion. On the one hand, the *partitocracies* in Italy used to be strong controllers, while the weak parties of the 5th French Republic could be found on the other side of the spectrum. Although the role of parties in the delegation process has declined in recent decades, Müller (2000: 331) nevertheless holds that "political parties can still be considered the most important means to make delegation and accountability work in Western European parliamentary systems."

7.4 Citizens Versus Voters: The Three Faces of Democracy

The theory and practices of democracy are contested. Here, I will highlight three aspects of democratic processes that are central—although to differing degrees—in democratic theory. As formulated by Ware, these are interest optimization, the exercise of control, and civic orientation (Ware 1987: 7–16). First, democratic theory includes some form of majority rule in the sense that authoritative decisions taken within the political system should reflect the interests of the majority of citizens. For a system to be democratic it must, as Ware puts it, "bring about results that optimally promote or defend the interests of the largest number of people in the relevant area" (1987: 8). In this formulation, there are many ambiguities to be discussed, but as a general concept interest optimization is definitely part of the democratic package. The second question deals with the procedures and mechanisms for bringing this about. In representative democracies, how does the citizenry control the decision makers? This is done through elections, election campaigns, and party/candidate programs. The electorate is asked to choose between the various policy packages on offer and the voters decide the parliamentary power vested in the different alternatives. There are additional debates about whether democratic systems must create certain outcomes or can be defined solely by procedures, but these points need not concern us here. Thirdly, most theories of democracy also include some version of civic responsibility. The people should not only have the opportunity to kick the scoundrels out or select which elite to be ruled by: also necessary are citizen involvement and institutionalized mechanisms for information, transparency, and participation. This democratic norm rests on the premise that, for interest optimization and control to work, the people must possess a minimum of civic capabilities.

In the following, I relate these three faces of democracy to the operation of PPGs and the modeling of democracy in PA terms. However, we must note that, as pointed out by Ware, disagreements on how to define democracy lead to differing conceptions of how to design the structures intended to promote it and consequently to differing views on what role parties should play in democratic systems (Ware 1987: 16). Disagreement over what democracy should be naturally leads to disagreement over what parties should do.

Before turning to the PPGs and how the PA approach handles these three faces of democracy, we should be explicit about some of the assumptions made in PA analysis. Strøm (2003: 61) makes the point that no model can do full justice to its topic. As noted, all models simplify and distort reality. This provides us with a precise language that can open complex realities to empirical analysis. Simplification will shed light on some parts of reality while keeping other parts in the dark. However, the way forward is not to disregard the models but to challenge and improve on their assumptions. Much can be gained by modeling democratic systems. Strøm (2003: 59–60) lists the assumptions implied by the PA approach in five points. Among his points are the following:

1. The preferences of both principals and agents are exogenously given: they are not part of the model
2. Both principal and agent act rationally on the basis of the information available
3. Principals may face information scarcities
4. The principal's preferences are privileged, and it is not the job of agents "to help the principal to determine her preferences" (2003: 60).

7.4.1 Interest Optimization

How can PPGs help relevant majority interests to win through? If we approach this question from the perspective of PPG research, the answer is that it is done primarily by the MPs, with their PPGs acting as guardians of the interests of the voters who sent them to parliament. These interests are defined by the party program and the political traditions of the party that the voters supported at the election. Here, there are many complicating factors. It is not enough to take the election program as a shopping list with items to be checked off during the ensuing parliamentary term. As noted, realities change; new issues arise while others are put to rest. Policies have continuously to be formulated and reformulated to match the long-term goals of the party and the interests of the voters. MPs will receive signals from their parties at the constituency level, from individual voters, from the EPO leadership, organized interests and businesses, from and through the media, etc. In multimember PPGs, this information is pooled, assigned political weight, and coordinated through group debates in order to formulate the PPG position on new parliamentary issues. Interparty compromises and larger political settlements may interfere. PPGs will sometimes have to trade a policy preference backed by their electoral segment for power positions benefitting their MPs. A short-term breach of party program may, however, improve the party's long-term negotiating power. A compromise that makes the PPG drop one policy in order to gain a more tempting political prize will not necessarily give the party credit in the relevant electoral segment, but it may still benefit the same segment in the long term. Consequently, it can be rational for a PPG to breach its (last election) voter contract in order to maximize the long-term interest of the voters.

Organized power structures may well interfere in this process. If, for example, the PPG is heavily dependent on the EPO, policy making might be more influenced by party activists at the expense of the voters. On the other hand, being anchored in the external party organization may also keep the PPG more in touch with the party grassroots. Party activists *may* know the preferences of local voters better than the more distant parliamentarians. On the other hand, they may also be less representative of the party voters, that is, blinded by ideology (see May 1973). Whichever of the two offers the best listening post to catch grassroots sentiments—the MPs or the party activists—depends on the PPG and on the EPO. The PPGs will, in this complicated and yet rather commonplace political terrain, have to find a way through, so that voter interests and party interests must ultimately be harmonized—at least on the rhetorical level. But as debates on populism and democracy make clear, the voters are not always right.

Will this approach to the PPG's handling of interest optimization differ from a presentation given from the PA perspective? In language definitely, but when it comes to realities on the ground, the answer, I would say, is generally negative. The paragraphs above can easily be formulated in PA language. The PPG will act as the agent of the voters/principals, but "agency loss" is clearly a possible risk, through hidden information, hidden action and moral hazard.

7.4.2 Controls: Where is the Contract? What are Voters Choosing?

One challenge to PA analysis comes under this heading, arising from the question of who is the principal of the PPG: the voters or the EPO? In democracies, voters control their representatives primarily through elections; election time is when they tell the politicians what to do. However, messages from the voters are usually difficult to interpret (e.g., Hersey 1992). Are the voters responding to issues at all, to the campaign packaging, or are they supporting the candidate that makes the best impression? Can a five o'clock shadow of a badly shaven candidate become a decisive electoral factor? Do voters make their choice on the basis of one or two hotly debated issues in the campaign, or do they respond to the overall party profiles? Is the vote basically a commentary on what has passed since the last election, or on profiling during the election campaign, or is it a vote intended to influence future policy decisions?

The only sure thing is that the answers will vary from voter to voter, from one election to another, and from one country to another. But does this really matter so much? It seems clear that within democracies it is elections, free and fair elections that give the legitimacy to govern. It is the political parties, the programs and the policy proposals presented to the voters prior to the election that give the winners the right to carry out their programs. These programs are the contract between voters and their representatives, between the principals and the agents. Democratic

government, then, involves formulating policies in line with the issue positions outlined in the program that was presented to the voters. The analytical challenges faced in the analysis of "party government" have of course been taken up in the literature (e.g., Blondel and Cotta 2000), but only recently in the PA mode.

Shareholders delegate to board members the responsibility to look after their interests in the company. We may assume that the majority and minority interests of the shareholders have communicated to their agents on the board the weight they attach to various company goals: whether to maximize the share value in the short term and/or the long term? What of value put on social responsibilities like employee welfare? How zealously should one follow legislation and regulations as to minimum pay, and how stringently should the company take ethics into consideration in its business dealings? And what of the importance of environmental and tax regulations, as well as the company's moral responsibilities toward "company towns"? We may also assume that the board communicates to the company management the balance of priorities they should apply in their daily business. To return to politics, then: What do voters tell their agents? Is it all in the party programs? We may assume that most voters choose the candidate/party with program they want their agent to follow. Most voters are unlikely to be familiar with the entire party program and some voters may, as noted, cast their ballots for very different reasons. Still, there is no reason to assume that the overall support given to a party is something based on irrational or irrelevant factors, in the sense that the ballot has nothing to do with a party's political program. If that were the case, we could probably forget about democratic government through elections altogether.

The question of which policies the voters choose at election time is bound to be complex and unclear, causing problems within any theoretical approach to democratic processes. But representatives, electoral programs, campaign pledges, party packages (including their candidates, leaders, and party activists)—all these are part of the contract offered to voters on election day. What the voters will actually choose is a hard guess even for well-informed journalists and observers. Here, we are not only talking about the moral hazard aspect, whereby the party may change policies contrary to the interests of the agent. As noted earlier, circumstances may change, making new policies imperative. By decision time, the whole setting may well be so different from that at election time that the party cannot know what its voters feel about the new issue and what revisions they see as necessary. However, the old program, in conjunction with the knowledge that voters will judge the party anew at the next election, should still provide a strong element of democratic control of what the party does in parliament.

Research into the role of PPGs in democratic processes will have to deal with internal decision making. How much leeway is available to the individual MPs? What is the role of the party at the constituency level, and the role of the EPO, in influencing the PPGs? These are challenging tasks, but traditional political analysis is equipped with a language to discuss them. Exactly the same questions can be analyzed within the PA approach. Earlier, however, we referred to Müller's discussion of whether the PPG was an agent of the voter or the EPO/party activist.

From which principal should the PPG take its cues when new or revised policy options come up for decision? Should the MPs interpret by themselves the intentions of their voters, or should they abide by the decisions of the EPO?

To find an answer, we might look into the nature of the contract between the voters and their representatives. On the one hand, it could be argued that voters delegate responsibility for interpreting this contract to the MPs alone: Results of the election establish an exclusive bond between voter and representative. This is the classic view of individual MPs and is entrenched in many constitutions: The MP is bound by nothing but her/his own will. The party cannot remove a representative from parliament after election, even if elected on a party list, nor can anyone else. The alternative view—and in many parliamentary systems this is much closer to reality—is that MPs are nominated by the party organization at the constituency level and are then elected on a party list and on the basis of a party program which in practice makes the PPG the agent of the EPO in parliament. This is generally discussed under the label of internal "party democracy." In the party democracy perspective, it is the EPO, not the MP, that establishes the democratic contract with the voters. In this perspective, the voter chooses *a party* on election day, a party with certain traditions, organization, leadership and election candidates. The candidate is an agent of the party—not the agent of the voters. The party holds the voter mandate, and the party representative has to follow party instructions.

In some ways, this may appear to be an artificial distinction between MP and the EPO. Both will usually be involved in discussing new and pressing matters, and in the final instance, the PPG will have to make a decision on the basis of an overall assessment. But there may be many practical and organizational elements that act to narrow the room for decisions in the PPGs. Are the PPG subordinated to the EPO central committee? Is the EPO represented in the PPG leadership? How much weight is to be given to the EPO in the process? The central question is: To what extent does the party organization come between the voter and the representative as principal and agent?

The analytical question raised by this within the PA framework is whether this leads to an indeterminate modeling where the empirical facts on the ground must determine—in advance—whether there is a "voter–representative" delegation or whether the chain of delegation is "voter–party–representative." A further question is who makes up "the party": the EPO's national leadership, the leadership at the constituency level, or the party activists who claim to be the basis of party democracy?

7.4.3 Civic Virtues

Is democracy dependent on actors providing voters with responsible "whole-package" choices, not the populist choice between one-issue offers? Is democracy about citizens, not voters as such? Citizens with a moral responsibility toward the

collective that goes beyond expressing interests at election time, citizens that need to be informed and feel obliged to participate in politics, for example, through parties? In short, is democracy also about moral commitment and mechanism for individual growth through experience and responsibility?

The Western democracy building of the nineteenth century was part of a broader effort to transform the urban bourgeoisie, the peasants, and finally the workers into citizens. Creating democracy was part of the program and so were the efforts to build a more robust nation—socially, economically, and militarily. Although voting rights were essential, democracy was more than elections and a procedure for making legitimate decisions. In the old society, ownership of land served as the basis for partnership in society, a responsibility expected also to nurture responsibility toward the state and future generations in handling resources and power. Entrusting democratic rights to the broader population had to go hand in hand with the extension of legal rights, basic education and channels for participation. Inducing civic virtues in the population, by making the voting public informed, capable and responsible, was part of the broader democratic project.

Bluntly put, civic virtues are *not* part of democracy as conceived within the PA framework. Voters are seen as the consumers of political products, without necessarily having any place in their production. This is no problem if democracy is defined in procedural terms as the opportunity to take part in and decide which candidates/parties to send to parliament. We recall that one of the assumptions made by Strøm was that preferences are exogenously given: where they come from or how they are created is not part of PA analysis as such.

This discussion can be linked to the points made previously on control and the role of parties in the chain of delegation. Provided we model this chain through the parties and make the party activists central, we could argue that the civic element also enters the PA analysis by way of party activists. In other words, those citizens engaged in political activities who take part in party affairs, discussing policy proposals, programs, ideological issues, and potential electoral candidates inside the parties will broaden the room for civic elements in democracy. The parties may give some breathing space for civic-minded voters and—at least potentially—provide an arena for deliberative politics.

Whether it actually works like that is of course an empirical question. According to a recent study of membership decline in parties, they no longer have any pretensions of being mass organizations (van Bietzen et al. 2012: 42). Whether they need to be mass organizations, however, in order to offer engaged citizens an arena for political debate and influence, is another matter (Dalton et al. 2011).

7.5 Conclusion: What is, and What Ought to Be

Modern democratic government is possible only when citizens delegate decisions to representatives; and, for the system to be democratic, the representatives must also be accountable to the citizens. PA analysis takes delegation as its reference

point and develops concepts and indicators to study how the chain of delegation works. The focus is on the institutional mechanisms for supporting delegation and accountability and how these mechanisms work in practice. The key question is to what extent a particular institutional design can make it possible to distort the principals' interests down the chain of delegation from the electorate to the bureaucrats.

In this chapter, I have focused on the activities of PPGs and their broader party environment within parliamentary democracies. My intention was to present the general research on PPGs and use this as a background for discussing some assumptions made by PA analysis. The overall conclusion is that, with one exception, PA analysis has few problems with including PPGs, although some further specification would be needed as to the place and role of different party actors within the scheme of principals and agents.

We noted one limitation in the reach of the PA scheme based on its embedded conception of democracy. Modeling democracy for empirical research includes both a definition and a research strategy. Such modeling coordinates hypotheses within an integrated analytical system. The distinction between theoretical and the empirical modeling may help clarify. Theory-based models will develop the definitions and research strategy on the basis of central elements in the theory. For example, a theory of democracy that includes the three elements of interest optimization, control, and civic virtues will develop an analytical model that can cover all three elements. Empirically based models, on the other hand, will take the realist approach and argue that facts on the ground must be the basis for the analytical approach. Thus, the question in empirically based modeling will be how things actually work, and how to extract a model that can offer a simplified description of essence and variation, rather than to model some theoretical ideal. While empirical modeling is inductive, theoretical modeling is deductive. In my view, PA analysis lies somewhere in-between: looking at the democratic ideal, but also adjusting its framework toward empirically realistic assumptions.

The question is what we can expect from real-life voters who are not, and probably never will be, at the level of the ideal democratic citizens. PA modeling is based on a realistic perspective where voters participate in elections, but their overall level of political participation and competence is rather low. Voters make a choice between parties and candidates, and thereby signal roughly what policies they support and how they evaluate the past record of politicians. Consequently, the "civic virtue part" plays a marginal role in PA analysis and is not part of its working definition of democracy.

The polycentric organization of most parties, however, makes the premise of a single chain of delegation from voters to bureaucrats problematic. In a semi-populist version of democracy, nothing should interfere with the preferences expressed by the voters on election day. But voters' choices are never unambiguous or final. Voters make their choice between candidates who offer not only themselves—as agents for interpreting the upcoming political necessities—but also between more or less integrated policy packages in the form of programs and election pledges. Thus, voters elect both representatives *and* their party. They elect

a party that has not only an election program but also a history, with factions, with an ongoing debate and convinced activists. This is the complete package or contract offered to the voters—whether they are aware of it or not. Subsequent interpretations of the mandate given to "the party" take place not only within the PPG but also within and between other party branches, including the EPO leadership, the constituency level and the party activists. The point is that the party debate as a whole will contribute to PPG decision making.

To avoid distorting the voters' message, representative systems offer institutional mechanisms for delegation and accountability, both before and after an election. Parliamentary democracies are generally better equipped with *ex ante* controls, whereas presidential systems score better when it comes to *ex post* controls. Before elections, parliamentary parties screen candidates and present programs, helping voters to understand what they will be choosing. Strøm et al. (2003a: 653) credit parties, particularly cohesive parties, with reducing "agency costs" by "bringing together voters and candidates with similar policy preferences." On the other hand, the empirical results in that same study indicate a decline in these party capabilities for *ex ante* controls.

Research focused exclusively on PPGs has been scarce. In parliamentary democracies, the PPG is one party branch, alongside several others. How central and autonomous the PPG is, in relation to the leadership in the central party organization and the constituency party, may vary—from an almost dominant position at Westminster, to a more integrated dependency in the German Bundestag, for example. The more autonomous the PPG and the less control it has over its members, the closer we come to the highly candidate-centered politics of the USA, and the less problematic it becomes to model the chain of delegation from voters directly to the representatives/PPGs. Strøm et al. (2003a: 694) register country variation in parliamentary-based accountancy regimes in which a role is played not only by institutional variation but also by party practices: "In the present world political parties play a crucial role everywhere." Crucial to our analysis here is also the statement that "the way in which the political parties coexist with the parliamentary chain… partly determine the way in which accountability works" (Strøm et al. 2003a: 694).

In other words, we are left with an indeterminate modeling. Given the empirically unsatisfactory solution to model "the party" as a black box hiding the rather crucial internal party affairs, the question of whether the PPG is an agent of the voters or an agent of the EPO is left open. Perhaps, it should be left that way, given the argument that how this works is conditioned upon the institutional and political practice found within the particular system. Delegation and accountancy will work and must be analyzed differently, depending on whether some party branch inserts itself in the chain of delegation between the voters and the PPG. This opens a new avenue for discussion not to be taken up here: Is party democracy potentially ruining for the prospect of a national democracy? Or is the issue the balance between collective and individual accountability in democracies, collectively through the party organization or individually through the MPs contact with the voters (see, e.g., Carey 2009).

The PPGs in parliamentary democracies are arenas for hard work and strategies. They are indeed the midfield of politics. Undirected kicks from the goalkeeper have to be taken down and controlled. The way forward must be carefully planned, traps must be set for the opponent, attackers from the other side neutralized, and fellow attackers played in position. Sometimes a Bobby Charlton will make an unexpected move in the midfield, followed by a powerful score. It is the midfield that wins the matches… and sometimes also the elections.

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Chapter 8
Parliamentary Voting

Simon Hug

Abstract Votes in parliament offer one of the few sources of behavioral data to study members of parliaments (MPs). As a consequence, an increasing number of studies rely on such data and by employing sophisticated methods generate new insights on how MP interact with their constituency, their party and their leaders in parliament. This paper reviews the main strands of research in this field and cautions against a too uncritical use of data on parliamentary voting. First of all, in many parliaments, information on individual voting behavior is not available for all votes; and second, votes by MPs are influenced by myriad of factors like their constituency, their party, etc. In addition, votes can obviously only be observed on objects having been admitted to the agenda. Consequently, to take full advantage of the wealth of information stemming from parliamentary voting, the full context of MPs' choices has to be taken into consideration.

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8.1 Introduction[1]

Since the early systematic studies by Lowell (1901) and Rice (1925), research on parliamentary voting has made impressive headway, in terms of both new theoretical perspectives and innovative empirical analyses. In addition, while having been dominated by studies on the United States (US) Congress (though see the comparative component in the study by Lowell 1901) for a considerable time, the field has expanded to cover parliaments in various areas of this world and deals with them both at the sub- and international level. Scholars have employed this rich behavioral data in innovative ways shedding light on important research questions dealing with parliaments, but also on topics that go well beyond the parliamentary (usually) hemicycle. Thus, with the help of parliamentary voting data, we now have a much better understanding of what explains the voting behavior of members of parliament (MPs). We also have quite some knowledge of the circumstances and contexts in which MPs of political parties vote in unison, and when they are divided. Finally, scholars have studied in detail what common patterns and thus conflict lines and cleavages may be detected in voting data. Positions of MPs derived in this perspective have been used in diverse research areas, many quite distinct from parliamentary research proper.

It is undeniable that some of this scholarly enthusiasm is related to the increasing ease with which information on parliamentary voting can be collected. While early studies, for instance, on the US Congress (e.g., Lowell 1901) or the General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA) (e.g., Ball 1951; Hovet 1960; Alker 1964), relied on painstakingly collected information from the printed versions of the official records and minutes, more recent studies can rely on information easily available online (see the instructive description of data collection on the French and British parliament in Burton 1936; Aydelotte 1963).

This increased ease with which information on parliamentary voting can be collected is in part due to the fact that many parliaments (especially in newer democracies) have increased their transparency by adopting voting methods conducive to more openness (see for instance Middlebrook 2003). At the same time, this increased transparency has shed new light on the extent to which parliaments differ regarding the visibility of what their members do (e.g., Saalfeld

[1] This paper has strongly benefitted from the students attending my lecture on "Parliamentary voting" at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Vienna in which I presented many of the arguments appearing here. They deserve my gratitude as do Stefanie Bailer, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Reto Wüest for their extremely helpful comments on a first draft, and the Swiss National Science Foundation for its partial financial support (Grant No 100012-111909).

1995; Carrubba et al. 2006; Carey 2009; Crisp and Driscoll 2012; Hug et al. 2012). As Carey (2009) convincingly argues, the extent to which voting by MPs is visible relates strongly to how well the latter's principals, for instance, voters or political parties, may monitor them.

As a consequence, parliamentary voting that is (to whatever extent) visible is likely to give a different view of many characteristics of parliaments and MPs than if non-visible voting were observable as well. Thus, several scholars have started to alert parliamentary researchers that they might face possible biases when relying too naively on information stemming from parliamentary voting (VanDoren 1990; Londregan 2000b; Carrubba et al. 2006, 2008; Roberts 2007; Thiem 2009; Hug 2010). To address many of these possible problems, innovative tools have been developed and evaluated empirically (e.g., Londregan 2000b; Clinton and Meirowitz 2003, 2004; Hug 2010; Crisp and Driscoll 2012).

Thus, in what follows I discuss the development of research on parliamentary voting, and how it has progressed and started to address the challenges mentioned above. In the next section, I briefly sketch the main themes covered in research on parliamentary voting, and what theoretical considerations have provided useful underpinning. In the third section, I show how this important field of research has developed and attempted to deal with the problems alluded to above. The fourth section deals with the most recent contributions that offer ways to address some of the limitations of information on parliamentary voting, while the last section concludes.

8.2 Background and History of the Field

If one approaches the field of parliamentary voting, one may be surprised that apart MPs, political parties appear as primary focus of interest. As this focus of research was largely initiated and developed in the United States, one must recall that the framers of the US Constitution, and thus also the designers of the US Congress, were very wary of political parties and factions. With their institutional design, they wished to ensure that the latter played a limited role (Hamilton et al. 1787). Also in the recent literature on Congress, an influential school of thought sees a very limited role for political parties (e.g., Krehbiel 1993). Scholars of this school suggest that parties do not have the means to control the relevant actors whose support is necessary to advance legislation.

Nevertheless, the early work by Lowell (1901) and Rice (1925) focused largely on the role that political parties played in parliaments. Lowell (1901, p. 323) characterized a series of votes in the US Congress, some state legislatures and the House of Commons by whether the main political parties were unified (i.e., at least nine-tenths of all voting members voted the same way). Similarly, Rice (1925) developed an index (named after him) which measured how cohesively members

of the two parties in Congress, more specifically the Senate, voted.[2] Both studies demonstrated a high degree of cohesion among the two parties present in the US Congress.

Despite the critical assessments of whether political parties may play an important role in understanding parliamentary voting, one or several of the following three reasons might well convince us otherwise. First, as both Cox and McCubbins (2005) and Carey (2009) nicely argue, a legislature without some sort of internal organization may lead to the theoretically well-documented chaos-results (McKelvey 1975).[3] By organizing work in parliaments, political parties are of central importance in structuring the discussion and adoption of bills to avoid indecision, even in the US Congress (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005). Second, political parties play a key role in elections. Electoral systems that allow voters few if any choices between candidates from the same party make candidate selection by party organizations a crucial phase in the survival of an MP in office (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Hazan and Rahat 2010). But even in countries with electoral systems giving almost no role to political parties in the selection of candidates (for instance, the United States), the former are useful devices for voters in providing shortcuts in the information gathering process (Aldrich 1995; Cox 1997). Finally, in parliamentary democracies, political parties structure the formation of governments and through the confidence procedure, as Diermeier and Feddersen (1998) convincingly argue, exert influence on MPs, especially of governmental parties (see also Huber 1996; Strøm 2000, 2003; Huber and Lupia 2001; Strøm et al. 2010).

Thus, it cannot surprise that two reviews of the literature on parliamentary voting put political parties more or less at center stage. Collie (1984) argues that the literature has essentially focused on research questions dealing with the collective (i.e., the parliament as a whole or subsets thereof, for instance, political parties) or individuals. In both sets of research questions, political parties are, however, central, as they are often the unit of analysis in the former set and an important explanatory variable in the latter. Similarly, and probably a bit too reductively, Uslaner and Zittel (2006) use the role of partisanship in parliamentary voting as thread to discuss in an eclectic fashion the literature [two more recent reviews focus more on methodological issues related to roll call votes, see Clinton 2012; Carroll and Poole 2013, forthcoming)].

A useful starting point to capture why political parties play a crucial role is Mayhew's (1974) contribution to understanding MPs' behavior. Whether MPs care about policy and/or office, the latter is of interest either intrinsically or indirectly to achieve the former goal (see also Müller and Strøm 1999). Consequently, as gaining office is only possible through elections, considering the "electoral

[2] It has to be noted that the larger part of Rice's (1925) analyses focus on the New York Assembly. Similarly, to be true to Rice's (1925) work, this author also contributed a second index allowing assessing how much alike two groups behaved in a legislature (see also Rice 1928).

[3] See the study by Andrews (2002) on the Russian Duma for a careful illustration and analysis of cyclical majorities.

connection" seems a necessary element in getting a better understanding of parliamentary voting. As Carey (2009) nicely discusses, this "electoral connection" can be best conceived of as a principal–agent relationship. In what he defines as "individual accountability," voters elect their MP(s) and at election time hold them individually to account. This requires, however, that voters can "throw the [individual] bums out." As many electoral systems do not permit voters to do so, "collective accountability," that is, holding political parties to account, may prevail. In these cases, MPs are only accountable indirectly to voters, namely through their parties. The latter hold MPs to account through the reselection as candidates and the selection for office in parliament or the party.

Envisioning MPs in such a fashion also suggests, however, that accountability requires some sort of information available to the MPs' principals on the former's actions in parliament (and possibly beyond). Several authors have recently highlighted that information on individual votes by MPs is not very frequently available (see for instance VanDoren 1990; Saalfeld 1995; Carrubba et al. 2006; Roberts 2007; Carey 2009; Hug 2010; Crisp and Driscoll 2012; Hug et al. 2012). Carey (2009) argues, for instance, that only roll call votes potentially make available information on MPs' votes to actors outside parliament like voters and interest groups. In signal votes, in which MPs indicate their vote by standing up, by a show of hands or by their voice, at best actors inside parliament may know who voted in favor or against a proposal. In secret votes (by using, for instance, an electronic voting system or a secret ballot), no actor may observe what MPs decide.

Unfortunately, not very many parliaments use roll call votes systematically for all their business (see Saalfeld 1995; Carrubba et al. 2008; Crisp and Driscoll 2012; Hug et al. 2012). Despite Poole and Rosenthal's (1997, p. 56) claim that for all practical purposes, most decisions reached in the US Congress are done so by roll call votes, several scholars have questioned this assessment. VanDoren (1990), studying how legislative proposals are dealt with by committees and which proposals are voted upon in roll call votes, notes that many never leave the committee stage.[4] But even among those proposals that make it to the floor, a fair share is adopted or rejected by voice votes. Clinton and Lapinski (2008) demonstrate in a more systematic manner and covering a longer time period that not for all laws adopted by Congress roll call votes occurred (see also Lynch and Madonna 2013, forthcoming). In addition, Roberts (2007) notes that for a considerable time roll call votes were not possible when Congress met as a "Committee of the whole." In such instances, either chamber of Congress met as a committee (and thus under committee rule) but membership corresponded to the entire chamber. Consequently, for Congressional decisions reached in the "Committee of the whole," no roll call record is available until the 1970s. Similarly, while studies on the European Parliament (EP) acknowledged that only a small minority of all votes

[4] A similar finding and argument appear in Londregan's (2000b) work on the Brazilian legislature.

taken are roll calls (e.g., Attina 1990; Brzinski 1995; Hix et al. 2006),[5] only recently have scholars started to consider how representative these roll call votes are. Both Carrubba et al. (2006) and Thiem (2009) show that roll call votes are much more frequent for non-legislative decisions and also often concern specific issue areas.[6]

As the data scholars can use is related both to the visibility and thus to the possibility of monitoring, some caution is advised when using information on parliamentary voting. If, as one might suspect, MPs will be influenced by their principals, this influence will depend on whether the latter (and which ones) may actually observe the behavior of the former. Only if votes are visible to the principals, can the latter assess whether their voting advice is heeded to. Thus, as in many quasi-experimental studies (Achen 1986), we need to be wary about possible selection issues.

These issues may affect in different ways the various types of research questions that have characterized the field. Following to some extent Collie (1984), one may identify three main areas of research having dominated the field. First, explaining votes in parliament, either specific ones or a whole set of votes, has been a main thread in the literature. A major preoccupation in this research area is to determine which of the (possibly many) principals influence the MPs' voting behavior. Second, and finding its origin in the first systematic studies discussed above, research dealing with the cohesion of political parties and sometimes other groups has proved an active field. Finally, determining what conflict lines and cleavages characterize the work in parliament has preoccupied scholars to a considerable extent. Such studies often implicitly or explicitly rely on the estimation of the underlying ideal points of MPs (i.e., their most preferred outcome represented in a policy space).

As each of these research areas relies on roll call vote data, having the latter only available for some votes may lead to biased inferences. When wishing to assess the influence of the various principals on MPs' voting decisions, the extent to which these decisions can be monitored is also likely to affect the relative importance of the various principals' view. If we follow Carey's (2009) argument, MPs may consider the preferences both of their voters and of their principals in parliament in roll call votes. The former's preferences will be of a reduced importance in signal votes (i.e., only observable in the parliament), while the latter will also be limited in secret votes. Consequently, the influence of the various principals on MPs' decision may well be estimated in a biased fashion when considering the overall effect.

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[5] Attina (1990, p. 562) notes that in the first elected EP, "only 15 % of the 936 initiative [sic] and urgent resolutions approved" were subject to a roll call vote, while Hix et al. (2006) estimate this share for latter EPs to be approximately a third. More detailed studies by Carrubba et al. (2006) and Thiem (2009) suggest that approximately a quarter of all votes are roll called.

[6] Hug (2010) shows for the Swiss lower house that particular topics are much more frequently subject to roll call votes requested by MPs, while Jenny and Müller (2011) show for the Austrian lower house variations over the legislative term.

If this is the case, also studies assessing how cohesive political parties or other groups are in parliament are likely to offer biased views. As in roll call votes both voters and political parties may observe what MPs do, the observed cohesion may be higher if parties gain the upper hand, but might also be lower given that the MPs' constituencies (both voters and interest groups) may be more central and have divergent interests from those of some political parties. Finally, even if we wish to study the cleavages and conflict lines in a parliament based on ideal points, we might need to worry, as roll call votes might only be carried out on particular topics or be influenced by principals as discussed above.[7] Consequently, even the recent sophisticated estimations of ideal points may yield biased estimates.

8.3 Major Lines of Developments

8.3.1 What Influences MPs' Voting Behavior?

The framework sketched out above envisioning parliamentary voting in a principal–agent relationship was implicit in much of the work dealing with, for instance, "Congressmen's voting decisions" (Kingdon 1973). As voters in the United States both select the candidates for general elections and then choose between the candidates of the various parties, the importance of the constituencies' interests seemed considerably important. Several studies, among them Kingdon's (1973), demonstrate that in explaining Congressmen's voting behavior, the voters' preferences play a considerable role. Others, however, come to the conclusion that once controlling for partisanship the influence of constituencies on Congressmen's voting behavior was reduced to sometimes even vanish (see for instance Weisberg 1978).

Assessing the effect of various influences on MPs' behavior, from their own preferences to those of their principals like voters, parties, etc., is, however, empirically quite difficult. First, as Fiorina (1975) shows relying on a simple theoretical model in an unfortunately often forgotten contribution, simply controlling for the party membership of MPs when assessing the effect of constituency preferences may lead to biased inferences. Second, Jackson and Kingdon (1992) caution against the frequent practice of using roll call votes to measure the preferences of MPs, which then were to be used to explain together with other information the voting behavior of MPs.[8]

[7] For the EP work by Carrubba et al. (2006) and Thiem (2009) highlights this point and thus echos similar concerns raised by VanDoren (1990), Roberts (2007), and Clinton and Lapinski (2008) on the US Congress.

