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Gabriel Twose *Editors*

International Handbook of Peace and Reconciliation

 Springer

Peace Psychology Book Series

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Kathleen Malley-Morrison
Andrea Mercurio • Gabriel Twose
Editors

International Handbook of Peace and Reconciliation

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Editors

Kathleen Malley-Morrison
Department of Psychology
Boston University
Boston, MA, USA

Andrea Mercurio
Department of Psychology
Boston University
Boston, MA, USA

Gabriel Twose
Public Interest Directorate
American Psychological Association
Washington, DC, USA

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Contributors

Abdelkader Abdelali Department of Political Science, University of Tahar Moulay, Saida, Algeria

Jacqueline Akhurst Department of Psychology, York St John University, England

Abdul Kareem Al-Obaidi Institute of International Education, New York, NY, USA

Sarah An Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

Jose Anazagsty University of Puerto Rico, Mayagüez, Puerto Rico, USA

Ricardo Angelino School of Medical Sciences, National University of La Plata, La Plata, Argentina

Majed Ashy Psychology Department, Bay State College, Boston, MA, USA

Emily Bales Psychology Department, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

Rodrigo Barahona Counselor, Brookline, MA, USA

Mariana Barbosa Universidade Catolica Portuguesa, Lisbon, Portugal

Tristyn Campbell Psychology Department, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

Maggie Campbell Clark University, Worcester, MA, USA

Nico Canoy Psychology Department, Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon City, Philippines

Eddy Carillo Universidad Independiente & Director of the Center for Psychoanalytic Studies of the Association for Socio-Critical Psychoanalysis, San Jose, Costa Rica

Helena Castanheira Psychology Department, New School for Social Research, New York, NY, USA

Elizabeth Claggett-Borne Alternatives to Violence Project, Friends Meeting, Cambridge, MA, USA

Amanda Clinton University of Puerto Rico, Mayagüez, Puerto Rico, USA

Chelsea Cogan Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

Irene Colthurst Department of International Relations, San Diego University, San Diego, USA

Michael Corgan Department of International Relations, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

Eduardo Correia ISCTE Business School in Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal

Jessica Cox Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

Mahlon Dalley Psychology Department, Eastern Washington University, Cheney, WA, USA

Jennie Davidow New York Medical College, Valhalla, New York, NY, USA

Carol Davis English Department, Texas State University at San Marcos, Texas, USA

Jenna Davis Department of Psychology, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA, USA

John Davis Department of Psychology, Texas State University, San Marcos, TX, USA

Raquel DeBartolo Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

William Dubbs Department of Psychology, Boston University, MA, USA

Helena Syna Desivilya Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Yezreel Valley College, Emek Yezreel, Israel

Eros Desouza Department of Psychology, Illinois State University, Normal, IL, USA

E.E. Diehnelt University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, USA

Ma. Regina E. Estuar Department of Information Systems and Computer Science, Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon City, Philippines

Adeniyi Famose Joavic's Foundation, Nigeria

Eric Fischer Department of Sociology, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany

Gabriella Gricius International Relations and Linguistics, Boston University, Boston, USA

Lauren St. Germain Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

Patrick Hanlin Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

- Kristina Hellqvist** Refugee Affairs, Church of Sweden, Stockholm, Sweden
- Jennifer Heinecke** Department of Psychology, Easter Washington University, Spokane, Washington, USA
- Etsuko Hoshino Browne** Department of Psychology, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, PA, USA
- Jas Jafaar** Department of Anthropology and Sociology, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, University of Malaysia, Malaysia
- Divya Japa** Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA
- Linda Jeffrey** College of Education, Rowan University, Glassboro, NJ, USA
- Laura Johnson** Croft Institute of International Studies, University of Mississippi, Oxford, MS, USA
- Janice Jones** Doctoral Leadership Studies Department, Cardinal Stritch University, Milwaukee, WI, USA
- Andrea Jones-Rooy** Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
- Olja Jovanovic** Department of Psychology, Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade, Serbia
- Grace Kibanja** Department of Educational, Organizational & Social Psychology, Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda
- Hillary Mi-Sung Kim** School of Social Work, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA
- Julia König** Lehrstuhl für Klinische Psychologie und Psychotherapie, Munchen, Germany
- Marineh Lalikian** Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA
- Heather Lane** Department of Psychology, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA, USA
- Elizabeth Leembruggen-Kallberg** Webster University, Leiden, Netherlands
- Marian Lewin** Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA
- Jorge Luna Torres** Corporacion Educativa B. F. Skinner, Lima, Peru
- Carla Machado** Department of Psychology, Minho University, Braga, Portugal (Deceased)
- Gina Major** Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA
- Kathleen Malley-Morrison** Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

Alfred McAlister Behavioral Sciences, School of Public Health, University of Texas, Austin, TX, USA

Sherri McCarthy Educational Psychology, Counseling and Human Relations, Northern Arizona University, Yuma, AZ, USA

Anna Medvedeva University of Finland, Helsinki, Finland

Alyssa Mendlein Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

Andrea Mercurio Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

Vlado Miheljak University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia

Daniela Miranola Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

Heyam Mohammed Department of Curriculum and Instruction, College of Education, Kuwait University, Kuwait

Adriana Muenta Markham College Early Years, Lima, Peru

Haslina Muhammad Monash University, Melbourne, Australia

Alice Murata Department of Counselor Education, Northeastern Illinois University, Chicago, IL, USA

Michelle Murata Department of Psychology, American University, Washington, DC, USA

Erin Murtagh Psychology Department, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

Leakhena Nou Department of Sociology, California State University, Long Beach, USA

Alan O'Hare Expressive Therapy Program, Lesley College, Cambridge, MA, USA

Kathryn O'Keefe Friendship Charter School, Washington, DC, USA

Silja Bara Omarsdottir Institute of International Affairs and Center for Small State Studies, University of Iceland, Vesturbær, Reykjavik, Iceland

James Page Department of Peace Studies, School of Humanities, University of New England, Armidale, NSW, Australia

Natalia Parnyuk Department of Psychology, St. Petersburg Railway College, St. Petersburg, Russia

Bailey Pescatore Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

Nebojsa Petrovic Faculty of Psychology, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia

Alexandra Plassaras International Relations Department, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

Marko Polič Department of Psychology, University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia

Andrew Potter School Psychology Program, UC, Berkeley, USA

Ellora Puri Department of Political Science, University of Jammu, Jammu, India

Nisha Raj Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA

Kimberly A. Rapoza Mercy College, Dobbs Ferry, NY, USA

Julia Rashid Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

Megan Reif Political Science and International Studies, University of Colorado Denver, Denver, CO, USA

Christine Roland-Levy Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne, Paris, France

Mathilde Salmberg Clinical Psychologist, Washington, DC, USA

Leia Saltzman Graduate School of Social Work, Boston College, Boston, MA, USA

Matthew Schauer International Security and Conflict Resolution, San Diego, USA

Natoschia Scruggs Asylum Division, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Arlington, VA, USA

Glyn Secker Board of Directors and Executive Committee member, Jews For Justice For Palestinians, London, UK

Darshini Shah Health Education Library for People, Mumbai, India

Anoushka Shahane Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA

Lane Smith Senior Research Scholar (Retired), University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA

Kamala Smith Behavioral Health Analyst, Abt Associates, Cambridge, MA, USA

Luciana Karine de Souza Department of Psychology, Federal University of Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, Brazil

Michael Stevens Department of Psychology, Illinois State University, Normal, IL, USA

Ariel Stone Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

William Tastle Ithaca College of Business, New York, USA

Raja Tayeh Director of Institutional Research, Doane College, Crete, NE, USA

Abram Trosky Department of Political Science, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

Charikleia Tsatsaroni Psychology Department, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

Feryal Turan Department of Sociology, Ankara University, Ankara, Turkey

Gabriel Twose Public Interest Directorate, American Psychological Association, Washington, DC, USA

Doe West Quinsigamond Community College, Worcester, MA, USA

Michael Whitely Educational Psychologist, Kent State University, Kent, OH, USA

Alev Yalcinkaya Department of Psychology, Yeditepe, Istanbul, Turkey

Dalit Yassour-Boroschowitz Department of Human Services, Emek Yezreel College, Israel

Rouba Youssef Psychology, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI, USA

Jenna H. Zhu Department of Psychology Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA, USA

Introduction to International Handbook on Peace and Reconciliation for Springer Publishing

1

Kathleen Malley-Morrison

Peace and Reconciliation

Many people believe that war has always existed and will always exist, that humans are inherently aggressive and self-centered, and that the only way to protect the interests and the security of oneself and one's country is to be stronger and better armed than the other guys. Yet, historically, not all groups of people have been equally warlike, and even in today's world, some groups and some nations are much more peaceful than others. Moreover, despite all the violence that has characterized many regions for centuries, there have also been many major peace treaties that have changed the face of the world and in some cases led to lasting peace between warring groups. We begin this chapter with some historical context regarding peace treaties and then describe the current project.

Most people in today's world are aware of the armed conflicts taking place in various parts of the world in 2011 – for example, in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria.

People tend to be less aware of the number of peacekeeping missions in operation; however, as of October 2011, the United Nations was involved in 15 peacekeeping operations – for example, in Western Sahara, Haiti, Darfur (along with the

African Union), Cyprus, Lebanon, South Sudan, Kosovo, Liberia, and India and Pakistan, to name some of the more familiar arenas. Moreover, they often lose sight of the fact that the majority of countries in the world are free from armed conflicts on their soil and live in peace.

The GIPGAP Research Program

GIPGAP: The Core Group

The core members of the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP) are located at Boston University and consist primarily of psychology faculty and students but also include some members of the International Relations Department. This research team evolved following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, particularly in response to the United States government's invasion of Iraq. In the next few years after 9/11, international representation in GIPGAP grew; a pilot survey was developed, tested, and modified, and the current project was launched. The core GIPGAP team (otherwise known as the Core Group) consists of a faculty advisor (Malley-Morrison), several postdocs, and international graduate and undergraduate students concerned with issues of violence. Although membership varies somewhat from year to year as some students graduate and move ahead with their careers and other students from various regions join, international students

K. Malley-Morrison (✉)
Department of Psychology, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA
e-mail: kkmalley@comcast.net

and colleagues participating in the Core Group have come from countries as diverse as Portugal, Germany, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Russia, Israel, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, China, Colombia, and Peru. Thus, we had a broad range of perspectives on which to draw in developing both the survey and the coding manuals.

GIPGAP: International Contributors

The international GIPGAP team (known as the International Group) consists of faculty and graduate students from a range of academic departments, including psychology, sociology, and international relations, in more than 40 countries. These international contributors were recruited through a number of different approaches: networking by Core Group members, notices in *Announcements from the APA Division of International Psychology*, notices in *International Psychology Bulletin*, and invitations during presentations at international psychology conferences. With approval from the appropriate institutional authorities, these contributors administered the Personal and Individual Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) to ordinary people from multiple countries in every major region of the world: Western Europe (Iceland, France, Portugal, Spain, Germany, and Sweden); Russia and the Balkan Peninsula states (Greece, Slovenia, Serbia); the Middle East including the Persian Gulf (Turkey, Afghanistan, Israel, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar); Africa (Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, Angola, Ghana, Botswana, Zambia, and South Africa); Central and South America (Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Argentina); South and Southeast Asia (Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Australia, and the Philippines); the Far East (China, Japan, and Korea); and a region we identified as a UK/Anglo “cultural region,” which included Great Britain, Northern Ireland, the United States, Canada, and Australia.

Although today Great Britain and Northern Ireland are both legally parts of the United

Kingdom (of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), we, for the most part, treat them separately in this book because Northern Ireland, for much of its history, was a subject of British rule, as were Australia, Canada, and the United States. It was the Great Britain part of the current United Kingdom that colonized what is now the United States, Australia, and Canada (and many other regions); it was not Northern Ireland that engaged in imperialistic expansion. Thus, in this and other chapters in this book, we report on findings from separate Great Britain and Northern Ireland samples.

All researchers contributing to this project adhered to human subjects ethical guidelines. The survey responses were collected between 2005 and 2008. In some cases, shortened versions of the survey were administered because the respondents were unfamiliar with taking surveys; moreover, in some cases, items that seemed particularly sensitive within the context of that country were deleted (e.g., “If your country is currently involved in armed conflict with another country, please respond to the following item: My country’s involvement in armed conflict is morally defensible.”). The survey could be completed either online over the Internet at a secure site or as a paper-and-pencil measure. Individual chapter authors made the decision as to which procedure best protected their participants’ rights and safety. In many of the Western countries, both procedures were used, although the bulk of the responses were submitted over the Internet. Most surveys were filled out individually; however, in one of the African countries, most of the participants completed the survey within the context of focus groups.

Participants were recruited through a variety of different strategies, varying based on local circumstances. In the majority of countries, participants were recruited through networking and snowballing techniques; however, in a few countries, substantial portions of the sample were recruited through university classrooms. Other methods included passing out the survey to passengers on a long train trip, inviting people in cafes to fill out the survey, and using the survey as a basis for interviewing refugees from armed conflict currently living in several different countries.

Many of the participants came from countries where they suffered terribly during past armed conflicts; some of them live in countries where armed conflict is still a daily threat. For some, it was an act of bravery to fill out the survey even under conditions of anonymity. Moreover, many of the contributors of chapters to this book are themselves survivors of armed conflict and some continue to work on the ground for peace and justice.

The PAIRTAPS

The Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) has six sections: (a) judgments concerning the extent to which governments have the right to perform such acts of aggression as torturing prisoners during times of war; (b) judgments concerning the rights of individuals to grow up and live in a world of peace and to demonstrate against war and in favor of peace; (c) conservative values and views on the role of apology in achieving reconciliation following armed conflict; (d) projected emotional responses that might be experienced following direct or indirect exposure to acts of governmental aggression, including attacks on protestors; (e) definitions of war, torture, terrorism, peace, reconciliation, and rights; and (f) views on the achievability of peace.

Several of the items in the first two sections are direct expressions of human rights guarantees (e.g., right to assembly) established in United Nations agreements. For Sections 1, 2, 3, and 6, respondents indicated on a scale from 1 (total disagreement) to 7 (total agreement) the extent to which they agreed with each item (e.g., “All human beings have a basic right to peace”). Then, in their own words, they provided an explanation of the reasoning behind their rating on the item. Sections 4 and 5 call only for open-ended qualitative responses – for example, examples of emotions that would be felt in the face of governmental aggression, and definitions of terms.

For the purposes of this current volume, chapter authors were asked to focus only on qualitative responses to the following selected items:

(a) definitions of peace and reconciliation; (b) “Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace”; (c) “If one country has in the past invaded, colonized, or exercised control over the governmental affairs of another country, an apology by the invading/colonizing/controlling country can improve the chances for reconciliation between the countries”; (d) “What steps or factors are necessary to make an apology successful in achieving reconciliation between the countries?”; (e) “I believe that world peace can be achieved”; and (f) “The best way to achieve world peace is: ...”

Also analyzed were participants’ responses to one of the emotional response scenarios from Section 4. The instructions for the scenario were (a) “Assume that you have very direct and dramatic exposure to each of the situations below – that is, either you witness them directly or you see them happening live on a TV show or documentary that exposes you to the event in the *most immediate and dramatic* way. Please indicate first how you would feel in the situation and then what you would want to do.” The first item stated that “Police are beating peaceful anti-war demonstrators. *What would you feel? What would you want to do?*” For the purposes of this book, it was only the responses to the “What would you want to do item that were analyzed, because we were interested for theoretical reasons in themes of intended agency.”

All researchers contributing to this project adhered to human subjects ethical guidelines. The anonymous survey responses were collected between 2005 and 2008. In some cases (e.g., Nigeria), shortened versions of the survey were administered because the respondents were unfamiliar with taking surveys. The survey could be completed either online on a secure website or as a paper-and-pencil measure. Individual chapter authors made the decision as to which procedure best protected their participants’ rights and safety. In many of the Western countries, both procedures were used, although the bulk of the responses were submitted over the Internet.

Although most chapter authors analyzed responses to most, if not all, of these items, some items had been omitted from some surveys.

Despite such relatively minor differences in coverage of survey items, each section of this volume ends with an integrative chapter summarizing similarities and differences found across regions in the themes that emerged.

In addition to responding to the PAIRTAPS items, participants completed a background information form asking for basic demographic information such as age, gender, ethnicity, nationality, and religion, as well as whether they or any family member had been in the military and whether they had participated in any protest activities. Participants typically responded to the survey in their native language, although in several of the countries, particularly the African countries (e.g., South Africa, Nigeria), the participants had been educated in English and responded in English. Translations of survey items from English to another language were either done independently by at least two native speakers of the other language who then compared translations and resolved differences in translations, often in consultation with members of the Core Group, or they were translated from English to the other language and then back-translated to identify problems in the translation. A similar process was followed for the translations of responses in other languages into English.

Sections A and B: Grounded Theory Coding of Definitions and Apology Items

The qualitative responses to the definitions of peace and reconciliation and to the two apology items were coded according to a grounded theory approach. That is, we did not start out with a particular theoretical framework and then strive to fit the responses into that framework. Instead, we followed the procedures recommended by Strauss and Corbin (1998), proceeding from open coding to axial coding, using a process of constant comparison. During the open coding phase, we divided the qualitative responses to the definitions and apology items into units of meaning (“codeable units”) that varied in length from one word

(e.g., “sincerity”) to phrases (e.g., “words are not enough”) and entire sentences (e.g., “Apology is necessary before two countries can reconcile.”).

At the axial level of coding, the relationships among the more fragmented, seldom-used categories initially identified were reviewed, and, where appropriate, these categories were organized into more inclusive categories. For example, in regard to qualitative responses to the definitions of peace, we combined two initially separate categories for *recognize/acknowledge* and *respect* into a more inclusive category called *recognize/acknowledge/respect*. Similarly, we combined two initially separate categories for *come to terms/agreement* and *compromise/negotiate* into the superordinate category called *come to terms/agreement/compromise/negotiate*.

In a grounded theory analysis, data collection, coding, conceptualizing, and theorizing take place simultaneously, and analyses of new responses are compared both with analyses of previous responses and with the concepts emerging from those analyses. A more detailed summary of the procedures followed and the categories derived for Section A (“Definitions of Peace and Reconciliation”) and Section C (“Perspectives on Apology”) can be found in the introductory chapters to each of those sections.

Sections C and D: Judgments on the Right to Protest and the Achievability of Peace

In Sections 2 and 4 of this volume, our focus is on understanding the forms of social cognition that individuals bring to their judgments concerning the right to protest (Section B) and the achievability of world peace (Section D). The coding systems for the protest and achievability items were developed using a modified form of *deductive qualitative analysis* (Gilgun, 2005), informed by the work of Albert Bandura on moral disengagement and personal agency.

Bandura (e.g., 1999, 2002) has identified several types of reasoning – which he calls mechanisms of moral disengagement – that provided a useful framework for the analysis of arguments

concerning the extent to which governments have the right to order invasions of other lands and torture prisoners during times of war. Based on his description of these forms of reasoning, the Core Group has identified a complementary series of sociocognitive mechanisms, which we loosely call mechanisms of moral engagement. Although we present a brief overview of Bandura's theory of moral disengagement and engagement here, our focus in our analyses was on the mechanisms (types of reasoning) rather than on the value-laden constructs of moral disengagement and engagement *per se*.

According to Bandura (1999), moral disengagement processes mediate between moral standards and actual behaviors; they allow individuals to behave immorally or tolerate immorality by others, even when these behaviors violate their own moral standards. Thus, moral disengagement theory shares assumptions with theories of cognitive dissonance and dissonance resolution (cf. Festinger, 1957; Matz & Wood, 2005), as well as with theories of escalation and self-justification (cf. O'Leary & Wolinsky, 2009; Wolff & Moser, 2008), all of which suggest that humans will go through a variety of psychological machinations to allow themselves to feel good about themselves and avoid feelings of guilt, despite various forms of misbehavior. In Bandura's view, these mechanisms of moral disengagement allow individuals to violate moral standards while continuing to maintain their self-image as caring human beings. More specifically, he suggests that when individuals commit injurious acts, they generally try to legitimize and excuse their behavior in order to avoid feeling guilt, regret, negative emotions, and/or other self-sanctions.

Although Bandura's (1999) theory was developed primarily to explain how individuals could excuse themselves for behaving in ways that violate universal moral codes, it is also applicable at group and state levels of behavior. For example, Bandura and his colleagues have applied the construct of moral disengagement to prisoner-guard relationships (Osofsky, Bandura, & Zimbardo, 2005), weapons manufacturers (Bandura, 1990), the tobacco industry (White, Bandura, & Bero, 2009),

group massacres (Bandura, 1999), and capital punishment (Osofsky, Bandura, & Zimbardo, 2005), as well as to everyday, nonviolent moral lapses in behavior, including in the corporate world (Bandura, Caprara & Zsolnai, 2000).

In addressing the problems of inhumane behavior, Bandura (1999) identified eight overlapping and interrelated mechanisms of moral disengagement, which he classified into four major groups: (1) mechanisms involving the cognitive reconstruction of harmful behavior; this group includes moral justifications, euphemistic labeling, and advantageous comparisons, all of which serve to psychologically reconstruct harmful behavior into something more benign; (2) mechanisms that misrepresent, minimize, and/or disregard the negative consequences of injurious behavior; (3) mechanisms that serve to remove or obscure personal accountability for harmful behavior (e.g., through displacing or diffusing responsibility for the misconduct); and (4) mechanisms that devalue the recipient of the harm through dehumanizing and/or blaming the victim or situation. Overall, these mechanisms of moral disengagement can operate independently and/or simultaneously in ways that allow individuals to be complicit in the perpetration of acts that are harmful toward others without feeling guilty or subjecting themselves to self-sanctions.

Considerable empirical support has been found for the role of moral disengagement in tolerance for governmental aggression. For example, McAlister (2001), an internationally prominent moral disengagement scholar, found that moral disengagement was related to individual support for military bombings of the former Yugoslavia and Iraq. Examining attitudes from over 21 nations, Grussendorf et al. (2002) found that moral disengagement was employed in accepting the use of deadly force in response to a threat. In addition to support for war, Aquino, Reed, Thau, and Feeman (2007) found that moral disengagement was linked to support for lethal punitive actions against perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks as well as detainee abuse in Iraq. Thus, Bandura's (1999) theory is particularly valuable for understanding individual agreement with and rationalizations for various forms of state

aggression, including invading countries and torturing individuals who are seen as some sort of threat.

Bandura (1999) and others (e.g., Grussendorf, McAlister, Sandstrom, Udd, & Morrison, 2002; McAlister, Ama, Barroso, Peters, & Kelder, 2000) recognize that not everyone acts in ways that violate their own and more general moral codes. In contrast to moral disengagement, moral engagement entails a conscious commitment to behave in ways that conform to one's moral standards, regardless of circumstances. Personalizing the victim, accepting responsibility, exercising personal agency, being sympathetic and empathetic, and recognizing the negative effects of inhumane behavior all contribute to moral engagement. Bandura further emphasizes the power of humanization, social obligation to helping others, and recognition of everyone's common humanity across differing political, ethnic, religious, and social groups. In his view, moral engagement and treating others with humanity are reflective primarily of empathy but also of perceived similarity and social or moral obligation.

Arguably, these characteristics of moral engagement may also be associated with support for humanitarian interventions, which Walzer (1977) argues are a justifiable response (in the context of "reasonable expectations of success") to acts that "shock the moral conscience of mankind" (p. 107). Moreover, Walzer indicates that he is referring specifically to "the moral convictions of ordinary men and women" (p. 107) – the same reference group of interest to our research group. In his view, "clear examples of what is called 'humanitarian intervention' are very rare" (p. 101). "Indeed," he says, "I have not found any, but only mixed cases where the humanitarian motive is one among many" (p. 101). Whether the rarity of cases of pure humanitarian intervention is linked to a lack of moral engagement in ordinary citizens concerning the well-being of people in other countries, the disinterest of states in committing resources for humanitarian purposes, some combination of these forces, and/or other factors is not clear; however, Bandura's (1999) argument that humanitarian justifications for inhumane behavior constitute forms of moral

disengagement is consistent with Walzer's arguments concerning the rarity of true humanitarian intervention.

Exercising moral agency has dual aspects—inhibitive and proactive. According to Bandura (2002), the inhibitive form of moral agency is the process that allows individuals to refrain from behaving inhumanely, whereas the proactive form expresses itself in the power to behave humanely. Bandura noted that individuals guided by proactive moral agency base "their sense of self-worth so strongly on human convictions and social obligations that they act against what they regard as unjust or immoral even though their actions may incur heavy personal costs" (p. 194). He also argued that when exercising proactive morality, people act in the name of humane principles even when experiencing pressure to engage in expedient and harmful behavior. When morally engaged people "disavow use of valued social ends to justify destructive means. They sacrifice their well-being for their convictions. They take personal responsibility for the consequences of their actions. They remain sensitive to the suffering of others" (Bandura, 1999 p. 203). Thorkildsen (2007) added that moral engagement "controls the regulation of humane behavior and the inhibition of inhumane behavior because it represents a vision of how the world ought to function" (p. 115). Although there has been less research on moral engagement than moral disengagement, McAlister (2001) found that students' attitudes regarding war changed in the direction of increased moral engagement when the students were exposed to information that countered the tendency toward moral disengagement; his findings indicate that not only do different social messages influence reasoning about moral issues but that moral engagement can indeed be promoted.

Informed by Bandura's theory, we developed a coding manual with guidelines for coding two items related to protest: (1) the right to protest item ("Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace") and (2) the related scenario item ("Police are beating peaceful anti-war demonstrators. *What would you want to do?*") Responses to the right to protest item

were organized first into two major types: *protest-tolerant* and *protest-intolerant*. Each of these major categories of response had several subcategories. The *protest-intolerant* subcategories included *general rejection* of the right to protest, *pseudo-moral justifications* for denying a right to protest, arguing in favor of *supporting troops or the government*, applying *negative labels* to protests and protestors, making *disadvantageous comparisons* of protest with presumably better behaviors such as obedience, *denying personal responsibility* for governmental aggression, *distorting the consequences* of protesting, and *dehumanizing* either the protestors or the targets of governmental aggression. There were also several *protest-tolerant* subcategories, including *social justification*, *moral responsibility*, and *humanization*. There were also two other coding categories for the protest items – *indeterminate status* and *perceived reality*. For a fuller description and examples of these coding categories, see the introductory chapter to the protest section of this book.

The coding categories for responses to the scenario in which police were attacking nonviolent protestors were designed to address as much as possible Bandura's emphasis on the role of agency in moral conduct while also reflecting the fact that some of the responses to the scenarios seemed to show agency in the service of disengagement. We first identified three types of responses: (a) *prosocial agency*, (b) *antisocial agency*, and (c) *lack of agency*. The *prosocial agency* category included the following subcategories: (a) *critical judgments of police*, (b) *personal initiative*, and (c) *institutional initiative*. Some responses could be coded only for *general personal disengagement*. The *antisocial agency* category included subcategories for (a) *support for police*, (b) *unlawful activism*, and (c) *actions against the demonstrators*. A much more extensive discussion, with examples, of all coding categories and subcategories for the right to protest and achieving peace items can be found in the introductory chapter in the section on perspectives on protest.

We also used concepts from Bandura's moral disengagement and engagement theory in

developing a coding manual for two items designed to assess thinking regarding the achievability of peace: (a) "I believe that world peace can be achieved" and "The best way to achieve world peace is: ...". For an extensive discussion, with examples, of all coding categories and subcategories for the achieving peace items, see the introductory chapter in the section on perspectives on the achievability of peace.

The Final Coding Process

As the Core Group developed these coding manuals on an ever-expanding international coding manual sample, it made the coding manuals available to the International Group. The International Group was invited to conduct their own deductive qualitative analysis (i.e., an analysis informed by Bandura's theory) or to use the Core Group's manuals for coding the data. We did not want to be restrictive in regard to any group member's coding, but rather to encourage them to use consistent category labels when discussing the same or similar types of arguments. The Core Group also offered to do the coding of the responses from any country, as long as they had been translated into English or could be translated by a member of the Core Group.

As previously noted, coding manuals were developed and refined by the local group and shared with the international team members. Each of the four sections of this book focuses on the responses to a particular set of items (definitions, protest, apology and reconciliation, and the achievability of peace); coding of the responses for each section was conducted by a team assigned to that section under the supervision of the team leader for that section. All coding was done by at least one team member and then reviewed by the team leader; in the case of the four countries for which responses to one set of questions were coded by an investigator from that country, a random sample of the coded responses was coded independently by the team leader for that section and feedback was provided until the international team member was completely reliable.

This Volume

The first chapter in each of the four sections of this volume (definitions of peace and reconciliation; perspectives on the right to protest, perspectives on apology and reconciliation, and beliefs concerning the achievability of peace) describes the coding system and variable formation process for all the chapters in that section. Each introductory methods chapter is followed by eight regional chapters and then a final integrative chapter for the section. The eight regions considered in each section of the book are: Western Europe, the UK/Anglo countries (Great Britain, Northern Ireland, the United States, Canada, and Australia), Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, the Middle East including the Gulf states, Africa, Latin America, South and Southeast Asia, and East Asia. In each regional chapter, the lead author provides a historical and political context for the survey findings presented in that chapter. The findings typically take the form of first a description of the distribution of responses across the major coding categories and then the results of some simple exploratory analyses (mostly nonparametric) designed to identify possible differences in response patterns based on demographic variables such as gender, participation in the military, religion, and nationality. Because we cannot assume that our samples are representative of the population in the regions studied for this book, it should not be assumed that our exploratory findings can be generalized to those populations. Our emphasis is always on the qualitative responses, as they provide the most direct access to the thoughts and feelings, the arguments and motivations, the fears and goals of our diverse sample of men and women from around the world.

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Part I

Definitions of Peace and Reconciliation

Definitions of Peace and Reconciliation

2

Elizabeth Claggett-Borne

“It cannot be said that humans are innately peaceful or aggressive,” argued Elise Boulding, a founder of the peace studies field in the United States (Boulding, 1998, third paragraph). In her view, both peaceful and aggressive behaviors flourish, but the shaping of children’s attitudes in different cultures determines how peacefully or violently the country handles conflicts. Moreover, she contended, “Society contains in itself resources that can shift the balance from a preoccupation with violence toward peaceful problem-solving behavior” (Boulding, eighth paragraph). What insights can people residing in different countries give us into this quintessential quest for peace in our time?

Social science researchers appear to have devoted much more attention to war and other forms of aggression than to issues of peace and reconciliation, yet the achievement of peace may be essential to human survival. Attention to international reconciliation is rapidly developing and integral to the pursuit of peace. Human fallibilities have inflicted gross pain and shame on entire peoples. Atrocities have been committed and denied, genocide happens, apologies are slow to transmit, and reconciliation often resisted. Yet warring parties have reached peace agreements and in many cases have achieved reconciliation – as was true of the Western European nations following World War II. Probably most people would

agree that peace and reconciliation are desirable goals, yet what is meant by these terms?

In this first section of the book, we report on definitions of peace and reconciliation from eight major regions of the world, involving 47 different countries. This chapter has several purposes: to address the historical context for peace and reconciliation, to offer some standard definitions of the words reconciliation and peace, and to explain the methods used in coding definitions of peace and reconciliation from our international sample. Lastly, this chapter addresses the importance of research on peace and reconciliation in helping to transform the world out from paralyzing violence.

Background

Peace and Reconciliation in the Last 100 Years

The Path Toward Peace

In the twentieth century, world citizens and world leaders strode forward in their understanding of peace. A petite, dark-skinned lawyer, often seen walking with a cane, rocked the world and spelled the demise of the British Empire. Mohandas Gandhi reconfigured human understanding of peace, with novel ideas for overcoming tyranny without bloodshed. Peace in action reached a pinnacle. In the northern hemisphere, Bertha Suttner, popular author of *Die Waffen nieder* (Down With Arms), persuaded Alfred Nobel to endow the

E. Claggett-Borne (✉)
Alternatives to Violence Project, Friends Meeting,
Cambridge, MA, USA

Nobel Peace Prizes, starting in 1901. An international peace conference was held at The Hague in 1907 with representatives from 44 countries from Europe, North and South America, and Asia. An organized army of tireless peacebuilders created libraries, advocated for diplomacy, and held congresses for at least 20 years until 1914. To wrestle with international conflicts, a shining example of popular insistence on negotiation occurred in 1905: Norway and Sweden peacefully separated despite threats of war from both governments. Then, in 1917, Europeans glowingly declared WWI as “the war to end all wars.” Hopes of world peace were dashed just 20 years later, as the Nazi power machine undertook conquest of Germany’s neighbors.

Although historians and scientists have frequently conceptualized peace simply as the opposite of war, Johan Galtung (1969, 1996) has urged people for 50 years to see equitable distribution of resources (positive peace) as just as important as stopping bloody conflicts (negative peace). After the aborted League of Nations (1920) and the end of WWII (1945), international diplomacy and conventions against war and abuse of power proliferated with monumental events such as the birth of the United Nations (1945); India’s non-violent independence from Great Britain (1947); the UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948); Geneva Conventions of humane treatment (1949); UNESCO’s Culture of Peace Program (1980s); and the Earth Charter, which extended our understanding of reciprocity to humans living in the natural world. Researchers are briskly adding to our understanding of peace in its myriad colors.

Similarly, in the 1950s and 1960s, sweeping liberation movements throughout Africa overthrew the yoke of colonialism, with the countries of Libya (1951) and Sudan (1956) leading the way. Peace processes in the horn of Africa, former Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe unfolded fitfully and usually painfully. More recently, the Balkan Peninsula sprouted new countries like Montenegro (2006), and in the horn of Africa, new countries like Eritrea (1993) and Southern Sudan (2011) have emerged.

Efforts by the United Nations have contributed to a decline in interstate warfare in the last 60

years; however, the level of civil war (intrastate) increased steadily throughout the Cold War period (1945–1991). In 1991, the Regieringen Institute calculated that there were over 50 armed conflicts, whereas by 2003 the numbers were down to 32 (Butaug et al., 2006).

The Path Toward Reconciliation

In the face of international crimes or any abuse of power, humans tend to push back with penalties or imprisonment. What does modern history offer as an alternative to punishment and retaliation following armed conflict? As illustrated by the failure of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, reconciliation is more than a contract. The International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR) responded to the horrors of WWI with programs of healing and people-to-people diplomacy. IFOR strove to transform social injustice: “There can be no genuine peace without reconciliation. [Reconciliation] transcends ... international law among the States and allows...the people to step in” (Committee on Peace and International Security of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2004, p. 3).

In the last 30 years, the study of reconciliation has arisen out of grassroots initiatives, restorative justice work, and the peace study fields. The 1980s saw many peace walks to establish people-to-people connections in the face of intergovernment hostilities, such as the American-Soviet Peace Walk in 1987–1988. In the 1990s, Reconciliation Walks began, such as the Pilgrimage of the Middle Passage in 1998, which retraced slavery routes in three continents from Massachusetts, USA, to Capetown, South Africa (PBS, Blackside, 2003). In 1990, the International Reconciliation Coalition (IRC) announced a religious call for reconciliation. The IRC sponsored a walk of forgiveness across Europe, 900 years after the first crusade, where thousands of innocent Jewish and Muslim people were massacred (Across Pacific and Asia, n.d.). Some 2,500 people retraced the footsteps of the crusaders for 3 years, walking in apology to Jerusalem: “We renounce greed, hatred and fear, and condemn all violence done in the name of Jesus Christ” (International Reconciliation Coalition, 1998, p. 1). Abdel Mounim Ariss, mayor of Beirut,

received a framed copy of the Reconciliation Walk apology in Arabic in a meeting with the team of participants on September 8. “I personally thank you for what you have started,” Mounim Ariss said. “I hope you are received well all throughout the Middle East. It is high time we had a world without bloodshed. Maybe this message will encourage leaders to make a healthy world that is safe for our children” (Reconciliation Walk, 1998, lines 5–6).

Since 1990, the UN has promoted reconciliation with two International Decades of the World’s Indigenous People. The UN promotes reconciliation through UNICEF, UNESCO, the Geneva Convention, and UN Peacebuilding Commission. The UN offers mechanisms to carry reconciliation forward. Two examples are formal apologies from governments that had forcibly removed children from their homes (Australia, Canada) and countries that had eradicated ethnic languages, religions, and culture (Japan). Truth commissions, mediation, and sports or music camps are among the efforts undertaken to address the trauma experienced by victims of war, with the goal of bringing former opponents together.

Since the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was created in 1995 under charismatic Bishop Desmond Tutu, as many as 20 other such commissions have been formed in other countries in response to domestic strife. South Africa’s commission allowed incentives to be used to give voice to the perpetrators. These reconciliation projects encourage members of both parties to gather within a contained space so as to learn about each other’s pain and fears in a context of at least a minimum level of trust

Because justice is integral to reconciliation, truth commissions that allow impunity for perpetrators in the interest of hearing the truth may be flawed. When heinous acts of terror or apartheid draw little redress to the offenders and no steps against governments that assailed human rights, survivors and their kin can feel ill-used. Nevertheless, according to Lind (2009), “Strategies of reconciling are unpalatable in many ways – yet are wise from the standpoint of international reconciliation.” Reconciliation is born out of sweat and hope and is carried out by many hands.

Reconciliation, as generally conceived today, is not surrender and is more than arbitration between enemies. It is not a one-way street. The path to peace includes efforts by both sides or all constituents. When achieved, reconciliation permeates all levels of society: dyads, family units, and wider communities. Reconciliation on the world stage can be powerful: In South Africa, Nelson Mandela cooperated with his rival F.W. DeKlerk in 1990; in Israel, Meacham Begin shook hands with Palestinian Yasser Arafat in 1993; in Ireland, Gerry Adams from the IRA and Ian Paisley from Northern Ireland signed the Good Friday Agreement in 2007.

Conventional Definitions of Peace

One of the major definitions of peace in the Merriam-Webster online dictionary (2011) is “tranquility; freedom from civil disturbance; a state of security or order within a community provided for by law or custom.” Sociologist Elise Boulding, who helped develop the concept of the culture of peace, described peace as when “humans live together nonviolently, creatively, fulfilling all the potentials.” Boulding (2000, p. 55) promoted the possibility that humanity can learn to grow “without compulsion and oppression” with one another. According to the World Government of World Citizens (2011, definition 7), peace is the “result of a codified social contract between equally sovereign humans living in the same geographical environment.”

Conventional Definitions of Reconciliation

The study of reconciliation has seen considerable growth, arising in the last 30 years out of the field of conflict resolution. John Paul Lederach (1999), a Mennonite scholar in peace studies, identifies four components of reconciliation: truth, justice, mercy, and peace. The Merriam-Webster online dictionary (2011) simply defines reconciling as “to restore to friendship or harmony.”

Reconciliation invites both parties to reach further than arbitration. “It transcends ...international law among the States and allows...the people to step in. ...There can be no genuine peace without reconciliation. Over the past years, reconciliation has tended to become an inescapable political and legal process” (Mongbe & del Picchia, 2004, pp. 2–3). Reconciliation appears to be most successful when achieved through a multifaceted strategy, including (a) mutual recognition, (b) making peace, (c) mediation, (d) establishing joint institutions, (e) justice, (f) remembrance, and (g) conducting joint projects (Mongbe & del Picchia).

Many researchers anchor reconciliation to peace. Joseph Maïla from the University for Peace defined reconciliation as the crowning achievement of peace. “It aims not to resolve the conflict but to go beyond it. It implies that rights are recognised but all the same, goes further, for its ultimate objective is to achieve an appeased society which recognises free and equal individuals able to confront a history marred by violence, and above all, overcome that history... Reconciliation goes hand in hand with forgiveness” (Mongbe & del Picchia, 2004, p. 2).

Although there are some differences in conventional views on peace and reconciliation, there are not huge divergences – probably the most significant one is between positive and negative views of peace. To what extent do ordinary people from very different countries and regions around the world define peace and reconciliation in relatively conventional terms? Do some of them conceptualize peace in positive peace terms, involving fairness, equality, etc.? Do others conceptualize peace as the absence of war or other forms of aggression? Do any of them define peace and reconciliation in unique ways? These are the questions to be addressed in the chapters in this section of the book.

Sample and Procedures

Respondents to the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos,

& You, 2006) were recruited by members of the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP) through many different approaches, including personal networking and posting of the survey link on a number of organizational sites. Participants completed either a paper copy of the survey or an online version. Our sample was a nonrepresentative convenience sample; as such, results cannot be assumed to be generalizable to the populations of the geographical regions.

The total global sample consisted of 5,000 adults from 47 countries, which we have organized into eight regional groupings for the purpose of this book: (a) Africa, including Angola, Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, and Zambia; (b) South/Southeast Asia, including India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka; (c) East Asia, including China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan; (d) Latin America, including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Peru; (e) the Middle East, including Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates; (f) Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, including Russia, Greece, Serbia, and Slovenia; (g) Western Europe, including France, Germany, Iceland, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden; and (h) United Kingdom/Anglo countries, including Australia, Canada, Great Britain, North Ireland, and the United States.

We collected basic demographic information from each respondent, although not all respondents replied to all items. In order to explore the possibility that definitions of peace and reconciliation varied as a function of some relevant demographic characteristics, we conducted some basic chi-square analyses to determine if definitions varied in relation to (a) gender, (b) military service, (c) having a close relative who served in the military, and (d) participation in at least one protest activity.

The Coding Process

A grounded theory approach was used to create coding systems for the participants’ definitions of

peace and reconciliation. Grounded theory (Clarke, 2003; Gilgun, 2005; Glaser, 1978) is a type of research method used with qualitative verbal material. Grounded theory researchers begin the coding process trusting that themes will emerge from the data in an inductive fashion (Charmaz, 2006). Grounded theory offers an approach to “build rather than test theory” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p.13).

The definitions of peace and reconciliation coded for in the chapters in this section were derived from responses to the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison et al., 2006), developed by a group based in Boston University, the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP). The survey included a section asking participants to provide definitions of a number of key terms, including “peace” and “reconciliation.”

Using the grounded theory approach, we derived coding categories from a diverse international coding manual sample that included several hundred definitions of peace and reconciliation from almost all of the countries contributing survey responses to the project. After reading, rereading, and sorting all codeable units within the definitions into thematic categories, GIPGAP members identified several major categories, as well as subcategories. For example, definitions of peace that cast some doubt as to whether peace was something that could be achieved were sorted into a major category that we called *question of achievability* and two subcategories that we labeled *unattainable* and something to *strive for*. The manuals were continually revised, with subcategories being added and combined until we established a final version that we could apply to a new set of responses with good intercoder reliability; it was this manual we used for the current study. All responses (codeable units) were independently coded by at least two coders and checked by a team leader.

As mentioned, definitional responses were segmented into separate units of meaning labeled codeable units, and each of these units received a code. In any particular answer to the request for definitions, we identified the smallest meaningful

units, which could range from a single word to a lengthy phrase. For example, one person defined peace as “serenity,” which is a single unit coded into a subcategory labeled *tranquility*. Another participant offered a more complex answer, saying that peace is “a time of no war and justice prevailing.” This answer has two codeable units: (a) “a time of no war,” which is coded into the *rejecting violence* category, and (b) “justice prevailing,” coded into a category for *prerequisites for peace*. Throughout the chapter, the terms “response” and “definition” are used to refer both to complete answers and to single codeable units.

Furthermore, the categories and subcategories for each of the major categories were added together to create superordinate categories that were scored for presence or absence (1 = presence, 0 = absence). That is, if a response was coded into any of the categories or subcategories within a major category, the response received a 1 for the superordinate category. The name of the variables created through these procedures was the name of the major category followed by the word “presence.” For example, if a response was coded for either *general question of achievability/ideal*, *unattainable*, *strive for*, or *spiritual/God*, it also received a score of 1 in the *question of achievability/ideal presence* category. This procedure allowed us to determine whether there were group differences not just in the individual subcategories of a major category, where the frequencies were often rather small, but determine whether there were group differences in the set of subcategories considered as a whole.

Coding System for Definitions of Peace

The four major categories of the peace coding manual are *negative peace*, *positive peace*, *question of achievability/ideal*, and *focus on perceived reality*. Except for a few extraneous answers that were identified as *uncodeable*, most responses were coded into one of these major categories or their subcategories. For

example, one definition of peace was “a world of love,” which was coded within the *positive peace* category. Another definition was “a state of order and harmony,” which had two codeable units. “A state of order” was coded within the *positive peace* category and “harmony” was coded for *positive outcomes harmony*.

Negative Peace Definitions

Responses coded into the major category labeled *negative peace* describe peace in terms of what it is not rather than what it is. That is, they define peace as involving the removal, absence, or end of some aggressive act or dangerous situation. One example of a *negative peace* definition is “a state of the mind feeling no danger”.

Within the *negative peace* category, there are five subcategories: *no conflict*, *rejecting violence*, *rejecting terrorism*, *negative emotions*, and *rejecting intimidation*. Responses in the *no conflict* subcategory define peace as the absence of conflict without specifically mentioning violence. One example of a *no conflict* response is “living amicably without disturbances.” Responses that define peace as the end of violence were coded into the *rejecting violence* subcategory, which includes responses defining peace as the absence of fighting. Two examples of *rejecting violence* are “atmosphere of no violence” and “when two fighting factions have put their arms down...”

Another *negative peace* subcategory is *rejecting terrorism* – for example, “the state where war or terrorism is not practiced.” Responses coded into the *negative emotions* subcategory identify peace with the absence of emotions such as fear or feeling threatened; for example, one person said peace is “a condition in which there are no worries in mind.” The last subcategory of the major *negative peace* category is *rejecting intimidation/threat* and is illustrated in a definition indicating that peace is “absence of war or the threat of any physical violence of any sort”; in this response, the second codeable unit was coded for *rejecting of intimidation or threat*.

Positive Peace Definitions

Positive peace is another major category that includes two subcategories as well as numerous tertiary subcategories. The subcategory of *prerequisites for peace* applies to responses describing conditions that must be in place so as to have peace or that lead to peace being achieved. An example of *prerequisites for peace* can be found in the statement that peace “is not only a state of being, it should be an environment that allows a human being to grow to his/her highest potential”.

Within the *prerequisites for peace* subcategory, there are an additional seven subcategories descriptive of the particular prerequisites mentioned with the greatest frequency: (1) *granting of human rights*, (2) *equality*, (3) *acceptance/tolerance*, (4) *democratic participation*, (5) *openness to working toward a mutual goal*, (6) *security*, and (7) *access to resources*. Moreover, within the third subcategory of *acceptance/tolerance*, two more subcategories emerged from analysis of the responses: (a) *understanding* and (b) *solidarity*.

The *granting of human rights* subcategory of *positive peace* includes responses identifying peace with the achievement of human rights; such responses often mention inherent rights to human dignity and to life. Two examples of *granting of human rights* are “liberty to live life” and “a state in which the basic human rights of people are being met...” However, responses that describe structural, legal, institutional, or cultural equality are coded into the *equality* subcategory. Examples of *equality* include “the respect of international human rights for all” and “genuine kindness toward all humans, regardless of color, race, economic, or social background.”

The third *positive peace* subcategory is *acceptance/tolerance*, which includes responses referring to individuals coexisting or getting along with others – for example, “complete agreement, getting along or at the very least indifference toward other countries.” Within the *acceptance/tolerance* subcategory, there are two additional subcategories: (a) *understanding* and (b) *solidarity*. Examples of responses coded for *solidarity* are “everyone respects each other” and “mutual tolerance and/or understanding”.

Table 2.1 Definitions of peace: coding categories and subcategories

I. Negative peace [N]
A. No conflict [NC]
B. Rejecting violence [NV]
C. Rejecting terrorism [NT]
D. Negative emotions [NE]
E. Rejecting intimidation//threat [NI]
II. Positive peace [P]
A. Prerequisites for peace [PP]
1. Granting of human rights [PPHR]
2. Equality [PPE]
3. Acceptance//tolerance [PPT]
a. Understanding [PPTU]
b. Solidarity [PPTS]
4. Democratic participation [PPD]
5. Openness to working toward a mutual goal [PPO]
6. Security [PPS]
7. Access to resources [PPA]
B. Outcomes [PO]
1. Positive emotions [POE]
2. Calm//tranquility [POC]
3. Harmony [POH]
III. Question of achievability//ideal [A]
A. Unattainable [AU]
B. Strive for [AS]
C. Spiritual//God [AG]
IV. Reality [REAL]

Democratic participation, the fourth *positive peace* subcategory included in the *prerequisites for peace* subcategory, applies to definitions focusing on the need for everyone, or the majority of people, to be able to voice their opinions. An example of *democratic participation* is “a state or condition where each citizen can say what he feels about his country.” A fifth subcategory, *openness to working toward a mutual goal*, contains responses identifying peace with open communication and cooperation and allowing groups to work toward a common goal. These responses mention processes designed to address root causes of conflict and solve problems through dialogue, negotiation, reconciliation, and treaties. For example, a respondent said that peace is “a state where conflict arises as it naturally does, but is solved around a table.” The sixth subcategory is *security*. These responses identify peace with a sense of security. Two examples are “one can live

in comfortable zone” and “a secure condition; in an individual’s case, a state in which there is satisfaction psychologically, physically, financially, and bodily.” One final subcategory within the *prerequisites for peace* subcategory is *access to resources*. For example, one respondent said peace is “justice, equality, and optimum conditions for human development.” In this example, the last phrase is coded *access to resources*.

In addition to *prerequisites for peace*, a second subcategory of *positive peace* definitions emerged for responses focusing on *outcomes* – that is, definitions mentioning the results of having peace or characteristics of a culture of peace (e.g., “everyone feels happy”). Responses identifying peace with the freedom to do something are coded into the *outcomes* subcategory, which has three subcategories: (a) *positive emotions* (e.g., “can love each other freely”), (b) *calm/tranquility* (e.g., serenity), and (c) *harmony* (e.g., “period of harmony and equilibrium”) (Table 2.1).

Other Major Coding Categories for Definitions of Peace

The major category *question of achievability/ideal* includes responses focusing on how attainable peace is or describes peace as an ideal. Three examples of *question of achievability/ideal* are “a dream in which everything is rose colored,” “unimaginable,” and “Good!” Within this major category are three subcategories: *unattainable*, which describes peace as never achievable; something to *strive for*, which describes peace as something that should be sought; and *spiritual/God*, for responses identifying religion or God as important to achieving peace. Responses such as “never” or “impossible” are coded into the *unattainable* subcategory. Examples of responses coded into the subcategory *strive for* include “we all need peace for the success of each country and everyone” and “something that humans should have and want to keep.” In the subcategory, *spiritual/God*, a typical example is “something attainable only by the wisest and spiritual beings”.

Responses in the fourth and last major category, which has no subcategories, focus on

perceived reality – that is, they refer to some sort of real-world situation as perceived by the participant rather than directly defining peace. Some examples are “Costa Rica” or “what we have now, the way we are living in Egypt today.” A small number of responses that were bizarre or inexplicable were labeled *uncodeable*.

Coding System for Definitions of Reconciliation

Developing a coding system for PAIRTAPS definitions of reconciliation was challenging due to a high level of diverse definitions. Nevertheless, based on responses from the international coding manual sample, we identified several strong themes in the reconciliation definitions, yielding five major coding categories: (a) *process*, (b) *state*, (c) *human characteristic*, (d) *future orientation*, and (e) *question of achievability/ideal*. Responses coded for a focus on *process* identify steps needed to address past conflicts. Those coded for *state* identify reconciliation as an end product. Some responses simply identified reconciliation as a *human characteristic*. The *future orientation* category is for responses suggesting that reconciliation involves a continuation of relationships into the future. Finally, responses coded as *question of achievability/ideal* imply that reconciliation is an ideal that may or may not be attainable.

Definition of Reconciliation as Process

Responses in the *process* category define reconciliation as a process needed to reach the end of hostilities. An example is “working things out.” Within the *process* major category are nine subcategories: (a) *move on*, (b) *engage in apology and forgiveness*, (c) *make reparations/compensations*, (d) *resolve/fix*, (e) *recognize/acknowledge/respect*, (f) *come to terms/agreement/compromise/negotiate*, (g) *reach understanding*, (h) *unite*, and (i) *undertake prevention/preventing*. Some of these subcategories are

Table 2.2 Definitions of reconciliation: coding categories and subcategories

I. Process
A. Move on
1. Active
B. Apologize and forgive
1. Without forgetting
C. Make reparations/compensations
D. Resolve/fix
1. Make amends
E. Recognize/acknowledge/respect
F. Come to terms/agreement/compromise/negotiate
G. Reach understanding
H. Unite
1. Healing/reuniting
2. Building new relationship with former enemy
I. Prevent future violence or conflict
II. State
A. Peace
B. End of conflict/violence/hostilities
C. Positive emotional state
III. Human characteristic
IV. Future orientation
V. Question of achievability/ideal
A. Strive for

divided further into a third-level subcategory (Table 2.2).

Move on defines reconciliation as the act of putting something behind you or forgetting the problem. An example in this category is “setting aside the past.” Within the *move on* subcategory is a third-level subcategory *active*, which describes reconciliation as a deliberate act of moving on. Two examples of the *active* subcategory are “agreement to ‘forget the past’” and “when people/countries try to forget their grudges”.

A second *process* subcategory is for all definitions using the term *apology* and/or *forgiveness*. Two examples are “forgiving past grievances” and “apologizing and asking forgiveness.” A subset of *apology and forgiveness* responses were coded into a third-level subcategory called *without forgetting*, for responses explicitly separating forgiving from forgetting – for example, “perhaps forgive but not forget”.

A third subcategory under the major category *process* is for references to *reparations/*

compensations. These responses refer to the provision of reparations or compensations for past wrongs or injuries committed. Examples include “repayment for misconduct” and “compensation, including (not necessarily all of the following) money, labor, and aid”.

A fourth subcategory, *resolve/fix*, includes responses identifying reconciliation with an effort to rectify problems between disputing parties. Some examples are “Participants in disagreement find a solution that solves the disagreement.” or “making things better.” Within the *resolve/fix* subcategory, there is a third-level subcategory, *make amends*, for responses that explicitly include the word “amends” – for example, “to make amends for past wrongs” and “amends are made for the damage caused”.

The fifth subcategory, *recognize/acknowledge/respect*, is for responses describing reconciliation as a process of acknowledging, recognizing, or respecting the issues that led to the need for reconciliation. One good example of this subcategory is “recognizes one country’s crime or accusation.” A further subcategory within the *recognize/acknowledge/respect* subcategory is for responses specifying arrangements to be made toward the goal of reconciliation that involve reducing demands or changing positions. Examples of responses in this third-level subcategory, labeled *come to terms/agreement/compromise/negotiate*, are “exchange of talks and give and take” and “conclusion to outstanding conflict through compromises”.

A sixth subcategory of *process* responses is *understanding*, for definitions focused on understanding or knowing the other party. Examples include “understanding between different countries that have been in a situation of conflict in the past” and “when two opposing groups come to understand one another”.

The seventh *process* subcategory is *uniting*, which includes responses that describe a restoration of the former relationship or a new start among disparate parties. Two examples of this category are “return to the old status” and “a new beginning.” The subcategory of *uniting* has two tertiary-level subcategories within it: *healing/reuniting* refers to restoring a formerly construc-

tive relationship and *building new relationship with former enemy* refers to an improved relationship between two former opponents.

Finally, the eighth *process* subcategory is *prevention/preventing*, which describe reconciliation as a process designed to prevent future violence. “The process toward inner peace, also preventing things happening again in the future,” and “prevention of future conflicts” are two examples of *prevention/preventing*.

Definition of Reconciliation as an Achieved State

The second major coding category is for definitions defining reconciliation as a *state*, which includes responses referring to the end of the process or the end of conflict or the achievement of peace. An example of a response coded for *state* is “conclusion of an unsettled situation.” Within the *state* category, there are three subcategories: (a) *peace*, (b) *end of conflict/violence/hostilities*, and (c) *emotional state*. Coded within *peace* are responses mentioning the regaining of peace or restoring or earning peace without specifying the process for reaching this state. Two examples of responses in the *peace* subcategory are “a return to peace” and “action of peace.” *End of conflict/violence/hostilities* is another subcategory of the *state* category and applies to definitions portraying reconciliation as the end of violence such as “the official ending of hostilities” or “ending the fight.” Definitions in the *emotional state* subcategory identify reconciliation with the achievement of a positive emotion such as “joy” and “good will”.

Other Reconciliation Coding Categories

Another major coding category into which the definitions of reconciliation fell is *human characteristic*; these responses indicated that reconciliation is inherent in our human condition – for example, “human nature.” A fifth major category is *future orientation*; these definitions portray reconciliation as an ongoing process that continues

into the future. Examples are “a long-term, ongoing healing processes” and “committing itself to desisting from any such harmful acts in the future.” The sixth major category, *question of achievability/ideal*, is for responses expressing doubts about the achievability of reconciliation or describing it as an “ideal” or “a utopia.” *Strive for* is a subcategory within the *question of achievability/ideal* category; examples of *strive for* responses include “efforts should always be directed in this direction,” “an absolute goal of humankind,” and “the best way toward peace.”

Summary

Section Structure and Limitations

This chapter provides an orientation to the first of the four major sections of this volume, namely, the definitions of peace and reconciliation. The following eight chapters summarize research findings related to definitions of peace and reconciliation within each of eight regions. This study, like all studies, has limitations, including the limited selection of countries within each region, restricted and varied sample sizes, and selection of participants through various nonrandom methods. Consequently, results should be interpreted with caution and not be generalized to populations as a whole. On the other hand, the chapters in this section offer a unique opportunity to consider the extent to which ordinary people across very diverse regions define peace and reconciliation in similar or divergent ways and to consider the extent to which their definitions vary in relation to characteristics such as gender, military experience, and involvement in protest.

Implications

PAIRTAPS is designed to provide respondents with a forum to share their perspectives and reasoning pertaining to complex and pressing socio-political issues of the present day, including peace and reconciliation. Leaders seeking reconcilia-

tion desire to understand the parties' priorities in the reconciliation process. These chapters partially address the following questions: Do ordinary people tend to associate reconciliation with reparations or with acknowledgement of past damages? Do they envision reconciliation as a process of negotiation or prevention? As we search for sustainable peace, can reconciliation lead us toward justice? Is it more useful to shift perceptions of peace away from complete tranquility to an achievement that ordinary people can see as attainable?

Nelson Mandela, in his 1994 inaugural address as president of South Africa, provides a model of hope for peace and reconciliation:

Out of the experience of an extraordinary human disaster that lasted too long, must be born a society of which all humanity will be proud... We, the people of South Africa, feel fulfilled that humanity has taken us back into its bosom, ... we, who were outlaws not so long ago. The time for healing of the wounds has come. The time to build is upon us. We have, at last, achieved our political emancipation. We commit ourselves to the construction of a complete, just and lasting peace. We pledge ourselves to liberate all our people from the continuing bondage of poverty, deprivation, suffering, gender, and other discrimination. We must therefore act together as a united people, for national reconciliation, for nation building, for the birth of a new world. Never, never, and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the oppression of one by another... The sun shall never set on so glorious a human achievement.

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Definitions of Peace and Reconciliation in Western Europe

3

Mathilde Salmberg, Kathryn O'Keefe, Sarah An,
Carla Machado[†], Silja Bara Omarsdottir,
Michael Corgan, Mariana Barbosa, Julia König,
Elizabeth Leembruggen-Kallberg,
and Christine Roland-Levy

Definitions of Peace and Reconciliation in Western Europe

This chapter considers definitions of peace and reconciliation within samples of ordinary people from six European countries. In an effort to explore these concepts from different cultural perspectives, we start by providing an overview of major conflicts in the area, a discussion of what prompted the conflicts, and a consideration of how peace and/or reconciliation was or was

not achieved following the end of the conflicts. Thereafter, we discuss the definitions of peace and reconciliation provided by respondents from the countries of France, Germany, Iceland, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. All participating countries described in this chapter are members of the European Union (EU) and have therefore relinquished partial sovereignty to the EU, except for Iceland, which is currently a candidate for membership. Also, all countries except Sweden are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

M. Salmberg (✉)
Clinical Psychologist, Washington, DC, USA
e-mail: msalmberg@mail.com

K. O'Keefe
Friendship Charter School, Washington, DC, USA

S. An
Department of Psychology, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA

C. Machado
Department of Psychology, Minho University, Braga,
Portugal (Deceased)

S.B. Omarsdottir
Institute of International Affairs and Center for Small
State Studies, University of Iceland, Vesturbær, Reykjavik,
Iceland
e-mail: bo@hi.is

M. Corgan
Department of International Relations,
Boston University, Boston, MA, USA
e-mail: mcorgan@bu.edu

Historical Context and Background

Western Europe has a history plagued by military conflicts followed by peaceful periods of various

M. Barbosa
Universidade Catolica Portuguesa, Lisbon, Portugal
e-mail: mbarbosa@porto.ucp.pt

J. König
Lehrstuhl für Klinische Psychologie
und Psychotherapie, Munchen, Germany
e-mail: koenig.julia@gmx.net;
julia.koenig@psy.lmu.de

E. Leembruggen-Kallberg
Webster University, Leiden, Netherlands
e-mail: dr.elisabeth.leembruggen@gmail.com

C. Roland-Levy
Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne,
Paris, France
e-mail: Christine.Roland-Levy@univ-reims.fr

lengths. Europe has paradoxically been both the scene for the most destructive wars in history and the region with the longest lasting peace (Blanning & Overy, 2000). Western Europe's remarkable history has unquestionably shaped peoples' perceptions of the meaning of peace and reconciliation.

Historically, Europe and Western Europe relentlessly pursued imperialism by going to war domestically and abroad. Europeans tended to regard war as an accepted means to achieve progress and in some cases even as a glamorous part of their history. As violent conflict was considered a rightful and essential means for conflict resolution and advancement, it is not surprising that war and expansionism frequented Western European political agendas (Black, Helmreich, Helmreich, Issawi, & McAdams, 1992). Britain was a pioneering extra-European imperialist in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. France, Spain, and Portugal pursued similar policies, as all had interests around the world (Polley, 2000).

In the twentieth century, competitive pressures among European countries resulted in a conflict between Serbia and Austria-Hungary that opened the gates to World War I (WWI) (1914–1918). The involvement of major world powers and modern arms led to a tremendously costly and lengthy war (Cook & Stevenson, 2005). Trench warfare caused fatalities on a previously unimaginable scale. For example, on the very first day of the Battle of the Somme, Britain lost 25,000 men (Millis, 1956). When the war came to an end, the major empires had left Europe disintegrated. The Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires were broken into smaller states, German and Russian territories significantly diminished, and even the victors of the war suffered tremendous economic, material, and emotional losses. Although WWI contributed to the creation of the Soviet Union, the power balance in the world remained relatively unchanged, with European countries continuing to be the world's major political and military powers.

Despite the fact that many European countries maintained their positions as world powers after WWI, an important change in the attitudes of the European people occurred. An essential aspect of what seemed to shape the mindset of Europeans was the contrast between the idealistic outlook before the war and its actual outcome. Europe

was shaken to its core by the war's magnitude and intensity. The initial optimism, coupled with the destructiveness of the conflict, created an overwhelming yearning for peace. In 1919, allies met to discuss and establish a peace settlement, the Treaty of Versailles. The treaty established the League of Nations, whose overall purpose was to promote peace and security in the region (Black et al., 1992). The League of Nations was successful in many regards but of limited effectiveness in others. The League of Nations succeeded in starting international discussions of issues, acted as a precursor to the United Nations (UN), and founded several international organizations such as the Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, the Court of International Justice, and the International Labor Organization. A significant portion of the work of these groups was carried on by the UN, which replaced the League of Nations in 1946. Problems with the League of Nations were partly due to the varying governing styles of different member states. Because unanimity was required for decisions, controversial decisions proved difficult to negotiate. Many member states also refused to cede sovereignty for the success of the international order. Although smaller states were generally more optimistic, larger nations like Britain and France cooperated only as long as the organization held no real power. Due to the League of Nations' lack of enforcement authority, larger states were less likely to abide by decisions with which they disagreed (Gardiner, 2010). Other problems included the rejection of a proposal to establish a peacekeeping force, the refusal of the United States Senate to permit the United States to join the League of Nations, and the lack of compliance of member states with disarmament recommendations (except for Germany, for which it was mandatory). In an effort to ensure Germany's compliance with disarmament, an Allied Control Commission oversaw the process of restricting Germany to an army of 100,000 in peace; disallowing general staff or offensive weapons, fortification, or aircraft; and requiring the dismantling of military facilities and destruction of weapons. However, in response to these restrictions, Germany established an air force (Blanning & Overy, 2000).

Not only did the USA decline membership in the League of Nations, but it also rejected the Treaty of Versailles and created separate treaties with individual states such as Germany, Austria, and Hungary to end WWI. Three types of directives were established in the agreements of the USA, Britain, France, and Italy with their former adversaries. These directives asserted that some states were unable to govern themselves and needed counsel from “enlightened” societies; this was a revised version of colonialist doctrine. Britain and France took over most areas of interest, the majority of the Middle East went to Britain, and Japan took control of a number of Pacific Islands, all German colonies in Korea and China, and parts of Manchuria.

Because Germany, Italy, and Japan were members of the League of Nations and therefore had veto powers, the League was powerless to take any action during the 1930s when each of these states violated the principles of the League of Nations. When Japan occupied parts of China and Manchuria, this violent action incited condemnation, but no other response from the League of Nations. Italy annexed Ethiopia in 1937 under Mussolini’s leadership and occupied Albania in 1939. Again, neither invasion resulted in action from the League of Nations. Similarly, Germany frequently defied the League of Nations through its actions, with no actual consequences. Japan gave notice of its intention to withdraw from the League of Nations in 1933, followed by Germany in 1935, and Italy in 1937 (Gardiner, 2010). These defections further reduced the possibility of any restraining influence from the League of Nations on the aggressive policies of these nations.

Following the end of WWI, Europe sought not only to disarm the losing states in order to avoid future conflicts but also to find leaders who would pledge to provide necessities for their countries as opposed to grandiose futures. Previous concerns for voting rights were replaced by concerns for the essentials in life, thus opening Europe to authoritarian influences. Black et al. (1992) contended that Europe’s disillusionment following the war was directly proportional to the continent’s absolute certainty of its own manifest destiny prior to the war. A powerful sense of loss, coupled with the exorbitant death toll, plagued

Europe. This devastation and the difficulty of adjusting to a new way of life left citizens feeling bitter about the past and cynical concerning the future, attitudes that allowed emerging authoritarian political movements to gain momentum. Fascism, which arose in post WWI Italy under Benito Mussolini, disregarded democracy and promoted a one-party state where the purpose of the people was to serve the state. At the same time in Germany, the National Socialism movement became increasingly recognized. With Adolph Hitler making promises to override the disastrous consequences of the war, the Nazi party gained popularity.

Hitler’s leadership and expansionist foreign policy ignited World War II (WWII). Europe was divided into an extreme right with Germany and Italy, an extreme left with the Communist Soviet Union, and a parliamentary center with France and Britain. WWII quickly took on global dimensions that deeply affected countless lives (Black et al., 1992). More than 41 million civilians died, more than in any previous war. Civilians were deliberately targeted by bombers in Europe and the Pacific. Whereas in WWI, a majority of the war was fought over approximately 100 miles of territory, the conflict of WWII engulfed virtually every continent; even neutral countries, such as Switzerland, were either invaded or attacked in some capacity.

Technological advances in arms production (e.g., aircraft carriers, tanks, and submarines) between WWI and WWII were significant, especially considering the relatively brief time between the wars. Ultimately the world’s most destructive weapon, the atomic bomb, was developed in the United States and dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 (Millis, 1956).

Even though historic moments are often motivated by economic and material factors, the end of WWII was also driven by the leaders and their unique personal characteristics. Hitler and Mussolini met repeatedly, but the meetings were largely irrelevant because of Hitler’s upper hand after 1937. Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt also met on several occasions, in addition to meeting twice with Joseph Stalin. The meetings were important because of Churchill’s belief in his ability to sway the other leaders.

The meetings between Churchill and Roosevelt in 1942 and 1943 prevented a second front in Europe and redirected it to action in North Africa. While Churchill was in charge, he was able to convince Roosevelt to relocate to Sicily, and Italian and German troops were removed from Africa (Lukacs, 2011).

With the end of WWII in 1945, Europe was left morally and economically depleted. Europe's long-standing control of global affairs was forced to yield to new world leaders (Black et al., 1992), particularly the United States and the Soviet Union. Europe's involvement in two world wars was followed by 50 years of Cold War, as the superpowers continuously strove to enhance their positions with skirmishes taking place on neither their soil nor Europe's soil. The Cold War ended with the fall of the Soviet Union.

The development of the atomic bomb altered modern war strategies following WWII. American technology became increasingly sophisticated and the Soviet Union aspired to match these advances. Once again, smaller European states were unable to compete because of the resources required to fund such research and development. Britain and France's efforts paled in comparison to that of the Soviet Union and the USA. The disintegration of the allies' relations after the war reinforced the interest in centralizing military strategies around the new technology, which led to the physical and political division of Europe between the USA and the Soviet Union. In 1949, NATO was established with the intent of inhibiting Soviet influence on Europe. This alliance provided continued security for Europe. In the same manner, the Soviet Union allied with Eastern European communist states in 1955 in the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union covered four fifths of the expenses for the Warsaw Pact, while the USA carried almost two thirds of the costs involved in NATO. Tactics shifted from organizing war preparation to preparing for "mutual assured destruction." Aside from smaller conflicts, such as the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and civil conflicts, most Europeans had no personal experience with war at the end of the twentieth century (Blanning & Overy, 2000).

This period of extended peace allowed Europe to recover gradually from its losses and rebuild communities. Countries began the process of integration by establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, currently known as the European Union (EU) which was established in 1950. The aim was to promote peace and stability, in addition to strengthening Europe's financial and political interests. Further progress was made after the Cold War when East and West Germany reunified in 1989 and the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 (Polley, 2000).

At the end of the twentieth century, Europeans generally lived longer and healthier lives, wealth, and urbanization were on the rise, and this prosperity appears to have contributed to reducing violence and conflict (Ferguson, 2006). Western European countries have abstained from engaging in any larger conflicts among themselves since the end of WWII. However, several Western European countries have participated in NATO's initiatives and other forms of mediation in the world. For example, Iraq's attack on Kuwait (1990–1991) prompted France, Spain, Britain, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, and Denmark to contribute military aid, and a number of other Western European countries to back to the coalition in the Persian Gulf War (Peters & Deshong, 1995). Also, a number of Western European NATO members became involved in different capacities in the Balkan war (Polley, 2000). There are many people living in Western Europe today who lived through and remember World War II, its devastating losses, and the difficult period of recovery. There are even more Western Europeans who have lived through decades of relative peace, particularly among the democratic nations. Following the failure of WWI to be the war to end all wars, Western Europeans were depressed and wary of war. Since WWII, previously warring nations have reconciled and joined together in an economic and political union, and they have managed mostly to preserve peace within their region. What then did the terms "peace" and "reconciliation" mean to Western Europeans as they moved through the first decade of the twenty-first century? That was one of the major questions underlying the study we report on in this book.

Methods

Sample

The Western European sample consisted of 357 participants, 13% from France (29 females, 18 males), 24% from Germany (58 females, 28 males), 23% from Iceland (62 females, 21 males), 4% from Portugal (10 females, 4 males), 17% from Spain (33 females, 29 males), and 18% from Sweden (31 females, 32 males, 2 unknown). The age of participants ranged from 18–76 years. Ten percent of the participants reported serving in the military, 55% reported having a relative with military experience, and 54% reported participating in some sort of antiwar protest.

Procedure

All participants in this sample responded to the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Scale (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006). This questionnaire had an open-ended response format and included items asking for personal definitions of key terms such as peace and reconciliation. For the purpose of this chapter, the definitions of these two terms were coded and analyzed.

Responses were coded by using the Definitions of Peace Coding Manual and the Definition of Reconciliation Coding Manual. Each definition was broken down into codeable units, also known as units of meaning, and each unit was categorized according to the relevant manual. Some responses contained multiple, independent units of meaning and thus more than one codeable unit. For example, a definition of peace as “opposite of conflict” has one codeable unit, whereas a definition of reconciliation as “agreement to settle differences and ‘forget’ the past” contains two unique codeable units. For the purpose of our discussion on coding, the terms definition and response are used interchangeably and refer to codeable units within an answer.

Definitions of Peace

Coding Definitions of Peace

The Definitions of Peace Coding Manual and the Definitions of Reconciliation Coding Manual were developed on the basis of grounded theory. The grounded theory approach allows common themes to be identified from the responses, providing the foundation for coding categories (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

The Definitions of Peace Coding Manual includes criteria for coding responses into four main categories, each of which has one or more subcategories. The major categories for definitions of peace are (a) *negative peace*, (b) *positive peace*, (c) *question of achievability/ideal*, and (d) *perceived reality*. Each of these categories included one or more subcategories.

The *negative peace* category applies to responses referring to the removal, absence, or end of a conflict-related process. It has five subcategories, depending on whether peace is identified with (a) *no conflict*, (b) *rejecting violence* (i.e., the end of specific forms of aggression such as war, torture, and fighting), (c) *rejecting terrorism* specifically, (d) the absence of *negative emotions* (e.g., “no worries”), or (e) *rejecting intimidation/threat*.

The *positive peace* category, which has two subcategories, applies to responses focusing on (a) *prerequisites for peace* and (b) *outcomes of peace*. Responses coded for *prerequisites for peace* described conditions that must be met if there is to be peace. Responses coded for *outcomes* mention results stemming from a state of peace or the characteristics of a culture of peace. The subcategories of *prerequisites for peace* are (a) granting of *human rights*, (b) *equality*, (c) *acceptance/tolerance* (with further subcategories for *understanding* and *solidarity*), (d) *democratic participation*, (e) *openness to working toward a mutual goal*, (f) *security*, and (g) *access to resources*. The *outcomes* subcategory has three subcategories: *positive emotions*, *calm/tranquility*, and *harmony*.

Table 3.1 Major coding categories with examples for definitions of peace

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Example
<i>Negative peace</i>					
	40				
Unspecified	2 (5)	Iceland	M	25	“No reason for arguing”
No conflict	4 (10)	Germany	F	18	“No conflicts with other countries or cities”
Rejecting violence	27 (69)	Spain	F	27	“State where violence in general does not exist”
Negative emotions	4 (9)	Germany	M	29	“A condition in which no one has fear for their own life based on the warlike interests which one of the parties had”
<i>Positive peace</i>					
	45				
Unspecified	4 (10)	Iceland	F	26	“People live peacefully”
Prerequisites for peace	6 (14)	Sweden	M	31	“Friendship between countries”
Acceptance/tolerance	6 (13)	France	F	25	“State of equilibrium in relations between countries”
Solidarity	5 (11)	France	M	50	“Mutual respect of states”
Openness to working toward a mutual goal	5 (12)	Sweden	F	72	“Collaboration in good spirit”
<i>Question of achievability/ideal</i>					
	13	Portugal	F	19	“The utopian and ideal state of the world”
Unattainable	1 (5)	France	M	21	“Utopia never realized”
Strive for	5 (39)	Sweden	F	25	“A world where the only killing and suffering existing won’t be because of the human factor”
<i>Perceived reality</i>					
	1	Iceland	M	41	“Normal state of being”

The first number in the percentage column refers to the percent of responses in the specified category or subcategory out of the total set of definitions of peace. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses out of the major category of definitions of peace.

M male, F female

The *question of achievability/ideal* category includes responses that do not explicitly define peace but express doubts concerning its achievability or label it as an ideal. It has three subcategories, which apply to definitions indicating that peace is (a) *unattainable*, (b) something to *strive for*, and (c) something that connotes *spirituality/god*. The fourth category, *perceived reality*, includes responses describing a real-life situation that the responder views as relevant to peace, without defining it. When a response does not fit into any of those categories, it is categorized as *uncodeable*.

Distribution of Definitions of Peace

When asked to provide their definitions of peace, most participants provided responses with multiple codeable units, ranging from 1 to 8, yielding a total of 623 codeable units. Of these total units, 40% were coded into the *negative peace* category.

The most prevalent type of *negative peace* definition was *rejecting violence*, which accounted for 69% of the *negative peace* responses. For example, a 37-year-old woman from Iceland defined peace as a time “when there is no war and no war in the near future.” Ten percent of the negative peace responses fell into the subcategory *no conflict*, which is exemplified by the definition from a 22-year-old French man who said peace is “when there is no conflict between two opponents.” Responses identifying peace with *rejecting intimidation/threat* accounted for 5% of the *negative peace* definitions. As an example, a 53-year-old German woman responded that peace is “the condition in which there is no menace to humans by other humans.” A 37-year-old man from Germany who said that peace is “being able to drink a cappuccino in a street café without fear” provides a good example of a response coded for freedom from *negative emotions*, accounting for 9% of the *negative peace* responses. Table 3.1 provides more examples of

Western European definitions of peace, along with basic demographic information.

Forty-five percent of all the responses to the definition of peace item were coded into the *positive peace* category, the second major category. The most prevalent positive peace subcategory was *prerequisites for peace*, used in 14% of the *positive peace* responses. A response that described conditions that must be met before peace can be achieved came from a 43-year-old Icelandic woman, who defined peace as “the state of being when every ethnicity whatsoever can live in peace.” An example of a response with multiple codeable units was provided by a 43-year-old Spanish woman who described peace as a “state of tranquility where one lives without bothering and without being bothered, solving possible frictions with others in a more intelligent manner,” which was coded as *calm/tranquility*, *acceptance/tolerance*, and *openness to working toward a mutual goal*. *Calm/tranquility*, a subcategory of *outcomes*, comprised 7% of the *positive peace* responses. *Acceptance/tolerance*, a subcategory of *prerequisites for peace*, accounted for 13% of the *positive peace* responses. *Openness to working toward a mutual goal*, another *prerequisites* subcategory, was included in 12% of the *positive peace* responses. A 31-year-old Swedish man described peace as “to live with mutual respect for one another,” which was coded for *solidarity*, a theme found in 11% of the *positive peace* responses. A response from a 24-year-old French woman who said peace is “harmony, well-being, [and] happiness,” was coded for both *harmony* specifically and for other *positive emotions*. Six percent of all *positive peace* responses were coded for *harmony*, while 7% of them were coded for other *positive emotions*. The least prevalent subcategory was *understanding*, accounting for only 1% of the *positive peace* responses.

Thirteen percent of all the definitions of peace were coded into the third major category, *question of achievability/ideal*. The most prevalent theme in this category is a general statement concerning whether peace was achievable or just an ideal, a theme that appeared in 52% of all the *question of achievability/ideal* peace responses. A 33-year-old German man provided an example

of this category when he described peace as “a gift, and great good, unfortunately an unprecedented dream for many.” An example of a response in the *unattainable* subcategory of the *achievability/ideal* category came from a 59-year-old German man who defined peace as “unimaginable: everyone [or] every country in harmony”; responses in the *unattainable* subcategory accounted for 5% of the *question of achievability/ideal* peace responses. An example of a definition portraying peace as something that should be worked toward was illustrated of a 41-year-old Icelandic woman, who defined peace as “something everyone on this planet should live with every day”; this response was coded as *strive for*, accounting for 39% of all the responses coded within the *question of achievability/ideal* peace subcategory. The least prevalent subcategory was *spiritual/god*, used in only 4% of the *question of achievability/ideal* peace responses.

Only five of the definitions of peace were coded for *perceived reality*. As an example, a 50-year-old woman from Iceland defined peace as “a normal state of being.” Only two of the responses definitions of peace item were deemed *uncodeable*.

Exploratory Analyses of Peace Definitions

Chi-square tests were run to assess the extent to which there were statistically significant and marginally significant group differences in definitions of peace. These analyses revealed that proportionately more women than men gave at least one example of a *negative peace* definition as well as at least one example of a *positive peace* definition. Proportionately more protesters than non-protestors also gave at least one example of a *positive peace* definition.

As compared to their counterparts, proportionately more respondents with a military relative defined peace as the absence or end of violence. However, those without a relative in the military were more likely to describe peace as an ideal or focused on the achievability of peace.

Table 3.2 provides significant chi-square results for the definitions of peace.

Table 3.2 Definitions of peace: percentage of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Category	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	χ^2
	Female	Male	
<i>Negative peace presence</i>	60	46	6.62*
<i>Positive peace presence</i>	58	45	5.64*
	Relative military	No relative military	
<i>Negative peace</i>			
Rejecting violence	32	24	5.03*
<i>Question of achievability/ideal presence</i>	17	26	3.90*
	Protector	Non-protector	
<i>Positive peace presence</i>	59	48	4.33*

If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference. “Presence” at the end of the variable name signifies that the participant provided at least one example of a response in at least one of the subcategories of a major category

* $p < 0.05$

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

Definitions of Reconciliation

Coding Definitions of Reconciliation

The Definitions of Reconciliation Coding Manual has five major coding categories, with one or more subcategories each. The major categories apply to responses defining reconciliation as a (a) *process*, (b) *state*, or (c) *human characteristic*, or identifying it with a (d) *future orientation*, or considering it in terms of a (e) *question of achievability/ideal*.

The *process* category has nine subcategories, which are (a) *moving on*, (b) *engaging in apology and forgiveness*, (c) *making reparations/compensations*, (d) *resolving/fixing*, (e) *recognizing/acknowledging/respecting*, (f) *coming to terms/agreeing/compromising/negotiating*, (g) *understanding*, (h) *uniting*, and (i) *preventing future violence*. Four of these nine subcategories have an additional level of subcategories. Specifically, *moving on* has a subcategory for responses indicating that reconciliation is an *active* process. *Apology and forgiveness* has a subcategory called *without forgetting*. *Making amends* is a subcategory within *resolving/fixing*. *Uniting* has two subcategories, which are *healing/reuniting* and *building new relationship with former enemy*.

The second major category, labeled *state*, includes responses mentioning endpoints of a reconciliation process. The *state* category has three subcategories, which are *peace*, *end of conflict*, and *positive emotional state*. The third major category, which is *human characteristic*, has responses that portray reconciliation as being natural to human nature or the human condition. The *future orientation* category has responses that imply an ongoing process that will continue into the future. The *question of achievability/ideal* category, which has one subcategory (*strive for*), includes responses questioning the achievability of reconciliation or describing it as an ideal. Responses that have little to do with reconciliation are considered *uncodeable*.

For more details regarding the coding manual or procedures, please see the introductory methods chapter of Definitions of Peace and Reconciliation in this volume (Chap. 2).

Distribution of Definitions of Reconciliation

The participants’ definitions of reconciliation generally had between 1 and 7 codeable units for a total of 498 codeable units. Out of these 498

Table 3.3 Major coding categories with examples for definitions of reconciliation

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Example
<i>Process</i>	62				
Unspecified	2 (4)	Germany	F	18	"A process that ends conflicts"
Apology and forgiveness	10 (16)	Portugal	F	20	"An apology to another to try to restore the peace"
Recognize/acknowledge/respect	8 (13)	Germany	M	19	"Both sides acknowledging their failures"
Come to terms/agreement/ compromise/negotiate	18 (29)	Iceland	F	43	"A consent where both parties are satisfied"
<i>State</i>	24				
Unspecified	3 (14)	Iceland	F	35	"Perfect balance between two groups"
Peace	5 (20)	Spain	F	28	"To return to a state of peace after a confrontation"
End of conflict	13 (55)	Germany	M	37	"Enduring end of a state of war"
Positive emotional state	3 (11)	France	M	26	"relief, respiration, liberty, serenity"
Human characteristic	0	France	F	20	"A jolt of humanity, the illumination of intelligence"
<i>Future orientation</i>	3	Sweden	F	30	"A wish to move forward"
<i>Question of achievability/ideal</i>	6	Spain	F	30	"Very hard to achieve with so much war"

The first number in the percentage column refers to the percent of responses in the category or subcategory out of the total set of definitions of reconciliation. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the subcategories out of the major category set of definitions of reconciliation

M male, *F* female

codeable definitions of reconciliation, 62% were coded into the *process* category. The most prevalent subcategory was *come to terms/agreement/compromise/negotiate*, which was used in 29% of the *process* reconciliation responses. As an example, a 41-year-old Icelandic woman defined reconciliation as "a solution that is agreeable for both parties."

An example of a response explicitly exemplifying the *apology and forgiveness* subcategory came from an 18-year-old German woman, who defined reconciliation as an "unconditional forgiveness even if the past is a notorious one." The *apology and forgiveness* theme accounted for 16% of all the reconciliation *process* responses. A 22-year-old French man defined reconciliation as "resolving certain problems"; this response was coded for *resolve/fix*, a subcategory that accounted for 7% of all the reconciliation *process* responses. A 29-year-old man from Spain defined reconciliation as a "return to normality," a response that was categorized as *uniting*, a subcategory accounting for 8% of all the reconciliation *process* responses. *Understanding* accounted for only 6% of the reconciliation *process* responses. As an example, a 56-year-old German

man said reconciliation is "the understanding that further conflict does not lead to the solution of the problem." A Swedish participant said reconciliation is "acceptance of previous opposition in war or opinion and a promise to respect, move on, and leave it," which had units codeable for *recognize/acknowledge/respect* and *moving on*. The *recognize/acknowledge/respect* subcategory accounted for 13% of all the reconciliation *process* responses, while *move on* was used in 5% of the *process* responses. Table 3.3 provides more examples of definitions of reconciliation, along with basic demographic information.

Twenty-four percent of all codeable units in the definitions of reconciliation were coded into the *state* category. A 20-year-old German woman said that reconciliation is to "make peace after a war/conflict"; this response was coded as both *peace* and *end of conflict*. *Peace* was used in 20% of the *state* reconciliation responses, while *end of conflict* comprised 55% of all the reconciliation *state* responses. A 46-year-old Spanish woman defined reconciliation as "joy," one of the responses coded as *emotional state*, which accounted for 11% of all of the reconciliation *state* responses.

Other coding categories were used much less frequently. Definitions of reconciliation that raised the question of whether reconciliation is *achievable* or an *ideal* constituted only 6% of the definitions; one example came from a 43-year-old woman who described it as “the beginning of something good.” A *future orientation* was seen in only 3% of all reconciliation definitions; for example, a 53-year-old German woman said reconciliation is “an opportunity to seek a better future together.” Only two responses defined reconciliation as a *human characteristic*; a 33-year-old man from Germany said reconciliation is “humanity, insight, and generosity to admit mistakes.”

Exploratory Analyses of Reconciliation Responses

Chi-square tests were run to assess the extent to which there were statistically significant and marginally significant group differences in definitions of reconciliation. Several group differences in definitions were found as a function of gender. Specifically, proportionately more women than men defined reconciliation by referring to processes such as an agreement, compromise, or negotiation ($\chi^2=7.81$; $p=0.005$). At a marginally significant level, proportionately more women than men referred to the completion of the process of reconciliation ($\chi^2=3.36$; $p=0.07$).

Discussion

This chapter considered the personal definitions of peace and reconciliation of 357 participants from France, Germany, Iceland, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. The data analysis focused on identifying patterns and trends across countries as opposed to comparing and contrasting responses from individual countries. The results of the study appear to reflect the region’s dramatic history of violent conflict, including the two world wars whose magnitude and destruction mobilized its citizens to work toward establishing and maintaining peace for decades to follow.

Most participants provided definitions of both peace and reconciliation with multiple codeable units, suggesting nuanced and complex understandings of these terms. For the participants who directly experienced war followed by peace and/or reconciliation, thorough reflection on the meaning of these concepts seems natural. Similarly, it is understandable that these terms would also be carefully deliberated by those who were indirectly exposed, yet personally affected, by war and conflict.

Out of all definitions of *peace*, the major categories that emerged were *negative peace* (40%), *positive peace* (45%), and *question of achievability/idea* (13%). Within the *negative peace* category, *rejecting violence* comprised the vast majority of definitions. These responses were generally simple, straightforward, and intuitive responses. Only a small portion of responses were subcategorized as *rejecting intimidation/threat*, perhaps because experiences of intimidation or threat may not be easily conjured up by those who have only lived in peace. Within the *positive peace* definitions, the largest subcategory was *prerequisites for peace*. These responses were generally more complex as they outlined the conditions necessary for peace. As the participants live in a region that has maintained peace for decades, it seems plausible that they would have reflected on the factors and influences in their countries/region that made peace possible, thus being able to easily articulate those prerequisites. The third largest category of all peace definitions was the question of whether peace is *achievable or an ideal*. The largest subcategory was *strive for*, suggesting a general mindset that peace is worth working toward and ought to be worked toward. Only a small subset of definitions of peace was categorized as *unattainable*, possibly because most participants have had opposite experiences in this regard. On the other hand, only five responses were coded for *perceived reality*, although this may indicate that participants do not take peace for granted. One of the smallest subcategories was *spiritual/god*; it is possible that the sparse spiritual references reflect the growing secularization of this region.

Regarding the definitions of reconciliation, the majority of responses (63%) were coded into the

process category, with the most prevalent subcategory being *come to terms/agreement/compromise/negotiate*. This inclination may mirror Western Europe's strong desire for peace and the recognition that a sustainable resolution typically involves a process of compromise or negotiation of some kind. Definitions coded for *apology and forgiveness* made up a smaller subcategory, yet appeared to be an important aspect of participants' understanding of this term. With the region's predatory history, citizens may feel a sense of responsibly or appreciation of the importance of validating the sentiments of the wronged party. These responses go hand in hand with the subcategory *recognize/acknowledge/respect*. The category *move on* comprised a very small portion of responses, seemingly logical as most respondents focused on what needs to happen before it is possible to move forward.

More women than men defined reconciliation as some form of process such as compromise, agreement, or negotiation, which may suggest that women gravitate toward definitions where all parties participate in finding a solution acceptable to all. Definitions of reconciliation categorized as *achievable* or an *ideal* made up a significantly smaller portion of definitions compared to peace definitions. This may reflect a primary concern with whether peace is achievable, and if so, reconciliation may be assumed to also be achievable or may be of secondary importance.

As all studies have limitations, this study does as well, including the limited participation of Western European countries, constrained and varying sample sizes among countries, and non-

random sampling of participants. Consequently, the results cannot be assumed to encompass the conceptions of all Western Europeans, yet offer unique insights about their perceptions of peace and reconciliation and how they may have been influenced by experience and history.

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Definitions of Peace and Reconciliation in Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Canada, the United States, and Australia

James Page, Sarah An, Michael Whitely,
Doe West, John Davis, and Carol Davis

This chapter examines the responses of ordinary citizens of Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Canada, the United States, and Australia to the task of defining peace and reconciliation. Before we commence this discussion, it is useful to note why these countries are grouped together in this study. At a superficial level, these countries have language in common – they are all English speaking or Anglophone. The notion of the Anglophone world was popularized by Sir Winston Churchill, both in writing (1956–1958) and also in his own leadership. More recently, James Bennett (2004)

and Andrew Roberts (2007) have also referred to the Anglophone world or the Anglosphere – that is, the nations of the United Kingdom, USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand – as components of a natural unity. Indeed, they argue that the Anglosphere has been supremely beneficial to the world, both in producing prosperity and in promoting freedom.

A more critical view of Anglosphere countries is provided by writers such as Noam Chomsky (1992, 2007). Srdjn Vucetic (2011a) argues that there is an Anglosphere triumphalism, based upon the military success of Anglosphere countries over the past 200 years, the global dominance of the English language, the economic prosperity of Anglosphere countries, and the dominance of the Anglosphere version of liberalism as the foundation of the aspirations for countries around the world. In Vucetic's view, the Anglosphere is essentially a racist conglomeration, and Anglosphere countries regularly “exempt themselves from the rules that have shaped war, peace, alliances, coalitions, and other manifestations of international conflict and cooperation in world politics (Vucetic, p. 3)”.

The introductory chapter to this section by Elizabeth Clagett-Borne ([in press](#)) makes reference to the conceptual distinction between negative and positive peace, as developed by Johan Galtung (1975–1988) – a distinction that is relevant to the work reported in this chapter. Working on the differentiation between negative and positive peace, Galtung (1996) also elaborates on a threefold distinction involving the concepts of

J. Page (✉)

Department of Peace Studies, School of Humanities,
University of New England, Armidale, NSW, Australia
e-mail: james.page@une.edu.au

S. An

Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston,
MA, USA

M. Whitely

Educational Psychologist, Kent State University,
Kent, Ohio, USA
e-mail: mwhitely@kent.edu

D. West

Quinsigamond Community College, Worcester, MA, USA
e-mail: doewest@aol.com

J. Davis

Department of Psychology, Texas State University,
San Marcos, TX, USA
e-mail: jd04@txstate.edu

C. Davis (Retired)

English Department, Texas State University at
San Marcos, Texas, USA
e-mail: jncdavis@the-cia.net

direct peace (the absence of armed conflict), structural peace (the presence of just and harmonious structures), and cultural peace (the presence of supportive and tolerant understanding between peoples). Environmental or ecological peace is sometimes added as a fourth dimension of peace, denoting living in harmony with our natural environment (Klinck, 2003; Kyrou, 2007; Wendon, 2004). Indeed the linkage of peace and environmental concerns is such that Pakulski (1991) referred to an “eco-pax” movement.

This chapter begins by examining six commonalities in the Anglosphere countries included within the sample for this chapter – namely, the United Kingdom, USA, Canada, and Australia (for logistical reasons New Zealand is not included). Of interest is how these commonalities might impact or be expected to impact the understandings of peace and reconciliation in these Anglosphere countries. These commonalities are (a) a common history, in that each is part of or a result of British colonial history, (b) a degree of cultural commonality, (c) a high level of development and a relatively high standard of living, (d) a basic geopolitical orientation, (e) a high degree of military spending, and (f) a common narrative with regards to peace and war. Thereafter, we examine the results from the participants’ responses to the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS), giving examples and statistical analysis and drawing some conclusions regarding the understandings of peace and reconciliation in the Anglosphere countries, as revealed in the research.

Common History

First, let us examine the common history of the Anglosphere countries. A more detailed description of the history of each of these countries is discussed in the companion edition to this study (Page et al., 2012). In some cases, England was not the only colonizing European power. For instance, there was a strong Spanish and French role in the colonization of North America. However, the eventual dominant colonizing influence in North America was Britain, secured through a series of military victories over Spain, the Netherlands, and France. The dominance of

England is reflected in the fact that the American War of Independence was fought to secure independence for the 13 colonies from England. Each of the other Anglophone countries has long been a member of the British Empire and subsequently the British Commonwealth.

Another way of expressing the common history of the Anglosphere countries is noting that they are linked through imperialism and conquest, and subsequent settler colonialism, albeit as a gradual process (Belich, 2009). Australia, Canada, and the United States are all settler countries, meaning that the majority of the population are descendants of European migrants or settlers. Even the United Kingdom itself may be seen as constituting a settler entity, since Scotland, Wales, and Ireland were colonized areas. Indeed the conquest of Ireland was seen as a template for the conquest and colonization of the New World (Ohlmeyer, 2006).

An obvious question regarding views on peace and reconciliation arising from the common history of these Anglosphere countries is how they view their own histories, and in particular how they have made peace with their own indigenous populations. It is clearly impossible to undo history. However, there is a strong case that countries with a history of violent conquest should be truthful about their past, and they should also seek reconciliation with the indigenous peoples or remnants within their borders. To advocate peace without acknowledgment of past aggression is at best inconsistent and at worst hypocritical. Thus, one of the things that it is natural to look for in the sample’s definitions of peace and reconciliation is an awareness of the implications of national history for meaning-making in regard to these terms.

Common Culture

The second area of commonality in the Anglophone countries is that they share a degree of cultural commonality, in addition to the obvious linguistic commonality. The Anglosphere countries listed claim to be representative parliamentary democracies in some form: they have similar public institutions, recognition of the rule of law, a

common tradition of individual freedom, in the case of Britain and the USA, a Bill of Rights, and importantly, each of these Anglophone countries has been, at least in the past, highly Christianized. Indeed the task of religious conversion was an important factor in the colonization process, along with exploitation of resources, resettlement of excess population, finding markets for goods, and strengthening military presence around the globe.

The intersection of religion and politics has assumed greater significance in the decade following the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent US-led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. Interestingly, the Anglophone countries tend to see themselves as secular and pluralistic societies, and indeed there is much to support this understanding, with the decline of formal religion in these countries. Yet, one of the concerns in Islamic countries, and especially among Islamists, is that countries like Britain and the USA represent a crusading force inimical to Islam (Lewis, 1990). Not surprisingly, there is resentment that the Anglosphere countries do not sufficiently recognize the rights of Islamic countries and the rights of occupied peoples who are primarily of Islamic faith, such as the people of Palestine.

It is interesting that the notion of clash of civilizations is usually framed by those in the west as being a clash between the liberal and illiberal, notably in the work of Samuel Huntington (1996). The Anglosphere world is viewed by such proponents as constituting the liberal world, while those opposed to the Anglosphere are regarded as opposing the forces of liberalism and freedom. It is noteworthy that the civilizational categories that Huntington uses for the non-western world are in most instances religious – although importantly, he does not utilize a “Christian” category, preferring instead to “western” civilization. Those within the Islamic world often see this very differently. The clash is not so much between the liberal and illiberal, but between the western and largely Christian world and those parts of the world that choose not to be Christian. Moreover, it is this western and Christian world that uses both force of arms and economic force to dominate the Islamic world.

This is clearly an area for intercultural dialogue, implied within the notion of cultural peace.

Developed Countries

The third area of commonality for the Anglosphere countries is that each is relatively highly developed and enjoys a high standard of living. Vucetic notes that Anglosphere countries make up less than 7% of global population but account for one-third of the global gross domestic product (2011a, p. 3). Why is this so? The reasons for this are complex. For instance, domestic stability, the injection of investment capital, and the incentive of liberal capitalism are arguably important factors. Yet the underlying factor is that most of the Anglosphere countries were, and still are, rich in agricultural and mineral resources. Put simply, these countries have access to a disproportionate amount of global resources, and it is relatively easy for them to feed their populations and to develop industries.

It is not difficult to see how this socioeconomic status translates into notions of peace. It is understandable that the most dominant perception of peace within Anglosphere countries would tend to be negative or direct peace, that is, peace defined as the absence of war or conflict. Aspects of positive peace, such as structural peace, or peace as an equitable distribution of resources, and cultural peace, or mutual understanding and support, are not aspects of peace that we would expect to find emphasized within Anglosphere countries. We would expect peace to be viewed as the status quo because the status quo is something which suits most of those within the Anglosphere countries, since these countries control a large percentage of global resources.

Of course, as is pointed out in the work of peace theorists such as Johan Galtung, it is inconsistent to advocate for only one form of peace. If one advocates only for negative peace – that is, the absence of war – such advocacy may be viewed as a form of self-interest and of preservation of an unjust status quo, rather than a noble pursuit. What is needed is an integrated notion recognizing that peace is a multidimensional

concept, involving not only the absence of armed conflict but also the presence of cooperative and equitable structures, the presence of positive and supportive attitudes, and environmental respect. Or as Saint Thomas Aquinas posited in *Summa Theologica*, at 2/2, Question 29, peace is a work of justice (1963/1975).

Geopolitical Policy

The fourth area of commonality is that each of the specified Anglosphere countries follows very much the same geopolitical policy of involvement in imperialist wars (Roberts, 2007; Vucetic, 2011b). Even the Anglosphere involvement in the twentieth century world wars can be viewed as imperialist. John Darwin (2007) posits that both world wars were imperialist wars, challenging the existing imperialist order by upcoming empires. Moreover, the wars of post-1945 can be regarded as wars to maintain the status quo. Even Anglosphere apologist Andrew Roberts (2007) argues that the history of the Anglosphere since 1900 has been one of combating challenges. The overall geopolitical position of Anglophone countries can be seen as maintaining the status quo; the Anglophone countries, the USA in particular, appear to be prepared to use military force to maintain this status quo.

One way to illustrate this commitment is through the issue of nuclear nonproliferation, and especially the way the USA and Britain, as nuclear powers, have responded to the obligations in the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – also known as the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. The Treaty is aimed at restricting the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. However, Article 6 of the Treaty equally obligates nuclear weapons states, such as the USA and Britain, to move toward nuclear disarmament (Joyner, 2011). Both the USA and Britain, and indeed the nuclear weapons states generally, have been reluctant to commit to nuclear disarmament, despite a ruling by the International Court of Justice confirming in general terms the illegality of nuclear weapons (Burroughs, 1997).

One of the many ironies of conquest and empire is that one part of the rationale for conquest and empire is the establishment of peace (Munkler, 2005). The peace established by force of arms has been described as an “imperial peace” (Aron, 1962) or “hegemonic peace” (Parchami, 2009, p. 252). The paradox of this peace is that it is achieved by force of arms and is characterized by a contrast of external stability and internal violence. The peace established by force of arms during the Roman Empire was called a *Pax Romana*, and similarly the peace established in the modern era through the military force of Britain and then the USA has been referred to as *Pax Britannica* and *Pax Americana*, respectively. As with ancient empires, the maintenance of a modern empire demands a high cost in military expenditure, and indeed some suggest that the overcommitment which tends to follow empire building and empire maintenance is what ultimately destroys them (Kennedy, 1987).

High Military Spending

The fifth area of commonality between the Anglophone countries is, as prefigured above, the high degree of military spending. Indeed, the United Kingdom, USA, Canada, and Australia rank, in absolute terms, among the 15 highest military-spending countries in the world (SIPRI, 2011). Moreover, the above four Anglophone countries account for some 50% of global military expenditure in absolute terms, with the USA alone accounting for over 40% of global military spending (SIPRI). When one looks at per capita military spending, the results indicate even more starkly the high degree of military spending by these countries. Why is this so, and what does this high level of military spending suggest about the understanding of peace and security in these countries?

One reason for the degree of military spending is that these countries represent a global imperium, and military expenditure is necessary to protect this imperium. Put otherwise, the Anglosphere countries are key countries in the global north, and there is a perceived need for military expenditure to protect the status quo in which those nations

control and have access to a disproportionate amount of the global resources. Most of the military interventions launched by or supported by the Anglosphere countries over the past two centuries can be viewed as having at least some economic motive, even if protecting human rights is also a motive in some military interventions.

The fact that the Anglosphere countries of the United Kingdom, USA, Canada, and Australia have such high military spending is indicative of a national narrative within these countries, a narrative that exalts the military history of the countries and legitimates the use of state violence. Of course, the Anglosphere countries mentioned are not the only nation-states with a tradition that legitimates the use of state violence. However, this is particularly the case with the Anglophone countries identified, not least because they were victorious in the two world wars, and this experience has tended to legitimate a belief in the efficacy of state violence and a very strong just war tradition.

Narrative of Peace and War

The sixth area of commonality between the Anglophone countries is a common narrative of peace and war. Mention of this has been made in the previous section, although it is appropriate to expand upon this. The narrative for the specified Anglophone countries is summed up in the dictum by another imperial writer, the Roman Flavius Vegetius Renatus (1993): “If you want peace, prepare for war.” Thus, peace is viewed as a constant struggle, requiring eternal readiness and eternal deterrence. Why? For the Anglophone countries the world is a fearful place, and it is clear that part of this fear is that the global south will seek their resources or at least will seek a more equitable distribution of global resources.

There are strong links universally between nationalism and war. Stephen van Evera starkly summarizes the scholarship on this issue: “Most writers take the war-causing character of nationalism for granted” (Van Evera, 1994, p. 5). However, there are specific elements of this linkage that apply especially to Anglophone countries. War commemoration is a strong element in

the national traditions of Anglophone countries, reflected in national days, war memorials, literature, and film (Page, 2010). A common theme is that war, and in particular the two world wars, is a testing ground that proves the nation, just as war in general is a testing ground that proves the individual. Thus, the result of the two world wars is seen as legitimating the moral worth of the Anglophone countries.

Any discussion of the narrative of peace and war within the specified countries is incomplete without reference to the resurgence of exceptionalism (Pease, 2009). This label is usually applied to the USA – that is, to the assumption by many Americans that the USA is a country uniquely blessed by God and that the people of this country are a special people. A variant of this belief is that the USA has a special role in the protection of freedom. This sense of self-belief is softer in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, yet there are variations on this theme, albeit more secular. For instance, in Australia this exceptionalism finds its expression in the idea that Australia is “the lucky country” (Horne, 2008). Of course, from an indigenous perspective, there was no luck at all – the invaders took possession of a rich land. The downside of exceptionalism is a sense of military righteousness and a predilection for unilateralism in foreign policy.

Likely Understandings of Peace

It is useful to examine the Anglosphere countries from the perspective of the north–south divide (Reuveny & Thompson, 2008). It is logical that countries within the global north, and in particular the Anglophone countries identified in this chapter, will tend to view peace as the maintenance of the status quo. One does not logically expect that there will be an emphasis on a notion of peace linked with social justice. One needs only to look at the material conditions of the Anglophone countries to see the reason for this: in the past two centuries, the above countries have been on the winning side, in terms of possession of global resources. Therefore, they tend not to want the status quo to be interrupted.

Thus, it can be expected that for Anglophone countries, people will tend to define peace as the absence of conflict (negative peace), rather than in structural or cultural terms. The reason is that understandings within Anglophone countries, at least at a policy level, are underscored by an understanding of imperial peace, as Anglophone countries form part of a contemporary imperium. There will be exceptions to this, and perhaps the fact that many individuals who completed the PAIRTAPS survey are committed to peace and justice means their self-selection into the sample may tend to skew the responses more toward a holistic or integrated understanding of peace.

Likely Understandings of Reconciliation

What can we expect reconciliation to mean for those in Anglophone countries? We have explained how it is logical to expect that the thinking on peace within Anglophone countries will be focused on the absence of formal conflict between nation-states, such as the world wars. If we extend this idea, it is logical to expect that reconciliation may be expected to denote rapprochement between peoples of former combatant nation-states, especially when participants in those conflicts are still alive.

Yet a more thorough understanding of reconciliation can be expected to go beyond this. Reconciliation can denote bringing together conflicting parties within a particular nation-state. Reconciliation can involve different ethnic groups within a nation-state and indeed conflict between indigenous and nonindigenous populations within nation-states. This is especially relevant to the Anglophone countries identified within this survey, in that these countries have come into existence through invasion by settler forces and the associated dispossession of indigenous peoples.

On a global scale, reconciliation may be taken to denote the bringing together of those on different sides of the global north–south divide. This is particularly relevant for the selected Anglophone countries, as all are representative of the global north. The logic behind such reconciliation is that the maldistribution of resources between the global

north and global south is one of the driving sources of tension in the world and also one of the stumbling blocks to achieving combined action on issues such as global warming. Whether the sample from the Anglophone countries will think of reconciliation in this way, however, is a moot point.

Even the notion of reconciliation between peoples of combatant countries tends to operate as a very limited notion in Anglophone countries. One of the cultural problems for Anglophone countries is that in both world wars, these countries were on the victorious side. The tendency is therefore to feel military righteousness. It is difficult for the Anglophone countries to admit responsibility, such as in the shared responsibility for the outbreak of World War I; for breaching of the 14 points upon which the 1918 armistice was signed; for a vengeful Treaty of Versailles; for the maintenance of the naval blockade and subsequent starvation of many in the Central Powers after the end of the war; for the failure to abide by the principle of self-determination with regard to former enemy populations; for the bombing of civilian targets during World War II; for the withholding of food and shelter to Axis prisoners-of-war at the end of the World War II; and for the use of nuclear bombs in the World War II.

The notion of shared responsibility has wider dimensions. For instance, if both world wars can be seen as an attempt by countries to embark on late imperialism, namely, the Central Powers in World War I and the Axis Powers in World War II (Darwin, 2007), then there is surely an onus on those countries that have already been engaged in imperialistic ventures or whose very existence is a result of imperialism, to own some responsibility for the world wars. In other words, if we see war on a global scale as an artifact of imperialism, then there is a shared responsibility on all who have been involved in the global project of imperialism to own this responsibility.

Just as the notion of cultural peace is a complex one, so too is the notion of cultural reconciliation. As Edward Said argued (1978), often those involved in imperialism are not aware of the cultural denigration that is associated with the processes of imperialism. Certainly the reaction of Anglophone leaders to the 9/11 attacks reveals little sensitivity to the long history of cultural denigration by those

in imperial power and the consequent deep resentment within those at the global periphery, especially within many Islamic countries. One dimension of reconciliation must be the bringing together of diverse cultures and religious groups.

“response” are used interchangeably and refer to codable units within a complete answer.

Methods

Sample

The Anglophone sample consisted of 882 participants, specifically 26% from Australia (120 females, 107 males), 11% from Canada (62 females, 34 males, 4 unknown), 8% from Northern Ireland (37 females, 36 males, 1 unknown), 9% from Great Britain (32 females, 48 males), and 45% from the United States (219 females, 182 males). The ages of these participants ranged from 18 to 86. Of those who responded, 13% reported serving in the military, 63% reported having a relative with military experience, and 35% reported participating in a protest.

Procedure

All participants in this sample responded to the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) (Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006). This survey had an open-ended response format and included items asking for personal definitions of key terms such as peace and reconciliation. For the purpose of this chapter, the definitions of these two terms were coded and analyzed.

Responses were coded using the Definitions of Peace Coding Manual and the Definition of Reconciliation Coding Manual. Each definition was broken down into codable units because some responses contained multiple, independent units of meaning. For example, a definition of peace as the “opposite of conflict” has one codable unit, whereas a definition of reconciliation as “agreement to settle differences and ‘forget’ the past” has two codable units, each of which receives a unique code. For the purpose of our discussion on coding, the terms “definition” and

Definitions of Peace

Coding Definitions of Peace

The Definitions of Peace Coding Manual and the Definitions of Reconciliation Coding Manual were developed on the basis of grounded theory. The grounded theory approach allows common themes to be identified from the responses, providing the foundation for coding categories (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

The Definitions of Peace Coding Manual includes criteria for coding responses into four main categories, each of which has one or more subcategories. The major categories for definitions of peace are (a) *negative peace*, (b) *positive peace*, (c) *question of achievability/ideal*, and (d) *focus on perceived reality*. Each of these categories is divided into subcategories.

The positive and negative peace categories reflect the distinctions within Galtung’s peace typology (1975–1988, 1996). *Negative peace* definitions refer to the removal, absence, or end of a conflict-related process. In our coding manual, the *negative peace* category has five specific subcategories, in addition to a very general *unspecified* absence of something negative. If a definition identified peace as a lack of conflict, it was coded for *no conflict*. If a response identified peace with the end of a specific form of war-related violence such as war, torture, and fighting, it was coded as *rejecting violence*, although if it specifically mentioned an end to terrorism, it was coded into the third subcategory, *rejecting terrorism*. Responses indicating that peace means the absence of certain emotions such as worries (the absence of worry) were coded into the subcategory called *negative emotions*. Finally, there was a subcategory, *rejecting intimidation/threat*, for responses defining peace as the absence of threats or intimidation.

Responses coded into the *positive peace* category, consistent with Galtung’s formulation, focus on what it takes to achieve a peaceful society and what a peaceful society provides for its

people. In our manual, we identified two subcategories for *positive peace* definitions: *prerequisites for peace* and *outcomes*. The *prerequisites for peace* subcategory, which is most directly reflective of Galtungian theory, includes responses that describe conditions that must be met to achieve peace or mention the means by which peace can be achieved. The subcategories of *prerequisites for peace* are (a) granting of human rights, (b) equality, (c) acceptance/tolerance, (d) democratic participation, (e) openness to working toward a mutual goal, (f) security, and (g) access to resources. Within the *acceptance/tolerance* category, there are additional two subcategories: *understanding* and *solidarity*. The *outcomes* subcategory includes specific subcategories for *positive emotions*, *calm/tranquility*, and *harmony*.

Responses coded into the third major category, *question of achievability/ideal* category, did not explicitly define peace but raised questions or expressed doubts about its achievability or referred to it as an ideal. The three subcategories of the *question of achievability/ideal* category are *unattainable*, *strive for*, and *spiritual/god*. A fourth major category, which we characterize as a focus on *perceived reality*, includes responses that describe the current situation in the world as the participant sees it without explicitly defining peace or mentioning whether or not peace is achievable. When a response does not fit into any of the other categories, it is categorized as *uncodable*.

Distribution of Definitions of Peace

In their definitions of peace, participants provided codable units varying from 1 to 11, yielding a total of 1,631 codable units. Out of this total, 49% of the responses were coded into the *negative peace* category. The most prevalent *negative peace* subcategory was *rejecting violence*, which accounted for 57% of the *negative peace* responses. An example of a *negative peace* response came from a 21-year-old man from the United Kingdom, who defined peace as a time “when two states are in a state of nonviolence.”

A 52-year-old Canadian woman responded that peace is “freedom from strife”; this response exemplifies the subcategory *no conflict*, which accounted for 15% of the *negative peace* responses. An example of peace as absence of *negative emotions* came from a 20-year-old Australian man who said that peace is “no bad feelings”; *negative emotions* accounted for 13% of the *negative peace* responses. The least prevalent category was *rejecting intimidation/threat*, which accounted for 4% of the *negative peace* responses. Table 4.1 provides more examples of definitions of peace, along with basic demographic information.

Forty percent of all definitions of peace were coded into the *positive peace* category. Thirteen percent of these *positive peace* definitions were coded into the general/unspecified subcategory for *prerequisites for peace*. The most prevalent type of *prerequisite for peace* definition was *acceptance/tolerance*, used in 14% of the *positive peace* responses. A good example of a multi-unit response came from a 69-year-old Canadian woman, who described peace as “a state of lawful cooperation that can only truly exist when individuals, communities, and nations have learned to consider others’ needs and to care for them as for themselves,” which was coded as *solidarity* and *openness to working towards a mutual goal*. Seven percent of the *positive peace* responses were coded for *solidarity*, and 10% of them were coded for *openness to working towards a mutual goal*. A 31-year-old man from Northern Ireland defined peace as “prosperity [and] happiness”; this was coded as *positive emotions*, accounting for 7% of the *positive peace* responses. A response from a 31-year-old Canadian man said peace is “a means to achieve tranquility or harmony with yourself or between oneself and others,” thereby identifying peace with both *harmony* and *calm/tranquility*. *Harmony* accounted for 7% of the *positive peace* responses, and themes of *calm/tranquility* appeared in 11% of the *positive peace* responses. The least prevalent category was *democratic participation*, accounting for only 1% of the *positive peace* responses.

Nine percent of all codable units for peace were coded into the third major category, *question*

Table 4.1 Major coding categories and examples for definitions of peace

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Example
<i>Negative peace</i>	4 (8)	United Kingdom	M	64	“Living uninterrupted by any forceful or invasive body”
No conflict	7 (15)	Canada	F	33	“An absence of conflict”
Rejecting violence	28 (57)	United States	M	21	“The absence of war, violence, or religious fighting at all”
Negative emotions	6 (13)	Australia	F	22	“No feelings of hate, anger, or any other negative emotions”
<i>Positive peace</i>	3 (8)	United Kingdom	F	21	“Holding hands”
Prerequisites for peace	5 (13)	United States	M	19	“A time when everyone is doing exactly what they want to be doing at any given time”
Acceptance/tolerance	6 (14)	Northern Ireland	M	24	“Being happy to share your life with others no matter what religion, origin they may be”
Openness to working towards a mutual goal	4 (10)	United Kingdom	F	59	“A state where conflict arises as it naturally does, but is solved around a table”
Harmony	4 (11)	Australia	M	56	“Living in harmony with others”
<i>Question of achievability/ideal</i>	4 (49)	Canada	M	61	“An abstract notion of graceful existence”
Unattainable	2 (20)	Northern Ireland	F	22	“Unachievable in our society today”
<i>Perceived reality</i>	1	United States	F	25	“What happens between last reconciliation and next war”

The first (or only) number in the percentage column refers to the percent of responses in that category or subcategory out of all of the definitions of peace. The second number (in parentheses) in the percentage column refers to the percent of responses in a subcategory out of the specific major category of definitions of peace

of *achievability/ideal*. A 22-year-old woman from Northern Ireland defined peace as, “unachievable in our society today,” which was coded as *unattainable*; responses in the *unattainable* category accounted for 20% of all the definitions coded into the *question of achievability/ideal* peace category. A 19-year-old woman from the United States defined peace as “something to strive for where there is no fighting”; this response was coded into the subcategory *strive for*, which accounted for 24% of all the *question of achievability/ideal* peace responses. *Spiritual/god* themes appeared in only 7% of the *question of achievability/ideal* peace responses.

A focus on *perceived reality* was seen in only ten of the definitions of peace in this sample. As an example, a 39-year-old Australian man defined peace as an “organized control where, unfortunately, the major powers have peace at the expense of the struggling nations.” Only two of the definitions of peace were *uncodable*.

Exploratory Analyses of Definitions of Peace

Exploratory chi-square analyses were run to investigate the possibility of group differences based on demographic characteristics in definitions of peace. There were a number of statistically significant and marginally significant group differences.

Specifically, a significantly greater proportion of women than men gave at least one example of a *positive peace* definition, equating peace with one of its prerequisites or outcomes. On the other hand, proportionately more men than women raised *questioned the achievability of peace* or referred to it as a not necessarily achievable ideal. At a marginally significant level, proportionately more men than women identified peace as the absence or *rejection of violence*.

As compared to their counterparts, a significantly greater proportion of respondents with military experience gave at least one *negative*

Table 4.2 Definitions of peace item: percentage of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Category	Group 2 ^a		χ^2
	Group 1 ^a Female	Male	
Negative			
Rejecting violence	25	30	3.24 [^]
Positive	41	38	6.11 [*]
Achievability	13	10	3.85 [*]
	Military	No military	
Negative	59	48	8.05 ^{**}
Positive	33	41	4.22 [*]
	Protest	No protest	
Negative			
Rejecting violence	23	30	8.97 ^{**}
Positive	43	37	9.67 ^{**}

Numbers in the columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

[^] $=0.051 \leq p < 0.10$; ^{*} $p \leq 0.05$; ^{**} $p \leq 0.01$; ^{***} $p \leq 0.001$

^a“Presence” at the end of the variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response in at least one of the subcategories of a major category

peace definition, equating it with the absence or end of something, such as conflict or violence. By contrast, as compared with their military counterparts, a significantly higher proportion of respondents with no military experience gave at least one example of a *positive peace* definition. In addition, proportionately more non-protestors than protestors defined peace as an *absence of violence* (a type of *negative peace* definition). By contrast, proportionately more protestors than non-protestors gave at least one example of one of the *positive peace* definitions.

Table 4.2 provides significant chi-square results for the definitions of peace item.

Definitions of Reconciliation

Coding Definitions of Reconciliation

The Definitions of Reconciliation Coding Manual includes five major categories with one or more subcategories for each. The major categories for definitions of reconciliation are (a) *process*, (b) *state*, (c) *human characteris-*

tic, (d) *future orientation*, and (e) *question of achievability/ideal*. The *process* category has nine subcategories: (a) *move on*, (b) *apology and forgiveness*, (c) *reparations or compensations*, (d) *resolve or fix*, (e) *recognize/acknowledge/respect*, (f) *come to terms/agreement/compromise/negotiate*, (g) *understanding*, (h) *uniting*, and (i) *prevention*. Four of these subcategories included an additional level of even more precise subcategories. *Move on* has a subcategory known as *active*. *Apology and forgiveness* has a subcategory called *without forgetting*. *Make amends* is a subcategory for *resolve/fix*. *Uniting* has two subcategories, which are *healing/reuniting* and *building new relationship with former enemy*.

The second major category, *state*, includes responses that frame reconciliation as a completed achievement or status; this category has three subcategories: *peace*, *end of conflict*, and *emotional state*. The third category, *human characteristic*, has responses that portray reconciliation as being natural to human nature or a human condition. The next category, *future orientation*, has responses that imply an ongoing process that will continue in the future. *Question of achievability/ideal*, which is the fifth category, includes responses that question the achievability of reconciliation or refer to it as an ideal. For *question of achievability/ideal*, there is one subcategory, which is *strive for*. For more details regarding the coding manual or procedure, please see the introductory methods chapter of the definitions of peace and reconciliation section of this volume.

Distribution of Definitions of Reconciliation

When asked to provide their definitions of reconciliation, participants varied in the number of codable units within their responses, with the number of units per response ranging from 1 to 7 for a total of 1,331 codable units. Seventy-eight percent of these units were categorized into the *process* category. The most prevalent subcategory was *comes to term/agreement/compromise/negotiate*, accounting for 23% of the reconciliation *process*

Table 4.3 Major coding categories with examples for definitions of reconciliation

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Example
<i>Process</i>	5 (6)	United Kingdom	M	28	“Creating solutions”
Apology and forgiveness	12 (15)	Canada	F	32	“When sins have been confessed and forgiven”
Resolve/fix	8 (10)	United States	F	21	“Righting past wrongs”
Recognize/acknowledge/ respect	9 (11)	Australia	M	21	“The acknowledgment of a former conflict or wrongs”
Come to terms/agreement/ compromise/negotiate	18 (23)	Canada	F	38	“Agreement between parties in dispute”
<i>Uniting</i>					
Healing/reuniting	7 (9)	Northern Ireland	M	69	“Becoming friendly again”
<i>State</i>	1 (5)	United States	F	45	“Truth”
Peace	8 (59)	United States	M	20	“Bringing yourself to a peaceful state of mind concerning whatever issues may be troubling you at the time”
End of conflict	4 (30)	United Kingdom	F	27	“Parties reaching a resolution to a conflict”
<i>Future orientation</i>	2	Australia	M	34	“The future”
<i>Question of achievability/ ideal</i>	2 (61)	Northern Ireland	M	45	“Only way forward”

The first number in the percentage column refers to the percent of responses out of all definitions of reconciliation. The second number (in parentheses) in the percentage column refers to the percent of responses out of the specific major category for definitions of reconciliation

definitions. As an example, a 26-year-old woman from Northern Ireland defined reconciliation as when “two sides put disagreement to rest.”

A 67-year-old man from the United Kingdom defined reconciliation as “an act of recognition that both sides of an argument could be wrong”; this response was coded into the subcategory *recognize/acknowledge/respect*, which accounted for 11% of the reconciliation *process* responses. The theme of *moving on* was found in 5% of the reconciliation *process* responses, while *apology and forgiveness* accounted for 15% of those responses. A 40-year-old Canadian man said reconciliation is “the act of resolving a dispute between parties”; *resolve/fix* themes like this were found in 10% of the *process* responses. Examples of both *uniting* and *healing/reuniting* were found in the definition of a 21-year-old woman from the United States who said reconciliation is “starting over or building a new bridge between two different groups.” *Uniting* was used in 5% of the reconciliation *process* responses, while *healing/reuniting* was used in 9% of the *process* responses. Table 4.3 provides more

examples of definitions of reconciliation, along with basic demographic information.

Fourteen percent of all the codable reconciliation units were coded into the *state* of reconciliation category. The most prevalent *state* subcategory was *peace*, accounting for 59% of all *state* of reconciliation responses. As an example of a definition linking reconciliation with *peace*, an 18-year-old man from the United States said reconciliation is “the act of willfully obtaining peace after war or a dispute.” A 28-year-old Canadian woman defined reconciliation as “the end of the war”; this response was coded as *end of conflict*, a theme that was found in 30% of the *state* of reconciliation responses. Six percent of the *state* of reconciliation responses were coded for *emotional state*. In the view of a 19-year-old man from Northern Ireland, reconciliation means “feeling good”.

Overall, the great majority of definitions of reconciliation were coded into either the *process* or *state* categories. Only 2% of all the responses were coded into the major category, *future orientation*. One of the few examples of a future-oriented definition came from a 21-year-old Australian

woman who defined reconciliation as “moving forward...” Only 4% of the responses were coded for *question of achievability/ideal*. In one example of this category, a 58-year-old Canadian woman defined reconciliation as “a great thing, if you can get it to work.” A 77-year-old woman from Australia defined reconciliation as “the only solution to all our problems, if we imprison others as a solution, then we have learned nothing”; this response was coded as *strive for*, a subcategory accounting for 39% of the responses coded into the *question of achievability* category. None of the Anglosphere definitions of *reconciliation* fell into the major category identifying reconciliation as a *human characteristic*. Only 1% of the definitions of reconciliation were uncodable.

Exploratory Analyses of Definitions of Reconciliation

Exploratory chi-square tests were run to assess the extent to which there were statistically significant and marginally significant group differences in definitions of reconciliation. There were a number of statistically significant group differences. A significantly higher proportion of men than women gave at least one example of a *process* definition, whereas a significantly higher proportion of women than men gave at least one example of a *state* definition, referring to reconciliation as a completed process or achievement. Nevertheless, a significantly higher proportion of women than men questioned the *achievability of reconciliation* or referred to it as an ideal.

As compared to their counterparts, proportionately more responders with military experience defined reconciliation as *recognizing, acknowledging, and respecting* a problem or someone else’s feelings. Proportionately more non-protestors than protestors defined reconciliation by referring to decisions toward a specific goal, such as an *agreement, compromise, or negotiation*.

At a marginally significant level, proportionately more protestors than non-protestors gave a definition of reconciliation focusing on *recognizing, acknowledging, and respecting a problem* or someone else’s feelings. Additionally, at a margin-

ally significant level, proportionately more responders with a relative in the military gave at least one example of a *process* definition and proportionately more responders with no relative in the military *questioned the achievability* of reconciliation or referred to it as an ideal. Table 4.4 provides significant chi-square results for the definitions of reconciliation.

Discussion

An overview of the Anglosphere results indicates that nearly half of the responses focused on *negative peace* – that is, peace as the absence of armed conflict. Forty percent of the responses focused on *positive peace* – involving some element of social justice or understanding between peoples. One of the things emphasized in the introductory discussion for this chapter is that public policy within Anglosphere countries implicitly works on the basis on negative peace. We see this in the commitment within the Anglosphere countries to high rates of military spending, to the geopolitical policy of Anglosphere countries, and to maintenance of the existing status quo wherein the Anglosphere countries exercise control of a disproportionate amount of global resources. Given all this, it seems that the percentage of responses defining peace in positive peace terms was unexpectedly high.

One simple explanation might be that the process of completing the PAIRTAPS survey itself acted as a self-selection device, meaning that those who thought seriously about the issue of peace were the ones who tended to take the time to complete the survey. We might speculate that if there were to be a captive sample, such as one finds in schools, prisons, or hospitals, then the result might have been different. Yet there is another possible explanation, namely, that the degree of expression of notions of positive peace reflects a growing democratic deficit (Norris, 2011) – a discontinuity between popular and official understandings of peace within Anglosphere countries. In other words, even if Anglosphere political leaders do not subscribe to an integrated understanding of peace, a significant proportion of the population of

Table 4.4 Definitions of reconciliation item: percentage of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Category	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	χ^2
	Female	Male	
<i>Process</i>	73	82	4.40*
<i>State</i>	21	15	6.15*
<i>Question of achievability/ideal</i>	7	3	7.68**
	Military experience	No military experience	
<i>Process</i>			
Recognize/acknowledge/respect	14	8	9.41**
	Relative military	No relative military	
<i>Process</i>	78	74	2.83 [^]
<i>Question of achievability/ideal</i>	4	7	2.78 [^]
	Protestor	Non-protestor	
<i>Process</i>			
Recognize/acknowledge/respect	10	7	2.77 [^]
Come to terms/agreement/compromise/negotiate	14	20	8.75**

Numbers in the columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

[^] $= 0.051 \leq p < 0.10$; * $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$

^a“Presence” at the end of the variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response in at least one of the subcategories of a major category

Anglosphere countries may do so. This would indeed be the cause for optimism.

On the other hand, the numbers of Anglosphere responders whose concept of peace fits the criteria for negative peace is also an indication of the need for peace education within Anglosphere countries. An important element in peace education should explain why peace must be conceptualized as more than merely the absence of war and that it necessitates the presence of just and cooperative relationships at all levels if it is to endure. The achievement of a positive peace is sometimes described as a culture of peace (UNGA, 1999), and education is essential to achieving this culture. What makes such an educational program especially important is that much popular culture within Anglosphere countries is at best focused on a limited view of negative peace, and at worst promotes a culture of violence.

It is significant that our analyses indicated Anglosphere women tended to understand peace more as a process, rather than an outcome like the end of conflict. The idea of peace as process represents a deeper understanding, and indeed the research finding that women tend to perceive peace in relational or process-oriented terms aligns with the research findings of Gilligan (1982). It is logi-

cal to argue from this finding that continuing changes in the status of women are important to the advancement of peace. In other words, part of the solution to narrow understandings of peace is to introduce more women into leadership roles and indeed to have a less adversarial model of leadership. This is true even in Anglosphere countries, which tend to pride themselves on having an enlightened stance regarding the status of women.

In our sample, respondents with military experience tended to equate peace with the absence of war, and, by contrast, antiwar protestors tended to see peace more as the presence of just and supportive relationships. Each of these results is understandable. The military is an institution that exists either to win or deter war. The military also tends to be a very task-oriented institution. Thus, seeing peace as the absence of war is very much part of the professional training and focus of the military. Page argues (2007) that it is important to “respect but not privilege” the military. Similarly it is important to recognize the importance of negative peace, while acknowledging that a more thorough and integrated understanding is needed if lasting peace is to be achieved.

A substantial proportion of protestors defined peace in the language of positive peace. This is

understandable, given that those who participate in protests against war are likely to be highly motivated about issues of peace and war, and thus likely to reflect about what peace means. Such reflections are not limited to people without military experience. There is a significant subset of the military, mainly veterans, who become anti-war activists. For peace protestors, the challenge is how to communicate a vision of positive peace to wider civil society.

The finding that more Anglosphere men than women viewed reconciliation as a process rather than a result runs counter to what might be expected according to the Gilligan hypothesis, and indeed appears inconsistent with the findings concerning definitions of peace. One may well argue that it is a cause for optimism that men tended to see reconciliation as process. Moreover, it is understandable that those with no military experience tended to describe reconciliation as recognizing, acknowledging, and respecting a problem or someone else's feelings, given that the nature of military training is task oriented. Within the military, one needs to focus upon achieving objectives, and reflection upon acknowledging problems and respecting feelings is not a high priority – otherwise the military might never go to war.

It is likewise understandable that more protestors than non-protestors within Anglosphere countries described reconciliation by referring to decisions towards a specific goal, such as agreement, compromise, or negotiation. Those engaged in protest against war are likely to reflect upon what is involved in long-term peace-making and thus reflect on reconciliation. In a sense, to give greater scope to reconciliation is inherent in the pursuit of positive peace. So, just as more protestors than non-protestors focused on positive peace and its complexities, so too more protestors than non-protestors tended to exhibit a more detailed and substantial view of what reconciliation entails.

What overall comment may we be entitled to make on the defining of peace and reconciliation by the Anglosphere respondents? Johan Galtung has wryly commented that “defining peace is a never-ending process” (1996, p. 265),

and no doubt the same can be said about defining reconciliation. The PAIRTAPS survey was not a simple one to complete, and yet the very fact that so many individuals from the Anglosphere countries did take the time to respond to the survey, and in such detail, is indicative that there is widespread concern about issues of peace and reconciliation. It also suggests there is a growing culture of peace movement, from people around the world and from diverse backgrounds. The task is to communicate this sentiment to political leaders and policy makers. Political leaders and policy makers need to catch up with popular sentiment, perhaps especially so within Anglosphere countries, which have so much power for influencing events in other countries, for good or bad, for progress or regression.

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Definitions of Peace and Reconciliation in Russia and the Balkans

5

Vlado Miheljak, Marko Polič, Chelsea Cogan,
Heather Lane, Natalia Parnyuk, Alev Yalcinkaya,
Sherri McCarthy, Anna Medvedeva,
Nebojsa Petrovic, and Charikleia Tsatsaroni

Peace and reconciliation are strongly desired but often unachieved aftermaths of conflicts and wars. Although many believe war is a necessary part of human nature, there is evidence that this may not be true, that humans inherently have the potential for peace, that conflict resolution is an inadequately pursued goal, and that conflicts could be handled in less destructive ways (e.g., Fry, 2007). In this chapter, we consider peace and reconciliation issues as revealed in definitions of both concepts by ordinary people in samples from Greece, Russia, Serbia, and Slovenia. All participants completed the *Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey* (PAIRTAPS) described elsewhere

(Malley-Morrison, 2009). This survey includes an item asking for the *definition* of several terms, including *peace* and *reconciliation*. It is these definitions, and the historical/cultural context in which the Russian and Balkans respondents formulated those definitions, that are the focus on this chapter.

Sociopsychological Perspective on Peace and Reconciliation

Our understanding of peace and reconciliation is derived from Johan Galtung's (1969, 2007) distinction between *negative* peace (absence of

V. Miheljak (✉)
University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia
e-mail: vlado.miheljak@guess.arnes.si;
marko.polic@guest.arnes.si

M. Polič
Department of Psychology, University of Ljubljana,
Ljubljana, Slovenia

C. Cogan
Department of Psychology, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA

H. Lane
Department of Psychology, Swarthmore College,
Swarthmore, PA, USA

N. Parnyuk
Department of Psychology, St. Petersburg Railway
College, St. Petersburg, Russia
e-mail: parnyuk@yandex.ru

A. Yalcinkaya
Department of Psychology, Yeditepe, Istanbul, Turkey
e-mail: yalcinkaya@prodigy.net;
ayalcinkaya@yeditepe.edu.tr

S. McCarthy
Educational Psychology, Counseling and Human
Relations, Northern Arizona University, Yuma, AZ, USA
e-mail: Sherri.McCarthy@NAU.EDU

A. Medvedeva
University of Finland, Helsinki, Finland
e-mail: an25medved@gmail.com

N. Petrovic
Faculty of Psychology, University
of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia
e-mail: nebojsa.beograd@gmail.com

C. Tsatsaroni
Psychology Department, Boston University, Boston,
MA, USA
e-mail: chtsa@bu.edu

violence) and *positive* peace (presence of structural conditions for peace and harmony). According to Galtung, an understanding of violence is necessary for defining peace; in his view, violence is present when *human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations* (p.168). Galtung (1990) also introduced the concept of *cultural violence*, to describe cultures that justify and legitimate violence, with violence redefined as *avoidable insults to basic human needs and more generally to life* (Grewal, 2003, p. 4). Based on these cultural issues, Galtung offered an extended definition of peace, focusing not only the absence of direct violence (negative peace) but also the presence of positive peace, which requires a social structure conducive to social equality. This distinction between negative and positive peace can undoubtedly be applied to the region under discussion. Cessation of armed conflicts leaves less apparent forms of structural or cultural violence intact, and continuing to prevent the full realization of human potential.

Negative and positive peace can be viewed as a continuum, positive peace being the ideal toward which peace is converging with many obstacles along the way. Positive peace is not easy to achieve. According to Bar Tal (2011), societies experiencing a prolonged conflict develop a culture that serves as a major factor for continuation of conflict. Moreover, there is a basic asymmetry between the forces of war and the forces of peace, in that the mobilization of societies for conflict is simpler than preparation for peacemaking. Nevertheless, peace building can begin when a sufficient number of citizens desire it, though this is not yet a sufficient condition for its achievement.

In his discussion of societies trying to emerge from prolonged conflict, Bar Tal (2011) distinguished between peacemaking and peace building. He defined peace building as a continuous exerted effort toward a full and lasting peaceful relationship with a former rival, while peacemaking focuses only on the official settlement of the conflict, ending it being only the first formal step in the peace process. Reconciliation offers a way of dealing with the conflict's termination.

Rouhana (2011) and Kelman (2008) distinguish between three qualitatively different pro-

cesses in conflict resolution: (a) *conflict settlement*, seeking a formal termination of open violent conflict and the establishment of an agreement between the involved parties reflecting the power relationship between them at that time; (b) *conflict resolution*, addressing the causes of conflict and the basic needs of all parties, regardless of the power relationship, with the needs of both parties equally addressed; and (c) *reconciliation*, a process of seeking a genuine, just, and enduring end to a conflict between parties, with a change in the relationship between them. In this sense, reconciliation is a pathway to positive peace and can lead to one of two possible outcomes. Either way, reconciliation is the development of a partnership based on reciprocity and mutual responsiveness and addressing both parties' needs; it thereby takes the parties beyond conflict settlement and conflict resolution.

National Contexts for Peace and Reconciliation

Western images and assumption concerning the Balkan/Russia region influence beliefs, expectations, and explanations of events connected with that region. A good example of negative prejudices concerning the region can be found in Jezernik's (2004) book about perceptions of the Balkans by Western travelers and politicians from the middle ages to modern times. The Slovenian edition of Jezernik's book, published 4 years after the English original, has the arresting title *Wild Europe*. Although geographical concepts are usually ideologically neutral in the case of Balkan this is not true. The concept is full of negative of Balkan connotations and synonyms for primitivism, violence, and war. Unfortunately it seems that events at the end of the twentieth century only strengthen such prejudices.

Besides a number of differences, there is a lot that Russia, Greece, Serbia, and Slovenia have in common. For example, Orthodox Christianity is the prevailing religion in Greece, Russia, and Serbia. In this chapter, only the historical and current issues that could strongly influence views on peace and reconciliation are considered. All four countries have been engaged in a number of

wars, liberation or otherwise, civil or international, and have had periods of democratic deficits, etc. All have open and unresolved conflicts of different intensity, either historically or currently, domestically or internationally.

Greece, Russia, Serbia, and Slovenia were all engaged in World War I and were on the Allied side during World War II. World War II was coupled with civil war in Slovenia and Serbia (both part of Yugoslavia) and followed by civil war in Greece. For centuries, Greece and Serbia were ruled by the Ottoman Empire, while Slovenia was controlled by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Russia, Serbia, and Slovenia had a socialist regime led by the Communist Party for a number of years but shifted to capitalism in the early 1990s. Kos (1993) argued that monocentrically managed systems of relatively low complexity like state socialism fall more easily into dictatorship than modern systems of high complexity. Greece was ruled by a military dictatorship from 1967 to 1974. Slovenia, when a part of Yugoslavia, was involved in a nonaligned movement and a struggle for peaceful coexistence in a bipolarized world. Today, Greece and Slovenia are members of EU and NATO and have been engaged in NATO actions.

Although Russia is not as strong as its predecessor, the Soviet Union, it continues to be regarded as a global superpower. Conflicts with some of the former USSR republics continue, and Russia has experienced terrorist attacks because of its military activities in Chechnya; it has also been enmeshed in some local conflicts. Serbia, weakened by the results of nationalism and participation in recent Yugoslav wars, nevertheless remains a local power. Like Russia, Serbia has not recognized the independence of the breakaway republic of Kosovo.

Despite ongoing tensions in the region and unresolved problems, there are also signs of movement in the direction of peace and reconciliation. Although Greece has been involved in a long-standing conflict with Turkey, relations between those two nations have improved considerably in the last decade, and they have signed numerous cooperation agreements, achieving what has been called a “shallow reconciliation” (Vatansever, 2011). As of November 2011, Greek

and Turkish Cypriot leaders were negotiating for a more permanent peace in Cyprus, where peacekeeping troops have been stationed for decades. Also as of 2011, Greece was involved in 16 ongoing peacekeeping missions.

Since gaining its independence, Slovenia has worked at contributing to more cooperative relationships among its neighbors and has been active in regional and other international peacekeeping efforts. A survey conducted in 2002 revealed that nearly 85% of a sample of Slovenian respondents said they supported the participation of the Slovenian Armed Forces in humanitarian operations and over 70% said they supported Slovenian participation in peace support operations. Serbia has participated in peacekeeping missions in Chad and the Central African Republic, and in 2011, the Serbian Defense Ministry announced that Serbia was prepared to undertake its first EU peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Russia has been involved in a number of “peacekeeping” operations around its borders since the breakup of the Soviet Union, but has had a difficult time learning to use negotiation rather than brute force to deal with conflicts (Sokolov, 1997). Indeed, many of the post-Soviet peacekeeping operations seemed to have a strong neo-imperialist basis designed to maintain Russian strategic influences (Mackinlay & Cross, 2003). As of 2011, Russia ranked 51st among member states of the UN in contributing to peacekeeping forces and increased its financial contribution to the UN peacekeeping budget; however, it also indicated an intention to focus more on peacekeeping operations in its own area of the world rather than sending its peacekeeping troops to scattered conflicts around the world (Editors, *World Politics Review*, 2012).

Thus, all four of the countries under consideration have been involved in serious armed conflicts going back hundreds of years and are not totally free of conflict today. At the same time, all of them are involved in peacekeeping missions either in the area or further from home. They have achieved varying degrees of negative peace within their boundaries, but we could hardly say that positive peace exists in the Balkans and Russia. When asked to define peace and reconciliation, do inhabitants of the region tend to provide positive

or negative definitions of peace, or some other form of definition altogether? And how do they define reconciliation? Do they tend to view it as something achievable or out of reach?

Methods

Sample

The sample for the Russia and the Balkan Peninsula region consisted of 574 participants, ranging in age from 18 to 90. Of these participants, 51% were from Russia (191 females, 98 males, 2 unknown), 17% from Greece (47 females, 45 males, 5 unknown), 16% (51 females, 37 males, 5 unknown) from Slovenia, and 17% from Serbia (59 females, 38 males). Out of all the respondents, 18% reported serving in the military, 50% reported having a relative who served in the military, and 16% reported participating in a peace protest.

Procedure

The participants in this sample all completed the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Scale (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006), which is described in depth earlier in this book. The survey included a section asking for the respondent's definitions of peace and of reconciliation. These were open-ended response items, not restricting participants to any particular range of possible responses.

In order to analyze the data, each individual's definition was broken down into codeable units, which were then coded according to the Definitions of Peace Coding Manual and the Definition of Reconciliation Coding Manual. Each codeable unit is an individual unit of meaning, or a separate concept, within a response. A respondent's definition can contain one codeable unit, such as "friendship," given as a one-word definition of reconciliation; a definition can also contain several units of meaning as in the case of this definition of peace: "When everybody is happy and pleased. And there is no war and torture." Throughout this chapter, the terms

response and definition refer to codeable units within an answer, not the answer as a whole.

Coding Definitions of Peace

The Definitions of Peace Coding Manual was developed through a grounded theory approach. Grounded theory allows for the identification of common themes among the responses, which then provide the basis for naturally emerging coding categories (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

The Definitions of Peace Coding Manual includes criteria for coding responses into four major categories, three of which contain subcategories. These four major categories are (a) *negative peace*, (b) *positive peace*, (c) *question of achievability/ideal*, and (d) *perceived reality*.

The *negative peace* category includes all responses that define peace in ways consistent with Galtung's conception of negative peace—that is, as the absence or removal of some form of violence. We identified five forms of *negative peace* definition, constituting five subcategories within the coding manual: (a) *no conflict*, for responses that refer to the absence of conflict, but do not mention violence; (b) *rejecting violence*, for responses referring to the end of war, torture, or fighting; (c) *rejecting terrorism*; (d) *negative emotions, for responses linking peace to a lack of negative emotions* such as "worries"; and (e) *rejecting intimidation/threat*. In addition, there were some definitions that fell best into the negative peace category but not into any of the specific subcategories described above; those definitions were identified as *negative peace-unspecified*.

The *positive peace* category is for responses defining peace as a process or outcome associated with a culture of peace – as conceptualized by Galtung and informed by UN's description of the steps necessary to attain a culture of peace. The *positive peace* category included general nonspecific but positively oriented responses as well as more specific responses fitting into one of two major subcategories: *prerequisites for peace* and *outcomes of peace*. *Prerequisites for peace* also included several subcategories: (1) *granting*

human rights, (2) equality, (3) acceptance/tolerance (which itself includes the subcategories *understanding* and *solidarity*), (4) democratic participation, (5) openness to working toward a mutual goal, (6) security, and (7) access to resources. The *outcomes* subcategory includes three subcategories: (1) *positive emotions*, (2) *calm/tranquility*, and (3) *harmony*.

In addition to the major categories for *negative peace* and *positive peace* definitions, two additional categories emerged in the grounded theory process. These two additional categories were (a) *question of achievability/ideal* and (b) *perceived reality*. The *question of achievability/ideal* category includes three subcategories: (1) *unattainable*, (2) *strive for*, and (3) *spiritual/god*. The fourth category, *perceived reality*, includes responses with a real-world reference (e.g., “Think of the Middle East”) without either defining peace or mentioning its achievability.

Distribution of Peace Definitions

Participants’ definitions of peace varied in amount of codeable content, with the number of codeable units per participant ranging from 1 to 9, resulting in a total of 873 responses (codeable units). Of these total units, 25% were coded into the *negative peace* category. Within this category, the most prevalent subcategory was *rejecting violence*, which comprised 63% of the *negative peace* responses. The second most prevalent subcategory, *no conflict*, accounted for 19% of the *negative peace* responses. A good example of both of these *negative peace* themes comes from a 19-year-old woman from Slovenia, who described peace as a “time without war, violence, and conflicts.” The subcategory *negative emotions* made up 6% of responses within the *negative peace* category and is illustrated in the definitions of a 52-year-old Russian woman who called peace the “lack of animosity” and a 24-year-old Slovenian man who said peace is “Life without worries.” The remaining negative peace responses were coded only into the general *unspecified negative peace* category.

The second major category, *positive peace*, contained 53% of all the definitions of peace. Twenty-four percent of these *positive peace* responses were very general and nonspecific and therefore not coded into any of the major subcategories. For example, a 40-year-old Russian woman defined peace simply as “balance.” The most common *positive peace* subcategory was *positive emotions* (a subcategory of *outcomes*), comprising 12% of the *positive peace* definitions. A 29-year-old Greek man described peace as “a situation of joy, happiness, relief and humanism” which was included in the *positive emotions* subcategory (twice). *Prerequisites for peace* made up 9% of the total *positive peace* responses. One such response describing the necessary conditions for peace was provided by a 57-year-old Russian woman who said peace means that “countries agree on all issues.” *Acceptance/tolerance*, a subcategory of *prerequisites for peace*, comprised a second 9% of all the *positive peace* definitions. For example, a 27-year-old Serbian man defined peace as “not jeopardizing someone else’s personality, rights, or property.”

The third major category, *question of achievability/ideal*, contained 17% of all definitions of peace. The majority of definitions in this category (56%) were of the most general form and simply coded as *unspecified*. For example, a 67-year-old Slovenian woman called peace “the highest value.” The most prevalent subcategory within the *question of achievability/ideal* category was *strive for*, accounting for 35% of those definitions. According to a 21-year-old Russian woman, peace is “the state of affairs that we should strive for.” Only 3% of responses were coded for *perceived reality* and only 2% were *uncodeable*. Table 5.1 provides more examples of responses in each category along with the percentage breakdown of themes and demographic information accompanying quotes.

Exploratory Demographic Analyses of Peace Definitions

To explore the possibility that the frequency with which different types of definition occurred might

Table 5.1 Major coding categories with examples of definitions of peace

	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Example
<i>Negative peace</i>	25				
Unspecified	1(6)	Greece	M	33	“No avarice”
No conflict	5(19)	Russia	F	56	“The absence of conflict”
Rejecting violence	16(63)	Slovenia	M	40	“Situation without war”
Negative emotions	1(6)	Serbia	F	26	“Absence of pain and fear”
<i>Positive peace</i>	53				
Unspecified	13(24)	Slovenia	F	84	“Means a lot”
Accept/tolerate	5(9)	Serbia	M	24	“A peaceful coexistence between nations and states”
Outcomes					
Positive emotions	7(12)	Russia	M	60	“Well-being”
<i>Question of achievability/ideal</i>	17				
Unspecified	10(56)	Serbia	M	23	“Utopia”
Strive for	6(35)	Greece	F	21	“Important good”
<i>Perceived reality</i>	3(100)	Slovenia	M	41	“Normal”

The first (or only) number in the percentage column refers to the percent of responses in that category or subcategory out of all of the definitions of peace. The second number (in parentheses) in the percentage column refers to the percent of responses in a subcategory out of the specific major category of definitions of peace

vary as a function of demographic characteristics (specifically, gender, military service, having a relative who served in the military, and involvement in protest activity), we conducted exploratory chi-square analyses. These results are summarized in Table 5.2.

Gender

Sixty-one percent of the women and 49% of the men gave at least one example of a *positive peace* response; chi-square analysis revealed that this difference was statistically significant. A significantly higher portion of women than men gave general, *unspecified* positive peace definitions; on the other hand, a significantly higher portion of men than women gave definitions that *rejected violence* or portrayed peace as a *potentially unachievable ideal*.

Military Service

There were also several statistically significant or marginally significant group differences in definitions of peace based on military service history. Specifically, a marginally greater proportion of respondents who had not served in the military, as compared with their military counterparts, gave at least one example of a *positive peace* definition; moreover, a significantly larger proportion of respondents without military experi-

ence gave general, *nonspecific positive peace* definitions. By contrast, as compared to those with no military experience, a significantly higher proportion of respondents who did have military experience defined peace as a *potentially unachievable ideal* and a marginally higher proportion indicated that peace was something to *strive for*.

Protest

As might be expected, as compared with non-protestors, a significantly higher proportion of protestors gave *positive peace* definitions (of the general *unspecified* sort) and gave at least one example of a response in the category of *question of achievability/ideal*. See Table 5.2 for the percentages of responses provided by participants in the target groups as well as the chi-square findings.

Coding Definitions of Reconciliation

The Definitions of Reconciliation Coding Manual, like the Definitions of Peace Coding Manual, was developed using grounded theory. This manual identifies five major categories, three of which contain subcategories. These five major categories are (a) *process*, (b) *state*,

Table 5.2 Definitions of peace: chi-square values and percentages of responses in coding categories by democratic groups

Category ^a	Group 1 ^b	Group 2 ^b	x ²
	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	
<i>Positive peace presence</i>	61	49	7.18**
Unspecified positive peace	14	8	7.49**
Rejecting violence	13	19	4.62*
<i>Question of achievability/ideal presence</i>	23	32	5.01*
	<i>Military experience</i>	<i>No military experience</i>	
<i>Positive peace presence</i>	48	57	3.12 [^]
Unspecified positive peace	5	12	6.13**
<i>Question of achievability/ideal presence</i>	36	23	6.29**
Strive for	10	6	3.22 [^]
	<i>Protest</i>	<i>No protest</i>	
<i>Positive peace</i>			
Unspecified positive peace	4	11	5.1*
<i>Question of achievability/ideal presence</i>	39	24	7.19**

Numbers in the columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories “Presence” at the end of the variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response in at least one of the subcategories of a major category

^{b^} = 0.051 ≤ *p* < 0.10, * *p* ≤ 0.05, ** *p* ≤ 0.01, *** *p* ≤ 0.001

(c) *human characteristic*, (d) *future orientation*, and (e) *question of achievability/ideal*.

The *process* category contains nine subcategories: (1) *move on*, which itself contains the subcategory *active*, for responses describing moving on as a deliberate conscious act; (2) *apology and forgiveness*, which contains the subcategory *without forgetting*; (3) *reparations/compensations*; (4) *resolve/fix*, which contains the subcategory *make amends*; (5) *recognize/acknowledge/respect*; (6) *come to terms/agreement/compromise/negotiate*; (7) *understanding*; (8) *uniting*, which contains the subcategories *healing/reuniting* and *building new relationship with former enemy*; and (9) *prevention/preventing*.

The *state* category, for definitions referring to reconciliation as an end state, has three subcategories: *peace*, *end of conflict/violence/hostilities*, and *emotional state*. The *human characteristic* category is for definitions portraying reconciliation as inherent in human nature. Definitions in the *future orientation* category imply that reconciliation is an achievement that will continue into the future. The final major category, *question of achievability/ideal*, includes responses raising the question of whether reconciliation can be achieved or por-

traying it as an ideal; *strive for* is a subcategory within that major category.

Distribution of Definitions of Reconciliation

Participants’ definitions of reconciliation varied in amount of content, with the number of codeable units per participant ranging from 1 to 5, resulting in a total of 620 responses (codeable units). Of these total units, 54% fell into the first major coding category: *process*. Within this category, the most prevalent subcategory was *come to terms/agreement/compromise/negotiate*, which comprised 34% of the *process* definitions of reconciliation. One example of a response coded as *come to terms/compromise/agreement/negotiate* comes from a 20-year-old Russian man who defined reconciliation as “the compromise of interests.” Out of the *process* reconciliation responses, 10% were coded as *apology/forgiveness*. For example, an 85-year-old Slovenian woman said reconciliation is “to show respect toward the other person/party/country.” This *recognize/acknowledge/respect* subcategory contained 10% of the *process* definitions of

reconciliation. A 59-year-old Greek man said reconciliation is the “active participation of both sides in order to find a solution,” which was coded into both the larger *process* category and its subcategory *resolve/fix*. The *resolve/fix* category contained 8% of the reconciliation *process* definitions. An example of a definition that fell into the *uniting* subcategory, which also constituted 8% of *process* responses, comes from an 18-year-old Russian woman who defined reconciliation as “making the relationship better.” Another 10% of *process* reconciliation responses fell into the two subcategories of *uniting*: (1) *healing/reuniting* and (2) *new relationship with former enemy*, explicitly referencing either a re-formed relationship or a newly created one.

The major category *state*, contains 24% of all the definitions of reconciliation. Within the *state* category, the largest subcategory was *peace*, which contained 35% of the definitions focusing on reconciliation as an end *state*. Most of these definitions consisted of the one word, “peace.” A 34-year-old Serbian man defined reconciliation as the “ending of conflict between opposed sides,” which was coded into the *end of conflict/violence/hostilities* subcategory, which made up 34% of *state* reconciliation definitions. The final subcategory, *emotional state*, contained 17% of all the *state* responses. For example, a 32-year-old Russian woman said reconciliation is “everyone is satisfied, everybody’s laughing,” which had two units codeable for *emotional state*.

Only 1% of all the definitions of reconciliation fell into the major category for *human characteristic*, and only 2% were coded for *future orientation*, another major category.

The final major category, *question of achievability/ideal*, included 17% of all definitions of reconciliation. Eighty-five percent of the responses in this category were simply coded as general, *unspecified question of achievability/ideal*. One such response came from a 51-year-old Serbian man who said that reconciliation is “a non-achievable ideal, something I don’t believe at all.” The subcategory *strive for* contained 10% of the *question of achievability/ideal* definitions. For example, a 39-year-old Greek man called reconciliation “necessary

after war,” which was coded as *strive for*. Finally, 31 (5%) of the definitions of reconciliation item were *uncodeable*. Table 5.3 gives additional examples of definitions of reconciliation in the major categories and most frequently used subcategories, along with percentages and demographic information.

Exploratory Demographic Analyses of Reconciliation Definitions

Exploratory chi-square analyses revealed that a significantly higher proportion of women than men gave at least one example of a definition that was coded into the *process* category or one of its subcategories. Military experience also played a role in response patterns: a significantly higher proportion of respondents with a history of military service, as compared to respondents without such experience, defined reconciliation in ways that questioned its achievability or identified it as an ideal. By contrast, more than twice as many participants lacking military experience identified reconciliation with *peace and/or harmony*. There was limited evidence that having a relative in military service played a role in definitions of reconciliation. Specifically, at a marginally significant level, proportionately more participants with a military relative than those without a military relative saw reconciliation as an ideal that was difficult to achieve. Finally, there were two significant differences between protestors and non-protestors in their definitions of reconciliation. Specifically, a significantly higher proportion of protestors than non-protestors gave definitions focusing on *recognition/acknowledgment/respect*, where as significant more non-protestors than protestors gave at least one example of a definition focusing on reconciliation as an end *state*. Table 5.4 presents the results of the chi-square analyses.

Discussion

The participants’ definitions of both peace and reconciliation varied in complexity and content. They were not homogeneous as might be expected

Table 5.3 Major coding categories with examples for definitions of reconciliation item

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Example
<i>Process</i>	54	Russia	M	47	“Positive process”
Unspecified	5(9)				
Apology and forgiveness	5(10)	Slovenia	M	32	“All involved parties admit their mistakes and forgive mistakes of others”
Resolve/fix	4(8)	Serbia	F	39	“Solving problems”
Recognize/acknowledge/respect	5(10)	Russia	F	20	“Acceptance”
Come to terms/agreement/ compromise/negotiate	18(34)	Serbia	F	43	“Compromise”
Uniting	4(8)	Russia	M	18	“Improving relations”
<i>State</i>	24	Greece	M	50	“Love among people”
Unspecified	4(15)				
Peace	8(35)	Slovenia	F	20	“Peace”
End of conflict	8(34)	Serbia	F	30	“Overcoming of conflict”
Emotional state	4(17)	Russia	M	20	“Decreasing of tension after some period of time”
<i>Human characteristic</i>	1(100)	Greece	F	26	“Human qualification”
<i>Future orientation</i>	2(100)		F	46	“A chance for the future”
<i>Question of achievability/ideal</i>	17	Greece	F	35	“Very difficult to achieve because of interests”
Unspecified	14(85)				
Strive for	2(10)	Serbia	M	39	“The only proper mode of solving problems”

The first number in the percentage column refers to the percent of responses in that category or subcategory out of all of the definitions of reconciliation. The second number (in parentheses) in the percentage column refers to the percent of responses in that subcategory out of the specific major category of definitions of reconciliation

Table 5.4 Definitions of reconciliation: chi-square values and percentages of responses in coding categories by democratic groups

Category ^a	Group 1 ^b	Group 2 ^b	x ²
	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	
<i>Process presence</i>	58	46	5.87*
	<i>Military</i>	<i>No military</i>	
<i>Question of achievability/ideal presence</i>	27	18	3.44 [^]
	<i>Relative</i>	<i>No relative</i>	
<i>Question of achievability/ideal presence</i>	23	14	2.73 [^]
	<i>Protest</i>	<i>No protest</i>	
<i>Process</i>			
Recognize/acknowledge/respect	9	3	7.13**
<i>State presence</i>	15	30	5.78*

Numbers in the columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^a “Presence” at the end of the variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response in at least one of the subcategories of a major category

^b [^] = 0.051 ≤ *p* < 0.10, * *p* ≤ 0.05, ** *p* ≤ 0.01, *** *p* ≤ 0.001

in a region with such a long, even recent, history of violence. Wish for a decent life prevailed, and the definitions often appeared to reflect respondents' deeper needs. Not surprisingly, there was evidence that demographic differences – for example, gender, military service, and engagement in peace protests – influenced the answers, women being more oriented toward positive peace, while men, those serving in the military, and peace protestors expressed greater concerns over the achievability of peace. There are likely to be diverse reasons for group differences – for example, the recent suffering of civil population (mainly women), knowledge of the military and its functioning, and greater understanding of peace and of obstacles to its achievement.

The majority of respondents defined peace in the language of positive peace – that is, focusing on the positive processes that can contribute to or reflect a culture of peace and thereby ensure a just and lasting peace. There was also considerable attention to the likelihood that both peace and reconciliation are ongoing and demanding processes. It could be said that people (nations) with such a long history of wars and conflicts and remembrance of violent and traumatic events in their collective memory want something more than simple ending of violence and war. Perhaps they understand that unresolved conflict creates an unstable situation that could easily develop into a new conflict as soon as one of the sides (or better its elites, politicians, etc.) realizes that it is stronger and could win this one battle (e.g., Serbia during Miloshević's time). Of course, the unrepresentativeness of our sample cautions us to consider our findings to be sources of hypotheses rather than of final conclusions. All of the involved countries deeply need reconciliation, but not as a universal acceptance of everything done, but as critical and ethically based evaluation of each party's sins, and then acceptance of the other side in their common future, because there can be no stable future if it is not common. In this sense, lack of future orientation in the answers of our respondents could be concerning. Nevertheless, the majority – women more than men, peace protestors more than non-protestors – are aware that

reconciliation is a process, something that could be achieved with an effort in time and not an easily achievable state. Those who are more aware of the need for peace either due to their engagement in peace building or due to their position of (potential) sufferers would be those who could prompt movement toward positive peace. And it can be hoped that this region of Europe, once and even now considered as “wild,” would lose this attribute and exchange it for a more peaceful one.

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Definition of Peace and Reconciliation in the Middle East

6

Glyn Secker, Patrick Hanlin, Gabriella Gricius,
Majed Ashy, Abdul Kareem Al-Obaidi,
Heyam Mohammed, Raja Tayeh, Irene Colthurst,
Lane Smith, Dalit Yassour-Boroschowitz,
Helena Syna Desivilya, Kamala Smith, Linda Jeffrey,
William Tastle, Feryal Turan, Alev Yalcinkaya,
and Rouba Youssef

Political and Economic Interests of the West in the Middle East

US foreign policy in the Middle East dates from its post-WWII Cold War with the USSR over spheres of influence, when Israel was central to

its goals. In the years following World War II, Pan-Arabism gained influence in the Middle East and North Africa. Led by Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, backed by the USSR, and inspired by the anticolonial revolt of the National Liberation Front (FLN) against the French in Algeria, this Pan-Arabism movement was seen by some as creating a potential for revolution across the Middle East and North Africa. The USA, UK, and France responded by backing specific autocratic regimes, in a bid to secure their military and oil-related interests in the Gulf region.

G. Secker (✉)
Board of Directors and Executive Committee member,
Jews For Justice For Palestinians, London, UK
e-mail: gmsecker@yahoo.co.uk

P. Hanlin
Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston,
MA, USA

G. Gricius
International Relations and Linguistics, Boston University
Boston, USA

M. Ashy
Psychology Department, Bay State College,
Boston, MA, USA
e-mail: majed.ashy@gmail.com

A.K. Al-Obaidi
Institute of International Education,
New York, NY, USA
e-mail: kareemobedy60@yahoo.com;
kareemobaidi@gmail.com

H. Mohammed
Department of Curriculum and Instruction,
College of Education, Kuwait University, Kuwait
e-mail: mobarak1955@msn.com

R. Tayeh
Director of Institutional Research, Doane College,
Crete, NE, USA
e-mail: rtayeh@unlserve.unl.edu;
raja.tayeh@doane.edu

I. Colthurst
Department of International Relations, San Diego
University, San Diego, USA
e-mail: irenecolth@gmail.com

L. Smith
Senior Research Scholar (Retired),
University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
e-mail: lanesmith0@gmail.com

D. Yassour-Boroschowitz
Department of Human Services,
Emek Yezreel College, Israel
e-mail: DalitY@yvc.ac.il

As the decline of the British military presence in the Gulf accelerated after the end of the Second World War, the Nixon Doctrine was developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s, under which the United States would prop up its regional allies (namely, the Shah of Iran, Turkey, and the Gulf states) and let them police the region by proxy. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Washington saw the opportunity to deploy its forces in the Gulf. The “Carter Doctrine” created a rapid deployment force – later to be reorganized as CENTCOM, whose jurisdiction initially enveloped North Africa, the entire Middle East, and Central Asia, as well as the bordering areas of South Asia (Hanieh, 2011).

Even before its overpowering victory in the 1967 war, Israel became a key ally of the West, serving as a strategic local foothold for NATO against the USSR and its allies, as well as directly supplying “special forces” to aid the French against the FLN (which had the support of Nasser and the USSR), and against the liberation movement in the Congo. As reward, France supplied Israel with nuclear weaponry. This, along with US

military aid and funding, turned Israel into a leading global military power. In addition to providing armed support for French imperial interests, Israel joined the British-French military action against Nasser’s Egypt in the 1956 Suez Crisis, attacked Syria in 1966, and continued to act on behalf of NATO’s interests in the region. Nasser had closed the canal to Israeli shipping, and in the settlement of the dispute, Israel returned the Sinai, which it had captured, in exchange for use of the canal. The aftermath of the 1973 Israeli-Arab War brought a shift in political alignments in the region, led by post-Nasserist Egypt. Sadat of Egypt turned from the USSR to the USA, and with the promised gain of \$1.5 billion per annum in US aid to the Egyptian military (the largest sum after Israel), the way was clear to a peace agreement with Israel. A realignment in Arab attitudes to the USA and to Israel ensued; Pan-Arabism declined, and several Arab states joined the US-led bloc. Following the collapse of the USSR, Jordan joined the trend started by Egypt, signing a peace accord with Israel in 1994, thus securing two out of four of Israel’s borders with its neighbors.

Ben-Zvi (1998) demonstrates that a subtle but profound shift in American policy toward Israel began not, as is commonly held by historians and analysts, in 1962 with the Kennedy administration’s decision to sell Hawk anti-aircraft missiles to Israel but 4 years earlier in the second Eisenhower administration. This change in policy occurred not primarily because of domestic American politics but because of strategic factors in the Middle East and a recognition that Israel could be a strategic asset to the United States instead of a burden (Leiber, 1998). Only after the administration began to recognize the strategic dimension and to appreciate how shaky other pro-Western governments in the region actually were did it start to adopt a more explicitly cooperative policy toward Israel.

On October 24, 1973, when the Soviets threatened to deploy several airborne divisions to aid the surrounded Egyptian Third Army on the east side of the Suez Canal, the administration of President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger reacted vigorously (Leiber, 1998). As Uri Davis points out, the USA, through its direct involvement in the 1973 war, not only saved Israel

H.S. Desivilya
Department of Sociology and Anthropology,
Yezreel Valley College, Emek Yezreel, Israel
e-mail: desiv@yvc.ac.il

K. Smith
Behavioral Health Analyst, Abt Associates,
Cambridge, MA, USA
e-mail: kamala_smith@abtaassoc.com

L. Jeffrey
College of Education, Rowan University, Glassboro,
NJ, USA
e-mail: jeffrey@rowan.edu

W. Tastle
Ithaca College of Business, New York, USA
e-mail: tastle@ithaca.edu

F. Turan
Department of Sociology, Ankara University,
Ankara, Turkey
e-mail: feryalturan@yahoo.com

A. Yalcinkaya
Department of Psychology, Yeditepe, Istanbul, Turkey
e-mail: yalcinkaya@prodigy.net;
ayalcinkaya@yeditepe.edu.tr

R. Youssef
Psychology, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI, USA
e-mail: rosyruby@hotmail.com

but also “brought the area under its undisputed dominance, driving the USSR very rapidly from its positions of paramount influence in Egypt and Syria” (Davis, 1977). While American foreign aid to Israel amounted to \$3.2 billion in the years from 1949 to 1973, it grew to a total of \$75 billion for the period from 1974 to 1997. Indeed, by the late 1970s, Israel had become the largest single recipient of American foreign aid (Bard & Pipes, 1967, p. 6).

Two Zionisms

The second important thread contributing to current conflicts in the Middle East was the development of two forms of Zionism – Christian Zionism and Jewish Zionism. It is noteworthy that Christian Zionism predated Jewish Zionism by some 200–300 years. It had its roots in the Reformation, in the period of the Enlightenment, and in the movements for personal liberty that drove the French Revolution and the social reformers of England (Israel, 2001). It gained strength during the era leading into World War I and its aftermath. Joseph Chamberlain (1836–1914, British President of Board of Trade, Colonial Secretary), like others before him, recognized that Zionist goals provided opportunities for extending the British Empire. “He saw the Jews as a ready-made group of European colonizers available to settle, develop and hold all but empty land under the British aegis” (Tuchman, 2011, p. 189). The significance of Palestine in the British imperial plan came to rest primarily in its proximity to Egypt. Lord Kitchener (1850–1916), Britain’s Secretary of State for War, also took up the gauntlet, calling upon his government to “secure Palestine as a bulwark to the British position in Egypt as well as an overland link with the East” (Shariff, 1983, p. 70).

But it was in America that Evangelical and Fundamentalist Protestantism were to achieve a critical mass and to become an enduring component of national and, thus, international politics, including promotion of Zionism. William Blackstone’s 1887 book on biblical prophecy, *Jesus is Coming*, argued that the Jews had a biblical right to Palestine and would soon be restored there. By 1927, *Jesus is Coming* had been translated into 36 languages, including Hebrew, and

had sold one million copies. William Blackstone became one of the first Christian Zionists in America to actively lobby for the Zionist cause. In 1888, it was Blackstone who, on his return from Palestine, helped popularize the now infamous phrase “a land without a people and a people without a land” (Davis, 1995a, p. 6), later taken up by Golda Meir and brandished as a mantra.

In recent decades, as Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum of the American Jewish Committee stated, “The evangelical community is the largest and fastest-growing bloc of pro-Jewish sentiment in this country” (quoted in Flannery, 2004, p. 265). A further factor that stimulated the emergence of the Evangelical Christian Zionist movement’s political agenda was the election of Menachem Begin as Israel’s prime minister in May 1977. Prior to Begin’s election, Israeli politics had been dominated by the secular Labor Party. Begin’s Likud Party was dominated by hard-line military figures such as Rafael Eitan and Ariel Sharon and supported by the increasingly powerful settler movement and by small Orthodox religious parties.

According to Mead (2006), “Conspiracy theorists and secular scholars and journalists in the United States and abroad have looked to a Jewish conspiracy or, more euphemistically, to a ‘Jewish lobby’ to explain how U.S. support for Israel can grow while sympathy for Israel wanes among what was once the religious and intellectual establishment. A better answer lies in the dynamics of U.S. religion. Evangelicals have been gaining social and political power, while liberal Christians and secular intellectuals have been losing it. This should not be blamed on the Jews.” So here we have a startling point of conjunction, where the priorities of political economy converged with the dominant cultural beliefs, a synergistic reaction that has yet to run its course.

The second Zionism is the one that developed in the second half of the 1800s in Eastern Europe. Its proponents were Theodor Herzl, Moses Hess, Leon Pinsker, Vladimir Jabotinsky, Ben Gurion, and Chaim Weizmann. In essence, it was a categorical break with millennia of Jewish tradition and belief: it was a secular movement that rejected the Orthodox belief that a Jewish state could be established only after the coming of the Messiah and that any attempt to do so before the divine action

would be a sacrilege. It was also a rejection of the social philosophy by which Jewish communities over millennia had sought to live peacefully within wider societies and to manage the prejudices and anti-Semitism encountered therein as the inevitable inadequacies of the lived faiths of humans.

The objective of this second form of Zionism was the establishment of a Jewish nation state. Bizarrely, the proponents considered a variety of lands deemed to be empty, including Uganda, Argentina, and El Arish. The problem was that the world had already been divided up between the great empires, which did not consider any remaining territories to be up for grabs. Also, to create a new state in a world dominated by empires, there was the need for a powerful ideological motivation. These two factors quickly focused attention on Palestine, with a disregard for the fact that it was clearly inhabited. As atheists, these nationalists coolly quoted the biblical gift of the land of Palestine to the Jews, the biblical existence of Jewish kingdoms, and the flights from Egypt and from Jerusalem. To this was added the slogan “For a people without a land, a land without a people” (Blackstone, 1891, p. 17). In one swipe, this motto erased the Palestinians as a people and facilitated their definition as less than human. From its inception, therefore, this Zionism was racist; its target being a Semitic people, it was also anti-Semitic.

There is ample evidence of various forms of racism and anti-Semitism in the writings of the Zionists. For example, Arthur Ruppin (1913), cited in Sands (2009, p. 263), founder of the Sociology Department of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, asserted that “owing to the process of selection...the Ashkenazim are today superior in intelligence and scientific capacity to the Sephardi and Arabian Jews.” Dr. Aaron Sandler, a leading Zionist and a physician at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, was convinced that the Jewish people had always been a pure race. The most well known, Redcliffe Nathan Salaman from Hebrew University and member of its Board of Trustees, claimed to have identified a Jewish “allele” or version of a gene (ones that facilitate hereditary variation) and believed that Zionism was a eugenic project for improving the Jewish race (Sands, 2009, p. 2).

This academic tradition is the antecedent of today’s Israeli secondary schools’ curricula: according to a recent study by Nurit Peled-Elhanan, in many hundreds of school textbooks, there is no depiction of Arabs as a normal people. They are pictured in Ali Baba dress, with a camel, and described as vile, deviant, criminal people who do not pay taxes and live off the state (Sherwood, 2011). They are portrayed as primitive farmers and terrorists. There are no references to Palestinian children, doctors, teachers, engineers, or modern farmers. The killing of Palestinians is depicted as necessary for the survival of the nascent Jewish state. Peled-Elhanan (2012) argues that from kindergarten through the 12th grade, Israeli children are inculcated with chauvinistic patriotic ideas and a racism that prepares them for their compulsory military service. Thus, school education is contiguous with the Hesder Yeshivot, the combined religious-military schools in the Israeli Defense Force for new recruits directly from school. One such school produced a field leaflet calling for soldiers to show no mercy toward the enemy during Operation Cast Lead on Gaza Dec 2008–Jan 2009 (Associated French Press, 2009).

Jabotinsky translated the theory of a Jewish state into an applied program that he named “The Iron Wall.” It had three components: Jewish land, Jewish produce, and Jewish labor, to be acquired by any means necessary, which included the use of physical force and terror. This was the bedrock upon which the kibbutzim were fashioned and the policy that informed the early settlers – hence the clashes with Palestinians in the period between the two World Wars and the notorious Plan Dalet (Plan D) – the ruthless eradication of some 520 Palestinian villages in the Fertile Crescent through a combination of slaughter conducted by the Stern and Irgun Gangs, and the spreading of this terror to create the mass flight of the inhabitants, known as the Nakhba (Sayigh, 1979).

There is systemic racial discrimination against the 1.25 million Israeli Palestinian – the “present absent” and “the absent present” – the 1950 land law which dispossesses Palestinians of ownership if they were absent in 1967 or left their property temporarily; Israeli Palestinian villages have been “unrecognized,” so that services are denied

and building expansion prohibited; schools for Palestinians are of inferior quality (and they are obliged to use the very same textbooks identified as racist propaganda by Elhanan). To this list must be added severe employment discrimination against anyone who has not completed military service (nearly all Palestinians), and they are denied all but the most menial jobs in enterprises related to Israel's military industrial complex (Sheffer & Barak, 2010).

Overlaying and intertwining with all this is the racism toward the black Falasha Ethiopian Jews and toward Jews of low social status (Neslen, 2006). And finally there is the program of house demolitions: since 1967, 26,000 Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Negev have been cleared in a process of ethnic cleansing, and the pace of demolitions was continuing to accelerate in 2012.

Not in Our Name

There has been, however, an alternative Jewish tradition. In the same period and in the same geographical area where Jewish Zionism started, there was a wholly different movement. Its core was the BUND, an organization of Jewish workers in the nineteenth century whose wages and working conditions in the factories and sweatshops in Russia and Eastern Europe were extremely poor. It grew to represent tens of thousands and became a social and political movement. Its language was Yiddish, the vernacular language of the Jewish people of the day. It played a central role in the revolutionary period of the time, allying with the reformist Mensheviks. BUND had one clear policy that set it aside categorically from the Zionists: it believed that the solution to anti-Semitism and racism was the wholesale reform and restructuring of the power relations of society so as to remove from it the causes and mechanisms for its creation and regeneration. It was this movement that was in the ascent until the demise of the socialist and humanist ideals of the 1917 Russian Revolution in the years immediately following the First World War (Harman, 1967; Englert, 2012).

These values informed the original ideals of the Kibbutz Movement and those who constituted

the First and Second Aliyah (Weinstock, 1969), but their practical achievements were quickly appropriated by the political Zionists. The rise of Stalin saw the reinstigation of racism, anti-Semitism, and terror in the USSR. With the disappearance of their political opponents, the way was clear for the political Zionists. The foundations of the Jewish state were being laid in the interwar years and were accelerated during the rise of fascism (Brenner, 1983); with the revelation of the Holocaust, the movement became ineluctable. It thus displaced the whole tradition of Judaism, sometimes referred to or epitomized as Hillel Judaism, which held at its center such profound rabbinical tenets as follows: "That which is hurtful to you do not do to your neighbor"; "Receive every man as a friend"; "The world rests on justice, truth and peace"; "The hero of heroes is not he who defeats his enemy but he who turns his enemy into a friend"; and such sayings from the Mishna as, "All are harmed by the oppression of another" and "The sword comes by the delay of justice of by the perversion of justice." This historically sidelined polarity of Jewish identity now shows signs of reasserting itself in groups such as Rabbis for Human Rights, Jewish Voice for Peace in the USA, and Jews for Justice for Palestinians in the UK.

We recognize that issues in the Middle East go beyond the relations between Israel and the other states in the region. Nevertheless, we believe that the history behind the establishment of the Jewish state and the role of the West in establishing and supporting that state are vital to the understanding of many conflicts besetting the area today. In the findings reported in the next section, we consider definitions of peace and reconciliation from the region as a whole. Because our samples were nonrepresentative, we believe it would be inappropriate to make comparison between participants from Israel and participants from the other Middle Eastern countries sampled for this study or to compare Jews with Muslims or other religious groups within the region. Our broad question is: In the volatile region of the Middle East in the years 2006–2008, what kinds of definitions of peace and reconciliation could be found among ordinary citizens?

Methods

The Sample

The Middle Eastern sample was comprised of 601 participants from Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. These participants had a mean age of 29 and a range from 18 to 80 years. There were 344 female participants, 226 male participants, and one participant who did not report gender. Regarding military service, 23% of the participants reported having been in the military, and 27% indicated that they had a relative who had served in the military. Approximately one-quarter of the participants (24%) indicated that they had participated in at least one protest activity.

Coding

All participants were asked to respond to the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006) developed by the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP). In this chapter, we report on the definitions of peace and reconciliation provided by the Middle Eastern respondents.

Coding manuals for definitions of peace and reconciliation were developed using grounded theory, which identifies overarching themes with the qualitative responses; these themes become the basis for coding categories (Glaser & Strauss, 2007). In providing definitions of peace and reconciliation, many participants gave multiple definitions; consequently, their definitions were first separated, when appropriate, into codeable (thematic) units. This process of coding each thematic unit allowed us to identify all of the meanings that could be captured in a complex response and yielded an average of nearly two definitions per response. By using grounded theory when developing the manuals, rather than coding responses into predetermined categories,

the GIPGAP was able to identify specific categories inherent in the definitions and label those categories to reflect their content.

Definitions of Peace

Coding System for Definitions of Peace

Definitions of peace were coded into four major coding categories: (a) negative peace, (b) positive peace, (c) question of achievability, and (d) perceived reality (e.g., statements appearing to reflect the participant's view of real-life events or circumstances related to peace). Each of these major categories included some general/unspecified definitions as well as a number of subcategories for more specific definitions. Very few responses were considered uncodeable. Although we used grounded theory methods to identify these categories, it is interesting that the two most prominent categories were negative and positive peace, quite consistent with the formulation of Galtung (1966), who has argued that scholars should stop defining peace as the opposite to or absence of war and conceptualize it more as the forms of justice and equality that are essential foundations for peace.

Responses coded into the *negative peace* category defined peace as an absence of some sort of aggression, violence, or conflict; that is, they defined peace in terms of what it was not. Subcategories included (a) *no conflict*, (b) *rejecting violence*, (c) *rejecting terrorism*, (d) *negative emotions*, and (e) *rejecting intimidation/threat*.

Definitions coded into the *positive peace* category focused on the necessary building blocks of a lasting peace or a culture of peace (e.g., fairness, reciprocity). The *positive peace* category includes two principal subcategories: (a) *prerequisites for peace* and (b) *outcomes*. The subcategories of *prerequisites for peace* are (a) *granting of human rights*, (b) *equality*, (c) *acceptance/tolerance* (including *understanding* and *solidarity* as an additional level of subcategories), (d) *democratic participation*, (e) *openness to working toward a mutual goal*, (f) *security*, and (g) *access to resources*. The *outcomes* subcategory

Table 6.1 Examples of Middle Eastern definitions of peace

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Example
<i>Negative peace</i>	14				I
General/unspecified	3(16)	Bahrain	Male	31	Application of a rule no harm and mischief
Rejecting violence	7(43)	Turkey	Female	34	Living without war
Negative emotions	2(9)	Israel	Female	22	Peace, understanding, and cooperation with no hate
<i>Positive peace</i>	67				
General/unspecified	6(9)	Lebanon	Male	21	Happiness
Acceptance/tolerance	6(17)	Turkey	Female	19	Living of nations with tolerance and tranquility
Granting of human rights	2(3)	Kuwait	Female	34	Establishing security and stability and the protection of human rights
Solidarity	4(10)	Israel	Male	33	Neighborly relations between states that include open borders and full economic and touristic cooperation
<i>Question of achievability</i>	17				
General/unspecified	8(46)	Saudi Arabia	Female	24	Every human being has the right to live in peace
Unattainable	2(9)	Kuwait	Female	45	Not possible to establish
Strive for	6(36)	Afghanistan	Male	29	The ultimate quest in life
<i>Perceived reality</i>	1	Lebanon	Male	18	We did not know this in Lebanon, its something (not clear) if it worked, the war stopped

The first number in the percentage column refers to the percent of responses in the category or subcategory out of the total set of definitions of peace. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the subcategories out of the major category set of definitions of peace

includes specific subcategories for (a) *positive emotions*, (b) *calm/tranquility*, and (c) *harmony*.

Definitions coded for *question of achievability* made some reference to the possibility of peace, often expressing some doubts about its achievability (with subcategories for *ideal*, *unattainable*, and *strive for*). Responses fitting into the *perspectives on reality* category generally referred to relevant events in the real world rather than constituting definitions. *Uncodeable* definitions, which were quite uncommon, generally appeared to be unrelated to peace.

Distribution of Definitions of Peace: Results

Table 6.1 provides examples and percentages of definitions of peace in the major coding categories and subcategories. The most prevalent major category (67% of all the definitions of peace) was *positive peace*, and the most prevalent sub-

category was *security* – a subcategory of the *positive peace* category. The *positive peace* definitions focused on the structural foundations of peace and the benefits of peace, rather than on the absence of violence, and included responses coded into the subcategories for *prerequisites for peace* (which accounted for 64% of all the *positive peace* definitions) and *outcomes of peace* (which accounted for 36% of all *positive peace* definitions). One of the best examples of definitions falling into the *positive peace* category and being very consistent with Galtung's formulation comes from an 18-year-old Lebanese man who described peace as “giving, loving citizens, equality, respecting mutual rights”; the individual themes in this reply were coded into the *prerequisites* subcategories for *equality* and *granting of human rights*. *Openness to working toward a mutual goal* appeared in 5% of all the definitions and focused on cooperation. A 20-year-old female from Lebanon defined peace as the “right to live in an adequate environment.”

This response was coded for *granting of human rights* and *access to resources*. Three examples of *positive peace* (*understanding, security, and democratic participation*) can be seen in the multiunit definition of peace provided by a Jordanian woman who defined peace as “stability of things, common understanding between the government and the people.” A 51-year-old Afghan man defined peace as “security and stability,” which can also be seen as *prerequisites for peace*. A 20-year-old Turkish woman responded that peace is “That all people live together under one roof without any resentment, hate.” The components of this response were coded into three subcategories: *solidarity* (a *positive peace* response) and *rejecting* and *negative emotions* (*negative peace* subcategories). A 19-year-old Lebanese woman defined peace as “not lashing out and resolving issues”; this particular response was coded within the two subcategories *rejecting violence* (a *negative peace* definition) and *openness to working toward a mutual goal* (a *positive peace* definition).

A number of *positive peace* definitions focused on the *outcomes* of peace. For example, a 31-year-old man said that peace is a “key term for people living together in happiness, tranquility, and calmness,” an answer coded for *solidarity, positive emotion, and calm/tranquility*. Six percent of all responses were coded for *positive emotions*. Peace was equated with *calmness/tranquility* in 9% of the responses. A 30-year-old man from Lebanon defined peace as “relief,” which was coded for *positive outcome*.

Of the 1,196 codeable units for definitions of peace, only 14% were coded into one of the *negative peace* subcategories (i.e., *no conflict, rejecting violence, negative emotions, and/or rejecting intimidation*). A 20-year-old Lebanese woman responded that peace is “No War,” coded as *rejecting violence*. A 29-year-old Israeli woman responded that peace is “Life without attacks, wars, and no terrorist activity,” a multiunit definition coded for *rejecting violence, no conflict, and rejecting terrorism*. Only 2% of all responses (10% of the *negative peace* responses) were coded for *no conflict*, and only five responses were coded for *rejecting terrorism*.

The third coding category, *question of achievability/ideal* (17% of all responses), had subcategories for *unattainable, strive for, and spiritual/god*. Definitions placed in this category questioned the *possibility of achieving peace*, rather than defining peace. A 29-year-old Israeli woman described peace as “an unattainable thing, especially for those who truly need the peace”; this definition was coded for *unattainable* and *question of achievability/ideal*. A 29-year-old man from Bahrain said peace was “the demand of every nation,” a response that was coded into the *strive for* category. A 32-year-old man from Qatar defined peace as “in Islam,” which was coded into the *spiritual/god* category (for definitions referring to a godlike presence or entity that improved the possibility of achieving peace).

Responses coded for emphasis on *perceived reality* were generally descriptions of what seemed to respondents to be peace “on the ground.” A 31-year-old woman from Israel offered a response that was coded in the *perceived reality* category: “When rockets do not fall on us, when there are no sirens, and you do not have to go hide in shelters.” The definition of a 38-year-old woman who answered “My son because his name is ‘Peace’” was identified as *uncodeable* based on our coding system.

Definitions of Peace: Exploratory Analyses

For the purpose of investigating potential group differences in the frequency of particular types of responses, exploratory chi-square analyses and Fisher’s exact tests were run. Responses in the *general nonspecific positive peace* category and responses indicating that peace means *security* were made by proportionately more men than women. A significantly higher proportion of women than men, however, equated peace with *positive emotions* and *calmness and tranquility*. A significantly higher proportion of respondents with military experience than their nonmilitary counterparts gave at least one definition in a *positive peace* category or subcategory, as well as providing

Table 6.2 Definition of peace chi-square results

Category	Group 1 ^a		χ^2
	Female	Male	
<i>Positive peace</i>			
General/unspecified	5	8	4.67*
Security	8	13	5.19*
Positive emotions	7	4	4.78*
Calm/tranquility	11	7	4.85*
	<i>Military</i>	<i>No military</i>	
<i>Negative peace presence</i> ^b	34	18	13.01***
<i>Positive peace presence</i> ^b	78	68	4.26*
General/unspecified	3	9	10.09**
Acceptance/tolerance	12	4	19.6***
Openness to working toward a mutual goal	11	3	21.17***
Security	4	13	16.32***
Calm/tranquility	10	5	5.08*
<i>Question of achievability</i>			
Strive for	2	7	9.13**
	<i>Relative</i>	<i>No relative</i>	
<i>Positive peace</i>			
General/unspecified	5	10	4.55*
Security	8	16	6.24*
Positive emotions	8	3	4.47*
	<i>Protest</i>	<i>No protest</i>	
<i>Positive peace presence</i> ^b	77	69	3.16*
Prerequisites for peace general/unspecified	8	4	4.92*
Calm/tranquility Question of achievability	8	11	3.24*
Strive for	5	8	3.35*

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^b“Presence” at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories. ^{*}0.05 < *p* < 0.10, ^{*}*p* ≤ 0.05, ^{**}*p* ≤ 0.01, ^{***}*p* ≤ 0.001

responses equating reconciliation with *acceptance and tolerance*, *openness to working toward mutual goals*, and *calmness and tranquility*; moreover, a significantly higher proportion of those with military experience gave at least one example of a *negative peace* definition. By contrast, proportionately more respondents without military experience gave a *general nonspecific* positive peace definition or equated peace with *security* (one of the positive peace subcategories) and indicated that peace is something to *strive for*. Proportionately more individuals with relatives in the military gave definitions equating reconciliation with *positive emotions*, whereas proportionately

more respondents without a military relative gave a *positive peace* definition and mentioned *security* specifically.

Differences between individuals with protest experience and those without experience were mostly at a marginally significant level. Proportionately more protestors than non-protestors gave at least one example of a *positive peace* response and an example of a general unspecified response, while proportionately more non-protestors equated peace with *calmness and tranquility* and declared people should *strive for* peace. A significantly higher proportion of protestors than non-protestors gave at least one example of a *prerequisite for peace*. Table 6.2

includes all significant and marginally significant chi-square results.

Definitions of Reconciliation

Coding System for Definitions of Reconciliation

Definitions of reconciliation were coded into four major categories, most of which had subcategories. The major categories were (a) *process*, (b) *state*, (c) *human characteristic*, (d) *future orientation*, and (e) *question of achievability/ideal*. The *process* category has nine subcategories: (a) *moving on*, (b) *engaging in apology and forgiveness*, (c) *making reparations/compensations*, (d) *resolving/fixing*, (e) *recognizing/acknowledging/respecting*, (f) *coming to terms/agreeing/compromising/negotiating*, (g) *understanding*, (h) *uniting*, and (i) *preventing*. Four of these nine subcategories have an additional level of subcategories. Specifically, *moving on* has a subcategory for responses indicating that reconciliation is an *active* process. *Apology and forgiveness* has a subcategory called *without forgetting*. *Making amends* is a subcategory within *resolving/fixing*. *Uniting* has two subcategories, which are *healing/reuniting* and *building new relationship with former enemy*.

The second major category, labeled *state*, includes responses mentioning endpoints of a reconciliation process. The *state* category has three subcategories, which are *peace*, *end of conflict*, and *emotional state*. The third major category, *human characteristic*, applies to definitions suggesting that reconciliation is a product of human nature or the human condition. The *future orientation* category has responses that imply an ongoing process that will continue into the future. The *question of achievability/ideal* category, which has one subcategory (*strive for*), includes responses questioning the achievability of reconciliation or describing it as an ideal. For more information regarding coding and the coding manuals, please refer to the introductory definitions chapter, Chap. 2, focusing on coding procedures.

Distribution of Definitions of Reconciliation: Results

Among the definitions of reconciliation, the most prevalent (34%) were the responses coded for *process*; the most common example of *process* themes was *come to terms* (*come to terms, agreement, compromise, and negotiate*). These definitions portrayed reconciliation as a process achieved through compromises, negotiation, or some sort of agreement. One example was from a 28-year-old Israeli woman who said reconciliation is “Acceptance, agreement, the beginning of a new way”; this multipart response was coded within three *process* subcategories: *unite, recognize, and come to terms*. Fifteen percent of all the definitions of reconciliation fell into the subcategory of *process* for *come to terms*. A 65-year-old man from Israel defined reconciliation as “an attempt to erase the violence of the past and willingness to return to a routine and to start a new page.” This definition characterizes reconciliation as an *active* effort to *move on*.

The major category of *process* also included subcategories for *apology and forgiveness* and *building a new relation*. Examples of both of these subcategories can be found in the definition given by a 51-year-old Israeli woman, who defined reconciliation as “forgiveness and rehabilitating the relationship between former enemies.” While the *apology and forgiveness* subcategory describes reconciliation as a process of apology, the *building new relation* subcategory portrays reconciliation as a new friendship (generally with a former enemy). A 19-year-old woman from Lebanon defined reconciliation as “to admit the mistake and have the desire to correct it and compensate for it”; this complex response contained units coded for *recognize, reparations/compensations, and resolve/fix*.

A 37-year-old woman from Israel defined reconciliation as “a process that is supposed to lead to peace, in which each side that was preoccupied by the past examines itself and tries to accept, or at least understand, the other side.” This was coded for *recognize* and *understand*. As a subcategory of *acceptance/tolerance* (which is a subcategory of *process*), *understanding* applied

to definitions that promoted understanding as a key component of reconciliation. An 18-year-old woman from Saudi Arabia defined reconciliation as “attempting to rebuild bridges”; this was coded into *healing/reuniting*, applying to definitions portraying reconciliation as a healing process or an event that focused on a reunion of old friends or enemies.

The second most common type of definition, comprising 28% of all the definitions of reconciliation, identified reconciliation with some form of end *state*, as an achieved outcome or a characteristic of reconciled societies. Responses in this category were further divided into subcategories based on whether they focused on *peace*, *end of conflict*, or an *emotional state*. Responses coded for *emotional state* linked reconciliation with an emotional end state, which frequently occurred within definitions, as the end result of actions taken to achieve reconciliation. A 29-year-old Jordanian man said reconciliation is “an agreement between two sides stating not to harm the other side or aggress against him”; this response was coded into the *state* subcategory *end of conflict*. A 43-year-old woman from Kuwait described reconciliation as “a method of humiliation and dishonor and to forget everything in order to achieve personal interests.” This multiunit response was coded into the *emotional state* subcategory as well as into the process subcategory *active move on*.

Twenty-one percent of all the definitions of reconciliation fell into the major category for *question of achievability/ideal*, which included the subcategories *ideal*, *strive for*, and *spiritual/god*. A 30-year-old Lebanese woman defined reconciliation as “a must,” which was coded under reconciliation into the subcategory *strive for*. A 30-year-old Iraqi man described reconciliation as “God’s work,” which was coded into the *spiritual/god* subcategory. A 25-year-old Lebanese man’s definition of reconciliation as “great, fair, and just” was coded into the *ideal* category. *Future orientation* was one category that had no subcategories to describe definitions that referred to reconciliation as something that would take place in the future. For example, a 32-year-old woman from Jordan defined reconciliation as

“something that leads to safety and stability.” Only a few responses were characterized as *uncodeable*. For example, a 19-year-old man from Oman defined reconciliation, as “I don’t know.” Only three of all the definitions were coded into the major category for definitions portraying identified reconciliation as a *human characteristic*. Table 6.3 includes percentages and examples of responses for definitions of reconciliation.

Definitions of Reconciliation: Exploratory Analyses

Chi-square and Fisher’s exact tests were conducted on an exploratory basis to look for any group differences in the frequency of specific definitional themes. These analyses indicated that a greater proportion of men than women gave definitions identifying reconciliation with *resolving or fixing*, at a marginally significant level. A significantly higher proportion of individuals with no military experience gave definitions equating reconciliation with *peace* than did those with military experience. Differences between individuals with relatives in the military and those without such relatives emerged in two of the major categories. A greater proportion of respondents without service relatives gave at least one example of reconciliation as a *process*, at a marginally significant level. However, proportionately more respondents with relatives in the military gave at least one example of a definition addressing the *achievability* of reconciliation. Finally, proportionately more antiwar protestors than non-protestors gave at least one example of a *process* definition of reconciliation and in particular were more likely to provide a definition focusing on *recognition*, *acknowledgement*, and *respect*. On the other hand, proportionately more non-protestors than protestors provided at least one example of a response coded into the major category for *state* or one of its subcategories and specifically gave more responses identifying reconciliation with *peace*. Table 6.4 includes all significant and marginally significant chi-square results.

Table 6.3 Examples of Middle Eastern definitions of reconciliation

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Example
<i>Process</i>	46				
General/unspecified	7(16)	Israel	Male	23	To reach reconciliation, a wind of “appeasement” must blow between the enemies
Move on	1(3)	Kuwait	Male	30	It is forgetting what happened or bad things between two or more sides
Recognize/acknowledge/ respect	5(12)	Lebanon	Male	53	Decreasing the differences
Uniting	5(12)	Iraq	Female	29	Collaboration among another
<i>State</i>	28				
General/unspecified	5(19)	Kuwait	Male	24	Something that leads to safety and stability
Peace	13(44)	Bahrain	Male	33	Making peace between the sides
End of conflict	5(19)	Israel	Female	58	Moving from a state of war and disconnect to closeness and mutual respect
Emotional state	5(18)	Oman	Male	21	Friendship and love
<i>Question of achievability</i>	21				
General/unspecified	15(69)	Bahrain	Male	44	Wanted
Strive for	6(29)	Qatar	Male	32	A demand but not with all people
<i>Future orientation</i>	3	Israel	Male	24	Leaving baggage behind and venturing on a new path

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of all the definitions of reconciliation. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percentages in the subcategory out of all the definitions in the major category to which that subcategory belongs

Table 6.4 Definition of reconciliation chi-square results

Category	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	χ^2
	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	
<i>Process</i>			
Resolve/fix	1	3	2.98 [^]
	<i>Military</i>	<i>No military</i>	
<i>State</i>			
Peace	9	16	4.56 [*]
	<i>Relative</i>	<i>No relative</i>	
<i>Process presence^b</i>	62	74	3.26 [^]
<i>Achievability/ideal presence^b</i>	47	33	4.35 [*]
	<i>Protest</i>	<i>No protest</i>	
<i>Process presence^b</i>	81	63	9.1 ^{**}
Recognize, acknowledge, respect	10	4	7.64 ^{**}
<i>State presence^b</i>	25	37	3.89 [*]
Peace	7	12	2.73 [^]

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^b“Presence” at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories. [^]0.05 < *p* < 0.10, ^{*}*p* ≤ 0.05, ^{**}*p* ≤ 0.01, ^{***}*p* ≤ 0.001

Discussion

Positive peace definitions predominated in responses of participants from the Middle East. Thus, rather than viewing peace just as the cessation of violence, the majority of participants focused on structural requirements for lasting peace such as justice and fairness, as well as describing the benefits of peace. A substantial portion of the definitions indicated that peace means security. Men and individuals with relatives in the military were particularly likely to focus on security as compared with their counterparts. Regarding definitions of reconciliation, the most common type of response identified reconciliation as a process such as coming to terms, making agreements, compromising, and negotiating. Protestors and individuals without any relatives in the military were particularly likely to give at least one example of reconciliation as a process, and individuals without military experience were particularly likely to equate reconciliation with peace.

These survey responses were collected approximately 3–5 years before the publication of this book. The Middle East continues to be a region of considerable volatility. As this book went to press, the world was still reeling from about 14 months of revolutionary activity in the Middle East. What is likely to happen next? The necessary and sufficient conditions for the just resolution of conflict arise when a watershed or tipping point in the balance of power is reached, such that each party to the conflict can believe that, on the balance of probabilities, it may have more to gain by the cessation of conflict than by its continuance.

As Secker (2011) commented extensively in *JNews*, “The US and the EU seem to be teetering between an attempt to curb the uprisings or prevent them spreading, and an attempt to more discreetly manipulate their results and harness them to protect their interests. One scenario for the Western response would be to support existing regimes. This might entail approval of brutal suppression in some countries, and temporary concessions and apparent political change in others, followed by slow reversion to an authoritarian status quo, with the option of improved economic exchange and development.”

The persistence of a determined movement in Arab countries able to overthrow oppressive regimes could lead to an alternative scenario: that the Muslim Brotherhood poses no immediate threat, that therefore the revolutions in North Africa and Egypt need not pose an “Islamic threat,” and that there is the prospect of social and political integration with the West, with the opportunity to develop liberal social democracies allied to the West, through a neoliberal “Marshall Plan.” The MENA, with high levels of educated populations and large unskilled workforce, are rich pools of labor offering a potential for international investment and economic exploitation.

In Tunisia and Egypt, a Western “hands-off” policy has been maintained, at least in public. Despite the strong showing in Egyptian elections by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist Nour Party, there have been no serious fears of an Islamic fundamentalist threat. Other moderate groups made reasonable advances. The trade

unions, which have yet to obtain a formal route into the electoral process, have organized very extensive industrial action and have significant new structures, thus building the power of the opposition. In Tunisia, the General Trade Union branches, together with social democratic movements, have been leading the action.

But, as Secker (2011) observed in *JNews*, the changes there are by no means secure; in 2011–2012, one could see something resembling “dual power” in Egypt: an unstable balance between popular power combined with the trade unions on the one hand and the military, still intact, on the other. The interim government’s response to youth demonstrations in Tahrir Square made clear the regime’s force was still intact with repetitions of prohibitions, violent dispersals, arrests, and torture. And very significantly in relation to Israel, when Egyptian demonstrators attempted to reach Gaza en masse via the Rafah Crossing, they were turned back by the Egyptian military and were obliged to resort to a mass demonstration in Tahrir Square.

With respect to Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, we saw a very different Western response, with the USA prepared to do all in its power to maintain the Saudi leadership and power structures intact. Bahrain is a regional base for the US Navy and Air Force and a wedge between Saudi Arabia and Iran, it has seen both rebellion and increasingly brutal repression by the regime, but despite reports of escalating violations there, the USA and EU gave tacit approval to Saudi Arabia to send in its troops to quell the rebellion. The USA, the UK, and French military support for the Libyan opposition against an unpredictable dictator, and the UN endorsement of this action, with the conference in London on March 29, 2011, attended by 40 bodies and countries, including the USA, Canada, Australia, the World Bank, the UN Secretary General, the Arab League, the Islamic Conference, and virtually the whole of the EU, followed by rapid disengagement, was unprecedented. Qaddafi’s eccentric rule of Libya had frustrated its inclusion into the new international financial order as exercised by the Gulf states, the USA, and the international financial institutions (IFIs). The revolution provided the

West with an opportunity to reassert control of the oil revenues, and Qaddafi's threats of genocidal assaults on civilian populations (inflated by Western media), together with his known gross violations of human rights, furnished the justification.

These events lead to a pivotal component absent from most discussions of the conflict and its possible resolution: the increasing financial influence over the MENA countries, and therefore on the Arab Spring, by the Gulf Cooperation Council. The Gulf states have become the mechanism through which Western finance, and the USA in particular, controls the region – with Israel and the Gulf states lining up on the same side (Hanieh, 2012). Mubarak accelerated the neoliberalism, enacting land reforms that deregulated rents, and forced farmers off their farms and into the cities in droves. The result was the enrichment of a tiny elite and the impoverishment of the vast majority (Mitchell, 1999). It was this action that laid the foundations of the Egyptian Arab Spring. Integrated into this complex are the primary Palestinian corporations, the first step in this process being the Oslo Accords. Thus, neoliberalism is offering both the solution to and the compounding of the political unrest.

In a JNews article, Secker (2011) wrote, "Israel has for some time been threatening another Cast Lead-style attack on Gaza. As a possible response to the Palestinian Authority's plan to obtain UN recognition of a Palestinian state last September (2011), some members of the coalition have suggested a full annexation of the West Bank. The total absence of any easing of the repressive measures either on Gaza or in the West Bank has offered nothing to Hamas, which is under pressure from jihadist breakaway groups to resume hostilities with Israel. If this provides Israel with a peg on which to hang a second Operation Cast Lead it could well backfire, igniting the whole region and possibly spurring the US into preemptive action with a push for a Palestinian settlement."

Members of the US administration have been at pains to point out how wrong this approach is. During the J Street conference in March 2011, Dennis Ross, then Special Assistant to the

President and Senior Director of Central Regional Policy, stated that "The US had made a strategic miscalculation in backing the authoritarian regimes in the ME, that the nature of the rebellions is characterized by joint Christian/Muslim programs, and that the US has therefore allocated \$150million to assist institution building among civil society." Ross stated that "Repression does not pay," that each and every government in the Middle East has responsibility for political freedom and human rights, and that the White House has been looking at regional reform over the last 6 months. He reiterated firm support for Israel, but stated that "it is not acceptable to get stuck in an unacceptable status quo" and that the longer the impasse lasts the more difficult it becomes to solve, for example, the possibility of a two-state solution in the context of demographic changes. He stated that reform and peace go hand in hand. He repeated that the status quo is unsustainable and that the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt did not aid peace with the Palestinians and concluded by saying that genuine democracy in Egypt combined with a genuine peace with Israel will significantly aid a resolution with the Palestinian Authority. Clearly, these words were intended for Israel's ears, but in case it did not register, Hillary Clinton repeated it: "The status quo between Palestinians and Israelis is no more sustainable than the political systems that have crumbled in recent months.... the only way to meet both people's aspirations is through a two-state solution" (Secker, 2011). The US administration is thus caught between its drive for neoliberal reforms in the region, which impoverish the bulk of the population, and the need that it therefore creates for authoritarian governments, and a need to move sufficiently toward political liberalization to accommodate the uprisings.

The USA has had to recognize the powerful movements for democracy. Repressing the revolutions across the region would entail commitments on the scale of the Iraq/Afghanistan interventions, and this is neither economically nor politically an option. At the same time, the establishment of even tentative forms of democracy in the region is having a major impact on the Palestinians, including the Fatah-dominated

Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, Hamas authorities in Gaza, and Palestinians in Israel.

A genuine process for a just settlement of the Palestinian question, if achieved, combined with less oppressive governments in the Middle East and North Africa, would weaken the rationale for and the grip of the regime in Iran, where there have been significant street demonstrations, brutally suppressed, and where the forces of social democracy might eventually gain the ascendancy. Such a success would remove the pretext for Israel's aggression toward Iran, with its threats of preemptive strikes. Such calming of the political environment in the Middle East would facilitate the eventual withdrawal of the US military from Iraq and Afghanistan, and the consequent reduction in war expenditure would afford the West the opportunity to move in a different direction.

One source of optimism in favor of resolution of the Palestinian question is the amazing spirit and humanity of the Palestinian people. That they have maintained their faith in a just resolution and sustained a distinction between Jews on the one hand and Israel and its political Zionism on the other as their persecutors is frankly astounding. But they remain pitted against the fourth most powerful military force in the world. Their hope, therefore, lies with the Arab Spring and in particular with Egypt. If democratic advances, however limited, become established in the Middle East and North Africa, particularly in Egypt, then on the one hand public opinion is unlikely to continue to allow its government to collude with Israeli policies, and on the other hand Israel's regional belligerence and its aggression toward the Palestinians would become counterproductive with respect to the regional interests of the superpowers, which would be based on liberal economic trade and development.

It is also clear that the youth in Egypt – the April 5th group – are unlikely to be able to hold the streets in the long term in the face of the military. If the Tahrir Square banner demanding regime change is to be honored, then the old regime needs to be challenged by the core of the society, by its economic backbone – that is, by its production workers in the industrial, manufacturing, and service industries. This would be true for

any society at such an historical juncture but is particularly pertinent in Egypt where the military, that is, the leading figures themselves, own large sectors of the economy, from armament production to straight commercial enterprises. It is the organizations of the workforces in these enterprises that is critical. And the tradition is there.

In 1938, textile workers in Egypt went on strike for the first time, demanding the two 12-h shifts be changed to three 8-h shifts. This marked the beginning of their fight for a fundamental change in the system. A decade later, in 1947, they organized another strike to demand the reinstatement of colleagues dismissed for demanding better working conditions. Tanks entered Mahalla for the first time to suppress the workers, killing three and injuring 17.

In July 1952, a group of army officers led by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrew Egypt's monarchy; this inspired the Mahalla factory workers who went on strike over long-standing grievances. They were in for a rude awakening – the strike was brutally suppressed by the army. Unrest at the factory continued throughout the early 1980s and in 1986; they struck again over their demand for a 30-day monthly wage rather than the 26-day wage. The company eventually caved in. In 1988, Hosni Mubarak announced the cancellation of special school grants to workers. Within hours, 20,000 factory workers were out on the streets in protest. For the first time, workers were making political demands. The government responded to the strike with an iron fist, and to this day, many workers still remember the brutal treatment meted out by the security forces.

When, in April 2008, 10,000 workers took to the streets to protest against privatization and corruption, they chanted "Down with Hosni Mubarak." It was the first anti-Mubarak protest to take place since the president came to power in 1981, and it would serve as a spark for others. The strikers received widespread support from outside the factory walls. The large picture of Mubarak in Mahalla Square was pulled down and burned. A giant step had been taken toward breaking the barrier of fear, and a clear message was delivered to the regime. The workers clashed with thousands of policemen, who used tear gas

and guns to quash the demonstrations; dozens were injured and three, including a young boy, were killed. The brutal force to silence unarmed and peaceful protesters became engraved in the memory of the city. State security eventually occupied the city, taking over control of the factory. Other Egyptian workers learned from Mahalla, and their plight came to symbolize the broader issue of deteriorating living standards for the majority of Egyptians, and their action was the connection between economic and political demands (Al Jazeera, 2012).

According to Alexander (2012), there is an aspect of the Arab Spring that has been ignored by the Western press – specifically, the mass strikes of September 2011 that paralyzed the government and the military council and opened up the road to the crisis of November. The independent unions and strike committees that led these strikes are part of what is now probably the biggest social movement in Egypt (with the possible exception of the Muslim Brotherhood) and certainly the biggest organized movement with real roots in the everyday struggles of the poor. The workers' organizations that have grown up since February 2011, with their roots in the pre-revolutionary strike waves, have already shown a remarkable degree of common purpose in articulating a set of demands for social justice and the "cleansing" of the state apparatus (Secker, 2011). So the tipping point is in the lap of the Arab Spring in general and in the organized urban workers of Egypt in particular. The opposition in Egypt may just be strong enough to shift the balance of power, at least in the short term. If this shift does occur, it will have a dramatic effect within the West bank, for Palestinian workers are likely to respond to their Egyptian counterparts, and any industrial action over job security, wages, and working conditions would bring them into direct conflict with the commercial and financial dimensions of the Oslo Accords, and by implication with its managers, the Palestinian Authority.

It is notoriously difficult to combine social reforms with the maintenance of authoritarian control. The instability of such arrangements

increases in proportion to the strength and the depth of the oppositional organizations. Such a balance is in process in Morocco, but it is early days. The history and the power of the organized opposition in Egypt is an entirely different proposition. Any government with a reforming agenda would seriously struggle to achieve credibility, would require considerable political skills, and would have to be authorized by the USA, the GCC, and the IFIs to extend freedoms, redistribute wealth, address calls for renationalizations, and extend civil participation. This would place the organized sections of Egyptian society, in particular the trade unions (EFITU), the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Salafist Nour Party, at the forefront. This contradiction, the prospect of easing the bars on the door, must place the USA, the Gulf states, the IFIs and not least the generals in a state of extreme anxiety. Given the abject failure of the current neoliberalization policy, they are caught between two stools: their commitment to the Gulf states on the one hand and their need to accommodate democratic freedoms on the other.

A second contradiction in the Middle East of 2012 was the strain between President Obama, representing the liberal Protestant sector of American society that was dominant in the latter half of the twentieth century, and the Evangelicals, whose Christian Zionism both served and drove US policy in the region for the last two decades. History informs us that in the final analysis, it has always been the national interests of the political economy that have been dominant. Since the Arab Spring, however, attempts to restart the peace process, with calls to halt the building of settlements in the West Bank, brought the White House into conflict not only with Netanyahu but the whole of Congress. Can a united opposition be overcome? Because Israel, from its inception, has been recognized by the people of the Middle East and North Africa as, in Nixon's words, the Sixth Fleet of the USA, the Palestinian cause has always been central in Arab consciousness. The litmus test, therefore, for the whole region is the Rafah Crossing – literally, watch this small space.

Conclusion: Conflict and Resolution

For the Evangelicals, the Israel/Palestine issue is not a question of conflict and conflict resolution; it is about the millennium, Christ's Second Coming, and the Rapture (the expunging of the sinful and the saving of the redeemable). Those who oppose the consolidation of the Jewish return and the creation of Eretz (Greater) Israel are seen to be preventing God's saving of the world; they are thereby understood as a force of evil and to be vanquished. It is existential; it is nonnegotiable. The only resolution is the utter fulfillment of God's word.

Like Gramsci, I hold fast to my optimism of the will, while maintaining pessimism of the intellect. Even after a resolution of the primary conflict, both the physical and the psychological walls will persist. A decade after the military conflict in Northern Ireland was brought to an end, there are still tall barriers between the communities. Conflict resolution necessarily has two phases. In Northern Ireland, the second phase of resolution and reconciliation is still very much in process. So far, no formal "truth and reconciliation" processes have taken place.

After any resolution of the primary conflict in Palestine, both the physical and the psychological walls will persist. And because for me the subtext of our banner head, Jews For Justice For Palestinians – *Two Peoples, One Future* – is a deep philosophical statement, the resolution is a necessary process and is axiomatic for the reclamation of our humanity.

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Definitions of Peace and Reconciliation in Africa

7

Mahlon Dalley, Jennifer Heinecke, Jacqueline Akhurst, Abdelkader Abdelali, Natoschia Scruggs, Raquel DeBartolo, Adeniyi Famose, Helena Castanheira, Eduardo Correia, and William Tastle

December, 10, 2011, three women, two from Liberia and one from Yemen, were awarded jointly the 2011 Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, Norway. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Leymah Gbowee, and Tawakkol Karman were cited “for their non-violent struggle for the safety of women and for women’s rights to full participation in peace-building work” (The Nobel Peace Prize 2011, 2011). Prior to this event, a total of only 12 women between 1901 and 2004 had received this prestigious recognition of peace, and only one of those women was from Africa, Wangari Muta Maathai from Kenya (The Nobel Peace Prize, 2004, 2007). Now there are two more African women to be added (Abrams, 2012). The hope of the 2011 Norwegian Nobel Peace Prize

Committee was that these honored women, two from Liberia, would help bring an end to the suppression of women from countries that are keeping women from achieving their promise for peace and democracy (Whalen, Sonne, & Almasari, 2011; The Nobel Peace Prize, 2011, 2011).

Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf crashed through the glass ceiling when she became the 24th President of Liberia and the first elected female African Head of State. She has constantly fought for women’s rights as well as all the people of Liberia to have a better future and to live in peace (Alistair, n.d.; Biographical Brief of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, n.d.). Like many African countries, Liberia has had a troubling past with continued civil wars and

M. Dalley (✉)

Psychology Department, Eastern Washington University,
Cheney, WA, USA
e-mail: mdalley@ewu.edu

J. Heinecke

Department of Psychology, Easter Washington University,
Spokane, Washington, USA
e-mail: junebug082@gmail.com

J. Akhurst

Department of Psychology, York St John
University, England
e-mail: J.Akhurst@yorks.ac.uk

A. Abdelali

Department of Political Science, University of Tahar
Moulay, Saida, Algeria
e-mail: abdelaliabk@gmail.com

N. Scruggs

Asylum Division, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Arlington, VA, USA
e-mail: nscruggs@aol.com

R. DeBartolo

Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston,
MA, USA

A. Famose

Joavic’s Foundation, Nigeria
e-mail: adeniyifamose@yahoo.com;
joavicfoundations@yahoo.com

H. Castanheira

Psychology Department, New School for Social
Research, New York, NY, USA
e-mail: helenacasta@gmail.com

E. Correia

ISCTE Business School in Lisbon, Portugal
e-mail: EduardoC.indeg@netcabo.pt

W. Tastle

Ithaca College of Business, New York, USA
e-mail: tastle@ithaca.edu

changes of one ruling party to another. Bloody coups have been the norm. Interestingly, Liberia was an American colony for ex-African American slaves; however, soon after establishing the colony, the former slaves began enslaving the local inhabitants and used a social system modeled after their former slave owners in America (Alistair). This oppression dominated the political and social order until the 1980s. After 133 years of Americo-Liberian rule, Samuel Kanyon Doe, a member of the Krahn ethnic group, overthrew the president, William R. Tolbert, in a bloody coup d'état. Twenty-six of Tolbert's supporters were murdered, and 13 of his cabinet were executed publicly. A series of coups occurred afterward, and two civil wars took place from 1989 to 2003 (Alistair). Charles Taylor was in power from August 1997, until his resignation on August 11, 2003. He was cited by the UN for war crimes and crimes against nature and was eventually exiled to Nigeria. Many see African woman such as Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and Leymah Gbowee as having a part in his overturn and a return to peace in their country. The National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) was formed after Taylor's end of power. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf served as chairperson of the Governance Reform Commission leading the country's anticorruption reform. She resigned this position to successfully enter the 2005 Presidential elections and became the first woman Liberian President on January 16, 2006 (Biographical Brief of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, 2012).

Leymah Gbowee was only 17 years of age when the first civil war began in Monrovia, Liberia, and because of the war, she was unable to focus on her studies and unable to attend college (Leymah Gbowee, 2008). Ironically, Gbowee trained as a trauma counselor, and as she was helping Charles Taylor's ex-child soldiers who had committed unspeakable acts, she came to believe and understand that these "children/soldiers" were not just perpetrators, but they were also victims as well (Leymah Gbowee). Gbowee encouraged Liberian citizens, especially women, to put an end to the civil war.

In 1998, as a reaction against the decade-long civil wars in Liberia, the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) began. Its main purpose was to work as an overriding organization

of peacebuilding for human rights projects around Liberia and 13 other West African countries. Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET) is the largest of the WANEP network and functions for women in Liberia to promote peace. The gathering of Liberian women in 2002 precipitated the nonviolent 2003 protests that were seen as the incentive for Charles Taylor's regime to begin negotiating; after years of war, this movement was seen as helping to bring the process of peace to Liberia. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf emerged as the first African woman to be elected as President of an African State partly due to WIPNET's continued sponsoring of peace and reconciliation in Liberia (West Africa Network for Peacebuilding, n.d.).

Amanda Molinaro (2008) reports that by 2002, after 15 years of civil war with thousands of Liberian citizens evicted from their homes and others faced with no food, no clean water, and no health care, the Liberian women had suffered enough. In 2002, Leymah Gbowee together with Comfort Freeman decided to recruit women from various churches to protest. They formed the Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET), which supported women's roles in male-dominated Liberia. Because the women had been sexually abused and abandoned, they felt they had the right to try to resolve the conflicts. After having been killed, raped, dehumanized, and infected with diseases and having watched their families destroyed, these women were saying "no" to violence and "yes" to peace. Muslim women were also victims of violence; therefore, the Christian women asked Muslim women neighbors to join them. As Gbowee states in the documentary, *Pray the Devil Back to Hell*, "Does a bullet know Christian from Muslim?" She also included Muslim women in the Liberian Mass Action for Peace, and both Christian and Muslim women met in churches and mosques. They even meet at Monrovia City Hall close to Charles Taylor's residence chanting, "We want peace. No more war." In addition, thousands of Christian and Muslim women descend upon the Monrovia Airfield with daily "sit-ins." In attempts to get rid of the protesters, President Charles Taylor sent armed men to beat the protestors, but these women did not conform to Taylor's demands and

continued to protest. Violence continued even as peace negotiations were taking place. Moving their protests from the airfield to the “peace hall,” these women gave their pledge that they would not leave without a peace agreement. Leymah Gbowee even led a delegation of women to Ghana, where peace talks were taking place. These women continued to apply pressure to all who were waging war at the time. During these protests, Leymah Gbowee was now referred to as “General,” while Charles Taylor was eventually forced to resign and flee to Nigeria with the help of the UN (Molinaro).

After the UN was able to help exile Charles Taylor to Nigeria, Gbowee was persistent in helping to prevent, avoid, and end conflicts throughout all of the West African region in fighting for peace (Center for American Progress, 2008). It should be noted that out of the eight African countries surveyed for this chapter, two belong to WANEP and are fairly close in proximity to Liberia. These two countries are Ghana and Nigeria.

Peace

As one begins to appreciate the enormity of the impact that two Nobel Peace Prize women recipients from Liberia have had on peace, one can gain a better understanding of what peace entails. When one reflects on what these two Liberian women wanted for their country, peace can be seen as freedom from civil disturbance, a state of security or order within a community, a state or period of mutual concord between government and the people, and a pact or agreement to end hostilities between those who have been at war or in a state of enmity (Merriam-webster, 2011a, b). Many researchers in the area of peace psychology view peace from the framework of negative and positive peace (Christie, Tint, Wagner, & Winter, 2008; Galtung, 1964, 1975, 1985, 1996; Wagner, 1988). Negative peace generally refers to efforts to reduce violent episodes such as an absence of war or reduction in conflicts; positive peace is more concerned with “the promotion of social arrangements that reduce social, racial, gender, economic, and ecological injustices as barriers to peace” (Christie et al., 2008, p. 543).

Positive peace is much more focused on creating equal status among all people. In addition to negative and positive peace, Galtung (1975) differentiated between three types of peace activities: peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. Peacekeeping is viewed as preventing aggressive action from different forces such as separating those engaged in hostile actions; peacemaking is seen as more active in helping to arrive at the agreements necessary to achieve peace; peacebuilding attempts to resolve the hostilities with a goal of no conflict or violence in the future. In the case of Africa, we have seen evidence tilted far toward negative peace. One just needs to be directed to the recent conflicts in Sudan, Uganda, Burundi, Ivory Coast, and DR Congo to name but a few conflicted states in Africa; however, as we have seen with Leymah Gbowee and Johnson-Sirleaf, a modicum of positive peace has been creeping into the context of conflict resolutions, stability, and reconciliation for many African nations (e.g., South Africa, Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone).

A comprehensive framework for defining and understanding the concept of peace has been the guiding principle of the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) (2010), which has begun to identify factors associated with peaceful societies. The IEP is a nonpartisan and nonprofit research organization attempting to understand factors, both social and economic factors, that advance peaceful societies. They have developed metrics (including the Global Peace Index (GPI), Peace Education, Structures of Peace, Understanding Peace, and now Global Truce 2012) designed to gauge peace and have many partners that collaborate internationally to measure the economic value of peace (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2012)

Using a negative peace definition similar to Galtung’s (1969), the IEP defines peace as absence of violence or absence of the fear of violence (Institute for Economics, 2012). Beginning in 2007, IEP used over 300 datasets from various countries to identify factors that make for peaceful societies, and each year has published on its Vision of Humanity website a Global Peace Index and a Structure of Peace Manual explaining the empirical and statistical analysis that produces the index. Within the publication *Structures of*

Peace, the IEP presents 23 indicators from 153 nations that represent both internal and external factors of negative peace. “Internal factors include such indicators as perceptions of criminality in society, the number of internal security officers and police per 100,000 people, the number of homicides per 100,000 people, the number of jailed population per 100,000 people, and the ease of access to weapons of minor destruction” (Visionofhumanity.org). These 23 indicators also include respect for human rights, imports of major conventional weapons, potential for terrorist acts, and number of deaths due to internal organized conflict as contributors to the internal factors in the Global Peace Index. The external factors from IEP include military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, number of armed services personnel per 100,000 people, UN peacekeeping data, and the number of heavy weapons per 100,000 people. Rankings vary from 1 the lowest to 153 the highest.

In addition, IEP uses eight broad categories that measure attitudes, institutions, and structures that can lead to positive peace. These include (a) sound business environment, (b) well-functioning government, (c) equitable distribution of resources, (d) free flow of information, (e) low levels of corruption, (f) acceptance of the rights of others, (g) high levels of education, and (h) good relations with neighbors.

Based on the 23 internal and external factors of the GPI rating scale, eight African countries surveyed for this chapter, and six other African countries were selected for illustration and comparison related to rankings on the GPI. The following are the rankings in order from lowest (most peaceful) to highest (least peaceful) for these 14 selected African countries (asterisks indicate the eight countries surveyed for this chapter): *Botswana, 35; *Ghana, 42; Mozambique, 48; *Zambia, 52; *Egypt, 73; *Angola, 87; Congo, 98; Rwanda, 99; *South Africa, 118; *Algeria, 129; Zimbabwe, 140; *Nigeria, 142; Democratic Republic of the Congo, 148; Sudan, 151; and Somalia: 153. This ranking system confirms Somalia as the worst rated country for peace in 2011. Botswana and Ghana, two countries surveyed for this chapter, ranked most peaceful of the African countries in

2011; however, Nigeria, also included in this chapter demonstrated a rather high GPI, the least peaceful African country surveyed. As one views all of the internal and external determinants of peace, it is fairly easy to see why an unstable and rogue nation like Somalia would top the list of least peaceful countries with a ranking score of 153, with its infant mortality rate of 108.5 per 1,000 live birth, life expectancy at 49.84, unemployment at 30%, hostility to foreigners/private property of 4/4, and the mean years of schooling of 3.5 years. Compare these numbers to a more thriving country in Africa, Botswana ranked 35 of 153 countries: infant mortality at 42.6 per 1,000 live births, life expectancy at 54.24, unemployment at 17.6%, hostility to foreigners/private property 1/4, and the mean years of schooling of 11.93 years. The eight countries surveyed for this chapter ranged in scores from the most peaceful being Botswana at 35 to least peaceful, Nigeria at 142 (Global Peace Index – 2011, 2012).

Reconciliation

In her second inaugural speech on January 16, 2012, Johnson-Sirleaf vowed reconciliation for the nation of Liberia, stating, “The cleavages that led to decades of war still run deep. But so too does the longing for reconciliation... True reconciliation means a process of national healing” (Johnson-Sirleaf, 2012). In the foreword to *Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook*, Desmond Tutu reflects, “There is no handy roadmap for reconciliation. There is no short cut or simple prescription for healing the wounds and divisions of a society in the aftermath of sustained violence. Creating trust and understanding between former enemies is a supremely difficult challenge. It is, however, an essential one to address in the process of building a lasting peace. Examining the painful past, acknowledging it and understanding it, and above all transcending it together, is the best way to guarantee that it does not – and cannot – happen again” (Bloomfield, Barnes, & Huyse, 2003, Forward).

Reconciliation is seen not only as a goal to achieve but also as a process to achieve those goals (Bloomfield, Barnes, & Huyse, 2003).

When seen from these two perspectives, possible confusions regarding the idea and the complexity of the concept of reconciliation are made clearer. Bloomfield et al. emphasized process rather than goal and focused on the continual fighting and conflicts after a war has ended. Their basic definition of reconciliation is “a process through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future” (p. 12). Caveats to this definition are as follows: (a) that reconciliation is a long-term process that takes time to establish; (b) that it is a deep process with frequent and multifaceted pain and dissonance occurring in beliefs and emotions, which may require profound, painful changes without any easy quick fixes; and finally, (c) that reconciliation must occur not just for the victims and perpetrators but over a large number of people and circumstances constituting what might loosely be referred to as the community.

A particularly poignant aspect of reconciliation that Bloomfield et al. (2003) discuss involves a gender perspective. For women, mass rapes, forced marriages, and prostitution enhance the difficulties involved in punishing and restoring justice brought on by the perpetrators but at the same time working toward reconciliation. This perspective addresses issues such as how victims, including the so-called war widow, might be compensated and understood, as well as how illegitimate children or “war orphans” can be accepted and cared for as legitimate citizens of the postwar nation and suggests that many men will need to be seen as victims of war and conflict if reconciliation and forgiveness are to occur. For reconciliation to occur, it may also be necessary to see how war has created for many men the so-called warrior identity. According to Bloomfield et al., war may be responsible for taking away the image of men as providers and protectors of the family; in the reconciliation process, the concern is how to change the image from a “warrior identity” back to one of defender and guardian of the family and community.

Although countries have increasingly used truth commissions since 1974 (Graybill & Lanegran, 2004), the best-known one is probably the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that emerged after the end of apartheid in South

Africa in 1994. In order to help countries view the impact of past injustices and to move forward in a positive manner, TRCs have increasingly been used as a means to heal countries after conflict. In many TRCs, victims have been encouraged to publically speak about crimes, immoral acts, and unacceptable behaviors that were committed against them. Additionally, perpetrators have been asked to give their testimony and in some cases possibly be granted amnesty for their roles in crimes and unacceptable and immoral acts against others in their country. The goal of a TRC is to allow citizens to speak openly about the crimes and injustices committed against them and then to hopefully resolve the wrongdoing and move forward (Truth & Reconciliation Commission, n.d.).

South Africa’s TRC appears to be one of the most well-known and celebrated TRCs in the world’s restorative justice procedures (Graybill & Lanegran, 2004; Graybill, 2002). South Africa’s suppression under apartheid lasted almost 50 years from 1948 until 1994, in which political violence and internal conflicts were the norm. When the laws of segregation were finally lifted in 1994 and a new election took place, Nelson Mandela became South Africa’s first-ever black president and forged the way to reconciling an embittered, disillusioned, and conflicted nation (Mandela, 1994).

Beginning in 1995, the TRC was charged with investigating human rights violation from 1960 to 1994 in South Africa. One of the purposes was to acknowledge the atrocities of that time but also to explore the possibility of offering amnesty to perpetrators, if they disclosed their part in past crimes. Religious principles contributed to this process through the philosophy of forgiveness advocated by Archbishop Desmond Tutu; however, also relevant was an African tradition of ubuntu (the essence of being human or humanness) practiced by the Xhosa of southern Africa. Ubuntu and Christianity were seen as playing a large role in the idea of forgiveness and repentance in the TRC proceedings. Many of the witnesses who told of their suffering at the Human Rights Violations Committee hearings felt that giving public testimony was healing (Truth & Reconciliation Commission (TRC), n.d.). The Amnesty Committee also heard from perpetrators who confessed their crimes and were appealing

for amnesty. About 16% of those who applied received amnesty (Graybill & Lanegran, 2004). The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was viewed as a model for other countries emerging from years of conflict. It should be noted that South Africa is one of the eight countries that responded to the PAIRTAPS survey and is discussed in the central findings of this chapter.

The diversity of Africa's peoples, religions, and climate has often been a contributing factor to the continual conflicts which are found and forged throughout the continent. One of the most notorious conflicts include the genocide of Rwanda in 1994, in which within 3 months an estimated 800,000 men, women, and children were murdered in a clash between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes in the most extensive genocide of the twentieth century (Funkeson, Schröder, Nzabonimpa, & Holmqvist, 2011; Genocide in Rwanda, n.d.). Since precolonial times, the Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa inhabited Rwanda. The Belgian colonial government promoted the inequality of these three groups, giving the Tutsi favorable status against the Hutu until Rwanda's independence in 1962. At this point, the Hutu took power against the Tutsi. In the following decades, discrimination, waves of violence, and massacres against the Tutsi occurred across Rwanda. A civil war erupted when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a Tutsi-led militia, crossed Uganda into Rwanda. They failed at first to gain power but repeatedly attacked the Hutu. The Tutsi became the object of intense hatred by the Hutu, and systematic propaganda against them ensued across the nation. An airplane with Rwandan President Habyarimana was shot down on April 6, 1994, which began 3 months of looting, torture, destruction, killing, and systematic rape in an attempt to spread the deadly HIV virus. The army and civilian militia massacred Tutsi and any Hutu who had been sympathetic to the Tutsi. Finally, after 3 months of carnage, murder, and butchery, the RPF took control of the country, and the killing and slaughter came to an end (Funkeson et al.).

Six years after the genocide, more than 125,000 Rwandans were awaiting prosecution in overcrowded prisons. Only about 5,000 had been

tried. Much of this delay in justice was because of the shambles of the Rwanda court system and lack of prosecutors and judges needed to handle the onslaught of court cases. Furthermore, it was calculated that it could take up to 200 years to try all those accused of genocide (Molenaar, 2005). In place of a traditional judicial system, Rwanda chose to revert back to its roots by using what are known as "gacaca" courts, loosely translated as "justice on the grass." Local citizens who act as judges and jury make up these courts and have the power to convict those suspected of genocide. One of the purposes of the gacaca courts was reconciliation between the victims and the perpetrators but also to restore balance and harmony within the communities (Khaleell, 2010).

In 2000, the Rwandan government decided that the majority of the accused would be tried in *gacaca* courts. Even though the gacaca courts were established in 2002, they were not officially implemented until 2005. The purpose of the *gacaca courts* was to uncover the truth, to achieve justice, and to establish reconciliation of the Rwandan genocide (Daly, 2002). By 2010, the gacaca courts were in their final or end phase within most of Rwanda. Although there is limited research on the outcomes of the proceedings, Funkeson et al. (2011) conducted qualitative interviews from eight women who had testified in the gacaca courts. They found that testifying had a negative psychological effect on the women, but that even though it was emotionally distressing for them to testify in these courts, over time there was a decrease in the emotional impact that it had on them. Funkeson et al. concluded that being a witness in these gacaca courts could either add to one's anger and hostility or it could establish more healing or reconciliation between the witness and the perpetrator (Funkeson et al.).

Other African countries have and are struggling with peace and reconciliation. The African nations highlighted in this chapter vary widely in both in current level of peace and involvement in efforts at reconciliation. In sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa established the TRC. Botswana, having never experienced a civil war since its founding in 1966, has not recently experienced the incendiary conflicts leading to formal

processes of reconciliation. Ghana, as well, has been a somewhat stable country since 1981 when Lt. Jerry Rawlings took over power. However, Ghana has established a National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) for human rights abuses by people in authority during various periods of unconstitutional rule. There are critics who question whether Ghana should have such commissions due to the fact that the level of atrocities and the extent of abuses do not rise to the level of other African countries such as South Africa, Rwanda, or Sierra Leone (Wain, n.d.). Nevertheless, Ghana has been surrounded by unstable states for the past 40 years, including close proximity to Nigeria, which is one of the countries considered in this chapter, a country that has and is still experiencing horrendous conflicts. In fact, since Nigeria gained civilian rule 5 years ago, it is estimated that about 10,000 people have been killed in intra-ethnic and religious group conflicts (In Pictures: Nigerian Reconciliation, n.d.). It would appear that Nigeria is one Africa's countries that will need to activate reconciliation courts once conflicts are contained. Zambia in the central southern region of Africa also contributed participants to the research considered in this chapter and has experienced relative calm but extreme poverty over the past 40 years. Civil conflicts and wars have not been a major consideration for this country, and therefore reconciliation commissions do not seem appropriate. Angola is a different story. Angola is said to exist in name only after 25 years of civil war. Reconciliation and peace for Angola is seen as elusive in the foreseeable future, especially in the absence of a peaceful society because of the ethnic divides separating the warring parties (Malaquias, n.d.).

Two countries discussed in this chapter come from Northern Africa – specifically, Algeria and Egypt. Algeria experienced a civil war from 1992 to 2002, when Islamic guerillas attempted to overthrow what they saw as a military-based secular government (Tlemcani, 2008). President Bouteflika indicated a desire to push forward a “Charter for Peace and Reconciliation” without input from the public, but that charter would close the investigation regarding what happened to

10,000 citizens who went missing during the civil war (Tlemcani). According to Tlemcani, this process undermines those who want reconciliation and compensation for the 10,000 Algerians. It is postulated that the government wants to ignore precedents of other African countries to pay victim families with money and to grant some type of amnesty to the perpetrators (Tlemcani). The last country that this chapter discusses is Egypt. Because of the recent downfall of Mubarak's government and ongoing protests within the country, it is probably too early to comment on any reconciliation efforts over the latest conflicts and civil strife within the state of Egypt.

Desmond Tutu sums up what is probably the best conclusion about reconciliation, stating that it means “addressing the pain and suffering of the victims, understanding the motivations of offenders, bringing together estranged communities, trying to find a path to justice, truth and, ultimately, peace” (Bloomfield et al., 2003, Forward). Archbishop Desmond Tutu further reflected that reconciliation reflects a need for both parties to come to terms and move forward together to rebuild their nation and communities; it is not about loving the enemy, it is about coexisting peacefully.

Methods

Sample

The African sample consisted of 330 participants: 3% from Algeria, 5% from Angola, 18% from Botswana, 20% from Egypt, 12% from Ghana, 15% from Nigeria, 22% from South Africa, and 5% from Zambia. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 74 years with the average being 33 years. Nine percent of the participants answering the question about military service reported having served in the military; 38% reported having a relative with military experience. Only 7% of the respondents reported participating in some sort of protest.

Respondents from all eight African nations provided a definition of peace; however, we had definitions of reconciliation only from Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, and Nigeria.

Procedure

All participants responded to the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006). This questionnaire has, in addition to ratings, an open-ended response format and included items asking for personal definitions of key terms such as peace and reconciliation. For the purpose of this chapter, the definitions of these two terms were coded and analyzed.

Responses were coded using the Definitions of Peace Coding Manual and the Definition of Reconciliation Coding Manual. Each definition was broken down into codeable units, also known as units of meaning, and each unit was categorized according to the relevant manual. Some responses contained multiple, independent units of meaning, and thus more than one codeable unit. For example, a definition of peace as “opposite of conflict” has one codeable unit, whereas a definition of reconciliation as “agreement to settle differences and ‘forget’ the past” contains two unique codeable units. For the purpose of our discussion on coding, the terms definition and response are used interchangeably and refer to codeable units within an answer.

Definitions of Peace

Coding Definitions of Peace

The Definitions of Peace Coding Manual and the Definitions of Reconciliation Coding Manual were developed on the basis of grounded theory. The grounded theory approach allows common themes to be identified from the responses, providing the foundation for coding categories (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

The Definitions of Peace Coding Manual includes criteria for coding responses into four main categories: (a) *negative peace*, (b) *positive peace*, (c) *question of achievability/ideal*, and (d) *perceived reality*. Each of these categories included one or more subcategories, as well as a general/unspecified category for responses that

fit into the main category but did not fit into any of the more narrowly defined subcategories.

The *negative peace* category applies to responses referring to the removal, absence, or end of a conflict-related process. It has five subcategories, depending on whether peace is identified with (a) *no conflict*, (b) *rejecting violence* (i.e., the end of specific forms of aggression such as war, torture, and fighting), (c) *rejecting terrorism* specifically, (d) the absence of *negative emotions* (e.g., “no worries”), or (e) *rejecting intimidation/threat*.

The *positive peace* category has two subcategories, for responses focusing on (a) *prerequisites for peace* and (b) *outcomes* of peace. Responses coded for *prerequisites for peace* described conditions that must be met if there is to be peace. Responses coded for *outcomes* mention results stemming from a state of peace or the characteristics of a culture of peace. The subcategories of *prerequisites for peace* are as follows: (a) granting of *human rights*, (b) *equality*, (c) *acceptance/tolerance* (with further subcategories for *understanding* and *solidarity*), (d) *democratic participation*, (e) *openness to working toward a mutual goal*, (f) *security*, and (g) *access to resources*. The *outcomes* subcategories are *positive emotions*, *calm/tranquility*, and *harmony*.

The *question of achievability/ideal* category includes responses that do not explicitly define peace but express doubts concerning its achievability or label it as an ideal. It has three subcategories, which apply to definitions indicating that peace is (a) *unattainable*, (b) something to *strive for*, and (c) something that connotes *spirituality/god*. The fourth category, *perceived reality*, is for responses describing a real-life situation that the responder views as relevant to peace, without defining it. When a response does not fit into any of those categories, it is labeled *uncodeable*.

Distribution of Definitions of Peace

When asked to provide their definitions of peace, most participants provided responses with multiple codeable units, ranging from one to seven, yielding a total of 621 codeable units. Of these

total units, 32% were coded into the *negative peace* category, the second largest category after *positive peace*. The most prevalent type of *negative peace* definition was *rejecting violence*, which accounted for 44% of the *negative peace* responses. For example, a 57-year-old woman from South Africa defined peace as “a condition when the county in which you are living is not at war with another.” Eleven percent of the *negative peace* responses fell into the subcategory *no conflict*, which is exemplified by the definition from a 19-year-old Nigerian woman who said peace is “absence of tension and conflict.” Responses identifying peace with *rejecting intimidation/threat* accounted for 4% of the *negative peace* definitions. As an example, a 55-year-old South African woman responded in part that peace is “the ultimate situation to live in whereby our daily lives can continue without any threat of terror or harm.” A 35-year-old man from Ghana provided a good example of a definition coded for freedom from *negative emotions* when he stated, “living without fear of anything.” This subcategory of *negative emotions* made up 14% of *negative peace* responses.

Forty-seven percent of all the definitions of peace were coded into the *positive peace* category or one of its subcategories. The most common *positive peace* themes fell into the *prerequisites for peace* subcategories. At the most general unspecific level of *prerequisites for peace*, accounting for 14% of the peace responses, we find definitions like the ones from a 23-year-old Egyptian man who provided two codeable responses when he said that peace is “when we live good and have an organized government.” Another frequently found type of prerequisites response, *access to resources*, was found in 15% of all the definitions of peace. In one poignant example, a 25-year-old woman from Botswana said peace is “when my children can go to school.” Another *prerequisites* subcategory, with 10% of the codeable units, was *acceptance/tolerance*. A response from a 54-year-old Ghanaian woman exemplifies the *acceptance/tolerance* subcategory in one word, “togetherness.” Within the subcategory of *pre-*

requisites, the additional subcategory for *granting of human rights* captured 8% of the *positive peace* definitions; for example, a 50-year-old Ghanaian man stated that peace is “a situation which enables individuals to enjoy the human rights.” Other subcategories of *prerequisites* had less than 5% of the responses and are not commented upon here.

The other majority subcategory of *positive peace* is *outcomes*, which also has multiple subcategories within it. The most responses were in the subcategory of *harmony* with 12% of the *positive peace* responses; another *outcomes* subcategory, *calm/tranquility*, accounted for 10% of the responses. A 50-year-old South African woman’s definition of peace as “people living in harmony with each other” typifies the *harmony* theme. A 35-year-old woman linked peace with both *calm/tranquility* and *positive emotions* (6% of *positive peace* responses) by writing that peace is “to live quietly and enjoy life.”

Fifteen percent of all the definitions of peace codeable units were coded into the third major category, *question of achievability/ideal*. The most prevalent theme in this category was a general statement concerning whether peace was *achievable or just an ideal*, a theme that appeared in 46% of all the *question of achievability/ideal* peace responses. A 20-year-old Botswana woman provided an example of this category when she said, “the only people who can truly understand and define peace are those who have experienced war.” The most used subcategory of *question of achievability/ideal* was *strive for*, which accounted for 32% of the responses in this category. A good example of this came from a 20-year-old Botswana man who wrote, “it is our job in life to find peace.” Seventeen percent in this category of peace had *spiritual/god* themes. A 50-year-old man from Angola said that peace is “gift from God, way for development and prosperity.” Only 4% of *achievability/ideal* responses asserted that peace is something *unattainable*. A 25-year-old Egyptian man wrote, “we cannot find peace. The first thing people did on earth was a crime (*reference to the story of Cane and Abel).” Here the coding was for both *unattainable* and *spiritual/god*.

Table 7.1 Examples and percentages of definitions of peace

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Example
Negative peace	32				
Rejecting violence	14(44)	Angola	F	56	State in which a country is not in war
Negative emotions	5(14)	Ghana	M	37	Living without fear of anything
No conflict	4(11)	Ghana	M	28	Condition or state devoid of any form of disturbances
Rejecting intimidation/threat	1(4)	Ghana	M	25	A feeling devoid of sorrow and intimidation
Positive peace	47				
Prerequisites for peace	7(14)	Egypt	M	23	When we live good and have an organized government
Accept/tolerate	5(10)	South Africa	M	50	People accepting each other's differences
Access to resources	7(15)	Botswana	F	25	When my children can go to school
Granting of human rights	4(8)	South Africa	M	35	The respect for the right to life of every citizen
Calm/tranquility	5(10)	Nigeria	F	20	State of tranquility
Harmony	6(12)	Ghana	M	26	Living in harmony with others
Question of achievability/ideal	15				
General/unspecific	7(46)	Algeria	F	20	Utopia or temporary reality
Strive for	5(32)	Angola	M	45	A good that should be conquered and preserved
Spiritual/god	3(17)	South Africa	F	42	God is the only one who can give us peace. We will never find peace on our own
Unattainable	1(4)	South Africa	M	63	Mission impossible for the whole world

The first number in the percentage column refers to the percent of responses in the specified category or subcategory out of all the definitions of peace. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the specified subcategory out of the major category to which it belongs
M male, *F* female

Table 7.1 provides more examples of Africans definitions of peace, along with basic demographic information.

Exploratory Analyses of Peace Definitions

Once the responses were coded into the appropriate categories and subcategories, exploratory chi-square analyses were conducted to assess the possibility of differences in response frequencies across selected demographic groups (gender, military service, having a relative in the military, and participation in a protest). Both statistically significant and marginally significant

group differences in definitions of peace are reported here and summarized in Table 7.2.

Gender

The chi-square analyses revealed that a significantly greater portion of African men than women defined peace as the absence of *negative emotions* such as fear. By contrast, a marginally significant greater proportion of females than males provided examples of *positive emotional outcomes* when defining peace. The final significant difference between African males and females was in a subcategory of *questions of achievability* for peace, with a significantly higher portion of males than females describing peace as something to *strive for*.

Table 7.2 Results of chi-square analyses for definitions of peace

Category	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	χ^2
	Female	Male	
Negative peace			
Negative emotion	2	6	4.21*
Positive peace			
Positive emotion	5	2	3.4 [^]
Q. of achievability			
Strive for	3	7	3.79*
	Relative in military	No relative in military	
Negative peace presence ^b	25	47	8.65**
Question of achievability/ideal presence ^b	37	18	8.24**
Strive for	12	5	3.87*

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^bPresence at the end of the variable name signifies that the participant provided at least one example of a response in at least one of the subcategories of a major category

[^] $p = 0.051-0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Relative in Military

Another demographic characteristic that showed significant group differences in response patterns were those who had a relative in the military compared to those who did not. A significantly greater portion of those without a relative in the military as compared to those with a military relative defined peace using one or more of the negative peace categories (i.e., they received a score of one in the superordinate *negative peace presence* category). In comparison, a greater proportion of those with a military relative gave at least one response coded for *question of achievability/ideal* and described peace as something that people should *strive for* as compared to those without a relative in the military.

Definitions of Reconciliation

Coding Definitions of Reconciliation

The Definitions of Reconciliation Coding Manual has five major coding categories, with one or more subcategories each. The major categories apply to responses defining reconciliation as follow: (a) *process*; (b) *state*; (c) *human character-*

istic; or identifying it with a (d) *future orientation*; or considering it in terms of a (e) *question of achievability/ideal*. Specific keywords, labeled *specifiers*, were also coded.

The *process* category for definitions of reconciliation as a process has nine subcategories: (a) *moving on*, (b) *engaging in apology and forgiveness*, (c) *making reparations/compensations*, (d) *resolving/fixing*, (e) *recognizing/acknowledging/respecting*, (f) *coming to terms/agreeing/compromising/negotiating*, (g) *understanding*, (h) *uniting*, and (i) *preventing*. Four of these nine subcategories have an additional level of subcategories. Specifically, *moving on* has a subcategory for responses indicating that reconciliation is an *active* process. *Apology and forgiveness* has a subcategory called *without forgetting*. *Making amends* is a subcategory within *resolving/fixing*. *Uniting* has two subcategories, which are *healing/reuniting* and *building new relationship with former enemy*.

The second major category, labeled *state*, includes responses describing endpoints of a reconciliation process. It has three subcategories: *peace*, *end of conflict*, and *emotional state*. The third major category, *human characteristic*, has responses that portray reconciliation as being

natural to human nature or the human condition. The *future orientation* category has responses that imply an ongoing process that will continue into the future. The *question of achievability/ideal* category, which has one subcategory (*strive for*), includes responses questioning the achievability of reconciliation or describing it as an ideal. Five types of *specifiers* (frequently recurring terms) were also identified: (a) *mutual*, (b) *peace/harmony*, (c) *bringing together*, (d) *individuals*, and (e) *nations/countries/groups*. Responses that have little to do with reconciliation are designated *uncodeable*.

For more details regarding the coding manual or procedures, please see the introductory methods chapter of the Definitions of Peace and Reconciliation section of this volume (Chap. 2).

Distribution of Definitions of Reconciliation

Sixty-three percent of the definitions of reconciliation were coded into the *process* category. The most prevalent subcategory was *uniting* with 20% of the responses for the *process* category. *Uniting* also had subcategories of *healing/uniting* and *building new relationships with former enemy*, which accounted for 26% and 6%, respectively, of responses in the superordinate *process* category. A 25-year-old Egyptian man linked reconciliation with *healing/reuniting* when he commented, "it (reconciliation) is a good restart... to have a good relationship again." Another 24-year-old Egyptian man commented that reconciliation means "to go back to a good relationship after having a bad relationship," coded into the subcategory *building new relationship with former enemy*. The second most popular *process* response was *come to terms/agreement/compromise/negotiate*, which constituted 14% of the *process* definitions. A good example came from a 35-year-old man from Ghana whose definition had two codeable units, which were coded into the *process* subcategories of *come to terms/agreement/compromise/negotiate* and also *recognize/acknowledge/respect*: "agreeing to patch up now

that one party or the two realized their mistake." Eleven percent of the responses coded for *process* fell into the *apology and forgiveness* subcategory, with an additional 1% falling into the subcategory with the additional qualifier of *without forgiving*. An interesting example of a complex definition of reconciliation came from a 20-year-old Algerian woman who defined it as "The act of pretending to forgive the past, in order to gain in the present," which encompassed both an *apology and forgiveness without forgetting* and an additional *active, move on, process* theme. The *resolve/fix* subcategory had only 8% of the responses; however, a 25-year-old Nigerian woman gave a simple example of a definition in the *resolve/fix* subcategory when she said reconciliation means "to resolve issues/conflict." All other subcategories of *process* as reconciliation were less than 4% of the responses and, therefore, are not commented on further.

Sixteen percent of all codeable units in the definitions of reconciliation were coded into the *state* category. The three subcategories for state are *peace, end of conflict*, and *emotional state*. As a *state*, the subcategory *peace* received the most responses (50% of all *state* responses). Two Nigerian women, a 21-year-old and a 22-year-old responded similarly, defining reconciliation as "restoration of peace" and "regenerating peace and harmony." Thirty-four percent of the state responses were coded into the *end of conflict* subcategory. An example of this comes from a 64-year-old woman from Egypt who declared, "reconciliation comes after big, big problems." The third state subcategory is *emotional state*. Only 11% of the definitions were coded into this category; one example comes from a 25-year-old Egyptian man who said, "reconciliation is the best way to express your sorrow after you did something wrong and want to apologize."

Sixteen percent of the definitions were coded into the *questions of achievability/ideal* category. A woman from Algeria, 20 years old, combined both a subcategory of *human characteristic* with *questions of achievability/ideal* when she commented, "A jolt of humanity, if this world really existed in act, the illumination of intelligence." A 25-year-old Egyptian man said that

Table 7.3 Examples and percentages of definitions of reconciliation

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Example
Apology/forgiveness	7(11)	Egypt	M	35	Reconciliation is exactly what the name says; it is to say sorry
Come to terms, agreement, compromise, negotiate	9(14)	Ghana	F	29	A compromise between two parties after a disagreement
Uniting	13(20)	Egypt	M	37	It is nice to make a different relationship with partners to start over
Healing/reuniting	16(26)	Nigeria	F	35	To reestablish friendship
Resolve/fix	5(8)	Ghana	M	28	The process of amicably resolving a conflict between people
Building new relationships with former enemy	4(6)	Ghana	18	M	People making friend after they quarreled
State	16				
Peace	8(50)	Nigeria	M	38	Restoration of peace
End of conflict	5(34)	Ghana	M		Settlement of dispute between the peoples
Emotional state	2(11)	Egypt	M	25	Reconciliation is when you feel guilty and self-conscious about what you did wrong to someone and you say sorry
Question of achievability/ideal	16				
General/unspecific	12(74)	Egypt	F	30	We always need this, even in our homes and international society

The first number in the percentage column refers to the percent of responses in the specified category or subcategory out of all the definitions of reconciliation. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the specified subcategory out of the major category to which it belongs

M male, *F* female

reconciliation is “something very important for good international relations,” suggesting that reconciliation is something *ideal*. Some participants made the point that reconciliation is something to *strive for* (26% of *questions of achievability/ideal* responses) such as when a 35-year-old Algerian man said reconciliation is “political solution, moral necessity.”

Table 7.3 provides more examples of definitions of reconciliation, along with basic demographic information.

Exploratory Analyses of Reconciliation Responses

As was done with the definitions of peace, once the definitions were coded, they were analyzed for any significant differences based on demographic characteristics (gender, military service, having a relative with military service, and participation in a protest). Chi-square tests were run

to assess the extent to which there were statistically significant and marginally significant group differences. Table 7.4 presents the results of the chi-square analyses.

Gender

Only one significant difference in definitions was found as a function of gender. Specifically, a significantly greater proportion of women than men defined reconciliation as a form of *healing and reuniting*, which is subsumed in the reconciliation *process* category of *uniting*.

Relative in Military

In regard to having a military relative, two significant differences were found. Specifically, a significantly higher proportion of respondents without military relatives than those with a military relative gave at least one example of a response coded into a *process* subcategory, and significantly more respondents with a relative in the military defined reconciliation in terms of *achievability*.

Table 7.4 Results of chi-square analyses for definition of reconciliation

Category	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	χ^2
Process	Female	Male	
Healing/reuniting	26	11	8.18**
	Relative in military	No relative in military	
Process presence ^b	74	88	3.98*
Question of achievability/ideal presence ^b	34	15	6.6**

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^b“Presence” at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$

Discussion

In this study, we asked 330 Africans to define peace and reconciliation using the PAIRTAPS. Ages ranged from 18 to 74; however, a preponderance of respondents were in their twenties. This is important in that our conclusions are based more on the younger generation than the older generation, who probably have had more experience with war, reconciliation, and peace. The demographics of this study tapped the quintessential African diversity of Northern Africa, West Africa, and Central Southern Africa; however, Africa consists of 52 nations, and to sample only eight countries leaves many countries and regions unrepresented; thus, generalizations from the data need to be tempered by this fact. Another concern is the lack of random sampling of participants, all of whom were asked to volunteer to take the PAIRTAPS; it is possible that the results are skewed in favor of those more willing to tell their stories and provide responses to questions.

In spite of these limitations, the results may reflect some of Africa’s unique history of battling for independence from the extensive grip of European colonial rule to the struggles for equality and democracy, and eventually to the infamous and tumultuous civil wars that have in some cases led to the ultimate outrage of genocide. We started this chapter by citing two 2011 Nobel Peace Prize winners, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and Leymah Gbowee and their endeavors to substitute peace and democracy for war in their small war-weary nation of Liberia. Their struggles for

the past 20 years parallel other Africans’ fight over the past half of century to establish nations of peace and reconciliation following injustices and wars that have ravished their sense of who they are as Africans. In addition, there are few other countries in the world as well known for attempts to heal past atrocities and injustices than South Africa with its Truth and Reconciliation Commissions after 50 years of apartheid rule and Rwanda with its gacaca courts attempting to provide a sense of forgiveness for the aggressors and justice for the aggrieved after the mass genocide in 1994.

Because of all the conflicts, bloodshed, and carnage throughout Africa’s past, we were at first somewhat surprised that almost half the definitions of peace (47%) were characterized by themes of *positive peace* whereas only about a third (32%) of the definitions focused on elements of *negative peace*. But then, perhaps that finding should not be so surprising, given that in 2011 the Nobel Peace prize was awarded to Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and Leymah Gbowee [The Nobel Peace Prize for, 2011, (2011)] in the hopes of freeing women from suppression and helping them achieve their promise for peace and democracy (Abrams, 2012; Whalen, Sonne, & Almasari, 2011). It makes sense that Africans may now be more focused on building a climate of peace than just trying to avoid wars or conflicts. In the past and in the present, we have seen evidence tilted toward negative peace with conflicts in Sudan, Uganda, Burundi, Ivory Coast, and DR Congo to name but a few conflicted states. We have seen with Leymah Gbowee and Johnson-Sirleaf, a

modicum of positive peace creeping into the context of restoring relationships, creating social systems, resolving conflicts, creating stable relations, and enhancing living together amicably through the lens of such countries as South Africa, Liberia, and Rwanda. Of course, there are still pessimists, and their views may be reflected in the 15% of responses from our sample that were coded for *question of achievability/ideal*, but this seemed to be a small number when compared to those looking at positive and negative peace given all the images of a war-torn, conflicted continent.

When Africans in our study provided definitions characterized by elements of positive peace, they tended to focus on *prerequisites for peace* such as having *access to resources*. As discussed in the first part of this chapter, the Global Peace Index rankings from the eight African countries surveyed in our study ranged from the most peaceful (Botswana and Ghana) to the least peaceful (Nigeria), with the other countries in our sample ranked between these two extremes. Other African countries also rated poorly on this Global Peace Index in comparison to other world nations. African countries are viewed as the poorest and least educated in the world (Global Peace Index – 2011, 2012; Vision of Humanity, 2011). It is no wonder that African nations when defining *peace* see themselves as wanting what other nations have and, therefore, write that the fundamentals of peace are access to justice, law, and order, as well as prosperity, property, and education. These are the same resources that they probably see many other countries around the world possessing and as contributing to a more stable peace. Africans also wrote about accepting and being tolerant of each other in their definitions of peace, which at first appears counterintuitive given many instances of prejudice and bigotry; however, at the same time, one can see why the African people long for non-judgmental attitudes and acceptance.

As noted by Galtung (1969), traditionally many definitions of peace have equated it with an absence of war or absence of violence; in our study, about a third of the responses were consistent with his portrayal of negative peace. Rejecting

violence, absence of tensions, and/or conflicts and having negative emotions were the most common forms of negative peace mentioned by respondents. When we looked at gender differences for definitions of peace, we found that significantly more men than women defined peace as the absence of *negative emotions* such as fear. This was a little surprising since there is a common belief that women would be more likely than men to discuss emotions with regard to peace, but this was not true in this case. However, when writing about *positive peace* and the *outcomes of positive emotions*, we saw marginally significantly more women than men who associated peace with *positive emotions*. Perhaps because of the strong growing presence of women such as Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and Lehman Gbowee in peace movements of Africa such as The Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP) or the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) or Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET), voices of women are being heard and amplified and perhaps these voices are saying that peace is not just the absence of war but “the integration of human society” (Gultang, 1964, p. 2).

As Desmond Tutu has stated (Bloomfield et al., 2003), there are no shortcuts to reconciliations. When participants were asked to define reconciliation, almost two-thirds of the responses were written about reconciliation as a *process*, something to be achieved rather than something already achieved. Africa as a continent and as a people have a long and troubling history of having to reconcile, following European colonization, apartheid, civil wars, mass murders, or genocide. Reconciliation as a *process* entails issues of uniting, reuniting, healing, and building new relationships even with former enemies. Consistent with the finding of women defining positive peace more in regard to positive emotions than men, we also found that African women showed a preponderance of definitions emphasizing *healing* and *reuniting* as compared to men. African women appear more sensitive to reconciliation after major conflict such as apartheid, injustices, civil war, or even genocides. The concerns faced by women following mass rapes, forced marriages, and prostitution and their

experiences as “war widows” and mothers of illegitimate children or “war orphans” need to be addressed sensitively in postwar nations. These concerns must be on the mind of many African women when defining reconciliation and may be reflected in their focus on reconciliation as a *process*.

A substantial minority of definitions of reconciliation focused on *apology and forgiveness* as well as on *healing/reuniting* and *building new relationships*. It would seem that many African participants felt that in order to have reconciliation, there not only needs to be an *apology* from the aggressor but also *forgiveness* from the aggrieved. These concepts were fundamental to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which emerged after the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994. Other countries have also incorporated the premise of a request for forgiveness and leniency into their restorative justice procedures (Graybill & Lanegran, 2004). One country in particular has seen the use of gacaca courts in Rwanda in which apology and forgiveness hinges on the well-being of the Rwandan people (Funkeson et al., 2011).

This study provides rich data and unique insights into perceptions of several hundred Africans from diverse nations concerning peace and reconciliation. It would appear that Africans look at peace primarily from a positive and optimistic viewpoint in spite of some nefarious periods in its history. They also tend to see reconciliation as a process that needs to be earned by apology and forgiveness. Women who in the past were relegated as onlookers, passive observers, and also victims have now started to make their mark on changing war into peace and determining their fate in attempts at reconciliation as well as men. Hopefully in the future, Africa will attain their ideals of peace and reconciliation.

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Definitions of Peace and Reconciliation in Latin America

8

Eros DeSouza, Tristyn Campbell,
Rodrigo Barahona, Luciana Karine de Souza,
Sherri McCarthy, Michael Stevens, Amanda Clinton,
Eddy Carillo, and Ricardo Angelino

Peace is not merely the absence of war but the presence of justice, of law, of order – in short, of government – Albert Einstein

The above quote highlights two definitions of peace proposed by Johan Galtung (1964, 1969), a Norwegian peace scholar: negative and positive peace. They constitute different types of peace that are separate from each other. Galtung defined negative peace as the lack of war and absence of direct physical harm (violence). Negative peace includes all efforts to curb direct violence (e.g., peacekeeping, including a ceasefire or truce). Another example of negative peace is what the media refer as “cold peace,” such as the one currently existing between India and Pakistan (International Crisis Group, 2006) and between Egypt and Israel (BBC News,

2011). Note that negative peace does not address the causes of the conflict that led to violence between nations in the first place (war or international terrorism) or within a nation (civil war or domestic terrorism). Thus, the absence of personal violence that negative peace provides following a violent conflict may be transitory.

Galtung (1964, 1969) defined positive peace as the absence of structural oppression. In other words, it occurs when institutions in civil society (e.g., government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, religious organizations, trade unions, the media, and universities) create

E. DeSouza (✉)

Department of Psychology, Illinois State University,
Normal, IL, USA
e-mail: erdesou@ilstu.edu

T. Campbell

Psychology Department, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA
e-mail: ttcams@gmail.com

R. Barahona

Counselor, Brookline, MA, USA
e-mail: rodbarahona@gmail.com

L. Karine de Souza

Department of Psychology, Federal University
of Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, Brazil

S. McCarthy

Educational Psychology, Counseling and Human
Relations, Northern Arizona University, Yuma, AZ, USA
e-mail: Sherri.McCarthy@nau.edu

M. Stevens

Department of Psychology, Illinois State University,
Normal, IL, USA
e-mail: mjstevan@ilstu.edu

A. Clinton

University of Puerto Rico, Mayagüez, Puerto Rico, USA
e-mail: amanda.clinton@gmail.com

E. Carillo

Universidad Independiente & Director of the Center
for Psychoanalytic Studies of the Association for
Socio-Critical Psychoanalysis, San Jose, Costa Rica
e-mail: ecarillo65@yahoo.com

R. Angelino

School of Medical Sciences, National University
of La Plata, La Plata, Argentina
e-mail: drangelino@uolsinectos.com

structural changes (e.g., social justice) that reduce social inequalities, as well as when there are changes in belief systems and norms in a population that support equality and democracy, replacing the culture of violence of the past. Thus, it is peace sustained by peaceful means.

In order for peace to be long-lasting, civil society needs to address the causes of the conflict at all levels (e.g., economic, social, and political) in a nonviolent manner. Positive peace secures the emergence of a culture of peace and nonviolence, which is multifaceted, including, but not limited to, the following components (United Nations, 1999): (a) education (e.g., teaching human rights and respect for all in the curriculum); (b) eliminating all forms of discrimination (e.g., based on sex, race/ethnicity, religion, culture, or language); (c) ensuring equality between men and women; (d) promoting understanding, tolerance, and solidarity (e.g., international cooperation); (e) democratic participation and sharing the use of power; (f) transparency and accountability in governance; (g) sustainable economic and social development; and (h) participatory communication and the free flow of information.

Such a culture of peace utilizes new approaches that are proactive rather than reactive, such as conflict management, including conflict prevention and conflict resolution (see Crocker, 2011, for an excellent review of conflict management). In addition, positive peace includes reconciliation as a goal of lasting conflict resolution.

Reconciliation

Reconciliation is a multidisciplinary concept that has been discussed in the religious, psychological, legal, and political literatures. Thus, there are many definitions of reconciliation that suit specific contexts. It ranges from the interpersonal level, in which peace is subjective or psychological in nature, to the national level, in which it becomes pragmatic and political in nature and is often defined as peaceful coexistence, with everyone having a voice in addressing the past, present, and future of his or her community or country (Bloomfield, 2006).

Galtung (2001) differentiates between passive coexistence, which is based on negative peace,

and is defined as a closure of hostilities, and active coexistence, which is based on positive peace, and is defined as achieving a lasting positive relationship between former enemies. For Galtung, reconciliation is closure plus healing. That is, reconciliation includes healing the traumas of past violence on both sides (i.e., victims and perpetrators). Assefa (2001) echoed this sentiment by defining reconciliation as a transformation of negative relationships into more positive (e.g., just, trusting, and cooperative) ones.

Regardless of the definition used, reconciliation is difficult to achieve, requiring time for the involved parties to solve their deep-rooted conflicts. Reconciliation is both a goal (i.e., future-oriented, something to strive for, as an end-state of harmony) and a process (i.e., based on the present, as a means of living together in peace; Bloomfield, 2003, 2006). As a process, reconciliation includes the search for truth and justice.

Truth refers to the process of recognizing and remembering past abuses, as well as learning from a painful past in order to prevent future abuses (Bloomfield, 2003). Justice refers to establishing blame and punishing the guilty for their wrongdoing (i.e., retributive justice) and repairing the harm done to the relationship between the victim and offender so that both can envision a peaceful future together (i.e., restorative justice), therefore healing the community (Bloomfield, 2006). Restorative justice may be particularly useful in addressing indigenous conflict resolution, such as in countries like Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia that endorse a communitarian worldview (Skelton & Frank, 2004).

It is important to highlight that national reconciliation is independent of forgiveness (Bloomfield, 2006). The latter reflects a religious and Christian perspective that has influenced some definitions of reconciliation (e.g., Truth & Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 1998).

Truth Commissions

Seventeen Latin American countries experienced some type of domestic or international conflict between 1970 and 2003 (Sikkink & Walling,

2007). They include the following: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Sikkink and Walling (2007) report that conflict is the best predictor of human rights violations that need to be investigated. They define a truth commission as “a temporary body officially authorized by the state to investigate a pattern of past human rights violations and issue a report” (p. 429). According to Sikkink and Walling, Latin America alone accounted for 37% of all truth commissions and 54% of all human rights trials in transitional countries (i.e., those changing from a nondemocratic to a more democratic political system). Sikkink and Walling empirically examined the impact of these trials in Latin America and found that they did not undermine democracy or lead to a rise in human rights violations. In addition, van der Borgh (2001) suggested that truth commissions in Latin America were helpful in revealing, even if partially, the atrocities committed (mostly by the state) and giving families of the disappeared and murdered some sense of justice served.

The Current Study

Research Questions

The purpose of the current study was to analyze definitions of peace and reconciliation provided by our Latin American sample. We were particularly interested in finding out whether there are significant gender differences in the percentages of men’s and women’s spontaneous definitions of peace according to the two definitions of peace discussed earlier: negative and positive peace (Galtung, 1964, 1969). In other words, when defining peace, are women more likely than men to focus on elements of positive peace? We were also interested in finding out whether there are significant gender differences in the percentages of men’s and women’s spontaneous definitions of reconciliation as a process (Bloomfield, 2003, 2006). In other words, are women more likely than men to define reconciliation as a process?

Method

Participants

The sample consisted of 438 (61%) women and 271 (38%) men, with four participants (1%) not indicating their gender. Thus, the total sample size consisted of 713 Latin American participants. Their average age was 28.5 years, ranging from 18 to 79 years. One hundred and twenty-five (18%) of the participants reported having been involved in protest activities. All participants provided, in their own words, their definition of peace and reconciliation.

Coding Manual Development

The peace and reconciliation coding manuals for this study were developed according to grounded theory methods, which involve inductive reasoning. The written responses were first unitized into independent ideas, which were then coded into categories and subcategories. For more information regarding the description of the coding manuals, please review Chap. 2, the introduction to the peace and reconciliation section of the book.

Results

Definitions of Peace

Table 8.1 summarizes the major findings for distribution of definitions into the major categories for *negative peace*, *positive peace*, and the *question of achievability*, as well as the more commonly used subcategories. The percentage column provides the distribution of the responses into the coding categories. We provide both their percentages of all responses and their percentages of the major category into which they fall. We also provide a verbatim example, along with the country, gender, and age of the participant. As can be seen, the vast majority of definitions (71%) were coded for *positive peace*, with substantially fewer definitions coded for *negative peace* (15%),

Table 8.1 Major coding categories with examples for definitions of peace item

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Example
<i>Negative peace</i>	15				
Rejecting violence	7(47)	Nicaragua	F	42	“Mutual relationship/situation in which there is no war”
		Columbia	M	26	“Action that ends violence”
<i>Positive peace</i>	71				
<i>Prerequisites for Peace</i>	5(8)	Argentina	F	30	“The unique appearance of living in freedom”
		Peru	M	18	“To live freely”
Solidarity	5(7)	Peru	F	21	“Respect for mankind and for life”
		Nicaragua	M	19	“Unity among members of a group of countries or people”
Outcomes	5(7)	Costa Rica	F	48	“To value life, energy, libido”
		Brazil	F	22	“Social and psychological balance”
Positive emotions	5(8)	Argentina	F	22	“Well-being, security”
		Peru	M	22	“Means by which we can attain happiness”
Calm/tranquility	20(29)	Argentina	F	31	“Tranquility and safety”
		Peru	M	19	“Tranquility and harmony”
Harmony	11(16)	Puerto Rico	F	28	“Harmony, peace, and happiness”
		Nicaragua	M	25	“Harmony for the whole world”
<i>Question of achievability</i>	13				
Unspecified achievability	8(62)	Argentina	M	33	“Values to live by”
		Peru	F	22	“Ideal for the world”

The first number in the percentage column refers to the percent of responses in the specified category or subcategory out of all definitions of peace. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the subcategory out of the specified major category of definitions of peace

M male, *F* female

and the *question of achievability* (13%). Nearly half (47%) of all the negative peace definitions fell into the subcategory for *rejecting violence*.

The positive peace subcategories were the largest percentages of responses were *calm/tranquility* (29% of all the *positive peace* definitions) and *harmony* (16% of all the *positive peace* definitions). Table 8.2 shows the results of our exploratory chi-square analysis regarding the definition of peace by gender, as well as an additional analysis to determine whether there were group differences in responses based on involvement in protest activities (protest vs. no protest). The findings revealed a stark contrast between men and women. A significantly greater proportion of women than men defined peace using one or more of the *positive peace* categories, especially *calm/tranquility*. On the other hand, a significantly greater proportion of men than

women defined peace using one or more of the *negative peace* categories, especially *rejecting violence*. Thus, these data suggest that, in our Latin American sample, women emphasize more positive peace than men, whereas men emphasize more negative peace than women.

Concerning involvement in protest activities, the main finding is that a significantly greater proportion of participants who reported having engaged in protest gave responses that were coded into one or more of the categories that are grouped under *questioning the achievability/ideal presence* than those who never engaged in protest. One speculation is that participants who had engaged in protest activities might be disillusioned with the prospects of peace, even negative peace, and openly question its achievability. Also, at a marginally significant level, more nonprotestors than

Table 8.2 Chi-square findings for demographic group percentages for definitions of peace coding categories

Categories	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	χ^2
	Women	Men	
Negative peace presence	18	25	5.09 [*]
Rejecting violence	6	10	4.93 [*]
Positive peace presence	78	61	16.07 ^{**}
Calm/tranquility	21	17	4.45 [*]
	Protest	No protest	
Negative peace presence	18	22	2.84 [^]
Question of achievability/ideal presence	26	15	4.15 [*]

Presence indicates that the participant provided a response that was coded for that category and/or one of its subcategories

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the specified demographic group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

[^]0.05 < p < 0.10, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.001

protestors gave at least one example of a *negative peace* definition.

Definitions of Reconciliation

Table 8.3 shows the (sub)categories under process, state, and question of achievability/ideal. As before, it includes a verbatim example, along with demographic information (country, gender, and age) about the participant. As can be seen, 60% of all the definitions of reconciliation associated it with a *process*. The specific processes most frequently identified were *coming to terms/agreeing/compromising/negotiating* (29% of all the *process* definitions) and *apology and forgiveness* (15% of all the *process* definitions). Twenty-eight percent of the definitions of reconciliation were coded as representing an end *state*; the majority of those definitions identified reconciliation with *peace*. Only 10% of the definitions were coded for question of *achievability/ideal*.

Table 8.4 shows the results of our chi-square analysis by gender for definitions of reconciliation. Again, a striking gender gap emerged, with a significantly greater proportion of women than men provided definitions of reconciliation coded for one or more of the process *presence* categories. In particular, a significantly greater proportion of women than men defined reconciliation in terms of *coming to an agreement, compromising, or negotiating*. Significantly more men than

women identified reconciliation with *peace*. In addition, a significantly greater proportion of men than women gave responses that were coded into one or more of the categories for the *question of achievability* of reconciliation. Thus, these findings suggest that women are more likely than men to view reconciliation as a process rather than as a goal, and to favor relationship-building in the form of agreement, compromise, or negotiation.

Discussion

One of the main findings from our analyses is that men and women tended to define peace and reconciliation differently. Overall, women were more likely than men to give positive *peace* definitions, whereas men were more likely than women to provide *negative peace* definitions. These findings may reflect the optimism and resilience of Latin American women who suffered many losses during the state terror and insurgency that afflicted many Latin American countries during the second half of the twentieth century (DeSouza et al., 2012; DeSouza & Stevens, 2009). Such optimism may also reflect relatively recent increased political liberalization, return to democracy, and peace negotiations between former enemies in Latin America (van der Borgh, 2001).

Although political intrastate conflicts have dramatically decreased in the twenty-first century,

Table 8.3 Major coding categories with examples for definitions of reconciliation item

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Example
<i>Process</i>					
Unspecified process	6(10)	Argentina	F	24	“It is the consequence of justice”
		Peru	M	25	“A step toward peace, making peace”
Apology and forgiveness	9(15)	Argentina	F	27	“Repentance, understand or simulation”
		Peru	M	18	“Pardon and comprehension”
Recognize/acknowledge/respect	5(8)	Peru	F	22	“Being conscious of the harm done and making sure there is no rancor”
		Puerto Rico	M	19	“Respect and communication”
Come to terms/agreement/compromise//negotiate	17(29)	Peru	F	20	“Common agreement for a good end”
		Costa Rica	M	30	“Compromise of differences between two parties”
Uniting	8(13)	Brazil	F	21	“To unite people, nations, countries”
		Nicaragua	M	39	“Sample through which two groups in conflict decide to work in harmony”
<i>State</i>					
Peace	14(51)	Argentina	M	22	“Harmony between one country or city with another country”
		Peru	F	37	“Beginning again with peace, negotiations, and communications”
Emotional state	6(20)	Peru	F	33	“The desire to be well with oneself and with everyone else”
		Puerto Rico	M	55	“Intelligence”
<i>Question of achievability/ideal</i>					
Unspecified achievability	6(65)	Brazil	F	20	“Illusion, interest”
		Columbia	M	24	“Good for the soul”

The first number in the percentage column refers to the percent of responses in the specified category or subcategory out of the total set of definitions of reconciliation. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses out of the specified major category of definitions of reconciliation

M male, F female

Table 8.4 Chi-square analysis by gender for definitions of reconciliation coding categories (N= 680)

Categories	Women	Men	χ^2
Process presence	86	77	8.48**
Come to terms/agreement/compromise/negotiate	18	13	3.73*
State			
Peace	13	18	5.6*
Question of achievability/ideal presence	12	17	3.85*

If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference. Presence indicates that the participant provided a response that was coded for that category and/or one of its subcategories

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.001$

violence and crime have become widespread in many Latin American countries, especially in the cities (Howard, Hume, & Oslender, 2007). According to Howard and colleagues, current

high levels of violence and crime are typically the result of unresolved societal prejudices based on gender, class, and race/ethnicity that intensify insecurity among the population and

undermine people's confidence in the democratic process.

Current high crime rates in Latin America may, in part, explain the disillusionment with the attainability of peace found among our participants who reported having engaged in protest activities. Thus, we may question whether the optimism reflected among many of our respondents' definitions of peace, especially among women, reflects true structural changes that are the key components of positive peace (Galtung, 1964, 1969).

Regarding reconciliation, the findings showed that, in our Latin American sample, women were more likely than men to view reconciliation as a process rather than as a goal, such as peace. In addition, more men than women voiced doubts about the achievability of reconciliation. These findings reinforce women's optimism, and are congruent with women's views on mediation, as evidenced by the greater proportion of women, compared to men, citing compromising, negotiation, and agreement in their definitions of reconciliation.

Reconciliation as a process is also related to relationship-building (Bloomfield, 2006). The psychological literature indicates that women have been socialized to sustain social relationships and restore group functioning, whereas men have been socialized to be direct and dominate group structure (Maccoby, 1990). Thus, overall, men may make it more likely than women to derail compromise and negotiation during the process of reconciliation.

Conclusion

We found several significant gender differences in our sample, suggesting that other studies should investigate other differences in the definitions of peace and reconciliation based on social class, region (e.g., urban vs. rural), and political affiliation to name just a few. In addition, our data provide a starting point to test hypotheses about actual peace and negotiation processes to be examined in future studies in different Latin American countries whose histories of violence and quests for peace vary greatly. According to

Bloomfield (2003), women have been ignored and/or silenced during actual peace negotiation processes, and women continue to be underrepresented in elected government positions.

Brazilians recently elected their first female president (Domit, 2010). Thus, scholars need to test the hypothesis that a substantial increase in elected women officials to high levels of the government will lead their Latin American countries toward positive peace. However, there is no "one-size-fits-all" solution to complex problems. Even the very definition of peace and reconciliation must be context specific to be meaningful and help create workable solutions to conflicts.

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Definitions of Peace and Reconciliation in South and Southeast Asia

9

Janice Jones, E.E. Diehnelt, Anoushka Shahane,
Ellora Puri, Darshini Shah, Ma. Regina E. Estuar,
Sherri McCarthy, Megan Reif, Haslina Muhammad,
Nisha Raj, and Jas Jafaar

There are many factors that contribute to views on peace and conflict in any given area. In this regard, the countries of South and Southeast Asia are no different from anywhere else. What distinguishes this area of the world is the unique interplay of particular cultural, socioeconomic, political, and historical factors that have their own unique features in this region. These are not separate or disparate factors; rather, they influence each other, ultimately impacting how people view the risks of violence, the efficacy of nonviolence, and their response to adversity and conflict. This chapter is devoted to a discussion of definitions of peace and reconciliation provided by participants from South and Southeast Asia. It focuses particularly on India, Pakistan,

Laos, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, and the ways in which citizens of those countries define peace and reconciliation.

India and Pakistan share a border, so one might expect commonalities between the two countries. Even though they share a common origin in the aftermath of the British Raj, there has been an unfortunate amount of conflict and tension between them (More, 2006). Given that the partitioning of British India was done along religious demographics, it is not surprising that India and Pakistan developed, to some extent, religious identities that have been an ongoing source of conflict. Even so, religions in India and Pakistan are not perfectly homogeneous, although India is the more religiously diverse of the two.

Terrorism has been a major cause of conflict for India and Pakistan. The other countries have

J. Jones (✉)

Doctoral Leadership Studies Department, Cardinal
Stritch University, Milwaukee, WI, USA
e-mail: je2jones@stritch.edu

E.E. Diehnelt

University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, USA

A. Shahane

Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA

E. Puri

Department of Political Science,
University of Jammu, Jammu, India
e-mail: ellorapuri@gmail.com

D. Shah

Health Education Library for People, Mumbai, India
e-mail: dnshahl@gmail.com

M.R.E. Estuar

Department of Information Systems and Computer Science,
Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon City, Philippines
e-mail: restuar@ateneo.edu

S. McCarthy

Educational Psychology, Counseling and Human
Relations, Northern Arizona University, Yuma, AZ, USA
e-mail: Sherri.McCarthy@NAU.EDU

M. Reif

Political Science and International Studies, University of
Colorado Denver, Denver, CO, USA
e-mail: reifm@umich.edu; reifmegan@live.com

H. Muhammad

Monash University, Melbourne, Australia

N. Raj

Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA

J. Jafaar

Department of Anthropology and Sociology, Faculty of
Arts and Sciences, University of Malaysia, Malaysia
e-mail: laile@um.edu.my

also had to deal with the issues surrounding terrorism, some with bombings and others with heightened antiterrorism efforts. However, recent bombings and terrorist activities in Mumbai, coupled with ongoing bombings in Pakistan, have left these two countries at the forefront of terrorist violence for countries in this region.

Issues Related to Globalization and Regional Development

Globalization sparks violence in many ways, from the economic hardships of displaced or dispossessed citizens to the wholesale restructuring of societies to a globally interconnected marketplace. However, globalization is also often seen as the best way for countries to develop, particularly when peaceful relations can be nurtured among potential trading partners. The impact of globalization can vary with cultural views of economic activity, social roles, globalization, the internet, etc., along with the current state of economic development and level of sustainability (Barbieri & Reuveny, 2005; Lieber & Weisberg, 2002; Li & Schaub, 2004). Because of these sources of variation, globalization affects every country differently. In each country, there are some people who work against globalization and others who favor greater globalization, and both groups may believe their efforts will lead to more peace.

Foreign Direct Investment, or FDI, is the investment of foreign currency directly into another country for building factories or infrastructure. This initiative is significant because it not only allows a country to acquire foreign currency to balance its trade but also creates ties and interdependence needed for peaceful relationships. Interregional FDI is of particular importance for peace because it creates vested interests in countries that are likely to be pragmatically averse to warring with nations in which they have invested. Furthermore, interregional FDI supports regional trade associations and agreements, such as the South Asian Free Trade Area, which includes India and Pakistan, and the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement, which includes Laos and the Philippines. The effects of FDI are still up for debate, as some view its impact as negative

(Blanton & Blanton, 2007; Kosack & Tobin, 2006). Nevertheless, the basic assumption is that remitting money from wealthier areas to poorer areas is important not only for strengthening ties and relations but also for providing economic support that can contribute to regional economic equality. This can be particularly useful for countries like the Philippines, where a large number of families receive earnings from their migrant members who send earnings back to their families.

The pathways to economic development, regional cooperation, and peace have faced challenges both from charges of corruption in the administration of programs and in the occurrence of natural disasters. The issue of corruption is complex because the definition of corruption is culturally dependent. What might seem like corrupt behavior in one culture may appear as a normal and standard practice in other cultures. Nevertheless, corruption can hinder regional economic integration and create needless tensions in international economic activity.

The effects of natural disaster on a region can also be complex. There are many interregional causes of natural disaster, such as typhoons, monsoons, tsunamis, and earthquakes. Although these extreme events are generally detrimental, they can involve regional assistance and integration, elements supportive of peace. However, the response to national disasters may also be detrimental to peace if it is done poorly and particularly if the response leads to blaming or recrimination. The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) indicated that because international responders are volunteers, the humanitarian system has flaws, such as the lack of dependable leadership and accountability. A good example of a natural disaster that generated problems in response was the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami.

These concerns can be seen in more than just natural disasters, as there are varying kinds of regional shared concerns that are supportive of peace if addressed well or undermine peace if the response is insufficient or harmful. There are shared ecological concerns, particularly for countries that border each other, as animal species do not stop at a nation's borders. This sharing of species and ecosystem applies to fishing, which is both an economic and food security issue. For example, there

is the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, which includes Malaysia and the Philippines, and supports the continued viability of fishing as a food source and as an economic activity (Eng, Paw, & Guarin, 1989). Another issue facing these countries is climate change, which involves economic changes, shared dangers, and political institutions on a regional level. This is a particularly relevant issue for this region, as there are many islands at risk for submerging under rising sea levels. Food security is also an issue, as climate change can threaten the productivity of crops (Gregory, Ingram & Brklacich, 2005).

The smuggling and production of narcotics have been a source of violence in the region, particularly in areas where it is grown as a crop. Food security issues arise from the fact that narcotics compete with agricultural goods for land and similar resources. Therefore, the growth of narcotics means that there are fewer buffer crops to resist shocks to the food supply system, which can create sudden shortages and sometimes famines, particularly when combined with droughts. Moreover, the trade in illegal narcotics creates an underground economy that often involves violence, and that, by virtue of the fact that those involved are unlikely to pay taxes, leads to a weaker government in the affected country. Countries within the region differ in their responses to the issue of narcotics (Fox, Krummel, Yarnsarn, Ekasingh, & Podger, 1995).

Psychological and Political Factors

There are also many psychological and political issues that influence the potential for cooperation in South and Southeast Asia. Cultural factors impact how the people of a region respond to violence. Tensions and exchanges of ideas occur on borders, and often borders are modified to halt the exchanges when those in power are concerned with preserving and reinforcing their own cultural identities. Minority groups in a nation are easier to dehumanize and thus become easier victims of violence, such as the pogroms that occurred in 1984 against the Sikhs in India (Kour, 2006).

One source of strife in the region is changing gender roles (Purkayastha, Subrmaniam, Desai,

& Bose, 2003), partly as a result of changing demographics. These roles are changing for many reasons. One is the improving rates of literacy in the adult populations of some of these countries. Another is the spread of better communication technologies, with everything from TV to the Internet exposing societies to different ideas concerning gender roles and structures (Steadly, 1999), possibly changing the culture of a nation in the process. This change can support gender equality through empowerment but can also hurt gender equality with a reactionary backlash. Either way, the tensions surrounding changing gender roles tend to be a source of violence.

The changes in demographics are important, whether viewed through the increases in female participation and advancement in economic activity or through improved sanitation and health care. Overlapping both of these advances is the spread of contraceptives, allowing for better family planning and decreasing average family size (Pachauri & Santhva, 2002). Changes in family size also impact schooling (Maralani, 2008), which can be important for the formation of perspectives on peace in a given country.

The economic growth experienced in these regions may bring about a revolution if the growth is not sustained, as expectations are built up during a period of growth but are not sustained in a recession (Davies, 1962). Gaps between expectations and reality can leave a populace with dashed hopes and susceptibility to revolutions. Given the growth experience by most of the nations surveyed in this region, there are good reasons for concern about the dangers of economic contraction, particularly around issues of sustainability.

All of the countries in this region have seen increasing urbanization and population density. This climate creates new opportunities for violence, as some citizens are unprepared for the challenges of city life. One challenge for the urban poor is how to obtain food, given that subsistence agriculture is unavailable to most city dwellers; the worst forms of poverty in cities have different effects from the worst forms of poverty in rural areas. This is part of the reason for incorporating food security into peace and conflict resolution efforts; another is the correla-

tion between rising food prices and political or social upheaval. These issues are particularly important in low-income countries, such as some of those in this chapter. Generally, the less income people have, the greater is the proportion they must spend on food. A related concern in this region is energy security, which is the ability of a country to supply its economy with sufficient electricity and other fuels (Sàez, 2007).

One response to such problems has been the humanitarian supplying of food, although the record on this has been mixed (Hoffman, Gardner, Just, & Hueth, 1994). Despite good intentions, food aid can undermine food security by further displacing agricultural production in a country. Efforts from both advocates and opponents of globalization have been undertaken to address some of the issues surrounding the transition from low-density rural population patterns to high-density urban population patterns.

Ongoing Disputes and Efforts for Peace

Disputed territory in the region of South and Southeast Asia includes many areas. Kashmir has been a frequent cause of conflict between India and Pakistan and also a source of national pride and symbolic strength for Kashmiris. Ambalat is a disputed area of the ocean between Indonesia and Malaysia, its significance tied to the oil and natural gas under the sea floor. Malaysia and the Philippines, among others, lay claim to parts of the Spratly Islands, primarily for the legal rights to the surrounding waters, not for the land itself. Although these areas are not the only disputed ones, they have the most significance. While only the situation in Kashmir has led to actual violence, territorial disputes are always a dangerous possibility. However, as sources of possible violence, these territorial disputes are relatively easy to solve for the governments involved, through bilateral negotiations, as compared to climate change or poverty, for example, which can demand multinational efforts.

The peace movement led by Gandhi to end the Raj is probably the most well-known peace move-

ment in this region. However, contemporary peace movements are afoot. One is the effort to denuclearize, the focus particularly on resisting nuclear arms buildup in favor of nuclear disarmament. The movement is not restricted to any individual country in this region but is particularly important for peace in India and Pakistan. These two nuclear-armed nations have had tensions and conflict in the relatively recent past, sparking fears of a nuclear exchange. Even if it were a limited exchange, it could result in millions of deaths. Although the two countries do not possess many nuclear weapons in comparison to other countries, particularly the USA and Russia, the destructive potential is still enormous. Rather unique in the world of nuclear-armed states is that India and Pakistan profess to keep their weapons unconstructed or unassembled (Geller, 2003). This is analogous to keeping a gun unloaded: it could quickly be loaded or "assembled," but if stolen would be of little use to anyone. As a safety measure, this is essential, not only in the case of possible theft, but also as a barrier to planned and authorized official use. Because these weapons are not launch ready, an accidental nuclear launch would be less likely to occur in a crisis.

The countries in this region vary in the structures or situations in which people hold their views on peace and reconciliation. India and Pakistan have each other as frequent combatants and sources of fear. Indonesia and Malaysia are neighbors as well but do not share this sort of consistent tension. The Philippines is the only country in the region to have historical ties to the United States. Laos is the only landlocked country and is the least economically developed, with agriculture having the greatest percentage of subsistence. Thus, there are many reasons for the views in this region to differ from country to country.

Methods

Sample

The sample consisted of 622 participants ranging in age from 18 to 75: 144 from India, 20 from

Indonesia, 14 from Laos, 149 from Malaysia, 57 from Pakistan, 230 from the Philippines, and 8 from Sri Lanka. Thirty-nine participants reported serving in the military, 147 reported having a relative who had served in the military, and 86 said they had participated in an antiwar protest at least once in their lives.

Procedure

The participants responded to the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) (Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006) either in hard copy or online, in their respective languages. The survey included open-ended questions to generate qualitative information concerning the ways in which individuals reasoned about issues of governmental violence and individual rights to peace. It also included items asking for individual definitions of peace and reconciliation. The definitions were coded using coding manuals developed by the Group on Individual Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP). All definitions were first broken down into codeable units for purposes of coding because some responses contained several units of meaning, each of which could be coded independently based on criteria in the coding manual. (See Chap. 2 for further information re: coding.)

Definitions of Peace

Coding Guidelines

The definitions of peace and definitions of reconciliation coding manuals were developed using grounded theory methods (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The manual for coding definitions of peace contains criteria to code participants' responses into four main categories, each of which has one or more subcategories. The major categories for definitions of peace are *negative peace*, *positive peace*, *question of achievability/ideal*, and *perceived reality*.

Responses in the *negative peace* category define peace as the removal, absence, or end of something

aggressive or threatening. *Negative peace* subcategories include (a) *no conflict* (peace as the absence of conflict), (b) *rejecting violence* (peace as the absence or end of violence), (c) *rejecting terrorism* (peace as the absence of terrorism), (d) *negative emotions* (peace as the absence of negative emotions such as fear), and (e) *rejecting intimidation/threat* (peace as the absence of threats of intimidation).

The second major coding category for definitions of peace is *positive peace*. These definitions focus not on the absence of war, terrorism, and other forms of violence but on the kinds of conditions that are necessary for a culture of peace. Our coding manual identifies two principal *positive peace* subcategories: (a) *prerequisites for peace*, describing conditions that must be met in order to achieve peace, and (b) *outcomes of peace*. The *prerequisites* subcategory includes an additional seven subcategories: (a) *granting of human rights*, (b) *equality*, (c) *acceptance/tolerance* (which includes *understanding* and *solidarity*), (d) *democratic participation*, (e) *openness to working toward a mutual goal*, (f) *security*, and (g) *access to resources*. The *outcomes* subcategory also includes an additional level of subcategories: (a) *positive emotions*, (b) *calm/tranquility*, and (c) *harmony*.

The third major coding category, *question of achievability*, was for responses that did not directly define peace but questioned its achievability or identified it as an ideal. The final major category, *perceived reality*, applied to responses that referred to peace in the current state of the world as seen by the participant rather than providing a definition.

Distribution of Definitions of Peace Across Coding Categories

Thirty-five percent of all the definitions of peace were coded into the *negative peace* category; of these *negative peace* definitions, nearly half (46%) fell into the *rejecting violence* subcategory. An example of a response coded for *rejecting violence* was "the absence of violence, bloodshed" (18-year-old female, Pakistan). Just over half (51%) of all definitions of peace were coded into the *positive peace* category. The most common theme among positive peace responses was

harmony, which accounted for 15% of the *positive peace* definitions and 8% of all definitions of peace in the South and Southeast Asia sample. An example of a response in the *harmony* subcategory was “a period or state of reconciliation and harmony among nations and individuals” (51-year-old female, Philippines). Each of the *positive peace* subcategories included responses within the range of 1–7% of the definitions of peace.

Only 7% of all the definitions were coded into the *question of achievability* category. An example of such a response was provided by a 20-year-old woman from Malaysia, who said “peace is an aspiration for the development of a country and its citizens.” Finally, only 1% of the responses were coded for *perceived reality*; for example, a 20-year-old Filipino man said that peace is “the common idea of good by the majority.” One percent of all the definitions of peace were uncodeable. Table 9.1 indicates the percentages of definitions coded into the major categories and most common subcategories, along with examples and the demographic characteristics of the respondents.

Exploratory Chi-Square Analyses

Chi-square analyses were conducted to explore the extent to which demographic groups differed in the frequencies of their particular definitions. These analyses were purely exploratory and cannot be generalized to the larger South and Southeast Asian population. To inform future research, marginally significant group differences ($\alpha=.10$) are included in the following presentation of the findings. Chi-square tests of independence were run to determine whether group differences based on gender and participants’ military service, whether participants had relatives in the military, and whether participants had participated in protests.

Chi-square analyses revealed that there were group differences based on military and protest participation and gender (See Table 9.2). A significantly larger proportion of participants with military experience than those without a military background gave at least one definition coded into the *question of achievability* category. A significantly larger proportion of protestors than non-protestors and of women than men provided at least one definition coded for *negative peace*.

Table 9.1 Major coding categories and examples of definitions of peace

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Example
<i>Negative peace</i>	35	Philippines	Male	46	“Cessation of hostilities toward a just resolution of grievances and genuine reconciliation”
No conflict	6(16)	Malaysia	Female	20	“A condition without fighting or being enemies”
Rejecting violence	16(46)	Pakistan	Male	21	“A time of no war and justice prevailing”
Negative emotions	4(13)	India	Female	24	“No fear in the mind and heart”
Nonspecific negative peace	7(20)	India	Female	24	“No fear in the mind and heart”
<i>Positive peace</i>	51	India	Female	29	“Love”
Prerequisites	6(12)	Philippines	Female	38	“Freedom”
Positive emotions	5(10)	Laos	Female	25	“People love each other”
Calm/tranquility	5(11)	Malaysia	Male	20	“Tranquil, calm”
Harmony	8(15)	Indonesia	Female	24	“To live in harmony with people of all backgrounds”
<i>Question of achievability/ideal</i>	7	Indonesia	Female	24	“Everyone should have [it]”
<i>Perceived reality</i>	1	Philippines	Male	45	“Within you not the world because you compose this world”

The first number in the percentage column refers to the percent of responses in the specified category or subcategory out of the total set of definitions of peace responses. The second number (in parentheses) in the percentage column refers to the percent of responses in the subcategory out of all the responses in the specific major category for definitions of peace

Table 9.2 Chi-square findings for demographic group percentages of peace coding categories

Categories	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	χ^2
	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	
Negative peace presence	44	35	5.02*
	<i>Military</i>	<i>No military</i>	
Question of achievability presence	33	18	4.58*
	<i>Protest</i>	<i>No protest</i>	
Negative peace presence	48	37	4.10*

The word “presence” at the end of a category name indicates that the participant provided a response that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the specified demographic group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^bFisher’s exact test

* $p \leq 0.05$

Definitions of Reconciliation

Coding Methods

The coding manual for definitions of reconciliation contains criteria to code participants’ responses into five major categories. Each category has one or more subcategories. The major categories to define reconciliation for this manual are (a) *process*, (b) *state*, (c) *human characteristic*, (d) *future orientation*, and (e) *question of achievability/ideal*.

The *process* category includes nine subcategories for more precise identification of themes. These subcategories are (a) *move on* (which includes *active*), (b) *apology and forgiveness* (which includes *without forgetting*), (c) *reparations/compensations*, (d) *resolve/fix* (which includes *make amends*), (e) *recognize/acknowledge/respect*, (f) *come to terms/agreement/compromise/negotiate*, (g) *understanding*, (h) *uniting* (which includes *healing/reuniting and building new relationship with former enemy*), and (i) *prevention/preventing*. The *state* category contains responses referring to reconciliation as an end state, a completed process. It has three subcategories: (a) reconciliation as *peace*, (b) reconciliation as the *end of conflict*, and (c) reconciliation as an *emotional state*. The third category, *human*

characteristic, contains responses portraying reconciliation as part of human nature or a human condition. The fourth category, *future orientation*, has responses portraying reconciliation as an undertaking that extends into the future. Finally, the *question of achievability/ideal* category includes responses questioning the achievability of reconciliation or referring to it as an ideal. This *question of achievability/ideal* category has one subcategory, which is *strive for*. For more details regarding the coding manual or procedure, please see the introductory methods chapter of Definitions of Peace and Reconciliation in this volume.

Distribution of Definitions of Reconciliation into Coding Categories

Sixty-two percent of the South and Southeast Asian definitions of reconciliation described it as a *process*. Within the *process* category, responses in the *recognize/acknowledge/respect* and *coming to terms/agreement/compromise/negotiate* subcategories were the most common. These subcategories comprised 14% and 22% of the responses in the major *process* category. A 22-year-old Filipino woman said that reconciliation is “compromise, settlement, and reunion,” which contains three codeable *process* units, all focusing on *coming to terms/agreement/compromise/negotiate* themes.

Approximately 27% of the definitions were coded into the *state* category, and a majority of these *state* responses (67%) identified reconciliation with *peace*. For example, a 20-year-old man from Laos defined reconciliation as “resolve by peace.”

Only a few responses were characterized by a *future orientation* (4%). An example of a response in the future orientation category was “patch up together and have at least one goal in common” (21-year-old woman, India). Definitions coded for *question of achievability/ideal* made up about 6% of the sample. Table 9.3 provides examples of definitions of reconciliation coded into the major categories and subcategories, along with percentages and demographic descriptors of the respondents providing the examples.

Table 9.3 Major coding categories and examples of definitions of reconciliation

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Example
<i>Process</i>	62	Philippines	Male	21	“Giving back one’s trust and respect after unwanted war/misunderstanding”
Apology and forgiveness	6(10)	Pakistan	Male	22	“The ability to forgive and forget past differences in pursuit of healthier future relations for all parties involved”
Recognize/acknowledge/ respect	9(14)	Philippines	Male	21	“Can be achieved when both parties recognized their faults. It is a great start after all the detriments had occurred”
Coming to terms/ agreement/compromise/ negotiate	14(22)	Malaysia	Female	20	“An agreement to stop violence”
Uniting	6(10)	Sri Lanka	Male	49	“Bringing together of opposing forces to discuss and compromise on disputes, whether perceived or otherwise, so that all parties involved will better understand and be willing to accept/tolerate the viewpoint/grievance that is causing the dispute”
Healing/reuniting	6(10)	India	Female	21	“Patch up together and have at least one goal in common”
<i>State</i>	27	Laos	Male	23	“Balance”
Peace	18(67)	Pakistan	Female	18	“The movement toward peace for two conflicting nations/groups”
<i>Question of achievability</i>	6	Indonesia	Male	21	“What everyone deserves”
<i>Future orientation</i>	4	India	Female	20	“A willful decision to learn from the past, let go of negativity, and cooperate for the future”

The first number in the percentage column refers to the percent of responses in that category or subcategory out of the region’s total set of definitions of reconciliation. The second number (in parentheses) in the percentage column refers to the percent of responses in the specified subcategory out of the specific major category for definitions of reconciliation

Exploratory Chi-Square Analyses

To examine the extent to which response patterns varied as a function of particular demographic characteristics of respondents from the South and Southeast Asia region, exploratory chi-square analyses were conducted; again, to inform future research, marginally statistically significant findings ($\alpha=.10$) are reported. Chi-square tests of independence revealed group differences based on participants’ gender and military service. Specifically, a significantly higher proportion of participants with military experience than their counterparts gave definitions coded into the *process* category. In addition, a significantly larger proportion of women than men also defined reconciliation as some sort of *process*, as well as identified reconciliation specifically with *peace*. See Table 9.4 for results of chi-square analyses.

Discussion

This study examined definitions of peace and reconciliation in South and Southeast Asia in the countries of India, Pakistan, Laos, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines; 622 participants were included in this sample. One limitation of this study could be the small sample size when one thinks of the population of South and Southeast Asia; however, its strength lies in the opportunity it provided for ordinary people in the region to reflect on the meaning to them of peace and reconciliation. The results indicate that nearly half of the definitions (46%) identified peace with “the absence of violence, bloodshed,” that is, they focused on *negative peace*. Results such as this indicate a focus simply on ending violence rather than on pursuing the kind of structural social change necessary to

Table 9.4 Chi-square findings for demographic group percentages of reconciliation coding categories

Categories	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	χ^2
	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	
Process presence	74	65	6.42*
Peace	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	2.94*
	16	12	
Process presence	<i>Military</i>	<i>Nonmilitary</i>	6.41*
	90	68	

The word “presence” at the end of a category name indicates that the participant provided a response that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the specified demographic group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

* $p < 0.05$

the development of a culture of peace. Given the amount of war and terrorism that this region has experienced, one might not find these results too surprising. Of interest, of course, is the relationship between having either served in the military or having relatives who have served in the military and definitions of peace and reconciliation – particularly the greater likelihood of veterans to question the achievability of peace.

Interestingly, there were also some significant gender differences in definitions, which may be related to changing gender roles in this region. Traditionally, men went to war and women stayed home. As women enter the workforce and are exposed to urban violence, an expanded literacy rate, and simply a move from agrarian lifestyles to urban lifestyles, responses to questions about peace and reconciliation may change.

This region has experienced significant tension around globalization through economic disparity experienced by its peoples. As Lieber and Wesiberg (2002) remind us, globalization impacts each country differently, some countries experiencing globalization as part of a peace movement while others are seeking globalization as economic development leading to greater sustainability for goods and services. Globalization can have similar effects to those of changing gender roles, as people’s day-to-day lifestyles change. Beyond just changing from rural to urban, job security and political clout can change as well. Landed farmers may not have the best quality of

life, but barring natural disasters, the land will produce food. Thus, subsistence agriculture provides a floor below which people cannot fall. However, once someone integrates with the global economy, they become affected not only by global upturns but also global downturns. Without a social safety net, global economic shifts can lead to widespread poverty in a region, particularly if they are practicing economic monoculture. For political clout, local constituencies can be displaced when global economic forces move in. This directly applies to peace studies as poverty and political destabilization can both be conducive to changing views on the utility of warfare and someone’s connection with their neighbors, domestically and internationally.

Natural disasters have plagued this region for centuries. Recently, the tsunami of 2004 brought in worldwide relief efforts that helped to bolster the economy and worked to return the region to a more normal state following the disaster. Peace efforts can benefit from collaborative efforts to respond to a natural disaster bringing people together to work toward a common cause.

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Definition of Peace and Reconciliation in China, Japan, and Korea

10

Alice Murata, Michelle Murata, Anoushka Shahane,
Andrea Jones-Rooy, and Hillary Mi-Sung Kim

Everybody loves peace, including residents of the East Asian countries of China, Taiwan, Japan, and Korea. It is in their best economic interest to maintain peace and reconciliation among themselves and with the other nations of the world. Difficulties in achieving peace and reconciliation are discussed in the brief history of each country. This chapter then examines definitions of peace and reconciliation from Chinese, Japanese, and Korean participants who completed the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Scale (PAIRTAPS).

A. Murata (✉)
Department of Counselor Education, Northeastern
Illinois University, Chicago, IL, USA
e-mail: A-Murata@neiu.edu; alicemurata@hotmail.com

M. Murata
Department of Psychology, American University,
Washington, DC, USA
e-mail: muratamh@gmail.com

A. Shahane
Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA

A. Jones-Rooy
Department of Political Science, University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, MI, USA
e-mail: ajonrooy@umich.edu

H.M.-S. Kim
School of Social Work, Rutgers University,
New Brunswick, NJ, USA
e-mail: mysongk@hotmail.com

China

China's recent history internally and with neighboring countries has been filled with conflict. In 1931, Mao Zedong was elected Chairman of the Soviet Republic of China in Jiangxi Province and instituted a policy called "The Great Leap Forward" – designed to move China from a farming society to a modern, industrial society in 5 years (Akbar, 2010). Under this policy, millions of Chinese citizens were forced into communes where they were compelled by the state to work in agriculture or manufacturing. Although Mao had hoped to increase agricultural, steel, and machinery outputs in 3 years, there was considerable damage to the land, and the Yellow River flood caused 20–48 million deaths due to starvation and drowning (Akbar). By the end of the third year, "The Great Leap Forward" was terminated, and the period between 1958 and 1960 came to be viewed as the *Three Bitter Years* (Harms, 1996).

The period between 1966 and 1976 was known as the Cultural Revolution. During this time, hundreds of thousands of Chinese people were subjugated, humiliated, tortured, and murdered. The Chinese government realized a need for reforms but was undecided on whether to move toward a more capitalist-oriented government or to continue with strict control over their economy and their citizens.

With the country in a political crisis, the people appealed to Hu Yaobang, a reformist who served as the General Secretary of the Chinese

Communist Party from 1980 to 1987. Because of Yaobang's beliefs in the rehabilitation of those persecuted in the Cultural Revolution, autonomy for Tibet, reestablishing relations with Japan, and social and economic reform, he was forced out of office and denied a state funeral when he died in April of 1989. His followers were outraged and students began to march on Tiananmen Square, petitioning for the restoration of Yaobang's reputation. When the government would not respond, the number of Beijing students and people from the neighboring cities protesting increased to approximately 100,000. On May 13, the students started a hunger strike that lasted for 7 days. Zhao, Yaobang's replacement, made a public speech on the Square pleading for the protesters to stop the hunger strike. In response, the students began to leave; however, other countrymen continued to march on the square (Evans & Richelson, 1999). On June 3, 1989, the Chinese government, with the Communist Party Elders, brought in as reinforcement the 27th and 28th divisions of the People's Liberation Army, on foot and with tanks to disassemble the protestors peacefully. The people were hostile, which led to the first casualties of the Tiananmen Square Massacre. In retaliation and fearful of additional military deaths, the army went down the streets firing. Most of the fighting took place just outside of the Square, with approximately 800–4,000 casualties among protestors and army personnel. The Chinese official count of 241 is a tremendous undercount (Evans & Richelson, 1999).

In the 1990s, aspiring to be a world power and to advance communism, China approached neighboring Asian countries in an attempt to weaken the influence of the United States (Sutter, 2004). Also during the 1990s, the Chinese leadership forged bonds with Russia to gain political support against the United States, import modern weapons, and establish a Sino-Russian military cooperation and trade relationship. Although initially this relationship was advantageous to both countries, Russian President Vladimir Putin concluded by early 2001 that Russia's best interests would be better served through improved relations with the United States (Sutter). Putin reduced Russia's commitments to China while

expanding its market for the sale of Siberian oil to include bidders from Japan as well as from China. The Chinese government recognized that it could no longer expect assistance from Russia regarding its differences with the United States and greatly reduced its own use of harsh criticism of the United States. Moreover, Chinese leaders came to believe that their interests were better served by cooperation rather than confrontation with the United States.

There continues to be a number of tensions between the Chinese and other Asian nations. The Chinese are strongly opposed to Japan's involvement with Taiwan, refusal to offer apologies to other neighboring Asian countries, and allegiance to the American military. Japan and other East Asian nations have their own concerns with China, including their own dependency upon China's economy for growth. They are threatened by the very size of China, which has nearly twice the territory and twice the population of all other Asian Pacific countries combined. Given China's immense direct foreign investments and huge volume of exports (Sutter, 2004), the other countries understandably have found it difficult to compete with China economically.

China has entered into free trade arrangements and security initiatives with the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) and has strengthened ties with Russia. Neighboring countries are both eager to take advantage of opportunities in China's growth and fearful of the Chinese. China has become the main export destination for South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan (Sutter, 2004). In another illustration of China's new approach to Asia, Beijing has pursued a slow process of reconciliation with India but has also continued active support for India's strategic opponent, Pakistan (Sutter).

China's leaders seek a stable environment in Asia in which to focus on domestic concerns and recognize that an extensive effort must be made to reassure other countries of its peaceful intentions (Bi, 2005). Fearful that its Asian neighbors may try to resist China's growing power and influence, Beijing has used diplomatic channels to offset regional worries about the "Chinese

threat” (Sutter, 2004) and has endeavored to build a supportive international environment in order to continue its rise both economically and politically. Most importantly, in a speech at Harvard University in December 2003, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao presented an outline of “China’s peaceful rise,” an undertaking based on the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”: (1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, (2) mutual nonaggression, (3) noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence (China’s Initiation, 2000). This concept, originally developed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, encourages countries to engage in mutually beneficial economic cooperation, which in turn opens up their economies to create a common prosperity (Pan, 2006).

Japan

A historically isolated country, Japan was forced by threats of war from the United States in 1854 to open itself to contact and trade. Unsatisfied with the unfair treaties signed, Japan vowed to become one of the most powerful first-class nations (Reischauer, 1964). The Western powers at this time were building colonial empires. In order to prevent other countries from infringing on Japan, the country adopted a strategy to extend its borders. Japan took control of Korea and Formosa in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894–1895 and in a war with Russia in 1904–1905 solidified its rights to Korea and the south part of the Sakhalin Island. During World War I, it gained the Marianas, Caroline, and Marshall Islands from Germany; at Versailles, it was recognized as one of the five big powers (Reischauer). In 1931, Japan took Manchuria. This expansion was viewed negatively internationally, but Japan continued to push forward militarily, seeking natural resources.

The United States entered World War II after Japan bombed Pearl Harbor. Although at first Japan was successful, the United States was more powerful. The war ended in 1945 with the dropping of two atomic bombs instantly killing 66,000 in Hiroshima and 30,000 in Nagasaki, with an

ultimate death toll estimated at 236,000 civilians (Henshall, 1999). Japan’s postwar constitution included a peace clause stripping Japan of its military and overseas possessions (Reischauer, 1964). Since then, the Japanese people see themselves as peace ambassadors, abandoning all thoughts of war, dedicated to helping others, and generous providers of foreign aid to impoverished countries (Tuman, Strand, & Emmert, 2009). Recently, Japan has faced increasing pressure to contribute to international peace-keeping efforts, and the growing number of Japanese “peace-keeping” troops overseas has caused considerable public debate as to whether Japan should continue to be defined as a “pacifist” country.

In East Asia, Japan has not been forgiven for its past aggressive acts. Reconciliation has not taken place between Japan and its neighbors, China and Korea, which struggle with the historical memory of Japanese imperialism. They object to Japan’s overlooking of its past aggressions and want a fair accounting its sins. Whereas Japanese leaders may try to argue that Japanese imperialism before and during WWII was a just effort to liberate Asia from the US control, to the Chinese and Koreans, it was more a matter of substituting one colonial overlord for another (Kushner, 2007). Japanese officials tend to ignore this controversy, hoping this legacy will go away. Japan does not, according to its neighbors, accept responsibility for past actions, preferring to be seen as among the victim, rather than the perpetrator of aggressive acts.

Recent controversies regarding historical memory have focused on the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, erected in 1869 to house the spirits of Japanese victims of war. It came to light in 1978 that Class A war criminals found guilty after WWII were enshrined there, suggesting that the Japanese government was denying responsibility for its war criminals (Kushner, 2007). Whereas the Hiroshima Peace Museum shows Japan not only as a victim of aggression but also as an aggressor, Japan’s war museums do not (Jeans, 2005), and Yasukuni remains the focus of the controversy between Japan and its neighbors. There seems to be a consensus for prime ministers

not to visit Yasukuni Shrine but to remember Japan's war heroes on August 15 at nearby Chidorigafuchi Cemetery, where unknown soldiers rest (Kingston, 2007). Nevertheless, in 1985, Prime Minister Nakasone made an official visit to Yasukuni, and Prime Minister Koizumi made six visits from 2001 to 2006, resulting in undermining goodwill with Korea and China and leaving strained relationships among these countries (Yamazaki, 2005).

The next Prime Minister, Abe Shinto, visited Korea and China in an attempt at reconciliation, resulting in a bilateral study group aimed at creating an acceptable joint history. In 2006, Yasukuni was modified but was still unacceptable to China and Korea, who cited Japan's wartime sins as a way of gaining diplomatic leverage and who view Japan's large economic assistance programs in China as a form of war reparations (Kingston, 2007). Growing resistance in Japan to the lack of progress in relations with China has resulted in cutting aid to China. The relationship between Japan and Korea improved in 2001 when Emperor Akihito acknowledged that the Japanese imperial line descended from Korea, resulting in praise from the Korean press. His expressions of contrition about the past were considered sincere and promoted reconciliation with neighboring countries.

Japan's relationship with Communist China resumed in 1972. Aggressive acts committed by Japan during World War II have not been acknowledged. The Nanjing Massacre Museum opened in 1985, and annual messages are sent to Japan concerning the need to correct Japanese history (Whiting, 1988). Also being questioned are the experiments on human subjects by Japanese Unit 731 and requests for compensation for forced labor during WWII. Some Chinese attempted to provoke unrest with Japan during the Asia Cup football tournament by engaging in anti-Japanese demonstrations. Japan did not retaliate. China has been successful in blocking Japan's desire to have a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council because of the country's refusal to accept historical responsibility (Kingston, 2007).

Another unresolved issue between Japan and its neighbors stems from Japan's WWII policy of systemically exploiting women from Korea, China, Japan, and other countries for use as sex slaves, or "comfort women," for men in all levels of the Japanese army (Min, 2003). The United Nations estimates that the number of sex slaves in Japan's military reached 400,000 (The Seattle Times, 2001, November 30). "Some were minors sold into brothels; others were deceptively recruited by 'human traders'; and still others were abducted" (Soh, 2003, para. 7). A number of human rights organizations have demanded an apology from Japan for war crimes committed against these WWII "comfort women" (Amnesty International, 2011; US State Department, 2010). Former "comfort women" themselves, forced into prostitution during WWII by the Japanese military, demand apologies, citing violations in international law.

Japanese historian Hirofumi Hayashi, of Kanto Gakuin University, contends that the practice of using women as sex slaves was condoned by both the military and the Japanese government. He stated, "The establishment and development of the military 'comfort women' system... was not only carried out by the total involvement of every section of the military but also by administrative machinery at every level of the Japanese state" (Hirofumi, 2001).

Even today, there is concern for the hundreds of thousands of women and children from various Asian and Eastern European countries who are trafficked into Japan every year, where they are forced to endure "slavery-like conditions" and work in the sex trade (Human Rights Watch, 2000; Polaris Project, 2010). The victims are coerced into commercial exploitation in strip bars, pornography, prostitution, escort services, hostess and entertainment services, and various types of sex shops, and they generate billions of dollars annually for their captors (Dean, 2008). According to a US State Department report in 2010, there has been no significant improvement in Japan's prosecution of sex trafficking even though the Japanese government is well aware of the problem (US State Department, 2010).

After Japan suffered a loss of nearly a 100,000 lives in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and World War II ended, a very strong commitment to peace was made. There is no military in Japan, and the people are committed to a mission of world peace. For more than 70 years, they have not just talked peace but acted in peaceful ways.

Korea

Korea has a long history of encroachment by groups and countries seeking to control it. In 1882, Korea signed a trade treaty with Japan ending centuries of isolation. Since then, China, Russia, and Japan have all invaded Korea. In 1910, Japan annexed Korea and ruled it until the end of World War II in 1945. At the end of World War II, Korea was divided at the 38th parallel into Soviet or North Korea and United States or South Korea zones of occupation (Korean War, n.d.). In 1948, rival North Korean and South Korean governments were formed, and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and Republic of Korea, respectively, were established. Interdependency of North Korea's natural resources and South Korea's farm areas were disrupted as was their economy. Battles resulted in the attempt to unify Korea, resulting in the Korean War. The conflict between Communist and non-Communist forces in Korea lasted from June 25, 1950, to July 27, 1953, ending in 1953 with a cease-fire, without replacement by a peace treaty, leaving the Korean peninsula technically still at war (Cho, 2010). The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1954 to 1987 contributed to tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

A desire to unify Korea has continued, despite the passage of time and mutual suspicions. A turning point between North and South Korea occurred in 2000 with successful summit meetings by President Kim Dae-jung of the Republic of Korea and Chairman Kim Jong-il of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Agreement about economic cooperation and

humanitarian issues such as reunifying families were made. Both parties seek a new treaty to replace the one ending the Korean War, but differences persist in how to achieve unification. They agreed to settle their differences by themselves without outside interference, to prevent war, to refrain from invading the other, to avoid engaging in any actions that threatened the other, and to establish further mutual agreements. Their school systems are attempting to teach peace, conflict resolution, and reconciliation. South Korea has invested money in the North and is helping North Korea join the international community (Park, 2000). The two Koreas entered the 2000 Sydney Olympics together and sent a single team to the 2001 World Table Tennis Championship.

The reason North Korea became open to negotiations was because severe economic failures required them to seek assistance from the international community (Park, 2000). Three million people starved to death. South Korea responded by giving humanitarian aid and encouraged the United States, Japan, and other countries to help North Korea. China and Russia, allies of North Korea, had moved in the direction of opening up to the West for economic reasons and encouraged North Korea to do likewise.

Both North and South Korea attempt to follow a path of peaceful coexistence and avoid confrontations. Still, they have engaged in building up arms, which threaten peace and reconciliation. North Korea not only has a standing army but also in 2005 announced possession of nuclear weapons and conducted missile tests in 2006. These actions make South Korea vulnerable and are counter to promoting mutual security. Both sides have failed to move forward in agreements to reduce military expenditures and production of arms (Kab-Woo, 2006). A concise and informative overview of armed conflicts among East Asian nations can be found in Oh, Murata, Kim, Murata, and Jones-Rooy (2012).

A desire for peace exists, but the differences between South and North Korea are difficult to overcome. There is also a difference between peace and reunification. The countries are working

together on the Gaeseong Industrial Complex with South Korea's capital and advanced technology and North Korea's cheap labor. Building a community dedicated to peace paves the way for reconciliation (Kab-Woo, 2006).

Kim Dae-jung received the Nobel Peace Prize for promoting peace, reconciliation, and democracy within South Korea and for working on peace and reconciliation with North Korea. Recently, concerns about North Korea reemerged after the death of Kim Jong-il and the replacement by his son Kim Jong-un. To seal his leadership and connect with his 1.2 million soldiers, Kim Jong-un makes many military visits. The international community is anxious during this transition time, since this leader is credited with heading past nuclear tests (Associated Press, 2012).

In the future, it is in the best interests of all countries, including the East Asian countries, to remain at peace with each other. However, this task is easier said than done. More recently, it has been economically beneficial for China, Japan, and Korea to cooperate, but their past is filled with unresolved conflicts. Apologies have been given by Japan, but without mutual trust among the nations, those apologies are deemed insincere and legal redress is desired. North Korea and China participate in building up nuclear capabilities that work against peace and reconciliation. Trust is lacking, so promises to disarm are not kept. Still, as these countries move forward and share common goals, the possibility of reconciliation is slowly being forged. Given the recent decades of peace among these East Asian nations and their apparent movement away from the armed conflict and hostility World War II and the immediate postwar period toward reconciliation, it is useful to consider how ordinary people from those countries define peace and reconciliation.

Methods

Sample

The sample consisted of 284 participants: 63 from China, 86 from Japan, 133 from Korea, and 2 from Taiwan. The ages of participants ranged

from 17 to 74. Sixty-six participants reported serving in the military, 87 reported having relative serving in the military, and 50 reported having participated in a protest at least once in their lives.

Procedure

The participants completed the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006) in hard copy or online in their respective languages. The questionnaire consisted of open-ended questions to acquire qualitative data, which were later quantified through coding. This chapter focuses on participants' individual definitions of peace and reconciliation. The definitions provided by the participant were first segmented into codeable units, and these units were then coded with the appropriate coding manuals.

Definitions of Peace

Coding Methods: Definitions of Peace

The definitions of peace coding manual and the definitions of reconciliation coding manual were developed based on grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 2007). The coding manual for definitions of peace coding provided criteria to code respondents' responses into four main categories, each of which had one or more subcategories. The major categories for definitions of peace are (a) *negative peace*, (b) *positive peace*, (c) *question of achievability/ideal*, and (d) *perceived reality*. Definitions in the *negative peace* category, which has five subcategories, identify peace with the removal, absence, or end of some form of violence or aggression. The subcategories consist of (a) *no conflict*, (b) *rejecting violence*, (c) *rejecting terrorism*, (d) release from *negative emotions*, and (e) *rejecting intimidation/threat*.

The second major category is *positive peace*, which identifies peace with the structural

components of a peaceful society and the outcomes provided by peace. The *positive peace* category has two main subcategories – *prerequisites for peace* and *outcomes* – both of which have an additional level of more specific subcategories. The *prerequisites for peace* subcategory includes seven sub-subcategories: (a) *granting of human rights*, (b) *equality*, (c) *acceptance/tolerance* (which includes *understanding* and *solidarity*), (d) *democratic participation*, (e) *openness to working toward a mutual goal*, (f) *security*, and (g) *access to resources*. The *outcomes* subcategory of *positive peace* includes sub-subcategories for *positive emotions*, *calm/tranquility*, and *harmony*.

The third major category, *question of achievability*, applies to responses that did not directly define peace but instead focused on the extent to which it was achievable or referred it as an ideal. The final category, *perceived reality*, is for responses that made reference to some perceived state of the world as the participant sees it. Refer to Chapter 2 for more information regarding coding.

Distribution of Definitions of Peace

Thirty-eight percent of all the definitions of peace were coded into the *negative peace* category, 40% of these *negative peace* definitions were coded specifically for *rejecting violence*, and 26% were coded for *no conflict*. One example of a *rejecting violence* definition came from a 34-year-old Korean woman who said peace is “the state in which war is not concerned with.” An example of a response in the *positive emotions* subcategory (14% of the positive peace definitions) was “the world that everyone has a satisfaction to everything” (21-year-old Japanese woman).

Forty-nine percent of all the definitions were coded into the *positive peace* category; 18% of these *positive peace* definitions were coded for *positive emotions*. An example of a response in the *positive emotions* subcategory, provided by a 21-year-old Japanese woman, was “the world that everyone has a satisfaction to everything.” A good example of a response coded into the major category

for *question of achievability/ideal*, which comprised of 11% of all the peace definitions, came from a 22-year-old Chinese woman who said peace is an “ideal state which realistically might be unattainable.” Only 1% of all definitions fell into the *perceived reality* category, and less than 1% of the responses were uncodeable. Table 10.1 provides additional examples and demographic characteristics of respondents for the major categories and subcategories of responses.

Exploratory Statistical Analyses

To assess the possibility of demographic group differences in types of definitions provided for the term peace, we conducted some exploratory analyses with the characteristics of gender, participants’ military service, whether participants had relatives in the military, and whether participants had participated in protests. Because our sample was a convenience sample, it is important not to generalize findings from these exploratory analyses. To inform future research, marginally statistically significant findings ($p \leq 0.10$) are included in the following discussion of the chi-square findings.

Chi-square tests of independence revealed that there were group differences based on gender, having relatives who participated in the military, and protest participation (see Table 10.2). A marginally larger proportion of women than men gave at least one definition coded into one of the *negative peace* subcategories. There were also marginally higher proportions of participants without a military relative who gave at least one *negative peace* definition and more specifically gave a definition linking peace to *rejecting violence*. By contrast, a significantly higher proportion of participants who did have a military relative gave at least one *positive peace* definition. A significantly larger proportion of nonprotestors than protestors gave at least one example of a *negative peace* definition, including being more likely to provide *no conflict*, and *rejecting violence* definitions. By contrast, a significantly larger proportion of protestors than nonprotestors gave at least one example of a *positive peace*

Table 10.1 Definitions of peace: frequency of responses in coding categories

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Negative peace</i>					
38					
Nonspecific negative peace	4(10)	Korea	Female	32	“A condition in which all people live without interference from others and can live in wanted directions”
No conflict	10(26)	Japan	Female	19	“Not at battle with other countries and areas, and no prospect of warfare in the future”
Rejecting violence	15(40)	Korea	Female	26	“A condition in which all people are not fighting”
Negative emotions	5(14)	China	Male	19	“A state in which people can live their lives without worrying about losing their properties or family members in an unexpected way”
<i>Positive peace</i>					
49					
Nonspecific		China	Male	32	“Peaceful co-existence”
Acceptance/tolerance	5(9)	China	Male	19	“Calm and quiet environment, everyone is nice to another”
Positive emotions	9(18)	Japan	Female	19	“That everybody is comparatively satisfied without psychological or physical pain”
Calm and tranquility	5(11)	Korea	Female	27	“Steady mind and calmness”
<i>Question of achievability/ideal</i>	11(58)	Japan	Female	20	“Something that everybody has it as an innate right”

The first number in the percentage column refers to the percent of responses in the specified category or subcategory out of all the definitions of peace. The second number (in parentheses) in the percentage column refers to the percent of responses in each subcategory out of the specified major category

Table 10.2 Definitions of peace: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Categories	Group 1 ^a		χ ²
	Female	Male	
<i>Negative peace presence</i>	56	45	3.37 [^]
	<i>Relative</i>	<i>No relative</i>	
<i>Negative peace presence</i>	39	60	9.05 [^]
Rejecting violence	10	18	2.50 [^]
<i>Positive peace presence</i>	71	47	13.07 ^{***}
	<i>Protest</i>	<i>No protest</i>	
<i>Negative peace presence</i>	32	54	7.76 ^{**}
No conflict	3	12	6.14 [*]
Rejecting violence	5	19	10.25 ^{**}
<i>Positive peace presence</i>	80	50	13.93 ^{***}

Presence indicates that the participant provided at least one response that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the specified demographic group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

[^]0.05 < p < 0.10, ^{*}p ≤ 0.05, ^{**}p ≤ 0.01, ^{***}p ≤ 0.001

definition. It is interesting that both antiwar protestors and respondents with a relative in the military are more likely than their counterparts to

identify peace with the foundations and outcomes of a culture of peace, rather than just as a cessation of violence.

Definitions of Reconciliation

Coding Methods: Reconciliation

The coding manual for definitions of reconciliation contains criteria to code participants' responses into six major categories; each category has one or more subcategories. The major categories to define reconciliation for this manual are (a) *process*, (b) *state*, (c) *human characteristic*, (d) *future orientation*, and (e) *question of achievability/ideal*. The *process* category has nine subcategories: (a) *move on* (which includes an additional subcategory *active*), (b) *apology and forgiveness* (which includes the additional subcategory *without forgetting*), (c) *reparations/compensations*, (d) *resolve/fix* (which includes the subcategory *make amends*), (e) *recognize/acknowledge/respect*, (f) *come to terms/agreement/compromise/negotiate*, (g) *understanding*, (h) *uniting* (which includes the subcategory *healing/reuniting and building new relationship with former enemy*), and (i) *prevention/preventing*. The *state* category consists of responses that refer to the conclusion of the process of reconciliation. This category has three subcategories, including (a) *peace*, (b) *end of conflict*, and (c) *emotional state*. The third category, *human characteristic*, incorporates responses that portray reconciliation as being natural to human nature or a human state. The fourth category, *future orientation*, includes responses that imply that reconciliation is an ongoing process that will continue indefinitely. The final major category, *question of achievability/ideal*, includes responses that question the achievability of reconciliation or mention it as an ideal. This category has one subcategory, which is *strive for*. For more details regarding the coding manual or procedure, please see Chap. 2 of this volume.

Distribution of Definitions of Reconciliation

Approximately 65% of all the Southeast Asia definitions of reconciliation identified it as a

process. Within the *process* category, responses in the *recognize/acknowledge/respect*, *come to terms/agree/compromise/negotiate*, and *understanding* subcategories were the most common. These subcategories applied to 14%, 27%, and 16% of the definitions in the major *process* category. An example of a participant's response in the *recognize/acknowledge/respect* subcategory was "a cooperation with the knowledge of each other's difference in opinion" (45-year-old man, Japan). About 28% of the definitions of reconciliation were coded into the *state* category; of these, 38% of the definitions equated reconciliation with *peace*. An example of a response in the *peace* subcategory was "finding a solution and looking forward to peace" (29-year-old man, Japan). Only 4% of all the East Asian definitions of reconciliation fell into the *question of achievability/ideal* category, and only 1% each fell into the *human characteristic* and *future orientation* categories. See Table 10.3 for additional examples of definitions of reconciliation in the major coding categories and subcategories.

Exploratory Analyses

To examine the possibility that definitions of reconciliation varied in relation to selected characteristics of the East Asian respondents, we ran exploratory chi-square analyses. As participants were not randomly selected from the region, it would be inappropriate to generalize these findings to the population of the region; however, the findings may be useful as a source of hypotheses for future research in the region. To inform future research, marginally statistically significant findings ($p \leq 0.10$) are included in the following presentation of the chi-square findings. Pea revealed group differences based on gender, participants' military service, whether participants had relatives in the military, and whether participants had participated in protests (see Table 10.4).

Chi-square analyses revealed that a significantly larger proportion of men than women gave at least one example of a definition of reconciliation coded into one of the *state*

Table 10.3 Major coding categories and examples for definitions of reconciliation

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Example
<i>Process</i>	65	Korea	Male	52	“Society filled with love in the stable life”
Resolve/fix	6(10)	Korea	Male	53	“Pay off and remove bad feeling that you had each other”
Recognize/acknowledge/respect	9(14)	China	Female	20	“Attempt to make up for the past”
Coming to terms/agreement/ compromise/negotiate	17(27)	Japan	Male	41	“To arrange each other their interests and to solve the disagreement or conflict by dialogue and agreement”
Understanding	10(16)	Korea	Female	27	“Procedure to understand and forgive each other”
<i>State</i>	28	China	Female	30	“Pretty good”
Peace	11(38)	Japan	Female	20	“A step to peace”
End of conflict	8(30)	Korea	Male	23	“The prohibition of use of military forces, between two parties”
Emotional state	9(32)	China	Male	27	“Everyone being happy with the result after conflict”
<i>Human characteristic</i>	1	Japan	Female	25	“Improvement. A meaning of human beings”
<i>Future orientation?</i>	1	Japan	Male	50	“Agree to accept the past, settle it and move on to future”
<i>Question of achievability</i>	2	China	Male	21	“The best way to go”

The first number in the percentage column refers to the percent of responses in the specified category or subcategory out of all the definitions of reconciliation. The second number (in parentheses) in the percentage column refers to the percent of responses in a specific subcategory out of the major category

Table 10.4 Definitions of reconciliation: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Categories	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	χ^2
	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	
<i>State presence process</i>	24	40	7.69**
Come to terms/agreement/ compromise/negotiate	24	8	19.18***
	<i>Military</i>	<i>No military</i>	
<i>Process presence</i>	64	75	2.96**
Come to terms/agreement/ compromise/negotiate	6	20	9.05**
<i>State presence</i>	45	29	5.87*
	<i>Relative</i>	<i>No relative</i>	
<i>State presence process</i>	38	25	4.42*
Come to terms/agreement/ compromise/negotiate	10	24	16.8***
	<i>Protest</i>	<i>No protest</i>	
<i>Process</i>			
Come to terms/agreement/ compromise/negotiate	8	22	6.95**
<i>State presence</i>	42	26	4.93*
<i>Question of achievability presence</i>	0	5	2.74*

Presence indicates that the participant provided at least one response that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the specified demographic group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

*0.05 < p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.001

subcategories. By contrast, a significantly larger proportion of women than men provide definitions coded for one the *process* subcategories – specifically, the *come to terms/agree/compromise/negotiate* subcategory. A significantly larger proportion of participants who did not have a military background than their military counterparts gave at least one definition of reconciliation as a *process* and in particular identified reconciliation with *coming to terms/agreeing/compromising/negotiating*. Reciprocally, a significantly larger proportion of participants with a military background than their nonmilitary counterparts viewed reconciliation as a *state*. A significantly larger proportion of participants with a relative in the military than those without such a relative considered reconciliation to be a way of *coming to terms/agreeing/compromising/negotiating*. By contrast, a marginally larger proportion of participants with a military relative gave at least one definition identifying reconciliation as a *state*. A significantly larger proportion of protestors than nonprotestors gave definitions coded into the *state* subcategory, and a significantly larger proportion of nonprotestors than protestors provided definitions coded for *question of achievability* and *coming to terms/agreeing/compromising/negotiating*.

Discussion

People from the East Asian countries of China, Japan, and Korea participated in the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace study. Their definitions for peace and reconciliation were analyzed; 49% of the definitions of peace were coded for *positive peace* themes, 38% for *negative peace* themes, and 11% for *questioning the achievability of peace* or identifying it as an ideal. In regard to definitions of reconciliation, most of the definitions represented it as a *process* (65% of the definitions), although more than a quarter of the responses (28%) linked reconciliation to an achieved *state*. Only 2% of the definitions questioned the achievability of reconciliation. This substantially lower number of definitions questioning the achievability of

reconciliation as compared to peace is interesting. Although the numbers are too small and the sample too nonrepresentative to allow for solid interpretations of the apparent difference in expectations, it is possible that the respondents believe that it is harder to achieve lasting peace than temporary reconciliations; this speculation seems consistent with the finding of greater emphasis on reconciliation as an ongoing process than as a final state.

China, Japan, and Korea have had a long history of wars followed by peace building. Recently, they have been talking and acting in peaceful ways even though their differences persist. China's blatant push for power has caused many conflicts with other countries, including both other Asian countries and the United States. Considering all of the conflicts taking place, it is understandable that China's inhabitants would tend toward negative peace definitions, in which wars, fighting, and terrorism are not the predominant features of life today.

Following the devastation experienced in World War II, ending with the United States dropping two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, Japan turned its back on war and became a peaceful nation striving for coexistence and harmony. Issues of trust frequently arise between North and South Korea; while both countries recognize the benefits of peace, they continue to build up their armies, and in 2005 North Korea announced that they possess nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the people of all of these countries desire peace.

As mentioned, most of our participants agree that reconciliation is a process; they view it as involving acts such as moving on, forgiving and/or apologizing, acknowledging faults, repairing relationships, and working toward understanding and healing. For example, a 41-year-old Japanese man defined reconciliation as "to solve the disagreement or conflict by dialogue and agreement."

Our exploratory analyses provided some support for group differences in frequencies of different types of definitions of peace and reconciliation. Although there were no major differences between men and women in definitions of peace, a marginally higher proportion of

women than men provided *negative peace* themes, focusing on the absence of conflict, terrorism, and worry. In the countries that were studied – China, Japan, and Korea – the military consists mostly of men. Although it is important not to come to sweeping conclusions based on this modest difference, it is possible that negative peace definitions like “no war, no fight” (Chinese woman, 18) and “calm state without war, dispute, and any conflicts” (Korean woman, 25) reflect the reactions of many women to decades of war among the East Asian nations and with other countries. Throughout the years, Asian women’s role has been to watch as men defended and fought for them, regardless of whether the battle was justified. Moreover, given the traditional patriarchal organization of East Asian countries, it may be a challenge for women to think of peace in terms of social equality rather than simply as an escape from war and other forms of violence perpetrated primarily by men.

Gender appeared to make a somewhat stronger contribution to definitions of reconciliation. Specifically, a significantly higher proportion of women than men gave definitions focusing on *processes* such as coming to terms, agreeing, compromising, and negotiating, whereas men were more likely to portray reconciliation as an achieved state or end result. These findings are consistent with general views such as women’s willingness to compromise and work with others for peaceful solutions. However, the idea that only men go to war is changing as more women serve on the front lines in Iran and Afghanistan.

Having a relative who had served in the military also seemed to contribute to conceptions of peace and reconciliation. For example, as compared to participants with a military relative, a proportionately higher number of participants without a military relative gave at least one *negative peace* definition, specifically *rejected violence*, and viewed reconciliation as a process involving coming to terms, making agreements, compromising, and/or negotiating. Conversely, a significantly higher proportion of participants with military relatives gave at least one example of a *positive peace* definition, focusing on such

prerequisites for peace as human rights, acceptance/tolerance, and equality, and viewed reconciliation as an end *state*. Participants’ own military service also seemed to play a role in conceptions of reconciliation, with significantly more service people than nonservice people viewing reconciliation as a state and significantly more of the nonservice people viewing it as a process, particularly coming to terms, making agreements, etc.

Finally, as compared to non-antiwar protesters, a significantly higher proportion of protesters gave at least one *positive peace* definition and at least one example of reconciliation as an end *state*; conversely, a significantly higher proportion of nonprotestors gave at least one *negative peace* definition and *questioned the achievability* of reconciliation. Interestingly enough, proportionately more nonprotestors than protesters identified reconciliation with *coming to terms/agreement/compromising/negotiating* – which could be seen as a kind of passive waiting for change to be made by others rather than striving actively for reconciliation.

Protests have been highly effective in East Asian countries, so there are many demonstrations in China, Japan, and Korea to obtain changes in government policies. A well-known protest took place in 1989 when Yaobang, the General Secretary in China, was forced out of office and initially denied a state funeral. His followers were enraged and protesters began marching on Tiananmen Square, which ultimately led to hunger strikes, military opposition, and many wounded and dead. This protest started by students evolved into a mass movement for political reform, with the students succeeding in focusing the world’s attention on human rights issues in China.

Steps taken to keep peace and reconciliation alive continue on a slow path. Trust is lacking, so forgiveness of past events has not yet occurred. Japan has taken steps toward becoming a peaceful nation; China and Korea do not consider Japanese acts of reconciliation adequate. Japan has acknowledged past sins against China and Korea to an extent; these countries ask for reparations and refuse to forgive Japan’s crimes.

In 2000, meetings between President Kim Dae-jung of the Republic of Korea and Chairman Kim Jong-il of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were successful in coming to terms concerning economic cooperation and humanitarianism. Both countries have been trying to get past their long history of conflict to make peace and reconciliation successful. The change in leadership after Kim Jong-il and the persistence of nuclear testing has again made South Korea and the world uneasy about the future. On the other hand, we see in our sample of ordinary people a desire not just to continue keeping violence at bay but a vision of a culture of peace with basic foundations for a lasting peace well established.

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Peace in Our Time? Reflections on Comparative Data About Peace and Reconciliation from All Regions of the World

11

Sherri McCarthy and Raquel DeBartolo

Psychologists understand the power of modeling. Those of us who do research on prevalence statistics related to domestic violence have seen that, regardless of culture, children who grow up witnessing a parent assaulting his or her partner are far more likely to do the same in their own future marital relationships (e.g., Archer, 2006; Malley-Morrison & Hines, 2004). Their experiences become a basic part of how they define what love is and how it is demonstrated. Conversely, those who see and interact with positive role models who accomplish tasks that others in their daily environments have not accomplished, whether that is achieving a higher education, breaking out of the cycle of gang warfare crimes and prison, or simply escaping from an abusive relationship, are far more likely to be able to do such things themselves (e.g., McCarthy & Hutz, 2006). In short, what people observe, encounter, and know on a daily basis is what their personal reality becomes. How life is defined, what options are available, and what possibilities can be imagined are the primary influences on our daily lives and how we live them.

Therapists often use this knowledge when using treatments such as creative visualization, desensitization, and various forms of “talk therapy” (Weiten, Lloyd, Dunn, & Hammer, 2009) to help clients overcome self-defeating or dysfunctional behavior patterns. We must dream a better life, a better self, and a better world before we can bring it into being. Even more than dream it, we must be able to see it, define it, and bring it into focus. Once we have it defined and in focus, we must believe it is possible for us and be able to imagine ourselves living or acting or being what we are striving for. Whatever goal or state of being “it” might be – whether living in a peaceful world, leaving an abusive intimate relationship and creating a safe and happy environment, achieving an important personal goal, or giving up a harmful habit – first steps toward reaching the goal and being in the conditions we desire include not just the desire for change but the belief that change is possible, based on knowing (from observing, creating, and defining) that to which we aspire. Those of us who study and practice psychology know this to be true. For individuals to change, they must know what the change looks like – at least what the next step of the change looks like – and they must believe it to be possible.

As the old Zen koan says, *the greatest is in the smallest*. What is true at the individual level in this case is also quite likely true at the cultural level. For a country or a region to be at peace, the people of that country or region must have a

S. McCarthy (✉)
Educational Psychology, Counseling and Human
Relations, Northern Arizona University,
Yuma, AZ, USA
e-mail: Sherri.McCarthy@NAU.EDU

R. DeBartolo
Department of Psychology, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA

definition of what peace is. If they have never observed peace, they are less likely to create it. If they have seen only war and strife, peace may be defined as the absence of these things that have been observed. Definitions of peace and perspectives regarding how likely it is will be based on what has been observed as well as on what has been longed for and dreamed of. Based upon differential experiences and socialization, human beings spending their daily lives in particular regions where particular experiences predominate may define peace and reconciliation differently. They may consider it possible or impossible based on their own cultural values and daily experiences. They may envision various paths toward achieving it. The work of the GIPGAP collaborators generating exploratory data from the PAIRTAPS instrument described elsewhere in this volume (e.g., Chap. 1; also see Malley-Morrison, Hines, & McCarthy, 2012) is based on this premise. Our experiences and the ways in which we are socialized (through culturally transmitted beliefs, modeling, media images, daily observations, and other means) vary according to our home region on this planet and the environmental, geopolitical realities we experience. The mythos, stories, and values of our cultures interplay to create our beliefs. This socialization, in turn, affects our definitions of peace and reconciliation and our beliefs about whether or not peace is possible in our lifetimes. This volume has been devoted to exploring this interaction.

It should be noted, however, that what may have applied more clearly in the past regarding cultural differences, when various cultures and regions of the world were more isolated from each other, is less clearly evident now. With increasing globalization and interdependence and the onset of worldwide media and information access for the masses, culturally transcendent entertainment such as movies and media, and multinational business alliances, regional differences are rapidly diminishing. Traditional cultural beliefs and values are rapidly being displaced. As Schaller and Murphy (2011) and others have demonstrated, the history of the cultural group to which we belong, the environment in which our particular culture originated, and

even the pathogens to which our ancestors were exposed still exert influence on our beliefs and personalities. But regardless, we are (for good or ill) moving toward becoming one world and one global culture as time goes on.

Or are we becoming one culture? Can there ever truly be one culture? Historically within all cultural groups on the planet for which we have records, there have been different castes, groups, and statuses. Experiences and treatment of various groups have varied based on group membership (gender, ethnicity, economic status, religion, etc.) and status hierarchies. Thus, expectations and possibilities have not been consistent for each member of the cultural group even within a given, homogenous culture. Even within the same region and the same culture, there is often great variation.

This may be less true in more homogenous societies and truer in multicultural societies. But, as just noted, we all now live, to a greater or lesser extent, in a multicultural society. Thus, we may not expect to see major differences any longer, from region to region, in how peace and reconciliation is defined, and we would expect more consistency in attitudes about whether or not it is achievable than would have been the case a century ago. We would expect to see many of the same ideas and attitudes reflected in all regions of the world, and within each region of the world, we would expect to see patterns of difference based upon differential group socialization.

For example, those with military experience may have different views than those without such background. Those who actively protest in order to change societal actions and attitudes may have different attitudes than those who do not. For a variety of reasons both personally and politically imposed, some are more likely than others to work actively for peace, reconciliation, or social change. This very action may in turn change ways of thinking about these issues, as Bandura (2001) has suggested. Because women and men are still socialized in different ways in most cultures of the world, men may express systematically different definitions of peace and reconciliation than women. All of these differ-

ential associations and group memberships, both between and within given regions, are likely to influence the construction of individual definitions and cognitions regarding peace and reconciliation. Specific cultural constructs and a given culture's orientation along the spectrum of individualist vs. collectivist dimensions (Triandis, 2001) will also influence the range of these definitions and attitudes.

Is this, indeed, what we found in our data? Well, to some extent, yes. As you have read in the summary chapters for the various parts of the world, there are some common threads, but overall, color and form of the fabric is still tied to regional political, environmental, economic, and social experiences. For example, areas of the world that experienced direct conflict during World War II such as Europe, Russia, and the Balkans are now more likely to include people who define peace in a negative way, citing the absence of bombing and bloodshed as a reasonable definition of peace.

As you will see below, there were differences between males and females in some, but not all, regions of the planet. There were differences between those with direct experience (self or family) with military organizations in some regions, though these did not vary in the same direction among the various regions of the world. This may be explained by the differential roles and focus of the military in different countries. For example, in countries such as Brazil and Malaysia, the focus of military service is on keeping peace on home soil by dealing with issues such as local emergencies and civil unrest, and troops are seldom armed. In countries such as the USA, the focus is more on attacking those in countries outside of national borders by use of force and weapons or extracting information from "enemies." These different orientations and experiences within military services are likely to affect the attitudes of those who have contact with military organizations.

The same differences were true of those who were active in protests to promote peace compared to those who were not. Their actions seemed to exert an influence on their attitudes, although the direction of the influence is not clear

and varied somewhat from region to region. These differences in direction may be related to how protest and civil disobedience is viewed and dealt with from country to country. In some countries, such as Brazil, it is seen now as a basic protected right – even a responsibility. In other countries, it is frowned upon socially or met with arrest and detainment. The next section of this chapter describes the statistically significant differences we found in definitions of peace and reconciliation when comparing the results across regions and by subgroups within each region.

Definitions of Peace

Distribution of Definitions Across Regions and Demographics of Respondents

In general, fewer than half of the definitions of peace from each of the regions were coded for *negative peace* (e.g., the absence of war or other forms of violence), but there was nevertheless a fairly broad range in the percentages of responses coded into that major category. It was most common in UK/Anglo countries (49% of their responses) and least common in Latin America (15%) and the Middle East (14%). Among the *negative peace* definitions given, "rejecting violence" was the most common (40–70% of the *negative peace* responses from each region were in this subcategory), with the highest percentage of these occurring in Western Europe (69% of *negative peace* responses) and Russia and the Balkans (63%) and the lowest percentage in East Asia (40%). A much less common definition in this category was "rejecting terrorism" (about 2–6% of the responses from each region were in this subcategory) with slightly higher percentages in Africa (6% of *negative peace* definitions) and the lowest percentages in East Asia (2%), the Middle East (2%), Latin America (2%), and Western Europe (2%). So, throughout all the regions, despite the preoccupation of many governments and media with terrorism, when the participants thought about peace, they were much more likely to view it as freedom from war and

similar forms of violence than freedom from a terrorist threat.

The criteria for *positive peace* definitions, which focused on the social foundations and outcomes of peace, applied to about 40–70% of the responses from each region. This thematic category was most common in Latin America (69% of their responses) and the Middle East (68%) and least common in UK/Anglo countries (40%). We find it remarkable that it is in the regions that had to deal with years of colonial occupation where we find peace most often associated with characteristics of a culture of peace, whereas in two of the regions long involved in imperialistic ventures, emphasis on a culture of peace is much lower. Among the *positive peace* definitions, those in the subcategory for “a state of *calm or tranquility*” were the most common, with the highest percentage of responses occurring in the Latin American sample (29% of *positive peace* definitions) and the lowest percentages coming from the UK/Anglo (7%), Western European (7%), and South and Southeast Asian (5%) samples.

About 9–17% of these types of responses from each region focused on the potential for *achievability* or mentioned peace as an *ideal*. This thematic category was most common in the Middle East (17% of their responses), Russia and the Balkans (17%), and Africa (16%) and the least common in the UK/Anglo (9%) and South and Southeast Asia (7%) samples. Among the *achievability/idealistic* definitions of peace, responses emphasizing that peace was “*something to strive for/work toward*” were the most common, with the highest percentages coming from Western Europe (39% of *achievability/idealistic* responses) and the lowest percentage coming from South and Southeast Asia (21% of *achievability/idealistic* definitions). The least common type of definition in this category referred to *religion or God*, with the largest percentage of such responses coming from Africa (17% of *achievability/idealistic* responses) and the fewest coming from Latin America (3%) and Russia and the Balkans (3%). Thus, overall, the percentage of responses across regions identifying peace as a lofty and perhaps unattainable goal is substantially lower than the number of

definitions with clear statements as to the violence and pain that can end with peace and the nature of a peaceful society. It is again interesting that regions that historically were most imperialistic provided the largest percentages of responses questioning the achievability of peace rather than defining it.

Exploratory Statistical Analyses

Given that none of the regional samples studied for this research project were probability samples, the results that we report here must be considered purely exploratory, as suggesting directions for further research, rather than as definitive findings concerning the contributions of the selected demographic variables to likelihood of defining peace and reconciliation in specific ways. In a number of cases, the directions of group differences vary across regions; in regard to that kind of inconsistency in patterns, it is difficult to know whether these differences are reliable indications of differing group attitudes in various regions or due primarily to sampling issues.

Gender

Our exploratory chi-square analyses revealed some statistically significant differences between women and men in the frequency of definitions in the major coding categories, and some of these were found in multiple regions. Overall, a greater proportion of women than men from Russia/Balkans, UK/Anglo countries, Western Europe, and Latin American samples defined peace using one or more of the *positive peace* categories. Although there were no significant gender differences in definitions emphasizing *acceptance/tolerance* and *openness to working toward a mutual goal*, a greater proportion of women than men in the Middle East and marginally more women than men from Africa defined peace as a state characterized by the *presence of positive emotions*. In the Middle East and Latin America, proportionately more women than men associated peace with *calm and tranquility*. There were also more men than women from the Middle East

region whose definitions of peace fit into the prerequisites for peace subcategory of “*security*.” Most of these group differences are consistent with fairly pervasive gender roles.

On the other hand, gender differences in regard to the use of *negative peace* definitions showed rather odd and inconsistent patterns. For example, a greater proportion of men than women in Russia and the Balkans, Latin America, and the UK/Anglo sample (marginal significance) provided responses that defined peace as *rejecting violence*. On the other hand, and perhaps more surprising, a marginally higher proportion of women than men in East Asia, South and Southeast Asia, and Western Europe gave at least one form of *negative peace* definition. In the Africa sample, a greater proportion of men than women described peace as the absence of *negative emotions*.

In regard to responses that did not directly define peace but instead focused on its *achievability*, there were again some inconsistent patterns across regions. In Russia and the Balkans, a statistically higher proportion of men than women gave responses coded into this category or one of its subcategories; in the UK/Anglo region, the reverse was observed. In Africa, significantly more men than women defined peace as something to *strive for*.

Military Experience/Relative in Military

Our exploratory analyses also revealed some differences in the frequency of particular definitions based on military experience but again the patterns of differences varied quite a bit across regions. In Russia and the Balkans and the Middle East, significantly more participants without military experience than those with military experience defined peace in ways coded for *positive peace*. The *positive peace* category included a number of subcategories where differences based on military experience were found. For example, in the Middle East, significantly more participants without military experience than those with military experience defined peace as dependent on the specific prerequisite of *security*. In regard to *prerequisites for peace*, in the Middle East a significantly higher proportion of participants

with military experience than those without such experience provided definitions linking peace to the prerequisites of *acceptance and tolerance* and *openness to working toward a mutual goal* and to the outcome of *calm/tranquility*. In Russia and the Balkans and South and Southeast Asia, a significantly greater proportion of respondents with than without military experience provided definitions *questioning the achievability* of peace. Additionally, marginally more participants with military experience than their counterparts defined peace as something to *strive for*; in the Middle East, the opposite was true. In regard to *negative peace* definitions, a significantly greater proportion of participants with military experience than without it provided definitions coded for one or more of the *negative peace* categories in the regions of UK/Anglo and the Middle East. Regional differences in these patterns may reflect a number of factors, including the numbers of respondents in each region who have experienced active duty in a conflict situation, the recency with which conflict has been experienced within a region, and the nature of the experience – for example, invading another country or defending one’s own. Alternatively, the differences in patterns may reflect sampling issues.

There were also a number of group differences in definitions based on whether or not the participant had a relative who had ever served in the military, but again there were differences in direction of patterns across regions. In East Asia, a significantly greater proportion of participants with a military relative than without a military relative gave at least one example of a *positive peace* definition, and significantly more respondents without a military relative who gave a *negative peace* definition coded into the subcategory for *rejecting violence*. However, in Western Europe, significantly more participants with a military relative than those without *rejected violence* in their definitions. In the Middle East, a significantly higher proportion of respondents with a military relative than those without one linked peace to *positive emotions*. In Africa proportionally more participants with a relative in the military defined peace as something to *strive for* than respondents without a relative in the

military. In both Africa and East Asia, a significantly greater proportion of participants without a military relative than those with a military relative provided definitions coded for one or more of the *negative peace* categories. Again, such differences in patterns may reflect political and experiential realities or be related to limitations of the convenience samples.

Protest

There were a number of statistically significant differences between participants who reported having engaged in some form of protest activities and those who did not report such activity. A significantly greater proportion of protestors than nonprotestors (a) gave at least one example of a *positive peace* response in the UK/Anglo, East Asia, Western Europe, and Middle East regions; (b) focused on the *prerequisites for peace* in the Middle East; (c) gave definitions coded for one or more of the *negative peace* categories in South and Southeast Asia; and (d) gave responses coded for one or more of the *question of achievability/ideal* coding categories in Russia and the Balkans and Latin America.

By contrast, a significantly greater proportion of nonprotestors than protestors (a) equated peace with *calm and tranquility* (marginal significance) as well as *something for which to strive* in the Middle East sample, (b) provided definitions coded for one or more of the *negative peace* categories in the East Asia and Latin America samples, (c) *rejected violence* in the regions of UK/Anglo and East Asia regions, and (d) associated peace with *no conflict* in East Asia.

mon in the Middle East (46%). Among the many different *process* subcategories, definitions focusing on *apology and forgiveness* were the most common, ranging from 16% of the process responses in Western Europe down through 10% in South and Southeast Asia and Russia and the Balkans to a low of 7% in East Asia. In general, 1–2% of the definitions referred to *apology and forgiveness* but added “*without forgetting*.”

Fewer than 30% of the definitions of reconciliation from each region identified it with an end *state* – that is, with the end of conflict or the achievement of peace without indicating how this state was achieved. This thematic category was most common in Latin America (28% of the responses), East Asia (28%), and the Middle East (28%) and the least common in the UK/Anglo countries (14%) – making one wonder if the achievement of reconciliation is of less interest to countries pursuing economic and political interests in other parts of the world. Among the subcategories of definitions focusing on reconciliation as an end state, *peace* was the most common example given in South and Southeast Asia (67% of responses in this subcategory) and least common in Western Europe (20%).

Responses defining reconciliation indirectly by focusing on its *achievability* or labeling it as an *ideal* ranged from 4% to 21% across regions. Responses coded into this category were most common in the Middle East (21% of responses) and least common in the East Asia (4%) and UK/Anglo (4%) regions. Among the achievability/idealistic responses, *something to strive for/work toward* was the most common theme.

Definitions of Reconciliation

Distribution of Definitions Across Regions and Demographic Characteristics

A majority of the responses from almost all regions defined reconciliation as a *process* (percentages ranged from 46% to 78%); this thematic category was most common in the UK/Anglo countries (78% of their responses) and least com-

Exploratory Statistical Analyses

Again, given that none of the regional samples studied for this research project were probability samples, the results that we report here must be considered purely exploratory, as suggesting directions for further research, rather than as definitive findings concerning the contributions of the selected demographic variables to likelihood of defining peace and reconciliation in particular ways.

Gender

Our exploratory chi-square analyses revealed some statistically significant gender differences in definitions of reconciliation. Specifically, a significantly larger proportion of women than men (a) defined reconciliation using one or more of the *process* categories in the samples from Russia and the Balkans, South and Southeast Asia, and Latin America; (b) provided definitions equating it specifically with a *healing/reuniting* process in the Africa sample; (c) identified it with processes of *coming to terms/agreeing/compromising* in East Asia and Latin America; (d) gave responses coded for one or more of the achieved *state* categories in the regions of UK/Anglo and Western Europe (marginal significance); (e) identified it with *peace* in South and Southeast Asia; and (f) gave at least one definition *questioning its achievability* in the UK/Anglo sample.

By contrast, a significantly greater proportion of men than women (a) gave definitions coded for one or more of the *process* categories in the UK/Anglo sample, (b) associated reconciliation with a *resolving/fixing* process in the Middle East (marginal significance), (c) gave at least one example of reconciliation as an achieved *state* in the East Asia sample, (d) identified reconciliation with *peace* in Latin America, (e) gave at least one definition *questioning its achievability* in the Latin American sample, and (f) declared that it was something to *strive for* (marginal significance) in the Middle East sample. Thus, although overall, across regions, definitions of reconciliation identify it more as a process than a state, there appear to be regional differences in the particular processes that women emphasize more than men do.

Military Experience/Relative in Military

As was true of definitions of peace, definitions of reconciliation varied somewhat in relation to military service. For example, as compared to participants with no military experience, those with military experience (a) defined reconciliation using one or more of the *process* categories in the South and Southeast Asia sample and (b) gave responses coded for one or more of the *state* coding categories in East Asia and South and Southeast Asia.

Participants without military service were more likely than their military counterparts to (a) provide a response coded for at least one of the *process* categories in East Asia and (b) identify it with *peace* in the Middle East sample.

There were also some differences based on whether or not the respondent had a relative who had served or was serving in the military. As compared with individuals without a relative having had military experience, proportionately more of those with a military relative (a) gave a response coded for at least one of the *process* categories in the UK/Anglo sample (marginal significance); (b) gave at least one response *questioning the achievability* of reconciliation in Africa, Russia and the Balkans, and the Middle East; and (c) portrayed it as a *state* using one or more of those categories in the East Asian sample.

By contrast, proportionately more of those without a military relative as compared to their counterparts (a) described reconciliation as a *general process* in Africa, (b) gave responses coded for one or more of the *question of achievability/ideal* categories in the UK/Anglo region, (c) identified it with *come to terms/agreement* in East Asia and Western Europe, and (d) described reconciliation using one or more of the *process* categories in the Middle East (marginal significance).

Protest

Within regions, several group differences emerged based on involvement in antiwar protests. Specifically, proportionately more protestors than nonprotestors (a) gave at least one definition identifying reconciliation as a *process* in the Middle East; (b) linked reconciliation with *recognize/acknowledge/respect* in the UK/Anglo (marginal significance), the Middle East, and Russia and the Balkans samples; and (c) gave at least one definition equating reconciliation with an end *state* in East Asia. On the other hand, a significantly higher proportion of nonprotestors than protestors (a) gave at least one definition coded into one of the *state* subcategories in the Russia and the Balkans and the Middle East samples, (b) gave definitions coded for *come to terms/agreement/compromise* in the UK/Anglo and East Asia samples, (c) gave responses that *questioned the*

achievability of reconciliation in East Asia, and (d) equated reconciliation with *peace* in the Middle East sample (marginal significance).

It appears reconciliation as a process is highlighted by protestors in regions of the world where conflict and political change is currently most salient, such as the Middle East. In turn, the military seeking to keep order in these same regions views it more as an end state – perhaps hoping the flood of protest will end when a state of reconciliation is achieved. Concurrently, those in the military or with family in the military in regions with more frequent recent conflicts such as Africa, the Middle East, Russia, and the Balkans were also less certain that it would be possible to achieve reconciliation. Elsewhere, such as in most of Asia, reconciliation was viewed as synonymous with peace.

Concluding Thoughts

It appears that the majority of people who responded to our survey from regions throughout the world have a clear idea of what peace is, though these ideas vary between individuals and among regions. Perspective taking ability may be a critical piece of enabling groups with different notions of the definition to work together to achieve peace. It may be even more relevant in achieving reconciliation. The direct, recent experiences of people in various regions of the world are critically important in understanding this connection, as well.

In addition, how likely individuals in cultures throughout the planet are to work toward peace and reconciliation is strongly connected to the actions and behaviors they themselves are engaged in and how these actions are justified, both publicly and privately. As Bandura (2000, 2002) has noted regarding moral disengagement theory, how we justify our actions in relation to our beliefs has major implications for our attitudes. Political psychology is informative in this light, as are media studies (e.g., Pickerill & Webster, 2006).

It is also interesting to note that it appears the countries and regions that are least optimistic about the possibility of peace being achieved are

those that have the strongest economies and most developed military-industrial complexes. Going back to the Zen koan noted earlier of *the greatest is in the smallest*, this seems to reflect that reasons for violence between nations and regions may not differ much from violence between individuals, specifically intimate partners. As many researchers have noted in reference to partner violence (Archer, 2006; Malley-Morrison, 2004; Malley-Morrison & Hines, 2004; Straus, 2006), relationships which are the least violent are those in which power is perceived to be distributed most equitably. Domestic violence between men and women is more problematic in regions where gender equity is least apparent, and relationships in which one partner is clearly dominant (whether the male or the female) are the most likely to be violent relationships – regardless of gender or of gender equity within the given social framework. In-group/out-group dynamics within social psychology (e.g., Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neubei, 1997; Cohen, Hoshino-Browne, & Leung, 2007) provide a similar story regarding majority versus minority groups and groups of differing status. In other words, when people are aware that one individual or group is obviously dominant over another, peaceful relations are less likely. It is often not even the dominant partner or group who disrupts the peace – it is simply a reaction to the inequity by the less dominant. Our data seem to suggest that this is true among countries and regions of the world as well as between domestic partners. When there is a good faith understanding that a truly equitable relationship with an equal balance of power exists, there is more hope for peace. The more the perception of an imbalance of power, the less likely peace and reconciliation is considered to be possible by either party. In order for peace to occur in our time, it is important that all human beings have a perception of equal human rights. This highlights the importance of establishing and accepting a platform of equal human rights for *all*, without exceptions or regional differences in how these rights are guaranteed and insured. Those rights include the rights to peace and security.

As those of us with a background in human development know, all human beliefs, attitudes,

and actions are multidimensional and dynamically interactive. Biological, social, and cultural factors interact with individual differences in multiple and interactive causal trajectories. There are few, if any, straight and simple causal path models to conclusively explain any aspect of human behavior. The data we have gathered as part of GIPGAP and presented here, however, does seem to suggest that peace in our time is perceived as possible by many citizens in regions throughout the world. The vision and belief is there. We have models of what peace looks like, including both absence of war and presence of human rights and quality of life. If human rights are insured and equity and balance of power among and between the various countries and geopolitical regions of the world can be established and maintained, we may be on our way to seeing peace in our time. It is a tall order, and it will take lots of work, effort, and vigilance, just as changing any habit or establishing any behavior on an individual level does. But the desire is there for many. We have the building blocks of behavior change, which originate with beliefs and attitudes about what is possible. The definitions and vision are coming into focus. Models of a peaceful world are embedded in the mythos, religions, and stories of our many cultures on this planet, and they are, for all of us, gradually being refined and coming into view, as recounted in the data presented in this volume. May we all live to see peace in our time.

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Part II

Perspectives on Protest

Tristyn Campbell

Freedom of Assembly: The Legality of the Right to Protest

The United Nations' (UN) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1997) serves to protect the civil and political rights of individuals, including the right to freedom of assembly. The ICCPR was put into force in 1976 and as of 2011, there were 74 signatories and 167 parties (World Health Organization, n.d.). This covenant guarantees the signatories' citizens the rights to assemble peacefully and take part in their government.

In addition to the ICCPR, there are many other charters and declarations that protect the right to protest. For instance, in the United States, the Bill of Rights expressly forbids Congress to pass a law denying the right to assembly (US Const. amend. I, 1798). Additionally, Article 11 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1979) assures African citizens of the right to assemble. Similarly, in Europe, Article 11 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) guarantees freedom of assembly and association. Despite national and international covenants protecting the right to protest, we know that many

governments, in many parts of the world, "crack down" on protestors, interfere with freedom of assembly, and arrest protestors with a variety of rationales (e.g., Hauser & Mackey, 2012).

The following nine chapters in this section of the book explore ordinary people's viewpoints regarding the right to protest against war. These viewpoints were derived from responses to two items on the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006). Respondents, who were recruited through a variety of convenience sampling procedures, completed either an online version or hard copy of the survey between 2005 and 2010. The final sample of 4,474 respondents came from more than 40 countries, comprising eight regions of the world. The next eight chapters in this section of the book address perspectives on protest in eight different regions of the world: (a) Western Europe, (b) the United Kingdom/Anglo region, (c) Russia and the Balkans, (d) the Middle East and Gulf States, (e) Africa, (f) Latin America, (g) South and Southeast Asia, and (h) East Asia. The last chapter in the section integrates the findings from the regional chapters to provide an international look at viewpoints concerning protest. Because all the samples are convenience samples, the results have been interpreted carefully and should not be generalized to the populations of the regions or the world as a whole. Rather, we hope our presentation of the views of ordinary people from around the world will stimulate thinking

T. Campbell (✉)
Psychology Department, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA
ttcams@gmail.com

about both similarities and differences in the ways diverse groups of people think about the issues.

The Right to Protest

The first PAIRTAPS item analyzed for the purposes of this section of the book was “individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace.” Respondents first rated their level of agreement with the prompt and then explained their reasoning for their rating. Participants also responded to a second item, “police are beating peaceful anti-war demonstrators. What would you want to do?”

A coding manual was developed to categorize the qualitative responses to the two protest items. Two different approaches were used in creating the protest coding manual: (a) deductive qualitative analysis and (b) grounded theory. When using deductive qualitative analysis, researchers begin with a conceptual framework, which is then applied to the responses and the theory is refined (Gilgun, 2004). For this coding manual, we worked with constructs from Albert Bandura’s (1999) theory of moral disengagement. His theory proved especially useful as the basis for the major coding categories. Grounded theory, in contrast, requires that the researcher approach the qualitative responses with an open mind and allow themes to emerge from the responses themselves instead of fitting them into predetermined categories (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This approach proved useful in creating specific subcategories for themes that emerged in the analysis of responses.

Bandura’s Theory of Moral Disengagement

Any discussion of rights, particularly human rights, inevitably has ethical implications. As such, instead of referring to morally engaged or disengaged responses, we refer to pro-protest or anti-protest responses respectively. In this book, we have adapted constructs from Bandura’s (1999) theory of moral disengagement in our analysis of arguments concerning the extent to which protesting is a human right. Traditionally, Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement has been applied to violent

or inhumane actions, such as invasion and terrorism (see Malley-Morrison, 2012).

Bandura (1999) developed his theory to explain why otherwise moral individuals engage in behavior that contradicts their moral standards. He postulated that moral standards, adopted in childhood through socialization, guide our behavior, but to do so, they must be consciously activated. Because our internalized moral guidelines must be consciously activated, they can also be selectively disengaged. Bandura further argued that disengagement from our morals can occur unconsciously. When people act in accordance with their moral guidelines, they develop a sense of self-worth; however, when they knowingly act against their moral standards, they are likely to develop a feeling of self-condemnation. Engaging in moral disengagement allows individuals to escape feelings of self-condemnation when they behave in inhumane ways.

Bandura (2002) theorized that moral disengagement involves four main sociocognitive processes: (a) cognitive reconstruction of injurious acts; (b) removing or obscuring personal agency; (c) misrepresenting, minimizing, or distorting consequences; and (d) devaluing the victim. Cognitive reconstruction occurs when a person reconstructs a violent or immoral behavior into one that serves a worthy purpose. Once the behavior is reframed as a morally worthy act, it is no longer seen as harmful and is instead viewed as benign or even helpful. Bandura identified three mechanisms of cognitive reconstruction: (a) moral justification (which we prefer to call pseudo-moral justification), (b) euphemistic labeling, and (c) advantageous comparison.

The sociocognitive process of removing or obscuring personal agency diminishes a sense of personal responsibility for an inhumane behavior by either diffusing responsibility for the behavior between a group of people or displacing responsibility onto another person (Bandura, 1999). When the feeling of personal responsibility is reduced, detrimental actions are more easily perpetrated. Similarly, the third major sociocognitive process – misrepresenting, minimizing, or distorting consequences – allows a person to disconnect psychologically from the consequences of an immoral action. The negative impact of the behavior is therefore lessened, making it easier for the person to engage in, support, or tolerate immoral behavior.

Finally, devaluing the victim works by either attributing blame for aggression to the victim of the aggression or dehumanizing the recipient of the aggressive act (Bandura, 2002). Attributing blame to the victim makes it easier to behave in an immoral manner because the person is seen as deserving the behavior. Similarly, dehumanizing the other person makes it easier to perpetrate transgressions because the person is not seen as human but instead as possessing animalistic or demonic qualities.

Bandura has directed much less attention to moral engagement than to moral disengagement; for example, he did not identify specific sociocognitive moral engagement processes comparable to the ones characterizing moral disengagement. Bandura (2002) did, however, link moral engagement to the concept of moral agency; thus, while he frames moral disengagement as a set of sociocognitive processes that can take place below awareness, he views moral engagement as requiring action, even in the face of great resistance and danger. In his view, there are two forms of moral agency: (a) inhibitive (refraining from immoral activity) and (b) proactive (behaving morally). When individuals refuse to act in an immoral manner, even under great pressure to approve or participate in inhumane acts, they are exhibiting *inhibitive* moral agency. By contrast, when individuals actively engage in moral behavior, operating with a sense of responsibility and empathy for others, they are exhibiting *proactive* moral agency. In an effort to expand upon his theory, however, we identified a set of sociocognitive mechanisms that were the reciprocals of his moral disengagement mechanisms; these reciprocal mechanisms appeared to be reasonable representations of moral engagement when associated with agency, specifically prosocial forms of agency.

The Right to Protest: Coding Responses for Moral Disengagement and Engagement Processes

To code the two protest items, a coding manual was developed using an international coding manual sample. The final version of the protest coding manual has two sections, each with a dis-

tinctive set of guidelines, designed to code for the presence of (a) sociocognitive mechanisms of disengagement and engagement and (b) agency. The guidelines in the first section were based on Bandura's theory and were used to code responses to the right to protest item. The second section of the manual was an expansion upon Bandura's notion of proactive moral agency, focused on what we termed prosocial agency. This section of the manual was used to code responses to the motivational item concerning police beating. Again, it is important to note that (a) the survey was not designed specifically to assess moral disengagement and engagement, (b) the sample was not representative, and (c) we are not characterizing people or regions as being engaged or disengaged. Rather, in describing the themes identified in the qualitative responses, we use the terms "protest intolerant" or "anti-protest" and "protest tolerant" and "pro-protest," instead of "moral disengagement" and "moral engagement." Our coding categories are informed by Bandura's theory, and the responses in those categories fit well with his theory, but we cannot assume that the responses are valid representations of the sociocognitive mechanisms he posits.

Coding Guidelines for an Individual's Right to Protest

Using Bandura's theory and grounded theory, we identified four main sets of coding categories regarding the right to protest: (a) *rejection of the right/anti-protest*, (b) *affirmation of the right/pro-protest*, (c) *indeterminate status* (also referred to as *nonspecific argument*), and (d) *perceived reality of the situation*. Additionally, we created two categories (*uncodable* and *does not address the question*) for responses that could not be coded or did not address the protest item, respectively. The four main sets of coding categories are outlined in Table 12.1 and discussed in the following section.

Protest-Intolerant Coding Categories

Using Bandura's theory of moral disengagement, we identified 12 themes that corresponded to specific sociocognitive mechanisms identified by

Table 12.1 Right to protest coding system

I. Anti-protest coding categories
A. General protest intolerance
B. Pseudo-moral reasoning
1. Supporting the troops or government
C. Negative labeling
D. Disadvantageous comparison
E. Denial of personal responsibility
F. Distorting consequences
G. Dehumanization
1. Of the protestor
2. Of the targets of war
H. Attribution of blame
1. Protestors as agents
2. Targets of war
II. Pro-protest coding categories
A. General protest tolerance
B. Social justification
1. Peace
2. Awareness of negative consequences
C. Moral responsibility
1. Civic duty
2. Nonviolent
3. Law abiding
D. Humanization
1. Reciprocal right
2. Human rights
a. It should be a right
b. International law
3. Socially sanctioned rights
III. Indeterminate status or nonspecific argument categories
A. Depends
B. Do not know
IV. Perceived reality categories
A. Focus on the perceived reality
1. Right might not be respected
2. Protest is futile
V. Other categories
A. Uncodable
B. Does not address the prompt

Bandura. These themes were organized into seven major categories, several of which had subcategories. We also created a *general protest-intolerant* category to capture responses that disagreed with the right to protest against war but did not provide a rationale for disagreeing.

The first anti-protest category was *pseudo-moral justification*. Responses coded into this category opposed the right to protest by arguing that protesting is harmful to society and/or that war serves a socially worthy purpose (e.g., protecting cherished values). This category is reflective of Bandura's mechanism of moral justification. We created the subcategory *supporting troops or the government* to encompass responses emphasizing patriotism. Another anti-protest category, *negative labeling*, corresponds to the sociocognitive mechanism that Bandura called euphemistic labeling. Typical responses coded into this category used discrediting labels to describe protesting, making protests seem immoral or dangerous.

The *disadvantageous comparison* category applied to responses that compared protests negatively to something purportedly better, such as obedience or compliance. Responses portraying protesting as evil or having a dangerous ideology were coded into this category. *Disadvantageous comparison* was similar to Bandura's construct of *advantageous comparison* in that responses in this category restructured the act of protesting into something harmful. There were no subcategories for this category.

To code responses indicating a rejection of the idea that individuals have some sort of obligation to exercise personal responsibility in regard to their government's actions, we created the category, *denial of personal responsibility*. This category was modeled after Bandura's construct of displacing responsibility. If a response shifted responsibility for ending war onto another entity, it was also coded for a *denial of personal responsibility*. There were no subcategories for this category.

Our fifth major anti-protest category was for responses *distorting the consequences* of protesting. Responses emphasizing perceived negative consequences of protests, framing them as interfering with the war effort or hurting morale, were coded into this category, which corresponds to Bandura's moral disengagement mechanism of misrepresenting, minimizing, or disregarding consequences. There were no subcategories for this category.

We created two major categories based on Bandura's construct of devaluing the victim. The first category was *general dehumanization*, which corresponded to his construct of dehumanization. Responses coded into this category attributed evil or subhuman qualities to protestors or the targets of aggression on whose behalf people might protest. The first subcategory, *dehumanization of the protestor*, was used to code responses that attributed demonic or subhuman qualities to protestors. The second subcategory, *dehumanization of the targets of war*, was used to code responses that attributed demonic or subhuman qualities to the victims of governmental aggression. The second major category for responses appearing to devalue the victim was *attribution of blame*. Responses coded into this category rejected the right to protest for one of two reasons: if blame was attributed to the protestor, the response was coded for *protestors as agents*, and if the victims of war were blamed, the response was coded for *targets of war*. Responses coded into these categories expressed arguments consistent with Bandura's conceptualization of attribution of blame as a moral disengagement mechanism.