[8] In part, Jackson and Kingdon's (1992) critique focuses also on the approach proposed by Kalt and Zupan (1990), which consists of regressing ideal point estimates on constituency characteristics and considering the residuals as the ideological position of MPs.

These cautionary remarks urged scholars to pay much more attention to the theoretical underpinning of their empirical analyses and to carry out the latter while being careful when measuring the preferences of both MPs and their principals. Innovative in both regards is Levitt's (1996) study dealing with how various principals affect the voting behavior of Senators. Assuming that a Senator voting against his or her own preferences or against those of a principal induces "utility loss," the author estimates an empirical model with proxies for the preferences of principals leaving as some sort of residuals the Senator's preferences estimated based on so-called fixed effects.[9] Proceeding in this way generates also weights indicating how important the Senator's preferences and those of the various principals are in explaining his or her voting behavior. According to this methodology, a Senator's preference is central in explaining his or her votes, while the voters' beat the national party's preferences to second place. The former, not surprisingly, become more important as elections are looming large.

A different approach relied on the fact that MPs switch either from one chamber to another or move from one party to another, changing by the same token some of their principals (i.e., the constituency in the first case and the party in the second). Grofman et al. (1995) argue that members of Congress moving from one chamber to another offer conditions of a "natural experiment," thus allowing to attribute any change in voting behavior to the different constituency. They find that such changes in constituencies only lead to changes in Congressmen's behavior if the former are more extreme (i.e., more to the left for Democrats and more to the right for Republicans). The same "natural experiment" argument is made by Nokken (2000) (see also Nokken and Poole 2004) to study the partisan effect on Congressmen. The author finds that Congressmen switching adjust their voting record to the one of their new party.[10] These studies need to make the strong argument that the MPs switching from one chamber to the other, or from one party to another, are identical or at least similar to all other MPs. One might reasonably question this strong assumption and thus also take the empirical results with a grain of salt (see also Sekhon and Titiunik 2012).

Several other studies distinguish themselves by paying much closer attention to the way in which preferences are measured. Snyder and Groseclose (2000) propose a way to implicitly address Jackson and Kingdon's (1992) critique. More specifically, Snyder and Groseclose (2000) rely on the voting behavior in lopsided votes (assuming that there is no party pressure in such votes) to estimate the preferences of Congressmen, before relating these estimates to the voting behavior in close votes. Based on this estimation approach, they find that party pressure varies across issue areas and topics, and also across time. McCarty et al. (2001), on the other hand, conceptualize party discipline as leading to two distinct dividing lines

[9] While this approach appears similar to Kalt and Zupan's (1990), it differs as it puts more structure on the empirical model to be estimated.

[10] Relatedly, Heller and Mershon (2008) study in more detail party switchers in the Italian parliament (see also Heller and Mershon 2009). They find that Italian MPs leave more frequently political parties with a high discipline, suggesting that they want to escape exactly this discipline.

in a policy space between the yes- and no-votes in each party. Proceeding in this way, they find only few party effects and thus question Snyder and Groseclose's (2000) approach and conclusion.

Bartels (1991), wishing to assess what influenced voting decisions on defense spending, relies on opinion polls to measure the preferences of Congressmen's constituencies. The results of his study suggest that the latter have contributed significantly to the defense buildup during the Reagan presidency. While Bartels (1991) focuses on a specific policy domain, namely defense spending,[11] Ansolabehere et al. (2001) assess more generally how strongly the preferences of Congressmen's constituencies are related with their representatives voting behavior. The constituencies' preferences are again measured on the basis of surveys but offer a much broader and less policy-specific measure. The authors find that even when controlling for party membership, a considerable effect for the constituencies' preferences on the Congressmen's voting record remains. An interesting extension of such work is offered by Lee et al. (2004), who study whether voters' preferences affect the positioning of candidates, or whether the former simply choose between the two platforms on offer. Using a regression-discontinuity design, Lee et al. (2004) can show that Congressmen elected with a very small margin differ considerably in terms of their voting behavior as a function of whether they are Democrats or Republicans. This suggests that accountability of Congressmen works through the election of the candidate with the more popular policy proposals but not through a push to convergence of these proposals by the candidates.

While such studies have largely originated in the United States, a series of scholars has started to proceed in a similar fashion while focusing on other legislatures. Hix's (2002) study, for instance, introduces a distinction between two partisan principals for members of the EP. While the selection of candidates for EP elections is controlled by the national political parties, party groups in the EP have some control over offices allocated in the EP and in the party group leadership. Using preference measures based on a members of the EP (MEPs) survey, he finds that national parties appear to be much more influential than the party groups in the EP, which can at best offer offices and perks inside the EP or their own organizational structure (see for a related study Faas 2003). Lindstädt et al. (2011) build on this idea but argue that national parties are especially influential before and after EP elections, while the party groups increase their influence over members of the EP in the middle of the legislative term.[12] For the largest parties, they find

[11] Bartels (2008) extends this type of analyses to cover other policy areas.

[12] In his study of the Danish Parliament, Skjaeveland (1999) finds an increase in cohesion before elections. Interestingly enough, this effect runs counter to Diermeier and Feddersen's (1998) argument that as an election approaches party discipline should be more difficult to maintain as the confidence procedure assorted with a threat for early elections becomes less credible. For a system without a confidence vote, namely Switzerland, Traber et al. (2013, forthcoming) show that in the run-up to elections parties become more cohesive, but that this effect depends on the substantive importance of the vote and is not the same for all parties.

empirical results supporting this argument and in a later study (Lindstädt et al. 2013, forthcoming) show that this is also related to the incumbency of MEPs.[13]

In Kam's (2008) study, deviations from the MP's party voting form a central part of his analysis (see also Kam 2001).[14] Based on survey responses, he is able to place British and Canadian MPs in a two-dimensional policy space and show that contrary to received wisdom it is not MPs close to the ideological divide between the two main parties that deviate most frequently from their party's line, but the more extreme MPs. Kam (2008), in a related analysis, also shows how constituency characteristics, MPs' preferences and partisanship affect three specific votes in the Canadian legislature on hate crimes. He finds that both partisanship and the MPs preferences affect considerably the MPs' voting behavior.[15]

Thus, the major developments in the area of understanding individual voting by MPs have been to pay much more attention to the necessary data to determine the importance of the several principals of MPs. At the same time, more theoretically refined analyses have also allowed for new insights.

8.3.2 What Explains Cohesion of Parties?

When turning to studies dealing with the cohesion of political parties in parliament, the field experienced mostly developments in the area of measurement and the geographical coverage of the studies (see for a review of this literature Owens 2003). While Rice's (1925) index to measure cohesiveness still plays a central role, several scholars have proposed modifications and extensions. As Rice's (1925) index only considers the yes- and no-votes, some authors suggest that abstentions should also be considered. Attina (1990, p. 564) proposes an "index-of-agreement" which subtracts from the number of votes in the modal category the sum of the two remaining categories before dividing the result by the total number of votes including abstentions.[16] Attina's (1990) "index-of-agreement" has the disadvantage that it may, contrary to Rice's (1925) index, yield negative values

[13] Strictly speaking, both of these studies are based on the dispersion of the estimated ideal points around the party group, respectively, national parties' position. In addition, the latter study does not assess the MPs' preferences independently. Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) proceeds in a similar fashion, namely by employing Kalt and Zupan's (1990) approach (see above), when wishing to assess how decisions by British MPs in the nineteenth century are influenced by their own ideology and their principals' interests.

[14] Both Stratmann (2006) and Sieberer (2010) offer related analyses for Germany assessing, especially if MPs elected on party lists vote differently than those elected in single member districts. They both find that the latter deviate from the party line more frequently.

[15] As both Hix (2002) and Kam (2008) simply control for partisanship, they might well fall prey to the inferential perils highlighted by Fiorina (1975).

[16] Lijphart (1963) also proposes an agreement index when criticizing earlier work measuring the affinity of different member states in the UNGA. In his measure, abstentions are only considered as a partial disagreement (to be precise, they are counted only half).

(i.e., each time when the modal category does not form a clear majority). Based on this criticism, Hix et al. (2006) propose an "agreement index" that also considers the third option an MP may have when considering voting, namely to abstain. Their measure, however, will always yield positive values, contrary to Attina's (1990). Relatedly, Desposato (2005) shows that Rice's (1925) index yields inflated cohesion measures for small parties and offers a way to correct for this bias. Similarly, though in another field, Häge (2011) demonstrates that the affinity measures based on voting in the UNGA (widely used in scholarship in international relations) do not consider that agreement might be due to chance. Correcting for these chance agreements yields a new measure questioning also the robustness of results presented in studies using these affinity scores.(see also Stokman 1977)

Perhaps even more impressive is the increased geographical coverage of studies dealing with the cohesion of parties and other groups in parliament. Desposato (2005, p. 731) nicely shows how the Rice (1925) index has been used extensively in many country-specific studies since its inception (for an early study focusing on France, see Burton 1936). Similarly, cohesion has also been studied in supranational assemblies like the EP (e.g., Attina 1990; Brzinski 1995)[17] and the UNGA (e.g., Hovet 1960; Luif and Radeva 2007) focusing on party groups and national delegations in the former case and groups of countries like, for instance, the member states of the European Union or of other groups in the latter one. In parallel, scholars have also started to carry out comparative studies. Özbudun's (1970) early study offered some systematic results on the cohesion of parties in a small number of Western democracies. Depauw and Martin (2009) extend this work to compare the cohesion of parties in several parliaments in mostly Western democracies,[18] while Thames (2007), for instance, covers new democracies in Eastern Europe, namely Russia and the Ukraine. Both studies find that electoral rules influence the cohesion of parties, while the former also shows that centralized candidate selection leads to more unified parties.[19]

Such comparative studies are probably the most severely exposed to the problems related to partial observability of parliamentary voting. As Hug (2010), based on a unique dataset shows, the cohesion of parties in roll call votes is different than those in other votes. As the rules for requesting roll call votes differ across parliaments (see for instance Saalfeld 1995; Carrubba et al. 2008; Carey 2009; Crisp and Driscoll 2012; Hug et al. 2012), this makes comparisons quite difficult and may lead to biased inferences. This even more so as several authors have demonstrated that roll call votes differ systematically from other votes in the

[17] Two recent studies on the EP focus on two specific aspects, namely the role of the party group leader (Bailer et al. 2009) in assuring cohesion, and how the ambition of MPs in the EP affect their defection from the party group (Meserve et al. 2009).

[18] See also the work by Kristinsson (2011) who while focusing on the cohesion of parties in Iceland offers a comparison with several other Western democracies and Jensen's (2000) study focusing on Nordic countries.

[19] See Sieberer (2006) and Carey and Reynolds (2007) for other studies focusing on party cohesion in established, respectively, new democracies.

US Congress (VanDoren 1990; Roberts 2007; Clinton and Lapinski 2008), the Swiss Parliament (Hug 2010), the Austrian Parliament (Jenny and Müller 2011), regional parliaments in Germany (Stecker 2011), the EP (Carrubba et al. 2006; Thiem 2009), or the UNGA (Hug 2012).

8.3.3 Measuring Cleavages and Conflict Lines

Work on measuring cleavages and conflict lines based on parliamentary voting has largely started in research on the US Congress and, though quite separately, the UNGA. While some early studies relied on Guttman scales or related tools (see for instance Aydelotte 1963), only with factor analytic models, as the one introduced by Harris (1948) in a study of ten votes from the 80th US Senate, precise scale estimates became possible. Thus, Harris (1948, p. 590) finds, for instance, that Congressmen differ on three different dimensions related to big business, foreign countries and one difficult to interpret. MacRae's (1958) study on the US Congress expands this type of analysis,[20] and Alker (1964) does the same in his work on the UNGA[21] to uncover the basic "dimensions of conflict in the general assembly."[22] Weisberg (1972) explores different other existing methods to position MPs in a political space based on their voting behavior, while Poole and Rosenthal (1985) propose an empirical model based on explicit behavioral assumptions to derive an estimator for MPs' ideal points. This methodology has been applied extensively to the US Congress (see for a survey for instance Poole and Rosenthal 1997), but to many other parliaments as well. Studies covering Poland (Noury et al. 1999), the Czech Republic (Noury and Mielcova 1997; Lyons and Lacina 2009), the UNGA (Voeten 2000), France (Rosenthal and Voeten 2004), Great Britain (Spirling and McLean 2006, 2007), Italy (Curini and Zucchini 2010), Switzerland (Hug and Schulz 2007), Korea (Jun and Hix 2010), Brazil (Desposato 2009), and even a large set of countries (Hix and Noury 2007) have recently been carried out to position MPs (mostly) on a left–right dimension and others if necessary.[23]

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[20] Interestingly enough, Alker (1964) in his study of the UNGA does not refer to Harris's (1948) and precursor studies focusing on the US congress. Equally notable is that studies on the French Parliament have also seen early developments of specific tools to measure cleavages and their innovative application to answer specific research questions (see for instance MacRae 1967; Warwick 1977).

[21] Anderson et al. (1966) provide an early review and discussion of the various methods used in this research area, while Poole (2005), Clinton (2012), and Carroll and Poole (2013, forthcoming) offer a more up to date discussion (for a related review focusing on the US Congress, see McCarty 2011).

[22] Heckman and Snyder (1997) provide a rational for using factor analysis relying on a linear probability model linking estimated ideal points with the likelihood of voting in favor or against a proposal. Both Ansolabehere et al. (2001) and Andrews (2002) use this approach in analyses focusing on the US Congress, respectively, the Russian Duma.

[23] Related is obviously Kam's (2008) study.

At the same time, critiques and innovations in the estimation of ideal points have appeared in the literature. Both Rosenthal and Voeten (2004) and Spirling and McLean (2006, 2007) make the argument that in order to provide credible estimates of MPs' ideal points, the underlying behavior of MPs has to follow the assumptions of the spatial model (see also Londregan 2000a; Kam 2008). As both sets of authors demonstrate, this is hardly the case in the French and British parliaments, leading to odd results. In parallel, Clinton et al. (2004) (see also Martin and Quinn 2002) have proposed a method to estimate ideal points that allows for more flexibility in integrating also in part the critical points raised by Rosenthal and Voeten (2004) and Spirling and McLean (2006, 2007).[24] This approach as well as Poole's (2000) has been used to study the MPs' positions in the Weimar Republic (Debus and Hansen 2010; Hansen and Debus 2012), the Canadian legislature (Godbout and Høyland 2011), the European Parliament (Han 2007; Høyland 2010), the Irish Parliament (Hansen 2009), and many more.

8.4 Recent Research Frontiers

The use of these recent methodological innovations also characterizes the current research frontier. More specifically scholars have started to address either directly or indirectly the main problems in the study of parliamentary voting, namely that the latter are often only partially observable and subject to considerable agenda influences. Drawing on Clinton et al. (2004) approach, both Clinton (2006) and Høyland (2010) offer new insights into the influence of various principals on MPs in the US Congress and the EP. The former's study of the US Congress highlights the influence of voter preferences on Congressmen's decision. The latter argues that as many roll call votes in the EP concern resolutions (i.e., non-legislative business) if party pressure is exerted it should be done in (consequential) legislative votes. Taking this into account leads to revised estimates of MPs' ideal points and a new assessment of the influence of party groups in the EP.

While implicitly these studies address some of the selection issues discussed above, other more recent studies do so more directly. Carrubba et al. (2008) propose a theoretical model based on the assumption that roll call votes are requested to allow for disciplining of MPs.[25] As they show, if this model is correct,

[24] Strictly speaking, Spirling and McLean (2007) question whether a less constraining method proposed by Poole (2000) allows circumventing the problems of possibly non-spatial voting. A useful survey of these various methods appears in Poole (2005).

[25] The literature on the reasons why roll call votes are requested is still rather thin. Fennell's (1974) study of why roll call votes are requested in the Argentinean Parliament is probably the earliest such study. More generally, one may distinguish between disciplining and two types of signaling motivations. The latter distinguish themselves by the fact whether the requesters' voting or the voting of other actors is to be signaled to a particular audience. See Carrubba et al. (2008) for a more detailed discussion.

not taking into account the selection issues will lead to rather biased inferences on how MPs behave in parliament. At the more empirical level, Hug (2010) evaluates a simple way that may allow to correct for some inferential biases when assessing the cohesion of parties based exclusively on roll call votes. This relies on estimating at the same time a selection equation (i.e., did a roll call vote occur or not) and an outcome equation (in this case, the level of cohesion of parties) (for a related study focusing on the UNGA, see Hug 2012). The results suggest, however, that more theoretically informed approaches, like, for instance, based on the model proposed by Carrubba et al. (2008), are likely to yield better results. Crisp and Driscoll (2012), on the other hand, offer for a series of Latin American legislatures detailed information on the conditions under which roll call votes are requested. These authors can also show that roll calls are requested under very specific circumstances in the Mexican and Argentinean legislature.

Related to this issue of partial observability is the more general question how votes in parliament have to be conceived in the larger context of parliamentary decision making. Londregan (2000b), for instance, shows that parliamentary voting is related to the various previous stages leading up to a parliamentary decision. This may lead to more complex strategic calculations by politicians wishing to achieve their preferred outcome. While Krehbiel and Rivers (1990) argue that this leads to strategic behavior in the committee- and agenda-setting-stage rather than during the floor debates and votes, other scholars explore whether strategic behavior might also prevail on the parliamentary floor.[26] Clinton and Meirowitz (2003, 2004) propose, based on Martin and Quinn's (2002) and Clinton et al. (2004) approach to estimate MPs' ideal points, a way to assess more in detail whether strategic voting has occurred. Taking advantage of the flexibility of these newer tools, Clinton and Meirowitz (2003, 2004) offer two studies of how strategic voting might be detected and demonstrated with the help of sophisticated methods.[27] In doing so, they consider much more closely the sequence of votes and the relationships between the latter. Thus, they also offer a more direct way to consider the effects that the voting agenda has on the behavior of MPs. As strategic voting leads automatically to interdependent votes in parliaments, this generates an additional problem in the analysis of roll call votes, as most basic estimators of ideal points assume independent votes. Consequently, more complex estimators, following in part Clinton and Meirowitz's (2003, 2004) lead, would need to be deployed.

Related to these innovations are studies that wish to assess cleavages and ideal points in more than one institution (or across time), Shor et al. (2010) and Treier

[26] I refrain from discussing here the rather extensive and specialized literature that had developed between the publication of Farquharson's (1969) early study of sophisticated voting and Krehbiel and Rivers's (1990) article, which constituted some sort of a death knell for this literature (a bibliometric analyses of Farquharson's (1969) book clearly demonstrates this).

[27] Relatedly, Bütikofer and Hug (2008) show that strategic voting may be prevalent in parliaments other than the US Congress.

(2011) show the utility of such approaches in the context of the US Congress,[28] while Hug and Martin (2012) and Masket and Noel (2012) use this method to position MPs and their voters on the same political scale.[29] These latter studies show how roll call votes analyzed with new methodological tools allow insights into research areas not directly related to the focus of studies on parliamentary voting. Thus, Masket and Noel (2012) use voting in referendums and votes by state legislators in California to assess two theories of representation finding that legislators are significantly more extreme than the median voter from their respective districts. Hug and Martin (2012) proceed similarly by relying on Swiss data and studying whether the electoral system is related to the dispersion of MPs around the median voters' preferences. They find that MPs elected in majoritarian elections are much more closely clustered around the respective district median voter, while they are much more dispersed if election in a proportional representation election.

8.5 Conclusion

The combination of easy access to rich behavioral data with the development of new methodological tools has led to a considerable progress in the literature on parliamentary voting. More and more studies appear offering new insights, for instance, into what determines MPs' voting decisions. Similarly, scholars have branched out considerably to cover parliaments from other geographical areas than Capitol Hill. As institutional rules are likely to structure an MP's behavior, having variation in these institutional rules is of importance and can be obtained only in comparative studies.

At the same time, however, despite the fact that various studies have alerted scholars to problems in the use of roll call votes, considerable headway is still needed. As in many if not most parliaments roll call votes are far from being the rule, neglecting the conditions under which such votes take place is considerably problematic. Several recent studies have been able to demonstrate that roll call votes are systematically different compared to other votes. As there might be different reasons for requesting roll call votes, solid theoretical underpinning are important to know how potential inferential biases might be addressed. Some headway has already been made in this area, but quite a few problems have still to be dealt with. Finding solutions to the latter will allow research on parliamentary voting to base itself on much more solid footing.

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[28] Bütikofer and Hug (2010) proceed similarly to assess the relative positions of MPs in the two chambers of the Swiss Parliament.

[29] Portmann et al. (2012) use another approach to assess whether, as a function of the electoral system employed, MPs represent more or less well the voters' preferences (see also Eichenberger et al. 2012). Similarly, Kaniovski and Mueller (2011) explore whether MPs in the EP represent well the voters' preferences.

Having such an improved based scholar might more convincingly address the still largely open research questions discussed in this paper. First and foremost, the observed votes in parliament are largely the end stage of a process that involved negotiations in governments, committees, etc. How these previous stages affect parliamentary voting is still a rather unexplored territory. Second, even though from the early work on parliamentary voting the influence of various principals on MPs' decision has been at the center stage, research is still needed to disentangle these various influences. Such studies should consider more explicitly the inter-dependent nature of votes in parliament and place them in the broader process of policy making. Progressing on these two research avenues in a comparative way, while considering more explicitly the way in which roll call data comes about, would allow parliamentary research to progress considerably.

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Chapter 9
Citizens' Confidence in European Parliaments: Institutions and Issues

Karin Dyrstad and Ola Listhaug

Abstract Parliament is a key institution in democracy and the main arena for inter-party politics. Citizens' confidence in parliament is an important indicator for how democracy works in society. In this chapter, we present an overview of recent research on comparative trends in voters' confidence in European parliaments in the last quarter century. We also compare trends for confidence in parliament and other political institutions with private institutions like major companies and the press. The literature has pursued explanations for variations in political trust in several directions. Building on the early studies by Miller, several scholars have explained the decline of trust from the evolvement of policy distance between government elites and citizens. In discussion and analysis, this chapter includes factors at the individual level as well as the national, aggregated level. Our main interest lies in the effect of political institutions and policy issues on political trust. While mature democracies see only smaller variations in confidence over time, there are larger fluctuations and decline in post-Communist Europe. Contrary to our expectations, institutional factors do not explain much of the differences in confidence in parliament in Europe, while policy issues play an important role.

Keywords Political trust · Political support · New democracies · Political parties · European politics

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9.1 Introduction

Parliament is a key institution in modern democracy. Citizens' confidence and trust in parliament is an important indicator of how well democracy works. The parliament is also the main arena for inter-party politics: parties organize to compete for votes in parliamentary elections; the outcome of these elections, in turn, determines the government the next period (see Chaps. 2 and 3 in this book). In this chapter, we present an overview of recent research on comparative trends in voters' confidence in European parliaments over the last 25 years and more. We also compare trends for confidence in parliament and other political institutions with private institutions and identify some important determinants of trust in parliament,[1] analyzing variation over time, across countries, and among individuals. In both discussion and analysis, we include factors at the individual level as well as the national, aggregated level. Our main interest lies in the effect of political institutions and policy issues on political trust.

Reports of declining political support (see e.g., Norris 1999) have spurred a large research literature on variations in political trust. The literature has pursued explanations in several directions. First, building on the early studies (Miller 1974), several scholars have explained the decline of trust from the evolvement of policy distance between government elites and citizens. This literature has found that certain types of political issues have a strong potential of undermining trust, in particular issues that define long-term minority positions and issues with a strong affective component.

Second, trust is also linked to state performance in areas where there is relative consensus on political goals—the economy in particular, but also on certain areas of welfare and the environment. Political leaders can strengthen or weaken trust and negative effects of leadership on trust are often associated with scandals.

Finally—and most important for the discussion in this chapter—voters' trust and confidence may also depend on the choice of electoral institutions in society. Research has focused on several comparative aspects. The comparative study of new and old democracies (in particular, the studies by Anderson and colleagues; see especially Anderson et al. 2005) and the comparison of systems that maximize representation versus those which maximize accountability (Listhaug et al. 2009). Institutions determine the nature of competition and cooperation between political parties and which kind of government is most likely to be formed after the election—single-party majority government, multiparty coalitions, and minority government.

In most countries, popularly elected parliaments and national assemblies are the most important political institutions. Citizens who elect the members of these institutions are the ultimate principals in the chain of delegation that characterize the working of the democratic process (Strøm et al. 2003). If citizens feel that they

[1] Some scholars draw a distinction between "confidence" and "trust" (e.g., Newton 2007). We treat the two concepts as synonyms and use them interchangeably throughout the chapter.

can trust institutions, this indicates that the political system works according to the democratic ideal. Conversely, low trust is an indication that something in the political system is not working. In this sense, it is advantageous for a society to have highly trusted institutions. However, high trust should not be equaled with a blind faith in institutions, as some sound skepticism might serve democracy as well (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995). Moreover, recent research has observed a high level of confidence in institutions in some authoritarian countries (Newton and Zmerli 2011). More research is needed to sort out the causal mechanisms that produce this relationship, in particular distinguishing between methodological effects (do people report their "true" political evaluations in authoritarian systems?) and the actual impact of political elites on citizens' trust levels. In the following, we discuss some mechanisms that affect the prevalence of political trust in society.

9.2 What Explains Variation in Political Trust?

There are many factors and mechanisms that explain variations in trust. We focus on several of these: political distance, political performance, social trust, attachment to demographic groups, and, at the aggregate level, the effects of institutions. Political distance is related to the difference in policy issues by the government and the policy positions of citizens as laid out by Miller in his classic article (Miller 1974). The idea is that trust in government will suffer if citizens choose different positions on important political issues than those pursued by the government, opening up a gap between masses and elites. The political gap can be caused by specific issues and conflicting positions among mass and elites, but may also develop by a more diffuse contrast in ideology that accumulates over several dimensions—for example, along the left–right divide. In many cases, the gap between mass and elites takes a curvilinear form, with low trust observed at the ends of the ideological spectrum—typically on the far left or the far right because governments choose their governing platforms normally on the center–left or the center–right.

Trust can be linked to demographic categories like gender, age, class, and other relevant characteristics. In line with previous research, we see these linkages as potential indicators of political distances to the various groups. Trust will be higher in demographic groups that benefit from the policies of the current government, while trust will suffer in groups that are excluded (in relative terms) from the prevailing political agenda of government. Another strand of literature identifies social trust as a determinant of political trust, and point to the effect of early life socialization. However, the evidence for this argument is mixed (Mishler and Rose 2001; Newton 2007, 2001; Zmerli and Newton 2008). In a thorough literature review, Levi and Stoker (2000) find that the strongest determinant of how people evaluate the political institutions is their political experiences, not their personality or social characteristics. In another review, Newton (2001) argues that political

trust is shaped by the political system more than from traits of the individual. All these arguments point to the effects of the political system and people's political experiences, rather than personal traits. One of the main, and perhaps not so surprising, finding in the literature is that people have high trust if they live in trustworthy societies (Newton 2007).

Turning to the role of policy issues, it is common to make a distinction between position issues and valence issues. The former category is relevant for the mechanism discussed above; trust declines if the political distance increases between government and the governed or between supporters of parties in government and those who vote for the oppositions. Valence issues denote political categories where mass publics agree on politics and policy (although not necessarily 100 %), and the question is, how well government solves the policy problem. The standard example of valence issues is in the economic domain where both unemployment and inflation are considered evils that the large majority of voters want to keep at a low level. This is analogous to the argument about institutional performance (Mishler and Rose 2001; Newton 2001). Citrin and Green (1986) analyze the effect of economic outcomes, policy preferences, and evaluations of presidential style on trust in government in the USA. They raise the distinction between "disagreement with policies (official goals and approaches adopted to reach them)" and "discontent with official performance (recent progress in achieving generally desired objectives)" as possible causes of low political trust. They find supporting evidence that evaluations of the president's performance mediated the effect of national economic performance. The performance of government is traditionally evaluated on the basis of a successful management of the economy. Huseby (2000) has argued that other policy areas than the economy may have valence characteristics, notably the core welfare state domains of health and care for the elderly, and that trust may depend on how well governments solve the problems in these areas.

In a recent article on state capacity, conflict, and political trust, Hutchison and Johnson (2011) argue that the state's capacity to deliver influences people's trust in institutions, combining the state capacity literature and the literature on political trust. As a measure of state capacity, they use tax revenue. However, they also see that the relationship between political capacity and trust can be endogenous, as others have argued that political trust is a prerequisite of good institutional performance.

As discussed previously, political institutions favor some party systems over others and make some forms of government more likely than others. Until recently, the studies of the impact of institutions were limited and relatively rare due to lack of comparative survey data across countries with institutional variation. This situation has been remedied with the accumulation of data from an increasing number of waves of cross-national surveys. With data from European Values Study, World Values Survey, European Social Survey, Latino barometer and other similar studies, it has been possible for some years to model the impact of political institutions on trust. Research has followed a trend where scholars' empirical

models were based on relatively simple coding of the political system which was used to compare trust across the systems.

Another strand of research aggregated survey data over time and performed time series analysis as, for example, in the study of Weil (1989). He used such time series data for a small number of countries and concluded that systems of accountability in the countries were important for confidence in institutions and for legitimacy (for a discussion, see Listhaug et al. 2009). Building on an extensive analysis of countries with data from the Values Studies, Listhaug and Wiberg (1995) combined the comparisons of single countries with aggregated survey data and found that government instability weakened trust. This study had some limitations in terms of the number of countries surveyed and the conceptualization of political institutions. The research that followed has improved on the earlier studies both with reference to number of countries included and the statistical methods employed. Much of the research has focused on comparisons of majoritarian systems and proportional systems, and which of these institutions—if any—have an advantage in creating political trust among citizens.

Anderson and Guillory (1997) initiated a discussion of how majoritarian systems created a large gap in trust and confidence among winners in elections as compared to those who voted for the losing parties. This pattern has been confirmed in an extensive research using a variety of comparative datasets (Anderson et al. 2005). While the gap between winners and losers constitutes a near universal pattern of political trust, what interests us here is primarily the institutional foundation of the gap. From a voter's perspective, a majoritarian system offers a clearer choice of politics. Those who voted for the winning party will be rewarded as their party will be able to carry out more of the promised politics, boosting their positive feeling for the political system. On the other hand, losing in a majoritarian system will have clear negative consequences, as the losing parties will have little influence in the policy-making process. This should lead to frustration and in turn to a lower level of political support among their voters. The muddled nature of proportional systems is better for losers as they will have political influence through smaller parties in coalitions and other bargaining mechanisms, making the loss hurt less in policy terms. Obviously, if a majoritarian system is good for winners and bad for losers and a proportional system tempers the effects for both winners and losers, it is not so easy to predict which institution is best for creating trust among publics. This is not only the case for majoritarian and proportional systems, but for several institutional variables. In their research, Listhaug et al. (2009) argue that many institutions do not combine the functions of accountability and representation in an optimal fashion; rather, they are strong on one of the dimensions. Although each of the systems might have their advantages, scholars tend to choose one form of institution as the most likely to enhance trust levels among citizens. This is striking for Norris (1999) who goes through a long list of institutional dichotomies and hypothesizes that one of the dichotomies will be linked to a higher level of trust. Strøm et al. (2003: 731–732) signal a preference for majoritarian type of institutions, although not without exceptions: "(…) party competition (…) reduces rent extraction and promotes general satisfaction with

democracy. Such salutary effects, then, are associated with the Westminster model of democracy, which according to our results deserve much greater respect than it has received in much of the of the recent literature. Yet the positive effects of electoral competition and cohesion do not strictly depend on the pure two-party format. Even alternational multiparty systems may under certain circumstances fit the bill. Pivotal, polarized, and fragmented party systems, however; do not."

While the mechanism for explaining differences in trust in the population is straightforward, it is normally not so important in explaining movements in trust over time. Within the time frame of our research, the Communist countries in Europe changed from dictatorships to some form of democracy. This makes it possible to study the dynamics of political trust in post-Communist countries and compare with other European countries.

In new and consolidating democracies, the dynamics of political trust are different than in countries with mature democratic institutions. As put by Mishler and Rose (2001: 32), "…initial political trust in new democracies is likely to be low. New democracies confront a variety of difficult problems linked to their political and economic transition, yet they have little experience governing democratically. It is almost inevitable in this context that they will suffer from a performance deficit while learning to govern through a process of trial and error." If institutional performance is the key to generating political trust, people's confidence in the new political institutions should increase as these start to deliver. Moreover, the party system in new democracies is usually not fully developed yet. As the party system develops, the political parties should be better at channeling people's preferences, thus increasing their sensation of being represented.

However, initial trust should not necessarily be low in new democracies. In many democratizing countries, people have high expectations to the democratic reforms and the benefits of democracy. Thus, initial trust in the new democratic institutions could be higher than after some years, when people have experienced that democracy is not a quick fix to all social problems, but rather a slow and often inefficient process of bargaining and compromises. This mechanism is commonly labeled the disenchantment effect (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). We will assess the success of post-Communist countries in creating trust in their parliaments both in a simple descriptive analysis and using more elaborate statistical models that include micro- and macro-factors that are relevant for the understanding of political trust. The next section gives a short description of the data that we use, and shows our results.

9.3 Data Analysis

The data used for the analysis in this chapter are a combination of three sources. Survey data are taken from European part of the World Values Survey (WVS) and European Values Study (EVS) four-wave integrated file (European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association 2006), which is combined with the

last wave of EVS (EVS 2010). The WVS data were collected in five waves: 1981 (1981–1984), 1990 (1990–1993), 1995 (1994–1999), 2000 (1999–2004), and 2005 (2005–2008). The EVS was also collected in five waves: 1981, 1990/1991, 1999/2000, and 2008/2010. The macro-level indicators stem from the quality of government dataset, which is a compilation of several datasets with variables on political institutions and performance (Teorell et al. 2011). The data cover the period from 1981 to 2009. We restrict ourselves to the European countries, and for the last part of the analysis, to the last wave of EVS only.

The following analysis consists of two main parts. First, we show trends of confidence in parliament the last 30 years. We also compare trends for confidence in parliament and other political institutions with private institutions like major companies and media, and we compare the level of confidence in parliament among mature democracies and consolidating democracies. Finally, we analyze macro- and micro-level determinants of confidence in parliament in European countries today, using the most recent data available.

The dependent variable, confidence in parliament, is measured through a question "How much confidence do you have in parliament?," where the answer categories ranged from 1 "none at all" to 4 "a great deal of confidence."

9.4 Trends in Political Trust

Figure 9.1 shows the mean value of confidence in parliament over time. To avoid composition effects due to the changing number of countries that participated in EVS or WVS, the sample is limited to the 12 countries that have participated in the surveys from the beginning.[2] This includes stable democracies like France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the Scandinavian countries, but also some newer democracies like Spain and Hungary. Overall, confidence in parliament seems to be quite stable over time, but with a marginal decline in the first part of the period.

Figure 9.1 indicates that while confidence in parliament has been relatively stable over time, it is not reassuringly high. The mean value of about 2.5 translates into a response between "not very much" and "quite a lot." As discussed previously, while high trust in society is an advantage, blind faith is neither desirable nor to be expected. To get a better impression of what constitutes "high" and "low" levels of trust, we compare confidence in parliament with confidence in some selected institutions.

Figure 9.2 provides a comparison of confidence in parliament with confidence in other political institutions, as well as confidence in other large social actors,

[2] The countries included here are United Kingdom, Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, Hungary, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Norway. Including all the countries for which we have data at two or more points gives somewhat larger fluctuations, but does not change the overall picture.



Fig. 9.1 Confidence in parliament in 12 European countries, 1981–2008

such as major companies and the press. The figure suggests that confidence in parliament follows quite closely trust in other large institutions, both political and private. Especially during the last decade, from 2000 to 2010, fluctuations in confidence in parliament follow the fluctuations in other types of confidence. The clearest decline is found for political parties, which from 1995 on enjoy considerably lower trust than the other political institutions. However, as discussed by Easton (1965), declining support for one part of the system does not translate into declining support for the system at a whole, so lack of trust in political actors is not necessarily a problem. Political parties and politicians who have lost support can be replaced at the next election (Norris 1999).

Overall, people express more confidence in the justice system than in any other institution. Perhaps more surprising is the finding that people evaluate the press, major companies, and the parliament to be almost equally trustworthy.

At the aggregate level, there is little variation over time in Europe. However, a disaggregation by country shows considerable variation among the European countries (Table 9.1). Here, we have split the countries into two groups: Western Europe and post-Communist Europe. Note that the period examined here is shorter than for the stable democracies in Western Europe.[3] With the exception of Hungary, data became available for Eastern Europe from 1990 onward, and for the former Yugoslav republics, from the mid-1990s.

Table 9.1 shows some interesting differences between Western Europe and the post-Communist countries. In Western Europe, political trust is quite stable over time within most countries. At the aggregate level, there is virtually no change in

[3] Ideally, the time span should be the same for both groups of country. However, as older data for are not available for the post-Communist countries, we choose to use all available data rather than shorten the period for the countries in Western Europe. If anything, this gives a larger bias towards Western European. Still, we find that the decline is larger in the East than in the West. The long time span in Western Europe can over course conceal larger fluctuations over time in some of the countries. However, as indicated by Fig. 9.1 and confirmed by separate country analyses not reported here, confidence remains relatively stable in most countries.



Fig. 9.2 Relative confidence in institutions in 12 European countries, 1981–2008

political trust over time, even if there are changes in some of the countries. The largest increase in political confidence in the period took place in Denmark, followed by Switzerland, while Finland and the United Kingdom saw the largest decrease in the period. In 2009, United Kingdom has the lowest level of political confidence in Western Europe, while Denmark had the highest level.

In the new democracies in East and Central Europe, despite the shorter time span, there are larger changes over time, and there is also more variation among countries. The region started out with about the same level of political confidence as the stable democracies in Western Europe, but saw a clear decline during the two decades from 1990 to 2009. The largest decline took place in Hungary and Poland, but also Bulgaria and some of the countries in southeast Europe saw decreased confidence in parliament in the period. Most of these countries had strong popular movements for democratic change, and expectations might have been higher here than in other countries. It should be noted that the level of political trust in Hungary in 1989 was very high, higher than in any of the stable democracies, probably as an anticipation effect of the prospects of democratization. Some of this decline can be explained as a disenchantment effect. People in

Table 9.1 Confidence in parliament in Western and Eastern Europe, change over time[a]

Western Europe	Initial	2008/ 20099	Change	East/Central Europe	Initial	2008/ 2009	Change
				Albania (1998)	2.61	2.13	−0.48
Austria (1990)	2.37	2.15	−0.21	Bosnia (1998)	2.60	2.06	−0.54
Belgium (1981)	2.25	2.31	0.06	Bulgaria (1990)	2.48	1.61	−0.87
Cyprus (2006)	2.46	2.57	0.11	Croatia (1996)	2.37	1.74	−0.63
Denmark (1981)	2.27	2.80	0.53	Czech Republic (1990)	2.42	1.83	−0.59
Finland (1981)	2.69	2.37	−0.33	Estonia (1996)	2.32	2.09	−0.22
France (1981)	2.50	2.43	−0.07	Hungary (1982)	3.45	1.92	−1.53
Germany (1990)	2.46	2.22	−0.24	Latvia (1996)	1.99	1.87	−0.12
Greece (1999)	1.99	2.09	0.10	Lithuania (1997)	2.17	1.92	−0.25
Ireland (1981)	2.59	2.42	−0.16	Macedonia (1998)	1.76	2.36	0.61
Italy (1981)	2.10	2.20	0.10	Montenegro (1996)[b]	2.14	2.21	0.06
Netherlands (1981)	2.42	2.44	0.02	Poland (1989)	3.02	1.88	−1.14
Norway (1982)	2.95	2.66	−0.29	Romania (1993)	1.89	1.98	0.10
Portugal (1990)	2.17	2.23	0.05	Russia (1990)	2.39	2.29	−0.11
Spain (1981)	2.49	2.43	−0.06	Serbia (1996)[b]	2.14	1.76	−0.39
Sweden (1982)	2.44	2.60	0.16	Slovakia (1990)	2.21	2.40	0.19
Switzerland (1996)	2.33	2.67	0.34	Slovenia (1992)	2.26	2.40	0.13
United Kingdom (1981)	2.40	2.00	−0.40	Ukraine (1996)	2.18	1.63	−0.56
Mean[c]	2.40	2.39	−0.02		2.36	2.00	−0.35

[a] Entries are mean value of confidence in parliament at the first time the country participated in EVS/WVS and in 2008/2009. Year of entry in the surveys is included in parenthesis

[b] The initial value for both Serbia and Montenegro is from Yugoslavia, which in 1996 consisted of what is today Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo

[c] The difference in mean level of confidence in 2008/2009 in the two groups of countries is statistically significant on a 0.001 level

Eastern Europe had great expectations to the political reforms carried out, but soon learnt that democracy is a slow process. In democratizing countries, support for democracy and trust in institutions are not theoretical exercises, but rather expressions of regime evaluations, where people compare the current regime with the previous (see Lühiste 2008; Newton 2001). To the extent that people express political confidence as a function of regime performance, slow economic growth and increasing poverty in many countries can also explain some of the decline in political confidence.

The clear exception here is Macedonia, which saw a substantial increase over a ten-year period. Dyrstad and Binningsbø (2012) explain the increase in political trust in Macedonia in part as the result of the 2001 peace agreement, which improved the political inclusion of the large Albanian minority.

As discussed previously, characteristics of the political institutions should also affect confidence in parliament. The next section analyzes possible macro-level determinants of confidence in parliament.

9.5 Determinants of Trust in Parliament

The findings presented above point to an important difference between change of confidence in parliaments in post-Communist countries and in Western Europe. The next step of the analysis will introduce several factors that are relevant to explain variations in confidence levels across countries, and may also contribute to an understanding of why support for parliaments have become weaker in post-Communist countries in the period that we study. What affects trust in parliament? In the following, we focus on macro- and micro-level determinants of political trust. At the macro-level, we analyze the effect of level of democracy, post-Communist legacy, regime type, and electoral system. At the micro-level, we use socio-demographic characteristics, social trust, regime performance, and various indicators of ideology and political position.

Table 9.2 shows a series of multilevel regression models with individuals (level 1) nested within countries (level 2). Model 0 is an empty model with just the intercept. This confirms that a substantial proportion of the variance in confidence in parliament is found at the second level of analysis, that is, at the country level, which justifies the use of multilevel regression analysis (see e.g., Hox 2002; Twisk 2006). Considering the findings in Table 9.1, it is not surprising that about 12 percent of the variance in the dependent variable is found at the country level.

Model 1 tests the effect of level of democracy, post-Communist political legacy, and institutional characteristics on cross-national differences in political trust. The inclusion of these variables reduces the level-two proportion of variance to about 10 %. The only statistically significant effect is the effect of the post-Communist political legacy; all the other variables turn out to be statistically insignificant. In other words, the differences observed in Table 9.1 are most likely not due to differences in institutional design or difference in level of democracy. Overall, post-Communist countries have a lower level of trust than the countries in Western Europe, as seen in Table 9.1.

Model 2 includes a set of socio-demographic, namely gender, age, education, and rural residence. Of these, education has the strongest effect; people with higher education tend to display a higher level of confidence in the parliament. Age and rural residence also increase political trust, whereas no significant difference between men and women can be found.

Model 3 expands Model 2 with a measure of social trust and regime performance, measured as unemployment status.[4] Unemployed people are relatively less well-off and should therefore be less satisfied with the performance of the political regime. People who display high levels of social trust should also show more confidence in the political institutions. Both these arguments find support in Model 3.

[4] Satisfaction with household income would be a better variable to use, but had too many missing values to be included in the analysis.

Table 9.2 Macro-level determinants of confidence in parliament in 33 European countries, 2008, multilevel ordinary least square regression model[a]

Determinants		0	1	2	3	4
Electoral System	Plurality		−0.241	0.236	−0.212	−0.218
			(0.330)	(0.312)	(0.226)	(0.222)
	Majority		0.316	0.214	0.043	0.036
			(0.263)	(0.231)	(0.224)	(0.220)
	Mixed system		0.311	0.267	0.067	0.065
			(0.269)	(0.235)	(0.082)	(0.080)
Executive branch	President		−0.143	−0.017	−0.016	−0.016
			(0.120)	(0.111)	(0.108)	(0.106)
Post-Communist country			−0.514*	−0.408*	−0.377*	−0.384*
			(0.097)	(0.089)	(0.087)	(0.086)
Level of democracy			−0.103*	−0.032	−0.030	−0.030
			(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Socio-demographic Characteristics	Male			−0.005	−0.000	0.000
				(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
	Age (years)			0.003*	0.002*	0.003*
				(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
	Education (years)			0.055*	0.045*	0.036*
				(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
	Rural residence			0.010*	0.010*	0.010*
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Social trust	Most people can be trusted				0.033*	0.030*
					(0.001)	(0.001)
Performance	Unemployed				−0.070*	−0.066*
					(0.022)	(0.022)
Left–right	Far left					−0.046*
						(0.012)

(continued)

Table 9.2 (continued)

Determinants		0	1	2	3	4
	Far right					0.095*
						(0.013)
Immigration	Prohibit from coming					−0.136*
						(0.014)
	Let anyone come					0.056*
						(0.011)
Environment	Not willing to pay					−0.168*
						(0.010)
Authoritarianism	Strong leader good					−0.015
						(0.011)
Constant		2.188*	3.134*	2.204*	2.214*	2.271*
		(0.048)	(0.284)	(0.298)	(0.216)	(0.213)
Sigma_u		0.286	0.253	0.221	0.215	0.212
Sigma_e		0.767	0.767	0.767	0.763	0.760
Rho		0.122	0.098	0.076	0.074	0.072
Observations		71,233	66,013	56,861	55,643	55,643
Number of countries		36	34	33	33	33

[a] Left and right are measured as the three lowest/highest values on an 11-point left–right scale. Attitudes toward immigration are measured through two dummy variables, coded from a question on immigrant policy where two of the answer categories were "let anyone come" and "prohibit people from coming." The variable on willingness to pay for the environment is coded as a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for everyone who answered "strongly disagree" on a question on whether they would be willing would give part of their income for the environment. Authoritarian attitudes are measured through a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for everybody who answered that having a political system with a strong leader would be "very good." Standard errors in parentheses, *$p < 0.01$. None of the variables were statistically significant on a 0.10 or 0.05 level. Sigma_u: variance at the country level, sigma_e: variance at the individual level. The intraclass correlation coefficient rho denotes the share of variance that is found on the country level

Finally, we include a set of indicators of ideology and position on some important political issues, such as the political left–right scale, immigration, environmental issues, and authoritarianism. Our results indicate that people far left on the political spectrum, strongly negative to immigration, and not willing to pay for an improved environment have lower confidence in the parliament than others. Conversely, people on the far right of the political spectrum or in favor of unrestricted immigration are more trusting than others. Showing authoritarian attitudes have no significant effect on confidence in parliament.

Taken together, our results suggest that both position in society, as measured by the socio-demographic variables, and central policy issues, such as immigration and the environment, are the main determinants of confidence in parliament in Europe. Rather than institutional design itself, political distance matters. People with attitudes far away from the political center are less likely to have their views represented in mainstream politics, and they should feel more alienated from the political system. Here, however, our results show some interesting variations, despite overall support for the argument. Starting with the left–right divide, people on the far right of the political spectrum are actually more trusting than people with a more centrist orientation. A possible explanation for this could be that people on the right tend to be more conservative, and therefore also be more supportive of traditional institutions. Similarly, people strongly in favor of a liberal immigration policy might be more trusting in general, not only of political institutions.

The lack of effect of any of the institutional characteristics resounds the argument made by Listhaug et al. (2009) that different systems each may have their advantages, so that their positive and negative effects cancel each other out; none of the designs are optimal.

Our models cannot fully explain the difference of citizens' confidence in parliament across the divide between post-Communist countries and countries in Western Europe as citizens in post-Communist systems remain less supportive of their parliaments even in statistical models that include several relevant factors: the economy, political issues, and social trust.

9.6 Conclusion

The parliament is the main arena for inter-party politics, and confidence in parliament is an important indicator of the state of democracy in a country. Parliaments are key institutions in political systems and work most effectively when they can rely on a reservoir of support from citizens. Needless to say, support must be balanced against some degree of critical assessment and evaluation from citizens as the ultimate principals. For a long time, scholars have voiced a concern for the development—and possible decline—of confidence in parliaments and other government institutions in mature democracies. As we have investigated this research question with data from European democracies of the last quarter century, the main conclusion which stands out is that mature democracies are mostly able

to keep up their confidence levels while the new post-Communist countries show a decline in confidence, leading to a lower level of confidence in the most recent time period than at the start of the democratization period. Differences in trust cannot be fully explained by factors from a multivariate statistical model, although the difference between post-Communist countries and West European countries declines somewhat when we control for a number of variables that previous research has linked to political trust. Thus, while political confidence in Western Europe is relatively stable, there is reason for concern about the development in the new democracies. Whether these countries over time will see stabilization, increase, or further decline, is an empirical question. However, in line with the valence issues argument, we believe that this largely depends on the ability of the political institutions in these countries to deliver basic goods, such as economic development.

Beyond the dichotomy between new and old democracies, institutional variables do not explain variations in confidence, but we find some effects of political issues as citizens with negative views on immigration and on environmental policies show less confidence in parliament. Besides position variables, we have found that the effect of one valence variable, unemployment, reduces confidence. The empirical findings also give support to the idea that political trust is linked to social trust as we find that persons who score high on social trust show more confidence in parliament than those who are less trusting toward their fellow citizens.

Our results indicate that in the recent years, political parties have seen experienced declining levels of trust. In line with Easton (1965) and Norris (1999), we do not think that this represents a problem for the political system itself, as incumbents and parties are continually evaluated and rewarded at the day of elections.

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Chapter 10
Structural Determinants of Party Choice: The Changing Impact of Socio-Structure Variables on Party Choice in Comparative Perspective

Oddbjørn Knutsen

Abstract This chapter addresses the issue to what extent the linkage between voters and political parties is based on stable cleavages. Such cleavages are expressing important and lasting societal divisions (rather than superficial and ephemeral ones), allow parties and voters to establish long-term linkages, and provide incumbents with clear representative and policy-making tasks against which they can be evaluated. The chapter first reviews research on the classic cleavages and subsequently turns to gender differences and new divisions among the large new middle class. The chapter reviews the literature and provides empirical information on European democracies, and argues that the cleavage changes have resulted in strategic reconsideration of important policies and changing location of the parties in the political space.

Keywords Cleavages · Social structure · Party choice · Dealignment · Realignment

10.1 Introduction

The notion of 'social cleavage' has been central to the study of party politics since the publication of the seminal essay on the development of the conflict structure in Western democracies by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). More recently, the cleavage concept has been much discussed since Bartolini and Mair's (1990) important work. Here, it is claimed that cleavages are more deep-seated than just having a structural anchorage, and is argued in favor of a cleavage concept that has three distinct elements: one empirical (social structure), one normative (a set of values

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and beliefs that provide a sense of identity related to those forming a socio-structural group), and one organizational or behavioral (individual behavior, institutions, and organizations expressing such groups) (Bartolini and Mair 1990: 215). Inspired by this cleavage concept, some of the more recent literature argues that one should be careful using this concept. In this chapter, I use a traditional notion of social cleavage in accordance with the often implicit definition of much of the reviewed literature. A cleavage basically reflects broadly based and long-standing social and economical divisions within society.

This chapter reviews the comparative research on the changing relationship between social structure and party choice. I focus on the structural variables included in the famous Lipset and Rokkan model for structural cleavages and in addition add gender and different versions of divisions within the service class or the new middle class. These new conflict variables are those among the structural variables that have mainly been focused upon in the literature. Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 15–23) focused on the historical origins of the major conflicts between the political parties. They identified four central cleavages which had their anchorage in the social structure:

1. The center–periphery cleavage which was anchored in geographical regions and related to different ethnic and linguistic groups as well as religious minorities.
2. The conflict between the church and the state which pitted the secular state against the historical privileges of the churches and over control of the important educational institutions. This cleavage has more specifically polarized the religious section against the secular section of the population.
3. The conflict in the labor market which involved owners and employers versus tenants, laborers, and workers.
4. Finally, the conflict in the commodity market between buyers and sellers of agricultural products, or more generally, between the urban and the rural population.

I start by examining research on each of these four cleavages, followed by gender and possible new divisions within the middle class. The section on class voting is larger than the other sections, partly because research on this topic has been extensive, and partly also because the development of class voting illustrates the development within the field. In the review, I include in particular two comparative works of my own (Knutsen 2004a, 2006). These works are comparative longitudinal studies based on a cumulative file of Eurobarometer data from the early 1970s to the late 1990s. The countries included are Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, West Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the Netherlands. I also include an empirical analysis based on a cumulative file of the three first rounds of European Social Survey to show the comparative pattern strength of the various social cleavages in 2002–2006. The empirical analysis is based on 24 countries. Most of these analyses are reported in greater detail in Knutsen (2012).

One important perspective in Lipset and Rokkan's work was the persistent impact of social structure on party choice which they called the "freezing of party

alignments." With few but significant exceptions, the party systems of the 1960s reflected the cleavage structure of the 1920s (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 50–54). The freezing hypothesis is basically explained by a strong relationship between the socio-structural variables which Lipset and Rokkan emphasize and party choice. This contributes to stability in the party system and fairly stable support for the various parties over time. Lipset and Rokkan's "freezing" perspective is a perspective of *stable alignment*.

In the stable alignment model, political parties frequently represented the interests of one particular social group. Parties were elite or mass parties, and the power in the party organizations was located within the parliamentary and the extra-parliamentary organizations, respectively. This occurred to the degree that strong cleavages were coupled to the mass party, a considerable portion of the party voters with more or less the same interests were members of a centralized political party that offered little opportunity for individualized political participation. The organization was democratic, but with powerful party leadership, as long as the leadership was considered to articulate the interests of the social group.

From around 1970, there has been considerable change in the electoral behavior of voters in Western democracies. Instead of stable alignment, research commenced to discuss dealignment and realignment. *Dealignment* means that the impact of the structural cleavage has become smaller. The increased instability in the party system is caused by the fact that voters do not vote according to their location in the social structure to the same degree as previously. *Realignment* implies the eclipse of old cleavages and the rise of new ones. *Secular realignment* implies that there is first a dealignment from the old cleavages followed by an alignment related to the new cleavage structure. While Lipset and Rokkan focused on the national and the industrial revolutions, Dalton et al. (1984: 455–456) referred to, for example, a third post-industrial revolution which might lead to the creation of a new basis of social cleavages.

There are two kinds of new conflicts that have been focused on in this research: New structural cleavages and value-based conflicts which, to a larger degree than in industrial society, have become important. Gender and new structural divisions within the new middle class are examples of such new structural divisions. Another type of realignment is that following directly from the changes in social structure. *Ecological* realignment implies that changes in party support follow directly from the changes in social structure. *Ecological* realignment contributes also to changing political agenda and party strategies, where parties try to appeal to some of the new expanding social groups.

10.2 Center–Periphery: The Changing Impact of Region on Party Choice

In their seminal article, Lipset and Rokkan identified the regional division as a center–periphery cleavage associated with the National Revolution. It was a "conflict between *the central nation-building culture* and the increasing resistance

of the ethnically, linguistically and religious *subject population* in the provinces and peripheries" (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 14—emphasis in the original). It was a conflict along a territorial axis during the nation-building process where we found "local oppositions to encroachments of the aspiring or the dominant national elites and their bureaucracies: the typical reaction of the peripheral regions, linguistic minorities and cultural threatening populations to the pressure of the centralizing, standardizing and 'rationalizing' machinery of the nation-state" (1967: 10).

The origin of regional conflicts is then associated with the nation-building process, and the regional conflict is essentially equivalent to the degree to which linguistic, religious, and ethnic groups are opposed along territorial lines.[1]

Rose and Urwin (1975) offer the first broad-based comparative study of regional differences in party support based on aggregate data, that is, electoral results in the regions. Their analysis included 19 Western democracies and 108 political parties covering the early post-war period (1944–1949 for the first election in different countries) to the early 1970s (1969–1973). In their empirical analysis, Rose and Urwin (1975: 19–24) developed three measures for the regional variation of support for the various parties and calculated the figures for all significant parties in the first and last elections in the period studied (1975: 24–32). They then calculated the magnitude of these three measures for the whole party system. The ranking of the countries varied somewhat from the late 1940s to around 1970, but based on the main pattern from their analyses, Switzerland had the largest regional differences in party support, while the smallest were found in Denmark and Sweden. In Table 10.1, I have used their three measures, transformed them to standard scores, and calculated the average for these standard scores in order to obtain a single measure of territorial variations in party support. As can be seen from the figure which represents the time period 1968–1973, Switzerland, Belgium, and Britain have the largest territorial variations in support for the various parties, while Denmark, Italy, and Sweden have the lowest.

In a more recent comparative study, Caramani (2004) examined the impact of the territorial cleavage from the first democratic elections to 1999 by using data on electoral results in general elections from territorial units. The main finding in Caramani's work on territorial variations in electoral support is the long-term weakening of the territorial cleavage, a change consistent with hypotheses about the nationalization of party politics. The large decline in the impact of the territorial cleavage took place in the period up to World War I, and the period since the 1920s was characterized as a stable territorial configuration. In a long-term perspective, the period since the World War II has been a period of fundamental stability of territorial configurations. Caramani's findings therefore support the Lipset and Rokkan hypothesis of "freezing of party alignments" from around the 1920s.

[1] This was also very evident in Rokkan's work on the cleavages in Norway. In an important work, he analyzed the degree to which religious, linguistic, and class differences could explain the regional differences in party choice. Rokkan's (1967) main finding was that these differences played a major role in this respect.

Table 10.1 The strength of the territorial cleavage according to Rose and Urwin's data

	Average standard scores
Switzerland	2.09
Belgium	1.18
Britain	1.18
Finland	0.18
Norway	0.06
Iceland	−0.04
France	−0.34
The Netherlands	−0.50
Austria	−0.54
Germany	−0.54
Denmark	−0.89
Italy	−0.90
Sweden	−0.95
Mean	0.00

The table is based on Rose and Urwin (1975:39, Table 5). The three measures Rose and Urwin used to tap the regional cleavage had very different scales and standard deviations. The measures were therefore transformed to standard scores. The figures are then the average of the standard scores for the three measures.

Caramani's basic research interest is a long-term perspective, but in an important section, he analyzes average scores for all post-war elections (1945–99) and for only the 1990s (Caramani 2004: 84–90). The measures based on data from the whole post-war period show that Switzerland and Belgium have the most heterogeneous party systems according to regions, followed by Finland, Spain, and Germany. The most homogeneous party system in this respect is found in Sweden, followed by Austria, Denmark, and Greece. The data based on only the elections in the 1990s show basically the same comparative patterns (see Table 10.2).

Caramani (2004: 90, 92–93) also examines trends within the post-war period and finds that there is a general decline in the strength of the regional cleavage from the late 1940s to the 1960s, but then there is an increase toward the 1980s and 1990s in some countries. Of the countries included in this study, this applies to Belgium, Great Britain and Italy, and partly also to Spain. The regional realignment in these four countries has attracted considerable attention in the political science literature. For Switzerland and Finland, the strength of the territorial cleavage remains high throughout the whole post-war period. The trend for the post-war period is then first and foremost stable alignment, but there is also evidence of further nationalization or dealignment in some countries, but also regional realignment.

Why does the electorate in different regions vote for different parties? This is the research question in my own article where I use survey data from 15 West European countries (European Values Study 1999–2000) (Knutsen 2010). While the strength and character of the regional cleavage can be studied by electoral statistics, a more detailed research question requires survey data. Three groups of

Table 10.2 The strength of the territorial cleavage according to Caramani's data

	1945–1999			1990s	
	Std. Dev.	IPR		Std. Dev	IPR
Switzerland	98.30	57.20	Belgium	102.91	68.91
Belgium	78.12	56.67	Switzerland	102.02	57.84
Finland	66.06	47.75	Finland	67.82	47.34
Spain	56.67	38.05	Spain	57.58	36.57
Germany	55.67	42.40	Italy	55.82	41.41
Italy	48.25	37.61	Germany	55.08	40.86
Britain	47.37	40.56	Britain	53.95	43.90
Portugal	42.35	38.09	Ireland	44.19	37.74
The Netherlands	37.74	36.56	France	34.20	32.19
Iceland	37.47	38.59	Iceland	31.87	35.57
Norway	34.29	36.23	Norway	28.52	33.03
France	34.23	31.61	The Netherlands	28.52	31.41
Ireland	32.88	32.08	Portugal	26.11	30.48
Greece	29.12	30.56	Austria	24.60	31.27
Denmark	28.41	31.88	Denmark	23.28	28.41
Austria	24.86	31.68	Sweden	22.28	29.12
Sweden	24.32	30.27	Greece	18.90	24.92
Mean	45.65	38.69	Mean	45.74	38.29

Source: Caramani (2004: 86, Table 3.2) and Caramani (2004: 89, Table 3.4)
Std. Dev (standard deviation) and IPR (index adjusted for party size and number of regions) are two of the main measures for tapping the size of the regional cleavage in Caramani's work. The higher the values on these measures the stronger is the regional cleavage.

variables were used as intermediate explanatory variables: (a) other structural variables, (b) various value orientations, and (c) territorial identities along a local, national and supranational dimension. The major findings were as follows:

1. The three intermediate variables could explain a large portion of the correlations between regions and party choice in the various countries.
2. Of the three types of variables, other socio-structural variables played the most significant role in explaining the regional variation in voting behavior, while value orientations had the second strongest role.
3. The class variables seem to play a somewhat more important role in explaining the regional cleavage than the religious structural conflict (religious denomination) or urban–rural residence.
4. Old Politics values (economic Left–Right and religious-secular values) played a somewhat larger role than New Politics values in this respect.
5. The role of territorial identities was also considerably less important for explaining the regional cleavage than social structure and value orientations.
6. There was some evidence that values and territorial identities were more important explanatory variables in three of the countries where the regional cleavage has increased since the 1970s, Belgium, Italy, and Spain.

10.3 Religious Voting: The impact of Religious Denomination and Frequency of Church Attendance

Lipset and Rokkan (1967) were impressively detailed about the development of the religious cleavage. This cleavage was first shaped by the Protestant Reformation which created divisions between Catholics and Protestants. These divisions had political consequences because the control of the nation-building process often became intermixed with the religious cleavage. Protestants frequently found themselves allied with nationalist forces in the struggle for national autonomy. In Anglican England and the Calvinist Netherlands, the Protestant church supported national independence and became a central element of the emerging national political identity. In other nations, religious conflicts also ran deep, but these differences side-tracked the nation-building process (Dalton 1990: 66; Martin 1993: 100–108).

Gradually, the political systems of Europe accommodated themselves to the changes wrought by the Reformation. The French Revolution renewed religious conflicts in the nineteenth century. Religious forces—both Catholic and Protestant—mobilized to defend church interests against the Liberal, secular movement spawned by the events in France. Conflicts over church/state control, the legislation of mandatory state education and disestablishment of state religion occurred across the face of Europe. In reaction to these liberal attacks, new religious political parties were formed in many West European countries. The party alignments developed at the start of the twentieth century institutionalized the religious cleavage in politics, and many basic features of these party systems have endured to the present time.

The religious cleavage has two aspects: the various religious communities of which people are members, including a category for those who are not a member of any religious community (religious denomination); and how religious they are—independent of the religious community to which they belong (Dalton 2008: 152–160). This latter aspect is normally measured by frequency of church attendance.

Many researchers have noted that there is a somewhat paradoxical situation related to the importance of the religious cleavage. Only a small number of political issues clearly follow the religious/secular conflict line. By the same token, there are very few issues that are completely divorced from them. Despite the paucity of explicitly religious issues and the lack of religious themes in most campaigns, religious beliefs have proven to be a strong predictor of party choice in many Western European democracies. Smith (1989: 20) has therefore characterized the religious cleavage as a *passive* rather than an *active* force in shaping political behavior.

Perhaps the most important reason why religion continues to play an influential role in voter choice is that religious conflicts helped determine the structure of the

modern party system and therefore still affect the electoral choices open to the voter. The religious cleavage is also important because it reflects deeply held human values which have a great potential for influencing behavior. Although religious issues are not very prominent on the political agenda, religious values are related to a wide range of social and political beliefs: work ethics, achievement aspirations, lifestyle norms, parent–child relations, morality, social relations, attitudes toward authority, and acceptance of the state. Religion signifies a *Weltanshauung* that extends into the political area (Dalton 1990: 86). Religious faith is strongly connected not only to party choice. The connection encompasses political ideology, issue outlook, and attitudes toward a wide range of political objects (Wald 1987: chap. 3).