For examples of participant responses coded into the anti-protest categories, refer to Table 12.2.

Protest-Tolerant Coding Categories

We created our pro-protest categories as counterparts to the anti-protest categories. There were four major protest-tolerant coding categories: (a) *general, nonspecific support for protest* which is the reciprocal of general denial of the right to protest; (b) *social justification*, which is the reciprocal of *pseudo-moral reasoning*; (c) *moral responsibility*, the reciprocal of *denial of personal responsibility*; and (d) *humanization*, the reciprocal of *dehumanization*. Most of these categories had subcategories that are also consistent with types of reasoning identified in Bandura's theory.

In contrast to anti-protest responses stating that protests threaten society and the social order, responses coded for *social justification* argued that protests can help society develop. This category has two subcategories: (a) *peace as a goal* (for responses indicating that peace is the end

goal of protesting) and (b) *awareness of negative consequences* (for responses mentioning detrimental outcomes of not protesting).

Moral responsibility, another of the major categories that affirmed the right to protest, was our counterpart for *denial of personal responsibility*. Responses coded into the *moral responsibility* category asserted that protest was a moral obligation or the best way to express an opinion. *Civic duty*, a subcategory of *moral responsibility*, encompassed responses stating that protest is one's obligation as a citizen. *Nonviolent*, a second *moral responsibility* subcategory, captured responses saying that people have the right to protest only if the protests are peaceful. Responses stipulating that protestors must abide by the law were coded for *law abiding*.

The pro-protest category *humanization*, corresponding to the anti-protest construct of *dehumanization*, was for responses that humanized the protestors. The first subcategory of humanization, *reciprocal right*, was designed for responses expressing a Golden Rule kind of moral reasoning ("do unto others..."). Responses coded into *human rights*, another *humanization* subcategory, mentioned that protesting is an inherent right of all individuals. The *human rights* subcategory itself had two additional subcategories: (a) *it should be a right*, which was used to code responses that mentioned that if protesting is not a right, it should be a right, and (b) *international law*, which was used to code responses that referred to international human rights agreements supportive of the right to protest. Finally, *socially sanctioned rights*, the third subcategory of *humanization*, was designed to categorize responses that said protesting is a right protected by national law.

For examples of participant responses coded into the pro-protest categories, refer to Table 12.3.

Indeterminate Status Coding Categories

Additionally, we identified the need for a major category to capture responses that could not be coded into Bandura's theory because they did not provide enough evidence of the sociomoral reasoning underlying any support for or rejection of a right to protest. This first *indeterminate* category

Table 12.2 Categories and examples for anti-protest sociocognitive processes

Major category	Subcategory
<i>General protest intolerance</i> Examples “No, this is not a right” “Absolutely not”	None
<i>Pseudo-moral reasoning</i> Examples “Unless those individuals are in the midst of being attacked” “It matters if the country is in a time of war, if the time is in the battle then of course not!”	<i>Supporting the troops or government</i> Examples “We need to support the people fighting and dying for us” “Patriotism!”
<i>Negative labeling</i> Examples “No, protestors are unpatriotic” “Protestors are betraying their government”	None
<i>Disadvantageous comparison</i> Examples “Protesting is bad, obedience is good” “We shouldn’t protest – we should be compliant with our situation”	None
<i>Denial of personal responsibility</i> Examples “It’s the government’s decision to end war” “That’s other people’s responsibility”	None
<i>Distorting consequences</i> Examples “I think this causes further complication to already complex matters such as national defense” “They are focusing on the negative and so they will foment it and create more negativity”	None
<i>Dehumanization</i> Examples “Vicious” “Evil”	<i>Of the protestor</i> Examples “Protestors are granola” “Protestors are worms” <i>Of the targets of war</i> Examples “Some people have to be treated roughly because they lack feelings that can be hurt” “They are savages, why would we help them?”
<i>Attribution of blame</i> Example “No, it’s their fault”	<i>Protestors as agents</i> Examples “Too many protests have become violent, so they no longer have the right” “No, they just get out of hand” <i>Targets of war</i> Examples “They brought the war upon themselves, why should we protest for them?” “Should we protest when terrorists of the other country are reported to be planning inhuman acts of violence?”

Responses have been edited to show only the codable unit coded for the coding category

was *depends*, used to code responses that said the right to protest depends on some factor, such as the situation. The other *indeterminate status* cat-

egory was *do not know*, which was used to code responses indicating that the respondent was not sure if protesting is a right. These *indeterminate*

Table 12.3 Categories and examples for pro-protest sociocognitive processes

Major category	Subcategory	Sub-subcategory
<i>General protest tolerance</i> Examples “Yes” “Of course”	None	None
<i>Social justification</i> Examples “To develop ourselves, to build upon what is already at all fields, to look for progress of economy, politics, society, and culture” “There can be no development or progress where there is war”	<i>Peace</i> Examples “Because I long for world peace” “Everyone wants to live in a peaceful place so it is reasonable that they have the right to protest for peace”	None
	<i>Awareness of negative consequences</i> Examples “Because war destroys life” “War is not the solution of any problem moreover if should not be carried out at the cost of the life of people”	None
<i>Moral responsibility</i> Examples “We have the responsibility to protest for peace” “People should voice their opinion/emotions”	<i>Civic duty</i> Examples “It is possible to protest if one thinks that the government made the wrong choice” “People have a right to talk and affect the government”	None
	<i>Nonviolent</i> Examples “As long as nonviolent protesting” “Peaceful protests”	None
	<i>Law abiding</i> Examples “Individuals should be able to do whatever they want, if it’s not against the law” “Legal protests”	None
<i>Humanization</i> Examples “Protestors are human” “People can say what they like”	<i>Reciprocal right</i> Examples “Some voice their opinions of being in favor of war, so others can voice their opinions in favor of peace by protesting” “Yes, people have the right to protest for and against whatever they want”	None
	<i>Human rights</i> Examples “This is the right of every person” “It is one of the basic human rights”	<i>It should be a right</i> Examples “Everyone should have that right” “It should be a right”
	<i>Socially sanctioned rights</i> Examples “It is among the rights of citizens” “Freedom of speech”	<i>International law</i> Examples “International law allows protesting” “International human rights agreements”

Responses have been edited to show only the codable unit coded for the coding category

Table 12.4 Categories and examples for indeterminate status categories

Major category	Subcategory
<i>Depends</i>	
Examples “It depends on the person” “Because it depends”	None
<i>Do not know</i>	
Examples “I don’t know” “I haven’t made up my mind about this”	None

Responses have been edited to show only the codable unit coded for the coding category

status categories could be used to code responses to the police beating item, as well as the right to protest item.

For examples of participant responses coded into the indeterminate status categories, refer to Table 12.4.

A Focus on Perceived Reality Coding Categories

The perceived reality coding category and subcategories were created to encompass responses presenting a view of the perceived reality of the context and outcomes of protests. For example, responses in the *general perceived reality* category generally acknowledged the reality of protests. The *right might not be respected* subcategory was for responses mentioning that not all countries or governments uphold the right to protest. Finally, the subcategory *protest is futile* was used to code responses saying that protests will not necessarily accomplish the goals of the protestors. Similarly to the indeterminate status categories, these categories could be used to code responses to either of the protest items.

For examples of participant responses coded into the focus on perceived reality of the situation categories, refer to Table 12.5.

Coding Guidelines for the Hypothetical Situation of Police Beating Peaceful Protestors

The coding guidelines for the hypothetical scenario in which police are beating peaceful

Table 12.5 Categories and examples for the perceived reality categories

Major category	Subcategory
<i>Focus on perceived reality</i>	<i>Right might not be respected</i>
Examples	Examples
“In Northern Ireland you can stand on the white lines on the road and not be moved”	“See, we live in the world of Stalin”
“They have this right but it can often be abused and get out of hand”	“They don’t have this right in many countries”
	<i>Protest is futile</i>
	Examples
	“I don’t think protests do much good”
	“Protests are nice but rarely achieve anything”

Responses have been edited to show only the codable unit coded for the coding category

protestors relied heavily on Bandura’s concept of moral agency. Particularly, we focused on proactive moral agency, which Bandura defined as people “act[ing] in the name of humane principles when social circumstances dictate expedient, transgressive, and detrimental conduct” (1999, p. 203). Informed by his theory, we created three major categories to code responses to the scenario: (a) *prosocial agency*, (b) *antisocial agency*, and (c) *lack of agency*. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the *indeterminate status* and *focus on perceived reality* categories could be used to code responses to this item. Finally, responses could also be categorized as *uncodable* or *not addressing the prompt*. Refer to Table 12.6 for a summary of the coding categories.

Prosocial Agency Coding Categories

The prosocial agency coding categories are for responses that demonstrate an expectation that the participant would want to respond actively in a prosocial nature if he or she saw police beating peaceful protestors. This first major prosocial agency category is *critical judgment of police*, which was used to code responses expressing active disagreement with the police aggression. The second major category, *personal initiative*, was designed to capture responses stating they

Table 12.6 Police beating protestors coding system

I. Prosocial agency categories
A. Critical judgment of police
B. Personal initiative
1. Activism
2. Personal understanding
3. Other solutions
C. Institutional initiative
1. Legal action
2. Government/other entity
II. Antisocial agency categories
A. Support for the police
B. Unlawful activism
C. Actions against the demonstrators
III. Lack of agency categories
A. Lack of initiative
B. Helplessness
IV. Indeterminate status
A. Depends
B. Do not know
V. Perceived reality categories
A. Focus on the perceived reality
1. Right might not be respected
2. Protest is futile
VI. Other categories
A. Uncodable
B. Does not address the prompt

would want to stop the actions of the police. This category had three subcategories: (a) *activism*, (b) *personal understanding*, and (c) *other solutions*. *Activism* encompassed responses expressing an intention to protest the actions of the police, report the incident to the media, etc. Participant responses coded for *personal understanding* generally expressed a desire to understand the rationale behind the beatings. The third *personal initiative* subcategory, *other solutions*, was used to code responses offering resolutions to diffuse or avoid this situation.

The third prosocial major coding category was *institutional initiative*, used to code responses expressing an intention to involve some institution in handling the police aggression. The first subcategory, *legal action*, was used to code intentions to seek the help of the legal system. The second subcategory, *government/other entity*, was for responses mentioning an intent to contact or involve the

government or other institutional agencies, such as human rights groups, in the matter.

For examples of participant responses coded into the prosocial agency categories, refer to Table 12.7.

Antisocial Agency Coding Categories

Quite a few scenario responses were characterized by agency – an intent to act – but the agency had an antisocial rather than prosocial character. There were three major categories for antisocial agency: (a) *support for police*, (b) *unlawful activism*, and (c) *action against the demonstrators*. Responses showing tolerance for or intended encouragement of the police aggression were coded as *support for police*. Responses indicating that the participant would want to harm the police were coded for *unlawful activism*. Finally, the category *against the demonstrators* was used to code responses recommending aggressive actions against the demonstrators, such as jailing them.

For examples of participant responses coded into the antisocial agency categories, refer to Table 12.8.

Lack of Agency Coding Categories

Responses that did not demonstrate any intent to take any action in regard to the police beatings were coded into the lack of agency coding categories. The first such category was *lack of initiative*. This category was used to code responses indicating that the respondent would do nothing in this hypothetical situation. The second category, *helplessness*, was used to categorize responses mentioning feelings that nothing could be done to provide help in this situation. For examples of participant responses coded into the lack of agency coding categories, refer to Table 12.9.

Coding Responses to the Right to Protest and the Hypothetical Situation Involving Police Beatings

For each respondent, up to two responses to the previously described items were available for coding. In some situations, participants did not complete both items, either due to personal

Table 12.7 Categories and examples for prosocial agency processes

Major category	Subcategory
<i>Judgment of police</i> Examples “The police are having ego trips” “Violence in the name of peace, that is no way to treat the people”	None
<i>Personal initiative</i> Examples “Stop it” “Make them stop”	<i>Activism</i> Examples “Join the protests” “Record it as much as I could”
	<i>Personal understanding</i> Examples “Find out what the circumstances are that brought about the events” “Write the police officials to ask why”
	<i>Other solutions</i> Examples “Give better training to the police so this doesn’t happen” “Remind them that this country has the right to free speech and so their actions are illegal”
<i>Institutional initiative</i> Examples “Support efforts to have the police dismissed and the leaders who supported the police recalled” “Report the abuse”	<i>Legal action</i> Examples “Demand that they face criminal charges for their actions” “Go to my lawyer”
	<i>Government/other entity</i> Examples “As long as nonviolent protesting” “Peaceful protests” “Send letters to Congress” “Contact human rights groups”

Responses have been edited to show only the codable unit coded for the coding category

Table 12.8 Categories and examples for antisocial agency processes

Major category	Subcategory
<i>Support for the police</i> Examples “Give support to the police” “Cheer them on”	None
<i>Unlawful activism</i> Examples “Beat the police back” “Kill the police”	None
<i>Action against the demonstrators</i> Examples “Beat them myself” “They deserve it and so throw them in jail”	None

Responses have been edited to show only the codable unit coded for the coding category

preference or because the item was not on the survey. Each response to the prompts was broken down into codable units and coded separately.

Table 12.9 Categories and examples for lack of agency processes

Major category	Subcategory
<i>Lack of initiative</i> Examples “Nothing” “Sit and watch”	None
<i>Helplessness</i> Examples “What could I do?” “I wish I could help but I am just one person against the police”	None

Responses have been edited to show only the codable unit coded for the coding category

Coders were trained to recognize codable units, which are distinct themes, sentences, or thoughts to which codes are applied. Many of the responses were complex and contained multiple codable units. For example, the response, “demand an

investigation and put charges against the abusive policemen” was coded for *institutional initiative* (demand an investigation) and *legal action* (put charges against the abusive policemen). When analyzing and coding the responses, coders were taught that they were not passing judgment on the respondents themselves but rather identifying themes in the responses given to the items. When discussing the results of our analyses of the protest responses in the regional chapters in this section of the book, we refer to codable units as “responses.”

Country files were created in Excel with demographic information unavailable during the coding process, which is a practice known as blind coding, which is done to reduce coder bias. First, the item concerning the right to protest was coded. Based on the rationale provided to justify the rating scale response to the item, coders began by deciding if a response affirmed or rejected the right to protest. In general, responses disagreeing with the right to protest were coded into the anti-protest categories. Conversely, responses agreeing with the right to protest were generally coded into the pro-protest categories.

After coding the right to protest item, coders then blindly coded the responses to the scenario that described police beating peaceful protestors. Coders had to determine if the respondent answered in a prosocial or antisocial manner. In general, responses expressing a desire to stop the beatings or find new solutions were coded into the prosocial categories. Conversely, responses supportive of the police aggression were coded for antisocial agency. In some cases, a response with several codable units could be coded for both pro- and anti-right to protest themes. For instance, “yes, all humans have the right to protest against war and in favor of peace. However, this is only a right if we are not presently at war.” In regard to this complex response, the unit indicating that “all humans have the right to protest” was coded for *human rights*, a pro-protest construct. “However, this is only a right if we are not presently at war” was coded as *pseudo-moral reasoning*, which is an anti-protest theme.

The completed files were then coded and checked by the team leader to establish coding

reliability. For the item regarding the individual’s right to protest, we had an intercoder reliability range between 85% and 93%. There was a 90–92% intercoder reliability range for responses to the police beating scenario.

Analysis of the Responses

Once the coding for each region was completed, analysis of the responses began. Frequencies and percentages for each code used were calculated using Excel. In the first portion of the results section for each chapter, we describe the percentages of responses coded into each of the major categories and subcategories. On an exploratory basis, chi-square tests were run in Excel to examine the possibility that demographic groups differed in their likelihood of providing responses in the different coding categories for protest intolerance, protest tolerance, indeterminate status, the perceived reality of the situation, prosocial agency, antisocial agency, and lack of agency. The demographic variables that were studied were (a) gender, (b) participation in the military, (c) relative’s participation in the military, and (d) participation in a peace protest.

We created presence/absence scores for every coding category and subcategory, so that every codable unit could receive a score for every coding category indicating whether or not the unit (“response”) fell into that category; for example, if a participant’s response was coded as *pseudo-moral reasoning*, that response received a 1 (“present”) for pseudo-moral reasoning. If a participant’s response was not coded as *pseudo-moral reasoning*, the response received a 0 (“absent”) for *pseudo-moral reasoning*. The presence/absence scores allowed us to compute chi-square tests to determine whether, for example, women gave different responses to the protest item than the men did. Additionally, the categories and subcategories for each of the sets of categories were added together to create superordinate categories that were also scored for presence or absence. We referred to these overall categories as presence categories. For example, *support for police*, *unlawful activism*, and *against the demonstrators*

were added together to create the *antisocial agency presence* category. If a response was coded into at least one of those three coding categories, the *antisocial agency presence* category received a 1. This procedure allowed us to see whether group membership affected the use of at least one of the categories in a set of categories.

Chapter Structure

As mentioned previously, each of the following eight chapters focuses on a region from around the world. Each chapter starts with an introduction to the region, which provides a brief history of protesting for that region and the individual countries within the region. The history can include the country's stance on protesting, protests that took place in that country, and/or something similar.

The methods and results section of each of the protest chapters first discuss the right to protest item. Following a brief recap of Bandura's theory, the coding categories, and a discussion of the sample from that region, the chapter focuses on the findings from the analyses of responses to the two protest items in that region.

The chapters end with a discussion of the results. Authors highlighted any interesting or provocative findings. They then carefully interpreted the results and tried to connect the results with literature on the region, if possible. This section of the book concludes with a chapter that integrates the findings from each of the individual regional chapters.

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Michael Corgan, Bailey Pescatore, Mariana Barbosa,
Daniela Miranola, Silja Bara Omarsdottir, Julia König,
Mathilde Salmberg, Carla Machado[†],
Elizabeth Leembruggen-Kallberg,
and Christine Roland-Levy

From Thucydides' recounting of 27 years of Peloponnesian war between Athens and Sparta some 2,400 years ago right down to today, the

idea that war could be stopped and that the people of various countries might force their leaders to do so would have seemed absurd, an attractive but impossible dream. The last 100 years, however, have shown that civil society protests do have an impact, and while wars still occur, by most accounts, there are fewer in the world today than at any time in the recorded past (Goldstein, 2011, p. 53). How and why did this happen?

M. Corgan (✉)

Department of International Relations, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA
e-mail: mcorgan@bu.edu

B. Pescatore

Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

M. Barbosa

Universidade Catolica Portuguesa, Portugal
e-mail: mbarbosa@porto.ucp.pt

D. Miranola

Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

S.B. Omarsdottir

Institute of International Affairs and Center for Small State Studies, University of Iceland, Vesturbær, Reykjavik, Iceland
e-mail: sbo@hi.is

J. König

Lehrstuhl für Klinische Psychologie und Psychotherapie, Munchen, Germany
e-mail: koenig.julia@gmx.net; julia.koenig@psy.lmu.de

M. Salmberg

Clinical Psychologist, Washington, DC, USA
e-mail: msalmberg@mail.com

C. Machado

Department of Psychology, Minho University, Braga, Portugal (Deceased)

E. Leembruggen-Kallberg

Webster University, Leiden, Netherlands
e-mail: dr.elisabeth.leembruggen@gmail.com

C. Roland-Levy

Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne, Paris, France
e-mail: Roland-Levy@univ-reims.fr

Thucydides' history contains within the famous Melian dialogue a passage that seems to sum up an irrefutable truth about war and its likely permanence in human affairs: "The strong take what they will and the weak suffer what they must" (Warner, 1972, p. 402). What followed immediately was the enthusiastically endorsed, wildly popular, and ultimately disastrous Athenian expedition for the conquest of Sicily. Thucydides concludes this next section by lamenting for all time a major problem of speaking out for peace: the charge of being unpatriotic (Warner, p. 425). When Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian Wars came to an end, around 411 BCE, Aristophanes' comedy *Lysistrata*, often understood to be antiwar, was first performed in the very city of Athens in whose army Thucydides himself had served until he was cashiered. However, Aristophanes' play is a comedy, not a condemnation of war, and it can be taken to be against a particular war in progress rather than against all wars in general. Certainly nothing like a presumptively antiwar work of such popularity or of any consequence appeared again in western

culture or any other for several millennia. Dante may have tentatively raised, 1,600 years later, the idea of some sort of universal antiwar law, but about 200 years after that, Machiavelli spelled out plainly what many state leaders had come to believe, if not openly propound, that the principal preoccupation of a ruler must be war (Machiavelli, 1995, p. 45). Indeed, it is reasonable to look primarily to Europe for the playing out of this harsh “truth,” for in no other part of the world was there such constant organized violence between one people and another in what came to be called Europe from the fall of the Roman Empire in 476 CE to the very recent past.

We live today in what is still sometimes referred to as the Westphalian order, a world of sovereign states (as noted in Article 2 of the [UN Charter](#)) in some sort of system or community, each state being sovereign. This idea of the autonomous, sovereign territorial state acknowledging no superior authority (e.g., the Pope) was codified by the Peace of Westphalia, which put an end to one of the most devastating wars that world had seen to that point: The Thirty Years’ War in central Europe continued without respite and without mercy from 1618 to 1648. The resolution of that incessant and often pointless cycle of violence in Europe came with the Peace in 1648. Although the idea of the territorial state, and more importantly, sovereignty, was introduced in this peace treaty, continuing peace was not one of the fruits. After the Pope was removed as even the nominal arbiter of disputes between the powers of Christendom, the absence of any overarching authority, even in theory, led to anarchy. The sovereign of every state, no matter what its size, could decide when to use war as a means of achieving the interest of that state. Even though this same period saw the introduction of the concept of codified international law with the publication of Grotius’s *De Jure Belle ac Pacis* in 1623, peace was no more prevalent afterward than it had ever been. It should be noted that this work by Grotius, which has been held by many to be the forerunner of modern international law, by no means condemned war. For example, on the matter of whether or not churches of the enemy could rightfully be burned, Grotius’s argument was that given all the other

depredations of war that were permissible under his concept of mutually agreed upon laws, why would churches be inviolable? Nothing pacifist or antiwar is to be found in his and others’ concepts of a rational law of nations.

These wars of Europe, which Thomas Jefferson would later call “the exterminating havoc of a quarter of the globe,” continued unabated throughout the so-called Age of Reason in the seventeenth and on into the eighteenth century. Lesser states were either dragged into the wars of the major powers or, like Poland, once the largest state in Europe, carved up and parceled out as the major powers saw fit. Nor was it only Europe that felt the blows of ever more modern and lethal modes of war. The development of oceangoing merchant and naval fleets brought the havoc of European gunpowder and cannon-enriched warfare to the rest of the world. For a time there would be a respite in major fighting on the European continent itself, but this ended with the introduction of nationalism, a new force that rivaled and often replaced religion as an organizing and motivating force in the efforts of social groups to do violence to each other.

Not only did the nationalism spawned by the French Revolution lead to nearly a quarter century of war as fierce as the earlier Thirty Years’ War but it also spread all across Europe, as the earlier conflicts had not. Moreover, the wars spilled over into the eastern lands when Napoleon invaded Russia with an army of 600,000. Less often regarded but perhaps even more ominous, the earlier Napoleonic invasions of Spain spawned fighters who persisted after the official national armies had been defeated or negotiated into quiescence. These new warriors were the guerillas who became a force in virtually all subsequent European wars, which meant wars everywhere, even down to the present day.

The Napoleonic Wars ended with the Congress of Vienna, which can be considered the first serious attempt to bring peace and security to the entire continent of Europe, at least as far as the five major powers: Russia, Prussia, Austria, France, and what is now the United Kingdom were concerned. What upset the security of nineteenth-century Europe most was the unification

of Italy and Germany under the aegis of Prussian leadership. By 1871, Germany was undisputedly the strongest power on the continent, and this predominance boded ill for future security in Europe. Only slowly did the emerging middle classes or bourgeoisie come into positions of power in some governments, and there was no thread of antiwar sentiment among any of them.

Other factors besides the constant balancing of strength among the great powers contributed to a growing heightening of an atmosphere of militarism and bellicosity. Ironically, growing literacy and compulsory education, designed to foster a sense of nationhood among the heretofore excluded working classes, meant that more of the population of any country could embrace nationalistic glory won by arms in distant lands. Popular enthusiasm for military triumphs around the globe drowned out the few voices protesting war.

It was not just mass literacy and imperial rivalry that fueled enthusiasm for wars; there was now, or there appeared to be, scientific justification for resorting to war to resolve differences between peoples. Darwin's theories, popularly misunderstood, seemed to sanction survival of the fittest (a term he had not used) as a guide to national policy. Writers such as Frederick T. Jane, the publisher of annual popular and avidly read catalogs of naval armaments possessed by the industrial nations, spoke in social Darwinian terms of "fitness to rule" as the measure of a nation's worth (Jane, 1906). War was simply a way of sorting out who was superior to whom. It was a way of asserting or restoring national pride. For example, in 1904, Russia's foreign minister Plevkhe encouraged his government to seek "a short, victorious war to stem the tide of revolution" (Weber, 1994, p. 1). The Japanese had other ideas, however. Russians had demonstrated against the Czar, but not against war.

Ironically, that same Russian Czar, Nicholas II, to whom Plevkhe had recommended war, may be credited with the beginning of a willingness of some state leaders to respond to pressure for seeking peaceful resolutions of international disputes. In 1898, the Czar called for an international conference to institute rules for war, for disarmament, and for the peaceful resolution of

disputes. Antiwar sentiment had a dynastic champion. The first conference in 1899 was successful mainly in limiting arms. The second conference in 1907, focusing more on naval warfare, was not a success, although it did help solidify the principle of the equality of all states. The German delegation raised many objections to proposed articles, but the United States did also, based on arguments that the proposed arbitration provisions allowing Europe to be involved in settling disputes in the Americas could undo the Monroe Doctrine and that limiting arms development could limit the creative talents of its citizens.

Eventually nationalism touched off an explosion at Sarajevo in the summer of 1914. While many elders were uneasy about the war that was bound to come, this was because of a possibly unfavorable outcome for the state, not the nature of war itself. One individual who foresaw the likely outcome of modern war was determined to do what he could to alert all countries to the dangers of mechanized, industrialized war. I. S. Bloch published the *Future of War* in seven volumes in Polish and then reduced the arguments to one volume in English (Bloch, 1899). He founded an institute to promote his ideas but to no avail. Most leaders, and most citizens, as well, still saw war as a way to sort things out between nations. As war was declared, large crowds everywhere cheered their countries' call to arms. Perhaps the most famous photograph of all is of a dense crowd in the Odeonsplatz in Munich, where a young Adolph Hitler can be seen joining the enthusiasm for war.

There were conscientious objectors to the Great War but they were relatively few and dealt with harshly. COs, as they were known in Britain, were given hard labor sentences for refusing to serve. On completion, they were again asked to serve, and when they again refused, were sent back to prison (Gilbert, 1994, p. 280). One even died from malnutrition in prison in 1918, and 3 days later Bertrand Russell received a 6-month sentence for openly calling for peace negotiations with the Germans. Probably the most dramatic antiwar protests occurred among soldiers serving during the actual war. The French army suffered a series of mutinies in 1916 when soldiers refused

to go on the offensive. It was not an antiwar movement as such, because the soldiers agreed to defend their positions if attacked. But they would no longer go on the suicidal offensives their generals had led them into. Most famously, it was the Czar's soldiers, from whom the magnitude of their military catastrophe could no longer be hidden, who "voted with their feet," in Lenin's phrase, and left the battlefield to return home. Even German sailors, in port on their ships' northern naval bases, mutinied and refused to go out on a last, vainglorious, and militarily pointless "death ride" to uphold the honor of the Kaiser's navy.

After the war, there were much stronger antiwar voices, especially in England. It was not possible to hide, at least from the elites, the absolute ineptitude and lack of imagination in the leadership's conduct of the war. Students of the Oxford Union vowed on February 9, 1933, never to "bear arms for king and country" (Pierce, 2004). Students elsewhere followed suit and leaders in the UK denounced the oath as shameful and squalid. It was said that Hitler referred to this oath whenever his generals objected to his policies as being too bellicose even for them. No such powerful antiwar protests arose in France or the other democracies, however. As William Butler Yeats wrote in his poem, *The Second Coming*, "The best lack all conviction and the worst are full of passionate intensity" (Yeats, 1919). And sure enough, another war loomed. Again there were conscientious objectors but not enough to stay any government's hand. The deadliest war in human history inevitably ensued.

After the Second World War, a constellation of factors came together to make antiwar protests and other movements more numerous and effective. First of all, the sheer scale of death and destruction in the war may have been a "tipping point" in the collective consciousness. Everyone was somehow involved. New weapons of war, especially long-range bombers, made everyone a potential target of violence. The imprecision of this kind of ordnance delivery, officials claim to the contrary notwithstanding, led to a change in whatever rules or at least strategic theories of war that had existed. Now everyone was a legitimate target since states had mobilized entire populations in the war effort.

If a soldier was a legitimate target of violence, why not the worker who made his rifle? "Behind the lines" ceased to have much meaning. The atomic bomb and its use, by itself, was probably enough to lead to a dramatic increase in antiwar protest. Some of its developers, like Robert Oppenheimer, stood appalled at what they had unleashed.

Even peacetime society after the war saw changes that made antiwar movements more likely. Mobilizing entire populations for war efforts also brought people, minorities, and women, heretofore underrepresented or unrepresented altogether, into the public arena. Their means of communicating with each other and thus organizing grew at an accelerating pace. More democratic states appeared and these saw the growth of new parties and movements within them, groups that could now reach out to like-minded people in other countries. The UN was now an inclusive organization, and its ideals, once brought into the public discourse by state leaders themselves, however cynically, could no longer be ignored or obfuscated. Above all loomed the threat of nuclear annihilation, not just of an army or even of a country but of civilization itself. We all became targets and "collateral" damage could mean the destruction of all humankind. Nuclear strategists like Herman Kahn could talk of megadeaths as a convenient shorthand, but that term could also crystallize opposition to the whole notion of any nuclear arsenal, let alone the ever expanding ones of the mirror-imaging superpowers. More frightening, even proponents of nuclear arsenals for defense or a "second strike" (retaliatory) capability could not guarantee that a minor war might not turn into a nuclear one if a nuclear-armed combatant thought it was losing too badly.

The focus of attention on just what the implications of modern weaponry were, with nuclear weapons the most powerful symbol, had the effect of raising the sophistication of peace movements and antiwar activists. They too knew the language and rationales of so-called defense intellectuals. Changes in the kinds or locations of weapons being deployed, such as cruise missiles into Europe in the 1960s, were seen for the dangerous escalation they could portend. We cannot know what targeting decisions were changed or what weapons were or were not deployed or developed,

but we do know that leaders changed their minds on squeezing the last ounce of lethality out of their force “postures.” Cancellation of the neutron bomb project and Henry Kissinger’s acknowledgment that putting multiple warheads on ICBMs was a mistake are but a few examples of what we do know. Peace movements and antiwar movements have not stopped global violence, but there is demonstrably less war – i.e., state-sponsored organized violence – than previously, and the worst has not yet happened. The right to protest peacefully has been established in international agreements. To what extent do Western Europeans acknowledge and embrace such a right? What would they want to do if they saw police beating up peaceful antiwar demonstrators? Those were the principal questions addressed in this chapter.

Methods

Sample

The Western European sample was composed of a total of 379 participants: 233 participants identified as female and 138 as male (7 undisclosed). Ages of the participants in the sample ranged from 18 to 76, with an average age of 33 years. Of these respondents, 46 were from France, 91 from Germany, 90 from Iceland, 16 from Portugal, 68 from Spain, and 65 from Sweden (3 undisclosed). Eleven percent of the sample reported having served in the military, while about 50% of the sample reported having a relative in the military. Roughly 50% of the sample had participated in a protest against war and in favor of peace.

Procedure

The Personal Institutional Rights to Aggression Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006) included two prompts regarding an individual’s right to protest against war. First, participants were asked to rate their level of agreement on a seven-point Likert scale (from 1 totally disagree to 7 totally agree) with the statement, “individuals have the right to

stage protests against war and in favor of peace.” Participants were then asked to explain the reasoning behind their response. The second prompt asked participants to describe what they would want to do if they are immediately and dramatically exposed to a situation where “police are beating peaceful anti-war demonstrators.”

The Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP) developed a coding manual using both Albert Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement and grounded theory to identify major themes in the qualitative responses to the right to protest and scenario items. Answers to each item were first broken into codable units, which were words, phrases, or sentences representing a specific idea. Although Bandura used the terms “moral disengagement” and “moral engagement” in presenting his theoretical constructs, we focus more on particular forms of reasoning in the “anti-protest” and “pro-protest” responses, with the forms of reasoning reflective of the sociocognitive mechanisms that he described in his theory. For a fuller description of the coding system and the PAIRTAPS, see the introductory methods chapter at the beginning of this section of the volume.

Coding Guidelines for the Right to Protest Item

Albert Bandura’s theory (1999) of moral disengagement identifies sociocognitive mechanisms by which individuals shield their sense of self-worth when they deviate from personal or social ethical standards. Anti-protest responses coded for *pseudo-moral reasoning*, *negative labeling*, *disadvantageous comparison*, *denial of personal responsibility*, *distorting consequences*, *dehumanization*, and *attribution of blame* all reflected reasoning associated with sociocognitive mechanisms that Bandura links with moral disengagement. Responses coded as *pseudo-moral reasoning* argued that protesting is detrimental to society; *support troops or the government*, its subcategory, captured responses that reject the right to protest based on a purported need to support one’s country. If a participant discredited protesting with a

label such as “disloyal,” the response was coded as *negative labeling*. Responses were coded as *disadvantageous comparison* if they compared protest negatively to what were purported to be better alternatives, such as obedience or compliance. The category *denial of personal responsibility* applied to responses denying any responsibility for protesting governmental aggression. Responses that mentioned perceived consequences of protesting were coded for *distorting consequences* and denigrating responses (e.g., calling the protestors evil, vicious, or savages) were coded for *dehumanization* (which had two subcategories, *dehumanization of the protestor* and *dehumanization of the targets of war*). Responses included in the category *attribution of blame* blamed the agents of protest (coded for *protestors as agents*) or the recipients of war (coded as *targets of war*) for the need to revoke the right to protest against war. Responses disagreeing with the right to protest without any explanation were coded as *general disagreement*.

The coding manual also identifies a number of forms of reasoning offered in support of a right to protest against war: *social justification*, *moral responsibility*, and *humanization*. *Social justification* refers to responses that support individuals’ right to protest against war for the betterment of the society as a whole. Subcategories of *social justification* are *peace* and *awareness of negative consequences*. Responses coded for *moral responsibility* claim protesting against war is a moral obligation or a legitimate way to express opinion. The *moral responsibility* category includes subcategories for responses indicating that protest is (a) a *civic duty*, (b) *nonviolent*, and (c) *law abiding*. Pro-protest responses coded for *humanization* emphasize the human qualities of the protestors; the humanization category includes more specific subcategories referencing *reciprocal rights*, *human rights*, and *socially sanctioned rights*; and the human rights subcategory has additional subcategories for responses associating protest specifically with *international law* or indicating that it *should be a right*. Responses that agreed with the right to protest without including a reason were coded as *general agreement*.

If a participant’s response did not adequately explain if he or she supported or opposed an

individual’s right to protest against war (saying, e.g., “depends,” or “I don’t know”), the response was classified as *indeterminate reasoning*. Responses could also be categorized as for *perceived realism*, which had two subcategories: *right may not be respected* and *protest is futile*.

Distribution of Responses Regarding the Right to Protest

Arguments Against the Right to Protest

Anti-protest arguments comprised only 1% of all responses to the right to protest prompt. These responses were divided among three coding categories (*denial of personal responsibility*, *pseudo-moral reasoning*, and *distorting consequences*). Table 13.1 provides examples of anti-protest responses with accompanying demographical information.

The most frequently used anti-protest theme, accounting for half of all anti-protest responses, was *denial of personal responsibility*. For example, a 40-year-old German woman commented that “...where peace is concerned, I don’t feel such an obligation.” *Pseudo-moral reasoning* accounted for 25% of the anti-protest responses and included responses that argued protesting is bad for society. A good example of *distorting consequences*, a category that accounted for 25% of the anti-protest responses, came from a 30-year-old from Iceland who said, “protests are also wars and therefore I do not like them.”

Arguments Supporting the Right to Protest

Ninety-five percent of all responses to the right to protest item supported an individual’s right to protest against war. Although the sample provided responses falling into almost every one of the pro-protest coding categories, only the categories that reached a criterion frequency of at least 8% of all responses are discussed in this section. Examples of these types of arguments are provided in Table 13.2 along with corresponding demographical information.

Table 13.1 Examples of anti-protest responses

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Anti-protest</i>	1				
Denial of personal responsibility	1 (50)	Iceland	M	36	I agree but I would not participate
		Germany	F	40	Reason??? In my mind, they have an obligation to do something against the war, where peace is concerned, I don't feel such an obligation
Pseudo-moral reasoning	<1 (25)	France	F	23	Of course, but they should also know the reasons why the men are fighting, because sometimes wars have saved our freedom
Distorting consequences	<1 (25)	Iceland	N/A	30	Protests are also wars and therefore I do not like them

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of all responses to the right to protest item, while the second number (in parentheses) refers to the percentage of anti-protest responses

M male, *F* female

Table 13.2 Examples of pro-protest responses

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Pro-protest</i>	95				
Moral responsibility	7(7)				
Nonviolent	16 (17)	Portugal	F	34	As long as it is done peacefully without danger to others
		Germany	F	24	They have to do that in a peaceful way
		Portugal	M	26	As long as the protests are peaceful (no pun intended) and don't disturb the everyday lives of others
Civic duty	8 (8)	Spain	N/A	27	Yes, as citizens of the world, if that is what they think they should do, without being influenced by those who choose not to protest
		Germany	F	20	Individual voices have to be heard, for the society as such is sometimes blind
		Iceland	N/A	21	The government needs to be aware of its people being unhappy
Unspecified humanization	0 (0)				
Socially sanctioned rights	26 (28)	France	F	25	It's the freedom of expression
		Germany	M	45	The freedom of opinion is one of the democratic basic rights without exception
		Sweden	M	63	As a democrat I want to have the right to express and act on my opinions
Human rights	13 (13)	Iceland	N/A	24	Of course. Those are basic human rights
		Portugal	F	31	Everybody has that right
		France	M	52	It's their right

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of all responses to the right to protest item, while the second number (in parentheses) refers to the percentage of pro-protest responses

M male, *F* female, *N/A* not applicable

Responses in favor of individuals' right to protest most commonly referenced *socially sanctioned rights*, a theme found in 28% of the pro-protest responses. For example, a 56-year-old German man stated: "it [anti-war protest] is about the fundamental freedom/right to free expression of opinion." Responses arguing that the right to protest is a basic *human right* (rather than a socially sanctioned right) accounted for 13% of

the pro-protest responses and was the third most common pro-protest response.

The second most frequently used pro-protest theme was *nonviolence*, which comprised 17% of the pro-protest responses. For example, a 21-year-old French woman stated that protest is a right "if the demonstrations are peaceful of course." Similarly, a 26-year-old man from Portugal agreed that protest is a right "as long as the protests are

peaceful (no pun intended) and don't disturb the everyday lives of others." *Civic duty* accounted for 8% of the pro-protest responses. The *civic duty* category included the response of a 22-year-old French woman who said, "in a democratic system, it is the duty of the citizen to participate and to give his opinion on a measure or an idea." *Civic duty* also referred to responses indicating that one needs to protest if one disagrees with the government. For instance, a 57-year-old German man wrote, "it must be shown to the government that the citizens wish to live in peace and will demonstrate for it..."

Perceived Reality of the Situation

The remaining 4% of responses to the right to protest item focused on the *perceived reality* of protesting. Sixty percent of these responses reflected the belief that protesting is *futile*, a subcategory of the focus on *perceived reality*. This reasoning was seen in the response of a 21-year-old French man who stated, "protests are nice but rarely achieve anything." Forty percent of these responses focused on what was seen as the *perceived reality* in a particular country. For instance,

a German 23-year-old woman said "this [the right to protest] is at least the case in Germany."

Exploratory Statistical Analyses: The Right to Protest

Exploratory chi-square analyses were run to assess the extent to which there were statistically significant and marginally significant group differences in responses to the right to protest item. These analyses revealed that at a marginally significant level, proportionately more women than men asserted that protesting is a right if it is done *peacefully*. A significantly greater proportion of civilian than military respondents also said that protest must be done in a *nonviolent* manner. Similarly, a significantly greater proportion of respondents without a relative in the military stated that *nonviolent* protest is a right as compared to their counterparts. Finally, a significantly greater proportion of non-protestors than protestors gave responses coded for one or more of the pro-protest categories (i.e., they received a score of 1 on the *pro-protest presence* variable). The percentages and chi-square values are represented in Table 13.3.

Table 13.3 The right to protest coding categories: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Category	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	X ²
<i>Pro-protest</i>	Male	Female	
Moral responsibility			
Nonviolent	12	20	3.72 [^]
<i>Pro-protest</i>	Military	Nonmilitary	
Moral responsibility			
Nonviolent	14	17	30.36 [*]
<i>Pro-protest</i>	Relative in military	No relative in military	
Moral responsibility			
Nonviolent	11	23	7.30 ^{**}
<i>Pro-protest presence</i>	Protest	No protest	
	62	72	3.77 ^{**}

If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference. "Presence" at the end of the variable name signifies that the participant provided at least one example of a response in at least one of the subcategories of a major category

[^]0.5 < p ≤ 0.1; *p ≤ 0.001; **p < 0.05

^aNumbers in the columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

Coding Guidelines for the Police Beating Scenario

According to Bandura, there are two forms of moral agency, which are essential to moral engagement: inhibitive and proactive. Individuals who demonstrate inhibitive moral agency have a strong sense of self-worth that allows them to resist pressures to behave immorally. Proactive agency stirs an individual to take action in support of a moral belief. Based on Bandura's construct of agency, responses to the scenario in which participants were asked what they would want to do if they saw police beating nonviolent protestors were categorized for type of personal engagement, with the major categories being *prosocial agency*, *antisocial agency*, and *lack of agency*. *Prosocial agency* coding categories included *judgment of police*, *personal initiative*, and *institutional initiative*. *Activism*, *personal understanding*, and *other solutions* are subcategories of *personal initiative*; the *institutional initiative* category included the subcategories *legal action* and *government/other agency*. The *antisocial agency* coding categories included *support for the police*, *unlawful action*, and *aggression against demonstrators*; responses in these categories expressed support for the police beatings, violent actions against the police, and action taken against the protestors, respectively. Responses showing neither *prosocial* nor *antisocial agency* were categorized for *lack of initiative*, *helplessness*, or one of the *indeterminate status* categories (e.g., "depends," "I don't know"). There were also some responses referring to the *perceived reality* of the scenario; these responses could be coded into two subcategories: *right may not be respected* and *protest is futile*.

Distribution of Responses to the Police Beating Scenario

Approximately 85% of responses to the scenario indicated that the participant would want

to take action if he or she saw police beating protestors. In this section, we discuss the coding categories into which at least 8% of responses fell. Examples of these responses and demographical information can be found in Table 13.4.

The most frequent response to the scenario item was *activism*, which accounted for 35% of *prosocial agency* responses. These responses indicated the participant would want to take action in support of the protestors. A 45-year-old Swedish man and a 23-year-old German woman demonstrated *activism* when they responded that they would "protest by writing letters" and "go to the press and make this public," respectively.

Twenty-six percent of *prosocial agency* responses indicated *personal initiative*, or a general type of expressed personal involvement in support of the protestors. These responses often indicated that the participant would want to stop the police without specifying how this would be done. For instance, a 34-year-old Portuguese man said he would "help the protestors."

The third most common pro-agency response, which comprised 13% of *pro-agency* responses, was *institutional initiative*, which was generally an unspecified appeal to an institutional authority. For example, a 39-year-old German woman said she would "file a complaint" if she witnessed police beating protestors.

Other solutions and *legal action* each comprised 8% of all responses (10% and 9% of the *prosocial agency* responses, respectively) to the scenario item. Responses in the *other solutions* category referred to a solution other than protesting to end the police brutality. For example, a 35-year-old participant from Iceland responded, "change the political thinking of the government." Responses labeled *legal action* specifically expressed the desire to take legal action against the police involved in the beatings, such as suing or jailing them.

Table 13.4 Examples of prosocial agency responses

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Prosocial agency</i>					
Personal initiative	22 (26)	France	F	21	Stop the police; people have a right to show their antiwar sentiments
		Germany	F	26	Somehow find a way that it will stop
		Sweden	M	26	Act in a peaceful manner to avoid giving the police an excuse to use more violence
Activism	30 (35)	Iceland	N/A	40	Protest to my fullest abilities if this was my country. Take part in politics to prevent this from happening
		Sweden	F	27	Protest against the actions. Try to change things if possible
		Germany	M	37	Take notes of their numbers (if possible), start disciplinary measures
Other solutions	8 (10)	Sweden	M	69	Exchange the police leadership and change their training
		Germany	F	29	For a start, each policeman (also in uniform) should have an identifiable personal number. This number is inscribed and identifies members of the police; the police in Germany have no authority to do this. Then I would attempt to make every step clear, since the training for police in relation to such situations is inadequate and should be made better!
		Portugal	F	19	I would want to train the police better to not use force
Institutional initiative	11 (13)	Iceland	N/A	50	Would want the matter to be investigated and that the police would say sorry
		Germany	F	59	Have them brought to account
		France	M	34	To condemn those who gave these men the justification of their actions
Legal action	8 (9)	Sweden	M	30	Convict the responsible police officers in court for assault and malfeasance
		France	M	24	Prison for these people

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of all responses to the police beating protestors prompt, while the second number (in parentheses) refers to the percentage of prosocial agency responses
M male, *F* female

Distribution of Antisocial Agency Responses

Antisocial agency responses comprised 7% of responses to the scenario item and were divided between the categories *unlawful activism* and *support for the police*. Examples of these responses can be found in Table 13.5 along with corresponding demographical information.

Responses indicating that the participant would want to engage in *unlawful activism* if police were beating protestors accounted for 89% of *antisocial agency* responses. This category includes all responses suggesting that

the participant would employ violence against the police to stop the beating of protestors. A 22-year-old French man's response that he would want to "kill the cop" beating protestors demonstrated this reasoning.

Support for the police accounted for the remaining 11% of *antisocial agency* responses to the scenario and includes responses supporting the police beating of protestors. For example, a 40-year-old woman from Sweden responded that she would "give police officers power so they are obeyed. One should not be able to have a discussion with a police on the street. The only way to arrive at a peaceful solution is for the police to set the rules

Table 13.5 Examples of antisocial agency responses

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Antisocial agency</i>	7				
Unlawful activism	6 (89)	France	M	21	Strike at the attacks of the police
		Germany	F	26	React, I would whip the police
		Germany	M	38	Beat the police so they see what it feels like
Support for police	1 (11)	Sweden	F	40	Give police officers power so they are obeyed. One should not be able to have a discussion with a police on the street. The only way to arrive at a peaceful solution is for the police to set the rules (give permission or rejection to carry out a demonstration) and for the people to obey

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of all responses to the police beating protestors prompt, while the second number (in parentheses) refers to the percentage of antisocial agency responses

(give permission or rejection to carry out a demonstration) and for the people to obey.” This response contains three codable phrases that demonstrate *support for the police*.

Distribution of Responses Characterized by Lack of Agency

Seven percent of the scenario responses demonstrated a *lack of agency*. Seventy-four percent of these responses were coded for *lack of initiative*. These responses indicated the participant would not take any action if police were seen beating protestors, either in support of the protestors or the police. A 38-year-old man from France demonstrated a *lack of initiative* when he said that if he saw police beating protestors he would “[run] away.”

The other 26% of the responses in the *lack of agency* category included responses reflecting a sense of *helplessness* in the participant. For example, a French woman stated “I don’t know if I am strong and courageous enough at the end of the day for a strike.”

Exploratory Statistical Analyses: Police Beating Peaceful Protestors

Exploratory chi-squares were run to test the contribution of gender, military service, relative military service, and protest participation

to use of the different agency themes. These analyses revealed that a significantly greater proportion of women than men used one or more of the *prosocial agency* categories (i.e., *prosocial agency presence*) in their responses. Also, a significantly greater proportion of women than men endorsed *activism*, such as reporting the police beatings to the media. Conversely, a significantly greater proportion of men than women gave responses coded for one or more of the *antisocial agency* coding categories (*antisocial agency presence*). A significantly greater proportion of participants with no relatives in the military responded with *personal initiative* as compared to their counterparts. Participants with relatives in the military were marginally more likely than respondents without relatives in the military to give responses coded for one or more of the *antisocial agency* categories. Finally, protestors were marginally more likely than nonprotestors to respond with reasoning coded for one or more of the *prosocial agency* categories (Table 13.6).

Discussion

The findings of our analyses indicate that many Western Europeans feel empowered to protest against wars they conceive to be wrong or wrongly entered into. Moreover, these ordinary citizens expressed in their statements the

Table 13.6 Prosocial agency, antisocial agency, and lack of agency: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Category	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	X ²
	Male	Female	
<i>Pro-agency presence</i>	71	80	4.05 [^]
Personal initiative			
Activism	24	33	4.13 [^]
<i>Antisocial agency presence</i>	10	5	3.88 [^]
	Relative in military	No relative in military	
<i>Prosocial agency</i>			
Personal initiative	20	30	5.25 [^]
<i>Antisocial agency presence</i>	8	3	3.51 [*]
	Protest	No protest	
<i>Prosocial agency presence</i>	80	72	3.23 [*]

If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference. "Presence" at the end of the variable name signifies that indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response in at least one of the subcategories of a major category

[^] $p < 0.05$; ^{*} $0.5 < p \leq 0.1$

^aNumbers in the columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

strongly held belief that they have a right and even obligation to protest. Further, these protests, provided they are peaceful, should be dealt with by police in a way that is not injurious or suppressive. The impetus to protest was categorized in several different ways: as a basic human right, as a hallmark of a democratic state, and in many cases as an absolute obligation on the individual as a moral agent. The police with whom potential protestors could expect to come into contact were seen as very real and immediately knowable agents of the government. Thus, as several statements show, the police should be individually identifiable so as to insure appropriate individual accountability for their actions if need be.

That Europeans have become thoroughly disenchanted with centuries of war seems reflected in the surveys as well as the growing sense that ordinary citizens or subjects can do something about the incidence of war. No monocausal explanation can be adequate for the growth of consciousness in this area from, say, the beginning of the nineteenth century, but a number of factors in a cascading manner certainly contributed. The idea inherent in a

democracy of citizen involvement in the affairs of state was reinforced and made more focused by mass literacy and mass circulation media. This availability of views, if not always of verifiable data, may have reached an apogee in the ubiquitousness of personal communication devices now a global phenomenon. Little goes unnoticed in today's world, including activities governments had long kept out of public view. There is now even an International Criminal Court, which for the first time has a body with worldwide reach that is able to bring individuals to account for acts against laws and treaties to which virtually all nations have subscribed but do not act upon individually. Our survey data show a public that is both aware of the possibility for and ready to demand the instantiation of a more just and peaceful world.

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Perspectives on Protest in Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Canada, the United States and Australia

14

Andrea Mercurio, James Page, Alyssa Mendlein,
Emily Bales, John Davis, Carol Davis,
Michael Whitely, and Doe West

Protest activities provide a forum and voice for the public to express their shared grievances against political elites. Of particular interest in

this chapter are mobilizing groups whose efforts are directed at promoting peace and/or ending and preventing invasions and other war-related activities. Although the specific, concrete goals of various peace and antiwar activists may not be achieved in whole, they can have a significant impact in other ways such as drawing attention to an issue, raising public consciousness, pressuring political leaders and policy-makers, and weakening a governmental infrastructure oriented toward solving problems through war (Carty & Onyett, 2006).

Important peace and antiwar movements have occurred throughout history in all the English-speaking countries considered in this chapter, namely, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Canada, the United States, and Australia. A thorough discussion of the antiwar and peace movements in all of these nations is beyond the scope of this chapter; consequently, we focus on recent protest activities in these nations. Specifically, we consider the antiwar movements against the 2003 US-led Iraq invasion. We also discuss the impact of the media and media bias on the public's perception of protest activities, which ultimately has direct and indirect consequences for the capacity of a social movement to be successful in its endeavors. Finally, we consider how recent technological advances have changed the nature of the way protest members mobilize and organize their efforts.

A. Mercurio (✉)
Department of Psychology, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA
e-mail: aemerc@bu.edu

J. Page
Department of Peace Studies, School of Humanities,
University of New England, Armidale, NSW, Australia
e-mail: james.page@une.edu.au

A. Mendlein
Department of Psychology, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA

E. Bales
Psychology Department, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA
e-mail: ebales@bu.edu

J. Davis
Department of Psychology, Texas State University,
San Marcos, TX, USA
e-mail: jd04@txstate.edu

C. Davis (Retired)
English Department, Texas State University at
San Marcos, Texas, USA
e-mail: jncdavis@the-cia.net

M. Whitely
Educational Psychologist, Kent State University, Kent,
Ohio, USA
e-mail: mwhitely@kent.edu

D. West
Quinsigamond Community College, Worcester, MA, USA
e-mail: doewest@aol.com

The 2003 US Invasion of Iraq

Leading up to the second invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United States and its allies, despite concrete proof, alleged that Saddam Hussein harbored weapons of mass destruction and thus posed a threat to the security and safety of other nations. As it became clear that an attack on Iraq was inevitable, citizens throughout the world began to express their opposition to the impending war through organized demonstrations. Prior to and during the Iraq invasion, massive public demonstrations were organized and carried out reflecting the strong antiwar sentiment among the public in various countries around the globe (Gillan, Pickerall, & Webster, 2008).

The height of these protests took place on the weekend of February 15, 2003 in over 600 cities all over the world. Though figures are not exact, the magnitude of these coordinated protest efforts were considerable and according to some represent the largest antiwar demonstration in contemporary history (Cotwright, 2008; Dardis, 2006; Gillan et al., 2008). The BBC reported that an estimated six to ten million demonstrators took to the streets in approximately 60 different countries (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2765215.stm>). Many of the larger marches took place in English-speaking countries discussed in this section (e.g., the USA, Great Britain, and Australia).

Demonstrations taking place in London during that weekend represent the biggest in their history with estimates ranging from 750,000 (estimate by the police) to 2 million (estimate by the protesters themselves), (Gillan et al., 2008). A noteworthy 100–200,000 individuals took part in another antiwar protest in London on March 22, 2003, highlighting the ongoing disapproval of the British government's support and participation in the invasion efforts. Although opinion polls showed shifting levels of support for Britain's involvement in the Iraq conflict, according to one poll, as much as 30% of the public opposed it in March of 2003 when British troops were actively fighting (Murray, Parry, Robinson, & Goddard, 2008). Some have speculated that opposition to the war may have been stronger among the public, but many likely felt compelled

to show support for their nation's troops (Lewis et al., 2005 as cited by Murray et al., 2008).

Antiwar sentiment was also strong in Australia. As in Great Britain, Australia too saw a record-breaking number protesting the Iraq war, with a reported 500,000 Australians rallying across the country on February 15th (O'Connor & Vucetic, 2010). Public opinion data suggest that the majority of Australians may initially have supported an attack on Iraq but that support for the Iraq war increased after 88 Australians were killed in the Bali attacks on October 12, 2002. However, when the national opinion polls specifically questioned citizens about the government's participation in the war without authorization from the United Nations, support for Australian involvement in Iraq seemed relatively low. For example, according to one opinion poll, 68–71% of Australians opposed participation in the war if the United Nations did not provide approval (O'Connor & Vucetic, 2010).

Relative to Great Britain and Australia, protests against the 2003 Iraq war in Canada and Ireland were smaller in scale during that weekend of organized protest around the world. Protest numbers in Toronto and Vancouver totaled only between 20,000 and 30,000 each (O'Connor & Vucetic, 2010). In Montreal, demonstrations on February 16th were larger, with between 150,000 and 250,000 protesters taking to the streets in opposition to the US-led invasion. There is some suggestion that the strong public opposition in Canada to the war was influential in the government's decision not to join US forces in Iraq (O'Connor & Vucetic, 2010). In Ireland, 100,000 protesters gathered to oppose the Iraq war in one of the biggest demonstrations that the country had seen in the last two decades (Cox, 2006).

In the United States, protest groups were relatively small during the administration's invasion of and war with Afghanistan (Heany & Rojas 2006). However, the antiwar movement gained momentum when the government expressed intent to invade the nation of Iraq (Meyer & Corrigan-Brown, 2005). New York City and San Francisco were both sites of larger demonstrations in the USA on the weekend of February 15th. A reported 400,000 protested in New York City while tens of thousands expressed their dissent in San Francisco (Cotright, 2008). Cotright, a scholar and self-

identified antiwar activist, commented that “in the course of just a few months, the movement in the United States reached levels of mobilization that, during the Vietnam era, took years to develop” (p. 201). According to Heany and Rojas (2007), during the first 2 years of the Iraq war, antiwar activists in the USA primarily relied on organized public demonstrations to express their opposition. Later on, some turned to more unconventional strategies. For example, in August of 2005, Cindy Sheehan held her own 26-day vigil at President Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas. Large-scale protests did, however, continue in 2004 and 2005. On August 29, 2004 an estimated 500,000 protested at the Republican National Convention (McFadden, 2004), and on September 24, 2005 over 300,000 antiwar activists reportedly protested in Washington DC (Dvorak, 2005).

Despite the hundreds of thousands of people opposing military action in Iraq, both prior to and during the war, President Bush and his advisors appeared to be unmoved by the magnitude of those rallying against the governmental policies of aggression. President Bush seemingly dismissed the significance of the massive organized demonstrations that occurred on the 15th and 16th of February and was quoted in a New York Times article as saying “Size of protest—it’s like deciding, well, I’m going to decide policy based upon a focus group” (Stevenson, 2003, para. 3). The Bush administration appeared determined to remove Saddam Hussein from power with or without the support of its own people and the world or UN backing. The eruption of organized protests taking places in nations across the globe led one New York Times reporter to comment that there were “two superpowers on the planet: the United States and world public opinion” (2003, pA1). It was the USA versus the world and the USA would not be denied.

The Media and Protests

Media coverage of antiwar protests plays a crucial role in the ability of protesters to be successful in their goals and can greatly influence public attitude toward the cause. The media has

been accused of favoring the government’s and military’s agenda during wartime (Murray et al., 2008). A number of factors may help account for this tendency or pattern of bias, including reliance upon official sources for information, patriotism, pressure to report on more dramatic news, and apprehension that reporting may undercut or damage war efforts (Di Cicco, 2010; Murray et al., 2008). In addition, there may be more subtle influences. McLeod and Detenber (1999) suggest that “media support for the status quo is embedded in the processes of news production and often occurs without the conscious awareness of the individuals who produce the messages” (p. 4).

News coverage of antiwar activism and peace demonstrations often portray protest groups that challenge the existing state of affairs in a negative light, marginalizing and delegitimizing them in a number of ways (Hallin, 1986; Luther & Miller, 2005; McLeod & Detenber, 1999). Antiwar protesters may be portrayed as a nuisance, irrational, extremist, anti-troop, or disloyal (Dardis, 2006; Hackett & Zhao, 1994; Hallin, 1986). In fact, according to one study conducted in the USA, the representation of protests as a nuisance and bothersome has increased over time since 1967 (Di Cicco, 2010). Coverage may focus more on confrontations with police, disorderly conduct, or unusual characteristics of the protesters themselves such as body decorations or unconventional clothing as opposed to emphasizing the position of the protesters (Dardis, 2006). All of this likely serves to render the views of the protesters as atypical and in the minority relative to the mainstream views of the general public. This type of reporting on antiwar protests is often referred to as the “protest paradigm,” and studies indicate that it can leave the public with an unfavorable view of the protesters themselves or the positions they advocate (e.g., McLeod, 1995; McLeod & Detenber, 1999).

Studies examining newspaper coverage of protests against the 2003 Iraq war suggest that this manner of biased reporting, or this protest paradigm, was apparent in both US and UK reporting (Dardis, 2006). For example, in these countries, reports of protest groups were delegiti-

mized through the use of certain techniques like focusing on “general lawlessness,” defined as “mention of arrests and illegal activities” (p. 17). Furthermore, use of this marginalization technique was associated with a general negative depiction of protesters in the USA and UK. Interestingly, however, Dardis found that US newspaper coverage of protests was more likely to utilize various marginalization techniques compared with the UK. Thus, relative to protest groups in the USA, protest groups in the UK appeared to receive less negative coverage on the whole. Other evidence suggests that prior to and during the Iraq war protest groups in the UK did receive more positive than negative coverage (Murray et al., 2008). However, Murray and colleagues also reported that once the Iraq war was under way, positive coverage of antiwar protest activity began to decrease.

Implementing certain delegitimizing tactics in news coverage is not the only way protest groups are negatively impacted. When newspapers avoid or fail to highlight the specific views or activities of protesters, this can be similarly damaging, as it clearly limits the public’s ability to assess the scope of antiwar efforts. Dimitrova (2006) found that the antiwar sentiment was noticeably absent from news coverage in a popular Australian newspaper. The *Australia* was examined from March 20 to May 1, 2003, and, despite the fact that marches took place across the country, antiwar protesters were not regularly covered.

During the period when the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) was being administered in the United Kingdom/Anglo countries (2005–2008), initial support for the invasion of Iraq in those countries was beginning to wane. Given that the 9/11 attacks were still a vivid memory, the United States was involved in war on Iraq, and that support for that war was showing some decline, what kinds of views did ordinary people within the USA and the other UK/Anglo countries think about the potential right to protest against war and in favor of peace? Did they see protests as a right? an obligation? an unpatriotic act? These were the questions we addressed through analysis of responses to the PAIRTAPS.

Methods

The Sample

The UK/Anglo sample was composed of participants from Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, and the United States (USA). There were a total of 946 participants in this sample (507 females, 439 males). Of these respondents, 244 (128 females, 116 males) were from Australia, 109 (71 females, 38 males) were from Canada, 86 (37 females, 49 males) were from Great Britain, 71 (35 females, 36 males) were from Northern Ireland, and 436 (236 females, 200 males) were from the USA. The respondents ranged in age from 18 to 86, with the average age of about 33. Fourteen percent reported military service, 64% reported having a relative in the military, and 35% reported having participated in protest at some point.

Participants were asked to complete the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Scale (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006). For more information on the PAIRTAPS, refer to Chap. 12. This chapter focuses on the participants’ responses to two items about protest. The first item was “Individuals have the right to stage protest against war and in favor of peace.” For this item, participants were asked first to rate their level of agreement on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1, totally disagree, to 7, totally agree. They were then asked to respond qualitatively, explaining their reasoning behind the rating. It was the qualitative responses that were the focus of our analyses. The second item proposed a scenario “Police are beating peaceful antiwar demonstrators. What would you want to do?” and then asked participants to indicate in their own words how they would want to act in such a situation.

Procedure

Participant responses were coded based on the occurrence of themes relating to the socio-cognitive processes described by Albert Bandura’s theory of

moral disengagement. Bandura's theory suggests that a person's moral agency is determined, guided, or deterred by society's standards (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Caparelli, 1996). He identified eight main socio-cognitive processes through which individuals may morally disengage themselves from feeling of guilt concerning their own detrimental conduct: (a) moral justification, (b) euphemistic labeling, (c) advantageous comparison, (d) displacement of responsibility, (e) diffusion of responsibility, (f) disregard or distortion of consequences, (g) dehumanization, and (h) attribution of blame (Bandura, 1999).

Moral justification, euphemistic labeling, and advantageous comparison all fall within Bandura's broad category of cognitive restructuring of inhumane conduct to frame it as worthy moral conduct. Displacement and diffusion of responsibility, identified by Bandura as ways of disavowing a sense of personal agency, operate by obscuring and minimizing the perpetrator's agentive role in the harm caused. Harmful actions that individuals carry out or accommodate to attributed to authorities or diffuse others rather than to themselves.

The disregard or distortion of consequences operates by minimizing and ignoring the injurious effects of actions. By distorting consequences, this mechanism subverts the self-regulating mechanism that generally becomes activated when people are faced with suffering, keeping them from becoming vicariously aroused and distressed and reducing the likelihood that they will act in a self-restraining manner regarding those who are being treated inhumanely. Dehumanization and attribution of blame fall within Bandura's final broad category of devaluing the victim. Dehumanizing the recipients of harmful acts and laying blame on them for their own suffering allows perpetrators to see themselves as faultless victims forced to harmful conduct by persuasive provocation. For more information on Bandura's moral disengagement theory, refer to Chap. 12.

Members of the Group on International Perspectives of Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP) developed the protest coding manuals. One set of coding guidelines was established using deductive qualitative analysis based

on concepts from Bandura's theory of socio-cognitive processes to create categories into which codeable response units were placed and then analyzed. The process of deductive qualitative analysis begins with a conceptual model, and as the responses are studied more in depth, the model is reworked to fit the responses (Gilgun, 2003). Coding categories were also derived using grounded theory methods, which allow categories to be formed using common themes appearing in qualitative data (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). In presenting our results from the UK/Anglo sample, we refer to responses that affirm or reject the right to protest, as well as pro-social and anti-social responses; we do not assume that these responses mean that the participants are morally engaged or disengaged, only that the arguments are consistent with the theoretical mechanisms in Bandura's theory.

Is There a Right to Protest?

Coding Guidelines for the Right to Protest Item

Examination of responses regarding a right to protest against war in favor of peace resulted in the identification of four basic sets of coding categories: (a) *affirmation of the right*, (b) *rejection of the right*, (c) *nonspecific argument*, and (d) *focus on perceived reality*. Responses affirming the right to protest against war were coded into one of four major categories: (a) *general affirmation of the right*, (b) *social justification* (with subcategories for *peace* and *awareness of negative consequences*), (c) *moral responsibility* (with subcategories for *civic duty*, *nonviolent*, and *law abiding*), and (d) *humanization* (with subcategories for *reciprocal right*, *human rights*, and *socially sanctioned rights*). *General affirmation* of the right applied to responses simply indicating general agreement with the right to protest. *Social justification* was coded when a response indicated that protest is a right because it supports the betterment of society in the short and/or long term. This category included subcategories for responses supporting protest as a means of achieving peace (*peace*) or avoiding the negative

results of inaction (*awareness of negative consequences*). Responses coded for *moral responsibility* indicated that protests are a moral way of expressing an opinion. A response was coded for *humanization* if it emphasized the human quality of the protesters. In addition, a response was coded into a *humanization* subcategory if it emphasized (a) having the same rule for others as for ourselves (*reciprocal right*), (b) an inherent right of every human to protest (*human rights*), or (c) the recognition of protest as a right sanctioned by society and/or government, or protected under national law (*socially sanctioned rights*). The subcategory *human rights* included an additional more specific set of subcategories for *it should be a right* and *international law* (e.g., “human rights agreements protect the right to protest”).

The second set of coding categories, for responses *rejecting the right* to protest, had seven major categories: (a) *general rejection of the right* (e.g., “no”), (b) *pseudo-moral reasoning* (e.g., “we need to support the people fighting and dying for us”), (c) *negative labeling* (e.g., “protests are unpatriotic”), (d) *disadvantageous comparison* (e.g., “it is better to obey the law”), (e) *denial of personal responsibility* (“Why should I protest? The government should stop the war”), (f) *distorting consequences* (“full protests are disrespectful to those fighting for their safety”), (g) *dehumanization* (“protesters are worms”), and (h) *attribution of blame* (e.g., “Should we protest when terrorists of the other country are reported to be planning inhuman acts of violence?”).

The third set of coding categories, for *nonspecific arguments*, consisted of two major categories, *depends* and *do not know*. Responses were coded into these categories if they did not provide enough information to qualify as either *affirmation of the right* or *rejection of the right*.

Finally, the fourth and final set of coding categories were for responses that *focused on perceived reality*; these responses referred to some real-world occurrence of or response to protests and fell into one of three subcategories: *general nonspecific focus on perceived reality* (e.g., “protests are happening everywhere”), *right may not be respected* (e.g., sometimes this right is, unfortunately, denied), and *protest is futile* (e.g., “protests are nice but rarely achieve anything”).

The Right to Protest: Distribution of Responses

In response to the right to protest item, 88% of the responses affirmed the right of the individual to protest. Although many of the *affirmation of the right* subcategories were identified in the responses, only those subcategories accounting for more than 10% of all responses in a category are discussed. The categories with responses portraying protests as being a *moral responsibility*, needing to be *nonviolent*, and *socially sanctioned rights* meet this criterion (10%, 19%, and 29%, respectively, of responses in the *affirmation of the right* category). A typical example of a response identifying the right to protest as a *socially sanctioned right* comes from a 50-year-old man from the United States, who stated that protest is “our constitutional right.” An example of a response coded for *moral responsibility* comes from a 58-year-old woman from Northern Ireland, who stated “can’t stand idly by;” and a 29-year-old Canadian woman gave a typical example of a response coded for *nonviolent*: “as long as they are using nonviolent means.” Two of these subcategories, *nonviolent* and *socially sanctioned rights*, were also among the most popular response overall (17% and 26%, respectively, of total responses). Examples of responses coded in the pro-protest category, as well as basic demographic information, are shown in Table 14.1.

Only 5% of responses to the right to protest item were coded for *rejection of the right*. Responses in this major category were most likely to be coded for *moral reasoning in support for troops or the government* or *distorting consequences* of protest (29% and 40%, respectively, of responses in the *rejection of the right* category). An example of a rejection of the right to protest based on *support for troops or the government* came from a 20-year-old woman from the United States, who stated: “Individuals have the right to express themselves, but in a time of war the country is fragile and I don’t think there should be major protests against the position the government has taken.” *Distorting consequences* was the most frequently used of the *rejection of the right* categories. For example, a 19-year-old female from Northern Ireland, when asked if people should have the right to protest, said “this can cause problems instead of helping.”

Table 14.1 Examples of pro-protest responses

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Pro-protest</i>	88				
<i>Moral responsibility</i>	9(10)	Australia	Male	27	“Provided said protests do not interfere with the rights of others”
		Australia	Female	57	“We must speak for our beliefs”
Nonviolent	17(19)	Canada	Female	29	“As long as they are using nonviolent means”
		USA	Female	18	“If the protests proceed in a peaceful manner, I see no problem with this. Violent protests, however, are completely contradictory of their cause”
<i>Humanization</i>	1(2)				
Socially sanctioned right	25(29)	UK	Male	65	“This is a basic democratic principle”
		Northern Ireland	Female	18	“Freedom of speech is a right not a privilege”

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percent of responses out of the total responses. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses for that specific subcategory out of all responses in the pro-protest category

Examples of responses coded as being protest intolerant, along with their demographic information, are provided in Table 14.2.

The *nonspecific argument* category, used to code responses providing no clear pro- or anti-protest argument, accounted for only 1% of all responses.

Six percent of the responses were coded into the category of *perceived reality*. An example of a *general focus on perceived reality* (56% of the responses within this category) came from a 34-year-old Australian man who said, “this [the item] says a lot about our society whereby the only way someone can voice opposition to war is through a protest” and an 18-year-old man from the United States who said “there should [be a right to protest] but this isn’t always the case in all countries.” Thirty-one percent of the *perceived reality* responses were coded into the *protest is futile* subcategory; for example, a 19-year-old woman from the UK said “the government does what it wants—they don’t give a shit about peoples’ opinions.” Examples of responses coded into the *perceived reality* category, as well as their demographic information, are provided in Table 14.3.

The Right to Protest: Exploratory Statistical Analyses

In order to explore the extent to which response patterns varied on the basis of demographic group characteristics, we conducted a series of chi-square analyses. The four demographics analyzed were (a) gender, (b) military experience, (c) a relative with military experience, and (d) protest experience.

There were a number of statistically significant group differences in responses to the right to protest item. A significantly larger proportion of women than men affirmed the right to protest if done in a *nonviolent* manner. There were also differences based on relatives’ military service in the use of two of the *humanization* subcategories: (a) respondents without a relative in the military were marginally more likely than their counterparts to state that protesting is a *human right* and (b) a significantly larger proportion of respondents with a relative in the military as compared to those without said that protesting is a *socially sanctioned right*. Non-protesters were marginally more likely than protesters to agree with the right to *nonviolent* protests. Conversely, a significantly

Table 14.2 Examples of anti-protest responses

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Anti-protest</i>	5				
<i>Pseudo-moral reasoning</i>					
Support for the troops or government	1(29)	Australia	Female	28	"I feel that we should show support for our troops who risk their lives so people can live!"
<i>Distorting consequences</i>	2(40)	Northern Ireland	Female	19	"This can cause problems instead of helping"
		USA	Male	24	"Ok and the consequences range from the Russian Revolution, to Kent State, to Woodstock"

Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percent of responses out of the total responses. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses for that specific subcategory out of all responses in the anti-protest category

Table 14.3 Examples of perceived reality responses

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Perceived reality</i>	6				
<i>Focus of perceived reality</i>	3(56)	Australia	Male	49	"This says a lot about our society whereby the only way someone can voice opposition to war is through a protest"
		Northern Ireland	Female	34	"They have this right but it can often be abused and get out of hand"
<i>Protest is futile</i>	2(31)	Northern Ireland	Female	21	"I don't think protests do much good"
		USA	Female	19	"Protests don't accomplish anything"

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percent of responses out of the total responses. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses for that specific subcategory out of all responses in the perceived reality category

higher proportion of protesters argued that protesting is our *civic duty* and said that protest *should be a right* in countries where it is not a right. Table 14.4 displays the results of the right to protest item with the chi-square values and organized by demographic characteristic.

Police Beating Peaceful Protesters Item

Coding Procedure

Bandura's theory describes moral agency as being inhibitive or proactive (Bandura, 1999). The proactive aspect of moral agency prompts people to engage in moral actions, not just inhibits them from behaving immorally (Bandura, 1999). Our second item, which asks participants

to report what they would do in response to police beating innocent protesters, taps into the proactive side of moral agency. Participants' responses were categorized into three major categories: *pro-social agency*, *antisocial agency*, and *lack of agency*. These major categories were then further divided into multiple subcategories.

Pro-social agency was divided into three subcategories: *judgment of police*, *personal initiative*, and *institutional initiative*. The subcategory of *personal initiative* was further broken down into *activism*, *personal understanding*, and *other solutions*. Similarly, *institutional initiative* was further divided into *legal action*, and *government/other agency*. The second major category, *antisocial agency*, had three subcategories: *support for police*, *unlawful activism*, and *demonstrators*. Finally, *lack of agency* was divided into the subcategories of *lack of initiative* and *helplessness*.

Table 14.4 Responses to the right to protest item: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and Chi-squared values

	Group 1	Group 2	χ^2
	Male	Female	
<i>Affirmation of the right</i>			
<i>Moral responsibility</i>			
Nonviolent	15	20	5.27*
	Relative military	No relative in military	
<i>Affirmation of the right</i>			
<i>Humanization</i>			
Human rights	6	10	3.64 [^]
Socially sanctioned right	28	21	4.28*
	Protest	No protest	
<i>Affirmation of the right</i>			
<i>Moral responsibility</i>			
Civic duty	12	5	17.77**
Nonviolent	15	20	3.71 [^]
<i>Humanization</i>			
Human rights			
It should be a right	8	5	5.6*

Note. If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference. Numbers in the columns are the percentage of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

[^] $=.051 \leq p < 0.10$; * $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$

Judgment of police, a subcategory of *pro-social agency*, was used to code responses critical of the police actions in general. Responses that referenced any general personal involvement in support of the protesters, such as attempts to interfere with police actions or voice support for the protesters, were coded for *personal initiative*. Within this subcategory, responses recommending a public display of action (e.g., protesting the action of the police, reporting the actions to the media) were coded for *activism*. Responses suggesting an intent to understand the rationale for the beatings without displaying action were coded under *personal understanding*, while responses referring to actions other than protesting as a way to end police beating were coded for *other solutions*. The final subcategory, *institutional initiative*, was for responses referring to an unspecified institution or punishment of police. If the response recommended taking legal recourse against the police involved in the beatings, or contacting institutional agencies, these responses were coded for *legal action* or *government/other entity*, respectively.

Antisocial agency, the second major category, included three subcategories: (a) *support for police*, used to code responses reflecting support for police beating the protesters; (b) *unlawful activism* for responses suggesting a desire to use of violent acts against the police; and (c) *action against demonstrators* including recommendations to take action against the protesters, such as jailing them. Finally, responses indicating that the participant would not want to do anything if he or she saw police beating protesters or that he or she would feel unable to do anything in this situation were coded for *lack of initiative* and *helplessness*.

Police Beating Protesters: Distribution of Responses

Pro-social agency was the most prominent theme among responses to the question of what people would do in the event police were beating peaceful protesters (81%). Only 11% of responses referenced an *antisocial* reaction to the prompt,

Table 14.5 Examples of pro-social agency responses

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Pro-social agency</i>	81				
<i>Personal initiative</i>	30(37)	Northern Ireland	Male	22	“End it if at all possible”
		UK	Female	19	“Make people listen and understand peacefully”
Activism	16(20)	Canada	Male	28	“Film everything. Get the word out about it”
		Australia	Female	30	“Join the demonstrators and be a witness”
<i>Institutional initiative</i>	7(9)				
Legal action	12(15)	Canada	Male	31	“Put the policemen in jail”
		Northern Ireland	Female	43	“Have police formally charged”

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percent of responses out of the total responses. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses for that specific subcategory out of all responses in the pro-social agency category

Table 14.6 Examples of anti-social agency responses

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Anti-social agency</i>	11				
<i>Support for police</i>	1(11)	Canada	Male	61	“Insist on the rule of law”
		Australia	Male	33	“Join in and help the Police”
<i>Unlawful activism</i>	8(74)	Australia	Male	34	“Beating those that are beating to get them to stop”
		USA	Female	20	“Beat up the police!”

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percent of responses out of the total responses. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses for that specific subcategory out of all responses in the anti-social agency category

while a mere 6% of responses reflected *little likelihood of involvement*.

Personal initiative, *activism*, and *legal action* were the most popular types of responses within the *pro-social agency* category (37%, 20%, and 15%, respectively, of the *pro-social* responses). An example of a response coded for *personal initiative* came from a 45-year-old Australian woman, who responded to the police beating prompt by saying that she would “make it stop.” A 23-year-old man from Canada provides an example of *activism* by responding that he would “post on the internet about it,” suggesting a desire to engage in a specific and public action to end the police beating. Finally, a response from an 18-year-old woman from Northern Ireland illustrates the theme of *legal action* in her statement that “people who beat innocent people should be arrested.” These three categories were also the most popular thematic responses overall (30%, 16%, and 12%, respectively, of the total responses). Table 14.5

displays examples of responses within the *pro-social agency* category.

Of the total responses from the *antisocial agency* major category, *unlawful activism* was the most popular type of response (74% of the *antisocial* responses). An extreme example of *unlawful activism* was provided by a 22-year-old woman from the United States who stated that she would want to “kill the police.” A 57-year-old woman from Australia offered a less severe illustration of this theme in her statement that she would want to “turn the water hoses on the police.” Responses that suggested action in *support for police* accounted for a much lower percentage of the total responses in the *antisocial agency* category (11% of the *antisocial* responses). *Support for police* is clearly reflected in the response from a 26-year-old male from Australia who said: “that’s up to them they are the law keepers.” Examples of responses coded as *anti-social agency*, along with their demographic information, are provided in Table 14.6.

Table 14.7 Examples of lack of agency responses

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Lack of agency</i>	6				
<i>Lack of initiative</i>	5(86)	Northern Ireland	Male	31	“Indifferent”
		UK	Female	24	“I don’t have a view on this”
<i>Helplessness</i>	1(14)	Australia	Male	24	“Helpless”
		Canada	Female	44	“There is nothing I can do alone”

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percent of responses out of the total responses. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses for that specific subcategory out of all responses in the lack of agency category

The *lack of agency* category was divided into two subcategories: *lack of initiative* and *helplessness* (86% and 14%, respectively, of the *lack of agency* responses). Many of the responses coded for *lack of initiative* were similar to one provided by a 41-year-old man from Northern Ireland who said he would do “nothing.” Other responses, were coded for *helplessness* indicated that the participant would feel powerless. For instance, a 44-year-old woman from Canada suggested, “there’s nothing I can do alone. I’m just a widdle person.” *Lack of agency* examples and the demographic information that corresponds to those respondents are provided in Table 14.7.

Police Beating Protesters: Exploratory Statistical Analyses

Chi-square analyses were run in order to examine the possibility of group differences in the use of the *pro-social agency*, *antisocial agency*, and *lack of agency* themes. Many statistically significant group differences were found. A significantly larger proportion of women than men gave responses coded for at least one of the *pro-social agency* categories (i.e., the *pro-social agency presence* variable) and specifically demonstrated *personal initiative* in their responses. Additionally, women were marginally more likely than men to reference *institutional initiative* in their responses. A significantly higher proportion of men than women gave responses coded for at least one of the *antisocial agency* categories (thereby receiving a score for *antisocial agency presence*), as well as for at least one of the *lack of agency* categories. Finally, a significantly larger proportion

of men than women *lacked initiative* to take action in response to witnessing police beatings.

A significantly greater proportion of civilians than veterans demonstrated *personal initiative* in their responses. Conversely, a significantly higher proportion of respondents with military experience mentioned involving the *government* or *another agency* in response to the beatings as compared to their counterparts. A significantly larger proportion of protesters than non-protesters gave responses coded for at least one of the *pro-social agency* categories. In contrast, non-protesters were marginally more likely than their counterparts to give answers coded for at least one of the *antisocial agency* categories. Additionally, a significantly higher proportion of respondents who had never protested as compared to respondents who had (a) gave responses coded for one or more of the *lack of agency* categories and (b) *lacked initiative* in their responses. Table 14.8 displays the results of the police beating protesters item, including chi-square values, organized by demographic characteristic.

Discussion

All of the UK/Anglo countries have a long history of protest activity, including antiwar protests. That tradition is well reflected in the responses to the PAIRTAPS survey reported in this chapter. For example, the vast majority of respondents supported the right to protest (88%). However, quite a few responses (17%) emphasized the need for protests to be nonviolent—as consistent with the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and other international documents guaranteeing

Table 14.8 Responses to the police beating protesters item: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-squared values

	Group 1	Group 2	χ^2
	Male	Female	
<i>Pro-social agency presence</i>	76	87	17.78**
<i>Personal initiative</i>	25	35	12.23**
<i>Institutional initiative</i>	6	8	3.16 [^]
<i>Antisocial agency presence</i>	17	11	6.22*
<i>Lack of agency presence</i>	12	5	10.96**
<i>Lack of initiative</i>	10	3	21.25**
	Military service	No military service	
<i>Pro-social agency</i>			
<i>Personal initiative</i>	20	32	7.4**
<i>Institutional initiative</i>			
Government/other	9	3	8.69**
agency			
	Protesters	Non-protesters	
<i>Pro-social agency presence</i>	89	78	14.57**
<i>Antisocial agency presence</i>	11	15	3.26 [^]
<i>Lack of agency presence</i>	4	10	9.73**
<i>Lack of initiative</i>	3	8	9.05**

Note. If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference. Presence indicates that the participant provided a response that was coded for that category and/or one of its subcategories. Numbers in the columns are the percentage of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

[^] $.051 \leq p < .10$; * $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$

the right to assemble peacefully. In response to the scenario describing police beating peaceful protesters, respondents who had themselves been protesters were significantly more likely than non-protesters to indicate that if they were in such a situation, they would respond pro-socially rather than antisocially, or not at all. The pattern of responses supports a relationship between particular set of values and beliefs (e.g., in the right to protest against war and in favor of peace) and a readiness to undertake action on behalf of those beliefs and in particular a readiness to act in response to injustice, and to do so in a way that is respectful to society and the rights of others. One of the arguments (8%) made regarding the right to protest—made more often by protesters than non-protesters—was that it was a civic duty. Again, this is evidence that many people who participate in antiwar protests do so because they believe that doing so is their moral obligation as citizens.

Although a vast majority of participants from the UK/Anglo countries supported the right to protest, there were a few (5%) dissenting points of view. The reasons for their lack of support—particularly that protesters are “unpatriotic”—reflected traditionally conservative views held throughout these countries. Patriotism was a major explanation for the lack of support for protest (29% of responses that disagreed with the right), with some respondents arguing explicitly that instead citizens should respect the decisions of the government and the actions of the troops. Other studies have indicated that even if individuals do not personally support a war, they may not actively oppose it because they want to support the troops (Lewis et al., 2005 as cited by Murray et al., 2008).

In our sample, a major reason given for rejecting a right to protest was that the consequences of protest are negative or “inefficient and disruptive” (40% of responses that disagreed with the

right). This view might be a result of the media portrayal of protest (see Dardis, 2006; Hackett & Zhao, 1994; Hallin, 1986; Luther & Miller, 2005; McLeod & Detenber, 1999). Fewer than half of the respondents self-reported that they had ever been involved in protest, so many of these opinions must be in some part shaped by the only consistent exposure to these activities: the media. The “protest paradigm,” as it is often labeled, is the media’s consistent portrayal of protesters in a negative light—more and more often as a nuisance and bothersome (Di Cicco, 2010).

While the powerful role of the media in spreading prejudice and rationales for violence must be recognized, recent advances in technology have made a significant impact on the way in which social movements mobilize support and advance their interests. The internet in particular has been identified as an important mass communication tool that has played an increasingly key role in activist efforts, particularly since the September 11 attacks (Kellner, 2003; Kahn & Kellner, 2004). The internet offers an efficient, quick, and far-reaching means of communication that activist groups can use to inform the general public, spread their message, and rally like-minded individuals. The internet was especially important in the unprecedented mass mobilization that occurred across the globe in February of 2003 in protest of the impending US-led Iraq invasion (Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2009). Political groups were able to use the internet to coordinate with one another and to disseminate information about the day of protest. However, although the internet facilitates communication and offers a number of advantages to political organizations and protest groups, it is not a panacea for obstacles that activists face and in some cases creates new problems (Carty & Onyett, 2006). Some suggest that use of the internet does not necessarily allow members of activist groups to interact in ways that promote robust social relationships or a strong collective identity. Over time it will probably become clearer how technology has changed the nature of organized movements.

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Charikleia Tsatsaroni, Sherri McCarthy,
Nebojsa Petrovic, Vlado Miheljak, Marko Polič,
Anna Medvedeva, and Alev Yalcinkaya

Although historically many conflicts took place both between and within states on European ground, it seems that human beings are quite often capable of resolving their disputes following peaceful paths (Christie, Tint, Wagner, & Winter, 2008); they have “[...] the potential for love as well as for hate, for constructive as well as deconstructive behavior, for ‘we’ as well as

‘us versus them’” (Deutsch, 1999; p. 19). According to Preiser (2004, as cited in Cohrs & Boehnke, 2008), antiwar or peace activism seems to be a significant contributor to the diminishment of conflict. Nonetheless, according to the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict research (2011), the number of conflicts has increased since the end of World War II; in this context, to what extent do individuals perceive themselves as having the right to participate in antiwar activism as a potential step toward achieving and maintaining peace?

The purpose of this chapter was to explore the perspectives of ordinary people from four European countries (Greece, Russia, Serbia, and Slovenia) on the individual’s right to protest against war and in favor of peace, as well as to explore different forms of personal agency displayed in qualitative responses to a scenario in which police are described as beating peaceful protesters. Of particular interest was the extent to which Greeks, Russians, Serbians, and Slovenians varied in the kinds of reasoning that accompanied their level of agreement or disagreement with the right to protest against war and in favor of peace and also the potential types of agency displayed in responses concerning aggression against peaceful antiwar protesters.

Carlson and Listhaug (2007) suggested that since millions of people are affected each year by violations of human rights, the exploration of how people view human rights issues within their country and the factors that influence their beliefs

C. Tsatsaroni (✉)
Psychology Department, Boston University, Boston,
MA, USA
e-mail: chtsa@bu.edu

S. McCarthy
Educational Psychology, Counseling and Human
Relations, Northern Arizona University, Yuma, AZ, USA
e-mail: Sherri.McCarthy@nau.edu

N. Petrovic
Faculty of Psychology, University of Belgrade,
Belgrade, Serbia
e-mail: nebojsa.beograd@gmail.com

V. Miheljak
University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia
e-mail: vlado.miheljak@guest.arnes.si

M. Polič
Department of Psychology, University of Ljubljana,
Ljubljana, Slovenia
e-mail: marko.polic@guest.arnes.si

A. Medvedeva
University of Finland, Helsinki, Finland
e-mail: an25medved@gmail.com

A. Yalcinkaya
Department of Psychology, Yeditepe, Istanbul, Turkey
e-mail: yalcinkaya@prodigy.net;
ayalcinkaya@yeditepe.edu.tr

seems important. Carlson and Listhaug also suggested that the way citizens think about human rights conditions is significant for at least two reasons: “First, perceptions are critical for the creation of motivations that lead citizens to participate in political action to improve human rights conditions in their country.... Second, what citizens think about human rights issues can be used as a means to evaluate the larger debate over the degree to which human rights values are universal or relative” (Carlson & Listhaug, 2007, p. 466).

In spite of the limited agreement as to what exactly the concept of *human rights* means, most scholars argue that *human rights* refer to the political, civil, social, and economic rights described in the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights (Howard & Jack, 1986, as cited in Carlson & Listhaug, 2007). Specifically, the right to protest, which is the focus of this chapter, is identified in the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ Article 20 (1948) as everyone’s right to freedom to peaceful assembly and association. On the other hand, although the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1994) and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1970), in their Articles 21 and 11, respectively, recognize the right to freedom of assembly, they also emphasize the need to assemble and associate peacefully. Particularly, they advocate the free exercise of the right with no other restriction than it be peaceful and within the limits of the laws that govern a democratic society, sensitive to the interests of national security and safety of the public and protective of the health, morals, rights, and freedoms of others. Additionally, if the exercise of the right to protest falls within the limits of the law, then the administrative branch of the state, members of the armed forces, and the police are prohibited from restricting that right.

Essentially, although the major international organizations recognize the right to free assembly and association, their provisions communicate the complexity of the issue of protesting and that complexity might be reflected in the thought patterns of ordinary citizens concerning this matter. Also, it seems reasonable to consider that individuals’ different thought patterns do not form in a vacuum but rather under the influence

and dynamic interactions of different contexts in which the individuals exist. According to Carlson and Listhaug (2007), “individuals within the same country will view human rights conditions differently, depending on their life experiences, opportunities, and the amount of information available to them” (p. 472). A useful theoretical framework for examining the development of individual perspectives concerning the issue of protest is an ecological approach as formulated by Bronfenbrenner (1979).

Bronfenbrenner’s cognitive-ecological model (1979) identifies four interrelated contexts that may affect individual perspectives on the right to protest in favor of peace: (a) the *individual* (e.g., the person’s gender, age, religion, and personal involvement with protest), (b) the *micro-system* (e.g., peer groups), (c) the *exosystem* (e.g., the greater community), and (d) the *macro-system* (e.g., the nation’s international agreements, the nation’s involvement in internal and/or external warfare).

Informed by an ecological perspective, this chapter explores the factors that may affect the thought patterns of participants from Greece, Russia, Serbia, and Slovenia, all of which are signatories of the international organizations mandating a right to protest. All of these countries also share a recent history of conflict within and around their borders. These conflicts were part of the macrosystems in which views concerning the right to protest were formed, so a very brief overview of some of the recent ones is provided here.

Recent Conflicts and Protests in the Russia/Balkan Peninsula Area

Slovenia

During World War II, Slovenia, as part of the former Yugoslavia, was occupied by the Powers of the Axis and experienced a subsequent division of its territory among the allies. Different groups (e.g., Communists, Christian Democrats, intellectuals, and artists) organized the resistance against the Axis Powers (Miheljak & Polic, 2009). With the end of World War II, Slovenia experienced relative peace until 1991 when, after a long-term

political crisis regarding the status quo of the former Yugoslavia, the Slovenian War of Independence led to Slovenia's independence. Currently, Slovenians live peacefully and their constitution reflects respect for *human rights*, including the right to peaceful assembly and public meeting and freedom of association with others as long as these liberties do not go against national security and public safety (The Republic of Slovenia, 1990). In 2003, Slovenians protested military intervention in Iraq by the United States and allied countries (Green, 2003; "Iraq War," 2003).

Serbia

Serbia suffered great casualties during both World War I and World War II. During World War II, Germany pressured Yugoslavia to join the Axis Powers. In Serbia, public protesting and a strong resistance against the Nazis resulted in the forceful and brutal reaction of the German occupation against the Serbs, Jews, Romans, and the anti-Ustasa Croats (Miheljak & Polic, 2009). In 1991, a series of wars led to the breaking up of Yugoslavia and the NATO military intervention against Serbia in 1999, which ended the war after almost 3 months of heavy bombing (Petrovic, Pota, & Castanheira, 2009). The end of these wars turned out to be a significant democratic turning point for Serbia, leading to an increasing emphasis on respect for human rights. Freedom to assemble is one of the freedoms granted by the current Serbian constitution, as long as this right is exercised within the limits of law that protects public health or morals or public safety or national security (The Republic of Serbia, 2006). Recent Serbian history demonstrates that the right to protest, granted or not, has been exercised by the Serbs in different occasions ranging from antiwar social mobilization against the Milosevic regime and the NATO bombings in 1999–2000 to antiwar demonstrations against the Iraq War in 2003 and against the most recent NATO military intervention in Libya (*Antiwar unrest in Serbia*, 1999; Molotsky, 1999; Nikolayenko, 2007; Petrovic et al., 2009; *Serbia Libya protest*, 2011; Sorensen, 2008).

Greece

Due to its strategic location and ideological/political unrest, Greece has been the battlefield for several national and civil wars throughout the centuries. During World War II, the forces of the Axis occupied Greece, starting in 1941. Coming from a long-standing revolutionary tradition (Kornetis, 2010), Greeks quickly formed a resistance movement (the National Liberation Front) that launched considerable attacks against the Axis powers, under the leadership of the Communist party (Daskalopoulos & Tsatsaroni, 2009). During 1943–1944, a bloody civil war broke out between the National Liberation Front on the one side and the national army and the British allies on the other. Long-term hostilities between Greece and Turkey over dominance of the Aegean Sea as well as the Turkish invasion and occupation of the northern part of Cyprus brought the two countries close to war in 1974 and 1996. However, since 1999 the two nations have tried to pursue more positive relations with each other.

Currently, the international community views Greece as a substantial peacekeeping force in the area. Grounded in a long-standing democratic tradition, the Greek constitution guarantees Greeks the right to assemble peacefully and unarmed. The police are allowed to be present only at outdoor public assemblies and are authorized to intervene only if public security and social and economic life are under serious threat, as specified by the law (Greece, 2008). Protesting in Greece is a very common phenomenon, including antiwar protesting against recent wars such as the bombing of Serbia from the NATO forces in 1999 (Ingram, 1999; *Protests around the world*, 2000), the war in Iraq in 2003 (Giles, 2007), and the 2011 conflict in Libya (Carassava, 2011).

Russia

Several significant military events took place in the twentieth century in Russia, leaving numerous human casualties and devastation. After 4 years of bloody battle, in 1945 USSR declared

victory over Germany and World War II ended. However, the Cold War between the United States and the USSR, which started mid-1940s and lasted until the second half of the 1980s, “was characterized by several international conflicts: The Berlin Blockade, Korean War, Berlin Crisis of 1961, Vietnam War, Soviet-Afghan War, and the Cuban Missile Crisis” (McCarthy, Tochilnikova, & Medvedeva, 2009, p. 67). The political system in post-Soviet Russia, although referred to politely as *controlled democracy*, has shown a significant turn to authoritarianism, which strongly limited the scope for civic action under Putin on grounds of national security (Brygalina & Temkina, 2004; McCarthy et al., 2009; Salmenniemi, 2008). As a result, although the constitution of the Russian Federation (1993), in its Article 31, guarantees the right to unarmed peaceful assembly, only rare public protest without mass participation was recorded during the wars in Chechnya (1994–1996 and 1999–2005), where numerous human rights abuses were committed (McCarthy et al., 2009). On the other hand, thousands of Russians protested the United States invasion of Iraq in 2003. Finally, it seems that Russians search also for alternative ways in order to demonstrate antimilitary activism mainly via the internet (Lonkila, 2008).

Given the war history of the participants from Greece, Russia, Serbia, and Slovenia as well as their protest experiences, it seems meaningful to adopt a context-dependent approach to the analysis of specific variables that may have contributed to people’s views on the right to protest against war. Specifically, adopting Bronfenbrenner’s ecological approach, presented earlier in this chapter, as a useful framework for considering perceptions on the right to protest for peace, we investigated several contextual factors to see if they contributed to differences in perspectives. Specifically, we examined the possibility of differences in perspectives based on having a relative in the military service as an exosystem variable and gender, personal military service, and prior participation in protest as individual variables.

Methods

Sample

The sample consisted of 608 participants (363 women, 235 men, and 10 participants with undisclosed gender), ranging in age from 18 to 90 with the average participant being 33-year-old. Specifically, 97 (16%) of the participants were from Greece (47 women, 45 men), 313 (51%) were from Russia (206 women, 104 men), 100 (16%) were from Slovenia (55 women, 44 men), and 97 (16%) were from Serbia (55 women, 42 men). Concerning social class, 56% self-reported as belonging to the middle class, 15% to the upper and upper middle classes (1% and 14%, respectively), 12% to working class, and 8% to lower class. The majority of the participants (62%) identified themselves as Christians; 12% identified as belonging to no religion, or as being agnostics or atheists; while 26% reported *other* or did not report religion. Although only 18% reported having participated in military service, 18% did not disclose whether they have been in the military or not, and the remainder specified that they had not served. Fifty-one percent of the respondents reported having a relative in the military; 35% did not report whether they had a relative in the military or not. Finally, 16% of the participants said that they had participated in protests against war and in favor of peace; 20% did not disclose whether or not they have participated in protest against war.

Procedure

Participants were recruited through convenience sampling via peer contacts, colleges, and universities from Greece, Russia, Serbia, and Slovenia. Due to the exploratory nature of the current research and the lack of external funding, the recruitment of probability samples was not possible. Ethical guidelines concerning the treatment of human participants were followed throughout the research process, with participants giving

permission for their anonymous responses to be used in future studies. Participants completed either the paper-and-pencil or the electronic version of the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Scale (PAIRTAPS) (Malley-Morrison et al., 2006), developed in order to investigate people's perspectives on different forms of governmental aggression. Specifically, PAIRTAPS has five parts: (a) the rights scale, consisting of subscales examining people's beliefs about the acceptability of state-sanctioned aggressive actions (e.g., capital punishment, torture), and human rights to nonviolence; (b) the governmental beliefs scale, for assessing political conservatism, the perceived morality of US involvement in Iraq, and the views on justice; (c) projected emotional responses that participants might experience if exposed directly or indirectly to acts of governmental aggression (Malley-Morrison, Oh, Wu, & Zaveri, 2009, p. 156); (d) participants' definitions of major concepts related to governmental violence or nonviolence (e.g., war, terrorism, peace, apology); and (e) beliefs regarding peace, national security, justice, and the ethic of reciprocity.

For the purposes of this chapter, two pertinent items were selected for analysis: the rights item *Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace* and the emotional/motivational scenario item *Police are beating peaceful antiwar demonstrators. What would you want to do?* Concerning the rights item, participants indicated on a scale from 1 (total disagreement) to 7 (total agreement) the extent to which they agree with the people's right to protest and then explained the reasoning behind their rating in their own words (Malley-Morrison et al., 2009). For the emotional/motivational scenario item, participants indicated what they would want to do in reaction to viewing police beating peaceful antiwar demonstrators.

Coding Manual Development

Using responses from an international coding sample assembled for the development of our coding manuals (Malley-Morrison et al., 2009), our research team implemented two approaches

in developing a coding manual to capture the complexities of the participants' open-ended responses. One approach was deductive qualitative analysis (Gilgun, 2004), which begins with a conceptual model for the purpose of testing it, refining it, or disaffirming it and constructing a set of concepts and hypotheses that fit well with various types of evidence and have implications for theory, research, policy, and practice (Gilgun, 2005). Our coding manual was informed by Bandura's (1999) four main sets of sociomoral disengagement mechanisms by which tolerance for injurious acts is facilitated: (a) moral justifications, euphemistic labeling, and advantageous comparisons; (b) displacement and diffusion of responsibility; (c) minimizing and disregarding negative consequences of harmful behaviors; and (d) dehumanization and attribution of blame. Our Bandura-derived coding manual was also informed by his notion of personal agency, which can have an inhibitive aspect by helping individuals refrain from behaving inhumanely and a proactive aspect facilitating "the power to behave humanely" (Bandura, 2002, p.111).

The second approach to coding the qualitative responses used grounded theory principles (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1992). Two principles of this approach were particularly helpful: (a) the microanalysis of written texts/responses from an international coding sample assembled for the development of coding manuals (Malley-Morrison et al., 2009) and (b) coding and explanation, building upon a series of conceptual comparisons, allowing the construction of variables (major categories and subcategories) based on the classification of the concepts (LaRossa, 2005).

When referring to *responses*, we mean each codable unit within an answer to the item analyzed; many answers provided by the participants included several codable units/responses. Therefore, answers with multiple themes were broken down into multiple responses/codable units and each codable unit was assigned to a thematic category or subcategory of the coding manual. Importantly, each codable unit was coded

primarily for only one major thematic category, according to its theme. Many codable units were not coded at the most general level of a coding category but rather were coded into one of the specific subcategories within the major thematic categories. For example, the response/codable unit *protesting is a human right* would be best coded into the *human rights* subcategory of the major thematic category of *humanization* since the participant used the specific theme of *human rights* in his/her response and did not simply refer to the human qualities of the protestors. (The major coding categories and subcategories are described in more detail in a later section of this chapter as well as in Chap. 12, the introductory chapter for the Protest section of this book.)

Quantification of Coding Categories

Presence/absence scores (presence coded as 1) were created to indicate whether a response was coded for any of the antiprotest, protest-tolerant, or indeterminate status/nonspecific argument rationales or for personal agency. For example, consider this response to the protest right item: “It is a human right.” This response refers to the right to protest against war and in favor of peace as a basic, human right and therefore was given a *present* score of 1 for the *human rights* subcategory of the *humanization* category of the *protest-tolerant* construct of the coding manual. Chi-square tests of independence were performed with the presence/absence scores in order to examine whether, for example, significantly more protestors than nonprotestors provided a particular type of response. Also, for the presence/absence analyses, variables were created to indicate that the participant provided at least one example of a response in at least one of the subcategories of a major category; these variables are identified by the term *presence* at the end of a major category name. For instance, an answer justifying the right to protest by saying “Yes to free speech and the right to assembly” provides two different reasons, both of which fall into the *socially sanctioned rights* subcategory of the major category for humanization responses, justifying the right to protest based on the principles

of *free speech* and *the right to assembly*. This answer would receive a *socially sanctioned rights* score of 2 and a *humanization presence* score of 1 (because it gives at least one example of a *humanization* response).

Analytic Strategies

Due to the exploratory nature of the current study, for the initial analysis of the qualitative responses, we looked at distribution of responses across coding categories. For this purpose, we used excel formulas to calculate the percentages of responses/codable units per thematic category/subcategory out of the total percent of responses provided by the regional sample, which included participants from Greece, Russia, Serbia, and Slovenia.

Our second analytic step involved conducting chi-square contingency analyses with the presence/absence scores for each of the qualitative coding category variables to examine whether type of argument varied by gender, having military experience, having a military relative, or protest participation. In order to inform future research and due to the exploratory nature of the present study, marginally statistically significant results are reported. All group differences identified as statistically significant had p values of .05 or smaller, while all group differences identified as marginally significant had p values between .051 and .10.

Is There a Right to Protest?

Coding Manual Categories and Subcategories

In regard to responses to the individuals’ right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace item, four major sets of coding categories were identified in the qualitative responses. The first set of responses were characterized by *antiprotest* thematic categories and subcategories such as (a) *general disagreement* (e.g., “no”),

Table 15.1 Percentages and examples of antiprotest themes most frequently identified in responses from the Russia/Balkans Peninsula region

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Antiprotest</i>	3				
<i>Pseudomoral reasoning</i>	2 (45)	Greece	39	M	“They have to think about people’s properties and not to destroy everything”
		Russia	56	M	“If it does not look like a betrayal of homeland”
		Serbia	19	F	“I believe that war should be taken in cases where the signing of peace means the presence of foreign forces on our territory”
<i>Distorting consequences</i>	1 (15)	Russia	47	M	“Such a right of the Government creates the illusion of permissiveness”
		Slovenia	48	F	“Protests sometimes only provoke even higher intolerance”

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the antiprotest responses. *M* male, *F* female

(b) *pseudomoral reasoning* (subcategory: *supporting troops or the government*), (c) *negative labeling*, (d) *disadvantageous comparison*, (e) *denial of personal responsibility*, (f) *distorting consequences*, (g) *dehumanization* (subcategories: *protester* and *targets of war*), and (h) *attribution of blame* (subcategories: *protester* and *targets of war*). The second major set of responses were characterized by *protest-tolerant* thematic categories and subcategories such as (a) general agreement (e.g., “yes”), (b) *social justification* (subcategories: *peace* and *awareness of negative consequences*), (c) *moral responsibility* (subcategories: *civic duty*, *nonviolent*, and *law abiding*), and (d) *humanization* (subcategories: *reciprocal right*, *socially sanctioned rights*, and *human rights*—which had further subcategories for *it should be a right* and *international law*). Finally, there was a third set of thematic categories named *indeterminate reasoning/nonspecific argument* that referred to responses not fitting into either the *antiprotest* or the *protest-tolerant* categories/subcategories (e.g., “depends,” and “do not know”) and a set of thematic categories that focused on *perceived reality* (subcategories: *the right may not be respected* and *protest is futile*). Responses that were *uncodable* or *did not address the question* were also identified.

Patterns in Qualitative Responses to Right to Protest Item

Content analysis of the responses regarding the right to stage antiwar protests revealed that only 3% percent of all responses argued against such a right. Within this small *antiprotest* group, the most common argument (almost 2% of all responses) used *pseudomoral reasoning* to oppose the right, arguing that protesting could be detrimental to society and its stability. Only a few responses (1%) cognitively *distorted the consequences* of protest. Table 15.1 provides percentages of responses for the most frequently identified *antiprotest* arguments out of the total percentage of the sample’s responses. It also provides sample quotes for each type of argument.

The majority of all the responses (84%) were coded into the *protest-tolerant* (proprotest) categories and subcategories. Specifically, 14% of all responses just restated the prompt or gave a *general affirmation* to the right (e.g., “yes”). Eight percent of all responses *socially justified* protest as a means for achieving a positive end (e.g., the betterment of society). For example, a 34-year-old Serbian man said, “Yes, to prevent war, to prevent killing of people.” Seven percent of all responses supported protest as a pathway to

Table 15.2 Percentages and examples of protest-tolerant themes most frequently identified in responses from the Russia/Balkans Peninsula region

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Protest</i>	84				
<i>Moral responsibility</i>	11 (13)	Russia	18	F	“Each person should defend his opinion”
		Greece	52	F	“Everybody should not only live peacefully, but defend this right”
		Serbia	34	M	“There is a need for expression, appeal, any contribution to the fight against evil”
Nonviolent	10 (12)	Serbia	21	F	“Peaceful protests of course”
		Slovenia	54	M	“Yes, but protests must be peaceful”
		Russia	20	M	“If the demonstration is peaceful”
<i>Humanization</i>	0 (0)				
Human rights	13 (16)	Greece	55	F	“Basic human right”
		Russia	30	F	“People have the right to choose between war and peace”
		Slovenia	40	M	“To live in peace is one of the basic rights”
Socially sanctioned rights	11 (13)	Serbia	37	M	“Everyone has the right to his/her opinion and to express it in public”
		Greece	26	F	“It is one of the fundamental rights of democracy”
		Slovenia	20	M	“Each citizen’s right”

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the protest responses. *M* male, *F* female

peace. A 32-year-old Russian woman suggested, “Yes for the purpose of peacemaking.” A few responses (3%) indicated an *awareness of the negative consequences* of inaction. A 57-year-old Slovenian man stated, “War always leads to crimes against humanity.” Several responses (11%) suggested that individuals have the *moral responsibility* to protest. Six percent of all responses portrayed protest as a *civic duty* if there was disagreement with the government. A 25-year-old Serbian woman commented, “If the views and opinions of the people disagree with the government, they should protest and thus fight for the right to live in peace.” Also, 10% of all responses suggested that the right should be expressed in a *nonviolent* manner. A 34-year-old Slovenian man said, “Peaceful protests without fights.” Thirteen percent of all responses accepted the right to protest as one of the inherent, basic *human rights* that every human has. A 55-year-old Greek woman said, “The world has a right to live in a peaceful environment and protest against war.” Additionally, 11%

of all responses accepted the right as a *socially sanctioned right* protected by national law. Table 15.2 provides percentages of responses for the most frequently identified *protest-tolerant* arguments out of the total percentage of the sample’s responses. It also provides additional illustrative quotes for each type of reasoning.

Concerning responses that reflected *indeterminate reasoning*, 1% of all responses were “it depends” statements. Also, 2% of all responses were uncodable; 5% of all the responses did not answer the prompt; 4% were statements about how the protests “in the real world” are used (*perceived reality*).

Results of Exploratory Analyses of Right to Protest Item

Pearson chi-square and Fisher’s exact tests were conducted on an exploratory basis to assess the extent to which there were statistically significant and marginally significant group differences

Table 15.3 Right to protest against war: chi-square values, Fisher's exact test probabilities, and percentages of responses in coding categories by democratic groups

Category ^a	Group 1 ^b		χ^2
	Men	Group 2 ^b Women	
<i>Protest</i>			
<i>Social justification presence</i>	15.4	22.6	3.52 [^]
<i>Social justification</i>	5.3	10.9	4.32 [*]
<i>Humanization</i>			
Socially sanctioned right	14.4	8.9	3.19 [^]
	With military experience	No military experience	
<i>Protest</i>			
<i>Social justification</i>	4.2	11.3	4.17 [*]
<i>Humanization</i>			
Socially sanctioned right	18.9	8.6	7.83 ^{**}
<i>Antiprotest</i>			
<i>Pseudomoral reasoning Presence</i>	5.3	1.0	6.35 ^{^c}
	With military relative	No military relative	
<i>Protest</i>			
<i>Humanization</i>			
Socially sanctioned right	11.3	3.1	3.95 [*]
	Protest	No protest	
<i>Protest</i>			
<i>Moral responsibility</i>	29.3	8.4	24.01 ^{***}
Civic duty	14.7	5.8	6.71 ^{**}

Note. If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference

[^] $=.051 \leq p < .10$; ^{*} $p \leq 0.05$; ^{**} $p \leq 0.01$; ^{***} $p \leq 0.001$

^a *Presence* at the end of the variable name signifies that the participant provided at least one example of a response in at least one of the subcategories of a major category

^b Numbers in the columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^c Refers to Fisher's exact test probabilities

based on demographic characteristics in responses concerning the individuals' right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace. A number of statistically significant group differences were found. Specifically, analyses revealed that a significantly greater proportion of women than men *socially justified* protest for the betterment of society. On the other hand, at a marginally significant level, proportionately more men than women identified protest as a *socially sanctioned right*.

Perspectives on protest also varied in relation to whether or not the respondents had military experience. Specifically, a significantly higher proportion of respondents without military experience

than respondents with military experience provided responses that *socially justified* protesting to achieve a positive end. Also, a significantly higher proportion of respondents with military experience than respondents without military experience recognized the right to protest as a *socially sanctioned right*. On the other hand, proportionately more participants with military experience than their counterparts provided at least one example of a response in at least one of the *pseudomoral reasoning* subcategories (*pseudomoral reasoning presence*), opposing the right to protest as a potential danger for the stability of the society, for example, "if it does not look like a betrayal of the homeland." Moreover, a significantly greater pro-

portion of respondents with a military relative than those without one provided rationales agreeing with protest as a right that is *socially sanctioned* by society and protected by national law. Analyses also revealed that a significantly higher proportion of protestors than nonprotestors provided responses referring to individuals' *moral responsibility* to protest as a way to express their opinions and considered protest as a *civic duty* to express disagreement with the government. Table 15.3 presents the chi-square and Fisher's exact test results for the individuals' right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace.

Police Beating Innocent Protestors Item

Coding Manual/Procedure

Deductive qualitative analysis procedures (Gilgun 2004, 2005) and grounded theory principles (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1992) were used for the identification of thematic categories and subcategories for coding responses to the hypothetical scenario in which police are beating peaceful antiwar demonstrators. The categories/subcategories for coding the responses to the hypothetical scenario item were informed by Bandura's notion of personal agency (1999). According to Bandura (1999), the exercise of moral agency has dual aspects—*inhibitive* and *proactive*. "The inhibitive form is manifested in the power to refrain from behaving inhumanely. The proactive form of morality is expressed in the power to behave humanely" (Bandura, 2002, p.111). Bandura (1999) has also suggested that "proactive moral action is regulated in large part by resolute engagement of the mechanisms of moral agency. In the exercise of proactive morality, people act in the name of humane principles when social circumstances dictate expedient, transgressive, and detrimental conduct" (p. 203).

Therefore, concerning the hypothetical scenario where participants were asked what they would want to do if they saw police beating

peaceful antiwar demonstrators, participants' responses were coded primarily for the construct of personal agency with several major sets of thematic categories. *Prosocial agency* categories included (a) *critical judgment of police*, (b) *personal initiative* (with subcategories for *activism*, *personal understanding*, and *other solutions*), and (c) *institutional initiative* (with subcategories for *legal action* and *government/other agency*). The *antisocial agency* categories were (a) *support for police*, (b) *unlawful activism*, and (c) *actions against demonstrators*. The *lack of agency* categories were *lack of initiative* and *helplessness*. When parts of the responses to this hypothetical scenario could be better captured using the categories of the *antiprotest*, *protest*, and *indeterminate reasoning* coding criteria, then they were coded into those categories. Also, some responses to the hypothetical scenario fell into the categories of *perceived reality* (*the right may not be respected* and *protest is futile*) or were *uncodable* or *did not address the question*.

Patterns in Qualitative Responses to Scenario Item

When asked what they would want to do if they saw police beating peaceful antiwar demonstrators, respondents provided a variety of responses, the majority of which (68%) expressed *prosocial agency*. At the most general level, 2% of all responses involved *negative judgments concerning the actions of the police* without indicating any intended personal action to stop the beatings; for example, a 76-year-old Greek woman said "One day these events have to end." Several responses (33% of all responses to the item) suggested a *personal initiative* intended to stop the police's action. A 20-year-old Russian man said he would want "To help antiwar demonstrators." Ten percent of all responses referred to *activism* such as protesting the actions of the police and reporting the actions to the media. A 32-year-old Greek woman stated, "Organize protests constantly until they decide to stop the beatings." A

Table 15.4 Percentages and examples of prosocial agency themes most frequently identified in responses from the Russia/Balkans Peninsula region

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Prosocial agency</i> 68					
<i>Personal initiative</i>	33 (49)	Greece	62	M	“Stop the beating by any mean possible”
		Russia	20	M	“To stop the police”
		Slovenia	52	F	“To prevent action”
		Serbia	20	M	“To defend myself and to defend them”
Activism	10 (15)	Slovenia	21	F	“To join the group of demonstrators”
		Greece	18	M	“Protest”
Other solutions	6 (9)	Russia	20	M	“To bring discipline to the state”
		Serbia	27	F	“If it is necessary to remove people from the street, I think that there are alternative solutions for this”
<i>Institutional initiative</i>	9 (13)	Russia	18	F	“To punish the police”
		Serbia	57	M	“To punish the police for this misdeed as drastically as possible, since they usually beat people unnecessarily”

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the prosocial agency responses. *M* male, *F* female

very small percent of all responses (1%) indicated that there would be a *personal effort to understand* the rationale for the beatings without displaying any action; for example, an 18-year-old Russian woman said she would want “To know why.” Six percent of all responses provided *other solutions* to stop police beatings. A 20-year-old Slovenian woman suggested, “Interfere with dialogue.” Suggestions for *institutional initiative* in order to stop and punish the policemen were found in 9% of all responses. A 21-year-old Serbian woman said, “Disband the police who serve the state.” Also, 5% of all responses referred to taking *legal action* against the police involved in the beatings. One percent of all responses suggested the involvement of the *government or other institutional entity* could help resolve the issue. Table 15.4 presents percentages of agentic responses for the most frequently identified processes of *prosocial agency* out of the total percentage of the sample’s responses, as well as additional examples of *prosocial agency*.

In contrast, some responses were characterized by *antisocial agency*. For example, 14% of all responses referred to forms of *unlawful activism*

such as taking violent actions against the police. A 55-year-old Greek woman stated, “Attack the policeman,” while a 19-year-old Slovenian woman said, “I would fight the police too.”

There were also responses indicative of a *lack of agency*; for example, 8% of all responses were coded for *lack of personal initiative* to stop the police (e.g., a 34-year-old Slovenian man said he would want to do “nothing”), while 3% of all responses reflected a feeling of *helplessness* in regard to police beatings (e.g., a 19-year-old Serbian woman, “Could do nothing”). Tables 15.5 and 15.6 present percentages of agentic responses for the most frequently identified processes of *antisocial agency* and *lack of agency*, respectively, out of the total response set, as well as additional examples of *antisocial agency* and *lack of agency*.

Finally, only about 3% of all the scenario responses were coded for focus on *perceived reality* or *not addressing the question* or were more appropriately coded into the *antiprotest* and *protest-tolerant* categories/subcategories of the coding manual, while 2% of all responses indicated uncertainty regarding how the participant would react if confronted with police violence

Table 15.5 Percentages and examples of antisocial agency themes most frequently identified in responses from the Russia/Balkans Peninsula region

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Antisocial agency</i>	14				
<i>Unlawful activism</i>	14 (96)	Serbia	21	F	"To beat police officers who apparently used their position to justify their inhumane behavior"
		Slovenia	40	F	"I would like to shot the policemen"
		Russia	43	M	"To beat the policemen"
		Greece	54	M	"Attack the police"

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the anti-social agency responses. *M* male, *F* female

Table 15.6 Percentages and examples of lack-of-agency themes most frequently identified in responses from the Russia/Balkans Peninsula region

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Lack of agency</i>	12				
<i>Lack of initiative</i>	8 (70)	Greece	23	M	"Nothing"
		Russia	51	M	"They will be punished by fate"
		Serbia	47	M	"To be away"
		Slovenia	85	F	"I would not react"
<i>Helplessness</i>	3 (30)	Greece	27	M	"What should I do?"
		Russia	22	M	"To escape"
		Serbia	47	M	"Not to see what happens"
		Slovenia	25	F	"There is nothing I could do about that"

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the lack-of-agency responses. *M* male, *F* female

against peaceful demonstrators (e.g., an 18-year-old Russian woman said, "I do not know").

Results of Exploratory Chi-Square Analyses for Scenario Responses

In response to this hypothetical protestor-beating scenario, several group comparisons were conducted using chi-square tests or Fisher's exact tests. These analyses revealed a number of statistically significant group differences. Specifically, a significantly higher proportion of women than men provided responses demonstrating *prosocial agency* by indicating that they would want to take

legal action against the policemen involved in the beatings. Also, at a marginally significant level, proportionately more respondents without a military relative than with a military relative referred to the necessity of an *institution initiating action* in order to stop the beatings without specifying the institution.

Finally, analyses revealed that a significantly greater proportion of protestors than nonprotestors provided responses demonstrating *prosocial agency* in references to personal beliefs (e.g., *judging the police*) without demonstrating an intent to take action, *activism* that would bring police actions into public display, or seeking *other solutions* than protesting in order to end

Table 15.7 Police are beating peaceful antiwar protesters: chi-square values, Fisher's exact test probabilities, and percentages of responses in coding categories by democratic groups

Category ^a	Group 1 ^b	Group 2 ^b	χ^2
	Men	Women	
<i>Prosocial agency</i>			
<i>Institutional initiative</i>			
Legal action	2.8	6.9	4.42*
	With military relative	No military relative	
<i>Prosocial agency</i>			
<i>Institutional initiative</i>			
	7.1	13.3	3.01 [^]
	Protest	No protest	
<i>Prosocial agency</i>			
<i>Judgment of police</i>			
	5.4	1.1	6.67 ^{^c}
<i>Personal initiative</i>			
Activism	22.8	9.5	12.03 ^{***}
Other solutions	14.1	6.0	6.70 ^{**}
<i>Lack-of-agency presence</i>			
	3.3	12.1	6.15 ^{**}
<i>Lack of initiative</i>			
	2.2	9.2	5.03 [^]

Note. If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference $^{\wedge}=.051 \leq p < .10$; * $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$

^a *Presence* at the end of the variable name signifies that the participant provided at least one example of a response in at least one of the subcategories of a major category

^b Numbers in the columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^c Refers to Fisher's exact test probabilities

police beatings. By contrast, a significantly greater proportion of nonprotestors than protesters provided responses showing *lack of personal initiative* to stop the beatings or provided at least one example of a response in at least one of the subcategories of the *lack of agency* major category. Table 15.7 presents the chi-square and Fisher's exact test results for agency responses to the scenario item.

Discussion

Response Patterns

The exploratory analyses examining the distribution of qualitative responses across coding categories in the sample as a whole revealed a plethora

of rationales for both items, reflecting a high level of agreement with the right to protest against war and in favor of peace.

The Right to Protest

Regarding the individuals' right to protest against war and in favor of peace, the great majority of the responses showed tolerance for the right by (a) simply affirming the right, (b) socially justifying the right in order to achieve a positive end in general or peace in particular, (c) recognizing the negative consequences of inaction, (d) considering protest as a moral responsibility and civic duty, (e) advocating a nonviolent exercise of the right, (f) viewing the right as a basic human right, and (g) socially sanctioning the right or considering the right as a reciprocal right.

Nevertheless, different worldviews were also expressed in participants' reasoning. Concerning the right to protest, a small percentage of the responses opposed the right, arguing that protesting could be detrimental to society and its stability, while others cognitively distorted the consequences of protest. Also, a small percentage of the responses took a "realistic" stance, reflecting the idea that the right might not be respected or considering protest as futile.

Police Are Beating Peaceful Antiwar Demonstrators

Concerning participants' agency in their responses to the scenario in which police are beating peaceful antiwar demonstrators, the great majority of the responses demonstrated prosocial agency, expressed in negative reactions to police behavior, an intent to use personal initiative or activism to stop the police aggression, searching for other solutions, searching ways to punish the police through institutions, taking legal action, and suggesting the involvement of the government or human rights entities. There were also a small group of responses that reflected antisocial agency (using unlawful activism against the police) or showed lack of agency (lack of personal initiative to stop the beatings or helpless feelings).

Findings from Exploratory Chi-Square Analyses

Conducting exploratory analyses of the extent to which coded responses varied in relation to relevant factors from different ecological levels (e.g., gender, participation to protest, having a military relative, etc.) proved to be a very useful methodological approach for identifying differences among groups and providing findings that could inform future research. In regard to the right to protest, more women than men socially justified the right to protest for the betterment of the society, a finding consistent with previous findings indicating that women show less tolerance for governmental aggression than men (e.g., Ashy & Malley-Morrison, 2007; Malley-Morrison et al., 2009) and less tolerance for war casualties

(Jayaratne, Flanagan, & Anderman, 1996). Also, our analysis revealed that more men than women believed that the right is socially sanctioned or provided a general affirmation to the right.

Concerning having military experience or not, findings were more complex. Although those with military experience believed that the right to protest is socially sanctioned by the society or the government, they also used moral reasoning that opposed the right, afraid that protests may be a potential danger for the stability of the society. On the other hand, those without military experience considered the right as socially justified in order to achieve a positive goal. It seems possible that respondents with military experience have higher needs for order and obedience to authority that are both features of the military experience (Lakoff, 2002), and these needs may contribute to observed differences between the two groups. Respondents with a military relative viewed the right to protest as a socially sanctioned right in order to prevent or to stop war and maintain peace, possibly reflecting their concern for their relatives in case their country gets involved in a war.

Finally, protestors considered antiwar protests to be a reflection of a moral responsibility to express beliefs and a civic duty, a finding that is consistent with Schwebel's (2005) suggestion that a motivating factor for protesters is their sense of duty and responsibility or intent to dispute war violence.

Police Are Beating Peaceful Antiwar Demonstrators

Concerning the hypothetical scenario where police are beating peaceful antiwar demonstrators, women demonstrated more prosocial agency than men, showing motivation to take legal action against the police, a finding that is consistent with previous findings indicating less tolerance for governmental aggression in women than in men (e.g., Ashy & Malley-Morrison, 2007; Malley-Morrison et al., 2009). Also, those with a military relative pointed out the necessity of an institution to initiate action in order to stop the beatings. Finally, protestors seemed empowered to show overall more prosocial agency than their counter-

parts by judging the police negatively, using activism, and searching for other solutions. Such findings are not uncommon for motivated activists, especially when they believe that their cherished values, such as for peace and social justice, are in danger (Schwebel, 2005). On the other hand, nonprotestors demonstrated an overall lack of agency in their rationales, showing lack of personal initiative to stop the beatings or feelings of helplessness.

Overall, this chapter, with its ecological approach and quantitative/qualitative methods, provided preliminary findings indicating widespread support for the right to protest against war and largely demonstrated participants' motivation to resist police violence against peaceful antiwar demonstrators. Future studies could identify more factors not examined in this chapter concerning people's beliefs and motivations (e.g., political affiliation, peace education, media exposure) that may contribute to differences among groups. Also, since how people perceive the human rights situation in their country seems significant for reasons such as improving human rights conditions in their countries (Carlson & Listhaug, 2007), future research should explore interventions that will raise awareness concerning the reality of war, human rights, and alternative ways for peaceful activism, as well as empower people to fight for their rights and the rights of others. Finally, future research should address limitations of the present study, by using representative samples and including more participants from different countries.

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Natoschia Scruggs, Jessica Cox, Majed Ashy,
Heyam Mohammed, Helena Syna Desivilya,
Raja Tayeh, Abdul Kareem Al-Obaidi, Lane Smith,
Dalit Yassour-Boroschowitz, Kamala Smith,
Linda Jeffrey, William Tastle, Feryal Turan,
Alev Yalcinkaya, and Rouba Youssef

Depending on the parameters one uses (i.e., geographic, religious, ethnic, linguistic, etc.), there are many ways to define the Middle East. The region is traditionally described as including Cyprus, Turkey, Egypt, the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, the countries of the Levant, and Iran.

Other definitions include the aforementioned countries, in addition to countries located in the North (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya), West (Mauritania, Western Sahara), and East Africa (Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia). However, this chapter highlights the perspectives on protest held

N. Scruggs (✉)

Asylum Division, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Arlington, VA, USA
e-mail: nscruggs@aol.com

J. Cox

Department of Psychology, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA

M. Ashy

Psychology Department, Bay State College,
Boston, MA, USA

H. Mohammed

Department of Curriculum and Instruction,
College of Education, Kuwait University, Kuwait
e-mail: mobarak1955@msn.com

H.S. Desivilya

Department of Sociology and Anthropology,
Yezreel Valley College, Emek Yezreel, Israel
e-mail: desiv@yvc.ac.il

R. Tayeh

Director of Institutional Research, Doane College,
Crete, NE, USA

A.K. Al-Obaidi

Institute of International Education, New York, NY, USA
e-mail: kareemobody60@yahoo.com;
kareemobaidi@gmail.com

L. Smith

Senior Research Scholar (Retired),
University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
e-mail: lanesmith0@gmail.com

D. Yassour-Boroschowitz

Department of Human Services,
Emek Yezreel College, Israel
e-mail: DalitY@yvc.ac.il

K. Smith

Behavioral Health Analyst, Abt Associates,
Cambridge, MA, USA
e-mail: kamala_smith@abtassoc.com

L. Jeffrey

College of Education, Rowan University, Glassboro,
NJ, USA
e-mail: jeffrey@rowan.edu

W. Tastle

Ithaca College of Business, New York, USA
e-mail: tastle@ithaca.edu

F. Turan

Department of Sociology, Ankara University,
Ankara, Turkey
e-mail: feryalturan@yahoo.com

A. Yalcinkaya

Department of Psychology, Yeditepe, Istanbul, Turkey
e-mail: yalcinkaya@prodigy.net;
ayalcinkaya@yeditepe.edu.tr

R. Youssef

Psychology, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI, USA
e-mail: rosyrouby@hotmail.com

by persons living in the following 12 countries: Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Iran, and Afghanistan. Given the diversity within and among these states, a brief comparative overview of their demographics, along with an analysis of the data collected from nationals of each state, will be provided following a discussion of protest and freedom of assembly as global concepts.

Protest and Freedom of Assembly

To protest is to object to or oppose something. The act of protesting can be executed singly by an individual or collectively by a group. Most often, protests take the form of demonstrations, strikes, and marches carried out by groups of people who come together with the goal of sending both a verbal and visual message for or against a social cause. During times of chaos created by political crisis, economic instability, war, etc., societies experience social movements. Social movements are organized responses to political and socioeconomic conditions by groups of persons who feel excluded, harbor a sense of unfairness, and feel unable to pursue satisfactory resolutions to their perceived problems (Tarrow, 1994). More importantly, social movements are composed of what Sidney Tarrow (1994) called “waves of protest,” which are meant to promote social change. For these reasons, the notion of protest is intrinsically linked to freedom of assembly.

Freedom of assembly is recognized as a cornerstone of a functioning democracy. It is mentioned as a right – along with freedom of association – in various international legal documents. Some of these documents include the United Nations’ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the American Convention on Human Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Basic Laws governing the residents of Hong Kong, and the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution (UN Secretariat for the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2006); The Basic Law of the Hong

Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China; The French Penal Code, Title III; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; and Article 40.6.1 of the Irish constitution also states that people have the freedom to assemble. However, these documents emphasize that citizens only have the right to defend their freedom in a *peaceable* manner. The Irish constitution has a clause forbidding assembling with arms, thus becoming a “nuisance to the general public” (Constitution of Ireland, 1999).

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) joins the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in adding other distinctions to their guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly. A peaceful assembly is recognized as such when its organizers are deemed to have peaceful intentions. Further, peaceful assemblies held in public spaces that are not structures or buildings raise particular regulatory issues. OSCE-ODIHR (2007) points out that protests held indoors pose different ethical, security, and logistical concerns from those held outdoors.

Socialization, Conceptions of Protest, and the Freedom of Assembly in the Middle East

According to Albert Bandura’s theory on moral disengagement/engagement, people adopt moral standards that influence whether or not they take action during socialization (Bandura, 1999). Most experts agree that socialization is a lifelong process, during which a person learns how to participate in society. In essence, it is through socialization that one becomes a “creature of society” (Chafetz, 1978a). Moreover, many social factors influence human development, making it more possible to understand individuals by examining their environment (Bronfenbrenner, Alvarez, & Henderson, 1984). It can be inferred that the opinions of participants who provided responses for this study’s survey have been impacted by occurrences in their society, along with events that have taken place throughout the Middle East region.

In many respects, the countries from which our Middle East respondents hail are similar, yet there are noteworthy differences. The Freedom

House “Freedom in the World Report: 2011” (Puddington, 2011, Sect. 3 box) is useful in that it classifies states into three categories based on political rights and civil liberties either enjoyed by or denied to their residents. The three categories identified by Puddington (2011, Sect. 3 box) are free, partly free, and not free. A free country is one “where there is open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent media.” A partly free country is one “in which there is limited respect for political rights and civil liberties,” where residents often must endure an environment of ethnic and religious strife, corruption, and weak rule of law. Although pluralism exists to an extent, a single political party frequently dominates. Finally, a not free country is one in which basic civil liberties are systematically denied and there is an absence of basic political rights. According to the Freedom House analysis, overall, the Middle East was the region with the fewest free countries (just one) and came in second only to Sub-Saharan Africa in regard to the number of countries not free. Sub-Saharan Africa has 19 such countries and the Middle East has 13 (Freedom House, 2011).

Regional Outlier: Israel

Israel’s population of 7.4 million has a 97% literacy rate and a per capita income of \$29,800 (CIA World Factbook, 2011). The country is the only parliamentary democracy in the Middle East region. It is also the only proclaimed Jewish state and the only Middle Eastern state classified as free. Israel is party to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), the United Nations International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). While there is no state constitution, in March 1992, the Knesset (parliament) passed the Basic Law on Human Dignity and Liberty, which was meant to guarantee the human rights of all people in Israel. However, the government has been criticized because the Basic Law’s terminology is vague and makes no mention of freedom of assembly. The government has been further criticized for

passing in July of 2011 what has been called the “Boycott Law.” It states, “any boycott against Israel, including those organized by groups inside its territory and in the West Bank, will be deemed a civil offense, such as libel or defamation” (Sanders, 2011). For opponents, the Boycott Law is a direct infringement on the right of the people to protest. In Freedom House’s estimation, the people of Israel’s political rights and civil liberties have “suffered a decline due to a series of laws and policies that posed threats to freedom of expression and civil society” (Freedom House, 2012).

Between the Arab World and Europe: Lebanon, Kuwait, and Turkey

Freedom House classified Lebanon, Kuwait, and Turkey as partly free. Despite the fact that all three countries are predominantly Muslim, Lebanon and Kuwait are the most similar. Both are republics with small populations and high literacy rates, although Kuwait has a much higher per capita income (Lebanon: four million people, 87% literacy rate, \$14,400 per capita income; Kuwait: 2.6 million people, 93% literacy rate, \$48,900 per capita income) (CIA World Factbook, 2011). Both countries have promulgated constitutions that guarantee its citizens’ rights, and both are party to the UDHR, ICCPR, and CEDAW, in addition to being members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (now known as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation – OIC) and the Arab League. In 1990, Lebanon and Kuwait adopted the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI). This was OIC’s attempt to make clear the human rights of all persons living in OIC member states. Made clear also was the fact that OIC views one’s rights as coming from God, a perspective endorsed in Shari’a (Islamic) law. Critics declared that the CDHRI limited freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and rights of women and non-Muslims (IHEU, 2008). When the Arab League adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights in 1994, Lebanon and Kuwait accepted all parts of the Charter, including Part II, Article 28, which states, “all citizens have the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. No restrictions shall be placed on the

exercise of this right unless so required by the exigencies of national security, public safety or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others” (Council of the League of Arab States, 1997).

The language used in the Charter was direct. Yet, in 2007, the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) felt it necessary to launch a project “aimed at reinforcing the legal framework for the freedom of assembly and association in the Arab world through national dialogue and empowering civil society” (Fadl, 2010, para. 4). With the support of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty and the European Union, EOHR’s 3-year project culminated in a report analyzing freedom of assembly and association in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Syria, among other nations. The Arab League also hosted a 3-day conference in February 2010 in an effort to develop a document addressing freedom of assembly and association (Fadl, 2010). Representatives from civil society groups throughout the Arab world (including Lebanon and Kuwait), various international organizations, and the European Union attended the conference.

Turkey straddles the European and Arab worlds – geophysically, socially, and legally. A republican parliamentary democracy, it has a population of 78 million, a literacy rate of 87%, and per capita income of \$12,300 (CIA Factbook, 2011). Like Lebanon and Kuwait, it is party to the UDHR, ICCPR, and CEDAW and is a member of OIC. It is not, however, a member of the Arab League. Rather, it belongs to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), setting it apart from all other Middle Eastern countries. Further illustrative of its close ties to Europe, in 1964, Turkey became an associate member of the European Community and began accession member talks with the European Community in 2005. It is a member of the European Council and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). As such, the Turkish government accepts and extends to its citizens all rights guaranteed per the legal documents associated with its membership in these organizations. More specifically, Turkey accepts all that is outlined in the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, which states the following in Article 12: “Everyone has the right

to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association at all levels, in particular in political, trade union and civic matters, which implies the right of everyone to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his or her interests” (EU Charter, 2004). In addition, Articles 33 and 34 of the Turkish constitution explicitly state that the people of Turkey have freedom of assembly and freedom of association (Hensler, Overson, & Muller, 2005).

A Disparate Lot: Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia

The seven remaining countries have two characteristics in common: they are all Muslim majority nations and they were all classified as “not free” by Freedom House. Afghanistan and Iran have governments that are based on religion. Afghanistan is an Islamic republic and Iran is a theocratic republic. Neither is a member of the Arab League nor is Iran a party to CEDAW. Due to Afghanistan’s turbulent political past and the wars it has experienced, the Afghan people are among those with the lowest regional literacy rate (28%) and per capita income (\$900); this has been detrimental, especially when Afghanistan’s population size is taken into consideration (29.8 million) (CIA Factbook, 2011). In 2001, a plan was put into motion for reconstructing the state politically, which included adopting a constitution. The constitution that emerged from this process allowed Afghans to enjoy the freedom of association and freedom of assembly only if they do not bear arms and do not have violent intentions. Owing to its unique history of political violence, ethnic animosity, and social divisions, militaristic organizations are strictly prohibited. Finally, persons who plan to contradict or defy the Islamic religion are denied their rights of association and assembly completely. This last characteristic of the Afghan constitution puts it in good stead with its Iranian counterpart, which states the following in Article 27: “Unarmed assemblies and marches may be freely organized, provided that no violation of the foundations of

Islam is involved” (Iran Chamber Society, 1979). Thus, in both Afghanistan and Iran, freedom of association and freedom of assembly are dependent upon deference to Islam. At the same time, Iran’s overall population (77 million) and per capita income (\$10,600) make it most similar to Turkey economically, while the fact that its economy is oil-based puts it in line with the oil-producing Gulf States (CIA Factbook, 2011).

Iraq and Jordan are both republics with similar per capita incomes (Iraq: \$3,800; Jordan: \$5,400) (CIA Factbook, 2011). Jordan has one of the smallest economies in the Middle East and a small, yet very literate population (6.5 million; 89% literacy rate) compared to the population of Iraq (30 million; 74% literacy rate) (CIA Factbook, 2011). Both are members of the Arab League and signatories to ICCPR and CEDAW. Iraq is party to the UDHR while Jordan is not. Citizens of Iraq and Jordan enjoy the freedoms guaranteed under the CDHRI and the Arab Charter on Human Rights since their governments adopted both. For Iraqis, these freedoms are in addition to the freedom of “assembly and peaceful demonstration” guaranteed under Article 38 of their state constitution, which was promulgated in 2005. The text reads as follows:

The State shall guarantee in a way that does not violate public order and morality:

- (a) Freedom of expression using all means.
- (b) Freedom of press, printing, advertisement, media and publication.
- (c) Freedom of assembly and peaceful demonstration, and this shall be regulated by law. (United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, 2005)

Articles 15(i) and 16 of the Jordanian constitution guarantee Jordanians the freedom of opinion and the right to hold meetings, which could be interpreted loosely to include the freedoms of both assembly and association.

Bahrain stands alone as the region’s only constitutional monarchy, defined as a governmental system “in which a monarch is guided by a constitution” that details in written law or by custom the rights, the monarch’s duties, and responsibilities (CIA, n.d., entry 9). The country is small with a tiny population (1.2 million) that reaps many benefits from the fact

that its economy is based on the nation’s oil reserves. Bahrainis enjoy a per capita income that is comparable to that of citizens in western democratic countries (\$40,300 annually) and a high literacy rate (86.5%) (CIA Factbook, 2011). Although Bahrain is not party to the UDHR and the ICCPR, it has ratified CEDAW and is a member of the Arab League. Article 28 of the Bahraini constitution guarantees all persons in Bahrain freedom of assembly, making a distinction between private and public assemblies. Meetings held in the private sphere (homes, etc.) do not appear to be regulated by the government. Meanwhile, any assemblies that take place in the public sphere are regulated by laws and seemingly subjective moral judgments that are most likely based on Islamic (religious) mores. The people of Bahrain also derive their rights to freedom of assembly and association from the CDHRI and the Arab Charter on Human Rights.

Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia are oil-rich nations governed by absolute monarchs. None of them are signatories of the UDHR or the ICCPR, yet all have ratified CEDAW and all are members of the Arab League. Citizens of each country are granted the rights described under the CDHRI and the Arab Charter on Human Rights as well as those outlined in their respective constitutions. Oman’s constitution, which was promulgated in November 1996, guarantees its three million citizens (CIA Factbook, 2011) “the right of assembly within the limits of the Law” in Article 32 (Sultanate of Oman Ministry of Information, 2002). This is in addition to Article 29, which guarantees the “freedom of opinion and expression, whether spoken, written or in other forms... within the limits of the Law” (ibid). With a literacy rate of 81% and per capita income of \$25,600, the Omani populace resembles that of Saudi Arabia far more than the Qatari populace (CIA Factbook, 2011).

Article 44 of the constitution of Qatar acknowledges, “the right of the citizens to assemble is guaranteed in accordance with the provisions of the law” (Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007). Qatar’s 848,016 citizens (CIA Factbook, 2011) also have the freedom to

establish association in accordance with the law per Article 45. Experts speculate that Qatar's educated (89% literacy rate) and rather passive populace can be attributed to the fact that Qataris have the world's highest per capita income (\$179,000) and little reason to revolt (CIA Factbook, 2011; Weingarten, 2011). On the other hand, Saudi Arabia's 26 million citizens (CIA Factbook, 2011) enjoy a high per capita income (\$24,200) and literacy rate (78%), yet they must contend with a vaguely worded state constitution that leaves the power of interpretation of all outlined rights up to the Saudi government.

Adopted by royal decree in March 1992, the Saudi constitution is based solidly on the religion of Islam. For example, Article Seven declares that the "government in Saudi Arabia derives power from the Holy Koran and the Prophet [Mohamed's] tradition," while Article Six states that "citizens are to pay allegiance to the King in accordance with the holy Koran and the tradition of the Prophet, in submission and obedience" at all times (Saudi Arabia Constitution, 2011). Interestingly, Article 26 determines that the state will protect the human rights of Saudi citizens in accordance with Islamic Shari'a law. Nonetheless, nowhere in the constitution's 83 articles are the freedoms of assembly and association mentioned. In fact, Article 12 seems to serve as a warning against any form of protest, stating that "the consolidation of national unity is a duty, and the state will prevent anything that may lead to disunity, sedition and separation" (ibid). It is fathomable that the monarchy could easily deem any form of opposition or protest as an action that could cause "disunity, sedition and separation," and thereby move to suppress it.

Clearly, there is great diversity among the Middle Eastern nations in regard to such characteristics as income, education, type of government, variations in constitutional law, and adherence to those laws. What views on the right to protest were held by citizens of our selected Middle Eastern countries in the second half of the first decade of the twenty-first century, in the last few years before the "Arab Spring"? Did they tend to believe that citizens do have a right to participate in antiwar and other protest activities? What basis did they see for such a right?

Methods

Sample

The Middle Eastern sample consisted of respondents from Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. There were a total of 743 codeable units from 431 respondents (217 females, 210 males, and 4 unidentified gender). Ages of respondents ranged from 18 to 81, with an average age of just over 30 years. Thirty percent had served in the military. Sixteen percent had a relative who had served or currently was serving in the military. Twenty-nine percent of the sample had taken part in a protest for peace and against war.

Procedure

The Personal and Institutional Rights to Governmental Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos & You, 2006), created by the Group on International Perspectives of Governmental Aggression and Peace, included two items pertaining to protest. For the first item, "individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace," participants were first asked to rate their level of agreement with the statement and then explain the reasoning behind their rating. The second item was, "police are beating peaceful antiwar demonstrators. What would you want to do?" Grounded theory and deductive qualitative approaches were used to create coding manuals for these responses, which were first broken down into codeable units. Many responses contained multiple codeable units. For example, a 23-year-old Israeli man wrote, "every citizen has the right to have his voice heard in legitimate ways, yet the protest does not necessarily get heard." This young man both affirms the right to protest, but also acknowledges that in the real world, rights do not always get respected. For more information regarding the protest coding manual, refer to the introductory chapter of this section on protest, Chap. 12.

The Right to Protest

Coding Procedure

Coding categories were initially derived through deductive qualitative analysis informed by Albert Bandura's theory of moral disengagement. Bandura's theory helps to explain how individuals rationalize immoral behavior in order not to feel that they are behaving immorally. Although many individuals may be highly moral in most walks of life, they may also find ways to detach themselves from the ethical implications of particular situations and behaviors, and thereby detach themselves from facing the consequences of their own immoral behavior or the behavior of others (Bandura, 1999). While the categories were developed based on his constructs of moral disengagement and engagement, we used the more neutral language of anti-protest (protest intolerant) and pro-protest (protest tolerant) in naming our coding categories in order to avoid reifying those constructs or implying that one group is more morally disengaged or engaged than another.

Working with an international coding manual sample, we identified four sets of categories in responses regarding an individual's right to protest: (a) anti-protest (protest intolerant), (b) pro-protest (protest tolerant), (c) indeterminate status, and (d) focus on perceived reality. The major anti-protest coding categories are (a) *pseudo-moral reasoning*, (b) *negative labeling*, (c) *disadvantageous comparison*, (d) *denial of personal responsibility*, (e) *distorting consequences*, (f) *dehumanization*, (h) *attribution of blame*, and (i) *general rejection of the right*. Several of these categories had subcategories. The major pro-protest coding categories, several of which included subcategories, were (a) *social justification*, (b) *moral responsibility*, (c) *humanization*, and (d) *general affirmation of the right*. The perceived reality coding categories included (a) *general focus on perceived reality*, (b) *right may not be respected*, and (c) *protest is futile*. Finally, the two major indeterminate status categories were (a) *depends* and (b) *do not know*.

Distribution of Responses Across Thematic Categories

Anti-protest Sentiments

In response to the prompt regarding a person's right to protest against war and in favor of peace, 4% of all of the responses were coded for protest-intolerant viewpoints. Protest-intolerant responses indicated that protesting was a negative way to express antiwar feelings or that protesting should not be allowed in general. The most frequently coded anti-protest argument was *pseudo-moral reasoning*, which represented 33% of the anti-protest responses and 1% of all the responses. Typical responses in this category expressed a desire to protect the government's right to engage in war without being affected by protestors. The response of a 29-year-old woman from Israel summed up this point when she indicated that protesting in favor of peace and against war is a right "to a certain extent as long as they do not act against the government." Thus, in her view, protesting can be an acceptable form of expression, but the government should be allowed to make decisions without taking differing viewpoints into consideration.

The second most common type of anti-protest response fell into the category of *distorting consequences*, representing 1% of all responses and 42% of anti-protest responses. Responses in this category exaggerated the negative consequences of protest as a way or rejecting the right to protest. For example, a 32-year-old woman from Jordan stated that "protests lead to shaking the security of the country." Table 16.1 provides more examples of the anti-protest coding categories as well as basic demographic information.

Pro-protest Sentiments

Eighty-nine percent of all responses to the right to protest item endorsed that right. Although all of the coding categories were identified in responses, only categories that included 5% or more of the total responses are discussed here.

Table 16.1 Examples of anti-protest responses

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Anti-protest</i>	4				
<i>Pseudo-moral reasoning</i>	1(33)	Israel	F	28	If the war is not justified or is being conducted irresponsibly (e.g., the Second Lebanon War)
		Lebanon	M	20	Only when they are sure that war isn't necessary
<i>Distorting consequences</i>	1(42)	Israel	M	27	It can help as well as destroy

Note. The number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percentage of anti-protest responses.

M male, *F* female

Sixteen percent of the entire response set and 18% of the pro-protest responses were coded for socially sanctioned rights – that is, they described protest as being a right because it is officially recognized or embedded in code of rights. A 28-year-old Lebanese man said, “the freedom of speech is a basic right provided for in the declaration of human rights, and in most constitutions, the said right is completed by the right to protest against war and in favor of peace.” A 19-year-old Lebanese woman commented, “because we are in a democratic country every individual has the right to express his opinion.”

The second most common pro-protest responses were those that referenced human rights, which accounted for 15% of all responses and 17% of the pro-protest responses. These responses stated or implied that protest is a right not just because some society says so but because it is inherent in humanity. A 30-year-old man from Afghanistan said, “yes, everyone has this right to be against war and always call for peace.”

Moral responsibility accounted for 10% of the total responses and 11% of pro-protest responses. Responses coded for moral responsibility spoke to the moral obligation of citizens to protest when governments take actions that citizens disagree with. Responses that demonstrated a moral responsibility to protest can be summed by the response of a 35-year-old woman from Jordan who said that “individuals have the right to express their opinions, even if no one listens to it they should not give up hope.” Subcategories of moral responsibility with a significant number of responses included the

subcategory of nonviolent protest, which accounted for 9% of pro-protest responses and 8% of all responses, and it is a civic duty to protest (7% of the total and 7% of pro-protest responses). Responses coded into the subcategory of nonviolence indicate that protest is a right as long as it is peaceful. This view is typified by a response from a 59-year-old individual from Saudi Arabia who said that “this is a fundamental right of human expression as long as it is carried out by peaceful means sans violence.” Civic duty responses are typified in the following response given by a 22-year-old Afghan man: “Yes, politicians are corrupt, we as commoners should protest against what is not right.”

Social justification accounted for 5% of all the responses and 6% of the pro-protest responses. These types of responses asserted that the freedom to protest helps to create positive change and allows the world to be a better place. A 22-year-old Jordanian man responded, “so they live in security and safety.” The subcategory of peace constituted 10% of all responses and 11% of the pro-protest responses. A 28-year-old Lebanese woman said protest is a right because “of course, everyone wants to live in peace.” Table 16.2 provides more examples of the pro-protest coding categories, as well as basic demographic information.

Indeterminate Reasoning

Six percent of all responses to the question of whether an individual has the right to protest

Table 16.2 Examples of responses coded for the pro-protest categories

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Pro-protest</i>	89				
<i>Social justification</i>	5(6)	Israel	F	27	It will allow change
		Lebanon	M	19	Because every human has the right to live in a country that is stable and secure
Peace	10(11)	Afghanistan	M	30	Always call for peace
		Jordan	M	24	It is their right to live in peace
<i>Moral responsibility</i>	10(11)	Israel	F	47	It is not only the right, it is the duty of those who believe in peace
		Kuwait	M	49	With the condition that these protests must be civilized
Civic duty	7(7)	Israel	F	51	Absolutely, it is important that individuals will express their protest in order to stop organized violence (of a state, party, etc.)
		Lebanon	F	25	I agree in the case the government is not respecting the law or keeping their promise
Nonviolent	8(9)	Israel	F	31	As long as it does not harm anyone else
		Saudi Arabia	N/A	18	Nonviolent protests absolutely!
<i>Humanization</i>	1(1)				
Human rights	15(17)	Israel	F	23	Yes, each one has the right to his opinions
		Turkey	M	25	Everyone can have a mind of his own and speak it freely
Socially sanctioned rights	16(18)	Israel	F	35	There is freedom of speech
		Lebanon	F	20	Yes, it is freedom of speech

Note. The number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percentage of pro-protest responses
M male, *F* female, *N/A* not available

against war were coded as indeterminate status, a category designed to capture two types of responses: (a) *I do not know* or (b) *it depends*.

Exploratory Statistical Analyses of Right to Protest Responses

To examine the possibility of group differences in types of responses, chi-square analyses were run. The demographic variables that we analyzed were (a) gender, (b) military service, (c) relative's military service, and (d) participation in peace protest. We followed standard statistical convention and consider any difference with a *p* value of

0.05 or less as statistically significant and any *p* value of 0.10 or less as marginally significant.

At a marginally significant level, proportionately more men than women held that protest is a person's moral responsibility. In regard to military service, a significantly greater proportion of respondents without military service than their counterparts cited peace as the goal of protesting. A significantly greater proportion of civilian respondents than military respondents stated that protesting is a socially sanctioned right. No other significant or marginally significant group differences were found. Table 16.3 provides chi-square results and percentages of responses by demographic item for these analyses.

Table 16.3 Right to protest against war: Chi-square values and percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic group

Category	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	x ²
	Males	Females	
<i>Pro-protest</i>			
<i>Moral responsibility</i>	13	7	3.14 [^]
	Military service	No military service	
<i>Pro-protest</i>			
<i>Social justification</i>			
Peace	2	16	13.39 ^{***}
Socially sanctioned rights	25	13	7.15 ^{**}

Note. If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference [^]=.051 ≤ p < .10; ^{**}p ≤ 0.01; ^{***}p ≤ 0.001

^aNumbers in the columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

Police Beating Peaceful Protestors

Coding Procedure

The coding categories for the responses were taken from Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement. His theory attempts to explain people’s willingness to tolerate and even support violence due to different models of displacement or dehumanizing the victim. Bandura explains that people selectively use their moral agency in order to make peace with actions that are taken by detaching themselves from the responsibility of these actions (Bandura, 2004).

Responses to the question regarding an individual’s reaction to police beating peaceful protesters were coded into four major sets of categories: (a) pro-social agency, (b) anti-social agency, (c) lack of agency, and (d) indeterminate status (again with categories for do not know and *it depends*).

The major coding categories for pro-social agency included (a) *judgment of police*, (b) *personal initiative*, and (c) *institutional initiative*. These categories had various subcategories. The major coding categories for anti-social agency included, (a) *support for police*, (b) *unlawful activism*, and (c) *against the demonstrators*. The major coding categories for lack of agency included (a) *lack of initiative* and (b) *helplessness*.

The coding categories for indeterminate status were discussed in the section above.

Distribution of Responses Across Thematic Categories

Pro-social Agency Responses

Pro-social agency was demonstrated in 75% of responses to the question, “Police are beating peaceful antiwar demonstrators. What would you want to do?” Only responses accounting for 6% or more of the total responses will be discussed here.

The largest number of responses was coded for *personal initiative*, which accounted for 29% of all responses and 39% of the pro-social responses. The response of an Israeli woman was typical of this category when she said she would want to “stop it and punish the policemen.”

The second most represented category was activism, a subcategory of *personal initiative*, which represented 19% of the entire response set and 25% of pro-social responses. Generally, responses in this category showed support for the right to protest against the government and to take public action to create peace. A 26-year-old Afghani woman summed up the subcategory of activism by saying that she would “protest against it.”

Legal action accounted for the next largest percentage of pro-social category responses, representing 8% of all responses and 10% of pro-social responses. A 25-year-old Turkish man responded by saying that he would “go to the legal system and seek rights.”

Table 16.4 Examples of pro-social agency responses

Code	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Pro-social agency</i>	75				
<i>Judgment of police</i>	7(10)	Israel	F	46	They do not need to be solving the problem with violence
		Jordan	M	39	They do not have the right to hit them if they are not acting irresponsibly
<i>Personal initiative</i>	29(39)	Bahrain	N/A	N/A	Insist on the protest and try to persuade the police it is peaceful
		Iran	M	23	Stop the police
Activism	19(25)	Israel	F	24	Demonstrate against such behavior
		Afghanistan	F	30	Take photos and send them to the media
<i>Institutional initiative</i>	4(5)				
Legal action	8(10)	Israel	F	36	Sue the state
		Afghanistan	F	32	Have the specific officers indicted

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category or subcategory out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of the responses in the specified subcategory out of all the pro-social agency responses

M male, *F* female, *U* unknown, *N/A* not available

Table 16.5 Examples of anti-social agency responses

Coding category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Anti-social agency</i>	10				
<i>Unlawful activism</i>	7(74)	Israel	F	25	Go hit the policemen
		Afghanistan	F	28	Retaliate against the police
<i>Support for the police</i>	2(17)	Israel	F	36	Join in (with the police)
		Oman	N/A	N/A	This is sometimes needed to stop chaos

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of the responses out of the anti-social agency responses

M male, *F* female, *N/A* not available

The category of *judgment of police* accounted for 10% of pro-social responses and 7% of all responses. Such responses were typified by a Bahrain respondent who said that “it is not a right for the police to hit because they (the protestors) want security and peace in the country (Table 16.4).”

Anti-social Agency Responses

Anti-social agency was demonstrated in 10% of the responses to the scenario of police beating peaceful protestors. Only the anti-social agency categories that represented 2% or more of the responses will be discussed here.

Unlawful activism was the most frequently coded anti-social category, accounting for 7% of all responses and 74% of anti-social responses. Such responses are summed up by those who said they would “strike back,” as a 28-year-old Israeli man did.

The next largest category within anti-social agency was *support for the police*, which represented about 2% of the total response set and 17% of the anti-social response set. Such responses are typified by a Qatar respondent who simply said, “support [the police].”

Table 16.5 provides more examples of the coding categories discussed above as well as basic demographic information.

Lack of Agency

Responses that demonstrated an inability to assist either side were coded for lack of agency, which accounted for 14% of all responses. Many lack of agency responses were coded into the category *lack of initiative* and said (as a 28-year-old Israeli woman did) that they “would do nothing.” This subcategory accounted for almost 10% of all responses and 71% of lack of agency responses. *Helplessness* accounted for almost 4% of all responses and 29% of responses that were categorized as lack of agency. A 32-year-old Iraqi expressed a feeling of helplessness by saying that he “can’t do anything.”

Exploratory Statistical Analyses

To examine the possibility of group differences in types of responses, chi-square analyses were run. The demographic variables that we analyzed were (a) gender, (b) military service, (c) relative’s military service, and (d) participation in peace protest. We followed standard statistical convention and consider any difference with a p value of 0.05 or less as statistically significant and any p value of 0.10 or less as marginally significant.

Several statistically significant and marginally significant differences in responses to the police beating scenario were found based on military service and having a relative in the military. At a marginally significant level, a greater proportion of women than men proposed forms of *unlawful activism* in their responses to the item regarding police beating antiwar protestors. In regard to military service, a significantly greater proportion of respondents with military service than their nonmilitary counterparts gave (a) at least one response characterized by *pro-social agency*; (b) expressed an intent to exercise *personal initiative*, such as generally trying to end the beatings; and (c) indicated a desire to take *legal action* against the police. Conversely, a significantly greater proportion of respondents who had never been in the military than respondents who had been in the military provided

reasoning that was coded into one or more of the lack of agency coding categories. Furthermore, a significantly greater proportion of nonmilitary respondents than military respondents showed a *lack of initiative* to act in response to the beatings, but interestingly, the nonmilitary respondents also mentioned *activism*, such as protesting the beatings, as something they would want to do. A significantly greater proportion of respondents without a military relative than their counterparts provided responses coded into the pro-social agency categories, along with displaying *personal initiative* to end the beatings.

In regard to protesting, protestors were marginally more likely than non-protestors to give responses coded into one or more of the pro-social agency categories, as well as responses demonstrating *unlawful activism*. A significantly greater proportion of non-protesting respondents than protesting respondents gave responses coded into one or more of the lack of agency and anti-social agency categories. Furthermore, non-protestors were marginally more likely than their counterparts to show a *critical judgment of the police* and a *lack of initiative*.

Table 16.6 provides chi-square results and percentages of responses by demographic item for the coding categories above.

Discussion

The Arab Spring and the Power of Protest

...people from Tunisia and Egypt to Bahrain and Iran [are] asserting their right to protest....

Joe Stork, Deputy Director, Middle East Division, Human Rights Watch

The events that have occurred in the Middle East in the past 2 years have bolstered the importance of this chapter. No one could have imagined that what began as a protest in Tunisia in December 2010 against a government the people long felt was oppressive and unresponsive to their

Table 16.6 Police are beating antiwar protestors: chi-square values and percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups

Category	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	χ^2
	Male	Female	
<i>Anti-social agency</i>			
Unlawful activism	5	9	2.78 [^]
<i>Pro-social agency presence</i>			
	Military service	No military service	
	80	68	11.93 ^{***}
<i>Personal initiative</i>			
Activism	44	37	4.83 [*]
	16	41	7.16 ^{**}
<i>Institutional initiative</i>			
Legal action	16	9	7.16 ^{**}
<i>Lack of agency presence</i>			
Lack of initiative	8	22	10.1 [*]
	8	24	6.39 [*]
<i>Pro-social agency presence</i>			
	Relative military	No relative military	
	50	68	3.85 [*]
<i>Personal initiative</i>			
	12	28	6.85 ^{**}
<i>Pro-social agency presence</i>			
	Protestor	Non-protestor	
	78	68	2.71 [^]
<i>Judgment of police</i>			
Lack of agency presence	2	8	3.58 [^]
<i>Lack of initiative</i>			
Lack of initiative	7	21	7.25 ^{**}
	6	13	3.07 [^]
<i>Anti-social agency presence</i>			
Unlawful activism	7	21	7.25 ^{**}
	11	6	2.81 [^]

Note. If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference. "Presence" at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories

[^].05 < p < .10; ^{*}p ≤ 0.05; ^{**}p ≤ 0.01; ^{***}p ≤ 0.001

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

needs was just the beginning of an unprecedented wave of protests that would take the world by surprise. More importantly, that protest altered the political, social, and economic landscapes of various countries throughout the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region. The protests, which have collectively become known as the "Arab Spring" in the English language press and the "Arab Revolutions" among Arabic speakers, have, to varying degrees, affected each of the 12 countries included in the sample for this chapter. However, it is the small group of countries not included in this sample, yet located in the MENA region, whose protests have had the greatest impact.

Leaders Be Gone: Change Driven by Youth (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen)

The population of the MENA region is young, as "more than two-thirds of the region's population is under the age of 25" (Davies, 2011, para. 1). Given the long tenures in office that most MENA leaders have traditionally maintained, many Middle Easterners and North Africans have known only one leader for their entire lives. It was the social solidarity displayed in youth-led protests, nevertheless, that resulted in the removal of Tunisia's Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, Libya's Muammar Gaddafi, and

Yemen's Ali Abdullah Saleh. Their departures occurred like a domino effect. Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia in January 2011, less than 1 month after a 25-year-old street vendor set himself ablaze and died in protest of the strong-arming he received at the hands of the police because he refused to pay bribes (Gardner, 2011). Ben Ali did not leave office because the vendor died; he left because Tunisians from all walks of life violently protested in response to their fellow citizen's treatment, simultaneously expressing their own discontent with the government. The raw anger that was unleashed and the boldness with which the protests were staged made Ben Ali fear for his life.

On February 11, 2011, it was announced that Mubarak had stepped down after having been in office for just shy of 30 years, earning him the nickname "Egypt's Last Pharaoh" (Elaasar, 2009). The 82-year-old leader was incredulous that protesters refused to leave Tahrir Square in downtown Cairo and demanded nothing less than his immediate ouster. The resolve of the people is embodied in a quote from a man named Islam, whose brother had been killed protesting:

I will not leave the square. Over my dead body.
I trust the army, but I don't trust those controlling
the army behind the scenes. Down with corruption
and repression. This is a new day of freedom.
I have tasted freedom and I will not turn back.
(Reuters, 2011)

In the end, Mubarak surrendered to the pressure exerted from 18 days of intense physical and electronic (online) protests he never thought Egyptians capable of orchestrating.

Gaddafi ruled Libya for a decade longer than Mubarak ruled Egypt and nearly two decades longer than Ben Ali headed the Tunisian government. Even those most optimistic for change had given up on the idea of Gaddafi ever leaving office, since there had been so many thwarted attempts to remove him in the past (Vandewalle, 2012). Put simply, the man seemed invincible – that is, until Gaddafi had human rights activists teargassed, beaten, arrested, and killed by plain-clothes state agents solely because they were organizing the Libyan people for a "Day of Anger," with public peaceful demonstrations

scheduled for February 17, 2011 (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Protests quickly escalated to a full civil war that ended in the brutal beating death of Gaddafi in his hometown. The once indomitable leader's demise was captured on video and subsequently broadcasted around the world (Sheridan, 2011). He pleaded for his life before a merciless crowd too tired of having their rights trampled upon for decades to consider his.

Arguably, the situation in Yemen was more desperate than in any of the other countries in the MENA region. President Saleh had held office for 32 years, essentially ruling over a highly controlled police state. Yemen's demographics partly explain Saleh's success. It is "the poorest country in the Arab world" (Genocide Watch, 2012, para. 2), with a per capita income of \$2,500 and an estimated 35% unemployment rate (CIA World Factbook, 2011). Moreover, competition between systems of tribal governance and centralized national leadership has resulted in social divisions (Al-Dawsari, 2012). Demonstrations began in January 2011. The crowds of protestors continued to swell in numbers and intensify in anger in response to violent government suppression throughout the months leading up to a failed assassination attempt against Saleh on June 3, 2011 (Jamjoom & Almasmari, 2011). After fleeing to Saudi Arabia, Saleh signed a Gulf Cooperation Council Agreement in which he conceded stepping down from office. Vice President Abd al-Rab Mansur al-Hadi won the February 21, 2012 presidential election, and Saleh left office on February 27, 2012.

The Unseen Future on a Newly Beaten Path

The launch of the Arab Revolutions was just the beginning. The nations of the MENA region are now grappling internally with how to create their own futures. In October 2011, Tunisians elected a pro-human rights president and a prime minister from a moderate Muslim party (Sherwood, 2012). The next task the Tunisian National Constituent

Assembly addressed was the promulgation of a new constitution, which was still being drafted in May 2012 (Hassine, 2012).

Libya's national transitional council, led by Prime Minister Abdurrahim al-Keib, is responsible for guiding the country from the chaos of civil war to democratic stability. There is still much violence between various factions vying for power and testing the legitimacy of the transitional government. At the same time, Libyans "are increasingly exercising their freedom of speech and have a strong desire to be consulted on national issues [coupled with] a determination to hold their leaders accountable" (Lederer, 2012, para. 6). United Nations representatives believe that Libya is making positive strides quickly, highlighting the fact that more than one million people have registered to vote for a national congress in June 2012 (UN News Center, 2012).

Despite sporadic sectarian and religious violence following the dawn of what Egyptians call the "White Revolution," there is an unmatched sense of exuberance among the people. One man articulated the feelings of many of his countrymen and women when he stated, "now we have our freedom and can breathe and demand our rights. In Mubarak's era, we never saw a good day. Hopefully now we will see better times" (Blair & Nakhoul, 2011, para. 5). This is a very decisive time in the history of the Egyptian state, and its progress toward free elections is likely to have bearing on the three regions bordering Egypt: Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.

Like Tunisia, Yemen held elections in February 2012 and undertook the process of drafting a new constitution. Unlike Tunisia, however, the prerevolution Yemeni state remained vulnerable to persisting insurgent-instigated violence. Al-Qaeda linked Islamists and others engaged in daily battles with government forces and tribes allied with the military (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Presidential and parliamentary elections were scheduled to take place again in 2014. It is possible that Yemen could be drawn into civil war well before then, due to offenses launched mostly from southern-based antigovernment forces that are believed

closely linked to Islamist networks operating throughout the Persian Gulf and East Africa (Anzalone, 2011).

Conclusion: Socially Sanctioned Rights and Pro-social Agency Responses

The Tunisian people acted on a firm belief that to protest is a socially sanctioned right. It was the vendor's right to express peacefully his objections to how he was treated by the police (the state). At the same time, it is clear by their actions that thousands of Tunisians agreed with members of this chapter's sample when they exercised their pro-social agency in response to the police beating of the vendor (the protestor). By taking to the streets and engaging with the media despite being aware that they risked harsh repercussions from the government, Tunisians proved that it is erroneous to underestimate any groups' support for protest as a means for change – even if they live in societies where protests have not been historically supported, or have been violently suppressed. One needs only to look at Egypt, Libya, and Yemen for evidence. Further, it is also incorrect to assume that persons who may not have the courage to initiate protest on their own would lack the courage to react to police brutality against those who dared to protest. In other words, people who may personally harbor anti-protest sentiments may simultaneously exercise pro-social agency in response to perceived injustice against others who express/exercise pro-protest sentiments.

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Grace Kibanja, Laura Johnson, Mahlon Dalley,
Natoschia Scruggs, Jacqueline Akhurst,
Adeniyi Famose, Helena Castanheira,
Eduardo Correia, and William Tastle

What will be the role of ordinary citizens in fostering changes needed for a peaceful and sustainable civil society in African countries? Beginning with street demonstrations in Tunisia in January 2011, much upheaval has occurred in countries across the African continent. “The Protestor” was named Time magazine’s “person of the year,” bringing recognition to the role of individual citizens engaged in social action via protest for the collective good (Andersen, 2011). African citizens are increasingly demanding accountability in social and economic policies, as in Algeria and South Africa, or seeking transformations in government, such as in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. Civic participation in protests is increasing across the continent.

By early 2012, social protests were occurring in a substantial portion of African countries. Driven by an overall motivation for democratic reform, violence was associated with elections in 2011 throughout sub-Saharan Africa, as African leaders clung to power and responded with tighter controls (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Although the protests often began as peaceful, they did not always remain so because it has been common in Africa for police and governments to respond with force. In Angola, the government attacked peaceful protestors and threatened citizens with violence if they failed to call off their protest and show up for work. In South Africa, President Zuma urged impoverished citizens to remain peaceful despite disruptions in basic services. In

G. Kibanja
Department of Educational, Organizational & Social
Psychology, Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda

L. Johnson (✉)
Croft Institute of International Studies,
University of Mississippi, Oxford, MS, USA
e-mail: ljohnson@olemiss.edu

M. Dalley
Psychology Department, Eastern Washington University,
Cheney, WA, USA
e-mail: mdalley@ewu.edu

N. Scruggs
Asylum Division, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Arlington, VA, USA
e-mail: nscruggs@aol.com

J. Akhurst
Department of Psychology, York St John University, England
e-mail: J.Akhurst@yorksj.ac.uk

A. Famose
Joavic’s Foundation, Nigeria
e-mail: adeniyifamose@yahoo.com;
joavicfoundations@yahoo.com

H. Castanheira
Psychology Department, New School for Social
Research, New York, NY, USA
e-mail: helenacasta@gmail.com

E. Correia
ISCTE Business School in Lisbon, Portugal
e-mail: EduardoC.indeg@netcabo.pt

W. Tastle
Ithaca College of Business, New York, USA
e-mail: tastle@ithaca.edu

Senegal, the world famous musician, Youssou N'dour, urged citizens to engage in peaceful protests of the presidential election. These events are but a small sample of how diverse citizens in different contexts are speaking out for change.

How protestors are viewed and reacted to by others in society is an important area of investigation and has important implications for establishing peace and security in the regions. In this chapter, we discuss social protests in Africa and describe views on peaceful protests expressed by 301 citizens from eight African countries, including Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, and Zambia. First, we discuss social protests more generally and some of the contextual factors that contribute to protest in Africa. This is followed by several case examples (including some recent protests) to illustrate the diverse methods, goals, and outcomes of protests in the region. Next, we report data regarding participant views on the right to engage in peaceful protest and on violent police reactions to peaceful protests. Qualitative data from interviews are presented along with percentages of responses in different categories to illustrate themes.

In Africa, peace and the history of social protest are deeply intertwined with economic and political development. Protests in Africa have occurred across regions and countries and have varied in their methods and in their end goals, whether expressing opposition, demanding attention to an issue, a change in policies, or a completely new government. The first organized social protests were against colonial invasions and rule, followed by those during the struggle for independence, the ousting of dictators and various transitional regimes, and the abolishment of apartheid in South Africa. More recent protests include the ousting of dictators in North Africa, along with sub-Saharan protests regarding elections, a lack of services, environmental degradation, or other unfavorable government actions or policies.

Today, Africa is ranked the least peaceful region in the world according to composite indices (Vision of Humanity, Global Peace Index, 2010), with civil conflict occurring in numerous countries in the region. Moreover, African people suffer from high rates of poverty, hunger, illness, disease, and human rights violations (United

Nations Human Development Program Report, 2010). Although most sub-Saharan countries ousted one-party systems and dictatorial rulers in the 1980s and early 1990s, the struggle for democracy remains across much of the continent, as does that for basic resources and services. Indeed, Africans have much to protest.

In a previous chapter Johnson, Kibanja, Abdelali, etc. (in press), we reported on a study with 407 participants from eight countries, in which African citizens were largely supportive of personal engagement in protesting war or promoting peace. Due to current contextual pressures and, in part, due to advances in technology and communication, we are seeing increased civic participation and social protest across the continent (Tettey, 2002). This is welcome news, and it is consistent with reports by the Pew Center that Africans (more than participants from other countries) reported optimism that their situation would improve in 5 years (Pew, 2010). Given the amount of civil conflict occurring in Africa and the continent's overall poor performance on Human Development Indicators (UN, 2010; UNDP, 2010), it is especially important to examine paths toward peace, social justice, and wellness, including the social protest pathway.

Information about the most effective and ethical means of achieving change is urgently needed. Some researchers have suggested, for example, that nonviolent protests are largely ineffective in countries with dictatorial African leaders who intimidate their citizens and persecute them with state violence or other injustices. This perspective argues that transformation may not occur without arousing armed demonstrations or military resistance (Dukor, 1991). However, the effectiveness of the 2010–2011 Arab world protests has proven that there may be exceptions to previous assumptions. For instance, recent events in North Africa have shown that self-immolation can instigate a revolutionary change in a nation.

Definitions and Types of Protests

A protest is an expression of objection, by words or by actions, to particular events, policies, or situations (Oliver, Cadena-Roa, & Strawn, 2003).

Protests are usually public because those concerned typically want to attract the public to their cause. In the past, protests were viewed as undemocratic intrusions into politics, but they are currently seen as vital routes to democracy and a significant factor in the transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes (Oliver et al., 2003). For this reason, protests are often seen as a “form of collective action and social movement participation at the same time” (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2010 p. 1).

In African countries, citizens have varied rights to engage in peaceful protests with some limiting those rights and others banning public protests. The nature of some protests (such as large rallies and marches) means that organizers must often inform the police or get the permission to hold a protest. Despite most Africans having a “right to protest,” governments engage in an array of methods to quell protests, from pleas to keep them peaceful to banning them or using tear gas and even live ammunition to disrupt them.

Protests may be violent or nonviolent. Violent protests are destructive in nature and have negative consequences on both the protestors, nonprotestors, and the state. African protests have taken different forms, such as riots, hunger strikes, bombings, suicides, and self-immolation. In South Africa, for example, there are sporadic violent protests over a lack of basic services for the majority population, including joblessness, a lack of water and sanitation, and housing shortages and delays. Nonviolent protests include public demonstrations, political rallies, boycotts, petitions, marches, strikes, picketing, sit-ins, die-ins, parades, freedom rides, lockdowns, legal challenges, civil disobedience, and peace camps, to mention several. The “walk-to-work” protests in Uganda and the stay-home (i.e., from opening shops) social protests in South Africa are recent examples of nonviolent initiatives.

Technology and in particular the use of Internet and cellular phones (e.g., blogs, Twitter, Facebook) in protests have quickly become new avenues for civic participation and protests against governments and policies. As Tetley (2002, p. 4) states, “technologies are believed to have very powerful transformative capabilities for political participation.” Media access and a

free press tend to go hand in hand with civic engagement. With this unprecedented access to information protests may be more successful because human rights organizations and other groups reporting government abuses can often bypass media blackouts and thus reach international audiences. Social protests and responses by the police can be watched live all over the world through instant uploads by journalists and citizens alike. Such was the case with Ben Mhenni, who ran the blog site “a Tunisian Girl” in which she documented crimes and actions of protestors. Mhenni joined protestors on the street and gave interviews through Skype to international media organizations. She was subsequently nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for her role in the revolution.

Reasons for Protest

Protests may be organized to openly express dissent or opinions in an attempt to influence the public’s attitudes and opinions toward a particular phenomenon (e.g., government policy), or they may be purposely organized in an action-oriented manner to cause a desired change directly. Protests range in their goals from bringing awareness to an issue to a complete transformation in government. Protests in North Africa that spurred the “Arab Spring” aimed to topple dictators clinging to power and despotism. On the other hand, most governments in sub-Saharan Africa ousted their dictators previously and have since moved toward “democratic” rule. Most protests are intended to be peaceful campaigns geared toward achieving a desired end, but experience in Africa demonstrates that government response, in most cases, propels the situations into violence. Nonviolent protests are assumed to be ethical yet violent ones give the dictatorial regimes the opportunity to use all available instruments of law and order, including torture, to squelch resistance. Nonviolent protests can be effective only where civil disobedience is tolerated, allowing citizens to operate in ways potent enough to drive home the point of the protest (Dukor, 1991).

There are a number of contextual factors that may give rise to social protest, including social,

political, economic, religious, and cultural factors. In Africa, people protest most often against government policies, economic upheavals, and abuse of human rights. Situations of government corruption, food insecurity, high unemployment, a lack of basic resources, social inequality, civil conflict, and environmental degradation may prompt social protest to either bring attention to issue or bring about changes in governments or their policies. Some Africans may protest on behalf of others (e.g., in human rights cases), and some may protest on their own behalf (e.g., in regard to unfair imprisonment). In Africa, current protests are in large part promulgated by factors such as:

- Increasing gap between the rich and the poor
- High inflation levels
- Corruption of the party leadership
- General inflation in food prices
- Lack of civil rights and political freedoms
- Lack of confidence in the judicial system
- Lack of confidence in a ruler who had been around for many years and/or not elected via “democratic” means.

Cases of Protest Across the African Continent

In the next section, we provide examples of different types of protests and various government responses within specific countries.

Algeria. The visibility of the December 2010 protests in Tunisia led to a major shake-up to the status quo of localized Algerian protests, which had been prevalent over the previous three decades. For instance, the country experienced several violent protests in the 1980s related to economic and political dissent. In 2003, workers protested against privatization policies, the erosion of their incomes, poor working conditions, and insufficient social security and pension schemes (Ottaway & Hamzay, 2011). In 2008, protests against unemployment were also prevalent. However, the wave of protests in Tunisia led to the first national Algerian protest on December 28, 2010, in response to unemployment, increase in food prices, food-price inflation, corruption,

restrictions on freedom of speech, lack of housing, and poor living conditions. The protests continued through January 2011, followed by several self-immolations, most of them in front of government buildings. The Algeria protests did not lead to a change in government because the government lowered food prices, which was the most pressing issue at the time.

Egypt. Egypt was best known for its 1977 bread riots until 2011, when the wave of protests in the Arab nations led to a change of government in this nation. After 1977, Egypt had years of localized protests, but these had not had significant impact. From 1998 to 2004, the country experienced more than 1,000 protests, with more than 250 protests in 2004 alone (Ottaway & Hamzay, 2011). The increase in protests was attributed to accelerated economic liberalization processes with limited social safeguards undertaken by the government. Protest activities continued after the 2005 elections, increasing in size and momentum every each year. On January 25, 2011, nonviolent protests started in the country’s largest cities of Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez but later spread to all other parts of the country. The date was strategically set to coincide with the National Police Day. The causes of the protests were rooted in a desire to change the government and entire governance system. There was also great opposition to the Emergency Law (Law No. 162 of 1958), which had given police more power and taken away constitutional rights of people. Many political activists had been imprisoned and not given a hearing based on this law. Repression by government law enforcement agencies, particularly the police, was very brutal, and innocent civilians were tortured. Also, corruption in the country was at its highest yet the country’s economic conditions were steadily dwindling. Protests in Egypt were in the form of street demonstrations, marches, rallies, acts of civil disobedience, riots, labor strikes, and violent clashes and were carried out mainly by educated youth—thus earning the uprising name of “youth revolution.” After 18 days of the protests, Hosni Mubarak resigned on February 11, 2011.

Libya. In mid-January 2011, protests broke out due to high housing prices in the major cities

of Libya, Darnah, Benghazi, and Bani Walid. On January 27, 2011, the government responded to the protests by investing 24 billion dollars in funds to provide housing and promote development. This first attempt of the protest was unsuccessful. A second protest, launched on February 15, 2011, escalated to a civil war, climaxed by the brutal murder of Col. Muammar Gaddafi and his two sons on October 28, 2011, thus ending his 41-year rule of the country. The Libyan protests were purportedly inspired by the wave of successful protests in Arab countries, especially Tunisia and Egypt. Gaddafi's original response was a violent one: the army sprayed hot water on protesters with the assumption that they would disperse. Although the dictator was strongly supported by the army, the protestors included police and military. In the history of the 2010–2011 Arab protests, Libya is the only country that took 8 months to overthrow the government. By the end, thousands of people had been killed, injured, and exiled.

Morocco. Morocco had its share of protests in the last decade, mainly by labor unions. In the first 10 months of 2007, there were approximately 945 protests against unemployment, high prices, and poor labor standards by labor unions, professional associations, and young activists (Ottaway & Hamzawy, 2011). On January 30, 2011, with the support of neighboring Tunisians, civilians of Morocco staged protests in the cities of Fez and Tangier, but these were immediately subdued by the government. Another attempt was made on February 1, 2011, by striking teachers in front of the Ministry of Education in Rabat, Morocco. One teacher, Nissan Nadir, set fire to himself. Firefighters doused flames.

Malawi. Malawi is reported to have a long history of protests although in most literature the Malawian people are stereotyped as passive and peaceful. Malawians protested against foreign rule during the colonial era and also protested against the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. That federation ended in 1963, followed by the country's independence in 1964 (Zezeza, 2011). After gaining independence, Malawi became a single-party state led by President Hastings Banda's Malawi Congress Party (MCP). Although

he had declared that he would be president for life, pressure from civilian protests led by students and the bishops of the Catholic Church resulted in Hastings Banda's agreement in 1993 to hold a referendum; in that referendum, the populace voted for a multiparty democracy (Carpenter, 2011).

After the referendum, Malawi suffered no further major protests until July 20, 2011, when organizations and local citizens staged a 2-day protest against the deepening authoritarianism and arbitrary power of President Mutharika's regime in which poor governance was manifested in worsening economic mismanagement, shortages of fuel, power outages, rising unemployment, and inflation. Protests were also directed at the regime's nepotism as evident in the redistribution of public sector jobs to people from the president's ethnic group and his desperate attempts to assure that he would be succeeded by his brother [LS4] (The African Press, 2011; Zezeza, 2011). The nonviolent protests, which started in several major cities, were spearheaded by civil societies, NGOs, FBOs, opposition leaders, and student groups who called themselves the "Red Army for Democracy and Peace" (Zezeza, 2011). The protests involved waving machetes, waving the old Malawi flag banned from public display by the Mutharika government, and wearing red clothing.

Nigeria. Since the colonial era, Nigeria, like many other African nations, has had a history of protests. Following the defeat of local rulers, the colonialists introduced a system of indirect rule designed to serve their interests by involving regional officials in administrative offices to ensure social order (Omobowale, 2009). One of the first major protests against this system was launched by the Aba Women's Revolt of October 1929, in which approximately 10,000 women protested the plan of British officials to levy a tax directly on women (Omobowale, 2009). Although the protest was forcefully quelled by the British colonial authority, leaving many protesters dead, the government dropped its plans to tax women (van Allen 1972, cited in Omobowale, 2009).

After obtaining independence, Nigerians suffered oppression from a succession of military

regimes. These military governments passed many decrees aimed mainly at suppressing civilian opposition to dictatorship, preempting both peaceful and violent protests, punishing protestors, and detaining them for civil disobedience (Dukor, 1991). Protests during this period included one by students and workers against the Anglo-Nigerian defense pact in 1962 and a student protest in 1989 against high prices of basic commodities and transport fares (Dukor, 1991). In 1993, then President General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida organized elections to enable the Nigerians to elect a leader of their choice and move away from the military dominance. Unfortunately, the June 12, 1993, Nigerian presidential elections were prematurely terminated when results showed Chief Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola leading in the entire country (Akanle, 2009). This led to one of the most popular prodemocracy revolts in the history of contemporary Africa, which left many people injured or dead.

Overall, Nigeria has been dominated by protests throughout the years over fuel price subsidiaries. For instance, there were protests in 1986, 1994, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2003, 2004, and 2005, and currently during the writing of this chapter (January 2012), there are protests over the removal of fuel price subsidies. In recent protests that lasted over a week, at least 12 activists have been killed by members of the Nigerian military and police forces (Meyer, 2012).

South Africa. South Africa has been proposed by many scholars to be the country with the highest rates of protests in the world. In some instances, it has even been referred to as the “protest capital of the world” (Rodrigues, 2010). During apartheid, protests and *toyi-toyi* (a Southern African dance originally from Zimbabwe) were frequently used by the black South Africans as a means to voice their dissent. Although South African protests are known to be violent, in the late 1980s, boycotts were used by large investors to persuade US firms to withdraw from the South African Market, thereby putting pressure on the South African government to denounce apartheid.

After apartheid, protests in the rainbow nation have become exceedingly numerous, with state

records reporting them to be over 100 each year in the first decade of the twenty-first century (Alexander, 2010). Since 2004, South Africa has experienced a number of local protests, largely by unemployed youth and school students, against inept service delivery and uncaring, self-serving, and corrupt municipal leaders (Alexander, 2010; Mphutlane wa Bofelo, 2011).

The methods for protests were mainly *toyi-toyi*, writing petitions, processions, stay-aways from work, brandishing toilet buckets and banners, singing, election boycotts, construction of barricades, blockading of roads, burning of tires, destruction of buildings and property, looting, confrontation with the police, chasing unpopular personalities out of townships, looting, etc. (Alexander, 2010). Although some of these actions were nonviolent, many were violent and were usually quelled by counterviolence from the police in some instances leaving people dead (report by anti-privatisation Forum Kathorus Concerned Residents, 2004). Apart from service delivery-related protests, xenophobia protests were also rampant in the country in May 2008, leaving many people dead and foreigners fleeing the country. In the lootings done during service delivery protests, it was mainly foreign merchandise that was stolen (Alexander, 2010).

Tunisia. Tunisia is important as it began the wave of social protests that spread to other North African countries and then to the Middle East, which became known as the “Arab Spring.” The country had experienced several local protests mainly against economic mismanagement. Ottaway and Hamzay (2011) noted that these protests were uncoordinated episodes as is the case in many African countries and no one would imagine that this country would be the first in the region where discrete protest episodes would coalesce into the 2010–2011 Arab protests that brought down a number of governments.

Tunisian protests started on December 18, 2010, in the form of street demonstrations that were sparked off by the self-immolation of a youth named Mohamed Bouazizi on December 17, 2010. The protesters were mainly civilians and labor unions, but they had the support of the army. The major causes of the protests were

authoritarian regime, corruption, high levels of unemployment, poor living conditions, lack of freedom of expression/speech, and inflation of food prices, to mention but a few. The protests led to the resignation of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali on January 14, 2011, the ending of his 23 years of rule marked by injuries and deaths. Within one month, the protests had spread to thirteen other nations, namely, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Egypt, and Morocco in Africa and Albania, Jordan, Oman, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine in the Middle East.

Uganda. For many years after achieving independence, Uganda experienced no protests against the central government. However, the spontaneous protests that broke out in the entire Buganda region (central Uganda) in September 2009 signaled the beginning of many more unarmed protests by civilians in the country. The September 2009 protests were preceded by the government's decision to block the Kabaka (Buganda King) from visiting a part of his kingdom (Kobusingye, 2010; Kibanja, Kajumba, & Johnson, 2012). The spread of these ethnic protests to more than six districts in one day showed the opposition leaders that the existing government was not well equipped and prepared to handle resistance as it had always professed. Since then, opposition leaders have staged several protests with the aim of forcing the government to address civilians' key pressing issues, including rising food prices, fuel prices, electricity power cuts, and protection of the Mabira forest among others. The brutal government response to peaceful protests occurred during the "walk-to-work" protests, which spread to the central region, Masaka, Jinja, and Gulu districts, leaving people dead and injured. Currently, the state and its law enforcement agencies resort to excessive use of force in response to citizens' demands for government. Key opposition leaders are arrested and detained in cells, an action that contributes to increased rowdiness and violence, such as throwing stones at the police and burning tires. The police use tear gas and bullets to disperse protesters, resulting in loss of lives, injuries, and the destruction of property. Human

rights defenders who come out to speak against inhumane acts by government agencies are intimidated; media is censored and restrictions made on what should/should not be published; journalists have also been intimidated and threatened while on duty (Uganda Women's Civil Society Organizations, 2011).

Responses by Governments to Protestors

In many African countries, governments have responded violently toward protestors. Responses to nonviolent protests have included intimidation, harassment, torture, illegal arrests, illegal shootings of protestors, and kidnappings (disappearances). For instance, in Egypt, media and social networking sites were blocked, and some journalists' broadcasting equipment was confiscated by the authorities. However, through proxy gateways, protestors were able to access the Internet to keep in touch with current occurrences. In Malawi, bullets and tear gas were used to disperse the protesters, leading to deaths. The government's response to these protests included preemptive arrests of civil society leaders and disruption of news dissemination. After several weeks of discontent over planned mass demonstrations, the government issued an order banning protests and hired mercenaries from Zimbabwe to patrol the streets and suppress a second planned protest because they realized that the Malawian army would not shoot Malawian protestors. The planned protest did not take place due to intervention by the UN.

Consequences of Protests

In Africa, it is not surprising to find that peaceful protests lead to violence and that protestors are frequently arrested, injured, kidnapped, or killed (Human Rights Watch, 2012). According to Head (2011), protests lead to many consequences. For example, they increase the visibility of the problem for which they are staged. When people protest, the local community, politicians, govern-

ment, media, students, and others take a closer look at the cause of the protest and most probably look at it from a new perspective (Head, 2011). Secondly, protests are a demonstration of power by those involved. Protestors are viewed as the nucleus around which change can grow (Boulding, 1965) through dismantling the legitimacy of the existing situation and leading to new pattern. Thirdly, protests promote a sense of solidarity, create social networks that are useful in advancing their cause, and energizing participants (Head, 2011).

Social and Psychological Theories for Protest

In addition to environmental pressures, there are a number of social and psychological processes that contribute to social protest. Instinct theory, drive theory (frustration-aggression), biological theories, social learning theory, and cognitive theory have been used to explain violent protests (Borum, 2004) but may not adequately address the nonviolent protests. Social psychological researchers have also applied efficacy theory, social identity theory, and appraisal theory of emotions to explain why people protest (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2010).

Relative deprivation (RD) is the conscious experience of a negative discrepancy between one's legitimate expectations and his/her present actualities (Schaefer, 2008). The discontent felt after comparing one's situation with a standard (e.g., someone else's situation or a cognitive standard such as justice or equity) can lead to protests when many people share the same discontents (Folger, 1986), and it can lead to protests when many people share the same discontents. According to this theory (Gurr, 1970 cited in Walker & Pettigrew, 1984, p. 303), if citizens in a country feel deprived of resources to which they feel entitled (e.g., adequate service delivery) or various forms of equal access to political and economic rights, they may protest, leading to actions such as civil disobedience.

Social justice theories explain both distributive and procedural justice. Distributive justice concerns the nature of a socially just distribution of goods, and procedural justice refers to fairness in decision-making procedures and the relational aspect of the social process (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2010). Tyler and Smith (1998) proposed that procedural justice might be a more powerful predictor of participation in social movements (protests in this case) than distributive justice (cited in Van Stekelenburg, & Klandermans, 2010). A country without discrepancies and inequalities in access to goods and services, with equal employment opportunities, may be less likely to engage in protests than countries characterized by inequalities.

Efficacy theory, which focuses on beliefs concerning the probability of altering conditions or policies, explains why some people can be mobilized and others not (Gamson, 1992). Group efficacy refers to the belief that group-related problems can be solved by collective efforts, and political efficacy refers to the feeling that political actions can have impact on the political process (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2010). Once citizens can perceive a sense of group cohesion that unites them in a shared desire to address a grievance, then they start perceiving possibility of change and can hence be mobilized into a protest. Bandura (1999) also offers theories of moral engagement and disengagement that explain what might promote or inhibit protest at the individual level and in regard to specific cases of injustice.

In the next section, we describe the methods we used to assess views on the right to protest in Africa just a few years before the Arab Spring. Did our participants view protesting as a right? If so, what sort of right? One that could only be provided by law or a fundamental human right? What were their views on police brutality in response to citizen protests? If they saw police beating up peaceful protestor, what would they want to do? These are the questions we asked ordinary African citizens from a wide range of countries on the brink of the Arab Spring.

Methods

Sample

The African regional sample included 292 respondents (146 females, 143 males, 3 unidentified genders) from Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, and Zambia. Ages ranged from 18 to 74 with an average age of 34 years old. In regard to military service, 10% of the sample had served in the military, while 41% of respondents have had a relative in the military service. Finally, only 8% of the sample reported having protested against war and in favor of peace at some point in their lives.

Procedure

The Group on International Perspectives of Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP) administered the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Scale (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006) to men and women living in different regions throughout the globe (PAIRTAPS;). Refer to Chap. 1 for further information on the PAIRTAPS. This chapter focuses on respondents residing in the African region and on their responses to two of the survey items. The first item requested participants' reactions to the following statement: "Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace." Respondents answered using a 7-point Likert-type scale to indicate their level of agreement with the statement, with 1 indicating complete disagreement and 7 indicating complete agreement; then, they explained their rating qualitatively. It was the qualitative responses that were of interest in the current study. The second item described a hypothetical scenario and asked respondents to indicate how they would want to respond after witnessing it: "Police are beating peaceful antiwar demonstrators. What would you want to do?" In the next two sections, we describe coding procedures, descriptive results, and exploratory analysis for each question, followed by a general discussion of the results from both questions.

Perspectives on the Right to Protest

Coding Guidelines

The coding system designed by GIPGAP placed participants' qualitative responses to the right to protest item into one of several categories derived in part from Albert Bandura's (1999) theory on moral disengagement and engagement. Central to this theory is the idea of socialization, through which humans adopt moral standards that can either guide or deter them from engaging in certain actions. These moral standards lead people to act in ways that will satisfy and build their self-worth and prevent them from violating their moral standards, thus preventing anticipated negative self-sanctions. Bandura identified four main processes that can serve to disengage moral self-sanctions from detrimental conduct in order to help the transgressor avoid feeling guilty: (a) cognitively reconstructing injurious behavior, (b) removing personal agency, (c) misrepresenting or disregarding consequences of said behavior, and (d) devaluing the victim. The opposite of moral disengagement, moral engagement, is described as acting in ways that employ empathy and demonstrate ethical conduct, either proactively behaving humanely or inhibiting inhumane behavior; personal agency is crucial to this achievement.

The tenets in Bandura's theory aided the creation of GIPGAP's coding categories, although we do not assume the validity of all his assumptions. Application of Bandura's constructs to the qualitative responses was supplemented by use of grounded theory techniques to identify additional recurrent themes. Responses to the right to protest item, in which respondents expressed agreement or disagreement with the statement, "Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace," were coded into four sets of thematic categories based on the overall orientation of the response: (a) *rejection of the right*, (b) *affirmation of the right*, (c) *indeterminate status/nonspecific argument*, and (d) *perceived reality*. Responses rejecting the right were coded into *rejection of the right to protest* categories, specifically (a) *general protest*

intolerance, (b) *pseudomoral reasoning* (subcategory *supporting the troops or the government*), (c) *negative labeling*, (d) *disadvantageous comparison*, (e) *denial of personal responsibility*, (f) *distorting consequences*, (g) *dehumanization* (subcategories *of the protestor* and *of the targets of war*), and (i) *attribution of blame* (subcategories *protestors of agents* and *targets of war*).

The *affirmation of the right to protest* categories included (a) *general protest tolerance*, (b) *social justification* (subcategories *peace* and *awareness of negative consequences*), (c) *moral responsibility* (subcategories *civic duty*, *nonviolent*, and *law-abiding*), and (d) *humanization* (subcategories *reciprocal right*, *socially sanctioned rights*, and *human rights*—with additional subcategories *it should be a right* and *international law*). The *nonspecific argument* set of categories was used to code responses that did not fit into the aforementioned categories. The two *nonspecific argument* categories were (a) *it depends* and (b) *do not know*. The fourth set of categories, *perceived reality*, included responses that did not discuss the participant's reasoning or justifications, but rather referred to some current or historical situation as perceived by the respondent. The two major *focus on perceived reality* categories were (a) *protest is futile* and (b) *rights may not be respected*. Refer to the introductory methods protest chapter, Chap. 12 of this volume, for more information.

The Right to Protest: Distribution of Responses

Eighty-nine percent of all responses indicated support for the right to protest, while a mere 3% of all responses expressed disapproval of the right. The most commonly identified *pro-protest* themes were (a) *awareness of negative consequences* (12% of all responses, 13% of *affirmation of the right* responses), (b) *moral responsibility* (14% of all responses, 16% of *affirmation of the right* responses), (c) importance of *nonviolence* (12% of all responses, 13% of *affirmation of the right* responses), and (d) *socially sanctioned rights* (11% of all responses, 12% of *affirmation of the right* responses).

Among the responses expressing an *awareness of the negative consequences* of a failure to protest against war were many that described the horrors and destructions of war. A response indicating this awareness was given by a 26-year-old woman from Botswana, who stated, "War is not good and normally brings very bad results. People lose their lives and their homes and it is better to protest against it." Responses categorized into the *moral responsibility* category indicated a belief that it is one's responsibility to protest or make one's opinion known. The response of a 59-year-old South African man indicated this belief: "Everyone should endeavor to bring peace about." Within the *moral responsibility* category, responses coded for the specific subcategory *nonviolence* argued that everyone has the right to protest against war, but only if it is done in a peaceful manner. A 51-year-old woman from Zambia stated that "Protests against war and in favor of peace may also result in violation of peace. However, non-violent methods of protesting against war and in favor of peace may be used." Her response was also coded for *focus on the perceived reality of the situation* as she mentioned that protests can also result in violence. Finally, responses coded into the *socially sanctioned rights* subcategory of *humanization* described protest as a right granted by society or by the government of the protester. One 25-year-old Algerian woman stated, "Citizens also have the right to rally to defend peace even when it is ignored by the government." Table 17.1 provides examples of responses coded into the *affirmation of the right* category, along with basic demographic information.

Responses indicating intolerance for antiwar protests comprised only 3% of the total response set. Within the *rejection of the right* categories, only two respondents answered with responses that demonstrated *pseudomoral reasoning* (1% of total responses, 33% of *rejection of the right* responses); one of these respondents, a 23-year-old man from Botswana, stated, "Sometimes war is a necessity to bring peace. No matter what they say, swift action can be more effective than talking about peace while innocent people are dying." Responses coded for a *distortion of consequences* accounted for 1% of all responses and 50% of the

Table 17.1 Examples of pro-protest responses

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Pro-protest</i>	89				
<i>Social justification</i>	4(4)				
Awareness of negative consequences	12(13)	Angola	Male	43	Because war only creates destruction and therefore hunger, poverty, and underdevelopment
		Ghana	Unknown	37	War is not a good thing, especially for those who are not interested to be forced into it
		Zambia	Female	34	Yes as war brings poverty and no development at all
<i>Moral responsibility</i>	14(16)	Angola	Female	25	Of course. The world is the product of our actions and our responsibility, and we have the right to make demands in favor of what we want
		Botswana	Female	22	One way of getting a message across to people who seem to only believe in warfare
		South Africa	Male	58	I personally would protest against war and in favor of peace.
Nonviolent	12(13)	Algeria	Female	21	Yes, of course, if the demonstrations are peaceful
		Ghana	Male	22	I agree but in good atmosphere and with no violence
		South Africa	Male	66	As long as the protests are peaceful
<i>Humanization</i>	1(1)				
Socially sanctioned right	11(12)	Zambia	Female	21	This is implied in the right to freedom of expression and freedom of speech (SA constitution)
		Botswana	Male	23	Yes peace is a basic right all people should exercise their freedom of expression
		South Africa	Female	59	I believe in democracy and this is a right

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses for that specific subcategory out of all responses in the *pro-protest* set of categories

rejection of the right to protest responses. The response of a 32-year-old South African man conveyed opposition to antiwar protests by over-emphasizing and distorting the frequency with which they become violent: “This can happen but most times it does not stay a peaceful gathering because of other people with different views—then it turns violent.”

Seven percent of all responses were coded for the *perceived reality* categories. These responses gave no evidence of moral reasoning or justification, but instead offered a commentary on reality as viewed by the respondent. For example,

a 51-year-old South African man stated, “I was part of a peace committee post 1992 that was involved in monitoring protests in the Eastern Cape, and the problem with any protest is that certain elements can hijack/manipulate the protest for their own ends.”

The Right to Protest: Exploratory Statistical Analysis

Chi-square tests of independence were used to analyze responses and demographic groups in

Table 17.2 Responses to the right to protest item: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-squared values

Categories	Demographic group (%) ^a		
	Male	Female	
<i>Pro-protest</i>			
<i>Moral responsibility</i>	9	20	6.27**
<i>Social justification</i>			
Awareness of negative consequences	21	13	2.89*
	Have relative with military experience	Have relative with no military experience	
<i>Pro-protest</i>			
<i>Social justification</i>			
Awareness of negative consequences	22	6	7.86**

Note. If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference

* .051 < *p* < 0.10; ** *p* ≤ 0.05

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

order to identify potential differences in response to themes based on specific demographic groups. The demographic variables analyzed were (a) gender, (b) military service, (c) relative’s military service, and (d) personal involvement in a protest activity. Significant results had *p* values of 0.05 or less.

A significantly greater proportion of women than men asserted that protesting is one’s *moral responsibility*. Conversely, a significantly larger proportion of men than women mentioned *the negative consequences* of war and of inaction to end it. Finally, a significantly higher proportion of respondents with at least one relative in the military as compared to their counterparts mentioned also *negative consequences* in their responses. Table 17.2 presents Chi-square values for the aforementioned categories, as well as percents of responses and *p* values.

Police Beating Peaceful Protestors

Coding Procedure for Reactions to Police Beating Antiwar Demonstrators

For the second item, coding categories were created based on the construct of moral agency. Bandura describes the role of moral agency in the process of moral engagement as either inhibitive,

enabling one to refrain from behaving inhumanely, or proactive, enabling one to behave humanely.

Responses to this item, in which respondents were asked what they would want to do if they witnessed an act of police brutality against peaceful protestors, were coded for agency, which was essential to Bandura’s theory. There were three sets of coding categories: (a) *pro-social agency*, (b) *antisocial agency*, and (c) *lack of agency*. Responses could also be coded into the *perceived reality* and *nonspecific argument* categories. The *pro-social agency* categories were used to code responses that expressed some kind of active support for the protestors. The specific *pro-social agency* categories were (a) *critical judgment of police*, (b) *personal initiative* (subcategories *activism*, *personal understanding*, and *other solutions*), and (c) *institutional initiative* (subcategories *legal action* and *government/other entity*). The *antisocial agency* categories were used to code responses indicating an intent to do something harmful or nonsupportive of the protestors. They included the categories (a) *support for police*, (b) *unlawful activism*, and *action against the demonstrators*. Finally, the *lack of agency* categories were used to code responses that expressed no intent to act in response to witnessing police aggression. These categories included (a) *lack of initiative* and (b) *helplessness*.

Table 17.3 Examples of pro-social agency responses

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Pro-social agency</i>	58				
<i>Personal initiative</i>	18(31)	Algeria	Female	25	Intervene
		Egypt	Male	25	I would want myself and others to speak out against it
		Ghana	Unknown	27	Beg for them to be treated fairly
		Nigeria	Female	25	They should be advised to stop
Activism	10(17)	Algeria	Female	18	Join the demonstrators and work to get support for them
		Botswana	Male	23	Join the protest. I will always stand up for my rights and people
		Ghana	Male	18	Will organize my people to protest against it
<i>Institutional initiative</i>	5(9)				
Legal action	13(22)	Botswana	Female	20	Arrest the police
		Ghana	Female	59	I would report to the Attorney General and publish an article in the media against the police
		Nigeria	Female	24	Dismiss such police

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percent of responses out of the total responses. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses for that specific subcategory out of all responses in the *pro-social agency* set of categories.

Refer to the introductory protest methods chapter, Chap. 12, for more information.

Police Beating Scenario: Distribution of Responses Among Coding Categories

In regard to the hypothetical police brutality scenario, 58% of the responses provided evidence of *pro-social agency*, while another 33% of the responses reflected a *lack of agency*, and 7% demonstrated *antisocial agency*. The most frequently identified *pro-social agency* responses were generally coded for (a) *personal initiative* (18% of all responses, 31% of *pro-social agency* responses), (b) *activism* (10% of all responses, 17% of *pro-agency* responses), and (c) *legal action* (13% of all responses, 22% *pro-social agency* responses). Responses coded into the general *personal initiative* category expressed a vague intention to aid the protesters but did not elaborate upon the actions. Typical of such responses was “Stop the police,” as affirmed by a 25-year-old woman from Botswana. Responses

referring to an intent to protest against the actions of the police or report the actions to the media were coded as *activism*, as in this response from a 25-year-old Egyptian man: “I would join the protesters.” Responses proposing a form of *legal action* in reaction to the police brutality included the response of a 59-year-old man from Ghana: “I would report to the Attorney General and publish an article in the media against the police.” His response was also coded for *activism*, as he mentioned going to the media to disperse information regarding the beatings. Table 17.3 shows examples of responses coded into the *pro-social agency* category, along with basic demographic information.

Responses within the *lack of agency* generally conveyed a *lack of initiative* (31% of all responses, 95% of *lack of agency* responses). The *lack of initiative* category encompassed responses indicating an intent to do nothing in the event of seeing the police beat protesters. Most of these responses were similar to what this 24-year-old Egyptian man said: “I would not do anything.” Responses indicating *helplessness* were not common, comprising

Table 17.4 Examples of lack of agency responses

Subcategory	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Quote
<i>Lack of agency</i>	33				
<i>Lack of initiative</i>	31(95)	Botswana	Male	20	Nothing
		Egypt	Female	22	Nothing, because I do not like protesting
		Algeria	Male	25	Nothing
<i>Helplessness</i>	2(5)	Egypt	Male	24	There is nothing I could do and I would not join the protesters

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percent of responses out of the total responses. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses for that specific subcategory out of all responses in the *lack of agency* set of categories

barely 2% of all responses and 5% of the *lack of agency* responses. Often, these responses expressed a desire to do something about the beatings by the police, but also demonstrated a feeling that it would not be possible to do anything. For instance, a 22-year-old Egyptian man stated, “I could not do anything.” Table 17.4 provides examples of responses expressing a *lack of agency*.

Responses coded as demonstrating *antisocial agency* accounted for a mere 7% of all responses; of this group, responses expressing *unlawful activism* were the most frequent (6% of total responses, 92% of *antisocial agency* responses). These responses referred to violent actions taken against the police, such as the response of this 52-year-old woman from Ghana: “Wage war against the police to stop such behaviors.”

Police Beating Scenario: Exploratory Statistical Analyses

Once again, chi-square tests of independence were performed to see if the various demographic characteristics provided had any relation to specific ways of answering the item. A significantly larger proportion of men than women showed a *lack of initiative* in their responses. Similarly, a significantly higher proportion of veterans than civilians indicated a *lack of initiative* to take action in response to the beatings. A significantly greater proportion of respondents with a relative in the military as compared to those without displayed some form of *activism* in their responses. Finally, a significantly greater

proportion of respondents without a relative in the military than those with a military relative mentioned that they would want to take *legal action* against the police. Table 17.5 presents chi-square values for the aforementioned categories, as well as percents of responses and *p* values.

Discussion

War and its consequences have undermined all African nations and negatively impacted its citizens, directly and indirectly. This regional reality has no doubt shaped citizens’ attitudes about protesting and war. In this study, the large majority of African participants (85%) affirmed the right to protest, with only 2% disapproving of this right. This view is consistent with historic and current high rates of conflict and the numerous and wide-ranging protests occurring on the continent.

Whether or not our participants are in direct contact with war or conflict, they certainly are not strangers to manifestations of conflict as reflected in media, commerce, development initiatives, social and human services, policies, and educational institutions. Africa’s World War, for example, involved over nine countries directly and, by its end, had resulted in 90% of conflict-related deaths since WWII, along with enormous consequences for human, social, and infrastructure development (Horowitz, 2000). In this study, the small proportion (2%) who indicated disapproval of the right to protest indicated that sometimes war was necessary and that peaceful protests

Table 17.5 Responses to the police beating item: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-squared values

Categories	Demographic group ^a		
	Male	Female	
<i>Lack of agency</i>			
<i>Lack of initiative</i>	25	17	2.73*
	Have military experience	Have no military experience	
<i>Lack of agency</i>			
<i>Lack of initiative</i>	79	25	24.18**
	Have relative with military experience	Have relative with no military experience	
<i>Pro-social agency</i>			
<i>Personal initiative</i>			
Activism	16	3	7.35**
<i>Institutional initiative</i>			
Legal action	3	18	8.08**

Note. If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference

*.051 < p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

tended to turn violent. This response reflects a reality in Africa, as protests often turn violent. However, it is usually not the protestors themselves who are the instigators or perpetrators of violence.

Participants provided a range of responses explaining why they supported the rights of protestors. Avoiding the negative consequences of war, such as destruction of lives and property, was a common response. This response was not more common among men or those with military experience indicating that firsthand knowledge does not increase awareness of the harmful effects of war for these individuals. Indeed, women and young people are reported to bear the brunt of conflict, and in our previous study of attitudes about invasion, women were more likely to report an awareness of the negative effects of war (Johnson et al., 2012).

Other reasons for supporting protestors included the idea that they were fulfilling a moral responsibility to act for the common good, to prevent harm. These participants indicated that it was necessary for individuals to act on behalf of civil society (i.e., to prevent harm to others, prevent war). This notion is consistent with

African cultural values of collectivism and of a sense of shared responsibility for the well-being of others and of the community (McCandless & Bangura, 2007; Triandis, 1995). Other reasons for supporting a right to protest were simply that it was a right that was sanctioned by either the government or by society. Although some African leaders continue to try to quell dissent and citizens' rights to protest, with protest bans and other crackdowns, African citizens across the continent are increasingly recognizing and also demanding their civil rights, rights to elections, rights to basic services, and a right to a peaceful and sustainable future (Bangura & McCandless, 2007; USAID, 2012). In our study, women, more than men, provided answers asserting that the rights to protest was socially sanctioned. This is consistent with the increased voice and participation of African woman in civil society.

When asked what they would want to do if police were beating peaceful protestors, the majority reported answers indicating some type of personal engagement or agency. The largest percent indicated an intent to exercise some general personal initiative to aid the protestors. Other responses indicated various forms of

activism, such as joining in with others in the protest or taking institutional or legal action, such as reporting the police to other authorities. These responses are indicative of the overall nascence of democracies and civic education in the region (ACCORD, 2006; Bangura & McCandless, 2007; McCandless & Bangura, 2007). That is, much protesting has been up to individuals who have not benefitted from well-established or resourced civic education and development groups, such as those enjoyed in countries with a long history of democracy and civic leadership infrastructure. Reporting police abuses or even joining a social protest group would likely carry some added threat in a context of political upheaval and mistrust. Moreover, education and infrastructure to promote civic literacy and political participation are lacking (GPI, 2010; UN, 2010).

Compared to those who supported the right of others to protest, there was a relatively large percent indicating an expected lack of agency in the event of exposure to police brutality (nearly 40%), with most of these responses citing a lack of personal initiative. The responses in this category, such as “I would do nothing,” were short and lacked detail or elaboration. Responses did seem to convey a certain detachment and indeed a moral disengagement from the issue at hand (Bandura, 1999). Although unvoiced, the reasons for this apparent apathy are likely complex and multifaceted. Lack of agency was higher among those with military experience, suggesting that military training that emphasizes taking orders and acting in accordance with authority may generalize to civilian life and inhibit one’s personal agency to respond against an authority (e.g., police or government). Other responses in this category could reflect fear or avoidance related to learning history—for example, previous experiences (or knowledge) of harsh government responses to protests or current threats to one’s safety or livelihood. We see this playing out in Angola, for example, where citizens are being threatened with consequences if they participate in protests. Although only 2% of our respondents indicated helplessness, it is possible that a lack of personal initiative could be the eventual result of a sense of helplessness, a lack of knowing what to do, or conversely

knowing what to do but feeling hopeless to make a difference because of a lack of resources and pathways to effect change via protest.

A Role for Governments and NGOs. In an African context, a lack of personal initiative or agency, as we have seen reflected here, may ultimately result from a lack of structural resources, opportunities, and scaffolding that limit chances for engagement and success (USAID, 2012). A country without discrepancies and inequalities in access to goods and services is less likely to experience frequent protests. Indeed, Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2010) emphasize that at the heart of every protest, there is perceived illegitimate inequality. Certainly, this is the case across Africa where far too many lack resources to meet their basic survival needs, despite some economic and democratic progress in the region (UN, 2010). According to the relative deprivation theory, if citizens in a country feel deprived of what they perceive as things they should be entitled to, such as goods or service delivery, they can protest (Gurr, 1970, cited in Walker & Pettigrew, 1984, p. 303). According to this theory, events and patterns of conditions, such as suppression of a political party, a drastic inflation, or the decline of a group’s status relative to its reference group, are likely to precipitate feelings of relative deprivation among whole groups or categories of people, leading to civil disobedience or protest (Gurr, 1970, cited in Walker & Pettigrew, 1984, p. 303). With food insecurity and unemployment on the rise in African nations, governments and NGOs should redouble their efforts toward achieving their development goals, such as those outlined in the Millennium Development Goals (UN, 2010).

African governments and NGOs should also work toward equitable distribution of resources and fair political participation among different cultural, ethnic, and religious groups (USAID, 2012). This point is particularly important, because of the historic and current role of tribalism in political conflicts on the continent. From colonialism until today, ethnic lines are manipulated via divide and rule policies, and regimes in power tend to favor certain groups (Kibanja et al., 2012). This approach undermines a sense of unity and nationalism and promotes mistrust, competition, and divisiveness among ethnic and religious

groups. Tajfel's social identity theory argues that people categorize the social world into in-groups and out-groups that have power and status relations to one another (Hogg & Abrams, 1988).

Identity politics are increasingly identified as causes of civic conflict in sub-Saharan Africa (Gettleman, 2010; Kaldor, 2001). Social identity theory research posits that protests are likely to occur after a comparative process revealing that the existing social structural characteristics (i.e., permeability of the group boundaries, the stability of status positions, and the legitimacy of the existing inequalities) can be challenged. People who conceive group status positions as variable (not stable) see protests as a possible method to cause change especially in circumstances where the low-status group sees its disadvantaged position as illegitimate (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2010). In cases where the boundaries are permeable, a social change strategy is adopted, which aims to improve the social position of the group as a whole. When subordinate groups can conceive of cognitive alternatives, the social competition strategy is adopted, in which violence and aggression, in the form of protests, strikes, boycotts and revolution, aim to overthrow the status quo and restructure the social order through direct attacks on a "superior" group by an "inferior" group (Foster & Louw-Potgieter, 1991). For African governments to survive, they will have to work hard to achieve a sense of unity, social justice, and equanimity among groups.

A Role for Citizens. Democracies and socially just societies are built upon and for individuals. After several decades of postcolonial rule, many African citizens are increasingly aware of the limitations of their current "democratic" leaders and institutions and voicing their dissent through protests. As we have seen in our results, the large majority support the right to protest. What, then, influences individuals and groups to take action? Efficacy theory, in addition to moral engagement and disengagement theories, can help us understand the disconnect between the affirmation of protest and the lack of agency or initiative to respond. Efficacy is defined as the individual's expectation that it is possible to alter conditions or policies through protest (Gamson, 1992). There are group efficacy and political efficacy. The for-

mer refers to the belief that group-related problems can be solved by collective efforts and the latter to the feeling that political actions can have impact on the political process (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2010). Once citizens can perceive a sense of group cohesion that enables them to unite and address a grievance, then they start perceiving the possibility of change and can hence be easily mobilized into a protest. Building confidence and efficacy is to be seen as a key aspect in health, development, and gender equity initiatives in Africa (Johnson, Kim, Johnson-Pynn, Schulenberg, Balagaye, 2012). Providing civic education in schools and to community groups is key to these efforts to promote self-, community, and political efficacy and thus stable nations

Implications and Conclusion

Finding a path toward peace in Africa is a major challenge of the twenty-first century. This is of urgent importance, given Africa's development potential, resources, and growing influence in world markets, not to mention the immense suffering and loss that has resulted from ongoing conflicts (Bangura & McCandless, 2007). Civic participation and in particular social protest as a means to effect pro-social and democratic change in African countries promise to play an increasingly significant role (USAID, 2012). As this and other studies have suggested, African citizens are optimistic about their futures despite the challenges to democracy and development. They have also voiced a strong desire to be engaged in a part of that change and are finding new ways, such as through communications technology, to participate and to lead. Youth and women are playing active and visible roles, especially with the aid of government and NGO initiatives supporting empowerment programs for youth, women, and more recently girls.

In fact, some progress has been made on some indicators of economic and democratic growth within the last decade (United Nation, 2010; Bangura & McCandless, 2007; UNDP, 2010). Although heartening, much work remains and the pathway to peaceful and socially just societies will be complex, multifaceted, and not without setbacks. In order to establish a sustainable peace

in the region, it is argued that certain conditions must be in place. They include (1) *effective communication*, consultation, and negotiation at different levels and between all major stakeholders; (2) *essential peace-enhancing structures* with internal and external support, such as a restorative justice system, education, information, and communication systems, and systems and structures to address IDP and refugee issues; (3) a *political-psychological environment* characterized by a feeling of collective identity and group cohesion that allows for multiple loyalties, the expectation of cooperation and of its benefits, reconciliation of guiding values, and a commitment to solve conflicts constructively; and finally (4) *objective and subjective security* through cease-fires, arms control and disarmament, and peace and security-building measures (United Nations, as cited in McCandless, 2007, p. 102).

Meeting these preconditions for peace in Africa will depend on collaborative efforts among multiple international, regional, and local initiatives to achieve basic goals as outlined in the MDGs; strengthen and empower civil society; and transform ineffective leadership and policies. We encourage investment in program development, implementation, and evaluation research in initiatives to further such goals. The best outcomes will be achieved via concerted and collaborative efforts by government and nongovernment organizations and academic institutions in the education, health, social service, community development, and political sectors.

In addition to programs offering basic development assistance, we suggest specific interventions to promote intercultural relations, social justice attitudes, empowerment, and civic participation. Community, women's groups, youth development organizations, and schools can incorporate intercultural learning and civic engagement in their programs (Kibanja et al., 2012). Strength-based approaches to youth development, for example, show promise for cultivating positive personal and cultural identities, emphasize positive intergroup attitudes, and promote civic engagement (Benson, Scales, & Leffert, 2003; Johnson et al., 2012). Attention to youth perspectives is key and should be included in future studies, as youth

constitute a "youth bulge" in many African nations (CIA, 2009; Fuller, 1995). Nations with youth bulges may be particularly influential in propelling their communities and nations toward peace and cohesion or toward ethnic division and violence (Hart, Atkins, Markey, & Youniss, 2004).

Indeed, program and research efforts need to include youth, as well as other diverse constituencies and marginalized groups (USAID, 2012). Public health, social welfare, and other programs to support peace and security in the region will ultimately fail if they fail to address the unique and specific concerns of women, minority ethnic or religious groups, persons with disabilities, gay and lesbian persons, those with HIV, displaced persons, and those living in extreme poverty or conditions of conflict. While gains have been made, the situation for the large majority in African nations and, in particular, these marginalized groups remains unjustifiably inequitable and precarious. There remains a great need to establish a collaborative, interdisciplinary research agenda to better understand situations of conflict, empower citizens, and promote socially just, peaceful, and sustainable communities, societies, and nations in Africa.

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Jorge Luna Torres, Adriana Muent, Patrick Hanlin, Michael Stevens, Amanda Clinton, Sherri McCarthy, Rodrigo Barahona, Ricardo Angelino, Eddy Carillo, Eros DeSouza, and Luciana Karine de Souza

Although there have been interstate rivalries (Thies, 2005) and boundary disputes (Dominguez et al., 2003) in Latin America in recent decades, there has been very little interstate warfare. Consequently, there has been little in the way of antiwar protests. On the other

hand, dictators have been toppled by civilians (Pion-Berlin, 2005), and there have been anti-US protests (Rénique, 2009), mostly about an economical model influence. Furthermore, the military in many Latin American countries avoid direct confrontations with civilians (Pion-Berlin, 2005); nevertheless, there continues to be protest activity in Latin America, directed primarily at economic tribulations and economic inequalities.

Protests have a long history of empowering people around the world to express discontent with a particular political issue or policy. As we try to analyze the origins and evolution of social protests, we need to understand that protestors represent only half of a dynamic relationship, the other half being the state or government. Carey (2006, p. 2) defined protest as “any confrontational activity by non-governmental actors that disrupts and challenges any government or state

J.L. Torres (✉)

Corporacion Educativa B. F. Skinner, Lima, Peru
e-mail: coqui35@hotmail.com

A. Muent

Markham College Early Years, Lima, Peru
e-mail: adrianamuent@gmail.com

P. Hanlin

Department of Psychology, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA

M. Stevens

Department of Psychology, Illinois State University,
Normal, IL, USA
e-mail: mjstevan@ilstu.edu

A. Clinton

University of Puerto Rico, Mayagüez, Puerto Rico, USA
e-mail: amanda.clinton@gmail.com

S. McCarthy

Educational Psychology, Counseling and Human
Relations, Northern Arizona University, Yuma, AZ, USA
e-mail: Sherri.McCarthy@NAU.EDU

R. Barahona

Counselor, Brookline, MA, USA
e-mail: rodbarahona@gmail.com

R. Angelino

School of Medical Sciences, National University
of La Plata, La Plata, Argentina
e-mail: drangelino@uolsinects.com

E. Carillo

Universidad Independiente & Director of the Center for
Psychoanalytic Studies of the Association for
Socio-Critical Psychoanalysis, San Jose, Costa Rica
e-mail: ecarillo65@yahoo.com

E. DeSouza

Department of Psychology, Illinois State University,
Normal, IL, USA
e-mail: erdesou@ilstu.edu

L. Karine de Souza

Department of Psychology, Federal University
of Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, Brazil
e-mail: luciana.karine@ufg.br

actor, agency or policy.” This definition implies that on one side of the relationship, there are the state’s agencies, representatives, and policies united in their aim to maintain their grasp on power while diminishing any kind of threat from potential or actual opponents. On the other side is the opposition formed by protestors, united by the common goal of changing the government, its policies, or the extent of its power.

Although countries in Latin America achieved their independence from Spain over 100 years ago, colonization left a big social, educational, and economic gap between races, and protest has often been used by underprivileged people of lower social economic status in Latin America to state their grievances. Political institutions in Latin America are viewed as weak in the eyes of the population and are often perceived as corrupt and inadequate. This is true even of citizens who vote and especially for the lower class. Consequently, there is a propensity to use protest as a way of expressing discontent when Latin Americans feel that the government does not represent their voices. This propensity is consistent with a pattern found in other countries where people believe that parties do not represent their constituencies and are thereby more likely to protest (Machado et al., 2011). Similarly, there is evidence of greater levels of protest activity when a country has low levels of party system institutionalization and high levels of legislative fragmentation (Arce, 2010). People feel misrepresented by the government and believe that it doesn’t listen to their voices and doesn’t act upon their needs and requests.

In recent years, social movements in Latin America have expressed their rejection of the effects of globalization on the continent, and there has been an increase in the convergence and coordination processes between these movements in regional political institutions. These protests against the democratic, economic model implemented by governments are a confirmation of the repoliticization view, which indicates that protest increases with economic liberalization in democratic settings (Bellinger & Arce, 2011). One example of this type of protest is the March Against Globalization and Life (*Globalización y por la Vida*), which gathered 10,000 people in

Porto Alegre, Brazil. Another example took place at the 2001 annual meeting of the Inter-American Bank of Development (BID) in Santiago de Chile, where the police repressed protestors who were seeking improvements in the base conditions of living (employment, education, etc.) (Seoane & Taddie, 2001).

There are some who believe that the so-called “new” social movements are born of spontaneous factors. This is a simple vision, which does not take into account national political, social, and cultural history. We must know a country’s past experiences regarding social movements and which parts of the populations were involved to understand these movements. Crossley (2003) pointed out that the lack of receptiveness to public opinion and pressure perceived in government institutions generates in the population a need to seek out alternative routes of self-organization. These proposed alternative routes of organization often result in street protests and new social movements. Some of these movements are organized in the blogosphere, which is considered by bloggers as a valid space of expression against their current political and social situation (Matheson, 2004); movements born in the blogosphere can oftentimes lead to street protests.

According to Rosen et al. (2010, p. 438), “the Internet effectively serves as a roadmap for searching, collecting, and exchanging information, and catalyzing the decentralized coordination of a political movement,” which allows people to communicate in an open and democratic way. Online resources are widely used and the Internet commonly serves as a space to express a position on a variety of contemporary issues including consumer and environmental advocacy. As mentioned previously, protests in Latin America have been against their own governments or political institutions but not against war. There is lack of data regarding perspectives on war protestation because Latin America has had little involvement in wars, except against drugs, corruption, or terrorism—internal rather than external wars.

In conclusion, it is important to mention the interdependency between protest and repression, whereby “protest leads to repression and repression leads to protest” (Carey, 2006, p. 8). The

nature of this interdependency varies depending on the kind of government the country has. Carey (2006) found that in general governments in democracies attempted to accommodate opposition groups and avoid using continuous repressive behavior, whereas in autocracies, hostile governments could sometimes intimidate opposition forces into cooperation. Furthermore, Latin American governors, upon history, try hardly to repress protest, mostly in authoritative governments, to achieve their political or economical goals.

In 2011–2012, there were massive protests in Chile to reform the educational system and demands for free and quality public education. These protest led to a 5 months of paralyzing activities in many universities and secondary schools around the country. In this context the figure of Camila Vallejo, the leader of students of 25 universities, stood up as an opinion leader with a high influence in the students in Chile. As a result of negotiations the Chilean government agreed to an increase in the educational budget by a tax reform that would allow collecting around \$700 million.

Methods

Sample

The Latin America sample consisted of 869 participants, of which 437 were female and 253 were male. The ages of participants ranged from 18 to 79 with the mean age being 27. Only 28 of the participants (4% of the sample) had any military background; however, 318 participants (57%) had a relative who was in or had been in the military. One hundred and thirty-three participants (24%) had participated in a protest. Demographic information was not provided by everyone; 4 participants did not identify their gender, 41 did not disclose information on military service, 152 did not disclose whether or not a relative had military experience, and 147 did not disclose protest activity. Seven Latin American countries were represented in this study: Argentina (46 participants, 5% of the sample), Puerto Rico (75, 9%), Brazil (251, 29%),

Columbia (63, 7%), Nicaragua (122, 14%), Costa Rica (61, 7%), and Peru (251, 29%).

Procedure

To recruit participants, convenience sampling was utilized by way of peer networking, the Internet and universities. Participants had the option of either completing a paper-and-pencil or electronic version (through a secure website) of the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Scale (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006). The PAIRTAPS survey was developed for the purpose of gauging individuals' thoughts on different forms of governmental aggression. Although there are many sections in the survey that touch on different issues, such as rights, state-sanctioned violence, peace, and reconciliation, this chapter focuses on two specific items.

The first item asked participants to indicate on a -point Likert scale how much they agreed with the statement "individuals have the right to stage protests against war" and in fact presented participants with the following scenario: "Police are beating peaceful antiwar demonstrators. What would you want to do?"

Coding Manual Development

The development of a coding manual for these two items was done using a deductive qualitative analysis. In this type of analysis, the coding system is derived from a preexisting conceptual model. The model is tested and refined in a way that allows it to best fit the evidence. Bandura's work on personal agency and moral disengagement was used as the cornerstone for this coding manual. Bandura's theory has been used to explain the cognitive processes underlying individuals' justifications of their own violent acts or the acts of others/institutions. He identified four principal moral disengagement processes that allow people to act in ways that conflict with their morals, and still avoid guilt and shame: (a) cognitive reconstruction of behaviors, (b) minimization and misrepresentation of the consequences

Table 18.1 Examples of anti-protest responses

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Anti-protest</i>	1				
<i>Pseudo-moral reasoning</i>	1(44)	Peru	F	18	We can protest for peace, but if we are attacked we have to defend ourselves although we would cause harm
		Peru	M	20	It does not seem that protesting would be the path toward peace; there is something else that is missing; people must be aware of reality and of a united existence
		Peru	F	19	But not when the war is necessary so that it is possible to reestablish order
<i>General disagreement</i>	>1(22)	Nicaragua	M	22	There is no right

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total right to protest codes. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the prerequisites major category. *F* female, *M* male

of behaviors, (c) diffusion of responsibility, and (d) devaluation and dehumanization of the victim. Bandura also emphasized the importance of personal agency, which explains how individuals behave in pro-social ways, even when doing so is difficult. There are two aspects to personal agency, a proactive aspect that allows individuals to “behave humanely” (Bandura, 2002, p. 111) and an inhibitive aspect that prevents individuals from committing antisocial acts.

Right to Protest

Coding Manual

All of the responses to the right to protest item consisted of codable units that fell into one of four major categories. The first major category was made up of responses that contained *anti-protest* themes. These themes included (a) *general disagreement* (“no”); (b) *pseudo-moral reasoning*, the subcategories of which were *support for the troops* or *support for government*; (c) *negative labeling*; (d) *disadvantageous comparison*; (e) *denial of personal responsibility*; (f) *distorting consequences*; (g) *dehumanization* (with subcategories for *dehumanization of protester* or *targets of war* specifically); and (h) *attribution of blame* (with subcategories for *blaming protester* or *blaming targets of war*). *Pro-protest* themes characterized the second major set of categories,

most of which also have subcategories: (a) *general agreement* (“yes”), (b) *social justification* (*peace* and *awareness of negative consequences* subcategories), (c) *moral responsibility* (*civic duty*, *nonviolent*, and *law abiding* subcategories), and (d) *humanization* (*reciprocal right*, *socially sanctioned rights*, and *human rights* subcategories, with *it should be a right* and *international law* as an additional level of subcategories of human rights). The third major set of categories, *indeterminate status or nonspecific argument*, contained responses of the form *I don’t know* or *it depends*. The last category was for responses that focused on the *perceived reality* of the situation (with *the right may not be protected* or *protest is futile* subcategories). There were also a few *uncodable* responses and responses that *did not address the prompt*.

Distribution of Qualitative Responses to Right to Protest Item

An analysis of the responses to the antiwar protest prompt indicated that only 1% of individuals disagreed with the statement that people have that right. The two most common antiwar responses were ones based on *pseudo-moral reasoning* or simple disagreements (*no*). Table 18.1 includes the percentage distribution for the most common anti-protest responses and examples from participants.

Responses that indicated individuals were *pro-protest* constituted 97% of all responses. Concise *yes* responses to the protest prompt comprised 8% of the responses. Five percent of responses were based on *social justification*; as one 24-year-old Peruvian woman said, protests are necessary to reach “social and cultural equilibrium.” Arguments that protesting is a viable means for reaching *peace* compromised 15% of responses, making it the third most frequently given rationale for a right to protest. Responses that acknowledged the *negative consequences* of war and the necessity of protesting war made up 6% of all responses. Ten percent of responses indicated that individuals had a *moral responsibility* to protest for the causes in which they believe, and 4% of responses indicated that individuals had a *civic duty* to protest. For example, a 27-year-old Brazilian woman said that protesting was a “way for populations to make governments know what they think.” Responses that specify that *nonviolence* is a necessary condition for a right to protest made up 10% of all responses. A number of individuals gave responses indicating that if war can be waged, then citizens should be able to protest such action; these responses, based on *reciprocal rights*, comprised 3% of all responses. Responses indicating that protest is a *human right* or that it is a *socially sanctioned right* constituted the subcategories with the largest percentage of all responses (17% each). Two percent of responses stated that people *should have the right* to protest against war. Table 18.2 shows the percentages of frequently given responses indicating a tolerance for war protests.

Statements that the right to protest *depended* on the situation made up only 1% of responses, and only 1% of the responses focused on the *perceived reality* of protest (e.g., whether they could achieve anything).

Exploratory Statistical Analyses of Right to Protest Themes

To investigate the possibility of group differences in the frequency of responses, exploratory chi-square analyses and Fisher’s exact test were

conducted. Only two differences were found, and both existed between individuals with protest experience and those without it. A significantly larger proportion of protestors than non-protestors said the right to protest is necessary to reach *peace*. Conversely, a significantly larger proportion of non-protestors than protestors indicated that protesting is a *human right*. Table 18.3 contains the results of the chi-square analyses.

Police Beating Peaceful Protestors Scenario

Coding Manual

The responses to the prompt in which police were beating peaceful protesters were coded into categories based on the type of agency that characterized the reaction. The first major category was characterized by responses indicating participants would engage in *pro-social agency*. These responses consisted of (a) *critical judgment of police*, (b) *personal initiative (activism, personal understanding, and other solutions subcategories)*, and (c) *institutional initiative (legal action and government/other agency subcategories)*. The second major category consisted of calls for *antisocial agency* in response to police beatings. The themes that comprised this category included (a) *supporting the police*, (b) *unlawful activism*, and (c) *demonstrations*. The *lack of agency* category included themes expressing (a) *lack of initiative* and (b) *helplessness*. There were also a few *uncodeable* responses and responses that *did not answer the prompt*.

Distribution of Qualitative Responses to Police Scenario

The majority of responses (83%) to the item in which individuals were asked how they would respond to police beating nonviolent protesters called for *pro-social agency*. In 4% of all responses, individuals indicated that they believed the *police needed to be judged*. The largest

Table 18.2 Examples of protest-tolerant responses

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Pro-protest</i>	97				
<i>General agreement</i>	8(8)	Nicaragua	F	28	Of course. It is logical
<i>Social justification</i>	5(5)	Brazil	F	27	This is a way to show the desire to improve life
		Puerto Rico	M	19	This way we can promote harmony among nations
Peace	15(15)	Peru	F	18	Yes, we have the right to live peacefully and not live a life full of destruction and constant threat
		Brazil	F	19	Because the search and “fight” for peace is important
Awareness of negative consequences	6(6)	Peru	M	18	Yes, because ultimately we are the ones that pay, sometimes with our own lives in war
		Columbia	M	55	War is always an abuse on human rights
<i>Moral responsibility</i>	10(10)	Peru	F	24	In this life the ultimate goal is to “live,” and to live means that we must defend and proclaim all forms of life
		Costa Rica	M	33	Of course, it is important that each person has their own opinion
Civic duty	4(4)	Costa Rica	M	37	And governments should hear us if they are to be the representatives (function of democracy)
		Costa Rica	M	22	It is perhaps one of the only ways that the people can really be heard
Nonviolent	10(10)	Peru	F	19	Yes, but without resorting to violence
		Nicaragua	M	21	Always if they use the correct mechanisms
<i>Humanization</i>	0(0)				
Reciprocal rights	3(3)	Brazil	F	38	Yes, likewise, people who are in favor of war also have the right to protest
		Puerto Rico	F	19	Respect that we have different opinions
Human rights	17(18)	Peru	F	22	Yes, because we have the right to our own opinion and it must be respected
		Columbia	M	30	This is a fundamental right in free individuals
It should be a right	2(2)	Nicaragua	F	20	Everyone should have the right to protest
Socially sanctioned right	17(17)	Nicaragua	M	25	It is a right called democracy
		Columbia	F	35	Yes because we are in a free country

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total right to protest codes. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the pro-protest response set. *M* male, *F* female

subcategory of responses (43% of all responses) was comprised of claims that *personal initiative* was the necessary reaction. These initiatives included *activism* (20% of total responses) and *personal understanding* of police officers' motives (1% of all responses); *other solutions*, not specified by respondents, made up 4% of all responses. Six percent of total responses indicated that individuals believed that *institutional*

initiatives were necessary; these included *legal action* (3% of the total response set) and *government intervention* (2% of all responses). Table 18.4 presents the percentages of responses that call for *pro-social agency* in responses to police beatings as well as examples of responses.

Only 6% of responses were coded into the *antisocial agency* categories. The most typical *antisocial* response expressed a desire to engage

Table 18.3 Right to protest: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Category	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	χ^2
	Protest experience	No protest experience	
<i>Pro-protest</i>			
<i>Social justification</i>			
Peace	13	7	6.24*
<i>Humanization</i>			
Human rights	17	24	5.31*

Note. If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference

* $p \leq 0.05$

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

Table 18.4 Examples of pro-social agency responses

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Pro-social agency</i>					
83					
<i>Judgment of police</i>	4(5)	Brazil	M	22	Disapprove of this action
		Brazil	F	26	Forbid them from beating, show that this is wrong
<i>Personal initiative</i>	43(52)	Costa Rica	F	30	Defend that person
		Peru	F	19	I would tell the police to stop and if not file a complaint against them
Activism	20(25)	Nicaragua	F	29	Protest and support the protest
		Nicaragua	F	24	Rapidly unite myself with the group
Personal understanding	1(1)	Columbia	M	34	Ask why they are fighting
		Nicaragua	F	30	See if this is a peaceful protest or not
Other solutions	4(5)	Puerto Rico	F	21	Prevent this situation
<i>Institutional initiative</i>	6(7)	Peru	F	19	Speak with the authorities or superiors
		Puerto Rico	F	49	Fire the police for being incompetent
Legal action	3(4)	Nicaragua	M	22	Sue the police
		Peru	F	20	I would speak with whoever I had to in order to get the police sanctioned
Government or other entity	2(2)	Argentina	F	24	Give the police to the government
		Columbia	M	26	Talk to the government in order to put a strong hand to the police

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total reaction to police beating codes. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the pro-social agency responses. *M* male, *F* female

in *unlawful activism* (6% of total responses). These responses varied from “beating up the police” to “killing the police.” Table 18.5 includes the percentages of *antisocial* responses and examples.

In addition to responses indicating a desire to engage in some action if confronted by a situation in which police were beating peaceful pro-

testors, a number of responses showed a *lack of agency* (8%). Six percent of all responses were claims that the respondent would do nothing, indicating a *lack of initiative*. Other responses (2% of all responses) suggested *hopelessness* on the part of the respondent. Table 18.6 contains the percentages and examples of responses with a *lack of agency*.

Table 18.5 Examples of antisocial agency responses

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Antisocial agency</i>	6				
<i>Unlawful activism</i>	6(92)	Brazil	F	20	Beat up the police officers
		Peru	F	19	Gather people to attack the police

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total reaction to police beating codes. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the prerequisites major category

M male, *F* female

Table 18.6 Examples of lack of agency responses

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Lack of agency</i>	8				
Lack of initiative	6(80)	Brazil	F	38	Nothing. Protestors should know the risks involved and decide if they're willing to take it. If they're there, it's by their own choice
		Costa Rica	M	29	Avoid it
Hopelessness	2(20)	Brazil	F	19	In the moment of the action, nothing could be done against the police

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total reaction to police beating codes. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the prerequisites major category

M male, *F* female

Exploratory Analyses of Scenario Themes

Chi-square analyses were conducted to consider the possibility of group differences in the frequency of particular thematic responses. At a marginally significant level, proportionately more women than men gave at least one response coded into at least one of the *pro-social agency* categories. On the other hand, men were marginally more likely than women: (a) to give responses coded for at least one of the *antisocial agency* categories and (b) suggest that they would engage in *unlawful activism*. A significantly larger proportion of men than women (a) gave responses coded for at least one of the *lack of agency* categories and (b) *lacked initiative* to do anything in response to this situation. Finally, protestors were marginally more likely than non-protestors to say that would want to exhibit some form of *activism* in the face of

the beatings. Table 18.7 contains the results of the chi-square tests run on the data.

Discussion

The present study provides data about the perspectives of Latino Americans concerning the right to protest. Based on Bandura's theory of personal agency and moral disengagement, the responses were divided into four major categories: general disagreement, general agreement, nonspecific argument, and perceived reality. The responses reflect a readiness among many Latin Americans to protest against what is seen as unjust. In regard to predictors of group differences, protest experience was a significant contributor to perspectives on protest: protestors were more likely than non-protestors to assert that the right to protest is necessary to achieve peace and is a human right.

Table 18.7 Reaction to police beatings: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and Chi-square values

Category	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	χ^2
	Female	Male	
<i>Pro-social agency presence^b</i>	84	79	2.79 [^]
<i>Antisocial agency presence^b</i>	6	10	3.26 [^]
Unlawful activism	5	8	2.8 [^]
<i>Lack of agency presence^b</i>	7	12	4 [*]
Lack of initiative	5	9	4.87 [*]
	Protest experience	No protest experience	
<i>Pro-social agency</i>			
<i>Personal agency</i>			
Activism	27	19	3.67 [^]

Note. If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference.

[^].05 < p < .10; ^{*} p ≤ 0.05

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^b“Presence” at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories

The study also provided evidence about intentions to exercise agency on behalf of protesters in a situation where police are beating peaceful protesters. The responses were divided in three major categories: pro-social agency, antisocial agency, and lack of agency. The majority of responses called for pro-social agency with a particular emphasis on the importance of personal initiative. Regarding predictors of group differences in themes, gender was significant: significantly more women than men indicated that they would want to take pro-social action, and significantly more men than women expressed an inclination to behave antisocially or to respond in ways that lacked agency.

Our findings are consistent with the view that Latin Americans believe they have the right to protest, mostly as a way to express their discontent with the government or policy, or against an economic model. Furthermore, they provide evidence that Latinos are ready to exercise agency on behalf or perceived human rights, which may indicate why the military in many of the Latin American countries avoids confrontation with

civilians (Pion-Berlin, 2005). However, more research is needed to understand the complex relationship between economic and political factors that contribute to an open expression of discontent by the citizens.

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Perspectives on Protest in South and Southeast Asia

19

Ma. Regina E. Estuar, Nico Canoy, Divya Japa,
Janice Jones, Sherri McCarthy, Ellora Puri,
Megan Reif, Darshini Shah, Haslina Muhammad,
Nisha Raj, and Jas Jafaar

In democratic countries, civil society is provided with a constitutional right to peaceful assembly. In these assemblies, disadvantaged collectives act in unison to express sentiments against a high-powered group, usually challenging the status quo (Hogg & Abrams, 2007). Social protest is powered by grievances that move people into provoking ameliorative action (Turner, 1969). These people are often minorities who engage in active nonviolent behavior hoping that such acts will lead to changes in attitude (Hogg & Abrams, 2007), in beliefs, and eventually to social change.

Over the years, reasons for protests have increased and varied. At the same time, forms of

protests have changed. Cross-national variations suggest that protest is more common in industrial democracies such as Sweden, France, or the United States as part of their normative politics, whereas developing countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, or Pakistan have one of the lowest number of protest activities (Dalton & van Sickle, 2005). This difference may also indicate that the meaning and content of political protest may differ between developed and developing countries. Though protest is by definition a form of unconventional political action such as signing a petition, joining boycotts, attending lawful demonstrations, or joining unofficial strikes (Dalton & van Sickle, 2005), protests also include

M.R.E. Estuar (✉)

Department of Information Systems and Computer Science,
Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon City, Philippines
e-mail: restuar@ateneo.edu

N. Canoy

Psychology Department,
Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines
e-mail: nicocanoy@gmail.com

D. Japa

Department of Psychology, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA
e-mail: nicocanoy@gmail.com

J. Jones

Doctoral Leadership Studies Department, Cardinal
Stritch University, Milwaukee, WI, USA
e-mail: je2jones@stritch.edu

S. McCarthy

Educational Psychology, Counseling and Human
Relations, Northern Arizona University, Yuma, AZ, USA
e-mail: Sherri.McCarthy@NAU.EDU

E. Puri

Department of Political Science, University of Jammu,
Jammu, India
e-mail: ellorapuri@gmail.com

M. Reif

Political Science and International Studies,
University of Colorado Denver, Denver, CO, USA
e-mail: reifm@umich.edu; reifmegan@live.com

D. Shah

Health Education Library for People, Mumbai, India
e-mail: dnshah1@gmail.com

H. Muhammad

Monash University, Melbourne, Australia

N. Raj

Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA

J. Jafaar

Department of Anthropology and Sociology, Faculty
of Arts and Sciences, University of Malaysia, Malaysia
e-mail: laile@um.edu.my

rallies, strikes, and other forms of civic engagement such as civil disobedience and noncooperation (Ackerman & Kruegler, 1994). More recently, newer forms of protest have evolved, aided by technology (Estuar & Montiel, 2009). Examples of such innovations are virtual protests and e-signature campaigns. Social media including blogs, tweets, and other social networking applications are also being tapped as a source for collective information including protests. These newer forms of technology have provided ordinary citizens with an engaging and liberating medium to express grievances and sentiments. It has been observed that there is a reciprocal relationship between the use of technology and civic engagement, in that evolving forms of technology shape collective engagement. At the same time, collective agents modify the functions and features of technology to serve a particular purpose, in this context, as a medium for protest.

Studying social protest means not only studying the forms of protest but more so intergroup relations. This process involves looking into how an individual identifies with a group, how this group expresses discontent, and how discontent is elevated into collective action (Hogg & Abrams, 2007). Another way to study social protests is to look into the reasons why this phenomenon occurs. In general, an investigation of reasons can take us down a number of paths, including looking at groups (Levine & Moreland, 1998), social conflict (Pruitt, 1998), intergroup relations (Brewer & Brown, 1998), and social justice and social movements (Tyler & Smith, 1998).

Research on collective action has provided some evidence that group representation rather than group membership alone propels an individual to engage in collective action (Taylor, Moghaddam, Gamble, & Zeller, 1987). This means that meaningful protest goes one step further than individual discontent. Furthermore, feelings of dissatisfaction alone (as suggested in equity theory and relative deprivation theory) do not account for *when* disadvantaged groups participate in collective action (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). It appears that the salience of one's social identity in relation to one's intergroup structure can contribute to the initiation of

collective action (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Taylor & McKirnan, 1984; Taylor & Moghaddam, 1987). Furthermore, the nature of these actions can be either normative (conforming to societal rules and structures) or nonnormative (operating outside the existing social system) (Martin, 1986).

As an example, in one classic experiment, volunteers were instructed to begin by assuming they were members of a low-status group with an opportunity to advance to a high-status sophisticated decision-making group, which would make them eligible for a \$100 lottery. They were also led to believe that acceptance in the higher status group would depend in part on their performance on a set of decision-making tasks. Perceived likelihood of being admitted to the high-status group was manipulated. All participants "failed" the task and were then asked questions concerning whether they would prefer to stay in the low-status group or participate in an individual or group protest. Specifically, the following options were available to them: (a) acceptance of their disadvantaged position, (b) normative individual action, (c) non-normative individual action, (d) normative collective action, and (e) nonnormative collective action (Wright et al., 1990). Wright et al. found that participants who believed that the high-status groups were open to some upward social mobility, even if very restricted or almost closed, endorsed individual action; by contrast, if the participants believed the high-status groups completely closed, they indicated a preference for disruptive forms of collective action (Wright et al., 1990).

Protest participation also reflects socialization within a particular sociocultural milieu and association with networks of participation anchored in structural opportunities. Paulsen (1994), in an analysis of a longitudinal dataset, found that coming from a higher economic status, being African American, being Jewish, or being related to someone who was a union member were all associated with participating in protests in the early 1970s. In other words, people engage in collective action such as protest because they have the opportunity to do so, suggesting that there are different levels of access to protest as a mode of political action. Additional support for the proposition that people engage in protest

because protest is an activity that is available to them comes from an analysis of data from nearly 70 countries participating in the 1999–2002 wave of the World Values Survey (Dalton & van Sickle, 2005). Dalton and van Sickle found that protest is positively correlated with both democratic political structures and relatively competent governmental institutions (supporting the rule of law), and negatively correlated with repressive structures. Also, perhaps surprisingly protest activity is lower rather than higher in countries characterized by high levels of income inequality. Dalton and Sickle conclude that “people protest because they can” (p. 15) and because they believe that their protests can make a difference. In another cross-national study, Montiel (2006) analyzed shared contextual features of countries during active nonviolent democratic transitions, namely in Cambodia, East Timor, and the Philippines. These characteristics included a history of systemic violence, episodes of direct political violence, and loosening up of the authoritarian regime. A history of systemic violence was evident in Indonesian occupation since 1975 in East Timor, Cambodia’s Buddhist walk for peace, and the Philippines’ People Power. Examples of episodes of direct political violence are Indonesians subjected East Timorese to forced labor with rampant killing and rape, Khmer Rouge killing fields, and strafing and burning of villages suspected of coddling insurgents in the Philippines. Lastly, loosening up of the authoritarian regime was catalyzed in some events such as Indonesian president Suharto resigns in 1998 and newly elected president Habibie calls for an East Timor referendum, Vietnam troops withdraw in 1988, and Philippine president Marcos calls for national elections in 1986 and Corazon Aquino runs for president against Marcos.

This chapter adds to the vast literature relevant to collective social action by examining perspectives on protest in South and Southeast Asia. We set aside traditional ways of studying social movements and protests and now try to understand how forms of active nonviolent movement affect ordinary citizens. Specifically, we will look into the reasoning of ordinary citizens regarding protest against war. We focus particularly on India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Laos, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

Right to Peaceful Assembly in Selected Regions in South and Southeast Asia

India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines are presently democratic regimes. Laos, on the other hand, is a communist single-party state. All participating countries have in their constitutions a statement on the rights of citizens to peaceful assembly. Table 19.1 contains the verbatim statements on the articles and rights for each country.

In summary, all articles specifically state that citizens have a right to peaceful assembly, regardless of form. All articles also contain a statement on the right to freedom of expression. Peaceful protest can therefore be viewed as a universal right. Protest is an equalizer that balances the relationship between governments and citizens.

Recent History of Protest in Southeast Asia: Post-democratic Movements

Over the past 37 years, various forms of community organizing have emerged in which some form of public protest (e.g., mass-based, democratic organization of poor people for power) is evident (Murphy, 2004). Svensson and Lindgren (2009) discussed a survey of unarmed conflicts in the East Asian region, specifically in countries such as China (Tibet), South Korea, Indonesia (Papua and East Timor), Thailand, Taiwan, the Philippines, Burma, and Mongolia, that had either governmental or territorial objectives spurring these nonviolent insurrections. Governmental objectives may include unarmed conflict with the intention of a change in state formation, demand for autonomy, or new leadership (e.g., the Philippines in EDSA People Power 1986, Indian Independence Movement in 1930, Fall of Suharto regime in Indonesia), whereas territorial objectives may include fighting over land acquisition (e.g., Papuan conflict in Indonesia from 1964 to 2006; environment degradation in San Fernando, Bukidnon and Cagayan de Oro, Philippines

Table 19.1 Constitutional rights to freedom of peaceful assembly

Country	Right	Constitution
India	Right to freedom 19. (1) All citizens shall have the right (a) to freedom of speech and expression (b) to assemble peaceably and without arms (c) to form associations or unions	(http://india.gov.in/govt/documents/english/coi_part_full.pdf)
Pakistan	<i>Freedom of assembly</i> Every citizen shall have the right to assemble peacefully and without arms, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of public order	http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/
Sri Lanka	Article 17 Every person is entitled to freedom of peaceful assembly	(http://www.priu.gov.lk/Cons/1978Constitution/Introduction.htm) (http://www.priu.gov.lk/Cons/2000ConstitutionBill/Index2000ConstitutionBill.html)
Indonesia	Chapter XA Human rights Article 28 The freedom to associate and to assemble, to express written and oral opinions, etc., shall be regulated by law Article 28E (3) Every person shall have the right to the freedom to associate, to assemble and to express opinions	(http://www.embassyofindonesia.org/about/pdf/IndonesianConstitution.pdf)
Laos	CHAPTER III Fundamental Rights and Obligations of the Citizens Article 31. Lao citizens have the right and freedom of speech, press, and assembly and have the right to set up associations and to stage demonstrations which are not contrary to the law	(http://www.un.int/lao/constitution.htm)
Malaysia	Article 10 (1) Subject to clauses (2), (3), and (4) (a) Every citizen has the right to freedom of speech and expression (b) All citizens have the right to assemble peaceably and without arms (c) All citizens have the right to form associations	(http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/malaysia.pdf)
Philippines	Article III bill of rights section 4 No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances	1987 Philippine constitution (http://www.chanrobles.com/philsupreme-law1.htm)

(Bautista, 2001)). Antidemocratic student-led protests and other mass protests arose in the 1970s as hopes for the future of democratic institutions were pushed aside by imposition of mar-

tial law in countries such as the Philippines, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, and Pakistan (Markoff, 1996). In the mid-1970s and 1980s, a turn of events arose as protesters

clamored for more democratic regimes (Markoff, 1996).

As a case in point, Montiel and Belo (2008) elaborated on the social-psychological aspects of the East Timor peace and liberation movement. They considered cognitions, values, emotions, and behaviors related to leaders and members of the liberation movement. Their results suggest that East Timorese beliefs about peace and liberation include liberation as a prerequisite to development, independence as inherent in human dignity, cognizance of the need for unity, and strong belief that peace through peaceful means is possible. Pervading emotions include acute suffering (e.g., experiencing political self-suffering), hope, and courage. Politico-cultural values such as respecting human rights and Catholicism were also present. Lastly, members of the liberation movement showed a wide array of behaviors aimed at achieving active peace, such as peaceful demonstrations and intergroup diplomacy (e.g., public protests, prayer rallies, diplomatic campaigns), rallying for international support, consciousness transformation and peace education, and housing refugees. Montiel and Belo also generated several key insights from East Timor's peace and liberation movement. They noted that a nonviolent yet forceful movement happens given a number of critical factors that support and sustain collective organization. Politico-psychological lessons for a successful liberation movement include to conscientise or to make people aware of exploitative social systems; to be consistent in terms of one's principles of active nonviolence and resulting practice, for instance, how the Catholic Church, priests, and nuns based in East Timor showed devotion to their goals of peace, liberation, and reconciliation between pro-integration and pro-independence Timorese and Indonesians; to encourage active participation from diverse sectors of the community at different stages of the struggle; and lastly to engage members of the international community such as civil societies and nongovernmental agencies to support one's struggle.

More Recent Protest Movements

To better understand perspectives on protest in the South and Southeast Asian regions, we now look at more recent protest movements as forms of discontent continue to rise in Asia. In India, protest groups are demanding decommissioning of a water reservoir (Mathew, 2011) and price hikes announced by the state government (Staff Correspondent, 2011). At the same time, old problems such as land for the Dalits continue to trouble India (Staff Reporter, 2011). In Pakistan, a Kisan Board Pakistan-led movement agitated for the increased availability of fertilizers for growers (Business Reporter, 2011). The theme of the most recent protests in Sri Lanka has touched on the right to cover demonstrations, as various media organizations have demanded that the police protect their rights (FMM, 2010). In May 2011, 28 Hmong protesters were killed because of a nationwide protest demanding religious freedom and land reform (Radio Free Asia, 2011). Led by a youth movement, another recent protest happened in Malaysia over the *Seksualiti Merdeka* (JMM, 2011), an event that celebrates and clamors for acceptance in sexual orientation. The "occupy wall street" is the most recent worldwide movement that has also appeared in countries such as Indonesia (Rachman, 2011) and the Philippines (Associated Press, 2011). A leaderless movement, citizens express anger toward corporations experiencing tremendous financial growth amidst a financial crisis that adversely affected ordinary citizens.

Making Sense of Perspectives on Protest Movements

Formal and informal political organizing such as protest movements in Southeast Asia are tied with local narratives of conflict among groups lodged in a socio-politico-historical landscape. Consequently, protesters' struggles may well be entrenched within locally endemic forms of meaning making. Furthermore, the colonial and postcolonial world of countries in the Southeast

Asian region emerged in an environment that nurtured the idea of a historic proletarian opposition to a capitalist state (Boudreau, 2001). Hence, internal and external political forces shaped this region's motivation to destabilize any hegemonic institution. Meanings of protest in Southeast Asia may inspire and portray the local collective consciousness, fueling their collective behaviors.

Over the years, one can imagine that political upheavals have also changed both in form and content. However, Thompson (2004) posited a challenging question about the reasons why dictatorships, not democracies, prospered politically since the Asian financial crisis. He maintained that democratic governance is always judged against authoritarian leadership in Pacific Asia. Moreover, several authoritarian rulers in Pacific Asia are well supported by the US-led anti-terror coalition to weaken internal opposition. On the other hand, local protests are the results of international pressures for new democracies to combat terrorism. This conflict between central power and local concerns has resulted in internal frictions provoked by middle class-based reformist movements in the name of good governance.

This internal friction motivated many local groups to pursue nonviolent political movements (e.g., People Power in EDSA I). Nonviolent action like "People Power" is employed by groups in diverse cultures as a central means of fighting for political freedom, democracy, human rights, and social and economic objectives (Sharp as cited in Ackerman & Kruegler, 1994). Pursuing peace by peaceful means proliferated throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s as the wave of democratization correlated with nonviolent action (Ackerman & Kruegler, 1994). In this sense, protest movements in the Southeast region signify a nonviolent cry echoing a political will for change.

Finally, there has been considerable interest in "collective action frames," which are the "action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614). Based on their review of the relevant literature, Benford and Snow suggested that the ways in which people frame collective action appear to contribute to the outcome of such

actions. Consequently, understanding how ordinary people frame protest can have important implications for the success of protest movements such as the ones taking place around the world today—including South and Southeast Asia.

Justifications for Protest

One way of framing protest is as a form of what Bandura calls moral engagement: "Moral engagement is concerned with questions of justice, ethical conduct, and reactions to interpersonal circumstances. This form of engagement controls the regulation of humane behavior and the inhibition of inhumane behavior because it represents a vision of how the world ought to function" (Thorkildsen, 2007, p. 115). Furthermore, the exercise of the dual mechanism of moral agency is *inhibitive* and *proactive* (Bandura, 1999). "The *inhibitive* form is manifested in the power to refrain from behaving inhumanely. The *proactive* form of morality is expressed in the power to behave humanely" (Bandura, 2002, p. 111). To elaborate, "proactive moral action is regulated in large part by resolute engagement of the mechanisms of moral agency. In the exercise of proactive morality, people act in the name of humane principles when social circumstances dictate expedient, transgressive, and detrimental conduct. They disavow use of valued social ends to justify destructive means. They sacrifice their well-being for their convictions. They take personal responsibility for the consequences of their actions. They remain sensitive to the suffering of others. Finally, they see human commonalities rather than distance themselves from others or divest them of human qualities" (Bandura, 1999, p. 203). Given this framework, nonviolent protests can be viewed as an agentive set of collective morally proactive behaviors driven by humane principles toward change. To what extent do the South and Southeast Asian participants in our sample view protest as a moral issue? To what extent do they exhibit agency, expressed in judgments concerning protest and coercive state responses to protest? These are among the questions addressed in this study.

Methods

Sample

The sample included 619 participants, consisting of 341 females, 276 males, and two participants with undisclosed genders. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 75, with an average age of 28 years old. The countries represented in the South and Southeast Asia sample were India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Approximately 5% of the sample reported having participated in the military, 23% reported having a relative who has served in the military, and 70% reported participating in an antiwar protest.

Procedure

The participants in the sample were recruited by convenience sampling through peer contacts, colleges, and universities from India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Laos. Regarding the treatment of human participants, ethical guidelines were observed throughout the research process, and permission was given by the participants to use their anonymous responses for future studies. Participants provided responses to either the paper-and-pencil or the electronic version of the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS). The survey was designed to investigate people's viewpoints on different forms of governmental aggression and is comprised of five parts: (a) the rights scale, consisting of subscales examining people's beliefs about the acceptability of state-sanctioned aggressive actions (e.g., capital punishment, torture), and human rights to nonviolence; (b) the governmental beliefs scale, for assessing political conservatism, the perceived morality of US involvement in Iraq, and views on justice; (c) projected emotional responses that participants might experience if exposed directly or indirectly to acts of governmental aggression; (d) partici-

pants' definitions of major concepts related to governmental violence or nonviolence (e.g., war, terrorism, peace, apology); and (e) beliefs regarding peace, national security, justice, and the ethic of reciprocity.

Two items from the PAIRTAPS were analyzed for this chapter on South/Southeast Asia. One is the rights item, "Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace," to which the participants indicated their level of agreement using a scale from 1 (total disagreement) to 7 (total agreement), and then further explained their responses in their own words. The other item of interest was the emotional/motivational scenario item "Police are beating peaceful antiwar demonstrators. What would you *want* to do?" to which the participants indicated the extent to which they would want to take some form of action.

Coding Manual Development

The coding manual utilized in this study was created using deductive qualitative analysis, derived from Bandura's moral disengagement theory. Bandura (1999) delineates four sociocognitive mechanisms that allow for tolerance or justification of harmful behaviors. These mechanisms are (a) moral justifications, euphemistic labeling, and advantageous comparisons; (b) displacement and diffusion of responsibility; (c) minimizing and disregarding negative consequences of harmful behaviors; and (d) dehumanization and attribution of blame. Furthermore, for coding responses to the police-beating scenario, our coding manual incorporates Bandura's concept of moral agency, which can have an inhibitive aspect expressed in individuals refraining from behaving inhumanely and a proactive aspect allowing them to behave humanely. We also used grounded theory to identify specific forms of agency.

At the beginning of the coding process, responses were broken down into codeable units representing major thematic categories and subcategories in the coding manual. For the quantification of coding categories, presence/

absence scores were coded as 1 and 0, respectively, and used to identify responses for any of the anti-protest, protest tolerant, indeterminate status, or perceived reality rationales, or for personal agency. Using the presence/absence scores, chi-square tests of independence were performed. In addition, major category presence/absence scores indicated whether the participant provided at least one response coded into at least one of the subcategories within a superordinate major category.

For the analysis of the qualitative responses, we examined the distribution of responses across coding categories. Percentages were calculated using excel to find the total number of codeable units per thematic category/subcategory out of the total number of responses provided by the regional sample. Next, chi-square analyses were performed using the presence/absence scores for each of the qualitative coding category variables to determine whether the type of responses varied by gender, having served in the military, having a relative serve in the military, or protest participation. We have reported the marginally statistically significant group differences with p values between 0.051 and 0.10 and statistically significant differences of $p=0.05$ or smaller.

The Right to Protest Item

Coding Categories and Subcategories for the Right to Protest

In order to analyze the responses to the individuals' right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace item, coding categories for the responses were grouped into four major sets. The first set of thematic categories and subcategories were for responses characterized by *anti-protest* themes such as (a) *general disagreement* (e.g., "no"); (b) *pseudo-moral reasoning* (subcategory: *supporting troops or the government*); (c) *negative labeling*; (d) *disadvantageous comparison*; (e) *denial of personal responsibility* (f) *distorting consequences*; (g) *dehumanization*

(subcategories: *protester* and *targets of war*), and (h) *attribution of blame* (subcategories: *protester* and *targets of war*). The second major set of coding categories and subcategories were characterized by *protest-tolerant* themes such as (a) general agreement (e.g., "yes"); (b) *social justification* (subcategories: *peace* and *awareness of negative consequences*); (c) *moral responsibility* (subcategories: *civic duty*, *nonviolent*, and *law abiding*); and (d) *humanization* (subcategories: *reciprocal right*, *socially sanctioned rights*, and *human rights*—with further subcategories for *it should be a right* and *international law*). Finally, there was a third set of thematic categories named *indeterminate reasoning* that referred to responses not fitting into either the *anti-protest* or the *pro-protest* categories/subcategories (e.g., "depends" and "do not know") and a category for responses focused on *perceived reality*, with subcategories for (a) *the right may not be respected* and (b) *protest is futile*. Only a few responses were identified as *uncodeable, not addressing the question*.

Distribution of Qualitative Responses Regarding the Right to Protest

Analysis of the qualitative responses revealed that 5% of all responses rejected the right to protest. Three percent of all responses cognitively *distorted consequences* of protest as the most common reasoning for anti-protest sentiment. An example of distorted consequences is exemplified by the response of a 21-year-old man from the Philippines who stated, "Staging a protest rally could only perpetuate the ill-effects of war." One percent of all responses were coded for *pseudo-moral reasoning*, arguing that protests could be detrimental to society as mentioned by a 45-year-old Indian man whose response was "If war is inevitable then there should be war but all individuals can protest" and was thus coded as *pseudo-moral reasoning* as well as for justifying protest as a basic *human right*. Table 19.2 indicates these percentages as well as examples of responses quoted from the participant.

Table 19.2 Percentages and examples of anti-protest themes most frequently identified in responses from South/Southeast Asia

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Anti-protest</i>	5				
<i>Distorting consequences</i>	3(50)	India	21	F	“Unrest in the country though”
		Malaysia	20	F	“If there are demonstrations, the country will be in chaos”
		Philippines	21	F	“When we protest against war, then we are promoting war already through that protests”
<i>Pseudo-moral reasoning</i>	1(16)	India	30	M	“If war is inevitable then there should be war but all individuals can protest”
		Philippines	49	F	“If war is not a great solution, meaning it will do more harm than good, I can join a protest in favor of peace”

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the anti-protest responses. *M* male, *F* female

The responses from the sample reveal that most of participants responded as protest tolerant, with 88% of responses coded for pro-protest arguments. Fifteen percent of all the responses supported protest as important for the establishment of *peace*, as demonstrated by a 21-year-old Malaysian woman who states that “We need to do anything for the sake of peace.” In addition, 16% of the sample responses claimed that protest was an inherent *human right* for individuals. A 59-year-old man from Sri Lanka who responded that “This [protest] is a fundamental right of human expression...” is indicative of responses coded into this category. Another 10% of all responses indicated that protest is a *socially sanctioned right*, or a right that is sanctioned by society and upheld by national law. A 21-year-old woman from Pakistan explains, “[protest is a] basic freedom of speech...” *Social justification* for protest or the belief that protest is beneficial to the improvement of society was found in 9% of all responses and is exemplified in a response from a 26-year-old Indian man: “To a larger extent, everyone has the right to protest against war because at the end of it, the money spent on war could be used for the betterment of human kind.” Refer to Table 19.3 for more examples of

these pro-protest coding categories, along with basic demographic information.

Results of Exploratory Analyses for Right to Protest Item

Pearson’s chi-square analyses revealed a few differences between men and women regarding an individual’s right to protest. The analyses revealed that a significantly higher proportion of women, as compared with men, gave responses coded for *social justification* in support for the right to protest. Conversely, a significantly higher proportion of men than women responded that protest is a *socially sanctioned right*. Chi-square analyses further revealed that significantly more participants who had at least one relative in the military suggested the right to protest was an inherent *human right*, as compared to participants who did not have a relative serve in the military. In contrast, significantly more respondents who indicated having a relative serve in the military than respondents with civilian relatives gave responses that *generally agreed* with the statement that individuals have a right to protest against war and in favor of peace. Table 19.4

Table 19.3 Percentages and examples of pro-protest themes most frequently identified in responses from South/Southeast Asia

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Pro-protest</i>	88				
<i>Social justification</i>	9(10)	India	21	F	“Because they have the right to think for the betterment of them and their country”
		Laos	27	F	“To follow what you believe strongly about is your purpose on earth”
Peace	15(17)	India	22	M	“This can help us to achieve & retain peace”
		Indonesia	21	F	“Why would any human being want a war anyway?”
		Malaysia	21	F	“We need to do anything for the sake of peace”
<i>Humanization</i>	0(0)				
Human rights	16(18)	Sri Lanka	59	M	“This is a fundamental right of human expression”
		Philippines	53	F	“Every person has the right to express ones thoughts and feelings”
		Laos	21	F	“People should and have the right to protest and call for peace when war occurred”
Socially sanctioned rights	10(11)	Pakistan	21	F	“Basic freedom of speech”
		Laos	45	M	“Freedom to speak and demonstrate their beliefs”

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the pro-protest responses. *M* male, *F* female

Table 19.4 Right to protest against war: chi-square values and percentages of responses in coding categories

Category	Group 1 ^a		χ^2
	Male	Female	
<i>Pro-protest</i>			
<i>Social justification</i>	2	6	4.25*
<i>Humanization</i>			
Socially sanctioned right	5	4	4.89*
	Military relative	No military relative	
<i>Pro-protest</i>			
<i>General agreement</i>	3	2	11.17*
<i>Humanization</i>			
Human rights	3	11	3.45*

Note. If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference

* $p < 0.05$

^aNumbers in the columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

provides the significant results from the Pearson chi-square analysis.

Police Beating Innocent Protestors Item

Coding Manual/Procedure

Another item of interest was respondents' views on a hypothetical scenario in which police are beating peaceful antiwar demonstrators. The responses to this item were coded into thematic categories and subcategories based on Bandura's theory of personal agency. The notion of personal agency encompasses both inhibitive and proactive aspects of moral agency. The inhibitive aspect of moral agency as described by Bandura as abstinence from behaving inhumanely, whereas the proactive aspect of morality is the power to behave humanely. Participants were asked what they would want to do in response to witnessing police beating peaceful antiwar demonstrators, and their responses were coded for the construct of personal agency. The major thematic *pro-social agency* categories were (a) *negative judgment of police*; (b) *personal initiative*—with subcategories for *activism*, *personal understanding*, and *other solutions*; and (c) *institutional initiative*—with subcategories for *legal action* and *government/other agency*. The *antisocial agency* categories were (a) *support for police*, (b) *unlawful activism*, and (c) *actions against the demonstrators*. There were two *lack of agency* categories: *lack of initiative* and *helplessness*. Other categories were *indeterminate status/nonspecific argument* (with subcategories for *it depends* and *do not know*) and *perceived reality* (with the subcategories of *the right may not be respected* and *protest is futile*). Responses that were *uncodeable* and *did not address the question* were also identified.

Patterns in Qualitative Responses to Scenario Item

Pro-social Agency. In response to the hypothetical scenario of witnessing police beating of

peaceful antiwar demonstrators, the majority of responses (83%) indicated *pro-social agency*, and 23% of all responses specifically indicated an intention to take *personal initiative*—that is, take action personally to stop the police or get involved in some other way. For example, an 18-year-old woman from the Philippines stated that she would tell them that “They don’t have the right to hurt the innocent ones.” Another 23% of all responses were coded into the *personal initiative* subcategory of *activism*, which encompassed responses describing public efforts to protest or report the action of the police. An example comes from a 30-year-old Indian man who declared that “I would want to raise voice against state terrorism through protest and media.” Six percent of responses to the police-beating item suggested *other solutions* in response to the police beating such as described by a 24-year-old Malaysian woman who said she would want to “think of the best way to prevent it from happening.” Another 6% of the responses indicated an intent to contact governmental or other agencies, as exemplified by a 44-year-old woman from the Philippines who stated that she would “Protest the police brutality by writing the president and the commission of Human rights of the Philippines.” The categories of *judgment of police*, *institutional initiative*, and *legal action* each encompassed 8% of responses to the police-beating item. Responses describing a negative reaction to the police brutality, such as “the police have no right to act like that,” as stated by a 21-year-old man from Malaysia, were coded as *critical judgment of police*. Responses describing an intent to report the situation without specifying an institution or agency—such as “report the police brutality” as given by a 21-year-old man from the Philippines—were coded for *institutional initiative*. The response of a 33-year-old woman from Pakistan who said she would “take them [the police] to court” was coded for *legal action*. Table 19.5 presents some of the most frequent type of responses for this region in response to police beating peaceful protestors.

Antisocial Agency. Of the total responses to the police-beating item, 8% were coded for *antisocial agency*. The majority of the *antisocial*

Table 19.5 Percentages and examples of pro-social agency themes most frequently identified in responses from South/Southeast Asia

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Pro-social agency</i>	83				
<i>Personal initiative</i>	23(27)	Philippines	18	F	“Tell them that they don’t have the right to hurt the innocent ones”
		Malaysia	32	M	“Let the demonstrators demonstrate but in a peaceful situation”
		Pakistan	20	F	“Stop the police”
Activism	23(28)	India	30	M	“I would want to raise voice against state terrorism through protest and media”
		Pakistan	21	F	“Stop the police, appeal to government, protest against such behavior through media”
		Sri Lanka	45	F	“Surrender, but demonstrate again and again”
<i>Judgment of police</i>	8(10)	India	42	M	“Police has no right to do so”
		Philippines	48	F	“Criticize the police engaged in violent actions”
<i>Institutional initiative</i>	8(10)	Malaysia	20	F	“Report the abuse of the police”
		India	22	M	“I will like to punish the police officers on the spot”
Legal action	8(10)	Sri Lanka	59	M	“Imprison them for life”
		Pakistan	26	F	“Take legal action against them”

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the pro-social agency responses. *M* male, *F* female

Table 19.6 Percentages and examples of antisocial agency themes most frequently identified in responses from South/Southeast Asia

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Antisocial agency</i>	8				
<i>Unlawful activism</i>	6 (71)	Philippines	19	F	“Throw stones to the police”
		India	47	M	“Hit them back”
		Malaysia	25	M	“Hit the police”

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the antisocial agency responses. *M* male, *F* female

agency responses (6% of all responses) proposed *unlawful forms of activism* such as violence against the police. A 20-year-old man stated that he would “beat the police” in response to witnessing police brutality against protestors. Further examples of *antisocial agency* are provided in Table 19.6.

The remaining 7% of all responses to the police-beating scenario were generally categorized as *lack of agency*, including *lack of initiative* and feelings of helplessness, as illustrated in the reply “even if there’s something that I want to

do, I am 100% sure that I can’t do anything about it” by a 21-year-old woman from Indonesia.

Results of Exploratory Chi-Square Analyses for Scenario Responses

Exploratory chi-square analyses of potential group differences, in responses to the hypothetical police-beating scenario, revealed some variations in frequencies of themes based on whether the participant had ever been involved in a protest

Table 19.7 Police are beating peaceful antiwar protesters: chi-square values and percentages of responses in coding categories

Category	Group 1 ^b	Group 2 ^b	χ^2
	Protest	No protest	
<i>Pro-social agency presence^a</i>	47	13	10.65*
<i>Personal initiative</i>	16	3	4.26*
<i>Activism</i>	11	6	10.13*

*significant at $p < 0.05$

^a“Presence” at the end of the variable name signifies that the participant provided at least one example of a response in at least one of the subcategories of a major category

^bNumbers in the columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

or not. A significantly greater proportion of protestors than non-protestors gave responses coded for one or more of the *pro-social agency* categories. Additionally, a significantly greater proportion of protestors than non-protestors responded with *personal initiative* and *activism*. Table 19.7 provides the categories that resulted in significant chi-square values.

Discussion

From Personal to Collective Engagement: Protest as a Moral Interface Between Agency and Structure

Although a small fraction of the respondents view protest as an aggravating factor in peace making, the majority of the participants identified and recognized a right to protest as a step toward achieving peace. Viewing protest as a socially sanctioned or inherent right of a person is partly reflective of Bandura’s proactive engagement construct, with its focus on the moral responsibility to act if one’s humane principles are violated. The qualitative responses to our survey echoed the construction of protest as a basic right to human expression—an accepted right embedded in an emotionally charged socio-politico-historical landscape of South and Southeast Asia. Endemic forms of meaning making in these

regions allow for this collective and agentic action to occur. Cultural resources such as pervasive media practices fuel some forms of collective action (Gamson, 1995), such as local labor strikes or the EDSA People Power in the Philippines. Moreover, social protest as a collective action frame consists of acceptable sets of beliefs that legitimize possible upheaval (Benford & Snow, 2000). Therefore, protest movements as socially justified may be infused in the everyday political consciousness of ordinary people in these regions.

In response to the item regarding witnessing police beating of antiwar demonstrators, most answers connoted pro-social agency. Thematic constructions of answers imply an active personal movement and activism against an oppressive structure. The nature of proposed responses indicate structural solutions such as involving government agencies to mitigate oppression and encouraging institutional initiative, in this case responding to police brutality. A few others also indicate antisocial thematic intentions such as hitting the police officer back. Such responses may reflect a tolerance for personal retaliation by claiming the right to hurt others following initial provocation. Underlying both pro-social and antisocial agentic constructions is evidence of the centrality of self-efficacy mechanisms to human agency. Perceived self-efficacy shapes patterns of thought, feelings, and potential action as produced in various modes of influence, achievement strivings, self-regulation of refractory behaviors, and the like (Bandura, 1982). In this study, the thematic responses to an oppressive structure reflect the link between perceived self-efficacy with social structure, specifically social stratification (Gecas, 1989). Most countries in South and Southeast Asia are historically shaped by tension among local groups. In this light, intergroup factions, as well as, embedded caste systems as in India breed contexts that allow opportunities for individuals to engage in efficacious behaviors (Gecas & Schwalbe, 1983). People are propelled to engage within these tension-filled spaces, such that protest movements are further influenced and sustained

by context-specific and stable-affective bonds (Jasper, 1998).

Inspiring Collective Agency in the South and Southeast Asian Region

A few responses among the participants showed lack of agency, exemplified by the recognition that their need to respond cannot be translated to action. Collective powerlessness sets up political inaction and apathy among people, which may stem partly from dwindling active commitment to pursuit of causes (Gecas, 1989). On the other hand, political inaction may also stem from structural barriers or a highly conservative political climate. Social protests, for some participants, are deemed ineffective and as potentially even perpetuating the effects of war. Such responses suggest that social protest can be viewed as counterproductive to the pursuit of peace within the region. Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2008) conducted a meta-analysis of quantitative research on sociopsychological perspectives on collective action. They found that perceived injustice, efficacy, and social identity have a medium sized effect on collective action. In particular, social identity links perceived injustice and efficacy, explaining collective action. In a sense, even if participants acknowledge social injustices or have the capacity to actively perform, people are predicted not to pursue collective action such as social protest if they fail to identify with the cause of protest or with their group. In effect, transforming spaces of powerlessness to an open terrain for human agency involves stable-affective bonds and loyalty among members of a group and (re) valuing one's personal commitment in support of progressive structures toward social peace.

Perspectives on protest rely heavily on everyday experiences of ordinary citizens including direct exposure to injustice, relation to military, and involvement in protest activism. Though themes (why people protest) and forms (how people protest) vary over time, people engage in peaceful political activism because of the existence of inequality between groups. Protest is

morally justified if it will effect peace. What we see worldwide is the power of ordinary citizens to create an impetus for social change.

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Hillary Mi-Sung Kim, Matthew Schauer,
Alyssa Mendlein, Alice Murata, Michelle Murata,
and Andrea Jones-Rooy

Protests in East Asia¹ have a very long history and must be put in a Confucian context if one wants to understand the protestors' perspectives. According to the "Mandate of Heaven," which developed in China in the Classical era, humans are moral agents who have a social role as well as a social responsibility to advocate for reform (Song, 2011). In other words, every individual—including a ruler—has a Mandate of Heaven. The subjects of the country are required to follow the ruler and all he dictates. If, however, he loses his mandate through ruling inappropriately, such as

failing to feed the people during a major famine, then the people are allowed to protest until the wrongs are righted, either through reform or revolution (i.e., founding a new dynasty). Thus, throughout the ages, protest movements have formed to address problem affecting citizens' daily lives (Wang, 2008).

On the other hand, from the perspective of local officials and central governments, protests have been viewed as signs of instability and therefore as subversive activities that must be halted, usually through harsh punishments such as long prison sentences, labor camps, and torture to both punish and deter (Apter, 1984; Funabashi, 2010; Hasegawa, 2010; Ho, 2010; Jin, 2010; O'Brien, 2008). Within the past century, large-scale protest movements and revolutionary struggle in East Asia have overthrown and instituted new regimes in the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China, and the People's Republic of China.

Although a few extreme cases of protests resulted in the overthrow of governments in

¹There are many debates around the world concerning which countries or regions should be regarded as belonging to East Asia. For example, the UN subregion of Eastern Asia contains the entirety of the People's Republic of China (including Hong Kong, Macao, and five autonomous regions such as the Tibetans in Tibet, the Zhuangs in Guangxi, the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, the Mongols in Inner Mongolia, the Huis in Ningxia), Taiwan (officially known as the Republic of China), Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Mongolia. This chapter accepts the UN's definition but excludes the five autonomous regions of China, from which no participants were recruited.

H.M.-S. Kim (✉)
School of Social Work, Rutgers University,
New Brunswick, NJ, USA
e-mail: mysongk@hotmail.com

M. Schauer
International Security and Conflict Resolution,
San Diego, USA

A. Mendlein
Department of Psychology, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA

A. Murata
Department of Counselor Education, Northeastern
Illinois University, Chicago, IL, USA
e-mail: A-Murata@neu.edu; alicemurata@hotmail.com

M. Murata
Department of Psychology, American University,
Washington, DC, USA
e-mail: muratamh@gmail.com

A. Jones-Rooy
Department of Political Science, University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, MI, USA
e-mail: ajonrooy@umich.edu

Asia, this does not mean that all protesters have the intent to overthrow their regime. In fact, research shows that the great majority of participants are seeking only to reform and alter the existing government (O'Brien, 2008; Wang, 2008). In contemporary times, many of these protesters have turned to “disruptive tactics,” that is, demonstrations, sit-ins, marches, blocked roads, hunger strikes, group complaints, and even self-immolation and suicide when they feel they have no other choice and have “exhausted all other channels” (O'Brien, 2008). Furthermore, when the regime ultimately responds to the demands of the protesters and the citizens are at least somewhat satisfied by the concessions, the government further solidifies its power (Chang, 2010; Funabashi, 2010; Wang, 2008).

This chapter first provides a brief history of protests in twentieth-century East Asia, alluding to the psychology behind these movements and the government's and society's varied perspectives on them. An overview of the effects of the Cold War on protests and large-scale resistance is a good starting point for elaborating on protests in East Asia. The influence of authoritarian regimes on protests, roles of students, and contemporary methods of protests is also introduced. The methodology and results of our survey and a discussion follow thereafter.

Protest and Resistance Movements During the Cold War Period

The Cold War's influence on protests in the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, People's Republic of China (PRC), and in the Republic of China (ROC) primarily influenced the political institutions that formed in the region after the end of World War II. With the separation of the world into communist and capitalist countries, the Soviet Union, the United States, and their respective allies strived to maintain areas of hegemony. In the early 1900s, communism arose in East Asia partly to combat Japanese power and influence over the region, giving rise to highly resistant or militant civil organizations, but also

as a means of modernizing political thought and opposing Western influence (Kim, 2004; Esherick, 1994). During the Cold War, the USSR's influence spread to the PRC and DPRK (the People's Democratic Republic of Korea), while the influence of the United States spread to the ROC, ROK, and Japan.

Before the Cold War in China, on May 4, 1919, there was a major gathering of students in Tiananmen Square protesting the weak acquiescence of the government to Western nations in the Treaty of Versailles. The May 4th Movement, as it is called, radicalized intellectual thought in anti-Western direction and pushed for a political system rooted in the people rather than the elites. The movement ignited a political firestorm nationwide that eventually led to the mass mobilization of peasants, who joined the Communist Party and helped it succeed to form the People's Republic of China (PRC) after the revolution (Hao, 1997). Through this mobilization of the peasants, Mao Zedong rose to power in China, overthrowing the Kuomintang (KMT) and officially establishing the PRC in 1949.

After the establishment of the PRC in the context of the Cold War era, there were many, prolonged resistance movements but usually at the behest of the government for ideological purification reasons. Due to this constant domestic political turmoil, the mainland essentially cut itself off from the world. Aside from occasional trips to the USSR and massive support for the North Koreans in the Korean War, there was little international engagement coming from the Mao regime. Large-scale movements tended to occur not in the form of protests, per se, but more in movements such as the Cultural Revolution, with the purging of “right roaders” (basically, non-radical individuals) and sending educated elites to the countryside for “reeducation,” as well as the Great Leap Forward, in which Mao mobilized the people to develop the country—and socialism—using the phrase “more, faster, better, [and] cheaper” (*duo, kuai, hao, sheng*) (Perry, 2000).

While the PRC regime stirred up many of the major movements in the middle of the century, the regime of Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist Party leader in the Republic of China, experienced

protests that were directed solely at its legitimacy, especially after his flight to Taiwan. This resulted in the imposition of martial law, tyrannical security policies, and overtly bloody authoritarian rule on the island for over 30 years (Chen, 1994; Chu, 1994; Ho, 2010). Within the Cold War context, the Chiang regime was also very sensitive to possible Communist movements and initiated especially harsh crackdowns on an estimated two to three protests daily for decades. For example, in December 1979, activists of the *Formosa Magazine*—one of the earliest supporters of KMT ideology advocating democratic reforms—promoted a major prodemocracy demonstration that was abruptly ended by the government. The leaders were arrested and imprisoned, confessions were coerced by the police, and the publication was destroyed (Ho, 2010; Hughes, 1997). Accordingly, as a result of its anticommunist stand, it was easier for the KMT regime to defend its reputation worldwide, thus receiving billions of dollars in financial support until 1971 when it lost its UN seat to the PRC (Chan, 1997; Chu, 1994). As this occurred, a sharp increase in wealth occurred in Taiwan, and the Taiwanese began advocating for more political inclusion. Thus, with political and electoral reform becoming more established in the country, and an increasingly wealthy and educated population, a marked rise in Taiwanese nationalism occurred that included more Taiwanese-born Chinese in the political system, eventually culminating in the presidential election of Lee Teng-hui in 1996 (Chen, 1994; Chu, 1994; Hughes, 1997; Wang, 2008).

After the end of WWII, Japan had to be rebuilt on almost every level: politically, economically, in infrastructure, etc., and underwent significant turmoil in the process. With the USA rewriting Japan's constitution as that of a democratic country, and the return to self-rule after direct US military control immediately following World War II, democracy slowly crept forward. Citizens did, however, have to struggle to force the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)—the ruling party for most of the country's history since the establishment of democracy—to maintain reforms adopted in the new constitution. Due to the US

takeover of the country after the war, however, and despite the nominal return of sovereignty to the Japanese, frequent protests began occurring that involved both radical and non-radical individuals opposing US imperialism, that is, the takeover of Japan, the expansion of military bases, the Vietnam War, opposition to nuclear weapons, and most prominently the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960 (Apter, 1984; Sasaki-Uemura, 2001). In the Cold War context, there were movements that were communist related, as seen by the tacit support of the Japan Communist Party and Japan Socialist Party, but generally people cared more about their individual rights in society than about the nuances of ideology (Apter, 1984; Sasaki-Uemura, 2001).

Korea, in the immediate aftermath of its liberation in 1945 from Japanese colonization and the demand for organizations replacing the colonial state apparatus, had proliferated civil groups, such as the National Council of Labor Unions (*Jeon-P'yung*) and the National Federation of Peasant Union (*Jeon-Nong*). Although the civil groups were not entirely under the influence of communists, an initiative role in organizing the civil groups was played by Korean communists, who had led a number of underground protests against Japanese colonialism (Kim, 2004).

Meanwhile, after Japan's surrender to the Allies, the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers decided on a four-power trusteeship of up to 5 years over Korea (Leckie, 1962). This ended with the rival Soviet and US trusteeship over the northern half and southern half of Korea, respectively. The US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK: September 8, 1945 to August 15, 1948) announced that the Japanese colonial government would remain intact. Faced with mounting protests, in October 1945, Lt. General John R. Hodge modified the original agenda and established the Korean Advisory Council; the majority of the seats, however, were given to former officials in the colonial government and to pro-Japanese Koreans. Despite the continued protests addressing the popular demands for reforms, the USAMGIK, alarmed by the close connection between civil organizations and communists, carried out its Cold War

policies by disbanding entirely civil organizations and leftist parties. At the same time, it encouraged formerly pro-Japanese and rightist groups in Korean society to organize a range of social organizations that were presumed necessary to smash their rivals by violence in order to maintain the Cold War policies (Choi, 1993; Han, 2009; Kang, 2011; Kim, 2003). The status quo of colonial structure under the USAMGIK in post-colonial South Korea and its maintenance over time had engendered a structure of political oppression (Kang, 2011). Further, the rhetoric regarding communist agitation was used to justify government suppression of prodemocratic movements in South Korea (Shin, 1995).

As we see in all four countries, the governments were not upholding their duty to help the nations develop and succeed in the world; therefore, the citizens were all protesting, in some form or another, their governments' Mandate of Heaven. The governments responded by repressing the populations severely, causing the citizens to push back with even more perseverance until reforms were implemented.

Authoritarian Influences

Authoritarianism has also played a significant role in the political development of these East Asian countries; each of the four countries experienced, in some form or another, significant dictatorial periods after the Second World War.

In the PRC, for example, protests have ranged in content from greater ideological purity to political reform and inclusion; from official corruption to nationalist movements against Japanese, US, or other international actors; and from a lack of enough economic growth due to rising regional growth disparities to greater environmental protection due to neglect of the environment during rapid economic growth periods. The central government has always kept a watchful eye on these protests, fearing that if grievances spread to the national level, they may lose control (O'Brien, 2008; Perry, 2000; Shirk, 2007; Wang, 2008). Consequently, unless a movement garners widespread public and media support, the

local government is likely to stop any and all "disturbances" (O'Brien, 2008).

Similarly in Taiwan, from the very beginning protests occurred frequently, usually in opposition to the KMT, mostly due to its lack of legitimacy on the island as a result of Chiang Kai-shek's fleeing from the mainland, setting up shop on the island, and ostracizing the local Taiwanese population for a considerable time (Hsiao, 2010). These protests were usually violently suppressed: in an extreme case, the 1947 antigovernment uprising may have left up to 30,000 Taiwanese protesters dead (Hughes, 1997). Later on, however, protests began shifting away from direct opposition to the regime and more toward political liberalization, including direct elections at the national level as well as, in Japan, focusing more attention on the consequences of rapid economic growth such as severe environmental degradation and labor rights issues (Chen, 1994; Chu, 1994; Hughes, 1997; Wang, 2008). As the country grew wealthier and more educated, the public grew less tolerant of Chiang's tyrannical policies (Chen, 1994; Wang, 2008).

In Japan, after the war and the subsequent US takeover, the government generally worked to improve people's livelihoods by focusing on the economy rather than on ideology, similar to Taiwan's policies in later years (Sasaki-Uemura, 2001). The government was thereby able to circumvent most, but not all, major protests focusing on philosophical disagreements; when protests to specific policies occurred, the government learned to consult its citizens in order to appease dissenting opinions (Apter, 1984). There was de facto one-party rule in the country, however, and when opinions were expressed that opposed the LDP's goals, such as protests to the building (or expanding) of airports like Narita in 1956 or to the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, the state used police force to strong-arm policies into implementation (Apter, 1984; Sasaki-Uemura, 2001). Nevertheless, by the 1970s, protests focused on social discrimination and consumers' rights. At the same time, environmentalism and sustainability began erupting, because the purely economy-focused growth strategy was seriously affecting the country's

forests, agriculture, waterways, local hills and mountains, and air (Hasegawa, 2010; Chen, 1994; Wang, 2008). Despite significant antipathy within the Japanese government, however, these issues began to be reconciled and improved.

Meanwhile, the Korean War (1950–1953) legitimated authoritarian governments through the doctrine of anticommunism and militarized Korean society (Shin, 1995). Since Syngman Rhee's authoritarian regime (1948–1961), South Korea had three consecutive autocratic military regimes (1961–1993). Students, intellectuals, laborers, and religious groups had protested against the repression of these regimes, which indeed had often changed Korean political configuration. For example, the corruption of the 3.15 election in 1960, which was rigged in favor of Rhee's regime, sparked citizen's protests that caused the resignation of Rhee and the collapse of the First Republic (Hong, n.d.). In another instance, the prodemocracy alliance of civil society in 1987, which encompassed students, laborers, religious groups, and the opposition party, as well as the middle class, contributed to the popular demand for the breakdown of Chun's (1980–1988) authoritarian politics and the democratic transition (Kim, 2004).

However, citizens' protests in South Korea were not always successful. For example, the Kwangju (a southwestern city) demonstration in 1980 was started by about 500 students, demanding an end to martial law and the resignation of General Chun Doo-hwan. But, it ended with the massacre of more than 1,000 Koreans killed by martial law troops, and Chun's regime remained in power (Shin, 1995).

The Role of Students in Protest

Students have historically played a major role in protest movements in East Asian countries, mostly as a result of Confucian effects and the role education has played in society (Funabashi, 2010; O'Brien, 2008; Sasaki-Uemura, 2001). Since most people were not wealthy enough to get an education, they tended to not play a major role in reform or overthrowing the government

because they did not have the time or the intellectual capacity to challenge the government. Students, on the other hand, did have the intellectual competence to advocate reform within the government, had the free time to determine whether the country was on the correct philosophical path or not, and were influenced by college socialization to participate in protest activity advocating reform (Lee, 1997).

One notable example in China in which students played an essential role is the 1919 May 4th Movement that completely changed the path of political development in the country. Starting with 3,000 students, representing 13 universities in Beijing, initially objecting to concessions to Japan and the general state of affairs at the time, students, workers, and businessmen in Shanghai and other movements became motivated to support the student movement and publicly condemn the government. Through this single protest movement, the KMT and Communist parties and their relevant movements were significantly affected, forever changing the development of the Chinese political system. More recently in mid-April of 1989, the Tiananmen Square protests occurred; students began gathering in waves to mourn and celebrate the belated Hu Yaobang's death because of his attitude toward reform and lenient attitude on protesters. Very rapidly, however, as a result of high inflation and widespread official corruption, the mourning turned into mass demonstrations (Zhao, 2010). While the government worked tirelessly to effect a compromise with the students, there were serious internal conflicts as to how much to compromise (O'Brien, 2008; Zhao, 2010). Eventually, however, the government decided to end the protests once and for all, and the infamous June 4th crackdown ensued.

Students in Taiwan played a major role in protests as well. In March the following year, Taiwan experienced a nearly exact copy of the Tiananmen Square protests, with over 5,000 people, many of them students, engaged in a sit-in and eventually, as Tiananmen Square, a hunger strike was initiated to force the government to submit to the protesters' demands (Wang, 2008). The only difference: the KMT government did not want

the same bloody ending and troublesome notoriety. Thus, the central government leaders met with protest leaders, and the demonstration ended peacefully (Chu, 1994; Wang, 2008). While major political reforms were already under way by the time this protest occurred, once the KMT leaders determined that negotiation was path they wanted to take, the previously mentioned turning points in reform were imminent, such as direct elections of the national legislation (1992), direct elections of the president (1996), as well as more freedoms of assembly and the press (Hughes, 1997; Wang, 2008).

In Japan, students have played a similarly large role in protest movements throughout the country (Apter, 1984). Specifically, many of the anti-US, environmental reform, or antiwar protests after the Second World War were started by, maintained, and/or became widespread due to the role of students. For example, in 1967, there were major protests against the Vietnam War, the building of a local airport, land acquisition, and police violence that involved huge numbers of students (Apter, 1984). Many of the demonstrations were extremely violent on both sides, with students wearing helmets and arming themselves with spears and sickles (Apter, 1984). Students after WWII were not ideologically inclined, however, and as time went on, a generational gap became apparent (Sasaki-Uemura, 2001). Slowly, protestors became less radical and held more objective viewpoints about individuals the movements had previously idolized, such as Mao and Ho Chi Minh (Apter, 1984).

To be a college student in South Korea was tantamount to being a potential protester until the early 1990s. Since the inauguration of the ROK in 1948, students had played a critical role in overthrowing authoritarian regimes or advocating legitimate reform of the state's policies (Hong, n. d.; Lee, 1997; Park, 1993). For example, in 1960, they overthrew the repressive regime of Syngman Rhee and ended the First Republic (1948–1960); during the 1960s and the 1970s, student activists were capable of waging opposition to the military dictatorship of President Park (1961–1979); during another military dictatorship of the Chun Doo-hwan regime (1980–1987),

student protests in 1987 led to concessions by the government that resulted in significant political changes. Student unrest in South Korea used such methods as sit-ins, hunger strikes, boycott of classes, and street demonstrations. These protests were often crushed by riot squads, sometimes resulting in the death or serious injury of protestors (Lee, 1997). A study using data gathered from a sample of 4,003 college students throughout the country in 1989 demonstrated students' overall perspectives toward the government when student activism was at its peak in South Korea (Lee, 1997). The study found that regardless of students' background characteristics, two-thirds of them were dissatisfied with government performance, and students in general thought communism compared to capitalism was neither superior nor humane.

Contemporary Methods of Protest

Contemporary methods of protest are varied and many. As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, some methods of protest include petitions, sit-ins, marches, self-injury, suicide, and many others. Studies usually show that regardless of the method, however, the more people that are involved and the higher the profile, the more likely the movement is to be successful in affecting change (O'Brien, 2008). For example, when students engage in large-scale hunger strikes, due to the fact that people will start dying if the government does not meet protesters' demands, this form of protest is very effective (Zhao, 2010). Violence, on the other hand, is a double-edged sword; it could lead to more immediate and widespread change, but the general public tends to discredit violent movements; therefore, the government may feel less pressure as a result of the drop in public support (Wang, 2008).

The Internet, however, has become a major focal point in garnering support locally, nationally, and internationally. When similar issues are occurring throughout the country and the people are aware that others are experiencing similar hardships, they will collaborate and mobilize to gather in very large groups (O'Brien, 2008). With

widespread Internet connection and globalization, rigid online impositions—as found in China, for example—are being circumvented more easily and with greater frequency.

As for South Korea, a revolutionary impact of the Internet was first witnessed at the presidential election of Roh Moo-hyun in 2002. During the campaign, the Internet made possible citizen-to-citizen participation in the political process as well as alternative, unfiltered sources of political information (Kim, Moon, & Yang, 2004). This experience has opened a new method of protests in South Korea as Milakovich (2010) suggested that the Internet would increase active participatory citizen involvement to address public challenges. For example, the candlelight vigil in 2008 was sparked by the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement negotiation, due to the threat of mad cow disease. Anonymous high school girls organized the protest online (Kim, April, 2009). As it continued for more than 100 days, about 1,700 civil organizations and about a million citizens had joined this candlelight vigil (Lee, 2011; Kim, April, 2009), and it expanded to address other issues such as education and the government's Grand Canal project. Also, these kinds of candlelight protests in South Korea have been conducted as a form of entertainment, partly because the ROK's laws banned any protest after sunset. These new forms of protests have expanded the range of protest participants to include moms, who bring their babies to the protests in strollers. Many Korean researchers have agreed that this kind of protest is a new form of civil movement that combines seemingly contradictory features of festivity and protests. The new form is distinguished from the previous protests that were led by groups with a focus of macro-discourse such as democracy. These spontaneous gatherings of anonymous citizens without a leading organization have addressed issues that are closely related to individual well-being, such as education, public health, and environmental protection (Lee, 2011).

As O'Brien puts it, "water-cooler grumbling can escalate into powerful, collective demands... [that] can create a cadre of anonymous netizens whose posts both demand *and* receive govern-

ment response" (emphasis added) (2008). Because citizens have greater access to resources to know their rights, they are more willing to defend them; small incidents thus escalate quickly (O'Brien, 2008; Wang, 2008). As mentioned earlier, when large numbers are involved, the media is more likely to cover the incident and thus the more pressure local leaders will feel to respond to the protestors' demands. In China, the central government has also realized this and has consequently passed over 12 regulations since the early 2000s concerning Internet use about what they consider "true dissent" as well as how they are allowed to restrict these activities (O'Brien, 2008). The "internet integrates and mobilizes offline protests," thereby linking people on- and off-line together, advocating different issues in different localities but all pursuing change (Lee, 2011; O'Brien, 2008; Wang, 2008; Zhao, 2010).

In sum, East Asian countries have used repression for the maintenance of their power throughout their respective histories. But when the people demand it, regardless of the nation's political institutions, states have always acquiesced to the demands of the people in some form or another to reform and adopt policies that were more palatable to local populations; this can be understood as an extension of the regime's Mandate of Heaven, where if they are ruling appropriately, the people will tolerate the regime and its policies. We now turn to modern day East Asia and the various viewpoints the people and the governments hold regarding protests.

Methods

Sample and Procedure

The East Asian sample consisted of 321 participants from China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan (171 females, 149 males, and 1 unspecified gender). The average age of the participants was 30 years, with ages ranging from 18 to 80. The sample was also asked about previous service in the military, if they had relatives in the military and if they had ever been involved in protest. Of the participants who responded to the items in question, 26%

reported being in the military, 40% reported having a relative in the military, and 24% reported engaging in protest at one point.

Participants were asked to fill out the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006). This chapter focuses on the participants' responses to two items regarding protest. The first item was "Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace." Participants were asked to rate their level of agreement on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1, totally disagree, to 7, totally agree, and then to respond qualitatively, explaining their reasoning behind the rating. The second item proposed a scenario and then asked participants to indicate in their own words how they would want to act in such a situation: "Police are beating peaceful antiwar demonstrators. What would you want to do?" For more information on the PAIRTAPS, refer to Chap. 12.

Right to Protest Item

Coding Procedure

Participant responses were coded based on the presence of themes relating to the socio-cognitive processes described by Albert Bandura in his theory of moral disengagement. Bandura's theory suggests that a person's moral agency is guided or deterred by standards adopted from society (Bandura, 1996). Four main socio-cognitive processes through which individuals can disengage themselves morally from detrimental conduct are (a) cognitive reconstruction of injurious behavior, (b) removing/obscuring personal agency, (c) misrepresenting/minimizing/disregarding consequences, and (d) devaluing the victim (Bandura, 1999).

The coding manual was developed by members of the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP). Working with the socio-cognitive processes described in Bandura's theory, as well as grounded theory approaches, the members of

GIPGAP created categories into which thematic units within qualitative responses could be coded and then analyzed. Grounded theory methods allow categories to be formed using common themes that appear in the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). In deductive qualitative analysis, the process begins with a conceptual model and as the responses are studied more in depth, the model is reworked to fit the responses (Gilgun, 2004). The GIPGAP members began with Bandura's model of moral disengagement and then reworked that model as responses were analyzed.

In our analysis of responses from the East Asian sample, we refer to pro-social and antisocial responses, as well as those that affirm or reject the right to protest; we do not assume that these responses mean that the participants are morally disengaged or morally engaged, only that the arguments are consistent with the theoretical mechanisms identified in Bandura's theory.

In regard to responses to the individuals' right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace item, four major sets of coding categories were identified from the qualitative responses: *anti-protest* and *pro-protest* thematic categories and subcategories, as well as *nonspecific arguments* and *focus on perceived reality*. The *anti-protest* categories were (a) *pseudo-moral reasoning*, (b) *negative labeling*, (c) *disadvantageous comparison*, (d) *denial of personal responsibility*, (e) *distorting consequences*, (f) *dehumanization*, (g) *attribution of blame*, and (h) *general disagreement*. These categories corresponded to themes described within Bandura's theory of moral disengagement. *Pro-protest* responses were coded into the categories of (a) *social justification*, (b) *moral responsibility*, (c) *humanization*, and (d) *general agreement*. These, in turn, also had multiple subcategories. The final two major sets of coding categories were *nonspecific argument* and *focus on perceived reality* (e.g., descriptive comments about protest rather than statements regarding point of view). For more information on Bandura's theory and the coding manual for the right to protest item, refer to Chap. 12.

The Right to Protest: Distribution of Responses

In response to the right to protest item, 82% of all responses affirmed the right of individuals to protest. Although many of the pro-protest categories were identified in the responses, only the pro-protest categories accounting for 10% or more of all responses in the category are discussed.

The categories with responses that portrayed protest as a *human right*, *socially sanctioned right*, *nonviolent*, and *generally agreement with the right* fit this standard (26%, 14%, 12%, and 13%, respectively, of the pro-protest responses). An example of responses describing the right to protest as a *human right* came from a 20-year-old Korean man, who said, “The right to express an individual’s thoughts and opinions is essential to [being] human.” A typical example of a response

identifying this right as one *legally provided by the government*, which is a more specific category within the broader *socially sanctioned right* category, was given by a 19-year-old Chinese woman, who said, “They have the right of free speech,” which gives reference to a right given by national law. The qualifier that the protest must be *nonviolent* is shown in the response of a 68-year-old Japanese man, who said, “Yes, [but] make sure that it does not become violent.” Responses in the *general agreement* category gave no further reasoning behind their answers. For example, a 27-year-old Japanese woman wrote only, “Yes, of course.” Examples of responses coded into the pro-protest category, as well as basic demographic information, are shown in Table 20.1.

Two percent of responses to the right to protest item were coded for protest-intolerant (anti-right to protest) themes. Among the responses

Table 20.1 Examples of pro-protest responses

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Pro-protest</i>	82				
<i>General agreement</i>	10(13)	Japan	Female	27	“Yes, of course (no reasons)”
		China	Male	33	“Totally agree”
		Korea	Male	51	“Yes”
<i>Humanization</i>	1(1)				
Human rights	21(26)	Korea	Male	20	“The right to express an individual’s thoughts and opinions is essential to being human”
		China	Female	18	“own individual rights”
		Japan	Female	34	“It’s right of freedom for human[s]”
Socially sanctioned rights	12(14)	China	Female	19	“They have the right of free speech”
		Japan	Male	27	“Natural as popular sovereignty”
		Korea	Female	26	“I have the right as a citizen of this country.”
<i>Moral responsibility</i>	8(10)				
Nonviolent	10(12)	Korea	Male	25	“The rights to stage protests against whatever is undoubted, provided that they are staged peacefully”
		China	Female	19	“If the protest is done peacefully, on the protestor’s parts, then it is okay. If it becomes violent, that is when they are being hypocritical”
		Japan	Male	68	“Yes, [but] make sure that it does not become violent”

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percent of responses out of the total responses. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses for that specific subcategory out of all responses in the pro-protest category

expressly rejecting a right to protest, two categories, reflecting *pseudo-moral reasoning* or the *distortion of the consequences of protestor action* to justify opposition to protest, emerged as more prevalent than others (43% and 43% of responses in the anti-right to protest set of categories). The remaining 14% was accounted for by responses indicating a *denial of personal responsibility* (a total of nine coding categories were never utilized in this sample).

Those respondents who were against the right to protest because of *pseudo-moral reasoning* had responses like this 18-year-old Japanese man, who stated that “Freedom of speech and expression allow this. Unless war is for national survival,” indicating that though the right to protest is supported by national law, national survival may preempt this right. Others distorted the consequence of protesting, such as a 20-year-old Japanese woman, who stated, “Although every individual has the right to express their opinion, staging protests could potentially lead to more violence, which would void the protest itself.” The only response illustrating a *denial of personal responsibility* was given by a 50-year-old Japanese man, who stated, “If politics/election is done in a fair democratic way that should be the most effective protest citizens can do.” This response suggests that the responsibility is solely in the hands of the democratic government and provides no recognition of personal responsibility.

Only a few responses (6% of total responses) were coded in the category of *perceived realism* but gave an interesting perspective when used. These responses did not say whether protesting should or should not be a right, but instead described what the participant saw as the reality of protesting. *Simple realism* accounted for 64% of responses in this category, with those portraying *protest as futile* accounting for 21% and those indicating that though *it may be a right, it may also not be respected* accounting for the remaining 14% of responses in this category. An example of a response coded for *simple realism* was given by a 19-year-old Japanese woman: “If one has things other than protesting and working for living, etc., it is difficult to actively engage in such protest, which seems to me the reality.” Typical of

those who saw *protest as futile* is the response of a 21-year-old Chinese woman, who stated, “protests don’t bring action.” An example of the view that the *right to protest may not be respected* is given by a 74-year-old Japanese man, who stated, “Basic human rights are not absolute rights granted by God. It is a historical right that the people had won over and unfortunately at present under the freedom of speech and thoughts, the freedom to support peaceful thoughts and expression of it as an action is not guaranteed rights in the range of legislature and are not universal.”

The Right to Protest: Exploratory Statistical Analyses

In order to explore the extent to which response patterns varied on the basis of demographic group characteristics, we did chi-squared tests on the frequency of the most popular codes based on demographic group membership. The four demographics that were analyzed were (a) gender, (b) military experience, (c) a relative with military experience, and (d) protest experience. Coding categories were analyzed using demographic data only if the category accounted 7% or more of the total responses. We also created superordinate *presence* variable based on whether participants gave an example of a response in any one of the subcategories of a major category. For example, not only did we run analyses for the more commonly used *pro-protest* categories separately but we also gave participants a score of one on the superordinate *pro-protest presence* variable if they gave at least one response in at least one of those pro-protest categories. For the East Asian sample, only a few statistically significant or marginally significant differences were found. Significant differences were those resulting in a *p*-value less than or equal to .05. Differences were considered marginally significant when *p*-values were between .051 and .10.

Two significant results were found when analyzing the overall *presence* variables. Proportionately more women than men gave at least one example of a *pro-protest* theme ($\chi^2=9.86, p<.01$). In addition, the proportion

of respondents without military experience was higher than respondents with military experience gave at least one example of a *pro-protest* theme ($\chi^2 = 6.21, p = .013$).

Police Beating Peaceful Protestors Item

Coding Procedure

Bandura's theory describes moral agency as being inhibitive or proactive (Bandura, 1999). The proactive aspect of moral agency—which causes people to engage in moral actions, not just inhibits them from behaving immorally—was the primary focus of the second item.

The second item prompted participants to report what they would want to do in response to the beating of peaceful protestors. Three major sets of coding categories were identified among these responses: *pro-social agency*, *antisocial agency*, and *lack of agency*. The *pro-social agency* thematic categories included (a) *critical judgment of the police*, (b) *personal initiative*, and (c) *institutional initiative*. The *antisocial agency* categories were (a) *support for the police*, (b) *unlawful activism*, and (c) *action against demonstrators*. The *lack of agency* categories were *lack of initiative* and *helplessness*.

Police Beating Protestors: Distribution of Responses

In response to the scenario item describing police beating peaceful protestors, 76% of the responses indicated that the participants would want to take actions, thereby indicating an expectation of *pro-social agency*, while 12% indicated a likelihood of *responding antisocially*, and 9% showed *lack of agency*.

Within the *pro-social agency* category, *general personal initiative* and *activism* were the most popular responses (44% and 26%, respectively, of the *pro-social* responses). Responses coded into the *general personal initiative* category included responses that indicated an intention to

engage in some nonspecific form of personal involvement in support of the protestors. Responses coded for *activism* typically expressed the wish to intervene on behalf of the protestors in some sort of public display of action. Examples of responses showing *general personal initiative* were given by a 45-year-old man from Japan, who stated, "I would want to stop the acts of the police and protect the participants," and a 21-year-old man from Taiwan, who said more generally that he would "stop the police." An example of a response in the *activism* subcategory is seen in the response of a 19-year-old woman from China, who stated, "I would want to continue peaceful protests and gather supporters until the cause is being noticed and not quieted," indicating a desire to engage in a more specific and public action than reflected in the more general personal initiative responses. These were also two of the most popular thematic responses overall (33% and 20%, respectively, of the total responses). Table 20.2 shows examples of responses within the *pro-social agency* category, alongside respondents' demographic information.

Within the *antisocial agency* major category, *unlawful activism* and *action against the demonstrators* were the most popular responses (78% and 17%, respectively, of the *antisocial agency* responses). An example of proposed *unlawful activism*, which focuses on action that may be in support of the protestors but is against the law, was given by a 33-year-old Chinese man, who said he would want to "kill the police." Responses indicating a *rejection of the hypothetical demonstrators* provided several different reasons for doing so, for example, a 34-year-old Korean man stated, "Need to stop the protest. If there is no violent protest, the police does not make appearance. Don't you know?" *Unlawful activism* was also one of the most popular responses overall (9% of all responses). Table 20.3 provides more examples of these categories along with basic demographic information.

Responses coded for *lack of initiative* accounted for 73% of the *lack of agency* responses, and themes of *helplessness* accounted for 27% of the *lack of agency* responses. Most responses indicating a *lack of initiative* were similar to a

Table 20.2 Examples of pro-social agency responses

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Pro-social agency</i>	76	Japan	Male	45	“I would want to stop the acts of the police and protect the participants”
<i>Personal initiative</i>	33(44)	China	Male	20	“Do anything I can”
		Korea	Female	24	“Stop the police...calm the peaceful opposition protest...If I am there I want to do that”
		Taiwan	Male	21	“Stop the police”
Activism	20(26)	Japan	Male	74	“I would take pictures of the scene and would want to show the whole world and bring it to their attention”
		Korea	Female	24	“I would make those police to get on the media and argue what is really wrong if they say that protest for peace is wrong”
		China	Female	19	“I would want to continue peaceful protests and gather supporters until the cause is being noticed and not quieted”

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percent of responses out of the total responses. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses for that specific subcategory out of all responses in the pro-social agency category

response from a 19-year-old Japanese man, who would want to “just go away.” Responses showing *helplessness* included one from a 27-year-old Korean woman, who said, “Even though I’m upset with that, I can do nothing.” Responses showing a lack of initiative constituted 7% of all responses.

Police Beating Protestors: Exploratory Statistical Analyses

Chi-square analysis was run in order to examine the potential contributions of the selected demographic groupings to the use of the *pro-social agency*, *antisocial agency*, and *lack of agency* themes. These tests revealed that proportionately more women than men expressed a desire to show *general personal initiative* in response to the police beating ($\chi^2=3.3$, $p=.0693$). Additionally, proportionately more men than women would respond to the beating scenario with a *lack of initiative* ($\chi^2=3.71$, $p=.0541$). There were no significant or marginally significant group differences in frequency of particular themes between groups based on personal military or protest experience, or relatives with military experience.

Discussion

This chapter investigated the views of ordinary East Asians (including Chinese, Taiwanese, Japanese, and South Koreans) concerning individual rights to stage protests in the context of historical and political events in the region. Consideration has been given to ideological conflicts during the Cold War period (approximately from 1945 to 1991 when the Soviet Union was abolished), authoritarian regimes, and students’ role in protests. This region is currently witnessing new forms of protests, of which features are quite different from those about a decade ago.

Although the responses given in this chapter did not come from a representative probability sample of the region, the qualitative responses provide unique insights into the ways in which a diverse group of ordinary East Asians think about their individual rights to stage protests. The findings from our participants indicate that most responses affirmed individual rights to protests, while a very few responses rejected the rights, suggesting civil rights is widely recognized in this region (Kim et al., 2012; Park & Shin, 2006).

The most common justifications confirming this right were identified as *human rights*, *socially*

Table 20.3 Examples of antisocial agency responses

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Quote
<i>Antisocial agency</i>	12				
<i>Unlawful activism</i>	9(78)	Japan	Female	19	“Want to hit the policemen”
		Korea	Female	U	“I will fight against the police blow by blow”
		China	Male	20	“Organize a revolt against the police”
<i>Action against the demonstrators</i>	2(17)	China	Female	21	“Stop police, jail demonstrators if they are out of line”
		Korea	Male	34	“Need to stop the protest. If there is no violent protest, the police do not make an appearance. Don’t you know?”
		Japan	Female	20	“Stop both the beating and the demonstration”

Note. *U* unknown gender. The first number in the percent column refers to the percent of responses out of the total responses. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses for that specific subcategory out of all responses in the anti-social agency category

sanctioned rights, general agreement with the rights, and nonviolence.

One of the interesting findings from our study was the relative lack of emphasis among participants on a *moral obligation of individuals to protest*, which was surprising given the influence of a Confucian idea of the Mandate of Heaven—a philosophical concept addressing that humans, as a moral agent, have a social role as well as a social responsibility to advocate for reform, as briefly indicated at the beginning of this chapter (Song, 2011). As a result, students and intellectuals who were educated on Confucian philosophy historically played a major role in protest movements in East Asian countries even before modernization (Funabashi, 2010; O’Brien, 2008; Sasaki-Uemura, 2001). Only one respondent, a 53-year-old Korean man, referred to the right to protest as a moral obligation, stating that “If government provokes a war or unfair policy making, people have to do it [protest] for peace.” A speculative explanation for this unexpected finding may be that the Confucian morality was abused as propaganda throughout the prolonged authoritarian regimes in China, Taiwan, and South Korea: using only one side of the Confucian idea, promoting the doctrine that subjects of the country are required to follow everything the ruler dictates. Although Japan adopted Western democracy in 1947, much earlier than other East Asian states, one commonality across the states is the lack of citizen power and the domination of the state rather than civil society

in the context of pursuing economic development (Befu, 1993; Kim, 1997; O’Dwyer, 2003).

This speculation may be supported by the patterns of responses from our participants who rejected individual rights to protest. The most common justifications rejecting this right were identified as *pseudo-moral reasoning, distortion of the consequences of protestor action, and denial of personal responsibility*. Examples of the responses from our participants include such statements as “Patriotism!”; “They are focusing on the negative and so that they will foment it...”; and “It’s the government’s decision to end war,” reflecting the rhetoric delivered by the authoritarian governments in this region.

In line with the findings that indicate the wide social recognition of individual rights to stage protest, most responses advocated willingness to support protestors in the hypothetical situation where police beat peaceful protestors. Also noteworthy is that although most responses indicated a desire for pro-social involvement in support of protestors, numerous responses also indicated antisocial action either in support of or against protestors. These findings may suggest that observing violence could activate moral agency that, postulated by Bandura (1999), is a pro-social way for some individuals as well as an antisocial way for other individuals.

A provocative finding was that the object toward which antisocial moral agency was directed in the scenario was sometimes the peaceful

protestors rather than the police who are abusing power. This finding suggests that the direction of antisocial moral agency can be affected by an individual's political perspectives or values. Such a potential role of political perspectives or values in the moral disengagement process could be examined in a future study.

Another provocative finding from our exploratory analyses was that proportionally more men than women would *not* take any action to the prompt in the hypothetical situation. Moreover, proportionally more women than men would take action in support of protestors. It remains as open question whether these gender differences are unique to East Asia or are a more general phenomenon.

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International Perspectives on Engagement and Disengagement in Support and Suppression of Antiwar Protests

21

Alfred McAlister and Tristyn Campbell

The previous eight chapters in this section have analyzed the responses of participants from Western Europe, the UK/Anglo region (the United Kingdom and its former Anglophone colonies excluding India), Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, the Middle East and Gulf States, Africa, Latin America, South and Southeast Asia, and East Asia concerning the right to protest. This chapter considers the extent to which the participants from these eight regions have similar or different viewpoints regarding the right of individuals to protest against war and in favor of peace, as well as what they would want to do if they saw police suppressing peaceful protestors by beating them.

As explained in earlier chapters, responses to the two protest items from the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006) were coded using a moral disengagement/engagement coding manual developed by members of the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP). The manual was researcher developed using a deductive qualitative analysis approach (Gilgun, 2004) based on work by Albert

Bandura (e.g., Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996; Bandura, 1999; McAlister, 2000; McAlister, Bandura, & Owen, 2006). It was further refined using grounded theory, which allows thematic categories to emerge from responses (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The first item directs survey respondents to indicate their level of agreement, on a seven-point Likert scale, with the item: “individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace” and then to explain the reasoning behind their rating. The second statement poses the scenario: “police are beating peaceful antiwar demonstrators. What would you want to do?”

Moral Disengagement Theory as a Basis for Coding

Albert Bandura’s theory (2002) of moral disengagement posits that individuals develop ethical standards that guide social conduct, promote self-esteem and worth, and protect against self-sanction, as long as the individuals act in accordance with these self-imposed standards. There are times, however, that the self-regulation of conduct is suspended as the person feels that ethical standards no longer apply to the situation, thereby diverting moral reactions away from reprehensible conduct. According to Bandura, the socio-cognitive processes that allow such diversions are best conceptualized as forms of moral disengagement. Conversely, when acting in accordance with their moral standards, individuals exhibit moral engagement.

A. McAlister (✉)
Behavioral Sciences, School of Public Health,
University of Texas, Austin, TX, USA
e-mail: alfred.l.mcalister@uth.tmc.edu

T. Campbell
Psychology Department, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA
e-mail: tristyn.campbell@gmail.com

In his theory, Bandura has identified several sociocognitive mechanisms by which self-condemnation for inhumane behavior is disabled. These mechanisms served as the basis for many of the major coding categories in our manual. Although much less developed, his theory of moral engagement shaped several of our major coding categories as well.

Bandura (2002) theorized that moral engagement is linked to moral agency. He identified two forms of moral agency: (a) inhibitive and (b) proactive. When a person refuses to act in an immoral manner and instead acts in accordance with his or her moral standards, he or she is exhibiting inhibitive moral agency. Proactive moral agency is exhibited by behaving morally, even when pressured to behave immorally. While exhibiting this form of moral agency, a person feels responsible for others and acts accordingly. It is important to note that when coding participant's responses, coders were not passing judgment on the respondent's morality but rather categorizing his or her responses into thematic categories informed by the theory.

The Right to Protest Coding Categories

The first major anti-protest category was also the most general category: *general protest intolerance*. This category, the only major category not based on Bandura's theory, was used to code responses that rejected an individual right to protest but failed to provide any rationale for the disagreement. *Pseudo-moral justification* encompassed responses that argued that protesting is harmful to society. Its subcategory, *supporting troops or the government*, was used to code responses that emphasized patriotism. The third major category, *negative labeling*, captured responses that used discrediting labels to describe protesting. Another major category, *disadvantageous comparison*, was used to categorize responses that compared protesting to some other behavior seen as more desirable, such as obedience. Responses that rejected any individual responsibility for protesting against injustice or aggression were coded for a *denial of personal*

responsibility. If responses emphasized perceived negative consequences of protesting, they were coded for *distorting consequences*. The major category of *dehumanization* had two subcategories: (a) *dehumanization of the protestor*, for responses that attributed demonic qualities to the protestor, and (b) *dehumanization of the targets of war*, for responses that attributed demonic qualities to the victims of war. Finally, the major category *attribution of blame* also had two subcategories: (a) *protestors as agents*, in which protestors were seen as blameworthy for protesting when they had no right to do so, and (b) *targets of war*, in which individuals were portrayed as having no right to protest because any country under attack deserved its fate.

Our pro-protest coding categories were created as complements to the anti-protest category. The first major category, *general pro-protest*, was used to code responses that agreed with the right to protest but failed to provide a rationale for the agreement. The second major category, *social justification*, was for responses arguing that protest helps society to develop. This category had two subcategories: (a) *peace as a goal*, which encompassed responses that stated peace is the goal of protesting, and (b) *awareness of negative consequences*, which encompassed responses that mentioned consequences that could arise from inaction. Responses stating that it is the obligation of individuals to protest were coded for *moral responsibility*. This category had three subcategories: (a) *civic duty*, which was used to code responses that stated protest is one's obligation as a citizen; (b) *nonviolent*, which was used to code responses that stated people have the right to stage peaceful protests; and (c) *law abiding*, which was used to code responses that stated protests must be done in accordance with the law. The final major pro-protest category was *humanization*. Its first subcategory, *reciprocal right*, was for responses asserting that our actions reflect that stated if people have the right to go to war, they should have the right to protest that as well. The second subcategory, *human rights*, was used to code responses indicating that protesting is an inherent right of all individuals. *Human rights* had two subcategories: (a) *it should be a right*, designed to capture responses stating that if protesting is not a right in some countries, it should be one,

and (b) *international law*, which was used to code responses that referred to protest as a right guaranteed by international human rights agreements. The final subcategory of *humanization, socially sanctioned rights*, captured responses that said protesting is a right that stems from national law.

It is important to note that (a) the survey was not designed specifically to assess moral disengagement and engagement; (b) the sample was not representative; and (c) we are not characterizing people or regions as being engaged or disengaged. Rather, in describing the themes identified in the qualitative responses, we use the terms “protest intolerant” or “anti-protest” and “protest tolerant” and “pro-protest,” instead of “moral disengagement” and “moral engagement.” Our coding categories are informed by Bandura’s theory, and the responses in those categories fit well with his theory, but we cannot assume that the responses are valid representations of the sociocognitive mechanisms he posits. Additionally, the results have been interpreted carefully and should not be generalized to the general public.

Patterns of Responses for Individuals’ Right to Protest

Across all of the regions, very few responses were coded for anti-protest sentiments. South and Southeast Asian and the UK/Anglo responses accounted for the highest percentage of these viewpoints, at 5% of all responses. Four percent of responses from the Middle Eastern sample rejected an individual right to protest, while 3% of all the responses from Russia and the Balkan Peninsula and Africa rejected this right. Finally, 2% of the East Asian responses and 1% of the Western European and Latin American responses did not agree that individuals have a right to protest against war and in favor of peace.

In general, responses rejecting the right to protest were coded into two categories: (a) *distorting consequences* and (b) *pseudo-moral responsibility*. Only in Western Europe were most anti-protest responses coded into a different category, *denial of personal responsibility*. *Distorted consequences* of protesting were most often seen in

the UK/Anglo, the Middle Eastern, African, and South and Southeast Asian responses. In the East Asian sample, *distorting consequences* and *pseudo-moral responsibility* reasoning were tied at 1% of all the anti-right to protest responses. Thinking consistent with *pseudo-moral responsibility* was most often seen in the Latin American and the Russian and Balkans responses.

In the UK/Anglo region, Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and South and Southeast Asia, several responses were coded for a *general disagreement* with individuals’ right to protest. Interestingly, there were no responses coded into two categories: (a) *dehumanization of the targets of war* and (b) blaming the *targets of war* across all of the regions. Reasoning consistent with every other coding category was identified in the responses of at least one of the regions.

The vast majority of responses to individuals’ right to protest supported this right. At least 82% of all responses were coded for pro-protest themes in these regions. Ninety-seven percent of all Latin American responses demonstrated this type of thinking, with Western Europe following closely with 95% of all responses supporting the right to protest against war. Responses from the Middle Eastern and African sample agreed with the right to protest at a rate of 89% of all responses. Eighty-eight percent of South and Southeast Asian and the UK/Anglo responses were coded for the pro-protest categories, 84% of the Russian and Balkans responses, and 82% of the East Asian responses.

As was true with the anti-protest responses, there was little variation across regions in the most popular reasons given for why individuals have the right to protest. Reasoning consistent with two of the *humanization* categories, *human rights* and *socially sanctioned rights*, was most often seen in the responses. Responses that said protesting is protected by national law and is therefore a *socially sanctioned right* were most often coded for in the Western European, the UK/Anglo, and the Middle Eastern samples, 27%, 25%, and 16% of all responses, respectively. In Latin America, this type of reasoning was seen in 17% of all responses, which was the same

percentage found for *human rights* responses. In addition to Latin America, protesting was seen as an inherent *human right* in responses from South and Southeast Asia and East Asia. Africa was the only region where the largest percentage of responses were coded for *moral responsibility*, with 14% of responses coded into this category. Examples of *moral responsibility* were seen in the responses from all of the other regions but at a lesser percent. In the Russian and Balkans sample, the most commonly coded category was *general agreement* with the right.

Additionally, at least 8% of responses in each of the regions specified that *nonviolent* protesting is a right that everyone shares. Still other responses were coded for *peace as a goal* of protesting in each of the regions. No responses from any of the regions showed reasoning that protesting is a right protected by *international law*. Every other category was identified in responses in at least one of the regions.

The Role of Demographic Variables in Viewpoints Concerning Individuals' Right to Protest

Respondents provided demographic information in addition to their responses to the PAIRTAPS. The demographic responses allowed us to determine the extent to which the frequency of particular forms of reasoning that were tolerant or intolerant of the right to protest varied as a function of gender, military service, having a relative in the military, and involvement.

Gender

Reasoning concerning individuals' right to protest varied as a function of gender in every region except for Latin America. Proportionately more women than men from East Asia gave responses coded for one or more of the *pro-protest* coding categories. In Russia and the Balkan Peninsula and South and Southeast Asia, proportionately more women than men gave *social justifications* for the right to protest, such as protesting helps society to develop. Proportionately more African men than women showed an *awareness of the*

negative consequences of not protesting against war and in favor of peace. Finally, in the Middle East, proportionately more men than women saw protesting as one's *moral responsibility*. Conversely, proportionately more women than men from Africa provided pro-protest reasoning coded for *moral responsibility*. Proportionately more women than men from the UK/Anglo region and Western Europe stated that for protests to be a right, they must be *nonviolent*. Finally, in Russia and the Balkans, Africa, and South and Southeast Asia, proportionately more men than women saw protesting as a *socially sanctioned right* given to citizens by their government.

Military Service

Military service as a predictor of responses was seen in fewer cases than gender. The only significant *anti-protest* result was found for military service: in Russia and the Balkans, proportionately more military respondents than civilian respondents gave responses coded for the *pseudo-moral reasoning* categories. In East Asia, proportionately more respondents without military experience than their counterparts responded with reasoning coded for one or more of the *pro-protest* categories. Proportionately more respondents in the military than not in the military stated that protesting is a *socially sanctioned right* in Russia and the Balkans and the Middle East. Conversely, proportionately more nonmilitary respondents than military respondents from Russia and the Balkan Peninsula gave *social justifications* as the reason why individuals have the right to protest. Finally, in Western Europe, proportionately more civilians than their counterparts saw protesting as a right if it is done *nonviolently*.

Relative's Military Service

Group differences based on a relative's military service were found on only four of the right to protest coding categories. In South and Southeast Asia, proportionately more respondents with a relative in the military gave responses that were identified as *generally pro-protest* in nature as compared to their counterparts. Similarly, proportionately more African

respondents with a relative in the military as compared to those without one showed an *awareness of negative consequences* in their responses. Proportionately more respondents without a relative in the military said that protests must be *nonviolent* than respondents with a relative in the military from Western Europe. In the UK/Anglo region and South and Southeast Asia, proportionately more respondents without a relative in the military than their counterparts stated that protesting is an inherent *human right* that all individuals share. Finally, in Russia and the Balkan Peninsula and the UK/Anglo region, proportionately more respondents with at least one relative in the military as compared to respondents without one saw protesting as a *socially sanctioned right*.

Protest Participation

Protest participation proved to be a fairly robust contributor to responses from Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, Latin America, and the UK/Anglo region. Proportionately more protestors than non-protestors from Russia and the Balkans saw protesting as one's *moral responsibility*. The opposite result was true in Latin America: proportionately more non-protestors than protestors stated that protesting is one's *moral responsibility*. Furthermore, in Latin America, proportionately more protestors than non-protestors stated that protesting is a *human right* that everyone shares. In the UK/Anglo region, proportionately more non-protestors than protestors stated that *nonviolent* protesting is a right. Conversely, proportionately more protestors than non-protestors from the UK/Anglo region saw protesting as one's *civic duty*. Finally, also in the UK/Anglo region, proportionately more protestors than non-protestors said that if protesting is not a right in a country, *it should be one*.

Police Beating Peaceful Protestors Coding Categories

In general, responses to the police beating peaceful protestors were coded into three thematic categories: (a) pro-social agency, (b) antisocial agency, and (c) lack of agency.

The first major theme, pro-social agency, captured responses that referenced actions or feelings that would be beneficial to the protestors, such as finding ways to end the police actions permanently. *Judgment of police*, the first pro-social agency category, was used to code responses that generally disagreed with the police's actions. The second category was *personal initiative*, which encompassed responses indicating a desire to stop the police but not specifying how to do so. This category had three subcategories, all of which indicated a goal of ending the beatings: (a) *activism*, (b) *personal understanding*, and (c) *other solutions*. The third pro-social category was *institutional initiative*. Responses coded into this category called for an unspecified institution to handle the situation. The two subcategories in this category, all of which specified an organization to end the beating, were (a) *legal action* and (b) *government/other entity*.

Antisocial agency themes were coded into three major categories: (a) *support for police*, (b) *unlawful activism*, and (c) *against the demonstrators*. Responses expressing support for the police aggression were coded for *support for police*. *Unlawful activism* was designed to categorize responses indicating that the respondent would want to harm the police. If responses supported taking actions against the demonstrators, they were coded as *action against the demonstrators*.

The first coding category under lack of agency was *lack of initiative*. This category applied to responses indicating that the respondent would not do anything if he or she saw police beating protestors. The other category, *helplessness*, encompassed responses that said the respondent would not be able to do anything useful in this situation.

Patterns of Responses for Police Beating Protestors Hypothetical Situation

A majority of responses across the regions were coded for the pro-social agency constructs. Responses from Western Europe, Latin America,

and South and Southeast Asia had the highest percentage of pro-social agency responses, with 83% of all responses to the scenario coded into these categories. In the other regions, the percentages of pro-social agency responses were 80% for the UK/Anglo region, 76% for East Asia and 75% for the Middle East, 68% for Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, and 58% for Africa.

All of the regions showed high rates of *personal initiative*. This coding category was the most frequently coded category in every region except for Western Europe. *Personal initiative* and *activism* were tied in South and Southeast Asia as the most commonly used forms of reasoning in response to police beating protestors. The most commonly seen response in Western Europe was *activism*, indicating that the respondents would want to protest against the police violence or report it to the media. All of the pro-social coding categories were identified in responses from every region, except that none of the African responses were coded for *personal understanding*. Many responses across the regions were coded for expressing an intent to take *legal action* against the police in this situation.

Antisocial agency was identified in responses at a much lower rate than pro-social agency. Russia and the Balkan Peninsula had the highest frequency of antisocial responses, with 14% of the responses being coded into these categories. The percentages of antisocial responses in the other regions were 12% for East Asia, 11% for the UK/Anglo region, 10% for the Middle East, 8% for South and Southeast Asia, 7% for Western Europe and Africa, and 6% for Latin America.

Unlawful activism was the most common form of antisocial agency identified in all of the regions. Some responses in every region except for Africa were coded for *support for the police*. Similarly, every region except for Western Europe had responses coded for actions *taken against the demonstrators*.

The regions differed somewhat in the percentage of responses coded into the lack of agency categories. In Africa, 33% of responses were coded for lack of agency. In the other regions, the percentages of responses coded into the lack of

agency category were 14% of all responses from the Middle East, 12% of the responses from Russia and the Balkans, 9% of East Asian responses, 8% of Latin American responses, and 7% of responses from Western Europe, the UK/Anglo region, and South and Southeast Asia. *Lack of initiative* was the most common lack of agency response in all of the regions. All of the regions also had some responses coded for *helplessness* but at a much lower frequency.

The Role of Demographic Variables in Viewpoints Concerning a Hypothetical Situation Involving Police Beating Peaceful Protestors

Gender

Across all of the regions except for South and Southeast Asia, gender proved to be a contributor to the frequency of particular themes in response to the police beating protestors scenario. Proportionately more women than men from Latin America and the UK/Anglo region gave responses coded for one or more of the *pro-social agency* categories. Conversely, proportionately more men than women from Latin America and the UK/Anglo region gave responses coded for one or more of the *antisocial agency* and *lack of agency* categories. Additionally, proportionately more men than women from those two regions, East Asia and Africa, projected a *lack of initiative* in their responses to the hypothetical scenario concerning police beating peaceful protestors. In East Asia and the UK/Anglo region, proportionately more women than men showed an intent to exercise *personal initiative* to end the beatings in their responses. Proportionately more women than men from Western Europe gave responses that were coded for *activism*, such as protesting the beatings. In Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, proportionately more women than men stated that they would want to take *legal action* against the police. Similarly, in the UK/Anglo region, proportionately more women than men gave responses coded for *institutional activism*. Finally, proportionately more women than men from the Middle East offered reasoning coded for

unlawful activism, such as beating the police, in response to this situation.

Military Service

Group differences based on military service were found in responses from only three of the regions. In the Middle East, proportionately more military respondents than civilian respondents gave responses coded for one or more of the *pro-social agency* categories, specifically including *personal initiative* and *legal action*. In the UK/Anglo region, as well as the Middle East, proportionately more nonmilitary respondents than veteran respondents said they would want to engage in some form of *activism* in their responses to this situation. Another of the *pro-social agency* themes also varied in relation to military service in the UK/Anglo region: proportionately more respondents in the military than not in the military gave responses saying that they would contact the *government or another entity* to help in the situation. Proportionately more nonmilitary than military respondents in the Middle East gave responses coded for one or more of the *lack of initiative* categories. Specifically, proportionately more nonmilitary respondents as compared to military respondents showed a *lack of initiative* in their responses. In Africa the opposite result was found to be true: proportionately more veterans than civilians gave responses coded for a *lack of initiative*.

Relative's Military Service

Very few significant differences were found for the use of these categories as a function of relative's military service. In Western Europe, proportionately more respondents without a relative in the military as compared to their counterparts displayed *personal initiative* in their responses. In Africa, proportionately more respondents with a relative in the military as compared to their counterparts displayed *activism* in their responses. Proportionately more respondents with civilian relatives than veteran relatives from Russia and the Balkan Peninsula gave responses coded for *institutional initiative* in response to the hypothetical situation. Finally, a significantly greater proportion of African respondents with civilian relatives than respondents with veteran

relatives mentioned a desire to take *legal action* against the police if they beat peaceful protestors.

Protest Participation

In the UK/Anglo region, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia, proportionately more protestors than non-protestors gave responses coded for one or more of the *pro-social agency* categories. Proportionately more protestors than non-protestors from Russia and the Balkans *judged the police critically* in their responses. Conversely, proportionately more non-protestors than protestors from the Middle East gave *critical judgments of the police* in their responses. Proportionately more protestors than non-protestors from South and Southeast Asia showed *personal initiative* for stopping the beatings in their responses. Additionally, proportionately more protestors than non-protestors from South and Southeast Asia, Russia and the Balkans, and Latin America stated that they would want to engage in some form of *activism*, such as reporting the polices' actions to the media. In Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, proportionately more protestors than non-protestors offered *other solutions* than beating protestors. Proportionately more respondents who had never protested as compared to respondents who had protested from the UK/Anglo region and the Middle East gave responses coded for the *antisocial agency* categories. Interestingly, proportionately more protestors than non-protestors from the Middle East gave responses with reasoning coded for *unlawful activism*. Finally, proportionately more non-protestors than protestors from the Middle East, the UK/Anglo region, and Russia and the Balkan Peninsula gave responses coded for the *lack of agency* coding categories, specifically including the *lack of initiative* category.

Conclusions

Reflecting on these findings, it is encouraging to find very little disagreement with the right to protest against war and for peace. Some men in Russia and the Balkans cited harm to society as a

moral justification for denying the right to protest. Among the extremely small group opposing the right to protest in Western Europe, it is interesting to find that they justify this belief by denying that individuals have the responsibility to take protest. It is extremely encouraging to find that negative labeling, dehumanization, and blame were almost never cited as reasons for opposing the right to protest against war anywhere.

Humanitarian engagement expressed in the form of active agreement with individuals' rights to protest war and support peace varied from near unanimity in Latin America and Western Europe to around nine in ten in the UK/Anglo region, the Middle East, Africa, and South and Southeast Asia. Lower levels of active support for the right to protest were found in Russia and the Balkans, and East Asia deserves comment, as they suggest that there is a significant minority in these regions that might be willing to see protest rights denied.

The social sanction provided by national laws emerged as the most common form of moral engagement in justifying the right to protest in Western Europe, the UK/Anglo regions, the Middle East, and among members of the military in Russia and the Balkans. Women in that region, Africa and South and Southeast Asia, also tended to cite national laws justifying the right to protest. Interestingly more general human right to protest, rather than the protection of national law, was commonly used to justify support for that right in Latin America, South and Southeast Asia, and East Asia.

It is interesting to note that among those whose level of moral engagement was great enough to lead them to participate in antiwar protests in Russia and the Balkans, the responsibility to take action is the most common justification. The moral responsibility to protest against war was also endorsed by men in the Middle East. Protesters in the UK/Anglo regions cited civic duty to justify their support for the right to protest. Protestors in Latin America expressed their human rights as a justification, while non-protestors there justified support for those who do protest on the basis of their moral responsibility to

take part in protests in opposing war and supporting peace.

Responses to the hypothetical question about the suppression of protest showed that the majority of respondents in every country would condemn that action, often citing the intention to be proactively engaged by engaging in protests against suppression, calling for attention from the media, and invoking the responsibility of government institutions to protect protesters. Four in five or more expressed proactive engagement in response to the beating of protesters in all regions, except in East Asia (76%), Russia and the Balkans (68%), and Africa (55%). This suggests that significant social forces may support the suppression of protest in these regions, and it is notable that an expectation of inaction due to perceived helplessness was most commonly expressed in Africa. Active support for the suppression of protest was most common in Russia and the Balkans, but not much less common in the UK/Anglo regions and East Asia. The most common justification for supporting the suppression of protest was the moral utility argument that it was unlawful and potentially harmful to the state.

While these findings are encouraging overall, they point to regions and groups in which there are threats to engagement in support of the right to protest and opposition to the suppression of protest. People in Russia and the Balkans and East Asia show a tendency toward less support for the right to protest and more support for the suppression than people in other regions. Regarding suppression of protest, people in Africa are notably less likely express proactive engagement in the condemnation of that suppression. In all regions, men generally lag behind women in the expression of engagement with respect to the right to protest and reactions to the suppression of protest. Probably the most notable findings in these studies concern the role of participation in protest, which appears to strengthen engagement in agreement with the human and legal right to carry out antiwar protests and in the active condemnation of efforts to suppress them.

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Part III

Apology and Reconciliation

Jennie Davidow

The Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006), developed by the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP), includes two items on the role of apology in achieving reconciliation among nations formerly involved in conflict. The following eight chapters address issues of apology and reconciliation in eight different regions (Western Europe, UK/Anglo countries, Russia and the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa, South and Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Latin America), with detailed descriptions of each sample appearing in the individual chapters.

Responses to two items were analyzed for this section. The first item asked participants to rate their level of agreement (from 1, totally disagree, to 7, totally agree) with the statement “If one country has in the past invaded, colonized, or exercised control over the governmental affairs of another country, an apology by the invading/colonizing/controlling country can improve the chances for reconciliation between the countries.” Participants were then asked to explain the reasoning underlying their rating scale score. The second item asked participants to answer the question: “What steps or factors are necessary to make an apology successful in achieving reconciliation between the countries?” Using

grounded theory methods (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Gilgun, 2005), which involved identifying themes in the responses and developing categories based on those themes, manuals were developed for coding responses to those two items.

Although grounded theory was used to derive coding manuals, research on apology and reconciliation in psychology and political science literature also proved useful in conceptualizing emergent themes. For example, there is evidence that unless victims perceive an apology as authentic, it will not facilitate forgiving and healing (Allan, Allan, Kaminer, & Stein, 2006). Although apology can be effective at freeing both the perpetrator and victim from pain, this is the case only if the apology is done in a convincing and acceptable manner. Research has shown that when apologies are insincere, without full acceptance of the blame, with no commitment to change, or done without thought, they are unsuccessful in the process of healing and can even aggravate a conflict (Minow, 1998). James (2007) indicated that an authentic apology must have the following characteristics: (1) is officially recorded, (2) names the wrongs, (3) accepts responsibility, (4) states regret, (5) promises non-repetition, (6) does not demand forgiveness, (7) is not hypocritical or arbitrary, and (8) undertakes morally engaged measures. Similarly, although it has been shown that apologies can affect judgments of fairness after an injustice, several studies found that simply apologizing was never enough—the nature and

J. Davidow (✉)
New York Medical College, Valhalla,
New York, NY, USA
e-mail: jendavidow@gmail.com

circumstances of an apology both matter (DeCremer & Shouten, 2008).

Although many people think of apology and reconciliation only in regard to personal relationships, these processes come into play on an international level as well. With increasing frequency since the late twentieth century, governments have been issuing apologies for atrocities they have committed. Some countries take further steps toward reconciliation even after an apology has been issued. For example, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) set up in South Africa in response to apartheid incorporates a committee on human rights, amnesty, and reconciliation and reparation. The TRC strove to include all of the stories being told into the transcript of the commission, empowering the people and the community collectively to be whole again. In a truth commission, the focus is on the whole narrative, not on every specific detail as in a trial. A truth commission may be only one step toward reconciliation. Some believe that further action must occur in the form of reparations and social changes to fully achieve peaceful relations (Minow, 1998).

Apology Coding Manual

The apology coding manual used in this study was designed to categorize the qualitative responses to the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) item “If one country has in the past invaded, colonized, or exercised control over the governmental affairs of another country, an apology by the invading/colonizing/controlling country can improve the chances for reconciliation between the countries.”

In order to code, each participant’s response to the item was divided into codable units. A codable unit was defined as a phrase or sentence that represents an idea and could be as short as one word or as long as a sentence. For example, a response that said only “If the apology is sincere, yes” would be considered one codable unit, while “It can’t hurt. But you can’t erase the past” would be considered two. Importantly, each codable unit was coded for only one major thematic response category

(thus, not double coded). One response could contain as many codable units as there were ideas and could contain multiple codable units that each received the same code.

Furthermore, for analysis purposes, the categories and subcategories for each of the major categories were added together to create superordinate categories that were scored for presence or absence (1=presence, 0=absence). That is, if a response was coded into any of the categories or subcategories within a major category, the response received 1 for the superordinate category. The name of the variables created through these procedures was the name of the major category followed by the word *presence*. For example, if a response was coded for either *general yes/agreement*, *healing*, *repair relationships*, *restore dignity*, or *it is necessary*, it received a score of 1 in the *yes/agreement presence* category. This procedure allowed us to determine whether there were group differences not just in the individual subcategories of a major category, where the frequencies were often rather small, but determine whether there were group differences in the set of subcategories considered as a whole.

Responses to each item were first sorted into three major groups (sets of categories) based on the extent to which participants agreed with the prompt (see Table 22.1 for summary of categories and subcategories of apology coding system). If participants’ responses endorsed the idea that apology can successfully lead to reconciliation, their response was placed into the *yes/agree* category. If responses suggested that whether or not apology could be effective depended on other factors, they were placed in the *depends* category. If responses stated that apology could never lead to reconciliation, they were placed in the *noldisagree* category. Each category included several subcategories.

Depends Categories and Subcategories

The group of responses with the most categories and subcategories was the group indicating that the success of an apology depends on some other factor. Some of these responses, categorized as *may be possible* were quite vague and nonspecific

Table 22.1 Apology coding system

I. Depends coding categories
A. May be possible/worth a try/possible to some degree
B. Depends on circumstances
1. Depends on severity of wrongdoing
2. Depends on relevance/timing
C. Depends on nature of apology
1. Sincerity
2. Recognition of wrongdoing
3. Remorse
4. Official/diplomatic
D. Depends on acceptance
1. Depends on forgiveness
E. Depends on further action
1. Actions speak louder than words
2. Change behavior/respect and tolerance/positive outlook
3. Material reparations in addition
F. Good beginning/only one step
1. Takes time
II. Yes/agree coding categories
A. Healing
1. Repair relationships
2. Restore dignity
B. It is necessary
III. No/disagree coding categories
A. Not possible
B. Irreversible wrongdoings/does not erase the past
C. “Forgive, don’t forget”
D. Words don’t matter
E. Actions speak louder than words
F. Not necessary
G. Negative consequences
Other coding
A. Historical reference
1. Positive historical reference
2. Negative historical reference
B. Uncodable/does not answer the question

as to what such factors might be; some examples of such responses included “depends on the situation” and “It could. Or it could bring up things that would worsen relations between the two countries.” Other examples of responses in the *may be possible/worth a try/possible to some degree* category included “It can’t hurt”; “If it doesn’t help at least, they should try and see what

happens”; and “I would hope an apology might help; it’s worth a try.”

In addition to such general *may be possible* responses providing no specific information about what success depends on, there were several more specific categories: (a) *depends on circumstances* (with subcategories for *severity of the wrongdoing* by the offending country and the *recognition of wrongdoing timing or relevance* of the apology), (b) *depends on nature of the apology* (with subcategories for *sincerity, recognition of wrongdoing, remorse, and diplomacy*), (c) *depends on acceptance* of the apology by the aggrieved nation (with a subcategory for *forgiveness*), (d) *depends on further action* (with subcategories for *actions speak louder than words, change behavior/respect and tolerance/positive outlook, and material reparations*), and (e) *good beginning only*.

Circumstances. Some responses said that whether an apology makes a difference or not depends on the *circumstances* associated with either current or past events. At an additional level of specificity, responses could be coded into a subcategory based on whether the circumstances that matter are those regarding the *severity of the wrongdoing* by the offending country or whether the *timing or relevance* of the apology is seen as crucial. An example of a response falling into the *severity of wrongdoing* subcategory indicated that the effectiveness of apology “depends upon the damage caused by the invading country.” Responses focusing on *timing and relevance* often indicated that apology will not lead to reconciliation because too much time has passed between the offending action and the apology—perhaps because those responsible for the wrongdoing are dead or because those who are apologizing are the descendants of those who committed the wrongdoing and not the wrongdoers themselves. Responses in this subcategory may also say more generally that too much time has passed for an apology to be appropriate or effective. Examples of such responses include “in the long run, the citizens of that country cannot be blamed for something that happened in the past”; “That would be difficult because it may happen that the apologizing political leader would not be the same person who

ordered the war/colonization. In that case the apology is not really authentic"; and "an apology now from people who had nothing to do with it would be a meaningless gesture."

Nature of the Apology. Another *depends* category is for responses suggesting that the effectiveness of apology depends on is the *nature of the apology* that was offered. For example, some participants focused on the *sincerity* of the apology. Examples include "If this apology is sincere, then it will help with morale; it will not work if it is done so out of obligation"; "I would think so. As long as it doesn't come across as condescending"; "It depends upon the sincerity of apology"; and "provided the apology is sincere." Other responses highlighted the importance of *recognition of wrongdoing*. Examples included "Reconciliation works better when one party does admit wrongdoing" and "if the governor realizes that was wrong, an apology is possible." A third subcategory in the *nature of apology* category indicated that for an apology to be effective, it must involve an expression of *remorse*. Examples included "a show of good faith and remorse is priceless." Finally, there was a subcategory for responses stating that to be effective, apologies must be *official*—either made by official state diplomats or other officials, delivered by public figures or written up officially as peace treaties. Examples include "Diplomatic apologies produce monumental progress" and "if made by the head of state in front of the media."

Depends on Acceptance. The third major *depends* category applied to responses holding that the effectiveness of apology could depend on whether or not the offended country accepts the apology. Examples include "if accepted" and "The apology can reconcile a country; you must have the humility to accept." This category included a *forgiveness* subcategory for responses saying that in order to lead to reconciliation, the country to whom the apology is offered must forgive the offender. Examples include "The country may not want to forgive" and "Yes, but it takes a lot to forgive."

Depends on Further Action. Another *depends* category suggests that whether or not apology is effective

at leading to forgiveness depends on the presence of *further action*. Responses in this category say that although apology can be helpful, the previous aggressor needs to take additional action. An example of a response coded at the most general level in this category is "It takes more than an apology to fix something that horrible that was done to the invaded country." This category included several subcategories for more specific forms of recommended action. One more specific subcategory was *change behavior/respect and tolerance/positive outlook on future*. Responses mentioning ideas of tolerance, equality, and respect were coded into this subcategory. Examples include "It probably wouldn't make much of a difference but it is a start. Treating them as equals and not colonized subjects is more important" and "Rebuilding of the country, true reconciliation and respect for the beliefs and customs of other country." Among the further actions recommended by participants were suggestions that former aggressors provide *material reparations* in addition to the apology.

Good Beginning/Only One Step. Finally, responses in the *good beginning/only one step* category look positively on apology, saying that it can help, but also indicate that it is only the beginning of what needs to be done if reconciliation is to be achieved. Examples include "An apology is a start, but more is needed" and "A simple apology is a first step to reconciliation."

Responses in the *takes time* subcategory suggested that although apology helps, once an apology is given, a passage of time is necessary before reconciliation will be able to take place. An example is "improve maybe, but it takes time."

Yes/Agreement Categories

The second major group of categories was for responses indicating that "Yes," apology leads to reconciliation. There were three major agreement categories: (a) *general nonspecific agreement*, most of the responses coded into this category consisted simply of the "Yes"; (b) *yes, apology leads to healing* (with subcategories for *healing relationships* and *restoring dignity*); and (c) *apology is not only effective, but necessary*.

Healing. A good example of a response with several units codable for *healing* is “Honest acknowledgement and acceptance of one’s own responsibility is essential for true healing of the body, mind, and spirit to take place. It is important to remember that healing is not complete until all ‘levels’ of a being are cleared and healed.” Responses in the *repair relationships* subcategory refer specifically to the role of apology in repairing the relationship between two countries, for example, “Yes, a heartfelt apology is a good start toward peaceful relations.” Responses in the *restore dignity* subcategory say that apology is effective because it serves to rebuild the dignity of one or both countries involved. Responses coded into this category included “The support or destruction of dignity is a large factor in conflict, and such an apology would serve to restore dignity to the controlled party.”

Necessary. The second agreement category was for responses stating that apology is not just helpful, but a necessity, for example, a response stating that to achieve reconciliation, apology is “a necessary step in the process.”

No/Disagreement Categories

One of the major disagreement categories applies to responses asserting that a role for apology in leading to reconciliation is *not possible*. Responses in this category often say that such a role might work in a perfect world, but not in the world we live in, or that economics matter more than apology. Responses coded into this category included “It does not matter that much. A superpower will not apologize and the smaller country needs the other’s country’s business to stay afloat. Economics takes that one” and “An apology is nice, but it will not suffice for the past. This issue is too deep rooted and too complex to solve with a simple apology.”

The second disagreement category states that apology can never work because *wrongdoings are irreversible and apology does not erase the past*. Responses in this category included “Reality check—Hi! I just killed, maimed, destroyed a goodly portion of both your people and your

natural resources—golly gosh I am sorry—let us be friends now,” “I’m sorry won’t bring dead, innocent victims back to life,” “An apology does not reverse the long-standing effects of invasion or colonization!” and “The dead cannot be brought back to life.”

The third of the disagreeing categories applied to statements that while countries may forgive, they do not forget. Responses in this category mention that while countries might officially forgive each other, the people will never forget the wrongdoing that has been committed and may never lose their anger. Examples included “countries may forgive but don’t forget” and “The damage will never be forgotten.”

Responses in the fourth category state simply that *words do not matter* and can never change anything. Examples include “words don’t mean much in politics, either on paper or spoken” and “Saying sorry is like trying to take your actions back through words. With something as serious as invasion, sorry does nothing to help the people rebuild their society.”

The fifth category reflects the idea that *actions speak louder than words*. To distinguish this category from the *depends on further action* category, coders were instructed that responses simply stating that words or apology does not matter were coded here, while responses suggesting positive steps on behalf of reconciliation were coded into that *depends* category. Responses in this category often used the exact words “actions speak louder than words.”

The next category was for responses asserting that apology is *not necessary*. Examples included “an apology is not really necessary. There’s a lot more of other things to do for reconciliation. Asking for an apology is somewhat like regretting what they have done and what the country has become,” “European (Western) colonization of the so-called third world brought nothing but advantage and progress to those countries. There is therefore absolutely NOTHING to apologize for in this respect,” and “It was the abdication of colonial responsibility of the great European imperial powers which was reprehensible however, as this has caused escalating decline and chaos throughout the third world—as recent events in Pakistan and Kenya have so well illustrated. It is this

abandonment of the peoples of the third world which we should apologize for!”

The final disagreement category is for responses claiming that there are *negative consequences* of apology. For example, one participant said, “What a lot of Bullshit. An apology will only lead to litigation following rejection of compensation claims. Maybe the Britons should sue the Romans?”

In addition to the three main categories, coders were instructed to note the presence of *historical references*. Responses coded into this category this way mentioned references to historical examples both of countries that have committed wrongdoings and countries that have apologized. To be coded into this category, responses had to specifically reference an example of an apology or failure to apologize from a country, group of people, or incident. One codable unit could fall into both one of the above three major categories and be a historical reference. Historical references were further divided into two categories—*positive*, for historical references that specified cases where apology had been helpful or effective in the past, or *negative*, for historical references that said that it had not. Some *positive historical references* included “It has been proven in Europe with their former colonies” and “The relationship between India and Pakistan now in comparison to immediately after the partition. There’s more peace between the two nations.” An example of a *negative historical reference* can be seen in the following response: “An apology may be the start, but what are they going to do to reconcile the situation? *That’s just like slavery in the US*. Just because the white people said their sorry, that doesn’t not make me forget everything and even began to think that from now on we are operating on a clean slate.”

Very few responses were *uncodable* based on this system.

Reconciliation Coding Manual

A second coding manual was designed to categorize the qualitative responses to the PAIRTAPS item “What steps or factors are necessary to make an apology successful in achieving reconciliation

between the countries?” As with the apology coding system, each response was segmented into codable units, and each codable unit was given only one code, with the exception that both a major thematic category and a historical reference could be identified. The apology coding manual was used as a reference in creating the reconciliation coding manual, as there were many nearly identical themes across items; however, the use of grounded theory methodology led to some changes in the major categories and subcategories. (See Table 22.2 for summary of coding categories and subcategories.)

Three groups of coding categories emerged in the analysis of the reconciliation responses: (a) responses that said that reconciliation was achievable after an apology, (b) responses that said apology would not lead to reconciliation, and (c) responses stating that the participant did not know whether apology would increase the likelihood of reconciliation.

Reconciliation Is Achievable Categories

Among the responses indicating that apology can lead to reconciliation, six major categories emerged: (a) the *circumstances* of an apology, (b) the *nature* of the apology, (c) the *acceptance* of an apology, (d) *interpersonal/psychological* factors, (e) the necessity of providing *goods or services*, and (f) a *change in behavior* of the former aggressor.

Circumstances. Responses were assigned to this major category if they linked the success of an apology to current or past circumstances seen as relevant to the apology. An example included “It depends on the countries that will try to reconcile.” The circumstances category had two subcategories: *severity of wrongdoing* and *passage of time*. Responses in the *severity of wrongdoing* subcategory indicated that whether or not an apology can lead to reconciliation depends on the severity of the wrong that was done or suggested that if the wrongdoing was too severe, apology will not work. Examples of *circumstances* that would support the achievement of reconciliation included “If the conflict is not very serious” and “Depends upon the reason of invasion and the

Table 22.2 Coding system: steps to reconciliation

I. Reconciliation is achievable categories and subcategories
A. Circumstances
1. Depends on severity of wrongdoing
2. Depends on passage of time
B. Nature of apology
1. Sincerity
2. Recognition of wrongdoing
a. Official public remembrance
3. Remorse
4. Official diplomatic/treaty
a. International supervision
b. International trial
C. Acceptance
1. Forgiveness
D. Interpersonal/psychological
i. Repair relations
ii. Understanding/tolerance/respect
iii. Faith/prayer
E. Provide goods or services
i. Rebuilding
ii. Education
iii. Money
iv. Land
v. Prisoners
vi. Democracy
F. Follow through on apology/change behavior
i. End current conflict
ii. Return rights/sovereignty
iii. Initiate positive actions
iv. Don't go back on apology
v. Sustain nonaggressive behavior
II. Reconciliation is unachievable categories and subcategories
A. Impossible
B. Irreversible wrongdoing
1. Only works superficially
C. Realism
a. Sign of weakness
b. Victims want revenge
III. Don't know

damage caused by the invading country.” Responses in the *passage of time* subcategory said that it is important to let time pass or that the steps to be taken to achieve reconciliation depend on timing. Responses in this category included “it’s important to wait for time to pass.”

Nature of Apology. The second major achievability category, *nature of apology*, applies to responses indicating that whether or not apology can lead to reconciliation depends on the manner in which the apology is given. Responses in the *sincerity* subcategory refer to the fact that to be effective, an apology must be sincere. Examples included “Be sincere and not fake apology” and “It has to be sincere.” Responses in the *recognition of wrongdoing* subcategory hold that for an apology to be effective, the country that is apologizing must admit and recognize that they committed a wrongdoing. Examples include “Reconciliation works better when one party does admit wrongdoing” and “Recognize own mistakes.” Some responses took this argument one step further and said that *official public remembrance* (e.g., a public memorial or establishment of a memorial day) is necessary. Responses that were coded into the *remorse* subcategory expressed the idea that in order for apologies to be effective, the former aggressors must feel and express remorse over what they have done; as one participant said, “A show of good faith and remorse is priceless.” Finally, responses in the *diplomatic/treaty* subcategory state that a diplomat, state official, or official state institution must make the apology or that an official treaty must be signed. Any response specifically stating that an apology must be written or specified that the apology must be public or identified a specific public official to make the apology was coded into this subcategory. Examples include “Each country should sign a treaty,” “he president has to come to the country that was invaded and offer a formal apology to the people of that beleaguered country,” and “A formal apology should be given by the head of state to the head of state in public.” The *diplomatic/treaty* subcategory included another more specific subcategory, *international supervision*, for responses indicating that an apology must not only be diplomatic but also be recognized internationally through a treaty, contract, or media supervision. Examples are “Commitment to peace relations with that country (the victim) throughout history according to an international contract” and “A formal apology given by the head of state to the head of state in public covered

by the media across the globe.” There were also coding criteria for another sub-subcategory, *international trial*, for responses asserting that an international trial is a necessary step toward reconciliation. One such example is “That the reconciliation between countries should not be talk and not ink on paper, and the trial (court trial) for them should be international and entered by great countries (supervised by superpowers).”

Acceptance. The third major achievability category is *acceptance* and applies to responses linking the effectiveness of apology to the way in which it is received by the offended country.

Specifically, responses in the *acceptance* category state that in order to reconcile, the invaded/wronged country must accept the apology made by the country at fault. An example includes “The state that receives the apology needs to accept the apology.” When the responses argued that not just acceptance but also forgiveness by the wronged country was necessary, they were coded into the *forgiveness* subcategory. Examples include “Only mutual forgiveness and trust! How I wish these were possible in this greedy world!” and “The understanding and forgiveness of both parts.”

Psychological/Interpersonal Factors. Responses in the *psychological/interpersonal* category indicate that to achieve reconciliation, the former aggressor needs to take additional action of an interpersonal or psychological nature. Responses in the *repair relationships* subcategory state that a country must make an active effort to improve the relations between the two countries in order for reconciliation to occur. Responses in this category may include responses that generally describe an increased willingness of two countries or other actors to communicate with each other, such as “dialogue” or “negotiations,” and “to produce a willingness to negotiate on both sides.” Responses in the *understanding/tolerance/respect* subcategory emphasize understanding or tolerance between the countries and other intangible, positive feelings that must occur, such as empathy and respect. Examples include “Understanding between

countries, understanding between people,” and “understanding and forgiveness on both parts.”

Provide Goods or Services. Many of the achievability responses indicated that in order to achieve reconciliation, a country must provide concrete support to the nation it had aggressed against. One example was “There should be practical things they should do. For example, if treasures have been stolen, the aggressive country should return them and rebuild what they destroyed.” This *provide goods or services* category has several subcategories, depending on which goods and services were mentioned by respondents. Responses in the *rebuilding* subcategory state that in order for reconciliation to occur, a country must actively attempt to rebuild the country it has caused harm to, such as “Do something for the people that were wronged. Build up the society again and the infrastructure of the government.” Responses in the *education* category state that in order for reconciliation to occur, there must be education, either about the conflict that is being resolved or general education provided by the offending country to the one they have wronged. Some examples include “The apology needs to entail a tangible prize. For example, better education and more opportunities to live a better life” and “An extending of an olive branch. An invitation for cultural exchange. An opportunity for education, less fear, diplomacy.” Responses in the *money* subcategory emphasized the importance of fiscal aid to the victimized country. Examples include “Provide financial retribution for the losses it (the aggressor state) caused” and “There should be steps for remediation, such as scholarships/funds for the abused parties.” Example of responses in the *land* subcategory included “ensure the respect of the body by land” and “Return the invaded lands,” and examples in the *prisoners* subcategory included “the return of war prisoners.” Finally, an example of responses in the *democracy* subcategory suggested that the aggressor “give the country’s rule to the public.”

Follow Through/Change Behavior. The final major category for responses suggesting necessary

steps in the process of achieving reconciliation following apology was *follow through/change behavior*. Response in this major category states that the aggressor must not only apologize but must also take actions, not go back on the promises they have made, and not transgress against the other country again in the future. This category had several subcategories, depending on the specific behavioral changes recommended by respondents. For example, responses in the *end current conflict/return rights/sovereignty* subcategory specify that the offending country must ensure that the current conflict ends. For example, they may specify that troops currently stationed in the offended country should be removed or that rights should be returned to the people from whom they were taken away. Responses that mentioned sovereignty were also coded into this subcategory. One example states that reconciliation can be achieved if the aggressor “removes his forces away from the country.” Responses in the *initiate positive actions* subcategory suggest that in addition to apologizing, the offending country must also take initiative in keeping peace between the two countries. Examples included “taking initiative and to show good intention, “respect, initiative, appreciation.” Responses in the *don't go back on apology* subcategory emphasize the importance of both countries following through and not breaking the terms of agreements reached. Responses in this subcategory included “does not go back on his apology.” Finally, responses in the *sustain nonaggressive behavior* subcategory say that the offending country must not transgress against the other country in the future. Responses in this subcategory such as “The country must measure up to its apology and should not repeat it again (the war) with it (this country) or another” have more of a long-term perspective than responses in the *don't go back on apology* subcategory.

Reconciliation Is Unachievable Categories and Subcategories

There were three major categories for responses indicating that reconciliation following apology is unachievable: (a) assertions that such reconciliation

is *impossible*, (b) references to *irreversible wrongdoing*, and (c) statements of political *realism*.

Irreversible Wrongdoing. Responses coded into the *irreversible wrongdoing* category included “There cannot be a reconciliation with an enemy that destroyed our country” and “it can never be successful; what is lost is lost and dead people cannot live again.” This *irreversible wrongdoing* category included an *only works superficially* subcategory for responses stating that reconciliation is unachievable because an apology can operate only on a superficial level. Examples include “I do not believe that apology will be useful or will put down what is in the hearts of the innocents who were displaced or orphaned as a result of the aggression, and even if this apology succeeds, it will be on the appearance level only.”

Realism. Responses in the *realism* category claim that reconciliation is unrealistic and therefore impossible. One such example was “mutual forgiveness and trust! How I wish these were possible in this greedy world!” Responses in the *sign of weakness* subcategory suggest that reconciliation is unrealistic because an apology would be seen as a sign of weakness. One example of this reasoning was “Apology will lead to the reacknowledging of the crimes, and it will deepen hatred. Apology is something that the more powerful steps down to the level of the weaker and asks for forgiveness.” Responses in the *victims want revenge* category state that reconciliation is unrealistic because the victims from the country invaded would *want revenge*.

There were few examples of *don't know* responses.

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Kristina Hellqvist, Elizabeth Leembruggen-Kallberg,
Julia König, Mathilde Salmberg, Carla Machado[†],
Michael Corgan, Silja Bara Omarsdottir,
Mariana Barbosa, and Christine Roland-Levy

Europe is a continent that has experienced centuries of wars and conflicts between different states and empires as well as within states, between minorities and majorities, and between rival powers. The words “Reconciliation matters

because the consequences of not reconciling can be enormous” (Haus, 2003, p.1) apply well to European history, where unresolved conflicts have led to conflicts for generation after generation of Europeans. In this chapter, we consider some of the major causes of the cycles of violence that have beset Europe, the nature and goals of reconciliation, and contemporary examples of reconciliation efforts. We also consider the views on apology and reconciliation of ordinary Europeans who completed the Personal and Institutional Right to Aggression and Peace Survey.

K. Hellqvist (✉)

Refugee Affairs, Church of Sweden, Stockholm, Sweden
e-mail: kristinahellqvist@yahoo.se

E. Leembruggen-Kallberg

Webster University, Leiden, Netherlands
e-mail: dr.elisabeth.leembruggen@gmail.com

J. König

Lehrstuhl für Klinische Psychologie und
Psychotherapie, Munchen, Germany
e-mail: koenig.julia@gmx.net; julia.koenig@psy.lmu.de

M. Salmberg

Clinical Psychologist, Washington, DC, USA
e-mail: msalmberg@mail.com

C. Machado

Department of Psychology, Minho University, Braga,
Portugal (Deceased)

M. Corgan

Department of International Relations, Boston
University, Boston, MA, USA
e-mail: mcorgan@bu.edu

S.B. Omarsdottir

Institute of International Affairs and Center for Small
State Studies, University of Iceland, Vesturbær, Reykjavik,
Iceland
e-mail: sbo@hi.is

M. Barbosa

Universidade Catolica Portuguesa, Portugal
e-mail: mbarbosa@porto.ucp.pt

C. Roland-Levy

Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne, Paris, France
e-mail: Christine.Roland-Levy@univ-reims.fr

The Dilemma of the Nation State

Although the Western European nations have been at peace with each other since the end of World War II, they have not been free of violence within their own national borders. For example, it was not until the 20th of October 2011 that the Basque liberation army, known as the ETA, announced that their armed struggle had come to an end and that they would continue their fight by democratic means. The cessation of five decades of violent conflict with 829 deaths was of course welcomed by the Spanish society. But as long as ETA has not handled in their arms, the declaration is not seen as totally trustworthy (Reuters, October 20, 2011).

While the mainstream media give much attention to the threat of Islamic terrorism in Europe, an overwhelming majority of terrorist acts in the region

are due to separatist movements, especially in Corsica (France) and in the Basque region (Spain). Their violence and brutality can by no means be justified, but their rage can to some extent be explained. The ideology of the nation state, which assumes that the political borders of the state coincide with a common cultural identity, and the organizing of Europe according to this logic have had and still have a devastating impact on the European continent. The ideology and structure of the nation state have its roots in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and were more firmly established after the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, largely due to the emerging “pseudoscience” that linked the romantic political philosophies of Rousseau and Hegel to so-called “scientific” history to spur the growth of ethnic nationalism (Geary, 2002, p.13).

Within a historical context of borders that have shifted through centuries of wars, power alterations, and migrations, the ideology of the nation state has led to a perceived need for forced removal or cultural genocide of minorities left on “the wrong side of the border” or minorities without a state, such as the Jewish and Roma minorities in Germany under Nazism. Hitler’s annexation of Austria and the Czechoslovak Sudetenland was purportedly justified by the fact that they were German-speaking areas. According to the same logic, France, after the French Revolution and up till the 1950s, used humiliating practices to abolish regional languages such as Breton and Provençal in favor of French.

Similar policies toward minority languages and cultural traditions were used in many other European states, including Great Britain (Geary, 2002)—not only in relation to the more known situation for Irish in Northern Ireland but also in relation to, for example, Cornish, Scottish, and Welsh minorities. The degrading treatment of the indigenous people, the Sami, in Finland, Sweden, and Norway during the last centuries has led to apologies and efforts at reconciliation; however, there are still many disputes concerning compensation and conflicts over access to land. The unjust and humiliating treatment of the Roma minority throughout Europe continues to be an open wound and represents the most severe human rights violations on the European conti-

nent (Hammarberg, 2011). These wounds that need to be healed, apologies that need to be given, and reconciliation that needs to be achieved are closely linked to conflicting visions of where the borders should be drawn and what the situation should be for ethnic, linguistic, and religious minorities throughout the region.

What Is Reconciliation?

Reconciliation is a fairly new concept in international politics and conflict resolution studies. It is closely linked to the “transitional justice” movement that emerged after the end of the Cold War and enabled democratic processes to emerge in many parts of the world. The concept of reconciliation generated increased interest with the groundbreaking work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) created in South Africa in 1995. Other countries have created similar commissions, spawning both theory and research regarding this approach to reconciliation. However, no standard definition of reconciliation has been adopted.

Much of the vocabulary and theory around reconciliation have doubtlessly religious roots. According to the well-known peace scholar, John Paul Lederach, reconciliation must be comprised of at least four components: truth, justice, mercy, and peace—an insight he had from a reading of Psalm 85, verse 10, where the psalmist portrays a place and time where “Truth and Mercy have met together. Justice and Peace have kissed” (Rigby, 2000, p. 3). At the same time, religion is seen as driving force behind many conflicts. Miroslav Volf (2001), a contemporary theologian who argues that reconciliation is the heart of the Christian faith, suggests that religions can become sources of conflict only when they become primarily a marker of cultural belonging instead of being a living faith. In other words, religions become enmeshed in violence only when they become part of the dilemma of nation-building instead of a source of reconciliation.

Volf (2001) also warns against what he calls “cheap reconciliation,” which he defines as giving up the struggle for freedom, giving up the pursuit of justice, and putting up with oppression. “If we were to pursue such cheap reconciliation, it is clear

that this would amount to the betrayal of those who suffer injustice, violence, and deception” (Volf, 2001, p. 2). On the other hand, Volf also criticizes those who claim that justice needs to come before reconciliation, because “all accounts of what is ‘just’ are to some extent relative to a particular group and therefore invariably contested by rival groups.” He concludes (2001, p. 4):

As in many of our activities, so in the struggle for justice: much depends on the *telos*, on the goal of that struggle. Toward what is it oriented? Is it oriented simply toward ensuring that everyone gets what one deserves? Or is it oriented toward the larger goal of healing relationships? My contention is that it must be oriented precisely toward the latter. The reason is simple. You will have justice only if you strive for something greater than justice, only if you strive after love.

In a similar way, the peace theorist and practitioner Andrew Rigby puts emphasis on the goal of a shared future. “At the core of any reconciliation process is the preparedness of people to anticipate a shared future. For this to occur it requires them not to forget the past as such, but to forgive it, in the sense of freeing themselves from its determining grip” (Rigby, 2000, p. 2–3). He agrees with Volf that one must give up justice claims that imply that the other side should “get what they deserve”: “Unless people manage to forsake their determination to ‘get even’, there can be no new beginning, no transformation of relationships” (Rigby, 2000, p. 2). There needs to be what Lederach calls *mercy*.