Empirical research on mass behavior has underscored the continuing importance of the religious cleavage. Rose and Urwin (1969) conducted one of the first comparative analyses of the topic, examining the social basis of party support in 16 western democracies. Their finding was that, contrary to conventional wisdom, "religious divisions, not class, are the main social basis of parties in the Western world today" (Rose and Urwin 1969: 12). In a comparative study that included most West European countries, Rose (1974: 16–18) compared the impact of religion, social class, and region on Left–Right voting on the basis of data largely from the 1960s and found that religion was much more important in all the Catholic and religiously mixed countries. Only in Britain and the Scandinavian countries was social class the most important predictor for Left–Right party choice.

Several studies have examined the impact of the religious cleavage (the two faces of it or only one) over time and in a comparative setting (Dalton 1990: 82–88, 2008: 152–160; Elff 2007: 279–284; Inglehart 1977: 216–225, 245–249), and numerous studies have focused on trends within a single country. The main findings from these studies are that although there has been a considerable change in the distribution of the religious cleavage variables in the direction of a more secular mass public, the correlation with party choice has shown a surprising persistence at a high level. For example, Dalton (2008: 159) compares the impact of religion on voting with the impact of social class in a comparative longitudinal study and concludes that "the trends for religious voting do not show the sharp drop-off found for class voting."

However, my own longitudinal study of eight West European countries from the early 1970s to the late 1990s based on Eurobarometer data showed a considerable decline in the impact of religion on party choice in the countries where the religious cleavage had been most pronounced in the 1970s—Belgium, France, Italy, and the Netherlands. Due to this decline, there was a trend toward convergence in the impact of the religious variables on party choice at a somewhat lower average level than in the 1970s. There were, however, also signs of a considerable persistence in the impact of religion in the other countries (Knutsen 2004a: Chaps. 2, 3, 234–236).

Table 10.3 shows the comparative strength of the two aspects of the religious cleavage. The impacts of religious denomination are strongest in two of the religiously mixed countries in continental Europe, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, and then in several Catholic countries: the correlations in Finland and Norway are also large in a comparative perspective. The mean correlations for the regions

Table 10.3 Party choice and religious variables

10.3.1 Religious denomination	CV	10.3.2 Church attendance	Eta
The Netherlands	0.289	The Netherlands	0.560
Switzerland	0.274	Slovenia	0.474
Belgium	0.223	Norway	0.445
Austria	0.213	Finland	0.398
Spain	0.211	Switzerland	0.392
France	0.202	Czech Republic	0.378
Norway	0.199	Austria	0.346
Finland	0.198	Belgium	0.341
Portugal	0.194	Slovakia	0.338
Slovenia	0.188	Sweden	0.318
Luxembourg	0.163	Poland	0.303
Czech Republic	0.163	Spain	0.297
Sweden	0.158	Luxembourg	0.267
West Germany	0.155	Italy	0.260
Estonia	0.150	Ireland	0.255
Slovakia	0.149	France	0.254
East Germany	0.148	East Germany	0.250
Italy	0.137	Greece	0.245
Poland	0.134	Denmark	0.244
Denmark	0.133	Portugal	0.236
Ireland	0.118	Hungary	0.224
Greece	0.114	West Germany	0.211
Hungary	0.111	Estonia	0.092
Britain	0.099	Britain	0.069
Mean	0.172	Mean	0.300
Regional Means		Regional Means	
Nordic	0.172	Nordic	0.351
Central West	0.217	Central West	0.339
South	0.164	South	0.260
Islands	0.109	Islands	0.162
East	0.149	East	0.294

CV Cramer's V
Data source Cumulative file of European social surveys 1, 2, and 3 (hereafter ESS 1–3)
The division of countries into regions
Nordic Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden
Central West Austria, Belgium, France, Netherlands, West Germany, Switzerland Luxembourg
South Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain
Island Britain, Ireland
East Czech Republic, East Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia

indicate that the denominational cleavage is strongest in the Central Western regions. We find some of the same comparative patterns for frequency of church attendance.

10.4 Class Voting[2]

10.4.1 Introduction

Social class represents the classic structural cleavage in industrial society. In Lipset and Rokkan's work, the class cleavage was first and foremost a cleavage in the labor market between owners and employers on the one side and tenants, laborers, and workers on the other. It sprang out of the Industrial Revolution and proved much more uniformly divisive than the other major cleavages they focused upon (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 14, 21, 35). The rising masses of workers resented their working conditions and the insecurity of their contracts. The result was the formation of a variety of labor unions and the development of nation-wide Socialist parties. The fact that the labor market cleavage was so uniformly divisive in a comparative setting implied that it tended to bring the party systems closer to each other in their basic structure. While conflicts and compromises along the other cleavages, especially the center–periphery and the state–church cleavage lines, tended to generate national developments of the party systems in divergent directions, the owner-worker cleavages moved the party system in the opposite direction. "… the owner-worker cleavage tended to bring the party system *closer to each other* in their basic structure" (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 35). The Russian Revolution, however, also brought about a more divisive party structure among parties that articulated the interests of the workers. In some countries, there emerged significant Communist parties which created a split among the Socialist parties, while the Communists became an insignificant force in other countries (Bartolini 2000: 86–120, Chap. 9; Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 46–50).

10.4.2 Generations of Class Voting Studies

Nieuwbeerta (1995: Chap. 1) groups studies of class voting into three "generations." These generations are distinguished by the research problems that were formulated in the studies, the content of the major hypotheses, measurement procedures, data collection, and methods of data analysis.[3]

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[2] This section builds to a considerable degree on Knutsen (2007).

[3] See Nieuwbeerta's (1995: Chap. 1) more extensive presentation of the three generations of class voting, and Jansen (2011: Chap. 1) who also includes a fourth generation of class voting.

The first generation of class voting studies was during the 1950s and 1960s. This research focused attention on a broad range of research problems concerning the relationship between social class and voting. The basic question was whether an individual's social and economic position was related to voting behavior. Researchers addressed this question by examining a limited number of datasets and using simple measures of social class (see for example, Alford 1964; Korpi 1983; Lipset 1981).

The second generation of class voting studies commenced in the late 1960s. The aim of these studies was to increase the amount of variance in voting behavior explained by adding variables to the equation rather than focusing upon the relationship between social class and party choice in detail. The empirical analyses were more sophisticated than those of the first generation (see, for example, Franklin et al. 1992; Inglehart 1990).

The first two generations of class voting found that the manual working class tended to support the left-wing political parties, while the non-manual classes generally supported the Right-wing parties. Researchers discovered substantial cross-national differences, although studies from different countries were restricted in their comparability. Class voting was largest in the Nordic countries, followed by Britain and Australia, then the continental countries, and considerably smaller in USA and Canada.

The third generation of class voting studies emerged around the mid-1980s. These studies used a detailed cross-nationally comparable class scheme, and applied log-odds ratios and nonlinear statistical techniques. All three generations of class voting relied on a dichotomous party choice variable that grouped parties of the Left into one category and all other parties (non-Socialist or rightist parties) into the other category. In recent research on class voting, one can, however, differentiate between three types of class voting:

1. "Total class voting" considers class differences (based on a detailed class schema) in voting between all the parties in the party system,
2. "Overall or total Left–Right class voting" examines the Left–Right voting of all social classes,
3. "Traditional (Left–Right) class voting" examines the Left–Right division of parties and only two social classes (the manual/non-manual division).

The party choice variable has (nearly) always been dichotomized into Left–Right in class voting research. This division can be questioned in advanced industrial societies. There is some evidence that social cleavages, and the class cleavage in particular, cut across the Left–Right division of parties. The New Left parties gain stronger support from the higher educated strata and the new middle class, while the New Right parties gain strongest support from the less educated and the workers. Therefore, newer research on class voting should consider all parties as separate categories. This applies increasingly to all studies of the relationship between social structure and party choice (see Knutsen 2004a, 2006).

Jansen (2011: 24–28) has systemized research of the fourth generation of class voting. He emphasizes that this fourth generation focuses upon explanations of the decline in class voting by socio-structural and political factors (such as changes in the positions of the political parties on important policy dimensions), and where multinomial and conditional logistic regressions are used as statistical methods.

10.4.3 Class Schema

The first two generations of class voting used a traditional two-class schema between manual workers and all other classes (Nieuwbeerta 1995). More recent class voting studies use more detailed class schemas. Prominent among these schemas is the so-called Erikson/Goldthorpe (hereafter EG) class schema originally developed in connection with social mobility studies (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Goldthorpe 1980). The third generation of class voting studies typically used this class schema.

A main division exists between the predominantly salaried professional—higher technical, administrative, and managerial—positions and the predominantly wage-earning manual occupations. The former are positions with a service relationship and thus constitute the basis of the "service class" or the "salariat" of modern industrial society. The latter, where the labor contract usually prevails, constitute the basis of the working class. The service class comprises administrators and managers, employed professionals, higher-grade technicians, and supervisors of non-manual workers. It is divided into a higher and a lower level according to administrative responsibility and educational training.

Routine non-manual employees in the EG schema do not belong to the new middle class or the service class. This includes routine non-manual positions, usually involving clerical, sales, or personal-service tasks which exist on the fringes of professional, administrative, and managerial bureaucracies (Goldthorpe 1980: 40). The working-class group comprises skilled and unskilled manual wage-earners in all branches of industry as well as supervisors of manual workers (foremen) and lower-grade technicians.

10.4.4 Measurements of Class Voting

Most analyses of class voting use a dichotomous party choice variable (Socialist/non-Socialist parties) and a dichotomous class variable (manual versus non-manual social classes). The traditional measure of class voting calculates the percentage difference. The Alford Index is simply the percentage difference in support for the Left or Socialist parties between the manual and the non-manual social classes (Alford 1964: 79–80).

Newer research on class voting emphasizes the difference between absolute and relative class voting, and suggests that log-odds ratios are a better measure of (relative) class voting. This measure, in contrast to the Alford Index, is insensitive to changes in the overall support for parties or party groups (Heath et al. 1985; Hout et al. 1993; Nieuwbeerta 1995). This measure—still based on a dichotomous class variable—is referred to as the Thomsen Index.[4]

When the assumption of only two social classes is replaced by more classes, as in the EG class schema, the analyses become more complicated. Hout et al. (1995) suggest using the *kappa-index*.[5] The higher the value of the kappa-index, the higher is the level of class voting. The kappa-index has several desirable statistical properties, the most desirable being that the index is based on log-odds ratios and therefore not dependent on the marginal distributions of the independent or dependent variables.

The development of how class voting is measured is partly also found in analyses of other social cleavages. For example, in more recent research on the impact of various structural variables on party choice, the kappa-index is frequently used (Brooks et al. 2006; Jansen 2011).

10.4.5 Trends in Class Voting

Nieuwbeerta's (1995) pioneering work is the most extensive analysis of class voting in a comparative perspective. Nieuwbeerta studied class voting in 20 countries over time, and, based on 324 class voting tables in the time span 1945–1990, found that the correlation between the Alford Index and the log-odds ratios (Thomsen Index) was 0.97. Nieuwbeerta (1995: 52–55) also found that the various measures did not yield substantively different results. Nieuwbeerta analyzed class voting trends based on the EG classes by using the kappa-index. He again found clear trends toward a decline in class voting in nearly all countries, and the trends are fairly similar to those found based on a dichotomous class variable. Nieuwbeerta's (1995) general results were that various measurements of the level of class voting and the amount of decline were highly correlated despite the fact that different measurements and very different class schemas were used (see also Jansen 2011: Chap. 2 for similar comparative findings).

Knutsen (2006) studied absolute and relative class voting in eight West European countries from the mid-1970s to the late 1990s. He found a decline in class voting; the average decline was 47 % of the original strength in the late 1970s (based on the Alford and Thomsen Indices), and 36 % for kappa-index for 4

[4] The index is named after Søren Risbjerg Thomsen, who was one of the first to apply the log-odds ratio in research on politics and political cleavages.

[5] The kappa-index calculates several log-odds ratios between a reference category on the class variable and each of the other classes and uses the standard deviation of these log-odds ratios as a measure of class voting.

Table 10.4 The strength of class voting according to three measures

10.4.1 Traditional class voting the Alford Index		10.4.2 Total Left–Right class voting the kappa-index		10.4.3 Total class voting weighted kappa	
Finland	27.1	Denmark	1.056	Finland	0.905
Sweden	22.6	Finland	1.028	Denmark	0.735
Czech Republic	19.3	The Netherlands	0.871	Austria	0.712
Britain	17.6	Sweden	0.826	Sweden	0.657
Austria	15.7	Austria	0.806	The Netherlands	0.617
Spain	13.9	Switzerland	0.779	Switzerland	0.540
Portugal	12.9	Luxembourg	0.667	Norway	0.532
Denmark	12.3	Belgium	0.617	Belgium	0.528
Luxembourg	12.1	Estonia	0.607	France	0.517
The Netherlands	11.9	Czech Republic	0.547	West Germany	0.490
Belgium	10.6	West Germany	0.489	Luxembourg	0.469
West Germany	10.1	Slovenia	0.449	Spain	0.457
Italy	7.7	Spain	0.438	Czech Republic	0.446
Hungary	7.6	Portugal	0.434	Poland	0.440
Ireland	6.3	Ireland	0.431	Portugal	0.411
Greece	3.7	Britain	0.421	Britain	0.411
Slovakia	3.4	East Germany	0.356	Estonia	0.409
France	1.2	Norway	0.348	Slovenia	0.400
Norway	0.7	France	0.347	Italy	0.348
Switzerland	−1.1	Italy	0.290	Slovakia	0.340
Poland	−1.6	Poland	0.281	East Germany	0.329
East Germany	−3.2	Slovakia	0.270	Ireland	0.305
Estonia	−3.8	Hungary	0.222	Hungary	0.273
Slovenia	−7.5	Greece	0.161	Greece	0.236
Mean	8.3	Mean	0.531	Mean	0.480
Regional Means		Regional means		Regional means	
Nordic	15.7	Nordic	0.815	Nordic	0.707
Central West	8.6	Central West	0.654	Central West	0.553
South	9.5	South	0.331	South	0.363
Islands	12.0	Islands	0.426	Islands	0.358
East	2.0	East	0.390	East	0.377

Data source ESS 1-3

social classes. The decline in class voting was largest in Denmark and the Netherlands, then Britain, France, and Italy and smallest in Belgium, Germany, and Ireland. Knutsen also found strong correlations between the various measures of class voting. Both studies found the decline in class voting to be greatest in those countries where class voting was largest, in particular the Nordic countries. Thus, class voting is converging to a fairly low level across Western democracies.

Table 10.4 shows the comparative strength of the class voting based on the ESS data for the three types of class voting that were discussed above.

Table 10.4.1 shows class voting according to the Alford Index, Table 10.4.2 the kappa-index based on all EG classes and Left–Right party choice, while the

kappa-index in Table 10.4.3 taps total class voting. The kappas that are included are based on calculation of kappa-values for each party. These kappa-values are then weighted according to the support for the given parties in the surveys. According to the mean for the various regions, class voting is—in accordance with previous findings—largest in the Nordic countries, while the ranking of the other regions varies somewhat for the various types of class voting. For several of the East European countries, class voting is negative. We also note that although class voting in the Nordic countries still is high on average, traditional class voting is low in Denmark and has vanished in Norway.

10.5 The Conflict in the Commodity Market: The Voting Pattern of the Peasant Class and Urban–Rural Contrasts

The cleavage in the labor market is the central class cleavage, but not the only one according to Lipset and Rokkan. The other cleavage is the conflict in the commodity market between peasants and others employed in the primary sector and those who wanted to purchase products from the primary sector, particularly the urban population. This cleavage also sprang out of the Industrial Revolution. The peasants wanted to sell their wares at the best possible prices and to buy what they needed from the industrial and urban producers at low cost, while the urban population often had opposing economic interests (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 20–21). This is then essentially an urban–rural conflict. Such conflicts did not invariably prove party-forming. They could be dealt with within broad party fronts or could be channeled through interest organizations into more narrow arenas of functional representation and bargaining. In many countries, the religious interests of the rural population were more influential than those which were strictly economic. The economic interest articulation took place within the Christian parties. Distinct Agrarian parties emerged only in some countries where strong cultural opposition had deepened and embittered the strictly economic conflicts (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 44–46).

The two class cleavages were not discussed in relation to each other in particular in Lipset and Rokkan's work, but Rokkan developed a more elaborate model based on the two economic cleavages in an important work on the Norwegian cleavage structure (Rokkan 1966: 89–105). This model has been used in the other Nordic countries for understanding the major cleavages and economic divisions in the Nordic societies (Knutsen 2004b).

Rokkan's model considered the functional-economic conflicts as comprising three poles of electoral attraction. At each pole, we find economic interests, issues, interest organizations and a major social class. These poles also comprise the major political parties strongly associated with the economic interests and interest organizations. Between the three poles, we find voters with "contradictory"



Pole L: The workers and their unions
Issues/concerns: Wages, pensions, social security, welfare
Organisations: Trade unions and their union confederations
Parties: Labour/Social Democratic P.

Pole F: Farmers (and self-employed in other primary industries) and their organisations
Issues/concerns: Prices, subsidies, toll protection and restrictions on import of provisions/food
Organisation: Farmers' League
Parties: Agrarian/Centre Parties in Finland Norway and Sweden, Agrarian Liberals in Denmark, Progress party in Iceland.

Pole B: Trade and industry/employers
Issues/concerns Prices, taxes and fees, economic regulations
Organisations: Trade/employer associations and their confederations.
Parties: Conservative P., Independence P. in Iceland

Source: Rokkan (1966: 92-94, Figure 3-3).

Fig. 10.1 Rokkan's model of electoral fronts: The functional-economic axis

economic and social positions, and—according to Rokkan—the decisive electoral struggles took place between these poles, and involved various political parties.

The "poles of electorate attractions" and the competition between the poles are shown in Fig. 10.1. In the text under Fig. 10.1, I have indicated the various issues,

Table 10.5 Party choice and urban/rural residence

	Eta
Finland	0.370
Norway	0.298
Poland	0.269
Austria	0.240
Slovenia	0.234
Switzerland	0.232
Slovakia	0.224
Belgium	0.213
Ireland	0.211
The Netherlands	0.207
Sweden	0.176
Estonia	0.175
East Germany	0.169
Denmark	0.162
Italy	0.152
Greece	0.152
Britain	0.152
Hungary	0.151
France	0.131
West Germany	0.130
Portugal	0.127
Czech Republic	0.109
Luxembourg	0.107
Spain	0.063
Mean	0.186
Regional means	
Nordic	0.251
Central West	0.180
South	0.124
Islands	0.181
East	0.190

Data source ESS 1–3

peak interest organizations, and parties located at the poles. The three interests are the labor unions and their peak organization, the farmer organizations, and the business community and their peak organizations. The three party families which are located at the poles are the Social Democratic, the Agrarian and the Conservative parties. The commodity market cleavage can be interpreted as various conflicts between the F-pole and the two other poles in the model.

There are generally two aspects of the commodity market conflict: (a) How the class of farmers (and other self-employed in the primary sector) vote compared to other social classes and (b) the differences in voting behavior between the urban and the rural population.

The population in rural areas is generally more conservative and religious than the urban population, and vote for Christian and also Conservative parties. There is

often a difference in character as well as size between rural areas and large cities. In rural areas, small communities have centuries of pre-industrial history and have been least affected by major population changes consequent to industrialization. "Traditional" values have a greater chance of survival in the countryside, even though some people may work in a modern environment (Knutsen 2004a: 132–133).

As to the urban–rural contrasts in voting behavior, the conclusions of my eight-nation study was that from the early 1970s and the late 1990s, the strength of the urban–rural cleavage was declining somewhat but was still of considerable importance in West European countries. The Christian parties gain their strongest support from farmers compared to all other social classes gaining (50–70 %) (Knutsen 2006: 53–66), and in the Nordic countries, the Center parties are clear class parties in accordance with Rokkan's model of electoral fronts (Knutsen 2004a: 65–73).

Table 10.5 shows the correlations between urban–rural residence and party choice based on the ESS data. The correlation is particularly large in Finland, also in Norway and in Poland. The strength of the correlation is on average largest in the Nordic countries, weakest in Southern Europe and fairly similar in the other regions.

The patterns for the party families based on both the eight-nation study and the ESS data are fairly consistent across countries. All the leftist party families and also the Liberals and Conservatives get strongest support from the urban population. The Left Socialist and the Greens have a very urban electorate, while the Agrarian, Christian, Ethnic-regional, and Radical Rightist party families have the most rural electorate. The Radical Right has somewhat greater support among the rural than among the urban electorate. In the East European countries, there is a strong and consistent tendency for the Liberal parties to gain stronger support from the urban population, and in the Czech Republic, the leftist parties gain strongest support in the *rural* areas (Knutsen 2012).

10.6 Gender: From the Traditional to the Modern Gender Gap

Until the end of the 1960s, women tended to have more conservative and traditional political orientations than men. Comparative studies indicate that women were more inclined to vote for religious and Conservative parties and less inclined to vote for Socialist parties. According to the *traditional gender gap*, women were expected to be more conservative or center–right than men, and a common finding was that women were more likely to support the Christian parties and vote less frequently for the leftist parties. This was, for example, documented in *Electoral Behavior*: *A Comparative Handbook* (Rose 1974), with data mainly from the 1960s.

Traditional women's values emphasizing "private" orientations associated with religion and family responsibilities were identified as the basis for these

differences. Moreover, women have been less integrated in trade unions and working-class culture and have thus been less solidaristic and collectively oriented than men. The most important explanation was their higher degree of religiosity since the major differences were found with regard to support for the Christian parties (Rose 1974).

In the course of the past two or three decades, however, women in many Western countries have changed from being more conservative than men to being more radical. The term *modern gender gap* has been used to characterize these new gender-based value differences and differences in voting patterns between women and men in many Western democracies (Norris 1999: 150).

Various explanations have been advanced for how and why gender differences occur and what they imply. Here, we may distinguish between two main types of explanation: those emphasizing structural accounts or economic *interests*, and those emphasizing *cultural and value differences* between women and men.

Explanations that emphasize *structural factors* and *interests* see changes in the gender-based division of work associated with the labor market and the family as the most important reasons for changes in women's and men's interests. The transition from an economy based on one breadwinner to one based on the two-income family has meant than women have increasingly become independent economic actors. Paid employment directly exposes women to gender inequalities that they are less likely to experience as homemakers, while also providing them with a means of economic independence that may shape their political behavior. Women are also more dependent on the public sector and the welfare state for employment than men, and they tend to depend more on social welfare to support and subsidize their families (Manza and Brooks 1998: 1243–1244; Togeby 1994).

Cultural or value-based explanations have also been applied to observed differences in political attitudes. This approach emphasizes that there are extensive and deep-rooted *value differences*, or differences with regard to central political issues, between women and men. This applies both to traditional economic Left–Right issues and moral and political questions like peace, welfare, the environment, and social care (Abzug 1984).

Another explanation which is supplementary to those mentioned above focuses on generation changes among women. The traditional gender gap is expected to be found among the older cohort while the post-war cohorts, who gained their formative experiences in the 1960s and 1970s, have been more strongly influenced by the transformation of gender roles, the women's movement and changes in political attitudes and values (Norris 1999: 154).

Inglehart and Norris (2000, 2003: Chap. 4) have formulated a developmental theory of the gender gap or of gender realignment. According to this theory, there will be (a) systematic differences in the gender gap between societies based on their level of political and economic development, (b) within societies, there will differences between generations, and (c) the explanations of the gender differences will be found in structural and cultural factors.

The various elements of this theory are supported by comparative survey data from advanced industrial societies, post-Communist societies and developing



Fig. 10.2 Trends in gender gap in eight Western European countries

societies (Inglehart and Norris 2000, 2003: Chap. 4). In their empirical analysis of the modern gender gap in advanced industrial societies, cultural factors seem to explain the gender gap better than structural factors (Inglehart and Norris 2000: 453–457).

However, in a comparative longitudinal study based on election data from the three Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden) from the 1970s to the late 1990s, which focused on the working population, women increasingly supported the Left Socialist and Green parties more so than men. On the other hand, men disproportionally and increasingly supported the Conservative and Radical Rightist parties. In a causal analysis where social class and sector employment were used as intermediate variables to explain the gender gaps, from 30 to 75 % of the gender gap for voting for the Left Socialist and rightist parties could be explained by the fact that women worked in the public sector to a much large degree than men. It was sector employment, not class location that explained the gender voting gap (Knutsen 2001: 338–344). Sector employment was, however, a much larger determinant of party choice in the Scandinavian countries than gender.

Figure 10.2 shows trend in gender gap in support for leftist parties from the early 1970s to the period 2002–2006.[6] In the early 1970s, men were more likely to

[6] The data from 1970 to 1974 and 1994 to 1997 are from a Cumulative File of Eurobarometer data, while the data from 2002 to 2006 is from ESS. The Gender gap in these eight countries is analyzed in details in Knutsen (2004a: Chap. 6).

Table 10.6 Gender and Left–Right party choice

	PDI
Norway	8.9
Denmark	8.0
Finland	6.5
Switzerland	6.3
West Germany	6.2
East Germany	5.7
The Netherlands	5.5
Belgium	4.6
Austria	4.5
Italy	3.5
Sweden	3.4
Estonia	2.7
France	2.5
Slovakia	2.2
Britain	1.2
Portugal	0.0
Hungary	−0.1
Slovenia	−0.5
Spain	−0.8
Greece	−1.5
Poland	−2.0
Luxembourg	−2.2
Czech Republic	−4.0
Ireland	−4.6
Mean	2.3
Regional Means	
Nordic	6.7
Central West	3.9
South	0.3
Islands	−1.7
East	0.6

Data source ESS 1-3
The PDI index is the percentage of women minus the percentage of men who support the leftist parties

support the leftist parties in all of the eight countries although the differences were small in some of the countries. The traditional gender gap was particularly strong in Italy, and similarly in Germany and Ireland. In the late 1990s, we find a modern gender gap in five of the countries, but in 2008, the modern gender gap is found in all countries apart from Ireland. The changes from a traditional to a modern gender gap have been particularly large in Italy (17 % points) and Germany (14). The modern gender gap in voting behavior is, however, fairly modest in all seven relevant countries in 2002–2006 (1–8 % points).

Table 10.6 shows the gender differences in voting behavior based on ESS data. The modern gender gap is largest in the Nordic countries and then in the Central

Western countries while there is no significant gender gap in any of the other regions. Again, the gender differences indicating a modern gender gap are modest.

10.7 Sector Employment/Social and Cultural Specialists and the Technocrats

10.7.1 Sector Employment

The degree to which the *public* versus the *private* sector is a party cleavage can be explained on the basis of the different economic interests of employees in the two sectors, as well as the cognitive conditions connected with different educational backgrounds and occupational experiences.

The extent to which one's own economic interests are directly linked to political decisions is perhaps the most noticeable difference between working in the public or the private sector. The public employee has clear self-interests connected with roomy public budgets, a well-developed welfare state and market restrictions. A large public sector means more jobs and greater possibilities for a better career and higher economic rewards. By contrast, the interests of many private sector employees are connected with the market and with capturing parts of it for the organizations or firms where they work (Kitschelt 1994: 24–25; Knutsen 2005: 594).

Many public sector employees are confronted with social problems in their work, something which can be expected to create attitudes which favor social reforms and more public initiatives. These aspects of work can also be expected to create an awareness of the weaknesses of market-oriented solutions. Furthermore, the ethics of welfare occupations, coupled with professional norms about what is best for the clients, often lead to a focus on the lack of resources and to demands for more vigorous public initiatives, resulting in a stronger public sector ideology (Knutsen 2005: 594–95).

Large numbers of middle class public employees are recruited from educational institutions and educational backgrounds characterized by the values of public sector ideology (education for the professions, social science education (Knutsen 2005: 595; Tepe 2012).

A macro-approach to political conflicts in advanced industrial democracies is related to the size, and structure of welfare states and differences in employment structures is to use the model of "trilemma of the service economy," put forward by Iversen and Wren (1998).

The neoliberal model emphasizes budgetary restraint and high private sector employment, accepting large wage inequality wherein the wages are low in the (expanding) private service sector (Iversen and Wren 1998: 514–515).

The second model also emphasizes budgetary restraints, but places greater weight on equality than the first model. The model has its origins in corporatist and

Christian democratic thought. High employment levels are a relatively low priority in this model because "women are viewed as the guardian of the traditional family and hence are encouraged to stay at home and care for children and spouse" (Iversen and Wren 1998: 515).

The third model gives priority to earning equality and high employment performance at the expense of budgetary restraint. This is the social democratic model, which combines a strong egalitarian ethos with a work ethic that emphasizes employment as the root of collective identity and pride.

According to Iversen and Wren, each model involves its own costs and political conflicts. Suffice it to mention here that the liberal model creates additional income inequality and perpetuates class division; the Christian democratic model creates high unemployment and breeds labor market exclusion and resentment among outsider classes; the social democratic model generates its own political conflicts about the size of the public budgets, and structural conflicts between public and private employees (Iversen and Wren 1998: 517–518, 539–540, 544–545). From the above discussion, the following may be expected:

1. Sector employment will have an impact on party choice. Public employees will vote for the parties of the Left, and primarily Left Socialist and Green parties.
2. The impact of sector will be largest within the service class. It is within the service class that the arguments about the awareness of social problems are most clearly coupled with the work in the public sector, and the arguments about professional ethics and educational background are also most relevant for more highly educated personnel, that is, the service class.
3. The impact of sector will be largest in social democratic welfare regimes due to the higher level of political conflict coupled with the welfare services in these countries.

My own study (Knutsen 2005) of the impact of sector employment on party choice in eight West European countries based on data from 1988 to 1994 strongly supported these expectations.

Similar findings have been made in studies which are based on the bureau voting model (hereafter BVM). The BVM model builds on the idea that government employees expect that an increase in public expenditure will lead to an increase in their salary or in job security. The model predicts that government employees favor larger public spending are more likely to participate in elections and vote for leftist parties that preserve or expand public budgets. They therefore have more leftist economic attitudes, vote more frequently for leftist parties and have a higher level of electoral participation than those in the private sector.

The three aspects of the model have been supported empirically by survey data from USA from the 1980s (Garand et al. 1991), while early comparative data analyses provide mixed support for the public/private sensor cleavage in voting behavior (Blais et al. 1990, 1991).

In two thorough comparative studies, all three aspects of the model had been confirmed (Jensen et al. 2009; Tepe 2012). Tepe's analysis of 11 countries based

on ESS 4 goes beyond the original BVM by differentiating between three branches of public sector production: (1) Executive and management tasks; (2) The provision of social services such as public health and education; (3) The manual production of public services.

With regard to party choice, Tepe (2012) finds that after controlling for traditional background variables, the public sector employees vote more leftist than those in the private sector. Those who work in provision of social services such as public health and education are more leftist than those affiliated to the other branches of the public sector and sector differences are largest in the Nordic countries which belong to the social democratic welfare state. There was, however, weaker support for the hypothesis of an interaction effect between social class and sector although there are some significant results.

A major conclusion from the study is that, contrary to the original BVM, it is not public administration employees who contribute to the overall sector cleavage; it is first and foremost the largest segment in the public sector, those in public health and education, and also those in public service production that do so. Those who work in public administration do not differ from the private employees with regard to leftist attitudes and voting behavior after control for various prior variables.

10.7.2 Social and Cultural Specialists Versus the Technocrats

Another approach which focuses on divisions within the service class is the theory of division between so-called social and cultural specialists versus the technocrats. This theory claims that a "new" class of knowledge workers has emerged and gained power in advanced industrial society. This new class is differentiated from the old class of technocrats (managers and administrators). The common feature of the new class theorists is that they differentiate between the knowledge workers on the one hand and managers and administrators on the other. The social and cultural specialists possess knowledge which is difficult to control for the managers and the executives. It is for this reason that the former group has gained power and autonomy within advanced industrial society.

The social and cultural specialists generally work in the public sector. Their work tasks are relatively less controllable than the technocrats. The social–cultural occupations require skills to serve people's need and well-being in society. They possess knowledge and skills that are relatively more humanistic and value-laden and which are not instrumental for economic goals.