Conflict theorist Ian Doucet (1997) defines reconciliation as a set of concrete steps, namely, (1) *acknowledgement*, which includes conflict parties and others (including “bystanders”), taking responsibility for their contributions to what happened and acknowledging the losses suffered; (2) *restitution*, wherein wrongs are corrected, including a fair trial of those guilty, but in the spirit of honesty and forgiveness rather than revenge, and compensation for victims; (3) *political and economic reconstruction*, repairing the damage caused by warfare but also making political and economic changes which address the issues from which the destructive conflict arose; and (4) *reconstruction of relationships*, healing the losses and divisions suffered by families,

communities, and other sectors of society. From this perspective, apology can be seen as one necessary step toward reconciliation, as it is part of the formal acknowledgement of the wrongs that have been made. Doucet places emphasis on trying to repair or compensate for the damage. An apology that makes no efforts to right the wrongdoings could be seen as a “cheap reconciliation.”

Forgetting or Remembering?

Historian Garton Ash (1999) reminds us that reconciliation has not been at the core of European history, even since World War II. Instead, he holds that much of postwar West European democracy was built on a “foundation of forgetting,” including efforts in West Germany in the 1950s to ignore the Nazi past (Garton Ash, 1999, p. 296). He notes that the postwar French Republic was built upon supplanting the painful memory of the Vichy regime’s collaboration with the Nazi occupation. General de Gaulle’s unifying national myth of a single, eternally resistant, fighting France became the prime version of French history. Kurt Waldheim’s Austria was “happily restyled, with the help of the allies, as the innocent victim of Nazi aggression” (Garton Ash, 1999, p. 296).

Dominique Moisi (2011) has pointed out that national repentance for past injustices, rather than collective “forgetting,” is increasingly recognized as important to reconciliation. Even if some politicians still find it embarrassing or irrelevant to apologize for things done in the past, a growing number do recognize that it is healthy for a country to “lift away the carpet of myth and indifference that has covered the dark side of its past” (Moisi, 2011, translation KH). Garton Ash identifies three main reasons why remembering past misbehavior and wrongdoing is important, namely, moral, psychological, and political reasons. All three are clearly spelled out in Germany’s motivation for dealing with the Nazi past (which emerged in the 1960s) and for dealing with East German repression of its citizens during communist rule (which emerged after the fall of the Berlin Wall):

Interestingly, the moral imperative, the commandment to remember, is often quoted in Germany in forms that come from the Jewish tradition: ‘To remember is the secret of redemption’. Then there is the psychological notion, spelled out in an influential book by Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, that it is bad for nations, as it is for individual people, to suppress the memory of sad or evil things in their past, and good for them to go through the hard work of mourning, *Trauerarbeit*. Above all, there is the political idea that this will help to prevent a recurrence of evil. How many times has one heard repeated in Germany George Santayana’s remark that those who forget the past are condemned to repeat it? (Garton Ash, 1999, p. 295)

Consistent with this trend, on July 16, 1995, French president Chirac acknowledged French responsibility for the crimes committed against Jewish citizens during the Vichy regime under Nazi occupation.

Moisi (2011) asks for much more repentance, also in relation to crimes committed by France in Algeria. There is some evidence that the next wave of apologies in Europe may be linked to the colonial heritage and aim at restoring relations with the people who suffered from Western European imperialism and colonialism. Some examples exist already. Resentment over Italy’s misbehavior during its colonial rule in Libya was formally settled with the signing in 2008 of a treaty on “Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation” between Italy and Libya. Italian president Berlusconi apologized in strong words for the ills of his country’s colonialism, returned a stolen statue, and agreed that Italy would make \$5 billion worth of investments in Libya over 20 years (Ronzitti, 2009). Both Silvio Berlusconi and Colonel Muammar Gaddafi have for good reasons recently been forced to leave office, but still it is an interesting example of—if not reconciliation—at least apology and some kind of restitution.

Postwar Reconciliation Between France and Germany

The most consistent effort on behalf of interstate reconciliation after World War II has undoubtedly been between France and West Germany. These

two neighboring states share much history and have fought many wars, often triggered by a spiral of revenge for previous wrongdoings. After the horrors of World War II, the improvement of French-German relations was seen as the key to building peace in Europe. Seung-Hoon (2008) reminds us of the fact that the Franco-German reconciliation was facilitated by international circumstances. Apart from ensuring no more war between the two states, it also aimed at securing Europe in an anti-Soviet alliance. The US Marshall Plan for Western European countries was another decisive external factor that pushed France and Germany to cooperate, since both countries were completely devastated. Or, as described by journalist Guy Lebègue, “Facing the threat of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, West Germany sought national security through re-integration into Western Europe, while France sought re-establishment as a Grande Nation” (Lebègue, 1992).

The new friendship between France and Germany was consolidated through various treaties, the first one being the Élysée Treaty, signed by Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer on January 22, 1963, containing a number of agreements for joint cooperation. The treaty was followed by the Schuman Declaration of 1950 and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of 1951, which also included Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. There have always been strong convictions behind the new alliance between Germany and France, but as pointed out by Seung-Hoon (2008), there are also pragmatic reasons behind the union. By engaging Germany in the European project, France was able to control German growth, while for Germany the reconciliation with France was the only way to find the “right” place in Western Europe without endangering its security. The economic cooperation between France and Germany has been accompanied by equally important efforts for cultural exchange and mutual learning—for example, joint schoolbook commissions, youth exchange, joint university programs, and the establishment (in 1992) of the French-German cultural TV channel Arte. Strong personal alliances have been another trademark of the French-German cooperation.

The horrors of World War I have also been part of the traumatic past that needed to be addressed by the two states. In 1984, the leaders of France and Germany, President François Mitterrand and Chancellor Helmut Kohl, chose the site of the 1916 battle of Verdun for a symbolic day of reconciliation. 2009 was the first year that a German leader, Andrea Merkel, attended the annual remembrance ceremony in Paris, where she spoke of the importance of reconciliation (New York Times, November, 11, 2009).

The Role of the Civil Society

Many scholars point to civil society as a key player in efforts toward reconciliation between previously warring groups. There were numerous peace movements born in Europe after World War I, which gained strength after World War II. Many of the movements had the simple aim of bringing together people that had been fighting each other. The International Fellowship of Reconciliation, founded in 1920, and the Pilgrims of San Francis, founded in 1927, anchored reconciliation in religious understanding. Others, such as Service Civil International (founded in 1920), have adopted a more practical approach, focusing on bringing together people doing manual reconstruction work as an exercise in peace and democracy. Research assessing the contributions of these movements to improved relationships among the European states in the decades after World War II is lacking, but it is quite reasonable to assume that this way of bringing former enemies together has played a significant role.

Germany Dealing with the Legacy from Nazism

The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's emphasis on reconciliation has been viewed as markedly different from the approach taken by the Nuremberg Trials after World War II and other denazification measures.

At the same time, South Africa, as well as other countries trying to come to terms with dark chapters in their histories, has been clearly inspired by West Germany's model of dealing with Nazism after the Nuremberg Trials, mostly beginning in the 1960s. However, immediately after the war, there was little recognition of national wrongdoing in Germany. When Germany's evangelical churches (EKD) published the *Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt* three months after the end of the war, the Declaration was viewed by many, despite its vague formulations, as adding to the humiliation of Germany and as betraying German interests. "What was inescapable was a growing sense of German Protestant victimhood—yes, Jews were victims, but so were German Christian" (Hockenos, 2004, p. 52–53). Responding to a demand from Israel for reparations, Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the German Federal Republic from 1949 till 1963, acknowledged that unspeakable crimes occurred against the Jewish people under National Socialism, but held that most Germans were not involved in the crimes and that many underwent considerable risk to help Jews. He acknowledged that Germany needed to make "moral and material amends," but his speech was viewed as failing to meet the criteria for a true apology (Lind, 2008). As Freimüller (2007, para. 6) has put it: "As West Germany experienced its economic miracle, the mood was in favor of rehabilitating those who had been convicted, of effectively discontinuing the process of legal action, and of keeping silent about the past." However, with time and with greater knowledge of the horrors of the Third Reich, this resistance to facing up to the Holocaust would change.

In the 1960s, radical youth movements in Germany spoke out against the silence of the ruling elite and clearly contributed to West Germany's progress in coming to terms with and facing the consequences of its past (Garton Ash, 1999, p. 299). In particular, the first Auschwitz trial (1963–1965) was widely perceived as a kind of turn. According to Mayerhofer (2009, para. 9), "the shocking eye-witness accounts and the great media echo ensured that, two decades after the war, the Federal Republic intensely discussed for

the first time the magnitude of Nazi crimes, their pre-conditions and their consequences.” German churches, which for the most part had shown little resistance to Nazism during the war, also contributed to this recognition process, especially through a renewed radical theology of internationalism and nonviolence in the protestant churches (Panzer, 2011).

According to Garton Ash, Germany has come to develop a *Deutsche Industrie Normen*—a German industrial standard—in “coming to terms with the past” (Mueller, 2010). In German, this process is called *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* and “refers to all judicial, scholarly, public and private, and legislative and administrative measures adopted to treat the National Socialist dictatorship and its crimes” (Mayerhofer, 2009).

East Germany underwent quite a different process. In the first years after the war, during the Soviet occupation of Eastern Germany, Nazi offenders were tried and imprisoned more frequently than in the western parts of Germany, a process that continued during the first year of German Democratic Republic (GDR) rule (Mc Adams, 2001). This policy, however, quickly shifted into one of neglect and distortion of history. Quoting Jeffrey Herf, McAdams stated that “by the time German unity was restored, commentators could contend that few of the GDR’s citizens had developed even the most rudiment vocabulary for conceptualizing their nation’s involvement in the atrocities of National Socialism” (Mc Adams, 2001, p.5).

Vergangenheitsbewältigung has since the 1970s meant extensive research, state-sponsored political education, school curricula putting strong emphasis on education around the Holocaust, and vast media coverage also in popular media—beginning with the American TV series “Holocaust—the Story of the Weiss Family” first broadcasted in Western Germany in 1979 (Mayerhofer, 2009). Also in philosophy and literature, the theme of dealing with the past has been a strong current with influential authors such as Günter Grass and Siegfried Lenz. There have also been numerous erections of public monuments to Holocaust victims, and many former concentration camps have been turned into

memorials and museums. Focusing on the role of the churches during and after the holocaust, Barnett (1998, p. 1) comments:

The early statements were vague, often referring only to the Churches’ general lack of decisiveness in opposing Nazism. More recently, however, the Christian Churches have been far more specific – recognizing that they not only failed to resist Nazism, but actually helped prepare the way for the mass destruction of Europe’s Jews through centuries of proselytization, attacks on Judaism, and tacit or overt support for pogroms and other anti-Jewish violence.

In addition to this increasing recognition of guilt, there are also examples of restitution and compensation. For example, in order to compensate slave laborers exploited in Germany during World War II, the German government and participating German corporations agreed in December 1999 to contribute the equivalent of \$5.2 billion into a fund called “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future.” The foundation also seeks to compensate for Nazi wrongdoings in other European countries.

Nevertheless, there are still controversies around the past and how to best deal with it, also in Germany. Which might be a health sign, as pointed out by Jan-Werner Mueller (2010):

Remembrance can degenerate into a routine, and consensus about the past is not necessarily a good sign. Many observers rightly concluded that continuous debates – including harsh, personalised controversies – were key to the success of coming-to-terms with nazism in particular. The real Holocaust memorial in Berlin might not be the physical entity designed by architect Peter Eisenman, but the long-lasting, deeply self-searching discussion that preceded its construction.

Civil Wars and Dictatorships

The traumas on the European continent are not limited to wars between states. There have been devastating civil wars as well as harsh dictatorships for long periods during the twentieth century. In Germany, the word *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* has also come to refer to how to deal with the dictatorship in former GDR and particularly with the archives of Stasi. The kind of dictatorships that

ruled communist Eastern Europe is however much more difficult to handle with truth and reconciliation commissions, since the repression involved almost everyone. According to Garton Ash (1999, p. 301–302),

Society was kept down by millions of tiny Lilliputian threads of everyday mendacity, conformity and compromise. This is a point Vaclav Havel has constantly stressed. In these late or post-totalitarian regimes, he says, the line did not run clearly between “Them” and “Us”, but through each individual. No one was simply a victim; everyone was in some measure co-responsible.

Nevertheless, Germany has to some extent managed to confront the communist past of former East Germany in a disputed but still respected way.

Spain is an example of a country that only recently is trying to come to terms with a civil war that ended more than 70 years ago and a dictatorship that is also fairly distant. The Spanish Civil War was fought between the years 1936 and 1939 and led to the victory of General Franco, who was the dictator of Spain until his death 1975. Death totals during the war remain debated, but there is a consensus that the loyalist side killed many more than the republican side; in total, approximately 200,000 or 300,000 died during the war. Yet after Franco’s death and the transition to democratic rule, there was no purge but rather an exercise in collective amnesia. As described by Omar Encarnación (2008, p. 8),

The aptly named *Pacto del Olvido* (Pact of Forgetting or Pact of Oblivion), an agreement between the parties of the right and the left, institutionalized collective amnesia about past political excesses, including the mass killings of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) and the repression of the Francoist era (1939–1975). This unwritten pact precluded any formal treatment of the past, and as a result there would be no transitional justice in Spain’s passage from dictatorship to democracy, an anomaly in contemporary processes of democratization.

As fear of reprisals has faded with a more consolidated democracy in Spain, this insistence on amnesia has been changing. During the last decade, especially under Zapatero’s Socialist

government, archaeologists and volunteers have been exhuming the remains of Republicans from unmarked graves—the bodies of most of those who died fighting for Franco were recovered long ago. The independent organization *Asociación para la Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica*, founded in October 2000 after revealing an unmarked grave from the civil war, plays a decisive part in these processes. In 2007, the government passed the Historical Memory Law, granting victims of the war and dictatorship formal rehabilitation and compensation. But after the change of government from Socialist to Conservative (*Partido Popular*) in November 2011, these processes have lost much of their official support. The previous government’s decision to move the body of Franco to a more modest grave and turn the mausoleum in the Valley of the Fallen into a place of reconciliation and remembrance for all victims from the civil war has been retracted. This shows again how sensitive it still is in Spain to try to remember and uncover instead of forgetting. The country has no shared understanding of what happened during the civil war, and (maybe even more importantly) there is no shared understanding of what Spain would have become without Franco—a democratic social, democratic republic, or a communist dictatorship controlled by the Soviet Union?

What is Real Reconciliation?

Although many positive steps have been taken in Spain toward healing the wounds from the violence of ETA, reconciliation efforts are still lacking when it comes to understanding why ETA emerged and to seeing the connection to Franco’s oppression of the Basque people, language, and culture. One day after ETA announced that they were giving up arms, a woman who had lost her husband in an ETA attack 16 years earlier asked, “Who do I need to be reconciled with? I don’t know. We didn’t hurt anybody. There was no confrontation here. The words ‘conflict,’ ‘confrontation,’ ‘reconciliation’ are used – but with relation to whom? Did anybody ask me for forgiveness?”

(Euronews, 2011). One implication of this very personal point of view is that real reconciliation must take place on a much deeper level than speeches about “turning the page.” According to Doucet (1997),

Many of the violent conflicts under way at present involve social and ethnic groups struggling to assure their security within an uncertain environment. Reconciliation often seems the thing most desired and yet most difficult to achieve, both in poor countries and in so-called developed societies. We risk death in order to defend our differences...yet there seems an enormous longing to live in peace with those differences. This suggests that the most fundamental concerns are universally shared ones, which can be used to bridge the differences between cultures, provided the particularity of each culture is recognised and respected.

In a context where apology and reconciliation have come to be recognized as important to the future of Europe, we do well to examine the views of ordinary people from Western European countries around the issues of apology and reconciliation.

Methods

Sample

This sample consists of 226 participants from France, Germany, Iceland, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden (59% females, 41% males). Of this sample, there are 34 participants from France (18 females, 16 males), 65 participants from Germany (40 females, 24 males, 1 unspecified gender), 37 from Iceland (25 females, 12 males), 12 from Portugal (8 females, 4 males), 28 from Spain (16 females, 12 males), and 50 from Sweden (26 females, 24 males). The age range of the sample is between 18 and 76, with an average age of 33. Participants were asked if they have ever served in the military and if they have family members who have ever served in the military. Thirteen percent of the sample reported having served in the military and 60% reported having a family member who served in the military. Additionally, roughly 30% of participants reported having participated in a protest.

Procedure

The primary methodology of this study is based on grounded theory. Grounded theory is the process by which a theoretical framework is generated through the analysis of qualitative data (Glaser, 1992). Participants were recruited through personal networking and via online links on various websites. They were asked to complete the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006) either electronically or in paper and pencil form. This section focuses on responses to the apology items on the PAIRTAPS.

Participants were given two statements: First, “If one country has in the past invaded, colonized, or exercised control over the governmental affairs of another country, an apology by the invading/colonizing/controlling country can improve the chances for reconciliation between the countries.” Participants rated on a 7-point Likert scale their level of agreement with the above statement (1 meaning “totally disagree” to 7 meaning “totally agree”) and were then asked to explain their reasoning for the rating. Second, the participants were asked, “What steps or factors are necessary to make an apology successful in achieving reconciliation between the countries?” The qualitative responses were then coded using the Apology Coding Manual.

Can Apology Lead to Reconciliation?

The Apology Coding Manual and Procedure

There are three main sets of categories and subcategories for responses to the apology item: (1) an effective apology *depends* on the situation, (2) *yes/agree*, apology improves the chances of reconciliation, and (3) *no/disagree*, apology does not improve the chances of reconciliation. Each of these categories is broken down further into subcategories.

The *depends* group has seven categories: (a) *may be possible* (e.g., it cannot hurt or is worth a

try), (b) *depends on circumstances* (e.g., the severity of wrongdoing or relevance/timing of the apology), (c) *depends on the nature* of apology, (d) *depends on acceptance* by the offended country, (e) *depends on further action* (e.g., a positive change in the countries' relations or material reparations), (f) recognition that apology is only the *first step* toward reconciliation, and (g) recognition that for an apology to be effective, it *takes time* before reconciliation can occur. Many of the listed depends categories include subcategories.

The second major set of categories apply to the *yes/agree* responses indicating that apology does lead to reconciliation. There are two main *yes/agree* categories: (a) apology leads to *healing* and (b) apology is *necessary* for reconciliation to occur.

Responses in the final major set of categories *no/disagree* provide arguments as to why apology will not lead to reconciliation. There are seven *no/disagree* categories: (a) it is simply *not possible* for apology to lead to reconciliation; (b) an apology does not erase the past because *irreversible wrongdoings* were committed; (c) while countries *forgive, they don't forget* past wrongdoings; (d) *words don't matter*, thus, an apology is an ineffective method to achieve reconciliation); (e) *actions speak louder than words*; (f) apology is *not necessary* for reconciliation; and (g) an apology may have negative *consequences*. For a more detailed description of apology coding procedures, see Chap. 22, the introductory method chapter for this section.

Response Distribution for the Apology Coding Categories

About 70% of all the responses to the apology item were coded into one of the *depends* categories. Additionally, nearly 10% of all responses stated that an apology *would* lead to successful reconciliation. On the other hand, roughly 13% of the responses to this item showed reasoning that suggested an apology *would not* lead to reconciliation between the countries. Six percent of all responses included a historical reference to

countries that have committed wrongdoings in the past.

The most commonly seen depends category, *an apology is only the beginning*, accounted for 20% of all the *it depends* responses. An example of this can be seen in the words of a 20-year-old woman from Germany, "There must be advances taking place so that it will be evident that the past doings are really regretted." The second most common response was that the *country must admit to their wrongdoing*, accounting for 16% of the answers within the *depends* group of categories. An example of this type of reasoning was provided by a 37-year-old woman from Iceland who responded, "It is a ground rule that we apologize to someone if we have wronged them." A third category, *need material reparations in addition to the apology*, made up the third largest portion of the depends responses (11%). A prime example of an answer typical of this category was given by a 53-year-old man from Iceland: "Some sort of reparation needs to be implemented due to the power-thirsty country damaging everything." The rest of the "depends" subcategories did not account for more than 10% of the depends responses.

Of the responses that said that an apology *would* lead to reconciliation, approximately 67% of those incorporated the idea that an apology would *allow the victims to heal*. For example, a 34-year-old woman from Sweden stated, "The road to lasting peace is through reconciliation." The second agreement category was for responses indicating that *the apology itself could repair the relationship*, accounting for 24% of the agreement responses. As a 33-year-old man from Sweden said, "One of the most powerful interpersonal reconciliatory gestures existing is to say I'm sorry. That also applies to societies."

Of the responses coded into the disagreement categories, which stated that *an apology would not lead to reconciliation*, a quarter of the responses were based on the idea that *an apology would never reverse the wrongdoing*. For example, a 32-year-old man from Germany claimed, "It can never make everything right or undo what was done." A second disagreement category, which accounted for 21% of those

responses, was based on the theme that *an apology would lead to negative consequences*. An example of this can be seen in the response of a 26-year-old woman from France, “No, it does nothing but feed the heels of a vicious circle.” Another 18% of the disagreement responses indicated that *words do not matter* and because of that, an apology would not lead to reconciliation. As 19-year-old woman from Germany stated, “words mean nothing. Politicians lie all the time. If you’re sorry, prove it.” The fourth category, which accounted for almost 15% of the disagreement responses, was for responses asserting that *an apology simply would never lead to reconciliation*. For example, a 45-year-old woman from Spain said, “It is as if I would punch you in the face and then tell you I did it because you had a fly on your face. It’s not going to solve anything.” Further examples of responses to the item concerning the possibility of apology leading to reconciliation, along with demographic information, can be seen in Table 23.1.

Exploratory Statistical Analysis

Exploratory chi-square analyses showed several demographic differences in the responses to the apology item. A significantly greater proportion of women than men gave responses that were coded into one or more of the *depends on the situation* categories (i.e., they scored a 1 on the *depends presence* variable). A significantly higher proportion of men than women gave responses that fell into one or more of the *apology does lead to reconciliation* categories. Differences were also noted in respondents who had served in the military versus those who had not. A significantly larger proportion of respondents who had served in the military asserted that an apology *does lead to reconciliation* as compared to those respondents who had not served in the military.

Lastly, chi-square analyses also showed that a significantly greater proportion of respondents who had participated in protests gave responses indicating that *the effectiveness of an apology*

depends on the situation as compared to those who had not participated in any protests.

Table 23.2 presents the percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values for responses to the apology item.

What steps or factors are necessary to make an apology successful in achieving reconciliation between the countries?

The Reconciliation Coding Manual and Procedure

A separate coding manual was used to categorize responses to the reconciliation item, which asked, “What steps or factors are necessary to make an apology successful in achieving reconciliation between the countries?” The three major sets of coding categories are (1) reconciliation is *achievable* through specific steps, (2) reconciliation is *unachievable*, and (3) the respondent *doesn’t know* how to achieve reconciliation.

If a response indicated that reconciliation is *achievable*, it was then put into one of six categories specifying necessary factors: (a) *depends on the circumstances*; (b) depends on the *nature of the apology* (e.g., sincerity, remorse, or recognition of past wrongdoings); (c) depends on the *acceptance* of the apology from the wronged country; (d) depends on interpersonal or *psychological* characteristics or actions such as repairing relationships, tolerance/respect, or faith and prayer; (e) necessitates *providing goods or services* to the offended country; and (f) requires a *change of behavior* on the part of the offending country. Assertions that reconciliation is *unachievable* were coded into two categories: reconciliation is (a) impossible due to *irreversible wrongdoings* and (b) reconciliation is *unrealistic*.

Response Distribution for the Apology Coding Categories

About 95% of the responses to the reconciliation item recommended steps that could potentially lead to reconciliation. Responses coded for *the*

Table 23.1 Examples of responses to apology increases chances of reconciliation

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Sex	Response
<i>It depends</i>	68				
<i>Nature of apology</i>	16(24)				
Recognition of wrongdoing	11(16)	Iceland	41	Male	To acknowledge that you have done wrong is a good step to further peace negotiations
		Spain	51	Female	We must recognize the mistakes and try to correct them and ask for forgiveness for the harm caused
		Spain	23	Female	...what is important is to be [a]ware of the mistakes committed in the past
<i>Depends on further action</i>	20(29)				
Need material reparation in addition	7(11)	Spain	27	Male	I don't think that it will help much if it doesn't go hand by hand with real compensations (treaties favoring the economic growth
		Germany	28	Female	It can help but it should be accompanied by paying reparations and aid money!
<i>Good beginning/only one step</i>	14(20)	Germany	25	Female	The first best step is always an earnestly meant apology
		Germany	18	Male	(1) An apology is not enough but it is a step in the right direction. (2) Perhaps if anything else one should render aid relief and or money payments
<i>Agreement</i>	9				
<i>Healing</i>	9				
Repairs relationships	3(24)	Iceland	30	Male	Every effort to gain peace is a good effort
		Sweden	33	Female	One of the most powerful interpersonal reconciliatory gestures existing is to say, "I'm sorry." That also applies to societies
<i>Disagreement</i>	13				
<i>Not possible</i>	2(14)	Spain	46	Female	Excuses to dominate or invade a country can never lead to a pacific resolution
		Iceland	34	Female	An apology is only good to those who do not believe in fundamentalism
<i>Irreversible wrongdoings</i>	3(25)	Germany	32	Male	"It can never make everything right or undo what was done"
		Portugal	26	Male	I think the damage has been done
		Sweden	60	Female	There is no excuse for what terrorists do and they definitely don't want to apologize
<i>Words don't matter</i>	2(18)	France	18	Male	Word don't mean much in politics. Either on paper or spoken
		Sweden	33	Female	An apology alone is meaningless
<i>An apology would lead to negative consequences</i>	3(21)	Germany	30	Female	In my view, there is no other option than apologizing in which the reversing of offenses goes so terribly
		France	26	Female	No, it does nothing but feed the wheels of a vicious circle

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parenthesis) refers to the percentage of responses within the major category

Table 23.2 Apology: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Category	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	X ²
	Male	Female	
<i>Agreement presence</i>	18	7	10.47**
<i>It depends presence</i>	38	79	15.26***
	Military	Nonmilitary	
<i>Agreement presence</i>	18	16	7.53**
	Relative military	No relative military	
<i>It depends</i>			
Change behavior/respect and tolerance/positive outlook on future	7	8	3.43 [^]
	Protest	No protest	
<i>It depends</i>	69	55	26.35***

“Presence” at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories

[^]0.05 < p < 0.10, p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01, ***p ≤ 0.001

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

nature of the apology accounted for 33% of all the responses. About 41% of the responses focusing on *the nature of the apology* emphasized the notion that *the apology must be made with sincerity*. For example, a 35-year-old man from Germany said that apologies need to “come from the heart.” Other responses in this category highlighted the fact that the country must *admit to and recognize their wrongdoing* and that a *diplomat* (26% of the nature of apology category), *state official*, or *official state institution must make the apology* (18% of responses in the nature of apology category). For example, a 29-year-old man from Sweden stated, “It is important that the official apology carries weight, that it is supported by democratically elected politicians and that it comes from the country’s highest leaders.”

An additional 15% of the total reconciliation responses indicated that *along with an apology, another more personal and psychological action needs to be taken*. For example a 30-year-old German woman said “The willingness of both countries to work out the past together and to put this into action” regarding reconciliation.

Another 24% of the total reconciliation responses emphasized the need for the country to

provide concrete support in order to achieve reconciliation. For example, a 23-year-old woman from Germany highlighted the importance of “the willingness of both countries to work out the past together and to put this into action!” Additionally, 19% of the total responses incorporated the idea that *the offending country must follow through on their apology and any promises they have made*. The response of a 58-year-old man from Sweden typified this category when he said, “an apology is a start, but then one has to act thereafter.”

Exploratory Statistical Analyses of Ways to Achieve Reconciliation Following Apology

Exploratory chi-square analyses revealed that although there were no significant differences in responses based on the gender of the participant, a significantly larger proportion of respondents who had served in the military than their military counterparts emphasized that in order to achieve reconciliation, the aggressor *country must admit their wrongdoing*. Exploratory chi-square analyses also showed that a significantly

Table 23.3 Examples of steps toward reconciliation

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Sex	Response
<i>Reconciliation is achievable</i>	96				
<i>Nature of apology</i>	33				
Sincerity	14(41)	Iceland	37	Female	The intentions need to be sincere
		France	21	Female	(1) The apologizing party has to show its sincerity and (2) its will to change offense behavior
		Germany	25	Female	It must, as said, be meant earnestly and the invaded country be ready for reconciliation
Recognition of wrongdoing	8(26)	Germany	32	Female	Actual recognition of guilt /Reconciliation, making things good as much as possible; contact for the people of both countries
		Sweden	21	Female	That the oppressing country admits everything and that nothing is being hid
Diplomatic/treaties	6(18)	France	59	Female	Peace, political and economic agreements...
		Sweden	29	Female	It is important that the official apology carries weight, that it is supported by democratically elected politicians and that it comes from the country's highest leaders
<i>Interpersonal/psychological</i>	15	Iceland	41	Male	(1) Do something for the people that were wronged. (2) Build up the society again and the infrastructure of the government
		Germany	24	Male	A psychological support of the victims
<i>Provide goods or services</i>	24	Iceland	28	Female	Concrete efforts to make obvious wrongs right

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parenthesis) refers to percentages of responses within the major category

higher proportion of participants who had relatives in the military than participants without military relatives indicated that in order for reconciliation to occur, *the offending country must restore freedom to the other country*. Notable differences were also seen in the responses of protestors compared with non-protestors. A higher proportion of non-protestors than protestors indicated that *a state diplomat or official must make the apology on the country's behalf*. Additionally a higher proportion of protestors than non-protestors argued that a country *must give concrete support* in order to achieve reconciliation (Table 23.3).

Table 23.4 presents the percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values for responses to the reconciliation item.

Discussion

The responses in this sample reflect to a large extent the theories around reconciliation presented in the introduction. We can recall John Paul Lederach's notion of reconciliation as comprised of truth, justice, mercy, and peace. Many of the survey responses focused on the need for an apology to really come from the heart, be sincere (truthful) and be accompanied by some kind of restitution and compensation (justice); others indicated that real reconciliation needs the offended country to accept the apology and be ready to look to the future (mercy) and to demonstrate real change in relations and in behavior after the apology (achieve peace). One can also see clear parallels to the model for reconciliation presented by Ian Doucet:

Table 23.4 Prerequisites for reconciliation: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Category	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	χ^2
	Military	Nonmilitary	
<i>Reconciliation is unachievable</i>			
<i>Impossible</i>			
Words don't matter	9	2	3.33 [^]
	Relative military	No relative military	
<i>Reconciliation is achievable</i>			
<i>Follow through apology/change behavior</i>			
Return rights/sovereignty	10	2	8.75
	Protest	No protest	
<i>Reconciliation is achievable</i>			
<i>Nature of apology</i>			
Diplomatic/treaty	12	2	14.11 ^{**}
<i>Follow through apology/change behavior</i>	4	7	3.87 ^{**}

[^]0.05 < p < 0.10, p ≤ 0.05, ^{**}p ≤ 0.01, ^{***}p ≤ 0.001

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

acknowledgement, restitution, political and economic reconstruction, and reconstruction of relationships. The answers appear to reflect well the interconnectedness of the different elements that are all prerequisites for real reconciliation. Respondents who answered that “words don’t matter” or “an apology alone is meaningless” do not necessary mean that apologies are wrong but that an apology is not enough, especially when they do not come from the heart.

Many respondents point to the importance of having the apology come from people in the highest positions who really can be seen as representatives of the state. This is a key feature in all diplomacy between states and can also apply to relations between state actors and minorities when the state has been the perpetrator and oppressed and limited the rights of minorities. Minorities that have engaged in separatist struggles involving terrorist acts, as in the case of IRA or ETA, are less obvious cases. Who should give the apology for innocent killings? Who is the spokesperson of the culminated frustration resulting in violence that is only one expression of the actual terrorist arm? Oppressed minorities need to be able to see their own wrongdoings. An armed group is never “only” a victim, but by nature also a perpetrator—whatever the reasons for the armed struggle might be. These situations are nevertheless not reflected in the

responses to the PAIRTAPS, which focuses more on interstate relations.

In the case of civil wars and dictatorship, likewise not covered in the survey, it is again difficult to say who needs to give the apology since the process of reconciliation only comes after the dictatorship has been overthrown. In the case of Spain, it is obviously a dilemma. Franco is long since dead as are many of the other persons who were in power in that era. One actor that would be able to apologize for its part in the wrongdoings is the Catholic Church in Spain due to its close relation to the Franco regime. But that is not very likely to happen in the near future.

It is interesting to note that participants in the sample with protest experience were more hesitant than the non-protestors to accept apologies. It seems that those who have put energy and work into protests are more likely to ask for concrete evidence of actual changes in attitudes and behavior, maybe with the fear of what Miroslav Volf has defined as “cheap reconciliation.” Just an apology is not enough, from their point of view. There need to be real measures for change and renewed relations as well. There must be an end to oppression and injustices. There needs to be a well-founded feeling that the goal of the apology and reconciliation is—if not love, as Volf suggests—at least peaceful relations and mutual respect.

There is also a difference between participants with military experience, military service, or who have family members with military experience and respondents without military experience either directly or through their relatives. Interestingly enough, it is those with the closer link to military life who express greater hope that reconciliation is possible and that there are no unforgivable actions. Maybe the hope for possible reconciliation in the future is more important when you are closely involved in military action. To imagine that there are wrongdoings that are irreversible in their effects and unforgivable may be less attractive when you are yourself directly involved in military action.

Maybe the answers can be said to reflect an individualistic western view of crime and punishment instead of a view reflecting wholeness and shared responsibility. Rigby (2000, p. 11) reminds us of the contribution from more communalistic cultures when it comes to reconciliation, taking the example from South Africa:

Archbishop Tutu in particular has written and spoken much about the notion of *ubuntu*, the understanding that we are all part of one community, and that by creating a space within which the perpetrators of abuses might rejoin this community, they can be helped to regain something of their lost humanity, and thereby enrich us all through the restoration of social harmony and wholeness.

The European continent certainly needs more of *ubuntu*.

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Apology and Reconciliation in Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Canada, the United States, and Australia

24

John Davis, Carol Davis, Ariel Stone, James Page,
Michael Whitely, and Doe West

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

The United Kingdom (UK) consists of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Great Britain or simply Britain is composed of England, Scotland, and Wales. “The British Isles” refers to Great Britain combined with all of Ireland and a number of small nearby islands. Regional labels that may be confusing to people from outside the

J. Davis (✉)
Department of Psychology, Texas State University,
San Marcos, TX, USA
e-mail: jd04@txstate.edu

C. Davis (Retired)
English Department, Texas State University at
San Marcos, Texas, USA
e-mail: jncdavis@the-cia.net

A. Stone
Department of Psychology, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA

J. Page
Department of Peace Studies, School of Humanities,
University of New England, Armidale, NSW, Australia
e-mail: james.page@une.edu.au

M. Whitely
Educational Psychologist, Kent State University,
Kent, OH, USA
e-mail: mwhitely@kent.edu

D. West
Quinsigamond Community College, Worcester,
MA, USA
e-mail: doewest@aol.com

UK are often important to the individuals within the UK. For this chapter, because Great Britain once colonized Northern Ireland in ways not unlike the colonization of Australia and North America, Great Britain and Northern Ireland are introduced separately and represented by separate samples.

The British Empire: Colonial Dominance and Injustices

In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Great Britain established and ruled an enormous colonial empire, the largest in history for more than a century. It dominated one-fifth of the world’s population by the beginning of the twentieth century and one-quarter of the earth’s land mass. The imperial expansion was motivated in part by economic and trade interests. Elements of the British society achieved great wealth from their overseas colonies. The imperial expansion was also motivated by a kind of missionary zeal based on the belief that parliamentary government and Christianity were superior to all other forms of government and religion. It was the “white man’s burden” to bestow these superior ways on those less fortunate.

It can be argued that British trade, parliamentary government, and Christianity, as well as the English language, have provided unquestionable benefits. At the same time, British insistence on exclusive control of their colonies led to many conflicts, and the supposed benefits were often imposed by force. A number of abuses resulted,

American colonies, participation in the slave trade, exploitation of India, the opium wars in China, and the Boer war in South Africa.

The British colonies in North America were first established in the early 1600s and continued for more than 150 years. Growing resentment among the colonists toward the British efforts to govern and tax the colonists without their consent led to the American Revolutionary War of 1776–1778 and the loss of these colonies. Nevertheless, Britain maintained many other colonies, dominions, protectorates, and territories. During the period from about 1880 to 1930, the British Empire dominated more than 60 colonies including Australia, Canada, India, and New Zealand. During that time, the British Empire occupied and dominated one-fourth of the land area on earth (Rapoza & Stuart, 2009).

After World War II, Great Britain no longer had the resources to maintain its colonial power and the Dominion countries rapidly succeeded in establishing their own political independence. Today most of Great Britain's former colonies are on equal status with their former colonial ruler. In fact, 53 former colonies, now independent states, maintain voluntary links in the Commonwealth of Nations. Because of its links with former colonies and its membership in the Commonwealth, Great Britain is a magnet for a great many immigrants from these former colonies. These immigrants are often not treated as equals, and many minority groups experience negative treatment from the British (Rapoza & Stuart, 2009).

Northern Ireland: War Between Protestants and Catholics

Northern Ireland has experienced centuries of conflict, religious conflict between Catholics and Protestants and political conflict between the English and the Irish. Beginning in the twelfth century, England exerted British rule over Ireland. At that time, both were Catholic. However, in the sixteenth century, King Henry VIII came into conflict with the Catholic Church over his determination to annul his marriage to Catherine of Aragon and to marry Anne Boleyn.

As a result, Henry broke with the Catholic Church and established the Church of England. Although Henry prevailed in England, he met resistance and rebellion in Ireland. Ireland remained largely Catholic, and the religious and political conflicts continue to the present day (Gottfried, 2002). For more details about the historical and political context of the United Kingdom, see Rapoza and Stuart (2009) for perspectives on Great Britain and see Whitely and Linsenmeier (2009) for perspectives on Northern Ireland. Following centuries of armed conflict, Prime Minister David Campbell apologized in 2010 for the “Bloody Sunday” killings of Irish citizens by the British in 1972.

Australia

Displacement and Persecution of Aboriginal People

The history of Australia taught to school children has undergone a dramatic change in the past two decades. For most of Australia's history, children learned that Australia began with the advent of European exploration of that landmass near the end of the eighteenth century (Macintyre, 1999). An Englishman, naval lieutenant James Cook, arrived in 1770 and claimed possession in the name of the British government. The subsequent exploration of the continent and development of English settlements provided the story that most school children learned. When the Aboriginal people were included in that history, they were “a tragic and disturbing presence, victims of the iron law of progress” (Macintyre, 1999, p. 5).

However, before the end of the twentieth century, that history had become untenable. The work of anthropologists and archeologists and actions by the Aboriginal peoples impelled the recognition that Australia had not been an empty continent before the Europeans arrived. Evidence for human presence was firmly established at least as far back as 40,000 years, along with the discovery of Aboriginal culture, oral tradition, and languages. The growing voice and influence of the Aboriginal peoples

is creating a new beginning to Australia's history, one that acknowledges to a greater extent the abuses against the original people of Australia (Macintyre, 1999).

Australian society has only recently begun to come to grips with the reality that war, expropriation, and destruction of Aboriginal families and cultures were central to the European role in the island continent. Not until 2008 did "the Australian parliament finally issue a formal apology to the Aboriginal peoples for the past wrongs committed upon them" (Page, 2009, p. 139).

The long series of events in Australia that culminated in this apology have been described in detail by a number of authors (Loader, 2008; Page, 2009). These events clearly reveal "a dark side" to Australian beliefs about peace and war and suggest an inherent level of denial. There were long, drawn-out wars for the purpose of expropriating land occupied by indigenous peoples. Even worse were massacres, depopulation through disease, and enforced assimilation. Aboriginal children were taken away from their parents. Many Aboriginal people were forced to live on reserves and mission stations.

The major churches in Australia and all of its state governments had previously offered public apologies for these abuses. The voices of the Aboriginal people had been presented in film, verse, and prose. Earlier prime ministers had refused to make a national apology. However, in 2008, newly elected Prime Minister Kevin Rudd led a bipartisan movement for a national apology, and this apology, supported by 70% of the people of Australia, was the first act of the new government. This formal apology had been preceded by a number of official actions that acknowledged Australia's historical abuses of its Aboriginals. The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission of 1997, in its report, *Bringing Them Home*, acknowledged that genocide had been perpetrated on the indigenous peoples (Bretherton & Mellor, 2006). Also, in 1992, the Mabo decision of the High Court of Australia accepted the fact that Australia was not a *terra nullius* (empty territory) when the Europeans arrived (Page, 2009).

Canada

Displacement and Persecution of Aboriginal Peoples

With the advent of European settlers, parallels arose between the events in Australia and those in Canada. As did Macintyre (1999) in writing about Australia, Bumsted (2007) begins his history of the Canadian peoples by noting that earlier accounts had usually begun with the arrival of the first Europeans. First came the Norsemen (Leif Erickson et al.) in the thirteenth century; in the fifteenth century Portuguese fishermen (and likely English fishermen as well) had discovered the plentiful fishing off the Grand Banks of Newfoundland. By 1500, ship design had progressed to a point that made transatlantic voyages possible, and the "ambition to visit new lands was fueled by the surge of intellectual confidence and the explosion of knowledge associated with the Renaissance." (Bumsted, 2007, p. 9).

Bumsted acknowledges that this is a misleading account of Canadian history and that the North American continent had been inhabited by humans for 30,000 years or more. He also points out that the claimed superiority of Europeans over the Aboriginals is highly suspect, considering that the former ate with their fingers, bathed seldom, enjoyed brutal sports such as pitting dogs against bears for a fight to the death, torturing heretics, and burning witches at the stake. As for sanitation, it simply didn't exist.

Early European settlers in Canada coexisted for the most part amicably with the Aboriginals and learned much from them about living successfully in this new land. Europeans, however, brought disease with them, and since the natives had no immunity, their population was severely decimated. Also, once the Europeans were fairly well-established, their preferred lifestyle as compared with that of the Aboriginals caused conflict. Europeans with superior weapons killed large numbers of the natives. By the eighteenth century, Europeans had recognized that they must learn to coexist peacefully with the Aboriginals, whom they now outnumbered. Their proposed solution

was separation—forcing the Aboriginals onto reservations where about half a million “status Indians” live today. An approximately equal number of non-status Indians and Métis live mostly in larger southern cities such as Winnipeg, in conditions similar to those of the poorest underdeveloped countries of the world.

In 1969, “the federal government’s White Paper on Indian Affairs called for the advancement of the individual rights of Aboriginals rather than their collective rights...” (Bumsted, 2007, p. 417). Harold Cardinal, a member of the Sucker Creek Reserve band and president of the Indian Association of Alberta, wrote a caustic book called *The Unjust Society* that became a best seller. Clearly, he was mocking Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s “Just Society” appellation. Cardinal termed the White Paper a program of “extermination through assimilation” and called for the recognition of his people’s treaty and Aboriginal rights that would make them equal to “the other cultural identities of Canada.” (Bumsted, 2007, p.417). In 2008, Canadian Prime Minister the Prime Minister apologized to the indigenous people for the former policy of assimilation resulting in a harmful system of Indian Residential Schools and committed the government to moving towards reconciliation and healing (Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, 2010).

Internment of Japanese During World War II

Another important Canadian apology concerned Canada’s treatment of its Japanese citizens during World War II. After Japanese forces attacked Pearl Harbor, Canadians (especially along the West Coast) feared invasion by Japan and thought Japanese citizens might be spies. Twenty-two thousand Japanese were therefore taken from their homes and interned in prison camps. In the camps, all located within 100 miles of the West Coast of Canada, they were harshly treated and received very low wages.

In 1988, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney signed a Redress Agreement between the Canadian government and the National Association of Japanese Canadians (Bumsted, 2007). The Redress Agreement symbolized the changes in attitudes reached in Canada by the end of the twentieth cen-

ture toward both ethnicity and reconciliation. In 1990, the Minister of State for Multiculturalism and Citizenship sent letters to 20,000 Japanese Canadians enclosing substantial compensation and the Prime Minister’s acknowledgement that the wartime treatment of Japanese Canadians “was unjust and violated principles of human rights as they are understood today” (Bumsted, 2007, p. 514).

United States

Displacement and Persecution of Native Peoples

In attempting to tell the story of humans in America from the beginning, Morison (1965, p. 3) wrote that “the lack of data quickly brings us to a halt.” Nevertheless, he devotes the first chapter of his authoritative history to the many contributions and rich culture of the “Indians” that inhabited America before the European “discovery” in 1492. During early colonial America, the Europeans benefited in many ways from the knowledge and goods provided by the Indians. The colonists and the British vied for allies from among the various Indian tribes during the years leading up to the revolutionary war (Morison, 1965).

However, as the number of European settlers increased in the newly independent United States of America and westward expansion accelerated, the interactions between Europeans and Indians grew more problematic. Interactions between the French and the Indians were mostly on the basis of trade, and the expectations of the two sides must have been fairly compatible. By contrast, interactions between the English and the Indians were often not based on compatible expectations. Although the records of these interactions come from the French and the English (the Indians left no records), it seems that the Indians accepted trading goods such as iron tools and firearms from the English as a form of rent for sharing the land. The English, on the other hand, typically offered trading goods with the intention of claiming possession of the land and wanted to either “civilize” and “convert” the Indians or remove them from the land.

Thus, the incompatibility of the way of life of American Indians and European Americans

resulted in a protracted period of warfare until the Indians were exterminated, removed to reservations, or assimilated. Treaties were made and broken. The homelands and hunting grounds of the Indians became battlegrounds, and the conflicts were pushed inexorably westward. Miners, cattlemen, railroad companies, and settler farmers invaded, fought, and generally prevailed against the Indians. The slaughter of the buffalo, white man's diseases, and the greater numbers and superior weapons of the European Americans were lethal to the Indians.

Today, many American Indians are assimilated into mainstream American culture and are highly successful, yet many remain on reservations. Some of these reservation cultures are strikingly successful, and others are pockets of poverty where the Indians exist in a marginal culture (Bordewich, 1996). The current conditions among American Indians on reservations are often dire (alcoholism, unemployment, high levels of murder and suicide, low levels of school completion).

Slavery of African Americans

In the days of early settlement in the "New World," there was much heavy work to do before crops could be produced. Soon Europeans began importing Negro slaves to undertake the labor that "Indians would not or could not do, and that Europeans were too proud or lazy to do." (Morison, 1965, p. 35). Laws were passed, such as the "black code" of Maryland that made a Negro a slave for life simply because of his color. The importation of slaves kept increasing until, by the time of the Revolution, Negro slaves represented nearly a third of the total population. Slavery was established in every colony. In North and South Carolina, both rice and tobacco required a great deal of labor before they could be marketed—and this was slave labor, with South Carolina becoming the greatest slave-importing colony by the eighteenth century.

Even at this time, however, some slaves were freed because owners felt it was wrong to keep a man in slavery once he had become a Christian (Morison, 1965). As the number of slaves increased, mutiny became more and more frequent,

and various forms of cruelty and terror took place followed by hasty trials and the putting to death of Negro perpetrators. One attempt at a solution sought to return freed slaves to Africa where the system of slavery had always existed but where treatment of slaves was much more humane than it was in the Americas. Finally in 1808, as more and more people saw slavery as untenable, Congress finally ended the African slave trade. After abolition, Blacks began to see themselves as Americans. Their conditions improved dramatically in some parts of the country. In New England, for example, they were now able to vote. In the Midwest, however, many racial restrictions persisted that made the lives of free Blacks precarious. John Malvin, a freeman who migrated from Virginia to Ohio in the late 1820s, said in disappointment, "I found every door closed against the colored man...except the jail and penitentiaries...." (Horton & Horton, 2005, p. 90).

With more and more Blacks becoming free, unrest grew. Whites wanted to deport them, believing that freed slaves made their enslaved brothers more difficult to control. And indeed slave unrest led to continual uprisings that involved killings and created high anxiety among Whites. The many forms of slave resistance finally led to the establishment of the Abolitionist Movement in the 1850s. Abolitionist Harriet Beecher Stowe published *Uncle Tom's Cabin* in 1852, the first book written by a white American to portray a black central character compassionately. The book was an overwhelming success, finally selling over three million copies and becoming the most important book on American slavery in the nineteenth century (Horton & Horton, 2005, p.154).

The climate was now rapidly changing as more and more people saw slavery as a disgrace. Britain outlawed it in the 1830s and fugitive American slaves were then allowed to enter Canada. Then came the Civil War, which created freedom as Blacks fought side by side with Whites. Although at first rejected as soldiers, by the end of the war, 186,000 Blacks had fought in the US Army. Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation finally ended the painful step-by-step process of African Americans to attain their rights. When John Wilkes Booth assassinated Lincoln, Blacks everywhere mourned him.

Although now emancipated, African Americans still struggled against many forms of racial injustice throughout the twentieth century.

In June 2009, the US Senate apologized for slavery, a year after the US House of Representatives had done so. The Senate vote was unanimous, their apology coming one day after *June seventeenth*, the day when word finally reached slaves in Galveston, Texas, that the Civil War and slavery had ended. The resolution adopted by the Senate says that “the legacy of African-Americans is interwoven with the very fabric of the democracy and freedom of the United States” but also recalls that “millions of Africans and their descendants were enslaved in the United States and the 13 American colonies from 1619 through 1865.” Six states (Virginia, Alabama, Florida, Maryland, New Jersey, and North Carolina) had previously apologized for slavery (*The Daily Voice*, June 19, 2009).

Internment of Japanese During World War II

Japanese immigration to Hawaii took place in the nineteenth century, and by 1900, 39.7% of the population was Japanese. These immigrants worked primarily in the sugar plantations. In the last part of the nineteenth century, Japanese immigration to the US mainland was substantial, and from its beginning, intense racial discrimination arose. Prior to 1900, immigrants to California worked primarily in agriculture, at which they were very skilled, so that by 1908 they owned 4% of California’s farmland but produced 10% of its farm products. Japanese-owned businesses also arose during this period. From 1900 to 1907, in San Francisco they grew from 90 to 545 and from 56 to 473 in Los Angeles. Many Japanese moved to other states, such as Washington, Colorado, Utah, and Alaska, where they became commercial fishermen, engaged in sugar beet farming, or were railroad workers (Avakian, 2002).

The Japanese in all parts of the mainland faced racism and discrimination on a daily basis. They were called “Dirty Jap,” etc. Western labor unions led the attacks, calling Japanese “dirty and unhealthy,” declaring that they could not be assimilated and that they lowered the standard of

living because they were willing to work for lower wages than others. In 1905, the Asiatic Exclusion League was formed for the purpose of terminating Japanese immigration. In California, the Alien Land Laws of 1913 and 1920 restricted Asian immigrants from owning or leasing land. Japanese Issei (immigrants) and Nisei (children of immigrants) felt betrayed by these measures but were still determined to prove their loyalty to the United States. Many served in World War I in hopes of attaining American citizenship but to no avail.

After Pearl Harbor, there was swift and fierce reaction against the Japanese living on Oahu in Hawaii. They were accused of espionage and badly treated, though later totally absolved of wrongdoing. On the mainland, Executive Order 9066, signed by Roosevelt, “forced more than 110,000 Japanese Americans to leave their homes and move into one of ten relocation camps.” (Avakian, 2002, p. 126). Here they lived in crowded barracks with a space of 20 × 20 ft allotted to each family. Food was poor and recreational, social, and health facilities primitive.

“Several decades later, America’s Japanese community finally succeeded in obtaining redress for their imprisonment during the war” (Avakian, 2002, p. 144). The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment ruled that their treatment had been unjust and that they were due monetary recompense. In 1988, a formal apology was issued by the government and those who had been imprisoned in the camps received \$20,000 each.

For more details about the historical and political context of the United States, see Soldz and Shalom (2009) for perspectives on European Americans and see Hines and Zaveri (2009) for perspectives on ethnic minorities.

Surveys of Perspectives on Apology and Reconciliation

Sample

A total of 775 participants from Australia, Canada, Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and Great Britain made up the UK/Anglo sample for perspectives on the effectiveness of apology and the steps to reconciliation.

Of these participants, 363 were male and 409 were female. Three participants chose not to report gender. The average age of the participants was 34, ranging from 18 to 86. Participants were also asked whether they had ever served in the military, if they had relatives in the military, and if they had ever participated in a protest. Of participants who chose to respond to these items, 14% reported having served in the military and 86% reported having never served in the military. 68% reported having relatives who had served in the military and 32% reported not having relatives in the military. 39% of participants reported having participated in a protest, while 61% reported having never protested.

Procedure

The coding manual for this study was created using the grounded theory method, a process by which the analysis of qualitative responses provides a basis for the development of a theoretical framework (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The manual was constructed from the responses of an international coding manual sample to the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006). This section focuses exclusively on responses to the apology and reconciliation items.

Participants were recruited through personal networking or via online links to complete the PAIRTAPS, either electronically or in paper and pencil form. Participants were presented with two statements regarding apology and reconciliation. The first statement read: "If one country has in the past invaded, colonized, or exercised control over the governmental affairs of another country, an apology by the invading/colonizing/controlling country can improve the chances for reconciliation between the countries." In response to this item, participants were asked to rate their level of agreement with the statement using a 7-point Likert scale (from 1 meaning "totally disagree" to 7 meaning "totally agree") and to explain why they provided this rating.

The second statement asked participants to respond to the question: "What steps or factors are necessary to make an apology successful in

achieving reconciliation between the countries?" The qualitative responses to the first and second items were coded using the Apology Coding Manual and the Steps to Reconciliation Coding Manual, respectively.

For a more detailed description of the coding manuals and PAIRTAPS, see Chap. 22, the introductory methods chapter for this section of the book.

Apology

Apology Coding Manual

Participants' qualitative responses to the first item (referred to as the apology item) were grouped into three sets of coding categories, reflecting the extent to which they said that (1) the effectiveness of an apology *depends* on the situation; (2) *yes/agree*, apology has the potential for improving chances of reconciliation; and (3) *no/disagree*, apology will not increase those chances. Responses that referred to *negative* or *positive* examples of *historical* incidences of apology were also noted.

Responses stating that the effectiveness of an apology *depended* on the situation were coded into seven categories, based on whether they said a successful apology: (1) *may be possible*; (2) *depends on circumstances* (with subcategories for *severity of the wrongdoing* by the offending country and the *recognition of wrongdoing timing or relevance* of the apology); (3) *depends on the nature of the apology* (with subcategories for *sincerity, recognition of wrongdoing, remorse, and diplomacy*); (4) *depends on acceptance* by the wronged party (with a subcategory for *forgiveness*); (5) *depends on further action* by the offending country (with subcategories for *actions speak louder than words, change behavior/respect and tolerance/positive outlook, and material reparations*); (6) *takes time* to work; and (7) *is a good beginning but only one step* in the reconciliatory process.

Responses stating that, *yes/agree*, apology can lead to reconciliation could be coded into one of two major categories: (a) apology can facilitate *healing*, and (b) apology is not only helpful but also *necessary*. The *healing* category had two subcategories: (a) *repair relationships* and (b) *restore dignity*.

Responses demonstrating the belief that apology *will not* lead to reconciliation were coded into 7 categories: (1) responses stating that reconciliation is *not possible* given the conditions of the world; (2) responses emphasizing *irreversible wrongdoings* and pointing out that apology cannot change the past; (3) responses stating that countries *forgive but don't forget* the offenses of the apologizing country; (4) responses stating that *words don't matter* or (5), similarly, that *actions speak louder than words*; (6) responses indicating that apology is *not necessary*; and, lastly, (7) responses focusing on possible *negative consequences* of apology.

Viewpoints on the Effectiveness of Apology

Slightly more than half of the responses (55%) indicated that whether or not apology is effective *depends on the situation*. Twenty-one percent of responses stated that apology *would not* lead to reconciliation. Only 14% of responses agreed that apology *could* lead to reconciliation.

Of responses emphasizing that the effectiveness of apology *depends on the situation*, the greatest proportion (9% of the entire response set) stated that a successful apology *might be possible*. For example, a 45-year-old woman from Canada gave the response: "An apology goes a long way, and can't hurt the chances for reconciliation." An additional 8% of the total response set indicated that apology is a *good start, but only the beginning* of the reconciliatory process. One 39-year-old man from Australia demonstrated this theme in his response: "It's certainly not the be all and end all, but a public acknowledgement will help somewhat." In a similar line of thought, 6% of all responses stated that successful apology requires *further action*. For example, a 49-year-old man from Australia responded, "an apology might be an easy way out if not substantiated by other acts." Five percent of the total response set indicated that the potential effectiveness of apology *depends on the circumstances*. This theme is represented in a response given by a 45-year-old woman from the USA:

"this is totally dependent upon the circumstances of the conflict, the resolution and how history regards the situation when given the chance to reflect." An additional 5% of all responses emphasized that for an apology to be successful it must contain *recognition of wrongdoing*. For example, a 44-year-old Canadian woman wrote: "Acknowledgment of wrong-doing is a first step in reconciliation. Empathy is a virtue that not enough world leaders possess." More examples of responses in the *depends* category can be found in Table 24.1.

Of responses arguing that apology *would not* lead to reconciliation, the most commonly cited reason (5% of the entire sample) was that reconciliation was *not possible*. For example, a 26-year-old woman from the United States stated, "People will still be hostile towards the invading country." Additional examples from this category are available in Table 24.1.

Exploratory Statistical Analyses

Exploratory chi-square analyses were conducted to investigate possible demographic differences in response patterns. Demographics of interest included gender, military status, having a relative in the military, and having participated in a protest. The chi-square analyses revealed that a significantly greater proportion of participants reporting military involvement than those without military experience gave responses stating that reconciliation following an apology is *unachievable*. In addition, a significantly greater proportion of military participants than civilians gave responses emphasizing the importance of *relevance and timing*, in determining the success of an apology. A significantly greater proportion of participants who did not have relatives in the military than those who reported having a relative in the military gave responses citing at least one of the *depends on the situation* subcategories.

The exploratory chi-square analyses also revealed that a significantly greater proportion of protestors than non-protestors gave at least one response in at least one of the subcategories indicating that reconciliation is *achievable* through

Table 24.1 Does apology increases chances of reconciliation? Examples of responses in the apology categories and subcategories

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Sex	Response
<i>It depends</i>	55				
<i>May be possible</i>	9(17)	Canada	65	Female	It cannot hurt
		USA	18	Male	Obviously this CAN improve the chance of reconciliation, but it is no guarantee
		UK	49	Female	It certainly wouldn't hurt, now would it!
<i>Depends on circumstance</i>	5(8)	USA	20	Female	This can be true in some instances and not in others
		Canada	47	Female	That might help to some extent, but that might depend on the present circumstances
		Australia	22	Male	Individual factors need to be taken into consideration
<i>Depends on nature of apology</i>					
Recognition of wrongdoing	5(9)	USA	22	Female	Reconciliation works better when one party does admit wrongdoing
		UK	51	Male	An apology indicates an understanding or even an admission that a regrettable and/or unwelcome event occurred, and/or that wrong was done. Without understanding, we go nowhere
		USA	25	Female	It is important for "former oppressors" to own up to the actions of their nation. It is empowering for the citizens of the victim nation if the invading/colonizing/controlling nation acknowledge that wrongs have been committed
<i>Depends on further action</i>	6(11)	Canada	68	Male	This must be followed by the right action
		USA	40	Male	Only if the verbal apology is backed by conciliatory, substantive, productive action
<i>Good beginning/only one step</i>	8(14)	Canada	70	Male	Naturally apologizing is the first step to making peace. Then other measures are needed
		Australia	20	Female	An apology isn't much, but, yes, it is the first move toward resolving differences
		USA	18	Male	Words are cheap, but are a start
<i>Agreement</i>	14				
<i>General agreement</i>	9(64)	UK	27	Male	I don't think an apology can ever make things worse so yes
		USA	60	Male	I believe this would be useful
		Australia	23	Female	Saying sorry always helps
<i>Disagreement</i>	21				
<i>Not possible</i>	5 (24)	Canada	46	Male	Who is going to do the apologizing- ever!
		USA	19	Female	I wish an apology would increase the chances for reconciliation, but I don't think it would

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parenthesis) refers to the percentage of responses within the major category

Table 24.2 Apology: percentage of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and Chi-square values

Category	Group 1 (%) ^a	Group 2 (%) ^a	X ²
	Military	Nonmilitary	
<i>Disagreement presence</i>	34	6	74.75***
<i>It depends</i>			
<i>Depends on circumstances</i>			
Depends on relevance/timing	10	3	13.22***
	Relative in military	No relative in military	
<i>It-depends presence</i>	56	63	17.13***
	Protest	No protest	
<i>Agreement presence</i>	25	17	5.35*
<i>Disagreement presence</i>	17	28	11.05***

Note. ^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

* $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.001$

apology. Conversely, a significantly greater proportion of non-protesters than protesters gave responses in at least one of the *unachievable* categories. Chi-square values and demographic proportions are presented in Table 24.2.

Reconciliation

Reconciliation Coding Manual

Participants' qualitative responses to the reconciliation item were coded into three major sets of categories. The first of these had categories for a range of responses stating that reconciliation is *achievable through certain steps*. The second group had categories for responses arguing that reconciliation is *unachievable*. There was also a category for responses indicating that the participant did not know whether or not an apology could lead to reconciliation.

Within the group of responses indicating that reconciliation following apology is *achievable through certain steps*, there were six major categories: (1) *circumstances* need to be ideal (with subcategories for *severity of wrongdoing* or the *passage of time*); (2) success depends on the *nature of the apology* (with subcategories for *sincerity*, *recognition of wrongdoing* or the need for *official public remembrance*, demonstration of *remorse*, and *treaties or apology by a diplo-*

mat or other official person); (3) the apology must be *accepted* by the victimized country (with subcategories for *depends on forgiveness* or *depends on the readiness of the offended country to forgive*); (4) *interpersonal and psychological* actions must be taken (with subcategories for *repairing relations* between countries, working to develop *understanding, tolerance, and respect* and *faith and prayer*); (5) the apologizing country ought to *provide goods or services* to the wronged country (with subcategories for *rebuilding* the country that has been harmed, providing *education*, offering *monetary reparations*, offering *land*, returning *prisoners*, and implementing *democracy*); and (6) *following through in changing behavior* (with subcategories for *ending current conflicts*, *removing all troops*; returning *rights and sovereignty*, *initiating positive actions*, *not going back on their apologies*, and *sustaining nonaggressive behavior*.) For our exploratory chi-square analyses, we included categories 5 and 6 in both the *achievable by certain steps* category and in an additional *practical steps* category.

Responses arguing that reconciliation is *impossible* were coded into two major categories. The first emphasized that reconciliation is impossible because of the *irreversible damage* caused by the offending country (with subcategories for responses stating that apologies *only work superficially* and that reconciliation is an *unrealistic goal*) (with

additional subcategories for *sign of weakness* and desire for *revenge*).

Viewpoints on Reconciliation

A great majority (90%) of the responses endorsed the belief that reconciliation is *achievable through certain steps*. Only 3% of responses contained statements that reconciliation is *unachievable/impossible*. Therefore, responses in this category are not discussed in this section.

Of responses stating that reconciliation is *achievable through certain steps*, the greatest proportion of responses (12% of the entire response set) emphasized the need for a *sincere apology*. For example, a 52-year-old woman from Australia wrote, “good men speaking truthfully” were needed for reconciliation. An additional 10% of the responses expressed that *monetary compensations* ought to be made. An 18-year-old woman from Canada demonstrated this theme in her response: “perhaps restoring items/money or giving money as a way of apologizing.” Another 8% of the response set contained references to the need for a *diplomatic apology or treaty*. For example, a 19-year-old man from the USA stated the need for “a legitimate authority representing that country making a specific admittance of past wrong-doing and expressing desire to open a dialogue about future relationships with the offended party and under what circumstances they will be carried out.” Finally, 8% of the total response set emphasized the importance of *following through on apology and changing behavior*. This theme is evident in the response of a 39-year-old woman from Australia who wrote, “it must be a true open doorway for change, not a mere symbolic brushing aside of the subject, in the hope it will go away.” Additional examples of responses in these categories are presented in Table 24.3.

Exploratory Statistical Analyses

Exploratory chi-square analyses were conducted to examine possible demographic variations in response patterns to the reconciliation item. The demographics examined were gender, participation

in the military, involvement of family members in the military, and participation in protests. These analyses revealed differences based on having a relative in the military and on having participated in protests. Specifically, it was found that a significantly greater proportion of participants with relatives in the military than respondents without military relatives gave responses including at least one of the themes stating that there are achievable *steps to reconciliation* and at least one of the categories citing *practical steps* to reconciliation. Conversely, a significantly greater proportion of participants without relatives in the military than their counterparts gave responses in at least one of the categories stating that reconciliation is *unachievable*. In addition, a marginally larger proportion of respondents with relatives in the military than their counterparts gave responses indicating that giving *money* could lead to reconciliation and responses indicating that *repairing relations* between countries could lead to reconciliation.

A significantly greater proportion of protesters than non-protesters gave a response in at least one of the categories supporting the idea that reconciliation is achievable by taking *certain steps*. Marginally more protesters than non-protesters gave at least one response citing *practical steps* to reconciliation. On the other hand, a significantly greater proportion of non-protesters than protesters gave at least one response in one of the categories indicating that reconciliation is *unachievable*. Finally, marginally more protesters than non-protesters suggested that *monetary compensation* and acting to *repair relations* between countries could lead to reconciliation.

Chi-square values and demographic proportions are presented in Table 24.4.

Discussion and Conclusions

This chapter provides historical context and contemporary views of ordinary people from Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, and the United States regarding matters of historical abuse, apology, and possibilities for reconciliation. This concluding section discusses common elements of historical abuse and addresses a number of concerns that remain controversial.

Table 24.3 Reconciliation is achievable through specific steps: examples of responses in common categories and subcategories

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Sex	Response
<i>Reconciliation is achievable</i>	90				
<i>Nature of apology</i>	29 (35)				
Sincerity	14 (42)	North Ireland	48	Female	Both have to mean it
		Canada	49	Male	Any apology has to be sincere
		Canada	19	Female	It has to be real, not blown out of proportion
Diplomatic/treaty	8 (26)	USA	30	Male	I believe an apology is a step forward, but additional treaties, pacts, or services will also show that the country is truly willing to work towards peace
		Canada	47	Female	Some kind of ongoing diplomatic talks
		Australia	53	Male	A treaty of agreement with the original owner could rectify that position of illegal sovereignty
<i>Provide goods or services</i>	22 (27)				
Money	10 (45)	North Ireland	56	Male	Financial reconstruction
		Australia	33	Female	I imagine improved trade relations, sharing of development strategies, and other forms of monetary compensation would be a great help
		USA	21	Female	Economic compensation, especially for those most negatively affected by the invasion (the disadvantaged)
<i>Follow through on apology/change behavior</i>	8 (9)	Canada	70	Female	Follow through efforts at improving relationships between old foes
		Ireland	59	Male	It must be supported by appropriate action over time
		UK	65	Male	Clear evidence that the attempt is genuine

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parenthesis) refers to the percentage of responses within the major category

The historical context addresses abuses that are primarily domestic, although the wording of the two survey items focuses primarily on conflicts *between* countries. Thus, the survey data are forward-looking. They anticipate that in the future such apologies will be more likely to take place. In discussing the historical contexts of the Anglo-Saxon countries, international conflicts such as the 1st and 2nd world wars were not addressed. Nor did we mention the Korean conflict or the war in Vietnam. Should the victors in these wars apologize for winning? The historical context we provided focused on domestic abuses that in today's society are clearly recognized as injustices. In a number of

cases, formal apologies have been proffered. The qualitative responses of the survey participants reveal a good deal of complex thinking about issues of historical abuse, apology, and reconciliation.

Common Elements of Historical Abuse

Some common elements of abuse are the following: (1) power imbalances, (2) clear ethnic categorization, and (3) a feeling of "us" versus "them." Finally, when historical abuses are acknowledged and recognized as wrong, an appeal to social justice often contributes to recognition of these

Table 24.4 Steps to reconciliation: percentage of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and Chi-square values

Category	Group 1 (%) ^a	Group 2 (%) ^a	X ²
	Relative in military	No relative in military	
<i>Reconciliation is achievable presence</i>	92	86	5.03*
<i>Practical steps presence</i>	58	49	4.28*
Money	12	9	3.01 [^]
<i>Interpersonal/psychological</i>			
Repair relations	9	6	3.6 [^]
<i>Reconciliation is unachievable presence</i>	3	9	8**
	Protest	No protest	
<i>Reconciliation is achievable presence</i>	92	87	5.43*
<i>Practical steps presence</i>	57	50	3.29 [^]
Money	12	9	2.92 [^]
<i>Interpersonal/psychological</i>			
Repair relations	9	6	3.52 [^]
<i>Reconciliation is unachievable presence</i>	3	9	8.05**

Note. ^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

[^]=.051 < *p* < .10; **p* ≤ 0.05; ***p* ≤ 0.01

injustices and efforts toward resolution and reconciliation (Davis, 2011).

Power imbalances between groups or between countries have been a common element in all of the historical abuses discussed above. Examples of these are slavery practiced by both the UK and the US during the colonial period (both later outlawed slavery). Power imbalances were also present during the time that Great Britain, Australia, Canada, and the United States suppressed and oppressed native peoples. Internment of the Japanese during the Second World War by both Canada and the US clearly illustrated a power imbalance as well.

The tendency toward ethnic categorization is another common element of the oppression of one group by another. Ethnic categorization was involved in the unfair treatment of the Aboriginal people, the Japanese, the Africans, and the Irish. All have been discriminated against and oppressed at one time or another. A third common element that has been researched extensively by social psychologists is a tendency to categorize people as “us” versus “them.” Finally, a fourth common element can be found in the process of acknowledging and seeking to end the types of maltreatment and exploitation addressed in this chapter. An appeal to justice contributed to recognition of

these historical abuses and efforts toward resolution. Typically, concerns with morality and social justice play a role in seeking to ameliorate injustice (Clayton & Opatow, 2003; Darley & Pittman, 2003; Davis, 2011; Exline, Worthington, Hill, & McCullough, 2003; Skitka & Crosby, 2003).

There is a growing literature that focuses on apology for and redress of historical abuses. This literature also includes the themes of forgiveness and reconciliation. For example, Andrieu (2009) set out to defend the role of official apologies for historical wrongdoings as a means of promoting national reconciliation. Bretherton and Mellor (2006) and the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1997) describe the historical removal of Aboriginal children in Australia from their families and the current effort toward reconciliation. Cunningham (1999) examines official apologies in a number of countries. Weston (2001) argues for the use of a “truth commission model” to deal with the historical records of abusive treatment of the American Indian in the United States. This chapter can be seen as a contribution to this literature.

Issues for future research might include the following: How sincere is an apology under pressure? Must an apology be voluntary to have merit? Are individual apologies directly to the person

wronged perceived as having greater legitimacy than group apologies? Should apologies for what one group's ancestors did to another group's ancestors be considered just and constructive?

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Perspectives on Apology and Reconciliation in Russia and the Balkan States

25

Vlado Miheljak, Marko Polič, Alexandra Plassaras,
Charikleia Tsatsaroni, Sherri McCarthy,
Nebojsa Petrovic, Anna Medvedeva,
and Alev Yalcinkaya

Apology and the role of apology in reconciliation efforts is a controversial area. Political apology can be defined as “the public announcement of a remorseful acceptance of responsibility for wrongful or harmful actions by a government that led to the disadvantage or victimization of a group of its own citizen, or attacks on the citizens

of another country” (Hook, 2008a, p. 3). In this chapter, we consider ordinary citizens’ views on apology and reconciliation between nations. Reconciliation is “the process through which the culture of peace is created and penetrates into the society” (Boehnke, Schmidtke, & Shani, 2011, p. 322). Understanding of participant views requires certain contextual (historical and current) knowledge about the countries under consideration in this chapter: Greece, Russia, Serbia, and Slovenia. In the next sections, we provide a brief presentation of our theoretical position regarding apology followed by a consideration of historical factors relevant to apology in the Russia/Balkans Peninsula area.

V. Miheljak (✉)

University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia
e-mail: vlado.miheljak@guess.arnes.si

M. Polič

Department of Psychology, University of Ljubljana,
Ljubljana, Slovenia
e-mail: marko.polic@guest.arnes.si

A. Plassaras

International Relations Department, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA

C. Tsatsaroni

Psychology Department, Boston University, Boston,
MA, USA
e-mail: chtsa@bu.edu

S. McCarthy

Educational Psychology, Counseling and Human
Relations, Northern Arizona University, Yuma, AZ, USA
e-mail: Sherri.McCarthy@NAU.EDU

N. Petrovic

Faculty of Psychology, University of Belgrade,
Belgrade, Serbia
e-mail: nebojsa.beograd@gmail.com

A. Medvedeva

University of Finland, Helsinki, Finland
e-mail: an25medved@gmail.com

A. Yalcinkaya

Department of Psychology, Yeditepe, Istanbul, Turkey
e-mail: yalcinkaya@prodigy.net; ayalcinkaya@yeditepe.edu.tr

Sociopsychological Perspectives on Apology

Koppe (2006, p. 27ff) partially attributes the beginning of peace research in Europe in the 1950s to the influence of relevant research in the United States of America (USA) as well as to the events that he views as milestones in the evolution of perceptions of war, peace, and conflict resolution. These milestones included reactions to emotionally charged and dramatic events and outcomes of World War II (including guilt for starting the war, fascistic dictatorships, and the holocaust), later long-lasting polarization in the East–west conflict culminating in the Cold War and its consequences (e.g., the arms

race), and growing public recognition of Third World problems (decolonization and wars of liberation). Recently, we could add Middle East unrest and hostility to the list of areas beset with conflict, as well as some regional conflicts and wars connected to disintegration in former socialist countries. There are two foci in the research regarding troubles facing the former socialist countries—(a) the conflict potential in the post-Soviet region and (b) escalation of conflict and wars in the region of ex-Yugoslavia in the first half of the 1990s.

It is difficult to consider perspectives on apology and reconciliation without considering perspectives on conflict and justice. For example, the parties to a conflict typically rationalize their own activities, even those that are difficult to justify. So, in the region of ex-Yugoslavia, preoccupation with the achievement of justice as “my justice” blocked every initiative for reconciliation. That is, the individuals who had opposed violence from the very beginning took an active role in trying to achieve apology and reconciliation, even when that meant apologizing for the aggressors whose behavior they had rejected. Unfortunately, the perpetrators of the violence, who could be seen as having a moral duty to apologize and make efforts at reconciliation, often continued to defend and justify their deeds, to see their former involvement in aggression as “just.”

Increased awareness of events that many people in the region wanted to dismiss as part of history has clearly shown that the assumption that time cures old traumas is wrong. The case of Yugoslavia showed that conflict potential is latently transmitted between generations along with particular views on the nature of justice. Without basic catharsis, as once demonstrated by Willy Brandt, reconciliation is not possible. Mediations could lead to armistice in the short term, but cannot assure permanent disentanglement.

There are a number of contrary opinions about political apology and its role in reconciliation, ranging from viewing an apology as the current “fashionable” thing to do to postulating it as a necessary first step in the process of reconciliation. Malik (2007) argued that the divisions at the end of the last century (e.g., related to the Cold

War) caused greater obsession with the past and a desire to atone for past wrongs, not as a way to achieve political change but simply to gain psychological comfort. In his opinion, an apology should be connected to one’s own actions; otherwise, an apology hinders steps necessary to ensure real change and perverts the notion of collective responsibility. Apologizing for others’ wrongdoings, he believes, suggests that people are guilty because they belong to particular national, religious, ethnic, or other group—not because of their own actions, but because “moral worth travels down the generations” and is somehow inherited. Nevertheless, Malik holds that the acknowledgment of past wrongdoing is important, at least as part of a process of learning how to avoid repeating past wrongdoings.

It is not easy to assess Malik’s consideration. For instance, was Willy Brandt’s silent apology in 1970 necessary? In Brandt’s words (quoted in Borneman, 1999), he felt as though he “*had to do something to express the particularity of the commemoration at the ghetto monument. On the abyss of German history and carrying the burden of the millions who were murdered, I did what people do when words fail them.*” Many believe that his kneeling became a symbol of real change in the relationship between two nations. In this situation, Brandt, the man who was not a perpetrator himself, who was even engaged in resistance against the perpetrators, apologized. But perhaps such events and the fact that somebody is aware of the past wrongdoings of his nation-state should change the situation, setting a new social model of behavior and opening new ways of thinking. Seeking apology seems to be becoming an accepted part of discourse between nations and groups experiencing conflict and violations of human rights, as well as being a crucial step to reconciliation (Rouhana, 2004; Lombardo, 2012; Thompson, 2005). If reconciliation requires justice, truth, historical responsibility, and restructuring of the social and political relationship between the parties, then a perpetrator’s apology is a natural part of this process, contributing to the advancement and deepening of reconciliation (Rouhana, 2004, 2011). Rouhana (2004, p. 174), emphasizing the importance of group identities formed over generations of

conflict, warned that the focus of analysis should not be misplaced “*from intergroup patterns of behavior that are the outcome of power structures to their interpersonal manifestations.*”

In the region studied, these processes are still not operating at full potential, though they are strongly needed.

National Contexts for Apology

With the fall of the Berlin wall, escalation of violence in the Balkan/Russia regions was a surprise: nobody expected that open conflicts characterized by violence and war could happen, especially in the region of ex-Yugoslavia. It was assumed that in almost half of a century of declared equality of nations and nationalities, reasons for conflicts should dissolve. But now, on the basis of bitter experiences from the 1990s, it can be inferred that throughout all this time, latent conflict was smoldering, along with the economic and political decompensation that ultimately exploded into violence. This violence would appear to be illogical given that the roots of the conflicts and partitions were older than the majority of inhabitants from the countries involved. But it seems that sentiments concerning relationships are transmitted and maintained through psychologically complex forms of family and collective initiation, especially where conflict relationships are relatively old and long lasting. Such an old latent conflict exists even between Greece and Turkey; fortunately, these two countries have continued to refrain from the kind of warfare that overwhelmed the region of ex-Yugoslavia, where much of the interstate conflict had roots in interethnic relationships within what was formerly a common state.

The history of the Balkans is reflective of the common history of wars. Such a statement could be applied to many regions, but rarely does it hold so much truth as for the Balkan Peninsula. The violence was not a result of special characteristics attributed to the peoples of the Balkans in stereotypes and often even in national auto-stereotypes, but rather it stemmed from a specific geostrategic position (Miheljak & Polic, 2009). It was through

the Balkans that Europeans advanced toward the Near East, and through the Balkans that the Ottomans advanced toward Central Europe, with both groups establishing relatively unique communities along the way. In the Balkans, a variety of cultural patterns formed that were bound to ethnic and religious identities, which often overlapped. Continuous warfare—along with conceptions of war, peace, and coexistence—shaped the worldview of people in the region.

Nevertheless, the history and experiences of Slovenia and Serbia greatly differ. Serbia was shaped through liberation wars over a rather long time period. It is not a big country, but nevertheless it has represented regional (military) power throughout its existence, due in part to its alliance with Russia—a connection involving Slavic ethnic origin and affiliation to the same orthodox religious group. After World War I, Serbia became a dominant entity in the Yugoslavia kingdom, and after World War II, it became the biggest and constitutionally most important member of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. Inside the kingdom, because of interethnic tensions (e.g. between Serbia and Croatia), conflict potential grew between the two World Wars and escalated during World War II. Despite the common resistance against the alliance of fascist occupiers (Germans, Italians, Hungarians, Bulgarians), civil war emerged in the area. For Serbs, conflict with Croatia was strong because pro-fascist Independent State of Croatia, under the leadership of Ante Pavelic during the war, massacred Serbian people living in Croatia and Bosnia. Also, in Serbia after the occupation, there was tension over pro-fascist forces and an unclear situation between resistance forces, with chetniks starting a collaboration with Germans rather quickly. At least we could say that historically Serbia was mainly a victim but sometimes the perpetrator.

Peter Imbusch (2006) attributes problems in the region to the fact that ethnic and geographic borders do not overlap. But as a noninvolved researcher, he warns that causes are complex, and the weight or influence of particular factors is unequally distributed; this complexity, he argues, increases the danger that in the interpretation of Yugoslav conflict, stereotyped conclusions or

senseless eclectic listing of problem complexes could emerge.

The double historical role of victim-perpetrator applies not only to small Serbia but also to big Russia, which was, in different historical periods from the ninth century on, also conquered—early by Mongols and in later centuries by Napoleonic France and Hitler’s Germany. Then, after the October Revolution, and especially after its victory in World War II, Russia emerged as a world superpower that partially annexed previously independent states and partially established political, ideological, and economic influence in others, which was perceived by those countries as occupation. This aggression produced a lot of conflict potential, but the disintegration of the empire took place relatively peacefully. The latent conflict potential, which was deeply suppressed during Soviet times, escalated only after the disintegration of the empire into local military conflicts, followed by reawakened nationalism and emancipation tendencies—or, more precisely, tendencies to reshape borders (e.g., secession of South Ossetia from Georgia and integration with North Ossetia). The issue was explosive not because of historical and religious reasons but because of economic and political interests (e.g., control over oil and pipelines) embedded in complicated relationships between strong Russia and local power Georgia, not to mention Chechnya.

Differences and similarities among Russia, Greece, Serbia, and Slovenia were already discussed in Chap. 5 of this book. In this chapter, only those historical and current issues that could strongly influence views on apology and its role in reconciliation are mentioned. All four countries were engaged in a number of wars, liberation or others, civil or international, and have had periods of democratic deficits. All have open and unresolved conflicts, historically founded or current, domestic or international, of different intensity. Some countries were usually the victims (e.g., Slovenia, Greece); others were perpetrators or in both roles (Russia, Serbia), depending mainly on their size, power, and historical circumstances. Therefore, views on apology and reconciliation may vary throughout the region. It is within this historical context that we consider views of ordi-

nary people from the Russian/Balkans region concerning the role of apology in achieving reconciliation among previously warring nations.

Methods

Sample

The sample for this chapter consisted of 466 participants from Greece, Russia, Slovenia, and Serbia: 25 were from Greece (14 men, 10 women, and 1 of unknown gender), 270 from Russia (97 males, 171 females, and 2 of unknown gender), 74 from Slovenia (33 males, 40 females, and 1 of unknown gender), and 97 from Serbia (42 males and 55 females). Participants were asked if they had ever served in the military, if they had family members who had ever served in the military, and if they had ever participated in an antiwar protest. Of the participants who responded to the items in question, 17% reported being in the military, 47% reported having a relative in the military, and 14% reported having engaged in a protest against war at one point.

Procedure

Participants were recruited through personal networking and via online links on various websites. They were asked to complete the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006, 2009) either electronically or in paper and pencil form. One section of the survey presented participants with two statements: (a) “If one country has in the past invaded, colonized, or exercised control over the governmental affairs of another country, an apology by the invading/colonizing/controlling country can improve the chances for reconciliation between the countries” and (b) “What steps or factors are necessary to make an apology successful in achieving reconciliation between the countries?” Participants rated on a 7-point Likert scale their level of agreement with the first statement (1 meaning “totally disagree” to 7 meaning “totally agree”) and were then asked to

explain in their own words their reasoning for their rating. Their responses were then analyzed using coding manuals developed based on grounded theory. As explained by Glaser (1992), grounded theory is a process by which a theoretical framework is generated through the analysis of qualitative data. For a more detailed description of the coding manual and the PAIRTAPS, see the introductory methods chapter for this section (Chap. 22).

Can Apology Contribute to Reconciliation?

Coding Guidelines

The first statement “If one country has in the past invaded, colonized, or exercised control over the governmental affairs of another country, an apology by the invading/colonizing/controlling country can improve the chances for reconciliation between the countries?” was coded using the Apology Coding Manual. This manual provides criteria for categorizing codable units within qualitative responses into three main sets of categories: (1) whether or not an apology is effective

depends on the situation; (2) *yes/agree*, an apology will lead to reconciliation; and (3) *no/disagree*, an apology will not lead to or increase the chances of reconciliation. When participants cited historical examples in their explanations of apologies that had or had not been successful, these *historical references* were also noted.

Responses indicating that the success of apology *depends* on situational factors fell into seven major categories: (a) *may be possible*, (b) *depends on circumstances*, (c) *depends on nature of apology*, (d) *depends on acceptance*, (e) *depends on further action*, (f) *are a first step*, and (g) *takes time*. Within some of these subcategories are further distinctions that help to analyze participants’ responses based on keywords. For example, in the *it depends on nature of apology* category, there are four subcategories: *sincerity*, *recognition of wrongdoing*, *remorse*, and *official or diplomatic initiative*. Table 25.1 shows the relative frequencies and examples of responses in the *depends* category and subcategories.

The second major category *yes/agree* is divided into two subcategories: (a) apology leads to *healing* and (b) apology is *necessary*. The *healing* subcategory has two additional subcategories: (a)

Table 25.1 Examples of responses that the effectiveness of apology depends on other factors

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Sex	Response
<i>Depends</i>	59				
May be possible/worth a try/ possible to some degree	14 (23)	Greece	34	Female	It is always good to try
		Russia	35	Female	Poor peace is always better than a good quarrel
Depends on nature of apology	12 (21)				
Depends on recognition of wrongdoing	6 (10)	Russia	54	Male	Avowal of guilt may help to reconcile a dispute
		Slovenia	85	Female	Because it recognized it was wrong and that it offended other nation
		Greece	35	Female	It shows recognition of the error of violence and the mistreatment
Good beginning/only one step	7 (12)	Greece	26	Female	Apology is one step
		Slovenia	25	Male	The apology is absolutely the step forward to improve conditions between countries
		Serbia	42	Male	First gesture toward creating better relationships

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parenthesis) refers to responses within the major category. Refer to the introductory chapter

Table 25.2 Examples of responses that apology can and cannot improve chances of reconciliation

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Sex	Response
<i>Yes</i>	13	Russia	62	Female	Obviously
		Slovenia	26	Male	If the country apologizes, matters are solved
It is necessary	4 (28)	Russia	44	Female	Apologies are necessary
		Slovenia	19	Male	Without apology the conciliation cannot begin
<i>No</i>	22				
Not possible	5 (25)	Russia	18	Male	The country aggressors will always be the ones
		Serbia	55	Female	There are no apologies. Since Herodotus, history has shown that there are no apologies, everything stay remembered
Irreversible wrongdoings	6 (26)	Greece	33	Male	The “bad things” they have done cannot be erased
		Slovenia	53	Male	Apology is one step forward, but it cannot change history. All acts have side effects and change things in life

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parenthesis) refers to responses within the major category. Refer to the introduction chapter

repairing relationships and (b) *restoring dignity*. Table 25.2 shows the relative frequencies and examples of responses for the *yes/agree* category and subcategories.

The third major grouping, *no/disagree*, includes seven categories: (a) *not possible* (for an apology to lead to reconciliation), (b) *irreversible wrongdoings* (impossible to erase the wrongdoings of the past), (c) *forgive don't forget*, (d) *words don't matter* (if responses claim words cannot solve anything), (e) *actions speak louder than words*, (f) *not necessary*, and (g) *negative consequences* (if responses focus on the negative consequences of apology). Table 25.2 includes the relative frequencies and examples of responses for each *no/disagree* category.

Distribution of Responses Regarding the Effectiveness of an Apology

The majority of responses (59%) to the effectiveness item indicated that the likelihood of an apology leading to reconciliation *depends on the situation*. Responses that stated that *yes*, an apology would lead to reconciliation were 13% of the total responses. Responses stating that *no*, apol-

ogy would not lead to reconciliation constituted 22% of the total. Responses that either cited *historical references* or were *uncodable* constituted 2% and 5%, respectively, and will not be discussed further.

Although a majority of responses emphasized that successful apology *depends on the situation*, only one of the subcategories within this major category accounted for more than 8% of the total response set: the subcategory for responses indicating that it *may be possible* for apology to lead to reconciliation. One example came from a 25-year-old Russian woman, who said: “[Apology] can bring reconciliation, but only to a certain extent.” Responses in other *it depends* categories occurred at lower frequencies—for example, *it depends on recognition of wrongdoing* (6%), *it depends on further action* (8%), and apology is a good *first step* in the process of reconciliation (7%). An example of an *it depends on recognition of wrongdoing* response comes from a 38-year-old Greek man who stated that “International petition of forgiveness means public recognition of mistakes of previous governments and negation of heinous acts.” A response illustrating the *it depends on further actions* category came from a 56-year-old Russian woman

who stated that “Some apology is not enough. Important actions that clearly understand that an apology is not an empty sound [are needed].” Other examples in this *further actions* subcategory mentioned the need to take *actions instead of words, change one’s behavior toward respect and tolerance*, and provide *material reparations* such as money and economic aid. Responses like one from a 51-year-old Slovenian woman who stated that “This [apology] should be the beginning of peace.” were categorized as indicating that apology is a good *first step*.

The category for responses indicating *agreement* that apology can lead to reconciliation had the third largest percentage of responses. Within this category, only two subcategories included at least 4% of all responses: (a) those that merely *agreed* that apology can help (5%) and (b) those that indicated that apology *is necessary* (4%). One example of general *agreement* that was seen more than once was “Obviously.” An example of a response coded into the apology *is necessary* subcategory was provided by a 19-year-old Slovenia man who stated that “Without apology the [re]conciliation cannot begin.”

Responses coded into the *no/disagree* category asserting that apology would not lead to reconciliation constituted the second largest group of responses. Within this category, only two subcategories included more than 5% of all responses: *not possible* (5%) and *irreversible wrongdoing* (6%). One example of a response in the *not possible* subcategory was from a 55-year-old Serbian woman: “There are no apologies. Since Herodotus, history has shown that there are no apologies, everything stay remembered.” An example of a response in the *irreversible wrongdoing* subcategory was provided by a 20-year-old Russian man who said “There are no activities that will give us back lost lives.”

Exploratory Statistical Analyses for Apology Themes

To assess the possibility of group differences in views concerning the effectiveness of apology, exploratory chi-squares were conducted on

themes that accounted for more than 15% of the responses within particular demographic groups. These analyses yielded the following results: (1) A significantly greater proportion of women than men said that reconciliation *may be possible* after an apology. (2) A significantly higher proportion of participants without military experience than participants with military experience suggested that it *may be possible* for apology to lead to reconciliation, and (3) a significantly higher proportion of antiwar protestors than non-protestors agreed that *recognition of wrongdoing* can improve the chances for reconciliation between countries. For percentages of responses in coding categories with chi-square values, see Tables 25.3 and 25.4.

Steps to Reconciliation

Coding Manual

The second statement “What steps or factors are necessary to make an apology successful in achieving reconciliation between the countries?” was used to elicit individuals’ suggestions on the achievability of reconciliation. Responses to this item could be coded into one of three major sets of categories: (a) reconciliation is *achievable* through specific steps; (b) reconciliation is *unachievable*; and (c) the participant *doesn’t know* how to achieve reconciliation.

Responses indicating that reconciliation following apology is *achievable* fell into six separate categories: (a) depends on *circumstances*, (b) depends on *nature of apology*, (c) depends on *acceptance* by aggrieved country, (d) requires *psychological/interpersonal* activity, (e) requires *provision of goods or services*, and (f) requires that aggressor show *change of behavior*. Within these subcategories, further distinctions were made based on keywords. Table 25.5 shows the relative frequencies and examples of responses in the reconciliation subcategories.

The *unachievable* category contained two sub-subcategories: *irreversible wrongdoing* (for responses stating that reconciliation is impossible due to the irreversible damage done by one coun-

Table 25.3 Apology: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Category ^a	Group 1 ^b	Group 2 ^b	x ²
	Men	Women	
<i>Depends</i>			
May be possible/worth a try/possible to some degree	9	17	5.4*
	Military	No military	
<i>Depends</i>			
May be possible/worth a try/possible to some degree	8	16	3.79*
	Protest	No protest	
<i>Depends</i>			
<i>Depends on nature of apology</i>			
Depends on recognition of wrongdoing	13	5	6.53*

Note. If there is a blank row next to a major category name, there were no significant group differences in scores at that level; however, we listed the major category whenever there was a significant group difference in scores in one of the subcategories

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^b = $p < 0.10$; * = $p < 0.05$

Table 25.4 Effectiveness of apology: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Category ^a	Group 1 ^b	Group 2 ^b	x ²
	Men	Women	
<i>Depends</i>			
May be possible/worth a try/possible to some degree	9	17	5.4*
	Military	No military	
<i>Depends</i>			
May be possible/worth a try/possible to some degree	8	16	3.79 [^]
	Protest	No protest	
<i>Depends</i>			
<i>Nature of apology</i>			
Depends on recognition of wrongdoing	13	5	6.53*

Note. “Presence” at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^b.05 < $p < 0.10$; * $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$

try to another) and *unrealistic* (for responses claiming that reconciliation is unrealistic—for example, because it shows signs of weakness or because victims want revenge).

Distribution of Responses on Achieving Reconciliation

The majority of responses (90%) indicated that reconciliation is *achievable* through various steps. Responses stating that reconciliation was *unachiev-*

able made up 4% of all the reconciliation responses as did responses stating that participants *did not know* whether or not reconciliation was achievable. The remaining 2% of responses were uncodable. These last three categories had so few responses when compared to the *achievable* category that they are not discussed further in this section.

Within the *achievable* set of categories, there were two subcategories (*repairing relations* and *providing money*) that each included over 10% of all suggestions as to how to promote reconciliation. *Repairing relations* is one of several

Table 25.5 Examples of steps to reconciliation being achievable

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Sex	Response
<i>Reconciliation is achievable</i> 90					
<i>Nature of apology</i> 1 (1)					
Sincerity	7 (26)	Greece	39	Male	They have to mean the apology in practice and not only in words
		Russia	21	Female	Apologies must be sincere
		Serbia	34	Male	Everything depends on sincerity of the act
Recognition of wrongdoing	8(32)	Serbia	35	Male	Ability to recognize and admit own mistakes
		Slovenia	52	Male	Acknowledgement of who was right and who wrong
		Russia	23	Male	The admission of guilt; no modification of historical facts
Diplomatic/treaty	8 (30)	Serbia	25	Male	It should be public apology which takes place in the wronged country. It should be given by the head of state
		Russia	23	Male	To sign the nonaggression pact
<i>Interpersonal/psychological</i> 24 (26)					
Repair relations	18 (78)	Greece	21	Female	When one country sides with another country in a period of need, it is an important step
		Slovenia	24	Male	Probably also other country should apology for some mistakes. Then they should find basis for agreement and further cooperation
		Serbia	47	Female	Willingness to cooperate on both sides
<i>Provide services</i> 21 (24)					
Money	12 (58)	Russia	55	Female	It is necessary to help suffered country to restore economy
		Serbia	29	Male	Apologies to be followed by concrete acts: providing of material reparations for the victims

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of all responses. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the major category

subcategories in the *interpersonal/psychological* category that stresses the need for additional interpersonal action as a way toward reconciliation. Examples of *interpersonal/psychological* themes include *repairing relations, understanding, and faith*. The category *repairing relations* contained 18% of all responses to the item, 20% of the *achievable* responses, and 78% of responses within the *interpersonal/psychological* category. An example comes from a 31-year-old Serbian woman from Serbia who stated that what is needed to achieve reconciliation is “Willingness of both countries to cooperate and create good—neighborly relations.”

The other popular subcategory was *providing money* as a way to promote reconciliation.

This subcategory is one of several subcategories in the *providing goods and services* category. Examples of necessary goods and services mentioned by the respondents included tangible objects such as *money, land, and prisoners* as well as intangible objects such as *education, democracy, and rebuilding countries*. The subcategory *providing money* contained 12% of the total responses, 14% of *achievable* responses, and 58% of the *providing goods or services* responses. One example from this category is from a 22-year-old Russian man who stated that reconciliation could be achieved through “cash compensation to the families affected by war.”

Other coding subcategories that included fewer than 10% but at least 7% of the reconcilia-

tion responses included *sincerity*, *recognition of wrongdoing*, and *diplomatic/treaties*—all of which are subcategories of the *nature of apology* subcategory that stresses that the form in which an apology takes can affect the reconciliation process. An example of a response coded for sincerity came from a 39-year-old Greek man who stated “They have to mean the apology in practice and not only in words.” An example of a response in the subcategory of *recognition of wrongdoing* was provided by a 62-year-old Russian woman who stated that in order to achieve reconciliation one needs “to admit an aggression.” The *diplomatic relations/treaty* category is illustrated by the response from a 23-year-old Russian man who stated that countries would need “to sign the nonaggression pact” in order for reconciliation to be achieved.

Exploratory Statistical Analyses: Reconciliation Themes

Exploratory chi-square analyses were conducted with themes that appeared in at least 7% of the responses in a demographic group. These exploratory chi-square analyses revealed that (1) a significantly higher proportion of participants with military experience than those without such experience suggested that reconciliation could be achieved *through recognition of wrongdoing* by countries and (2) a marginally higher proportion of participants reporting being military experience than those without such experience held that *providing goods and services* could lead to reconciliation.

Discussion

The majority of participants were aware that the effectiveness of apology as a way to achieve reconciliation depends on the situation. Their perspectives appear to be quite realistic, considering the different situations characteristic of deadly conflict (historical or current, shorter or long lasting, with different degree of violence and number of victims, etc.), the varying nature of

apologies that may be offered (e.g., their motivation, sincerity, and content), accompanying events, etc. All four nations from which samples were taken have in their history up to modern times a lot of different experiences of conflicts and wars registered in nations’ collective memory and reflected also in views about the role of apology collected in this study. Answers were probably reflecting not only some general belief about the role of apology but also consideration of different events important in one nation collective memory, historical or current. That apology is not perceived as only a single event limited in time and space is evident from the answers in the subcategories *depends on further action* and apology is a good *first step* in the process of reconciliation. Not every apology is acceptable. It is not enough just to say the words; sincerity is expected. This emphasis on particular features of a successful apology supports findings by other authors (e.g., Hook, 2008b).

Views on how to achieve reconciliation between countries previously engaged in aggression against each other sometimes explicitly mentioned apology but often revealed a wish for peace and good mutual relationships as well as very concrete social (e.g., recognition of wrongdoing) and material (e.g., providing money) contributions. Many of the responses echoed the views of Rouhana (2004, 2011) that apologies are important to the process of the restructuring of the social and political relationships between the parties that can lead to reconciliation.

Conclusion

Respondents in all four countries consider apology as an important aspect of reconciliation, giving relatively homogeneous responses to both questions. Across the four countries, respondents were aware of the situational limitations to and importance of the nature of apologies. The homogeneity of the findings suggests that general, cultural, and ethnic differences did not have a strong impact on perceptions of reconciliation and what is needed to achieve it. Their shared views may well be influenced by

shared historical context and experiences, particularly of murderous armed conflict.

In the Russia/Balkans region, many war crimes were committed, including during one of the most recent war between ex-Yugoslavia (Serbia) and Croatia. In 2010, the president of Serbia, Boris Tadic, became the first Serbian leader to visit a site where more than 200 Croatians were killed in a 1991 massacre during Croatia's war of independence. The Serbian leader said he came to the area to "bow down before the victims" and "once again offer words of apology and express regret." Some in Serbia were not satisfied with his gesture, which means they were not aware of their own country's past wrongdoings. There were a number of other war crimes in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Chechnya, and elsewhere that are still waiting for apology from this or that side.

All four countries also have a history of within-state violence—for example, during WWII, anti-Nazi rebellion in Slovenia and Serbia was accompanied by civil war between partisans and domestic Nazi collaborators, "domobranci" (home guards) in Slovenia and "četniki" (guerilla) in Serbia. These old conflicts are still present in collective memory and have divided the population for generations. Yet we can see within the responses from our sample, a strong wish that reconciliation be achieved. Perhaps an apology could be a first step toward this goal.

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Perspectives on Apology and Reconciliation in the Middle East

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Majed Ashy, Marian Lewin, Lane Smith,
Rouba Youssef, Helena Syna Desivilya, Abdul Kareem
Al-Obaidi, Raja Tayeh, Dalit Yassour-Boroschowitz,
Heyam Mohammed, Kamala Smith, Linda Jeffrey,
William Tastle, Feryal Turan, and Alev Yalcinkaya

Several factors influence perspectives on apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation in the Middle East. One approach to analyzing and understanding these factors is through application of an ecological model. A well-known ecological model, developed by Bronfenbrenner (1979) and later refined by (Belsky, 1993), provides a framework that takes

in account variables influencing behavior at four levels of analyses. The individual/developmental level includes factors such as biological/genetic characteristics, gender, age, personality, cognition, and emotions. Individuals develop within microsystems that include their proximal social environment, particularly their family members. The microsystem variables are located within the exosystem, which is the source of experiences

M. Ashy (✉)

Psychology Department, Bay State College,
Boston, MA, USA
e-mail: majed.ashy@gmail.com

M. Lewin

Department of Psychology, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA

L. Smith

Senior Research Scholar (Retired),
University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
e-mail: lanesmith0@gmail.com

R. Youssef

Psychology, University of Rhode Island, Kingston,
RI, USA
e-mail: rosyrouby@hotmail.com

H.S. Desivilya

Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Yezreel
Valley College, Emek Yezreel, Israel
e-mail: desiv@yvc.ac.il

A.K. Al-Obaidi

Institute of International Education, New York,
NY, USA
e-mail: kareemobody60@yahoo.com;
kareemobaidi@gmail.com

R. Tayeh

Director of Institutional Research, Doane College,
Crete, NE, USA
e-mail: rtayeh@unlserve.unl.edu; raja.tayeh@doane.edu

D. Yassour-Boroschowitz

Department of Human Services,
Emek Yezreel College, Israel
e-mail: dality@yvc.ac.il

H. Mohammed

Department of Curriculum and Instruction,
College of Education, Kuwait University, Kuwait
e-mail: mobarak1955@msn.com

K. Smith

Behavioral Health Analyst, Abt Associates,
Cambridge, MA, USA
e-mail: kamala_smith@abtassoc.com

L. Jeffrey

College of Education, Rowan University, Glassboro,
NJ, USA
e-mail: jeffrey@rowan.edu

W. Tastle

Ithaca College of Business, New York, USA
e-mail: tastle@ithaca.edu

F. Turan

Department of Sociology, Ankara University, Ankara, Turkey
e-mail: feryalturan@yahoo.com

A. Yalcinkaya

Department of Psychology, Yeditepe, Istanbul, Turkey
e-mail: yalcinkaya@prodigy.net;
ayalcinkaya@yeditepe.edu.tr

within the community. The individual, the micro-system, and the exosystem are all embedded in and interact with the macrosystem, which includes broad national, historical, and cultural forces (Ashy & Malley-Morrison, 2007). Understanding how individuals from the Middle East reason about apology and reconciliation requires an examination of historical, cultural, community, family, and individual factors and how they interact. This review begins with a consideration of broader macrosystem variables and ends with an analysis of the exo- and microsystem variables that can contribute to Middle Eastern perspectives on apology and reconciliation.

The Middle East is a diverse place with several cultures, religions, races, and sociopolitical realities. Even though there are a lot of deep commonalities among the cultures of the Middle East, there are also significant differences. For example, Turkey has special historical and cultural realities due to its location near Europe, its membership in NATO, its Ottoman history, its nationalistic forces, and its geopolitical roles and influences in the region. However, Israel has other realities that shaped its orientation toward the rest of the Middle East, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Arab-Israeli wars, the diversity of its population due to the immigration process, and the presence of the Arab-Israeli population within its borders. Furthermore, whereas tribalism plays an important role in the Arabic cultures, nationalism plays more significant role in Turkey (Arman, 2007), and existential worries are influential in Israel (Landau, 1990). Thus, many of the forces within the Arabic history and cultures can be also seen in Turkey or Israel to various degrees; however, some unique forces exist in each of these countries and cultures.

Some cultural and historical forces in Arabic history encourage politeness, apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation, while other forces can encourage standing up for one's rights, fighting for justice, honor and dignity, revenge, and retaliation (Khadduri, 2006). For example, some aspects of chivalry have been part of the Arabic culture through history, and it has its own code of rules, morals, and expectations that include rituals for apology, forgiveness,

and reconciliation. It is considered a part of knighthood that one forgives when the other side offers an apology and asks for forgiveness, and pardons and forgives when the other side is in a much weaker position. In addition, the ability to control one's anger and desire for revenge and retaliation and to use violence only in measured ways, and as a last resort, has been integral parts of chivalry. In more modern times, in countries like Syria or Egypt, the concepts of "Futuwwa" or "Al Batal," the strong young man or hero, have evolved (Salinger, 1950). The role of the hero is to stand by the weak, protect them, and in many cases "force" the aggressor to offer an apology. This narrative has been demonstrated frequently in Arabic novels, movies, and soap operas. This type of role was more common under colonization when the local governments were weak or not present and people were dealing with their issues on personal or neighborhood levels using force instead of the law. As a possible reaction to oppression, fantasies regarding the presence of a hero who will protect people and bring justice might be a way to escape the harsh realities of colonization. In such an environment, apology and forgiveness might not be possible until justice is done and the status quo changed.

Politeness and frequent expressions of apology and pardoning are important components of the Arabic culture in part because they can help maintain the delicate social structure and harmony. Samarah (2010) examined the different forms of apology in Arabic language from a linguistic point of view and found eight classes of apology that can be ranked from casual or normal to more serious or higher. For example, an Arab man will offer a normal casual apology if he accidentally pushes someone while walking in the street by saying the word "asif" or sorry. He will be violating an important social norm if he does not apologize in that situation. A higher form of apology is to say "samihni" or pardon me. Another higher form of apology, "ana atazer," is typically used in more professional settings. The highest form of apology is to say "ighfir li" or forgive me, and this expression is mainly reserved for asking God for forgiveness

(Samarah, 2010). Basically, in the Arabic language, God forgives and people pardon.

However, some aspects of chivalry in Arabic culture might encourage retaliation and discourage weakness and defeat. For example, defending “honor,” pride, and dignity have been major forces in the Arabic culture. The concept of “honor” includes defending one’s tribe, land, and belongings. Some wars in Arabic history started when a woman’s “honor” had been violated. Violating a woman’s honor was, and to some degree still is, considered a violation of the honor of all members of her tribe or nation and calls for revenge. This mixture of macho attitudes and negative attitudes toward apology and forgiveness not only fueled a lot of the wars in the history of Arabia, sometimes over very insignificant incidents that hurt the pride of a tribe, but also made it difficult to end the wars after they started. Ending such wars without winning was considered sacrificing the honor of one’s whole tribe or nation, and such an act was not an option. For example, one of the longest two wars in Arabic history, which happened in Arabia before Islam, was called the “Dahis and Alghabra war,” which lasted more than 40 years. Named after two horses, this long war started due to a dispute over a horse race between two horses that belonged to competing tribes. The other war, which also lasted more than 40 years, was called the “Al Basoos war,” named after a woman. It started after a camel belonging to an Arabic woman called “Al Basoos” was killed by men belonging to another tribe. These two wars stayed in Arabic history as symbols of how wars can start over insignificant disputes and how hard it is to end them after they start.

These wars were maintained in Arabic culture and awareness through poetry and folk stories produced by the people who suffered through them and documented their suffering and longing for peace. However, men and women of the time also produced some poetry that encouraged revenge and the continuation of wars, provided moral support, and stimulated tribal and masculine pride to promote a readiness to mobilize and fight. The poet in pre-Islamic Arabia sometimes played the role of the historian and sometimes

participated directly in a war effort. Later, in Islamic culture, poetry continued to play an important role in war and peace efforts and attitudes, mainly on a national instead of tribal level. These poets documented almost every little detail of in the history of Middle East conflicts, either expressing general public sentiments or shaping these sentiments, as in the Arab-Byzantine conflict (Saikal & Al Mutanabbi, 1995), the struggles against colonization (Al Musawi, 2006), and the Arab-Israeli conflict (Suliman, 1984).

One of the most famous and influential Arab-Palestinian poets in modern history was Mahmoud Darwish, who wrote a lot about the Arab-Israeli conflict in ways that were unique and challenging. Jaggi (2002) quoted Darwish in *The Guardian* when he said “Poetry and beauty are always making peace. When you read something beautiful you find coexistence; it breaks walls down... I always humanize the other.” He added: “I will continue to humanize even the enemy... The first teacher who taught me Hebrew was a Jew. The first love affair in my life was with a Jewish girl.” He continued: “These poems take the side of love not war” (Jaggi, 2002, para. 19). Such stories and poems were passed from generation to generation, told as folk stories and songs in cafes, taught in literature courses in schools, documented in soap operas and movies, and contribute to the Arabic attitudes toward war and peace and apology and reconciliation.

Tribalism contributes also to both positive and negative attitudes toward apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation in the Arabic culture. As a member of a tribe or a large family, the behavior of the individual can reflect on the reputation and the status of the group in addition to having possible serious consequences for the whole family, tribe, or nation (Barakat, 1993). A man or woman’s behavior may bring shame not only to the person but also to his or her whole family, tribe, or nation. Furthermore, the group can be held responsible for the actions of its members, can suffer the consequences, and be, as a group, a target for revenge. While belonging to a tribe can offer its members pride, support, and protection, such belonging can also put pressure on individuals to adhere closely to social codes of behaviors so they do not err in

the first place. This set of relationships can also put pressure on the group to offer a collective apology and restitution to the other side in order to avoid larger conflicts if one of its members offends. However, sometimes an individual might be willing to apologize, forgive, or reconcile, but the family, tribe, or nation to which he belongs might not be ready to move in that direction. This group reluctance to reconcile might inhibit the individual from moving in the direction of peace. Thus, having positive attitudes toward apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation on the cultural and group level might contribute to individuals' choosing such options more or less frequently.

In addition to old traditions, folk stories, and poetry, the three major religions in the Middle East, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, have influenced Arabic views on apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation in various ways. To varying degrees in the three religions, the quality of forgiveness and peace have been attributed to God, and people were encouraged to seek and practice these values to reap good spiritual, social, and afterlife consequences. In addition, several stories in the sacred books underline the virtue of admitting errors, offering apologies, and forgiving others. For example, in the Old and New Testaments and in the Qur'an, there is the story of Prophet Joseph who forgave the woman who falsely accused him after she told the truth and also forgave his brothers for trying to get rid of him as a child. In Christianity, Jesus practiced forgiveness and offered it to all people.

In Islam, God has 99 names and descriptions, including "Al-Ghafur" or the All Forgiving. Islam teaches that God forgives whomever He wishes and that God forgives all sins: "O people who overindulged themselves, do not lose hope in the mercy of God, as God forgives all sins, He is the Most Forgiving, the Most Merciful" (Qur'an, 39:53). The Qur'an also encourages people to forgive others for their mistakes (Qur'an, 3:34; 7:199) and encourages taking the path of peace if the other side chooses it: "If they go to the side of peace then you too go to the side of peace, and depend on God" (Qur'an, 8:61).

Arabic history has several stories modeling forgiveness and reconciliation by Prophet

Mohammad. For example, one of the major events in Islamic history was the return of Prophet Mohammad to Mecca after years of living in Medina to which he immigrated due to the persecution he and his followers suffered in Mecca, which contributed to the death of many early Muslims including Khadiga, the beloved wife of the Prophet. Historians narrate that when Prophet Mohammad entered Mecca with the Muslim army, many of the people of Mecca were afraid of retaliation. Instead, the Prophet announced to the people of Mecca that no one would be harmed and told them "go, you are free." He assured them that those who had led the persecution against him and his followers would be safe. Such stories, embedded in the Arabic culture, indicated to Muslims that forgiveness and reconciliation are options of strength and that the powerful might choose them.

In addition, similar to Judaism and Christianity, Islam puts a lot of emphasize on Al-Tawbah, or repentance, which can be considered a form of apology to God and reconciliation with God, oneself, and others. Al-Tawbah as a state of mind and existence differs from the state of mind characterized by pride or ignorance, feelings that contribute to refusals to apologize or to forgive. In Islam, components of Al-Tawbah include admitting the mistake and regretting it, correcting it and its consequences as much as possible, seeking forgiveness from God and from the people who were wronged, accepting punishment for the error or compensating people for the harms caused by the behavior, promising not to do the mistake again, and actually not doing it again. Sincere Tawbah is considered a sign of humility, a way to correct errors, a less shameful way to adjust direction in life, a process of healing relations with God and people, and an effort to seek the forgiveness of God. Asking for God's forgiveness in Islam is a component of faith; it shows that the person has a high opinion of God as The Forgiving and that he or she has hope in God.

The three major religions in the Middle East also contain stories of God's punishment and wrath against those who offend and transgress and warnings to those who insist on making their mistakes and do not repent. Some followers

of all religions choose to focus on these punitive verses or stories and that is true in Islam as well as the other religious communities. Historically, a number of Muslim scholars have had long and complicated debates regarding the concept of abrogation, the idea that some verses in the Qur'an (called "Al Nasikh" or the replacer) replace some others (called "Al Mansukh" or the replaced). According to some interpretations of this principle, there are some verses that call for Jihad that replace the verses calling for peace or pardoning. There have been a lot of discussions among Muslim scholars regarding which verses replace which if at all, and these discussions require years of scholarly study and specialization in religious studies (Ibn Hazim, 1986). The views of some Muslims toward apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation have been shaped by these debates.

Another cultural factor that can influence Middle Eastern perspectives on apology and reconciliation is the hierarchical social structure of the Arabic cultures (Barakat, 1993). Within the Arabic culture, the individual is placed within a specific social structure of status and power. This social location grants individuals certain rights and forms of respect but also assigns them certain obligations and responsibilities. Thus, everyone in society is "above" someone and "below" someone. Due to this cultural hierarchy, in cases of conflict, the one with the lower status is expected to start by offering an apology as a sign of respect, and the one with the higher status is expected to pardon as a sign of generosity and power. The one with the higher status might acknowledge a mistake she or he made and might offer an indirect apology, a symbolic one, and not necessarily a verbal one. For example, a father who recognizes his error in the treatment of his child might go to the room of the child and ask the child how she or he is doing. No direct verbal apology might be necessary in order to keep the status and the authority of the father, but an indirect behavioral apology might be sufficient. It is considered very disrespectful in the Arabic culture to ask parents to apologize for actions toward their children. This principle can be applied to some degree to other forms of social relations depending on the horizontal and vertical

distances in the relationship. For example, apology or forgiveness can go in both directions in friendships, whereas apology or forgiveness might go only in one direction in employer-employee relationships.

In the Arabic culture, there are various rituals that symbolize the offering of apology or forgiveness depending on the subculture. For example, in Upper Egypt, "Al Thar" or revengeful killing has been a concern for a long time, where the family of the murdered would seek revenge by killing the murderer or someone from the murderer's family (Hopkins & Saad, 2004). This can start a cycle of violence. One way to end this cycle is for the person who is accused of killing a member of another family, or who is targeted for revenge, to go alone to that family while carrying his coffin as a symbolic way to ask for forgiveness and to avoid bloodshed between the two families.

Processes of apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation play an important role in the judicial system in Saudi Arabia and in Islamic law in general. Depending on several factors, including the nature of the offense, its severity, and the past history of the offender, a sincere repentance or "Tawbah" can reduce or stop some forms of punishments. In addition, an appropriate, and accepted, apology and compensation to the victim or his/her family can help the person avoid serious punishments, including the death penalty. The programs for reeducation and de-radicalization of extremists in Saudi Arabia have employed, among other processes, the concept of sincere repentance and reform as a possible path to abandon extremism and reintegrate in society (Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Stracke, 2007). In addition, in Saudi Arabia, the family or tribe of the accused might negotiate a settlement with the family or tribe of the victim, with the guidance or mediation of the government, in order to avoid the death penalty for the offender and reconcile both families or tribes.

Thus, the processes of apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation in the Middle Eastern cultures can include certain traditional ceremonies that might differ from one subculture to another and might include poetry and other symbolic acts

signifying apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation. Several factors influence the Arabic attitudes toward such processes including past cultural experiences with war and peace, the values expressed in the major religions, the accumulated literature and poetry, and social traditions, norms, and structures reaching down into the community and family levels.

Perspectives on Apology and Reconciliation in the Middle East

Methods

Sample

This sample consisted of 341 participants from 12 countries: Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Oman, and Bahrain. Of these participants, there were 181 males, 159 females, and one participant of unspecified gender. The average age of the participants in this sample was 30, with ages ranging from 18 to 81. Participants were asked if they had served in the military, had a relative who had served in the military, and if they had ever been involved in an antiwar protest activity. Twenty-seven percent of the participants reported their own involvement in the military, 16% reported having a relative who was involved in the military, and 28% reported that they had participated in protest activities.

Procedure

Participants were recruited through links to an online survey, personal networking, and the distribution of paper surveys at universities and shopping malls. They were asked to fill out the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006). This chapter focuses on participants' responses to two items from the survey pertaining to apology and reconciliation. The first item was: "If one country has in the past invaded, colonized, or exercised control over the governmental affairs of another country, an apology by the invading/colonizing/

controlling country can improve the chances for reconciliation between the countries." Participants were asked to rate their level of agreement to that statement on a 7-point Likert scale, with answers ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). In addition, they were asked to respond qualitatively by providing an explanation of their Likert rating. Participants were then asked to respond qualitatively to the second item pertaining to reconciliation, which was: "What steps or factors are necessary to make an apology successful in achieving reconciliation between the countries?" All of the qualitative responses were coded using the apology and reconciliation coding manuals. A more detailed description of the coding manuals and the PAIRTAPS can be found in the introduction to this section of the book (Chap. 22).

Development of Coding Manuals

The apology and reconciliation manuals used in this study were created using procedures based in grounded theory. Grounded theory coding involves the use of inductive approaches in the generation of theory from qualitative data. Hypothesis testing is not involved in grounded theory; instead, qualitative responses are coded into categories based on emergent themes identified in those responses. Major categories are identified and defined through the examination of the relationships among initial categories, which allows for the emergence of theories. Consequently, grounded theory is intended to produce theories that fit the qualitative data obtained in the study (Anderson, 2006).

Can Apology Contribute to Reconciliation?

Apology Coding Manual

Three major sets of categories were identified in responses to the apology item: (a) the effectiveness of the apology *depends* on the situation; (b) *yes/agrees* that an apology can lead to reconciliation; or (c) *no/disagrees* that an apology can lead to reconciliation. It was additionally noted if a

response made a *historical reference* to a country that has committed wrongdoings and had or has not apologized.

There were several major categories for responses indicating that the effectiveness of an apology *depends* based on whether the effectiveness is portrayed as depending on (a) the *nature of the apology*, (b) the *circumstances* in which the apology takes place, (c) whether *acceptance* of the apology occurs, and (d) whether *further action* is seen as necessary. There were also categories for responses that (e) note that an apology is a *good start but is only the beginning*, (f) say that apology *may work* or *is worth a try*, or (g) indicate that an apology may take *time* to work. Several of these categories include subcategories to allow for greater specificity in coding.

Responses that *agree* with the idea that an apology can lead to reconciliation could be coded into one of two categories: (a) apology will lead to *healing* and (b) apology is *necessary*.

Responses that *do not agree* with the idea that an apology can lead to reconciliation could be coded into one of seven categories: (a) reconciliation is *not possible*; (b) an apology *does not erase the past*; (c) people in the country that was mistreated can *forgive but not forget* the wrongdoings; (d) *words do not solve the problem*; (e) *actions speak louder than words*; (f) an apology is *not necessary*; and (g) an apology has *negative consequences*.

Lastly, for responses that made historical references, it was noted whether the reference was made to *positive (effective)* or *negative (ineffective) historical examples* of countries that have committed wrongdoings or countries that have apologized.

Viewpoints on the Effectiveness of an Apology

In regard to whether an apology could lead to reconciliation, the majority of responses (55%) were coded into one of the *depends* categories. The *depends* category with the highest frequency of responses (20% of all the *it depends* responses) was an apology is a *good beginning and first step*. For example, a 27-year-old Israeli

woman said of an apology, “It is a beginning, but really only the beginning for reconciliation.” In addition, 12% of the *it depends* responses suggested that, in addition to an apology, at least one of the following is needed: a *change in behavior*, *the development of tolerance and respect*, and a *positive outlook on the future*. An example of a response demonstrating this point of view can be seen in the comment from a 32-year-old Afghan woman: “(1) An apology is an opportunity for communication. (2) Communication, whether we agree or disagree is the only way we can see what the opposing side’s position is and why.” Lastly, 11% of responses in the *depends* category highlighted the need for *material reparations in addition* to an apology. Table 26.1 provides the breakdown of responses in the *depends* category, in addition to information regarding relative percentages and examples of responses in each category.

Twenty-one percent of responses to the apology item expressed *agreement* with the idea that an apology can lead to reconciliation. Of these responses, 69% indicated *general agreement* with the idea that an apology can lead to reconciliation. For example, a 21-year-old Lebanese woman said, “Apologies do a lot more than it may seem.” Seventeen percent of the agree responses were coded into the *healing* category, and 15% of these responses indicated that an apology is necessary. Table 26.2 provides the breakdown of responses in the *agreement* categories, including information regarding relative percentages and sample responses.

Nineteen percent of responses to the apology item *disagreed* with the idea that apology can lead to reconciliation. Within this category, the majority of responses (39%) suggested that an apology is not effective because it *does not erase the past*. An example of responses highlighting *irreversible wrongdoings* can be seen in the following statement from a 25-year-old Kuwaiti woman: “Apology cannot erase the effects of the invasion of destruction or taking hostages or killing children and the people of the country.” Twenty-two percent of responses fell into the subcategory indicating that an apology will not lead to reconciliation because *words do not matter*. This kind of

Table 26.1 Does apology increases chances of reconciliation? Examples of responses in the “it depends” categories and subcategories

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>It depends</i>	55				
<i>Depends on nature of apology</i>	9 (17)				
Sincerity	4(7)	Bahrain	Male	37	“Honesty and trust involved”
		Kuwait	Male	39	“That this apology must originate from brotherhood and friendship and not an apology of interests”
		Kuwait	Female	34	“True realistic reconciliation is a first step toward peace”
<i>Depends on acceptance</i>	6 (11)				
Depends on acceptance general	5(9)	Jordan	Male	24	“Because it is possible for the countries that were invaded to refuse”
		Israel	Female	35	“There is not always someone to accept the apology”
		Israel	Unspecified	23	“It depends on the character of the occupied nation”
<i>Depends on further action</i>	17(31)				
Need material reparations in addition	6(11)	Lebanon	Male	22	“It won’t be enough. For example, it has to pay back the damage done and to give all other suspects of help”
		Israel	Female	38	“An apology is not enough. Financial compensation must be given and improvement of the living conditions of the occupied people”
		Israel	Female	23	“Only returning the territory will solve the problem”
Change behavior/ respect and tolerance/positive outlook on future	7(12)	Oman	Male	21	“I still think we need to get our rights”
		Afghanistan	Female	32	“(1) An apology is an opportunity for communication. (2) Communication, whether we agree or disagree is the only way we can see what the opposing side’s position is and why”
		Israel	Female	51	“It may improve, however only after ending the violence and a process of discussion that will guarantee an order of behavior/life between the sides”
<i>Good beginning/first step</i>	12 (22)				
Good beginning/first step general	11(20)	Bahrain	Male	22	“It is good start”
		Turkey	Male	25	“It won’t solve it all, but will open the doors”
		Lebanon	Female	20	“Apology is the first step toward reconciliation”

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percent of responses in the specified category or subcategory out of all responses to the apology item. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses for that specific subcategory out of all the *it depends* responses

Table 26.2 Does apology increases chances of reconciliation? Examples of responses in the agree categories and subcategories

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Agreement</i>	21				
<i>General agreement</i>	14(69)	Israel	Female	39	“To apologize is always a good thing”
		Kuwait	Female	43	“Because our religion encourages that we reply to a bad action by a good one”
		Lebanon	Male	19	“Because admitting mistake is a virtue”
<i>Healing</i>	4 (17)				
Repairs dignity	2(7)	Lebanon	Male	28	“More important is the respect between 2 countries”
		Lebanon	Male	26	“This is important for reconciliation of ‘morally good’”
		Lebanon	Female	19	“Because it violated its dignity”
<i>It is necessary</i>	3(15)	Kuwait	Female	45	“It is a must to purify intention and to give up greed”
		Israel	Male	23	“Yes, because history cannot be taken back and people must exist”
		Lebanon	Female	19	“Always any party has to apologize to finish the war, other than that nothing with achieve any result”

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percent of responses in the specified subcategory out of all the responses to the apology item. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses for that specific subcategory out of all the agreement responses

Table 26.3 Does apology increases chances of reconciliation? Examples of responses in disagree categories and subcategories

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Disagreement</i>	19				
<i>Irreversible wrongdoing/ does not erase the past</i>	7(39)	Jordan	Female	38	“Apology cannot erase the effects of the invasion of destruction or taking hostages or killing children and the people of the country”
		United Arab Emirates	Female	18	“An apology is a nice gesture, it could go a long way, but unless it can rebuild infrastructure and bring the dead back to life it’s only a formality”
		Kuwait	Male	32	“Because it is not possible to forget the past and the wounds”
<i>Words do not matter</i>	4(22)	Iran	Female	20	“I do not know, can’t really win people over with words anymore”
		Israel	Male	30	“The apology is not true acknowledgement and understanding”
		Lebanon	Female	19	“Apologies are not enough”

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percent of responses in the specified subcategory out of all the responses to the item. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses for that specific subcategory out of all responses in the disagreement category

response was provided by an 18-year-old Saudi Arabian man: “Sorrys don’t cut it.” Lastly, 12% of responses indicated that it is *not possible* for an apology to lead to reconciliation. Table 26.3 provides the breakdown of responses in the *disagree-*

ment categories, relative percentages, and examples of responses.

Only 4% of responses made a *historical reference*. Of these responses, 30% made a *positive reference*, 30% made a *negative reference*, and

Table 26.4 Apology increases chances of reconciliation: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Category	Group 1 (%) ^a		X ²
	Military service	No military service	
<i>Agreement presence</i>	12	35	10.81**
<i>Disagreement presence</i>	32	19	4.08**
<i>It depends</i>			
<i>Further action</i>			
Change behavior/respect and tolerance/positive outlook on future	11	5	2.63 [^]
	Protest		No protest
<i>Agreement presence</i>	33	18	5.24**
<i>Disagreement presence</i>	18	30	3.14 [^]

Note. If there is a blank row next to a major category name, there were no significant group differences in scores at that level; however, we listed the major category whenever there was a significant group difference in scores in one of the subcategories. "Presence" at the end of a variable name signifies that the variable was created by giving a score of 1 to every participant who provided a response coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories

[^].05 < *p* < 0.10; ***p* ≤ 0.01

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

40% were neutral. The remaining one percent of responses were uncodable.

Exploratory Statistical Analyses of Apology Themes

Exploratory chi-square analyses were conducted in order to determine whether there was any variation among the responses of different demographic groups. The four demographics examined were (a) gender, (b) military experience, (c) a relative with military experience, and (d) protest experience.

Within the Middle Eastern sample, there were a number of statistically significant and marginally significant differences in perspectives on the efficacy of apology. For example, a significantly larger proportion of the respondents without any military experience, as compared with those who did have military experience, gave at least one response indicating *agreement* with the proposition that an apology can lead to reconciliation (i.e., they had a score of 1 on *agreement pres-*

ence). In addition, a significantly greater proportion of respondents with military experience than those without such experience *disagreed* with the notion that an apology can increase the chances of reconciliation. Moreover, respondents with military experience were marginally more likely than those without military experience to agree that, in addition to an apology, an aggressor country must also *change its behavior and have a positive outlook on the future*.

Compared to non-protestors, a significantly greater proportion of antiwar protestors provided at least one response in one of the categories *agreeing* that an apology can lead to reconciliation (i.e., they had scores for *agreement presence*). Additionally, non-protestors were marginally more likely than protestors to provide at least one example of a response in one of the *disagreement* categories (the *disagreement presence* variable). There were no significant group differences in the apology themes based on gender or relatives' military service. Table 26.4 provides the results of these chi-square analyses of group differences in arguments concerning the effectiveness of apology.

Steps to Reconciliation

Reconciliation Coding Manual

Responses to the second item regarding apology and reconciliation (“What steps or factors are necessary to make an apology successful in achieving reconciliation between the countries?”) were categorized into three sets of major categories: (a) reconciliation is *possible* by a specific means; (b) reconciliation is *not possible*; and (c) the participant *does not know* if reconciliation is possible.

There were four major categories for responses expressing the view that reconciliation following apology is possible based on whether success was linked to (a) certain *circumstances*, (b) the *nature of the apology*, (c) the wronged country’s *acceptance* of the apology, and (d) *additional interpersonal or psychological actions* in conjunction with an apology. Each of these categories had several subcategories to allow for specificity in coding. Responses asserting that reconciliation is *not possible* could be coded into one of two categories: (a) reconciliation is not possible due to the *irreversible* nature of the offending country’s wrongdoings, and (b) it is *unrealistic* to believe in the possibility of reconciliation. A more detailed description of the coding manual can be found in Chap. 22.

Viewpoints on Steps Needed to Achieve Reconciliation

Ninety-three percent of all responses to the reconciliation item suggested that reconciliation is *possible*, while merely 4% of responses indicated that reconciliation is *not possible*. Of the remaining responses, 2% were *unsure* of how to achieve reconciliation.

Twenty-six percent of all responses to the reconciliation item indicated that reconciliation is possible based on the *nature of the apology* given by the aggressing country. Of these responses, the largest proportion (33%) indicated that an apology must be given by a *diplomat*

or state official or that an official *treaty* must be signed. For example a 49-year-old Afghan man implicated the need for diplomatic intervention by saying, “The leader of the invading country should apologize I think.” In addition, 33% of responses indicated that the apology must be *sincere*. For example, a 25-year-old man from Turkey said, “The apology must be from the heart and no ‘buts’.” Sixteen percent of responses made reference to a *psychological or interpersonal* component of the reconciliation process. Forty percent of responses in this category mentioned the *reparation of relations* as part of the reconciliation process, while 52% called for *understanding, tolerance, and respect* between countries. For example, a 35-year-old man from Bahrain referenced the reparation of relations by mentioning “continuous talks,” while a 38-year-old Lebanese man invoked a theme of understanding, tolerance, and respect in the following: “Respect the other countries in religion, work, understanding, cooperation.”

Among the suggestions as to what was needed in order for an apology to promote reconciliation, 27% of all responses mentioned the *provision of goods and services*. Within this category, the major portion (43%) of responses indicated the need for *monetary* aid. For example, a 20-year-old man from Oman simply said, “compensation,” while a 25-year-old Israeli said, “not only an apology, compensation as well (like the Jewish Holocaust).” Only 2% of responses implicated the wronged country’s *acceptance* of an apology as part of the reconciliation process. Of responses in this *acceptance* subcategory, 29% indicated that reconciliation depends on *forgiveness*. Lastly, 22% of responses to the reconciliation item suggested that the aggressor’s *change in behavior* is an essential part of the reconciliation process. Of these responses, 35% indicated that, in addition to an apology, the aggressing country must also *end the current conflict*. For example, a 25-year-old Lebanese woman indicated that the aggressing country needs “to give back the rights which were taken away” in order to end current conflict. Table 26.5 provides the relative percentages and examples of

Table 26.5 Reconciliation is achievable through specific steps: examples of responses in common categories and subcategories

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Reconciliation is achievable</i>	93				
<i>Nature of apology</i>	26 (27)				
Sincerity	8(33)	Israel Jordan Kuwait	Male Female Male	22 45	“A true desire and intention” “Apology (must) be with deeds that show that they are sincere in their apology” “Sincere intention and not just an apology that will transform by days to another war”
Diplomatic/treaty	8(33)	Afghanistan Kuwait Oman	Male Female Male	24 19 19	“The president has to come to the country that was invaded and offer a formal apology to the people of that beleaguered country” “Signing a peace contract” “National agreement”
Internat’l supervision	3(13)	Lebanon Oman Lebanon	Female Male Female	21 22 18	“Make it public” “International involvement to reconciliation” “There must be a written apology from the president of the republic and prime minister as well as a press conference for both of them to apologize in front of all people for all the damage that affected both countries”
<i>Interpersonal/ psychological factors</i>	16 (17)				
Repair relations	7(40)	Jordan Lebanon Bahrain	Female Female Male	36 20 20	“Sending representatives for negotiations” “Making agreements that secure the rights of each one” “Serious dialogue”
Understanding/ tolerance/respect	8(52)	Lebanon Israel Jordan	Male Female Male	38 46 22	“Respect the other countries in religion, work, understanding, cooperation” “Serious and mutual understandings in the direction of an apology” “That they reconcile with each other and love and kindness be generalized among them, and that they stand in one line and forget the past, and this must start by the country that started the war of course”
<i>Provide goods or services</i>	27 (30)				
Money	12(43)	Israel Lebanon Oman	Male Male Male	27 18 21	“Money- compensation” “To give financial compensation to families of victims” “Pay the cost of losses and compensation of the State that is attacked”
General goods or services	5(20)	Afghanistan Lebanon Oman	Male Female Female	35 18 44	“Some humanitarian assistance would be a great thing to start” “To compensate for all that it caused” “Restitution to their owners”
<i>Follow through on apology/change behavior</i>	22				
End current conflict/return rights/sovereignty	8(35)	Israel Lebanon Bahrain	Female Female Male	26 25 26	“Opening borders, respecting the other, learning openly” “To give back the rights which were taken away” “Stop damaging the people”

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percent of responses in the specified categories or subcategories out of all the responses to the item. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses for that specific subcategory out of its higher-level category

responses indicating that reconciliation is possible through the aforementioned categories.

Exploratory Analyses of Factors in Reconciliation Themes

Again exploratory chi-square analyses were conducted to determine whether there were demographic group differences in views about the factors needed to achieve reconciliation. These analyses revealed that a significantly higher portion of men than women stated that a *diplomat or official state institution* must issue the apology or that an *official treaty* must be signed ($\chi^2=6.37$, $p=0.01$). It was also determined that non-protestors were marginally more likely than protestors to state that the *provision of goods and services* is necessary to achieve reconciliation ($\chi^2=3.21$, $p=0.07$). There were no other significant group differences found.

Discussion

The findings of this study can be explained within the ecological model (Belsky, 1993). Given the frequent wars and peace efforts in the Middle East, the end of violence and the offering of apology are seen by as just one step toward a more comprehensive solution. The apparent “rejection” or conditionality of apology or reconciliation by some participants might reflect a rejection of pseudo-apologies and a genuine desire for real apologies accompanied lasting change. Thus, many responses reflect a desire for assurances that apology and reconciliation are accompanied by concrete and long-lasting behavioral changes and compensations. In order to reach such assurance, respondents required contingencies on the individual, national, and international levels such as sincerity, presence of positive outlook, respect, the offering of diplomatic official apologies, signing a treaty, and monetary compensations. This might explain the high percent of responses in the *depends* category. Furthermore, the responses of the participants can also reflect underlying levels of hope or pessimism. The long history of

conflicts, colonization, and wars might have produced in some a sense of hopelessness that might be reflected in the pessimism among some respondents regarding reconciliation and apology. That might explain why some respondents mentioned “having positive outlook for the future” and “sincerity” as requirements for apology and reconciliation. The requirements of several assurances on various levels might be seen as defensive and protective mechanisms against the repeat of trauma frequently seen in victims of war and posttraumatic stress disorder (Ehnholt & Yule, 2006).

In addition, some respondents see apology and reconciliation as a start of a process of communication that can lead to mutual understanding, respect, and tolerance. Several respondents mentioned “respect” as an important part of reconciliation. This might reflect the cultural significance of respect in the Middle East. Several studies in Eastern cultures underlined the importance of “respect” in Eastern cultures (Li, 2006; Li & Fischer, 2007). Restoration of “respect” and “honor” is seen as an important part of the restoration of peace and of the healing process. War can be viewed as an expression of “disrespect” for other nations’ human rights, territory, dignity, cultures, history, and their choices in life. Apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation need to be expressed at all the levels that have been affected by war. Restorations will need to occur on all the levels of the ecological model that were affected by war in order for healing to occur on the individual, social, cultural, and international levels.

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Megan Reif, Abdelkader Abdelali, Ariel Stone,
Adeniyi Famose, Jacqueline Akhurst,
Helena Castanheira, Eduardo Correia,
Mahlon Dalley, Natoschia Scruggs,
and William Tastle

States or representatives of international actors, such as empires, city-states, popes, and kings,¹ issued apologies in their conduct of international relations long before the emergence of the Westphalian state system in the seventeenth

century. Apologies have taken on three forms on the international stage: religious apologies to God for violation of religious law, diplomatic apologies for violation of the routinized rules and norms of international conduct, and historical apologies for grave violations of human rights (Bagdonas, 2010). Social scientists have yet to quantify systematically both fulfilled and unfulfilled opportunities for apologies for state

¹ A state apology involves the public, formal, and ritualized (Kampf & Löwenheim, 2012) acknowledgement by a representative of a state of collective responsibility for a transgression against groups or individuals who reside in another state, accompanied by “regret and a disposition to avoid transgressing in the future” (Bagdonas, 2010, p. 202) and aimed at reconciliation with the victims as well as rehabilitation into international society (Carroll, 2008, p. 17). This reconciliation with victims and restoration of the enjoyment of the full benefits of membership in international society is akin, some argue, to forgiveness, since no apology made in the international realm has ever been answered by a formal statement of forgiveness (Griswold, 2007). Many scholars have argued that state apology requires additional components, such as expression of emotion, sympathy for the victim, and acceptance of a narrative of past events that represents a common, factual understanding of what happened as understood by the victim, but it is not clear how fulfillment of these criteria would be measured (Cole, 2008).

M. Reif
Political Science and International Studies, University of
Colorado Denver, Denver, CO, USA
e-mail: reifm@umich.edu; reifmegan@live.com

A. Abdelali (✉)
Department of Political Science, University of Tahar
Moulay, Saida, Algeria
e-mail: abdelaliabk@gmail.com

A. Stone
Department of Psychology, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA

A. Famose
Joavic’s Foundation, Nigeria
e-mail: adenyifamose@yahoo.com;
joavicfoundations@yahoo.com

J. Akhurst
Department of Psychology, York St John University,
England
e-mail: J.Akhurst@yorks.ac.uk

H. Castanheira
Psychology Department, New School for Social
Research, New York, NY, USA
e-mail: helenacasta@gmail.com

E. Correia
ISCTE Business School in Lisbon, Portugal
e-mail: EduardoC.indeg@netcabo.pt

M. Dalley
Psychology Department, Eastern Washington University,
Cheney, WA, USA
e-mail: mdalley@ewu.edu

N. Scruggs
Asylum Division, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Arlington, VA, USA
e-mail: nscruggs@aol.com

W. Tastle
Ithaca College of Business, New York, USA
e-mail: tastle@ithaca.edu

violations against other sovereign states, former colonies, or occupied territories (Bagdonas, 2010; Bilder, 2005; Chalkley, 2009). Nevertheless, some argue that apologies of the third type have increased during the past 50 years (Fette, 2008; Hook, 2008a; Kampf & Löwenheim, 2012; Löwenheim, 2009; Mills, 2001) and that transnational apologies contribute to reconciliation, conflict resolution, and improved interstate relations (Amstutz, 2005; Barkan & Karn, 2006; Hook, 2008b; Lazare, 2005; Radzik, 2009; Smith, 2008; Tavuchis, 1991). These assertions are largely untested and belie the fact that the number of public state apologies for historic injustices is miniscule in comparison with the number of state transgressions associated with silence or explicit refusals to apologize (Chalkley, 2009, pp. 102–103; Liauzu, 2005). That is, this research is vulnerable to what social scientists call “selection bias” because it tends to analyze only situations in which public apologies occur but not those circumstances in which states consider and reject apology without public knowledge or simply remain silent. In observing an increase in state apology, the literature does not account for the increase in the number of states in the international system nor likely changes in the denominator—a concomitant increase in the *number of opportunities* for apology (i.e., the number of violations of international law for which apologies might be warranted). Transnational apologies, then, are still the exception, rather than the rule, following serious state violations of human rights standards and laws (Bilder, 2005; Chalkley, 2009). While this study does no better in addressing the methodological challenges of measuring state apology and assessing its effects, it is important to keep them in mind as a caution that inferences about trends and causes should not be made based only on observed apologies and the qualitative interview responses analyzed here.

States view apology as more than mere “cheap talk.” Modern states avoid acknowledgement of transgressions against other states, groups, and individuals for legal and practical reasons. First, states are careful to avoid statements that validate demands for material

compensation of past wrongs (Bilder, 2005; Gibney & Roxstrom, 2001). The symbolic notion of apology is related closely to material compensation as a remedy for injustices committed by states. Reparations have longer and more established history as a legal remedy to repair relations between international actors. Compensation for injuries to individuals has been central to the development of law since Aristotle distinguished between revenge and its alternative, corrective justice, which involved payments proportional to the injury in order to offset the desire for revenge and offset escalating blood feuds (Engerman, 2009, pp. 594–595). Known as indemnity when sovereign actors are involved, the practice of state compensation for injustices against groups and individuals that occurred in Feudal England, post-Revolutionary War and post-Civil War America, and the aftermath of the 1871 Franco-Prussian war are a few examples of periods during which states paid indemnities to individual citizens or foreigners for past wrongs (Engerman, 2009). In cases of physical harm or murder, Islamic law, which has had considerable influence on and is compatible with many aspects of international criminal justice and humanitarian law (Cockayne, 2002; Maged, 2008), allows victims or their families to choose between limited physical punishment (*Qassas*) of the transgressor or compensation (*diyya*), with a preference for the latter in combination with forgiveness (Bassiouni, 1997, pp. 283–284; Hakeem, 2003; Layish, 2006). In the twentieth century, international parlance evolved, and the concept became known as state reparations in 1951 when Konrad Adenauer acknowledged German responsibility for persecution and execution of Jews during the Holocaust, as well as Germany’s duty to make moral and material reparations (Engerman, 2009, p. 598).

Second, states avoid making symbolic statements that set general legal precedents that will constrain future behavior or create obligations for intervention or action (Bilder, 2005). Third, states face domestic costs for apology, including what Lind calls “remembrance backlash” in her recent empirical study of the internal and external effects

of interstate apology (Lind, 2010).² Fourth, because state apologies are necessarily public performances made on an international stage, third parties are also important audiences whose anticipated reactions factor into a state's calculation about whether to issue an apology for past wrongs (Carroll, 2008; Kampf & Löwenheim, 2012; Warner, 2002). In issuing apologies, states risk subsequent demands from third parties for similar acts committed elsewhere or during different periods, in addition to criticism by third parties and the international community that the apology is insufficient. A botched or insincere apology can subject the apologizing state to further ostracism or marginalization.

In contrast with a tendency to avoid establishing apology as an international norm following *interstate* transgressions, the international community has embraced a norm of "transitional justice" following *intrastate* conflict, which includes apology along with some combination of mechanisms that balance justice and reconciliation (Thoms, Ron, & Paris, 2010). African countries have contributed heavily to this international norm of pursuing accountability and reconciliation to stabilize intrastate relations following past episodes of civil conflict (Backer, 2006, 2009). Many studies document the numerous and varied formal and informal instruments of *intrastate* reconciliation that Africa's states and communities have employed, including investigative inquiries, domestic and international court proceedings, truth and reconciliation commissions, apology and reconciliation measures, reparations for victims, and offers of amnesty, community reentry, rehabilitation, and/or reintegration

for transgressors (see, e.g., Backer, 2009; Graybill, 2004; Graybill & Lanegran, 2004; Gready, 2010; Huyse & Salter, 2008), but Africa features less prominently in studies of *interstate* apology and reconciliation. Well-known African examples are included in the growing literature on transnational apology (e.g., Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Engerman, 2009; Gibney & Roxstrom, 2001; Hook, 2008b; MacLachlan, 2010; Shelton, 2004), but in comparison to studies of intrastate truth and reconciliation in Africa, those that explore the African experience of international apology (e.g., Howard-Hassmann & Lombardo, 2008; Lombardo & Howard-Hassmann, 2005) are scant. Few efforts have been made to assess systematically how ordinary people feel about state apology, in Africa or elsewhere.

Empirical studies from a variety of disciplines have explored the more general concept of apology at the individual unit of analysis. One group of studies explores differences in the practices and perceptions of interpersonal and group/public/political/institutional apologies (Neto, Pinto, & Mullet, 2007a, 2007b). Another category of research investigates rhetorical, ritual, and/or behavioral components of apologies (e.g., Auerbach, 2009; Griswold, 2007; Kampf & Löwenheim, 2012; Vinsonneau & Mullet, 2001). A third group looks at whether apologies and the terms under which they are accepted differ across groups and cultures (e.g., Hickson, 1986; Mullet & Neto, 2009; Neto et al., 2007a, 2007b; Vinsonneau & Mullet, 2001). Several studies conducted in African countries explore individual attitudes about reconciliation following civil conflict (Backer, 2005; Chapman, 2007; Gibson, 2002; Mullet & Neto, 2009; Neto et al., 2007a, 2007b; Rettig, 2008; Stein et al., 2008) and views on transnational apology and reconciliation (Lombardo & Howard-Hassmann, 2005). Further research on the attitudes of individuals toward state apology can help answer questions that the scholarly literature, Bilder argues, has yet to address: "Are state-to-state governmental apologies really successful in resolving grievances and disputes and how can we measure success? Are people injured aware of such governmental apologies and do they really feel better and more forgiving because of them? Do such apologies

²If apology as a practice of international diplomacy does contribute to reconciliation, it does so on an informal basis in that it is not recognized as a formal remedy in international law, although apologies may affirm the existence and justify application of existing remedies for the violations of laws and norms that the apology may acknowledge. As a result, leaders craft state apologies that avoid providing evidence or admission that specific norms and rules with binding legal remedies or obligations were violated (Bilder, 2005). State apologies for their past injustices have largely been limited to conduct that so obviously violated international norms that they only reinforce existing norms rather than establish new precedents (Bilder, 2005, p. 359).

affect reconciliation or healing between countries and peoples, and how can we measure such reconciliation” (2005, pp. 470–471)?

While answering these questions definitively is beyond the scope of the present study, this chapter explores *how* ordinary people from diverse contexts on the African continent understand the concept of transnational apology, *under what conditions* they believe the practice might contribute to peace and reconciliation between countries, and *the patterns of reasoning* that they employ when weighing its effectiveness. The study uses grounded theory to identify and describe response patterns according to common themes, categories, and subcategories that emerged from the 69 available qualitative, written responses of participants from Angola, Ghana, Botswana, Algeria, and Egypt that elaborate on their quantitative ratings on items of apology and reconciliation as part of a broader, ongoing research project, the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006), developed by the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP). Although there are many limitations on the generalizability of findings from responses to open-ended questions in a small, disproportionately literate, and economically well-off sample, we hope that this identification of patterns and assembly of illustrative voices from Africa will shed some light on why state apologies are rare, whether they generally enhance bilateral relations between peoples, and, if they do not, what symbolic or tangible elements, such as material compensation, must accompany them if they are to contribute to reconciliation.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: First, we describe state apologies (and non-apologies) and available information on interstate reconciliation on the continent³, as well

³ While sub-Saharan and North Africa are often separated in academic studies, North and sub-Saharan Africa have worked together in continent-wide efforts to seek apology and reparations for “slavery, colonialism, and neocolonialism” in the tradition of pan-Africanism started by Caribbean-American Marcus Garvey in the 1920s (Howard-Hassmann, 2004, pp. 86–87).

as any available information about elite and citizen attitudes toward those apologies. Second, we describe the sample used in the present study and the procedure used to code the qualitative responses that identify elements of apology that must be present, actions that must accompany the apology if reconciliation is to occur, and what reconciliation looks like in the minds of ordinary people. Third, we describe the pattern of responses and illustrative examples of respondent voices on the topic. Finally, we discuss the findings and how they relate to previous work on the subject as it applies to Africa.

State Apologies and Non-Apologies in Africa

One can imagine that there is an opportunity for apology for each of the countless episodes of brutality committed during the intra-African, Arab, American, and European slave trades; colonialism by European powers in Africa (Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, Italy, and Belgium); Cold War Era proxy wars and covert operations; and post-Cold War interventions or failures to intervene. Some have argued that Africans are particularly entitled to transnational apology and reparation compared to peoples in other regions, because “only Africans endured the double burden of both being enslaved and colonized” (Howard-Hassmann, 2004, p. 93, citing Ajaye, 2002, p. 3; Jones, 1992). Before discussing specific demands for apologies and moments of state repentance, it is important to begin with a discussion of the more comprehensive, continent-wide effort to obtain general material compensation for state transgressions against Africans.

Drawing inspiration from successful efforts by Jews to obtain reparations for the Holocaust, the African-American movement for reparations in the United States (US), US government to payments to Japanese-Americans interned during the Second World War, American demands that Iraq pay reparations to Kuwait after the 1991 Gulf

War, and other cases,⁴ Nigerian businessman Bashorun M. K. O. Abiola, who was later elected president of Nigeria but prohibited from taking office, sought to design institutions that could seek reparations for Africa, writ large. Those involved in this and related efforts recognized that remedies for state transgressions of international law can include symbolic reparations, such as apology, but viewed symbolic acts as meaningless without financial compensation and thus emphasized the narrower meaning of the term (Howard-Hassmann, 2004, p. 90).

In response to Abiola's urging, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) established a 12-member Group of Eminent Persons (GEP) in 1992 to pursue reparations for slavery and other wrongs perpetrated on Africa by other states. Members represented Nigeria, Egypt, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, South Africa, Kenya, Cape Verde, Ghana, and Jamaica. The GEP and the OAU Commission for Reparations sponsored the first and only Pan-African Conference on Reparations in April 1993, which issued an official proclamation declaring that states that had engaged in slavery, colonialism, and neocolonialism owed moral and material debts to Africa. It called for compensation in the form of return of art and treasure taken by colonial powers, cancellation of Africa's debts, and greater representation of African countries in international organizations such as the UN Security Council (Howard-Hassmann, 2004, p. 86). In contrast with activists who sought to assign dollar values to reparations owed to Africa, the GEP did not quantify its demands for compensation (Howard-Hassmann, 2004, p. 91). In interviews with the GEP's principals, Howard-Hassmann (2004) found that the GEP effort was largely decentralized and depended on individual statements and activism by its members. By 2003,

Abiola's hope of generating an African movement for reparations had largely evaporated, with only three of the Eminent Persons remaining active in 2003 and a few small groups in Britain, Jamaica, Ghana, and Kenya having opened and closed their doors by that year. The African Union, which succeeded the OAU in 2002, has not put reparations on its agenda (Howard-Hassmann, 2004, p. 93).

Drawing to some extent on the experience of the GEP, as well as postapartheid South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the 2001 United Nations World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance in Durban, South Africa, produced a Final Document that stated:

We acknowledge that slavery and the slave trade.... are a crime against humanity, and should always have been so, especially the transatlantic slave trade, and are among the major sources and manifestations of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance.... We recognize that colonialism has led to racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance. (Howard-Hassmann, 2004, p. 82)

The declaration went on to say that the victims of violations of human rights should have the right to seek reparations. Statements made at the conference linked the slave trade to contemporary problems in Africa and the African Diaspora (Howard-Hassmann, 2004). Attendees of the preparatory conference for Durban noted that "other groups which were subject to other scourges and injustices have received repeated apologies from different countries as well as ample reparations," and that Africans deserved the same remedy for its double burden of slavery and colonialism (Howard-Hassmann, 2004, p. 83).

While many African leaders supported the official declarations made at these events, some, such as Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, disagreed, arguing that many Africans were themselves descendants of slaveholders who should then also be required to pay monetary compensation to the descendants of their slaves. He and others also suggested that the causes of Africa's contemporary underdevelopment were more

⁴In the early 1990s, Jewish groups demanded payment of unpaid life insurance policies on Holocaust victims and release of funds in Swiss Banks deposited by Jews before and during World War II to their descendants. Reparation claims in the United States include the (unsuccessful) 1997 introduction of legislation on the subject in the US House of Representatives by white Congressman Tony Hall and a movement for descendants of slaves to bring class-action civil lawsuits against corporations that profited from slavery (Howard-Hassmann, 2004, pp. 88–89).

complex than to be attributable to a single, historic cause and that reparations deflected attention to the more proximate problem of internal African politics and abuse of power by African dictators (Howard-Hassmann, 2004, p. 83). Arab slavery was omitted because it was less race conscious—enslaving both whites and blacks—and provided for institutions for the emancipation and integration of slaves into free society, often through application of Islamic law. Critics of the omission felt that Arabs should be held accountable for their ancestors' initiation of the market for slaves on the continent (Howard-Hassmann, 2004, p. 84). Malay and Chinese traders were also involved in the slave trade on the east coast of Africa (Shelton, 2004). Those who are critical of the idea of paying reparations to African governments for slavery note such examples and also point out that if reparations are to be paid, they should go to the African Diaspora whose ancestors were enslaved, not to Africans in Africa (Shelton, 2004).

Slavery

In 1985, Pope John Paul II, on behalf of the Catholic Church, asked for forgiveness from Africans for “the slavery that moved people to Europe and America” (Engerman, 2009, p. 599). During a 1998 trip to Uganda, US President Bill Clinton made an apology to Africa for the slave trade, stating that, “...going back in time before we were a nation, European Americans received the fruits of the slave trade. And we were wrong...” (Gibney & Roxstrom, 2001, p. 913, note 8). Criticizing the apology for its purely symbolic nature, Osabu-Kle writes: “without commitment to reparation, President Clinton’s apology...is totally unacceptable” (Osabu-Kle, 2000, pp. 346–347). Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair also described the slave trade as a crime against humanity, which, some argued, constituted an apology. Critics noted the absence of the words “sorry” or “apology” in his statement (Engerman, 2009, p. 599).

Recognizing the role of Africans themselves in the slave trade, the governments of Ghana and Benin have apologized to the descendants of Africa slaves, while Mauritania provided funds

to reduce the poverty suffered by its former slaves (Engerman, 2009, p. 599). A human rights organization in Nigeria has demanded that traditional rulers in the country apologize for the role of their ancestors in the slave trade (Ulasi, 2009).

The Sudan Commission for Human Rights (SCHR) is pursuing reparations for both the historic and recent Arab-led slavery in Sudan, inspired by Namibian Herero reparation litigation against Germany (Bankie, 2004), discussed below. The 2003 Conference on Arab-Led Slavery of Africans in Johannesburg, convened by the Cape Town Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society (CASAS) and the Drammeh Institute of New York, has played a role in shaping African claims against Arab states for their slave trade (“Arab slavery of Africans,” 2005). At the second Afro-Arab summit in Sirte, Libya, in 2010, President Qaddafi apologized to Africans on behalf of Arabs, stating, “I regret the behavior of the Arabs...they brought African children to North Africa, made them slaves, sold them like animals, and took them as slaves...I regret and am ashamed when we remember these practices. I apologize for this” (Atentra, 2010). Atenra argues that material reparations should proceed from this apology (2010).

In 1998, the 150th anniversary of the French abolition of slavery prompted calls for state apology and a march initiated by over 300 French-African organizations (Camus, 2006). The official commemoration of the anniversary celebrated the “French model of integration” of former slaves, inviting harsh criticism and galvanizing several nongovernmental organizations, which had begun seeking redress for slavery in 1981, to seek more explicit French recognition of slavery as a system in which France participated (Faustinien, 2009, p. 7). Their activities culminated in the French parliament’s passage of the Taubira Act in 2001, which made France the first nation to recognize slavery as a crime against humanity (Fette, 2008; Howard-Hassmann, 2004). The law granted no financial compensation to organizations representing the African community in France or to descendants of victims. Until the 1990s, France had engaged in “organized oblivion of its history just after the abolition in 1848” (Faustinien, 2009, p. 1), a policy that began to change with official French recognition of

and compensation for the Vichy regime's crimes against the Jews. Other victims of French injustices argued that they were equally entitled to redress.

As one of several measures following riots in Paris involving members of African minority groups in 2005 and 2006, President Jacques Chirac inaugurated an annual commemoration of the abolition of slavery (Fette, 2008) and promoted national coverage of the event on French public television (Faustinien, 2009). Like the 1998 commemoration, critics characterized the event and official media coverage for celebrating French abolitionists and lauding the Republic's embrace of its revolutionary principles, rather than recognizing French involvement in the evils of the institution and its long-term effects (Camus, 2006).

Portuguese journalist and writer de Figueiredo has called on Portugal, second only to Britain in the extent of its slave trade in Africa, to apologize for its slave trade, noting that the country at least owes a moral debt, if not reparations that would far exceed its gross national product (de Figueiredo, 2001). He shares this view with Portuguese academics and intellectuals (Jason, 2009), but there is little evidence that there are formal demands for an apology from former Portuguese colonies in Africa or a willingness on the part of the government to issue one.

Despite requests from Nigeria, Jamaica, and other former colonies, the British have consistently refused to apologize for the slave trade. In 1999, the city council of Liverpool apologized for the city's role as a major docking point in the trade, and the Church of England synod apologized the same year (Muir, 2007). The latest government refusal came from Tony Blair in 2007 and met with apologies from the Baptist church in England (Rösler, 2007) and the Mayor of London, who referred to the French repentance as further justification that Britain should issue a formal apology (Muir, 2007).

Apologies and Non-Apologies for Colonialism

In 2001, the European Union (EU) applauded nations that had apologized for colonialism and slavery and called on others to do so at the UN

World Conference against Racism in Durban, South Africa (Fette, 2008, p. 102). Britain worked to block a plans for direct apology by the EU. According to Engerman (2009) as of 2008 there had been no direct reparations or formal apologies from Europeans to African nations for colonialism writ large. There are some signs, however, that the global economic recession, the fragility of the Euro Zone, and increasing global competition for energy have made European nations eager to strengthen ties with their former colonies.

France has taken more steps toward a general apology for colonialism than have Belgium, Britain, Germany, Italy, and Portugal, but its efforts have been mixed with measures that, in the eyes of critics, are designed to avoid taking responsibility for the wrongs it committed as a colonial power. In 2005, for example, the French Parliament, with a majority held by the center-right *Union pour un Mouvement Populaire* party of former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, passed the French Law on Colonialism, containing two controversial articles declaring that France's influence on its former colonies had been positive and requiring teachers to impart this message to their students. In response to sharp criticism from historians and all parties on the left, President Chirac broke with his own party and orchestrated a repeal of the disputed articles from the otherwise uncontroversial law, which contained measures to improve conditions for French people who left Algeria for France after independence. Despite Chirac's efforts, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika canceled plans that year to sign a new friendship treaty with France, stating during a rally that the law demonstrated France's "mental blindness" and that, in order to establish better relations with Algeria, the French had "no choice but to recognize that they tortured, killed and exterminated Algerians from 1830–1962" (Anderson, 2005a).

The following year, François Hollande, leader of the French Socialist Party between 1997 and 2008 and 2012 President-elect of France, visited Algeria and stated in an interview with Algeria's primary independent French-language newspaper, *El-Watan*, that:

Colonization was an unequal and oppressive system. The war in Algeria has produced, like any war, human tragedies. To recognize this truth is not to add insult to injury, but to fulfill our duty to the victims of this period. A return to our past is necessary to prepare for the future... The law of February 28, 2005, passed in France by a majority of the right, sparked anger and misunderstanding not only in Algeria, but also in France. It is because the left mobilized to repeal Article 4, which recognizes the positive nature of colonization, that Jacques Chirac eventually overturned the provision. (Bouzeghrane, 2012)

In his book *Devoirs de vérité: Dialogue avec Edwy Plenel* (*Duties of Truth: A Dialogue with Edwy Plenel*) published in the same year, Hollande stated that France should apologize for its colonial past and its consequences. In those interviews, Hollande spent a great deal of time talking about the importance of economic cooperation between France and Algeria.

If now-President Hollande takes formal steps consistent with his past statements, he could make France the first former colonial power to issue an apology, which would be a major departure from France's decades-long policy of enforcing silence about the realities of French colonialism in Africa (Liauzu, 2005, pp. 102–103). The absence of a common understanding between France and its former colonies of the historical events during the colonial period has had a lingering effect. There is an enormous gap between research by specialists who have documented the less-flattering history of French colonialism and official French curricula. Universities are reluctant to revise curricula to reflect new research on the subject of colonialism, not only for general instruction but also even in the training of future historians and social scientists (Liauzu, 2005, p. 105).

Specific Transgressions During Colonialism

While apologies for slavery and colonialism in general are rare, there have been more instances of apology and, in some cases, material reparations, for particularly brutal episodes of colonialism, including those committed by colonial

powers as they either fought to retain or abandoned their colonies.

The Herero people, a minority ethnic group in Namibia, have long demanded an apology and reparations from Germany for the systematic extermination of an estimated 65,000–75,000 Herero in 1904, a request that met with refusal until the centennial of the genocide in 2004. Germany finally issued an apology and promised development aid to Namibia as compensation. Viewing this form of payment as insufficient (Marrus, 2007; Morgan, 2012) and of only marginal benefit to the politically powerless Herero minority (Anderson, 2005b), the Herero community continues reparation claims without support from the Namibian government, which receives more aid from Germany than any other donor (Anderson, 2005b; Engerman, 2009). The Herero reparation claims are unresolved at the time of this writing in 2012.

Backed by the Kenyan Human Rights Commission, victims of the British response to the Mau Mau rebellion against its rule in Kenya in the 1950s, which resulted in the mass killing of approximately 90,000 and torture and detention of 160,000 Kenyans who refused to renounce their oath to the Mau Mau rebellion, have redoubled their efforts recently to obtain British apology and compensation. New research and release of records documenting their claims has strengthened their case (Sears, 2011). Their supporters also have been galvanized by British hypocrisy in its demand for apologies from Libya's new revolutionary leaders for President Mu'ammār al-Qaddafi's role in blowing up the Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. (McGreal, 2011). While it does not deny the well-documented record of its atrocities during the Mau Mau rebellion, Britain's Foreign Office refuses to apologize. Britain employs a number of legal arguments to avoid payment of compensation in a law suit by four Kenyan victims in the British High Court in London, arguing, for example, that British responsibility for colonial-era transgressions ended when Kenya became independent in 1963 (McGreal, 2011).

The government of Belgium apologized for its complicity in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba just after Congo's independence from Belgium. As a result, Mobutu Sese Seko came to

power and ruled as a tyrant for 36 years. Belgium also established a Patrice Lumumba Foundation to fund conflict resolution programs in the country (“Belgium faces up to its bloody past,” 2002).

In contrast to the emphasis on material compensation among victims of colonial brutalities in Africa, for Algerians, “a verbal apology has become the benchmark for reconciliation” (Fette, 2008, p. 10). In fact, limited material overtures have met with lukewarm response. Recognition of single incidents has only emboldened demands for a more comprehensive apology. In early 2005, for example, with Jacques Chirac’s permission, French ambassador to Algeria Hubert Colin de Verdière recognized as “an inexcusable tragedy” the French massacre of between 15,000 and 90,000⁵ people on May 8, 1945, in Sétif, a reprisal for the earlier Algerian Armistice Day protests on November 11, 1944 (Peyroulou, 2006). Algerians responded to de Verdière’s statement by calling for a full official French apology for the war against Algerian independence and stating dissatisfaction with half measures, such as opening of archives, posting of plaques, and commissioning of monuments (Fette, 2008).

Fette argues that a consensus among scholars and some citizens in France has emerged that an apology would improve bilateral relations between the two countries and contribute to better integration of Algerian immigrants, who are “the living reminder of decolonization and its unresolved conflicts” into French society (2008, p. 102). A 2001 survey, for example, found that 56 % of respondents favored an official French apology to Algeria (Fette, 2008, p.101). There is some evidence that an apology could be forthcoming in the relatively near future.

⁵Estimates of the number killed range from a low of about 1,000, according to official French sources, to a high of 90,000. Algerian scholars differ in their estimates, which range from 15,000 to 30,000, with estimates in the popular media typically 45,000 and as high as 90,000 (Peyroulou, 2006). Ordinary Algerians, particularly those in Sétif, seem to have a common belief that the number killed on May 8, 1945, alone was 45,000 (Observations based on Reif visit to the monument to the massacre at Sétif in June 2004 and conversations with Algerians in 2004 and 2007, in which the phrase “the French massacred 45,000 people in a single day” was uttered repeatedly).

After Jacques Chirac’s May 1995 admission of French guilt, or what he called “collective fault” for the transgressions of the Vichy regime against its citizens and role in the Holocaust, including responsibility for persecution and deportation of more than 76,000 Jews to concentration camps (Fette, 2008), the country has been much less forthcoming in its acknowledgement for transgressions against former colonies. Chirac’s apology was a response, in part, to public campaigns in 1992 for an apology targeted at Chirac’s socialist predecessor, Mitterrand, whose agreement to commission a monument commemorating Vichy’s victims did not make up for his refusal to apologize formally. Chirac’s apology, then, was politically advantageous at a time when polls showed that about three in four French citizens supported it, although some on the extreme right opposed it vocally (Fette, 2008, p. 82). In 1997, the French Catholic Church issued an apology to the Jewish community for its inaction during the Holocaust, not all of its bishops signed it (Fette, 2008, p. 87). Professional organizations of lawyers, police, and medical personnel also issued apologies for their respective roles in persecuting Jews, but not all members of these associations agreed with the apology, weakening their impact (Fette, 2008, p. 96).

This spate of apologies for Vichy atrocities against the Jews, combined with the publication of revelatory studies documenting French torture in Algeria, prompted many scholars, and prominent French personalities to petition the president and prime minister to apologize for French atrocities during Algeria’s war for independence, explicitly citing Chirac’s apology for Vichy transgressions as a model (Fette, 2008, p. 99). Neither President Chirac nor Prime Minister Jospin responded, despite high hopes for a French apology when Chirac visited Algeria in March 2003. Mitterrand’s decision to settle in France and accept a high-level position with the Vichy regime after escaping from Germany in 1942 (made under duress, he argued) may explain his refusals to acknowledge French responsibility for atrocities against the Jews. Chirac’s decision as a lieutenant in the French Army to volunteer to fight in Algeria rather than take a post in

Germany in 1956, a period of his life he characterized with pride (Bacqué & Beaugé, 2003), may have influenced his reluctance to apologize for the French-Algerian war.

During the 2007 presidential election campaign in France, both center-right candidate Nicolas Sarkozy and Socialist candidate Ségolène Royal criticized the trend toward state repentance (Fette, 2008). Nevertheless, Algerians were hopeful before President Sarkozy's visit to Algeria on July 2007 as a result of his enthusiasm for a Mediterranean union with North Africa and his statement that French companies were ready to "invest massively" in Algeria. They were disappointed when Sarkozy defended France's refusal to apologize for colonial injustices in interviews with *El-Watan* and *Al-Khabar*. During Sarkozy's second visit to Algeria in December of the same year, *Al-Khabar* printed a front-page demand for an apology encompassing the colonial period, the war, and nuclear tests carried out in the Algerian Sahara in 1960 and 1966, while more than 160 Algerian and Moroccan politicians, lawyers, and rights advocates published a joint appeal for France to acknowledge the "trauma caused by the colonization of Algeria," in order to heal ties between the nations (Agence France-Presse, 2007). In a speech to Algerian business leaders presumably responding to these demands, Sarkozy admitted, "Yes, the colonial system was profoundly unjust, contrary to the three founding words of our Republic: freedom, equality, brotherhood," but stopped short of apology and called on Algerian and French historians to write the history of the "tormented period" together ("Sarkozy says colonial rule unjust," 2007). Algeria's Interior Minister Nouredine Yazid Zerhouni responded to the statement by saying that it was "a step in the good direction" (Ward, 2007).

When he visited Algeria in 2010, France's President-elect (2012) François Hollande did not make any promises or commitments to apologize if elected in 2012, but he suggested it would be likely. Hollande's overtures, however, could have been calculated to get more votes both for the nomination to be the Socialist presidential candidate and for the general election (TPH, 2011). In statements

on the topic, Hollande referenced explicitly his desire for the Algerian community's support (Bouzeghrane, 2012).

French transgressions against the people of its former colony prior to the war for independence are also the subject of demands for apology and material reparations. Only recently, in large part due to the critically acclaimed 2006 film *Indigènes/Days of Glory*, directed by Rachid Bouchareb, has France recognized Algeria's contribution to the Liberation of France during the Second World War. In 1944, half of the regular French army was made up of troops from the country's colonial territories, and Algeria supplied just over half through both conscription and voluntary enlistment—an estimated total of 125,000 Algerians (Cooper, 2007). A series of French laws froze pensions for veterans of "indigenous" origin (former colonial subjects) who were compensated at one-third the level of their French counterparts (Cooper, 2007) until the film prompted compensation for the discrepancy in indigenous veterans' pay at a cost of 100 million Euros (Cooper, 2007, p. 92).

Although over 20 countries in Africa fell under French colonial influence, and France continued to interfere in African politics and supply arms to African leaders long after independence (Luckham, 1982), only a few Francophone African states have asked for apologies. On July 21, 2005, during an official visit to Madagascar, President Sarkozy decried "the unacceptability of the repression caused by the misconduct of the colonial system," referring to the deaths of tens of thousands of Malagasy, in 1947, massacred after revolting against France, but stopped short of apology (Beaugé, 2007). In 2009, in response to French criticisms of his regime's arrest of a journalist and measures to minimize opposition in the October 2009 election, Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali reiterated demands for a French apology for colonialism (Lagarde, 2009).

Although many have criticized the enforced silence surrounding French colonial history, particularly in Algeria, according to Italian historian Claudia Gazzini, "Italians suffer from a general colonial amnesia and know very little about their country's adventures in Africa—far less, for

instance, than the French know about Algeria” (Gazzini, 2009). Italian rule in Libya was extremely violent. One episode of during armed resistance to Italian occupation resulted in the deaths of more than 100,000 people in concentration camps (Gazzini, 2009). Despite this history, there was no pressure from the Libyan public for apology, no Libyans have sought reparations in Italian courts, and the Libyan government under Colonel Qaddafi never raised the issue at the International Court of Justice (Gazzini, 2009). Around 2005, the Qaddafi government started pressuring Italy to recognize its atrocities. Qaddafi asked Italy to make a “grande gesto” and proposed that the former colonizer transform its colonial-era coastal road into a highway linking Libya’s borders with Tunisia in the west and Egypt in the east. Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi visited Benghazi in August 2008 and said, while bowing before the son of the leader of the Libyan resistance to colonial rule, “It is my duty to express to you, in the name of the Italian people, our regret and apologies for the deep wounds that we have caused you” (Gazzini, 2009).

In the midst of an economic recession in Italy, Berlusconi signed a treaty with Qaddafi that day committing Italy to paying \$5 billion to Libya over 30 years. in exchange for Libyan efforts to stop migrants from crossing the Mediterranean and entering Italy illegally (Zimmerer & Schaller, 2008). Although the treaty is, in effect, an indemnity for the crimes committed during Italy’s 30 years in Libya, the text of the treaty does not mention the colonial history (Gazzini, 2009). Although historians criticized this omission, the treaty drew little criticism from ordinary Italians and Libyans, neither in 2008 nor again in March 2012, when it was reactivated by Prime Minister Mario Monti and the leader of Libya’s Transitional National Council Mustafa Abdul Jalil (“Friendship treaty with Libya reactivated,” 2012). Although the treaty would benefit Italian companies more than the Libyan people, the verbal apology and material benefits of the treaty achieved a sense of reconciliation on the part the Libyan people, if Gazzini’s characterization of the Libyan response is typical:

On the streets of Tripoli, ordinary Libyans claim that Italians and Libyans are now “*sawa sawa*,”

which in the local dialect means “the same” or “equals.” In their eyes, thanks to this agreement Italy has once and for all set aside the discriminatory and racist attitude that characterized the colonial period. (2009).

Other responses to Italy’s overture to Libya included proclamations by Algerian and Egyptian politicians and intellectuals and some activists from sub-Saharan Africa that their countries should get deals similar to Libya’s for their sufferings at the hands of European colonizers (Gazzini, 2009). Later in 2008, three members of parliament from Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) asked the Egyptian Prime Minister and Foreign ministers to demand that Britain pay 29 billion pounds sterling in compensation for “looting the country’s resources” for more than 70 years of colonial occupation (Essam El-Din, 2008). Ibrahim Salih, former chairman of Egypt’s Court of Cassation, claims that Britain owes Egypt no less than 100 billion pounds (\$140 billion) (Essam El-Din, 2008). Other NDP MPs suggested that Egypt should make similar demands on Italy and Germany for \$50 billion in each for damage from the mines they planted in the Western Desert during World War II and Israel for \$19 billion for its 6-year occupation of the Sinai Peninsula (Essam El-Din, 2008).

Cold War Era Proxy Wars and Interference

During the same March 24, 1998 speech in which he acknowledged America’s role in the slave trade, President Bill Clinton also admitted, stopping short of full apology, the role of the United States in supporting undemocratic regimes in Africa during the Cold War:

I think it is worth pointing out that the United States has not always done the right thing by Africa. In our own time, during the Cold War, when we were so concerned about being in competition with the Soviet Union, very often we dealt with countries in Africa and in other parts of the world based more on how they stood in the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union than how they stood in the struggle for their own people’s aspirations to live up to the fullest of their God-given abilities. (Gibney & Roxstrom, 2001, p. 916)

Although Russia has apologized to other nations, such as the Baltic states and Poland, for the Soviet Union's Cold War transgressions, it has not offered any similar statements for its interventions in Africa, nor is there publicly available evidence that African countries have demanded any (see, e.g., Dodds, 2003; Howard-Hassmann, 2012). The dominant view in international law holds states responsible only for actions committed by a state against another state or the citizens of another state, but not its allies or agents in another state. Clinton's statements imply that it is wrong for a state to contribute to human rights abuses, whether at home or in another state (Gibney & Roxstrom, 2001, p. 922).

Post-Cold War Interventions and Inaction

While visiting Rwanda in 1998, President Clinton apologized for the US inaction during the genocide in 1994 (Bilder, 2005), stating that:

The international community, together with nations in Africa, must bear its share of responsibility for this tragedy, as well. We did not act quickly enough after the killing began. We should not have allowed the refugee camps to become safe havens for the killers. We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name: genocide. We cannot change the past. But we can and must do everything in our power to help you build a future without fear, and full of hope. (Gibney & Roxstrom, 2001, p. 923)

In 2000, the prime minister of Belgium requested forgiveness from Rwandans for his country's part in failing to prevent the genocide (Löwenheim, 2009). In a 2010 visit to Rwanda, French President Nicolas Sarkozy admitted "grave errors in judgment" in reference to French policy with respect to Rwanda, but did not issue a formal apology for its role (Sundaram, 2010). In 2006, Rwandan President Paul Kagame broke off relations with France when a French judge accused him and his associates of orchestrating the plane crash that killed his predecessor and contributed to the 1994 genocide (Bryant, 2012). He accused the French government of arming and training the Hutu government troops that carried out the killings (Bryant, 2012). In

September, 2011, however, Kagame said he had no interest in asking France for a formal apology for its role in the Rwandan genocide after a French judicial investigation issued a report clearing Kagame of the charges made by the judge in 2006 (Bryant, 2012).

Methods and Results

Participants

A total of 69 participants from Angola, Botswana, Ghana, Algeria, and Egypt who answered open-ended responses to items on apology and steps to reconciliation comprise the sample of responses analyzed here, 37 of whom were males, 32 of whom were females. The age range of these participants was 19–63, with two who did not provide their ages. The average age was 31. Participants reported whether they had ever served in the military, if they had relatives in the military, and if they had ever participated in a protest. Of the participants who responded to these items, 6% served in the military and 94% never served; 54% reported having and 46% reported not having relatives in the military, and 24% participated and 76% never participated in a protest.

Procedure

Recruited online or in person through personal networking, university courses, or in shopping malls, respondents were asked to fill out either a paper or an online version of the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison et al., 2006). This chapter focuses on participants' responses to two items from the survey pertaining to apology and reconciliation. The first item was, "If one country has in the past invaded, colonized, or exercised control over the governmental affairs of another country, an apology by the invading/colonizing/controlling country can improve the chances for reconciliation between the countries" ("apology item"). Participants

were asked to rate their level of agreement with that statement on a 7-point Likert scale, with answers ranging from one (totally disagree) to seven (totally agree). In addition, they were asked to respond qualitatively by providing an explanation of their Likert rating. Participants were then asked to respond qualitatively to the second item pertaining to reconciliation, which was, “What steps or factors are necessary to make an apology successful in achieving reconciliation between the countries?” (“reconciliation item”).

Qualitative responses were coded using a manual developed from a deductive and iterative process based on grounded theory, which allows for the construction of a theoretical framework based on the data collected (Glaser, 1992). There is no hypothesis testing involved in grounded theory, but rather, qualitative data are coded into emergent categories based on the themes that can be identified across responses. An earlier international sample of PAIRTAPS participants (Malley-Morrison et al., 2006) was used to develop the manual (“manual sample”). For a more detailed description of the coding manuals and the PAIRTAPS, see the introductory methods chapter for this section of the book.

Can Apology Contribute to Reconciliation?

Apology Coding Manual

Below we describe the themes that emerge from the coding manual sample for the first item, only some of which were present among the African responses, discussed in the next section. Among the manual sample respondents who explained their agreement or disagreement with the idea that apology can improve relations between states, three major sets of categories emerged: (1) the effectiveness of the apology *depends* on the situation (qualification or condition), (2) *agreement* that an apology can lead to reconciliation (unqualified agreement), and (3) *disagreement* with idea that an apology will lead to reconciliation (rejection).

Within each of these three main groups of categories, several categories emerged further explaining, qualifying, or conditioning participants’ views about the effectiveness of apology. Responses indicating that the effectiveness of the apology *depends* on the situation fall into seven categories based on whether they say an apology’s effectiveness *depends* on (a) the *nature of the apology*, (b) the *circumstances* in which the apology takes place, (c) whether *acceptance* of the apology occurs, (d) whether *further action* is seen as necessary, (e) whether the response notes that an apology is a *good start, but is only the beginning*, (f) may take *time* to work, and (g) *may work or be worth a try*. Each of these categories has several subcategories to allow for finer distinctions among responses. For example, among those who suggested that the success of an apology depends on the nature of the apology itself, four characteristics of effective apologies were identified: (a1) *sincerity*, (a2) *recognition of wrongdoing*, (a3) *expression of remorse*, and (a4) *official or diplomatic level of delivery*.

Among the responses *agreeing* with the idea that an apology can lead to reconciliation, two major categories emerged: (a) apology is a mechanism for *healing* and (b) apology is *necessary* for reconciliation. Among the responses *disagreeing* with the idea that an apology can lead to reconciliation, seven categories of explanation emerged in which respondents suggested that (a) reconciliation is *not possible*, (b) an apology *does not erase the past*, (c) a country’s people can *forgive but not forget* the wrongdoings, (d) *words do not solve the problem*, (e) *actions speak louder than words*, (f) an apology is *not necessary*, and (g) an apology has *negative consequences*. Lastly, responses that made *historical reference* to countries that have committed wrongdoings and/or have apologized could be characterized as *positive*, citing examples of times when apology successfully led to reconciliation, or *negative*, citing examples of times when apology was ineffective.

A more detailed description of the coding manual can be found in the methods section of the introduction to apology chapter of this book (Chap. 22).

Qualitative Results: African Perspectives on Apology

About half of qualitative responses to the apology item (57%) in the African sample indicated that the likelihood of an apology leading to reconciliation *depends* on some condition, while 24% did not offer conditions or qualifications in their *agreement* that apology can lead to reconciliation. Only 13% of responses indicated unqualified *disagreement* with the idea that apology can lead to reconciliation, while 3% provided historical references to specific countries. In the foregoing discussion, responses are quantified in terms of percentages of *all qualitative responses to the apology item* (“African responses” or “response set”), within *each of the three main categories*, and, when sufficiently preponderant, within the subcategories of the main categories identified in the previous section.

Within the first main set of categories for responses emphasizing that successful apology *depends on the situation*, 23% of all African responses fell into the categories indicating that some *further action* is necessary beyond apology. Some responses specified what is meant by further action, which permits further coding into subcategories. *Material reparations* were mentioned in 16% of the *it depends* responses, or 9% of all African responses. For example, one man from Ghana, who declined to share his age, stated that apology can lead to reconciliation “when the colonial masters will assist the country to formulate meaningful policy to improve living standards of the citizens.” Another Ghanaian, a 43-year-old man, writes, “measures to improve the material well-being of the citizen must be formulated and implemented.” Also from Ghana, a 27-year-old man asks, “What can apology bring reconciliation? Reconciliation can only be achieved *when the invader can give out to the colonies the wealth taken from them* and not to interfere in affairs of each other again.”⁶

⁶ This response is an illustration of respondent statements that contain several elements and thus contain more than one “codeable unit,” all of which are coded independently. To provide the context of the respondents’ statements, the full responses are sometimes included in the discussion with the relevant codeable unit in italics. The coding methods are discussed in more detail in the introduction to this section.

A 26-year-old Angolan man shares these views, suggesting that reconciliation may result “if the apology is accompanied by compensation.” Similarly, a 25-year-old Algerian stated, “apology and reimbursement [can lead to reconciliation].” The other type of future action on which respondents said successful apology depends was a *change of behavior, respect, tolerance, and/or a positive outlook on the future*, also making up 16% of the *depends* responses and 9% of all African responses. A 25-year-old man from Ghana, for example, suggested that a “change in attitudes and relations are more likely [than apology] to help.”

Among those who said apology *depends on the situation*, 20% of all African responses emphasized that an apology’s effectiveness *depends on the nature of the apology*. *Recognition of wrongdoing* was identified as essential to an apology leading to reconciliation in 12% of the *depends* responses and 7% of all African responses. A 27-year-old man from Angola, for example, said that “recognizing past mistakes looks good.” A 50-year-old Ghanaian man writes that reconciliation “occurs after one has realized one’s mistake.” *Expression of remorse or regret* was another characteristic of effective apologies. Another 12% of *depends* responses and 7% of all African responses mentioned the importance of demonstrating *remorse* on the part of the apologizing country. “It is always good to show regret,” wrote one 23-year-old woman from Angola. A 40-year-old Angolan woman wrote, “to show regret always helps apology. Apologies exist for this reason.”

Additional examples of *depends* responses, along with the percentages in categories with the most numerous responses, presented in terms of the entire response set and within the main category, are shown in Table 27.1.

Within the group of responses that apology can lead to reconciliation, some further elaborated their support. Responses indicating that apology can *repair relationships* between countries made up 52% of these further elaborations (13% of the total response set). For example, one 22-year-old woman from Botswana said,

Table 27.1 Does apology increase chances of reconciliation? Examples of “it depends” responses

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Sex	Response
<i>It depends</i>	57				
<i>Nature of apology</i>	20				
Recognition of wrongdoing	7(12)	Algeria	35	Male	Apologize to what happened in the past
		Ghana	50	Male	Apology occurs after one has realized one’s mistake so an apology to the country offended can bring about reconciliation
		Angola	43	Male	(1) Because the apology implies the recognition of the mistake and the invasion country’s blame. (2) This is the first step for dialogue
Remorse	7(12)	Angola	23	Male	It is always good to show regret
		Ghana	29	Male	Then it is true that they show remorse for their actions
		Ghana	19	Female	It makes the people know that you really feel sorry for causing them harm than good and who will feel safe inviting you back to the country as brothers and sisters. An apology brings peace and gives you free conscience
<i>Further action</i>	23				
Change behavior	9(16)	Botswana	22	Female	Done for the good of the people in these countries
		Ghana	28	Female	Reconciliation to be done that will bring mutual understanding and good with each other country
Material reparation	9(16)	Algeria	25	Male	Apology and reimbursement
		Ghana	43	Male	Measures to improve the material well-being of the citizen must be formulated and implemented
		Angola	26	Male	If the apology is accompanied by compensation

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parenthesis) refers to the percentage of responses within the major category

Table 27.2 Does apology increases chances of reconciliation? Examples of agreement responses

<i>Agreement</i>	24				
<i>Healing</i>	5(19)				
Repair relationships	13(52)	Ghana	63	Male	Reconciliation, even with oneself, and you maker, is needful.(1) Between countries it would demonstrate goodwill (2) only it does not mean they had not been caused, often, to innocent civilians
		Botswana	22	Male	That can build strong relationships

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parenthesis) refers to the percentage of responses within the major category

“reconciliation can always help rebuild friendship amongst who have not been at peace with one another.” Similarly, a 56-year-old woman from Angola stated, “dialogue is fundamental for good relations.” A 22-year-old woman from Botswana wrote, “reconciliation can always help rebuild friendship amongst those who have not been at peace with one another.” Further examples of *agreement* responses are available in Table 27.2.

Due to only a small percentage of respondents identifying themselves as having at any time been involved in the military, we were not able to perform chi-square tests for this demographic. No significant group differences were found based on gender, relative’s participation in the military, or involvement in protest. This is not surprising. Although Smith (2008) refers in passing to a few studies showing that women apologize more often than men, whether women

apologize or respond differently to requests for forgiveness varies according to gender is still an empirical question (Cole, 2008).

African Perspectives on Steps to Reconciliation

Steps to Reconciliation Coding Manual

For the second PAIRTAPS item regarding reconciliation (“What steps or factors are necessary to make an apology successful in achieving reconciliation between the countries?”), coding manual sample responses were grouped into three main sets of categories based on whether participants (a) identified specific means by which reconciliation is *achievable*, (b) made a statement suggesting that reconciliation is *unachievable*, or (c) stated that they *did not know* if reconciliation is achievable.

Responses indicating that apology makes reconciliation achievable when certain steps or factors are present were grouped into six major categories, with further specification of subgroups specifying additional nuances, illustrative examples of which are given in parentheses: (a) the *circumstances* surrounding the apology (*severity of wrongdoing, time since it has passed*), (b) the *nature of the apology* (*remorse, recognition of wrongdoing, whether apology is official, inclusion of a trial or international supervision*), (c) the wronged country’s *acceptance* of the apology (*forgiveness*), (d) *additional interpersonal or psychological actions* in conjunction with an apology (*effort to repair relations, respect*), (e) the necessity of *providing goods or services* along with the apology (*money, land, prisoner exchange, democracy*), and (f) a *change in behavior* on the part of the transgressor (*discontinue aggressive behavior, positive actions*). Not all of these categories and subcategories were present among the African responses, and only results for the most common subcategories within categories are presented. A more detailed discussion of the coding manual can be found in Chap. 22.

Responses expressing the view that no factors or steps make apology effective fell into two

major categories based on whether the participant believes reconciliation is *not possible* because (a) the offending country’s wrongs are *irreversible* or (b) the goal of reconciliation is *unrealistic*. Responses of those who stated that they *don’t know* if reconciliation is possible could not be sorted further into common themes.

Qualitative Results: Response Patterns for Achieving Reconciliation

A majority (93%) of African responses suggested that apology, when accompanied by specific steps and conditions, can help achieve reconciliation. The second two sets of categories each comprised no more than 6% of the responses.

Of those who expressed the idea that an apology can achieve reconciliation through *psychological or interpersonal steps*, 75% (14% of all African responses) suggested that actions to *repair relations* between the involved countries are important. Many of the responses included language about dialogue between countries. “There should be dialogue,” wrote one 59-year-old woman from Ghana. Other ideas included a suggestion from a 22-year-old man from Botswana that apology be accompanied by “negotiation and agreements over time.” A 38-year-old woman from Egypt gave a response more explicitly focused on healing relationships, stating, “There is only one simple thing that can be done. The government that did harm to the country it controlled must fix what it ruined and try to improve the relationship for the future.”

An additional 57% (14% of all responses) of responses indicating that *goods and services* are necessary factors for apology to achieve reconciliation emphasized *monetary provisions*. For example, a man from Botswana made suggestions for actions the transgressor should take to achieve reconciliation with an apology: “compensate them, cancel their debts, provide them with money to build their economies.”

A preponderance of remaining responses fall into the category describing reconciliation as conditional on the *nature of the apology*. An

Table 27.3 Reconciliation is achievable through specific steps: Examples of responses in common categories and subcategories

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Sex	Response
<i>Reconciliation is achievable</i>	93				
<i>Nature of apology</i>	29				
Recognition of wrongdoing	10(36)	Botswana	21	Female	The colonizing country accept that they have colonized a country and seek reconciliation. It can call another country to help in the reconciliation process
		Algeria	20	Female	Recognition of the harm done. Recognition, and subsequent action, that people of every nation are people and merit the same rights and resources that one's self does
Diplomatic/treaties	8(28)	Angola	26	Male	A public apology, some type of agreement, and compensation
		Botswana	26	Female	Peace talks, agreement in writing and officially signed
<i>Interpersonal/psychological</i>	19				
Repair relations	14(75)	Botswana	22	Female	Communication between the two countries
		Botswana	23	Male	Collaborate in a lot of beneficial activities
		Algeria	20	Female	A dialogue in common agreement
<i>Provide goods or services</i>	24				
Monetary provisions	14(57)	Ghana	29	Male	They should apologize and compensate the victim's country
		Algeria	35	Male	Official apology, compensation

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parenthesis) refers to percentages of responses within the major category

additional 36% (10% of all responses) of *nature of apology* responses identified *recognition of wrongdoing* as a necessity to achieve reconciliation. For instance, one 24-year-old woman from Algeria suggested that the apologizing country must demonstrate “recognition of faults, committed crimes, and then ask for pardon.” Similarly, a 55-year-old man from Angola wrote that it was necessary “to show recognition for the past mistake, publicly and unequivocally.”

An apology expressed through an official *public, diplomatic apology or treaty* is described as a prerequisite to reconciliation in another 28% of *nature of apology* (8% of all African responses). One example of this sort of response was provided by a 40-year-old man from Ghana: “recognition of treaties, laws, etc., recognition of each state’s sovereignty.” Further examples of responses to the reconciliation item are available in Table 27.3.

Due to an insufficient number of respondents reporting military experience, it was not possible to run chi-square tests for this particular demographic. Proportionately, there were no significant differences found in the responses on the basis of gender, having relatives in the military, or having participated in protests.

Discussion

In their qualitative interviews on apology and reparations with elites and activists, Lombardo and Howard-Hassmann (2005) found that perceived sincerity of an apology depends not only on acknowledgement of the wrongs done but also on material compensation and commitments beyond words. The qualitative responses of ordinary people from areas of past British (Botswana, Egypt, Ghana), Portuguese (Angola),

and French (Algeria) dominations are remarkably similar to the views of the elites and activists emphasizing recognition of wrongdoing, remorse, changes in offender behavior, and material compensation as important conditions for effective state apologies. Participants also indicated that apologies can achieve reconciliation if they are delivered through formal, official, or diplomatic channels, and most (87%) believe that, when accompanied by specific steps and conditions, apology can help achieve reconciliation. The elite and PAIRTAPS responses are also consistent with Africa's experience with apology and reconciliation.

Indeed, the African responses also reflect the major components of successful interpersonal apologies identified in the literature (Auerbach, 2009; Lazare, 2005; Tavuchis, 1991). According to Nick Smith, for example, some important elements of effective apology include an agreement of what happened, recognition of wrongdoing and accepting responsibility for its occurrence, affective elements such as remorse and sincerity, a promise not to repeat the offense, and redress, which may include moral or material reparations (Smith, 2008). To these components, effective state apologies must also add some performative or ritual statement or act delivered by high officials (Bagdonas, 2010).

The method used here and the nature of the sample do not permit more than speculative reasoning about the apparent consistency across respondent perceptions elite opinion, and public discourse in Africa, but they do point to possible theoretical relationships that could be tested empirically with quantitative survey research, event history analysis, or other methods.

The number of responses emphasizing financial reparations for transgressions may reflect a common cultural expectation in Africa that apologies must be accompanied by actions, both material and symbolic (Lombardo & Howard-Hassmann, 2005). In Tanzania, for example, if a chief wrongs someone in the community, he apologizes publicly, states that he would never commit a wrong again, and gives a gift of a cow to the family of the wronged individual(s) (Lombardo & Howard-Hassmann,

2005, p. 535). The elements of this ritual are consistent with the PAIRTAPS participants' frequent belief that admitting mistakes, taking measures to ensure the mistakes will not be repeated, and monetary compensation—delivered through an official representative of the offender—are factors necessary for apologies that can achieve reconciliation. Similarly, Islam, which has a strong presence in Africa, particularly north of the Sahara, emphasizes the payment of *diyya* to victims as a substitute for physical punishment and a means of avoiding cycles of conflict and revenge (Badar, 2011; Layish, 2006; Maged, 2008).

Although culture may shape the African responses, however, existing research suggests that perceptions of the characteristics of a good apology are fairly stable across cultures (Neto et al., 2007b). In any case, the size of the African sample does not permit comparison of responses between countries, but patterns identified for other regions of the world in the other chapters of this volume may shed some light on the question of whether people in different societies have systematically different expectations of state apologies.

Culture may influence demands for and granting of apology, but the timing of these types of events, described in the first half of this chapter, suggests otherwise. Apologies and demands for reparations may have more to do with instrumental economic and domestic political considerations on the part of both offenders and victims than with their culture. Italy's recent apology and treaty establishing reparations to Libya and François Hollande's hints that a French apology to Algeria might be forthcoming while he talks about the many economic benefits that would result from a Franco-Algerian reconciliation are strong indications of the strategic nature of apology. It would not be surprising if, as European states face persistent economic insecurity, including large populations of unemployed, low-income minorities, they may turn to resource-rich former colonies for support. A prerequisite of that support may be the admission of and repentance for past wrongdoing. Given the importance that both African politicians and ordinary people seem to place on material reparation for the harms of the past, however, whether apologies alone will be

enough to fully reconcile African countries with former colonizers is uncertain.

The fact that some of the world's poorest countries and people live in Africa may help to explain both why most of the African countries seeking apology also seek reparations and why respondents mention material redress as a condition for successful apology. Although the 2001 Durban conference and other reparations movements often note that slavery and colonialism are responsible for Africa's contemporary underdevelopment, neither the countries nor people who have sought reparations, however, are most in need of economic compensation. The African PAIRTAPS responses that mention reparations occur across countries with very different economic backgrounds, none of which are engaged in material reparations claims. It seems unlikely, then, that residing in countries that are relatively poor motivates participants' beliefs that monetary provisions are important to reconciliation.

Another factor that may help to explain the pattern that emerges in the African responses may be that the continent-wide movement for reparations and high-profile demands by some countries has influenced the views of ordinary people. With the notable exception of Algeria, which has not demanded material compensation beyond a formal apology from France, most of the public demands for apology involve requests for monetary rewards. The Durban conference and African countries also emphasize the importance of official, symbolic actions by heads of state, which are also important for the African PAIRTAPS sample. Many African academics are engaged in efforts to document the specific harms and injustices of European slavery and colonialism on the continent, not only to strengthen reparations claims but also to pressure European governments to recognize their transgressions and make it more difficult for them to engage in denial or silence. Recognition of wrongdoing is a condition many respondents placed on effective apologies.

There may also be a demonstration or diffusion effect that explains the consistency of the African reparations claims, elite attitudes, and individual opinions. The apology and reconciliation issue

receives substantial media coverage in Africa. Just as elites and activists were inspired by apologies and reparations received by Jews in Europe, ordinary Africans may be increasingly conscious of processes that achieve or fail to achieve reconciliation between other states. As Gibney and Roxstrom write, "When an apology is directed at the citizenry of a particular country, people in all other countries tend to be excluded. This, then, leads to the exercise of guessing why apologies have been issued in certain countries but not in some others" (2001, p. 932). The more ordinary Africans are exposed to news about cases of apology and reconciliation in other places, the more consistent their ideas about reconciliation may become and, perhaps, the more exacting and specific their demands as expectations rise about what apology can achieve. Only a longitudinal study would permit evaluation of this hypothesis.

The issue of apology and reconciliation, with both domestic and international processes of restorative justice underway in the public eye, is salient on a daily basis in Africa. Although the dynamics of interstate and intra-state apology are different, with domestic processes rarely involving material compensation, the number of countries engaging in some form of internal reconciliation in Africa, including Algeria and Ghana, means that many Africans simply have direct experience with apology and the conditions under which it works, so that the answers may be less hypothetical and more practical in nature.

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Amanda Clinton, Jose Anazagsty, Marian Lewin,
Sherri McCarthy, Michael Stevens,
Rodrigo Barahona, Eddy Carillo, Ricardo Angelino,
Eros DeSouza, and Luciana Karine de Souza

Political apologies have become a basic tool in the stock of standard strategies for addressing social injustices and human rights violations. To introduce political apologies, we first define and identify some of their fundamental traits. Then we offer insights concerning the “era of apologies” and their significant proliferation since the 1990s. Next, we relate these apologies to a new political culture, responsible for redefining what it means to apologize in the field of politics. Finally, we offer some examples of political apologies in Latin America.

A. Clinton (✉) • J. Anazagsty
University of Puerto Rico, Mayagüez, Puerto Rico, USA
e-mail: amanda.clinton@gmail.com

M. Lewin
Department of Psychology, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA

S. McCarthy
Educational Psychology, Counseling and Human
Relations, Northern Arizona University, Yuma, AZ, USA
e-mail: Sherri.McCarthy@NAU.EDU

M. Stevens
Department of Psychology, Illinois State University,
Normal, IL, USA
e-mail: mjstevan@ilstu.edu

R. Barahona
Counselor, Brookline, MA, USA
e-mail: rodbarahona@gmail.com

E. Carillo
Universidad Independiente & Director of the Center for
Psychoanalytic Studies of the Association for
Socio-Critical Psychoanalysis, San Jose, Costa Rica
e-mail: ecarillo65@yahoo.com

The Concept of Political Apologies

Political apologies are an official expression of guilt regret contrition shame or remorse together with the acknowledgement and repudiation of wrongful acts. Confession, contrition, and a repudiation of policies, practices, and character traits that led to the wrongdoing in the first place must be part of a political apology (Hook, 2008a).

A simple expression of regret does not constitute an apology, although it often passes for one. For instance, the remarks of Jean-Claude Duvalier on his return to Haiti from exile in 2011 do not constitute an actual political apology (Political Apologies and Reparations Website, 2012). His exact words were “I take this opportunity to express once again my profound sadness for those of my fellow citizens who genuinely see themselves as victims under my government.” Although an expression of sadness, this was not a

R. Angelino
School of Medical Sciences, National University of La
Plata, La Plata, Argentina
e-mail: drangelino@uolsinects.com

E. DeSouza
Department of Psychology, Illinois State University,
Normal, IL, USA
e-mail: erdesou@ilstu.edu

L. Karine de Souza
Department of Psychology, Federal University
of Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, Brazil
e-mail: luciana.karine@ufrgs.br

political apology, since it included neither a confession nor a repudiation of wrongful activities.

Non-apologies may also occur. This happens when a declaration is given in the form of an apology but turns out to be nothing of the sort. A classic non-apology was issued by Pope Benedict XVI in 2006. Having cited from an ancient text critical of Islam, he was required to issue an apology, which he delivered by conveying compunction not for his remarks but for the reactions to them (Hook, 2008a). The Pope stated that he “sincerely regrets that certain passages of his address could have sounded offensive to the sensitivities of the Muslim faithful and should have been interpreted in a manner that in no way corresponds to his intentions.” He basically blamed Muslims for being too sensitive and for the allegedly erroneous interpretation of his words.

Some apologies, although significant, may not become official government apologies. A good example is Fidel Castro’s admission in *La Jornada* that he failed to stop the persecution of gays and lesbians in Cuba (Political Apologies and Reparations Website, 2012). Although Castro expressed regret and acknowledged his responsibility, his words were not an official apology.

At the most basic level, political apologies are no different from personal and more private apologies. They are written or vocalized expressions of regret, sorrow, and remorse for having wronged, insulted, failed, or injured another. Hence, political apologies are in a sense a form of “sentimental politics,” in which affect and emotion, often reserved for the private and personal, influence state and public affairs (Colishaw in Mookerjee, 2009). But besides adopting the affective qualities of private and personal apologies, political apologies adopt and adapt the moral principles and values of the private realm, together with its lack of formality, while generating a different set of expectations (Colishaw in Mookerjee, 2009; Mills, 2001). Although similar in many respects, political apologies differ from the more customary individual apologies and their differences must always be acknowledged. Failure to do so reinforces the supposition, quite popular, that political apologies are an inappropriate mistake (Celermajer, 2008). In this

respect, Hook (2008a) offers a better definition. He defines a political, state, or public apology as the open declaration of a repentant acceptance of responsibility for wrongful or harmful actions by a state government that led to the detriment or victimization of a group of its own citizens or to the detriment or victimization of the citizens of another state (Hook, 2008a). In a way, what makes political apologies dissimilar from other kinds is the political quality of the harms committed. As Celermajer (2008, p. 14) points out: “Apologies are thus not simply concerned with an aberrant wrongful act, or even a collection of aberrant acts committed by wayward individuals, but with a class of acts that were embedded in the nation itself.” Accordingly, an important characteristic of political apologies is that they pertain to the wrongdoings of a given nation-state. Not only do these apologies involve a class of acts entrenched in the nation-state but they also are official, authorized, approved, or sanctioned formally by the state itself.

Another important attribute of political apologies is that they are, like other kinds of apologies, fundamentally social. They are collective, socially generated expressions of mutual regret. As sociologist Tavuchis (1991, p. 14) explains:

A consummate apology, no matter how personal or private an act, is rarely the sole concern of the principals. It is not easily contained because it inevitably touches upon the lives and convictions of interested others while raising both practical and moral questions that transcend the particular situation that prompted it. In this sense, it is quintessentially social, that is, a symbolic relational gesture occurring in a complex interpersonal field, with enormous reverberatory potential that encapsulates, recapitulates, and pays homage to a moral order rendered problematic by the very act that calls it for it.

Political apologies are not only the concern of the principals but of all citizens, making them truly public. While a personal apology may or may not involve efforts to keep it private or reserved to a particular individual or group, political apologies are open to all interested parties and citizens from the moment they are issued. Regardless of the sincerity expressed by these apologies, their audience reaches beyond the victims and perpetrators

Table 28.1 Categories and examples of political apologies

Categories	Description	Examples
Humanitarian	Apologies aimed at correcting an injustice perpetrated upon a group of citizens of a country by past actions of its government or other political leaders	The 1999 apology issued by the USA to Guatemala for supporting and aiding the 1954 coup and a government that committed numerous violations of human rights
Academic	Apologies aimed at correcting past wrongs simply because these should be corrected. These are academic in the sense that these apologies have no practical purpose or use	The 1979 apology issued by Pope John Paul II indicating that the church might have made a mistake in its handling of Galileo Galilei's trial by the inquisition of 1663
Economic	Apologies motivated by economic interests, given because there is a potential monetary or economic gain for the apologizer	The 2012 apology issued to contract teachers by Rafael Correa, President of Ecuador, for the exploitation they were victims of
Personal	Apologies given for stupidities, foolish acts, mistakes, or immoral acts enacted by politicians and/or government officials	The apology issued by Evo Morales, President of Bolivia, for singing sexist <i>coplas</i> in a carnival

Adapted from Hook (2008b)

because they are always part of a political strategy whose subject is the whole of civil society. Political apologies, like individual personal apologies, not only touch upon the lives of various interested parties but also nurture practical and moral inquiries that exceed the specific situation that prompted the apology. In short, political apologies reach many more people than individual apologies. In addition to nurturing practical and moral questions, political apologies also nurture important and often fundamental political questions above and beyond the specific events that prompted the apology. Finally, political apologies are also symbolic relational gestures, but in contrast to private and personal apologies, are signals deployed in a far more complex field of social interactions: the field of politics.

The political apology is also an internally heterogeneous classification. It encompasses a wide range of violations: various crimes against humanity; political assassinations; coups and the overthrow of governments; war crimes; illegal experiments; murder; torture; rape; political, racial, or religious persecution; and many other acts. Other actions addressed by political apologies are not that grave and may include minor offenses and immoral acts like insults and soliciting sex from prostitutes, among others. Likewise, there is a whole spectrum of public apologies: "Some are outstanding, some amusing, some

irrelevant by today standards and some downright foolish" (Hook, 2008a, p.4). Some offer reparations and restitution and others do not. Some may include acts of penitence but most do not. Some may be more credible, sincere, or cynical than others (Bolívar, 2011; Hook, 2008a). Political apologies also vary in terms of their motivations. Based on these motivations, Hook (2008b) distinguishes between four categories: humanitarian, academic, economic, and personal (see Table 28.1 for more details). However, as noted by Hook, apologies may be motivated by multiple reasons and can often be placed in more than one of these categories. It is also possible that political apologies issued for one particular reason might in the end be driven by an entirely different reason, even to the extent of concealing the original motive for the apology.

Political apologies are not only internally diverse but also ethnically or culturally diverse: what constitutes an apology in a given culture may not in another culture. Genuine apologies may be interpreted as hypocrisy, false, or insincere, if local ceremonies of apology are not respected (Howard-Hassman & Gibney, 2008). Apologies are therefore contingent to time and space and dependent on the sociocultural context in which they are issued (Bolívar, 2011; Howard-Hassman & Gibney, 2008; Hook, 2008b). The so-called new culture of apology, although

widespread around the world, is neither universal nor homogenous. Public apologies affect cultures around the world, but these, in turn, affect political apologies by adopting and adapting them to local circumstances and practices.

An additional characteristic of political apologies is that they rely on a cohesive understanding of time or history. As Coicaud and Jönsson (2008, p. 77) explain: “The possibility and the need for an apology presupposes not only that the past and present are connected, that the past continues in and has bearing on the present, but also that it shapes the future. And the more this continuum is denied, the more the past will haunt the present, and its pathologies persist.” An apology is always articulated and communicated as the expression of the need to recall painful memories. It involves being mindful of what we were and had as members of a particular collectivity and, simultaneously, what we have endangered or lost because of our wrongdoings (Tavuchis, 1991). But the need to remember may not be reserved solely for the perpetrator, since the victims, often marginalized groups, are the ones who most often demand acknowledgement of harms done to them by the state. Their demands also rely on a unified view of history, on the assumption that the past, present, and future are connected; that the past has bearing on their present condition; that the present was shaped by a long history of inequalities, injustices, and wrongdoings; and that past and present will shape their future. For many activists representing those communities, an apology offered in the present for past events may be an important starting point for a better future.

Because political apologies constitute strategic instances that illuminate complex ethical and sociopolitical phenomena, often quite controversial phenomena, these apologies are a fuzzy affair that often fosters uneasiness, even among scholars. For instance, although Howard-Hassman and Gibney (2008) hope that political apologies will lessen the degree of bitterness, anger, and vengeful intentions among the victims, that they will also engender the transformation of the perpetrators, and that they will at least express genuine remorse and

straight understanding of the wrongdoings of the past, the authors also fear that hypocrisy, *realpolitik*, resentment, and cynicism will limit the potential of political apologies. We cannot help but wonder whether the politics of apology is not merely a cynical type of symbolic politics, meant to erase real injustices from public memory and acquit their perpetrators. Consequently, Bolívar (2011) proposes that in examining political apologies, scholars should incorporate criteria to evaluate or measure their sincerity, credibility, and whether apologies are or not cynical. Distrusting political apologies, Gibney and Roxstrom (in Parodi, 2008) argue that the major problem is that while the apologizing state claims credit for admitting harmful acts against others, it wants everything to remain *status quo*, just as it was before the apology was delivered. Questioning political apologies in Latin America, Parodi (2008) renders them partial and unfinished because they often chose to neglect US involvement in the appalling atrocities and violation of human rights of the second half of the twentieth century in the region. For him, Latin American truth commissions and apologies, because of that neglect, reproduce and reinforce the American hegemony in the region. Consequently, political apologies end up operating as ideological instruments at the service of US foreign policy.

The Era of Political Apologies

Public and/or political apologies are certainly not new. Indeed, many political apologies have been offered through history. Hook (2008a) offers examples dating back to 1,077. But there was a major upsurge of political apologies at the end of the twentieth century, a time scholars refer to as the “age of apology” (Fette, 2008; Hook, 2008a, 2008b; Mills, 2001). Between 1997 and 2002, about 150 political apologies were issued by various states (Hook, 2008a). The increased number of apologies began peaking around 2002, then began to fall again. However, political apologies have become a typical policy for dealing with

injustices and human rights violations. Along with reparations, historical commissions, and court trials, public apology emerged on a global scale during that period, together also with a new academic field: reconciliation studies (Fette, 2008). Political apologies have even been introduced in the international legal framework. The United Nations 1996 *Basic Principles on the Right to Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law* include apologies as a prescribed form of reparation (Celermajer, 2008). They are also included in the 2005 *Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations International Human Rights Law*.

Fette (2008) identified several reasons, offered by various scholars, for the unusual rise of international public apologies since the 1990s: the downfall of communist states; the anticolonial movement and its challenge against the racial and ethnic inequalities that sustained empires; a new international focus on ethics and morality; a revised understanding of universal human and civil rights, state sovereignty, and international law; the emergence of apology, not as a sign of a flaw but as an expression or symbol of strength, a political asset; the globalization of memory and history in the post-Cold-War era; the democratization of history; the decline and/or weakening of the nation-state; and the increased demand for recognition and apologies by past victims and social movements. Malik (2007) includes among the reasons for the dramatic increase of public apologies in the 1990s to the end of the Cold War the disintegration of the working class and the blurring of the difference between left and right. Hook (2008a, p. 9), rejecting Malik's causes, proposes that the rise in public apologies was a millennial phenomenon:

The upsurge of political apologies at the end of the 1990s could have been a millennial phenomenon unintentionally driven by the Catholic Church, and by none other than Pope John Paul II himself. It is possible that the example of Pope John Paul II triggered the outpouring of contrition even in places where Christianity is of little

concern. It is also true that most of the apologies have come from Nations where Christianity holds considerable sway although not exclusively (see the political apologies issued by Japan, for example.).

In a subsequent article, Hook (2008b) also points to a rising of national consciousness as a potential cause of the upsurge. For him, many nations have felt the need to confront, review, and revise their past. Meanwhile, Haward-Hassman and Gibney (2008) pinpointed the role of social movements. Since the 1960s, various social movements, including the indigenous movement, the Civil Rights movement, and multiculturalism, have focused on personal suffering and feelings and demanded acknowledgement of harms done to the people and communities they represented. They introduced into the public realm a "new politics of recognition," the recognition of the "other," which in the view of Haward-Hassman and Gibney, contributed to the increased popularity of political apologies in the 1990s. However, for many scholars this recognition is really the reflection of a new culture, a new orientation toward politics and a new orientation to political apologies themselves. Such recognition belonged to a wider transformation in politics, a change in the attitudes, beliefs, and values that support political systems.

Political Apologies the New Political Culture

Since the 1990s, political apologies have become an important instrument in the pursuit of social justice, a standard strategy for addressing injustices, inequalities, and human rights violations. Political apologies an essential tool characteristic of a new political culture. As Mills (2001, p. 113) states:

What makes the pope's apology even more striking is that it does not stand in isolation as the act of a powerful leader defying expectations. It reflects the degree to which public apologies, historically a rare event in the lives of nations and institutions, have become a vital part of the global culture. A speech act once considered a sign of weakness, the tribute those lacking power traditionally pay to

those with power, has in just over a decade emerged as a strength, a sign that one has the confidence to own up to mistakes.

For Mills (2001), the significance of this new culture is the change in susceptibilities it involves, the responsiveness it contains: feelings, emotions, and caring have become, as much as policy, an inseparable part of winning politics, and victims, particularly those whose suffering and sorrow are tied to their race and ethnicity, have acquired unprecedented moral status. The outcome of the modern public apology has been to make the antipathy to voicing regret and repentance seem dated and old-fashioned (Mills, 2001). Furthermore, as Mills explains, the idea that offering an apology is a sign of weakness that can only make the apologizer liable to further demands for public contrition has been substituted by a more intricate set of beliefs. Today, the apologizer has been humanized and valued more than in the past. For Mills, it is not only the apologizer who is changed by apologizing; so too is the historical viewpoint on the actions and words that are the focus of the apology. The injuries, damages, and injustices of the past are no longer dismissed as irrelevant. The consequences of these past wrongs, whether psychological, social, or economic, are treated as important, and in turn those wrongs are understood to be affected by current actions, either through compensation or, at the least, through the materialization of a context in which a victim's suffering is acknowledged and respected.

Finally, the modern political apology turns old notions of status and power upside down by underlining the primacy both to do justice to the victims of past wrongs and to advocate reconciliation. Once an apology is accepted, it is expected that victims and apologizer will not have the same relationship they did before the apology was offered. Thus, the apology is but a step in the difficult road toward forgiveness and eventual reconciliation. Public apologies offer a way of releasing the social actors involved from the cycle of blame and counter-blaming that transgression and unlawful actions against particular groups predictably impose. As ethical problems, political apologies involve not only

the duty to apologize but also the responsibility to forgive. As Josephides (in Mookerjee, 2009) affirms, following Jacques Derrida, we are not only in the age of apology but also in the age of forgiveness. And when it comes to political apologies, forgiveness takes the form of a pardon for pragmatic, legal, or political reasons, a forgiveness that precedes the desired reconciliation.

Some Instances of Public Apologies Involving Latin America

Since the era of the apology began, various public apologies have been issued involving Latin American nations. One of the most controversial and memorable was the one issued in the early 1990s by Pope John Paul II for the Spanish colonization of the Americas in the name of the Church. Since then numerous other apologies involving Latin American nations have been issued.

In the same region, many political apologies involve the wrongdoings of the United States. In 1989, President George Bush apologized for a military raid that ransacked the home of Antenor Ferrey, Nicaraguan Ambassador to Panama, violating the Geneva treaties by invading Nicaraguan territory. The United State embassy in Managua also expressed regret for the offense.

Ten years later, in 1999, President Bill Clinton apologized to the Guatemalan government for supporting and aiding the 1954 coup that led to a civil war that lasted until 1996. The postcoup government and the armed forces, aided by the United States, committed many human rights violations, including the killing and disappearances of thousands of Guatemalans. Clinton pledged that the USA will never do this again and provided funds to support the peace accords and rebuild the country.

A few years later, in 2005, John Rood, American Ambassador to the Bahamas, apologized to Deputy Prime Minister of the Bahamas, Cynthia Pratt, for pinpointing the country as a major drug transport point en route to the United States in the International Narcotics Control

Strategy Report. More recently, in 2010, the United States government, under the leadership of President Obama, issued an apology to Guatemala for the nonconsensual inoculation of its citizens with syphilis, gonorrhea, and chancroid by the US Public Health Service between 1946 and 1948 (Cohen & Adashi, 2012).

Many other apologies involved the wrongdoings of Latin American authoritarian, military, or dictatorial governments during the 1970s and 1980s. In 2004, Gen. Juan Emilio Cheyre Espinosa, the Chilean Army Commander, apologized for the human rights violations committed by the armed forces during Augusto Pinochet's authoritarian regime. From 1973 to 1990, thousands of Chileans were killed or disappeared. Thousands were also confined and tortured. In 2005, the year after Pinochet's death, the Chilean Navy organized a reparations ceremony aboard *Esmeralda*, a flagship where many citizens were tortured during the Pinochet regime. But the victims refused to attend the reparation ceremonial, since ex-detainees have not come to any settlement with the Chilean Navy. They also wanted the Navy torturers to go to trial.

In 2006, the President of Suriname, Ronald Venetiaan, apologized to the victims and families of the massacre at the village of Moiwana in 1986, during the military and dictatorial regime of President Desi Bouterse. At least 39 citizens were killed by the Suriname Armed Forces. The public apology was ordered by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The court also ordered the Suriname government to pay compensation to the victims and to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the massacre. President Venetiaan announced that he would follow the court ruling and give each of the victims \$13,000 as compensation.

In 2008, Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo apologized to the victims of human rights violations committed by the authoritarian and repressive government of General Alfredo Stroessner from 1954 to 1989. The public apology was a consequence of a report produced by the Truth and Justice Commission, which compiled evidence and confirmed the violations during Stroessner's regime, including torture, assassina-

tions, abduction, and the harassment and maltreatment of citizens.

In a 2009 ceremony in Brasilia, Brazil, Justice Minister Tarso Genro made an apology on behalf of the government to all victims of human rights violations—indiscriminate arrests and detention, assassinations, and disappearances—committed by the military government following the *coup d'état* in 1964 that ended the elected government of Joao Goulart. Minister Genro also authorized the construction of the Amnesty Memorial in Belo Horizonte.

In 2011, Guatemalan President Alvaro Colom issued an apology to Jacobo Arbenz, who was removed from power by a Central Intelligence Agency-backed coup in 1954, 3 years after being democratically elected by Guatemalan citizens. The dictatorship that followed encountered resistance that led to a civil war. Arbenz's reputation was ruined and he died in exile in 1971. The apology issued by Colom was a response to the demands raised by the Arbenz family in 1999 at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The administration not only apologized but also offered economic reparations to the family and is restoring the ex-president's reputation by revising school curricula and naming a highway after him. However, some argue that Arbenz's family should ask the United States to apologize for the CIA's backing of the coup that ended Arbenz's government. The latest apology was proffered in 2012 by President Mauricio Funes of El Salvador for the infamous Massacre of El Mozote, where hundreds of villagers were killed by the armed forces in 1981 (Ayala, 2012).

Political apologies involving other types of wrongdoings have also been issued in Latin America. In 1999, then Governor of Puerto Rico, Pedro Roselló, apologized to pro-independence Puerto Ricans for the covert surveillance and espionage they were unknowingly subjected to because of their political orientation. For decades the Government of Puerto Rico collected and stored a large amount of information regarding citizens linked to anticolonial and pro-independence organizations and political parties. A file for each citizen was

established, known locally as “las carpetas.” This practice was denounced in the 1980s by the Puerto Rican Independence Party, which demanded that such practice be declared unconstitutional and discriminatory. Through an executive order, Roselló issued an apology in the name of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, admitting the practice, apologizing for it, and putting in place mechanisms for reparations to the victims (Anazagasty, 2012).

Recently, Bolivia’s President Evo Morales apologized for singing in a town carnival sexist *coplas* that were widely criticized by the opposition and by women’s organizations around the country. (El Día, 2012). President of Ecuador Rafael Correa also recently apologized to contract teachers for their historical exploitation in that country (América Economía, 2012).

We have argued that political apologies are not only social and political but also public and therefore open to all citizens and interested parties. Yet public opinion and/or attitudes toward political apologies have received little scholarly attention. This chapter focuses on Latin Americans’ reactions to apology and reconciliation, specifically their views concerning whether apologies can encourage and reassure reconciliation and what they consider necessary conditions or practices to make apologies successful in achieving reconciliation.

Methods and Results

Sample

This sample was comprised of 512 participants from Costa Rica, Peru, Argentina, Colombia, Brazil, Nicaragua, and Puerto Rico (304 females, 202 males, and five with an unspecified gender). Within this sample, there were 36 participants from Costa Rica (20 males, 15 females, one unspecified), 189 from Peru (66 males, 121 females, two unspecified), and 31 participants from Argentina (13 males, 17 females, one unspecified). In addition, there were 39 participants from Colombia (15 males, 23 females) and 71 from Brazil (23 males, 48 females). There

were also 99 participants from Nicaragua (43 males, 55 females, one unspecified) and 47 participants from Puerto Rico (22 males, 25 females). The average age of the participants in this sample was 29, with all ages ranging from 18 to 79.

Participants in this study were also asked if they had served in the military, have a relative who served in the military, and if they had ever been involved in a protest activity. Twenty-three percent of the participants reported having a relative who was or is involved in the military, 11% were involved in protest activities, and about 1% reported their own involvement in the military.

Procedure

Participants were recruited in a number of ways, including links to an online survey, the distribution of surveys at universities and shopping malls, and through personal networking. They were asked to complete the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Scale (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006). This chapter focuses on participants’ responses to two items concerning apology and reconciliation. The first item regarding apology was “If one country has in the past invaded, colonized, or exercised control over the governmental affairs of another country, an apology by the invading/colonizing/controlling country can improve the chances for reconciliation between the countries.” Participants were asked to rate their level of agreement on a seven-point Likert scale, with answers ranging from one (totally disagree) to seven (totally agree), and also to respond qualitatively by providing an explanation for their Likert scale rating. Participants were then asked to respond to the second item, “What steps or factors are necessary to make an apology successful in achieving reconciliation between the countries?” All qualitative responses were coded using the apology and reconciliation coding manuals. A more detailed description of the coding manuals and the PAIRTAPS can be found in Chap. 22, the introduction to the apology section of this book.

Coding Manual Development

The apology and reconciliation coding manuals for this study were developed using procedures derived from grounded theory. Grounded theory coding involves generating theory from qualitative data through inductive approaches. There is no hypothesis testing involved in grounded theory, but rather, qualitative data are coded into emergent categories based on the themes that can be identified across responses. The relationships among initial categories are examined and then major categories are identified and defined; it is through this process of examination that theories emerge. As a result, grounded theory is intended to produce relevant theories that fit the qualitative data obtained in the study (Anderson, 2006).

Can Apology Contribute to Reconciliation?

Apology Coding Manual

Three major sets of categories were identified in responses to the apology item: (a) indicates that the effectiveness of the apology *depends* on the situation, (b) *agrees* with the idea that an apology will lead to reconciliation, and (c) *disagrees* with idea that an apology will lead to reconciliation. It was also noted when responses made a *historical reference* to countries that have committed wrongdoings and those that have apologized.

Within the group of responses indicating that the effectiveness of an apology *depends* on the situation, there are seven categories, based on whether the effectiveness of an apology is portrayed as depending on (a) the *nature of the apology*, (b) the *circumstances* in which the apology takes place, (c) whether *acceptance* of the apology occurs, (d) whether *further action* is seen as necessary, (e) whether an apology is a *good start but is only the beginning*, and (f) whether an appropriate amount of *time* has been provided for an apology to work. There is also a *general* category for responses indicating that apology *may work or be worth a try*. Each of these categories

includes several subcategories to allow for finer distinctions among responses.

Responses that *did not agree* with the idea that an apology will lead to reconciliation were sorted into seven categories: (a) reconciliation is *not possible*, (b) an apology *does not erase the past*, (c) the victimized country's people can *forgive but not forget* the wrongdoings, (d) *words do not solve the problem*, (e) *actions speak louder than words*, (f) an apology is *not necessary*, and (g) an apology has *negative consequences*. Also of interest was whether any responses made *references to positive (effective) and negative (ineffective) historical examples* of countries that have committed wrongdoings or countries that have apologized.

Finally, there are two major categories for responses that *agree* with the idea that an apology will lead to reconciliation: (a) an apology will lead to *healing* and (b) an apology is *necessary*. A more detailed description of the coding system can be found in Chap. 22.

Viewpoints on the Effectiveness of an Apology

Forty-four percent of all responses to the apology item were coded into one of the *depends* category. Responses in the *depends* category were further broken down into six subcategories. Most of the responses coded for the *depends* categories indicated that an apology is a *good start* (27% of the depends responses). For example, a 23-year-old Peruvian man referred to an apology as a first step by saying, "An apology is the start but we need much more." In addition, 19% of responses in the *depends* category indicated that the effectiveness of an apology *depends of further action*. For example, a 35-year-old Nicaraguan man commented, "An apology should be accompanied by actions." Table 28.2 provides a summary of responses in the *depends* categories and provides information regarding relative frequencies and examples of responses in each category.

For the apology item, 27% of all responses *disagreed* with the idea that an apology leads to reconciliation. Most of the responses within this

Table 28.2 Does apology increase chances of reconciliation?: Examples of responses in the “it depends” category and subcategories

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>It depends</i>	44				
<i>Depends on further action</i>	8(19)	Puerto Rico	Female	21	“Good decisions need to be made to reach the goal”
		Nicaragua	Male	35	“The apology should be accompanied by actions”
		Brazil	Male	28	“But it should go beyond an apology and there should be a promise and also actions to repair the damage”
<i>Good beginning</i>	12(27)	Puerto Rico	Male	52	“It would be the beginning of a good relationship between countries”
		Costa Rica	Male	41	“They can, but this is definitely not sufficient”
		Colombia	Female	30	“It is the first step towards getting closer it is not sufficient”

The first number in the percent column refers to the percent of responses in the specified category or subcategory out of all responses to the item. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses for that specific subcategory out of its major “*it depends*” category

Table 28.3 Does apology increase chances of reconciliation?: Examples of responses in “disagree” category and subcategories

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
Disagreement	27				
<i>General disagreement</i>	5(18)	Nicaragua	Female	21	“Totally disagree”
		Brazil	Female	20	“The people might reconcile, but not the government”
		Colombia	Female	21	“I’m not sure what good it can do”
<i>Irreversible wrongdoings</i>	9(35)	Puerto Rico	Male	19	“Forgiveness can not be asked for a lost life”
		Nicaragua	Female	20	“The damage is already done”
		Brazil	Female	25	“It can be important although it doesn’t erase the mark the invasion left in history”

The first number in the percent column refers to the percent of responses in the specified category or subcategory out of all responses to the item. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses for that specific subcategory out of its major “*disagreement*” category

category (35%) indicated that *irreversible wrongdoings* prevent the possibility of reconciliation. An example of a response highlighting irreversible wrongdoings is the following statement from a 19-year-old Puerto Rican man: “Forgiveness cannot be asked for a lost life.” Twenty-two percent of the *disagreement* responses were coded into the category labeled *not possible*. For example, a 26-year-old Brazilian woman stated, “Apologies are not enough to resolve a conflict that has lasted for years.” Lastly, the category containing responses that *generally disagree* with

the idea that an apology leads to reconciliation contained 18% of the disagreement responses. Table 28.3 shows the breakdown of responses in the *disagreement* categories, including their relative frequencies and sample responses.

Twenty-two percent of the responses to the apology item *agreed* with the idea that an apology leads to reconciliation. Among these *agree* responses, a majority (63%) indicated they *generally agreed* that an apology can lead to reconciliation. For example, a 64-year-old Nicaraguan woman stated that “everyone has a second

Table 28.4 Does apology increase chances of reconciliation?: Examples of responses in the “agree” category and subcategories

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Agreement</i>	22				
General agreement	14(63)	Nicaragua	Male	25	“Yes because there are countries who recognize their effort”
		Brazil	Female	39	“To err is possible, and to redeem yourself from the error shows humility”
		Argentina	Female	22	“An apology is always a step towards reconciliation”
Healing	0(0)				
Repair relationships	7(31)	Puerto Rico	Female	19	“In the dialogue there is a good choice for change”
		Nicaragua	Male	31	“An apology helps to rectify mistakes made by previous governments”
		Peru	Male	18	“Yes, because it helps heal old wounds and repair conflict among countries”

The first number in the percent column refers to the percent of responses in the specified category or subcategory out of all responses to the item. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses for that specific subcategory out of its major “*agreement*” category

chance,” while a 21-year-old Brazilian man said that “apologies tend to work towards reconciliation.” Thirty-one percent of *agreement* responses specified that an apology could *repair relations* between countries. For example, the statement from a 39-year-old Costa Rican man indicates that an apology “would help in improving international relations.” Table 28.4 provides more information regarding responses in the *agreement* categories, as well as relative frequencies and examples.

Only 2% of responses made a *historical reference*. Of these responses, 55% made a *positive historical reference*, 36% made a *negative historical reference*, and 9% were *neutral*. The remaining 4% of responses to the apology item were uncodeable, meaning that they failed to answer the prompt or were unable to be coded using the apology coding manual.

Exploratory Statistical Analyses: Apology

Exploratory chi-square tests were performed in order to examine the possibility of variation

among the responses based on demographic group membership. The four demographics analyzed were (a) gender, (b) military experience, (c) a relative with military experience, and (d) protest activity. Within this sample, a number of marginally significant differences were found.

Exploratory statistical analyses show women were marginally more likely than men to say that apology could lead to reconciliation if *further steps were taken*, as well as giving at least one response *disagreeing* with the idea that apology could lead to reconciliation. In addition, respondents who did not have relatives with military experience were marginally more likely than those who did have a relative with military experience to state that in addition to an apology, *further actions* are necessary. Also non-protestors were marginally more likely than protestors to give at least one example of a response *disagreeing* with the idea that an apology can lead to reconciliation. There were no significant differences in responses found on the basis of military experience. Table 28.5 provides the Pearson chi-square values for the apology items in regard to gender, relative’s military service, and protest.

Table 28.5 Apology increases chances of reconciliation: Percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Category	Group 1 (%) ^a	Group 2 (%) ^a	X ²
	Male	Female	
<i>Depends</i>			
<i>Depends on further action</i>	5	10	2.64 [^]
<i>Disagreement</i>			
<i>Disagree presence</i>	24	32	2.93 [^]
	Military relative	No military relative	
<i>Depends</i>			
<i>Depends on further action</i>	6	13	2.72 [^]
	Protest	No protest	
<i>Disagreement</i>			
<i>Disagree presence</i>	20	34	2.88 [^]

If there is a blank row next to a major category name, there were no significant group differences in scores at that level; however, we listed the major category whenever there was a significant group difference in scores in one of the subcategories. “Presence” at the end of a variable name signifies that the variable was created by giving a score of 1 to every participant who provided a response coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories

[^]= .051 ≤ p ≤ .10

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

When Does Apology Promote Reconciliation?

Reconciliation Coding Manual

Responses to the second item regarding reconciliation (“What steps or factors are necessary to make an apology successful in achieving reconciliation between the countries?”) fell into three sets of categories: (a) reconciliation is possible by a specific means, (b) reconciliation is not possible, and (c) the participant does not know if reconciliation is possible.

Responses indicating a belief that reconciliation is possible were coded into four major categories depending on whether reconciliation is portrayed as possible based on: (a) certain *circumstances*, (b) the *nature of the apology*, (c) the wronged country’s *acceptance* of the apology, and (d) *additional interpersonal or psychological actions* in conjunction with an apology. Each of these categories was broken down into subcategories to allow for greater specificity in coding. Responses expressing the belief that reconciliation is not possible fell into major subcategories:

(a) reconciliation is not possible due to the *irreversible* nature of the offending country’s wrongdoings and (b) reconciliation following apology is *unrealistic*. A more detailed description of the coding manual can be found in Chap. 22.

Viewpoints on the Role of Apology in Achieving Reconciliation

Ninety-five percent of responses to the reconciliation item *agreed* that reconciliation could follow from an apology, while only 3% of responses considered reconciliation to be *impossible*. About 1% of the remaining responses to the reconciliation item were *unsure* of how to achieve reconciliation and another 1% of the responses were uncodeable.

Responses indicating that the reconciliation is possible depending on the *nature of the apology* accounted for 30% of all responses to the reconciliation item. Of this 30% responses, 44% focused on the necessity of a *diplomatic* component or mentioned a *treaty* as components or correlates of a successful apology,

Table 28.6 Reconciliation is achievable through specific steps: Examples of responses in common categories and subcategories

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Reconciliation is achievable</i>	95				
<i>Nature of apology</i>	30				
Sincerity	7(23)	Nicaragua Brazil	Female Male	25 21	“If it is a sincere apology” “To unconditionally admit what the real motivations were”
		Colombia	Male	26	“Demonstrate interest in change”
Diplomacy/treaty	13 (44)	Nicaragua	Male	19	“Reach peace agreements, that favor both countries”
		Brazil	Female	24	“Political agreement”
		Peru	Female	21	“That the country give cultural recommendations that helps the dominated country grow culturally”
<i>Interpersonal/psychological</i>	31				
Repair relations	16(54)	Argentina	Female	36	“Agreement, intention of reparation, dialogue”
		Costa Rica	Male	50	“(1.) Have better relations (2.) Have better relations between their citizens”
		Argentina	Male	24	“The most important thing is that they collaborate in the reconciliation”
Understand/tolerate/respect	14(46)	Costa Rica	Female	23	“Respect between nations”
		Peru	Female	37	“Respecting the culture, their beliefs”
		Nicaragua	Female	28	“Yes, respect for human dignity”
<i>Goods or services</i>	17				
General	4(25)	Brazil	Female	24	“To do something that can repair the damage caused”
		Costa Rica	Male	33	“Certain act of generosity from the government to the other country, but something never seen before”
		Nicaragua	Female	22	“Help the country that has been affected”
Money	7(44)	Peru	Female	18	“Rectifying, paying, economical assistance”
		Nicaragua	Male	48	“Compensation”
<i>Follow through on apology/change behavior</i>	14				
Initiate positive actions	5(36)	Peru	Female	25	“That governments stop looking for individual power and start thinking about community”
		Nicaragua	Female	21	“Before apologizing you have to change”
		Nicaragua	Female	26	“Reconciliation actions”

The first number in the percent column refers to the percent of responses in the specified category or subcategory out of all responses to the reconciliation item. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses for that specific subcategory out of its major category

while 23% of the *nature of the apology* responses pinpointed *sincerity* as a significant factor. An example of a response recommending a *diplomatic* component or a *treaty* is in the following statement by a 30-year-old Peruvian woman: “Peace treaties, reconciliation treaties, programs and work plan, execution of the plan,

results evaluation.” Thirty-one percent of responses made reference to *psychological* or *interpersonal* components as part of the reconciliation process; within this *psychological* or *interpersonal* category, 54% of the responses specifically referred to *repaired relations*, and 46% called for *tolerance, respect, and under-*

standing. For example, a 23-year-old Brazilian woman recommended, “Understanding the other country, even if you don’t agree with it.”

Seventeen percent of all responses to the reconciliation item indicated that reconciliation is possible with the provision of *goods and services*. Of these *goods and services* responses, 44% made reference to *monetary* reparations, while 25% of these responses indicated the *general necessity of goods and services*. Lastly, 14% of all responses to the reconciliation item commented that a *change in behavior* on the part of the aggressor was essential to the reconciliation process. Within this *change in behavior* category, the largest proportion (36%) of responses indicated that, in addition to an apology, the aggressor must *initiate positive actions*. For example, a 26-year-old woman from Nicaragua mentioned “reconciliation actions.” Table 28.6 provides examples of these categories, along with basic demographic information for the respondents.

Exploratory Statistical Analyses: Reconciliation

Exploratory chi-square analyses for the reconciliation item showed that gender and whether or not respondents had a relative in the military yielded marginally significant or statistically significant differences in response patterns. Women were marginally more likely than men to suggest at least one *possible step that could be taken to achieve reconciliation*, 95% versus 90%, $X^2=3.46$, $p\leq 0.1$. Also, a significantly greater proportion of respondents with relatives in the military than those without a military relative stated that an active effort to *repair the relations* between two countries could lead to reconciliation, 16% versus 9%, $X^2=4.23$, $p\leq 0.05$.

Conclusions

As defined by Merriam-Webster dictionary (www.m-w.com), an apology may be understood as an admission of error. In political terms, the

use of apologies and the degree of sincerity expressed by the individual, group, government, or organization seeking forgiveness for prior acts varies according to the moment in history and the context of the situation. Naturally, an apology is further defined by the particular act for which remorse is being sought and whether that act is classified as humanitarian, academic, economic, or personal (Hook, 2008b).

Toward the end of the twentieth century, the use of apology as a political strategy has flourished. During the 1990s, in particular, endeavors to seek forgiveness and offer reparations reached a historic peak, potentially due to significant historical changes. Events that merited apologies included the fall of communist regimes, international shifts in favor of morality, an emphasis on human rights, and demands for recognition by victims of injustice, to name a few. What can be said about the use and acceptance of apologies in the public forum is that the political figure admitting responsibility and seeking forgiveness must demonstrate human characteristics in the process. This, in turn, allows those wronged to address their suffering at an individual and a societal level.

Many political figures and governments have proffered apologies in the Latin American region. These range from US President George H. Bush apologizing for sending American troops to invade the home of the Nicaraguan Ambassador to Panama, to US President Bill Clinton apologizing to Guatemala for a 1954 CIA intervention that led to a brutal civil war, to Puerto Rico’s governor Pedro Roselló apologizing to the citizens who had been spied upon by the government for their pro-independence politics, and, further, to acknowledgment of human rights violations by prior dictatorships that held power in Chile, Brazil, and Paraguay, among others.

Given the tumultuous historical landscape in Latin America, it is not surprising that most of the participants in this study indicated that apologies vary in their effectiveness depending on the situation. For many Latin Americans, an apology offers a beginning but must be followed by

concrete reparations and/or changes in political policy. A notable number of Latin Americans indicated that apologies are, effectively, too little too late and that they do nothing to address harm previously incurred. Essentially, extended conflicts and the loss of life are viewed as too serious to be erased with a few words. Although fewer than those who believe in apology if the context is appropriate or those who simply disagree with apology as an effective tool, many Latin Americans indicated that apologies can help facilitate progress toward a better future for one's own country or relationships between distinct countries. In spite of their relative pessimism about apologies per se—a possible consequence of highly corrupt politics in the region—Latin Americans expressed belief in apologies as a step toward reconciliation between parties. This is particularly true when a diplomatic envoy endeavors to repair relationships and when this is done having allowed for the passage of time.

In effect, when asked to explore the potential of an apology in terms of leading to reconciliation, Latin Americans concluded that, yes, it is possible to heal wounds and move toward a better future. They agree with the general movement toward initiating apologies. Latin Americans add to that idea the importance of being honest in doing so, of establishing a positive agenda for future relationships, and of taking real action as part of that process. The Latin American emphasis on putting action to words seems a timely one and, as one respondent indicated, certainly represents a means of leading to a world where we can understand one another in spite of our disagreements. That is the power of a sincere apology.

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Perspectives on Apology and Reconciliation in South and Southeast Asia

29

Leakhena Nou, Julia Rashid, William Dubbs,
Haslina Muhammad, Ma. Regina E. Estuar,
Janice Jones, Megan Reif, Sherri McCarthy,
Jas Jafaar, Darshini Shah, Nisha Raj, and Ellora Puri

This chapter focuses on perspectives on apology in South and Southeast Asian countries. It addresses the issue of whether apology can lead to reconciliation among conflicting nations within this region and in Asia Pacific more generally and discusses factors associated with conflict resolution in the context of emerging societies with vested interests in economic growth and overcoming postwar challenges. It also reports on some of the personal experiences of Nou, the first author of this chapter, in her interactions with the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) in its efforts to bring perpetrators of the Cambodian genocide to justice.

The complexity of South and Southeast Asian countries makes it especially difficult to focus on specific social, cultural, economic, and political conditions affecting this region – which for the purposes of this chapter includes India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka. This chapter relies on research, other literature, and the personal experiences of the first author in Cambodia in order to examine apology and reconciliation as they relate to the pursuit of global peace, conflict resolution, social justice, and economic sustainability in South and Southeast Asia.

L. Nou (✉)
Department of Sociology, California State University,
Long Beach, USA
e-mail: Leakhena.Nou@csulb.edu

J. Rashid
Department of Psychology, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA

W. Dubbs
Department of Psychology, Boston University, MA, USA

H. Muhammad
Monash University, Melbourne, Australia

M.R.E. Estuar
Department of Information Systems and Computer Science,
Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon City, Philippines
e-mail: restuar@ateneo.edu

J. Jones
Doctoral Leadership Studies Department, Cardinal
Stritch University, Milwaukee, WI, USA
e-mail: je2jones@stritch.edu

M. Reif
Political Science and International Studies, University of
Colorado Denver, Denver, CO, USA
e-mail: reifm@umich.edu; reifmegan@live.com

S. McCarthy
Educational Psychology, Counseling and Human
Relations, Northern Arizona University, Yuma, AZ, USA
e-mail: Sherri.McCarthy@NAU.EDU

J. Jafaar
Department of Anthropology and Sociology, Faculty of
Arts and Sciences, University of Malaysia, Malaysia
e-mail: laile@um.edu.my

D. Shah
Health Education Library for People, Mumbai, India
e-mail: dnsahl1@gmail.com

N. Raj
Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA

E. Puri
Department of Political Science, University of Jammu,
Jammu, India
e-mail: ellorapuri@gmail.com

The global interconnectedness of nation-states in the post-Cold War era leads countries to depend on each other economically, socially, and to some extent culturally. This interdependence, in turn, requires countries to face and to a certain extent resolve or otherwise overcome unsettled historical or political wounds. However, this is especially challenging between countries with a long history of conflict and/or present-day struggles as, for example, in the case of India and Pakistan. In most cases, a peaceful climate is a necessary precondition for reconciliation to occur.

South and Southeast Asia and Its Neighbors: New Opportunities

Because of the interrelatedness of the modern world, ongoing competition and distrust between Japan and China may have a profound impact on South and Southeast Asia. As Stephen Leong noted, “For Asia to be secure, Japan and China have to be getting along ... Otherwise the security architecture of Asia will fall to pieces” (cited in Yang, 1998, p. 30). Also, China’s relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is as important as the triangular relationship between China, America, and Japan. For Japan, ASEAN’s perception of Japan’s political role in the years since World War II (i.e., expression of remorse for the suffering Japan inflicted on Southeast Asia in that war) has led to a steady evolution toward acceptance as Japan takes an active interest in the political affairs of Southeast Asia.

According to Yang (1998), Southeast Asia is likely to benefit from its strategic partnership with China and Japan for several reasons. For example, Southeast Asia has geopolitical control over both China and Japan; China and Japan’s trade and access to oil from the Middle East pass through Southeast Asia, and Japan gets many of its raw materials from the region. In addition, with a growing population of approximately 450 million people and increased economic-political viability, Southeast Asia is an important emerging economy. Both China and Japan have invested heavily in postwar Cambodia’s emerging economy; such investments include clothing factories or rural development in natural resources.

Toward Reconciliation: Western and Indigenous Approaches

To take advantage of economic opportunities and achieve economic and political stability, the South and Southeast Asia region needs to establish peaceful relations among neighboring nations. Darby and MacGinty (2008) argued that indigenous peacemaking (i.e., participatory and relationship-focused peacemaking) is likely to promote peaceful outcomes with cooperation from the community, while the universal style of international peace interventions predicated on “liberal peace” (i.e., Western styles of peacemaking and support) fails to deliver lasting peace. They suggest considering indigenous approaches to peacemaking and reconciliation as an alternative or the simultaneous application of both styles in complementary ways. East Timor and Afghanistan adopted indigenous styles of dispute resolution alongside a more formal, Western-inspired model – which resulted in the implementation of a broader, internationally supported peace framework.

Powers and El-Nawawy’s (2009) argument that we should recognize and apply indigenous approaches in peacemaking efforts is consistent with the view of Bellamy and Davies (2009), who have suggested that policies with a security-focused agenda (including Western-style policies such as early warnings, sanctions, and intervention) should not be allowed to overshadow other equally effective programs taking a development-focused approach.

Bellamy and Davies (2009) also argue that to implement the United Nation’s Right to Protect (R2P) principle fully, “global norms need to be ‘localized’ in order to be internalized and eventually implemented” (p. 568). For example, in the Asia-Pacific region, the countries espousing the R2P doctrine must be prepared to accept the principle of noninterference that is consistent with the region’s indigenous value on maintaining sovereignty – including working together to address Myanmar’s troubling human rights record. As such, the political elites of ASEAN are requesting that the international community, particularly Western-style leaders, approach peace and conflict resolution in the region by

respecting indigenous pathways to peace and reconciliation.

This respect may be difficult for many Western countries that are preoccupied with fears related to the issue of terrorism/counter-terrorism; such fears have often been a driving force behind unjust policies and violent initiatives. Yuan Woon (2011) expands on this topic by scrutinizing how fear is connected to the US-led “war on terror” in regard to the Philippines in the post 9/11 era. Woon argues that the framing of terrorism in the Philippines has allowed the government to manipulate the public’s fear in order to justify eradicating imminent threats such as the one purported to be linked to the communist “rebel” group, Rebulusyonyong Partido ng Manggagawa ng Mindanao (RPM-M). Woon views such initiatives as counterproductive in the search for sources of terror and as contributors to the perpetuation of violence. By highlighting the actions of RPM-M, Woon points out that a terrorism discourse focused on state-induced vulnerability and marginalization allows fear to be transformed into other emotional dimensions central to the development of random acts of state violence and their consequences.

Like R2P, war tribunals have emerged in the World War II era as an international effort to deal with violence within and between states. Roper and Barria (2007), in their consideration on the motivations behind voluntary contribution to war crimes tribunals by donors (as opposed to the mandatory Chap. 7-funded tribunals by the United Nations Security Council), examined four case studies: the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). Several important results emerged:

1. Donor states with a better record on political rights, civil liberties, and good governance were more likely to contribute to a war crimes tribunal; this likelihood increased when these states had strong economies.

2. Donors are more likely to contribute when they are from the same region as the region in need. For example, in the case of the ECCC, the regional effect showed that Asian donors provided the financing. This is partly due to the hybrid nature of the ECCC (the majority of judges and prosecutors are Cambodian) and partly because the Cambodian government yields substantial authority in the decision-making process. Asian states have contributed, thus reinforcing their position of noninterference in the domestic affairs of neighboring countries.
3. The status of formal colonial power was a significant predictor in motivating states to contribute.

The Cambodia Case

One problem in regard to voluntarily funded tribunals is that if funds do not become available, continuation of the tribunals may be jeopardized, which ultimately harms both national reconciliation as well as the search for justice. This is happening with the ECCC: a lack of funds coupled with internal politics has delayed the process of prosecuting defendants responsible for atrocities committed during the Khmer Rouge period. As such, the survivors – who closely monitor the Court’s activities – are learning about the limitations of the legal system in delivering the justice they seek. For example, victim participation is one of the mandates of the ECCC, yet victim-survivors without access to information about the Court are particularly vulnerable to marginalization from the process. Because of the lack of funding for effective outreach programs to inform survivors about the ECCC, elderly survivors and those in remote parts of Cambodia (in short, survivors without access to the internet or to nongovernmental organizations working on victim participation or the Victims Support Section of the ECCC) are unable to participate fully in the ECCC. The defendants, like the victim-survivors, are aging and in poor health, and the longer the ECCC is delayed, the less likely it is that justice will be delivered.

As an observer of and participant in interactions with the ECCC in case 002 (the prosecution of former senior Khmer Rouge officials Khieu Samphan, Noun Chea, Ieng Sary, and Ieng Thirith), I (the first author of this chapter) learned that the hybrid structure of the ECCC has caused tension between the local and international staff and also between the Cambodian government and the United Nations. The ECCC's obligation to conform to both domestic and international rules of law, for instance, is problematic because of the cultural dissonance between the local court staff and their international counterparts. Court staff report clashes in regard to their linguistic-behavioral mores, legal training, and interpretation of procedures. This discord has created distrust and unpleasant working relationships within the ECCC system and has resulted in the resignations of several international staff members. As news reports surfaced about the dwindling funding for the ECCC, many victim-survivors expressed their concern that defendants who are in their late 70s and 80s may die before they are prosecuted.

Elderly survivors in the diaspora who had filed as civil parties in Case 002 traveled with me to Cambodia to participate in the opening of Case 002 in November 2011. These individuals were mainly interested in hearing an apology from the senior defendants for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge and learning about the mechanics of the Court. For 2 weeks, they waited patiently in the Court's gallery, hoping to hear some form of remorse or apology from the defendants. They never did. What they learned from this participation was the complicated nature of seeking justice within the structures of legal arguments and frameworks. The survivors now realize that the definition of justice cannot be limited to a conviction handed down by the Court. Despite the limitations of the Court, the survivors continue to remain optimistic and patient that when all the evidence is presented, justice may prevail.

Conviction in the form of Court proceedings is an example of retributive justice, which has shown its limitations as a process that can promote reconciliation in Cambodia. Retributive justice

focuses on individual accountability and punishment, usually in the form of a criminal trial. Currently, many Cambodian scholars (e.g., Doung & Ear, 2009) see the ECCC's ability to provide healing as limited; these scholars propose augmenting the Court's work with community- and dialogue-based restorative justice efforts. Restorative justice refers to promoting reconciliation between survivors and perpetrators.

Case 002 has been delayed for numerous reasons, from lack of funding to the poor health of the defendants (e.g., Ieng Thirith's diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease). Along with Case 002, there are other cases to be introduced, specifically, Cases 003 and 004 involving other high-profile defendants who have yet to be investigated; the lack of progress on these cases adds to the survivors' frustration.¹ For the survivors and their families 37 years after the crimes were committed, learning such lessons is difficult. This is especially true when we factor in some potential degree of memory loss among the survivors and defendants alike in providing evidence of the atrocities committed and endured. Perhaps the greatest challenge of all, though, is determining what measure of accountability is justifiable and adequate to serve the simultaneous goals of retributive justice for the Cambodian people and the social health and healing of Cambodian society.

The survivors who traveled with me to Cambodia spoke with the son of Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch (Chief Warden of S-21). Duch's son expressed his emotional remorse and apologized to them (and other victims, indirectly) for the crimes committed by his father at S-21. This apology offered some closure for the survivors who had hoped to hear an apology from the defendants on trial, but were unable to do so due to delays in the ECCC. This single personal interaction between one perpetrator's son and a handful of victim-survivors is a symbolic and

¹For more information about the ECCC, please refer to the ECCC website: www.eccc.gov, and to learn about my activities with the survivors' participation in the ECCC, please visit www.asricjustice.com.

encouraging first step in a long, ongoing dialogue of apology and reconciliation I hope to foster in my search to find closure for all Cambodians who endured this tragic chapter in our history.

An apology for their suffering and losses feels essential to survivors of the Khmer Rouge atrocities and to their families. Can reconciliation take place without apologies? Does the motivation behind apologies play an important role in their effectiveness? According to Hook (2008), political apologies signal governmental policy changes that have opened the door to reconciliation with marginalized ethnic communities, such as the war apologies of Japan or the Australian government's apology to the indigenous Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders for the government-caused injustices they suffered and the 1993 Apology Resolution of the United States to Hawaii for overthrowing the Kingdom of Hawaii. Hook outlined four common motives behind political apologies: (a) humanitarian apologies, which involve injustices inflicted on a group of citizens within a country by past actions of its government or other leaders – as exemplified in the Cambodia case; (b) academic apologies, intended to correct a past wrongdoing simply because it “should be” corrected – essentially an apology resulting in official documentation “for the record;” (c) economically motivated apologies – for example, Japan's post-WWII apologies motivated at least in part by Japan's desire to pursue trading opportunities with China and other Asian nations; and (d) personal apologies, made for poor behavioral choices on the part of an individual, especially when that individual thought no one was watching.

The Cambodian case presented in this chapter provides some anecdotal evidence of the desire of one group of genocide survivors and their families to receive an apology for atrocities perpetrated in a former regime. What do other people from South and Southeast Asia think about the role of apology in reconciliation between nations or groups within a nation? That is the kind of question we can address with responses to our international survey on perspectives on governmental aggression, peace, and reconciliation.

Methods

Sample

The South and Southeast Asian sample consists of 336 participants from India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka (57% females, 43% males). Ages ranged from 18 to 74, with an average age of 27. Six percent of respondents reported having served in the military at some point in their life, and 27% of respondents reported having a family member who has served or is serving in the military. Only 20% of the sample reported ever participating in a protest.

Procedure

Participants were asked to complete the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006). The PAIRTAPS is composed of items aimed at gauging the respondents' perspectives on war, torture, terrorism, protest, peace, and reconciliation. It was developed by the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP). Responses to the apology survey items were coded using a grounded theory approach. Grounded theory is the process by which a theoretical framework is generated through the analysis of qualitative data (Glaser, 1992). Consistent with grounded theory, common themes were derived from answers provided to the open-ended questions on the PAIRTAPS.

In this chapter, we examine responses to two items from the PAIRTAPS: the apology item and the steps to reconciliation item. The apology item states: “If one country has in the past invaded, colonized, or exercised control over the governmental affairs of another country, an apology by the invading/colonizing/controlling country can improve the chances for reconciliation between the countries.” Participants were asked to rate on a 7-point Likert scale their level of agreement with that statement (1 meaning “totally disagree,” 7

meaning “totally agree”) and, then, were asked to explain their reasoning behind the rating. The reconciliation item states: “The steps that should be taken to achieve reconciliation are...” and participants are asked to complete the sentence. These questions were answered in an open-ended format, and the responses were coded for common themes using the Apology Coding Manual.

Both the apology and reconciliation items were coded using their own coding guidelines. Responses to each item were broken into “codable units,” or parts of the response that contain a single idea. One response, therefore, might contain multiple codable units. This way, multiple ideas in a single response can be more fully represented. Since the responses are broken into codable units, there are more codes in the dataset than there are responses. However, the distinction between responses and codable units is not fundamental to the interpretation of the results, and for simplicity, these terms will be used interchangeably from this point forward.

The Apology Item

Coding Procedure

Responses to the apology item fell into three major sets of categories: (a) an effective apology *depends* on the situation, (b) *agreement* that apology can lead to reconciliation, and (c) *disagreement* that an apology can lead to reconciliation. Responses were also coded for *historical references* if they referred to a historical event. For a more detailed description of the coding manual and the PAIRTAPS, see the apology introductory methods chapter (Chap. 22).

Results

Distribution of Thematic Responses to the Apology Item

Forty-six percent of the responses to the apology item were coded into one of the *it depends* cate-

gories: (a) depends on the *circumstances*, (b) depends on the *nature* of the apology, (c) depends on *acceptance* of the apology, (d) depends on *further action*, and (e) apology is a *good start* or *only the beginning*. More specifically, 15% of the *depends* responses indicated that reconciliation depends on the *circumstances* surrounding the apology, such as the *severity of wrongdoing*, *general circumstances*, or the *relevance and timing* of the apology. For example, a 74-year-old Pakistani man referred to the severity of wrongdoing saying, “It depends on the damage. If a country can recover from damage on its own then an apology would work. However, if the damage cannot be indemnified/recovered, then no apology.” Twenty-three percent of the *it depends* responses fell into the category focused on the *nature* of the apology, specifying that an apology needed to be *sincere*, *recognize wrongdoing*, show *remorse*, or be *diplomatic* in nature (involving state officials or a public apology). Responses indicating that *acceptance* is the key to reconciliation made up 10% of the *it depends* responses. The responses suggesting that reconciliation depends on *further action* comprised 24% of the *depends* responses. Lastly, the largest category in the *depends* group (26% of the *depends* responses) contains responses indicating that an apology is a good beginning, but only the *first step* toward reconciliation. Table 29.1 shows the breakdown of responses in the *depends* categories, as well as relative frequencies and examples of responses in each category.

Thirty percent of the apology responses were coded into one of the *agreement* categories. The largest portion of the *agreement* responses (44%) were a *general agreement* that apology can lead to reconciliation. For example, a 21-year-old woman from Sri Lanka stated simply, “total agreement,” while a 21-year-old male from the Philippines said, “definitely both for moral and civil purposes.” In addition, many of the agreement responses were coded one of two more specific categories: (a) apology leads to *healing* of the victims (7% of the agreement responses); and (b) apology is a *necessary* step toward reconciliation (13% of the agreement responses). Statements that apology can help *repair*

Table 29.1 Does apology increase chances of reconciliation? Examples of responses in the “it depends” categories and subcategories

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>It depends</i>	46				
<i>Circumstances</i>	7(15)				
General	3(7)	Philippines	Female	20	“Well it depends on the situation because it may not matter at all”
Severity of wrongdoing	3(6)	India	Female	20	“Yes, if the harm done is not much”
Relevance/timing	1(3)	Philippines	Male	36	“(Apology)... must be undertaken right away...”
<i>Nature of apology</i>	11 (23)				
Sincerity	3(6)	Malaysia	Female	22	“Only a sincere apology can be accepted”
Recognition of wrongdoing	5(11)	Pakistan	Male	23	“Admitting the mistakes can pave the way for better ties”
Remorse	1(3)	Philippines	Male	30	“An apology, may improve only if there seems to be some remorse...”
Diplomatic/treaty	1(3)	Pakistan	Male	22	“I believe the best route is to seek diplomacy...”
<i>Acceptance</i>	5(10)				
General	2(5)	India	Female	21	“It depends on the mindset of the (wronged country)”
Forgiveness	2(5)	Malaysia	Female	23	“Forgiveness is the key to peace”
<i>Further action</i>	11(24)				
General	2(5)	Sri Lanka	Female	45	“... but more will be needed”
Change behavior	5(12)	India	Male	29	“(Apology) would prove that the country has changed its perspective toward the other country and make significant difference in improving the relationship”
Material reparations	3(7)	Laos	Male	45	“... an apology and compensation is solution to this”
<i>Good beginning/only first step</i>	12(26)	Pakistan	Female	18	“(Apology is) the first step in solving the issue...”

The number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category or subcategory out of all responses to the apology item. The second number (in parenthesis) refers to the percent of responses in the specified category out of all the *depends* responses

relationships, which was a subcategory of *healing*, accounted for 35% of the agreement responses. Table 29.2 presents the *agreement* category, complete with relative frequencies and examples of responses.

Only 17% of responses to the apology item *disagreed* with the idea that apology leads to reconciliation. A response may indicate a *general disagreement* with the statement or be categorized into one of six other categories: (a) it is *not possible* for apology to lead to reconciliation; (b) *irreversible wrongdoings* prevent reconciliation; (c) countries *forgive but do not forget*; (d) *words do not matter*; (e) *actions speak louder than words*; (f) an apology is *not necessary* for recon-

ciliation; and (g) an apology has *negative consequences*. Of the responses indicating *disagreement* that apology leads to reconciliation, 40% mentioned *irreversible wrongdoings*, distinguishing this category as the most popular reasoning why apology cannot lead to reconciliation. For example, a 32-year-old Pakistani woman said, “Apologizing would not undo the destruction and bloodshed.” The *disagreement* categories, except for *actions speak louder than words*, as it accounted for less than 1% of all responses, as well as relative frequencies and examples of responses are presented in Table 29.3.

Responses were also coded for *historical references*. About 4% of responses made a *historical*

Table 29.2 Does apology increases chances of reconciliation? Examples of responses in the agree categories and subcategories

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Agreement</i>	30				
<i>General agreement</i>	13(44)	Malaysia	Male	22	“Of course”
Healing	2(7)	Philippines	Female	26	“Through humanity... it can start healing”
Repairs relationships	10(35)	Indonesia	Female	21	“Yes... it will definitely improve the relationship between both countries.”
It is necessary	4(13)	India	Male	22	“... the only thing you can do for past events is to apologize & that is the best thing you can do...”

The number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category or subcategory out of all responses to the apology item. The second number (in parenthesis) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the responses agreeing that apology can lead to reconciliation

Table 29.3 Does apology increases chances of reconciliation? Examples of responses in disagree categories

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Disagreement</i>	17				
General disagreement	2(9)	Pakistan	Male	25	“No way...”
Not possible	2(11)	India	Female	21	“In today’s world no one is willing to admit they were wrong or are wrong”
Irreversible wrongdoings	7(40)	Philippines	Male	35	“Its kind of hard due to the damages done”
Forgive, do not forget	2(11)	Malaysia	Male	25	“That is only a consolation act, but the memories and trauma (are) not to be forgotten”
Words do not matter	2(9)	Philippines	Female	19	“Saying sorry is like trying to take your actions back through words... sorry does nothing to help...”
Not necessary	1(6)	Philippines	Female	21	“An apology is really not necessary...”
Negative consequences	2(11)	Sri Lanka	Male	69	“Digging up the past, does not help. It only open(s) wounds that give immense pleasure to Extremist”

The number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of all responses to the apology item. The second number (in parenthesis) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the responses disagreeing that apology can lead to reconciliation

reference. Of those historical references, 40% were positive, 20% were negative, and 40% were neutral. A positive historical reference is illustrated in a statement by a 23-year-old Indian woman: “As Britishers ruled our country for about more than 100 years then also today we have good relations with Great Britain.” A 72-year-old Sri Lankan man’s response embodies a negative historical reference when he says, “America must pull out from both Iraq and Afghanistan, and No apology is enough for the destruction already caused.” The remaining 4% of responses to the apology item were identified as uncodable, meaning they failed to address the

prompt or are simply unable to be coded using the Apology Coding Manual.

Exploratory Statistical Analyses of Apology Themes

Also of interest to our research were the extent to which there might be differences in responses to the apology item as a function of specific demographic variables – namely, gender, military service, relative’s military service, and participation in protest. To test the effects of these variables, a Pearson chi-square was calculated for each category.

Table 29.4 Apology increases chances of reconciliation: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Category ^a	Group 1 ^b Men	Group 2 ^b Women	χ^2
<i>Depends</i>			
Depends presence	42	52	3.17 [^]
<i>Agreement</i>			
Agreement presence	42	30	4.87 [*]
General agreement	19	10	5.60 [*]
	Military relative	No military relative	
<i>Agreement</i>			
Agreement presence	26	41	6.34 [*]
	Protest	No protest	
<i>Depends</i>			
Depends presence	62	42	7.62 ^{**}
<i>Agreement</i>			
Agreement presence	27	39	2.96 [^]

^aIf there is a blank row next to a major category name, there were no significant group differences in scores at that level; however, we listed the major category whenever there was a significant group difference in scores in one of the subcategories. “Presence” at the end of a variable name signifies that the variable was created by giving a score of 1 to every participant who provided a response coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories

[^]= .051 ≤ *p* ≤ .10 * = *p* ≤ .05 ** = *p* ≤ .01

^bThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

There were several statistically significant or marginally significant group differences on the frequency of responses in some of the *it depends* on the situation categories. Specifically, at a marginally significant level, a higher proportion of women than men gave at least one example of a response in one of the *it depends* categories (thereby receiving a score of 1 for the *depends presence* variable). In addition, a significantly greater proportion of men than women gave responses coded into one or more of the *agreement* categories (agreement presence), as well as providing more general, nonspecific *agreement* responses. Furthermore, a significantly greater proportion of respondents without family members with military experience gave at least one example of an *agree* response than their counterparts. A significantly greater proportion of protestors than non-protestors provided at least one response indicating that apology can lead to reconciliation *depending* on the situation,

whereas, at a marginally significant level, proportionally more non-protestors than protestors gave at least one response *agreeing* that apology can lead to reconciliation. The Pearson chi-square values for these group differences are presented in Table 29.4.

The Reconciliation Item

Coding Procedure

There were three sets of categories for responses to the reconciliation item (“What steps or factors are necessary to make an apology successful in achieving reconciliation between the countries?”): (a) reconciliation is *achievable*; (b) reconciliation is *unachievable*; and (c) the respondent is *unsure* of whether or not reconciliation is achievable. Responses coded into the *achievable* category indicate that reconciliation is attainable

through specific steps such as material reparations or a sincere apology. Conversely, the *unachievable* category contains responses stating that reconciliation cannot be achieved, possibly offering explanations as to why not. For a more detailed description of the coding manual and the PAIRTAPS, see the apology introductory methods chapter (Chap. 22).

Results

Distribution of Reconciliation Responses

In response to the reconciliation prompt, an astounding 97% of responses described steps to make reconciliation *achievable*, while a mere 2% portrayed reconciliation to be *unachievable*, and 1% suggested that the respondent was *unsure* of the steps needed to achieve reconciliation.

The *achievability* responses were coded into six major categories: (a) reconciliation *depends on the circumstances* (e.g., *passage of time*); (b) reconciliation depends on the *nature of the apology*; (c) reconciliation depends on the *acceptance* of the apology; (d) the reconciliation process must have *psychological or interpersonal* components; (e) *good or services* must be provided to achieve reconciliation; and (f) the aggressing country must *change its behavior* to achieve reconciliation. One of the smaller response categories, the *depends on the circumstances* category, specifically, *depends on the passage of time*, accounted for only about 1% of all responses to the reconciliation item. Responses indicating that reconciliation *depends on the nature of apology* were much more common, comprising 35% of all reconciliation responses. Responses in this category were sometimes a very general statement regarding the importance of the *nature* of the apology, but more commonly fell into one of three subcategories: (a) an apology must be *sincere*; (b) an apology must *recognize wrongdoing*; or (c) an apology must have a *diplomatic component* or culminate in a treaty. The *diplomatic* subcategory had an additional subcategory, *international supervision*, for response indicating the need for a public apology and/or international

recognition. For example, a 20-year-old woman from the Philippines said, “Every country should make an apology through media or have a meeting(s) between officials from both countries.” The third category of responses to the reconciliation item emphasized the importance of interpersonal or *psychological* components to an apology for reconciliation. Such responses *generally* referenced interpersonal or *psychological* characteristics of reconciliation or specifically mentioned behaviors such as *repairing relationships*; promoting *understanding, tolerance, and respect*; or using *faith and prayer* to achieve reconciliation. For example, a 25-year-old man from the Philippines said it was important to “love and unite.”

Of the responses to the reconciliation item, 31% indicated that reconciliation is *achievable* if the offending country *provides goods or services* to the offended country. The three primary goods/services recommended in our sample were *rebuilding, education, and money or reparations*. Furthermore, 43% of the suggested goods or services to be provided specified that *money* ought to be provided to the offended country. For example, a 44-year-old woman from the Philippines stated, “it should be accompanied by reparation or economic indemnification.” The fifth category of responses to the reconciliation item indicates that reconciliation is *achievable* through a *change in behavior* of the offending country – for example, through *ending the current conflict, returning rights and/or sovereignty* to the offended nation, *initiating positive actions, not going back on an apology, and sustaining nonaggressive behavior*. An example of a response coded for both *rebuilding* and *returning rights and sovereignty* is the response from a 34-year-old Pakistani woman: “... (returning) civil liberty of affected citizens; helping to rebuild invaded country.” Table 29.5 provides examples of responses denoting reconciliation as *achievable*, except for the categories that represented less than 1% of all responses, along with relative frequencies and demographic information.

The remaining responses to the reconciliation item were coded into one of three categories: (a) reconciliation is *unachievable* (viz., *it only works superficially*); (b) the respondent is *unsure* of the

Table 29.5 Reconciliation is achievable: examples of responses in common categories and subcategories

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Reconciliation is achievable</i>	97				
<i>Circumstances</i>	2(2)				
Passage of time	1(67)	India	Female	20	"...ideally an adequate amount of time should also have passed..."
<i>Nature of apology</i>	32(35)				
General	2(6)	India	Female	21	"One must say sorry to the citizens of that very country"
Sincerity	11(34)	Pakistan	Female	23	"Practical steps which demonstrate the sincerity of the apology..."
Recognition of wrongdoing	6(18)	Philippines	Female	37	"Acknowledgement of the hurts/pains caused by the invading country..."
Diplomatic/treaty	9(27)	India	Female	23	"Mutually a treaty should be signed..."
Int'l supervision	4(12)	Philippines	Female	20	"A worldwide apology will do"
<i>Interpersonallpsychological</i>	16(18)				
General	1(8)	Philippines	Female	56	"By assisting the concerned country rise up from its rubbles help in... emotional upliftment"
Repair relations	8(48)	Pakistan	Female	27	"A formal apology and establishment of friendly relations between the countries"
Understand/respect	6(36)	Sri Lanka	Female	45	"Understand and acknowledge the pain and suffering we have caused..."
Faith/prayer	1(8)	Philippines	Female	33	"Do it by prayer"
<i>Provide goods or services</i>	31 (34)				
General provides goods or services	9 (28)	India	Female	21	"...apologizing country can try to help the other country"
Rebuilding	5(18)	Indonesia	Female	24	"Help in the rebuilding of the country..."
Education	2(7)	Pakistan	Male	27	"...restoration of economic, <i>educational</i> , cultural and religious heritage"
Money	13(43)	Sri Lanka	Male	59	"...then help redress the problems... ultimately via financial support"
<i>Change behavior</i>	16(17)				
General change behavior	2(12)	Philippines	Male	24	"Complimenting an apology with acts..."
End current conflict	1(8)	Philippines	Male	20	"Stop the war..."
Return rights/sovereignty	3(17)	India	Female	23	"... sovereignty must be followed"
Initiate positive actions	4(23)	Philippines	Male	36	"...the persons involved should initiate the first move..."
Do not go back on apology	1(8)	Philippines	Female	20	"Follow through"
Nonaggressive behavior	5(32)	Pakistan	-	22	"... intention to refrain from such actions in future"

The number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parenthesis) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the responses in the major category

steps to achieve reconciliation; and (c) *uncodable* responses. Responses indicating that reconciliation is *unachievable* because apologies *only work superficially* made up 1% of all the responses to the reconciliation item. For exam-

ple, a 23-year-old woman from the Philippines said, "I believe actions speak louder than words. You would have to do something really selfless for the other country, and I believe not one country has the capability to do that."

Table 29.6 Reconciliation is achievable: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Category ^a	Group 1 ^b	Group 2 ^b	χ^2
	Men	Women	
<i>Reconciliation is achievable</i>			
Provide goods or services			
Money	18	11	3.87*
	Military relative	No military relative	
<i>Reconciliation is achievable</i>			
Nature of apology			
Sincerity	5	14	5.24*
Practical steps presence			
	Protest	No protest	4.48*
<i>Reconciliation is achievable</i>			
Practical steps presence	69	52	4.19*

^aIf there is a blank row next to a major category name, there were no significant group differences in scores at that level; however, we listed the major category whenever there was a significant group difference in scores in one of the subcategories. "Presence" at the end of a variable name signifies that the variable was created by giving a score of 1 to every participant who provided a response coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories

* $p \leq .05$

^bThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

Exploratory Statistical Analyses for Reconciliation Responses

As for the apology item, we considered the potential contribution of gender, military service, relative's military service, and participation in protest to responses to the reconciliation item.

Chi-square analyses revealed that a significantly greater proportion of men than women recommended *monetary goods and services* to the offended country as a step to reconciliation. A significantly higher proportion of respondents who did not have a relative with military experience than those who did have a military relative suggested that reconciliation is achievable through *sincere apology*. On the other hand, a significantly greater proportion of respondents who did have a relative with military experience mentioned one or more of the *practical steps* categories as means toward reconciliation. Finally, a significantly higher proportion of protestors than non-protestors recommended at least one *practical step* for promoting reconciliation. The results of the chi-squares for the reconciliation responses are provided in Table 29.6.

Discussion

Previous literature has acknowledged the starkly different views and practices between indigenous and Western styles of approaching apology and reconciliation. A lack of appreciation and understanding for these different approaches to conflict resolution remains a significant barrier to achieving peace. This problem is exacerbated by misperceptions within countries, both about each other (often encouraged by the media) and about the construction of peace and justice within diverse societal and cultural frameworks.

Darby and MacGinty's (2008) analysis of indigenous versus Western liberal models of peace reflects the continuing struggle we all have as human beings to confront issues related to apology and reconciliation at the personal or group level when we have been wronged or have violated the rights or well-being of others. Undertaking apologies at the state level as a way of coping with crises such as state-sponsored atrocities requires sophisticated cultural awareness and careful political diplomacy.

Many of the findings from our analyses of the South and Southeast Asian qualitative survey responses were consistent with what Darby and MacGinty view as components of an indigenous approach to reconciliation—that is, an emphasis on participatory and relationship-focused peacemaking. Our respondents frequently reported (46% of the responses) that a successful apology that leads so reconciliation *depends* on several key conditions: (a) the *circumstances*, such as the severity of wrongdoings or the relevance of the timing of the apology; (b) the *nature* of the apology, that is, whether the apology appears sincere, is public, recognizes wrongdoing, shows remorse, or involves diplomatic acknowledgment from state officials; (c) *acceptance* of the apology from the aggrieved group; and (d) *further action* by the aggressing country to change its behavior or provide material reparations. Many respondents saw an apology as either a *good start* or *only the beginning*.

Courageous, collective action by citizens is essential to holding governments responsible when there is a record of domestic or international state-sponsored violence. Continued engagement in the process of apology and reconciliation dialogue is critical to achieving social justice in individual nations and the global community. We see this social trend among the world's governments in the form of political apologies propelled by an upsurge in national conscience. Echoing this, an astounding 97% of the responses to the reconciliation item were recommendations concerning how to achieve reconciliation following an apology, with a strong emphasis on provision of goods and services such as education and monetary reparations.

Who stands to gain more – the recipient of the apology or the apologizer? Hook's overall conclusion is that regardless of motivation, all political apologies have the beneficial effect of encouraging apology and bringing the apology's recipient closer to peace and reconciliation. In the case of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of South Africa, the path to reconciliation began with confession, which led to an apology, which was followed by forgiveness, and which paved the way for reconciliation. South African President Thabo Mvuyela Mbeki

described the search for truth and its importance to South Africa as follows (Mbeki, 2004, p. 9):

At a critical moment in our history, as a people, we came to the conclusion that we must, together, end the killing. We took a deliberate decision that a violent conflict was neither in the interest of the country nor would it solve our problems.

Together, we decided that in the search for a solution to our problems, nobody should be demonized or excluded. We agreed that everybody should become part of the solution, whatever they might have done and represented in the past. This related both to negotiating the future of our country and working to build the new South Africa we had all negotiated.

South Africa presents an excellent example of an indigenous approach to conflict resolution, and the effectiveness of their approach continues to be analyzed and discussed. In fact, scholars studying the intersection of transitional justice and societal recovery are reassessing the effectiveness of formal truth commissions (e.g., the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) in promoting lasting peace. Fletcher, Weinstein, and Rowan (2009) argue that the formal trials and truth commissions designed to initiate a transitional justice process need to attend to the dynamic system in which transitional justice interventions occur. In contrast to formal truth commissions, various civil societies have devised creative ways of “truth telling” or historical memory projects. Two examples of this innovative work are the Peace and Justice Service (SERPAJ) report in Uruguay, where a team of lawyers, doctors, and human rights activists wrote “Nunca Mas” to present objective information about contextual history, interviews with victims, and statistical data on political violence perpetrated against prisoners by the Uruguay military regime (1973–1985) and the Iraq History Project, which compiled testimonies of victims terrorized under the Ba’ath party in Iraq (1968–2003) (Bickford, 2007).

According to Bickford, while official truth commissions are more likely to institute a wider societal dialogue about past crimes compared to unofficial truth projects (UTPs), UTPs have the advantage of community-level truth-telling. As Patricia Lundy posits, “...in some cases UTPs

might represent a shift away from the top-down ‘one size fits all’ approach to a bottom-up model that allows ‘voices from below’ to be heard and heeded” (cited in Bickford, 2007, p. 995). This standardization of social recovery and establishment of transitional justice coincide with Darby and MacGinty’s point about the indigenous peace-making model and the idea behind the R2P principle, under which all states maintain social harmony and peace by respecting each other’s sovereign political boundaries.

Chapman (2010) argues for feminist and gender-sensitive methodology to capture stories of the Khmer Rouge. Chapman challenges the portrayal of stereotypical images of the Khmer Rouge period and its aftermath, focusing in particular on the narrative of a former Khmer Rouge woman and her gender relations with others. Likewise, we advocate a careful examination of international law (which tends to be conceptually and procedurally “male gendered”) to critically analyze how its structural framework, content, and rules favor men and to what extent this approach might discount the rights of women and harm everyone involved (see Fellmeth, 2000). Our own findings concerning gender differences in assumptions about apology and reconciliation reinforce the importance of using research methods that are sensitive to gender and other status disparities.

Two key purposes of justice and truth-telling are, first, to benefit the people whose lives are scarred, disrupted, or even destroyed by the perpetrators of violence and, second, to discover whether apology can foster reconciliation and promote a sense of wholeness among victims. In a population-based survey assessing knowledge and perception of justice and the ECCC, Pham and colleagues (2011) found that 81% of respondents reported that the ECCC helped promote national reconciliation, and 76% indicated it helped promote justice and accountability for the victims.

In closing, we would like to share an apology by Kaing Guek Eav (alias Duch) to illustrate the impact of apology and whether it can lead to reconciliation. As a form of symbolic conciliation to the victim-survivors of the Khmer Rouge genocide and to promote national reconcilia-

tion, the ECCC disseminated Duch’s apology to the Cambodian public and international community shortly after he received his life sentence on 3 February 2012. The long-term impact of his apology remains to be seen, but his words reflect a genuine desire for forgiveness and apology, which hopefully will lead to reconciliation. What lessons can we learn about apology and reconciliation from a perpetrator?

May I be permitted to apologize to the survivors of the [Khmer Rouge] regime and also the loved ones of those who died brutally during the regime [...] I know that the crimes I committed against the lives of those people, including women and children, are intolerably and unforgivably serious crimes. My plea is that you leave the door open for me to seek forgiveness. (Kaing Guek Eav official apology, 31 March 2009, transcript compiled by the ECCC.)

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Apology, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation in East Asia

30

Etsuko Hoshino Browne, Jenna H. Zhu,
Alexandra Plassaras, Hillary Mi-Sung Kim,
Alice Murata, Michelle Murata,
and Andrea Jones-Rooy

As in many other parts of the world, East Asian countries have experienced a number of international conflicts including colonization, invasions, and wars. Sometimes these international conflicts were initiated by Western countries seeking to control and take advantage of East Asian economic and political resources. The most prominent trans-

gressor, however, has been Japan, particularly toward China and Korea during the first half of the twentieth century. Although most East Asian countries currently seem to be at peace, that does not mean that all the wounds of previous invasions have been healed. In this chapter, we focus on apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation involving Japan, China, and South Korea. First, some historical, political, economic, sociological, and psychological contexts for apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation are briefly reviewed. Then, analyses of data collected from East Asians in Japan, China, South Korea, and the USA are presented. Finally, the issues and the challenges of offering and accepting international apologies, forgiveness, and reconciliation are discussed.

E.H. Browne (✉)
Department of Psychology, Bryn Mawr College,
Bryn Mawr, PA, USA
e-mail: ehoshinobrowne@gmail.com

J.H. Zhu
Department of Psychology Swarthmore College,
500 College Avenue, Swarthmore, PA 19081, USA
e-mail: jennazhu@gmail.com

A. Plassaras
International Relations Department, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA

H.M.-S. Kim
School of Social Work, Rutgers University,
New Brunswick, NJ, USA
e-mail: mysongk@hotmail.com

A. Murata
Department of Counselor Education,
Northeastern Illinois University, Chicago, IL, USA
e-mail: A-Murata@neu.edu; alicemurata@hotmail.com

M. Murata
Department of Psychology,
American University, Washington, DC, USA
e-mail: muratamh@gmail.com

A. Jones-Rooy
Department of Political Science, University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, MI, USA
e-mail: ajonrooy@umich.edu

Brief Review of International Apology and Reconciliation in East Asia

Historical Incidents of Apology and Reconciliation

According to Dodds (2003), there are a number of apology-related incidents that involve East Asian countries as victims or perpetrators. After excluding apologies related to isolated international incidents (e.g., an apology given by North Korea to South Korea in 1997 for the deaths caused by a North Korean spy submarine and an apology offered by the USA to Japan in 2000 for its military personnel's rape of Japanese women),

Dodds identified 40 apology-related incidents between 1965 and 2002 that are concerned with past major international aggressive acts such as war, invasion, and torture. In these instances of apology in East Asia, Japan has both received and offered apologies, while the other East Asian nations were recipients only.

These incidents identified by Dodds (2003) involved demands for an apology, whether they were granted or not, as well as refusals to apologize. For instance, in December 1991, US President Bush refused to apologize to Japan for the use of nuclear bombs in World War II. Similarly, in April 1995, US President Clinton stated that the USA owed no apology to Japan for using nuclear bombs. In April 1998, South Korean President Kim Dae Woo stated that his government would seek an official apology from Japan for the use of “comfort women,” while the South Korean government would end its effort to obtain official compensation (see also Van Dyke, 2006). A few days later, in April 1998, a Japanese court rejected the demand for an official apology and compensation made by former Korean “comfort women,” while acknowledging the great suffering these women endured. The court’s decision was later upheld by the Tokyo High Court in August 1999. Another example concerns the South Korean people’s demonstration in October 1999, in which citizens demanded that the USA apologizes for hundreds of civilian deaths in 1950 when the Korean War started. In response to this demand, the US government refused to offer an official apology in December 2000. Similarly, in November 2000, China announced that it would not apologize for its involvement in and support of the activities of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia between 1957 and 1979.

For some transgressions, however, apologies have been offered. In 1965, Japanese and South Korean foreign ministers issued a joint statement that contained a vague apology for Japan’s colonization of Korea. In 1972, Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka apologized to then visiting Chinese Premier Chou for Japan’s aggression toward China during the war. In 1985, in his address to the United Nations, Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone apologized for Japan’s role in World War II. In January 1999, a US federal judge

approved a settlement for Latin American Japanese citizens interned during World War II¹ mandating that the US government would give those internees an official apology and compensation (\$5,000 each). In August 1991, the mayor of Honolulu City invited Japanese officials to a ceremony for the 50th anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack, on the condition that Japan apologizes for the war. Japanese officials refused. However, in December 1991, the Japanese Foreign Minister expressed “deep remorse” regarding Japan’s Pearl Harbor attack. A few months later, in January 1992, Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa issued an apology for Japan’s use of “comfort women.” Later in October of the same year, Japanese Emperor Akihito expressed his regret (“sorrow”) for Japan’s wartime aggression.

During 1993, Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa issued several apologies for Japan’s aggression and for the suffering it caused during World War II. In November 1993, the Japanese Prime Minister specifically apologized to South Korea for Japan’s actions during the war. On August 15, 1994, the Japanese Prime Minister acknowledged in his apology that Asian nations suffered “tragic sacrifices beyond description” due to Japan’s wartime aggression. In July 1995, Japanese Prime Minister Murayama apologized to 200,000 women who were forced to serve as “comfort women” during the war and founded a private “Asian Women’s Fund” to make reparations. Almost a year and a half later, in December 1996, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto offered a letter of apology and monetary compensation to 500 survivors of the 200,000 “comfort women.” However, only six accepted the compensation. In January 1998, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto offered an apology to the

¹In early twentieth century, some Japanese people immigrated to Latin America, especially to Brazil and Peru, to escape the increase taxes, mandatory military service, and economic difficulty (Tsuha, 2008). As US anti-Japanese racism during World War II reaches Latin America, the USA abducted about 2,200 Japanese Latin Americans (of which 1,800 were from Peru) and placed them in the US concentration camps. The kidnap was a result of the USA’s plan to use the Japanese Latin Americans in prisoner exchange programs with the Japanese government.

British government for Japan's abuse of British prisoners of war (POWs) in World War II. A few months later, in May, Japanese Emperor Akihito also apologized to Britain for Japan's actions during wartime.

Japan has continued to offer apologies for its wartime conduct. However, Japan's apologies have not been well received or viewed as sufficient. For example, in October 2000, Chinese Prime Minister Zhu stated that China felt that Japan had never properly apologized for its aggression and abuse. Perhaps in response to this dissatisfaction, in October 2001, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi expressed condolences in his apology for the Chinese deaths during World War II. While two Japanese prime ministers (Murayama in 1995 and Hashimoto in 1996) offered survivors of "comfort women" an apology and monetary reparation, only a handful accepted at that time. A few years later, however, South Korean president (Kim Dae Woo in 1998) announced that the South Korean government intended to continue seeking an apology from Japan for its use of "comfort women."

Why do nations refuse to apologize or refuse to accept apology? Why do nations perceive that an offered apology is not sufficient or satisfactory? Since 2002 to early 2011, Japan has continued to apologize to Asian nations (Koizumi, 2005a), to China (Onishi, 2003), to South Korea (e.g., Koizumi, 2005b; Sue-young, 2010; Fackler, 2010), to the USA for the American POWs (Udenans, 2009; Blair, 2010), and to Australia for the Australian POWs (AAP, 2011). The fact that Japan continues to offer its apology seems to indicate that their apologies have not been well received.

Observing the list of international apologies that Dodds (2003) compiled, one may note some unique characteristics in these instances of apology. For example, when Japan offers an apology, it is not always clear to whom the apology is addressed. To commemorate the end of World War II by Japanese surrender, each year on August 15, Japanese prime ministers traditionally issue a statement of regret and apology. In these announcements, Japan apologizes for its wartime aggression and expresses its remorse to the world and to other Asian nations without addressing it to specific

countries. Perhaps such a general apology is perceived as insufficient and therefore not acceptable. Also, Japan seems to have offered more apologies to South Korea than to China, although Japan's aggression has caused much suffering in both countries. As reviewed below, Japan's relationship to South Korea is different from its relationship to China, and this difference is reflected in Japan's apology to these two nations.

It is clear that apology and monetary reparations do not always lead to forgiveness and reconciliation. It is easy to imagine that Asian women who were forced to work as "comfort women" or sex slaves cannot easily forgive the Japanese government and military or forget their nightmarish experiences and its memory, regardless of the amount of compensation they may receive. It does not require much effort to empathize with POWs or internees who cannot forget their suffering or grudges, whether they received an apology and/or reparations from the Japanese government or not. What is required, then, for an apology to be successfully accepted by the victimized party?

Tavuchis (1991) contends that the most important concern of the victimized party is to receive an apology that contains an acknowledgement of wrongdoing and responsibility for the action, acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the victim's claim, and words of genuine regret and remorse for the wrongdoing. Yet, sometimes even the most sincere apology may not lead to forgiveness or be accepted. Tavuchis highlights the difficulty and challenges associated with apology and forgiveness in efforts toward reconciliation, writing that "... an apology, no matter how sincere or effective, does not and cannot *undo* what has been done" (p. 5). Below, we briefly review the factors that may influence the success of efforts for apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation in East Asia.

Political and Economic Issues with Apology and Forgiveness in Reconciliation

Field (1997) argues that the value of an apology has an inverse relationship with its instrumentality. The weaker the relationship between an

apology for past aggressions and the political and economic gains from the apology, the greater its perceived sincerity. She further argues that an apology is a kind of “self-imposed punishment” (p. 8) in the sense that it should cost the apologizer “pride and pocket” (p. 8). The apparent sincerity of an apology would not be sufficient for forgiveness or reconciliation. According to Field, a successful historical apology requires three components: (1) a verbal apology that includes the recognition of facts and acknowledgement of responsibility, (2) a statement of regret and a request of forgiveness, and (3) monetary compensation. Digeser (2001) also asserts that recalling and understanding the past, especially “the shared account of what happened” (p. 57), is essential for political forgiveness in the process of reconciliation. Van Dyke (2006) adds a fourth component that would be necessary for a complete reconciliation: prosecution of the wrongdoers. Brooks (1999) and Honda (2000) contend that efforts to redress the wrongdoing should be handled by legislators in order for reconciliation to be successful. By passing legislation, the government can make its apology formal, unequivocal, and show its sincerity. When the Japanese emperors or Japanese political figures like prime ministers and the Minister of Foreign Affairs issue a statement of apology, they are sometimes made personally, rather than officially by the Japanese government. These unofficial apologies, and lack of formal acknowledgment by the government, may understandably be perceived as insufficient.

Another important insight Field (1997) shares is the fact that Japan has been paying monetary reparations after World War II in the form of loans and credit to Asian nations. Because the Asian countries have been desperate for such money from Japan, many have signed various bilateral peace treaties to receive the Japanese funds at the expense of monetary compensation for their citizens. Thus, many of the lawsuits and demands of apology that have emerged after several decades since World War II have come from individual citizens who were victimized as comfort women, slave laborers, or POWs but did not get any compensation or the Japanese govern-

ment’s official apology on a personal level (Er, 2002).

Like Field (1997), Brooks (1999) and Honda (2000) also argue that reparations are an essential component to successfully restore the relationship between victimized countries and perpetrating countries. Brooks (1999) specifically distinguishes reparations from settlements: reparations are accompanied by an apology or an expression of remorse, whereas settlements are not. According to Brooks, reparations or settlements can be monetary or nonmonetary (e.g., amnesty, building hospitals, creating new educational programs). Furthermore, reparations or settlements can be directed individually (compensation) or collectively (community rehabilitation). The distinctions that Brooks makes are useful in understanding the relationship between Japan and the comfort women. Japan did pay a small settlement to some of the women who were forced to work as comfort women during the war. Japan also provided money for community rehabilitation through the Asian Women’s Fund. However, the reason that so few women have accepted the monetary compensation through the Asian Women’s Fund is that it was not an official form of reparation made by the Japanese government (Field, 1997; Yamazaki, 2006). The Asian Women’s Fund was a charitable organization, and its fund was “sympathy money” donated by Japanese citizens. Moreover, the Japanese government never properly offered an apology to those women, despite the fact that several Japanese prime ministers did. Without an official, remorseful apology, Japan’s compensatory actions may be regarded as a mere settlement. Thus, it is easy to understand why women forced to work as sex slaves for the Japanese military have been claiming that the Japanese government owes them reparations accompanied by an official governmental apology.

Hook (2008) has observed a conspicuous increase in political apologies in recent years. Political apology is an apology that is offered by a national government or a major institution to its citizens or the citizens of another country who are victims of its past aggressions, such as war and racism. Hook categorizes political apology into

four types: personal, academic, humanitarian, and economic. Personal political apology is one offered by politicians for their personal actions such as sex scandals. It may not be remorseful, as politicians may apologize merely because they were caught engaging in immoral actions. Academic political apology is given to correct a past wrongdoing as recognition of the injustice. For example, 360 years after the inquisition of 1633, Galileo Galilei, who supported the theory of heliocentrism first suggested by Copernicus, was finally acquitted by the Roman Catholic Church. Humanitarian political apology is given to correct past injustices suffered by particular groups of people. For instance, some aboriginal groups would receive reparations and settlements from governments for the loss of their land, the violation of their basic human rights, and the racial discrimination they suffered. Finally, economic political apology is an apology that is motivated by economic gains, often for apologizers, by improving a relationship between the victimized nation or group and the perpetrating nation. The underlying motivation may not be reconciliation per se, but rather a desire to get economic benefits.

Hook (2008) argues that some of Japan's apologies fall in the category of economic political apology. If the receiver of such an economic political apology perceived the true motivation of the apology, they would feel the insincerity in it and might not accept the apologies. Dahl (2008) critically points out that Japanese apologies and expressions of regret for past aggression have not been well received internationally because these statements can be regarded as an instrumental way to develop economic relationships with the countries to which Japan apologizes. Such a cynical view would also lead Asian nations to consider Japan to be unwilling to acknowledge its full responsibility for its wartime atrocities.

Still, Hook (2008) believes that any kind of apology is a good start toward reconciliation. Reconciliation may or may not, however, lead to forgiveness because it partly depends on how the victimized nation has been treated and on how the victimized nation has responded to the harm. Hook gives us hope by stating that "apology, reconciliation, and forgiveness are the three doors to

ethnic harmony" (p. 13) and that "the human heart has a great capacity to forgive and time ultimately heals all" (p. 13).

Similar to the views presented above, Lind (2008, 2009) also maintains that an acknowledgment of past aggression and atrocities is an important step toward reconciliation after war, particularly to cultivate trust. After all, reconciliation must occur in cooperation between the apologist and the recipient of the apology. However, she is unique in arguing that apologies and reparation are not always necessary for reconciliation, particularly in East Asia. Examining Japan's relationship with South Korea and China, for example, Lind contends that such apologies often polarize a nation and invite backlash within the nation, leading to a worsening of foreign relations with another country. She recommends that Japan follows the Adenauer model of West Germany after World War II, which is a compromise between contrition and denial: clear and official acknowledgement of past aggression and atrocities along with recognition of the nation's postwar achievements.

Japan's difficulty in acknowledging its past aggression is epitomized in the Japanese history textbook controversy. The controversy has spurred protests, anger, and concern in Japan's neighboring countries. Most of the Japanese history textbooks published after World War II until recently did not clearly acknowledge Japan's aggression in Asia as a historical fact (Dahl, 2008; Lind, 2008, 2009; Liu & Atsumi, 2008). For instance, the Japanese history textbooks published before the 1980s omitted the Japanese imperial military's involvement in the Nanjing Massacre and described Japan's invasion of Manchuria as a military advance. Such omissions or misrepresentations of the historical facts of Japan's wartime aggression have continued even until today (Liu & Atsumi, 2008). This issue is of major concern to neighboring Asian countries because Japan would appear to be justifying its atrocities by omitting or only superficially covering these wartime historical incidents in the textbooks (Van Dyke, 2006). When Japanese historians and publishers try to publish textbooks that include proper accounts of Japan's wartime aggression, they are met with resistance and

interference from the government, as well as from nationalists in Japan. After witnessing Japan's repeated denials to take responsibility for their wartime aggression, Asian countries now regard Japan as insincere and remorseless, no matter how many apologies it offers (Lind, 2008, 2009).

Japanese politicians' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine are another sensitive topic in Japan's relationship with Asian nations (Dahl, 2008; Lind, 2008, 2009). The shrine is dedicated to war criminals as well as veterans and civilians who died in the war. When a Japanese prime minister visits the Yasukuni Shrine in remembrance of the end of World War II, it triggers negative reactions and controversy because it reminds Asian countries of Japan's imperialism and militarism. Lind's recommendation suggests that acknowledgement of past aggression or apology is a critical step toward reconciliation, but it needs to be founded on sincerity and sensitivity to victimized nations. Until Japan addresses these thorny issues squarely, its apologies will not be effective in its effort to reach reconciliation with the other Asian nations.

In line with Lind's (2008, 2009) arguments, Renteln (2008) argues that reparations may not always be a necessary component of reconciliation and indeed may stir up additional problems. For instance, how should one determine the amount of monetary compensation? Any sum of money seems inadequate in light of violation of human rights and injustice people experienced. Also, reparations can cause interethnic or intergroup conflict when some compensatory claims fail while others succeed. Moreover, by paying reparations, the government may not try further to correct serious social problems as needed. Still, Renteln considers the government's apology without reparations to be "an empty gesture" (p. 70). Like other scholars (e.g., Field, 1997; Brooks, 1999), Renteln argues that victims of serious injustice should receive both reparations and an apology.

Many scholars (e.g., Er, 2002; Gries, 2004; Lind, 2008, 2009) consider Japan's relationship to South Korea to be quite different from its relationship to China. Due to political and economic reasons, reconciliation between Japan and South Korea would be easier than between Japan and

China (Lind, 2008, 2009). Japan and South Korea share the same political ideology and both have embraced capitalism, while they also share a threat from communism. In contrast, Japan and China do not share a political ideology or a threat that can unite them (Lind, 2009). Also, not only has South Korea shown its reconciliatory attitude to Japan and its willingness to accept Japan's apology, but South Korea is also not a geopolitical rival to Japan. On the other hand, China has not been receptive to Japan's apology, and it geopolitically competes with Japan (Er, 2002). Whereas Koreans have been dealing with their past suffering for some time, the Chinese have begun to face their victimization only recently, and their anger and wounds are too fresh to accept apologies from Japan (Gries, 2004). Also, Chinese nationalists and the Chinese government have been regarded as indifferent to reconciliation. Whereas South Korean President Kim truly wished to resolve the past negative relationship and suffering, Chinese President Jiang did not. Moreover, whereas Korea and Japan regarded one another as equal in the 1998 apology statement, Chinese nationalists do not hold themselves in an equal status: they believe that they are superior to Japan (Gries, 2004; Liu & Atsumi, 2008). Apologies made in the context of such a disagreement over status would make reconciliation even harder. Moreover, by prolonging its victimized status and postponing reconciliation, China could also manage to obtain material goods from Japan. Digeser (2001) argues that once political forgiveness takes place, it should settle the past, and the past wrongdoing should not be used for further legitimate claims in future. From this vantage point, China's refusal to accept Japan's apology and its indifference to reconciliation appear to have political and economic motives. As long as China does not forgive Japan, it can continue to use Japan's wartime atrocities as leverage to get more financial aid, settlements, reparations, and political advantages. According to Gries (2004), by refusing to accept Japan's apology, Chinese nationalists can also remind the world of Japan's wartime atrocities and China's existence, and they can influence China's domestic and foreign policies to their advantage. Thus, until China

becomes a willing, equal partner, no amount of apology from Japan will help the two nations reach reconciliation.

Sociological and Psychological Aspects of Apology and Forgiveness in Reconciliation

Although Japan has offered its apologies numerous times internationally, these apologies have not always been supported by the entire nation. While Japanese socialists and liberals have argued that Japan should acknowledge its past aggression and apologize properly, Japanese nationalists strongly disagree with this view (Er, 2002; Lind, 2008; Yamazaki, 2006). Several complex factors have created these conflicting views within Japan. First, it has been difficult to assign blame for Japan's aggression. Under normal circumstances, the head of a country, in Japan's case, Emperor Hirohito, would have been responsible. Yet, as part of the peace settlement, the USA removed him from culpability. The imperial military then became solely responsible for the wartime atrocities, but the nationalists have argued that what Japan did was no different from what any other nations did during the war, and thus it does not need to apologize for its aggression. Also, the nationalists believe that by apologizing and paying reparations to other countries, Japan's own suffering would be downplayed, and this would dishonor Japanese soldiers who died in the war (Cunningham, 2004). Moreover, many Japanese citizens have considered themselves to have been victimized by the war as well (Dahl, 2008; Field, 1997; Yamazaki, 2006). This "victim consciousness" (Field, 1997, p. 19) is understandable given their suffering during the war as well as the horrific disasters they experienced from atomic bombs dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the USA. Nevertheless, such a "victim mentality" (Yamazaki, 2006, p. 61) also presents obstacles to Japan's acknowledgment of its past aggression and its international apologies.

In this review, we contrasted Japan's successful apology to Korea and its failed attempt at apologizing to China. Is there any psychological explanation for this failure? Liu and Atsumi (2008)

contend that in the reconciliation process, the power to improve the relationship resides with the victim, not with the perpetrator, and that apology would only be effective when the victim feels that the perpetrator is sincere and trustworthy. Some researchers (e.g., Darby & Schlenker, 1989, as cited in Liu & Atsumi, 2008; Nadler & Liviatan, 2006) argue that an apology that is not sincere or that comes from an untrustworthy party is worse than no apology. The omission, suppression, and misrepresentation of wartime atrocities in Japanese history textbooks and Japanese prime ministers' regular visits to the Yasukuni Shrine may make Japan appear insincere and untrustworthy no matter how many times Japan offers apologies or how many reparations it pays in the form of financial or economic aid to Asian nations.

Blatz, Schumann, and Ross (2009) conducted archival and experimental studies to examine the effectiveness of government apologies. They found that either apology only without compensation or compensation only without apology would lead to more negative reactions than when both or neither was offered. They argue that the most important elements for an effective apology are an expression of remorse and a full attention to the victimized party's demands and psychological needs by the perpetrator. Thus, when the victimized party demands monetary compensation, an apology without such reparations would not be accepted or regarded as sincere. When the victimized party needs to sense the perpetrator's remorse, willingness to acknowledge full responsibility for their wrongdoing, or desire to build a trustworthy relationship, any behavior that would indicate that the perpetrator is not responsive to these psychological needs may reduce the effectiveness of apology. According to Blatz and his colleagues, fulfilling the victimized group's demands and needs should affect the quality of relationship between the victim and the perpetrator, which in turn strongly influences the effectiveness of apologies.

However, even if apologies are sincere and even if they do come with reparations, they may not necessarily be accepted by the victim, and the perpetrator may not always be forgiven. Worthington, Jr. (2005) and Baumeister, Exline,

and Sommer (1998) observe that forgiveness can be costly for the victimized party because by forgiving the perpetrator, people give up rights to retaliate or pursue retributive justice. From this vantage point, China may have been reluctant to forgive Japan for its wartime atrocities because once China forgave Japan, it would have to give up its rights to various monetary and nonmonetary claims and benefits.

In addition to desire for retaliation and pursuit of retributive justice, prejudice and in-group bias or in-group favoritism seem to hinder forgiveness and reconciliation. Shriver, Jr. (1998) argues that racism often plays a large role in intergroup conflicts including wars and genocides. Dehumanizing out-groups or other nations makes it easy to justify and conduct atrocious acts on them. Shriver, Jr. contends that forgiveness is essential for countries or groups to recover from the past conflicts and achieve reconciliation and that forgiveness must be mutual between the involved parties. For instance, Americans and Japanese can choose to maintain hostility toward each other by remembering Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima/Nagasaki. Or they can choose to forgive one another for their wartime aggression. Even if one party apologized for its wartime action, if the other did not do the same, it would be difficult to achieve reconciliation. However, because of in-group bias arising from human needs to maintain a positive social identity, forgiveness and reconciliation face psychological obstacles.

According to Gries and Peng (2002; also Gries, 2004), social identity plays an important role in the apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation process. Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) suggests that people's sense of who they are comes partly from their identification with their in-group or society. According to this theory, by regarding their group or society positively or by favoring their own group or society, people can maintain and increase their self-esteem. From this theoretical perspective, forgiveness after international conflict may be difficult because both groups engage in self-serving explanations of their own actions and "out-groups do not get the benefit of the doubt" (Gries & Peng, 2002, p. 176). Also, in order to

maintain collective self-esteem, both parties may become more nationalistic, exacerbating their in-group bias (Gries, 2004).

Brown, Wohl, and Exline (2008) also argue that social identity or in-group identification is an important factor in forgiveness, especially when people themselves are not victims but when their in-group members have been victimized (i.e., secondhand victimization). They argue that people can experience transgressions vicariously when their in-group members are victimized. According to these researchers, people's in-group identification affects their forgiveness of the perpetrator even though victimization was not experienced firsthand. Across three experiments, they found that stronger in-group identification resulted in less forgiveness of the perpetrator who harmed in-group members and more blame and desire for retribution of the perpetrator. They also found that when priming the need to assimilate to one's in-group evoked in-group identification, people were less forgiving, especially when they were more empathetic to their in-group victims.

Moreover, people's in-group identification and resulting in-group bias appear to affect their collective memory, which can play an important role in forgiveness and reconciliation. The victim of a transgression or aggression may hold on to the negative memory far longer and more clearly than the perpetrator (Sahdra & Ross, 2007). Because the negative memory of Japan's aggression is prominent in Korean and Chinese political memory (Dahl, 2008), the Japanese history textbook controversy and the Japanese political figures' Yasukuni Shrine visits may continue to evoke negative reactions and animosity in China and Korea, making forgiveness and reconciliation more difficult.

Examining memory for intergroup apologies, Philpot and Hornsey (2011) surveyed Australians, Filipinos, and Malaysians whose countries were affected by Japan during World War II. The survey contained questions such as whether Japan has apologized for its wartime aggression, whether Japan has been remorseful since the end of World War II about its atrocious actions, and whether participants would forgive Japan for its wartime atrocities. The researchers found that

despite a number of apologies actually offered by Japan, only 13% of the participants correctly recognized that Japan had apologized for their wartime actions. In this study, 22% of the participants were certain that Japan had never apologized, and 65% were unsure whether Japan had ever apologized. Moreover, the level of awareness of the apology influenced participants' perceptions of remorse and forgiveness. Those who correctly identified that Japan had apologized felt that Japan had been remorseful about its wartime actions and were more forgiving of Japan, compared to participants who were unsure of whether or not Japan had ever apologized or those who believed that Japan had never apologized. The researchers' further analysis indicated that the effect of apology awareness on forgiveness was mediated by the perception of remorse such that greater perception of remorse was associated with greater forgiveness.

A subsequent study by Philpot and Hornsey (2011) showed an influence of social identity on apology awareness. Among Australian university students, the stronger their national identity (i.e., the more they identified with being Australian), the less likely they believed that Japan had ever apologized for their wartime aggression. This finding has important implications for reconciliation. At a very basic level, strong social identity seems to bias information processing by not allowing accurate assimilation or storage of information. In addition, as in Gries and Peng's (2002) argument that strong national identity helps individuals to maintain a strong collective self-esteem, perhaps not believing or remembering that the perpetrator apologized would help victims to strengthen their sense of social identity and collective self-esteem.

Philpot and Hornsey's (2008) earlier research similarly captured less optimistic patterns of intergroup forgiveness and reconciliation. Across four studies, they examined Australian university students' forgiveness regarding the Japanese imperial military's abuse of Australian POWs during World War II. They found that official apologies often do not promote forgiveness, although, compared to the absence of apologies, the presence of apologies increased participants'

perceptions of the perpetrator's remorse and their satisfaction with the apologies. Because Philpot and Hornsey (2008, 2011) employed real international conflicts and the historically accurate apologies in their studies, their results are more generalizable to real-world intergroup conflict. Their findings suggest that intergroup forgiveness is not easily achieved.

What other psychological factors may be associated with forgiveness and reconciliation? A number of researchers (e.g., Cehajic, Browne, & Castano, 2008; Hewstone et al., 2005; Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, Hamberger, & Niens, 2006; Swart, Turner, Hewstone, & Voci, 2011) have suggested that positive intergroup contact between the victimized party and the perpetrator can be an important factor in promoting forgiveness and in fact maybe crucial for building trust between nations. The development of trust by the victimized party is a key factor toward full reconciliation after an intergroup conflict (e.g., Nadler & Liviatan, 2006; Nadler & Shnabel, 2011; Tam, Hewstone, Kenworthy, & Cairns, 2009).

Concern for justice has also been found to be relevant to forgiveness (Karremans & Van Lange, 2005; Hill, Exline, & Cohen, 2005). Justice is a rather complex concept, particularly in relation to forgiveness. When an offense or transgression takes place, people are motivated by their desire for retributive justice to punish the perpetrator in accordance with the harm done. However, restorative justice, which preserves the rights and dignity of the victimized party and the perpetrator, is also a possible solution (Hill et al., 2005). People can also pursue procedural justice and distributive justice, both of which are concerned with fairness and welfare of others, as well as one's own welfare (Karremans & Van Lange, 2005). Karremans and Van Lange speculated that retributive justice, which has a more self-interested focus, would lead to less forgiveness, whereas prosocial justice (procedural and distributive justice) would lead to more forgiveness. They examined this idea by priming participants with the concept of justice and measuring the participants' levels of forgiveness. The researchers found that when the notion of justice was primed, people tended to think about prosocial or positive justice, which in turn increased their levels of forgiveness.

Research shows that a belief in a just world (BJW) is also related to forgiveness (Strelan & Sutton, 2011). According to Lerner (1980, as cited in Strelan & Sutton, 2011), BJW refers to the tendency for people to believe that the world is just and fair, and therefore, individuals deserve what they get and get what they deserve. Strelan and Sutton examined two types of BJW in relation to forgiveness in interpersonal transgression: BJW for self and BJW for others (Lipkus, Dalbert, & Siegler, 1996, as cited in Strelan & Sutton, 2011). The BJW for self is a belief that the person herself is being treated fairly; the BJW for others is a belief that other people are being treated fairly. Strelan and Sutton found that when a interpersonal transgression was minor (e.g., someone cuts in on you in traffic or line, a classmate gets more help than you from an instructor), people with strong beliefs that they get treated fairly in the world are more forgiving and less likely to be bitter, punishing, or retaliating against the offender, compared to those who hold a belief that others are treated more fairly than themselves. However, when the transgression was more serious (e.g., your partner cheats on you, someone physically or sexually abused you), the BJW for the self did not lead to a more positive response. Considering that wartime aggression and international conflict are extremely severe and harmful both physically and psychologically, Strelan and Sutton's findings in interpersonal transgression may or may not be applicable to forgiveness following atrocious international conflict. Still, the BJW is an important variable to examine in the international reconciliation context.

Another psychological variable that may influence forgiveness and reconciliation is emotions, more specifically intergroup emotions (e.g., Leonard, Mackie, & Smith, 2011; Wohl, Hornsey, & Bennett, 2012). Leonard and her colleagues argue that because intergroup apology often produces changes in intergroup emotions, and intergroup emotions influence intergroup behaviors, intergroup emotions evoked by intergroup apology should mediate forgiveness and retribution. In an experiment in which the presence or absence of apology was manipulated after intergroup transgression, they found that respect and anger

were particularly important emotions as they influenced forgiveness and retribution. Specifically, they found that an apology reduced retributive motivation, whereas the absence of an apology after intergroup transgression increased the desire for retribution, with anger toward the perpetrator mediating this process. Moreover, an apology increased forgiveness of the perpetrator, whereas absence of an apology decreased forgiveness of the perpetrator. Importantly, respect toward the perpetrator mediated this process. Whether or not the same psychological processes unfold in international conflict and in the East Asian cultural context is unclear and in need of further study.

As has been reviewed briefly, East Asian nations have experienced a number of international apologies as both an apologizer and as the recipient of apologies. As many scholars point out, the processes of apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation in East Asia are complicated, and an apology does not always lead to forgiveness or reconciliation. The scars of Japanese wartime atrocities are still particularly fresh in many East Asian nations' minds, and they are far from reaching full reconciliation, despite the number of apologies Japan has made. How do contemporary East Asians view the role of international apology? Do they think that an apology would improve international relations? What factors do they think are important for an apology to be successful in achieving reconciliation? These are the kinds of questions we examine next, based on responses to our survey.

Methods and Results

Sample

This sample consists 101 males and 110 females ($N=212$, 1 participant did not report gender) from Japan, South Korea, and China. Sixty-five participants were from Japan, 109 from South Korea, and 38 from China. Participants were asked if they had ever served in the military, if they had family members who had ever served in the military, and if they had ever participated in a protest.

One quarter of the sample reported having served in the military, 31% reported having a family member who served in the military, and 15% reported participating in a protest against war.

Procedure

The primary methodology of this study is based on grounded theory, which is the process by which a theoretical framework is generated through the analysis of qualitative data (Glaser, 1992). Participants were recruited through various websites and personal networking. They were asked to complete the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Scale (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006) either electronically or in paper and pencil form. This section focuses on responses to items on the PAIRTAPS that related to apology and reconciliation.

The first apology item stated, "If one country has in the past invaded, colonized, or exercised control over the governmental affairs of another country, an apology by the invading/colonizing/controlling country can improve the chances for reconciliation between the countries." Participants rated on a 7-point Likert scale their level of agreement with that statement (from 1 meaning "totally disagree" to 7 meaning "totally agree"), then explained their reasoning for the rating. The second apology item reads: "What steps or factors are necessary to make an apology successful in achieving reconciliation between the countries?" Qualitative responses to these items were analyzed using the apology and reconciliation coding manuals. For a more detailed description of the coding manuals and the PAIRTAPS, see the introductory methods chapter for this section of the book.

Can Apology Contribute to Reconciliation?

Apology Coding Manual

Responses to the first statement ("If one country has in the past invaded, colonized, or exercised

control over the governmental affairs of another country, an apology by the invading/colonizing/controlling country can improve the chances for reconciliation between the countries") were coded into one of three main sets of categories: (1) whether or not an apology is effective *depends* on the situation, (2) *agreement* that an apology can lead to reconciliation, and (3) *disagreement* that an apology can lead to reconciliation; in addition, responses could be coded for *historical references* to either successful or unsuccessful efforts at apology and reconciliation in history. Each of these sets of categories includes several major categories, and in some cases additional subcategories that allow for greater specificity and precision in coding the thematic units in each response.

There are seven major categories for the *it depends* responses. If responses suggested that apology might lead to reconciliation or that it may be worth a try, they were categorized as *may be possible*. There were also coding categories for responses indicating that the success of an apology depends on (a) *circumstances*, (b) the *nature of the apology*, (c) whether or not the offended country accepts the apology, coded for *depends on acceptance*, and (d) if additional action is taken, coded as *depends on further action*. Responses indicating that apologies help but are only the beginning of what needs to be done to achieve reconciliation were categorized as a *first step*. Lastly, responses suggesting that after an apology is given, the passage of time is necessary before reconciliation can occur were coded for *takes time*. Several of these categories included subcategories based on keywords to again classify themes as precisely as possible. For example, responses within the *depends on nature of apology* category could be coded into more discrete subcategories based on use of the keywords *sincerity*, *recognition of wrongdoing*, *remorse*, and *official or diplomatic initiative*.

The *agreement* responses fell into two categories: apology leads to *healing* and an apology is not only helpful but also is *necessary*. Within the *healing* category, there are two sub-categories: for responses indicating that apology *restores*

relationships and responses indicating that apology *repairs dignity*. The third major grouping, for responses *disagreeing with the potential effectiveness of apology*, consists of seven categories: (a) *not possible*, (b) *irreversible wrongdoings*, (c) *forgive don't forget*, (d) *words don't matter*, (e) *actions speak louder than words*, (f) an apology is *not necessary*, and (g) apology can have *negative consequences*.

We also noted whether any of the responses included a *historical reference* – either a *positive historical reference* or a *negative historical reference*. *Positive historical reference* refers to responses that cite specific historical examples when apology is effective. In contrast, *negative historical reference* refers to responses that cite specific historical examples when apology is ineffective.

Distribution of Responses Concerning the Effectiveness of an Apology

The majority of responses (56%) to the apology item indicated that the likelihood of an apology leading to reconciliation *depends on the situation*. The second largest category (20%) characterized responses *agreeing* that an apology can lead to reconciliation. Responses in the *disagree* category constituted 14% of the total. Responses providing *historical references* as explanations or examples of the role of apology in reconciliation constituted 9% of all responses. Only 2% of the responses were *uncodeable*.

Although the majority of responses emphasized that a successful apology *depended* on the situation, only three categories within this group accounted for 5% or more of all the apology responses. The first subcategory, apology *may be possible* in the reconciliation process, accounted for 9% of all apology responses. As a 49-year-old Japanese woman said, “An apology might help.” The assumption that apology *depends on recognition of wrongdoing* constituted 8% of the apology responses and is illustrated in the statement of a 29-year-old Korean woman who said, “I think reflection on one’s

faults gets positive responses from an opponent.” The category representing the idea that apology *depends on further action* accounted for 6% of the total responses. For example, a 19-year-old Chinese woman stated, “It takes more than an apology to fix something that horrible that was done to the invaded country.” Table 30.1 shows the relative frequencies and examples of responses of some of the most common *depends* subcategories.

Responses that *generally agreed* that apology can lead to reconciliation constituted the second largest group of responses (14% of all responses). One example is from a 47-year-old Korean man who stated that “When you deliver your sincere heart with your apology, it will be a genuine opportunity.” Responses that *disagreed* that apology would lead to reconciliation constituted the third largest group of responses. Within this category, the most common type of response (5% of all responses to the item) indicated that apology could not lead to reconciliation because of *irreversible wrongdoings*. A 60-year-old Chinese man simply stated that an apology would be “too late.” For the responses providing *historical references*, the subcategory of *negative historical reference* is the only subcategory that accounted for 5% of the total; for example, a 74-year-old Japanese man stated that “For invasion and controlling in the past war, just like Japan and China, how many ever times of apology and support, their grudge will never disappear, and no improvement from the bottom of the heart is possible.” Table 30.2 shows the relative frequencies and examples of responses in the “*agree*,” “*disagree*,” and *historical reference* categories.

Exploratory Statistical Analyses for Apology Themes

Exploratory chi-square analyses were conducted to examine the possibility that the frequency of particular themes differed by gender, military experience, and protest involvement. These analyses revealed that a significantly higher proportion

Table 30.1 Does apology increases chances of reconciliation? Examples of responses in the it depends categories and subcategories

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Sex	Response
<i>It depends</i>	56				
May be possible/worth a try/ possible to some degree	9 (16)	Korea	21	Male	The reconciliation between the countries can be possible to some degree
		Japan	27	Female	It may be somewhat of an improvement
Depends on nature of apology	19 (34)				
Depends on recognition of wrongdoing	8 (14)	China	19	Male	If there is an admission of guilt, then it is one step closer to cooperation
		Korea	28	Female	I think that the admission and apology for the faults will be the only way to go forward to reconciliation
		Japan	22	Male	Far too often, we dismiss the symbolic and emotional power of acknowledgement and apology. I believe that a significant part of reconciliation includes taking of responsibility for past actions
Depends on further action	6 (10)	Korea	40	Female	Specific actions should follow in relation to voluntary repentance
		China	19	Female	It takes more than an apology to fix something as horrible as what was done to the invaded country

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category or subcategory out of all responses to the apology item. The second number (in parenthesis) refers to the percentage of responses in the specific category or subcategory out of all the *it depends* responses

Table 30.2 Does apology increases chances of reconciliation? Examples of responses in the agree, disagree, and historical reference categories and subcategories

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Sex	Response
<i>Agreement</i>	20				
General agreement	14(72)	China	19	Female	If the country is sorry for mistreating the other country, an apology will definitely help the situation
		Japan	49	Female	The reflection is a step to the hope for the future
<i>Disagreement</i>	14				
Irreversible wrongdoings	5 (40) ^a	Korea	27	Female	The past facts cannot be justified
		Japan	27	Female	I don't think there is anything we can do to erase the past
<i>Historical references</i>	9				
Negative historical reference	5 (55) ^b	Korea	26	Female	In the case of our country and Japan, the Japanese attitude of unwillingness to apologize makes us angry
		China	19	Male	Since Japan never formally apologizes to China for its invasion during the WWII, it is Japan's fault that the two nations are still having political, ideological contradictions, and issues that make the Asian Pacific area dangerous

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of all the apology responses

^aThe number in parentheses is the percentage of responses in the specified category out of all the disagreement responses

^bThe number in parentheses is the percentage of responses in the specified category out of all the historical reference responses

of participants who reported being in the military compared with their non-military counterparts (a) suggested that *apology generally would lead to reconciliation*, 21% versus 11%, $X^2=3.87$, $p \leq 0.05$, and (b) gave responses coded for at least one of the *agreement* categories, 29% versus 16%, $X^2=5$, $p \leq 0.05$.

Steps to Reconciliation

Reconciliation Coding Manual

For coding responses to the second apology item (i.e., “What steps or factors are necessary to make an apology successful in achieving reconciliation between the countries?”), a second coding manual was developed. Three major sets of categories were identified: (1) reconciliation is *achievable* through specific steps, (2) reconciliation is *unachievable*, and (3) the respondent *does not know* how to achieve reconciliation. The *achievable* responses were coded into one of the six major categories: (a) *depends on circumstances* (with further subcategories for *severity of wrongdoings* and the *passage of time*); (b) *the nature of the apology* (including references to the degrees of *sincerity*, *recognition of wrongdoing*, *remorse*, and the inclusion of an *official apology*); (c) *acceptance* by wronged country; (d) additional action that is interpersonal or psychological in nature (coded as *psychological reparation*); (e) *provision of goods or services* (including references to rebuilding infrastructure; providing education, money, land, and democracy; and returning war prisoners); and (f) *change of behavior* by former aggressor (e.g., ending current conflicts, returning sovereignty, initiating positive action, not going back on apology, and sustaining nonaggressive behavior).

Distribution of Responses Regarding Steps to Reconciliation

The great majority of responses (94%) indicated that reconciliation is *achievable* through various steps. The remaining two sets of coding catego-

ries (*unachievable* and *do not know*) accounted for only 6% of all responses and will not be discussed further.

Four of the subcategories for responses proposing steps for making reconciliation *achievable* (*sincerity*, *repairing relations*, *understanding and tolerance*, and *providing money*) included over 10% of all the responses to the reconciliation item. Responses coded for *sincerity* are within the *nature of apology* category, which stresses that the form in which an apology takes can affect the reconciliation process. The category *sincerity* accounted for 16% of all the responses and 45% of responses within the *nature of apology* category. As a 29-year-old Japanese man stated, “It’s important to apologize sincerely and honestly.”

Repairing relations is a subcategory within the *interpersonal/psychological* category, emphasizing the need for relationships between and among parties. Responses focused on *repairing relations* accounted for 13% of the total responses and 50% of responses within the *interpersonal/psychological* category. The notion of *repairing relations* is exemplified in the response of a 19-year-old Chinese man who stated that “They should come together and talk about solution.” *Understanding and tolerance* is another subcategory within the *interpersonal/psychological* category. Responses within the *understanding/tolerance* accounted for 12% of the total responses and 48% of responses within the *interpersonal/psychological* category. An example from this category is represented in a statement by a 25-year-old Korean woman who stated, “We should make an effort to accept the opinions of each other.”

The final category *providing money* as a way to promote reconciliation is a subcategory of the *provide goods and services* category that underscores the need for reparation as a means to achieve reconciliation. The *providing money* accounted for 13% of the total responses and 65% of responses within the *providing goods or services* category. As stated by a 19-year-old Chinese woman, reconciliation may be achieved through “perhaps not only an apology but some kind of payment to help the country recover.”

Table 30.3 Reconciliation is achievable through specific steps: examples of responses in major categories and subcategories

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Sex	Response
<i>Reconciliation is achievable</i> 94					
Nature of apology 1 (1)					
Sincerity	16 (45)	China	19	Female	Most importantly it must be genuine, as there is no point just apologizing for the sake of good PR
		Korea	37	Male	Humble position that you regret your faults
		Japan	21	Female	To offer apology with sincerity
Recognition of wrongdoing	9 (25)	Korea	32	Female	The country that did wrong should know its faults
		Japan	52	Female	To admit that past invasion, colonization, and controlling were wrong, and it must come from both citizens and the government
Official diplomatic apology/treaty	5 (15)	Korea	17	Male	Extensive public apology
		Japan	79	Male	An expression of apology by the government
Interpersonal/psychological 27 (26)					
Repairing relations	13 (50)	China	19	Male	They should come together and talk about solution
		Korea	70	Female	Conversation is needed
		Japan	50	Male	Having student exchanges, business partnership, and finally the political negotiation/discussion and trust building. Politics alone will never achieve it
Understanding/tolerance/respect	12 (48)	China	29	Female	Treat each other with equality
		Japan	50	Female	Mutual understanding
Provide goods or services 21 (20)					
Providing money	13 (65)	Korea	28	Female	I think that the compensation for the victims and the admission of the faults are necessary
		China	18	Female	Aid through money

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total prerequisites for reconciliation codes. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the major category

Other coding categories that appeared in fewer than 10% but at least 5% of the reconciliation responses included *recognition of wrongdoing* and *diplomatic/treaties*. *Recognition of wrongdoing* is a subcategory of the *nature of apology* category; it accounted for 9% of all reconciliation responses and 25% of responses within the *nature of apology* category. An example of *recognition of wrongdoing* comes from a 40-year-old Korean woman who stated that “[a country] must admit and apologize for historical faults.” Responses in the second *nature of apology* subcategory, *diplomatic/treaties*, accounted for 5% of all reconciliation responses and 15% of responses within the *nature of apology* category. For example, a 40-year-old Korean woman stated, “There should be a reflection in the opinion of leading groups

first, such as statesmen and intellectuals, inside the country toward the coordinated statements.” Table 30.3 shows relative frequencies and examples of responses in the *nature of apology*, *interpersonal/psychological steps*, and *providing goods and services* categories.

Exploratory Statistical Analyses: Reconciliation Themes

Exploratory chi-square analyses were conducted to examine whether the frequency of themes in the different categories varied by gender, military experience, and protest involvement. Only those categories that accounted for more than 15% of the responses are discussed. Only two gender results

were found: (a) a significantly greater proportion of men than women (17% vs. 9%) mentioned that through *repairing relations* reconciliation is possible, $X^2=3.71, p\leq 0.5$, and (b) women were marginally more likely than men (16% vs. 9%) to say that reconciliation is achievable through *understanding and tolerance* between countries, $X^2=3.23, p\leq 0.1$.

Discussion

The survey results indicate that two thirds (76%) of the responses from East Asian participants indicate that an apology by a perpetrating nation could help the reconciliation process when one nation had previously invaded or colonized or ran the affairs of another nation. Also, the vast majority (94%) of their responses identified specific steps to achieve reconciliation following an apology for previous aggression. The results present an optimistic vision and hope for healing from the wounds of war, torture, invasion, and colonization that East Asia has experienced during the last century.

At the same time, East Asians appear to be realistic in their beliefs. About 74% of the positive responses (or 56% of the 76%) conveyed some diffidence, maintaining that the usefulness of an apology is contingent on various factors. The factors the East Asian participants mentioned included whether or not the apology includes an acknowledgement of wrongdoing and whether further actions are taken following the apology. Also, slightly more tentative responses, such as suggestions that an apology may make reconciliation possible or would be worth a try, were frequent. Furthermore, many East Asians emphasized the importance of sincerity in apology, recognition of wrongdoing, efforts to repair damaged relationships between countries involved, and the development of understanding, tolerance, and respect for one another as necessary steps or factors for reconciliation. They have also suggested that official governmental apology and monetary reparations are important for achieving reconciliation.

These responses are consistent with various scholars' views on apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation. Many scholars have argued that the

recognition of facts and the acknowledgement of responsibility are important components of an apology (e.g., Dahl, 2008; Field, 1997; Lind, 2008, 2009; Liu & Atsumi, 2008), that reparations should accompany an apology (e.g., Blatz et al., 2009; Brooks, 1999; Field, 1997; Honda, 2000; Minow, 1998; Renteln, 2008), and that any kind of apology is good and would be worth a try (Hook, 2008). They have also suggested that an apology must be sincere and must be followed by further actions (Dahl, 2008; Lind, 2008, 2009; Liu & Atsumi, 2008; Nadler & Liviatan, 2006; Van Dyke, 2006) and that an apology must be official (Field, 1997; Yamazaki, 2006). Moreover, a number of scholars agree that repairing relationships, forming positive relationships, and having mutual understanding, respect, and trust are essential for achieving forgiveness and reconciliation (Dahl, 2008; Er, 2002; Gries, 2004; Lind, 2008, 2009; Liu & Atsumi, 2008; Minow, 1998; Worthington & Aten, 2010).

The importance of having positive relationships between the victimized party and the perpetrator in promoting forgiveness is well supported by psychological research (e.g., Cehajic et al., 2008; Hewstone et al., 2005; Hewstone et al., 2006; Swart et al., 2011). Positive intergroup contact has been shown to be particularly important in building intergroup trust (e.g., Nadler & Liviatan, 2006; Nadler & Shnabel, 2011; Tam et al., 2009) because the victimized party's trust in the perpetrator is a key factor that contributes toward full reconciliation after an intergroup conflict.

The significance of cultivating the sense of understanding, respect, and trust was mentioned in the survey by many East Asians, particularly by women. Psychological research (e.g., Leonard et al., 2011; Wohl et al., 2012) provides strong evidence for the importance of intergroup emotions, in particular, respect and anger, in the processes of forgiveness and reconciliation. Leonard and her colleagues manipulated the presence or absence of apology on the part of faculty after intergroup transgression took place against students and found that the absence of an apology increased the desire for retribution, through increased anger. Moreover, an apology increased forgiveness of the perpetrator, when more respect was present. Although the intergroup transgres-

sion (between the faculty and students) in this study is not comparable to that found in international conflict in regard to its nature and magnitude, the finding on the importance of having respect, as opposed to anger, sheds light on the international reconciliation process.

The process of building a positive relationship and cultivating understanding and trust takes time, and it requires a long-term plan. Dahl (2008) holds that reconciliation is a continuous process, in which apologies and other peace-making actions should be continually offered in order for trust to develop among the nations involved. Minow (1998) makes a similar suggestion by pointing out that making monetary reparations sometimes risks giving a false sense of conclusion to the conflict. She cautions that paying reparations cannot undo the harm that was done and that reparations do not complete the reconciliation process. Reparations are important in promoting forgiveness and reconciliation, but they would never be sufficient to eliminate or repair the psychological harm, trauma, physical injuries and disabilities, and the loss of loved ones that people have suffered. Thus, one would agree with Dahl's argument that apologies or reparations should not be considered a one-time event, but rather they should be thought of as part of a long, conciliatory healing process.

Although a long-term reconciliation process is necessary, it also has its challenges. Dahl (2008) points out that as older Japanese generations who were directly involved in the war die out, the younger generations begin to question the need for apology. This tendency may be exacerbated by the Japanese history textbooks, which have not accurately included or sufficiently covered the historical facts of Japanese wartime aggression, which may lead younger Japanese generations to misjudge the true extent of their nation's past aggression. However, psychological research (Brown et al., 2008) has shown that strong in-group identification influences people's willingness to forgive perpetrators even if the people themselves did not experience any victimization firsthand. The results indicated that stronger in-group identification led to less forgiveness of

the perpetrator who harmed the in-group members and more blame and desire for retribution, especially when empathy for their in-group victims was strong. Thus, while younger Japanese generations may regard the brutal aggression of their ancestors as only a distant memory, their counterparts in China and Korea with strong national identity may maintain the traumatic memory, along with a sense of hatred and resentment. This discrepancy between the historical amnesia in Japan and the fresh, vivid memory about Japan's past aggression among younger generations in other Asian nations can create a drastic difference in personal attitudes and foreign policies, which in turn presents greater difficulty for these countries to develop the mutual trust and respect necessary for forgiveness and reconciliation.

Group-serving bias (Pettigrew, 1979; Taylor & Doria, 1981) can also greatly hinder the formation of positive relationships based on trust and respect between countries involved in international conflict. Group-serving bias is the tendency to explain one's own group's behaviors in a positive manner and excuse its own negative behaviors while attributing one's out-group's negative behaviors to the out-group's characteristics or dispositions. East Asian nations, whether they are the victimized nations or the perpetrating nations, may continue making negative dispositional attributions about one another, which will prevent them from moving forward in their efforts toward peace and reconciliation.

Another major challenge to the process of apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation that one must consider is that it operates on two different levels: at the government level, from one country to another, and at the individual level, from the citizens in one country to those in another. Digeser (2001) states that "governments can forgive" (p. 145). But do the citizens of these nations automatically and necessarily forgive as well? As reviewed earlier, numerous international apologies have been offered in East Asia, and some of them have been accepted, such as the Japanese government's apology to Korea. Yet, successful reconciliation at the

government or national level does not mean that the citizens have also accepted the apology and settled the past at an individual level. For instance, consider the fact that Japan is one of the least liked countries in South Korea (Lind, 2009). Consider also the response that a 26-year-old Korean man gave in the survey (Table 30.3), “In the case of our country and Japan, the Japanese attitude of unwillingness to apologize makes us angry.”

The challenge that East Asian nations and their individual citizens are facing is, therefore, not only offering the diplomatic apology, reparations, acceptance, forgiveness, and reconciliation between the governments but also making sure that their citizens understand, process, and remember these events as their own. International reconciliation will not be truly and completely achieved until every step of the entire reconciliation process and its results are transfused to individual citizens. To realize this, it is imperative that efforts toward forming positive relationships and cultivating respect and trust also take place at an individual level among the citizens of countries involved by overcoming differences in views, history, and culture.

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Kimberly A. Rapoza and Marineh Lalikian

The words “I am sorry” are simple and yet can make a tremendous difference as to whether a relationship can be reconciled or dissolves in bitterness. What is the meaning of an apology offered between individuals? The word apology is derived from the Greek words *apologia*, and the most colloquial use of the word entails one of its meanings, which is an expression of regret or remorse for having wronged another (Apology, n.d.). However, the original Greek meaning of the word was used as a defense, excuse, or justification for one’s cause (Apology). The Apology written by Plato was actually a description of Socrates’ formal defense against charges that he was corrupting the youth and had rejected the state sanctioned gods (Top ten apologies, n.d.). This dual meaning and use of the word perhaps explains some of the ambivalence with which apologies are greeted. Suspicion that the apology is directed more toward defending the offender’s actions and blaming the victim for misunderstanding intentions are reasons enthusiasm for an apology might be dampened. This chapter will focus more closely on implicit theories regarding political apologies, rather than apologies between individuals. Celermajer (2008) noted that political apologies differ from individual apologies in that they

generally are not concerned only with a wrongful act or a collection of wrongful acts by wayward individuals, but by a distinct political quality of the wrongful act that was committed under the mantle of the nation. Political apologies tend to address the structural exclusion of certain groups, disenfranchisement of rights, and a failure to respect the victims as full citizens with the rights and responsibilities due to them.

National or political apologies are nothing new. For instance, Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV offered an apology to Pope Gregory VII for usurping the pope’s authority in 1077 by trekking across the Alps and standing in the snow for three days waiting for an indication of forgiveness (Top ten apologies, n.d.). However, the giving of a national apology or the request or demand for one by a wronged nation has seemingly become more common in the modern era (Fehr, Gelfand, & Nag, 2010). There have been recent and memorable uses of a national apology as a diplomatic tool or strategy in international or intranational events from many regions discussed in this volume, such as:

- In 1970, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, while visiting the Warsaw Ghetto in Poland, spontaneously fell to his knees in front of a memorial to the city’s Jewish population murdered by the Nazis. The gesture was seen as a desire for atonement by Germany for the Holocaust and past atrocities (Willy Brandt, 1992).
- In 1981, the Soviet Union apologized to Sweden for a submarine that ran aground in a

K.A. Rapoza (✉)
Mercy College, Dobbs Ferry, NY 10522, USA
e-mail: krapoza@mercy.edu

M. Lalikian
Department of Psychology, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA

restricted military zone. The Swedish government said the apology was insufficient for the return of the submarine. However, with tensions building between the two nations, Sweden completed an interrogation of the crew, who were then released along with the submarine (*Moscow Apologizes*, 1981).

- In 1988, the United States government formally apologized to Japanese Americans held in US internment camps during WWII. The passage of the Civil Liberties Act, almost 50 years after the event, both apologized for the government's actions and pledged to pay \$20,000 to each survivor or their heirs (Isikoff, 1990).
 - In 1996, President F.W. de Klerk, head of the National Party which governed South Africa, formally apologized in front of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission for the atrocities committed during apartheid but denied direct knowledge of or personal orders resulting in the systematic torture and murder of black activists by security forces. Four hundred people jeered when de Klerk denied knowledge of infamous assassinations. The commission, headed by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, recommended reparations for victims and, controversially, amnesty for some offenders (*De Klerk Blames Rogue Security Units*, 1996).
 - In 1999, Prime Minister John Howard acknowledged deep personal sorrow concerning the injustice and treatment of Australia's Aboriginal people. However, he refused to sign a document for reconciliation developed by Aboriginal activists, based on key parts of the document asking for apologies regarding the forced removal of Aboriginal children from their homes and appropriating land, indicating the document went too far. This lack of apology in other areas has led to divisiveness (Erllich, 2000).
 - In 1998, two former Khmer Rouge leaders apologize to the Cambodian people for the murder of two million people in that country. Controversially, one of the men, Khieu Samphan a former Prime Minister overseeing the genocide at that time, asked that the past be forgotten and to let bygones be bygones. Although initially it seemed Prime Minister Hun Sen would not seek trials, international pressure and pressure from the King have resulted in the trial and conviction of two Khmer Rouge leaders (Bardacke, 1998; Mydans, 2001).
 - In 2000, Guatemalan President Alfonso Portillo apologized for two specific incidents during Guatemala's bloody civil conflict. The apology admitted responsibility for only one massacre and for "disappearances" and indicated the state would pay reparations to the victim's families. It is estimated that 200,000 people were "disappeared" or executed, with the majority of offenses committed by the army, directed primarily toward Mayan indigenous people (Welsh & Ulltveit-Moe, 2000). Following a UN commission report that implicated the United States as funding, supporting, and training the Guatemalan military during the period in which atrocities were committed, President Clinton apologized for the US support of the rightist regime (Gerstenzang & Darling, 1999).
 - Within a year of the election of President Obama, the US House of Representative and US Senate issued congressional apologies for slavery. The 2009 apology was not covered widely in the media and the apology specifically stated it could not be used to support claims for reparations (Thompson, 2009).
 - In 2010, Japan's Prime Minister Naoto Kan apologized to South Koreans for suffering caused by decades of colonization ending after World War II. Although the apology fell short for many by not mention the forced manual labor and sex slavery of the Korean people at that time, the South Korean President Lee Myung-bak noted the sincerity of the apology and that words should be translated into action (Kim, 2010).
- The United Nations adopted a joint draft resolution in December 1995 entitled "Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law" (Basic Principles, n.d.). The resolution adopted a victim-oriented perspective, whereby it was acknowledged that current violations of international human rights and humanitarian law may

occur directly to individuals as well as targeted toward groups of persons. Victimization may consist of individual or collective harm comprised of physical, mental, emotional or economic injury, or suffering, as well as deprivation of fundamental human rights. The resolution stated victims are entitled to certain rights and remedies, such as access to justice, restitution, compensation for suffering, satisfaction, or guarantee of non-repetition of the acts in question. It is interesting that while many of the resolutions focus on restoring or compensating the victims loss, two named aspects of satisfaction for the victim deemed important were a "Public apology, including acknowledgement of the facts and acceptance of responsibility" and "An official declaration or judicial decision restoring the dignity, the reputation and the rights of the victims..." (p. 16).

While a skeptic might rightly view a public apology or official declaration as no more than hollow words, words that may never be capable of reparations or compensation for a people who have been victimized and survived atrocities, the UN resolution through the inclusion of apology as an aspect of victim's rights affirms the power of public affirmation of a nation's wrongdoing. National apologies can be important, as an affirmation and historical record that atrocities and violations of human rights did occur (Bergen, 2007). Often, events in history are disputed and many versions of any given historical event can be perceived to have some validity. An official apology on a national level can serve to "set the record straight" and affirm on a global and historical level that the victim's claim is legitimate. However, as Celermajer (2008) has discussed, not all scholars have been in favor of political apologies. Apology has been viewed by some as a highly personal and individual act, not meant to be translated into the larger political arena. In discussing Levinas' views, Celermajer noted there are ethical concerns regarding the transfer of suffering between specific people into a public event, with the potential to drown out the voices and grievances of individual victims. Government apologies hence may usurp the individual victim's rights to reconcile and forgive the oppressor and may annihilate differ-

ences in experience, in effect "shutting the victims up once and for all" (p. 19).

Forgiveness is an area of study that has spanned the disciplines of philosophy, theology, political science, law, anthropology, and psychology (Fehr et al., 2010). While this chapter focuses on implicit theories regarding political apology and reconciliation, forgiveness is the conceptual bridge between the two acts. Bergen (2007), in discussing the theological framework of political apologies by churches, nations, companies, and other institutions, noted that "reconciliation entails both repentance, which may include apology, and forgiveness" (p. 81). What exactly constitutes forgiveness is still not settled and a consensual definition has not been developed. Strelan and Covic (2006) stated that forgiveness is generally perceived as distinct from excusing, condoning, pardoning, forgetting, and reconciling. It also contains two primary processes whereby the victim has a reduction in negative thoughts, feelings, and behaviors toward the offender (i.e., anger, bitterness, revenge), which are subsumed by an increase in positive regard toward the offender (i.e., empathy, compassion, reframing of actions). However, Lawler-Row, Scott, Raines, Edlis-Matityahou, and Moore (2007) found that when individuals are asked what they think constitutes forgiveness, lay definitions do not always fall into line with scholarly definitions. A sample of 270 young adults viewed forgiveness equally as expressions that can be behavioral, cognitive, and emotional. The participants also often defined forgiveness as equally having passive (i.e., letting go) and active (i.e., moving on) qualities as well as comprised of forgetting, reconciliation, empathy, or excusing the offender's behavior. Indeed Strelan and Covic propose that clinicians need to be aware of the conflation of forgiveness with concepts such as excusing, as lay beliefs influence not just clinical work but also the workplace, the justice system, and the forgiveness process between groups.

While forgiveness would seem intuitively to carry with it opportunities for letting the heavy psychic burden of anger and hatred go and the potential for smoother or repaired interpersonal relationships, the benefits of forgiveness also

seem to extend to health and psychological well-being. Harris and Thoresen (2005) posit that unforgiveness carries with it concomitant negative emotions (e.g., resentment, anger, bitterness, hostility, hatred, and rumination), which are known to produce physiological responses in the body similar to chronic stress responses that wear and tear at biological systems (i.e., cardiovascular and immune). A study by Lawler et al. (2003) found individuals characterized generally as having a forgiving personality also had lower blood pressure and better blood pressure recovery after a stressful experience. Interestingly, state forgiveness for a specific incident was also correlated with lower blood pressure levels, heart rate, and lower arterial pressure. Harris and Thoresen also note the relationship between forgiveness and better physical and mental health was also found to grow stronger with age, with middle-age adults and the elderly reporting more benefits than young adults. However, almost all studies on forgiveness and health are on the individual level. One provocative question is whether collective forgiveness can improve, or collective unforgiveness can hamper, the general health of the general populous within a nation.

Perspectives on Apology

The previous chapters in this section have considered the coded qualitative responses of participants from Western Europe, Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, South and Southeast Asia, East Asia, and the UK/Anglo regions regarding political apology. This chapter considers the extent to which the participants from these eight regions have similar or different views concerning the effectiveness of one nation's apology on the chance for reconciliation between two countries, as well as similar or different expectations on what concrete actions would need to be taken to achieve true reconciliation.

As explained in earlier chapters, responses to the two reconciliation items from the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace

Survey (PAIRTAPS) were coded using a coding manual developed by members of the Group on International Perspectives of Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP). For more information, refer to the apology introductory methods chapter in this volume.

Coding Manual on the Effectiveness of an Apology

The coding manual for perspectives on the effectiveness of an apology was used to code responses to the following Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) item: "If one country in the past invaded, colonized, or exercised control over the governmental affairs of another country, an apology by the invading/colonizing/controlling country can improve the chances for reconciliation between the countries." Qualitative responses to this item were first sorted into one of three major groups (sets of categories): *it depends, yes/agreement, and no/disagreement*.

The *it depends* responses generally fell into one of several major categories defined by specific delineation of what the effectiveness of an apology would *depend* on. Specifically, responses could be categorized based on whether they indicated that (a) *it may be possible* for an apology to lead to reconciliation, that it is *possible to some degree*, or that it is at least *worth a try*; (b) the *circumstances* of current or past events, such as the *severity of the wrongdoing* or the *relevance/timing* of the apology, will determine the effectiveness of the apology; (c) the *nature of the apology* is important, including its *sincerity*, the necessity of *recognition of wrongdoing*, whether or not the apologizing country shows *remorse*, or if the apology comes from a *diplomat or state official*; (d) success depends on whether or not the offended country accepts the apology and, further, if this country *forgives* the offender; (e) the apologizing country must take *further action* in order for an apology to be successful – for example, through a *change in behavior* or the provision of *material reparations* to the victimized country; and (f) an apology is a *good begin-*

ning toward achieving reconciliation, but it is *only one step* and *success takes time*.

Categories of responses for *agreement* included the following: (a) an apology could lead to *healing*, by *repairing relationships*, or *restoring dignity*; and (b) an apology is not only helpful in achieving reconciliation, *it is necessary*. Responses expressing disagreement with the notion that particular steps improved the likelihood that an apology could lead to reconciliation can also be coded into specific categories, depending on whether they indicate that (a) it is *not possible* for an apology to lead to reconciliation, (b) an apology *does not reverse wrongdoings of the past*, (c) the victimized people will *never forget* the wrongdoing that was committed, (d) *words don't matter*, (e) *actions speak louder than words*, (f) an apology is *not necessary*, and (g) there may be *negative consequences* resulting from an apology.

Patterns of Responses to the Effectiveness of an Apology

Apology Can Lead to Reconciliation

Overall, responses across regions revealed considerable optimism concerning the possibility that an apology *could lead to reconciliation* between nations; almost four times as many responses supported rather than rejected the possibility. The strongest level of support came from the South and Southeast Asia region, with 30% of the responses from this region endorsing the potential effectiveness of apology. About one-fifth of responses from the Africa, East Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East regions also expressed agreement. Only 13% of Russia and the Balkan Peninsula and 9% of Western Europe samples gave responses indicating that an apology *could lead to reconciliation*. However, in the UK/Anglo region, only 6% of all responses agree with this possibility.

Among the responses agreeing that apology could lead to reconciliation, all regions also provided responses specifically indicating that an apology *would repair the relationship*

between the two countries. Africa provided the highest proportion of responses in this category, with 52% of *agreement* responses specifying that an apology *would repair the relationship* between the two countries. About one-third of *agreement* responses from Latin America and South and Southeast Asia and about a quarter of responses from Russia and the Balkan Peninsula and Western Europe fell into this category. Only 8% of *agreement* responses from East Asia, 7% of *agreement* responses from the Middle East, and 2% from the UK/Anglo region agreed that an apology *would repair the relationship* between the two countries.

Africa also provided the highest proportion of responses in the agreement category (19%) stating that an apology would lead to *healing*. The UK/Anglo region followed closely behind with 16% of *agreement* responses coded for *healing*. There were no responses in this category from East Asia, Latin America, or Western Europe. Although there were responses from these three regions indicating that an apology could *lead to reconciliation*, none of these responses specifically mentioned that the apology would allow the country and the victims of the crime to *heal*.

All regions besides the UK/Anglo region also specified that not only is an apology helpful in reconciling the relationship between two countries, but it is also *necessary*. Russia and the Balkan Peninsula had the highest rate of responses coded into this category (28% of *agreement* responses). East Asia, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and Africa also had a fairly large proportion of responses that fell into this category: 16% of the *agreement* responses from East Asia, 15% of the *agreement* responses from the Middle East, 13% of the *agreement* responses from South and Southeast Asia, and 10% of the *agreement* responses from Africa. Only 5% of the *agreement* responses from Western Europe and 3% of the *agreement* responses from Latin America fell into this category.

There were several demographic differences between people who gave responses indicating that an apology *could lead to reconciliation* – with

or without going into detail about specific mechanisms by which an apology could be effective – and those who did not provide a response that fit into this category. Exploratory chi-square analyses showed that there were significant gender differences in Western Europe and in South and Southeast Asia on agreement responses. In both regions, a significantly greater proportion of males than females gave at least one response indicating that an apology *could lead to reconciliation* (*agreement presence*). The same pattern was found in South and Southeast Asia for responses that showed general agreement that an apology could be effective, with a significantly greater proportion of men than women providing responses in this category. These findings regarding gender differences are provocative. Although it has often been assumed that women might be more likely than men to forgive, empirical studies and meta-analysis have not provided unequivocal evidence to validate this claim and there may be no reliable differences between men and women in propensity to forgive (Fehr et al., 2010). However, there is some evidence that some variables, such as empathy, can moderate gender differences in propensity to forgive. For instance, Toussaint and Webb (2005) found that while women do score higher on empathy, as compared to men, empathy was associated with forgiveness only in men. Toussaint and Webb argue that although women may have higher levels of empathy, empathy may be more important for men in promoting forgiveness. It would seem that within some cultures, men and women may differ on their views on the effectiveness of apology and either through behavioral norms or cultural scripts may have different views on the acceptableness and form of political apologies.

Differences in responses were also found as a function of whether or not respondents had ever served in the military. More military veterans than nonmilitary personnel from East Asia and Western Europe provided responses indicating that an apology *could lead to reconciliation*. Also in East Asia, more veterans than nonmilitary personnel provided general agree-

ment with the notion that an apology *could lead to reconciliation*. Interestingly, this pattern was reversed in the Middle East, where a significantly greater proportion of nonmilitary than military participants gave responses indicating that an apology *could lead to reconciliation*.

Effectiveness of the Apology Depends on the Situation

In response to the question of whether an apology from the invading/colonizing/controlling country to the invaded/colonized/controlled country can improve chances of reconciliation between the countries, the notion that an apology may be effective *depending* on a variety of circumstances yielded the greatest number of responses from all regions. Western Europe had the highest rates of responses indicating that the effectiveness of an apology *depends* on the situation, with 68% of the all responses coded for this category. Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, East Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the UK/Anglo region followed with over 55% of all responses coded for this category. Latin America and South and Southeast Asia had the smallest rates of responses in this category, but each region still provided at least 44% of all responses that were coded into this category.

Responses from Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, the UK/Anglo region, and East Asia showed the greatest consensus that *depending on the situation, it may be possible* for an apology to lead to reconciliation and that *it is worth a try to reconcile* through an apology. Twenty-three percent of the *it depends* responses from Russia and the Balkans, 17% of the *depends* responses from the UK/Anglo region, and 16% of the *depends* responses from East Asia fell into this category.

All regions had high rates of responses agreeing that an apology is a *good beginning* but *only one step* in what needs to be done in order to achieve reconciliation. Over a quarter of the *depends* responses from Latin America and South and Southeast Asia and 20% of the *depends* responses from the Middle East and Western Europe fell into this category. Although this was not the highest-rated category for the rest of the regions, at least

10% of the *depends* responses from Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, Africa, and the UK/Anglo region and 8% of the *depends* responses from East Asia also agreed with this notion.

Exploratory chi-square analyses revealed that proportionately more women than men from South and Southeast Asia and Western Europe and proportionately more respondents from the UK/Anglo region who did not have a relative in the military than those who did have a military relative gave responses indicating that the effectiveness of an apology *depends* on the situation. This effect was reversed in South and Southeast Asia, with a greater proportion of respondents with a relative in the military than their counterparts providing *depends* responses. A significantly greater proportion of protestors than non-protestors from South and Southeast Asia also provided responses indicating that the effectiveness of an apology *depends* on the situation.

Responses collected from Russia and the Balkan Peninsula showed demographic group differences regarding the specific situations in which an apology may be effective. A significantly greater proportion of women than men and a significantly greater proportion of respondents with no military experience than with military experience indicated that reconciliation through apology is *possible to some degree*. Also a proportionately greater number of respondents who did not have a relative in the military than respondents with a military relative and proportionately more protestors than non-protestors indicated that the apologizing country must admit and recognize that they *committed a wrongdoing* in order for the apology to be effective in leading to reconciliation. A significantly greater proportion of protestors than non-protestors also indicated that the effectiveness of an apology is *dependent on the sincerity* of the apology.

The choice to forgive has been found to be influenced by personality, environmental, and contextual factors that promote or inhibit forgiveness on the individual level. For instance, in a meta-analysis, Fehr et al. (2010) found having a disposition prone to agreeableness,

perspective taking, positive mood empathy, and social desirability makes forgiveness more likely; while rumination, negative mood, neuroticism, and anger make forgiveness less likely. Interestingly, many of the situational correlates found to be important on the interpersonal level were also frequently named by participants in this study as caveats as to whether an apology can lead to reconciliation. For example, Fehr and colleagues also found the severity of harm, attribution of negative intent to the offender, and a belief that the offenders were responsible for their actions made forgiveness less likely, while increased time from the event, an apology, and a closer or more committed relationship made forgiveness more likely. To date there is little information on what might make a group of people more likely to forgive, as in the case of transgressions against a nation, but the findings from this study allude to some overlap between interpersonal correlates and macro-level factors.

Other demographic differences in response patterns were observed in the UK/Anglo region and in Western Europe. A significantly greater proportion of veterans than nonveterans from the UK/Anglo region indicated that the effectiveness of an apology *depends on the relevance and the timing of the apology*. A significantly greater number of respondents from Western Europe with a relative in the military than those without a relative in the military indicated that the apologizing country must also *change its behavior* in the future in order for an apology to be effective.

It is interesting that in many of the regions, our lay participants seldom listed timing as an important factor; previous work on the process of forgiveness has emphasized the importance of timing. For example, McCullough, Luna, Tabak, Berry, and Bono (2010) explored the relationship between the time of an offense and victims' perceptions of forgiveness. They found that the longer the amount of time that passed the less forgiveness was reported. That is, more recent transgressions were more quickly forgiven. Although the study focused on interpersonal transgressions, apology, and forgiveness, the findings appear to have some

relevance for political apologies. Perhaps, as the veterans from the UK/Anglo counties in this study indicated, larger strides in reconciliation between nations may occur early on in relation to the transgression, but larger amounts of time (perhaps even generations) may be needed before similar progress can be made for long-standing transgressions.

Apology Will Not Lead to Reconciliation

Some responses from across the regions indicated that an *apology will not lead to or increase the chances of reconciliation* and some also included more specific details as to why an apology would not be effective. Twenty-seven percent of all responses from Latin America, 23% of all responses in the UK/Anglo region, and 22% of all Russia and the Balkan Peninsula responses *disagreed* that apology would lead to reconciliation. Africans showed the lowest level of *disagreement*, with only 13% of all African responses expressing *disagreement*.

Interestingly, 9% of the *disagreement* responses from Africa, East Asia, South and Southeast Asia, and the UK/Anglo region all *generally disagreed* that an apology will lead to reconciliation. The Middle East and Russia and the Balkan Peninsula also provided similar rates of *general disagreement*, with 10% and 11% of the *disagree* responses, respectively, coded for this category. Latin America had the highest rate of responses coded for *general disagreement*, with 18% of the *disagreement* responses, while Western Europe had the lowest rates of *general disagreement* response with only 4% of the *disagree* responses coded for this category.

In the Middle East and Western Europe, reasoning consistent with the *words don't matter* category proved to be fairly popular. Twenty-two percent of *disagreement* responses from the Middle East indicated that an apology would not be effective because *words don't matter*. Additionally, almost one-fifth of the *disagreement* responses from Western Europe were coded into this category.

In regard to the notion that although countries may forgive each other, the people *will never for-*

get the wrongdoings that were committed, Russia and the Balkan Peninsula and South and Southeast Asia provided the highest rates of responses in this category. These responses, however, accounted for only 11% of the *disagreement* responses from each of these regions. Responses from each of the rest of the regions accounted for less than 10% of the total responses in this category, with no African responses in this category.

Almost one-fifth of the *disagreement* responses from Western Europe focused on *the negative consequences that may come with an apology*. About 10% of the *disagreement* responses from Africa, East Asia, South and Southeast Asia, and the UK/Anglo region but only 2% of *disagreement* responses from Latin America, the Middle East, and Russia and the Balkan Peninsula were coded into this category.

Only one chi-square result was found for the *disagreement* categories: proportionately more non-protestors than protestors from Latin America responded that they *generally disagreed* that an apology would lead to reconciliation.

One current example of a nation engaged in peace building and reconciliation is Ireland. The year 1998 marked the end of a long-standing civil war in Ireland and the start of a peace-building process. The conflict centered on the "clash between the claim to British sovereignty in Ireland and the claim to Irish national self-determination" with the Nationalist (predominately Catholic) arguing for a free Ireland and the Unionist (predominately Protestant) arguing against home rule and for remaining a British nation (Hennessey, 2001, p. 1). According to Hennessey, the Ulster Unionists were a paramilitary force in Northern Ireland and would only accept home rule if six Ulster counties in the north remained outside the jurisdiction of an Irish Parliament. The Government of Ireland Act in 1920 split Ireland into Northern and Southern Ireland, and although the population of Northern Ireland contained the majority of all Protestants in the country, it also contained sizable numbers of Catholics (1/3 of the population) and non-Unionists. According to Hennessey, the general election of 1918 marked the start of a long conflict between the paramilitary Nationalist group, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Sinn

Féin political (Nationalist) movement, and the British forces, which culminated in 1968 as the start of The Troubles. According to Shanahan (2009), The Troubles marked decades of protest, riots, police brutality, assassinations, bombings, and violent acts that caused the death of 3,562 people and injured and estimated 30,000 people. Shanahan noted the number of people killed in political violence between 1969 and 1990 was greater than all other European countries combined. A ceasefire and peace agreement was reached in 1998 known as the Belfast Agreement.

In 2000 the consultative group on the past was an independent group formed to develop a plan for the best ways to deal with the legacy of The Troubles. Some of the group's recommendations were for acknowledgment, a reconciliation forum for victims and survivors, an annual day of reflection, a shared memorial, and, controversially, reparations for all victims (Albert, 2009). Following the ceasefire, the IRA engaged in acts of disarmament and in July 2002 the Irish Republican Army apologized for violence and killing of civilians (Daye, 2004).

Ireland's struggle to resolve social conflict highlights some of the general difficulties of intergroup forgiveness and reconciliation, many of which were mentioned by participants in this study (i.e., actions speak louder than words, the wrongdoings that were committed will never be forgotten, apology may have negative consequences). McLernon, Cairns, Hewstone, and Smith (2004) interviewed Catholic females that had experienced verbal or physical injury or bereavement due to political violence in Northern Ireland. The authors note that unforgiveness and avoidance of reconciliation may be mechanisms utilized to keep faith with the dead, not allowing them to be forgotten. Overall, they found that the participants' self-rated forgiveness scores were low as compared to other studies measuring individual forgiveness, indicating generally that intergroup forgiveness may be more difficult than individual forgiveness. The strongest predictors of forgiveness were the extent to which the participant felt hurt by the injury (independent of the type of injury) and the length of time that had elapsed since the injury (more recent acts were

forgiven less). The authors note that although the Belfast Agreement occurred in 1998, participants still reported experiencing injury up to 2 years before the 2004 study. It would seem then that a level of conflict still seems to exist, despite the peace treaty, apologies on the part of the IRA, and the formation of reconciliation-based groups. McLernon and colleagues note that "forgiveness is easier if the harmful consequences of the act diminish with time" (p. 590); thus, it is possible that political apologies and state mechanisms for reconciliation may have only small impact or benefits initially, especially if the conflict is recent and still simmering beneath the surface of the current society.

Steps to Achieving Reconciliation

Coding Manual on Achieving Reconciliation

In the coding manual for perspectives on achieving reconciliation, respondents from each region were asked to respond to the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) item that states, "The steps that should be taken to achieve reconciliation are..." Each qualitative response was then coded as falling into one of two major sets of categories – reconciliation is *achievable* or reconciliation is *unachievable* – or into the *don't know* category for respondents who were unsure.

Responses indicating that reconciliation is *achievable* generally fell into several different categories identifying specific steps through which it could be achieved. Some responses mentioned that the *circumstances* of the situation, *depending on the severity of the wrongdoing* or the amount of *time that has passed*, could make a difference as to whether or not reconciliation could be *achieved*. Responses were also coded for mentioning the *nature of the apology*, such as whether the apology is *sincere*, the apologizing country *recognizes that they have done something wrong*, there is an expression of *remorse* in the apology, or if the apology is provided through a *diplomat or official treaty*.

Other responses indicated that the *acceptance* of the apology was a crucial step toward reconciliation or that *interpersonal or psychological* action should be taken – including efforts to *repair the relationship* or demonstrate *understanding/tolerance/respect* between the countries. Some responses were also coded for the mention of *faith and prayer* in aiding the *achievement* of reconciliation.

Another category accounted for responses indicating that the apologizing country must *provide goods or services* to the wronged country in order to *achieve* reconciliation. More specific statements within this category included the notion that the apologizing country should attempt to *rebuild* the country that it has caused harm to, *education* must be provided, *monetary aid* should be offered, the offending country should return or provide *land* to the other, war *prisoners* must be returned, or *democracy* must be implemented. The final subcategory included responses stating that in order to achieve reconciliation, the apologizing country must also *follow through on their apology or change their behavior*. This could be through *ending the current conflict*, *returning the sovereignty* of the harmed country, *initiating positive actions*, *not going back on the apology*, or *sustaining nonaggressive behavior*.

Some respondents who indicated that reconciliation is *unachievable* also provided more specific reasons as to why it could not be achieved – for example, because it was simply *impossible*, perhaps due to the *irreversible wrongdoing*, or would *only work superficially*. Other elaborations said reconciliation is *unrealism* or said apologizing is a *sign of weakness* or that the *victims want to get revenge*.

Patterns of Responses to the Achievability of Reconciliation

Reconciliation Is Achievable

An overwhelming majority of the responses from all regions indicated that reconciliation is *achievable* through a variety of steps. The highest rate of *achievability* agreement was seen in South and

Southeast Asia, where 97% of all responses fell into one of the *achievability* categories. Russia and the Balkans and the UK/Anglo region showed the lowest rates of agreement that reconciliation is *achievable* through specific steps, but still an astounding 90% of all responses were coded into one of these categories.

That an apology must be *sincere*, a *nature of apology* subcategory, proved to be a fairly popular response across the regions. Over 40% of the *nature of apology* responses from the UK/Anglo region, Western Europe, and East Asia stated that the *sincerity* of the apology was an important factor in leading to reconciliation. Roughly one-third of the *nature of apology* responses from the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia and one-quarter of the *nature of apology* responses from Latin America and Russia and the Balkan Peninsula also emphasized the importance of the *sincerity* of the apology. Interestingly, although seven regions had high rates of agreement with this notion, only 4% of the *nature of apology* responses from Africa called for *sincerity*.

Two other *nature of apology* categories proved to garner a fair number of responses across several of the regions: *recognition of wrongdoing* and *diplomatic/treaty*. About 30% of the *nature of apology* responses from Africa and Russia and the Balkan Peninsula indicated that a country's *recognition of their wrongdoing* was important in determining the effectiveness of an apology. Another one-third of the *nature of apology* responses from Russia and the Balkan Peninsula and one-third of the *nature of apology* responses from the Middle East stated that if the apology was *diplomatic or part of a treaty*, then it could lead to reconciliation. In Latin America, 44% of the *nature of apology* responses mentioned *diplomatic strategies or treaties*.

Within the category concerning the *interpersonal and psychological aspects* of reconciliation, all regions besides the Middle East and Western Europe gave the highest rates of responses concerning the importance of *improving the relations* between the countries. Over three-fourths of the *interpersonal/psychological* responses from Russia and the

Balkan Peninsula mentioned *improving relations*. Furthermore, over half of *interpersonal/psychological* responses in Latin America and the UK/Anglo region fell into this category. Reasoning consistent with *tolerance or understanding*, another *interpersonal/psychological* subcategory, was seen in a fair number of responses as well. Fifty-two percent and 60% of the *interpersonal/psychological* responses in the Middle East and Western Europe, respectively, were coded into this category.

All regions also provided high rates of responses indicating that in order for reconciliation to occur, the apologizing country must provide *monetary aid* to the aggrieved country. Within the responses indicating that reconciliation is achievable through *providing services*, 65% of responses from East Asia, 57% from Africa, 58% of the responses from the Russia and Balkan Peninsula, 45% from the UK/Anglo region, 44% from Latin America, 43% from the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia, and 35% from Western Europe stated that providing *monetary aid* is an important step in achieving reconciliation.

Fehr and Gelfand (2010) stated that apologies can play a vital role in how conflicts are managed, can help restore national relationships, and can repair individual relationships. Fehr and Gelfand also noted that apology is a risky strategy and has a potential to fail or to make a situation worse; for example, apologies have components that can influence the way a victim responds, dependent on the victim's own self-concept. In general, participants in their study recognized offers of compensation, expressions of empathy, and acknowledgement of a violated rule/norm as components of a good apology. However, a greater independent self-construal (i.e., the self is unique and autonomous) was related to a stronger belief that a good apology includes offers of compensation. A greater relational self-construal (i.e., the self is fundamentally connected to other people) was related to the belief that a good apology contains expressions of empathy. Finally, a stronger collective self-construal (i.e., self identification through groups and social categories) was related to greater belief that a good apology acknowl-

edged violations or rules or social norms. Although the severity of harm caused by an action did reduce willingness to forgive, it did not alter the relationships between the type of self-construal and the form of apology viewed as best. Although the study addressed issues at an individual level, the authors note the findings have implications for the national level. For instance, an apology that acknowledges violations of norms or social rules might be important for some non-Western cultures, and the lack of such content in an apology might lessen effectiveness. It is interesting that in our study, responses from Africa and Russia and the Balkan Peninsula (countries with greater collective self-construal) contained the greatest number of references to *recognition of wrongdoing* as important for the effectiveness of an apology. However, other regions that also had high frequency rates of response in that category were East Asia, UK/Anglo region, and Western Europe. So, while *recognition of wrongdoing* was mentioned most often by regions that could be characterized by a greater collective self-construal, it was also mentioned somewhat less often, but still frequently, by participants from regions characterized by a more independent self-construal.

Likewise, although it could be expected that regions characterized by greater independent self-construal would prefer apologies that offer compensation, the most frequent responders in the category indicating the apology should offer *monetary aid* were Africa, South and South East Asia, East Asia, and Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, all regions that could be characterized as possessing a more collective self-construal. In fact, the regions with greater independent self-construal, UK/Anglo region and Western Europe, provided the fewest references to *monetary aid* – perhaps because of current distance from war or conflict in the region and the level of poverty in the country. Africa, South and Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Russia and the Balkan Peninsula (particularly the Balkan Peninsula) have all had more recent wars, civil wars, or conflict and have larger segments of the population living in poverty than countries in the Western world. It is also possible that the former imperialistic countries are the ones that might be expected to make the

economic reparations. Although self-construal may determine some preferential aspects of the components of an apology, practical concerns such as decaying infrastructure, poverty, and poor living conditions take precedence in the minds of respondents.

Gelfand et al. (2001) noted that American culture has roots in ideals of the separate self with emphasis on individual reason and free will, while Japanese culture has roots in the ideal of an interdependent self fostered by Confucian and Buddhist ideology. Indeed, it is thought that these cultural self-orientations influence the way individuals view conflict. In Gelfand and colleagues' study, judgments of responsibility for a conflict differed by culture, with the Japanese sample perceiving more mutual blame and need for compromise to deal with the conflict, as compared to the US sample, which had a greater focus on winning and on one party being to blame for the conflict. The Japanese sample also viewed conflict as due more to *giri violations* or breaches in social position, while the American sample perceived conflict as due to infringements on the self. That the very idea of what causes conflict and the best ways to resolve conflict differ by culture and national character might indeed lend credence to the notion that an apology, to be successful, should also make reference to remorse in a way that will be culturally meaningful and resonant for the victims. It is interesting to note that in our study, countries dominated by more of a collective self-construal, such as Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, Latin America, Africa, and East Asian, all indicated that for an apology to be effective, a nation must make an effort to *improve relations* between itself and the other country involved.

Gender differences in the steps that are necessary to achieve reconciliation were observed in East Asia, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia. Proportionately more men than women (a) from East Asia specified that is important for the apologizing country to make an active effort to *repair their relationship* with the other country, (b) in the Middle East believed that an apology would be effective if it was made by *a diplomat or in a treaty*, and (c) from South and Southeast Asia found it important for the apolo-

gizing country to provide *monetary aid* along with an apology. In East Asia, proportionately more women than men provided responses supporting the notion that *building tolerance and understanding* between countries is an important step in achieving reconciliation.

Whether or not respondents had a relative who served in the military also made a difference in responses from four regions. Proportionately more respondents from East Asia who did not have a relative in the military than those who did (a) gave responses indicating that reconciliation is *achievable* and (b) stressed the importance of good *interpersonal and psychological relations*. Conversely, proportionately more respondents from Latin America, South and Southeast Asia, and the UK/Anglo region with relatives in the military gave responses coded for *interpersonal and psychological relations*. Finally, proportionately more respondents from South and Southeast Asia, and the UK/Anglo region with relatives in the military than those without indicated the importance of *monetary aid* in the process of achieving reconciliation.

Military service was also a source of differences in responses from Russia and the Balkan Peninsula and Western Europe. In both regions, proportionately more respondents with military service than those without agreed that in order for reconciliation to be achieved, the apologizing country must first *recognize that they have committed a wrongdoing*.

Reconciliation Is Unachievable

Fewer than 5% of all responses from each region took the position that reconciliation is *unachievable*. Africa and Western Europe provided the lowest rates of responses in this category, with only 1% of all responses portraying reconciliation as *unachievable*. The Middle East and Russia and the Balkan Peninsula provided the most *unachievable* responses but still only 4% of all their responses.

One of the most commonly seen *unachievable* responses across five of the regions was that reconciliation is *impossible*. Over one-third of the *unachievable* responses from the UK/Anglo region and Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, half

of the *unachievable* responses from the Middle East, and almost two-thirds of the *unachievable* responses from Latin America fell into this category. Finally, every response from Western Europe indicating that reconciliation is *unachievable* stated simply that reconciliation is *impossible*.

South and Southeast Asia provided the highest rate of responses in the category stating that reconciliation is *unachievable* because an apology *only works superficially*, with a majority of the *unachievable* responses falling into this category. The only other region with responses coded into this category was Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, which accounted for 5% of their *unachievable* responses.

Lastly, four regions provided arguments against the achievability of reconciliation that asserted that it was *unrealistic*. Over a quarter of the *unachievable* responses from Russia and the Balkan Peninsula and the UK/Anglo region, almost one-third of the *unachievable* responses from the Middle East, and over half of the *unachievable* responses from East Asia stated that reconciliation is *unrealistic* and therefore cannot be achieved. The only *unachievable* response from Africa was coded in this category.

Only one statistically significant chi-square result was found for the reconciliation responses. In the UK/Anglo region, proportionately more men than women provided responses indicating that reconciliation is *unachievable*.

While studies of the influence of macrolevel sociocultural environments regarding international apology, forgiveness, revenge, and reconciliation are lacking, smaller-scale studies of organizations indicate that the climate regarding justice and power can have a large impact on organizational stability and a culture of hostility. For instance, Aquino, Tripp, and Bies (2006) found that organizations with formal procedures to promote just outcomes for employee disputes tend to have more individuals willing to use the system and less endorsement of personal vengeance to provide redress to a victim. When victims had a power advantage over the offender or perceived the organization as unlikely to mete out justice, there was an increased willingness to take revenge. However, when the climate was per-

ceived as fair and a procedural justice climate was strong, there was increased willingness to undertake forgiveness and reconciliation. Aquino et al., note that power and justice are intricately intertwined and “citizens will not comply with the law unless they perceive it and the lawmakers and legitimate, and they will not perceive legitimacy unless they also perceive justice; hence one cannot wield legitimate power without being perceived as just” (p. 666). These findings on a small scale could also shed some light on whether apologies on a national scale might be viewed as a step in the right direction or as symbolic and hollow. A nation that apologizes and provides mechanisms and channels for victims to seek justice (i.e., public trial of offenders, court proceedings for return of property or valuables, restitution) might be viewed as more earnest in remorse and desire for reconciliation, while without procedural justice the apology may not necessarily calm desires for revenge or anger on the part of the victims. Although the number of responses indicating reconciliation was not possible was far fewer than those indicating it could be, it is possible that without the specification of the ways in which justice will be implemented as part of the apology, some participants may implicitly feel that an apology alone will have little effect on reconciliation, as power imbalances and systemic injustice may not have evaporated.

Conclusion

This current chapter offers an overview of implicit theories concerning apology and reconciliation from eight different world regions. Participants described whether an apology from an invading/controlling/colonizing nation would help improve the chances of reconciliation with an invaded/controlled/colonized nation. Participants also offered their thoughts on what steps should be taken to achieve reconciliation. Across regions, the responses provided by participants suggested a belief that an apology could be a positive step or tool in the reconciliation process. Overwhelmingly, participants across all regions stated beliefs that an apology could help.

It is interesting that while the responses overall were positive, there were a fair number of participants across all regions who noted that the effectiveness of an apology depended on circumstances. For instance, the timing of the apology, the sincerity with which it was given, the severity of the wrongdoing, and the recognition of wrongdoing were all frequent caveats regarding the effectiveness of an apology. No clear pattern emerged along developed versus developing country, Eastern versus Western, or colonized versus colonizer regional lines in endorsement of the effectiveness of an apology. However, participants in South and Southeast Asia, Africa, East Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East offered frequent responses indicating an apology could lead to reconciliation, while Africa and the UK/Anglo regions indicated an apology could lead to healing. Respondents from Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and the Middle East noted an apology could repair the relationship between two countries, and respondents from Russia and the Balkans, East Asia, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and Africa offered the most frequent responses indicating an apology was in fact a necessary component of reconciliation.

Overall, most participants stated that reconciliation was achievable if certain steps were followed. Across all eight world regions, agreement with this possibility was very high, with as high as 97% of individuals from South and Southeast Asia giving this response to 84% agreement from the UK/Anglo region. Reflecting participants' implicit theories regarding reconciliation, the most frequently recommended steps were insuring the sincerity of the apology, the recognition of wrongdoing, a diplomatic or state apology or treaty, and monetary aid. There appeared to be patterns across regions along lines of developed versus developing and regional characterization of independent self-construal or collectivistic self-construal. For instance, participants from East Asia and Western Europe noted the sincerity of the apology was most important. More collectivistic-oriented cultures such as Africa and Russia and the Balkans seemed to have more responses indicating recognition of wrongdoing was important, while the Middle East and Russia and the Balkans had frequent responses favoring diplomatic responses

or a treaty, indicating perhaps the importance of state or state figurehead sanctioned statements within those regions. Interestingly, Africa and South and Southeast Asia were most in favor of monetary aid as a step toward reconciliation, perhaps reflecting the more recent experiences of those countries with colonization, war, conflict and widespread poverty, and poor infrastructure reflective of those struggles.

It is encouraging that the responses overall contain a sense of optimism that two nations, one a perpetrator of injustices and the other victimized by errant behavior, can carve out a path toward reconciliation. It would seem that in the long run, individuals favor redemptive behavior and peaceful relations between nations and have many culturally informed ideas as to how reconciliation can be achieved. The views presented in this volume are a sampling from each region but are from small convenience samples and do not necessarily have the power to be generalized without further study and replication. The data, however, do provide provocative starting points for questioning how nations might better atone for past actions, how those victimized might move forward acknowledging truth, but not being limited by the past, and how cultural factors can influence the effectiveness of an apology.

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Part IV

Perspectives on Achieving Peace

Tristyn Campbell

In response to world events, the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP) developed the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) to study attitudes regarding state violence (Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006). The following nine chapters explore responses to two items from the PAIRTAPS concerning world peace. Respondents were recruited through convenience sampling and completed either an online version or hard copy of the survey. Data were collected from 2005 to 2008; the final sample consisted of 3,379 respondents from 54 countries, comprising eight regions of the world. The first eight chapters in this section of the book, as in the previous sections, provide survey responses and context from different regions of the world: (a) Western Europe, (b) the United Kingdom/Anglo region, (c) Russia and the Balkans, (d) the Middle East and Gulf States, (e) Africa, (f) Latin America, (g) South and Southeast Asia, and (h) East Asia. The concluding chapter integrates the findings from each regional chapter to provide an international look at viewpoints concerning the achievability of world peace. It is important to note that since the sample is a convenience

sample, the results have been interpreted carefully and should not be overgeneralized.