On the basis of arguments for this division, Güveli et al. (2007a, 2007b) adjust the EGP class schema and divide the service class into a class of technocrats and one of the social and cultural specialists, and since the service class in the original

class division was divided into a lower and a higher group, the two "new" classes are each also divided into such.

The arguments for why the social and cultural specialists tend to have leftist views and vote for leftist parties are very similar to those formulated for the public sector employees and sector location is also used as an argument for the political orientation and voting behavior of this group.

The criteria for distinguishing between the new class of social and cultural specialist and the "old" class of technocrats (Güveli et al. 2007a: 132) are twofold. (1) The first criterion is difficulty in monitoring the task performance by employee; (2) the second criterion has two components: (a) whether an occupation has a feature of social service, and/or (b) whether it needs social and cultural specialist knowledge to perform the task well. Occupations do not need to have both components to be classified as social and cultural specialist; one is sufficient.

The empirical analyses which document the political consequences of this differentiation are based on Dutch data from 1970 to 2003. The main findings are the social and cultural specialists (within the service class) are more inclined to vote for the leftist parties, and in particular for the New Left parties than the technocrats. The differences increase over time and persist when controlling for education and sector employment (Güveli et al. 2007a: 139–141; see also Kriesi 1998, Oesch 2006a, 2006b).

10.8 Conclusions

The point of departure for this article was the changing impact of socio-structural variables after the fairly stable period in voting behavior which Lipset and Rokkan characterized as "the freezing of party alignments." The discussion of electoral change can to a considerable degree be discussed in relation to the concepts stable alignment, dealignment, and realignment.

Class voting is indeed the clearest example of structural dealignment. Class variables also show examples of realignment since a significant and increasing part of the service class vote for parties of the Left. The discussion of the impact of sector employment and social and cultural specialists versus the technocrats are fruitful efforts to find structural bases for this changing voting behavior within the service class. This possibly comprises the major new structural variable(s) within the field, aiming at explaining the new differences in voting behavior within the large and heterogeneous service class.

The modern gender gap is also an example of a realignment, but as we have seen, the impact of gender on party choice is fairly modest.

The religious cleavage seems to be more resistant to change compared to the class cleavage, and we have underscored that this might be caused by the fact that religious voting reflects deep-seated values. Such voting behavior is difficult to change even though religious-secular issues are not so significant in political debate and election campaigns.

Caramani's study illustrates that in a long-term perspective, the impact of region on party choice has been quite stable in the post-war period in Western Europe when average trends are examined. It should be underscored that this example of fairly stable alignment covers different country-specific trends and that the highly visible examples of increased regional differences in voting behavior are not representative for most of the West European countries.

The freezing of party alignments implied strong and stable social cleavages. Social groups were important reference points providing information about politics and orienting voters toward political issues. Individuals learned about politics and about which policies would benefit people like themselves, and which party best represents his or her interests from the same social milieu. Group references were then also a common basis for party evaluations. The cues provided by social networks and associations that were coupled to the political party (and trade unions) helped to guide many citizens' political orientations and voting behavior (Dalton 2008: 144–145).

Cleavage voters often have a high degree of trust in the party leadership as long as they feel that their basic interests are represented by "their" party. Such high trust flourishes where the divisions between the parties are significant and the party representatives consider it a central task to represent their social group. There is a high degree of cohesion within these parties and the political leadership has considerable leeway as long as it is considered to represent the social group.

The dealignment and realignments indicate that issues and value orientations have also become more important for voting choice. These findings indicate realignment from social structural variables to cultural variables, but many findings indicate that this realignment might not produce the stable alignments based on clearly defined and highly cohesive social groups. Multivariate analyses of the impact of social structure on party choice nevertheless indicate dealignment. Another indication is the increase in electoral volatility. Electoral politics has become dealigned related to the impact of social structure and more volatile from one election to the next.

Another important aspect of the change in cleavage politics is the fact that the size of the core electorate of important party families such as the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats has declined dramatically, and these structural changes are an important explanation for the decline of many parties within these party families.

All the changes mentioned above have resulted in strategic reconsideration of important policies, and changing location of the parties in the political space. One important consequence for party democracy is that greater strategic maneuvers for party leadership are considered necessary: the leadership has got greater autonomy in order to appeal to different strata of voters and to have the opportunity to change political strategies during fairly short periods of time (Kitschelt 1994: Chap. 5).

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Chapter 11
Political Parties and Constitutional Change

Shane Martin and Bjørn Erik Rasch

Abstract This chapter explores why constitutions are changed. The chapter begins with an overview of why constitutional design and redesign are important questions. The second section provides a background to the study of constitutional change which has tended to be embedded within legal scholarship rather than political science. The third section reviews competing theories of constitutional change, noting the general absence of political parties from these theories and the lack of success in explaining observed patterns of constitutional amendments. The next section suggests the need to "bring the party in" and suggests how incorporating the preferences of parties and the shape of the party system can advance our understanding of constitutional change. A number of empirical cases suggest that parties and party systems shape constitutional change are discussed briefly. The chapter concludes with suggestions for how further progress can be made in integrating research on parties and party systems with research on constitutional change.

Keywords Constitutions · Constitutional design · Constitutional change · Political parties · Party systems

11.1 Introduction

Constitutions, which regulate many of the fundamental structures of government and enunciate certain societies' more revered values and principles, are central to political life. It is the expectation that all political actors, in democratic societies at

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least, operate within constitutional structures, which represent "high-laws", superior to and, in the event of conflict, having priority over other rules or laws. Constitutions are, generally, "laws for making law" (Kelsen 1945: 124; Congleton 2003: 11). Determining the allocation, sharing, and limitations of political power renders constitutions critically important for understanding the role of political parties in modern democracies.

Constitutions shape many of the challenges political parties facing today. For example, constitutions typically specify at least the broad parameters of the electoral system—the all-important means for translating votes into legislative seats or the means for selecting other elected officials for office (Farrell 2011). Constitutions thus shape what political parties must do in order to win elected office. Shaping those electoral systems through constitutions contributes to the configuration of the party system (Duverger 1954; Lijphart 1994). By extension therefore, constitutions determine the degree to which political parties must compete or cooperate in governing a country by determining the prevalence of single party or coalition governments and majority/unified versus minority/divided governments (Lijphart 1999). Constitutions also tend to specify whether or not the system of government is presidential, parliamentary, dual executive and unified, or federal in nature, any of which determine the degree to which a party or groups of parties seek to control, or share political influence (Elgie 1998; Müller 2002). Some constitutions even provide for banning or restraining "extreme parties" or "anti-democratic parties", even in liberal democracies (Pildes 2010).

Surprisingly then, a degree of obscurity surrounds the origins of constitutional design. Exceptions certainly exist, not least the understanding of the intentions and preferences of some of the Founding Fathers who drafted the United States Constitution—a topic closely studied by historians, scholars of American political development, and constitutional lawyers (Kelly 1983). Yet as Elster (1995) observed, constitution-making is a stagecraft not well studied or well understood.

If the constitutions' origins are obscure, so are the dynamics of constitutional evolution and constitutional change. Constitutions are living documents. Change can occur in many ways, for example, by judicial interpretation and activism or by formal changes in the wording of the written texts. Some political systems forego amendments or updating in favour of complete constitutional overhaul: The French Republic has a history of both moderate change through amendment and more complete change, such as the adoption of the 5th Constitution in 1958 following the relatively short-lived constitution of the 4th Republic (1946–1958). More recently, in the wake of its banking and financial crisis, Iceland established a constitutional convention which proposed adopting a new constitution (Hardarson and Kristinsson 2011). Recent regime change in the Middle East and Africa has resulted in new constitutional orders (Rubin 2004; Carey and Reynolds 2011). In short, constitutional change is a reoccurring feature of many well-established democracies and increasingly prevalent with each new wave of democratization.

The aim of this chapter is to explore the politics of constitutional change and, in particular, the role of political parties, who tend to be active agents in this process. An understanding of political institutions and policy outcomes requires an

understanding of the influence of preferences and interests of partisans for shaping and reshaping constitutions.

Political scientists have been slow to appreciate and understand the nature of constitutional change, despite a renewed interest in the origins of political institutions as part of the neo-institutional revolution (Peters 1998). As explored subsequently, legal scholarship tended to be the source of most understanding of constitutional change. This has had important consequences for the evolution of this field of inquiry. Even political scientists studying the rules governing constitutional change and the rates thereof have tended to ignore the role of political parties and party systems in configuring the agendas for change.

The next section describes the mechanisms by which constitutions evolve and change. While primary attention focuses on amendments, political parties potentially play key roles in constitutional change through other avenues, such as influencing judicial interpretation through judicial appointments. Section 11.3 reviews the lines of development in understanding why constitutional change occurs, with an emphasis on formal changes to the constitutional texts. Perhaps, most notable is the observation that political parties have been largely sidelined in accounts of constitutional amendments, which may partly explain the lack of success in explaining observed patterns of amendment. Section 11.4 suggests the need to "bring the party in" and proposes that incorporating the preferences of parties and the shape of the party system can advance understanding of constitutional change. The introduction of a number of brief qualitative cases provides evidence of the degree to which constitutional change can be a party-driven phenomenon. Moving from the specific to the general, it is suggested that the veto-player approach provides opportunities to better understand the role of political parties in constitutional change. The chapter concludes with suggestions for further research and the need to move beyond treating constitutions and constitutionally mandated political institutions as exogenous variables when trying to understand the impact of political parties on politics and public policy.

11.2 How Constitutions Change

Virtually, every political system allows for modification of its constitution, at least occasionally. Economic, technological, and demographic changes within which the political system operates may render present structures and obsolete rules. Political preferences are not constant over time, and associated changes in values and attitudes of the population may generate a need to update any principles and ideals enshrined in the constitution. For example, as the awareness of human rights has grown over the last decades, many amendments to constitutions include an increasing range of individual rights and freedoms. Also, major realignments in the political arena may expectedly generate demand for institutional reforms. Citizens may seek to modify the system arising from awareness of unintended, unexpected, and unwanted consequences of current constitutional texts.



Fig. 11.1 Amendment rates (yearly) for select countries. *Sources* Long-term series based on Lutz (1994, 1995) are corrected for Denmark and have been updated for Norway (1814–2001), Sweden (Instrument of Government only, 1975–2000), and Germany (1949–1994). Short-term series 1993–2002 are taken from Lorenz (2005), Table A3. (No data for Iceland and Luxembourg). *Notes* Correlations between series: Pearson's r = 0.072 (sig 0.776) and Spearman's rho = 0.580 (sig 0.012)

Four main types of change in the constitutional arrangement of a country exist, as shown in Fig. 11.1 (see also Voigt 1999: 70; Giovannoni 2003). The foundation of the simple matrix relies on two dimensions. One dimension focuses on the *formality* (altering the text or not) of constitutional change, with the other dimension focused on its *legality* (legal change in a strict sense or not). As indicated, this gives us four possible combinations.

The first possibility is revision or replacement of the constitutional document by means of a formal amendment procedure specified in the constitution itself (Bergman et al. 2003, pp. 120–127). Although amending processes are often strikingly complex, usually a relatively small set of devices are common among constitutions around the world (see Maddex 1996).[1] Appendix I outlines the

[1] Few countries establish absolute barriers to amending any of the articles in their constitutions. Outlier examples include Germany and the United States. In Germany, the federal system is protected against changes. Similarly, amendments of the basic principles of Articles 1 (on human dignity) and 20 (on basic principles of state order and the right to resist) are inadmissible (see Article 79). Article 5 of the US Constitution says, "No state, without its Consent, shall be

formal amendment process for a number of selected countries. Several scholars suggested ways to summarize the complexity of rules governing constitutional amendments and developed lists of hurdles for constitutional amendments. For example, Elster (2000: 101) applied the categories: absolute entrenchment, adoption by a supermajority in parliament, requirement for a higher quorum than for ordinary legislation, delays, state ratification (in federal systems), and ratification by referendum. Hylland (1994: 197) identified four main techniques: delays, confirmation by a second decision, adoption by qualified majorities, and participation from actors other than the national assembly. Lane (1996: 114) listed six mechanisms: no change permitted, referendum, delay, confirmation by a second decision, confirmation by qualified majorities, and confirmation by sub-national government. Lutz (1994: 363) differentiated between four general amendment strategies: legislative supremacy, intervening election (double vote), legislative complexity (referendum threat), and required referendum or the equivalent.

The various instruments provide constitutions with different degrees of rigidity. In other words, the inflexibility of constitutions depends on the difficulty of overcoming formal amendment provisions. The rigidity of amendment processes, in turn, reflects a previous commitment by political forces to *entrench* certain political structures and values. Rigidity assists in providing commitments with credibility. This technique institutes a higher legal system that will stand above and limit ordinary legislation (Ferejohn 1997). On the other hand, if amending the constitution is too difficult, change by other means becomes more likely (as discussed below).

The second possibility is (gradual) revision of the constitutional framework by means of judicial interpretation. Most constitutions require interpretation because the language of constitutions is often vague and non-specific. Moreover, constitutions may contain internal inconsistencies, with seemingly contradictory sentences or articles. Typically, a country's legal system has the responsibility for being the ultimate arbiter of constitutions' interpretations in cases of conflict. Usually, the Supreme Court or in some countries a special Constitutional Court stands at the apex of the legal system, with the power to render final judgements for the meaning of the constitution (Epstein et al. 2001).

Constitutional jurisprudence and the politics of constitutional change via judicial adjudication are perhaps most closely associated with the United States. The 1803 landmark *Marbury versus Madison* decision of the US Supreme Court established the principle of judicial review (Murphy 2000). However, not all agree with constitutional change via judicial interpretation: Literalism is a judicial and political philosophy, which suggests that decisions of constitutionality ought to be based solely on the written text of the constitution (Kannar 1990). Wording should

(Footnote 1 continued)
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate". A recent example to the same effect appears in the constitutional framework of Bosnia-Herzegovina, based on the Dayton agreement. Paragraph 2 of Article 10 states: "No amendment to this Constitution may eliminate or diminish any of the rights and freedoms referred to in Article II of this Constitution or alter the present paragraph".

not gain credence by conjecturing the drafters' intentions or revision caused by changing society, technology, or political developments. In contrast, originalists demand that judges faithfully interpret the discoverable intentions of those who drafted the constitution (Whittington 1999). Such conservative and minimalist-oriented perspectives argue that the judicial system should discount interpretation of a constitution in the context of modern society. Constitutional change through interpretation has the reputation of being an unwanted opportunity for judges to dictate public policy and act more as lawmakers than judges. In contrast, judicial pragmatists argue that judges should make decisions reflecting the needs of modern society and politics, even if this requires forgoing reliance on the written word or interpretation of intent (Chemerinsky 1997). Advocates of the "living constitution" argue that in the absence of judicial pragmatism, constitutions would become obsolete.

Variation in jurisprudence concerning constitutional change underlies deep conflict in American politics and society regarding the appropriate role of the United States Supreme Court in upholding and interpreting the constitution. For many, the expansion of individual rights under the Warren Court affirmed their fear of a juristocracy—the idea that the Supreme Court interprets the constitution to the extent that the Supreme Court itself becomes a political institution (Hodder-William 1992).[2] The decision in *Roe versus Wade* divided the country's population and ever since remains the subject of questions from senators to perspective Supreme Court justices (Kastellec et al. 2010).

Indeed, party politicization of the selection process for Supreme Court justices in the United States reflects the degree to which voters and politicians accept the Supreme Court as the protector of, or threat to, the constitution (Moraski and Shipan 1999). Recent presidents eagerly nominated Supreme Court justices who align themselves closely with the president's policies and attitudes towards constitutional law and change. An American president, serving no longer than 8 years, may have continuing influence long afterwards from decisions and judicial philosophies of their Supreme Court nominees (Gibson and Caldeira 2009). Clearly, individual politicians (the president and senators) and political parties in American seek to influence and shape the level of constitutional change by controlling nominations and Senate confirmations (Segal and Cover 1989). Of course, from a principal-agent perspective, politicians may err and appoint justices who then behave at odds with their appointers' political philosophies (Szmer and Songer 2005).

Although the politics of judicial interpretation is perhaps the greatest in the United States, judiciaries in other countries have also developed the notion of judicial interpretation. Although the Norwegian Constitution does not mention judicial review, the courts introduced it through interpretation during the first half

[2] Judicial activism, defined here as "a willingness to find unconstitutional the laws and actions of duly elected officials" (Hodder-William 1992: 17), may not necessarily have a constitutional basis. For example, the executive may be held judicially accountable for breaching legislation rather than the constitution.

of the nineteenth century (Smith 1993). A truly comparative framework to measure the level of constitutional change via judicial adjudication is still wanting, but area or country-specific studies highlight the prevalence of the practice in places as diverse as Asia (Ginsburg 2003), Chile (Couso 2003), Germany (Kommers 1997), Hungary (Brunner 2000), and Mexico (Domingo 2000).

The third possibility is revision or replacement of the constitutional text by irregular means. The 13th and 14th Amendments of the US Constitution in the 1860s, which emancipated the slaves and bestowed suffrage (Mueller 1999), are illustrations. Since southern states had sufficient votes to block change, the amendments would have failed ratification if the process, established in Article 5 of the constitution, had strictly followed its dictates. A similar example of ignoring the formal amendment procedure is the changes in wording of Article 1 of the Norwegian Constitution in November 1814, reflecting the union with Sweden, and in 1905, marking the dissolution of the union. Likewise, many questioned the legal basis of the 1962 referendum to elect directly the President of France. Some suggest that the procedure used by de Gaulle's to call the referendum was extra-constitutional (Stone 1992). Popular opinion, particularly if expressed through a plebiscite or referendum, can render decisions valid even if the outcome is contrary to structures governing constitutional change. Currently, no known systematic measure for the level of constitutional change through such extra-legal behaviour seems to exist.

The fourth and final possibility mentioned in Table 11.1 is an intended or unintended revision of the constitutional framework by means of political adaptation by legislative and executive bodies. An important example in Norway and many other European countries is the introduction, or rather evolution, of forming parliamentary government (e.g. Congleton 2001). The example is, however, ambiguous, as the Norwegian case illustrates. The first instance of formation of parliamentary government in Norway occurred as early as in 1884, but this change had no reflection in a revision of any article in the constitution. After a generation or two, lawyers and politicians came to accept parliamentarism as a constitutional custom to which governments must abide. In other words, parliamentarism became a constitutional principle even though the constitution itself had no mention of it whatsoever. In 2007, however, negative parliamentarism—practiced consistently for over a hundred years—gained codification (Article 15). In general, the lack of reference to political parties in many constitutions, despite the centrality of party government, indicates a gap between the formal constitution and the practice of constitutional government. As indicated earlier, several examples exist for

Table 11.1 Main types of constitutional change

	Legal change	Extra-legal change
Explicit change (change in constitutional text)	Formal amendment procedures	Irregular procedures
Implicit change (no change in constitutional text)	Judicial interpretation	Political adaptation

constitutional changes that do not follow the formal regulations established in the constitution. However, reasonably, such examples are rare, at least in established democracies, and irregular forms of change in the constitutional text represent highly exceptional circumstances.

11.3 Measuring and Explaining Constitutional Change

Interest in political aspects of constitutional change and the characteristics and effects of amendment procedures has expanded over time. Simultaneously, empirical measurement of constitutional stability faces significant challenges. A new constitutional order following regime change may be very noticeable, but measuring constitutional change through judicial interpretation and especially (often unobservable) political practice is particularly difficult and has not been comparatively investigated in any significant detail. Consequently, the nature and causes of constitutional change tend to focus on formal amendments.

Even comparative (cross-national) literature, which relies primarily on amendment rates—for instance yearly averages—to indicate the degree of change in constitutional rules over time, is sparse. Figure 11.1 shows such amendment rates for a selection of countries. The data are from Lutz (1994), updated, or corrected for some countries, and Lorenz (2005). The latter is based on the time 1993–2002. Lutz used the entire lifespan of constitutions from their origins until the early 1990s. As a glance at the data in Fig. 11.1 confirms, the two time series are oddly unrelated (Pearson's $r = 0.072$).[3]

Lorenz (2005: 351) found Lutz' data for Germany, France, and Ireland to be inaccurate. Another explanation for the different rates reported in Fig. 11.1 is that different authors apply different operational definitions of "change" in their calculations. Counting instances of amendments and identifying a single instance of constitutional change may seem to have obvious answers, but the reality is the opposite. In the context of the US Constitution, identifying an amendment is relatively easy, since each amendment—so far 27—appears at the end of the constitution; the wording of the original document has no revision. Some of the amendments are rather broad and complex, with several sections (e.g. the 14th Amendment), and only one amendment occurs at a specific ratification date, except for December 1791, the ratification of the first ten amendments, which represent more than one-third of the total number of amendments. Perhaps, counting the first ten amendments as a single change in the constitution is reasonable, or perhaps, counting some of the later amendments as more than one change is also reasonable?

[3] The rank-order coefficient Spearman's rho is however positive and significant at conventional levels (rho = 0.580; sig. 0.012). This correlation is produced by the two countries with no change at all on both series (Denmark and Japan), and it disappears (and Pearson's r turns negative) if the two countries are removed.

In contrast to the American case, changes take the form of textual revisions in most national constitutions, sometimes as simple as deleting, changing, or adding one word in a single sentence of an article. If we observe simultaneous reformulation of several articles in different parts of a constitution, is it still to be counted as one change? Norway is an example: In February 2007, amendment occurred to several articles. In one committee report based on proposals submitted before the 2005 election, recommendations suggested changes to six articles (two of them new articles); the assembly unanimously accepted them later. Most of the changes concerned the court of impeachment and the legal foundation of its operation.[4] On the very same day, abolishing the quasi-bicameral organization of the parliament (against through just one vote) involved revisions of wording to seven articles in different parts of the constitution. The actual number of changes is obscure: one, two, or, perhaps, thirteen. The amendments concerned two issues and required two roll-call votes. Had preferences been more diverse, allowing some legislators to support only various subsets of the articles' amendments, as many as thirteen or more roll-calls, could (and would) have been arranged. In any case, counting constitutional reform issues ("packages" involving several articles) or counting numbers of changes to single articles produces different empirical measures of constitutional change. In the 2007 example, counting the changes as only two might seem reasonable; however, reproducing the Lutz (1994, 2006) amendment rate is not possible this way.

Regardless of the method for counting amendments, distinctions between small and large reforms, or between important or unimportant changes, may be significant. If the interest is the extent to which amendment procedures affect changes to the status quo, the point becomes significant. Symbolic, small, or virtually inconsequential amendments do not represent real changes in the constitutional status quo. In a sense, such reforms constitute distorting "noise" in the data. For example, in 1962, establishment of the office of the Parliamentary Ombudsman occurred in Norway, and the constitution (Article 75) enshrined the office in 1995. The actions produced exactly what existed before, and the reforms substantially changed nothing (although, of course, the Ombudsman from then on gained constitutional protection, and the office could not be abolished by a simple majority). The new Article 15 from 2007 (parliamentary government) was simply a codification of constitutional custom and did not represent any change in the status quo.[5] Arguably, the 22nd amendment of the US Constitution also was insignificant, in that it simply codified a political norm that only one (Franklin D.

[4] The previous institutional arrangement—not used since 1927—was seen as obsolete. The voting results indicate that this status quo was located outside the unanimity core of the major parliamentary players and that the new proposal belonged to the unanimity winset.

[5] Article 15 says, "Any person who holds a seat in the Council of State has the duty to submit his application to resign once the Storting has passed a vote of no confidence against that Member of the Council of State or against the Council of State as a whole." This had been a reality for more than 100 years.

Roosevelt) of the previous presidents had disregarded; Roosevelt could have remained the only exception even if the amendment had failed to be adopted.

The literature identifies several measures of constitutional rigidity. The most complex approach appears in Lutz (1994, 2006, pp. 145–182) who established an *index of difficulty* by specifying the added value of nearly seventy aspects of amending rules. The index ranges from 0.50 (New Zealand) to 5.10 (the United States) in Lutz' cross-national material (N = 32 countries). Although the approach is highly systematic, some of the results are counterintuitive. Constitutional scholars seem to agree that amending the Danish constitution is very difficult, but the entry for Denmark (2.75) is close to the average (2.50). Amending the Norwegian constitution is certainly easier, but the index value is significantly higher for Norway (3.35). According to the index, amending the Japanese constitution (3.10) is easier than the Norwegian constitution. This is clearly erroneous, since Japan requires a two-thirds majority in each legislative chamber as well as a referendum; Norway requires a two-thirds majority once, but after an intervening election (no majority decision before the election). Austria and Portugal require two-thirds majorities in single legislative decisions, but appear close to majoritarian New Zealand on the index (0.80 versus 0.50 for New Zealand). Clearly, the index is not entirely satisfactory; it is, perhaps, overly complicated, and on their face, some of the resulting scores lack validity.

Lijphart (1999: 219) reduced the great variety of methods for amendment to four basic types: ordinary majorities, between two-thirds and ordinary majorities, two-thirds majorities or equivalent, and supermajorities greater than two-thirds. In effect, that research disregarded aspects of amending provisions other than majority requirements and focused on a one-dimensional approach. Anckar and Karvonen (2002) suggested a slightly more complex measure with nine values, involving either the legislature or the people (in referendum) or both (or even none) in constitutional changes. If involved, the requirement is either an ordinary or a qualified majority. Crossing the dimensions gives nine cells, but the numbering of them (which represent the values of the resulting rigidity variable) is arbitrary and difficult to validate. Lorenz (2005: 346) created a two-dimensional additive index; a slightly modified version of Lijphart's measure combines scores for the number of "arenas with different voters". In a set of 39 countries, the index ranges from 1 to 9.5.

The current study cannot attempt to resolve the debate surrounding measurement of constitutional change, but the discussion of the causes of constitutional change requires sensitivity to the fact that employing different measures of constitutional change provide evidence for and against competing explanations.

In a cross-national analysis, Lutz (1994) demonstrated that the degree of flexibility or rigidity of a constitution influences the amendment rate. Leaving aside Lutz's measures for a moment and referring to Appendix I, New Zealand is

prominent as an example of a country with a flexible constitution.[6] Japan, the United States, Finland, and Greece clearly are more rigid because they require qualified majorities in one form or another, as well as referenda or an intervening election. The amendment procedures in Denmark, France, and Italy may also—less obviously—gain consideration as examples of quite rigid rules. The source of rigidity in Denmark is the referendum requirement and the fact that at least 40 % of the electorate needs to vote in favour of a constitutional amendment for it to pass. This is actually a super majoritarian element. In France, the main procedure involves the president as a veto player; alternatively, the referendum is used. Italy requires double decisions in both chambers (initiation of a referendum occurs if decisions in the national assembly are by majority). Ireland and Sweden have a multiple actor approach within a majoritarian framework, whereas Germany and Portugal allow qualified majorities of the legislatures alone to amend the constitution.

Focusing on US State Constitutions, Lutz (1995) found that the more the procedural difficulty in amending state constitutions, the more the amendments were made. This counter-intuitive finding supports his earlier cross-national work (Lutz 1994) that found the relationship between ease of amendment process and rate of amendment to be negative and curvilinear. For that study, Lutz used information from 36 national constitutions. The dataset included a wide range of countries, from Western Samoa (1962–1984), Kenya (1964–1981), and Argentina (1853–1940) to many well-established Western democracies. Beyond measurement problems, a common criticism of the Lutz research is the lack of control variables employed: To some extent, only length and age of constitutions were controlling variables [in most studies, both the length of the constitution and the age of the constitution correlate positively with rates of amendment, as Dixon (2011) notes].

After disaggregating the Lutz index of difficulty, Ferejohn (1997: 523), in a reanalysis, claimed that "[T]he requirement of special majorities or separate majorities in different legislative sessions or bicamerality—is the key variable to explaining amendment rates". He continued by saying that "[T]here is no evidence that a ratification requirement, whether involving states or a popular referendum, has any significant impact on amendment rates" (Ferejohn 1997: 523). In other words, special majorities in the legislature may be both necessary and sufficient to achieve a moderate amendment rate. Lorenz (2005) considered the effects of several measures of rigidity on both of the amendment rates. The results

[6] Formally, amendments to New Zealand's constitution occur in the same way as ordinary legislation. Thus, the Constitution Act 1986, as with other standard legislation, can be amended by a simple parliamentary majority. In practice, any major changes in a constitutional nature are typically the subject of a binding referendum, but these have been rare. However, a few entrenched provisions in the Electoral Act 1993 require a super majority for amendment. The entrenching provision is not itself entrenched and thus (in theory at least) could be amended or removed by a simple majority.

appear mixed, especially with regard to the 1993–2002 amendment rates.[7] Rasch and Congleton (2006) reanalysed the Lutz amendment rates for a small set of 19 OECD countries. Veto authorities (or points) and supermajority requirements are among the variables, but the latter surprisingly has no significant effect on changes in any of the models. Dixon and Holden (2012), revising the issue of amendment rules in state constitutions, found that having a supermajority requirement at the legislative stage reduced the rate of constitutional amendments. In addition, US States' Constitutions tended to be amended more when states allowed popular initiatives, such as in California.

Clearly, the results from studies seeking to explain the rate of constitutional change through formal amendments are ambiguous and inconclusive. Overall, it has not been demonstrated that the pace of change in constitutions in practice decreased with higher hurdles of constitutional amendment procedures. More reliable cross-nation results do however require that the measurement issues related to the dependent variable (amendment rate) and the main independent variables (various aspects of rigidity) be addressed. Some other challenges require consideration: First is the question of selection bias. Empirical studies so far exclusively focus on successful reforms, that is, the cases for study are selected on the basis of outcomes on the dependent variable (Geddes 2003). Either failed constitutional proposals need inclusion in the analysis, or negative cases in the form of periods or years of stability need consideration (e.g. by using country-years as observations). Second is the problem of controls. At the present stage, then, achieving reliable results in single-country studies (e.g. analyses of time series) with carefully crafted comparative case studies might be easier. In small-N comparative designs, avoiding selection bias and selecting only reasonably similar cases are perhaps possible.

None of the studies so far has included any extra-constitutional explanatory variables, which means those variables not generated by the constitution itself (as its age, length, and, of course, amendment procedure). Additionally, avoiding incorporation of political actors' interests and preferences in seeking to explain change would produce skewed results. Noting the general absence of political parties from previously proffered theories, the next consideration is attending to the role of political parties in constitutional change.

11.4 Bringing the Party in

As discussed earlier, most of the existing quantitative literature on constitutional change largely ignores political parties. This section discusses the rationale for,

[7] Lorenz (2005: 353, Table 4) reports adjusted R2 ranging from 0.77 to 0.92 in regression models with rigidity measures and length of constitution as independent variable. For example, Lutz' index of difficulty and length explains 95 % of the variance in the dependent variable. It is questionable whether these high coefficients are reliable.

and means by which, political parties ought to have consideration as central to the process of constitutional change via formal amendment. Arguably, the interests and preferences of parties and the shape of the party system are necessary elements of any model of constitutional change. To understand the influence of political parties on constitutions, our initial spotlight is on one common constitutional prescription—the electoral system—as a focus for political parties' agendas for reform and change. The Irish case is used to illustrate the relationship between political parties, electoral systems, and constitutional reform. A discussion of how scholars of electoral system change have incorporated constitutional amendment procedures into their research follows. The section concludes with suggestions for how the veto-player framework provides insights into how parties and the party systems shape demand for, and patterns of, constitutional change.

The case of Irish electoral reform highlights the degree to which political parties can actively promote constitutional change in an attempt to advance a party's interests. The 1937 constitution was the brainchild of the Fianna Fáil party and in particular its charismatic leader, Eamon de Valera. That constitution included an article directing that the electoral system be proportional representation by means of single transferable vote (STV). As Gallagher (1987: 27) noted, STV came to Ireland earlier in the century at the behest of electoral reformers in England and became well established in Ireland as the preferred electoral system by the 1920s. During the 1937 constitutional debate in the Irish parliament, de Valera indicated that he wanted the constitution to reflect the details of the electoral system, "as the matter was too important to be left to the vagaries of party warfare" (Sinnott 2010: 113). Notably, de Valera implied that in-office politicians recognize the enticement of future politicians to manipulate the electoral system for partisan gain. Enshrining electoral rules in the constitution was a way of ensuring serving governments could not change the electoral rules for future electoral benefit.

Within two decades, de Valera proposed a constitutional amendment to change the electoral system with the aim of enhancing his party's electoral fortune. In 1959, Fianna Fáil sought to switch from a proportional representation system to a plurality system. Fianna Fáil had maintained power for virtually all of the time, but of the nine governments formed since 1937, the party secured majority status on only four occasions (Sinnott 2010). Fianna Fáil and de Valera wanted an electoral system that would produce for greater electoral rewards for themselves. In the subsequent referendum, voters narrowly rejected the amendment. The narrowness of the result motivated Fianna Fáil to attempt the same constitutional reform within the decade; the results again were a defeat at the referendum stage—this time by a much more significant margin. What this case highlights is the degree to which partisan interest can motivate the desire for constitutional change. The demand for constitutional change among political actors, including political parties, is likely an important factor in determining the rate of attempted constitutional change.

While constitutional scholars generally ignored the preferences of political parties in shaping and reshaping constitutions, scholars of electoral studies have

long been aware of the desire of political parties to influence constitutional rules. Boix's (1999) seminal contribution is a reminder that self-interest is central to political parties' preferences for constitutional design and, by logical extension, redesign. Parties are strategic actors who attempt to shape political structures to maximize the potential future access to power. The earlier mentioned Irish case clearly illustrates this preference of political actors in this regard. The frequent changes to the French electoral system by incumbent parties attempting to gain a political or power advantage (Elgie 2005) are further evidence of the general desire parties harbour to "fix" constitutions to maintain or expand upon elected office.

Shugart (2008) suggested that demand for constitutional change by political parties may be driven less by a desire to hold future power than by a sense of dissatisfaction with the past performance of established constitutional structures. Shugart asserted that parties who assumed power and who tended to suffer electoral disadvantage (in terms of the disproportionality between seats obtained and votes won) for a long period are most likely to seek constitutional change to remedy what they perceive as unfairness in the system. Britain's Liberal Democrats seemed to follow this pattern exactly. Shortly after entering into a coalition agreement with the Conservative Party, a referendum on electoral reform occurred in May 2011 with the proposal that the alternative vote replaces the single-member plurality system. Neither the Labour Party nor the Conservatives were strong advocates of reform (although the Labour Party leader campaigned for electoral reform in 2011 and the Labour Party agreed with the Liberal Democrats to electoral reform before the 1997 general election—but not pursued once in power). The Liberal Democrats in government placed their trust in voters to reform Britain's electoral system—but in a significant defeat for the party, voters decided against such change.

Renwick (2009) observed a crucial phenomenon: Constitutional reform regarding electoral systems is elite-driven, and voters tend to have weak preferences for initiating change. Why we do not see more political parties using their time in government to propel constitutional change, in particular electoral reform that would enhance the incumbent's advantage, remains unresolved. Pilet and Bol (2011) found evidence that self-interest mixed with an analysis of risk and satisfaction drives political parties' demands for electoral reform. Political parties know the impact of current constitutional features and may be slow to alter these, even if change would be beneficial to the party in power. As such, political parties may act conservatively in terms of constitutional change. Psychological factors may also be at play—mirroring Shugart's (2008) "dissatisfaction" explanation, Pilet and Bol (2011) determined that the degree to which political parties feel cheated by the system partly determines the desirability to change the electoral system. Interestingly, when considering the rate of electoral system change, research on constitutional electoral reform fails to consider the likely impact of rules governing constitutional amendments. Indeed, in general, scholars of party politics generally ignored the institutional obstacles to constitutional change.

One exception is Hooghe and Deschouwer (2011) who explore the difficulty of constitutional change in the Belgium system. The consociational nature of the Belgian Constitution makes amending the constitution very difficult. Regionally defined political parties are effective wielders of vetoes (see below). As a result, and despite interest among political parties in power to reform the constitution, very little has changed in Belgium. The significant point is that scholars of political institutions must account for both the preference of political actors and the processes by which constitutional change can occur.

As Colomer (2005) suggested, the party system is as likely, if not more likely, to shape the constitutional structure, as the constitutional structure is likely to shape the party system. Colomer's "behavioural–institutional equilibrium" theory argued that existing parties attempt to ensure (new) constitutions maintain the status quo in terms of party systems. Although political parties are fundamental to representative government in Europe, scholars with a different regional focus have been quicker to recognize the significance of political parties' influence on constitutional change. Many Latin American countries have experienced constitutional shifts both away from plurality electoral rules and towards stronger presidential power. Negretto (2009) argued that pre-existing party competition and party organization are crucial variables for explaining the substance of constitutional change. Specifically, higher levels of factionalism in the party system lead to relatively more inclusive electoral rules. Similarly, party decentralization associates with strengthening the president vis-à-vis the legislature. In short, the preferences of existing parties in power shape the type of amendments proposed.

Beyond the preferences of political parties over constitutional change, one way to consider the likely actual impact of political parties on constitutional change is to apply the veto-player approach (Tsebelis 2002) to constitutional amendment procedures. By using this approach, and considering political parties as one of many potential sources of vetoes, identifying connections between the different procedural devices and roles of political parties as actors in constitutional redesign becomes easier. Furthermore, it is so general that any part of amendment procedures can be discussed with respect to its effect on one important variable: the capacity or potential for *change in the status quo* (i.e. change in the present constitutional norms at any point in time).

According to Tsebelis (2002: 19), veto players are "individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo". Veto players can be either institutional or partisan (for an overview, see Strøm 2003: 77). In our context, the former type is specified in the amendment clause of the constitution. The parliament, a legislative chamber (in a bicameral parliament), voters in a referendum, a constitutional court, or a president are typical examples of institutional veto players. Parties or other actors inside an institution are (potential) partisan veto players. A disciplined majority party within an assembly that renders decision based on majority rule is an example of a partisan veto player. Disciplined political parties are a common feature of most European parliaments and many legislatures in other parts of the world (Depauw and Martin 2009). Certainly, identification of partisan veto players may be problematic and ambiguous

(Ganghof 2003), and the ambiguousness may partly explain the focus on institutional veto players in the literature. Still, identification of individual veto actors inside institutional (collective) veto players is necessary to gain accurate understanding of the consequences of constitutional amendment procedures. Veto players create constraints on decision-making, and therefore, accounting for all relevant actors is a requirement for in any complete model of institutional change.

Political actors try to further their interests, and political parties with veto power should be expected to block proposals that go against their interests. Veto players will not accept changes that make the status quo worse from their perspectives, and no changes occur. A potential for change only exists if all veto players prefer certain outcomes that modify the status quo, that is, if the *winset of status quo* (the set of alternatives or outcomes that can alter the status quo) is not empty. Figure 11.2 illustrates the set of constitutional amendments that can replace some part of an existing constitution, for instance, one of its articles. The size of the winset is, perhaps, a proxy for stability (Tsebelis 1995: 295). If the winset is empty, the situation is stable; no relevant actor prefers to overturn the status quo. If the winset is small, only incremental changes are possible. The existence of transaction costs and external constraints may also preclude changes in this situation. If the winset is large, a lot of proposals potentially can defeat the status quo. Thus, the larger the winset of the status quo, the more susceptible to change the current constitutional framework becomes.

Repeated decisions are a common technique in constitutional amendment procedures. For example, a parliament needing to render a decision for any constitutional amendment twice creates, in a sense, a parliamentary status at time t_1 and at time t_2, which represent two veto players. Amendments to the Italian constitution require adoption by each of the two parliamentary chambers (Chamber of Deputies and the Senate) twice. The Swedish Constitution can only be amended if the *Riksdag* approves the changes twice, with one general election having been held in-between the two votes. Another way to describe it is to say



Fig. 11.2 Ideal points of Actors *A*, *B*, *C*, and *D*. Status quo (*SQ*) and a constitutional proposal in the winset of status quo $W_{AB}(SQ)$

that it is two *veto points* with the same institutional veto player. Any proposal encounters defeat in either the first or the second vote; consent (by a sufficient number of members) on both occasions is the requirement for altering the status quo. Preferences of course may change between the two points in time. This can occur simply due to the passage of time, the tempering of passions, the presence of new information, or an electoral event. In the last instance, the composition of the second parliament may differ from the first with respect to members and party composition. Ideological differences between the parliaments (at t_1 and t_2) may or may not appear as a consequence of the intervening election. This in turn has the potential to affect stability by making adoption of constitutional amendments more difficult. A recent trend in well-established democracies is increased instability at the polls (higher volatility), which creates difficulty for amending those constitutions that require consent of the pre-election and post-election parliaments. Thus, an easily overlooked external factor (shifts in the partisan composition of one or more chambers) may significantly affect the difficulty of amendment processes.

Choice of agenda-setting rules for constitutional proposals is an alternative way to highlight the impact of political parties on constitutional change. The potential power of the agenda setter is illustrated by Romer and Rosenthal (1978), who formulate a *setter model* with two players—a proposer and a veto player—and two stages of decision-making. In the first stage, a committee—in our case, one which formulates a constitutional amendment—sets the agenda by introducing a proposal to the parliament. Then, in the second stage, the parliament votes on whether to accept the proposal. Political parties are likely to dominate at least one of these stages. If the parliament uses its veto, rejecting the proposal, the status quo prevails. In the model, the parliament as a second-stage actor is *not* allowed to amend the first-stage proposal. Thus, the decision-making power of the parliament is severely restricted and actually reduced to a *take-it-or-leave-it* choice. If the ideal points of the proposer and the legislative assembly (median legislator) deviate, the agenda control described above makes it possible for the proposer to move the status quo towards its own ideal point.

The agenda setter in the Romer and Rosenthal (1978) model has both *positive* power and *negative* power over the agenda (Cox and McCubbins 2004; cf. also Denzau and Mackay 1983; Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Heller 2001). Positive power over an agenda is the authority to propose changes to the status quo and to ensure that these proposals become part of the legislative schedule for consideration. Negative power over an agenda is the ability to prevent certain proposals from entering the legislative docket (gate-keeping power), the ability to delay considerations of proposals (a weak form of gate-keeping), or the ability to block changes to the status quo (veto power). In the setter model, the first mover has proposal and gate-keeping power; if it decides to close the gates, no proposal emerges. The second mover can neither introduce proposals nor make amendments to proposals. In the vetoing parliament, proposals are considered under a *closed*

rule rather than an *open rule*, meaning that no amendments to the original proposal are allowed.

The details surrounding agenda setting are important for the outcome of decision-making processes. In particular, it is essential whether or not a veto player can amend a proposal that is already on the agenda. We can again illustrate this by Table 11.1. Suppose that only actor B has proposal rights and that A is a veto player without rights to amend proposals (as in the setter model of Romer and Rosenthal 1978). Then, B will propose an amendment as close as possible to its own ideal point, that is, P in the figure. Seen from actor A's perspective, P is marginally better than SQ and P will be accepted. What happens if veto player A can amend the proposals that B places on the agenda? If P is proposed, A can revise it so that the decision reflects its own ideal point. But the ideal point of A is worse than the status quo of the proposer B, and no proposal should be forthcoming in the first place as it is not in the proposers interest. In this case where the veto player operates under open rule, the proposer will only make proposals if the ideal point is preferred to the status quo. Thus, even if the winset of the status quo is non-empty, the situation is entirely stable because of the agenda-setting rules.

Finally and notably, the structure of the party system may also impact the ability of political parties to institute constitutional reform, depending on the type of majority required. For example, the purpose of the device of a *qualified majority* is to protect the (formal) status quo or the existing constitutional provisions. Obviously, achieving adoption of a constitutional amendment is more difficult according to the degree of majority required. Importantly, the impact of requirements for majority will depend on the party system. Contrast, for example, the likely difficulty of constitutional amendments under qualified majority in countries with many parties of relatively equal size, compared to countries with a dominant party (a political system where one large party tends to dominate politics over a significant period of time). As Dixon (2011) suggested, bipartisanship may be a requirement for constitutional change in a multi-party system, whereas, in contrast, qualified majority rules are largely irrelevant in dominant party systems. The suggestion is, then, that political parties gain relevance not only from their preferences for constitutional change, but also from the configuration of the party system which determines the effectiveness of veto players in decision-making processes.

11.5 Conclusion

Constitutions shape the actions and behaviour of political parties. In liberal democracies, the steps necessary to win elected office and share power are of great concern for political parties, their elected officials, their memberships, and their wider base of support. By defining the rules of political encounters, constitutions

create incentives and rewards for political parties. Modern political science focuses heavily on explaining political outcomes by examining the consequences of the preferences of actors' interacted with instructions and rules. Within this research agenda, the understandable practice has been to treat the rules and structures as exogenous. Citing a political institution or rule as having a constitutional basis is a typical way to assure readers that the institution in questions is truly exogenous of party and political influence.

In reality, political parties are not just shaped by constitutions, but also shaped by constitutions. Political interests shape constitutions. More importantly, perhaps, political interests have the potential to reshape constitutions. Constitutional change can occur in a number of ways, from formal amendment procedures (the focus of this chapter), to extra-legal regime change, a change in the practice of politics, or through judicial interpretation. In each one of these methods, political parties are crucial in many democracies. Partisan politicians decide who ascends to a country's Supreme or Constitutional Court and in so doing influence, potentially for many generations, the level and nature of constitutional evolution or rigidity. Political parties tend to be, collectively or individually (dependent on the shape of the party systems), potential veto players in most procedures for formal constitutional amendment. Even in situations in which citizens' initiatives set the agenda for constitutional reform, political parties may be key players in the referendum campaign, as in the case of Switzerland. In many ways then, political parties, as self-interested players in political systems, have the potential to impact constitutional continuity or constitutional change. Accepting this proposition may seem obvious, but the consequences and challenges of this are significant for scholars of constitutional law, for constitutional change, and for political scientists interested in the impact of institutions and preferences. The dominant approach of treating constitutionally prescribed institutions as exogenous to particular models and theories of political behaviour and political outcomes requires rethinking. Political parties are not just shaped by constitutions but actively shaped and reshaped by them. Clearly, further investigation into political parties' interactions with amendment structures and other political variables is necessary. An understanding of how constitutional change reflects changing preferences or political opportunities is a first step towards a fuller appreciation of how modern political parties impact the organization and operation of politics. However, even for such inquiry, the origins of the mechanisms by which constitutions change cannot be divorced, original rules governing change—which have likely been shaped by parties and the party system.

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Appendix I: Formal Amendment Rules in Selected Countries

Country	Legislative decision(s)	Referendum and/or ratification	Comments
Australia (federation)	- Lower house 1/2 - Upper house 1/2	Majority (1/2+)	Constitutional amendment must secure the support of a majority of the whole electorate and majorities in a majority of states (i.e. in 4 of 6 states).
Austria (federation)	- Lower house 2/3	(Referendum threat)	Referendum if claimed by more than 1/3 of lower *or* upper house Separate procedure for "total revision" (referendum required)
Belgium (federation)	- Pre-election declaration of revision (by federal legislative power) - Post-election lower 2/3 - Post-election upper 2/3		
Denmark	- Pre-election 1/2 - Post-election 1/2	Majority (1/2+)	Referendum majority more than 40 % of electorate
Estonia	- First vote 1/2 - Second vote 3/5	(Selected articles only)	Referendum required to amend important articles (e.g. general provisions). 3/5 in parliament to call referendum Urgency: single decision with 4/5 majority
Finland	- Pre-election 1/2 - Post-election 2/3		Urgency: single decision with 5/6 majority
France	Either (I) - Lower house 1/2 - Upper house 1/2 or (II) - Parliament 3/5	Majority (if Procedure I)	No referendum if president decides to submit proposed amendment to parliament convened in congress (i.e. Procedure II) The republican form of government is not subject to amendment.
Germany (federation)	- Lower house 2/3 - Upper house 2/3		Some articles of the constitution cannot be amended (e.g. division of federation into states)
Greece	- Pre-election 3/5 twice - Post-election 1/2		The pre-election decisions should be separated by at least one month. Reversed majority requirements possible (i.e. absolute majorities before election and 3/5 majority after election) Some articles of the constitution cannot be amended (e.g. the basic form of government)

(continued)

(continued)

Country	Legislative decision(s)	Referendum and/or ratification	Comments
Iceland	- Pre-election 1/2 - Post-election 1/2 - Consent by president	(Selected articles only)	Referendum required to change the status of the church
Ireland	- Lower house 1/2 - Upper house 1/2	Majority 1/2	
Italy	Either (I) - Lower house 1/2 twice - Upper house 1/2 twice or (II) - Lower house 1/2 and 2/3 - Upper house 1/2 and 2/3	(Referendum threat if Procedure I)	Referendum according to Procedure I (absolute majority—but less than two-thirds—in second vote in the chambers) if claimed by (1) 1/5 of members of either chamber (2) 500.000 electors or (3) at least five regional councils
Japan	- Lower house 2/3 - Upper house 2/3	Majority	Referendum requirement: "the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon"
Latvia	- 2/3 majority in *three* readings	(Selected articles only)	Referendum required to amend important articles (e.g. general provisions)
Lithuania	- First vote 2/3 - Second vote 2/3	(Selected articles only)	Referendum required to amend important articles (in which ¾ of electorate support the amendment) Delay of at least 3 months between decisions in parliament
Luxembourg	- Pre-election 1/2 - Post-election 2/3		
Netherlands	- Pre-election lower 1/2 - Pre-election upper 1/2 - Post-election lower 2/3 - Post-election upper 2/3		Ratification by king required
New Zealand	- Majority vote (1/2)	(Majority)	Confirmation in referendum expected or customary if the amendment is considered sufficiently important
Norway	- Pre-election proposal by MPs (no decision) - Post-election 2/3 (closed rule)		Delay, but single decision in parliament
Portugal	- Parliament 2/3		Some limits on revision of substance of the constitution specified in Article 288.

(continued)

(continued)

Country	Legislative decision(s)	Referendum and/or ratification	Comments
Spain	Either (I) - Lower house 3/5 - Upper house 3/5 or (II) - Lower house 2/3 - Upper house 1/2	(Referendum threat)	Referendum if claimed by more than 1/10 of the members of either chamber Separate procedure for total revision (i.e. 2/3 majority in each chamber, dissolution, 2/3 majority in both chambers, and ratification by referendum) Absolute majority required in the Senate according to Procedure II
Sweden	- Pre-election 1/2 - Post-election 1/2	(Referendum threat)	Referendum if claimed by more than 1/3 of MPs
Switzerland (federation)	- Lower house 1/2 - Upper house 1/2	Majority (1/2+)	In referendum, majority of votes nationwide as well as majority support in a majority of Cantons
United States (federation)	Either (I) - Lower house 2/3 - Upper house 2/3 or (II) - Constitutional convention (called by 2/3 of the states)	Ratification by ¾ of the states	Procedure II has never been used.

Notes Key to table: Simple or absolute majority = 1/2; qualified majorities indicated by 3/5, 2/3, 4/5, etc. *Sources* Formal constitutions (www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law), Taube 2001, and Rasch 1995

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Chapter 12
The Change of Party–State Relations in Advanced Democracies: A Party–Specific Development or Broader Societal Trend?

Nicole Bolleyer

Abstract This chapter discusses the literature on parties in advanced democracies and develops three arguments. First, we need to move beyond a conceptualization of parties as citizen representatives and more systematically consider which functions parties as organizations fulfill when 'running the state,' a task that is keeping party elites increasingly busy. This allows us to assess whether party government handles the 'functional' challenges linked to governing better or worse than alternative models, such as expert government, which is increasingly prominent in the debate. Second, it is argued that observing symptoms of organizational decline of mainstream parties is in itself insufficient to conclude that the presence of an extra-parliamentary organization is not longer crucial to assure parties' long-term success in an increasingly volatile electoral market. The study of organizationally new parties that faced the decision to invest resources in an organizational infrastructure over the last decades opens a window of opportunity to examine whether the mechanisms linked to the mass party model are really outdated as often claimed. Finally, the chapter raises the most fundamental question, namely whether indications of party change, especially intensifying party–state interpenetration, form part of a broader societal development that concerns voluntary organizations more generally or whether they are party-specific.

Keywords Party-state relations · Party cartelization · Party organization · New parties · Party decline

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12.1 Introduction[1]

Parties in advanced democracies are not what they once were. Yet, while change has been identified on different levels or in different arenas, debates are ongoing about the *extent of change* (how much have parties changed?), its *nature* (do we see a qualitative shift more appropriately described as a transformation?), and its *direction* (are parties in decline or is their weakening in the societal sphere compensated by their strengthening in the institutional sphere, which might be best described as a reconfiguration?). Rather than making the attempt to answer these questions, I will try to identify some of the conceptual and methodological constraints that shape the way existing research on political parties in advanced democracies has been conducted. It is those constraints that created systematic caveats in the literature, which, in turn, make it difficult to resolve the above disagreements.

Thus, rather than trying to provide answers based on existing research, this chapter develops three arguments that might deserve to be targeted by future research more than done so far. First, in order to arrive at a sound evaluation of the implications of party change, we need to move beyond a conceptualization of parties as representatives of citizen preferences and the functions attached to this role as closely associated with the theory of party government. We need to conceptualize and more systematically consider which functions parties as organizations fulfill when 'running the state,' a task that—according to the existing literature—is keeping party elites increasingly busy.[2] This reorientation allows us to assess whether parties handle these 'functional' challenges better or worse than alternative models, such as government by experts which is increasingly prominent in the academic and public discourse. This might lead to a less gloomy assessment of the future of 'party government' than often found in the debate (Mair 2007). Second, I will argue that observing symptoms of organizational decline (Poguntke 2002a; Biezen et al. 2011) is in itself insufficient to conclude that the presence of an institutionalized extra-parliamentary organization is not longer crucial to assure parties' longevity and long-term success in an electoral market increasingly characterized by high levels of volatility.[3] To examine this implicit assumption is important to judge to which extent

[1] This chapter was supposed to be a co-authored piece with Peter Mair. Sadly, Peter died unexpectedly in August 2011, and we never made it beyond a brief discussion of which issues we would like to raise and the submission of an initial chapter abstract. While this chapter starts out from this initial abstract, it developed into an elaboration of some central ideas in Peter's work.

[2] See on the reorientation of party elites toward the state, for instance, Kirchheimer 1966; Katz and Mair 1995, 2009; Pierre et al. 2000; Blondel 2002; Poguntke 2002a Biezen 2003; Biezen and Kopecký 2008; Biezen et al. 2011; Kopecký et al. 2012.

[3] See on the changing environments parties have to operate in and the challenges related to this, for instance, Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Dalton 2003; Farrell 2006; Webb et al. 2002.

party elites can afford to neglect party organization as a 'stabilizing mechanism', which, in turn, has implications for whether the current trends are likely to continue and their likely repercussions. The study of organizationally new parties that faced the decision to invest resources in an organizational infrastructure over the last decades opens a window of opportunity to examine whether the organizational mechanisms linked to the mass party model are really as outdated as often claimed.

In a concluding section, the chapter raises the most fundamental question, namely whether indications of party change (however they ought to be evaluated), especially intensifying party–state interpenetration, form part of a broader societal development that concern voluntary organizations more generally or whether they are party-specific, that is, a consequence of the special role political parties plays in modern democracies and is best understood as 'self-inflicted' by party elites' self-interested, strategic choices. On a more abstract level, it raises the question whether the theory of party cartelization developed by Katz and Mair (1995, 2009) might provide the foundation for a much broader theoretical framework on the cartelization of voluntary organizations in advanced democracies.

12.2 The Change of Parties as Organizational Actors: Symptoms of Decline

It has been argued that parties as representatives of citizens' preferences (that are forced to operate in increasingly individualized societies) are in decline in their linkage and representative functions and therefore risk to be replaced by more issue-specific or participatory organizations serving citizens better (Lawson and Merkl 1988). More particularly, the importance of a traditional membership organization for parties' success in contemporary democracies is questioned. This finds reflection in notions of the catch-all party (Kirchheimer 1966), the cartel party (Katz and Mair 1995, 2009), or parties as franchise systems (Carty 2004), party models that are considered to capture the nature of contemporary political parties more convincingly than the traditional mass party model. Similarly, notions such as the 'business firm model of party organization' (Hopkins and Paolucci 1999) or conceptualizations of parties as networks (Koger et al. 2009) challenge traditional assumptions that link the setup of a traditional membership organization to a party's capacity to achieve its goals (Epstein 1980: 233; see also Eldersveld 1964). These arguments have various empirical starting points: the traditionally weak US parties or new parties in old democracies, most notably the former *Forza Italia* (2009 it merged into the *Popolo della Libertà*) which, initially, had virtually no infrastructure and relied predominantly on the provision of selective, material incentives (McCarthy 1996), a case I will return to below.

At the same time, these arguments form a response to broader trends in the changing nature of established parties in advanced democracies. Research on party change points to the decreasing incentives and increasing costs for party leaders in

modern democracies of recruiting and retaining members (e.g., Katz and Mair 1994, 1997). With party membership being in decline (Biezen et al. 2011), with parties being increasingly dependent on state resources to finance costly campaigns, devaluing the contributions of members (Katz and Mair 1995, 2009; Biezen and Kopecký 2008) and with party elites increasingly relying on professional advisors to run campaigns (Scarrow 1996; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Webb et al. 2002; Farrell 2006), the centrality of party organization for party success in the electoral and institutional arena might have become a thing of the past. Janda and Colman (1998: 631–632) found—using data from the late 1950s and early 1960s—that party organizational features such as organizational centralization or member involvement support party performance in terms of electoral success, legislative cohesion, and breadth of party activities (see also Harmel et al. 1995). However, the authors immediately concede that this might not longer be the case. Their concluding remarks echo the contested status of party organization in contemporary democracies:

> These findings on party organization and performance reflect arguments in Duverger's *Political Parties*. This is with good reason since the data come from the 'Golden Age' of political parties – the time of his writing. (…) Whether or not such findings would hold today is questionable. Presumably if parties have moved more toward 'electoral professional' or 'cartel party' models, the more society-oriented variables of involvement and breadth of activities would diminish in significance while complexity[4] and electoral success might increase. (Janda and Colman 1998: 632)

Yet even if parties care less and less about their membership organization and their ties to society more generally weaken (Biezen et al. 2011) and increasingly diverge from Duverger's (1959) classical mass party model, this development, in itself, does not mean that parties are—overall—in decline and party government is under threat, for instance, of being replaced by alternative models such as expert government. There is little doubt that parties have lost popularity in advanced democracies, especially when compared to more 'neutral' institutions such as the judiciary (Dalton and Weldon 2005; Mair 2005). Simultaneously, the creation of independent, regulatory bodies to assure depoliticized decision making has become popular, a trend reinforced in democracies where parties and politicians have been involved in various scandals such as in the UK (Flinders 2009). Nonetheless, to assess these developments' consequences for the future of parties, we need to know *how parties operate in government*. Since most of the existing literature has naturally assumed that parties ought to represent citizen preferences and ought to implement them once in government, which *characteristics allow parties to cope with the functional pressures of government* has been rarely looked at.

[4] Complexity denotes 'the complexity of regularized procedures for coordinating the efforts of party supporters in executing the party's strategies and tactics.' (Janda and Colman 1998: 618).

12.2.1 Decline or Reorientation? from Parties as Representatives to Parties as Governors

While it is widely accepted that political parties fulfill crucial functions in advanced democracies, the normative expectations that underpin our idea of 'party functions' naturally shapes our evaluations of the change in parties or in interparty relations that we observe in advanced democracies over the last decades. The debate has so far mainly focused on parties' weakening representative functions and its consequences for the viability of party government (Mair 2005, 2007). This is because—despite a turn toward studying party–state (rather than predominantly party–society) relations as initiated by Katz and Mair (1995)—party research still adheres to the traditional perspective on parties as representatives. It conceptualizes parties as vehicles for citizen representation rather than decision-making organizations, which explains why empirical studies analyzing parties as governmental actors are still rare (Cansino 1995: 124; Blondel 1995: 128–129; Strøm et al. 2003).

'Those who step aboard the ship of state find that they are subject to powerful currents, and are not taking command of a passive or easily maneuvered vessel' (Rose 1984: 14). Richard Rose reminds us to take seriously the challenges and constraints generated by government that confront parties when taking over office. Thinking about the functions of political parties in advanced democracies, the quotation implies a different yardstick along which to evaluate the role of parties. This yardstick is quite distinct from one that starts out from the policy preferences of voters and asks whether parties implement policies in line with those or not. If governing is difficult in functional terms, the question is not only whether parties are responsive or responsible and choose to make policies reflecting their manifestos once in power (including all the complications of coalition government, see on this Bergman and Müller in this volume). We also need to ask how parties as organizations and collective actors handle the basic challenges to run government in the first place.

When it comes to policy making, the core of 'governing' which is thought to keep parties increasingly busy, leading scholars consider parties as replaceable by specialized agencies and experts (Sartori 2005: 27–28; Mair 2005). A party is depicted 'as an agency which plans and carries out *a policy* at the governmental level' (Sartori 2005: 24). Administrative and policy studies, however, stress that 'carrying out a policy' is much less the point than coping with the increasing need to deal with interdependencies and spillover effects across policy issues and areas (e.g., Verhoest et al. 2007). Intensified by the growing scope of government activities, parties face the need to simultaneously handle a variety of interdependent policies within an internally differentiated government apparatus composed of functionally specific as well as generalist jurisdictions. Thus, we need to conceptualize a party's role in the light of citizen expectations as well as consider the functional requirements associated with party government—defined as the capacity of parties to translate the possession of the highest formal offices of a political regime into *operational* control of government (Rose 1969: 413).

Irrespective of whether parties assure policy making in line with citizen preferences, party linkages facilitate communication and coordination between the different decision-making arenas a government apparatus is composed of. Different from expert government- or candidate-centered politics, party government helps public office holders to cope with intensifying coordination pressures. To capture parties' role when engaged in 'governing' (rather than 'representing' or 'legislating'), Lawson (1980: 3) conceptualized parties as agencies which set up linkages, a mediating process connecting citizens and policy makers. Schwartz (2005: 48) further emphasized the importance of linkages between party subunits. Similarly, Peters (2006: 1081) argues in an article on Belgium that parties are indispensible to establish 'cohesion' in this highly fragmented governance system. Parties counteract fragmentation and reduce complexity. They integrate government processes irrespective of functional divides generated by increasing specialization and functional differentiation, a party function that is often overlooked, although Sjöblom (1987: 176) has rightly emphasized that the capacity to counteract specialization by coordinating across policies is a main function of parties.

More specifically, party linkages capture a shared organizational affiliation between office holders, connections rooted in office holders' belonging to and common socialization within a membership organization that also operates outside public institutions and thereby creates connections between its office-holding members that cross-cut functional divides. Being forced to run elections across a wider range of issues, party politicians need to adopt a generalist outlook, which in itself, once occupying government posts, facilitates communication and coordination between decision-making arenas. A shared organizational affiliation is expected to support these processes, even at times when actors' opinions on the specific policies at stake differ. Specialists, in contrast, tend to reinforce complexity by emphasizing the commonality of expertise shared by small circles without providing incentives to maintain communication across such specialist circles. This is why parties as organizations can assure policy integration, defined as the systematic interconnectedness of processes within and across policy fields (policy fields that one or different layers of government can be in charge of depending on the type of system we look at)[5]. Such policy integration is essential to counter the fragmentation inherent in increasingly complex decision-making processes.

At the same time, however, we should not equate 'integration' with increased efficiency since the integration of different decision-making arenas can also facilitate competition or transfer conflict from one arena to the other. Looking at *inter*governmental policy coordination between regional governments in federal

[5] Looking at integration within the same policy field, the question is whether and how the political-level and the administrative level are linked and interact (Peters 1998). As far as integration across policy fields is concerned, it is crucial whether actors operating in a policy field (who might belong to the same or different government units) are informed about, can be affected by and respond to processes in other policy fields or whether processes in different policy fields evolve in isolation (Metcalfe 1994).

systems—particularly complex and fragmented institutional settings—as one empirical example, we see that policy integration through party linkages supports efficient coordination only under certain conditions and that it can have contradictory effects depending on the arena we focus on. Party linkages integrate different departments within regional governments in Switzerland as they do in Canada, while *intra*governmental integration is much tighter in Canada where parties are more disciplined, party systems less fragmented and the formation of one-party governments the norm. Moving on to the implications of the latter configuration for *inter*governmental policy coordination instead, the irony of the Swiss case is that party linkages can facilitate *inter*governmental coordination because party ideological differences are muted through interparty compromise struck in oversized regional executives. In Canada, in contrast, policy integration facilitates the channeling of conflicts across different policy-specific, *inter*governmental arenas handled by ministers embedded in internally integrated majoritarian one-party governments governed by rivaling parties, resulting in a weakening of coordination in the intergovernmental arena overall (Bolleyer 2011).