The two items analyzed were: (a) “I believe world peace can be achieved” and “The best way to achieve world peace is...” For the first item, respondents rated their agreement on a Likert scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree) and then explained the reasoning for their rating. For the second item, respondents completed the prompt with what they felt was the best way to achieve peace.

Using an international coding manual sample, we created an achieving peace coding manual utilizing deductive qualitative analysis and grounded theory methods. When using deductive qualitative analysis, researchers begin with a conceptual framework, which is then applied to the responses (Gilgun, 2004). In this way, responses are put into predetermined categories and the theory can be refined to improve its fit with the data. For the purpose of codifying the responses to the achieving peace items, we used Albert Bandura’s (1999) theory of moral disengagement. To analyze qualitative material that was not conducive to coding using the Bandura-based system, we applied grounded theory methods, by which researchers examine the data with an open mind, allowing themes to emerge from the responses, rather than being placed into predetermined categories (Corbin & Strauss, 1990).

T. Campbell (✉)
Psychology Department, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA
e-mail: ttcams@gmail.com

Moral Disengagement Theory as a Basis for Coding

Bandura's theory of moral disengagement (1999) helps to explain why otherwise moral individuals act in a manner contradictory to their moral standards. According to Bandura, moral standards, adopted in childhood, serve as self-regulatory guides for behavior. When individuals act in accordance with their moral standards, they experience feelings of self-worth; when they behave in ways contrary to moral standards, feelings of self-condemnation arise. Although they guide behavior, these standards must be reinforced to stay activated; otherwise, largely unconscious sociocognitive mechanisms allow selectively disengagement from them. These mechanisms allow individuals to feel justified in violating their moral codes and thus avoid self-censure.

Bandura (1999) postulated that there are four main ways in which individuals disengage from moral principles that they view themselves as endorsing. Cognitive reconstruction, the first major process of disengagement, occurs through the restructuring of harmful behavior into one that can be seen as serving socially or morally worthy purposes (Osofsky, Bandura, & Zimbardo, 2005). In this way, the behavior is no longer viewed as detrimental, but instead as a behavior that serves a higher purpose (Bandura, 2002). A person can also disengage by lessening personal agency for an action. In the process of removing/obscuring personal agency, one's sense of personal responsibility for an action is reduced, thereby making it easier to perpetrate atrocious acts. Misrepresenting, minimizing, or disregarding consequences is the third major moral disengagement process (Bandura, 1999). When using this process, a person mentally disconnects the consequences from the action; thus, the impact of the consequences is reduced, making the behavior appear more tolerable. Finally, a person can disengage through devaluing the victim (Bandura, 2002), thereby making the victim appear to be deserving of the inhumane behavior.

Bandura's counterpart to moral disengagement, moral engagement, has received much less development within his theory. Although he did not identify specific sociocognitive mechanisms for moral engagement, he did, however, link it to moral agency (Bandura, 1999). Thorkildsen (2007, p. 115) wrote,

“Moral engagement concerns questions of justice, ethical conduct, and reactions to interpersonal circumstances. [Moral engagement regulates] humane behavior and the inhibition of inhumane behavior because it represents a vision of how the world ought to function.”

Moral agency has two forms: inhibitive and proactive (Bandura, 2002). Inhibitive moral agency is expressed through a refusal to act in an immoral manner. The proactive form of moral agency is exhibited by behaving morally, even under pressure to act immorally. As mentioned earlier, one's sense of self is ingrained in one's moral guidelines and a “failure to do what is right would incur self-devaluation costs. [In proactive moral agency,] people do good things as well as refrain from doing bad things” (Bandura, 1999, p. 194). When manifesting proactive moral agency, people feel responsible for others and act accordingly.

The Achieving Peace Manual

The achieving peace manual incorporates two main coding systems, one for coding themes of disengagement and engagement and the other for coding themes regarding the achievability of world peace and the ways to achieve it. Due to the complex and overlapping nature of the responses to the two world peace items, both responses were coded for both coding systems, rather than one item being coded for only one system.

Coding System I: Bandura's Constructs of Agency and Sociocognitive Mechanisms

The first coding system in the achieving peace manual was based on Bandura's sociocognitive mechanisms of disengagement and his construct

Table 32.1 Coding system I: Bandura's constructs of agency and sociocognitive mechanisms

I. Coding system I, part I – agency
A. Presence of agency
B. Absence of agency
C. Not applicable – agency
II. Coding system I, part II Bandura's mechanisms
A. Disengagement
1. Rationalization
2. Displacement of responsibility
i. Military/force
3. Ignoring consequences of harmful actions
4. Destructive human nature
5. Attribution of blame
i. Government/political blame
B. Humanitarian engagement
1. Justification
i. Principles/beliefs
2. Assumption of responsibility
i. Practical strategies
ii. Governmental responsibility
iii. Ineffectiveness of negative relations
3. Humanization
i. Interpersonal values
ii. Social equity
4. Removal of blame
C. Not Applicable – Mechanisms

of agency; thus, all of the major categories in this coding system reflected these constructs. In addition, we built on his theory to provide a basis for coding sociocognitive themes of moral engagement. The subcategories were created from common themes identified in the responses and reflective of sociocognitive reasoning consistent with moral disengagement or engagement (Table 32.1).

It is important to note that (a) the survey was not designed specifically to assess moral disengagement and engagement, (b) the sample was not representative, and (c) we are not characterizing people or regions as being engaged or disengaged. In describing the themes identified in the qualitative responses, we deliberately use the terms “disengagement” and “humanitarian engagement,” instead of “moral disengagement” and “moral engagement.” Our coding categories are informed by Bandura's theory, and the responses in those categories fit well with his

theory, but we cannot assume that the responses are valid representations of the sociocognitive mechanisms he posits.

Coding for Agency

As agency is central to Bandura's theory, all responses were first coded for the presence or absence of agency. For the purposes of the manual, agency was conceptualized as any involvement or action taken or recommended to achieve peace, whether it was expressed explicitly or implicitly. The first agency coding category was *presence of agency*, which was used to categorize responses that recommended or described any form of action by individuals, communities, or institutions to achieve peace. The second category was *absence of agency*. Responses were coded into this category if they did not suggest any actions on behalf of peace or denied its achievability. If a response did not address the prompt, it was coded for *not applicable – agency*. For examples of responses coded into the agency categories, refer to Table 32.2 below.

Because respondents often address the first prompt when answering the second and vice versa, responses to both achieve peace items were considered as a single codable unit and coded for either *presence of agency*, *absence of agency*, or *not applicable – agency*. (A codable unit is the representation of an idea, whether through a single word, phrase, sentence, or an entire response, which coders were trained to recognize.) If action was identified at any point in the response, it was coded for *presence of agency*, even if other parts of the response were not agentic or did not indicate a belief that world peace could be achieved. For example, if the responses to the two items were “Peace is never going to be achieved in this lifetime” and “(Peace can be achieved) through compassion and love,” the responses were coded for *presence of agency*. Furthermore, if a response demonstrated agency more than once or if it lacked agency in several places, it still received only one of the applicable codes. For instance, if the two responses were “impossible” and “there is no way to achieve peace,” the responses were coded only once for *absence of agency*.

Table 32.2 Categories and examples for agency responses

Major category
<i>Presence of agency</i>
Examples
“Love one another, fight injustice where ever it appears. Listen to other opinions and open our hearts and minds. Share our wealth so all can live a full life. Support institutions such as the United Nations and the international courts”
“There must be absolute recognition of every class society and further unification of their views into one common body which will then overrule the defects of the member societies or bodies”
<i>Absence of agency</i>
Examples
“Time”
“It won’t be achieved”
<i>Not applicable – agency</i>
Examples
“I like birds”
“I wouldn’t be taking this survey if I could achieve peace”

Coding for Disengagement and Humanitarian Engagement

The coding manual also provided guidelines for categorizing themes representing disengagement and humanitarian engagement in ways that were consistent with Bandura’s sociocognitive theory. In general, responses coded into the disengagement categories provided arguments denying the achievability of peace or recommending ways to achieve it that could have harmful effects on society. The first disengagement category was *rationalization*. Responses coded for *rationalization* stated that the world does not need peace. The second category, *displacement of responsibility*, was used to code responses that shifted responsibility for achieving peace onto another entity. *Military/force*, the subcategory of *displacement of responsibility*, was used to categorize responses that specifically mentioned using the military or forceful tactics to obtain world peace. *Ignoring consequences of harmful actions* was the next major disengagement category and was used to code responses failing to take into account consequences that could arise from the suggestions made to achieve peace. The fourth major category, *destructive human nature*, applied to responses devaluing people or mentioning unfavorable human characteristics, such as greed, which are seen as potential barriers in achieving peace. Finally, *attribution of blame*, the fifth major disengagement category applied to responses blam-

ing external events, ideological differences, or interpersonal difficulties as the barriers to achieving peace. *Government/political blame*, a subcategory of *attribution of blame*, applied to responses that specifically blamed the actions or attitudes of governments, politicians, etc., for making peace unachievable.

Four major humanitarian engagement categories were created as counterparts to the disengagement categories. Responses coded into these categories displayed agency on behalf of the achievement of world peace. The first major humanitarian engagement category was *justification*, the parallel to *rationalization*. Responses coded for *justification* offered general explanations why peace is achievable and how to achieve it. Its subcategory, *principles/beliefs*, applied to responses referencing moral philosophies or religion as pathways to peace. *Assumption of responsibility*, another humanitarian engagement category, was used to code responses portraying the pursuit of peace as a duty of the general population; the reasoning in these responses is the opposite of what is seen in responses coded for *diffusion of responsibility*. *Assumption of responsibility* has three subcategories: (a) *practical strategies*, for responses listing pragmatic ways to achieve peace; (b) *governmental responsibility*, for responses referring to governmental actions that could facilitate the achievement of peace, such as a

conscious laissez-faire approach or diplomacy; and (c) *ineffectiveness of negative relations*, for responses warning that negative interactions or emotions, such as violence and hatred, are counterproductive ways of treating others and/or resolving disagreements and thereby hinder peace efforts. The third category, *humanization*, the counterpart to *destructive human nature*, was used to categorize responses highlighting general positive human characteristics and similarities. Its first subcategory, *interpersonal concepts/values*, captured responses referencing principles such as love or understanding that would help achieve peace. Responses coded into the second subcategory, *social equity*, included ideas involving social and/or economic equality, human rights, or the resolution of social injustice on an individual or global level. The final humanitarian engagement major category was *removal of blame*, which acted as the mirror to *attribution of blame*. Responses recommending forgiveness or reconciliation between individuals or nations were coded into this category.

Finally, if responses did not address the prompt or failed to elaborate beyond a simple agreement, disagreement, or hope for achieving peace, they were coded *not applicable*. For examples of the disengagement and humanitarian engagement coding categories, see Table 32.3.

The coding criteria for disengagement and humanitarian engagement applied to both responses. Unlike the presence/absence coding for agency, however, the responses to the two items were broken down into more specific codable units, each of which stated a new idea, elaborated on one already been expressed or reiterated a previously stated theme; a comment that merely clarified a previous codable unit was not categorized separately. Responses could have distinct codable units that fell into the same coding category. For example, the response “Aid, education, promotion of skills in nonviolent action and compassion for others” was coded for *practical strategies* three times (aid, education, and promotion of skills in nonviolent action) and *interpersonal concepts/values* once (compassion).

Coding System II: Focus on Achievability and Prerequisites for Peace

The second coding system provided guidelines for coding responses characterized by a focus on achievability or statements regarding prerequisites for peace. Although Bandura’s theory proved useful in identifying themes of agency, disengagement, and engagement, we observed that many themes were not captured well by that set of coding guidelines. In response, we used grounded theory methods to identify themes that focused on general views on the achievability of peace and on specific prerequisites for peace identified in the responses.

Table 32.4 outlines the coding categories in this system, which are discussed below.

Coding for Focus on Achievability

Responses coded into these categories focused on issues concerning the achievability of world peace. There were four major achievability categories: (a) *indeterminate achievability*, (b) *explicitly achievable*, (c) *ideal*, and (d) *unachievable*. Responses coded for *indeterminate achievability* simply referred to the past or questioned the achievability of peace. The *explicitly achievable* category was for responses that simply agreed that world peace is achievable. Its subcategory, *work in progress*, captured responses that stated achieving peace is an ongoing process that will take time. The subcategory of *work in progress, difficult*, was used to code responses that said while peace is achievable, it is hard to achieve.

Responses coded for peace as *ideal* mentioned that peace is the optimal state for the world. If a response did not agree that world peace is achievable, it was coded for *unachievable*. *Identifying reasons*, the subcategory of *unachievable*, was used to code responses that gave reasons for why peace is unachievable. Finally, responses could be coded for *not applicable – achievability and prerequisites* if the response did not address the prompts. Refer to Table 32.5 for examples of

Table 32.3 Categories and examples for disengagement and humanitarian engagement categories

Major category	Subcategory
<i>Rationalization</i> Examples “Peace might not be the best situation for the world” “At this time, the world does not need peace”	None
<i>Displacement of responsibility</i> Examples “Perhaps alien from other worlds will seek to invade and achieve peace” “It depends, not from mere citizens”	<i>Military/force</i> Examples “We need a more powerful military to achieve peace” “Probably, because we have a <i>strong army</i> ”
<i>Ignoring consequences of harmful actions</i> Examples “Put all the men into a spaceship and send them on their merry way (and Condi)” “Stop the existence of people”	None
<i>Destructive human nature</i> Examples “Greed for power and property is always there” “Basic human nature will never bring an end to groups attempting to use violence to impose their own order on the world”	None
<i>Attribution of blame</i> Examples “People have too much trouble accepting and trying to understand the unfamiliar” “(1) Conflicts are bound to come every day, it can never stop. (2) Misunderstanding can never be eradicated”	<i>Government/political blame</i> Examples “I don’t think that world peace cannot be achieved because of the assumed leadership of a powerful country” “Governments will always maintain a level of corruption”
<i>Justification</i> Examples “Through achievements transferred to the next generations” “Sooner or later it will become clear to all that either we all live together in peace or perish together”	<i>Principles/beliefs</i> Examples “It can be achieved if people will follow the teachings and principles of religion” “It is only possible through the cross that is the symbol of forgiveness”
<i>Assumption of responsibility</i> Examples “With effort and dedication, but it depends on all human beings” “We must all do our part to help”	<i>Practical strategies</i> Examples “Aid” “Bring education to those who don’t have it” <i>Governmental responsibility</i> Examples “By strengthening the UN and the courts of international law” “Can only be possible if almost all countries cooperate and lay down their selfish intentions” <i>Ineffectiveness of negative relations</i> Examples “People need to realize the futility of violence against other people” “Hatred only brings more hatred”
<i>Humanization</i> Examples “We all share the same lineage” “If all individuals regarded one another as brothers and sisters”	<i>Interpersonal concepts/values</i> Examples “It can be achieved through by understanding one another” “Through respect” <i>Social Equity</i> Examples “No status discrimination” “If we are to treat each other equally just as human beings”

(continued)

Table 32.3 (continued)

Major category	Subcategory
<i>Removal of blame</i>	
Examples “Through reconciliation” “We Must forgive each other”	None
<i>Not applicable – mechanisms</i> “Let history be our guide here” “One would hope”	

Responses have been edited to show only the codable unit coded for the coding category

Table 32.4 Coding system II: a focus on achievability and prerequisites for peace categories

I. Coding system II, part I – focus on achievability
A. Indeterminate achievability
B. Explicitly achievable
1. Work in progress
i. Difficult
C. Ideal
D. Unachievable
1. Identifying reasons
E. Not applicable – achievability and prerequisites
II. Coding system II, part II – prerequisites for peace
A. General prerequisites for peace
B. Philosophical principles
1. Positive interpersonal values
i. Understanding/acceptance
2. Inner peace
3. Religion/spirituality
4. Equality
C. Prosocial actions
1. Pragmatic solutions
i. Elimination of global obstacles
2. Interaction
i. Elimination of negative interactions
3. Unification
4. Social justice
i. Human rights
ii. Economic fairness
iii. Elimination of social injustice
D. Constructive government/political action
1. Diplomacy
2. Global/political change
i. Equality among nations
3. Elimination of negative motivations
E. Antisocial action
1. Force/control
2. Population adjustments
i. Violent elimination
F. Recognition of multiple possibilities
G. Uncertain of ways
H. Not applicable – achievability and prerequisites

responses coded for the aforementioned focus on achievability categories.

Coding for Prerequisites for Peace

Many responses went beyond simple agreement or disagreement with the achievability of world peace and mentioned specific ways to accomplish that goal. We identified several categories for these responses: (a) *general prerequisites for peace* (responses that mentioned steps to achieving peace that could not be coded into one of the preceding categories), (b) *philosophical principles*, (c) *prosocial actions*, (d) *constructive government/political action*, and (e) *antisocial agency* themes. Responses that did not specify prerequisites for peace could be coded for *recognition of multiple possibilities* (responses that said there are many ways to achieve peace) and *uncertain of ways* (responses that were not sure how to achieve peace).

Philosophical principles were designed to capture responses that referred to moral or ethical principles as the best way to achieve world peace. This category had several subcategories: (a) *positive interpersonal values*, (b) *inner peace*, (c) *religion/spirituality*, and (d) *equality* or its sub-subcategory, *understanding/acceptance*. *Positive interpersonal values* was used to code responses recommending principles such as compassion and trust. Its subcategory, *understanding/acceptance*, captured responses saying that recognition and tolerance of others, as well as their differences, was the best way to achieve peace. Responses coded for *inner peace* said that before world peace can be achieved, individuals must achieve inner peace. *Religion/spirituality* was used to code responses saying that

Table 32.5 Categories and examples for focus on achievability categories

Major category	Subcategory	Sub-subcategory
<i>Indeterminate achievability</i>		
Examples		
“Peace might not be the best situation for the world”	None	None
“At this time, the world does not need peace”		
<i>Explicitly achievable</i>		
Examples		
“I do believe it is possible”	<i>Work in progress</i>	<i>Difficult</i>
“That is possible”	Examples	Examples
	“We will always be trying to maintain peace”	“It is very hard”
	“This is an ongoing process that takes time”	“Very difficult to achieve”
<i>Ideal</i>		
Examples		
“One has to hope”	None	None
“I wish”		
<i>Unachievable</i>		
Examples		
“No”	<i>Identifying reasons</i>	
“It won’t be achieved”	Examples	None
	“As long as there are financial interests”	
	“Not as long as there is poverty”	
<i>Not applicable – achievability and prerequisites</i>		
Examples		
“The contract conclusion”		
“Treats”		

Responses have been edited to show only the codable unit coded for the coding category

specific world religions or teachings/spirituality would help the world achieve peace. Finally, *equality* was used to categorize responses that referred to equality among individuals.

The *prosocial actions* category applied to responses saying that general positive actions should be undertaken to achieve peace. Its first subcategory, *pragmatic solutions*, captured responses referencing practical solutions that should be adopted. *Elimination of global obstacles*, the subcategory of *pragmatic solutions*, was used to code responses promoting the ending of global hardships. The second subcategory of *prosocial actions* was *interaction*. This subcategory was used to code responses stating that through cooperation, working together, and other interaction, world peace could be achieved. *Elimination of negative interactions*, its subcategory, was designed to capture responses stating that peace cannot be achieved while there are wars, violence, hatred, etc., and that these must

be ended and people should forgive each other. *Unification*, another subcategory of *prosocial actions*, was for responses recommending bringing people together or creating a community.

Responses coded for *social justice*, another subcategory, emphasized such themes as fairness, solidarity, etc. *Social justice* had several subcategories: (a) *human rights*, used to code responses that mentioned respecting peoples’ inherent rights as humans; (b) *economic fairness*, for responses saying economic equality or redistributing wealth would help to bring about world peace; and (c) *elimination of social injustice*, for responses that stated ending social injustices, greed, or corruption could lead to world peace.

Constructive government/political action captured responses that referred to utilizing government or governmental agencies as the best way to obtain peace. The first subcategory, *diplomacy*, applied to responses that mentioned diplomatic solutions

among countries or nations. Responses coded into *global/political change* stated that through beneficial global or governmental actions, world peace could be achieved. Its subcategory, *equality among nations*, was used to code responses saying that economic, social, or cultural fairness on a national or global level was the key to achieving peace. Finally, *elimination of negative political motivations* was used to code responses recommending an end to governments', countries', or leaders' greed, corruption, and hunger for power.

Antisocial action, the last major prerequisites for peace category, was used to code responses emphasizing harmful methods of achieving peace. The first subcategory, *force/control*, captured responses that described peace being achieved through the use of power, strength, negative governmental actions or armed military strategies. The next subcategory, *population adjustments*, stressed the need for either subsets of a population or all of humankind to change or be removed. Its subcategory was *forceful elimination*. Responses coded for *violent elimination* referred to ending the human race or specific populations in an aggressive manner.

Many of the responses were coded for both the focus on achievability categories as well as the prerequisites for peace categories, for example, the response "I do hope that peace can be achieved. Before that day comes, though, we must first end all wars and respect human rights." This response was coded for *ideal* ("I do hope that peace can be achieved"), *elimination of negative interactions* ("end all wars"), and *human rights* ("respect human rights"). Responses could also be coded for *not applicable – achievability and prerequisites* if the response did not address the prompts. Refer to Table 32.6 for examples of responses coded for the prerequisites for peace categories.

Analytic Procedures

Once the coding for each region was completed, analysis of the responses began. Using Excel, frequencies and percentages were calculated for each coding category and subcategory. In the first portion of the results section for each chapter, we

describe the percentages of responses coded into each of those major categories and subcategories.

On an exploratory basis, Statistical Package for the Social Science (SPSS) analyses were run to examine the possibility that demographic groups differed in their likelihood of providing responses in the different coding categories for agency, disengagement, humanitarian engagement, focus on achievability, and prerequisites for peace. The demographic variables that were studied were (a) gender, (b) military service, (c) relative's military service, and (d) participation in a peace protest.

We created presence/absence scores for every coding category and subcategory so that every codable unit could receive a score for every coding category indicating whether or not the unit (*response*) fell into that category; for example, if a participant's response was coded as *assumption of responsibility*, that response received a 1 (*present*) for assumption of responsibility. If a participant's response was not coded for *assumption of responsibility*, the response received a 0 (*absent*) for assumption of responsibility. The presence/absence scores allowed us to compute chi-square tests to determine whether, for example, proportionately more women than men provided particular themes in their responses to achieving peace. Additionally, scores for the subcategories of the major categories, along with the general scores for the major categories, were added together to create superordinate categories (referred to as presence categories) that were also scored for presence or absence. For example, *identifying reasons, unachievable, ideal, work in progress, difficult, explicitly achievable*, and *indeterminate achievability* were added together to create the superordinate *focus on achievability presence* category. If a response was coded into at least one of those seven coding categories, the *focus on achievability presence* category received a 1. After these scores had been computed, we were able to run Pearson's chi-squares to test for demographic group differences in responses. The presence categories allowed us to test for demographic differences on the use of one or more of the categories in a set of categories. Significant chi-square results discussed in chapters had a p-value of less than or equal to 0.05 and marginally significant chi-square results had a p-value of between or equal to 0.051 and 0.1.

Table 32.6 Categories and examples for prerequisites for peace categories

Major category	Subcategory	Sub-subcategory
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i> Examples “I believe we just have to give it a chance” “If we stay at home”	None	None
	<i>Positive interpersonal values</i> Examples “To treat everyone with due respect” “At an individual level, for each of us to take action each day to love and respect one another” <i>Inner peace</i> Examples “We have to be engaged in peace creating activity and practices such as mindful meditation, yoga, etc.” “It always starts with individuals” <i>Religion/spirituality</i> Examples “Becoming a Christian” “To follow the golden rule” <i>Equality</i> Examples “To see the human being” “More equality”	<i>Understanding/acceptance</i> Examples “Open our ears and hearts” “To understand one another”
<i>Prosocial actions</i> Examples “No harm trying” “What we can do is step up our responsibilities to humanity”	<i>Pragmatic solutions</i> Examples “Teach people” “Health care” <i>Interaction</i> Examples “Communication and common experiences” “Cooperation and interaction” <i>nification</i> Examples “Become unified politically, economically, socially, and religiously” “Unification of views”	<i>Elimination of global obstacles</i> Examples “To prevent hunger!!!” “Bring an end to poverty” <i>Elimination of negative interactions</i> Examples “The global absence of major acts of war” “Stop hating others, stop having enemies”

Social justice

Examples
 “To look beyond socially constructed -isms and categories (such as gender and religion) and to see how similar we really are”
 “Many forms of social justice need to be in place”

Human rights

Examples
 “The realization of independence, freedom, and justice inherent to each human being”
 “Respect human rights”
Economic fairness
 Examples
 “Economic equality”
 “Share our wealth so all can live a full life”
Elimination of social injustice
 Examples
 “Fight injustice where ever it appears”
 “Decrease corruption”

Constructive government/political action

Examples
 “United Nations and the international courts”
 “With the assistance of the international organizations for the defense of peace”

Diplomacy

Examples
 “Dialogue among countries”
 “Diplomacy”
Global/political change
 Examples
 “Exhaust options states have ignored in the past”
 “It will come with a lot of compromise from countries”
Elimination of negative motivations
 Examples
 “If a dominant country’s greed will reduce...”
 “It’s all up to other countries to stop being greedy for power”

Antisocial action

Examples
 “If there will be no murders, there will be an Earth overpopulation. And everyone will die”
 “To degrade people”

Force/control

Examples
 “The government must become very powerful and control the people”
 “War”

Violent elimination

Examples
 “Kill everyone”
 “If kill about 60 % of people”

Population adjustments

Examples
 “We will need a new human species”
 “Human extinction”

(continued)

Table 32.6 (continued)

Major category	Subcategory	Sub-subcategory
<i>Recognition of multiple possibilities</i>		
Examples		
“There are many good ways to achieve peace”		
“There is no one best way to achieve peace”		
<i>Uncertain of ways</i>		
Examples		
“I am not sure”		
“Do not know”		
<i>Not applicable – achievability and prerequisites</i>		
Examples		
“The contract conclusion”		
“Treats”		

Responses have been edited to show only the codable unit coded for the coding category

Chapter Structure

As mentioned previously, each of the following eight chapters focuses on a region from around the world. Each chapter starts with an introduction to the region, which provides a brief history of that region and the individual countries within the region. The history can include peace efforts the country has made, international or national agreements regarding peace, wars the country has been involved in, other hindrances to peace in the country's past, and/or something similar.

Following a brief recap of Bandura's theory, the coding categories, and a discussion of the sample from that region, the chapter focuses on the findings from the analyses of responses to the two achieving peace items in that region.

The chapters end with a discussion of the results. Authors highlighted any interesting or provocative findings. They then carefully interpreted the results and tried to connect the results with literature on the region, if possible.

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Eric Fischer, Julia König, Ariel Stone, Gina Major,
Mathilde Salmberg, Carla Machado[†],
Silja Bara Omarsdottir, Michael Corgan,
Mariana Barbosa, Elizabeth Leembruggen-Kallberg,
and Christine Roland-Levy

In this chapter, the Western European history of peace and reconciliation will be discussed, utilizing both historical and philosophical perspectives. Although there were phases of armed conflict and periods of peaceful understanding before the seventeenth century, the period following the 30 Years' War provides a good starting point for our considerations, as this period marked the beginning of the formation of nation-states in Europe. Therefore, the states and their rulers will be considered the key players in terms of war and peace. The actions of other groups and movements, which may be understood as “political” in

a broader sense – including efforts to promote peace beyond or contrary to state action – are addressed in a separate chapter (see Chap. 13 on protests in Western Europe).

Definitions

Peace is often simply referred to as the opposite of war. In this sense, peace exists where no war can be found. The Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP) uses a broader perspective

E. Fischer (✉)
Department of Sociology, Universität Bielefeld,
Bielefeld, Germany
e-mail: eric.fischer@gmx.de

J. König
Lehrstuhl für Klinische Psychologie und Psychotherapie,
München, Germany
e-mail: koenig.julia@gmx.net; julia.koenig@psy.lmu.de

A. Stone
Department of Psychology, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA

G. Major
Department of Psychology, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA

M. Salmberg
Clinical Psychologist, Washington, DC, USA
e-mail: msalmberg@mail.com

C. Machado
Department of Psychology, Minho University, Braga,
Portugal (Deceased)

S.B. Omarsdottir
Institute of International Affairs and Center for Small
State Studies, University of Iceland, Vesturbær, Reykjavik,
Iceland
e-mail: sbo@hi.is

M. Corgan
Department of International Relations,
Boston University, Boston, MA, USA
e-mail: mcorgan@bu.edu

M. Barbosa
Universidade Catolica Portuguesa, Portugal
e-mail: mbarbosa@porto.ucp.pt

E. Leembruggen-Kallberg
Webster University, Leiden, Netherlands
e-mail: dr.elisabeth.leembruggen@gmail.com

C. Roland-Levy
Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne, Paris, France
e-mail: Christine.Roland-Levy@univ-reims.fr

which emphasizes the distinction between a negative and a positive definition of peace (see Galtung, introductory chapter to this section).

Peace is not only a time or place in which there is no war or armed conflict. Peace can also be seen as a process, an orientation, or a goal of governments and people, which emphasizes nonviolent mechanisms of conflict resolution. It is in this sense an end of social action, a policy that – modifying Clausewitz’s phrase – is anxious not to be dependent on the continuation of politics by war:

Peace does not mean the absence of conflict... Conflict is intrinsic in human relationships, although it does not have to be and usually is not violent. The challenge for peace practitioners is to find ways in which communities can resolve differences without physical violence. In this context peace is understood as a dynamic process not an absolute end point. The goal of peacemakers is to develop more effective ways of resolving disputes without violent conflict, to identify and transform the conditions that cause war. (Cortright, 2008, pp. 7–8)

In the following section, the most important developments of peace and reconciliation in Europe will be traced.

Historical Perspectives

1618–1789: The Peace of Westphalia, Absolutism and the Enlightenment

The 30 Years’ War (1618–1648) was the first war that involved the whole of Europe. It was fought primarily for religious reasons between Protestants and Catholics, but struggles for state power, state formation, and political dominance also played a major role (Emer, 1999). Spain, France, the Holy Roman Empire, Switzerland, Sweden, Portugal, the Danish provinces, and the German principalities participated in the peace negotiations in the cities of Münster and Osnabrück, which came to be known as the Peace of Westphalia (Adolf, 2009). The religious freedom that had already been codified in the 1555 Peace of Augsburg was confirmed and barriers to trade were relaxed. The political results can be characterized by the implementation of the prin-

ciple of state sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs of other states, and self-determination of states (Adolf, 2009):

Thomas Hobbes’ *Leviathan* was written during this time period and is still utilized to justify state power (and state violence) as a precondition for peace (Adolf, 2009). According to Hobbes:

During the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man [...] the nature of war consists not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace. (Hobbes, 1886, p. 64, cited in Adolf, 2009, p. 121)

According to Hobbes, people are dependent on the “artificial man,” the “*Leviathan*,” to whom they grant absolute power. Since everyone is in fear of that “*Leviathan*,” he guarantees social order and inhibits the “war of all against all;” through his strength, he is presumed to ensure man’s natural right to peace.

In response to Hobbes, Montesquieu (1689–1755) authored “*The Spirit of the Law*,” also stressing that peace was the first natural right of man. In contrast to Hobbes’ conception of the natural state of “war of all against all” though, he emphasizes the weakness of each individual alone. He concludes that state authority secures peace and prosperity only if the power of the state is not given to a single authority but divided to ensure a balance of power. Executive, legislative, and judicial branches should not merge but should control one another, enabling the law to reflect the will of the people. This work had great influence on the Constitution of the United States, although it had a rather cool reception in then absolutist France (Adolf, 2009), where Louis XVI, the French “*Sun King*,” famously used the phrase “*I am the state*.”

According to Adolf (2009), people today are more attuned to the dangers of an absolute monarch (or dictator) than in the days of Louis XVI, but the identity of nation-states and their capacity to act are founded on the principles of centralization of authority and state monopoly of force. For democratic states, the legitimacy of power is not provided by God or by military strength, but through democratic elections. Although power is

centralized, it is limited by the plurality of political actors and the rule of law.

The Peace of Westphalia also established the idea of the equality of states. Individual states were to be treated as equals in legal and diplomatic matters, regardless of differences in military resources, economic status, or geopolitical importance (cf. Adolf, 2009, p. 121). This principle can still be observed today, e.g., in the General Assembly of the United Nations, in which each country has one vote.

John Locke (1632–1704), another prominent Enlightenment thinker, highlights the possibility of peace through reason and experience. He contradicts Hobbes' view that state power must originate in violence, instead emphasizing the possibility that it can begin peacefully through consensus among the people. He states that people have an indefeasible, natural right to freedom and the right to free themselves from illegitimate powers with force:

Any government which takes or keeps power by conquest, usurpation or tyranny is a priori illegitimate and can be legitimately overthrown, preferably non-violent but with violence if necessary to preserve civil society's state of peace. (Locke, quotes in Adolf, 2009, p. 124)

Therewith, Locke provided the intellectual superstructure and justification for the French, American, and communist revolutions.

1789–1918: The French Revolution, the Geneva Conventions, Peace Conferences in the Hague, European Alliances

Following John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) had a great influence on the French Revolution. Like Locke, he contradicts Hobbes' views in his "Social Contract" (1762):

Men, from the mere fact that, while they are living in their primitive independence, they have no mutual relations stable enough to constitute either the state of peace or the state of war, cannot be naturally enemies. (Rousseau, 1950: p. 9, quoted in Adolf, 2009, p. 124)

Social contracts aim to promote peace by barring oppression of the people. Rousseau's work was

implemented through the French Revolution (1789–1799), as France moved from an absolutist monarchy into a republic. The identity of the state was no longer the emperor but the people. The motto was no longer "long live the king" but "freedom, equality, fraternity." However, this was achieved with considerable violence. Thousands of "enemies" of the revolution were executed; even the revolutionary leader Maximilien Robespierre became a victim of his own struggle, when moderate Republican forces beheaded him (cf. Adolf, 2009).

Soon thereafter, more radical forces took control. In 1802, Napoleon Bonaparte was elected "first consul for life" by plebiscite (cf. Böhning, 1999). Under the pretext of replacing tyranny with liberty, oppression with equality, and fragmentation with unity, he gained dictatorial control over almost the entire European continent (cf. Adolf, 2009). After Napoleon had been overthrown, the Congress of Vienna (1814/1815) restored the old balance as the major European powers of Britain, Russia, France, Austria, and Prussia regained control.

Building on the Geneva Convention, where minimum standards for the humane handling of prisoners of war, civilians, and aid workers in battle situations had been established, the 1899 and 1907 Peace Conferences at The Hague developed the first framework of international law, focusing on codification of accepted standards relating to martial law and war crimes. Attendees agreed upon rules concerning the treatment of "neutral states" during conflict and the prohibition of certain weapons and pursued some degree of disarmament (International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], n.d. a, b). Some states, such as Russia and the United States, advocated the establishment of an international tribunal with binding decision, which would have created a functional alternative to war. Due to the veto of Germany, among others, though, the tribunal was not endowed with binding decision-making authority.

At the turn of the century, the European political map was characterized by various alliances with mutual obligations to support one another in case of conflict. While initially these alliances were able to ensure stability and peace, their function was eventually perverted to a degree that some historians (Berghahn, 2009) trace the outbreak of

World War I to the mechanisms of the alliance obligations. It took only a small trigger – the 1914 assassination of the Austrian Crown Prince in Sarajevo – to bring the whole of Europe into war.

1918–1939: Between World Wars, Treaty of Versailles, League of Nations, Kellogg-Briand Pact, and Appeasement Policy

During World War I (1914–1918), 17 million people lost their lives. Belgium and Northern France were almost completely destroyed. The Armistice of Compiègne finally ended the hostilities on 11 November 1918, and on 18 January 1919, the Paris Peace Conference began. The German Empire signed the Versailles Treaty on 28 June under pressure from the Allies. This meant a cession of territory, partial demilitarization, high reparations, and the recognition of sole war guilt. Many Germany citizens referred to this treaty as a “dictated peace,” and it later became a central aspect of Nazi propaganda.

Preventing further wars was the central post-war European concern. Even France and Germany were able to move closer together. Tensions were raised due to lagging German reparation payments and the subsequent occupation of the Ruhr by Belgium and France, but German foreign minister Stresemann and French Prime Minister Briand managed to rely on negotiation. Their efforts culminated in the 1925 Locarno agreements guaranteeing, among other things, the eastern borders of France (Sheehan, 2008).

The Kellogg-Briand Pact, outlawing war, was signed in Paris in 1928. Sixty-two countries joined the treaty, essentially rejecting war as a legitimate instrument of politics. Particularly interesting here is the reversal of the Clausewitz’s famous formula, describing war as the continuation of politics by other means (see Sheehan, 2008). Additionally, aggressions and repressions that did not reach the threshold defining a war were not delegitimized until decades later by a general prohibition of violence in the Charter of the United Nations. The prosecution at the post-World War II Nuremberg Trials was based partly on the Kellogg-Briand Pact (Sheehan, 2008).

Until the collapse of the world economy in 1929, moderate political forces maintained power in Germany. However, the new political system of the Weimar Republic was never broadly accepted. German citizens resented the perceived unfairness of the postwar burdens, especially the enforced acceptance of sole war guilt and the immense reparations payments. The democratic governance was also regarded with suspicion. Many had thought that Germany had been close to victory and hence suspected that leaders had deliberately surrendered for selfish reasons. The so-called stab-in-the-back legend had seared into collective memory. According to this view, the self-proclaimed democratic leadership of Germany stabbed the successful army “from behind” through the armistice and peace treaty (Pfändtner & Schell, 1986).

The 1930s were marked by increased violence in all of Europe: Germany suffered the violent enforcement of the Nazis, the persecution of political and religious dissenters, and increasingly extreme violence against Jews (Pfändtner & Schell, 1986). Additionally, there were riots in France, a short civil war in Austria, a brutal conflict in Spain (which led to half a million deaths), and a war between Italy and Ethiopia (see Sheehan, 2008).

The period before the Second World War was characterized primarily by noninterference into the internal affairs of other European countries, even when minority groups were persecuted. No country wanted to run the risk of a civil war expanding into an interstate conflict, even as the post-World War I peace treaties were eroded. When Hitler moved troops into the demilitarized Rhineland in March 1936, Britain and France protested but were not willing to enforce the provisions of the Versailles Treaty with military action. In March 1938, Hitler marched into Austria and realized the “Anschluss,” a procedure which again violated the Versailles Treaty and again was tolerated by the other European powers (Pfändtner & Schell, 1986).

At the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, the French marshal Ferdinand Foch stated: “This is not a peace. It is an armistice for 20 years.” (Henig, 1995, p. 52) He was proved prescient on 1 September 1939, with Germany’s invasion of Poland and the beginning of the Second World War.

1945–1989: Consequences of War, Cold War, Division of Europe, European Integration

The Second World War ended in Europe on 8 May 1945 with the surrender of the German Wehrmacht. Through the war, about 55 million people had lost their lives, more than 20 million of whom were civilians. Over five million Jews had been killed in the German concentration camps. Through the intense ground and air war, numerous residential areas, roads, and production facilities had been destroyed (cf. Böhning, 1999).

After Eastern and Southern Europe had been freed (and conquered) by the Soviet Union, communist governments were established in almost all of these countries, and Europe lost its prominent role in world politics. At the 1945 Allied conference in Potsdam, Germany was divided into four occupation zones (France, UK, USA, and USSR). The German eastern territories Pomerania, Silesia, and East Prussia were subordinated to the administration of Poland and the USSR.

Even during the war, there had been indications of bloc formation between the Western Allies and the Soviet Republic. Churchill, in 1946, was the first to publicly apply the term “iron curtain” to the division of Europe and of Germany into the communist East and capitalist West (Churchill & James, 1974). Germany’s former capital Berlin was a focal point. It was itself divided into four occupation zones, but as an enclave was completely surrounded by Soviet-occupied territory. When the Western Allies introduced a currency reform in their zones in June 1948, the USSR responded by blocking all supply routes to the Western sectors of Berlin. The West did not abandon the freezing and starving citizens of West Berlin. They supplied them with necessities through an airlift until May 1949, significantly altering West Germans’ perception of their occupying powers. Reconciliation was facilitated through the Marshall Plan’s massive financial help to the whole of Western Europe, as well as by common fear of a new enemy, the Soviets (Hogan, 1987).

The East–west conflict in Europe was in many ways centered in the creation of two German states in 1949. These states had different economic systems and were affiliated with the respective military alliances (NATO in the West and the Warsaw Pact in the East). This initially led to a strong solidarity with the respective “protecting power” in both West and East Germany, but as differing standards of living became apparent, more and more people flowed into the prosperous West Germany across the open borders in Berlin. East Germany responded to this population exodus by building the Berlin Wall in 1961, thereby cementing the division of Germany (Haydock, 1999).

The first decades of West Germany were characterized by Chancellor Adenauer’s Western integration. With the election of Chancellor Willy Brandt in 1969, efforts to improve relations between the two German states intensified. The Eastern Treaties of 1970 resulted in acceptance of the postwar borders of Germany, and the “Basic Treaty” of 1972 between East and West Germany, led to both countries’ UN membership. The still simmering conflict between the East and the West, along with the constant threat of nuclear war in the middle of Europe, climaxed by the end of the 1970s, resulting in the emergence of numerous protests and peace movements. Much of the European population was tired of living in constant fear due to mutual nuclear deterrence. For details, see the chapter on protest in Western Europe in this book (Chap. 13).

Since the war, the relations between the Western European states had been characterized by an increasing convergence, born mainly of necessity. Already in 1947, the Marshall Plan had led to cooperation between the Western and Southern states to rebuild Europe. France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries strengthened their cooperation in the economic arena and founded the European Community (EC) between 1955 and 1957. Great Britain, the Republic of Ireland, and Denmark joined in 1973, followed by Greece, Spain, and Portugal in 1981 and 1986. Political and military integration remained difficult, but the first direct elections to the European Parliament were held in 1979, the

European Union was founded in 1991, and a European internal market was realized in 1993 (see Jung-Paarmann, 1999).

Efforts for reconciliation not only took place on the state-level, between statesmen, or within the economic sphere. Community-level cultural diplomacy was amplified through twinning towns and cities in different countries. School-based student exchange programs brought thousands of young people together, providing the opportunity to experience one another firsthand, reducing stereotypes and prejudice.

Since 1989: Reunification, the End of the East–west conflict, Yugoslavia War, War on Terror

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the fall of the Soviet Union and German reunification in 1990, a new European era began. The Two Plus Four Agreement finally ended the postwar status of Germany, with the Allies giving up all responsibility for Berlin and Germany as a whole. German unification was enabled and final agreements on the borders, alliance membership, and armament were negotiated between the two German states and the “four powers” of France, Great Britain, USSR, and USA. The Two Plus Four Agreement was the *de jure* peace settlement following World War II. As the war had ended over 50 years before the contract was signed, the phrase “peace treaty” is avoided. However, it is still indicated in the title of “Final Settlement” and the phrase “instead of a peace treaty” is frequently mentioned. Peace treaties are important but, as shown by the failure of the Versailles treaty, are not sufficient to ensure peaceful coexistence.

Democratic changes in Eastern Europe contributed to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1990. This ended the East–West conflict and led to an attenuation of nuclear armament. Europe was no longer the front it had been in previous decades, when the “Cold War” constantly threatened to heat up (see Weismantel 1999b, p. 211). Hopes were high that the collapse of the Soviet Union would reduce the danger of war in Europe and that future crises could be solved peacefully.

Many former Eastern bloc countries joined the European Union, and in 2001, a common currency was introduced.

On the other hand, the dissolution of the Soviet bloc led to an escalation of ethnic and religious conflicts in the former Yugoslavia that had been suppressed under Soviet influence (see also Chap. 35 on achieving peace in the Russian and Balkan Peninsula). The European Union had a civil war directly on its border. May 1999 featured more than 10,000 peace activists assembled in The Hague, as well as NATO’s bomb attacks against Serbia. NATO resorted to this strategy in order to prevent both the invasion of the Kosovo and the increasingly violent ethnic cleansing perpetrated by Yugoslavian police and military forces against the Albanian population of the Kosovo. The gathered peace activists, who had pursued a common goal for decades, realized that they strongly differed in their views of the NATO intervention. Did NATO have the right to interfere in the conflict? Was it their duty to prevent a war, even by beginning another? (see Cortright, 2008). The General Assembly of the UN addressed the fundamental problem of intervening in the actions of sovereign states by emphasizing the humanitarian responsibility of the international community:

The issue is not the “right to intervene” of any State but the “responsibility to protect” of *every* State when it comes to people suffering from avoidable catastrophe – mass murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate starvation and exposure to disease. (UN General Assembly, 2004, cited in Cortright, 2008, p. 295)

Germany had particular problems deciding what stance to take because two defining principles of postwar German history were no longer compatible: “No more war” and “never again Auschwitz.” The participation in the Kosovo war in 1999 was the first combat mission of the German military since World War II.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, changed the conditions of peacemaking and reconciliation. It is no longer a war between states that threatens peace but the vague fear of a possible terrorist attack. The Europeans were forced

to face this conclusion after the attacks in 2004 in Madrid and 2005 in London.

Europeans had largely been in solidarity with the United States after 9/11, and for the first time, NATO put the “case of the alliance” into effect. After broad European military involvement in the “Enduring Freedom” mission in Afghanistan, the situation changed when the USA sought supporters for a possible war against Iraq. Parts of the European community (especially France and Germany) were not convinced that Iraq supported the Taliban or al-Qaeda and possessed weapons of mass destruction; others (including Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Poland, Netherlands, Denmark, Czech Republic, and Portugal) participated at least initially in the Iraq war in 2003. For Europe as a whole, this meant a political defeat: It was obvious that the states were not able to agree on a common position. Very significant in this context was the distinction between an “old” and a “new” Europe by US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (see, e.g., British Broadcasting Corporation, 2003). Nevertheless, peace protests and election results in many European countries led to the withdrawal of their combat brigades from Iraq within a year.

As becomes apparent from the paragraphs above, Europe has a long tradition not only of war but also of thinking about peace and of ways to achieve it. These traditions form the backdrop for the public discourse about peace and reconciliation which influences and informs our participants’ responses. It also has to be borne in mind that while Western Europe looks back on a long period without armed conflict on its territory, it has to be expected that most respondents are only one or two generations removed from people who have experienced World War II.

Methods and Results

Sample

The Western European sample consisted of a total of 324 participants from France, Germany,

Iceland, Spain, and Sweden. Of those subjects, 43 were from France (28 women, 15 men), 86 were from Germany (58 women, 28 men), 80 from Iceland (61 women, 19 men), 53 from Spain (29 women, 24 men), and 62 from Sweden (29 women, 33 men). The participants ranged in age from 18 to 76 with a mean age of roughly 34 years old. Eleven percent of the sample indicated that they had served in the military, and 58% percent had a relative in the military. Fifty-five percent of the participants reported involvement in protests against war or for peace.

It is important to note that the samples from these countries are not indicative of the ideals or beliefs of the entire population of that region. Results are not intended to make claims about the morality of the people of entire nations. Rather, the results should serve to focus on themes to be discussed around the achievability and advancement of peace.

Procedure

The Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression Survey (PAIRTAPS) (Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006) was administered to populations from Western Europe. Participants were recruited through various mediums including online surveys, personal networking, and paper distribution. Two items were included in the PAIRTAPS regarding the achievability of peace. The first item was “I believe world peace can be achieved,” and the second item was “The best way to achieve peace is ...” Subjects first indicated their level of concurrence with the first item on a 7-point Likert scale and then explained qualitatively why they chose such a rating. They then qualitatively completed the second item. Many participants did not understand that there was a difference between the two items. Many answered the first item in its entirety and wrote, “see my answer above” in response to the second item. As a result, the two items were analyzed together using deductive qualitative analysis and grounded theory. Deductive qualitative analysis is a process of drawing from a conceptual model

to see how well it fits with the data (Gilgun, 2005). Grounded theory does not use a prior theoretical model but searches for commonality in responses, revealing underlying themes (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

Participants' responses were coded using the achieving peace manual, described in the achieving peace introductory methods chapter, Chap. 32. The same coding manual was used for responses to both items. For the purposes of our analysis, we will be referring to two coding systems: (a) Bandura's mechanisms and (b) focus on achievability and prerequisites for peace.

Coding System I: Bandura's Sociocognitive Mechanisms

Albert Bandura's theory of moral disengagement (1999) addresses why people act in ways that conform to or conflict with their moral standards. People can either abide by their moral standards (moral engagement), which can involve either behaving humanely or avoiding inhumane actions or contradict their moral code and act against it (moral disengagement). Individuals may disengage from their moral code through justification, euphemistic labeling (such as verbal sanitation), advantageous comparison, avoiding agency through displacement of responsibility, misrepresentation, disregarding the consequences of actions, and devaluing the victims with dehumanization or assignment of blame (Bandura, 1999).

It should not be assumed that responses indicate that the participants themselves are morally disengaged or morally engaged. Rather, the coding shows that their responses are consistent with the theoretical constructs in Bandura's theory. Accordingly, we refer simply to disengagement and humanitarian engagement in the discussion of results. Coding System I has two distinct components: (a) *agency* and (b) *disengagement* and *humanitarian engagement*.

Agency. Responses to the achieving peace items were coded into one of three categories: (a) *presence of agency*, (b) *absence of agency*, and (c) *not applicable agency*. Responses were coded for

presence of agency if they referred to actions that could be taken to achieve peace by individuals, institutions, or communities to work toward peace. If responses to both items lacked references to action or involvement, or both responses stated that peace was not achievable, a code for *absence of agency* was given. If a participant's responses did not address either prompt, a code of *not applicable agency* was given.

Frequency of Agency Themes. Eighty-three percent of responses from the Western European sample were coded for *presence of agency*. For example, a 22-year-old Portuguese woman declared that the best way to achieve peace is "to accept these differences, to live with them, and be tolerant of others." In addition, a 21-year-old French man stated that "[Peace] is realizable; if we clear away our political men and our military chiefs."

Conversely, 17% of participants from this region were coded for *absence of agency*. For example, a 22-year-old French man wrote: "there will be peace on Earth the day that there are no more men." This theme is also evident in the response by a 58-year-old woman from France who said, "Hatred and selfishness are too much a part of human nature." For more examples of responses coded for *presence* and *absence of agency*, please refer to Table 33.1.

Exploratory Statistical Analysis. Exploratory chi-square analyses were conducted to assess the possibility of group differences in the presence of agency in responses. The demographic groups investigated included the following: (a) gender, (b) military service, (c) relative's military service, and (d) protest participation. Our analyses revealed differences on the basis of participation in protests. A significantly ($p < .05$) greater proportion of protestors than non-protestors gave responses demonstrating the *presence of agency*, while a significantly greater proportion of non-protestors than protestors gave responses indicating an *absence of agency*.

Disengagement and Humanitarian Engagement. Responses to each item were broken into codable

Table 33.1 Percentages and examples of presence of agency and absence of agency in responses

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Sex	Response
Presence of agency	83	Sweden	69	Female	Continue to work through every avenue.
		Spain	45	Not listed	Starting with each one of us. Each human being should live in peace with himself, be worthy, and whole. Then we'll have to learn how to communicate without aggression. Then there will be world peace.
		France	56	Female	To begin by one's self, ones family, ones city, ones country, ones way of life, ones religious priorities, of consummation, re-creation, and sharing.
Absence of agency	17	Germany	23	Female	Completely unrealistic!
		Spain	18	Not listed	This is a dream that will never be achieved.
		France	38	Male	It's impossible. Too many lives for nothing, it's not worth it. Let's live separate from the rest of the world; as long as we are not bothered, who cares? It should not be our problem.

units, each of which suggested a new idea or elaborated on a previously stated thought. Codes were classified into one of many disengagement or humanitarian engagement themes based on Bandura's (1999) theory. Responses describing reasons that peace was achievable and displaying agency were coded for the humanitarian engagement categories, while responses describing why peace was unachievable, or providing ways to achieve peace that would be detrimental to broader society, were coded for the disengagement categories.

Responses indicating disengagement were coded for five categories: (a) responses *rationalizing* that there was no need for peace, (b) responses *displacing the responsibility* for achieving peace onto other people or groups, (c) responses *ignoring the consequences of harmful actions* that could be taken to achieve peace, (d) responses citing *destructive human nature* as a reason peace is unachievable, and (e) responses placing *attribution of blame* on external factors. Responses coded for *displacement of responsibility* could be further categorized as emphasizing the responsibility of the *military and use of force* to achieve peace. Similarly, responses that demonstrated *attribution of blame* could be further coded for *blaming the government or politics* for preventing achievement of peace.

Responses demonstrating humanitarian engagement were coded into four categories: (a) responses providing general *justifications* for

why peace could be achieved, (b) responses describing the need of the population to *assume responsibility* in taking action toward achieving peace, (c) responses using *humanization* to describe positive human characteristics that make peace achievable, and (d) responses *removing blame* from individuals and nations. Responses demonstrating the use of *justifications* could be further categorized as referencing *principles and beliefs* as pathways to achieving peace. Responses emphasizing *assumption of responsibility* could be further coded as (a) referencing *practical strategies* to achieve peace, (b) emphasizing *governmental responsibility* to work toward achieving peace, or (c) referencing the *ineffectiveness of negative relations*. Finally, responses coded for *humanization* could be further coded as emphasizing the importance of *interpersonal concepts and values* or as noting the importance of *social equity*.

Responses that indicated either general agreement or disagreement without elaboration and responses that did not address the prompts were coded for *not applicable mechanisms*.

Frequency of Disengagement and Humanitarian Engagement Themes. Sixty-four percent of all responses were categorized as demonstrating *humanitarian engagement*. The most frequently coded humanitarian engagement categories were *assumption of responsibility*, *practical strategies*, *governmental responsibility*, *ineffectiveness of*

negative relations, interpersonal concepts/values, and social equity.

Responses demonstrating *assumption of responsibility* accounted for 10% of the total response set. A 26-year-old French man demonstrated this principle in his statement that the best way to achieve peace is for “each person [to be] accountable for himself. That everyone learns to know each other.” A 20-year-old German woman also illustrated an assumption of responsibility, stating the need to “not use violence anymore and educate people to peaceful values everywhere. Children who are exposed to violence will also take it. Create just systems of government everywhere!”

Another 8% of the response set contained references to *practical strategies* toward achieving peace. A 63-year-old French woman demonstrated this in her response: “stabilize the world population, learn to share, close down stock exchanges to stop speculation.” Another example is provided by a 42-year-old man from Germany, who answered that we ought to “eliminate hunger, poverty, and lack of education.”

One of the most prevalent *humanitarian engagement* themes was *governmental responsibility* (13% of the entire response set). A 26-year-old German woman exemplified this theme by arguing that if we “abolish the super powers, and create equal conditions between countries,” world peace can be achieved. A 30-year-old woman from Sweden agreed that it is the government’s responsibility to work toward peace. She wrote that peace could be achieved via “global democratization, ban of weapon exports, development or alternative conflict management methods.”

Responses that demonstrated the *ineffectiveness of negative relations* comprised 5% of the total response set. For example, a 29-year-old Swedish woman wrote that it is necessary to “solve the conflicts that are going on and to actively work to prevent new conflicts from surfacing.” A 38-year-old Swedish man similarly felt that the best way to achieve peace was the “downsizing of arms.”

Responses emphasizing *interpersonal concepts/values* accounted for 15% of all responses. A 30-year-old Swedish man demonstrated this theme in his response: “People have to have the courage to meet each other. We are basically all

the same, and if we meet each other we can learn that.” A 25-year-old French woman claimed the best way to achieve peace was “to respect one’s neighbor and his ideas, on a small as well as on a large scale.” An additional example is evident in the response of a 40-year-old woman from Sweden who stated that there must be “understanding for other cultures and religions.”

Social equity was another prominent theme, accounting for 9% of all responses. For example, a 38-year-old Swedish man gave a response emphasizing the importance of “wise distribution of the resources of the earth.” Similarly, a 46-year-old woman from Germany wrote of the necessity to have “equality.” A 25-year-old German woman responded that the best way to achieve peace through social equity would be to “equally distribute resources and give everyone the possibility to have the same degree of luxury as they find fit.” Additional examples of responses demonstrating these humanitarian engagement categories are available in Table 33.2.

Twenty-eight percent of the responses were coded as *disengaged*. The most frequently displayed themes referencing humanitarian disengagement were *attribution of blame* and *destructive human nature*.

Answers that demonstrated *attribution of blame* accounted for 12% of all responses. For example, a 26-year-old French woman wrote: “When children have known a form of violence against themselves or their family, it is difficult for them to not reproduce this schema of hate.” A 51-year-old German woman responded that peace could not be achieved because “ethnic, religious, and economic interests are too different.”

Destructive human nature was the second-most prevalent theme under disengagement, making up 9% of all responses. For example, a 38-year-old Swedish man argued that peace would be difficult to achieve because “the human being is destructive by nature. We desire others’ possessions and without a break seek to force our values on others.” A 26-year-old German woman wrote that attaining peace was “doubtful; man is an aggressive creature, power and money are sufficient reasons for waging war. Even if everybody had all they needed,

Table 33.2 Percentages and examples of the most frequently identified humanitarian engagement categories

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Sex	Response
<i>Humanitarian engagement</i> 64					
<i>Humanization</i>					
Interpersonal concepts/ values	15 (24)	France	22	Female	To accept these differences. To live with them and be tolerant of others.
		Germany	57	Male	To accept others in their diversity, to tolerate different opinions/views, to see both sides.
		Germany	18	Male	Learn from one another.
Social equity	9 (15)	Spain	28	Not listed	Solving the most acute problems from their roots: poverty; hunger; oppression.
		France	25	Female	That each person respects the liberties of his neighbors.
<i>Assumption of responsibility</i>	10 (15)	Iceland	30	Not listed	To do everything you can to make your surroundings better.
		Spain	70	Not listed	It's an ideal toward which we should strive
Governmental responsibility	13 (20)	Germany	19	Female	If war would be rejected by every government
		Sweden	36	Male	Get politicians to have the courage to make difficult decisions and stop caring about power and reelections.
Practical strategies	8 (13)	Iceland	42	Not listed	Educate women.
		Sweden	38	Male	Create resources and education/care for children.
Ineffectiveness of negative relations	5 (8)	Iceland	41	Not listed	If we say no to violence and give love a chance, we will find peace in the end.
		Germany	29	Female	Eliminate war as an option, and abolish all military weapons.

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of the responses within the humanitarian engagement responses

this would probably not be enough for some people.” These viewpoints, like many other disengaged responses, stress a cynicism toward mankind, which hinder the attainment of peace. More examples of disengaged responses are presented in Table 33.3.

Exploratory Statistical Analyses. Exploratory chi-square analyses were conducted to examine demographic differences in response patterns explaining that world peace is achievable or unachievable. Significant ($p < .05$) and marginal differences ($p \leq .10$) were found in responses on the basis of gender, military participation, relative's military participation, and participation in peace protests.

Our results indicated that women were marginally more likely than of men to give responses

that listed *social equity* as the reason that peace could be achieved. Conversely, a significantly greater proportion of men than women gave responses *ignoring the consequences of harmful actions* in regard to peace. Military participants were marginally more likely than their counterparts to give responses providing general *justifications* for the belief that peace is achievable. A significantly greater proportion of participants without relatives in the military than participants with relatives in the military gave responses citing *principles and beliefs* to explain why peace is achievable.

A significantly greater proportion of participants who had participated in protests than those who had not gave responses espousing at least one of the *humanitarian engagement* categories. A significantly greater proportion of

Table 33.3 Percentages and examples of the most frequently identified disengagement categories

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Sex	Response
<i>Disengagement</i>	28				
<i>Attribution of blame</i>	12 (43)	Sweden	27	Female	I believe to a certain extent that the world is driven by conflicts. If you look at history, conflicts and human cruelty has always existed.
		France	24	Female	Man is not capable of living in harmony, there will always be conflicts for religious reasons, money, power, etc.
		Sweden	28	Male	Conflicts will always exist and are natural.
<i>Destructive human nature</i>	9 (32)	Germany	40	Female	This does not easily suit the nature of mankind.
		Iceland	28	Not listed	I believe the possibility is slim because of human selfishness, intolerance, and ignorance.
		Sweden	30	Male	I believe humans all too often live after the adage: Who already has a lot wants more!

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of the responses within the disengagement responses

protestors than non-protestors specifically gave responses emphasizing (a) *practical strategies* to achieve peace, (b) *humanization*, and (c) *interpersonal values* that are conducive to achieving peace. Protestors were marginally more likely than non-protestors to cite the *ineffectiveness of negative relations*. A significantly greater proportion of non-protestors than protestors gave responses used at least one of the *disengagement* categories, and cited *destructive human nature* in their responses as a barrier to achieving peace. Chi-square values and further demographic information are available in Table 33.4.

Coding System II: Focus on Achievability and Prerequisites for Peace

The second half of the coding manual for this topic addresses qualitative responses that focus on the achievability of peace and responses that list prerequisites to achieving peace. This section of the coding manual was created utilizing grounded theory (Glaser & Straus, 1967).

Focus on Achievability. Responses were coded for focus on achievability if they included statements as to whether or not peace was a possibility.

Responses in this category could also be coded into four more specific subcategories: (a) responses demonstrating *indeterminate achievability*, including references to past or historical events and responses questioning the possibility of peace; (b) responses indicating that peace is *achievable*; (c) responses stating that world peace is an *ideal* condition, and expressing desire or hope for peace; and (d) responses stating that peace is *unachievable*. Responses that emphasized the *achievability* of peace could be further coded for arguing that peace is a *work in progress*, noting that peace takes time and effort. These responses could also be subcategorized if they stated that peace is possible but *difficult* to achieve. Responses that argued that peace was *unachievable* could be coded as *identifying reasons* if they included explanations as to why peace could not be achieved.

Frequency of Focus on Achievability Themes. Many of the focus on achievability responses *identified reasons* as to why peace cannot be achieved. Nineteen percent of all responses demonstrated this theme. These responses gave explanations as to why peace is unattainable. For example, a 24-year-old German woman provided a detailed explanation of why she felt that peace was not a realistic goal:

There have always been wars and conflicts, on a personal as well as on a national level. The reason for

Table 33.4 Bandura's mechanisms: Percentage of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Categories	Demographic Group ^a		χ^2
	Male	Female	
<i>Disengagement</i>			
<i>Ignoring consequences of harmful actions</i>	10	3	6.07*
<i>Humanitarian engagement</i>			
<i>Humanization</i>			
Social equity	18	26	3.20 [†]
	Military	Non-military	
<i>Humanitarian engagement</i>			
<i>Justification</i>	8	2	3.71 ^{†b}
	Relative in military	No relative in military	
<i>Humanitarian engagement</i>			
<i>Justification</i>			
Principles/beliefs	3	11	9.15**
	Protest	Non-protest	
<i>Humanitarian engagement presence</i>			
<i>Assumption of responsibility</i>			
Practical strategies	24	11	8.64**
Ineffectiveness of negative relations	16	10	2.69 [†]
<i>Humanization</i>			
Interpersonal values	35	22	6.05*
<i>Disengagement presence</i>			
<i>Destructive human nature</i>	16	30	7.78**

If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference. "Presence" at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percentage of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^bFisher's exact test. [†].05 < p < .10; *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001

this is that every person, because of the experiences they have made in the world, has their own, limited view of world events and therefore is limited in his/her ability to understand others' actions. This leads to an inability to see that another person's actions, based on that person's point of view, are reasonable and comprehensible. Any suffering, and therefore any violence, happens out of ignorance. And since there is so much ignorance in the world due to the limits of personal perception, there will always be suffering.

More specifically, a 55-year-old Swedish man claimed that peace is unachievable because there are "too many states, too many wills, too much bitterness, too little resources, etc." The other categories under focus of achievability were found to be very small within the Western European sample.

Exploratory Statistical Analyses. Exploratory chi-square analyses were conducted to investigate demographic differences in focus on achievability responses. We found marginal or significant differences in response patterns contingent on gender, military participation, having a family member in the military, and protest participation.

Men were marginally more likely than women to demonstrate at least one of the *focus on achievability* themes and to state that peace is *explicitly achievable*. Participants who had never been in the military were marginally more likely than their counterparts to describe peace as *ideal*.

Table 33.5 Focus on achievability: Percentage of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Categories	Demographic Group ^a		χ^2
	Male	Female	
<i>Focus on achievability presence</i>	87	80	3.23 [^]
<i>Explicitly achievable</i>	17	10	3.46 [^]
	Military	Non-military	
<i>Focus on achievability</i>			
<i>Ideal</i>	5	16	2.97 [^]
	Relative in military	No relative in military	
<i>Focus on achievability</i>			
<i>Explicitly achievable</i>			
Work in progress	9	16	4.12 [*]
	Protest	No protest	
<i>Focus on achievability presence</i>	78	87	4.18 [*]
<i>Explicitly achievable</i>	16	8	4.69 [*]
<i>Unachievable</i>	11	21	6.54 ^{**}
Identifying reasons	36	52	8.24 ^{**}

If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference. "Presence" at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories.

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percentage of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories: [^].05 < *p* < .10; ^{*}*p* ≤ 0.05; ^{**}*p* ≤ 0.01

Additionally, a significantly greater proportion of participants without relatives in the military than participants with relatives in the military gave responses describing the achievement of peace as a *work in progress*. A significantly greater proportion of non-protestors than protestors gave responses indicating at least one of the *focus on achievability* categories, being specifically more likely to state that peace is *unachievable* and to *identify reasons* that it cannot be achieved. Conversely, a significantly greater proportion of protestors than non-protestors argued that peace is *explicitly achievable*. Chi-square values of these findings are presented in Table 33.5.

Prerequisites for Peace. Responses were coded for prerequisites for peace if they mentioned steps that must be taken for peace to be achieved. Responses that provided prerequisites could be coded in three subcategories: (a) responses refer-

encing *philosophical principles* such as moral and ethical precepts that are necessary to achieve peace, (b) responses indicating *pro-social actions* that enable the achievement of peace via positive steps, (c) responses that mentioned *constructive government and political action*, and (d) responses endorsing *antisocial actions* to achieve peace via harmful or destructive methods.

Responses emphasizing the importance of *philosophical principles* could be further coded into four subcategories: (a) responses referencing the need for *positive interpersonal values* such as respecting or loving others, (b) responses referencing the need for individuals to achieve *inner peace*, (c) responses specifically endorsing *religion and spirituality* as necessary to achieve peace, and (d) responses citing the need for *equality* among people on a social level. Responses emphasizing *positive interpersonal values* could be subcategorized if they

referenced *understanding and acceptance* of others.

Responses providing references to *pro-social actions* were further coded into five subcategories: (a) responses referencing *pragmatic solutions* or practical actions, (b) responses emphasizing *interaction* and the need for communication and cooperation between individuals, (c) responses endorsing *unification* of people into a cohesive community, and (d) responses citing the need for *social justice* and the need for fairness and solidarity. Within the category of *pragmatic solutions*, responses could be further categorized as referring to the need to *eliminate global obstacles* such as poverty and hunger. Responses pointing toward the need for *interaction* could be further coded as referencing the need to *eliminate negative interactions* such as war and hate. Responses emphasizing *social justice* could further be coded into three subcategories: (a) responses recognizing the need for inherent *human rights* to be met, (b) responses citing *economic fairness*, and (c) responses referring to the *elimination of social injustice* such as corruption or greed in the general population.

Responses that emphasized *constructive governmental or political action* as the best way to achieve peace cited the need for positive governmental or political change. These responses could be further coded into three subcategories: (a) responses referring to a *diplomatic* approach to achieving world peace, (b) responses endorsing *global political change*, and (c) responses citing the need to *eliminate negative political motivations*. Responses citing the need for *global political change* could be further categorized as referencing the need for *equality among nations*.

Responses endorsing *antisocial action* to achieve peace could be further coded in to two subcategories: (a) responses promoting the use of *force or control*, such as governmental aggression or the forced adoption of a universal mindset, and (b) responses referencing the need for *population adjustments* by general removal of subsets or the entirety of the population. The latter category could be further coded as endorsing *violent elimination* if the response referenced

destroying a part (or all) of the human race in a violent way.

Finally, responses could be coded for citing *multiple ways* that peace could be achieved or for expressing an *uncertainty* of how to achieve peace. Responses that could not be coded into any of the above categories were marked as *uncodable*.

Frequency of Prerequisites for Peace Themes. Responses emphasizing the need to *eliminate negative interactions* comprised the greatest proportion (7% of all responses) of responses that provided prerequisites for peace. For example, a 33-year-old Swedish man simply stated that peace “is possible if everyone stops fighting.” A 40-year-old Swedish woman expanded on this concept, writing: “we can start with never having a conflict in a family, school, city, etc.”

An additional 6% of all responses referenced the importance of *understanding and acceptance* between people as a way to achieve peace. This pattern of reasoning is evident in the response of a 33-year-old Swedish woman who argued that peace could be achieved “if everyone could see, understand, and accept each other’s viewpoints and religion.” In accordance with this theme, a 30-year-old Swedish woman responded that peace could be achieved with “trust, understanding, and acceptance.”

Another 6% of responses suggested *pragmatic solutions* to the achievement of peace. For example, a 47-year-old Spanish woman suggested that “food, drink, medicine, space, and protection for all in equal measure for development and education” are necessary to achieve peace. These responses often cited the need for education, as in the response of a 29-year-old man from Sweden who simply said, “education!!”

Additionally, another 6% of all responses emphasized *interaction* as the way to achieve peace. An 18-year-old German man described the best way to achieve peace as “learning from one another, traveling to other countries, and learning about their cultures.” A 19-year-old German woman simply responded, “talk to one another.” Communication between individuals appeared to be the most conventional example of an interaction that could help achieve international

Table 33.6 Percentages and examples of the most frequently identified prerequisites for peace categories

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>	61				
<i>Philosophical prerequisites</i>	16				
Positive interpersonal values	4 (6)(24)				
Understanding/acceptance	6 (10)(38)	Spain	22	U	Each person, from what ever country she is from, should respect everyone who surrounds her
		France	22	F	To accept these differences, to live with them and be tolerant of others.
<i>Pro-social actions</i>	31				
Pragmatic solutions	6 (10)(20)	Sweden	57	F	Alleviate poverty, improve health and education status, provide sustainable livelihoods. Involve poor and vulnerable groups, the next generation, and women in the work toward peace.
		Germany	39	F	To start in a small scale and volunteer to help disadvantaged people or groups.
Interaction	6 (9) (18)	France	52	M	Communication is the solution
		Sweden	30	M	People have to have the courage to meet each other. We are basically all the same, and if we meet each other we can learn that.
Eliminate negative interactions	7 (12)(24)	Sweden	76	F	to learn to turn around conflicts, in other words to handle them without violence and weapons – and this is possible to learn, just like we can learn to read, write and count
		Iceland	41	U	If we say no to violence and give love a chance we will find peace in the end.

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of the responses out of the prerequisites responses. The third number (also in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses out of the major prerequisites category responses
M male, *F* female

peace. A 28-year-old German man asserted that “communication and the exchange of ideas, increasing contact, and the connection of people” were the best ways to achieve peace. Additionally, a 37-year-old man from Germany felt that “The establishment of more possibilities for communication between peoples and religions” would be a beneficial step on the road to peace. The interactions described above allude to nonviolent ways of working together for the achievement of peace. Further examples of responses giving prerequisites for peace are presented in Table 33.6.

Exploratory Statistical Analyses. Exploratory chi-square analyses were run to investigate demographic

differences in responses addressing the prerequisites for achieving peace. Our results indicated marginal and significant differences in response patterns on the basis of gender, military involvement, relative’s military service, and protest participation.

A significantly greater proportion of women than men gave responses emphasizing: (a) at least one of the *philosophical principles*, (b) the necessity of *understanding and acceptance*, and (c) an *uncertainty of ways* in which to achieve peace. Women were marginally more likely than men to give responses citing the importance of *human rights* as a prerequisite for peace. A significantly greater proportion of men than women proposed one or more of the *antisocial action* categories,

specifically mentioning *population adjustments* as ways to achieve peace.

Participants who had never been involved in the military were marginally more likely than those who had to give responses citing *understanding and acceptance* as a prerequisite to achieving peace. Veterans were marginally more likely than civilians to emphasize the importance of *religion and spirituality*. Additionally, a significantly greater proportion of participants without relatives in the military than those with relatives in the military gave responses focusing on the necessity of *religion and spirituality*. Those with relatives in the military were marginally more likely than their counterparts to emphasize the importance of *social justice* and *economic fairness* as prerequisites to achieving peace.

A significantly greater proportion of protesters than non-protestors gave responses citing at least one *prerequisite for peace* as well as at least one example of a *pro-social action*. Protestors were marginally more likely than non-protestors to give responses emphasizing: (a) at least one of the *philosophical principles*, (b) at least one type of *constructive government or political action*, (c) the need for *positive interpersonal values*, and (d) the need to *eliminate negative interactions*. A significantly greater proportion of protesters than non-protestors gave responses citing: (a) *pragmatic solutions* to achieve peace, (b) the need to *eliminate global obstacles*, and (c) the need for *social justice*. Finally, a significantly greater proportion of non-protestors than protesters gave responses demonstrating *uncertainty of ways to achieve peace*. Chi-square values are presented in Table 33.7.

Discussion

In this chapter, we outlined the history of peace and reconciliation in Western Europe from the Peace of Westphalia (1648) to current events. We report data from 324 Europeans from six countries, France, Germany, Iceland, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. Therefore, our sample comprised respondents from countries that have not had war on their territories for some time

but that are partly engaged in warfare outside Western European soil.

The responses mirror on one side a broad wish to achieve a lasting peace, but on the other side, see a lot of reasons why this is considered impossible. Bad education, poverty, selfishness, and social inequality are often mentioned as hindrances. Some explain the ongoing violence with the human nature and the historical fact that there has always been war for several reasons.

Interestingly, since Western Europeans tend to not consider war an accepted means to reaching political goals, armed conflicts are usually justified by arguing that the armed intervention ensures peace. In this context, the most difficult question is whether the use of weapons is legitimate to prevent even greater evil. As mentioned above, the war in Yugoslavia in the 1990s gave raise to that problem. British Prime Minister Chamberlain's policy of "appeasement" before World War II is also a remarkable example. In retrospective, this policy is often interpreted as a weakness of the other European states toward the German Reich in the late 1930s. Keeping the peace – or better: preventing war at all costs – had become such a high priority that for a long time concessions were made to the Reich which amounted to accepting the violation of basic conditions of the Versailles Treaty. But Sheehan also points out that "appeasement is not necessarily a bad thing. In their efforts to resolve conflicts without resorting to violence, diplomats often must appease their opponents. It is also important to recognize that the alternative to appeasing Hitler in 1938 was fighting him. [...] It was not wrong to seek a peaceful solution to the Czech crisis, but it was criminally irresponsible not to consider what to do if that didn't satisfy Hitler's appetite for conquest" (2008, p. 116).

The policy of "appeasement" serves as a good example of the dominance of a "negative definition of peace," as the prevention of an immediate outbreak of war was seen as a great success. In retrospect, it is especially important to consider lessons for future conflicts. A peace that is understood only by the absence of war can prove to be a very unstable peace.

Table 33.7 Prerequisites for achieving peace: Percentage of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Categories	Demographic Group ^a		χ^2
	Male	Female	
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>			
<i>Philosophical principles presence</i>	28	40	4.95*
Positive interpersonal values			
Understanding/acceptance	7	17	7.01**
<i>Pro-social actions</i>			
Social justice			
Human rights	3	8	3.02 [^]
<i>Anti-social action presence</i>	13	5	6.31*
Population adjustments	8	3	4.81*
<i>Uncertain of ways</i>	<1	6	4.91 ^{^b}
	Military	Non-military	
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>			
<i>Philosophical principles</i>			
Positive interpersonal values			
Understanding/acceptance	3	15	4.03 ^{^b}
Religion/spirituality	8	2	4.73 ^{^b}
	Relative in military	No relative in military	
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>			
<i>Philosophical principles</i>			
Religion/spirituality	<1	5	6.72 ^{^*^}
<i>Pro-social actions</i>			
Social justice			
Economic fairness	10	4	2.97 [^]
	Protest	No protest	
<i>Prerequisites for peace presence</i>	92	73	19.59 ^{***}
<i>Philosophical principles presence</i>	40	30	3.38 [^]
Positive interpersonal values	14	7	3.54 [^]
<i>Pro-social actions presence</i>	66	46	12.52 ^{***}
Pragmatic solutions	21	9	7.79 ^{**}
Elimination of global obstacles	6	<1	5.99*
<i>Interaction</i>			
Elimination of negative interaction	26	17	3.73 [^]
Social justice	6	2	4.11*
<i>Constructive government/political action presence</i>	32	23	2.89 [^]
<i>Uncertain of ways</i>	2	7	3.94*

If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference. “Presence” at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^bFisher’s exact test: [^].05 < p < .10; *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001

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Mathilde Salmberg, Kathryn O'Keefe, Jenna Davis,
John Davis, James Page, Michael Whitely,
Carol Davis, and Doe West

This chapter investigates perceptions of whether peace is achievable from the perspective of participants in an Anglo *cultural region* consisting of Great Britain, Northern Ireland, the United States, Canada, and Australia. Although Great Britain and Northern Ireland comprise a unified

country today, these regions are treated separately for the purposes of this chapter, as their relationship has historically been that of colonizer/colonized. We briefly review the history of these countries as it relates to major conflicts and/or peace processes followed by a review of different approaches to achieving peace. As these countries have a rich and varied history regarding approaches to conflict and peace, it seems natural that their backgrounds would be reflected in participants' responses. Many of the nations in this region have histories plagued by imperialism, colonization, invasion, and/or intimidation for the purposes of expansion, acquiring resources, and asserting one's status as a military or political power, which can sometimes be argued as self-defense, to keep the conflict off one's own turf or to promote long-term goals of peace.

Throughout the last few centuries, Great Britain has put forth remarkable efforts to establish empires around the world. The first empire was established in North America and disintegrated after the American Revolutionary War in 1778. The second empire encompassed over 60 colonies over the world and existed from approximately 1880–1930, collapsing with the end of World War II (Butler, 2002). With the significant loss of status as a world power, Great Britain refocused its efforts on safeguarding strategic and economic interests around the world, such as a military base in Cyprus (Eden, 1960), the Suez Canal (McLean & McMillan, 2003), and the Falkland wars (Freedman, 2005). Britain has also

M. Salmberg (✉)

Clinical Psychologist, Washington, DC, USA
e-mail: msalmberg@mail.com

K. O'Keefe

Friendship Charter School, Washington, DC, USA

J. Davis

Department of Psychology, Swarthmore College,
Swarthmore, PA, USA

J. Davis

Department of Psychology, Texas State University,
San Marcos, TX, USA
e-mail: jd04@txstate.edu

J. Page

Department of Peace Studies, School of Humanities,
University of New England, Armidale, NSW, Australia
e-mail: james.page@une.edu.au

M. Whitely

Educational Psychologist,
Kent State University, Kent, OH, USA
e-mail: mwhitely@kent.edu

C. Davis (Retired)

English Department, Texas State University at
San Marcos, Texas, USA
e-mail: jncdavis@the-cia.net

D. West

Quinsigamond Community College,
Worcester, MA, USA
e-mail: doewest@aol.com

engaged in a number of military efforts in the Middle East as well as Northern Ireland (Kee, 2003). Britain's past as an imperialistic superpower still influences its relations with many states, including Canada and Australia, Northern Ireland, and the United States.

Canada was originally inhabited by aboriginal peoples and was invaded by French and British settlers. While the encounters between aboriginal peoples and the settlers were less severe than in countries like the USA, the aboriginal population numbers were drastically reduced as a result of European infectious diseases and battles (Wilson & Northcott, 2008). Canada became independent from Britain in 1867; however, relationships with former colonizers Britain and France remain influential. Canada is a member of the Commonwealth and maintains a strong emotional and cultural bond with Britain, in addition to recognizing Queen Elizabeth II as its head of state (Cooper, Higgert, & Nossal, 1993). Additionally, because Canada and the USA share the world's longest undefended border, Canada tends to cultivate its relationship with its neighbor, further emphasizing its Anglo influences. Partly influenced by these ties, Canada has participated in a number of international conflicts including the two World Wars, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Afghanistan War. Although Canada typically supports American military undertakings, it did not support actions against Cuba and did not participate in the Iraq war (Malley-Morrison, 2009a).

Similarly, Australia was originally populated by indigenous aboriginal people, who suffered greatly due to the settlement of Europeans. These colonizers subjected them to genocide, forced assimilation, and separated children from their families. In recent years, Australian society has made efforts to recognize the atrocities committed toward the aboriginals. For example, in 2008, the Australian Parliament issued a long overdue apology for past abuses to the aboriginal peoples (Australian Government, 2008). Australia has traditionally allied with superpowers like Britain and more recently the USA.

These affiliations have influenced Australia's participation in wars such as the Sudan War, the Boer War, the World Wars, and more recently the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (Malley-Morrison, 2009b).

Northern Ireland also has had a complex historical relationship with Britain. The Catholic population of Northern Ireland suffered tremendous losses after the potato famine in the mid-1800s, during which Britain failed to intervene. Many people starved to death, and large numbers emigrated. After many years of relentless British efforts to suppress Catholic culture and religion, and several unsuccessful Irish attempts to remove the British, Northern Ireland finally united with Britain in 1925 (Kee, 2003). Following the unification of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the strong opposition between Protestants and Catholics persisted and evolved into 30 years of *The Troubles*, consisting of civil discord, violence, terrorism, and human losses from which people are recovering today.

Throughout the USA's relatively brief history, it has managed to protect, assert, or increase its influence through a high level of involvement in conflict. The USA has engaged in battles with indigenous peoples, continental expansion, civil war, colonization, both World Wars, the Vietnam War, and numerous military efforts in the Middle East, to name only a few. Following the end of World War II, the USA emerged victorious with the added power of a temporary monopoly on nuclear weapons and an economy invigorated by the war (Malley-Morrison, 2009a). This led to a nuclear arms race and rising tensions with the Soviet Union, which evolved into the Cold War. This nonmilitary conflict lasted for decades, creating US allies in Western Europe and ensuring that the Soviet Union increased its influence over Eastern Europe (Reynolds, 1994). The Cold War came to an end with the fall of the *Iron Curtain* as the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991 (Polley, 2000). In 2001, the 9/11 al-Qaeda attacks on the USA threatened the nation's fundamental sense of freedom and security. The USA immediately declared a global war on terrorism for which it initially received

considerable support from Britain, NATO, and many other countries (Gordon & Shapiro, 2004). However, after launching attacks against Afghanistan and Iraq without UN sanctions, the USA's approach to the war on terror was highly criticized around the world (Gallis, 2004).

Although this review has focused primarily on conflicts, thus far these nations have also embarked upon number of attempts toward achieving peace and stability through various treaties, international agreements, and unions. For example the Treaty of Versailles ended World War I and established the League of Nations in an effort to promote peace and cooperation after the devastating losses of the war (Black, Helmreich, Helmreich, Issawi, & McAdams, 1992). While the League of Nations successfully promoted dialogue and laid the ground for the present-day United Nations, it had significant weaknesses related to its decision-making process, the unwillingness of some member states to give up sovereignty, and the lack of enforcement authority. Smaller states tended to be generally enthusiastic, while more powerful states like Britain only collaborated as long as the League held no actual power. The USA not only declined membership in the League but also rejected the Treaty of Versailles, preferring to establish individual treaties with states including Germany, Austria, and Hungary to end WWI. The agreements between the USA, Britain, France, and Italy did not exactly promote peace, as they allowed the victorious nations to stake claim areas of interest, such as Britain taking the majority of the Middle East (Gardiner, 2010).

As the process of decolonization continued, Britain established the Commonwealth of Nations in 1931 in order to organize countries that had been part of the Empire. The Commonwealth is an intergovernmental organization, consisting of 54 member states (including Canada and Australia), almost all of which are former or current colonies of Britain. The Commonwealth operates on the tenets of the Singapore Declaration including the promotion of human rights, democracy, good governance, rule of law, individual liberty, egalitarianism, multilateralism, free trade, and world peace (Commonwealth Secretariat,

n.d.). Lately, however, the Commonwealth has been criticized for not holding member states accountable for violations against human rights and democracy. Some contend that the Commonwealth has little relevance today because of the failure to censure members who violate the fundamental values of the organization (Borger, 2010).

1998 was an important year for Northern Ireland: The Good Friday Agreement (or Belfast Agreement) was signed, Prime Minister Tony Blair acknowledged and apologized for the Irish Famine, and the Bloody Sunday Inquiry in Northern Ireland was initiated (Hamber, 2007). The Belfast Agreement has been one of the most effective efforts dedicated to improving relations between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland and has been the longest lasting peace agreement to date. It received the political support of both Unionists and Republicans: They each recognized the benefits of the agreement and established a government representing both parties. More specifically, the agreement has been successful partly because Unionists saw low risks and significant short-term certainty, and Republicans saw the potential for long-term political change if their population comprised a majority. While maintaining the potential of a future reunification with the Republic, the agreement also safeguarded political certainty for Unionists for the predictable future. While improvement has not been linear, due in part to a lack of specificity regarding execution and goals (Maney, 2006), the Belfast Agreement has significantly contributed to peacebuilding and cooperation in the region. Peacebuilding, however, is a challenging and complex process. Some in Northern Ireland view reconciliation as a challenging and at times threatening concept. Many are not ready to reconcile, particularly if such a process involves forgiveness of past violations, pointing to the importance of timing in peace processes (Hamber, 2007).

It is likely that the experiences of conflict and peacebuilding described above affect people's perceptions on the achievability of peace. The next section will discuss our investigation into these opinions.

Methods and Results

Sample

The UK/Anglo sample consisted of 854 participants. Participants were from an Anglo *cultural region* which consists of Great Britain, Northern Ireland, the United States, Canada, and Australia. Responses from Northern Ireland are accounted for separately from Great Britain, because although the two countries are unified today, results were sensitive to the historical colonizer/colonized relationship. Respondents ranged in age from 18 to 86, with a mean age of 34. Fifty-four percent of respondents identified themselves as women, while 46% identified as men. Almost 14% of the sample responded that they had served in the military, and 64% of those who responded had a relative in the military. Thirty-six percent of the respondents had protested against war. This sample is a convenience, rather than random, sample, and as such, responses have limited generalizability. Nevertheless, they are examples of the thinking of ordinary citizens from the UK/Anglo countries regarding the achievability of peace.

Procedure

In the interval between 2004 and 2009, the Personal and Individual Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006) was disseminated both in paper form and online to ascertain what ordinary people thought about the possibility of world peace. In one section of this survey, participants rated their agreement with the statement, "I believe world peace can be achieved" on a 1–7 Likert scale (1 – completely disagree to 7 – completely agree) and were then asked to explain this rating. Responses were usually a sentence or two, indicating whether or not respondents believed that world peace was possible and why. Participants were then asked to respond to the statement, "The best way to achieve peace is..." The answers to these two questions were analyzed together, because respondents answered each prompt with

the other in mind and commonly addressed both prompts while only answering one of them.

Themes of Agency and Moral Disengagement

Basis of Coding Guidelines for Agency and Moral Disengagement

Members of the Group for International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP) utilized both grounded theory and deductive qualitative analysis to develop coding manuals, which were used to analyze the responses to the two questions referenced above. Grounded theory methods allow categories to emerge from the data itself, rather than coding responses into predetermined categories (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Deductive qualitative analysis uses a conceptual model to guide the coding of responses (Gilgun, 2005); in this case, the categories were based in part on constructs from Albert Bandura's theory of moral disengagement (1999). Although the first coding system was developed using deductive qualitative analysis, codable units were not restricted to those explicated in Bandura's theory but were also discovered using grounded theory.

The first step in coding the responses was to break complex, multi-thematic responses into separate codable units. For example, if a respondent replied that peace could be achieved if everyone worked together and the governments would honor their peace agreements, that response would have two separate ideas and therefore two separate codable units.

All responses (codable units) were first coded for both (a) agency and (b) disengagement and/or humanitarian engagement. Although Bandura focuses on the morality of particular forms of reasoning about inhumane behavior, the GIPGAP focuses simply on those types of reasoning rather than assuming that particular forms of reasoning always signify particular levels of morality. Fundamental to Bandura's conception of the moral person is the construct of agency, the importance of action in morality. According to Bandura

(1999, p. 193), “A complete theory of moral agency must link moral knowledge and reasoning to moral action. This requires an agentic theory of morality rather than one confined mainly to cognitions about morality.” Agents act within the world, self-regulating their moral conduct, either engaging in moral acts (proactive agency) or refraining from immoral acts (inhibitive agency). There are also numerous ways to convince oneself that one is not engaging in an immoral act, which Bandura calls *moral disengagement*. These include (a) moral justification (which we call *pseudo-moral* justification), which entails reconstructing or redefining one’s behavior so it may fit with one’s view of oneself as a moral person; (b) diffusing or displacing responsibility so that individual accountability is mitigated; (c) disregarding or distorting the consequences of one’s actions; and (d) dehumanizing and/or demonizing one’s victims. Bandura also discusses moral engagement, wherein people are aware of others’ humanity and consciously refuse to exploit or manipulate them, even under pressure from others to behave inhumanely. Here, engagement is proactive and people act in firm resolution of their principles.

Agency Coding

In Bandura’s theory, agency is one of the defining features of moral engagement, and thus, the peace responses were coded for evidence of agency. Responses to both peace items were analyzed together and coded into one of three agency categories: *presence of agency*, *absence of agency*, or *not applicable-agency*. Responses were coded for *presence of agency* if they showed evidence of actions that may be taken toward achieving peace, whether or not the participant’s answer also included elements indicating a lack of agency. If a response did not mention any actions that could help achieve peace or declared that peace is impossible, a code of *absence of agency* was given. If the response did not address the prompt, it was coded as *not applicable-agency*. Only one code was given, so multiple codable units demonstrating agency or a lack of it were coded for agency just once.

Frequency of Agency Themes

Seventy-nine percent of all responses were coded for *presence of agency*, which means that these responses indicated a belief that people may work toward achieving peace, as individuals or as groups. A 61-year-old man from the United States wrote that peace could be brought about by “addressing the political, economic, justice, and spiritual needs of all people while recognizing that each person/culture/society is unique and worthwhile.” On the other hand, 21% of all responses were coded for an *absence of agency*, holding that peace is not possible and/or there are no steps that may be taken to achieve peace. For example, a 36-year-old Australian man said that “true world peace will never be achieved” because “tribalism and religion do not subscribe to peaceful coexistence.” He went on to call world peace “a fantasy.” Additional examples of both a *presence of agency* and an *absence of agency* may be found in the Table 34.1.

Disengagement and Humanitarian Engagement Coding

Disengaged responses could be coded into a number of different categories, and each codable unit within a response was coded independently, in contrast to the procedures for coding for *agency*. Responses indicating that achieving peace was not necessary were coded as *rationalization*. Responses placing responsibility for peace elsewhere were coded as *displacement of responsibility*, and responses specifically mentioning military responsibility were coded as *military/force*. *Ignoring consequences of harmful actions* was coded when respondents described taking a negative action and disregarded its outcome. Responses were coded for *destructive human nature* when they attributed the impossibility of peace to negative human characteristics. Responses citing interpersonal conflict or external events were coded as *attribution of blame*. Responses were coded as demonstrating *governmental/political blame*, a subcategory of *attribution of blame*, when traits of leaders, nations, or governments were said to prevent peace.

Table 34.1 Percentages and examples of presence of agency and absence of agency in responses

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
Presence of agency	79	Australia	F	20	“Forgive each other and move on”
		Canada	F	71	“Education, open mind, assistance from agencies and countries that have the political and human resources to assist in helping establish infrastructure in some of the world’s less developed areas. The key would be to help but not take over”
		Northern Ireland	M	31	“Repentance and faith in Christ as Savior and Lord”
		UK	M	34	“Through individual reformation. As war is started in the minds of men, peace too starts in the human mind. I know of no better way than through the practice of Nichiren Daishonin’s Buddhism”
		USA	M	41	“Limit population growth and distribute wealth more evenly. Promote sustainable environments to ensure sustainable economies. Happy, well-fed, and purposeful people tend to be peaceful”
Absence of agency	21	Australia	M	33	“No way. The only way to achieve this would be for humans to be completely devoid of freedom. This is undesirable (and not practically achievable), so world peace will not occur”
		Canada	M	40	“I have been to combat in the Middle East and in Asia – there is no way that world peace can be achieved”
		Northern Ireland	F	19	“Satan is a very strong presence in the world and he would never let people live in peace. He will do all he can to destroy peace”
		UK	M	19	“If there are two people left on earth, there will still be war”
		USA	M	20	“It won’t happen”

F female, M male

For a response to be coded for *humanitarian engagement*, it must display both *agency* and a belief that peace is possible. If a response gave general reasons why world peace is attainable, it was coded as *justification*. Responses that specifically mentioned a system of ethics or religion were coded into its subcategory, *principles/beliefs*. *Assumption of responsibility* was coded when responses acknowledged a duty to work toward peace and included several subcategories, such as *practical strategies*, *governmental responsibility*, and the *ineffectiveness of negative relations*. *Practical strategies* referenced concrete actions that may be taken by anyone, while *governmental responsibility* referenced the necessity of diplomacy or pro-social governmental intervention. Responses coded for *ineffectiveness of negative relations* recognized that world peace cannot be obtained through negative

interactions, such as war. *Humanization* pointed to positive human attributes that could lead to peace, with subcategories such as *interpersonal values/concepts*, emphasizing principles such as tolerance or understanding, and *social justice* emphasizing social and economic justice. Responses that mentioned reconciliation or forgiveness received a code of *removal of blame*. Responses that answered the prompt but did not elaborate, or did not address the prompt at all, were coded as *not applicable-mechanisms*.

Frequency of Disengagement and Humanitarian Engagement Themes

Thirty-one percent of responses were coded for the presence of *disengagement* themes. Forty percent of the disengaged responses were coded

Table 34.2 Percentages and examples of disengagement themes most frequently identified

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Disengagement</i>	31				
<i>Attribution of blame</i>	12 (40)	Australia	M	27	“There will always be a socioeconomic imbalance, and as money is often the foundation for conflict, this will never be eradicated”
		Canada	F	18	“It’s nice to think it could happen but the reality of the world is those who are in power work to maintain their power and they do so by taking advantage of those who are not in power”
		Northern Ireland	M	31	“Never at the one time. There will always be confrontation at some place in the world”
		UK	M	64	“There will always be tyrants or fanatics who seek to usurp the morals and creeds of others”
		USA	M	18	“I don’t believe world peace is possible because of the amount of hate and violence in the world”
<i>Destructive human nature</i>	12 (38)	Australia	F	21	“Too many people carry hate and revenge in their hearts”
		Canada	M	22	“People are too stubborn to accept agreements for a long period of time. Sometimes governments aren’t willing to give and take during peace talks”
		Northern Ireland	M	20	There are “megalomaniacs in our world”
		UK	F	27	“There will always be individuals who act for their own good, not the good of people as a whole, so there will never be world peace”
		USA	F	20	“I don’t think that conditions can ever be completely ideal – people will always be suffering and conditions will always be somewhat unfair – but maybe we can come close”

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of the disengagement responses

M male, *F* female

for *attribution of blame*, which means that respondents pointed to individual or institutional actions, many motivated by greed and selfishness, to explain why peace is impossible. Many responses noted that competition for resources fuel quests for power or control that is counter-productive to peaceful ends. A 52-year-old woman from the United States wrote that “there are just too many people with too many issues.” Thirty-eight percent of disengaged responses cited *destructive human nature*, despairing, for instance, over the human ability to resolve conflict or live with difference. This 22-year-old American woman said, “there will always be something... humans will always want what they don’t have.” Table 34.2, below, gives examples of disengaged responses.

Fifty-five percent of all responses were categorized as displaying *humanitarian engagement*. Twenty-three percent of the *humanitarian engagement* responses cited *interpersonal concepts and values*, such as respecting and understanding differences, as the motivating factor of engagement. Many responses in this category emphasized tolerance and empathy. For example, a 77-year-old woman from the United Kingdom wrote that peace exists “each second that others see themselves in the other.” The second most cited theme was *governmental responsibility*, comprising 19% of *humanitarian engagement* responses. Many responses in this category highlighted the importance of international bodies of governance and the necessity of negotiation. Many also pointed to the need to rid the world of

Table 34.3 Percentages and examples of humanitarian engagement themes most frequently identified

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Humanitarian engagement</i>	55				
<i>Humanization</i>	21				
Interpersonal concepts and values	13 (23)	Australia	M	38	“Understand that everyone is just trying to make it through life as best they can”
		Canada	F	19	“Not just tolerance, but acceptance of others is necessary”
		Northern Ireland	F	18	“Live and let live”
		UK	F	35	“Teach children to love and respect others”
		USA	M	20	“Complete openness”
<i>Assumption of responsibility</i>	31				
Governmental responsibility	11 (19)	Australia	M	38	“Democracy and a strong and active UN”
		Canada	M	85	“Legal agreements to curb and prevent violence”
		Northern Ireland	F	21	“I believe if the world was ruled by 1 government then world peace would be possible”
		UK	F	62	“It has been said that peace will be achieved under a one world government and that will be achieved when two or three important issues arise which unite the world in agreement”
		USA			“Maintain open lines of communication among nations”

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of the humanitarian engagement responses

M male, F female

weapons. In this vein, a 71-year-old Canadian man wrote that “the best way (to achieve peace) would be for nations to cooperate and to disarm.” Examples of *humanitarian engagement* responses may be found in Table 34.3, below.

Demographic Differences in Disengaged and Engaged Responses

Exploratory chi-square tests were run on the *humanitarian engagement* and *disengagement* categories to investigate the possibility of group differences based on the following demographics: (a) gender, (b) military service, (c) relative’s military service, and (d) protest experience. Only results that were statistically significant ($p \leq 0.05$) or marginally significant ($0.051 \leq p \leq 0.10$) are reported here.

These analyses revealed that a significantly greater proportion of men than women were will-

ing to use *military/force* and to *ignore consequences of harmful actions*. A significantly greater proportion of women than men provided responses that were coded for one or more of the *humanitarian engagement* categories and specifically cited *interpersonal values*.

A significantly greater proportion of respondents who had served in the military than those who had not gave responses that *ignored consequences of harmful actions*. A significantly greater proportion of nonmilitary participants than their counterparts gave responses that were coded for one or more of the *humanitarian engagement* categories and *humanization*. A significantly greater proportion of people who had relatives in the military expressed *social equity* than their counterparts, while a marginally greater proportion gave responses coded for *justification*.

A significantly greater proportion of non-protesters than protesters gave responses coded for

Table 34.4 Humanitarian disengagement and engagement: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Categories	Group 1 (%) ^a	Group 2 (%) ^a	X ²
	Male	Female	
<i>Disengagement</i>			
<i>Displacement of responsibility</i>			
Military/force	3	0	10.02**
<i>Ignoring consequences of harmful actions</i>	11	4	16.41***
<i>Humanitarian engagement presence</i>	66	76	10.8***
<i>Humanization</i>			
Interpersonal values	17	29	17.19***
	Military	Nonmilitary	
<i>Disengagement</i>			
<i>Ignoring consequences of harmful actions</i>	13	6	6.85**
<i>Humanitarian engagement presence</i>	61	73	6.59**
<i>Humanization</i>	0	4	4.88 ^{ab}
	Relative military	No relative in military	
<i>Humanitarian engagement</i>			
<i>Justification</i>	1	0	3.5 ^b
<i>Humanization</i>			
Social equity	15	8	8.28**
	Protest	No protest	
<i>Disengagement presence</i>	48	59	10.31***
<i>Ignoring consequences of harmful actions</i>	4	9	6.7**
<i>Attribution of blame</i>	20	31	11.24***
<i>Humanitarian engagement presence</i>	85	63	43.91***
<i>Assumption of responsibility</i>	26	11	31.43***
Practical strategies	19	14	3.63 [^]
Governmental responsibility	30	19	11.40***
<i>Humanization</i>	6	2	6.92**
Social equity	16	11	5.59*
Interpersonal values	32	19	18.66***

If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference. "Presence" at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories

[^]=0.051 < p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^bFisher's p-value

one or more of the *disengagement* categories, *ignored the consequences of harmful actions*, and *attributed blame* onto others or external events for making peace unachievable. A significantly greater proportion of protesters than non-protesters provided responses coded for one or more of the *humanitarian engagement* categories, *assumed responsibility* for their actions, and expressed opinions that peace could be achieved through *governmental responsibility*, *humanization*, *social*

equity, and *interpersonal values*. Protesters were marginally more likely than non-protesters to suggest *practical strategies* to achieve peace.

Table 34.4 presents the percent values of each statistically significant or marginally significant group difference in *disengagement* and *humanitarian engagement* responses. The table is arranged in order of demographic category and also shows the chi-square value and its level of significance.

Focus on Achievability and Prerequisites for Peace

Although Bandura's theory was useful for examining agency and engagement, GIPGAP utilized grounded theory to identify other themes within the survey responses, namely, the extent to which peace is portrayed as achievable and the necessary prerequisites that participants identified for achieving peace.

The first part of this coding system, focus on achievability, was used to code responses that discussed the achievability of peace. Responses that referenced peaceful or non-peaceful trends in the past and/or questioned whether peace can be achieved were coded for *indeterminate achievability*, the first major category. Responses stating that peace is achievable were coded for another major category, *achievable*. *Work in progress*, a subcategory of *achievable*, applied to responses emphasizing that peace requires time and effort. *Difficult*, a subcategory of *work in progress*, referred to answers that stated that peace is possible, but that it is hard to achieve. Conversely, responses indicating that peace is not achievable were coded *unachievable*, a third major category. Responses providing reasons as to why peace cannot be achieved were given the code *identifying reasons*, a subcategory of *unachievable*. Responses that expressed hope for peace or portrayed it as an ideal were coded *ideal*, the final major category.

Responses identifying the actions that must be taken to achieve peace were coded into the category *prerequisites for peace*. This general category had four major categories, *philosophical principles* (achieving peace through existing or improved ethical and moral systems), *pro-social actions* (positive actions that could bring about peace), *constructive government/political action* (governmental changes that must take place to achieve peace), and *antisocial actions* (harmful actions that could bring about peace). *Philosophical principles* was broken down into an additional level of subcategories specifying interactions and mind-sets that might promote peace, specifically (a) *positive interpersonal values* (*understanding/acceptance*, a

subcategory of *positive interpersonal values*), (b) *inner peace*, (c) *religion/spirituality*, and (d) *equality*. *Pro-social actions* included (a) *pragmatic solutions* (*elimination of global obstacles*, a subcategory of *pragmatic solutions*), (b) *interaction* (*elimination of negative interactions*, a subcategory of *interaction*), (c) *unification*, and (d) *social justice* (*elimination of social injustice*, *human rights*, and *economic fairness*, subcategories of *social justice*). *Constructive government/political action* was broken down into (a) *diplomacy*, (b) *global/political change* (subcategory *equality among nations*), and (c) *elimination of negative political motivations*. Finally, *antisocial action* encompassed (a) *force/control*, (b) *population adjustments*, and (c) *violent elimination*.

Frequency of Focus on Achievability Responses

Twenty-two percent of all responses and 53% of *focus on achievability* responses identified reasons why peace is unachievable. Many respondents believed that there are too many conflicting, incompatible interests and groups and that these make it impossible for peace to ever be realized. A 24-year-old British woman answered in this manner: "There will always be a group that will be fighting for their own wants and needs." Supporting this sentiment, a 20-year-old man from the United States wrote that "conflict can be minimized, but it will always be with us." Respondents also expressed doubts that everyone desires peace or is willing to compromise. Conflict can provide opportunities for profit, and humans are loath to give up control. Many responses highlighted the belief that humans are *animals* and have fought throughout all of human history. Many respondents indicated that they did not believe peace could be achieved in their lifetime.

Frequency of Prerequisites for Peace Responses

Twenty-six percent of the total response set was coded for the *pro-social actions* categories, which indicates that respondents believe that positive

social actions, whether by governments, individuals, or communities, are a prerequisite for peace. Seven percent of entire response set suggested that peace could be attained if *negative interactions*, such as war or the distribution of weapons, were *eliminated*. A 21-year-old Australian woman said that everyone needs to “take a step back and look at what war does.” Sixteen percent of the entire response set was coded as citing *philosophical principles* categories as necessary to attain peace. Six percent of the total response set was coded for the principle of *understanding/acceptance* as the best way to achieve peace, which often highlighted the need for connection and tolerance between diverse cultures and opinions. A 20-year-old American woman wrote that to achieve peace, it is necessary “to develop an understanding of how people operate in their own societies.” These responses express hope that the differences that divide humanity may be reconciled. For examples of the *focus on achievability* and *prerequisites for peace codes*, see Table 34.5.

Exploratory Analyses: Focus on Achievability and Prerequisites for Peace Responses

Exploratory chi-square analyses were run on responses in the focus on achievability and prerequisite for peace categories to assess group differences in response patterns based on the following demographics: (a) gender, (b) military service, (c) relative’s military service, and (d) protest experience. Only results that were statistically significant ($p \leq 0.05$) or marginally significant ($0.051 \leq p \leq 0.10$) are reported here.

Focus on Achievability

A marginally greater proportion of women than men expressed and gave responses coded for one or more of the *focus on achievability* categories, and a marginally greater proportion of men than women believed that peace was a *work in progress*. A significantly greater proportion of women than men indicated that peace was of *indeterminate achievability*. A significantly greater proportion of protesters than non-protesters believed

that peace was a *work in progress* or was of *indeterminate achievability*. A significantly greater proportion of non-protesters than protesters thought that peace was *unachievable* and *identified reasons* why this might be the case.

Table 34.6 presents the percent values of each statistically significant or marginally significant group difference in focus on achievability responses.

Prerequisites for Peace Responses

A significantly greater proportion of women than men stated one or more of the *philosophical principles* categories for achieving peace and cited the need for *positive interpersonal values*, *understanding/acceptance*, *equality*, and *diplomacy* to achieve peace. Women were marginally more likely than men to respond with one or more of the *pro-social actions*. A significantly greater proportion of men than women recommended one or more *antisocial actions* prerequisites for achieving peace. A significantly greater proportion of men than women cited the need for *social justice*, *force/control*, *population adjustments*, and the *elimination of global obstacles*.

A significantly greater proportion of nonmilitary respondents than their counterparts responded with one or more of the *philosophical principles* and *understanding/acceptance*. A significantly greater proportion of people in the military recommended *unification*, *constructive governmental/political action*, and *population adjustments* and were marginally more likely to express the need for one or more of the *antisocial action* categories than their counterparts.

A marginally greater proportion of people who had relatives in the military than their counterparts responded with *equality*, *unification*, and *antisocial action* themes. A marginally greater proportion of people who did not have relatives in the military than those who did answered with references to *pro-social actions* and *equality among nations*.

A significantly greater proportion of protesters than non-protesters gave examples of one or more of the *prerequisites for peace* categories and gave responses coded into one or more of the *philosophical principles*, *pro-social actions*, and the *constructive governmental/political action*

Table 34.5 Percentages and examples of prerequisites for peace and focus on achievability peace themes most frequently identified

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Focus on achievability</i>					
<i>Unachievable</i>					
Identifying reasons	22 (53)	Australia	M	34	“With the declining availability of resources and the global desire to increase individual and national wealth, there will always be conflict”
		Canada	F	18	“Too many different world views in the world. I don’t see how people can admit to others that other views may be legitimate”
		Northern Ireland	F	21	“Religion is the main cause of world conflict and as things are it won’t be possible”
		UK	M	67	“After 4,000 years of almost continuous aggression mankind has not learned anything. In this context might is always right”
		USA	F	21	“Human nature is selfish, frightened, and irresponsible. We haven’t achieved a moment of world peace since the beginning of human interaction”
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>					
<i>Philosophical principles</i>					
Positive interpersonal values	4(7)(26)				
Understanding/acceptance	6(11)(40)	Australia	F	34	“The more we know and understand each other, the less we have to fear and hate”
		Canada	F	44	“We must learn to see humanity as connected to each other, rather than separate, competing entities”
		Northern Ireland	F	41	“Be more tolerant of each other”
		UK	M	60	“Listen to other opinions and open our hearts and minds”
		USA	F	50	“For every person to view all other people as human beings”
<i>Pro-social actions</i>					
Interactions	4(8)(17)				
Elimination of negative interactions	7(12)(25)	Australia	M	27	“Resolve any disagreements prior to conflict”
		Canada	F	31	“Stop war against less powerful countries”
		Northern Ireland	M	53	“Stop selling arms to countries who use same arms against sovereign and peaceful states/ countries”
		UK	M	23	“Improve international relations to dispel mistrust and suspicion”
		USA	M	19	“Destroy all the weapons”

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of the major category. The third number (also in parentheses for the prerequisites categories) refers to the percent of responses in that category of the major prerequisites category
M male, *F* female

categories. A significantly greater proportion of protesters than non-protesters also provided responses recommending general *pro-social actions*, *positive interpersonal values*, *understanding/acceptance*, *pragmatic solutions*, *interaction*, and general *constructive government/political action*. Protesters were marginally more likely than non-protesters to

Table 34.6 Responses to focus on achievability: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Categories	Group 1 (%) ^a		X ²
	Male	Female	
<i>Focus on achievability presence</i>	81	85	2.94 [^]
<i>Indeterminate achievability</i>	7	18	23.27 ^{***}
<i>Achievable</i>			
Work in progress	11	8	2.72 [^]
	Protest		No protest
<i>Focus on achievability</i>			
<i>Indeterminate achievability</i>	17	11	8 ^{**}
<i>Explicitly achievability</i>			
Work in progress	13	7	9.88 ^{**}
<i>Unachievable</i>	11	17	6.71 ^{**}
Identifying reasons	39	51	11.79 ^{***}

If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the sub-categories had a significant group difference. “Presence” at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories

[^]0.05 < p < 0.10, ^{*}p ≤ 0.05, ^{**}p ≤ 0.01, ^{***}p ≤ 0.001

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^bFisher’s p-value

state that *inner peace* and *diplomacy* were necessary for world peace. A significantly greater proportion of non-protesters than protesters advocated the use of *force/control*, and non-protesters were marginally more likely than protesters to recommend one or more of the *antisocial action* categories.

Table 34.7 presents the percent values of each statistically significant or marginally significant group difference in prerequisites for peace responses.

Discussion

This chapter considered the perceptions of whether peace is achievable from 854 participants from the Anglo cultural region including the countries of Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, and the United States. The conflict-ridden history and engagement in peace processes to varying degrees appear to be reflected

in the participants’ responses. The majority of these countries have experiences with imperialism, colonization, and initiating conflict or being on the receiving end of being colonized or invaded. Responses from Northern Ireland were accounted for separately from Great Britain, due to the past colonization, and results were therefore sensitive to how this may affect perceptions. All participants responded to the two achieving peace items on the PAIRTAPS survey. The coding system and categories were partially based on Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement.

The results demonstrated a general belief that peace can be achieved as a result of the actions of groups or individuals. The presence of agency and belief that one’s voice and actions count may be a reflection of the democratic governments of the participating countries, as compared to the lack of agency and learned helplessness that are fostered in societies where individuals are suppressed under totalitarian rule. Participants generally appeared to have trust in their governments,

Table 34.7 Responses to prerequisites for peace: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Categories	Group 1 (%) ^a		X ²
	Male	Female	
Prerequisites for peace			
<i>Philosophical principles presence</i>	23	37	20.72***
Positive interpersonal values	7	13	6.07*
Understanding/acceptance	10	20	17.66***
Equality	1	4	7.27**
<i>Pro-social actions presence</i>	43	49	3.01 [^]
Pragmatic solutions			
Elimination of global obstacles	4	1	4.64*
Unification	11	4	17.68***
Social justice	3	0	6.73**
<i>Constructive governmental action</i>			
Diplomacy	5	9	3.91*
<i>Antisocial action presence</i>			
Force/control	3	1	6.36**
Population adjustments	5	1	9.16**
	Military	Nonmilitary	
Prerequisites for peace			
<i>Philosophical principle presence</i>	20	32	6.3**
Positive interpersonal values			
Understanding/acceptance	9	16	3.87*
<i>Pro-social actions</i>			
Unification	14	8	5.06*
<i>Constructive governmental/political action</i>	12	4	13.24***
<i>Antisocial action presence</i>	12	7	3.64 [^]
Population adjustments	7	2	8.26** ^b
	Relative military	No relative in military	
Prerequisites for peace			
<i>Philosophical principles</i>			
Equality	3	1	3.58 [^]
<i>Pro-social actions</i>	4	7	3.19 [^]
Unification	10	6	3.23 [^]
<i>Constructive government/political action</i>			
Global political change			
Equality among nations	1	3	2.82 [^]
<i>Antisocial action</i>	3	1	3.04 [^]
	Protest	No protest	
Prerequisites for peace presence			
<i>Philosophical principles presence</i>	84	70	21.75***
Positive interpersonal values	39	26	13.72***
Understanding/acceptance	16	7	16.82***
Inner peace	21	12	10.99***
Interaction	4	2	2.1 [^]
<i>Pro-social action presence</i>	56	40	17.85***
<i>Pro-social actions</i>	10	3	19.09***
Pragmatic solutions	16	11	4.08*
Interaction	14	8	7.83**

(continued)

Table 34.7 (continued)

Categories	Group 1 (%) ^a	Group 2 (%) ^a	X ²
<i>Constructive government/political action presence</i>	29	19	11.25***
<i>Constructive government/political action</i>	8	4	4.52*
Diplomacy	9	6	2.96 [^]
<i>Antisocial action presence</i>	5	8	3.44 [^]
Force/control	1	3	4.81*

If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference. Presence indicates that the participant provided at least one response that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories. Refer to the Achieving Peace Methods chapter for a more detailed description

[^]=0.051 < p < 0.10, *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01, ***p ≤ 0.001

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percentage of respondents who gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^bFisher's exact test

and both engaged and disengaged participants tended to hold their governments responsible for whether peace is achieved or not.

It appears logical that with the high presence of agency and general optimism regarding one's ability to achieve desired results through actions, more than half of all responses indicated humanitarian engagement. Many pointed to the importance of understanding and respect of differences, tolerance, and empathy as motivating factors of engagement. It appears that engaged participants generally held an optimistic view of human nature. On the other hand, almost a third of responses demonstrated disengagement, and these participants tended to place blame elsewhere and frequently cited unflattering human characteristic as barriers to peace. Many cited selfishness, greed, unwillingness to compromise, and reluctance to give up control which can manifest in conflicts for resources and power. The belief that humans are inherently destructive may have translated into the hopelessness some expressed about the ability of humans to resolve conflicts or accept differences. Not unexpectedly, differences between engagement and disengagement emerged between protesters and non-protesters. Protesters leaned toward humanitarian engagement responses, assumed responsibility for their actions, and expressed a desire to achieve peace through governmental responsibility, humanization, social equity, and interpersonal values, while non-protesters gravitated more toward disengaged

responses, ignoring consequences of harmful actions, and attributing blame elsewhere.

Negative peace concepts were demonstrated as a few participants suggested that peace could be attained if negative interactions like war or the distribution of weapons were eliminated. A similar portion leaned toward positive peace concepts, citing understanding and acceptance as the best way to achieve peace.

Predictable gender differences also emerged as men and those with a military background generally leaned toward using military/force and ignoring consequences of harmful actions. Conversely, women and those without military backgrounds tended to cite humanitarian engagement and interpersonal values and humanizing responses. Considering that the vast majority of military personnel are male and that men are evolutionary and socially more prone toward physical aggression, these results are not surprising. In the same vein, more women and nonmilitary participants stated philosophical principles for achieving peace, and women cited the need for positive interpersonal values, understanding/acceptance, equality, and diplomacy to achieve peace.

Like all studies, this study also has limitations such as the restricted and varied sample sizes and nonrandom selection of participants through various methods. Therefore, the results do not directly reflect the views of the population of the Anglo region and should be interpreted cautiously. However, this study offers a rare glimpse into the

minds of ordinary people from this region and their thoughts on the achievability of peace and how these perceptions may have been shaped by the participants' experiences and history.

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Achieving World Peace: Views from Russia, Serbia, Slovenia, and Greece

35

Nebojsa Petrovic, Olja Jovanovic, Erin Murtagh,
Sherri McCarthy, Vlado Miheljak, Marko Polič,
Charikleia Tsatsaroni, Anna Medvedeva,
and Alev Yalcinkaya

And he shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people: and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any-more. (The Old Testament; Isaiah, II 4)

Achieving world peace is an eternal ideal, an elusive but magnificent dream of human harmony

N. Petrovic (✉)
Faculty of Psychology,
University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia
e-mail: nebojsa.beograd@gmail.com

O. Jovanovic
Department of Psychology, Faculty of Philosophy,
Belgrade, Serbia
e-mail: olja.jovanovic@f.bg.ac.rs

E. Murtagh
Psychology Department, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA
e-mail: emurtagh1015@gmail.com

S. McCarthy
Educational Psychology, Counseling and Human Relations,
Northern Arizona University, Yuma, AZ, USA
e-mail: Sherri.McCarthy@NAU.EDU

V. Miheljak
University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia
e-mail: vlado.miheljak@guest.arnes.si

M. Polič
Department of Psychology, University of Ljubljana,
Ljubljana, Slovenia
e-mail: marko.polic@guest.arnes.si

C. Tsatsaroni
Psychology Department, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA
e-mail: chtsa@bu.edu

and placid coexistence. Thoughts about peace could be found everywhere: from the Miss World contest where it is often considered as shabby phrase and an object of mockery to more serious places like among warriors on front lines and refugees far away from their homes, to teachings of the most influential philosophers and UN discussions among heads of states.

In this chapter, we consider views on the achievability of peace and reconciliation from ordinary people from four countries: Russia, Serbia, Slovenia, and Greece. Three of these countries (all except Slovenia) are predominantly Eastern Orthodox Christian. Two of them are in the European Union (Slovenia and Greece), and two of them were formerly in Yugoslavia. Russians, Serbians, and Slovenians belong to the Slavic group of nations, with common origin and similar languages. These countries have specific recent history, geostrategic position, and social, economic, and political situation that justifies considering them as a region and analyzing answers from their inhabitants in this chapter.

For four and a half decades following the end of the Second World War, Russia was the main and biggest part of the Soviet Union, one of two superpowers (with USA) who led the world and

A. Medvedeva
University of Finland, Helsinki, Finland
e-mail: an25medved@gmail.com

A. Yalcinkaya
Department of Psychology, Yeditepe, Istanbul, Turkey
e-mail: yalcinkaya@prodigy.net; ayalcinkaya@yeditepe.edu.tr

substantially decided all important international affairs. The two countries and their blocs of satellites led the arms race that included enough nuclear arms to destroy all civilization and life on earth several times. Life in the Balkan Peninsula was very much influenced by the Cold War conflict between Russia and the United States.

After disintegration of the Soviet Union and its block, Russia experienced a sudden decline in influence in international affairs and in many other fields. Although most people there had always been relatively poor, after disintegration of the USSR, they lost the sense of power that had given them some compensation in the domains of self-respect and self-importance. Today's Russia is doing better than in beginnings of the 1990s, but its voice in international affairs is still much quieter than before 1990. All those objective factors make the Russia/Balkan Peninsula region a rich context for assessing views on the achievability of peace—especially considering also strong criticism in the area toward the “new world order” and new invasive wars hidden behind phrases of alleged “war against terrorism” and similar justifications for the conquest of other countries.

The modern history of Greece, cradle of European civilization in several centuries B.C., is not so glorious. After the Second World War, Greece was ruled by a military junta to the mid-1970s, when its democratization started, followed by membership in European Union. Since then, Greece has been considered a relatively prosperous European country, with specially developed tourism, but recently Greece became embroiled in economic turmoil followed by almost constant demonstrations and strikes of tens of thousands workers and other citizens. It is almost every day that some media mention bankruptcy of the country and other EU members recently offered hundreds of billions euro of credit, but on very strict conditions. Many Greek people considered their situation as undeserved and are full of rage and frustration. Those psychological states certainly influence their opinions in many areas, including views about achieving peace.

Serbia and Slovenia were parts of Yugoslavia until its disintegration in 1991. Yugoslavia was a

founder and one of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, which consisted mainly of Third World countries trying to balance between superpowers during the Cold War and often condemning the arms race and imperialistic politics of both blocks (e.g., military intervention of Warsaw pact into Czechoslovakia in 1968 or in Afghanistan in 1978 or US intervention in Vietnam). Mass rallies for a “peaceful world” have not been rare. One of those rallies happened after the assassination of a Congolese independence leader and the first legally elected Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo, Mr. Patrice Lumumba, by the assistance of Belgians (former colonizer). But Yugoslavia itself had disintegrated in the early 1990s, and this disintegration was followed by vicious, fratricidal war. Slovenia, the westernmost, most developed, and ethnically most homogeneous republic, formed an independent state relatively quickly and painlessly. It passed through a transition period successfully and became an EU member in 2004.

Serbia, on the other side, was the biggest Yugoslav republic, and there were many ethnic Serbs in several other republics. Therefore, it was interested in keeping the country together. Unfortunately, the Serbian political élite at the time were determined to use all possibilities to save their position and consequently made big mess that eventually led Serbia into military conflict with NATO and the loss of one of its regions—Kosovo, which is recognized as a independent state by some 40% of the world's countries. All of those turbulent events created two relatively strong but competitive movements in Serbia: one that wants to overcome the delay in European integration as soon as possible and one that is resentful of the Western countries and consider them as culprits for some decisions against Serbian interests. Both sides have influence on public opinions and interpretations of different international events. The influence of all those social factors on Serbian views on the potential for world peace and ways to achieve it are strong and lead to diverse beliefs.

All our participants, like the participants from other countries, live in a vibrant and dynamic world, full of TV news on wars, killings, revolu-

tions, and instability. It is real great sign of hope, if people, despite such situations, can imagine world peace. It is a paradox at first sight that Bar-Tal (1998) put beliefs about peace into the conflictive ethos of societies engaged in intractable conflicts! These beliefs refer to peace as an ultimate goal that human society desires but also frame peace itself as a utopian ideal, a dream or wish, with the function of providing hope and optimism. Beliefs in world peace can be seen as a light at the end of the tunnel of suffering and a means of strengthening the positive self-image of those who share them.

The advantage of the current research on perceptions of the potential for peace and the best ways to achieve it is in the fact that readers will be able to understand the worries and hopes of different people from around the world, instead of one socially and culturally specific view from people in particular surroundings and from more or less biased media. Unfortunately, decisions about what the world order should be have always been imposed by those with the biggest power regardless of what the majority of people want. During history, there has been a clash between the enforced values of the power structures and, on the other side, the natural visible or invisible resistance of subordinated nations, races, countries, or different social groups (the poor, women, workers class, different minorities, etc.). Some authors have even proclaimed a final victory of their hegemonic world view and subsequently “the end of history” (Fukuyama, 1992).

On a societal level, real and sustainable world peace is not only the absence of armed battles but a general agreement of different peoples and groups on multilateral preferences, based on common principles and life-enhancing values, with enough space for development of all different human potentials. Besides that societal level, it is also very important to consider the meaning of peace at individual psychological levels. Individuals are at the base of public opinions; they form social character and whole clusters of similar concepts. Thus, people connect peace with their personal chances to develop a high quality of life that includes happiness, creativity, and fulfillment, just as prominent psychologists like Maslow,

Pearls, Rogers, and many others dating back to William James explained in their teachings.

The pursuit of peace has been portrayed in many different ways. Will Durant (1929; quoted in Breymann, 2001, p. 14) wrote: “History books describe the history of the world as a river red with blood. Running fast, it is filled with the men and events that cause bloodshed; kings and princes, diplomats and politicians. They cause revolutions and wars, violations of territory and rights.” However, he continued with perfect explanation of peoples real longings: “But the real history of the world takes place on the riverbanks where ordinary people dwell. They are loving one another, bearing children, and providing homes, all the while trying to remain untouched by the swiftly flowing river.” Using a nonverbal art form, 700 years ago, Ambrogio Lorenzetti gifted the world with a remarkable painting that impressively presents all positive gifts of peace and good governance.¹

On the other side, there is also a long history of authors who consider war as a “purification” of the human race. They viewed warfare not only as necessary but even desirable for societies. Hegel & Dyde (1820/2010) wrote that “...war prevents a corruption of nations which a perpetual peace would produce” (p. 259). Herbert Spencer, considered one of the founders of Social Darwinism, argued that despite its horror and destructiveness, war was a means for the more organized societies to defeat the inferior ones. Many oppressors during history use those views as a rationalization for their actions, including and different war crimes and misdeeds (often with deformation and decontextualization of basic ideas of authors like Spencer). In his influential book *On Aggression*, Nobel prize winner Konrad Lorenz (1974) indicated that human aggression is universal and inevitable.

Other authors have also found justifications for war in superior goals: According to them, the First World War was intended to be the end of all wars; the French revolution aimed at achieving

¹ The painting is located in the Sala dei Nove (salon of nine or council room) in the Palazzo Pubblico (town hall) of the city of Siena, Italy.

liberty, brotherhood, and equality; the Russian revolutionaries wanted to stop oppression of the working class; the Crusaders wanted to stop occupation of holy places; modern revolutions by people of color in former colonies seek to overthrow dictators; and battles for domination over natural resources are a necessary part of the war on terror. It appears that it is always easy to find some “grand and noble” justification for killing fellow human beings. In the wonderfully articulated in *Tomorrow is now*, Eleanor Roosevelt (1966) commented that in every conflict, each side is convinced that it is in the right, that it is justified in attacking the forces of darkness, and that the enemy is personification of evil.

In the history of ideas, we can also find optimists, like Margaret Mead (1928/1971), who believed that society can be fundamentally good and harmonious like the Samoans she studied. She even thought that such a society, which encourages the development of nonaggressive personality traits, may be able to serve as an example to American society (and other modern societies) and to provide the knowledge necessary for the formation of a ‘good’ violence-free society.

However, such views are very rare in the history of ideas. Thomas Hobbes (1651/1982) witnessed many tumultuous events that shook England in the mid-seventeenth century. These events led to his belief that man (the male form of the noun was not politically incorrect at that time) was basically egocentric and asocial. In his view, as long as there was no common law, people would use their energies to war with each other instead of working productively, and life would be brief and miserable. Fear of death is what makes people more prone to peace and willing to give up their natural rights, provided that others do the same. Hobbes argued that if any two people want the same thing, and both cannot achieved it, they become enemies and seek to destroy or subdue one another on the path to their goal. What can we do to prevent such a discouraging picture? Hobbes (1651/1982) proposed two “natural” laws. The first is that everyone should strive for peace as long as there is hope that it can be achieved, and the other is that a man should be willing, if there are others who will do so, to give up rights to all things as much as is

necessary for the sake of peace and self-defense and to be satisfied with as much liberty for other men as he would allow for himself.

This spirit of compromise and abandon of maximalist demands for oneself and one’s group can be found in the teachings of the most influential French enlightenment thinker, Jean Jacques Rousseau. According to Rousseau, scarcity and external threats push people to enter into a social contract to help them cope with all these plagues. Both Hobbes and Rousseau suggested the need for a certain level of emancipation, compromise, and acceptance of particular rules, which may take the form of law or a social norm and that must be respected even when they do not reflect one’s personal desires, in order to have some security and stability and to have an opportunity to build a common civilization. In the modern vocabulary of international relations, the idea is that we transfer part of our sovereignty to the society and in turn get more security. A similar idea is Sigmund Freud’s (1929) argument that we suppress some of our authentic (especially aggressive and destructive) impulses and in that way pay the price of living in civilization. Freud (1933) is also well known by his correspondence with Albert Einstein where he stayed pessimistic regarding the possibility of achieving world peace. In his essay *Perpetual Peace*, Immanuel Kant (1795/1957) invited nations to emerge from their natural, wild state, and contract to keep the peace, just like individuals inside a state. “The history of the human race, viewed as a whole, may be regarded as the realization of a hidden plan of nature to bring about a political constitution, internally and externally perfect, as the only state in which all the capacities implanted by her in mankind can be fully developed” concluded Kant (1914/2009, p. 14). What is stunning in Kant’s writings is the similarity of his concerns with some of the issues of today as he wrote more than 200 years ago, when powerful, civilized nations wanted to exploit those less developed: “...the inhuman behavior of the civilized, and especially the commercial, states of our continent, the injustice practiced by them even in their first contact with foreign lands and peoples fills us with horror; the mere visiting of such peoples

being regarded by them as equivalent to a conquest. . . . on being discovered, were treated as countries that belonged to nobody; for the aboriginal inhabitants were reckoned as nothing. . . . And all this has been done by nations who make a great ado about their piety, and who, while drinking up iniquity like water, would have themselves regarded as the very elect of the orthodox faith” (1914. p. 68).

Recently, Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker published a book *The Better Angels of Our Nature* (2011). The book gives us reasons to be optimistic because according to Pinker, level of violence is in constant decline. By pointing to ideas in evolutionary psychology, he put human beings between their inner demons and their better angels. Our strategic calculation tells us to resist violence when it seems riskier than the alternative—and in today’s world, the alternatives to peace are riskier than ever. Pinker concludes that despite the fact that our inner demons are still here, our better angels become stronger and stronger, and it looks as if they will stay dominant in the future.

The Current Study: Methods

Sample

The Russian/Balkan sample consisted of 440 participants from Greece, Russia, Slovenia, and Serbia. Fifty-nine percent of the sample identified as female, and 40% identified as male. The participants ranged in age from 18–82, with a mean of 34 years ($SD = 10.61$). Although not all participants provided their demographic information, of those who did, 19% indicated that they had served in the military, 47% indicated that they have had a relative in the military, and 15% indicated that they had participated in protests in favor of peace.

It is imperative to note that the samples from the region are not representative of the populations as a whole. Accordingly, the results are not intended to assess the general morality of people in the countries and regions in the study. Rather, the patterns uncovered in the study should serve to illuminate themes surrounding the achievabil-

ity of peace and add to discussions on how to make peace a reality.

Procedure

In order to gain insight into how people from the Russian/Balkan region regard the possibility of peace, the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006) was administered to a number of citizens of the region from 2004 to 2007. Participants were recruited for the study largely through personal networking. Correspondingly, some participants submitted online surveys, while others completed a paper version. The PAIRTAPS encompasses two different items regarding the achievability of world peace. Participants were first asked to utilize a 7-point Likert scale (from 1, completely disagree, to 7, completely agree) to signify their level of agreement with the prompt “I believe world peace can be achieved” and then asked to explain their reasoning in their own words. The second item asked participants to provide responses to the statement “The best way to achieve peace is. . . .” Many respondents provided similar, or identical, responses to both prompts or gave suggestions as to achieve peace in the space intended for statements regarding beliefs in the achievement of peace—or vice versa. For this reason, both responses were coded based on the themes identified in the coding manual, regardless of which prompt they were addressing. Similarly, in discussing the major themes in the responses, we generally do not specify which of the two prompts were being addressed when a particular theme appeared in a response.

The qualitative responses were coding using a moral disengagement/moral engagement coding manual developed by members of the Group for International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP). The manual was developed using grounded theory along with deductive qualitative analysis methods. The aim of a grounded theory approach is for concepts to emerge from the data collected during a study (Gilgun, 2005). Conversely, deductive qualitative

analysis utilizes an existing conceptual model to interpret data collected during a study. Researchers use the collected data to shed new light on the theory, attributing meaning to the qualitative information obtained during a study based on the theory.

The manual is divided into two separate systems each consisting of two parts, also described below. (For more information on the theory, method, and manual, refer to the introductory methods chapter of this section, Chap. 32, in this volume).

Likert Scale Results

An examination of the rating scale scores indicating degree of belief in the possibility of achieving world peace revealed that the average score was approximately 4 points out of 7. There was a statistically significant difference in rating scale scores among the countries as determined by a one-way ANOVA ($F=2.937$, $p=.033$). A Tukey post hoc test revealed a significant difference ($p=0.021$) in rating scale scores between the Greek ($M=5.04$, $SD=1.74$) and Serbian sample ($M=3.71$, $SD=2.19$), with the Greeks being significantly more likely to endorse the achievability of world peace than the Serbians. However, there were no other significant differences among the countries. Also, the analysis revealed no statistically significant difference in rating scale scores as a function of gender.

Agency, Disengagement, and Engagement

Albert Bandura's theory of moral disengagement (1999) provided the conceptual foundation of the first part of the coding manual, which delineated two separate components found in the majority of responses: (a) *agency* and (b) *humanitarian engagement* and *disengagement*. According to Bandura, people can act in accordance with their moral standards (moral engagement) by partaking in humane behavior ("proactive agency") or by abstaining from

inhumane behavior ("inhibitive agency"). Conversely, people may act in a way that goes against their moral standards (moral disengagement). Bandura theorizes that several moral disengagement processes enable individuals to act in ways that contradict their moral values without their acknowledging that this is what they are doing. These processes include (a) cognitive reconstruction of actions to morally justify behavior via euphemistic labeling and advantageous comparison, (b) displacing or diffusing responsibility for an action onto another party in order to decrease the sense of personal responsibility for the action, (c) minimizing or disregarding consequences of negative actions, and (d) devaluing or dehumanizing the victim of a negative action (Bandura, 1999). The coding manual that GIPGAP developed includes thematic coding categories embodying each of Bandura's disengagement concepts. Corresponding to each of Bandura's processes as delineated above, coding categories pertaining to *disengagement* are as follows: (a) *rationalization*; (b) *displacement of responsibility*, including the subcategory of *military/force*; (c) *ignoring consequences*; (d) *destructive human nature*; and (e) *attribution of blame*, with a subcategory for blaming the *government*.

Though Bandura's theory of moral engagement and disengagement provided the framework for the coding manual, responses were analyzed using terms that did not impart judgment onto the moral standing of participants themselves. For this reason, responses were coded under *humanitarian engagement* and *disengagement* or simply as *engaged* and *disengaged*. The coding manual was designed to analyze participants' responses for sociocognitive themes derived from Bandura's theory, not to assess the morality of the people who provided the responses.

Agency Coding

When discussing moral engagement, Bandura emphasized the role of agency; accordingly, defining and identifying agency played a pivotal role in the creation of the coding manual. Agency,

whether proactive or inhibitive, underscores morally engaged behavior. Therefore, for a response to be coded for *humanitarian engagement*, it must indicate one or both forms of agency. As a result, the purpose of the first level of coding was to identify whether or not agency was present in a response. This level of coding served as a precursor to the next level that involved identifying themes of *humanitarian engagement* and *disengagement*. Each participant's responses to the two prompts were examined together to determine whether any agency was projected in the response and were given one of three possible codes: (a) *presence of agency*, (b) *absence of agency*, and (c) *not applicable agency*. *Presence of agency* was given if a participant referenced actions taken by individuals, communities, institutions, etc. that could bring about peace in either one, or both, of their responses to the two prompts. *Absence of agency* was given if both of the participant's responses denied the possibility of peace and/or failed to reference actions that could achieve peace. Finally, responses that did not address the prompts were given a code of *not applicable agency*. Responses received only one code for agency even if they exhibited more than one instance of *presence* or *absence of agency* themes. If a multi-thematic response had components for both *agency* and a lack of *agency*, it was coded for *presence of agency*. That is, if agency was present in a response to the two items, it was coded for; it was not nullified by a lack of agency in another component of the response.

Frequency of Agency Themes

Sixty-seven percent of all the responses from the Russian/Balkan region were coded for *presence of agency*. These responses indicated that action should be taken toward achieving peace by individuals, groups, states, etc. For example, a 35-year-old Greek woman stated that peace could become a reality through "reciprocal help between the countries." Another agentic response was given by a 29-year-old Slovenian woman who stated that peace could be achieved "with education and bridling our own sometimes selfish

interests and needs." Thirty-two percent of responses were coded for *absence of agency*, meaning the responses did not mention actions necessary to achieve peace or denied that peace could be achieved. A 20-year-old Russian man stated, "this [peace] is impossible because of humanity." Similarly, a 43-year-old Slovenian woman said peace "is not possible because people have different opinions" when prompted to describe the best way to achieve peace. For more examples of agentic and non-agentic responses, along with basic demographic information for the respondents being quoted, see Table 35.1.

Exploratory Demographic Analyses of Agency Themes

Exploratory chi-square tests and Fisher's exact tests were run to examine the possible contribution of gender, military service, and relative's military service to responses coded for *presence* or *absence of agency*. Results of these analyses were considered significant if the results yielded a *p*-value of 0.05 or less and marginally significant if the *p*-value was in the range of 0.051–0.10. In relation to the *presence* or *absence of agency* in responses, there were significant group differences based on military service and participation in peaceful protest. A significantly larger proportion of participants who had served in the military, as opposed to those who had not served, provided responses that indicated a *presence of agency*. By contrast, a significantly larger proportion of respondents who had not served in the military, as opposed to their military counterparts, provided responses that lacked *agency*. In regard to whether or not the participant had participated in peaceful protests, a significantly larger proportion of those who had protested provided responses that indicated *agency* as compared to respondents who had not participated in protests. Similarly, proportionately more non-protestors, as compared to protestors, provided responses that were coded for an *absence of agency*. Refer to Table 35.2 for more information on these chi-square results.

Table 35.1 Percentages and examples of presence of agency and absence of agency in responses

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Presence of agency</i>	67	Slovenia	25	F	“We start with individuals: Inform them about peace and encourage them to reach peace. Positive approach. To encourage personal development”
		Russia	35	F	“To show all the people that they should love not only themselves but their neighbors in the house, city, country, world”
		Greece	50	M	“By the collaboration of the people to achieve a purposeful enterprise for the good of people”
<i>Absence of agency</i>	32	Slovenia	21	M	“This is an illusion. You can’t reach world peace”
		Russia	30	F	“Wars will be always. There are people and countries which want to become rich at the expense of other people and countries”
		Greece	21	F	“I believe there is no way”

Percentages in the percent column refer to the total response set
M male, *F* female

Table 35.2 Agency: Percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Categories	Group 1 ^a Group 2 ^a		X ²
	<i>Military</i>	<i>Nonmilitary</i>	
<i>Presence of agency</i>	76	63	4.95*
<i>Absence of agency</i>	30	36	4.91*
	<i>Protest</i> <i>No protest</i>		
<i>Presence of agency</i>	86	63	13.27***
<i>Absence of agency</i>	14	36	12.01**

* $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

Humanitarian Engagement/Disengagement Coding

As was true for the *agency* coding, responses to both survey prompts were examined together to determine whether there were *humanitarian engagement* or *disengagement* themes. However, in contrast to the *agency* coding system, complex multi-thematic responses with more than one codeable unit could receive more than one code for *humanitarian engagement* and/or *disengagement*. The number of codes applied to a response corresponded to the number of codeable units (separate ideas within a single response) it contained. In order for a response to be considered *engaged*, it must (a) imply that peace is achievable and (b) exhibit *agency*—i.e., identify an action that could make a difference.

Based on Bandura’s theory, the coding manual provided detailed thematic categories denoting *humanitarian engagement*. The four major categories of *humanitarian engagement* were *ethical justification*, *assumption of responsibility*, *humanization*, and *removal of blame*. Responses that provided general methods for achieving peace were coded for presence of *ethical justification*. *Principles/beliefs*, a subcategory of *ethical justifications*, was used to capture responses that indicated religious, moral, or philosophic ideology as a means to achieve peace. If a response expressed the need for the population as a whole to actively pursue efforts to achieve peace, it received a code of *assumption of responsibility*. This coding category encompassed several subcategories: (a) *practical strategies* (such as education), (b) *governmental responsibility*, and (c) *ineffectiveness of negative relations* (arguing that negative actions/emotions, like violence and hate, do not foster a peaceful environment). Responses coded for *humanization* noted general positive human characteristics that could facilitate a peaceful way of life. *Humanization* had two subcategories: (a) *interpersonal concepts/values* (such as love, tolerance, understanding, and unification) and (b) *social equity* (economic and/or social equality, human rights, rectifying social injustices). Additionally, responses referring to forgiveness

or reconciliation between nations or individuals as a way to achieve peace were coded for *removal of blame*.

Although to be coded for *humanitarian engagement* a response had to include at least one indication of *agency*, a response could receive a *disengaged* code regardless of whether or not *agency* was implied. The overarching *disengagement* themes included *rationalization*, *displacement of responsibility*, *ignoring consequences of harmful actions*, *destructive human nature*, and *attribution of blame*. If a response indicated that there was no need for peace, it was coded for *rationalization*. Responses transferring responsibility for achieving peace onto another party were coded for *displacement of responsibility*. A response coded for *military/force*, a subcategory of *displacement of responsibility*, shifted responsibility of achieving peace onto the armed forces. A response that disregarded the potential negative outcomes of actions taken to achieve peace would be coded for *ignoring the consequences of harmful actions*. *Destructive human nature* was applied to responses that emphasized unfavorable human qualities or devalued people in general. Responses that referenced external events, like conflicts or ideological differences, were coded for *attribution of blame*. Responses could also be coded for *governmental/political blame*, a subcategory of *attribution of blame*, if governing bodies were seen as a hindrance to achieving peace.

As noted previously, the codes applied to a response refer only to the response itself. They do not reflect on the individual participant who provided the response. If a response received a code indicating agency or a lack of agency, that does not mean that the person who gave the response is agentic or non-agentic. Responses coded for the presence of themes of disengagement or humanitarian engagement cannot be assumed to demonstrate that the participants themselves are disengaged or engaged. The codes serve only to indicate whether or not responses are consistent with the theoretical mechanisms described in Bandura's theory.

Frequency of Humanitarian Engagement and Disengagement Themes

Thirty-two percent of the responses were coded for the presence of *disengagement* themes. Although all of the disengagement categories and subcategories were coded for at least once, only those categories that comprised at least 5% of all the coded responses are discussed.

Attribution of blame was the most common disengagement theme: It comprised 11% of all of the responses coded with the *humanitarian engagement/disengagement* coding system and 35% of the responses coded for *disengagement*. To review, responses received an *attribution of blame* code if they mentioned external events or interpersonal conflicts as a hindrance to achieving world peace. For example, a 26-year-old woman from Greece said "unfortunately there are so many interests that I do not think it [peace] is absolutely feasible." Similarly, an 18-year-old Russian woman stated that peace is unattainable because "the conflict will soon appear."

The second most common argument indicated that *destructive human nature* thwarted the possibility of achieving peace. Eleven percent of all responses coded for *humanitarian engagement/disengagement* referenced *destructive human nature*, and this subcategory accounted for 34% of the *disengagement* responses. Responses were coded into the *destructive human nature* subcategory if they referenced negative human attributes (such as greed) in their explanation of why achieving peace is implausible. A 20-year-old woman from Russia stated that attaining peace is thwarted by the "human being essence. They [people] have some animal instincts with its cruelty and sadism. Peace will be achieved when the humanity die." Additionally, a 37-year-old woman from Slovenia said, "I wish [peace] could be possible, but I think there is too many greedy people." For more examples of the disengagement coding categories, see Table 35.3.

Fifty-two percent of the responses coded with the humanitarian engagement/disengagement system were coded as showing *humanitarian*

Table 35.3 Percentages and examples of the most frequently identified disengagement categories

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Disengagement</i>	32				
<i>Attribution of blame</i>	11(35)	Slovenia	42	F	“It is impossible to have all people satisfied; therefore, conflicts, wars... will always occur”
		Russia	21	F	“It is impossible to live without conflicts and wars”
<i>Destructive human nature</i>	11(34)	Russia	21	M	“People have to carry on war. It is human nature”
		Greece	60	M	“As long as there are vain and evil people, it is very difficult”

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total humanitarian engagement/disengagement responses. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of the disengagement responses

M male, *F* female

engagement. Although all *humanitarian engagement* themes were coded for at least once, only those themes that constituted a frequency of at least 5% of the total codes under this level are discussed.

The most frequently cited *humanitarian engagement* theme was *governmental responsibility*, which accounted for 14% of all of the *humanitarian engagement/disengagement* responses and 26% of the *humanitarian engagement* responses. Responses coded as exhibiting *governmental responsibility* indicated that it is the duty of a government to achieve peace. A response received a code for *governmental responsibility* if it suggested that more governmental influence was necessary to achieve peace or if it implied less governmental interference could contribute to a peaceful environment. This category also encompassed responses indicating a need for diplomacy or for the elimination of state-sponsored conflict. For example, a 35-year-old Greek woman stated peace could be attained “perhaps with the assistance of the international organizations for the defense of peace; dialogue and diplomacy.” A 40-year-old Slovenian man stated that “international formation, multilateral agreements” are necessary in order to achieve peace.

Following closely behind *governmental responsibility* was the category of *interpersonal concepts/values*, which accounted for 13% of *humanitarian engagement/disengagement* responses and 26% of the *humanitarian engagement* responses. Unlike responses coded into the *governmental responsibility*

ity subcategory, this subcategory stressed concepts such as love, respect, and understanding that could facilitate the prospect of achieving peace. For example, a 35-year-old woman from Greece stated that peace could be realized by “increasing tolerance for differences and understanding other’s perspectives. If we all agree to live with the motto: my freedom ends where the other person’s freedom begins.” Additionally, a 20-year-old Russian woman stated that “recognition of differences between nations, cultures, etc.” plays a vital role in achieving peace.

Ten percent of all the responses coded for *humanitarian engagement/disengagement* (19% of all responses coded for presence of *humanitarian engagement*) were coded into the *assumption of responsibility* subcategory. These responses indicated that in order to achieve peace, efforts must be made by the general public. A 50-year-old man from Greece highlighted the notion of collective participation when he stated peace can be achieved “by the collaboration of the people to achieve a purposeful enterprise for the good of the people.” A 21-year-old man from Russia reiterated this concept when he stated “people should understand that peace depends on them.”

Responses emphasizing the importance of *practical strategies* in regard to achieving peace comprised 7% of all *humanitarian engagement/disengagement* responses and 13% of the *humanitarian engagement* responses. This category was exemplified in a response given by a 38-year-old Greek man when he stated achieving peace “is a matter of education and I hope that every achieve-

Table 35.4 Percentages and examples of the most frequently identified humanitarian engagement categories

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Engagement</i>	52				
<i>Assumption of responsibility</i>	10(19)	Slovenia	25	F	“We can reach peace if we all want it and with our joint power. Nothing is impossible”
		Greece	33	F	“It can be achieved if everybody tries”
Practical strategies	7(13)	Slovenia	52	U	“Education of poor areas helps in production and remaking”
		Russia	19	F	“Try to use peace methods in deciding conflicts”
Governmental responsibility	14(26)	Russia	20	M	“To coordinate the work of all governments of the world”
		Slovenia	52	M	“Right leaders should be chosen”
<i>Humanization</i>	18				
Interpersonal concepts/values	13(26)	Russia	21	F	“If people are tolerant to each other”
		Slovenia	51	F	“Tolerance toward different people and their customs”
Social equity	5(9)	Slovenia	18	M	“All people should be equal without exceptions (the same look, opinion, acts...)—utopia!”
		Russia	62	M	“To respect the rights of each life”

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total humanitarian engagement/disengagement codes. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of the humanitarian engagement responses

M male, *F* female

ment is transferred to the next generations. However, we also learn through our history.” A 40-year-old woman from Russia said that peace lies in the hands of “educated people.”

Finally, *social equity* accounted for 5% of all the responses coded with the *disengagement/humanitarian engagement* system and 9% of all the responses coded for *humanitarian engagement*. A 57-year-old man from Russia illustrated the importance of social equality in the pursuit of peace when he stressed the need to “observe treaties and peoples’ rights.” Additionally, a 62-year-old man from Slovenia reasoned that “abolishing inequality and poverty” is a vital component in achieving peace. For more examples of the coding categories discussed above, see Table 35.4.

Exploratory Demographic Analyses with Disengagement/Humanitarian Engagement Themes

Again, exploratory chi-square and Fisher’s exact tests were used to analyze the possible role of cer-

tain demographic variables in the use of *humanitarian engagement/disengagement* themes. Again, the demographic variables included gender, military service, relative’s military service, and participation in peaceful protest. Chi-squares and Fisher’s t-tests illuminated a number of significant (*p*-value of 0.05 or less) and marginally significant (*p*-value between 0.051 and 0.10) differences between groups based on demographic characteristics. A significantly higher proportion of women than men gave responses citing *interpersonal concepts/values*, whereas a significantly higher proportion of men than women emphasized *practical strategies* in their responses.

At a marginally significant level, proportionally more participants with military experience cited *practical strategies* than those without military experience. Additionally, proportionally more participants with a military background than those without such a background suggested using *military/force* (a disengagement category) as an avenue to achieve peace.

There were also a number of differences in frequency of the presence of *humanitarian*

Table 35.5 Disengagement and humanitarian engagement: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Category	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	X ²
	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	
<i>Engagement</i>			
<i>Humanization</i>			
Interpersonal concepts/values	25	15	5.83*
<i>Assumption of responsibility</i>			
Practical strategies	5	11	5.00*
	<i>Military service</i>	<i>No military service</i>	
<i>Engagement</i>			
<i>Assumption of responsibility</i>			
Practical strategies	12	7	2.72 [^]
<i>Disengagement</i>			
<i>Displacement of responsibility</i>			
Military/force	5	.3	13.51 ^{*b}
	<i>Protest</i>	<i>No protest</i>	
<i>Humanitarian engagement presence</i>	80	56	13.13 ^{***}
<i>Justification</i>			
Principles/beliefs	6	1	9.92 ^{*b}
	8	2	5.90 ^{*b}
<i>Assumption of responsibility</i>			
Governmental responsibility	30	20	3.57 [^]
<i>Humanization</i>			
	3	.3	4.92 ^{^b}
<i>Disengagement</i>			
<i>Ignoring consequences of harmful actions</i>	0	6	4.35 ^{*b}

If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference. “Presence” indicates that the participant provided a response that was coded for that category and/or one of its subcategories

[^]0.05 < p < 0.1; *p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.001

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percentage of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^bFisher’s exact test

engagement codes, as well as particular humanitarian engagement/disengagement themes, based on whether or not participants had ever engaged in an antiwar protest activity. For example, a significantly higher proportion of protestors than non-protestors gave humanitarian engagement responses. In particular, proportionally more protestors than non-protestors cited principles/beliefs and ethical justification as paths to peace. Additionally, at a marginally significant level, proportionally more protestors than non-protestors cited the need for governmental responsibility and emphasized positive human qualities (humanization) in the pursuit of peace. Proportionally, more non-protestors than

protestors ignored consequences of harmful actions (a disengagement theme) in their responses. Refer to Table 35.5 for more information on these results.

Focus on Achievability and Prerequisites for Peace

Though Bandura’s theory was extremely useful in identifying agency (or a lack thereof) and themes corresponding to moral engagement/disengagement, many responses contained information that the team realized was not always well classified into these thematic categories. As a

Table 35.6 Percentages and examples of the most frequently identified achievability categories

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Focus on achievability</i>	39				
<i>Unachievable</i>	7(19)	Russia	18	F	"It's impossible"
		Slovenia	69	F	"There's no way"
Identifying reasons	18(45)	Greece	30	F	"Difficult because human life doesn't seem to be a priority"
		Slovenia	43	F	"It is not possible because people have different opinions"
<i>Ideal</i>	5(13)	Russia	21	F	"Well, it would be wonderful, maybe one day it will be possible"
		Russia	51	M	"Utopia!"

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the entire response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the achievability category
M male, *F* female

result, the research team supplemented the agency and moral engagement/disengagement coding system with another set of coding guidelines derived from a grounded theory approach. This approach mandates that researchers analyze qualitative data without preconceived ideas in order capture themes and outline a theory based on the data alone, rather than using the data to assess an existing theoretical model (Gilgun, 2005). By adopting a grounded theory approach, the team was able to sort and categorize themes that emerged through multiple examinations of the PAIRTAPS data into a new set of categories that are not explicitly linked to Bandura's theory. Specifically, the *focus on achievability and prerequisites for peace* coding system (which we henceforth refer to as the *achievability and prerequisites* coding system) was created using the grounded theory approach.

Similar to coding for *humanitarian engagement/disengagement*, responses examined with the *achievability and prerequisites* coding system were broken down into codeable units, meaning that multiple codes could be applied to a response with multiple thematic units. Again, as with the previous coding system, all of the themes identified in the coding manual were coded according to the specified criteria, regardless of which of the two items they seemed to be addressing. Within the *achievability and prerequisites* coding system, there are two major umbrella categories, each with several subcate-

gories: (a) *focus on achievability* and (b) *prerequisites for peace*. Table 35.6

All responses indicating that peace may or may not be achievable were coded into the *focus on achievability* category, which had a number of categories, depending on whether peace was described as (a) *achievable*, (b) *a work in progress*, (c) *an ideal*, (d) *achievable but difficult*, (e) *unachievable*, and (f) or *identifying reasons*.

Responses indicating general steps that could be taken to achieve peace were coded into the overarching thematic category of *prerequisites for peace*. Responses were given the most general, unspecified code *prerequisites for peace* if they mentioned vague, abstract steps toward achieving peace, such as "we just have to give it a chance." Responses providing more specific, detailed measures for achieving world peace were coded into one of the *prerequisites for peace* subcategories: (a) *philosophical principles*, (b) *prosocial actions*, (c) *governmental actions*, or (d) *antisocial actions*.

The *philosophical principles* subcategory was used to capture responses referring to moral or ethical principles as the best way to achieve peace or indicating that a new mindset was necessary to achieve peace. The *philosophical principles* subcategory included another level of subcategories to allow a greater degree of specificity in coding philosophical themes; specifically, the subcategories for *philosophical principles* were *positive interpersonal*

values (such as respect, love, trust, or specifically *understanding/acceptance*), *inner peace*, *religion/spirituality*, or *equality*.

Prosocial actions (i.e., general positive ways to achieve peace) emerged as another major thematic subcategory for *prerequisites for peace*. This *prosocial actions* subcategory included another level of subcategories: (a) *pragmatic solutions* (for responses focusing on concrete actions such as education or aid as steps toward peace), (b) *elimination of global obstacles* (practical strategies specifically recommending rectifying global hardships such as poverty and hunger), (c) *interaction* (references to communication, cooperation, or cultural exchange), (d) *unification* (responses emphasizing the importance of community relations and bringing people together), and (e) *social justice* (responses emphasizing fairness.)

Many of these subcategories included an additional level of subcategories. For example, the *interaction* subcategory included a further subcategory labeled *elimination of negative interactions*, used to code responses indicating that peace cannot be achieved, while war, hate, and/or violence are allowed to prevail. The *social justice* subcategory included the following more specific subcategories: *human rights*, *economic fairness* (such as the redistribution of wealth), and *elimination of social injustice* (eradication of injustices such as corruption).

The *constructive government/political action* subcategory referred to positive action toward achieving peace utilizing governing bodies and institutions. This subcategory also included an additional level of subcategories denoting (a) *diplomacy*, (b) *global/political change* (positive actions made globally or by governments toward achieving peace, or specifically citing *equality among nations*), and (c) *elimination of negative political motivations* (putting an end to greed and corruption within governments).

Conversely, the major category *antisocial action* was created to account for responses that emphasized harmful methods of achieving peace. This category also had several subcategories: (a) *force/control* (use of power, negative governmental actions, or armed military strategy) and (b)

population adjustments (changing or removing a subset of a population or all humankind, including *violent elimination* of the population/subset of the population.)

Lastly, *recognition of multiple possibilities* referred to responses stating that there are many ways to achieve peace. Responses indicating that the participant was unsure of how best to achieve peace were coded as *uncertain of ways*. For a full explanation of *achievability and prerequisites* themes, see the introductory methods chapter of this section, Chap. 32, in this volume.

Frequency of Focus on Achievability Themes

Thirty-nine percent of all responses coded with the *achievability and prerequisites* system focused specifically on *achievability*. Although exemplars of all the subcategories were identified in the responses, only those themes that comprised at least 5% of the *achievability and prerequisites* codeable units are discussed.

The most common theme relevant to the *achievability* of peace was *identifying reasons* why peace is unachievable which comprised 18% of all *achievability and prerequisites* responses and 45% of the *focus on achievability* responses. These rationales for why peace is unachievable included a wide range of possibilities. For example, a 35-year-old woman from Greece acknowledged that world peace is “very difficult to happen, if not impossible, as long as there are financial interests.” Additionally, a 20-year-old woman from Slovenia said that “there are too many different people, opinions, so it is hard to achieve equality and unity.” The second most utilized *focus on achievability* theme was *unachievable*, which accounted for 7% of the responses coded for *achievability and prerequisites* and 19% of the *focus on achievability* responses. Responses were coded into the *unachievable* subcategory if they rejected the idea of achieving peace all together, without supplying possible reasons as to why it is unachievable. For example, a 21-year-old woman from Greece simply stated that she “believes there is no way” to achieve peace. Additionally a 46-year-old woman from Slovenia

stated “if we look from past experience, I’m afraid it [peace] is not possible.” Lastly, responses indicating peace was the *ideal* constituted 5% of all *achievability and prerequisites for peace* responses and 13% of *focus on achievability* responses. This theme was expressed by an 18-year-old woman from Russia who succinctly said achieving peace is “utopic.” Similarly, a 23-year-old man from Russia stated that peace could be achieved “because everything is possible.”

Frequency of Prosocial Action Themes

The most common theme among the *prerequisites for peace* responses was *prosocial actions*, which accounted for 25% of the entire *achievability and prerequisites* response set, and 58% of the responses coded specifically for *prerequisites for peace*. These responses indicated that peace could be actualized through some form of positive action. Although *prosocial actions* included a number of subcategories, all of which were utilized at least once, only those themes reaching a threshold of at least 5% of all the *achievability and prerequisites* codeable units are discussed. Thirty-three percent of the *prosocial action* responses were coded into the *interaction* subcategory, which applied to responses that mentioned positive interpersonal actions such as cooperation and communication. For example, a 55-year-old Russian woman suggested that “open communication of people from around the world” could facilitate peace. Similarly, according to a 35-year-old Greek woman, “dialogue-communication. Will for cooperation. To be aware of other cultures, ethics and customs. Individuals’ education in peaceful conflict resolution” are vital to making peace a reality. The next most common *prosocial* theme cited *pragmatic solutions* (such as education or aid) as the optimal way to achieve peace. Twenty percent of *prosocial action* responses referred to utilizing *pragmatic solutions* to achieve peace, such as “education on the level of mutual cooperation,” as suggested by a 41-year-old Slovenian woman. A 21-year-old Russian woman added that “education of mentally

healthy and responsible people. Conflictology and political science spread of knowledge. Tolerance education” is vital to the pursuit of peace. *Elimination of negative interactions*—recognizing the hindering effect of negative forces (such as violence or hate)—was the next most commonly used subcategory, making up 19% of all *prosocial action* codes. A 20-year-old woman from Russia said “destroying all weapons” could bring about peace. Additionally, a 24-year-old Slovenian man stated “peace means absence of violence in each part of society in the world.” Table 35.7 provides additional examples of prosocial action responses.

Frequency of Constructive Government/Political Action Themes

Responses that indicated that *governmental* actions could most effectively bring about peace constituted 14% of all *achievability and prerequisites* responses. General reference to governing bodies as important in the pursuit of peace fell into *constructive government/politics*, which accounted for 27% of all *government/political action* responses. For example, a 52-year-old Slovenian man said “right leaders should be chosen” in order to bring about peace. Similarly, a 19-year-old Russian woman cited “to elect very good governments everywhere” as a way to achieve peace. *Global/political change* and *diplomacy* themes each comprised 26% of *government/political action* codes. *Global/political change* is more specific than *government/political action*, referencing specific action that could be taken by governing bodies, as opposed to just citing political/governing institutions. A 54-year-old Russian man illustrated this subcategory when he suggested that if governments “do not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries,” peace could be achieved. Additionally, a 21-year-old Greek woman stated that “the governments and the superiors should change” in order facilitate world peace. The subtheme of *diplomacy* was demonstrated by a 70-year-old Russian woman who said peace could be achieved “on the basis of international treaties.” Additionally, a

Table 35.7 Percentages and examples of the most frequently identified prosocial actions categories

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Prosocial actions</i>					
Interaction	8(14)(33)	Russia	27	F	“The efforts of all, negotiations”
		Slovenia	55	M	“Conversation, negotiation”
Elimination of negative interactions	5(8)(19)	Russia	20	U	“To destroy the myth that every conflict should be decided with weapons. To find constructive decisions”
		Slovenia	58	F	“To prevent wars”
Pragmatic solutions	5(9)(20)	Greece	38	M	“It is a matter of education, and I hope that every achievement is transferred to the next generations. However, we also learn through our history”
		Slovenia	50	F	“Education of poor areas helps in production and remaking”

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the entire response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the prerequisites for peace category. The third number (also in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the prosocial actions category
M male, *F* female, *U* unspecified

Table 35.8 Percentages and examples of the most frequently identified governmental actions categories

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Constructive government/political actions</i>					
Constructive government/political action	4(6)(27)	Greece	46	M	“International community and law”
		Russia	21	F	“Competent government”
Global/political change	4(6)(26)	Slovenia	57	M	“To put in president or leader’s chairs people who want peace, also more women”
		Russia	54	F	“To stop aggression and invent peaceful politics”
Diplomacy	4(6)(26)	Slovenia	84	M	“World leaders should make an agreement”
		Greece	35	F	“Perhaps with the assistance of the international organizations for the defense of peace, dialogue, and diplomacy”

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the entire response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the prerequisites for peace category. The third number (also in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the governmental actions category
M male, *F* female

60-year-old Greek man who suggested that “dialogue—appeal to international organizations, i.e., UN” could bring about peace. For more examples, refer to Table 35.8.

Frequency of Philosophical Principles

Philosophical principles constituted 14% of all the *achievability and prerequisites* responses. Only the responses coded into the subcategory for *understanding/acceptance* reached the criterion of at least 5% of the *achievability and pre-*

requisites responses (comprising 5% of the codeable units), so is the only subcategory we discuss here. Responses coded for *understanding/acceptance* cited tolerance for the diversity of human life as the driving force behind achieving peace. Examples are provided by a 21-year-old Russian man exemplified this subtheme as he stated “world peace can be achieved only if all people realize that human life is unique and no one has the right to kill.” Additionally, a 51-year-old woman from Slovenia said “tolerance toward different people and their customs” could help make the world more peaceful.

Table 35.9 Percentages and examples of the most frequently identified philosophical principles and antisocial actions categories

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Philosophical principles</i>					
14					
Positive interpersonal values					
2(4)(18)					
Understanding/acceptance	5(9)(38)	Russia	21	F	“If people are tolerant to each other”
		Russia	20	F	“Recognition of differences between nations, cultures, etc.”
<i>Antisocial action</i>					
5					
Population adjustments					
	3(5)(51)	Russia	20	F	“In a case if the mankind will disappear”
		Russia	21	F	“If there are no people”

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the entire response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the prerequisites for peace category. The third number (also in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the philosophical principles and antisocial categories, respectively
M male, *F* female

Frequency of Antisocial Actions Themes

Antisocial actions was the least common subcategory of *prerequisites for peace*, comprising only 5% of the total *achievability and prerequisites* responses. For this reason, only the most common *antisocial actions* subcategory, *population adjustments* (3% of all codeable units and 51% of the *antisocial action* responses) is discussed here. Although all *antisocial* themes emphasized negative actions, responses coded for *population adjustments* imply that an end to all or part of the human population is necessary to obtain peace. A 20-year-old Russian man stated peace can only be achieved the public reverts “back to the primitive life.” While an 18-year-old woman from Russia stated that peace can be actualized after “all people perform an operation on their brains that they become kind altruists.” See Table 35.9 for additional examples of philosophical principles and antisocial action responses.

Exploratory Demographic Analyses of Achievability and Prerequisites Themes

Exploratory chi-square tests and Fisher’s exact t-tests were again used to examine the possibility that the different *focus on achievability and prerequisites for peace* themes vary in relation to demographic characteristics (gender, military service, relative’s military service, protest partic-

ipation). At the marginal significance level (*p*-value is between 0.051 and 0.10), proportionally, more participants with a military background than those without such a background saw achieving peace as a *work in progress*, and proportionally more respondents without military relatives than those with military relatives used at least one of the *focus on achievability* themes. Additionally, a significantly higher proportion of respondents without a military relative deemed peace *unachievable* as compared to respondents with a relative in the military. Involvement in peaceful protest also seemed to affect the use of any of the *focus on achievability* and *unachievable* themes. A significantly greater proportion of non-protestors than protestors gave at least one example of an *achievability* theme but doing so in particular by describing peace as *unachievable*. See Table 35.10 for a summary of the chi-square analyses for *achievability*.

Group differences were found among all four demographic groups regarding the use of *prosocial action* themes. A number of marginally significant differences were observed between men and women. Specifically, the proportion of women who gave at least one *prosocial* theme was marginally higher than the proportion of men who did so. Also at the marginal significance level, proportionally more women than men emphasized the importance of implementing *pragmatic solutions* to achieve peace, while proportionally more men than women emphasized

Table 35.10 Focus on achievability: Percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Category	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	X ²
	<i>Military</i>	<i>Nonmilitary</i>	
<i>Focus on achievability</i>			
<i>Achievable</i>			
Work in progress	7	3	3.57 ^{ab}
	<i>Relative in military</i>	<i>No relative in military</i>	
<i>Focus on achievability presence</i>			
<i>Unachievable</i>	71	83	3 [^]
	13	25	5*
	<i>Protest</i>	<i>No protest</i>	
<i>Focus on achievability presence</i>			
<i>Unachievable</i>	62	75	4.28*
	3	17	8.62**

If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference. "Presence" indicates that that participant provided a response that was coded for that category and/or one of its subcategories. ^b Fisher's exact test

[^]0.05 < *p* < 0.1; **p* ≤ 0.05; ***p* ≤ 0.01

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percentage of respondents that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

the importance of *eliminating global obstacles* in the pursuit of peace. At a 0.05 level of significance, proportionally more women than men stressed the need for positive *interactions* to make peace a reality. A significantly higher proportion of respondents who had served in the military argued for the *elimination of global obstacles* than did those without military experience, and a marginally greater proportion of those who had served in the military provided responses coded for one or more of the *prerequisites for peace*. At the marginal significance level, proportionally more respondents with a relative in the military than their counterparts gave at least one example of a *prerequisite for peace*. A significantly higher proportion of protestors than non-protestors gave at least one example of a *prerequisite for peace*. Furthermore, a significantly higher proportion of protestors than non-protestors gave at least one example of a *prosocial action* theme, particularly *pragmatic solutions, unification, and social justice*. Table 35.11.

Significant differences were also uncovered in regard to *antisocial* themes. Proportionally, more men than women utilized any of the *antisocial* themes, particularly emphasizing the need for an outside party to use *force/control* to obtain peace. Proportionally, more participants with a military

background also cited *force/control* significantly more than their counterparts. Table 35.12.

Significantly more women than men referenced the *philosophical principle of inner peace*, but military service was the most significant factor impacting the use of *philosophical principle* themes in responses. Proportionally more participants with military experience, when compared to their nonmilitary counterparts, cited any of the *philosophical principle* themes in their responses. Of the *philosophical principle* themes, the subcategory, *positive interpersonal values*, and the umbrella category, *philosophical principles*, were used significantly more by those who had served in the military than by those who had not. Use of *positive interpersonal values* was also significantly affected by a having a relative in the military. Proportionally more participants without a relative in the military stressed *positive interpersonal values* as a way to achieve peace than their counterparts. Table 35.13.

There were also a number of statistically significant group differences in regard to *governmental action* themes uncovered in responses. Proportionally more protestors than non-protestors cited any of the thematic categories pertaining to *governmental action*. In particular, proportionally more protestors than their counterparts referenced

Table 35.11 Prosocial actions: Percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Category	Group 1 ^a <i>Female</i>	Group 2 ^a <i>Male</i>	X ²
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>			
<i>Prosocial action presence</i>	38	29	3.48 [^]
Pragmatic solutions	10	5	3.56 [^]
Elimination of global obstacles	0	2	4.4 [^]
Interaction	17	7	8.17 ^{**}
	<i>Military service</i>	<i>No military service</i>	
<i>Prerequisites for peace presence</i>	72	61	3.33 [^]
<i>Prosocial actions</i>			
<i>Pragmatic solutions</i>			
Elimination of global obstacles	4	0	10.57 ^{**b}
	<i>Relative in military</i>	<i>No relative in military</i>	
<i>Prerequisites for peace presence</i>	69	56	3.35 [^]
	<i>Protest</i>	<i>No protest</i>	
<i>Prerequisites for peace presence</i>	82	63	9.01 ^{**}
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>	3	0	9.26 ^{**b}
<i>Prosocial actions presence</i>	52	32	8.78 ^{**}
Pragmatic solutions	17	8	4.40 [*]
Unification	8	2	4.81 ^{**b}
Social justice	5	.3	9.02 ^{**b}

If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference. “Presence” indicates that the participant provided a response that was coded for that category and/or one of its subcategories

[^]0.05 < p < 0.1; *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percentage of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^bFisher’s exact test

Table 35.12 Antisocial actions: Percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Category	Group 1 ^a <i>Female</i>	Group 2 ^a <i>Male</i>	X ²
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>			
<i>Antisocial action presence</i>	5	13	7.69 ^{**}
<i>Antisocial action</i>	0	2	5.87 ^{**b}
Force/control	.4	3	5.96 ^{**b}
	<i>Military service</i>	<i>No military service</i>	
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>			
<i>Antisocial action</i>			
Force/control	6	.3	13.15 ^{**b}

If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference. “Presence” indicates that the participant provided a response that was coded for that category and/or one of its subcategories

*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percentage of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^b Fisher’s exact test

Table 35.13 Philosophical principles: Percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Category	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	X ²
	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>			
<i>Philosophical principles</i>			
Inner peace	3	0	4.89 ^{*b}
	<i>Military service</i>	<i>No military service</i>	
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>			
<i>Philosophical principles presence</i>	28	18	3.84 [*]
<i>Philosophical principles</i>	11	5	4.04 [*]
Positive interpersonal values	10	3	6.34 ^{*b}
	<i>Relative in military</i>	<i>No relative in military</i>	
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>			
<i>Philosophical principles</i>			
Positive interpersonal values	1	9	8.16 ^{*b}

If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference. "Presence" indicates that the participant provided a response that was coded for that category and/or one of its subcategories

* $p \leq 0.05$

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percentage of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^bFisher's exact test

Table 35.14 Governmental action: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Category	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	X ²
	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>			
<i>Constructive government/political action</i>			
Elimination of negative political motivation	4	.6	4.68 ^{*b}
	<i>Relative in military</i>	<i>No relative in military</i>	
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>			
<i>Constructive government/political action</i>			
	9	2	3.52 ^{^b}
	<i>Protest</i>	<i>No protest</i>	
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>			
<i>Constructive government/political action presence</i>			
<i>Constructive government/political action</i>	33	20	5.8 [*]
<i>Global political change</i>	17	5	11.43 ^{**b}
Equality among nations	8	3	3.17 ^{^b}

If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference. Presence indicates that the participant provided a response that was coded for that category and/or one of its subcategories

[^]0.05 < $p < 0.1$; * $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percentage of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^bFisher's exact test

constructive government/political action. At a marginally significant level, proportionally more protestors than non-protestors insisted that *equality among nations* must be reached before peace can be achieved. A significant group difference among men and women emerged in regard to the rate at which *elimination of negative political motivation* was mentioned as an appropriate avenue to achieve peace. Specifically, proportionally more women than men emphasized the need for *negative political motivation* to be eliminated in order for peace to be obtained. Finally, at a marginally significant level, proportionally more respondents with a relative in the military than their counterparts called for *constructive government/political action* in the pursuit of peace. Table 35.14.

Discussion and Conclusions

Albert Bandura's theory of moral disengagement proved to be a very useful conceptual framework for analyzing Russian and Balkan Peninsula responses concerning the achievability of peace. It is particularly encouraging that the framework seemed to work equally well in the analysis of the four very different countries, with different positions in the international community, different levels of development, and differences in political culture and current politics. It is also encouraging that in this diverse and recently troubled region of the world, the majority of respondents expressed views about the achievability of peace that were characterized by humanitarian engagement. Moreover, it is quite interesting that more than a quarter of these humanitarian engagement responses identified governments as appropriate institutions for achieving peace.

Beliefs in the achievability of peace are encouraging in part because they indicate that political elites do not have unlimited ability to generate hatred and violence by attempting to dehumanize whole groups of people from some country or religion. The roots of problems in international politics and the current lack of world peace do not lie in the views of the major-

ity of ordinary people but in the interests of those in power, who often unite to trample on human rights, exploit and devastate natural resources, conspicuously display military power, etc. Although some of our respondents appeal to governments to promote peace, many others are skeptical about the role of governments in achieving peace and instead emphasize education, interpersonal values such as collaboration, the promotion of equal rights, diplomacy, global political change, and recognition and respect of differences among nations and cultures.

Despite the optimism and suggestions apparent in the responses of many of our participants, the best way to achieve peace remains elusive. All the great religions and many philosophers, diplomats, and other thinkers have offered suggestions as to how to achieve universal peace. Unfortunately, many injustices continue to be apparent in everyday life, and it is probably necessary to address those injustices, oppressions, and inequalities if lasting peace is to be achieved—as Galtung (date) has suggested. Many people, throughout history, have struggled to create a better world. Should Gandhi be the model for achieving peace? Or is aggression an inherent and inseparable part of human nature, as gloomily concluded by Freud? Or was Margaret Mead correct when she suggested that human beings will find a way to eradicate wars, just as they eradicated some previously lethal diseases? It is not possible to answer these questions at the moment, but our findings confirm the importance of peace to the great majority of ordinary people from Russia, Greece, Slovenia, and Serbia, as well as considerable faith that war is not indeed the necessary route to peace.

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Middle East Perspectives on the Achievability of Peace

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Lane Smith, Tristyn Campbell, Raja Tayeh,
Heyam Mohammed, Rouba Youssef, Feryal Turan,
Irene Colthurst, Alev Yalcinkaya, William Tastle,
Majed Ashy, Abdul Kareem Al-Obaidi,
Dalit Yassour-Boroschowitz, Helena Syna Desivilya,
Kamala Smith, and Linda Jeffrey

Although the Middle East has endured many armed conflicts throughout the centuries, and much of the aggression has come from imperialist or oil-seeking nations outside the region, it is likely that when people today think about the possibility of peace in the Middle East, they think about various forms of the “Arab-Israeli conflict.”

What they often do NOT think about is the extent to which Israel has already achieved peace with some of its Arab nations. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s decision to recognize and then enter into negotiations with Israel in 1977 repre-

L. Smith (✉)
Senior Research Scholar (Retired),
University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
e-mail: lanesmith0@gmail.com

T. Campbell
Psychology Department, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA
e-mail: tcams@gmail.com

R. Tayeh
Director of Institutional Research, Doane College,
Crete, NE, USA
e-mail: rtayeh@unlserve.unl.edu; raja.tayeh@doane.edu

H. Mohammed
Department of Curriculum and Instruction,
College of Education, Kuwait University, Kuwait
e-mail: mobarak1955@msn.com

R. Youssef
Psychology, University of Rhode Island,
Kingston, RI, USA
e-mail: rosyrouby@hotmail.com

F. Turan
Department of Sociology, Ankara University,
Ankara, Turkey
e-mail: feryalturan@yahoo.com

I. Colthurst
Department of International Relations, San Diego
University, San Diego, USA
e-mail: irenecolth@gmail.com

A. Yalcinkaya
Department of Psychology, Yeditepe, Istanbul, Turkey
e-mail: yalcinkaya@prodigy.net;
ayalcinkaya@yeditepe.edu.tr

W. Tastle
Ithaca College of Business, New York, USA
e-mail: tastle@ithaca.edu

M. Ashy
Psychology Department, Bay State College,
Boston, MA, USA

A.K. Al-Obaidi
Institute of International Education, New York, NY, USA
e-mail: kareemobody60@yahoo.com;
kareemobaidi@gmail.com

D. Yassour-Boroschowitz
Department of Human Services,
Emek Yezreel College, Israel
e-mail: DalitY@yvc.ac.il

H.S. Desivilya
Department of Sociology and Anthropology,
Yezreel Valley College, Emek Yezreel, Israel
e-mail: desiv@yvc.ac.il

K. Smith
Behavioral Health Analyst, Abt Associates,
Cambridge, MA, USA
e-mail: kamala_smith@abtassoc.com

L. Jeffrey
College of Education, Rowan University, Glassboro,
NJ, USA
e-mail: jeffrey@rowan.edu

sented a major turning point in modern Middle Eastern history: an official peace process between the Jewish state and an Arab country. He was hailed in the West as a peacemaker, while his standing with the Egyptian people, and especially the rest of the Arab world, declined. Not only did Sadat lose the goodwill he had garnered through fighting the October 1973 war, but his actions contributed to the resurgence of Islamic radicalism in Egypt. Yet he foresaw longer-term benefits to the country from the peace process, and as an ardent nationalist first and foremost, he chose to place those rewards before concerns over the negative regional consequences, and short-term domestic backlash, of the shift in policy (BBC, 1977).

Egypt is the most populous Arab country, and is a militaristic, ideological, and cultural leader of the Arab world, heightening the importance of the crucial first case of Israeli-Arab peacemaking. Therefore, there was a significant Arab backlash against Sadat in the wake of the peace treaty with Israel. Egypt was expelled from the Arab League, and calls went out for Sadat's assassination. Two years later, that assassination was carried out (Kamrava, 2011), but peace between Israel and Egypt survived. Trade cooperation, most notably in the form of Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs), was part of the peace deal, and the economic record of recent decades shows that the hoped-for economic integration – based on the theory of international political economy that countries with healthy trading relationships do not go to war against each other – has materialized, at least in terms of trade, although there is a strong perception to the contrary (Sullivan, 1999).

The relationship between Jordan and Israel has had a similar trajectory, at least vis-a-vis economic relations. Jordan, which lost the West Bank to Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War, faced a fundamentally different challenge in coming to the peace table – a massive flow of refugees from the West Bank had completely altered the country's demographics, even as its territory had been reduced. The war increased Jordan's Palestinian refugee population by 43% (U.S. Department of State, 2011). "Back-channel" negotiations between Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom began in 1987, which led to a formal declaration

the next year renouncing any Jordanian claim to the West Bank (Kifner, 1988). Negotiations culminated in a peace treaty 7 years later.

The Madrid-Oslo process itself followed in 1993 and was made possible by two developments in conventional power politics: the breakup of the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf War. The USSR's breakup removed the bipolar capitalism-communism ideological frame from the region, allowing the United States and Russia to coordinate their efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. That conflict, like the others in the region, could once again be approached as a unique confluence of religio-nationalism and contested sovereignty, as opposed to being pigeonholed into one or the other side of the superpowers' grand ideological contest. For the regional powers, the Gulf War created a moment of existential crisis: one Arab country invading another. Moreover, there was the real fear that Saddam Hussein (the Iraqi President) would not be satisfied with invading Kuwait. Moreover, the Palestinian *intifada* ("shaking off") which broke out at the end of 1987 also served as an especially decisive factor – of which students of peacebuilding should take special note (Arnoff & Aronoff, 1998). This uprising was mostly nonviolent, but notably involved the development of Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement. This development

turned the *intifada* into an armed struggle and challenged PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] dominance, further contributed to perception that the Palestinian rejection of autonomy under the Camp David agreements had been a missed opportunity, and another missed opportunity could be fatal to the Palestinian national moment. (Arnoff & Aronoff, 1998, p. 12)

"As much as any other factor, this growing sentiment among Palestinians convinced Israelis that the Palestinian public was now ripe for substantive discussions toward a *modus vivendi*" (Aronoff & Aronoff, 1998, p.12). That the development of an armed insurgent ("terrorist") group could play any sort of constructive role in laying a popular groundwork for peace will strike many as counterintuitive at best and offensive at worst. Yet, understanding the nature

of conflict resolution in this region involves acknowledging the role played by armed insurgents.

The Madrid conference (cosponsored by the United States and the USSR) involved not only Israeli and Palestinian delegates but also representatives from Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, with negotiations continuing through the signing of the peace treaty with Jordan. Also influential was Israel's recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Organization as the basis of the Palestinian Authority, an unprecedented on-the-ground proto-government (Owen, 2000). The United States was conspicuous throughout, marking its reentry into the contested role of mediator-partner, symbolized by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Arafat's iconic handshake in the Rose Garden after signing the Oslo Accords.

Students of peacemaking must be aware of the degree to which these processes were conceived, directed, and driven by regional elites. Sadat did not consult the Egyptian people before he went either to Jerusalem or to Camp David. King Hussein of Jordan did not explain to his people, two-fifths of whom were refugees as a result of Israeli seizure of their lands, that he was going to forge a peace treaty with Israel. The public of these two countries, who formed a considerable portion of what was then termed "the Arab Street," were simply not part of the equation. These peace treaties were thus not made between the Israeli people and the Egyptian or Jordanian peoples; they were agreements between ruling elites, with only one side possessing democratic legitimacy. The public opposition to the treaties, particularly in Jordan's case, resulted in a regime crackdown on the democratizing public sphere (Lynch, 2012). This is a dynamic that has had negative consequences for the peace itself.

Grassroots Palestinian support for the Madrid-Oslo process must be considered in a somewhat different light – Chairman Arafat was, after all, a former resistance fighter with considerable popular legitimacy. On the other hand, due to the unique political nature of the Israel-Palestine conflict – state actor vs. substate actor, existential, zero-sum, the use of guerrilla tactics, and the lack of an institutionalized cease-fire or *modus*

vivendi agreement until 1988 – the Palestinian people were seemingly further away from an orientation toward a peace settlement than any other Arab public (Buchanan, 2000). Moreover, the Palestinian cause is central to modern Arab identity. Thus, it is important to consider how ordinary Palestinians viewed the Oslo Accords, both as part of the specific peace process and as a basis for understanding grassroots attitudes toward peacemaking across the modern Arab world.

In contrast to the internationally mediated Madrid-Oslo process, the end of the Lebanese Civil War, culminating in the Ta'if Agreement of 1989, was a model intra-Arab peacemaking initiative – heavily leavened with *realpolitik*. As Krayem (2003) explains,

Iraq, free from the pressure of the war with Iran, intervened in support of General Aoun and the Lebanese Forces and against Syria. This could have led to an escalating regional conflict between Iraq and Syria; therefore, the Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, held a summit meeting in Casablanca and formed a Tripartite Committee composed of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, King Hassan of Morocco, and President Shadli Ben Jedid of Algeria to deal with the Lebanese crisis. (Sect. 2, para. 17)

The process was instructive, showing that the regional powers did not need the mediation assistance of the superpowers in order to arrive at a resolution, if admittedly flawed, to a regional conflict. The Saudi leadership is also noteworthy, as the traditional rationale for the domestic and regional legitimacy of the House of Al-Sa'ud had been to that point based nearly exclusively on the custodianship of Mecca and Medina, the two holiest cities in Islam. The Ta'if Agreement represents an early instance in which the Sa'udis sought to play a more active regional role, augmenting their existing influence. Hosting the talks to end one of the longest and most brutal civil wars in the region's modern history was a first step toward the Kingdom exercising diplomatic influence in the Middle East.

The process behind the Ta'if Agreement can in turn be contrasted to arguably the most extreme case of former colonial intervention in the region: the Suez Crisis of 1956. Both Britain and France acted in accordance with their recently colonial

roles, augmented by Israel's support of the old colonial powers. The United States, still relatively new to the role of superpower, was the decisive influence – the Suez Crisis experience and the subsequent stature the Americans gained in the region paved the way for the American leadership roles at Camp David, and in the Madrid-Oslo process.

Yet, this history of state actor peacebuilding should not overshadow regional grassroots conflict resolution efforts. Examples such as the Sunni Awakening movement in Iraq's Al-Anbar province, the One Voice movement in Israel/Palestine (international but with a substantial regional component), the Kefaya movement in Egypt, the Qaba'at movement in Jordan demonstrate that both domestic issues like corruption and regional conflicts can be addressed indigenously without the often ulterior motivations of regional elites or Western powers (Lynch, 2012).

From the Suez Crisis through the Madrid-Oslo process, the legacy of colonialism in the Middle East has influenced regional peacemaking efforts. The conflicts that these peacemaking efforts were addressing were themselves the product of the intersection between local identities and the aftermath of colonial-era policies. In addition to colonial legacies, peacemaking in the Middle East has been heavily influenced by the contrasting efforts of regional leaders and the West, the intersection of elite and grassroots peacebuilding, and of course the centrality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The historical interactions of these various forces has shaped the sociopolitical space available for peacebuilding in the region through the twentieth century. This history illuminates the present-day Middle East and can perhaps offer clues to how peacebuilding will evolve in the region in the coming decades.

Given this history, what might ordinary people from the Middle East, from both Israel and several Arab states, think about the possibility not just of peace in the Middle East but of world peace? In these years of the twenty-first century, are they optimistic? Pessimistic? What are their views regarding the best ways to achieve world peace? These are the questions addressed in this chapter.

Methods

Sample

The Middle East sample consisted of participants from Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). There were 398 respondents, including 196 females, 200 males, and 2 who chose not to disclose their gender. Ages ranged from 18 to 80 years, with a mean of just under 30 years. Of the respondents who answered the demographic questions, 29% had been in the military, 16% had a relative in the military, and 25% had protested against war and in favor of peace.

The Survey

All participants in the study completed the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006) developed by the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP). They completed either a hard copy or an electronic version of the survey. Participants were recruited through several channels, such as personal networking and a survey link posted on various websites. This form of recruitment resulted in a convenience sample, hence the results should be considered exploratory and interpreted carefully. Any generalizations should be made with caution.

For this chapter, we will be looking at participants' responses to two items on the PAIRTAPS regarding the achievability of world peace. The first item asked participants to respond to the statement "I believe world peace can be achieved." Participants were first asked to rate their agreement to the item using a 7-point Likert scale (1 – completely disagree to 7 – completely agree) and then expand upon their rating in their own words. The second item stated, "The best way to achieve peace is..." Participants were asked to complete the statement with whatever methods they

believed would be most effective in achieving peace.

GIPGAP developed a coding manual to organize responses to both of the aforementioned items. The resulting achieving peace coding manual had two systems, both of which are described below. For more information on the PAIRTAPS, Bandura's theory, and the achieving peace coding manual, refer to Chap. 32, the introductory methods chapter of this section of the book.