The differentiated effects of party linkages revealed by this example lead to a broader point. While party linkages might have integrative implications and sometimes increase coordination efficiency, this observation is unrelated to a clear party mandate which is linked to a normative standard derived from parties' role as representatives. The latter presupposes the capacity of a party to implement those policies promised in its manifesto and thereby to effectively represent citizen preferences, which is usually considered as the essence of party government (Katz 1987). Due to the constant need for interparty compromises, the match between individual party programs and government action is likely to be limited in systems run by oversized coalition governments as the case in Switzerland. The integration of policy across sectors and issues (as a functional demand in government to which party organization responds) is unrelated to the congruence between government policy and party programs though. In Switzerland, parties tend to be more effective as decision-making organizations when it comes to *inter*governmental coordination because executives rest on ideological compromises and the immediate link to citizens is weak, which clashes with conventional definitions of party government. Within Canadian one-party governments, policy integration and 'partyness' seem more in line. Yet, while this constellation tightly integrates *intra*governmental processes and facilitates coordination within individual governments, it complicates *inter*governmental relations between the same governments. (Similar contradictions emerge when rivaling parties need to govern together in post-electoral coalitions as developed in the chapter by Bergman and Müller in this volume).

Future work on party government and the assessment of the challenges parties are confronted with in advanced democracies needs to go beyond parties' political role as citizen representatives and the 'mandate theory' underpinning it. Party functions linked to representing citizens and to governing need to be analytically distinguished since they refer to different perspectives on parties, to parties as vehicles for citizen demands or as decision-making organizations (Cansino 1995:

124; Blondel 1995: 128–129). When operating in complex environments and addressing multiple functions simultaneously, these two roles of parties might conflict, and the conditions helping a party to meet the demands of the former role might weaken its capacity to meet the latter. While conflicts have been highlighted between strategies through which parties pursue their various political goals such as maximizing votes and accessing government (Müller and Strøm 1999), they have received less attention between political and merely 'functional' roles. The latter deserve more attention not only because parties' ties to society weaken as stressed in the literature. If citizens indeed increasingly oppose partisan and politicized government, they might care more about effective governing rather than the realization of ideological convictions. To fully recognize parties' contribution to governing might not necessarily compensate for their declining representative capacity in terms of legitimacy.[6] Citizens might not be satisfied with a 'functional underpinning' of party government alone. But we still need to know to which extent contemporary party government can be justified in mere functional terms. To answer this question, future research needs to more evenly examine the full range of party functions and explore whether and how parties' capacity to operate in government is affected by the various symptoms of organizational decline.

12.3 Changes on the Party System Level: What New Parties can Tell us About (Old) Party Decline

'Organization' might help a party to function *within* public institutions, which is easily overlooked as long as we focus on symptoms of organizational decline outside institutions, a focus again echoing a conception of parties as citizen representatives. The traditional mass party model stressed the importance of an institutionalized, extra-parliamentary organization able to maintain a loyal support base for party survival and success (Duverger 1959), Nowadays, other factors are considered increasingly important, for instance, a popular leader, the availability of professional, full-time staff and the skillful exploitation of modern campaign techniques (Farrell 2006). Yet, observing such development is in itself insufficient to evaluate whether the presence of an institutionalized extra-parliamentary organization is still crucial to assure parties' longevity or not. When studying old parties in old, consolidated party systems that institutionalized decades ago (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Panebianco 1988), the relative importance of having an institutionalized organization is difficult to judge and with it, the consequences of the

[6] Similarly, van Biezen (2012) suggests that parties' increasing constitutionalization might be an attempt to legitimize parties in face of their weakening representative capacities.

latter's decline. The core parties in advanced democracies (leaving Italy aside[7]) have been around for decades. Their ongoing capacity to defend a niche in the national party system and their past ability to institutionalize and thereby form a self-sufficient organization able to renew its leadership (Panebianco 1988) are only rarely perceived as a puzzle. While the electoral gains and losses of established parties are a frequent theme in cross-national electoral research, *organizational persistence* (i.e., the ongoing participation in elections) and *sustainability* on the national level (i.e., ongoing parliamentary representation) tend to be taken for granted. Unlike the human life cycle, the longer a party is around, the less its death is expected. At the same time, studies tend to focus on parties that form part of the national parliamentary party system, which means scholars often lose interest in parties once they leave the national stage, although they might persist on the regional or local level for longer periods (Pedersen 1982). Focusing on the core parties in a system, organizational persistence becomes visible *through* parties' electoral sustainability. And since most established parties in advanced democracies do not only persist but also maintained national representation for many decades, both can be taken as a given.

New parties do not possess either characteristic, yet what we assume in the study of established parties seems to have affected the study of new parties, even though these assumptions do not necessarily travel well. Looking at the full range of new parties, persistence is indeed the exception, not the rule and the younger a new party is, the more vulnerable it can be considered to be. Still—our thinking about new parties is shaped by our thinking about old parties—as long as a party is young, we are tempted to consider it as ephemeral, when a (formerly) new party has been around a few decades, we consider its presence as natural. This is why, similar to the study of old parties, we know a lot about determinants of relative electoral success of new parties but more fundamental questions about the sources of persistence and sustainability and how the two dimension link remain unanswered. In analytical terms, the newness of parties in old party systems pushes us 'backwards' and facing the persistence of some and the decline of others leads to the question why some of them stay around and mature, while others do not. This is why the study of *organizationally new parties that break into consolidated party systems* opens a window of opportunity by providing a critical test of whether the long-term investment of building an institutionalized organization inside and outside public office is still a worthwhile enterprise in advanced democracies, a claim that is increasingly questioned in the broader party literature but is hard to examine without moving beyond old parties themselves.

Similar to the decline in party membership or parties' dependence on state resources, the rise and lasting success of new parties has been interpreted as a symptom of (old) party decline, in a range of countries leading to party system change and altered patterns of coalition formation characterized by an increasing flexibility in coalition formation (Ignazi 1996; Mair 1997; Müller and Strøm 2000).

[7] See for analyses of the Italian case Bardi (1996, 2006).

By now we find an impressive literature on these phenomena, with a particular focus on new green and new right-wing parties that have been the most successful new party families (Poguntke 2002b; Mudde 2007).[8] Four decades after the first new left or new environmental parties started to enter national parliaments followed a bit later by an increasing number of new right or new anti-immigrant parties, the study of new parties' long-term performance and their evolution in the context of consolidated party systems now allows us to get a better sense of whether the formation of an extra-parliamentary structure is indeed crucial to a new party's consolidation in advanced democracies. This, in turn, gives us a better foundation to evaluate the (relative) organizational decline we observe in old parties.

New parties usually start out with few financial resources at their disposal and few material incentives to distribute to followers. This scarcity makes them particularly dependent on non-material benefits that can be generated, in the short run, by a charismatic leader, yet once a less appealing leader is in charge, need to be generated organizationally (Wilson 1973). It is telling that even Forza Italia initially considered as the prototype of a 'virtual party' or 'business model or party organization' (McCarthy 1996; Hopkin and Paolucci 1999) built up local structures after having suffered various electoral defeats on the subnational level (Poli 2001; Pasquino 2003). When the party started out, it had little grassroots presence and was heavily reliant on its leader, Silvio Berlusconi and the resources provided by his corporation Fininvest. Back then, Fininvest formed FI's organizational core and was indistinguishable from the party itself. Later on, however, the party built up a membership organization including hundred thousands of members and several thousand ambitious office holders. It established itself as an 'organized' and 'entrenched' party (Pasquino 2003: 207).[9] This is particularly noticeable because it happened despite the new party's strong position in the restructured Italian party system, its superior financial resources and media access, privileges hardly any organizationally new party ever enjoys in advanced democracies. Such a development in a party, whose access to material resources has been vast, hints toward considerable pressure to complement the provision of selective incentives with an infra-structure able to provide (non-material) collective incentives to be viable in the long run. Even for a party with plenty of resources, organization seems to provide something money cannot buy, although campaigns become increasingly professionalized and costly and the impact of short-term advertising on voting behavior is growing (e.g., Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Webb et al. 2002; Dalton 2003; Farrell 2006).

[8] Recognizing the importance of the rise of new parties in advanced democracies, we find a wide range of insightful comparative studies focusing either on the evolution of particular party families (e.g., Kitschelt 1989, 1990; Poguntke 2002b; Ignazi 2003; Mudde 2007; Art 2011) or on cross-national patterns of new party emergence, entry and performance (e.g., Mair 1999; Hug 2001; Abedi 2004; Tavits 2006; Deschouwer 2008; Meguid 2008).

[9] In how far this is enough to keep the party going in the longer term, remains to be seen.

A cross-national study of 140 organizationally new parties entering national parliaments across 17 democracies echoes the importance of party building and institutionalization for parties' long-term survival and success (Bolleyer 2013). A majority of these new parties[10]—themselves a small subsection of new parties that entered electoral contests—stayed in national parliament only relatively brief periods and more than 40 % of them were inactive by the end of 2011. Institutionalization is no natural process that party elites necessarily invest in. A considerable range of fairly long-lived new parties is run by ambitious individuals whose time horizons do not transcend their own political careers and who see little reason to invest in a lasting extra-parliamentary structure. Crudely put, institutionalization through building a membership organization able to generate organizational loyalty is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for persistence or sustainability, nor is it necessarily aspired by party founders. However, this qualification does not mean that the formation of an institutionalized membership organization does not pay off for those party founders who want to see their parties outlive their own careers and form a lasting part and established force in the political landscape (Bolleyer et al. 2012). Ironically, some of the (along several yardsticks[11]) most successful new right parties—a party family that long had the reputation to be run by charismatic leaders with little infrastructure around them—such as the Norwegian Progress Party or the French Front National have deliberately emulated organizational strategies of mass parties at the other end of the ideological spectrum. And unlike those parties that relied on leadership-oriented loyalty throughout their careers and died with their founders, they outlived the founding generation, which constitutes a fundamental challenge for most new parties, especially those whose leaders do not bother investing in building an infrastructure outside public institutions. Similarly, while the rotation of core party offices was an in-built mechanism of Green party organization that prevented them from relying too strongly on leadership-oriented loyalty, they were pushed to reform their often very permeable organizational boundaries and adopt more selective recruitment strategies on the level of both membership and office aspirants to increase followers' commitment to the organization as such. They as well moved—although often unwillingly—toward a more conventional, institutionalized membership organization.

To conclude, extra-parliamentary institutionalization that generates an emotional affiliation of followers to the party and thereby an interest in the organization's

[10] Following Mair (1999) newness was defined as organizational newness, not as ideological or programmatic newness. Parties qualified as new if their organizational foundation took place in or after 1968 and if they a) were built from scratch ('newly born'), b) if they were mergers in which newly born parties participated, or c) if they were minor splits from old parties. All of them faced or still face the challenge to build a viable infrastructure and stabilize support while operating in increasingly volatile contexts (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Mair 1997), which complicate the setup or reliable ties to members and voters(see for details Bolleyer 2013)

[11] Possible yardsticks for party success are national vote shares, seat shares, repeated parliamentary access and government participation.

survival (Panebianco 1988) is no precondition for (new) party long-term success in advanced democracies (as far as a 30-year period qualifies as 'long'). Yet, it seems essential for an organization to renew its leadership, which allows a party to maintain its niche *beyond* individual political careers and thereby to form a lasting part of the party system. This has important repercussions for the assessment of old parties that built an institutionalized organization many decades ago. They might show signs of organizational decline. Yet, since they institutionalized in the first place, this decline remains relative. Consequently, basic, structural mechanisms associated with the mass party cannot be generally dismissed as unimportant factor for party survival or success. After all, (still) having an institutionalized organization allows us to start out from the assumption that core parties in advanced democracies are 'stable' in the first place.

12.4 Party Cartelization: Party-Specific Development or Broader Societal Trend?

In the concluding section of this chapter, we shift the perspective away from the direct repercussions of party change for parties themselves and assess its parties' broader foundations. Is party change—particularly its parties' 'movement to the state' (Katz and Mair 2009)—a party-specific phenomenon or should it be approached as part of a broader, societal process? The very prominent conception of parties as public utilities was initially introduced by Epstein (1989)[12] to characterize the changing nature of US parties and further developed by Biezen (2004) to theorize two trends in Western democracies, the increasing dependence of parties on state resources and their increasing regulation by the state (see also Biezen 2012). Returning to Epstein's (1989: 156) original argument, he observed that the 'statutory treatment of certain business enterprises as public utilities' resembles state regulations of parties and described parties' current nature as 'public utilities' in the following way:

> (…) an agency performing a service in which the public has a special interest sufficient to justify governmental regulatory control, along with the extension of legal privileges, but not governmental ownership or management of all the agency's activities (Epstein 1989: 157).

Reviewing the literature dealing with voluntary organizations[13] more generally, specialists point to 'their' organizations' entanglement with the state. Not only do

[12] The book was published first in 1980.

[13] Core characteristics of membership groups relevant to this discussion are those with a formal organization including a formal, mostly voluntary, membership that pays regular subscriptions, a (not necessarily exclusive) orientation toward the provision of a collective good (either accessible by/beneficial to the members only or the public as a whole), which are run with the involvement of volunteers (even though the intensity and type of involvement can vary widely). They are further non-profit-seeking and non-governmental.

party scholars argue that parties transform from voluntary associations embedded in society into 'public utilities,' 'semi-public agencies' (Epstein 1989; Biezen 2004, 2011), or even 'state institutions' (Katz and Mair 2009). Interest group experts observe the transformation of environmental advocacy groups into 'protest businesses' that increasingly compete for state resources and are less and less driven by their activist base (Jordan and Maloney 1997, 2007). Public policy scholars, welfare state experts, and civil society scholars discuss the transformation of voluntary associations driven by volunteers into 'voluntary agencies' driven by professional staff oriented toward service provision on behalf of the state (Billis 2010; DiMaggio and Anheier 1990; Hasenfeld and Gidron 2005). Finally, looking into comparative law, O'Halloran (2011) observed in reforms of charity law that governments increasingly specify which organizations ought to receive funds and how those ought to use public funds, strengthening organizations' accountability to the state. These remarkably parallel trends have created concerns among scholars since increasing state control of organizational life is associated with the latter's detachment from society, although it is far from clear how these two developments are connected, whether one triggers the other or whether they simply coexist. Yet due to disciplinary divides insights in different organizations' relationship to the state have so far remained disconnected.

But let us return to the party literature first. Kirchheimer (1966: 190) pointed out as early as the 1960s that the transformation of parties (e.g., their increasing dependence on state funding) is triggered by 'present conditions of spreading secular and mass consumer-goods orientation, with shifting and less obtrusive class lines' putting 'parties under pressure to become catch-all people's parties,' that is, parties that are less strongly rooted in particular groups in society and deliberately diversify and broaden their support base. This perspective suggests that party change should be read as a response to societal change rooted, for instance, in the decline of group affiliations, which complicates the life for voluntary organizations. Voluntary organizations—in contrast to firms or government agencies—depend on the resource input and loyalty of mass members (Knoke 1988: 312), members that, by definition, can exit the organization any time they want (Wilson 1973).[14] Linking this to Kirchheimer's work, we see that the challenge of self-maintenance that voluntary organizations struggle with by their very nature intensifies the more individualized societies become. Thus, the less citizens perceive themselves as part of pre-defined groups, the less stable the underpinnings for voluntary organizations such as parties. The state can be seen as a resource provider filling the growing gap (Biezen 2004, 2012).

If societal change is indeed a major driving force, it is plausible to expect that the same pressures that trigger party change shape other types of voluntary organizations as well. Consequently, they should over time develop tendencies associated with the 'cartel party model'. If, instead, the change of parties is a result

[14] While employers can exit firms (Hirschman 1970), the decision to change employer is more consequential than leaving a voluntary organization to join another.

of a strategic collusion of political elites themselves, a behavior rooted in parties' particularly close association with the state, such tendencies should affect organizations less whose activities are more 'removed' from the state, for instance, groups that try to influence policy making (e.g., interest and advocacy groups) or organizations involved in welfare provision. Clearly, what makes parties special is that their representatives in public office (at least those of the major parties) decide on the finance regime for political parties and eligibility requirements to access these resources themselves.[15] They define the level of regulatory control the 'state' (in which their representatives occupy core positions) exercises over parties operating in the system (Katz and Mair 2009). The self-referential nature of this process is different from the situation of interest groups or charities, for instance, organizations that might lobby for the introduction of financial support but are not 'in control' of the eventual decision. This different position in the political process, however, does not mean that the implications of the availability of such subsidies are not similar for different types of voluntary organizations, that is, regarding their relationship with their members, once taking the perspective of organizational elites that need to keep their organization going. Neither is it clear whether one type of organization is more regulated than the other because in one configuration organizations regulate themselves (i.e., parties), while others can only lobby decision-making process from outside. In fact, leading party scholars have argued that parties have become 'legitimate objects of state regulation to a degree far exceeding what would normally be acceptable for private associations in a liberal society' (Katz 2002: 90; see also Biezen 2012). At the same time, voluntary sector studies[16] have pointed to the increasingly intense regulation of welfare-providing voluntary associations' internal and external activities (Billis 2010) and have argued the amount of government control—in regulatory and financial terms—to be stronger than in other areas of organizational life (Kuhnle and Selle 1992).

Comparing these studies and the conclusions they draw, two questions arise: first, whether the regulation of organizational life in democratic states has generally increased (suggesting that the regulation of parties and of other organizations might resemble each other more than usually assumed within the respective subfields); second, to which extent the evolution of voluntary organizations is shaped by their particular function and to which extent we find shared patterns of institutionalization that cross-cut organizational types due their exposure to similar environmental pressures (diMaggio and Powell 1983; diMaggio and Anheier 1990).

[15] In countries such as Australia, Germany, or the Netherlands, parties need to meet requirements in terms of their internal organization.

[16] Depending on the field scholars work in, there are various labels for the group of organizations relevant here such as third sector or voluntary sector organizations or voluntary agencies (e.g., Billis 2010; Cunningham and James 2011). Alternatively, they are called civil society organizations, voluntary associations, or collective action associations (e.g., van Deth 1997; Knoke 1988). Reflecting this pluralism in terms of terminology, there is also disagreement about the exact specification of the universe of relevant groups that count as voluntary organizations and how to distinguish different types (Jordan et al. 2003).

The latter question has been raised frequently in the different specialist literature [see on religions groups Torry (2005), on interest groups Jordan and Maloney (2007); Halpin and Jordan (2012), on voluntary associations providing welfare services Cunningham and James (2011), or on collective voluntary organizations generally Wilson (1973); Knoke (1988)].

Yet, different types of organizations are rarely compared directly, especially in cross-national research. While party research is relatively self-contained, political parties are often conceptually excluded from studies of voluntary organizations (e.g., by adding a criterion excluding organizations that compete for government office) or excluded from the empirical analysis although they meet the basic definition (Salamon and Anheier 1998).[17] Both tendencies are indicative for why only few scholars have so far tried to compare parties to other voluntary organizations rather than treating them as sui generis.[18] Attempts to narrow down the range of relevant groups to be studied in the voluntary sector is understandable and often sensible on pragmatic grounds. Conceptually, this decision is not that obvious, as a range of classical studies suggest (see for instance Hirschman 1970; Wilson 1973).

This division of labor is particularly problematic if other voluntary organizations in advanced democracies become more centralized and professionalized, less participatory, more strongly shaped by state regulation and increasingly dependent on state subsidies, that is, if they 'cartelize' as well (Katz and Mair 2009). Epstein's observation that US parties transform from private associations into 'public utilities' might not only apply to parties more generally (Biezen 2004, 2012), but to other voluntary organizations in advanced democracies as well. This, in turn, would suggest the need to develop a more encompassing, interdisciplinary perspective on state–voluntary relationships (see on this Salamon 1987; Hasenfeld and Gidron 2005).

Looking at various specialist literature substantiates this argument by highlighting a range of parallels in the ways organizations have changed in advanced democracies. Epstein (1989: 158) himself considered the regulation of parties as part of a broader reorientation of government that not only transcended parties but the voluntary sector. He pointed out that the American states began to regulate parties when they (as well as the federal government) began to regulate business enterprises performing special services for the state, and that both processes were driven by the same reform spirit (see for a similar perspective on non-profit organizations Salamon 1987). Not only does this observation suggest that the notion of organizations (or institutions) as public utilities is more broadly applicable than to parties. If regulatory tendencies apply similarly to parties and firms

[17] Examples for this are DiMaggio and Anheier (1990: 138); Jordan et al. (2003: 199).

[18] Jordan and Maloney (1997, 2007) have indicated that successful and longer-lived 'new politics organizations' (e.g., environmental groups) develop over time tendencies similar to parties. They are among the few scholars that have explicitly challenged the widely shared assumption in the social movement literature and sometimes also present in the party literature that these new organizations are fundamentally different from parties in the way they operate.

because both provide public goods, why should they not affect other voluntary organizations that by definition pursue some collective interest and often provide public goods as well such as charities or public benefit organizations?

Indeed, in a recent study, Smith (2011: 203–234) indicated that voluntary agencies in the United States are increasingly dependent on the state and compete for government contracts and with it become subject to government regulation and monitoring in relation to standards of service provision and eligibility requirements. As the elites of different parties are considered to become indistinguishable and to distance themselves from their members in the cartel party literature, '[v]oluntary agencies with government contracts tend to adopt similar internal practices' (Smith 2011: 212) as well. The conflicts resulting from these developments that are accompanied by the increased influence of paid staff at the cost of members parallel the ones pointed at in the party literature, for example, conflicts between professional staff and ideologically committed volunteers mirroring the simultaneous accountability of the organization to its members and the state as provider of funding (Smith 2011: 212–214). When conflicts occur the legal accountability to the state creates considerable pressure, particularly in large voluntary organizations, since the withdrawal of state funding has often a strange impact on the organization's operations than member exit, as long as the latter does not occur on a mass scale (Lansley 1996: 225–226; 235). Or as Cornforth and Spear (2010: 75) put it, there has been a trend in voluntary associations involved in welfare provision to 'commoditize' membership and see it primarily as a source of funding rather than a mechanism for accountability, an observation that parallels observations made by scholars of party change. Both literature at the same time indicate that membership fees become a less important income source, with state subsidies becoming more important (Katz and Mair 2009; Davies 2011).[19] This is even the case in environmental groups, initially hailed as providing a new, less hierarchical and more participatory form of political involvement for citizens. Struggling with high membership turnover, to assure their survival, long-lived environmental organizations started to rely less on membership subscriptions and more on more reliable sources of income such as public subsidies (Jordan and Maloney 1997, 2007; Bosso 2003). Finally, as parties increasingly recruit from the public sector and become entangled with the state in terms of their core personnel (Biezen et al. 2011: 15–16), there is an increasing prevalence of what Clark and Wilding (2011: 49) call 'boundary changers', employees—often at senior management level—moving between the public, private and voluntary sector reflecting 'a closer relationship between a mainstream voluntary sector and other public sector bodies', which 'contributed to changing organisational cultures (…) within the voluntary sector.' While the latter study focuses on the UK, the increasing 'marketization' of welfare provision is a broader trend that intensifies pressures on

[19] Note that organizations in the voluntary or third sector do not necessarily have members, although many do, especially those that are formed bottom-up and grew out of citizen initiatives (Halpin and Jordan 2012).

voluntary organizations to compete for grants, to rely more strongly on staff with managerial experience and adopt private sector practices (Bode 2011).

Observing various parallel developments, both scholars of public administration and scholars of civil society started to discuss to which extent organizations' closer involvement with the state undermines their autonomy, change their internal dynamics, and thereby makes them less responsive to society, that is, organizational members and supporters (e.g., Lansley 1996; van Deth 1997; Cairns et al. 2005; Cornforth and Spear 2010). This discussion directly parallels the concerns party scholars have raised confronted with parties' movement toward the state. Not only do we observe similarities in empirical trends, but also the normative concerns when evaluating these trends correspond to other.

Digging deeper, one wonders which evolutionary logic(s) these processes follow.[20] Some parallel developments (e.g., centralization or professionalization) might simply be an expression of organizational maturity, features which elites of voluntary organizations deliberately adopt to consolidate and assure their organization's survival in an increasingly volatile environment. The literature suggests that new parties that by now managed to consolidate support started to resemble traditional parties, forms of organization they initially opposed (Poguntke 2002b; Bolleyer 2013). The same development has been observed in environmental groups. Initially welcomed as a more participatory alternative to conventional party politics, once organizationally consolidated, these movements had adopted many features of conventional interest groups (Jordan and Maloney 1997, 2007; Bosso 2003). This suggests the relevance of 'life cycle effects' organizations go through (Stinchcombe 1965; Pedersen 1982) that are dependent on the resource input and loyalty of mass members, yet due to the constant exit possibility of its members try to rely on more reliable sources of income, especially in times when the membership of mass organizations is in decline. At the same time, we saw that studies suggest that state subsidies, regulation and monitoring not only reinforce (in large membership organizations possibly 'natural') tendencies toward centralization and professionalization and thereby lead to the assimilation across organizations operating in similar environments. They can push organizations—as already Epstein (1989) indicated—to conduct their internal affairs other than they would choose to, constituting conflicts between internal accountability to members and external accountability to the state (Lansely 1996).

As Biezen et al. (2011: 19) pointed out in a recent piece on party membership, 'the decline of mass organizations is not something that affects parties alone'. To clarify whether different types of voluntary organizations—when operating in similar institutional environments and societal contexts—adapt similar structures or whether their specific organizational origins push them in different directions, we need to conceptualize and measure the incentive structures through which democratic states (through legislation, administrative procedures, or court rulings) might influence the evolution of different types of voluntary organizations (see Gauja 2010 on party

[20] See for distinct logics of party formation and adaptation Biezen (2005).

regulation; see Biezen (2012) on party constitutionalization; Hopt and von Hippel 2010 on non-profit regulation). Once these tasks are dealt with we might realize that parties in advanced democracies are less *sui generis* in their long-term evolution than we often assume.

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Chapter 13
Party Development in the Old World: And in the New

Lars Svåsand

Abstract This chapter discusses how well our understanding of political parties, based on the knowledge and models of political parties in established democracies, can help us to understand political parties in new democracies. Armed with concepts and models from the party literature, party scholars have tried to make sense of the vastly expanded universe of parties in the wake of the third wave of democratization. Are parties and party systems in newer democracies very different from parties in established democracies? And if so, are there commonalities between parties in newer democracies? This chapter revisits the debate on parties and democracy while discussing three related topics (typologies, functions, and contrasts of parties between old and new democracies) within the study of political parties to discuss the extent to which our understanding of political parties in established democracies is adequate when applied to new democracies.

Keywords parties · democratization · democracy

13.1 Introduction[1]

This chapter discusses how well our understanding of political parties, based on the knowledge and models of political parties in established democracies, can help us to understand political parties in new democracies. Armed with concepts and models from the party literature, party scholars have tried to make sense of the vastly expanded universe of parties in the wake of the third wave of

[1] An earlier version of the chapter was presented in the workshop on comparative politics at the Norwegian National Conference in Political Science, Trondheim, January 4–6, 2012. I thank the participants at the workshop for constructive comments.

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democratization. Are parties and party systems in newer democracies very different from parties in established democracies? And if so, are there commonalities between parties in newer democracies?

In this chapter, I first briefly revisit the debate about parties and democracy. On the one hand, political parties are seen to be necessary institutions in democracies, but on the other hand, political parties as they exist are among the least trusted institutions (Dalton and Weldon 2005). This paradox is particularly relevant for the study of new democracies, where many scholars have expressed concern over the status of the parties.

I then turn to three topics in the study of political parties and discuss the extent to which our understanding of political parties in established democracies (Key 1964) is adequate when applied to new democracies. These topics include typologies of parties, the functions of parties, and factors that may explain why parties in new democracies deviate from those in old democracies.

These themes are central in the study of political parties. I argue that these ways to our general understanding of the phenomenon of political parties only partly fit with the new empirical universe of parties in modern democracies. I go on to discuss some explanations that may account for the contrasts between parties in new and established democracies, primarily linked to the environment of parties (electoral administration and regime type). Finally, I return to the question of contrasts by asking whether there is a trend toward convergence between parties in old and new democracies. Arguments in favor of such trends are (a) lack of trust in parties, (b) a narrowing of ideological space, and (c) the importance of informal networks.

Naturally, this exercise is exploratory. There are many approaches that could have been chosen, and the selection of empirical material is more illustrative than meant as empirical tests of hypotheses.

13.2 Political Parties and Democracy

Although it is common to claim that political parties are necessary institutions in a democracy (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002; Lipset 2000), not too long ago, it was equally common to claim that parties represented a form of 'endangered species' of political organization. The perception that political parties were weakening was triggered in 1971 when one of *Washington Post's* most respected journalists, David Broder, published a book entitled *The party is over* (Broder 1972). It became the start of a series of similarly titled volumes all depicting the decline of political parties in the United States, the country where organized political parties in the modern sense had first emerged (Crotty and Jacobson 1980; Everett Carll Ladd 1978; Wattenberg 1984). The view of parties in decline spreads to Europe as well (Daalder 2002; Selle and Svåsand 1991; Webb 1995), but with more reservations and nuances than in the American scenario.

A common approach to analyze the state of political parties is to analyze the functions of parties. I will organize the discussion along the following dimensions

of political parties introduced by Key (1964): parties in the electorate, party organization, and party in public office (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002). The decline of parties has primarily been related to the first two aspects. Parties' linkages to the electorate are characterized by weakening ties between voters and parties, as expressed in declining party identification, increased electoral volatility, and increased impact of the electoral campaign (Dalton et al. 2009). The decline of party organization is primarily one of the shrinking membership (van Biezen et al. 2012), but not necessarily affects other aspects of their organization. The functions of the party in public office, in parliaments (Bowler 2002), or in governments (Strøm 2000) seem resilient against the decline affecting their electoral rooting and mass organization.

But just as Mark Twain dismissed reports of his death as exaggerated, the claimed decline of political parties was soon followed by a revisionist line of publications arguing for the revival of the same parties (Reiter 1989; Sabato 1988). Although voters express less trust in political parties than they have in the past, at the same time, a substantial majority also thinks that parties are necessary in a democracy (Dalton and Weldon 2005). There is a range of non-party-based ways of organizing the political process in democracies (Dalton et al. 2006; Smith 2009), but all of these are *supplementary* alternatives to political parties, not substitutes for them. No one has yet outlined an idea for a democratic political system that can do without political parties. This view of the centrality of political parties for democracy to function is what motivates foreign aid programs to new democracies to include assistance to political parties, although the effects of such programs seem to be limited (Carothers 2006; Rakner and Svåsand 2010).

The idea that parties were a thing of the past was silenced further by the 'third wave of democracy' (Huntington 1991). In the contemporary world, there is only one example of country with at least some democratic characteristics that has been able to do without parties, in a formal sense of the term, Uganda, between 1986 and 2005.

Uganda had, until 2005, what was known as a 'zero-party system' (Kasfir 1999).[2] Although parties were permitted to exist at a formal, registered level, they could not nominate candidates or establish local branches. In other words, parties could exist, but could not carry out any of the core functions associated with the concept of a party. The ban on party activity was legitimized by President Museveni's claim that multiple political parties had caused the collapse of the political, economic, and social order in Uganda after independence. Yet, Uganda was not completely undemocratic. It held regular elections—at five different levels in the political system. Almost one million citizens held some kind of elected office (Kiiza et al. 2008). Elections were competitive in the sense that there were multiple candidates running for the same seat. However, every candidate had to run on his/her 'individual merits.' Eventually, however, this system was

[2] Others, as, for example, Carbone (2003) argued that it was a de facto one-party system.

abandoned in response to domestic factors and international pressure and replaced with a multiparty system (Makara et al. 2009).

In Russia, there is no ban on parties as such, but according to Hale (2007), parties are so insignificant that he titles his book *Why no parties in Russia?* Parties exist in a formal sense, but they are *not meant to be* strong institutions. This, according to Hale, is explained as a rational choice of political entrepreneurs: Access to public office and getting the benefits of office have simply been better served by *substitutes* for parties than by party labels. Hale argues that political actors choose not to be associated with parties when they find that they can be elected without the constraint of running as party candidates. In the 'standard' view of parties, parties are seen as a solution to collective action problems: in getting elected in the first place and in coordinating policy makers in legislatures (Aldrich 1995). Much of the literature on political parties in established democracies sees political parties in this benevolent light: Parties are superior to other forms of winning office and for implementing policies. As a consequence of a long historical development, political parties were institutionalized, that is, they become durable organizations that survived across several elections, independently of the original leaders' values and goals (Panebianco 1988). Institutionalized parties not only facilitate the recruitment of political leaders, but also constrain the same leaders in what they can do (Müller and Strøm 1999). In this respect, many political parties in newer democracies appear to be fundamentally different. Being created from the top, they are not meant to function as institutionalized organizations, as defined above. Rather, many parties in new democracies are vehicles for the individual party leader, who through several means, particularly control of party finances, virtually determines what the party can do or not. Once the leader disappears, there is no 'glue' to keep the party together or ensure its survival.

13.3 Political Parties in New Democracies

The increase in the number of political systems with at least some elements of democratic rule has led to a revival in the study of political parties. This revival has been triggered by the widely shared view in political science that there are many functions that parties perform in a democracy (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002).[3] The transition to some form of democratic regime is only the first step toward democratic consolidation, the point when it is more likely that a democracy will endure than being reversed. Although some transitions away from autocratic forms have resulted in a steady progress toward consolidation, as in the case of Eastern and Central Europe, many other states seem stuck in a gray zone between autocracy and democracy (Carothers 2002), and some states have experienced a reverse to more autocratic rule after a promising start (Diamond 2008).

[3] For critical views on party functions, see King (1969) and Scarrow (1967).

Given the significant role attributed to political parties in a democracy, it has been a concern in studies of new democracies if the parties are able to function as theorists expect them to do. Diamond (2000), for instance, argued that strengthening political parties was a key element in improving democratization in Africa, a view shared by Peeler (1998) who in his summary of ten elements impacting on democratization in Latin America states: 'Party systems that are institutionalized and characterized by moderate pluralism are most conducive to liberal democratic stability' (Peeler 1998: 192).

But some scholars, as, for example, Schmitter, are deeply pessimistic about the developments: 'one of the major reasons that I am so convinced of the basic weakness of parties in these neodemocracies is that *virtually all the difficulties that they have been experiencing are also being experienced by contemporary parties in achaeodemocracies*' (Schmitter 2001: 84).

Polities recently embracing a form of democratic rule do not seem to lack political parties, but rather often the reverse is the problem, as exemplified by the 380 political parties registered for the Congolese parliamentary and presidential elections in November 2011 (http://www.ceni.gouv.cd/partipolitique.aspx?id_parti=498).[4]

Many political parties are not the same as a *well-functioning* party system, as each of the parties is not always well-functioning organizations (Webb and White 2007). Although parties have been mushrooming in many countries, a recurrent problem is that many of the parties have failed to develop into routinized organizations that are able to endure over time. In a routinized party, there will be established—and generally accepted—rules for decision-making, but in many parties in new democracies, the rules are often ignored; the parties have shallow roots in society and are heavily dependent on their leader. Where parties are created from above, primarily as vehicles for their leaders, their programmatic orientation (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007) is weakly developed. As a consequence, the party *system*, as understood as a predictable pattern of cooperation and competition between parties (Mair 1996), is also weakly developed. The combination of lack of individual party institutionalization and weak party system institutionalization does not bode well for democratic consolidation (Randall and Svåsand 2002).

The sheer number of—and variations in—democratic polities expanded the universe of political parties. Given the wider range of geographic, economic, and cultural contexts of new democracies, we should not be surprised to find that our traditional understanding of what constitute parties based on the experience of established democracies is challenged. Given the fact that 'new democracies' cover countries in five different continents, it can hardly be expected that they should display many similarities. Even within a particular geographic region, such as sub-Saharan Africa or Latin America, there are enormous variations in the

[4] Accessed 09.12.2011.

characteristics of political parties and party systems. However, one region seems to stand out: Central and Eastern Europe. After an initial period of fluid party systems with weak institutionalization (Lewis 2000; Wyman et al. 1995), several authors now have pointed out that political parties in the new democracies in that region do not differ substantially from those in the established democracies in terms of ideological orientations, in terms of strength of the respective party families (Bardi et al. 2010; Hlousek and Kopecek 2010), or in terms of organizational style (van Biezen 2005). Democratization, combined with integration of the European Union, seems to have had a 'standardizing' effect on the parties (Pridham 2006).[5]

Applications of standard models of political parties to other parts of the world have met with greater problems. The literature on parties in new democracies has shown that in terms of typologies, parties in new democracies do not fit with standard types. Also, some of the functions associated with political parties in established democracies do not seem to be performed very well in new democracies. In the following sections, I will deal with each of these themes.

13.4 The Typology of Parties

Typologies are used as analytical tools to create some kind of 'order' in a universe. It is recognized that even if a set of objects all conform to the main properties of a concept, many of these objects also contain properties that they share with only some, but not all, of the other objects. The concept of political party is of this nature. Ware, for instance, defines party as 'an institution that (a) seeks influence in a state, often by attempting to occupy positions in government, and (b) usually consists of more than a single interest in the society and so to some degree attempts to "aggregate interests"' (Ware 1996: 8). Each of the elements in the definition contains a range of properties ('institution,' 'seeking influence,' 'interests,' and 'aggregate'). It is this range of qualities that expands that number of objects covered by the concept which therefore encourages the creation of subsets of objects by means of some classification criteria.

In the literature on parties in established democracies, there are two subsets of issues dealing with classification of parties: the use of a *label* to differentiate between parties and the use of an *organizational model* to distinguish between types of parties and party systems across time and space.

It is also necessary to distinguish between the properties of parties, as individual entities, and party systems (i.e., the configurations of parties). In the following section, I am concerned primarily with parties as individual entities.

[5] However, it should be noted that several authors (Bertoa and Mair 2010; Pop-Eleches 2010; Sikk 2005) emphasize lack of party system consolidation as well as variations between countries.

13.4.1 Party Labels

A tool for identifying subsets of parties is to assign political parties to 'party families' (von Beyme 1985; Mair and Mudde 1998). The concept of 'party family' refers primarily to a party's placement on an ideological dimension (usually left–right), but as von Beyme's classification demonstrated, other categories were also needed, such as parties based on ethnic or territorial cleavages.[6] Even with these additional categories, some parties in Western democracies were hard to place, such as the two major Irish parties and the two US parties (Ware 1996: 24–26). Nevertheless, the idea that parties could be distinguished from each other on the basis of an ideological orientation or appeal to a specific economic (e.g., agrarian), ethnic, or territorial segment of the electorate made it possible to classify *most* of the *significant* parties in the polities.

Mair and Mudde (1998: 214–215) identify four ways of assigning parties to party families: (1) the origins and/or sociology of parties, (2) memberships in international party federations, (3) similarities in party policy or party ideology, and (4) classification based on party name or label. Their advice is to use what they call a comprehensive study of ideology to classify parties, including documents such as electoral manifestos but also other publications that reveal the parties' views on principal issues of how society should be governed (Mair and Mudde 1998).

Parties in new democracies seem to differ from old democracies with respect to ideological orientations. For old parties, the criteria of ideology are linked to the *origin* of parties, usually a gradual development of party initiatives responding to some form of cleavage politicization. In new democracies, a multitude of parties often originated almost overnight. Cleavages with corresponding identities are harder to observe. Although formally registered parties that can be classified into one of von Beyme's categories exist in many new democracies, they are *not necessarily significant parties*. The vast *majority of relevant*[7] *parties* outside of the European continent do not easily fit into these categories. An indicator of how the concept of party family fails to include parties in new democracies is to look at membership in the international party federations, such as the Socialist International (SI), the conservative International Democratic Union (IDU), and the Liberal International (LI).[8]

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[6] Von Beyme's (1985: 29–136) categories were (1) liberal and radical parties, (2) conservative parties, (3) socialist and social democratic parties, (4) Christian Democratic parties, (5) communist parties, (6) agrarian parties, (7) regional and ethnic parties, (8) right-wing extremist parties, and (9) ecology movement.

[7] 'Relevant' in the sartorial sense of parties that may impact on government formation, either as a coalition partner or as a party that is able to exercise considerable influence ('blackmail potential') on party competition (Sartori 1976).

[8] Lack of membership in international party organizations could also reflect lack of interest or financial capacity to become members. SI has a list of 32 observer parties that have failed to pay their membership fee. However, there are also incentives for new parties to be included in the organization.

SI has 131 full member parties, of which 26 are from established democracies and 22 from new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe (http://socialistinternational.org/viewArticle.cfm?ArticlePageID=931).[9] With a few exceptions, most of the membership parties from established democracies have a central role in their political system, as governing parties for an extended period of time. Of the member parties from new democracies outside Europe, only a few are—or have been—governing parties, such as the member parties from Chile, Brazil, and South Africa.

A case that illustrates the problem with applying von Beyme's party family concept to new democracies is the category 'regional and ethnic' parties, a group of parties that is explicitly prohibited in a number of new democracies (Bogaards et al. 2010).

It remains to be empirically tested, but for now it seems that the concept of party families, based on ideological categories, or on subgroups of the electorates, does not help us to classify most of the significant parties.

However, it must be admitted that the empirical basis for this assertion is thin, as there are few examples of studies in non-European contexts that examine party manifestos in similar ways as in the Comparative Party Manifesto project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 1994). A case study of Malawi by Mpesi (2011) finds only limited differences in saliency between parties, but no left–right dimension. In a comprehensive study of parties in Latin America, Kitschelt and associates (Kitschelt et al. 2010) find mixed evidence of ideological orientation. Based on surveys among parliamentary members in twelve countries, they find that parties are relatively easy to locate on the left–right dimension, but when analyzing specific issues, party cohesion is much less limited and clearly less so than in Eastern and Central Europe.[10]

This does not mean that all parties in new democracies lack elements that shape *party identity*. One subgroup is probably former liberation movements that have turned themselves, more or less successfully, into political parties, but using the left–right dimension to classify parties does not seem to help very much in creating subgroups of parties.

Another form of classification is based on party organizational characteristics, such as the relationship between members and elites of the parties, between the party organization and the parties' representatives in elected office, and between the parties and their electorates. In the study of established democracies, it has become common to distinguish between the mass party (Duverger 1967), the catch-all party (Kirchheimer 1966), and the cartel party models (Katz and Mair 1995). In trying to cope with the expanding universe of parties in the new democracies, Gunther and Diamond have proposed a typology of fifteen parties

[9] Accessed 14.12.2011.

[10] See also (Colomer and Escatel 2005) who finds that most Latin American voters locate themselves on the left–right dimension, but that many voters are alienated from the party system, indicating a lack of a similar dimension among the parties.

(Gunther and Diamond 2001), based on five main categories, elite parties, mass-based parties, ethnicity-based parties, electoralist parties, and movement parties, each with several sub-categories. The typologies of parties developed in the mainstream party literature are based on a time dimension: One type is being replaced by another as the dominant model of party. The typologies of parties in new democracies usually lack this dimension, for obvious reasons, but try to grapple with a wide range of different types of parties.

Typologies are useful devices for classifying objects in a population, but the analytical use of categories is as independent or dependent variables. Gunther and Diamond (2001), for example, use their categories to understand how the different types of party impact on the parties' ability to perform the functions expected of parties, such as candidate nomination, electoral mobilization, issue structuring, societal representation, interest aggregation, forming and sustaining governments, and social integration (Gunther and Diamond 2001: 7–8).[11] Another use of the categories is to see them as the values a dependent variable can take. The question then is what factors lead to the development of the various types. It is primarily this last question that will be addressed in the remainder of the chapter.

13.5 The Functions of Parties in New Democracies

While the categories of party families as we know them from established democracies do not fit easily in other parts of the world, political parties may still perform the same 'functions.' Although space prevents us from discussing all of the 15 functions listed by Dalton and Wattenberg (2002), we can point to a few similarities and contrasts with parties in established democracies, using the party in the electorate, party in public office, and party organization framework. With respect to the former of these aspects, the contrasts between parties in new and old democracies appear to be less significant than for the two latter.

13.5.1 Parties in the Electorate

Parties in established democracies have become more weakly connected to the electorate than they used to be: Party membership and party identification are declining and the electorate increasingly skeptical of parties as institutions.

Parties in new democracies are, more often than not, similar in these respects to parties in old democracies. Data on party membership in new democracies are almost none existent, what information exists indicate that party membership is

[11] This is a subset of a more extensive set of functions discussed in (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002).

fundamentally different in many new democracies compared to the older ones. This is particularly true for sub-Saharan democracies emerging out of one-party regimes. During one-party rule, all citizens were often required to be party members, as, for example, in Malawi. As a consequence, in the new democracy, the notion of a dues-paying member evokes negative associations. Hence, parties claim to have members, but hardly anyone pays to be a member. There is no way of verifying parties' claims of membership size since hardly any records exist.

Public opinion research has advanced more comprehensively, including providing information about the electorates' views on political parties. In Latin America, Africa, and Asia, several rounds of surveys covering a range of countries have been conducted.

The electorate is split in its views on parties as institutions. In Latin America, as in Europe, a majority of citizens, 58 %, believed that 'Without parties there can be no democracy.' However, in five countries (Columbia, Bolivia, Panama, Brazil, and Ecuador), less than half of the voters agreed. In contrast, almost three-quarters of the citizens agreed with the statement in Argentina, Uruguay, and the Dominican Republic. Intra-regional differences are therefore significant and limit the notion of a 'regional' pattern (Latinobarometro 2011). In spite of the view that parties are needed, Latin American voters, as their European counterparts, do not trust parties as institutions. For all years from 1996 to 2011, political parties were consistently ranked as the least trusted of 16 institutions. The low point was in 2003 when only 11 % of voters expressed trust in parties. For most years prior to and after 2003, between a fifth and quarter of the voters trusted parties (Latinobarometro 2011: 51). A similar distrust of parties is found in Africa, although the questions asked are not identical. Thus, Logan (2008) found that opposition parties were the least trusted among 13 institutions covered by the Afrobarometer for 18 countries. Ruling parties enjoyed, in general, higher trust, 56 % versus 36 %. But as with Latin America, intra-regional variation is significant: 90 % of Tanzanian respondents trust the ruling party, only 35 % the opposition, while in Nigeria, there was practically no difference between the two; they were equally without trust: 22 versus 24 %. Also in Asian countries, such as in Nepal, for example, three-quarters of those surveyed had not much, or not at all, confidence in political parties. Parties displayed the highest level of distrust of all public institutions compared in these surveys (Askvik et al. 2011).

There are two important findings from these regional surveys. First, with respect to public opinion about parties, voters in new democracies seem at least as skeptical of parties as those in established democracies. Second, there is a tendency for party analysts of new democracies to focus on particular geographic regions, which is understandable given the geographic range of new democracies. However, whether or not there is a particular regional pattern of parties in each of these regions is more questionable. The Afro- and Latinobarometers display enormous variation within the regions. Thus, comparisons between 'weak' and 'strong' parties across regions would better help us understand the commonalities of parties in a variety of new democracies.

13.5.2 Parties in Public Office

That parties should be significant in terms of public office seems self-evident in democracies, but as Hale's analysis of Russia demonstrates, the party is hardly an institution that controls access to office. Rather, it is an instrument individual politicians can use to the extent they find it necessary. The party in office in established democracies is, generally, characterized by strong cohesion: MPs stick with the party they have been elected to represent, and voting in parliaments follows party lines (see the Chap. 8 by S. Hug). However, most established party systems are found in *parliamentary* systems, and the majority of them have some form of *proportional* electoral system. Between 1950 and 1975, parliamentary systems made up more than 60 % of all democratic regimes, but as more countries became democratic after 1975, that share declined to about one-third of all regimes. Pure presidential regimes increased during the same period from less than 10 % to more than 30 % (Samuels and Shugart 2010: 6). Parliamentarism and proportional electoral systems have been found to strengthen parties as organizations, but almost all new democracies (outside Europe) have strong presidencies and weak parliaments (and many plurality-type electoral systems). This combination, Samuels and Shugart (2010) argue, contributes to weaker political parties because it changes the incentive structure of office seekers. In a parliamentary system, the executive arm of the government emerges from, and is accountable to, the parliamentary fraction. The 'survival' of the executive, in Samuel and Shugarts' term, depends on the parliamentary party group. Thus, the two arms of the governing party, or parties, are locked together. In a presidential system, and particularly in one where the elections for parliament and presidency are not coordinated, the parties tend to be weak because office holders face different electorates and their survival in office is independent of each other: Presidents cannot fire legislators, while legislators have little or no formal say over cabinet appointments. Brazilian parties, according to Ames and Power (2010), are characterized by all the weaknesses following from a presidential system combined with other features limiting strong party organization, such as federalism, open electoral ballots, and none-existing ideological foundations for parties. With partial exception of the PT (Brazil's Workers party): 'No matter what definition of party institutionalization one prefers, contemporary Brazil's party system can be described as highly fragmented, highly competitive, highly volatile, and weakly institutionalized' (Ames and Power 2010: 180). More than a third of the legislators can be expected to defect from the parties they were elected to represent during a 4-year electoral cycle (Ames and Power 2010: 198). Also in Argentina, the dominance of the presidency reduces the significance of parties. Cecilia Szusterman describes parties as '…silent witnesses to presidential decisions and volte-faces … The identity of the government is thus a function of the personality of the president' (Szusterman 2010: 232). Again, intra-regional differences are pronounced with Costa Rican, Chilean, and Mexican parties being less subject to the influence of personalities.

13.5.3 Party Organization

The nature of party organization is probably where parties in new democracies are most different from those in old democracies. There are, of course, several reasons for this, but the ways parties have emerged and developed are probably among the most significant factors.

The most common way to explain the development of parties in established democracies is the Lipset–Rokkan model of politicization of social cleavages. This perspective on party development has three properties that travel uneasily to new democracies outside of Europe.

First, the model of party development rests on a model of state and nation building in which territorial formation intersected with cultural traits, such as religion and language, and later with socioeconomic conflicts (urban–rural, worker–owner). Second, the time dimension is crucial. Parties developed in tandem with gradual democratization, as expressed in the so-called thresholds: legitimation, incorporation, representation, and control of executive power (Rokkan 1970). Third, political parties were the political expression of groups mobilized in different ways, like social movements and a range of voluntary associations (Rokkan 1977).

To the extent that the processes of state formation and nation building preceded the development and the shaping of the party system, there is no a priori reason why these processes should not have an impact on parties in the newer democracies as well. There is nothing 'natural' about the state- and nation-building processes in Europe, which were primarily the results of wars, international and civil. Regional, ethnic, linguistic, and religious divisions were conflict lines in many European state formations, as it has been in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. But in contrast to Europe, state formation outside of Europe was driven by colonial powers, not by domestic elites. However, if state- and nation-building processes have an impact on later party developments, we should expect that Latin American parties and party systems will be different from party systems in Africa and Asia where independence arrived much later.

In contrast to the gradual passing of the thresholds as in most—but not all—European nations, the 'third wave' of democratization compressed all four thresholds into one singular event, or at least a process concentrated in a short time.[12] In some cases, this process also combined the political transformation with a radical transformation of the economy.[13] This kind of dual transformation clearly distinguishes new democracies from older ones. Democratization in the 'third wave' took place in countries where the population already was fully enfranchised. Rose and Shin (2001) refer to this process as 'democratization backwards.' They argued that in third-wave democracies, competitive elections were introduced without a civil society and without rule of law, resulting in 'incomplete

[12] As illustrated by the fallout from the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya.

[13] See, for example (Rakner 2003).

democracies,' which could develop in three directions: toward consolidation, as has happened in the Czech republic, regressing toward some form of authoritarianism, as in the case of Russia, or remaining in the gray zone. Rose and Shin do not discuss the impact of this reversed process for the development of political parties, but I will return to this point later because I believe there are two major effects on party developments: The lack of rule of law impact on the organizing of elections and the fully enfranchised populations, combined with weak civil society, provide an opportunity for *entrepreneurial parties*.

The abrupt democratization process in the third wave also means that the gradual emergence of political parties based on civil society organizations and social movements, as found in the established democracies, is largely absent—with one exception. The exception is political parties that have emerged out of liberation movements and which therefore have, initially at least, had legitimacy and often an extended organizational network that could be turned into political party organization. The prime example of a successful conversion of this kind is the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa. In fact, it has been so successful that its dominance is considered to be problematic for democratic consolidation (Southall 2001).[14] However, not all liberation movements succeed in the same way. The Ethiopian People's Democratic Front (EPDF) is an example of the exact opposite of the ANC in terms of institutionalizing as a 'normal' political party.

Ingrid van Biezen (2005) has tried to incorporate the time dimension by offering a framework that includes potential dynamics of organizational developments. She hypothesizes an interaction between the *timing of party formation* and the *time dimension of party development*, resulting in three different models, the *life-cycle scenario,* the *generation effect,* and the *period effect*.

The life-cycle scenario assumes that parties change over time in similar ways. That is, regardless of when they formed, they will pass through identical stages as they develop over time. The second model, *the generation effect*, assumes that parties formed at time *t*1 will maintain the model then adopted across time, while parties formed at *t*2 will have a different model, which will also be maintained across time. The *period effect* predicts that regardless of when parties were formed, at time *t*3, they will all look the same. In her own empirical studies, van Biezen (2005) has applied these models to the study of party formation in Eastern and Central Europe, Spain, and Portugal, but the models offer interesting perspectives also for parties in other regions of the world.

The life-cycle scenario is a close approximation of how party researchers have interpreted the change from elite parties, via mass parties and catch-all parties, to the cartel party. However, it is now commonly agreed that this particular sequence of stages, for example, that there will be a mass party stage is unlikely to be repeated in new democracies. Also, the 'democratization backwards' paradigm

[14] In general, Rakner and Skage find that democratic consolidation is more likely in states where liberation movements have overturned an internal authoritarian regime (Rakner and Skage 2011).

presented by Rose and Shin (2001) does not indicate that the life-cycle scenario is a likely model for party development in the new democracies. Moreover, the life-cycle scenario of parties in what are now the established democracies took place in a specific institutional context: parliamentary regimes with mostly proportional electoral system. This combination has proved to be particularly advantageous for the development of strong party organizations. Yet, few of the newer democracies outside of Europe are parliamentary.

The most prominent exponent of the generational effect scenario is Angelo Panebianco (1988), who argued that 'A party's organizational characteristics depend more upon its history, i.e. on how the organization originated and how it consolidated, than upon any other factor' (50).[15] Thus, if parties are shaped differently, pending on how and when they are formed, they are likely to retain those features later. New democracies have a multitude of parties which may be hard to classify, either ideologically or in the Gunther and Diamond (2001) typology, but two types stand out because of their success electorally: movement parties and entrepreneurial parties. Movement parties are those parties that transformed themselves from resistance movement, either against a colonial regime or against an autocratic domestic regime, into political parties. Some of these parties have been highly successful in the electoral arena, surviving the transition to a multiparty democracy, as CCM in Tanzania, and ANC in South Africa. Others have 'succeeded,' but only with applying less than democratic methods against their opponents, such ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe and NRM-O in Uganda. For such movements-turned parties that have succeeded in holding on to power for a long time, it is an open question how they would react to an eventual electoral defeat. More common than movement parties are what we can label entrepreneurial parties.

To the extent that the generation effect model is relevant for parties in new democracies, there are reasons for worrying about the process of party institutionalization. In new democracies, a frequent phenomenon is the *entrepreneurial party*, that is, parties created from the top, often by a single individual, without any links to established parties and/or civil society actors. Although there are examples of such parties also in established democracies, particularly on the far right (Declair 1999; Harmel and Svåsand 1993; Svåsand and Wørlund 2005), they are rarely successful parties in government office, with the exception of Italy under Berlusconi.

Parties built by and dominated by a single individual are less likely to institutionalize than parties emerging from some form of social movement. It seems reasonable to hypothesize that party entrepreneurs are motivated by using the party machinery to control access to power and may not, at least in the short run, be interested in building a party organization, which as it develops may be less easy to control. While a party organization with established rules and procedures, election

[15] This view is echoed by those who emphasize the problems of fundamental party change, see (Harmel and Janda 1994).

of office holders, and mobilization of supporters and members may be useful for political competition with other parties, such institutionalized parties can also provide opportunities for potential intra-party challengers to the party leadership. When party entrepreneurs eventually resign from politics one way or another, there is no 'glue,' organizationally or ideologically, to keep the party together. Entrepreneurial parties are therefore likely to be temporary phenomena. In newer democracies, in Asia, Africa as well as in Latin America, entrepreneurial parties have been highly successful. Dressel (2011: 535), for example, argues that 'The Philippines has no real parties in terms of philosophy or institutional longevity …; parties have often been simply a vehicle for individual candidates or specific elections.' Perhaps, the most successful entrepreneurial party is Thailand's Thai Rak Thai. The party is the creation of a wealthy businessman, Thaksin Shinawatra (Ferrara 2011).[16] An African example is Malawi, where Bingu wa Mutharika, elected president in 2004 as the candidate of United Democratic Front, created his own party DPP in 2005 and sailed to victory in 2009 with almost 2/3 of the votes (Magolowondo and Svåsand 2009).

A particularly lethal combination is entrepreneurial parties in systems with a high level of corruption and few spheres autonomous from the state. As entrepreneurial parties succeed and survive by building coalitions of interests, the parties become vehicles for the advancement of private interests. Successful entrepreneurial parties are therefore associated with clientelism and patronage and become a magnet for other smaller entrepreneurial parties, where the party leaders may see benefits for themselves and disregard the opinions of their followers. A typical example of this would be a party leader who joins a government, regardless of the opinion of other members of his party.[17]

In the third scenario, the *period effect*, in specific historical periods, parties assume the same organizational characteristics, regardless of when and how they originated. An example of such an effect is the impact of new communication technologies. Thus, parties that did develop in a time when the printed mass media were the dominant communication channel between leaders and followers, a part of the larger party apparatus linking the top levels in the party with the grassroots, will be transformed organizationally when first television and later Internet and social media replace the print media. Older parties therefore will assume organizational characteristics of newer parties. In many of the new democracies, parties have developed in a technological environment that makes the traditional communication function redundant. This does not mean that it will be *the same* technology that affects all parties everywhere. In many Third World countries, the

[16] Even after being ousted from power and barred from reentering politics, Thaksin's party again succeeded in 2010—with his sister as the party leader.

[17] Malawi offers several examples of this. G. Chakwumba founded the Republican Party in 2004, and although he was the presidential candidate for an opposition alliance against the United Democratic Front (UDF), he immediately joined the UDF government when offered a cabinet post, against the preference of the parties' MPs and in the process tried to de-register the party he had founded.

spread of television is limited, but radio is available everywhere. Yet, the consequences for parties are often the same: Party organizations are not the only, or even the main, source of information.

Party organizations in many new democracies have usually not emerged out of broader social movements, except in the cases of liberation movements. Thus, constructed from above in a context of presidentialism, often in societies with extensive corruption, and where the electorate already has access to a wide variety of information, has rendered formal models of parties based on mass membership—if not irrelevant—than certainly very different from parties in established democracies. The result is often absence of ideological orientation, leading to frequent defections of MPs. Party organizations tend to be dominated by the party founder/leader.

Why is it then that the development of political parties in new democracies has resulted in many weakly institutionalized parties and weak party system institutionalization? Apart from the very different social, economic, and cultural circumstances of party development in new democracies, there is one factor that seems common to many new democracies that is also different from party developments in the now established democracies: the regulation of parties and the electoral process.

13.5.4 Legal Regulation of Parties and the Problem of the Electoral Process

The Lipset–Rokkan model explaining party institutionalization in established European democracies emphasizes the origins of parties in movements and the gradual democratization process as factors contributing to party institutionalization. Apart from analyzing the impact of the electoral system, analysis of parties in established democracies generally takes the 'electoral environment' as a neutral constant. However, in new democracies typically, the rule of law is weak. More specifically, there is a lack of autonomy in the management of elections, and the general separation of the state from the governing party is highly imperfect.

Most established party systems have developed in parliamentary regimes and in regimes where the civil service has become professionalized and operates impartially (Rothstein and Teorell 2008). Impartiality means that rules are applied without considering who is being subject to the rules. Political parties in many new democracies face what Schedler calls a two-level game (Schedler 2002b). One game is the competition between parties, but there is also another 'game': the struggle over the rules of the game. In many new democracies, the management of the electoral arena, from the registration of political parties and candidates, to the conduct of the election campaign, the actual voting, the counting of the ballots, and the handling of election disputes, is shrouded in controversies. Incumbents use the administrative and legal instruments of elections to manipulate the process and

thereby increase the probability of remaining in office. A wide repertoire of 'electoral malpractice' can be used for this purpose (Alvarez et al. 2008; Birch 2011; Case 2006; Schedler 2002a) and in the process undermining the ability of opposition parties to survive. Electoral management therefore constitutes a source of uncertainty in many new democracies. This, in turn, contributes to the lack of institutionalization of the party system, as well as that of individual parties.

There are several examples of how uneven and shifting application of electoral rules negatively impacts on some of the political parties. According to Ferrara (2011), Thai citizens enjoy extensive freedom to form and join parties. However, in spite of this freedom, unelected institutions, in particular the military and the judiciary, selectively intervene to overturn election results and force parties to dissolve. Another case is Malawi where the electoral commission is unable to create a level playing field, in spite of the regulations, giving the incumbent party an advantage (Rakner 2011).

Finally, the lack of separation between state and party undermines the institutionalization of the party as an instrument of democracy and turns it into a distributor of scarce resources. Control of the executive office in strongly centralized systems also excludes the losing parties from everything: literally 'winner takes all.' Orre (2010), for example, has shown how resistance movements winning power in Mozambique and Angola have successfully used their control of the government to remain in power after the introduction of multiparty politics. Ironically, several development assistance programs meant to strengthen democratic developments have instead reinforced the position of the governing party (Zeeuw and Kumar 2006).

13.6 Convergence Between Parties in Old and New Democracies?

Schmitter's pessimistic scenario, quoted in the beginning of the chapter, was based on the impression that the similarities between parties across the new–old division were increasing. Is he right?

There are some elements indicating convergence in party developments between newer and older democracies: public distrust of parties, weakening of party ideology, and informality in party organization.

Public trust in parties as institutions is rapidly declining in established democracies (Dalton and Weldon 2005), and few new democracies seem to offer a contradictory pattern. The lack of ideological divisions between parties in new democracies is to some extent mirrored in the contracting ideological space in established democracies. In this sense, old parties are becoming more like new parties, rather than the other way around.

The contrasts between new and old parties are often presented as contrasts in formal organizational structure. But all parties, new and old, operate both along

formal channels and in informal ways. Freidenberg and Levitsky (2006) argue that informal networks are substitutions for weak formal structures in Latin American parties. However, also in well-established parties do informal networks play a role, as documented in Seth Masket's study of how the informal party organization—the IPO—and its impact on the formal Californian party organizations (Masket 2009). Perhaps, party scholars have overrated the importance of the formal organization, just as studies of clientelism and patronage have been assumed to be primarily a characteristic of parties in the new democracies. However, as Kitschelt and Levitsky have shown, similar practices are widespread also in established democracies, such as Italy, Japan, Austria, and Belgium (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).

But there are also important contrasts. The excessive personalization of parties in new democracies has few parallels in established democracies. Although there is talk of 'presidentialization of parties' (Poguntke and Webb 2006), there are few examples of governing parties created by political leaders, Italy's FI/PdL being the exception. Political leaders in established democracies are recruited through the established parties, even in countries experiencing severe economic problems, such as in Ireland, Portugal, and Spain during the current Euro crisis. To the extent that new types of leaders are recruited, it is from *outside* the party system, as with the 'technocratic' governments of Greece and Italy, both came to office as temporary solutions to the weaknesses of parties and the party systems.

13.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have first highlighted some contrasts between parties in newer democracies and in established democracies. It is easier to say what parties in newer democracies are *not like* than to point out similarities. Parties in new democracies do not on the whole correspond to the 'standard' repertoire of party families, based mainly on the location along the left–right continuum. In reality, many of them have a regional and/or ethnic electoral basis, but legal regulations prevent them from using this as an explicit label.

With the exception of liberation movements, few parties in new democracies can claim to have emerged out of social movement or a network of voluntary associations. In its place, party formation tends to be constructions initiated by political entrepreneurs, while the mechanism connecting the actors inside the parties is extensive clientelism.

Schmitter's pessimistic note regarding the problems of political parties is partially correct. It is true that parties are not what they used to be, but that has always been the case and is a consequence of the capacity of political parties to adapt to changing circumstances. Parties that fail to adapt will disappear, just as all kinds of institutions. The perception of parties as an endangered species is still exaggerated because hitherto no one has come up with a credible alternative that solves the collective action problem arising from the need for delegation in large-scale communities.

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