Coding System I: Constructs Derived from Bandura's Theory of Moral Disengagement

Theoretical Framework

Coding System I was developed using deductive qualitative analysis and grounded theory. When utilizing a deductive qualitative approach, researchers first begin with a conceptual model that is then redefined for the purposes of the study (Gilgun, 2004). The conceptual model in this case was Albert Bandura's theory of moral disengagement (1999), which was expanded to capture the nuances in responses that seemed to reflect the sociocognitive mechanisms of moral disengagement that Bandura identified. Conversely, grounded theory takes an initially atheoretical approach, allowing common themes to be identified from the responses (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Although we used Bandura's theory of moral disengagement as a basis for the development of coding categories, one should not assume that the coded responses indicate that the participants themselves are morally disengaged or morally engaged. Rather, their responses are consistent with the theoretical constructs in Bandura's theory. Accordingly, we refer simply to disengagement and humanitarian engagement in the discussion of results.

Bandura's theory (1999) provides explanations as to why people behave in a manner contradictory to their moral standards. The theory identifies four main methods, along with eight

sociocognitive constructs, that individuals use when selectively disengaging from their morals: (a) cognitive reconstruction of injurious behavior through moral justifications, euphemistic language, and advantageous comparison; (b) removing or obscuring personal agency through displacement or diffusion of responsibility; (c) misrepresenting, minimizing, or disregarding consequences; and (d) devaluing the victim through dehumanization or attribution of blame. Conversely, individuals exhibit moral engagement when their actions align with their moral standards despite external environmental influences that may encourage alternative behavior (Bandura, 2002). Moral engagement is demonstrated by activation of moral agency, either through inhibitive or proactive means. When an individual refrains from behaving inhumanely, he or she exhibits an inhibitive form of moral agency. Proactive moral agency takes this a step farther and is exhibited through behaving humanely.

Agency

Agency Coding Categories

Responses were initially coded for agency, an essential component of moral engagement. Responses were categorized according to *presence of agency*, *absence of agency*, or *not applicable agency*. Responses coded for *presence of agency* described actions that could be taken to achieve peace, either explicitly or implicitly. *Absence of agency* captured responses that denied the achievability of peace or did not show action. Responses coded for *not applicable agency* did not address the prompts. Because respondents often answered both prompts in the same response or repeated the same response for both prompts, responses to the two items were combined and analyzed together.

Frequency of Agency Themes

An overwhelming majority of responses (83% of all responses) were coded for *presence of agency*, while only 17% were coded for *absence of agency*. A 21-year-old Lebanese woman exemplified the

Table 36.1 Examples of responses coded for the agency categories

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Presence of agency</i>	83	Iran	M	55	Eliminate poverty
		Qatar	F	19	Respect of human rights and international treaties
<i>Absence of agency</i>	17	Iraq	M	29	As long as there is idiots in this world who are ruling
		Saudi Arabia	U	22	Has it ever been achieved?

The number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set
M male, *F* female, *U* unknown

Table 36.2 Agency: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Category	Group 1 ^a		χ^2
	Military	Nonmilitary	
<i>Presence of agency</i>	74	87	9.53**
<i>Absence of agency</i>	26	13	9.53**
Category	Protestor		χ^2
	Protestor	Non-protestor	
<i>Presence of agency</i>	88	76	5.23*
<i>Absence of agency</i>	12	24	5.23*

* $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

presence of agency category in her response: “The best way to achieve peace is cooperation between countries.” Although this response does not emphasize personal action, she believes that countries need to be active in the achievement of world peace, clearly describing a peace-promoting action. Another example is provided by a 25-year-old Turkish man who stated that peace could be achieved through “education and teaching people how to think for themselves.” Conversely, a 20-year-old Kuwaiti woman displayed an absence of agency in her response: “The best way to achieve peace does not exist.” The complexities of this coding system are shown in the response of a 36-year-old man from the UAE, who stated, “I still hope that one day, we will have peace across the world.” His response was coded for *absence of agency* because although he expressed hope regarding the achievability of peace, his response provided no evidence of actions that he or others could take to achieve it.

For more examples of responses illustrating the agency coding categories along with basic demographic information, see Table 36.1.

Exploratory Statistical Analyses for Agency

Exploratory chi-square analyses were run to examine the possibility of demographic differences in the expression of agency in responses. The demographic variables studied were (a) gender, (b) military service, (c) relative’s military service, and (d) protest participation. Differences are considered statistically significant if they have a *p* value of less than or equal to 0.05 and marginally significant if they have a *p* value between 0.05 and 0.1. Non-significant results are not reported.

These analyses revealed that a significantly greater proportion of civilians than veterans showed a *presence of agency* in their responses. Conversely, a significantly higher proportion of veterans than civilians gave responses coded for *absence of agency*. A significantly larger proportion of protestors than non-protestors gave *agentic* responses, while a significantly greater proportion of non-protestors than protestors *lacked agency* in their responses. Table 36.2 provides the significant results for the chi-square analyses of the agency coding categories.

Disengagement and Humanitarian Engagement

Disengagement and Humanitarian Engagement Coding Categories

The guidelines for coding responses for disengagement and/or humanitarian engagement themes were also derived from Bandura’s theory. In general, responses were coded for the disengagement categories if they gave reasons why

peace cannot be achieved or offered ways to achieve peace that would be detrimental to society. Informed by moral disengagement theory (Bandura, 1999), we identified five major disengagement categories, reflecting five different forms of social cognition: (a) *rationalization*, to code responses that denied the need for peace; (b) *displacement of responsibility*, for responses that shifted responsibility for achieving peace onto some other entity (subcategory *military/force*); (c) *ignoring consequences of harmful actions*, used to code responses that did not take into effect the consequences of certain aggressive actions; (d) *destructive human nature*, for responses indicating that unfavorable human characteristics made peace impossible; and (e) *attribution of blame* (subcategory *government/political blame*), used to code responses that blamed external events for the unachievability of world peace.

We also identified four humanitarian engagement categories reflecting sociocognitive reasoning in support of achieving world peace; in order for a response to be coded for humanitarian engagement, however, it needed to display agency as well as to imply that peace is achievable. The four major humanitarian engagement categories were (a) *justification*, which was used to code responses that gave general explanations as to why peace is achievable (subcategory *principles/beliefs*); (b) *assumption of responsibility*, which captured responses that described effort taken by the world's population to achieve peace (subcategories *practical strategies*, *governmental responsibility*, and *ineffectiveness of negative relations*); (c) *humanization*, for responses that described positive human characteristics (subcategories *interpersonal concepts/values* and *social equity*); or (d) *removal of blame*, which was used to code responses that mentioned forgiveness or reconciliation.

If a response either did not address the prompt, or simply agreed or disagreed with the achievability of peace and did not elaborate on peace-building mechanisms, it was coded for *not applicable – mechanisms*.

Frequency of Disengagement and Humanitarian Engagement Themes

Seventeen percent of all responses were categorized into the disengagement categories. The most frequently identified disengagement category was *attribution of blame*, which accounted for 42% of the disengaged responses. Oftentimes, responses coded into this category stated that ideological and religious differences hindered the achievement of peace. For example, a 20-year-old woman from Jordan believed that peace will not be achieved any time soon because “religious battles have been going on for years and until people can accept that we all believe in one God whether his name is Jesus or Allah, we will always be at war.” Other responses blamed certain groups of people for interfering with the achievement of peace; for example, an 80-year-old Israeli man said peace could not be achieved because “rich people, who are the opinionated people, use everything to their advantage.” Reasoning consistent with *government/political blame*, a subcategory of *attribution of blame*, was found in 19% of the disengaged responses. Typical responses coded into this category faulted the government, leaders, or other political institutions for making peace unachievable. The answer of a 26-year-old man from Lebanon typified this category when he said, “US imperialist ambitions, China’s economic interests, arms industry in the US and Europe, etc.” were hampering peace efforts.

Responses that emphasized internal attributes that prevented world peace were coded for *destructive human nature*. Thirty-two percent of the disengaged responses were coded for this type of thinking, such as the response of a man from Qatar: “Whatever we do, still there are people who love destruction and ruin lives of others, for example, burglars and criminals.” Another response that cited greed came from a 20-year-old Turkish woman who said, “There will never be world peace as long as there is this great thirst for power and wealth.” Finally, 4% of the disengaged responses were coded for *ignoring consequences of harmful actions*. The response of a 23-year-old Israel woman who stated that peace could be achieved by “moderating the Muslims by global sanctions” did not take into consideration

the negative effects such a suggestion could have on society. Other responses coded into this category suggested killing off certain populations of the world. For more examples of the disengagement categories discussed above, along with basic demographic information, refer to Table 36.3.

Seventy-four percent of all responses were coded for humanitarian engagement. The most frequently seen humanitarian engagement theme was *governmental responsibility*, a subcategory of *assumption of responsibility*, which was identified in 21% of the engaged responses. Responses coded into this category often discussed changes that needed to take place within political institutions before peace can be achieved. A typical response coded into this category was that of a 59-year-old person from Saudi Arabia: “All we need are a bunch of decent human beings [to be] elected to govern the nations across the planet. The UN can mandate a system of conformance for these candidates in order to ensure a minimum standard of decency and honor.” *Assumption of responsibility* accounted for a further 14% of the humanitarian engagement responses. Responses coded into this category described general efforts taken to achieve peace. For example, a 21-year-old man from the UAE said that peace could be achieved, “only if people start to fight against the hate that we feel toward one another.”

Reasoning consistent with the three *humanization* subcategories, *interpersonal concepts/values*, *ineffectiveness of negative relations*, and *social equity*, were found in responses fairly often. *Interpersonal concepts and values* was the second most frequently identified type of humanitarian engagement, accounting for 18% of the humanitarian engagement responses. Typical responses in this category highlighted positive human characteristics necessary to achieve world peace. For example, a 34-year-old woman from Bahrain stated that through “love” world peace could be achieved. Another response from a 58-year-old man mentioned that “forgiveness and cooperation” were necessary for peace to be achieved. (The forgiveness portion of his response was coded for *removal of blame*, which accounted

for 2% of the engaged responses.) Responses that cited the need to eliminate hatred or violence were coded for *ineffectiveness of negative relations*. Seventeen percent of the engaged responses were coded for this category; for example, a 70-year-old man from Israel simply responded that the best way to advance peace was “to not fight.” Finally, *social equity*, used for coding responses that focused on social justice or ending social injustice, accounted for 16% of engaged responses. The response of a 20-year-old Iranian woman typified this thinking when she said, “eliminate poverty.” A 19-year-old man from Lebanon stated that the world needs “justice for all” before world peace can be achieved. Other responses coded into this category mentioned equality, freedom, etc. For more examples of the humanitarian engagement categories and basic demographic information, refer to Table 36.4.

Exploratory Statistical Analyses for the Disengagement and Humanitarian Engagement Coding Categories

Again, chi-squares were run to explore possible demographic differences in the use of the disengagement and engagement categories. Two gender differences emerged in the use of the humanitarian engagement. First, women were marginally more likely than men to *assume responsibility* for achieving world peace. Conversely, a significantly greater proportion of men than women *removed blame* (e.g., recommended reconciliation) in their responses.

Military service proved to be a fairly robust predictor in the use of the disengagement and humanitarian engagement categories. A significantly larger proportion of military respondents than nonmilitary respondents gave at least one response coded for one or more of the *disengagement* categories (i.e., received a code of 1 for disengagement presence). Specifically, a significantly higher proportion of veterans than civilians *ignored the consequences of harmful actions* when recommending ways to achieve peace and *attributed blame* onto external events for hindering the achievement of world peace. Civilians were marginally more likely than veterans to *blame the government or politics*

Table 36.3 Examples of responses coded for the disengagement categories

Category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Disengagement</i>	17				
Destructive human nature	5 (32)	Lebanon	F	20	With the way the world is today and the greed for power and dominance increasing, I do not believe it is possible
		Turkey	M	18	Too much greed
Attribution of blame	7 (42)	Oman	M	19	Disagree because of religion and communities differences
		Jordan	F	32	Due to the presence of several religions
Government/political blame	3 (19)	Bahrain	F	30	I wish that peace be established but there are some parties and governments that love things and control
		Kuwait	M	24	Due to differences in international goals
Ignoring consequences of harmful actions	1 (4)	Israel	M	60	To change the human race – perhaps through the genome project
		Israel	F	22	To kill all those who do anything in order for there to be war

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in the specified category or subcategory out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of the responses in the specified subcategory out of all the disengagement responses

M male, *F* female

Table 36.4 Examples of responses coded for the humanitarian engagement categories

Coding category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Humanitarian engagement</i>	74				
Assumption of responsibility	10 (14)	Israel	M	47	If everyone will truly want it
		Kuwait	F	19	Stop just focusing on the future and trying to better our lives right now, with little steps.
Governmental responsibility	15 (21)	Oman	M	20	By international treaties between countries
		Jordan	F	21	That big countries give up their control over small countries
Interpersonal concepts/values	13 (18)	United Arab Emirates	F	20	LOVE
		Qatar	F	U	Cooperation
Humanization	1 (1)				
Social equity	12 (16)	Kuwait	M	39	The respect of others' rights regardless of their status or value
		Israel	F	48	Economic equality
Ineffectiveness of negative relations	13 (17)	Jordan	F	38	Prohibition of the use of weapons
		Saudi Arabia	U	59	To open all borders and let the earth be treated as everyone's village

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category or subcategory out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of the responses in that category or subcategory out of the humanitarian engagement responses

M male, *F* female, *U* unknown

Table 36.5 Achievability of peace and best ways to achieve peace prerequisites: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Category	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	χ^2
	Male	Female	
<i>Humanitarian engagement</i>			
Assumption of responsibility	17	24	3.01 [^]
Removal of blame	6	2	4.00 [*]
	Military	Nonmilitary	
<i>Disengagement presence</i>			
Ignoring consequences of harmful actions	4	0.4	6.55 ^{*b}
Attribution of blame	25	9	15.86 ^{***}
Governmental/political blame	3	9	3.54 [^]
<i>Humanitarian engagement presence</i>			
Assumption of responsibility	73	85	7.09 ^{**}
Practical strategies	26	17	3.70 [^]
Humanization	12	6	3.38 [^]
Interpersonal values	19	30	4.49 [*]
	Relative military	Nonmilitary relative	
<i>Disengagement</i>			
Attribution of blame			
Governmental/political blame	16	7	3.40 [^]
	Protestor	Non-protestor	
<i>Disengagement</i>			
Attribution of blame			
Governmental/political blame	12	5	3.53 [^]
<i>Humanitarian engagement presence</i>			
Assumption of responsibility	87	75	5.29 [*]
Practical strategies	32	19	5.65 [*]
Governmental responsibility	19	3	16.75 ^{***}
Humanization	34	23	3.72 [^]
Interpersonal values	31	22	2.83 [^]

If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference. "Presence" at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories

[^]0.05 < p < 0.10; ^{*}p ≤ 0.05; ^{**}p ≤ 0.01; ^{***}p ≤ 0.001

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^bFisher's Exact Test

when disagreeing with the achievability of world peace. A significantly higher proportion of civilians than veterans gave at least one example of a *humanitarian engagement* response (i.e., received a score of 1 for humanitarian engagement presence). A significantly larger proportion of nonmilitary respondents than their counterparts mentioned *interpersonal concepts and values* associated with *humanization* in their responses. Conversely, veterans were marginally more likely than those without a military history

to *assume responsibility* for achieving world peace and to recommend *practical strategies*, such as education or aid, as the best way to achieve peace. In regard to relative's military service, respondents with a relative in the military were marginally more likely than their counterparts to give responses coded for *government/political blame*.

Protestors differed from non-protestors in the frequency of the use of a number of disengagement and engagement themes. For example,

protestors were marginally more likely than non-protestors to *blame the government and politics* for hampering peace efforts. A significantly greater proportion of protestors than non-protestors gave at least one example of a *humanitarian engagement* response. Specifically, a significantly larger proportion of protestors than non-protestors *assumed responsibility* to achieve peace and offered *practical strategies* for achieving it. Protestors were marginally more likely than non-protestors to cite *governmental responsibility* and *interpersonal concepts and values* in their responses. Refer to Table 36.5 for the percentages of responses provided by participants in these groups, as well as the chi-square values.

Coding System II: Focus on Achievability and Prerequisites for Peace

The focus on achievability and prerequisites for peace coding system was developed using grounded theory principles only; thus, the categories emerged from the qualitative responses themselves rather than being imposed on them (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

Focus on Achievability

Coding Procedure

Responses that focused on the achievability of world peace were coded into four major categories: (a) *indeterminate achievability*, which referred to responses that mentioned the past or historical events without taking a stance as to whether peace can be achieved; (b) *explicitly achievable*, for responses stating that world peace is achievable (subcategory *work in progress*, sub-subcategory *difficult*); (c) *ideal*, for responses stating that world peace is the desirable condition for the world; and (d) *unachievable* (subcategory *identifying reasons*), for responses stating that world peace will never be attained. Responses that did not address the prompt were coded for *not applicable – achievability or prerequisites*.

Frequency of Focus on Achievability Themes

Twenty-six percent of all responses were coded for these themes. The most commonly identified achievability theme (49% of the achievability responses) was *identifying reasons*, a subcategory of *unachievable*. Responses coded for this category cited reasons why they believed world peace is unachievable. For example, a 23-year-old Turkish woman said, “people are too greedy to achieve it nowadays,” blaming human greed for hindering world peace. Peace as *unachievable* was another fairly common response, accounting for 11% of the achievability responses. Responses coded for this category did not elaborate but simply disagreed with the achievability of world peace. The response of a 22-year-old Jordanian man summed up the responses in this category when he simply stated, “not possible.”

Thirteen percent of the achievability responses mentioned that peace is *ideal*. The response of a 30-year-old woman from Bahrain typified this category: “I wish that peace could be established.” Another 15% of achievability responses stated that peace is *achievable*. For example, a 19-year-old Lebanese woman said, “Yes, I believe world peace can be achieved.” *Work in progress*, a subcategory of *achievable*, was used to code responses that stated peace is achievable but is an ongoing process. This category accounted for 6% of the achievability responses. For example, a 23-year-old Israeli man stated, “I think that the way to peace is still long.” Finally, responses coded for *difficult* to achieve, a subcategory of *work in progress*, stated that peace is achievable, but it will be hard to achieve. This category accounted for 7% of the achievability responses and is typified by a 44-year-old Iranian woman: “Peace is extraordinarily difficult.” For more examples of the aforementioned categories, as well as basic demographic information, refer to Table 36.6.

Exploratory Statistical Analyses for the Achievability Themes

Exploratory chi-square analyses revealed several statistically significant or marginally significant

Table 36.6 Examples of responses coded for the focus on achievability categories

Code	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Focus on achievability</i> 26					
Explicitly achievable	4(15)	Saudi Arabia	U	59	Certainly
		Qatar	F	U	Without doubt
Work in progress	2(6)	Lebanon	F	29	It will be one day when the planet will reach collective enlightenment
		Israel	F	38	The way is still long
Difficult	2(7)	Kuwait	F	25	I do not believe that international peace is easy to obtain
		Oman	M	19	It can be reached, but it is tough
Ideal	4(13)	Saudi Arabia	F	18	I pray it can
		Lebanon	F	34	It should be
Unachievable	3(11)	Israel	F	35	I am not that naïve...
		Oman	M	20	There will not be international peace
Identifying reasons	13(49)	Iraq	M	29	As long as there are idiots in this world who are ruling
		Iran	F	20	No, religious battles have been going on for years

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category or subcategory out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of the responses in the specified subcategory out of all the focus on achievability responses

M male, *F* female, *U* unknown

group differences in the frequency of the different achievability themes. A significantly larger proportion of women than men gave at least one response that was coded into a *focus on achievability* subcategory (i.e., received a score of 1 for focus on achievability presence). A significantly higher proportion of women than men believed peace to be *difficult* to achieve but also argued it was the *ideal* state for the world. In addition, a significantly greater proportion of women than men *identified reasons* they felt made world peace could be unattainable. In regard to military service, a significantly greater proportion of veterans than respondents without a military history gave responses coded for one or more of the *focus on achievability* categories. More specifically, a significantly higher proportion of respondents with military experience than respondents without such experience argued that peace is *unachievable* and *identified reasons* why they believed that sentiment to be true.

Respondents with a relative in the military were marginally more likely than those without a relative in the military to state that world peace is *unachievable*. Protestors were marginally more likely than non-protestors to see peace as a *work in progress* and *ideal*. Finally, a significantly

greater proportion of non-protestors than protestors believed world peace to be *unachievable*. Refer to Table 36.7 for the percentages of responses provided by participants in these groups, as well as the specific chi-square values.

Prerequisites for Peace

Coding Procedure

Responses that mentioned ways to achieve peace were coded as to their specified prerequisites for peace. Prerequisites for peace had four major categories: (a) *philosophical principles*, used to code responses that referred to moral or ethical principles (subcategories were *positive interpersonal values*, which had a further subcategory *understanding/acceptance*; *inner peace*; *religion/spirituality*; and *equality*); (b) *pro-social actions*, which captured responses that mentioned positive actions that must happen before peace can be achieved (subcategories were *pragmatic solutions*, with a further subcategory *elimination of global obstacles*; *interaction*, with a further subcategory *elimination of negative interactions*; *unification*; and *social justice*, with

Table 36.7 A focus on achievability: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Category	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	χ^2
	Male	Female	
<i>Focus on achievability presence</i>	43	62	13.93 ^{***}
Explicitly achievable			
Work in progress			
Difficult	3	8	4.27*
Ideal	6	14	7.48**
Unachievable			
Identifying reasons	19	28	4.06*
	Military	Nonmilitary	
<i>Focus on achievability presence</i>	62	50	4.64*
Unachievable	11	4	7.62**
Identifying reasons	33	22	5.09*
	Relative military	Nonmilitary relative	
<i>Focus on achievability</i>			
Unachievable	7	0.9	4.37 ^{nb}
	Protestor	Non-protestor	
<i>Focus on achievability</i>			
Explicitly achievable			
Work in progress	10	4	3.53 [^]
Ideal	16	9	3.05 [^]
Unachievable	2	12	7.56 ^{**}

If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference. “Presence” at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories

[^]0.05 < p < 0.10; *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^bFisher’s Exact Test

further subcategories *human rights, economic fairness, and elimination social injustice*); (c) *constructive government/political action*, which was used to code responses that referred to government, nations, and other groups (subcategories were *diplomacy; global/political change*, with a further subcategory *equality among nations*; and *elimination of negative motivations*); and (d) *antisocial actions*, which captured responses that gave harmful methods of achieving peace (subcategories were *force/control* and *population adjustments*, which had a further subcategory *violent elimination*). Finally, responses that did not mention specific prerequisites were coded for either *recognition of multiple possibilities* if the response mentioned

there were several ways of achieving peace or *uncertain of ways* if the response mentioned not being sure of the best way to achieve peace. Responses that did not address the prompt were coded for *not applicable – achievability or prerequisites*.

Frequency of Prerequisites for Peace Themes

Seventy-two percent of all the responses in this coding system were coded for the prerequisites for peace categories. Within that 72%, 16% were coded for *philosophical prerequisites*, 38% were coded for *pro-social prerequisites*, 16% were coded for *constructive government prerequisites*, and 1% were coded for *antisocial prerequisites*.

Positive interpersonal values were the most commonly identified *philosophical* prerequisites, accounting for 40% of those responses. Responses coded into this category referred to principles such as respect, love, or compassion as the best way to achieve peace. For example, a 30-year-old Afghan man said, "If there is kindness, then it must be." Responses that mentioned *understanding or acceptance* of others were also fairly common *philosophical* responses, accounting for 26% of those responses. The response of a 28-year-old woman from Israel typified this category when she said, "Understanding those who are similar to us and different from us."

Eliminating negative interactions accounted for 34% of *pro-social* responses. Responses coded into this category mentioned ending hate, conflict, violence, etc. For example, a 28-year-old Jordanian man said, "Do not collect destructive weapons, that is, weapons of mass destruction." Principles of *interaction*, such as cooperation or working together, were mentioned in 21% of the *pro-social* responses. For instance, a 21-year-old man from Bahrain said that "talking and resolving differences" was the best way to accomplish peace. Finally, 10% of the *pro-social* responses mentioned *human rights* issues, arguing that people's inherent rights as human beings must be recognized. The response of a 19-year-old Lebanese woman summed up this category when she said that we must "abide by human rights law completely."

Diplomacy was the most common *constructive government* prerequisite, accounting for 39% of those responses. Responses coded for this category mentioned diplomatic solutions among nations as the best way to achieve peace. For example, a 45-year-old Kuwaiti woman argued for "dialogue between countries." Another common governmental prerequisite was *global or political change*, which was seen in 36% of these responses. For example, a 35-year-old man from Kuwait claimed that the best way to achieve peace was a "commitment toward the principles and international treaties that criminalize wars against countries for any reason."

The most common *antisocial action* response was *population adjustment*: 47% of the *antisocial*

responses fell into this category. For a response to be coded as such, it must have mentioned the need to change or remove certain world populations. For example, an 18-year-old Lebanese man stated that peace could be achieved "by eradicating all Muslims in the world." Refer to Table 36.8 for more examples of the prerequisites for peace categories, along with basic demographic information.

Exploratory Statistical Analyses

Again, exploratory chi-square analyses revealed a number of statistically significant or marginally significant group differences based on demographic characteristics. Women were marginally more likely than men to respond that peace could be achieved through *interaction, economic fairness, and understanding or acceptance*. A significantly greater proportion of women than men mentioned *pro-social actions* in their responses and stated that there must be *global/political change* before peace can be achieved. Men were marginally more likely than women to argue for the necessity of *human rights* in achieving world peace.

A significantly higher proportion of participants who had not served in the military than veterans gave responses coded for at least one of the *prerequisites for peace* coding categories. In addition, more particularly, a significantly greater proportion of respondents without military experience cited *positive interpersonal values, religion or spirituality, elimination of negative interactions, and social justice* than did their counterparts. A significantly larger proportion of veterans than those without a military history offered *philosophical principles, pro-social actions, and pragmatic solutions* as the best ways to achieve peace. Respondents with military service were marginally more likely to give at least one example of *anti-social actions* as compared to respondents without military service. A significantly greater proportion of veterans than those without military experience mentioned *adjusting the population* in order to achieve peace. Additionally, a significantly larger proportion of veterans than civilians were *uncertain of the best way* to achieve world peace. Respondents

Table 36.8 Examples of responses for prerequisites for peace

Coding category	Percent	Country	Gender	Age	Response
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>	72				
Philosophical prerequisites	16				
Positive interpersonal values ^a	6(9)(40)	Lebanon	F	49	Yes, by respecting each other
		Israel	M	33	I simply think that peace can be reached through the education of "love thy neighbor as thyself"
Understanding/acceptance ^a	4(6)(26)	Bahrain	M	25	Common understanding
		Kuwait	F	19	We should strive to teach our kids understanding, and hopefully, they will pass that along to their kids
Pro-social actions	38				
Interaction ^b	8(11)(21)	Oman	M	22	Cooperation and working together
		Iran	F	44	To focus on consensus building
Elimination of negative interactions ^b	13(18)(34)	United Arab Emirates	F	20	Eradicating hate; forgiveness
		Qatar	F	20	When there is no killing
Human rights ^b	4(5)(10)	Afghanistan	M	51	Respect others' rights
		Jordan	F	21	The respect of human rights
Constructive government/political action	16				
Diplomacy	6(9)(39)	Israel	F	35	Diplomacy
		Lebanon	F	25	Cooperation between countries
Global/political change ^c	6(8)(36)	Saudi Arabia	U	59	All we need are a bunch of decent human beings elected to govern the nations across the planet.
		Qatar	M	33	Commitment from all parties to the treaties
Antisocial action	1				
Population adjustment	1 (1) (47)	Israel	M	60	To change the human race – perhaps through the genome project
		Israel	F	23	To moderate the Muslims

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of the responses out of the prerequisites responses. The third number (also in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses out of the philosophical principles, pro-social actions, governmental/political action, and antisocial responses

M male, *F* female

^aPhilosophical principles

^bPro-social actions

^cGovernmental responses

with a relative in the military were marginally more likely than respondents without a relative in the military to cite *economic fairness* and *constructive government/political action* as two of the best ways to achieve world peace.

A significantly greater proportion of protestors than non-protestors gave at least one example of a *prerequisites for peace* response, as well as at least one example of a *philosophical principle*. Protestors were marginally more likely than non-protestors to

Table 36.9 Prerequisites for peace: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values

Category	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	χ^2
	Male	Female	
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>			
Philosophical prerequisites			
Positive interpersonal values			
Understanding/acceptance	7	13	3.69 [^]
Pro-social actions	4	10	5.80 [*]
Interaction	13	19	2.98 [^]
Social justice			
Human rights	12	7	3.37 [^]
Economic fairness	2	5	3.22 [^]
Constructive government/political action			
Global/political change	9	17	6.05 ^{**}
	Military	Nonmilitary	
<i>Prerequisites for peace presence</i>	76	87	6.76 ^{**}
Philosophical principles			
Positive interpersonal values	6	20	11.20 ^{***}
Religion/spirituality	2	7	4.01 [*]
Pro-social actions	12	5	6.67 ^{**}
Pragmatic solutions	12	6	3.38 [^]
Interaction			
Elimination of negative interactions	19	31	5.57 [*]
Social justice	3	9	4.43 [*]
Anti-social action presence	6	2	4.37 ^{^b}
Population adjustment	4	0.9	4.40 ^{^b}
Uncertain of ways	10	4	5.01 [*]
	Relative military	Nonmilitary relative	
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>			
Pro-social actions			
Social justice			
Economic fairness	7	0.9	4.37 ^{^b}
Constructive government/political action	7	0.9	4.37 ^{^b}
	Protestor	Non-protestor	
<i>Prerequisites for peace presence</i>	88	77	4.72 [*]
Philosophical principles presence			
Positive interpersonal values			
Understanding/acceptance	18	11	2.65 [^]
Pro-social actions presence	68	56	3.50 [^]
Pragmatic solutions	19	3	18.94 ^{***}
Interaction	23	14	3.22 [^]
Social justice			
Human rights	12	5	3.53 [^]
Constructive government/political action presence	37	27	3.26 [^]
Global/political change	25	12	7.83 ^{**}
Equality among nations	6	1	4.15 ^{^b}

(continued)

Table 36.9 (continued)

Category	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	χ^2
Uncertain of ways	2	10	6.16**

If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference. “Presence” at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories

[^]0.05 < p < 0.10; * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^bFisher’s Exact Test

view *understanding or acceptance* as the best way to achieve peace, to give responses coded for at least one of the *pro-social action* categories, and to offer *pragmatic solutions* for achieving peace. Furthermore, protestors were marginally more likely than non-protestors to say that *interaction* and respecting *human rights* were necessary efforts in the fight to achieve world peace and to give responses coded for one or more of the *constructive government/political action* coding categories. Specifically, a significantly greater proportion of protestors than non-protestors argued that *global/political change* must happen before peace can be achieved. Protestors were also marginally more likely than non-protestors to believe that there must be *equality among nations* in order to achieve peace. Conversely, a significantly larger proportion of non-protestors than protestors were *uncertain of the best way* to achieve peace.

Refer to Table 36.9 for the percentages of responses provided by participants in these groups, as well as the specific chi-square values.

Discussion

Prospects for Peace in the Middle East

Although the introduction to this chapter focused broadly on modern Middle Eastern history, this discussion session focuses more on the region’s future, particularly in light on the recent Arab Spring. We see in the Middle East responses to the PAIRTAPS strong evidence of humanitarian

engagement in the achieving of peace. Nearly 75% of the responses to the achieve peace items were coded for humanitarian engagement, while only 17% were coded for disengagement. The following humanitarian engagement themes were prominent: assumption of responsibility, interpersonal concepts and values, social equity, ineffectiveness of negative relations, and governmental responsibility – all of which can be seen as forerunners of the values espoused in the Arab Spring and Occupy movements of 2011.

Throughout the winter of 2011–2012, as the anniversaries of the Arab Awakening began to roll by, events evoked Winston Churchill’s 1942 observation, after an important victory: “Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning” (The Churchill Society, 1942). The euphoria of those early “Arab Spring” days beginning with the revolution in Tunisia, then Egypt, Libya, and more recently Yemen, is rapidly dissipating. The excitement is gradually being replaced by a growing disillusion and awareness that years, rather than months, of hard work, tensions, and challenges await the affected countries. Heydemann (2012) said that getting rid of oppressive leaders is the easy part. He noted that Egypt and Tunisia took only a few days, Yemen and Libya a bit longer, but there are ongoing concerns. Specifically, in his view, the societies left behind in the aftermath of the uprisings confront severe legacies, with economies in disarray, national institutions very weak, and civil society in its infancy (Heydemann, para. 2).

Fig. 36.1 The J curve (Bremmer, 2006, pp. 6–7)



Conventional wisdom is that both autocratic, closed regimes and open, maturing democracies may feature high levels of stability and low levels of violence. Transitional eras tend to be the most problematic: “for a country that is ‘stable because it’s closed’ to become a country that is ‘stable because it’s open’, it must go through a transitional period of dangerous instability” (Bremmer, 2006, p. 5). Ian Bremmer described this phenomenon as a “J” curve, drawn on a two-dimensional scale, with the vertical axis depicting stability and the horizontal axis depicting openness (see Fig. 36.1). As countries transition from autocracy to democracy, stability deteriorates, although the degree of deterioration will be different in each country. In successful transitions, the combination of leadership and growing effectiveness of the governance institutions begins to take hold, and stability commences a long, often halting ascent, eventually exceeding previous levels. In cases where the transition fails, the country may disintegrate, as in the Soviet Union.

The J curve aptly describes the situation in the Middle East today. Marwan Muasher (2012) recently characterized the Middle East as falling roughly into three camps – countries already in transition (Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya), countries where the autocratic leadership is on its way out but unwilling to acknowledge it (Syria, Iran), and countries where the autocratic leadership has some remaining margin for maneuver

(Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco). In the four countries moving toward more openness and democratic political systems, the degree of instability and violence ranged from moderate in Tunisia and Egypt to severe in Yemen, to cataclysmic in Libya. Muasher noted that the duration and trauma involved in the recovery toward stability is likely to be directly proportional to the degree of violence.

There are two overlapping challenges to overcome in successfully moving to the right on the J curve: The first is fostering the growth of key governance institutions, including rule of law, legislation, and civil society and the media. These institutions must develop sufficient resilience, flexibility, and capacity to mitigate the tensions and challenges that naturally arise when established autocratic constraints are removed. Laipson (2012) has termed this a matter of construction: “Deconstruction” for those countries where oppressive state institution must be dismantled (e.g., Syria), “reconstruction” where previous democratic institutions and practices need to be reestablished and modernized (e.g., Tunisia), and simply “construction,” where systems must be established from scratch (e.g., Libya).

The second challenge is restoring sustainable Economic growth, key to aiding regime stability (Bremmer, 2006). Countries such as Libya and the Gulf states have resources that enable them to buy time. Most countries, though, such as Egypt,

face a financial crisis that could destroy or severely constrain any economic recovery (Laipson, 2012). Many Middle Eastern youth are poorly educated and ill-equipped to compete in the globalizing economy. Complicating this economic restructuring is the loss of confidence in the “Washington Consensus,” terminology coined in 1989 by the economist John Williamson (1990) to describe economic policy reforms that would help poor countries to achieve sustained economic growth. The “street view” of these reforms is that they were executed without a system of checks and balances and without broad societal support. The poor paid the price while the leaders and elites captured the bulk of the benefits (Muasher, 2012). The Islamist parties that have emerged victorious in Tunisia and Egypt have embraced capitalism as the way forward.

A third important factor is leadership. Most modern Middle East countries appear to lack a charismatic leader, particularly one who has gained stature as a potential leader of reform, or as a face of the opposition who has undertaken great personal risk. Historical examples include Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia, who led the fight for independence against the French and Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia, who fought for independence from the Soviet Union. While the circumstances and times differed and the degree of persecution they suffered varied enormously, each of them maintained a steady focus on the power of the governed to deny power to the governors.

In spite of the deteriorating environment for the cause of independence toward the end of 1937, Bourguiba’s focus remained consistent. He described his strategy to the second congress of the Neo-Destour Party, arguing that independence would occur through one of three processes:

1. A popular, violent, and widespread revolution that toppled the French protectorate
 2. A military defeat suffered by France in a war with another power
 3. A nonconfrontational, step-by-step solution, with the support and guidance of France itself
- The imbalance of forces between the people of Tunisia and France eliminated all chances of a

popular victory. French military defeat would not help independence because Tunisia would fall victim to a new colonialism. The third option was all that remained, and indeed, it was successfully pursued (Belkhdja, 1998).

Vaclav Havel authored a penetrating essay as early as 1978, opening with:

A SPECTER is haunting Eastern Europe: the specter of what in the West is called “dissent” This specter has not appeared out of thin air. It is a natural and inevitable consequence of the present historical phase of the system it is haunting. It was born at a time when this system, for a thousand reasons, can no longer base itself on the unadulterated, brutal, and arbitrary application of power, eliminating all expressions of nonconformity. (Havel, 1978, para. 1)

Conclusion

One expert views the term Arab Spring as misleading, ignoring the rest of the year. Rather, it should be viewed as only one “season” in the “Arab Awakening” (Hadley, 2012). Whatever metaphor is chosen, it is clear that the timeline for Middle Eastern peace will be varied, incorporating both advances and retrenchments. Some newly democratized countries will move ahead steadily while others will face a more tumultuous process as their institutions mature and their economies seek their place in the globalizing world. As a region, however, we may be optimistic about Middle Eastern peace. Bahrain has launched a process seeking to bridge the centuries old divide between the Shi’as and the Sunnis (U.S. Library of Congress, 2012). Oman continues to play a positive role in reaching across this historical divide to Iran and other majority Shi’a countries. Turkey serves as a model of a resilient, maturing Muslim state (although officially secular) and continues to engage deeply in the region in social and economic terms. The Emirates, with all their energy resources, have seen a generational shift, where aging fathers have stepped aside and a younger generation has emerged to begin a steady transformation of their economies and societies. Although these

movements are varied, they share a common forward momentum toward openness and transparency, a possible harbinger of the future of the region.

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African Perspectives on the Achievability of Peace

37

Gabriel Twose, Mahlon Dalley, Jacqueline Akhurst,
Adeniyi Famose, Natoschia Scruggs,
Abdelkader Abdelali, Helena Castanheira,
Eduardo Correia, and William Tastle

Africa is a large, diverse region, and it is difficult to draw meaningful continental generalizations. Nevertheless, this chapter examines some of the factors – historical, sociological, political, or psychological – that contribute to African views on the potential for peace. This introduction is necessarily a broad overview – the reference list should be consulted in order to gain more detail on any of the topics. To illustrate themes, there is an emphasis on the nations from which the sample was drawn – Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, and Zambia – but other countries are mentioned to further explicate ideas where useful.

Division

We will take the nineteenth century “Scramble for Africa” as a continental turning point, and the beginning of our exploration. Formalized at the 1884 Berlin Conference, the major European powers rapidly colonized much of Africa, splitting the territory and resources amongst themselves, ignoring local rule and staking claim to virtually the entire continent. Boundaries were drawn irrespective of cultural groupings, making country-mates out of strangers and tearing apart traditional societies (Meredith, 2005). The untenable result of this European division was conflict between the colonists and the colonized, and among groups in the newly and arbitrarily formed countries.

G. Twose (✉)
Public Interest Directorate, American Psychological
Association, Washington, DC, USA
e-mail: gabe.twose@gmail.com

M. Dalley
Psychology Department, Eastern Washington University,
Cheney, WA, USA
e-mail: mdalley@ewu.edu

J. Akhurst
Department of Psychology, York St John University,
England
e-mail: J.Akhurst@yorksj.ac.uk

A. Famose
Joavic’s Foundation, Nigeria
e-mail: adeniyifamose@yahoo.com;
joavicfoundations@yahoo.com

N. Scruggs
Asylum Division, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Arlington, VA, USA
e-mail: nscruggs@aol.com

A. Abdelali
Department of Political Science, University of Tahar
Moulay, Saida, Algeria
e-mail: abdelaliabk@gmail.com

H. Castanheira
Psychology Department, New School for Social
Research, New York, NY, USA
e-mail: helenacasta@gmail.com

E. Correia
ISCTE Business School in Lisbon, Portugal
e-mail: EduardoC.indeg@netcabo.pt

W. Tastle
Ithaca College of Business, New York, USA
e-mail: tastle@ithaca.edu

Colonial Struggles

Existing African powers did not simply stand by and passively allow themselves to be taken over by the invading colonists. Groups such as the Mandingo (in modern day Cote d'Ivoire), the Dahomey (in modern day Benin), the Mahdists (in modern day Sudan), and the Ashanti (in modern day Ghana) all struggled against European powers. The Ashanti Empire was one of the most powerful West African states from the early eighteenth to the late nineteenth centuries, and fought a series of wars with the British over valuable coastal land. The Anglo-Ashanti wars spanned nearly 75 years of the nineteenth century, and were characterized by a series of early victories for the Ashanti before they finally succumbed to the greater military might of the British (Wilks, 1975). The Ashanti were forced to sign a treaty of protection, and Ghana would not emerge as an independent nation (comprised of several groups, including the Ashanti) until 1957.

Ghana was not the only nation to gain independence during the post-World War II time period. Decades, sometimes centuries, of colonial rule gradually ended with a wave of liberation in the 1950s and '60s. Although a positive move forward, this newfound freedom exacted an immediate cost in the form of violent struggles for independence. For example, in 1954, the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria launched a guerrilla campaign for independence from France, dividing the country between those who wanted freedom and those who wished to remain part of the French Empire (Horne, 1978). The war featured subterfuge, terrorism, torture, extrajudicial killing, and massacres. After 8 years of war, all sides of the conflict agreed to a ceasefire and French President Charles de Gaulle held a 1962 plebiscite to discover the wishes of Algerians, resulting in a nearly unanimous decision to declare independence. Although it is nearly impossible to gain an accurate count of those killed during the war, estimates converge at around 700,000,

not to mention the two million Algerians who were forced to flee into the hinterland, or to relocate to France (Horne, 1978). Although a relatively long time ago, it is likely that colonial struggles impact the opinions of Africans today.

Elite Politics

For a number of reasons, including colonial domination, many African states have not developed effective systems of democracy. Much recent attention was paid to Gaddafi in Libya and Mubarak in Egypt, but the elite domination of the political system has been widespread. Algeria was ruled by a one party state for the first 40 years of independence, as power was passed down to a succession of FLN leaders (Ruedy, 2011). Nigeria, although ostensibly a democracy, has suffered a series of coups and military dictators, including General Yakubu Gowon (1966–1975), General Olusegun Obasanjo (1975–1979), Major General Muhammadu Buhari (1983–1985), and Major General Ibrahim Babangida (1985–1993). Kenneth Kaunda was a dictator in Zambia from 1964–1991, while Jose Eduardo dos Santos has been the non-democratic president of Angola since 1979.

Democracy appears to be gaining currency in Africa, but this is certainly not a universal trend throughout the continent. Botswana, for example, has a history of multiparty pluralism and is often held up as a shining example of African democracy. But some fear that, due to a lack of checks and balances, the ruling party's growing influence is leading to the marginalization of any opposition, and the growing possibility of a more restrictive political system (All Africa News, 2004; Sebudubudu & Osei-Hwedie, 2006). Botswana is far from a dictatorship, but it is worth noting the potentially authoritarian trends in ostensibly democratic societies. Although democracy should not be considered a universally positive solution (e.g., Moran, 2006), if citizens are unhappy with their political system, this may well inform their views on the possibilities of peace.

Racial/Ethnic Divisions

Although South Africa today is a democratic society, nowhere in Africa are racial divisions more pronounced. Colonial conflict took place between settlers and local tribes such as the Xhosa and the Zulu, as well as between competing settler groups during the Boer Wars (1880–1881, 1899–1902). Later, following the National Party's electoral victory in 1948, the divisions among various groups were codified during apartheid, translated as "separateness." Four separate racial groups were established, which eventually became commonly known as white, black, colored, and Indian. Apartheid's aim was the complete separation of blacks and whites. Colored (mixed-race) and Asian people, although discriminated against, were never expelled from the country, and in fact, were eventually granted some degree of political representation. Blacks, though, were denied citizenship and urged to move to economically dependent and politically impotent "homelands" (Gibson, 2004).

In addition to these legal measures, the state engaged in systematic violent repression (including torture, assassination, and murder) against liberation forces. Abuses were carried out primarily by Afrikaner rulers against the black population, but atrocities were committed on all sides. Examples of abuses include beatings, near-strangulation or asphyxiation, segregation, forced relocation, "necklacing" (execution by forcing a tire filled with gasoline around a victim's arm and chest and setting it on fire), and a campaign of landmines and bombing (Krog, 2002).

Although the apartheid system is no longer in existence and South Africa has held open elections since 1994, racial divisions remain prominent. It is increasingly unusual for both black and white South Africans to designate themselves primarily as South African, with many blacks identifying as "African" (Gibson, 2004) and whites also choosing an ethnic identification (Bornman, 2010). Although some racial attitudes are improving, the black majority has become less reconciled with whites (Gibson &

Claasen, 2010) and many black South Africans remain racially isolated. Although most whites support integration in principle, a great many remain opposed to it personally (Durrheim & Dixon, 2010).

While South Africa provides an extreme example, other African nations also suffer racial or ethnic divisions, resulting in part from the short-sighted colonial redrawing of international boundaries. For example, in post-independence Nigeria, there were sharp differences between the primary ethnic groups: the Hausa, the Igbo, and the Yoruba. Political and ethnic tension led to military coups, which engendered more tension, eventually leading to the 1967 secession of the self-proclaimed independent Biafra Republic in the Southeast (Diamond, 1967). The Nigerian state refused to accept the secession, leading to millions killed in a civil war, and the eventual reincorporation of Biafra into Nigeria (Nixon, 1972).

Cultural tensions in Nigeria continue to this day. Nigerian elections tend to revolve around locale, ethnicity, and religion, particularly involving the predominantly Muslim north and predominantly Christian south, partially a result of the colonial-era boundary drawing. In fact, there exists an informal agreement within the ruling party to rotate the Presidency between north and south after two terms in office (BBC News, 2011). However, after the 2010 death of Muslim President Umaru Yar'Adua, Christian Goodluck Jonathan took power, leading to argument over whose turn was next and widespread violence in northern Nigeria. Over 1,000 were killed and more than 74,000 displaced (International Crisis Group, 2011b) before Jonathan was eventually declared the electoral victor. Living through this ethnic and cultural conflict is likely to inform opinions concerning the feasibility of peace.

Resource Conflicts

The exploitation of resources is another common conflict driver in Africa. For example, the Niger Delta provides a large amount of valuable petro-

leum, but benefits have typically not extended to everyday people. The majority of the regional population has grown poorer, particularly as levels of urbanization have increased and the proportion of the population involved in agriculture has decreased. The Nigerian government has been accused of appropriating land without fair compensation and distributing it to oil companies. Peoples such as the Ogoni and the Ijaws claim to have been taken advantage of, leading to the formation of a variety of militias, such as the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force and the Niger Delta Vigilante. Conflict has led to displacement and deaths, with local residents unable to escape the violence (Human Rights Watch, 2005).

Weak States

Partially due to the establishment of such militias, many African nations have at one point or another been considered "weak" or even "failed" in that the government cannot successfully perform its basic functions, leading to the collapse of political order (Zartman, 1995). There have been times when several African states, including both Angola and Nigeria, have ceased to be states in the empirical sense at all: Generally during periods of war, governments have lost complete control over their territory (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982). Even among states that do not reach this extreme, many struggle to fulfill their responsibilities. Liberia, for example, lacks effective security or judicial sectors, which are recognized as primary governmental responsibilities. Peace is currently ensured by the presence of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), as current Liberian institutions are simply not capable of providing security themselves (International Crisis Group, 2011a). The Liberian government officially assumed responsibility for the Armed Forces of Liberia from the United States in January 2011, but the army will not be fully functional until mid-2012, and reports of misconduct and desertions remain common (International Crisis Group, 2011a). Basic training of the Liberia National Police is complete, but reports of bribery, abuse, and human rights viola-

tions are prevalent. The judiciary remains undeveloped, with undertrained, overworked judges, rampant corruption, and inadequate prison facilities (International Crisis Group, 2006, 2011a). If people do not believe that they are safe and that they will be treated fairly, this will almost certainly affect their viewpoints on peace.

Poverty

The structural violence of poverty and inequality is common in Africa. Zambia, for example, although showing strong economic growth in recent years, has an extremely high rate of poverty; 64% of Zambia's population lives below the poverty line (CIA World Factbook, 2011). Moreover, Zambia is ranked 150th in level of development out of 169 ranked countries (United Nations Development Programme, 2010). Other countries, such as South Africa, are far wealthier, but this wealth is not evenly distributed: Since the end of apartheid, the country has enjoyed high economic growth, but income inequality has also grown (Leibbrandt, Woolard, Finn, & Argent, 2010). South Africa now features one of the most unequal income distributions in the world (Landman, Bhorat, van der Berg, & van Aardt, 2003), particularly among black South Africans. The economic strategy of Black Economic Empowerment, aiming to redress some of the inequalities resulting from apartheid, appears to have successfully aided a small number of black South Africans, but has not trickled down to the community as a whole. Poverty and inequality are major conflict drivers, seriously affecting opinions of peace.

Intrastate Conflicts

For many of the reasons described above, several African nations have suffered from nationwide intrastate conflicts. Perhaps the best known is the Rwandan genocide. Resulting in part from the Belgian designations of Tutsi as superior and Hutu as inferior, Rwanda suffered decades of conflict between the two groups, culminating in the 1994

assassination of Hutu President Habyarimana and the reciprocal slaughter of Tutsis and pro-peace Hutus. In just 100 days, between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Rwandans, out of a population of around 5,000,000, were killed – as much as 20% of the Rwandan population. Eventually, the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), led by current President Kagame, managed to defeat the opposing forces (Gourevitch, 1998), many of whom fled to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, contributing to further chaos.

Angola's decades long post-independence civil war provides another prominent example of intrastate conflict. Following its 1975 independence from Portugal, Angola's primary guerilla factions failed to agree to a lasting power-sharing agreement, and the country plunged into nearly 30 years of war, primarily between the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Fighting moved in cycles, broken by periods of fragile peace, eventually resulting in 500,000 killed, a million more displaced, the highest proportion of limbless people in the world, and incalculable economic and infrastructural damage (Pycroft, 1994). The conflict also became tied to war elsewhere in Africa, particularly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Namibia, potentially increasing its influence on African opinions on the possibilities of peace.

Interstate Conflicts

Both the Rwandan and Angolan conflicts fed into war(s) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The Congo Free State, originally colonized by King Leopold of Belgium, was ruled by Belgium until independence in 1960 (Hochschild, 1999). A subsequent power vacuum led to a political crisis eventually resulting in Mobutu Sese Seko's rise to power. Although guilty of human rights abuses, tremendous corruption, and political repression, Mobutu was generally supported by the United States due to his anti-Communist stance, and clung to power for decades (Prunier, 2011).

In 1996, Mobutu was overthrown by Laurent Kabila, who was supported by a Rwandan government angry at Mobutu's perceived support for Hutu militias operating from the Eastern DRC. Fighting quickly resumed after Kabila took power, lasting until 2003 and drawing in Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad, Sudan, and Libya. So all-encompassing was this conflict that it is sometimes referred to as The African World War, and indeed, it was the world's deadliest engagement since World War II. Between 1998 and 2004, when the worst of the fighting occurred, almost four million people died in the Congo (many due to starvation and disease), while millions more became IDPs or refugees (International Rescue Committee, 2006/7). Tension and violence continue today, particularly over the integration of various militias, the exploitation of natural resources, and lingering ethnic tensions. None of the peace agreements have held, and the DRC retains the world's worst rate of sexual violence, as well as poverty, disease and fighting that have led to millions more deaths since the war (International Crisis Group, 2010). This continental conflict cannot help but influence Africans' views on the potential for peace.

Global Politics

Africa has long been a stage for global politics. From the colonial partitioning onwards, world powers have invested in the continent. In the Angolan civil war, both of the primary militias – MPLA and UNITA – were left-leaning, but the former claimed to be Marxist to gain support from the Soviet Union and the latter proclaimed themselves anti-Communist, siding with the United States. Their ploy was successful, as the two global powers invested massive amounts in the war, viewing it as a crucial Cold War battlefield, potentially critical to the international power balance. Partially due to international involvement by the Cold War powers and their allies (such as Cuba and South Africa), the Angolan civil war became one of the most prominent armed conflicts in African history (Pycroft, 1994). The United States and the Soviet Union also became involved

in wars in South Africa, Mozambique, and Namibia, providing funds and weaponry, deepening and prolonging the conflicts.

Foreign involvement today can be military, for example, NATO in Libya (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2011); economic, for example, Chinese investment in Africa, (The Economist, 2011a); or political, for example, China influencing South Africa to deny the Dalai Lama a visa (New York Times, 2011). In some situations, citizens may resent the incursion of external powers into their countries, and in others, they may welcome it. Whether the reaction is positive or negative, the involvement of a globalizing world may well influence opinions of the feasibility of peace.

Methods and Results

Sample

The Africa sample consisted of 201 participants who responded to at least one of the achieving peace prompts. Participants were recruited from: Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, and Zambia. They ranged in age from 18 to 74, with a mean of 35. Fifty-three percent of the respondents identified as women, while 46% identified as men. Only 2% of the sample had served in the military, while 11% of respondents reported having a relative in the military. As with other chapters in this volume, the samples cannot be considered representative of individual countries, or the region as a whole. Our purpose here is to highlight themes relevant to the achievability of peace and the resources considered useful to an effort to advance such a process.

Procedure

To gain a sense of the kinds of reasoning a diverse set of Africans might invoke when thinking about possibilities for peace, participants were recruited through local universities, nongovernmental organizations, personal contacts, networking, and word of mouth. Between 2004 and 2008, respondents

filled in The Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006), which contained two items regarding the achievability of world peace. Participants first indicated their level of agreement with the statement, “I believe world peace can be achieved” using a 1–7 Likert scale, and then explained their rating in their own words. They then responded to the second prompt, “The best way to achieve peace is...” Since many participants responded to both prompts similarly or identically, responses were coded using the same manuals, and results are presented together, without identifying the item to which responses are specifically referring.

Likert Scale Results

One hundred and ninety-one African participants responded to the closed-ended prompt, “I believe world peace can be achieved.” The mean score on the 1–7 scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) was 4.42 ($SD=1.97$), indicating that the majority of respondents felt slightly positive about the possibility of world peace.

Agency, Disengagement, and Engagement

Members of the Group for International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP) used several systematic techniques to develop coding manuals to analyze qualitative responses to the two peace items. Specifically, responses were coded through a combination of: (a) grounded theory methods, involving exploring data without preconceived notions (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), and (b) deductive qualitative analysis, drawing from a conceptual model to see how well it fits with the data (Gilgun, 2005). Although Chap. 32 provides a full description of the coding procedures, we provide a brief overview of each of the manuals here.

This first coding system focused on two separate components identifiable within many responses: (a) *agency* and (b) *humanitarian engagement* and *disengagement*. This coding

system was created through deductive qualitative analysis, utilizing Bandura's theory of moral disengagement (1999), but expanded to include themes derived from grounded theory methods. According to Bandura, people can abide by their moral standards, which may involve actively engaging in humane behavior (which he calls "proactive agency") or refraining from behaving in an inhumane manner (which he calls "inhibitive agency"). Or, they can fail to abide by their moral standards, which, according to Bandura's theory, can be facilitated by several moral disengagement processes, including: (a) cognitive restructuring, such as moral justifications, euphemistic labeling, or advantageous comparison; (b) removing or obscuring personal agency; (c) misrepresenting, minimizing, or disregarding the consequences of harmful actions; and/or (d) devaluing the victim(s) of the negative behavior (Bandura, 1999).

These coding systems are used to code responses, not participants. Some responses are phrased very much in the language of Bandura's moral disengagement mechanisms or proactive agency, but it would be inappropriate to leap from the occurrence of those themes to judgments concerning the moral character of participants. Accordingly, in describing our coding system and patterns in the responses, we refer to *humanitarian engagement and disengagement* or simply *engagement and disengagement*, rather than "moral disengagement" and "moral engagement."

Agency Coding

Bandura placed strong emphasis on the role of agency in moral engagement; consequently, identifying evidence of agency in our survey responses was one of the goals of our deductive qualitative analysis. Participant responses to both achieve peace prompts, treated as a single unit for coding purposes, were coded into one of three *agency* categories: *presence of agency*, *absence of agency*, or *not applicable-agency*. A code for *presence of agency* was given if either of the responses to the two items referenced governmental, social, or political actions that could facilitate peace. If neither response indicated action, or if both responses denied the possibility of achieving peace, the

code for *absence of agency* was assigned. If the responses did not address the prompts, a code of *not applicable-agency* was given. If the responses displayed both *presence* and *absence of agency*, they were coded as *agency-present*, and if they showed either *agency* or *lack of agency* more than once, they still received only one code.

Frequency of Agency Themes

Sixty-nine percent of all responses indicated some level of *agency*, and implied that peace was an achievable goal. For example, a 22-year-old Motswana woman stated that peace could be achieved if people would "learn to compromise and communicate." Thirty-one percent of all responses described no actions that could advance the likelihood of peace, usually blaming situations, individuals, or groups for the impossibility of achieving peace. According to a 55-year-old South African woman, "There are too many power and money hungry people for there to ever be true peace in the world. There are corrupt leaders in many countries. The world is too split up by race, by values, by religion, and by economics." For further examples of responses illustrating the agency coding categories, see Table 37.1.

Humanitarian Engagement/Disengagement Coding

Unlike the *agency* coding, in the level of *humanitarian engagement/disengagement* coding system, each codeable unit was given a separate code. Thus, a complex response like the one from the South African woman quoted in the previous paragraph would be coded for multiple categories. Responses had to meet two criteria to be coded as *engaged*: (a) imply that peace can be achieved and (b) express *agency* (an intention to act).

Following Bandura's theory, several *engagement* themes were identified, including ethical *justification*, *assumption of responsibility*, and *humanization*. *Justification* responses referred to general beliefs as to why peace is achievable, and included a sub-code,

Table 37.1 Percentages and examples of presence of agency and absence of agency in responses

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
Presence of agency	69	Botswana	22	F	“Learn to compromise and communicate”
		Angola	44	M	“Promoting meetings between people with the objective of reminding people of the importance of maintaining world peace and conflict resolution”
		Ghana	59	F	“If we enforce the laws, the whole world would respect the laws”
Absence of agency	31	South Africa	55	F	“There are too many power and money hungry people for there to ever be true peace in the world. There are corrupt leaders in many countries. The world is too split up by race, by values, by religion, and by economics”
		Ghana	40	M	“It is impossible to have world peace due to diverse ideological differences and the class society we have across the globe: the fundamentalists, the zionists etc”
		Algeria	21	F	“Impossible, war creates common enemies and allies. Conflict is in human nature”

Note. M= male, F=female

principles/beliefs, which specified that religion or moral philosophies were the best way to achieve peace. *Assumption of responsibility* applied to responses that described efforts taken by the general population to achieve peace, and included sub-categories such as *practical strategies* (for example, aid or education), *governmental responsibility*, and the *ineffectiveness of negative relations*, emphasizing that negative emotions or interactions (such as violence or hatred) are futile ways to resolve disagreements. Responses coded as stressing *humanization* explained that general positive human characteristics are the reason peace can be obtained, and could be sub-coded as emphasizing *interpersonal values*, such as understanding or love, or *social equity*, stressing equality, human rights, or the resolution of injustice.

Although responses could not be coded as *engaged* unless the response included some form of *agency*, they could be coded as *disengaged* regardless of whether or not the total answer indicated *agency*. It was the type of reasoning that was the basis of *disengagement* coding, not readiness to act in some manner. Relevant *disengagement* themes included *rationalization*, *displacement of responsibility*, *attribution of*

blame, and *destructive human nature*. Responses coded for *rationalization* could, for example, suggest there was no need for peace. Responses coded for *displaced responsibility* shifted any obligation for pursuing peace away from the self. Responses that *attributed blame* emphasized external events or interpersonal difficulties preventing the achievement of peace, while those stressing *destructive human nature* highlighted counterproductive human qualities, such as greed or violence.

Participants sometimes gave suggestions for how peace could be achieved when responding to the “I believe peace can be achieved” item rather than to “The best way to achieve peace is...” item, and conversely, they sometimes expressed their belief regarding the possibility of achieving peace in response to the “best way” item. For a fuller discussion of the engagement and disengagement coding categories and subcategories, see Chap. 32.

We will provide in-text examples of the two most commonly used sub-codes of all umbrella categories (which are indicated by sub-headings). The interspersed tables provide examples of all sub-codes that make up at least 10% of the umbrella category.

Table 37.2 Percentages and examples of the most common humanitarian engagement categories

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Humanitarian engagement</i>	61				
<i>Assumption of responsibility</i>	10(16)	South Africa	20	F	“If everyone co-operates”
		Botswana	20	F	“If we all put our hearts into it. Put our differences aside and work together towards it”
Governmental responsibility	15(24)	Ghana	34	M	“When all nations agree to respect the right of one another for peaceful development, both social and economic”
		South Africa	52	F	“As long as negotiations are possible peace can be possible but there are always the possibility that headstrong government can upset the peaceful applearct”
<i>Humanization</i>	37				
Interpersonal concepts/values	15(24)	Ghana	19	F	“Listen to others’ points of view and look them over. Involve them in decision-making. (Do) not look or be superior over others as they are also important” “Understand that we need each other to live”
		Botswana	22	F	“If we come together as one and love each other as we love ourselves”
Social equity	7(11)	Botswana	21	F	“Stop obsessing over money and power”
		Algeria	21	M	“By respecting the liberties of one and all”

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of the engagement responses. M= male, F= female

Frequency of Humanitarian Engagement and Disengagement Themes

Sixty-one percent of all responses were classified as *engaged*, meaning that they displayed *agency* and a belief that peace can be achieved. The most commonly utilized *humanitarian engagement* themes were *governmental responsibility* (a subcategory of *assumption of responsibility*) and *interpersonal values* (a subcategory of *humanization*), each of which comprised 24% of the total engagement codes. Responses stressing *governmental responsibility* argued that achieving peace is a governmental duty to be carried out through positive actions such as diplomacy or a consciously *laissez-faire* stance chosen to advance peace. For example, a 37-year-old Ghanaian man argued that the best way to achieve peace was to “implement effective judiciary systems to eliminate corruption and respect the rules and laws demanded by our constitution.” Many responses focused on the importance of democracy, such as that of a

22-year-old Motswana man who urged governments to “enforce democracy in all countries.”

In contrast to *governmental responsibility*, responses that stress *interpersonal values*, as stated, link the achievement of peace to principles such as understanding, love, tolerance, or unification. When asked if she believed that world peace could be achieved, a 19-year-old Ghanaian woman, for example, urged people to “Listen to others’ points of view and look them over. Involve them in decision-making... Understand that we need each other to live.” A 21-year-old Algerian man argued that it is only “By respecting the liberties of one and all” that we will be able to achieve peace. Similarly, a 34-year-old Ghanaian man emphasized individual responsibility, stating that “(Peace) can be realized when people are ready to be tolerant of each other’s view and ready to make sacrifices without parochial or selfish interests.” For further examples of the *humanitarian engagement* coding categories and subcategories, see Table 37.2.

Table 37.3 Percentages and examples of the most common disengagement categories

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Disengagement</i>					
Destructive human nature	12(34)	Angola	F	44	“Because human beings are excessively ambitious and use any means to achieve their ends”
Attribution of blame	16(46)	Botswana	25	F	“We are facing finite resources, greedy capitalists. Therefore conflicts will always remain”
		Angola	23	M	“There will always be an incentive for war because society is shaped that way, whether because of scarcity of resources, etc”
		South Africa	F	58	“Man is too greedy and ready to resort to fighting to get what he wants”
Government/political blame	6(16)	Zambia	40	F	“Because some countries want to dominate other countries”
		Angola	23	M	“It is impossible as long as there are corrupt and ambitious leaders”

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of the disengagement responses. M= male, F= female

Thirty five percent of all responses were classified as *disengaged*. The most commonly coded rationale for *disengagement* was *attribution of blame*, which encompassed 46% of all *disengagement* responses. A response was coded as *attributing blame* if it emphasized external events (e.g., ongoing conflict) or interpersonal difficulties (e.g., ideological differences) as preventing the achievement of peace. For example, a 25-year-old Motswana woman cites a flawed political system and competition for limited resources as limiting the possibilities of peace, removing personal factors from the equation: “We are facing finite resources and greedy capitalists, therefore conflicts will always remain.” Similarly, the response of a 23-year-old Angolan man identifies societal inequalities as contributors to the inevitability of violent conflict: “There will always be an incentive for war because society is shaped that way, because of scarcity of resources, etc.”

The next most common rationale for denying the achievability of peace was *destructive human nature*, comprising 34% of the *disengagement* responses. These responses typically stressed negative internal characteristics such as greed or aggression, devaluing people in order to emphasize the impossibility of

peace. For example, a typical response was given by a 58-year-old South African woman, who argued that, “man is too greedy and ready to resort to fighting to get what he wants,” or even more simply, a response of a 21-year-old woman from Botswana, who stated that, “some people are always out to cause trouble.” Viewpoints such as these, emphasizing the destructive side of human nature, generally reflect cynicism toward any possibility of widespread peace. For further examples of the most frequently used *disengagement* codes, see Table 37.3.

Exploratory Analyses with Demographic Variables

Exploratory chi-squares were run to test the influence of gender, military service, and relative’s military service on participants’ responses as coded for *humanitarian engagement* and *disengagement*. Significant results had a p-value of less than or equal to 0.05. These analyses revealed that a significantly greater proportion of men than women utilized *justification*, providing general explanations

Table 37.4 Chi-square tests and percentages for humanitarian engagement/disengagement categories

Category	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	X ²
	Male	Female	
<i>Humanitarian engagement</i>			
Justification	7.6	0.0	8.36***
	<i>Relative in military</i>	<i>No relative in military</i>	
<i>Humanitarian engagement</i>			
Assumption of responsibility	40.0	17.1	4.21**
Ineffectiveness of negative relations	6.7	22.9	3.25*
<i>Disengagement</i>			
Attribution of blame			
Government/political blame	16.7	2.9	3.677*

Note. If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference

* $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

as to why world peace is obtainable. A significantly greater proportion of those who had relatives in the military than those who did not utilized an *assumption of responsibility* to explain why world peace is achievable, and engaged in *government/political blame* to explain why it is not. A significantly greater proportion of those who did not have relatives in the military cited the *ineffectiveness of negative relations* as way of resolving disagreements than those who did have relatives in the military. Table 37.4 presents the results of the chi-square analyses for significant group differences in the use of *humanitarian engagement and disengagement* responses to both of the peace items.

Focus on Achievability and Prerequisites for Peace

Our research team utilized grounded theory to create the *focus on achievability and prerequisites for peace* coding system. Based on guidelines from Glaser and Straus (1967), responses were repeatedly read and analyzed in order to identify recurring concepts and themes independent of the coding system informed by Bandura's theory. We followed these procedures because the range of responses concern-

ing whether or not peace could be achieved and the identification of prerequisites for peace did not seem to fit well and fully within the Banduran coding system. That is, the Banduran coding systems worked well for identifying the presence or absence of agency (operationalized as stated intention to act) and for themes consistent with the mechanisms of moral disengagement that he identified; however, that system did not account for other forms of valuable information contained in the responses but that could be sorted into meaningful categories using grounded theory methods.

As with the *humanitarian engagement/disengagement* coding, responses were broken down into codeable units, so each response could be given multiple codes. Responses were separated into several umbrella categories: (a) those that focused on the *achievability* of peace, indicating that peace is *achievable*, *unachievable*, or an *ideal*; (b) those that referenced *philosophical principles*, emphasizing moral or ethical principles as the best way to achieve peace; (c) those that stressed *pro-social actions*, referring to general positive actions as the best way to achieve peace; (d) those that emphasized *governmental actions*, referring to elite-level strategies to advance peace; and (e) those that promoted *anti-social actions* for achieving peace, such as military force or governmental oppression. In our Africa sample, only five codeable

responses fit into this last category so it will not be discussed further.

Responses that referenced *philosophical principles* were further sorted into specific subcategories, including *positive interpersonal values* (such as respect, love, and compassion), *religion/spirituality* (referring specifically to world religions or religious/spiritual teachings), and *equality* (specifying the necessity of social equality among individuals). Responses that promoted *pro-social actions* were divided into *pragmatic solutions* (such as education or aid), *interaction* (such as communication, cooperation, or cultural exchange), *unification* (referencing bringing people together), *social justice* (stressing concepts such as equality or fairness), or *constructive political actions* (emphasizing the benefits of government or its agencies). Responses that advocated *governmental action* were separated into categories such as *diplomacy*, *global political change*, *equality among nations*, or the *elimination of negative political motivations*. Many of the above categories were further broken down into an additional level of subcategories. For a fuller explanation, see the introductory methods chapter of this section, Chap. 32.

why peace cannot be achieved: 64% of *achievability* responses fit into this category. These reasons could be any number of things – for example a 39-year-old Zimbabwean man drew on his own experience and observations, arguing that, “Due to differences in beliefs and religion, it will be wishful thinking to dream of a total world peace as it sometimes involves intra-country conflicts that would not allow for international intervention, as is the case in The Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, and a few other countries, including Zimbabwe.” More concisely, a 23-year-old man from Angola claimed that, “It is impossible as long as there are corrupt and ambitious leaders.” The second most common sub-category was made up of responses that portrayed peace as an *ideal* outcome, something to be desired and pursued. A 44-year-old South African woman responded that, “One must live with this goal, however unattainable.” A 20-year-old woman from Botswana simply replied “I wish,” and similarly, a 32-year old South African woman answered, “It is what I hope.” These responses expressed a strong desire for peace, but were not always convinced of its achievability. For further examples of the most commonly used achievability categories, see Table 37.5.

Frequency of Focus on Achievability Themes

Forty-four percent of all responses were coded for the *focus on achievability* categories. The majority of the achievability responses *identified reasons* as to

Frequency of Pro-Social Actions Themes

Pro-social actions comprised 26% of all *achievability and prerequisites for peace* responses. Responses that were coded into this category suggested general positive actions as the optimal way

Table 37.5 Percentages and examples of most common achievability categories

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Focus on achievability</i>	44				
Ideal	5(11)	South Africa	59	F	“We should strive for it”
		Botswana	23	F	“World peace is desired, but it is far fetched”
Unachievable	7				
Recognizing reasons	28(64)	South Africa	31	F	“We’re brutal and stupid animals. We will always have war, we will always have ethnic and religious disagreements that escalate into violence and horror”
		Angola	50	M	“There are several interests in the world that are not consistent with world peace”

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the achievability category. M= male, F= female

Table 37.6 Percentages and examples of the most common pro-social actions categories

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
Pro-social actions	26				
Pragmatic solutions	2(4)(10)	Angola	44	M	“Promoting meetings between people with the objective of reminding people of the importance of maintaining world peace and conflict resolution”
		Angola	55	M	“Make social benefits (well-being, education, health and universally recognized freedoms) available to all men”
Interaction	5(9)(19)	Botswana	23	F	“Communication is the key to it”
		Ghana	34	M	“Diplomacy with maximum dialogue and mediation to iron out differences.”
Elimination of negative interactions	7(12)(26)	Botswana	21	M	“All weapons (must) be stopped being made and all misconceptions be cleared, because most wars are caused by misconceptions”
		South Africa	32	M	“If governments from other countries stop interfering with other countries then maybe we have a chance”
Unification	4(7)(16)	Ghana	19	F	“It could be achieved if only we become one people with a common goal”
		Ghana	18	M	“It can be achieved if we unite”

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the prerequisites for peace category. The third number (also in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the pro-social actions category. M= male, F= female

to achieve peace. There were many subcategories, resulting in relatively small percentages for each. The most frequently occurring was *elimination of negative interactions*, which made up 26% of all *pro-social action* responses. One example comes from a 21-year-old man from Botswana who argued that, “All weapons (must) be stopped being made and all misconceptions (should) be cleared, because most wars are caused by misconceptions.” At a governmental level, this response from a 32-year-old South African man makes a similar argument, stating that, “If governments from other countries stop interfering with other countries then maybe we have a chance.” Broadly, these responses focused on the existence of harmful negative interactions between individuals or societies as the primary barrier to widespread peace. The next most common subcategory was *interaction*, comprising 19% of all *pro-social action* responses. Responses coded for *interaction* referred to communication, cooperation, working together, or cultural exchange, such as the response of a 48-year-old man from Algeria, who stated that “dialogue between cultures

and inter-respect” was the best way to bring about world peace, and a 44-year-old Angolan man’s response stressing the importance of “promoting meetings between people with the objective of reminding people of the importance of maintaining world peace and conflict resolution.” For further examples of the most commonly used *pro-social action* categories, see Table 37.6.

Frequency of Philosophical Principles Themes

Philosophical principles made up 15% of all *achievability and prerequisites for peace* responses. Responses that were coded into this category generally referred to the essentiality of moral or ethical ideologies. Of this group, one of the two most common subcategories was *positive interpersonal values* (28% of all *philosophical principles* responses). Typical responses included the importance of “learn(ing) to compromise and communicate” (as reported by a 22-year-old

Table 37.7 Percentages and examples of the most common philosophical principles categories

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
Philosophical principals					
Positive interpersonal values	4(8)(28)	Algeria	20	F	“Teach people to recognize the value in everyone. Show them that diplomacy is infinitely better than violence”
		Ghana	27	M	“If we learn to understand each other and in our own small way contribute to peaceful co-existence”
Understanding/acceptance	3(6)(22)	Botswana	24	F	“If we all put our hearts into it, put our differences aside and work together towards it, surely world peace can be achieved”
		Ghana	26	M	“We agree to accept one another”
Religion/spirituality	4(8)(28)	South Africa	59	M	“Jesus promised us that, if we all will follow Him and His Word”
		Ghana	19	F	“Where religious fights are going on all over, it (peace) will be very difficult to be done”

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the prerequisites for peace category. The third number (also in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the philosophical principles category. M= male, F= female

woman from Botswana), and more specifically, the response of a 20-year-old woman from Algeria noting that we must “teach people to recognize the value in everyone. Show them that diplomacy is infinitely better than violence.” *Religion/spirituality* was the other most commonly occurring code, also making up 28% of *philosophical principles* responses. These responses were typified by the response of a 22-year-old Ghanaian man who said, “It can only be achieved when we turn away from evil and do good and follow Christ Jesus because He is the true way, life and peace.” A 19-year-old Ghanaian woman gave a slightly broader answer, arguing that, “Where religious fights are going on all over, it (peace) will be very difficult to be done.” For further examples of the most commonly used *philosophical principles* categories, see Table 37.7.

Frequency of Governmental Action Themes

Thirteen percent of *achievability and prerequisites for peace* codes argued that *governmental action* was the best way to advance a widespread peace. *Diplomacy* (32% of *governmental action* codes) was the most commonly occurring

sub-category. A 43-year-old Angolan man, for example, pleaded for nations to “put dialogue first in all situations in which there is a disagreement between countries.” A 22-year-old woman from Ghana was more specific in her proposal, arguing for high-level diplomacy. She called for, “Good relationships between heads of state from different countries, special invitations by heads of states and governments, exchanges of goods between members, and heads of governments advising each other.” *Global/political change* comprised the next more frequently occurring sub-category, making up 24% of *governmental action* codes. A 22-year-old Mtswana man called for, “a more powerful UN,” while a 43-year old man from Ghana argued that, “All sovereignties must adopt a charter which has aims and objectives of peaceful co-existence.” For further examples of the most commonly used *governmental action* categories, see Table 37.8.

Exploratory Analyses with Demographic Variables

Exploratory chi-squares were run to test the contribution of gender, military service, and relative’s military service to participants’

Table 37.8 Percentages and examples of the most common governmental actions categories

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
Governmental action	13				
Constructive government/ political action	3(5)(21)	Botswana	20	M	“Stop being greedy, socialism”
		Ghana	56	M	“If all governments take bold steps to ratify international conventions and abide by the tenets of these conventions”
Diplomacy	4(8)(32)	Botswana	26	F	If all countries can work together to achieve a common goal (democracy)
		Ghana	34	M	“Diplomacy with maximum dialogue and mediation to iron out differences”
Global/political change	3(6)(24)	Angola	50	M	“Change the way of thinking of world powers... Shorten the gap between rich and poor”
		Ghana	30	M	“The world should be ruled or governed by single body”
Equality among nations	1(3)(10)	South Africa	58	F	“If only developed countries will stop exploiting developing countries” “If some God-miracle could occur that persuaded one state to look to the other state’s interests, then maybe world peace might occur!”
		Zambia	37	F	“If other counties were not selfish then it would be achieved”

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the prerequisites for peace category. The third number (also in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the governmental actions category. M= male, F= female

responses as coded for *achievability and prerequisites for peace*. These analyses revealed that a significantly greater proportion of men than women utilized *constructive government/political action* to explain how they believed peace could best be achieved, while a significantly greater proportion of women than men referenced *unification*. A significantly greater proportion of respondents who had served in the military than those who had not referenced the importance of *economic fairness* or *force/control*, while respondents who had relatives in the military were significantly more likely than those who did not to refer to *prosocial actions* as the best way to achieve peace. Table 37.9 presents the results of the chi-square analyses for significant group differences in the use of *achievability and prerequisites for peace* responses to both of the peace items.

Discussion

Humanitarian Engagement/ Disengagement

Disengagement. The disengagement that can be seen in some responses can be linked to many of the topics discussed in the introduction to this chapter. The two most common disengagement themes were attribution of blame and destructive human nature. To review, responses were coded for attribution of blame when they emphasized external events or interpersonal difficulties as the primary barriers to advancing a widespread peace. They blamed issues such as a defective political system, competition for scarce resources, or societal inequalities as limiting peaceful possibilities. Responses emphasizing the destructive side of human nature emphasized negative human

Table 37.9 Prerequisites for peace: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and Chi-square values

Category	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	X ²
	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>			
Pro-social actions			
Unification	5.4	12.3	2.78*
Constructive government/political action	10.9	3.8	3.78*
	<i>Military</i>	<i>Non-military</i>	
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>			
Pro-social action			
Social justice			
Economic fairness	20.0	0.0	18.79*
Anti-social action			
Force/control	20.0	0.0	18.79*
	<i>Relative in military</i>	<i>No relative in military</i>	
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>			
Pro-social actions	16.7	2.9	3.68*

Note. If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference

* $p \leq 0.05$

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

qualities, such as greed, violence, or simply troublemaking, as the primary hindrances to peace.

The emphasis on external events, beyond the influence of oneself, may well be related to issues such as weak states (Zartman 1995), resource conflicts (Human Rights Watch, 2005), elite politics, intra- or interstate war (Prunier, 2011), or the legacy of colonialism (Meredith, 2005). Individuals may see their present and their past as influenced by factors beyond their control, as they feel unable to influence their political situation or level of societal conflict. They may be particularly affected if they do not feel that their government is providing them reliable security and judicial sectors (International Crisis Group, 2011a). Respondents' opinions may even be linked to the legacy of colonialism, particularly if they feel that world powers are interfering in their country. Similarly, participants' reflections on the destructive side of human nature are plausibly linked to factors such as dictatorships and widespread poverty, reflecting perceived greed and inequality, as well as histories of violence, which may be interpreted as reflecting the negative side of human nature. If respondents feel that their

past and presents are attributable to factors beyond their control, such as negative human characteristics, then it is logical that this would affect their opinions of the possibilities of a more peaceful future.

Engagement. Although problematic histories may have negative effects, they can also engender positive reactions. Participants' responses illustrating humanitarian engagement themes may also be interpreted as a response to negative factors. For example, many responses were coded as indicating an assumption of responsibility, describing efforts taken by the general population to achieve peace. Despite the fact that many African nations were colonized by European states (Meredith, 2005), and that many are still heavily affected by their place in the world, participants nevertheless accept that we all have a personal responsibility to work toward a more peaceful world. Given the history of outside interference and the lack of personal influence, it would be easy to renounce responsibility. The fact that people still stress individual accountability as a realistic way to work toward a more peaceful world is an encouraging

finding, emphasizing the respondents' resilience and forward-looking nature.

Many participants cited governmental responsibility as the best way to achieve peace. Despite the historical pattern of dictatorships and weak states (Zartman, 1995), people believe that their governments have the ability to turn things around. And rightly so: Despite the problematic history, dictatorships are declining (Goldsmith, 2001), and in the 1990s and beyond, more African states held multiparty elections than at any time since the 1960s (Radelet, 2010). Democratization should not be taken for granted, and elections are often still imperfect, but democracy, which aids governmental legitimacy, does appear to be emerging as a continental norm. Legitimacy is a prerequisite for meaningful and lasting peace, and may enable the government to provide much needed services, such as security, education, job creation, health care, and social services.

Another common humanitarian engagement theme was social equity, stressing equality, human rights, or social justice as important peacebuilding factors. Respondents believed in the importance of equal treatment, which could be financial, legal, or moral. Particularly given the unequal wealth distribution (Leibbrandt et al. 2010), the legacy of dictatorships, and the ongoing conflicts over the imbalanced distribution of scarce resources (Human Rights Watch, 2005), one might expect cynicism. Rather than pessimism, though, people saw these factors as challenges to be overcome. Peace is possible, if only these problems can be surmounted. Incomes are indeed rising, with the recent establishment of a genuine middle class showing that the polarization between rich and poor, while still extreme, is not quite as severe as it once was (Ncube, Lufumpa, & Vencatachellum, 2011). Political stability and technological advances have enabled many segments of society, not just the elite few, to improve their lot (The Economist, 2011b).

Prerequisites for Peace

Pro-social actions. The most commonly used major category for prerequisites for peace

responses was pro-social actions, specifying practical initiatives as the best way to achieve peace. Common recommendations included positive interactions, the associated elimination of negative interactions, and unifying behaviors. Desired interactions included communication, cooperation, and dialogue, while negative interactions to be abolished included hate, violence, and war. These ideas fit with established psychological theories, such as the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), emphasizing the necessity of certain kinds of contact to overcome conflict and increase cooperation. Respondents who highlighted unification stressed bringing disparate people and groups together as one. This strategy also corresponds with prominent psychological ideas such as the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), which includes the creation of an inclusive group membership that encompasses previously separate groups. Hence, people's "common sense" responses are supported by established psychological theory.

Participants' stress on communicating and coming together may be viewed in part as a reaction to the continent's history of separation and ethnic and cultural divisions. As noted, the colonial redrawing of boundaries led to conflict among different ethnic groups who found themselves living in the same state (Meredith, 2005). The ensuing clash of cultures and religions, exacerbated by subsequent struggles over issues such as race, power, government, and access to limited resources, led to increased division within (and sometimes between) nations. It is certainly understandable that division is highlighted as a problem, but it is also notable that in general, it, like inequity, is viewed as solvable. Respondents called for "dialogue" and "meetings" aiming to "unite" into "one people with a common goal." Despite recognizing that many nations have been characterized by separation and disunion, participants believe that these issues are surmountable, and that a more peaceful, cohesive future is possible.

Philosophical principles. The second umbrella category for prerequisite for peace responses was philosophical principles, characterized by responses stressing the importance of religion and

spirituality, understanding and acceptance, and positive interpersonal values. Many participants referenced religion as foundational to any future peace. Some respondents promoted literal scripture, and others broader religious tenets, but a great many people invoked religion in some form. Although, as noted, religion can be a divisive force (BBC News, 2011), many people clearly believe it also has the potential to contribute to, or in some cases even create, peace. Harnessing the positive potential of religion, and finding ways to minimize religion-related conflict, remain a central task for African leaders. Archbishop Desmond Tutu, for example, opened each day of hearings at the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (the central mechanism by which that country addressed its legacy of apartheid) with prayer, and imbued the process with Judeo-Christian values such as mercy and forgiveness (Tutu, 2000). Although some people were deeply critical of a too overtly religious dimension of what was assumed to be a legalistic process, many South Africans accepted the benefits of such an approach, utilizing the positive message in Tutu's teachings (Meiring, 2000).

Numerous respondents cited the importance of understanding or acceptance in approaching a more peaceful world. This theme is similar to the interaction and acceptance stressed in the prosocial actions coding, but at a slightly more abstract level, emphasizing the philosophy undergirding the necessary actions. Responses urging people to "put our hearts into it, put our differences aside" are important in displaying participants' belief in thinking and feeling in positive ways. Again, while certain portions of African history have not been typified by such characteristics, people recognize that a change must underlie the way forward.

On a similar note, many participants argued that positive interpersonal values are vital to achieving peace. Analogous to the interpersonal values coding in the humanitarian engagement section, respondents argued for "compromise," "communication," and "recognizing the value in everyone." Related to the prosocial actions, many of the responses referenced understanding each other and forming communities. Although not specified, these strategies seem linked to the

Bantu concept of *Ubuntu*, so prevalent in South Africa's attempts to move beyond apartheid. Loosely translated as common humanity, or the unity of all people, Desmond Tutu describes Ubuntu as,

You are generous, you are hospitable, you are friendly and caring and compassionate. You share what you have. It is to say, "My humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in yours." We belong in a bundle of life. We say, "A person is a person through other persons"...He or she has a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they were less than who they are (2000, p. 31).

The centrality of community, as a philosophical principal as well as a physical reality, was important to many participants. Often claimed as an "African philosophy," these ideas of togetherness and interdependence are considered vital in any attempt to realize peace.

Agency

Perhaps the most encouraging finding of all is that nearly 70% of participants expressed agency in regard to achieving peace. Rather than passively accepting the future, more than two-thirds of participants indicated that peace was achievable and cited specific principles or actions that could be taken to promote that outcome. Despite an often stressful and conflictual history, respondents were forward-looking, offering ideas as to the best ways to create a more peaceful world. Their thinking reflects growing trends in Africa, which, despite media reports to the contrary, is moving in the right direction. Over the past few decades, elections have been freer and fairer, per capita economic growth rates have been positive, education and health care have improved, and civic and media freedoms have exceeded all prior levels. Reasons for improvements revolve around democratization, but also include better economic policies, debt reduction, new technologies, and innovative leaders (Radelet, 2010). Many people can sense the changing fortunes of their continent, and by extension, their selves. This is

reflected in their growing sense of agency and in their belief, however hesitant, that peace is possible. The sense of possibility and responsibility expressed by agentic participants is a sign of hope for a more peaceful future.

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Michael Stevens, Amanda Clinton, Sherri McCarthy,
Luciana Karine de Souza, Rodrigo Barahona,
Eddy Carillo, Eros DeSouza, and Ricardo Angelino

Latin America includes both Spanish-speaking and Portuguese-speaking countries, stretching from Mexico in the north, through the Caribbean and Central America, to the cone of South

America. Latin America has witnessed significant armed conflict, mostly internal, over the past 50 years, but has enjoyed fairly widespread and sustained peace of late. Although much has been written on peace and reconciliation in the region, there is a scarcity of literature on the attitudes and beliefs about peace held by ordinary people (e.g., Rohrer, 1991). This chapter addresses that dearth by focusing on perceptions of peace and reconciliation in a lay sample drawn from seven Latin American countries and territories. The broad terms “peace” and “reconciliation” are defined in detail in Chap. 8, but we first discuss how the ideas overlap, yet remain distinct. We also distinguish peace and reconciliation from the related constructs of apology and forgiveness, which are discussed further in Chaps. 22 and 28, and present several attempts to further peace and reconciliation in Latin America. We then explain our methods, present empirical data, and finally discuss our findings in the context of the region’s history.

M. Stevens (✉)

Department of Psychology, Illinois State University,
Normal, IL, USA
e-mail: mjstevens@ilstu.edu

A. Clinton

University of Puerto Rico, Mayagüez, Puerto Rico, USA
e-mail: amanda.clinton@gmail.com

S. McCarthy

Educational Psychology, Counseling and Human
Relations, Northern Arizona University, Yuma, AZ, USA
e-mail: Sherri.McCarthy@NAU.EDU

L. Karine de Souza

Department of Psychology, Federal University
of Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, Brazil
e-mail: luciana.karine@ufrgs.br

R. Barahona

Counselor, Brookline, MA, USA
e-mail: rodbarahona@gmail.com

E. Carillo

Universidad Independiente & Director of the Center for
Psychoanalytic Studies of the Association for Socio-
Critical Psychoanalysis, San Jose, Costa Rica
e-mail: ecarillo65@yahoo.com

E. DeSouza

Department of Psychology, Illinois State University,
Normal, IL, USA
e-mail: erdesou@ilstu.edu

R. Angelino

School of Medical Sciences, National University of La
Plata, La Plata, Argentina
e-mail: drangelino@uolsinects.com

Terms

Although the terms peace and reconciliation are often used interchangeably, they are not synonymous. Peace tends to precede reconciliation in that reconciliation is essential to a durable peace. Peace processes can take several forms, namely, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding (Santiso, 2002). Each form can be viewed as one in a series of steps designed to resolve violent

conflict and establish more harmonious relations. Peacemaking centers mainly on negotiations to end violent conflict, whereas peacekeeping serves to monitor, verify, and at times enforce compliance with peace agreements. Unlike peacemaking and peacekeeping, which emphasize the attainment of peace, peacebuilding focuses on consolidation of a negotiated peace by addressing issues linked to the transition from conflict resolution to reconciliation. Reconciliation reaches beyond a cessation of hostilities by overcoming the psychological, interpersonal, and structural hurdles that impede the transformation of adversarial relationships into more harmonious ones (Daly & Sarkin, 2007). Reconciliation not only serves to heal past injustices and trauma but may also include mechanisms for creating a vision of a more equitable and viable society (Borris & Diehl, 1998; Newman, 2001). Factors that contribute to reconciliation include an end to violence and threats of violence, acknowledgment of responsibility for wrongdoing, establishment of conditions that persuade opponents to join forces, and time to grapple with the impact of the past (Hayner, 1999). Because reconciliation is a mutual, consensual endeavor, it cannot be imposed by a victor or intermediary but must be embraced by all parties (Mendez, 1997).

Apology bears some connection to reconciliation when framed as public acknowledgment of responsibility for wrongful and harmful actions toward others (Cohen, 1995; Ross, 2004). Apology may be an expression of reconciliation – for example, within the context of a truth or reparations commission. Forgiveness, whether a precursor to (Borris & Diehl, 1998) or outcome of (Daly & Sarkin, 2007) reconciliation, is the psychological reconfiguration of a perpetrator based on appreciation of his or her humanity, whereas reconciliation is a behavioral “coming together” of adversaries for a common purpose. Although apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation are transformational processes that draw upon the painful past to launch a more cooperative future, reconciliation may occur without apology and forgiveness (Ross, 2004).

Given the diverse approaches for achieving peace and reconciliation, we turn to methods that have

gained traction in Latin America: amnesty, truth commissions, reparations, lustration, and social reconstruction. Each approach has advocates and detractors. There also are circumstances that favor one approach over another, along with evidence to challenge the model of a single, best approach.

Resolving the Past and Moving Forward

Approaches to peace and reconciliation range from maximalist, to moderate, to minimalist; a fourth defies convention by favoring a holistic method that fits a country’s competing needs for accountability versus stability (Hayner, 1999; Olsen, Payne, & Reiter, 2010).

Trials

Maximalist approaches to peacebuilding include trials or tribunals in which offenders are prosecuted according to domestic or international law. Advocates of trials argue that accountability is a necessary component of the goals of redressing injustice, deterring future violence, and strengthening democratic institutions such as rule of law (Sikkink & Walling, 2007; Toms, Ron, & Paris, 2010). Critics claim that the prospect of trials hampers peace negotiations, that trials are costly and tax the capacity of a resuscitated judiciary, and that verdicts threaten fragile new democracies, especially in polarized countries (Hayner, 1999; MacLean, 2006; Ross, 2004). Given their adversarial format, trials ironically may obstruct full disclosure of past crimes. Seventeen Latin American countries have held human rights trials during their recent transition to democracy (Sikkink & Walling, 2007). In Argentina, such trials were conducted immediately after the military junta, whereas in Uruguay they were launched in 2006 with the indictment of ex-President Juan Maria Bordaberry. Justice in Latin America has not proceeded swiftly or evenly, with legal maneuvering and political turmoil delaying or limiting the effectiveness of trials. Nevertheless, as Latin American democracies have matured and regional

organizations (e.g., Inter-American Commission on Human Rights) have questioned the legal bases of amnesty laws, there has been a spike in calls to investigate, prosecute, and punish with vigor (Mendez, 1997; Newman, 2001; Popkin & Bhuta, 1999; Sikkink & Walling, 2007).

Amnesties

Minimalist approaches to peacebuilding include amnesty laws enacted by outgoing authoritarian or incoming democratic regimes. Amnesty laws grant human rights violators immunity from prosecution. Proponents of amnesty claim that legal impunity is a tool in negotiating peace, insurance against a return to violence, and a means of protecting weak democratic institutions, including, paradoxically, the rule of law (Cohen, 1995; Olsen et al., 2010). Opponents retort that impunity perpetuates direct and structural violence by circumventing accountability, stymies the transition to a more peaceful future, and compromises the ability of a successor government to operate with autonomy, integrity, and the trust of its citizens (Opatow, 2001; Popkin & Bhuta, 1999). At best, amnesty is a political solution for a negative peace (Ross, 2004); at worst, it is an “enemy of democracy” (MacLean, 2006, p. 27). Various forms of amnesty have been adopted in 16 of 19 Latin American countries that have recently transitioned to democratic governments, some having multiple amnesty laws (Sikkink & Walling, 2007). In 1979, Brazil’s military granted itself amnesty 6 years before restoring civilian governance. El Salvador ratified an unconditional amnesty bill shortly after publishing the findings of its UN-sponsored truth commission.

Amnesties in Latin America have not been entirely successful in shielding perpetrators from justice. A normative shift in national and international jurisprudence has eroded or reversed some amnesty laws (Newman, 2001; Popkin & Bhuta, 1999; Sikkink & Walling, 2007). In keeping with international law, Guatemala’s National Reconciliation Law waives amnesty for the crime of genocide. Although constitutional challenges to amnesty laws have failed in El Salvador and

Guatemala, Chile’s Supreme Court ruled in 1998 that certain crimes, like disappearances, are not covered by its 1978 amnesty law. Regionally, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights declared in 2001 that Peru’s amnesty law violates its obligation as signatory to the American Convention of Human Rights to investigate human rights violations, identify those responsible, and impose punishment. Finally, the International Committee of the Red Cross has interpreted Additional Protocol II of the 1949 Geneva Convention as precluding amnesty for violators of international law. Notwithstanding the success of legislation, court rulings, and human rights groups in asserting the right to justice by trial, in many cases justice remains elusive, as in the failed Spanish indictment of Chile’s ex-President Augusto Pinochet (Popkin & Bhuta, 1999).

Truth Commissions

Moderate approaches to peacebuilding consist of truth or truth and reconciliation commissions. Truth commissions are given temporary authority to investigate human rights abuses by parties engaged in armed conflict over a period of time, whereas truth and reconciliation commissions have an added mission to unify a society divided by violent struggle (Kaye, 1997). Latin American commissions have disseminated their findings in government publications (e.g., Argentina, Chile, Guatemala) or informal reports (e.g., Brazil), often using *Nunca Mas* (Never Again) in their title. Some commissions involve public hearings (e.g., Peru), with others suppressed entirely (e.g., Bolivia) (MacLean, 2006). Truth commissions achieve a balance between maximalist demands and minimalist concerns by seeking a public account of past human rights abuses, while posing less risk of destabilizing new democracies (Olsen et al., 2010). They are best suited to countries that have traditionally denied past crimes, yet desire a truth-seeking process (Hayner, 1999).

Advocates point to the value of truth commissions in aiding psychological healing and social reconciliation, in spite of the lack of moral duty or legal authority to prosecute. It is argued that truth commissions restore dignity to victims and survivors

and promote a culture of human rights by validating memory, condemning atrocities, and guarding against violence (Cohen, 1995; MacLean, 2006; Ross, 2004). Critics caution that documenting past abuses is “an exercise in tokenism” (Mendez, 1997, p. 265) and falls short of the obligation to individuals and society of a full judicial reckoning. Moreover, skeptics argue that truth commissions may inflame grievances and divisions at a precarious time in a country’s transition to peace (Mendez, 1997; Thoms, Ron, & Paris, 2010). Twelve of seventeen Latin American countries that experienced internal or international conflict have convened a truth commission (Sikkink & Walling, 2007). In Argentina and Chile, truth commissions arose in the context of transition from authoritarian to civilian rule, whereas in El Salvador and Guatemala they evolved out of negotiations to end civil war (Hayner, 1999). In 2010, the Organization of American States (OAS) imposed a truth commission on Honduras as a reinstatement requirement after the coup against President Jose Manuel Zelaya.

The success of truth commissions is due partly to the support of various external organizations, such as human rights groups, the Catholic Church, and the UN. In response to the unease of the Uruguayan government, the Peace and Justice Service NGO (nongovernmental organization) investigated human rights abuses in the early 1990s and produced *Uruguay Nunca Mas*. The Archdiocese of Sao Paulo and World Council of Churches secretly gathered information on human rights abuses by the military from 1964 to 1979. The Catholic Church assisted Guatemala’s Historical Clarification Commission by submitting its Recovery of Historical Memory Project, an archive of human rights violations begun years before the commission. The Salvadoran Truth Commission of 1992 was the first to be sponsored, paid for, and staffed entirely by the United Nations (UN). Occasionally, truth commissions have been the handiwork of courageous officials, such as Leo Valladares Lanza, who spearheaded the National Commission for Human Rights in Honduras.

The outcomes of truth commissions have been mixed. Commission reports for El Salvador and Guatemala exonerated victims who had been labeled “terrorists” or “criminals,” and commission recommendations placed law enforcement under

civilian authority and reduced judicial corruption (Kaye, 1997). Commission findings in Argentina were given to the courts, which then selectively prosecuted former junta leaders. However, many victims were too traumatized, ingrained in silence, or skeptical of the process to give testimony. In El Salvador, commission findings were never acknowledged by those responsible. Worse still is the persistence of violence, as in the murder of Guatemalan Bishop Juan Gerardi, who presided over the Recovery of Historical Memory Project, 2 days after the report was released. These mixed outcomes suggest that certain conditions must be present to maximize the effectiveness of truth commissions, such as a political power balance, a mandate, operational independence, a mature civil society, and international support (Hayner, 1999; Ross, 2004).

Holistic Approaches

The recently conceived holistic approach combines methods to address the complex and sometimes unique issues that individuals, communities, and nations face after prolonged violent conflict (Olsen et al., 2010). In an empirical study of 91 transitions in 74 countries – including 15 from Latin America – Olsen et al. showed that trials and amnesties together, with or without truth commissions, improve human rights and strengthen democratic institutions. Truth commissions alone had a negative effect on both transitional justice indicators, whereas trials and amnesties alone had no impact. Together, these findings challenge the myth of a single best approach to peace and reconciliation. Trials and amnesties may provide complementary functions that balance accountability and stability, respectively (Ross, 2004), with truth commissions reinforcing both, but not being key to positive social transformation. Like Olsen et al., Sikkink and Walling (2007) debunk the prevailing view that transitional justice requires a permanent dichotomous choice from among available options. Every Latin American country that launched a truth commission also conducted human rights trials, and 15 of 16 Latin American countries with amnesty laws also held trials. Furthermore, transitional justice solutions tend to evolve over time, with truth commissions typically appearing before trials.

In regard to consequences, Latin American countries that implemented trials and truth commissions showed superior human rights records; such approaches neither prolonged nor intensified conflict, nor undermined the rule of law. Thus, the data reveal that Latin America, which has made the greatest use of trials and truth commissions of any world region, has witnessed the most profound democratic transition of any region, with very few reversals (Daly & Sarkin, 2007). Latin America's success speaks to its resilient human rights principles and legal traditions (Kacowicz, 2005; Sikkink & Walling, 2007).

Trials, amnesties, truth commissions, or some combination thereof are not the only approaches to peace and reconciliation. We next briefly examine reparations, lustration, and structural methods for resolving the past and moving forward.

Reparations

Reparations are prominent in the discourse on peace and reconciliation due to the harm suffered by victims of inhumane treatment and the obligation to repair shattered lives, especially given obstacles to prosecuting offenders (Hayner, 1999; Lean, 2003). Reparations entail monetary payment or other restitution and are offered as tangible or symbolic acknowledgment of wrongdoing (Lean, 2003; Ross, 2004). Objections to reparations include the claim that they are not sufficiently punitive of perpetrators, are often experienced as insulting, and buy silence (Cohen, 1995; Lean, 2003; Mendez, 1997). Although reparations rest on international law and human rights conventions, they are more likely to be awarded when victims and perpetrators have been identified and there is a consensus about the abuse (Ross, 2004).

Reparations are recommended mainly by truth commissions (Popkin & Bhuta, 1999), with responsibility placed on the state to institute meaningful compensation (Mendez, 1997). Reparations can also be mandated by domestic or international courts, as in Honduras. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile have offered reparations to victims and families. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Uruguay are considering reparations. Bolivia, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru have resisted appeals for reparations by human rights

groups, and in Peru's case, by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Reparations in Latin America have been directed largely toward individual victims and surviving families. For example, Chile awarded \$4000–\$5000 in pensions to families of executed or disappeared persons, offered education benefits, and waived military service and taxes for exiles. An unresolved issue concerns collective reparations, which are not the norm in Latin America. Although collective reparations carry great costs for economically strapped countries, when victims share a common identity (e.g., indigenous Mayans of Guatemala), collective reparations provide unmistakable acknowledgment of wrongdoing, provide a form of restorative justice, and move people toward a more inclusive society (MacLean, 2006).

Lustration

Lustration involves purging supporters of a once abusive regime from power by removing or disqualifying them from services, particularly in law enforcement and the military (Cohen, 1995). Lustration promotes accountability, reduces the chances of further violence, increases public trust, and frees a new government from "spoilers" who would undermine social reconstruction (Mendez, 1997). Lustration, however, can operate as collective retribution in which some are denied due process or purged for mere association with an authoritarian regime, while others are exempted from prosecution (Kaye, 1997). As part of their peace agreements, some Latin American countries have stipulated the retirement of military officials responsible for human rights abuses. The truth commission in El Salvador called for the dismissal of military, judicial, and government personnel who were responsible for, concealed, or failed to investigate human rights abuses. However, their removal was slow in coming, and they retained retirement benefits and were not barred from public service.

Social Reconstruction

The most ambitious and difficult aspect of advancing peace and reconciliation is repairing

the fabric of a country after protracted conflict has ended. Cultures of violence are replaced by reversing long-standing and pervasive economic, political, and social conditions that nurture grievances and violence (Cohen, 1995; Moser & Clark, 2001). Unlike the methods previously described, social reconstruction requires comprehensive and systematic change.

Power sharing is a cornerstone of peaceful governance in Latin America (Adekanye, 1998). Peace and reconciliation cannot be understood without examining how political power has been reconfigured and has impacted a post-conflict society (Pearce, 1997). Although power sharing typically manages disparate agendas through constitutional provisions, power-sharing arrangements can be fragile, as in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. A number of factors can undermine the stability of power-sharing arrangements, including weakened democratic norms and governmental institutions, tension between the competing needs for infrastructure rebuilding and macroeconomic reform, and difficulties maintaining balance in national decision-making when political coalitions dissolve (Adekanye, 1998; Thompson, 1997).

Power sharing, although important, is insufficient for social reconstruction. In many Latin American nations, enduring peace and reconciliation hinge on overcoming the legacy of colonialism, particularly its “naturalization of the ethics of war” (Maldonado-Torres, 2006, p. 225). Years after gaining independence, many Latin American countries still operate according to the colonialist dynamics of exclusion and exploitation in their national politics, business practices, and intergroup relations (Hristov, 2004; Maldonado-Torres, 2006). With up to 43% of Latin Americans living in poverty, structural inequalities that have oppressed much of the population clearly remain. Regrettably, peace agreements are essentially political accommodations that rarely articulate solutions to the underlying causes of conflict (Pearce, 1997; Thompson, 1997). National and regional reconstruction demands a humane vision of progress in order to liberate millions. Liberation in this sense entails facing harsh situational

realities and working to free people from oppression and injustice (MacLean, 2006; Pearce, 1997).

Peru’s colonial legacy of economic, political, racial, and social inequality fueled its 15-year violent struggle between the government and the revolutionary organization, Shining Path (DeSouza & Stevens, 2009). That three-fourths of murdered and disappeared Peruvians were Quechua-speaking Indian or *mestizo* (mixed European and native) villagers attests to the racism and classism of both the sides of the conflict. These facts position peace in an ecological framework and emphasize the importance of developing indigenous capacities to redress the chronic and endemic conditions that impede equality, inclusion, and democracy (Pearce, 1997). In terms of local empowerment, we note the contributions of psychologists who often intervene through internationally funded NGOs (Sacipa Rodriguez, Tovar Guerra, Galindo Villarreal, & Vidales Bohorquez, 2009). One such contribution, psychosocial accompaniment, emancipates individuals and reconstitutes communities by transforming the meaning of the painful past through discourse. This intervention resulted in gains in empowerment, reflected in the personal narratives of internally displaced Colombians. Participants spoke of heightened consciousness, personal dignity, solidarity with others, and appreciation of the promise of socially responsible collaborative action.

Clearly, there is no Latin American template for peace and reconciliation. Although many strategies have potential, others disappoint by seemingly acquiescing to injustice (Daly & Sarkin, 2007; Opatow, 2001). Even holistic approaches fall well short of social reconstruction, the ultimate transformation to peace. We now review major national and regional peace agreements in Latin America, including the successful Arias Plan that terminated armed conflict in four Central American countries, as well as regional human rights conventions that many Latin American countries have adopted. Table 38.1 lists recent agreements, legislation, and judicial decisions that demonstrate significant strides toward peace and reconciliation in Latin America.

Table 38.1 Recent agreements, laws, and court rulings that promote peace in Latin American countries

Country	Year	Outcome
Argentina	1995	Law 24517 forms national committee to investigate war crimes
	2007	Supreme Court rules amnesty decree 1001/89 unconstitutional
Bolivia	2004	Constitutional tribunal allows civil trials for human rights abuses
	2008	IACHR awards reparations in human rights abuse cases
Brazil	1995	Law 9140 grants reparations to families of dead and disappeared
	1996	Law 3299 moves human rights from military to civilian courts
	2002	Law 10599 extends 1998 constitutional amnesty provisions
Chile	1978	Decree 355 creates Truth & Reconciliation Commission
		Law 19-123 establishes national authority for reparations
		Decree Law 2-191 establishes amnesty
	1998	Supreme Court Decision 12 limits amnesty for certain crimes
Colombia	2003	Decree 128 provides amnesty for paramilitary
	2005	Law 975 creates Commission on Reparation & Reconciliation
		Decree 250 forms national action plan for forced displacement
	2006	Law 1095 makes <i>habeas corpus</i> a constitutional right
2007	IACHR orders prosecution and reparation in human rights cases	
	Peace agreement between government and AUC paramilitary	
Costa Rica	1948	Article 12 of constitution abolishes the military
	1987	Esquipulas II offers plan to resolve five Central American conflicts
	2002	Law 8272 punishes war crimes and crimes against humanity
El Salvador	1992	Chapultepec Peace Agreement and law on national reconciliation
	1993	Law introduces General Amnesty for Consolidation of Peace
	2004	Decree 45 forms Commission on Search for Missing Children
	2005	IACHR finds violation of American Convention on Human Rights
Guatemala	1994	Agreement to form Historical Clarification Commission
	1996	Agreement on Firm & Lasting Peace
		National Reconciliation Law
		Decree 41-96 moves human rights cases to civilian courts
	1999	Article 19 constitutionally prohibits torture and provides reparations
		Congress approves bill of rights arising out of peace agreement
	2001	Government establishes reparation fund for human rights victims
	2004	Formation of Historical Clarification Commission
2006	Decree 264 forms Search Commission for Disappeared Persons	
Honduras	1982	Article 68 of constitution prohibits torture
	1995	Decree 153-95 establishes Commission for Human Rights
	1996	Supreme Court requires judicial investigation before amnesty
	2005	Article 187 limits executive suspension of constitutional rights
	2007	Decree 21 recognizes authority of International Criminal Court
	2010	OAS requires Truth & Reconciliation Commission after coup
	Mexico	1994
2005		IACHR finds violation of American Convention of Human Rights
Nicaragua	1993	Law 163 awards amnesty to encourage demobilization
	1999	Criminal code prohibits war crimes, torture, and disappearances

(continued)

Table 38.1 (continued)

Country	Year	Outcome
Panama	1991	Law 12 adopts Inter-American Convention Against Torture
	1993	Army abolished by constitutional amendment
Paraguay	1992	New constitution forms pluralistic, participatory democracy
	1996	Law 838 enacts reparations for victims of dictatorship
	1999	Law 1066 guarantees constitutional rights of assembly and protest
		Law 1500 constitutionally guarantees <i>habeas corpus</i>
Peru	2006	Law 2225 establishes Truth & Justice Commission
	2001	IACHR and Supreme Court rule to reopen human rights case
		Truth & Reconciliation Commission established
	2006	IACHR finds against government in four human rights cases
	2007	Supreme Court rules on extradition of Fujimori for rights violations

IACHR Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

Peace Agreements and Human Rights Conventions

We note that a majority of Latin American peace agreements aimed to transform internal conditions, either from authoritarian military regimes to democratic civilian governments or from civil war to demobilization. We also note that many such peace agreements benefitted from the coordinated efforts of regional and international organizations, such as the OAS and UN (MacFarlane & Weiss, 1994; Santiso, 2002).

Peace Agreements

From the 1980s to the 1990s, Latin America witnessed a steady decline in armed conflicts, from 14 to 2 (Wallenstein & Sollenberg, 1997), and for nearly a decade, most Latin American countries have been free of such violence. Armed conflict is defined as use of force in a dispute over governance or territory in which at least 25 deaths are tallied (Wallenstein & Sollenberg, 1997). Six of twelve conflicts ended with one faction victorious (Panama, Paraguay, Peru, UK, the USA, Venezuela), four with a peace agreement (El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Ecuador-Peru), and one with a ceasefire (the government of Mexico vs. the Popular Revolutionary Army). Eleven conflicts involved insurgencies by opposition groups against the government, or violence by a government against its citizens, and three

involved armed conflict between countries: the 1982 war between Argentina and United Kingdom over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands, the 1989 border skirmish between Ecuador and Peru, and the 1989–1990 invasion of Panama by the United States. To what does Latin America owe its historical and current status as one of the most democratic and peaceful regions of the world? Latin American norms regarding peace and security have restrained or prevented war, as well as engendered and sustained regional peace (Kacowicz, 2005). Latin American normative traditions include legalism, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, self-determination and noninterventionism, peaceful coexistence (*convivencia*), consensus seeking (*concertacion*), political pluralism, and regard for human rights. Although these norms have been expressed more in principle than in practice, due in part to a heritage of colonialism, statism, corporatism, and elitism, they contribute to benign international disputes (e.g., the 1984 treaty by Argentina and Chile that settled the Beagle channel maritime border), the limitation of violence to internal conflict and civil wars, cyclic waves of authoritarianism versus democracy, and strategies for economic and political integration and liberalization (e.g., Mercosur, OAS) (Kacowicz, 2005).

Transitions from military to civilian governance and from civil war to demobilization have seldom involved peace agreements. In Argentina, for example, the junta simply dissolved due to economic collapse, corruption, revulsion over the

“Dirty War,” and the 1982 defeat in the Falklands/Malvinas war. However, the eventual success of the Contadora/Esquipulas process is a noteworthy example of regional peacemaking (Kacowicz, 2005). By the mid-1980s, conflict between government and guerrilla forces in El Salvador and Nicaragua, and to a lesser extent in Guatemala and Honduras, had stalemated. In 1983, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela, joined in 1985 by Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay, launched the Contadora process, an initiative to resolve these conflicts by isolating them from the East–west rivalry being played out in the region (Kacowicz, 2005; MacFarlane & Weiss, 1994). From 1983 to 1986, the renamed Rio Group drafted a series of documents for peace, security, and democracy in Central America that called for an end to military and guerrilla activity, national reconciliation, and respect for human rights. Notwithstanding the support of every Central American government, pressure by the United States foiled the Contadora resolution. In 1986, the Central American presidents held a summit, known as Esquipulas I, drawing on the Contadora process as fundamental to regional peace. Led by President Oscar Arias Sanchez of Costa Rica, a second summit, Esquipulas II, formulated a peace plan that emphasized domestic political matters rather than geopolitical concerns. Esquipulas II was later accepted and implemented, with President Arias receiving a Nobel Peace Prize for his diplomacy. The Arias Plan, or more formally “Procedure for Establishing a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America,” led to more summits in which peace agreements were reached on a number of measures including disarmament; national reconciliation; free elections; OAS and UN mechanisms to monitor and verify processes of demobilization, repatriation, elections, and human rights; and confidence-building measures (i.e., steps to reduce intergroup mistrust). Evidence for the effectiveness of these agreements lies in the 1990 fall of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua (through the Sapoa Agreement), the 1992 end of civil war in El Salvador (through the Chapultepec Agreements), and the 1996 peace settlement in Guatemala (the Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace). Worth

underscoring are the complementary roles of regional, intergovernmental, and NGO entities in advancing peace and democratic reforms in Central America (MacFarlane & Weiss, 1994; Santiso, 2002).

Rights Conventions

Three prominent Latin American conventions on human rights are the American Convention on Human Rights, the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, and the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons (Bite, 2002). The American Convention on Human Rights was adopted in 1969 by OAS members and was in effect by 1978. Parties to the convention undertake to ensure that citizens can exercise their rights and freedoms without discrimination. The first part of the convention details civil and political rights and the conditions under which some rights may be suspended. The second part establishes the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The commission receives complaints from individuals, groups, or states regarding human rights violations after domestic legal remedies are exhausted. For example, the commission discovered and reported a correlation between a decrease in human rights violations by Colombian security forces and an increase in violations by paramilitary groups during the 1990s. The Inter-American Court has jurisdiction over cases involving human rights violations either through a country’s voluntary declaration or by agreement between disputing parties. The Court has called on countries to bring their laws in line with the American Convention on Human Rights and has voided blanket amnesty laws. The convention recognizes some rights not protected by UN human rights treaties, such as the right to privacy and the territorial application provision, which recognizes the federal structure of American countries.

The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture was adopted in 1985 and in force by 1987. Signatories commit to the prevention and punishment of torture within their jurisdiction

and must prosecute alleged torturers or extradite them to another country for trial. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights must be informed about and report on national efforts to implement the convention.

The Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons was adopted in 1994 and in force by 1996. Parties to this convention agree to ban forced disappearances and punish those convicted of this crime. The convention permits no exemptions from the duty to abide by its articles and stipulates that when the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights receives a petition concerning an alleged forced disappearance, it will confidentially contact the government in question for details, regardless of the admissibility of the petition.

Having defined and distinguished terms, presented a full range of approaches to peace and reconciliation, and detailed important peace agreements and human rights conventions, we are ready to address an overlooked topic in the literature: the perceptions of peace and reconciliation held by Latin Americans. Do they believe peace can be achieved? Can they identify ways to achieve peace? Are their views of peace related to gender, military service, a relative's military service, and involvement in protest against war and for peace? These are important questions, given the history of armed struggle in Latin America and qualms about the durability of peace and especially given the region's colonial legacy, racially mixed population, underdeveloped political institutions, and economic disparities.

Lay Perceptions of Peace and Reconciliation in Latin America

Sample and Procedures

The sample consisted of 776 Latin Americans. Fifty-one were from Argentina, 103 from Brazil, 69 from Colombia, 63 from Costa Rica, 129 from Nicaragua, 272 from Peru, and 89 from the territory of Puerto Rico. The sample included 480 women and 291 men, ranging in age from 18 to 79 ($M=26.9$, $SD=10.4$). Most (90.9%) reported

no military service. Many (42.8%) had a relative who was in or had been in the military. Few (18.7%) indicated they had protested against war or for peace by marching or petitioning.

As part of a study of terrorism, war, and peace across 40 plus countries (Malley-Morrison, 2009), all participants completed the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006), described in Chap. 32 of this book. Two items from the PAIRTAPS concern peace. The first item, on the achievability of peace, has participants rate their agreement with the statement "I believe that world peace can be achieved" on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (total disagreement) to 7 (total agreement) and then provide a written explanation of their rating. The second item, on prerequisites for peace, directs participants to complete the sentence stem "The best way to achieve world peace is..." in their own words. We report the results of a qualitative and quantitative analysis of participants' written responses to both peace items taken together. This is because these items appear consecutively in the PAIRTAPS, and thus a sizable number of participants responded either to one item or the other or gave identical responses to both.

Responses were coded using a manual prepared by the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP) at Boston University, which is discussed extensively in Chap. 32. The manual features two coding systems, one informed by Albert Bandura's (1999) mechanisms of agency and moral disengagement and engagement, whereas the other centers on the achievability and prerequisites for peace. When coding for agency and moral disengagement/engagement, written responses were analyzed using a modified deductive method (Gilgun, 1999). This is because Bandura had already identified several types of reasoning that provided a framework for coding mechanisms that produce disengagement from moral standards and for creating a complementary set of mechanisms that engage moral standards. Coding for achievability and prerequisites for peace involved grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), an inductive approach that lacks a preexisting

framework to guide qualitative analysis. Across coding systems, written responses were first divided into codeable units, with each unit representing a complete and independent idea, and placed into a single category; participants often generated more than one codeable unit per response. Each unit was coded for the presence or absence of each of the themes identified in the coding manual. We subjected these data to exploratory chi-square analyses in order to identify potential differences based on gender, prior military service, past military service by relatives, and involvement in protest against war or for peace. We report only statistically ($p < 0.05$) or marginally ($p = 0.051-0.1$) significant findings where expected cell counts for frequencies of responses in particular coding categories exceed five. Because the sample is a volunteer sample and not a probability sample, it cannot be assumed that the findings are generalizable to the countries in the region or the region itself.

Coding for Agency and Moral Disengagement/Humanitarian Engagement

Participants' responses were analyzed with a coding system derived in part from Albert Bandura's research on moral disengagement. Specifically, responses (not participants) were coded for *presence* or *absence of agency* and for presence or absence of various forms of disengagement or humanitarian engagement. We believe it would be inappropriate to label participants as morally disengaged or engaged simply because they provide arguments that appear to be reflective of the sociocognitive mechanisms identified in Bandura's theory. Consequently, in describing our coding system and patterns in the responses, we refer to *humanitarian engagement* and *disengagement* or simply *engagement and disengagement*, rather than "moral disengagement" and "moral engagement."

Informed by Bandura's emphasis on the role of agency in moral engagement, our coding manual (derived from a large international sam-

ple of responses) identified two major categories into which responses could be coded: *presence of agency* or *absence of agency*. Responses coded for *presence of agency* focused on actions that could be taken by individuals, communities, and institutions to achieve peace. Responses coded for *absence of agency* are characterized by passivity regarding any efforts to pursue peace, or an expressed lack of intention to act on behalf of achieving peace, or denial of the possibility of peace. The coding manual also identified criteria for coding responses into one of seven different *disengagement* categories (e.g., *rationalization*, *displacement of responsibility*, *attribution of blame*, and *destructive human nature*) or one of ten different *engagement* categories (e.g., *interpersonal concepts-values*, *assumption of responsibility*, *social equity*, *governmental responsibility*, and *ineffectiveness of negative relations*). We omit from discussion categories with fewer than 10% of the coded responses. See Chap. 32 for more information concerning the coding systems and their categories and subcategories.

Patterns in Qualitative Responses for Agency and Disengagement/Humanitarian Engagement

Agency

Eighty-six percent of coded responses were coded into the *presence of agency* category; only 14% were coded for *absence of agency*. Several different forms of agency were identified. For instance, a 29-year-old Peruvian woman wrote that the way to achieve peace is to "reflect and overcome what has been done." More broadly, a 20-year-old Nicaraguan man recommended "dialogue and willingness to act for peace on behalf of all governments," while a 41-year-old Costa Rican man suggested "boosting economic development." A 27-year-old Argentine woman made several proactive suggestions: "transmit [ideas] without aggression, caring for the environment, live each day significantly, and love everything."

In contrast to these suggestions for potential actions to be taken to achieve peace were responses coded for *absence of agency* because of the passivity they expressed. A 21-year-old Brazilian woman commented, “I don’t know if it [peace] is possible.” A 29-year-old Colombian man despaired at the prospects for peace by writing, “everyday the situation is worse,” and a 19-year-old Peruvian woman indicated, “it is a long road ahead.” A candid 19-year-old Nicaraguan man put it plainly, “[Peace] does not interest me much.”

Exploratory Chi-Square Analyses for Agency

Exploratory chi-square analyses revealed a significant gender difference for the presence of responses in the *presence of agency* category ($p=0.042$) and a trend for *absence of agency* responses ($p=0.052$), specifically. A significantly greater proportion of women than men endorsed some form of action as integral to peace (87.6% vs. 81.7%), whereas a marginally significant higher proportion of men than women renounced active involvement in peace or questioned its usefulness (17.9% vs. 12.2%).

Disengagement

Fifteen percent of responses were coded into one of the *disengagement* categories. Nearly all of these *disengagement* responses (93%) were clustered in one of two major categories, *destructive human nature* and *attribution of blame*, and into one of the subcategories of *attribution of blame* – specifically, *government-political blame*.

Destructive human nature comprised 40% of the responses coded specifically for disengagement and 6% of all the responses. The *destructive human nature* category encompassed responses that expressed the view that seeking peace is pointless due to negative qualities inherent in human beings, such as aggression and avarice. For example, a 28-year-old Brazilian man stated, “Man is evil by nature,” and a 21-year-old Colombian man wrote, “We are humans full of... internal conflicts.” A conflicted 23-year-old

Argentine woman acknowledged, “we do not change.”

Attribution of blame constituted another 31% of responses coded into a disengagement category, and 5% of all disengagement/engagement responses. This *attribution of blame* category speaks to external conditions and events as well as internal difficulties that short-circuit peace, such as conflicts and ideological differences. A 45-year-old Peruvian woman qualified her otherwise upbeat perception that peace is achievable by explaining “fights are everywhere.” A 35-year-old Costa Rican man admitted, “There is always going to be some group that will want to dominate another.” A 30-year-old Nicaraguan man wrote of “too many economic interests.”

Finally, *government-political blame*, which was a subcategory of *attribution of blame*, constituted 22% of the disengagement responses and 3% of all disengagement/engagement responses. Responses in this category identify leaders and nations as culprits for obstructing peace due to their motivations and actions. A 25-year-old Peruvian woman reflected, “Sometimes I think that the developed countries try to colonize not the same as it was in the past, but by means of polarization.” A 28-year-old Colombian man offered his take on how powerful entities undermine peace: “The FARC sells drugs, the U.S. sells arms, Africa sells diamonds, Asia sells oil.”

Humanitarian Engagement

Seventy-seven percent of coded responses were coded into one of the *humanitarian engagement* categories. A large majority of these responses (85%) clustered in five categories: *interpersonal concepts-values*, *assumption of responsibility*, *social equity*, *governmental responsibility*, and *ineffectiveness of negative relations*.

Interpersonal concepts-values consisted of the 23% of the humanitarian engagement responses and 18% of the total set of responses. This category encompassed appreciation of positive human qualities, such as empathy and togetherness. An 18-year-old Peruvian woman formulated this strategy for peace: “Establish a

society with tolerance of differences at its base and living in accordance with universal principles and ethics.” A 37-year-old Puerto Rican man wrote that “love is the best way to find peace.”

Assumption of responsibility comprised 20% of humanitarian engagement responses and 16% of all responses. This category included obligations and efforts taken by the general population in pursuit of peace. For example, a 20-year-old Brazilian woman declared that peace can be reached with “each person acting toward that goal,” with a 22-year-old Colombian man echoing, “[if] everyone does their part.”

The *social equity* category contained 17% of the *humanitarian engagement* responses and 13% of all *disengagement/engagement* responses. This category views elimination of economic and social inequality and commitment to social justice as contributing to peace. A 23-year-old Argentine man insisted, “End the corruption.” A 31-year-old Costa Rican man stipulated, “If homes unite without borders or racism.” A 32-year-old Puerto Rican woman reminded, “We all have the right to enjoy life to the maximum.”

Governmental responsibility represented 13% of the humanitarian engagement responses and 10% of all responses. This category focused on the duty of government to foster peace either by active involvement or intentionally standing aside. For example, a 20-year-old Peruvian woman wrote of countries “respecting norms, laws, agreements, [and] protocols.” A 21-year-old Brazilian man indicated that he did not anticipate peace “without a mechanism for global regulation of military entities.”

Finally, statements regarding the *ineffectiveness of negative relations* were found in 12% of humanitarian engagement responses and 10% of all responses. This category summarized the realization that hostile emotions and violent interactions are futile to resolve disputes. A 22-year-old Nicaraguan woman noted that peace might exist if “countries did not attack one another” and a 40-year-old Colombian man emphasized, “being aware of the damage that can be done to people.”

Exploratory Chi-Square Analyses for Disengagement and Humanitarian Engagement Responses

Exploratory chi-square analyses revealed several statistically significant group differences in types of arguments made concerning whether world peace is achievable or not. A significantly higher proportion of women than men gave responses coded for one or more of the *humanitarian engagement* categories ($p=0.020$; 87.1% vs. 80.2%). In addition, chi-square analysis revealed a gender difference in the presence of responses in the *interpersonal concepts-values* category ($p=0.062$); a significantly larger proportion of women than men identified relating to others with integrity as an ingredient for peace (36.3% vs. 29.0%).

Other group differences were also found. Proportionately more participants without military service than those who had served indicated that peace could be achieved through *assumption of responsibility* ($p=0.045$; 32.0% vs. 12.5%). Participants who did not have a relative with military service were significantly more likely to urge *social equality* than those who had a relative who served ($p=0.037$; 27.5% vs. 19.7%). In addition, participants with a history of protesting against war or for peace encouraged *social equity* as solutions to peace more so than those who had not protested ($p=0.079$; 29.8% vs. 22.2%). Finally, a significantly greater proportion of non-protestors than protestors perceived *negative relations as inimical* to peace ($p=0.001$; 21.7% vs. 9.2%).

Coding for Achievability and Prerequisites for Peace

In addition to themes that could be coded for agency and disengagement/humanitarian engagement, there were additional themes in the qualitative responses that were coded, based on a grounded theory analysis, into one of several categories for (a) *achievability of peace* and (b) *prerequisites for peace*.

Achievability of Peace. Twenty-nine percent of coded responses were coded into one of the

achievability of peace categories. Just over half (52%) of the *achievability* responses were sorted into one of four major categories: (a) *recognizing reasons*, (b) *achievable*, (c) *work in progress*, and (d) *ideal*.

Identifying reasons comprised 32% of the *achievability* responses and 9% of all responses. This category subsumed various negative explanations for why peace cannot be achieved. For instance, a 23-year-old Peruvian woman wrote, "How things are going today, I doubt it," and a 23-year-old Brazilian man added, "Where there are people, there will not be peace."

Achievable represented 26% of the *achievability* responses and 8% of all responses. This category captured the opposite viewpoint, namely, a favorable outlook toward the eventuality of peace. A 28-year-old Argentine man wrote, "They have always had war in the history of man; however, no one should think that we cannot do it." With greater detail, a 61-year-old Colombian woman suggested, "Yes, with economic, political, racial, educational, and cultural equality."

Work in progress comprised 16% of *achievability* responses in the theme and 5% of all responses. This category included opinions that peace requires time and sustained effort to succeed. A 24-year-old Nicaraguan man noted, "One day we will all know the truth," and an 18-year-old Puerto Rican woman wrote, "I believe so, but it will take time."

Finally, the *ideal* theme was found in 10% of the *achievability* responses and 3% of all responses. Responses in this category focus on perceptions of peace as an aspiration or desire. A 19-year-old Peruvian woman stated that peace "is everyone's desire including me," and according to a 47-year-old Argentine woman, "It's more of a desire than reality."

Exploratory Chi-Square Analyses for the Achievability of Peace

Chi-square analyses revealed a significant gender difference for the presence of responses in the *focus on achievability* categories; a greater proportion of women than men gave responses coded

for one or more of those categories ($p=0.005$; 79.6% vs. 69.8%). A significant gender difference emerged for the *achievable* category, with a significantly higher proportion of women than men reporting positive general expectations about finding peace ($p=0.015$; 27.5% vs. 19.0%). A greater share of women than men identified peace as the *ultimate condition* for humankind ($p=0.057$; 11.4% vs. 6.7%). Furthermore, a significantly larger portion participants who did not have a relative with military service were more likely to express *idealistic* views about reaching peace than those with a relative who had served ($p=0.063$; 11.8% vs. 6.8%).

Prerequisites for Peace

Sixty-nine percent of coded responses were coded into one of the *prerequisites for peace* categories. Nearly all (99%) clustered in three categories: (a) *philosophical prerequisites*, (b) *pro-social prerequisites*, and (c) *governmental prerequisites*.

Philosophical Prerequisites. Twenty-three percent of coded responses were grouped in the *philosophical prerequisites* categories. A majority of responses (86%) were sorted into four subcategories: (a) *positive interpersonal values*, (b) *understanding acceptance*, (c) *philosophical principles*, and (d) *religion/spirituality*.

Positive interpersonal values comprised 44% of responses in the *philosophical prerequisites* category, 14% of *prerequisite* responses, and 10% of all responses. This subcategory referenced principles such as compassion, respect, and trust that are believed to be essential for peace. For example, a 24-year-old Costa Rican woman wrote, "Everything is possible including love and respect for all." A 22-year-old Colombian man added, "respecting the decisions and preferences of others."

Understanding/acceptance represented 21% of responses in the *philosophical prerequisites* category, 7% of *prerequisite* responses, and 5% of all responses. This subcategory captured the perceived importance for peace of recognizing and tolerating others, especially those who are

different. The words of a 25-year-old Costa Rican woman echo the necessity of being “more open minded and tolerant.” A 22-year-old Brazilian man stated simply that “respecting differences” is important to achieving peace.

Philosophical principles constituted 11% of responses in the philosophical prerequisites category, 4% of prerequisite responses, and 2% of all thematic responses. This subcategory included the perception that peace demands change in attitudes toward others based on morality and ethics. According to a 19-year-old Peruvian woman, “The basis for world peace to begin and be sustained arises from ... our moral development.” A 34-year-old Peruvian man recommended, “cultivating knowledge, truth, and justice.”

Finally, *religion/spirituality* comprised 10% of responses in the philosophical prerequisites category theme, 3% of prerequisite responses, and 2% of thematic responses. This subcategory summarized the view that religious and spiritual teachings and customs offer a pathway to peace. A 19-year-old Nicaraguan man stressed the importance of a higher power, arguing that peace may be pursued, “always, when we seek God,” with a 40-year-old Puerto Rican woman agreeing “Look for and know God.”

Pro-social Prerequisites. Thirty-five percent of coded responses were grouped in the *pro-social actions* categories. A majority (81%) were sorted into six subcategories: (a) *elimination of negative interactions*, (b) *interaction*, (c) *pro-social action*, (d) *pragmatic solutions*, (e) *unification*, and (f) *human rights*.

Elimination of negative interactions comprised 28% of responses in the pro-social prerequisites category, 14% of prerequisite responses, and 10% of thematic responses. This subcategory encompassed the view that peace cannot coexist with hate and violence. For instance, a 19-year-old Brazilian woman advocated “try(ing) to reconcile,” and a 23-year-old Argentine man wrote, “End corruption.”

Interaction represented 20% of responses in the pro-social prerequisites category, 10% of prerequisite responses, and 7% of thematic responses. This subcategory captured the opinion that intergroup contact, dialogue, and coop-

eration on projects of mutual interest enhance peace. A 51-year-old Puerto Rican woman wrote of the “need for communication between people of different countries.” A 20-year-old Colombian female urged succinctly, “Arrive at an agreement!”

Pro-social action, *pragmatic solutions*, and *unification* each constituted 11% of responses in the pro-social prerequisites category, approximately 6% of prerequisite responses, and 4% of all responses. *Pro-social action* focused on general ways to maximize peace, whereas *pragmatic solutions* encompass specific peace-seeking strategies. An 18-year-old Nicaraguan woman highlighted the former, suggesting, “if we set our minds to it we can achieve it,” whereas a 58-year-old Costa Rican man was more specifically pragmatic, stressing the necessity of “bringing education and other social services to the dispossessed people of the world.” *Unification* subsumed recommendations for bringing people together and creating communities. For example, an 18-year-old Peruvian man wrote of “treating each other as members of one family” and a 25-year-old Argentine woman of “brotherhood.”

Finally, *human rights* made up 10% of responses in the pro-social prerequisites category, 5% of prerequisite responses, and 3% of thematic responses. This subcategory emphasized the perceived value to peace of fundamental and inalienable rights. A 55-year-old Colombian woman urged “respecting the rights of inhabitants from each country and free choice for the people,” while a 24-year-old Peruvian woman instructed, “respect the rights of all human beings.”

Governmental Prerequisites. Eleven percent of coded responses were grouped in the *constructive government/political action* categories. A majority (85%) were sorted into four subcategories: (a) *global political change*, (b) *diplomacy*, (c) *elimination of negative political motivations*, and (d) *constructive government/political action*.

Global political change comprised 36% of responses in the governmental prerequisites category, 6% of prerequisite responses, and 4% of thematic responses. This subcategory dealt with the perceived effectiveness of government, international

organizations, and certain political philosophies in advancing peace. A 19-year-old Peruvian woman wrote that peace could be realized by “making the governments of all countries agree.” A 21-year-old Brazilian man mentioned the need for “a good international code of conduct.”

Diplomacy represented 28% of responses in the governmental prerequisites category, 4% of prerequisite responses, and 3% of thematic responses. This subcategory captured the view that negotiated solutions to disputes between adversaries are integral to peace, including reconciliation between leaders. A 20-year-old Brazilian woman and a 39-year-old Colombian man favored peace “agreements and treaties.”

Elimination of negative political motivations constituted 20% of responses in the governmental prerequisites category, 3% of prerequisite responses, and 2% of all responses. This subcategory included the opinion that peace requires an end to corruption, greed, and abuse of power by leaders and governments. A 20-year-old Puerto Rican man demanded, “Eliminate tyranny!” A 25-year-old Argentine woman stressed the importance of “not promoting their own interests to the rest of the world.”

Finally, *constructive government/political action* captured 11% of responses in the governmental prerequisites, 2% of prerequisite responses, and 1% of all responses. This subcategory summarized perceptions that certain political perspectives and governmental bodies can facilitate peace. A 20-year-old Nicaraguan woman emphasized that governments should “implement laws that benefit the people and put them into practice.” A 36-year-old Costa Rican man advocated, “for everyone to have democracy.”

Exploratory Chi-Square Analyses for Prerequisites for Peace

A chi-square analysis produced a significant gender difference for the presence of responses belonging to the *prerequisites for peace* theme; a greater proportion of women than men gave responses coded for one or more of the *prerequisites for peace* categories ($p=0.042$; 87.6% vs.

81.7%). A significant gender difference emerged for the presence of responses in the *philosophical principles* category; a higher percentage of women than men gave responses coded for the *philosophical principles* categories ($p=0.010$; 48.3% vs. 37.7%). Women were significantly more likely than men to report *positive interpersonal values* as a requirement for peace ($p=0.001$; 27.0% vs. 15.9%). Participants who had a relative with military service also were significantly more likely to express *positive interpersonal values* than those without a relative who served ($p=0.048$; 23.4% vs. 16.2%).

Chi-square analyses revealed significant differences based on military service for the presence of responses in the *pro-social prerequisites* category: A greater proportion of participants without military service than those with past service specified one or more *pro-social action* as the best route to peace ($p=0.035$; 59.6% vs. 37.5%). Similarly, a significantly larger share of participants with relative with military service advocated one or more of the pro-social prerequisites than those without a relative who served ($p=0.049$; 63.8% vs. 54.9%). A chi-square analysis yielded a significant difference in the presence of responses in the *elimination of negative political motivations* category based on history of protest: Participants with no history of protesting against war or for peace were more likely to articulate the need to resolve enmity as the best road to peace than those who had protested ($p=0.017$; 25.3% vs. 15.3%).

Summary and Conclusion

Before proceeding, we wish to reiterate that our sample was one of convenience; therefore, the results may not reflect the diverse voices within Latin America on peace and reconciliation. Participants tended to be middle-class women in their mid-20s, making it difficult to generalize with confidence to men, younger and older groups, and the affluent and poor. Moreover, a sizeable number did not indicate whether they had family with military service or had protested against war or for peace. Thus, we exert caution when discussing our findings.

Our qualitative analysis of written responses to the two peace items of the PAIRTAPS offers a rich and nuanced glimpse into Latin American perceptions of peace and reconciliation. Our findings represent a substantial addition to the literature, as very few studies of this scope have examined the views of ordinary citizens on peace and reconciliation or have situated their results in a theoretical framework, such as Bandura's moral disengagement/engagement (1999). Over 20 years ago, Rohrer (1991) identified metaphors used in press accounts of the political discourse of world leaders. Similar to our sample's endorsement of the interpersonal dimensions of peace, the Costa Rican news stories featured active expressions of peace that implied a relationship with others at a personal and collective level. Furthermore, Costa Rican media placed accountability for their country's behavior squarely on its citizens. It emphasized a country-as-person metaphor in which national identity embodies citizens' behavior. This perspective also resonates with calls by our sample to take responsibility for peace, which emphasizes the notion of "peacebuilding from below" (Pearce, 1997, p. 441) or peace and reconciliation as manifestly human endeavors.

Engagement

With regard to Bandura's mechanisms, the Latin American sample voiced an unmistakable sense of agency in its perceptions of peace, with women, more so than men, endorsing action at the individual, group, and/or institutional level for the purpose of achieving peace. These results speak to the importance of mobilizing ordinary people and strengthening their individual and collective capacities to play an influential role in addressing the aftermath of violence and shaping a realistic vision of peace (Pearce, 1997). The findings also suggest that, perhaps due to the success of women's movements in Latin America (such as Mothers of Plaza de Mayo in Argentina and Platform of Salvadoran Women in El Salvador), women's voices in resolving conflict and building peace have become more insistent, whereas historically their opinions have been marginalized (Moser & Clark, 2001). Are

Latin American women becoming local custodians of national development as witnessed by their leadership of grassroots peace movements?

The sample was highly engaged, possibly owing to participants' clear preference for agency. Being coded for humanitarian engagement required a proclivity for agency along with a belief that peace is achievable. Participants' active involvement in peace is evident in the variety of steps they generated for bringing about peace. These suggestions ranged from regulating aggressive feelings and behaviors to embracing humane values in relationships at all levels. The sample also believed in taking responsibility for correcting oppression and injustice, and they insisted that government play a role in peace, or at least allow peace to emerge unencumbered by self-serving laws, policies, and decisions. Women tended to draw on positive human qualities to further peace, dovetailing with broad differences in how women and men interpret and react to wrongdoing within relationships (Buss, 1994; Gilligan, 1982). Following relational transgressions, women typically are more compassionate and seek restorative justice, whereas men are generally less forgiving and pursue retributive justice. Two groups leaned against certain strategies for peace: Participants with military service or family who had served in the military and participants with experience protesting against war or for peace were less disposed toward overcoming social inequality and injustice. Neither group anticipated that such efforts would succeed. Because personal and familial military service and protest history are newly introduced to peace research, further study is needed to uncover why these groups responded as they did.

The Latin American sample had mixed and worldly opinions about whether peace can be attained, with women and those unconnected to military service displaying more confidence in the possibility of realizing their aspirational vision of peace. Such idealism and optimism may reflect insulation from and, hence, lack of understanding of the overwhelming burden of direct and structural forms of violence, perhaps due to gender stereotyping and class privilege.

Prerequisites

Women were more likely than men to offer opinions on how best to achieve peace, lending additional support to the observation that Latin American women are committed to designing a world free of violent conflict. The sample also emphasized an interpersonal dimension to peace. Women in particular appeared inclined to preserve relationships (Gilligan, 1982), as did participants with family in the military, who may have been unusually sensitive to the human cost of armed conflict. The sample underscored the importance both of ending conflict and of reconciling enemies, particularly those with military service or family who served, again reflecting a heightened awareness of the enormous sacrifices associated with military deployment. Participants' views of peaceful communities rest on human rights and the strategic improvement of dialogue and cooperation. They also identified different sources and traditions from which to build more accepting attitudes and interactions. Together, these findings portray a sophisticated Latin American perspective on peace that includes not only a cessation of hostilities, but also methods to address the relational issues so crucial to a successful transition from conflict resolution to reconciliation (Daly & Sarkin, 2007; Newman, 2001). Finally, the sample invested national leaders, governments, and international organizations with authority to remove obstacles to peace and to adopt policies and procedures for peace. Those who never protested against war or for peace were more likely to feel this way, perhaps indicating that they did not appreciate the power of dissent in facilitating social change.

While speculative, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the prerequisites for peace identified by the sample emphasize holistic approaches and social reconstruction, with little resemblance to amnesty. Participants clearly recognized that multilayered, multi-sectoral, and multinational strategies are needed for peace and reconciliation (Olsen et al., 2010; Santiso, 2002; Sikkink & Walling, 2007). They also were cognizant that peace agreements must offer more than shallow political accommodations, like the Contadora/Esquipulas process (Kacowicz, 2005), and instead require adherence to conventions that enshrine

human rights (Bite, 2002). The sample also grasped that healing a country after protracted conflict requires comprehensive solutions to historical, economic, political, and social conditions that fuel current grievances which can lead to future violence (Hristov, 2004; Maldonado-Torres, 2006; Opatow, 2001). We hope that the fairly positive expectations, proactive stance, and cache of ideas for peace expressed by ordinary Latin Americans strengthen the region's long-standing norms regarding peace (Kacowicz, 2005) and herald the continued stability and expansion of democratic practices throughout all levels of society.

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Perspectives on Achieving Peace in South and Southeast Asia

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Maggie Campbell, Janice Jones,
Ma. Regina E. Estuar, Sherri McCarthy,
Ellora Puri, Megan Reif, Darshini Shah,
Haslina Muhammad, Nisha Raj,
and Jas Jafaar

This chapter focuses on perspectives on the likelihood of achieving peace, and the pathways to doing so, in South and Southeast Asia. While the classifications of these regions have varied over the years, and continue to vary across sources, the United Nations Statistics Division (2010) classifies the countries of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka as belonging to South Asia and defines Southeast Asia as encompassing Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic (Laos), Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam. This chapter focuses on the countries from which data were collected

during the period of 2004–2009: India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka in South Asia and Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Laos in Southeast Asia.

The regions of South and Southeast Asia have rich histories replete with examples of both peace and violence, all of which have the potential to influence current perceptions of the achievability of peace. Commonalities among the various countries include legacies of colonization, and ethnically and religiously diverse populations. Most colonies became independent following World War II, but colonizers bequeathed lasting legacies of societal divisions, structural problems, and authoritarian governments benefiting the powerful (Noor, 2009b). Beeson (2002) explains that authoritarian governments may be particularly appealing to some of the countries of these regions because colonialism left them with

M. Campbell (✉)
Clark University, Worcester, MA, USA
e-mail: maggiecampbell28@gmail.com

J. Jones
Doctoral Leadership Studies Department, Cardinal
Stritch University, Milwaukee, WI, USA
e-mail: je2jones@stritch.edu

M.R.E. Estuar
Department of information Systems and Computer Science,
Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon City, Philippines
e-mail: restuar@ateneo.edu

S. McCarthy
Educational Psychology, Counseling and Human
Relations, Northern Arizona University, Yuma, AZ, USA
e-mail: Sherri.McCarthy@NAU.EDU

E. Puri
Department of Political Science, University of Jammu,
Jammu, India
e-mail: ellorapuri@gmail.com

M. Reif
Political Science and International Studies, University of
Colorado Denver, Denver, CO, USA
e-mail: reifm@umich.edu; reifmegan@live.com

D. Shah
Health Education Library for People, Mumbai, India
e-mail: dnshah1@gmail.com

H. Muhammad
Monash University, Melbourne, Australia

N. Raj
Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA

J. Jafaar
Department of Anthropology and Sociology, Faculty of
Arts and Sciences, University of Malaysia, Malaysia
e-mail: laile@um.edu.my

a “predictable occupation with internal stability and security” (p. 551). Additionally, though some countries have integrated political parties, elections, and other elements of democracy into their political systems, in others, power still often stays within political parties or even within the same family for multiple decades (e.g., [Beeson](#); [Noor, 2009b](#)), such as the Nehru family in India and the Bhutto family in Pakistan.

The religious and ethnic diversity in South and Southeast Asia has proven challenging at many levels to the social fabric and enterprises of the different countries ([Beeson, 2002](#)). Part of this diversity is due to large scale migrations from both within and outside of the region. For example, labor migrations from China changed the composition of the population in both Indonesia and Malaysia ([Beeson](#)). Because migrations in much of South and Southeast Asia have tended to revolve around labor needs or conflicts rather than around individual needs, many people still hold strong ties to their own ethnic group ([Montiel, 2009](#); [Noor, 2009b](#)). Moreover, many of the strict divisions set up and/or reinforced by the colonizing powers as part of the “divide and rule” method have been perpetuated by leaders who have found it in their best interest to do so ([Noor, 2009b](#)).

The world’s major religions, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, as well as other faiths such as Shinto and Taoism, are all represented in Asia. [Syamsuddin \(2009\)](#) points out that peace is a major concept in each of these religions, though the specific focus differs between faiths. For example, Islam and Judaism both emphasize the idea of inner peace (salaam and shalom); Christianity emphasizes peace, love, and mercy; Hinduism emphasizes ahimsa, or the avoidance of violence; while Buddhism emphasizes the absence of chaos or nirvana ([Syamsuddin](#)). Identification with a religious group is particularly salient in regions of South and Southeast Asia because religion is often “part of public space rather than a private affair” ([Montiel 2009](#), p. 8). Even with the influence of globalization, religion remains a major part of the culture and daily life of much of the region and is often integrally related to the power structure of an area as religious leaders often have important social roles ([Noor, 2009b](#)). Most analysts and researchers do not believe that religious ten-

sions are the cause of conflicts in South and Southeast Asia, but many argue that the causal economic and political power differentials are magnified by religion ([Noor](#)). Thus, these religious tensions are likely to influence ideas about both the achievability of peace and the steps needed to achieve it.

Southeast Asia in particular is noted to be “the most populous Islamic region in the world” ([Houben, 2003](#), p. 149). However, despite the widespread prevalence of Muslims in South and Southeast Asia, they are still the minority in many of the countries in these regions. Also, due in part to the recent international focus on Islamic terrorism, Muslim minorities may feel insecure and attacked due to both national and international dynamics (e.g., [Houben](#)).

Despite these challenging factors, South and Southeast Asia are often considered peaceful and harmonious, due in part to their connections with Eastern philosophies, as well as prominent advocates for social justice and peace in the past and present, such as Mahatma Gandhi and Arundhati Roy. Asian countries are also often associated with collectivism and a focus on group orientation ([Noor, 2009b](#); [Triandis, 1995](#)), but most of the relevant research has been conducted in East Asia, and characteristics of the value system in South and Southeast Asia have been less well articulated. Moreover, although a collectivist mindset can aid group cohesion, it can also lend itself to emphasizing intergroup differences ([Brewer, 1999](#); [Triandis, 1995](#)), particularly if it is in the best interest of those in charge to promote these differences.

India

The majority of Indians identify as Hindu, but Muslims are a substantial minority, making up an estimated 13.4% (or perhaps even 20–30%) of the population ([Khan & Sen, 2009](#)). Like many countries in the region, India’s past has been marked by intergroup conflict around religion-based group identities (e.g., [Noor, 2009b](#)). There has also been a great deal of conflict in regard to the caste system, with lower castes falling victim to both structural and physical violence, and sometimes responding with physical violence

(Vincentnathan, 1996). This history of conflict is likely to influence current perceptions of peace.

The Hindu-Muslim struggle is probably the best-known conflict in India, dating back to the violent occupation of the Mughal emperors from Central Asia from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. These tensions are thought to have intensified under British rule, in part because of a deliberate divide and conquer policy in the British Empire (Khan & Sen, 2009; Montiel, 2009; Varshney, 1997).

In 1947, India and Pakistan became two separate nations based largely on religious grounds, with most Hindus and Sikhs staying in or moving to India and many Muslims settling in Pakistan. The state of Pakistan actually consisted of two large regions, East Pakistan and West Pakistan, separated by nearly 1,000 miles of Indian territory. Bangladesh was created in 1971 when East Pakistan seceded from the Islamic State of Pakistan following a war in which India sided with the East Pakistan fight for independence (International Crisis Group, 2012a). Since India and Pakistan were partitioned into separate nations in 1947, they have engaged in at least four wars, three of which have been over Kashmir (International Crisis Group; Khan, 2009). Similarly to the case of Bangladesh, Pakistan wanted control over Kashmir, situated between Pakistan and India, but the Kashmiris have sought independence and India has sided with them.

Khan and Sen (2009) highlight the desire to move beyond the past violence by engaging in “collective amnesia” (pp. 44) following partition. They suggest that this was beneficial in some ways, as dwelling on the violence could have further solidified group categories and perpetuated intergroup violence. However, it is likely that the intensity of the intergroup violence could not just be “forgotten,” and that additional attempts at understanding and healing were necessary to move beyond the conflicts. Khan and Sen explain that violence between Hindus and Muslims (both within India and between India and Pakistan) continued after the partition and expanded in focus (Khan, 2009; Khan & Sen, 2009). Kashmir, in particular, has been the setting of a violent, complicated, and protracted conflict (Khan, 2009).

Muslim and Hindu identities became increasingly salient and divisive in this context. Khan and Sen (2009) explain that “religion was changed from being a faith and turned into an ideology” (p. 53). These ideologies, based in but separate from religion, placed people into distinct groups, justifying violence against the out-group. Even as secular strides were taken, state politics were not entirely separated from religion, hence failing to dispel the tension between groups. For example, although the Indian constitution was secular, the army and the bureaucracy remained affiliated with Hinduism (Khan & Sen). Further, in the latter part of the twentieth century (1970s–early 1990s), there were active attacks on secularism by some Hindu communalist groups as well as a rise in intergroup violence, predominantly, although not solely, inflicted on Muslims (Khan & Sen). Researchers have also noted that increased communal violence has been a corollary of a rise in the Hindu nationalist movement, though it is recognized that violence is not the sole contributing factor to the rising nationalism (e.g., Brass, 2003; Khan & Sen, 2009).

Though India has been the site of violent riots, displacement of people, and bloodshed, it is important to remember the numerous examples of non-violence and resources for peace in that nation. India’s most well-known nonviolent activist is undoubtedly Mohandas Gandhi, leader of the non-violent movement for independence from England and proponent of bridging the gap between religious groups to create a sense of unity, a goal opposed by many for political reasons. Models for peace also exist beyond international figures. Peace has also been fostered by lesser-known figures. Although many aspects of Hindu-Muslim relations are bleak, violence has not been equally present in all areas of India. Varshney (1997, 2002) points out that peace, or at least the absence of violence, has been demonstrably possible between Hindus and Muslims in parts of India, even where these identities are salient. For example, Varshney (1997) compared the cities of Hyderabad, where there has been a great deal of violence between Hindus and Muslims, and Lucknow, where there was only one major riot in the 1900s. Varshney posited that the major reasons for the different lev-

els of violence in these two communities relate to “historical legacies, political strategies, and economic structure” (p. 4). Specifically, the historical conflict in Lucknow had been between Sunnis and Shias (both Muslim denominations), but in Hyderabad, there had been a history of violence between Hindus and Muslims. Additionally, political authorities in Lucknow stressed connections between the religious groups, whereas the authorities in Hyderabad capitalized on the strong group differentiation to serve political goals. Along similar lines, Lucknow, unlike Hyderabad, has been characterized by economic interdependence between Hindus and Muslims. Varshney’s analyses of violent and peaceful Hindu-Muslim cities reveal the importance of the legacies of conflict, as well as intergroup contact, in forming current relations. Khan (2009) followed similar logic in arguing that the best approach to the Kashmir conflict is to focus on fostering mutual dependence between the opposing sides, with long-term goals in mind.

Pakistan

Perhaps reflecting the prevalence of conflict in its brief history, Pakistan has often been ruled by military regimes, which, along with extremist religious groups, have opposed the more moderate goals of some of the mainstream political parties (International Crisis Group, 2012a). Even during periods of democracy, the military and Islamic extremist groups have remained powerful, shaping legal and educational systems, and facilitating violence in Kashmir and Afghanistan. This militancy has led to the United States and other world powers focusing on Pakistan’s ties to terrorist organizations. In addition to conflict in Kashmir and Afghanistan, there has also been a great deal of violence within Pakistan itself, often between political parties, both reflecting and perpetuating a lack of stability.

Although the relationship between Pakistan and India has often been characterized by violence and animosity, complicated in recent years by both sides’ acquisition of nuclear weapons, there have also been steps toward peace, at both the governmental and interindividual levels. For example, at the time of data collection, the leaders

of Pakistan and India were engaged in peace-building dialogue. While not always successful, the two nations have made positive progress (Croft, 2005). A positive interpersonal example is provided by the 2005 resumption of bus service that connects the Pakistani- and Indian-controlled sections of Kashmir, leading to more “person-to-person contact” (Kemkar, 2005, p. 6).

Philippines

Like many of the countries in South and Southeast Asia, the Philippines is a diverse nation with a long history of colonization and power struggles. Some of the regime changes have taken place relatively peacefully, for example, the People’s Power movement and the Catholic Church’s removal of Marcos and Estrada from power in 1986 and 2001 (Noor, 2009b). However, other power struggles have been sustained and violent. Specifically, much of the violence has taken place in and around Mindanao, resulting from fighting between the Philippine army and the Moro people, who are comprised of Muslims of various ethnic groups (Houben, 2003). The conflict in Mindanao dates back to the sixteenth century, when the Moro people resisted colonization by the Spanish. Following Filipino independence in 1946, Mindanao was relatively peaceful until 1951, when the Filipino government resettled former communist rebels in the area to quell peasant unrest and encouraged a mass migration to Mindanao from other areas of the Philippines to increase the non-Moro population (Batistiana, 2009). Many of the Moro groups, such as the Moro National Liberation Front and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, have sought the establishment of an independent Islamic state by way of armed struggle (Batistiana; Houben, 2003).

There have also been several nonviolent attempts to end the problems between the Moros and the Filipino government. Various peace agreements have been reached, including in 1976 and 1996, but none have proved successful (Batistiana, 2009; Houben, 2003). However, talks have continued, and civil society (such as churches, NGOs, etc.) has played an increasing role in the peace processes

(Rood, 2005). Though there are limitations to what civil society groups can do, their impact has been meaningful. Efforts include encouragement of interfaith dialogue, the creation of “space for peace” (Rood, p. viii), and directly influencing the formal peace process. Those invested in the peace process face the substantial challenge of overcoming broader public perceptions, based on historical patterns, viewing violence as the only tool to end violence and achieve peace (Rood).

Malaysia

Malaysia is also a multiethnic society: Malays make up roughly 54% of the population, along with substantial Chinese and Indian minorities that have been living in Malaysia for centuries due to migrations along trade routes. Malaysia is also religiously diverse, as Malays tend to be Muslim, while the Chinese and Indian minorities are mainly Buddhist, Hindu, and Christian (Noor, 2009a). Colonization under the British in the 1700s greatly impacted relations between the ethnic groups, as unregulated labor migrations led to the economic affluence of the Chinese and Indian minorities at the expense of the Malays (Montiel, 2009; Noor, 2009a). Noor posits that “the plural society turned into a culture divided along labor lines,” which kept the “Malays and Chinese structurally isolated from one another” (p. 161–162). A 1957 agreement granted political supremacy to the Malays, while enabling the Indian and Chinese populations to remain more economically powerful. However, this did little to alleviate the conflict between the groups in the long term, as communal violence erupted in 1969 following elections that increased the political strength of the Chinese (Noor).

Though governmental responses to the violence (e.g., efforts to create some bridges between ethnic groups) have been somewhat helpful to the Malays, they remain economically disadvantaged and resentment continues on both sides. The Chinese retain economic supremacy, but Malaysia remains an Islamic state (Noor, 2009a). Because both the Malays and non-Malays are disadvantaged, both groups feel threatened and strive to retain their religious and cultural identities, potentially hindering

intergroup understanding (Noor). Fueling further unrest, scholars suggest there has been a growth in Islamic movements in Malaysia, likely due in part to reactance to globalization and the “cultural domination of the West” (Noor, p. 312), and that some of these movements become radicalized. Noor contends that the responsibility for a peaceful Malaysia has to rest mainly with the people, as opposed to the government; in her view, the various groups must recognize and build on their shared common values, while still respecting and allowing for differences. There are various heterogeneous groups in Malaysia, including interfaith groups, who are actively striving to build connections between the Malays and the non-Malays (Noor).

Laos

Once a part of French Indochina, Laos (Lao People’s Democratic Republic) officially became independent in 1953, following French rule and a short period of Japanese occupation (Stuart-Fox, 1997). The population consists of the politically powerful ethnic Lao, who are lowland inhabitants, as well as mountain tribes such as Hmong-Yao and Tibeto-Burman, among others. Buddhism is the most common religion in Laos, with only few Christians and Muslims, and several mountain tribes who also practice Animism (U.S. Department of State, 2012).

Following independence, Laos went through a number of often violent power transfers and periods of waning and resurging civil war. Laos was also brought into the Vietnam War due to a strong military presence by both the United States and North Vietnam (U.S. Department of State, 2012). The long-standing monarchy in Laos ended in 1975, with the takeover by the communist Lao People’s Revolutionary Party and the creation of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. The communist leadership instituted media censorship and put many of those who previously held power in so-called reeducation camps. Many ethnic Lao people and Hmong people left the country following the communist takeover, though a large percentage of them returned in the late 1990s (U.S. Department of State).

Like many countries in the region, Laos suffered during the financial crisis of the late 1990s (Thayer, 2003). Following the crisis, the ruling Lao People's Revolutionary Party faced challenges from opposition groups, such as the Lao Citizens Movement for Democracy, as well as a variety of Hmong resistance groups. These challenges have often been violent, involving urban bombings, but have resulted in little governmental or military change (Thayer, 2004, 2005). Additionally, the government has been accused of human rights abuses against both the Christian and Hmong minorities (Gunn, 2008; Thayer, 2003, 2004). Though Laos maintains positive relationships with neighboring countries and does not have strong external enemies (e.g., Gunn, 2007), it remains a somewhat insecure country due to intermittent domestic fighting as well as economic underdevelopment and reliance on foreign aid.

Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka became an independent nation in 1948, after more than 400 years of colonial rule (International Crisis Group, 2012b). Like much of South and Southeast Asia, Sri Lanka is a heterogeneous society, with strong divisions between groups. The Sinhala majority makes up roughly 74% of the population, while Tamils constitute 18%, and Muslims 6% of the population (International Crisis Group). Majority-minority relationships are further complicated by the fact that the Sinhalese are actually the minority in the broader region of South Asia, perhaps leading to insecurity despite their majority position in Sri Lanka. Thus, all groups in this situation can perceive themselves as vulnerable minorities, leading to greater concern for the in-group at the expense of devaluing and stereotyping out-groups, factors which are not conducive to peace (Schaller & Abeysinghe, 2006).

The minorities in Sri Lanka, above all the Tamils, have been subject to structural discrimination in various forms, which has severely limited social and economic opportunities for the youth. As in many similar situations, violent movements grew out of frustrations—for example,

over the inadequacy of services in area populated primarily by Tamils. The 1970s saw the growth of Sinhala nationalist groups, namely, the People's Liberation Front, as well as militant Tamil movements. The violence on the part of the Tamil groups led to the Sinhala nationalists killing over 1,000 Tamils and displacing tens of thousands more. This conflict continued in a cyclical manner, as the violence and oppression resulted in increased support for Tamil separatist groups. The collective trauma of years of violence became part of the rhetoric of the Tamil groups and served as a justification for the instigation of more violence (Ramanathapillai, 2006). There was also conflict within the Tamil groups themselves, but by the 1980s, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) emerged as the leading Tamil power (International Crisis Group, 2012b).

The following decades have involved heavy violence from both the Tamil and government sides, as well as multiple failed peace-building attempts, stemming from within Sri Lanka and from outside forces, such as India. Because the civil war officially ended in May of 2009 (with the government declaring victory), the participants responding to the PAIRTAPS were doing so in the context of a nation at war. Even now, the problems that led to the civil war have not been addressed, and the situation is still unstable. Many citizens remain in displaced camps, and others are returning home to limited opportunities. Additionally, concerns remain about war crimes and human rights abuses committed by all sides of the conflict. Though the Sri Lankan government created a Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Committee (LLRC) in June 2010 to investigate these abuses, the international community believes that, for a variety of reasons, the LLRC is "unlikely to contribute to either reconciliation or post-war accountability" (International Crisis Group, 2012b).

Indonesia

In terms of its population, Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim country (Khisbiyah, 2009, p. 124). Traditionally, Islam in Indonesia has been viewed as more tolerant and moderate than in

other regions. However, a tension has emerged between this majority of moderate Muslims and other Muslim groups who ascribe to more fundamentalist interpretations of Islam (Khisbiyah). As in Malaysia, radical Islamic groups have increased in popularity, particularly following the widespread international reactance against Islam. This dynamic is likely to affect people's perceptions of peace both in their own region and around the globe. Conflicts between more moderate and more radical groups led to violence in the early 2000s and fatwas issued in 2005 by the Indonesian Council of Ulama, which placed bans on "pluralism, secularism, and liberal interpretations of Islam" (Khisbiyah, p. 125).

Conflict between Muslims and Christians dates back to when Indonesia was a Dutch colony and subject to a divide and rule policy (Muluk & Malik, 2009). As is often the case, these policies created structural inequalities, with Christians having an advantage during the years of colonization and Muslims gaining an advantage in many areas after independence. Additionally, Christians and Muslims often lived, and in some cases continue to live, segregated from one another. The area of Maluku is particularly known for Christian-Muslim violence and riots. Some of the most severe recent violence was sparked by a 1999 disagreement between a Muslim passenger and a Christian bus driver, leading to intercommunal conflict and over 8,000 deaths that year (Muluk & Malik). Initially, governmental security forces became directly involved with the conflict rather than interceding to alleviate the violence. However, interventions by the Indonesian government helped to lessen the violence in 2002 (Muluk & Malik, 2009).

Clearly, religious divisions have been a source of conflict in Indonesia. There was a unifying state ideology (emphasizing belief in one supreme God, humanitarianism, nationalism, consultative democracy, and social justice) embedded in the nation's constitution and designed to keep relations between groups relatively peaceful, but this fell apart after the collapse of Suhart's New Order regime in 1998. Baidhaway (2006) explains that this ideology was not entirely successful even prior to 1998, par-

tially because the ideology was instituted from the top-down rather than initiated by the public and partially because the ideology focused on homogenizing rather than celebrating differences. In Baidhaway's view, the government gave lip service to the promotion of religious dialogue and respect for diversity but instead, "indoctrinated students with only state sanctioned concepts of religious freedom" resulting in a "model of religious education [that] negated mutual respect and neglected minority group contributions to Indonesian culture" (p. 18).

The reform era, beginning in 1998 following Sudharto's resignation, had great promise to improve relations between groups in Indonesia, but unfortunately, unforeseen consequences meant that this promise was unrealized in many aspects. For example, the reform brought about more freedom of press, but this fostered further group divisions and hate speech between different Islamic groups (Khisbiyah, 2009). Decentralization of power was successfully pursued but resulted in the emergence of local leaders who have capitalized on the existing ethnic and religious divisions and thus weakened the democracy (Baidhaway, 2006).

Though religion has been the cause of many problems in Indonesia, it has also been used to promote peace. For example, Khisbiyah (2009) mentions the National Alliance for Freedom of Faith and Religion, which "marched to promote religious diversity and interfaith harmony in the context of a 'diverse yet united Indonesia'" (p. 125). Religious leaders have also taken an active role in fostering positive interactions between religions. For example, following Muslim-Christian riots in 1998, Kiai Fawa'id, an Islamic religious leader, involved his students in rebuilding Christian churches that had been destroyed (Pohl, 2009).

Muluk and Malik (2009) suggest that localized peace efforts that involve the general Indonesian public can often be beneficial. They point out that many failed peace efforts to address the Muslim-Christian violence in Maluku have been on the governmental level and have aimed at ending the violence rather than really fostering reconciliation. In contrast, the Baku Bae

movement, a grassroots approach begun by non-governmental activists and academics in early 2000, focused on building peace beyond the absence of violence through cultivating kind and respectful interactions between Christians and Muslims at both elite and the grassroots levels. This movement involved a series of workshops and the creation of neutral zones, such as the Baku Bae Market for Muslims and Christians, in order to “enhance intergroup contact and to raise trust and solidarity” (Muluk & Malik, p. 97). Though the Baku Bae movement recognizes the importance of both international and national governmental support in building peace, the focus is on building support for peace and reconciliation from the bottom up.

Summary

Though the countries of South and Southeast Asia each have their own unique histories and cultures that may influence perspectives on peace, there are also commonalities among these regions. All of the countries discussed above share a history of colonization, in which the colonizers often used the “divide and rule” policy, either creating or capitalizing on existing group differentiations. These policies set the stage for ethnic, religious, and cultural divisions that still have very serious implications for the degree of peace and violence in these regions. While these countries are generally heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity and religion, the occurrence of mass migrations of the various groups kept them fairly isolated from one another, allowing the sharp divisions to continue. The power structures of this region are complex, as minorities in one country may be majorities in the region, and majorities in the country may be minorities in the region. Additionally, some groups that hold economic power may be disadvantaged politically, and vice versa. Despite the strong divisions and complicated power struggles, the participants from South and Southeast Asia also have reason for optimism, as there have been and continue to be, strong grassroots, and occasionally governmental, movements toward peace.

The remainder of this chapter focuses on perspectives on achieving peace from people in the South and Southeast Asia regions.

Methods and Results

Sample

The South and Southeast Asia sample consisted of a total of 501 participants from India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka. Fifty-six percent of the sample identified as female and 42% identified as male. The participants ranged in age from 18 to 82, with an average age of 27 years ($SD=10.01$). Six percent of the sample indicated that they had served in the military, and 24% of participants reported having a relative in the military. Fifteen percent of participants said they had been involved in protests against war and in favor of peace. The participants from the selected countries were volunteers and not recruited through probability sampling techniques so they cannot be considered representative of the countries or regions from which they were recruited. Therefore, we make no claims concerning the extent to which the findings are generalizable. Rather, the results should serve to highlight themes that come up in discussions around the achievability of peace and the resources that can be drawn on to make peace a reality.

Procedure

The Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression Survey (PAIRTAPS) (Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006) was administered to people from South and Southeast Asia from 2004 to 2009. Participants were recruited through various websites and through personal networking. Consequently, some participants completed the survey online and others completed a hard copy version. The PAIRTAPS included two items regarding the achievability of peace. The first item stated, “I believe world peace can be achieved.” Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with this

statement on a 7-point Likert scale and then to explain the rating response in a qualitative format. The second item was a prompt stating, “The best way to achieve peace is...” Participants responded to this prompt in a qualitative format.

The qualitative responses to the aforementioned two items were coded using a coding manual developed by members of the Group for International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP). This manual was created through deductive qualitative analysis and grounded theory methods. The coding manual is broken down into two separate systems, described below. (Refer to the introductory methods chapter of this section, Chap. 32 in this volume, for more information regarding the theory, methods, and manual described below.)

Coding System I: Bandura’s Sociocognitive Mechanisms

Deductive qualitative analysis was used to derive a set of coding categories from Albert Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement in order to assess the reasoning involved in participants’ judgments of the extent to which peace could be achieved. Deductive qualitative analysis involves starting with a conceptual model to determine the types of themes one might find in a set of responses, and then seeing if those themes can actually be found in the data. The model can be refined during the process of exploring the data (Gilgun, 2004). Bandura’s (1999) theory of sociocognitive mechanisms explains why people behave in ways that are or are not consistent with their overall sense of morality. People can either abide by these moral standards (moral engagement) or fail to do so and act in a contradictory manner (moral disengagement). Moral engagement involves active involvement in humane behavior or refraining from behaving in an inhumane manner. In contrast, moral disengagement, as conceptualized by Bandura, allows individuals to behave inhumanely while viewing themselves as moral. Mechanisms of moral engagement include cognitively restructuring the injurious behavior through moral justifications, euphemistic labeling, or advantageous comparison; removing

or obscuring personal agency through displacement or diffusion of responsibility; misrepresenting, minimizing, or disregarding consequences of the harmful actions; and devaluing the victim(s) of the negative behavior through dehumanization or attribution of blame (Bandura, 1999). Coding System I involved coding the qualitative responses for two distinct components: (a) agency and (b) disengagement/humanitarian engagement.

Part 1: Agency. There were three possible codes in this first set of coding criteria: *presence of agency*, *absence of agency*, and *not applicable agency*. Each participant was given one agency code based on their responses to both prompts. Participants were coded for *presence of agency* if either of their responses referenced actions, whether by individuals, communities, or institutions, that could be taken to achieve peace. If neither response referred to actions or involvement, or if both responses denied the possibility of peace, an *absence of agency* code was given. If the responses did not address the prompts, a code of *not applicable agency* was given.

Before a discussion of the results, an important distinction needs to be made clear. Participant responses were coded for presence of agency or absence of agency and for disengagement or humanitarian engagement. It is crucial to keep in mind that these coded prompts do not mean that the participants who provided these responses are agentive or non-agentive, or are morally disengaged or morally engaged, only that the arguments they have given are consistent with the theoretical mechanisms in Bandura’s theory. It would be inappropriate, and inaccurate, to jump from participants’ responses to judgments about their moral character. Accordingly, in describing our coding system and patterns in the responses, we refer to *humanitarian engagement and disengagement* or simply *engagement and disengagement*, rather than “moral disengagement” and “moral engagement.”

Frequency of Agency Themes. Ninety percent of responses from the region of South and Southeast Asia were coded for *presence of agency*, meaning these responses expressed some actions

Table 39.1 Percentages and examples of presence of agency and absence of agency in responses from the South and Southeast Asia region

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
Presence of agency	90	Pakistan	64	M	“Strong and developed nations should help the weaker and developing nations”
		Indonesia	31	M	“Mutual respect among fellow human beings”
		Malaysia	23	F	“If each human upholds human rights”
Absence of agency	10	Philippines	21	M	“There is no way to achieve this”
		India	24	M	“No way to achieve peace because history of earth is full of war”
		Laos	25	F	“We live in a fallen, sinful world, we have no peace until Jesus returns and a new heaven and earth is created by God”

Note. M male, F female

(personal, societal, governmental, etc.) that could be taken to achieve or work toward peace. For example, a 45-year-old Sri Lankan woman said that the best ways to achieve peace are to “be peaceful, educate children, lead by example, learn by tolerance and compassion.” Another agentic response came from a 27-year-old man from the Philippines who said that peace can be best achieved “by listening to someone’s opinion and respecting them as well.” Almost 10% of responses were coded for absence of agency, meaning that they said peace could not be achieved in any way, or did not suggest steps that could be taken to achieve peace. For example, a 25-year-old Pakistani man said, “You just can’t do it. It’s not natural,” to clarify his disagreement with the statement that peace is achievable. A 20-year-old man from India said, “Nothing we can do to achieve it, it has to happen of its own accord,” demonstrating that non-agentic responses do not always eliminate the possibility of peace. For more examples of the coding categories discussed above, see Table 39.1.

Part 2: Disengagement/Humanitarian Engagement. In the coding system for disengagement/humanitarian engagement, each codable unit (separate representation of an idea) was given a code. Therefore, each response could be given multiple codes for disengagement or humanitarian engagement. In the analyses described below, the presence of any disengagement or humanitarian engagement theme was noted, regardless of which of the two items it addressed. Responses coded for

one of the disengagement themes might or might not have been agentic and might or might not have implied that peace can be achieved. The manual identified several different disengagement themes. A response was coded for *rationalization* if it referenced the lack of need for peace. *Displacement of responsibility* was applied to responses that shifted responsibility for achieving peace to other entities, such as *military/force* (a subcategory of *displacement of responsibility*). Disengaged responses also included *ignoring the consequences of harmful actions* if negative (e.g., violent) actions were suggested without recognition of the potential damaging consequences of the actions. *Destructive human nature* responses identified unfavorable human qualities as the reason peace cannot be achieved. *Attribution of blame* responses emphasized external events, such as conflicts or ideological differences as reasons peace cannot occur, and contained a subcategory, *attribution of blame to the government or politics*.

In contrast, for a response to be coded for one of the humanitarian engagement themes, it had to imply that peace can be achieved, thereby expressing agency. The humanitarian engagement category included subcategories such as *justification*, *assumption of responsibility*, and *humanization*. *Justification* applied to general explanations why peace is achievable. A subcategory of this *justification* subcategory, *principles/beliefs*, specifically referenced religion or moral philosophies as pathways to achieving peace. *Assumption of responsibility* applied to responses that described the duty or effort taken by the general

population to achieve peace and included the subcategories of *practical strategies* (such as education or aid), *governmental responsibility*, and *ineffectiveness of negative relations*. Responses coded for *humanization* described general positive human characteristics as the reason peace can be obtained. Subcategories of *humanization* included *interpersonal concepts/values* (such as love or understanding) and *social equity*. Responses could also be coded for *removal of blame*, meaning that they referenced forgiveness or reconciliation between nations or individuals as a reason why peace is achievable. For a full explanation of the humanitarian engagement categories, see the introductory methods chapter of this section, Chap. 32 in this volume.

Frequencies of Disengagement and Humanitarian Engagement Themes. Twelve percent of the total response set were coded for *disengagement* themes. Although all of the disengagement themes identified in the coding manual were utilized at least once, only the two categories that were most commonly coded for are discussed, as the others each made up only 1% or less of the total response set. The most common disengagement response *attributed blame*, which accounted for 6% of all responses and 48% of the disengagement responses. Responses were coded for *attribution of blame* if they focused on external events or interpersonal differences as obstacles to achieving world peace. For example, a 21-year-old Indian woman said that she did not know if world peace was achievable because “everyone does not think alike.” Similarly, a 37-year-old man from the Philippines said, “It is just impossible with all the different beliefs and interests.”

The second most common argument that denied the achievability of peace referenced a belief in an innate *destructive human nature*; this theme accounted for 3% of all responses and 28% of the disengagement responses. Responses were coded for *destructive human nature* if they attributed the impossibility or difficulty of world peace to human nature or internal human attributes. For example, a 59-year-old Sri Lankan man stated that “power-lusting and power-abusive people will always be around.” Another example comes from a 20-year-

old Filipina woman who said, “As long as there’s jealousy and hatred, there will be always be war.” For more examples of the coding categories discussed above, see Table 39.2.

Seventy-eight percent of the response set were coded for the humanitarian engagement categories. Although all of the humanitarian engagement categories were coded for, only those that comprised at least 5% of the total *disengagement/humanitarian engagement* codes are discussed. The most common humanitarian engagement response was *interpersonal concepts/values*, which accounted for 21% of all responses and 27% of the humanitarian engagement responses. Responses were coded for *interpersonal concepts/values* if they cited interpersonal principles, such as understanding or love as part of the ways peace could be achieved. For example, a 21-year-old Filipina woman explained her agreement that world peace is achievable by saying, “I strongly believe that we will obtain peace if we try to understand one another,” and a 20-year-old Malaysian woman argued that peace can be achieved “if the world is united.” Another example came from a 37-year-old Indian woman who said that people from diverse religions and cultures should get to know one another because “it is impossible not to recognize the similarities. The more people from different cultures we get to know and love, the closer we get to where we can respect the differences as well as the similarities.”

The second most commonly coded humanitarian engagement response was *assumption of responsibility*, which accounted for 13% of all responses and 17% of the humanitarian engagement responses. Responses were coded for *assumption of responsibility* if they referenced effort by the general public as the reason peace was achievable. One example of this comes from a 22-year-old Indonesian woman who asserted “each of us can give our best efforts to achieve it.” A 22-year-old Indian man expressed a similar sentiment, stating, “Everyone has to realize their own responsibilities toward peace.”

The theme of *governmental responsibility* was the third most common humanitarian engagement response, accounting for 13% of all responses and 16% of the humanitarian engagement responses.

Table 39.2 Percentages and examples of disengagement themes most frequently identified in responses from the South and Southeast Asian region

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Disengagement</i>	12				
Attribution of blame	6(48)	Pakistan	53	M	“Too much economic/social injustice and no willingness to give”
		Malaysia	22	F	“As long as there are differences in philosophy, peace will never be achieved”
Destructive human nature	3(28)	Pakistan	30	F	“Impossible. There are too many people out there with an enormous thirst for power”
		India	47	M	“Universal peace may not be achievable, given the intrinsic nature of man”

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total disengagement/humanitarian engagement responses. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the disengagement responses. *M* male, *F* female

Responses were coded for *governmental responsibility* if they stated or implied that it is the duty of the government to work toward achieving peace. For example, a 21-year-old from Pakistan said, “I think a radical transformation of politics and the role of government could possibly ensure peace, or eliminate violence.” Another example came from a 30-year-old Filipino man who said, “It can be achieved, if only nations would learn how to listen.” A further response invoking *governmental responsibility* came from a 25-year-old Malaysian man: “Each leader must sit and discuss and not fight to see who is better...how much longer we need to witness small children weep over deaths of their parents. Please think, leaders.”

The theme of *social equity* accounted for 7% of all responses and 10% of the humanitarian engagement responses. Responses were coded for *social equity* if they referred to social or economic equality, human rights, or the resolution of social injustices as being important in achieving peace. For example, a 26-year-old Pakistani man said that peace could be achieved “through social justice and economic equality.” A 23-year-old Malaysian woman said that the best way to achieve peace would be “to form a policy that gives priority to human rights.”

The category of *principles/beliefs* accounted for 6% of all responses and 8% of the humanitarian engagement responses. Responses were coded for *principles/beliefs* if they referenced moral philosophies or religion as a pathway to achieving peace. A 20-year-old Malaysian man included this idea in his response, saying that peace is achiev-

able “with the existence of moral values in each person in the community.” A 36-year-old Filipina woman said, “Ultimately, prayer will work wonders.” A 27-year-old man from Malaysia invoked a specific religion, saying that peace can be achieved “if [people] follow the Islamic teachings.”

Recognizing the *ineffectiveness of negative relations* constituted 5% of the total response set and 7% of the humanitarian engagement responses. Responses were coded for *ineffectiveness of negative relations* if they argued that that negative interactions or emotions are futile ways of treating others or resolving disagreements. For example, a 64-year-old Filipino man said that the best way to achieve peace is to “cease the use of terrorism.” A 24-year-old Indian woman said, “The day each and every human being will realize the futility of war, peace won’t be a distant dream.” For more examples of the coding categories discussed above, see Table 39.3.

Exploratory Analyses with Demographic Variables. Exploratory chi-square analyses were run to examine all possible associations between the demographic variables of gender, military service, relatives’ military service, and participation in a protest, and the various coding categories for themes of *agency* and *disengagement/humanitarian engagement*. Groups that were extremely disproportionate (i.e., the demographics or presence/absence of a thematic code had more than a 90/10 split) were not included. All group differences reported here had statistically significant *p* values ($p < .05$); nonsignificant results are not reported. It is important to reiterate

Table 39.3 Percentages and examples of humanitarian engagement themes most frequently identified in responses from the South and Southeast Asian region

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Humanitarian engagement</i>	78				
Assumption of responsibility	13(17)	Philippines	38	F	“Each person needs to act- people should not depend on their governments alone to work towards peace”
		India	22	F	“It’s a condition that is not impossible and efforts can be made for it”
Governmental responsibility	13(16)	Sri Lanka	59	M	“Certainly. All we need are a bunch of decent human beings elected to govern the nations across the planet. The UN can mandate a system of conformance and even nomination to office for these candidates who choose to govern the nations in order to ensure a minimum of decency and honor”
		Malaysia	23	F	“A close relation between countries”
Ineffectiveness of negative relations	5(7)	India	20	F	“The world needs to learn simply to condemn violence against human life and dignity not just in rhetoric but in the strongest terms in its consciousness, in all countries”
		Philippines	33	F	“We should not use arms”
Humanization	4(6)				
Interpersonal concepts/values	21(27)	Pakistan	23	F	“To give everyone their rights, <i>to be empathetic and compassionate towards other human beings, to care for the troubles of others</i> , to want to share your blessings with others”
		Indonesia	31	M	“Mutual respect among fellow human beings”
Social equity	7(10)	Pakistan	20	F	“...and division of money should be fair, at one place people are wearing Gucci and Prada and at some places they haven’t even got clothes to cover themselves, this creates frustration and crimes are born”
		Sri Lanka	69	M	“Economic prosperity to EVERYONE without exception”
Justification					
Principles/beliefs	6(8)	Philippines	56	F	“ <i>If people have Christ in their hearts</i> , everyone can be at peace with themselves and with others”
		Indonesia	31	M	“If no gun, no bomb, and <i>in Islam everything can happen</i> ”

Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total disengagement/humanitarian engagement responses. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the humanitarian engagement responses. *M* male, *F* female

that all of these analyses were exploratory in nature and that generalizations are not possible.

In the humanitarian engagement categories, a significantly greater proportion of women than men gave responses emphasizing the *assumption of*

responsibility (see Table 39.4). Relatives’ military service was also associated with use of several of the humanitarian engagement thematic categories. A significantly greater proportion of participants who had a relative who had served in the military

Table 39.4 Chi-square tests and percentages for humanitarian engagement responses per coding category

Category	Group 1 ^a	Group 2 ^a	χ^2
	Males	Females	
<i>Humanitarian engagement</i>			
Assumption of responsibility	20.3	33.3	10.28***
	No relative in military	Relative in military	
<i>Humanitarian engagement</i>			
Justification			
Principles/beliefs	12	20.2	4.66*
Humanization			
Interpersonal concepts/values	35.7	51.3	8.64**

Note. If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference

* $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

than those who did not provided responses that referenced both *principles/beliefs* and *interpersonal concepts/values*. See Table 39.4 for more detail.

Coding System II: Focus on Achievability and Prerequisites for Peace

The focus on achievability and prerequisites for peace coding system was created using grounded theory to capture the themes evident in the responses. Grounded theory involves exploring the data with an open mind and without preconceived ideas about what will emerge. Reoccurring concepts and themes were identified through multiple examinations of the responses, and codes were developed based on these themes (e.g., Glaser & Straus 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1994). These themes all involve possible pathways to achieving peace. Here again, responses were broken down into codable units, and thus, multi-thematic responses could be assigned multiple codes. Again, we coded for the presence of the themes identified in the coding manual regardless of which of the two items was being addressed in the response containing the theme.

Responses were coded for the focus on achievability categories if they focused on the possibility that peace can or cannot be achieved.

Categories and subcategories for this part of the manual included (a) *indeterminate achievability*, (b) *explicitly achievable*, (c) *work in progress*, (d) *achievable but difficult*, (e) *peace as the ideal*, (f) *unachievable*, and (g) *identifying reasons* that peace is unachievable. Any response indicating steps that can be taken at any level to achieve peace was coded for prerequisites for peace categories, which included categories of *philosophical principles*, *pro-social actions*, *constructive government/political action*, and *antisocial action*. The category of *philosophical principles* applied to responses that referenced moral or ethical principles, or the development of a new mindset, as necessary to achieve peace. *Philosophical principles* included subcategories such as *positive interpersonal values* (e.g., love or trust, or specifically the subcategory *understanding/acceptance*), *inner peace*, *religion/spirituality*, and *equality*. *Pro-social actions* applied to responses stressing general positive actions as the best way to achieve peace. This pro-social actions category included several subcategories, including (a) *pragmatic solutions* (e.g., education, aid, or the specific subcategory *elimination of global obstacles*), (b) *interaction* (including the specific subcategory of *eliminating negative interactions*), (c) *unification* (such as bringing people together), and (d) *social justice* (including the specific subcategories of

human rights, economic fairness, and the elimination of social injustice).

Constructive government/political actions applied to responses that mentioned positive governmental changes taken to achieve peace. This category included the subcategories of *diplomacy, global/political change* (subcategory *equality among nations*), and the *elimination of negative political motivations*. Responses could also be coded for references to *antisocial action*, if they emphasized harmful methods of achieving peace, such as *force/control* (achieving peace through forceful methods) or *population adjustments* (changing or removing all of humankind or a subset of the population, including *violent elimination*). Responses mentioning that world peace can be achieved in many ways were coded for *recognition of multiple possibilities*. The category *uncertain of ways* applied to responses conveying uncertainty as to how peace can be best achieved. For a full explanation of themes at this level, see the introductory methods chapter of this section, Chap. 32 in this volume.

Frequency of Focus on Achievability and Prerequisites for Peace Themes. Each major category in focus on achievability and prerequisites for peace, and the two most frequently coded subcategories are discussed here. *Pro-social actions* were the most commonly identified prerequisites, accounting for 35% of all responses. Of the responses coded for pro-social prerequisites, responses most often expressed opinions related to *interaction* among individuals, which accounted for 10% of all responses and 29% of pro-social actions responses. Many of these responses included references to cooperating, working together, or engaging in discussions. For example, a 37-year-old Filipina woman stated that the best way to achieve peace is “through genuine dialogue.” Similarly, a 21-year-old Filipina woman said that peace would be achievable “if everybody would cooperate.” Another common pro-social actions response was one of *elimination of negative interactions*, which accounted for 8% of all responses and 23% of pro-social actions responses. Many responses were along the lines of that of a 23-year-old Malaysian woman who said, “Stop the

violence and war.” Other responses in this category focused more on internal ways of eliminating negative interactions, such as a 21-year-old Filipina woman who suggested peace could be achieved “by not harboring hatred and learning to forgive.”

Twenty-three percent of all responses were coded for the focus on achievability categories. The most common focus on achievability theme was a straightforward assertion that peace is *achievable*, accounting for 7% of the entire response set, and 31% of the focus on achievability responses. For example, a 23-year-old Pakistani woman said, “Humans can achieve anything they put their mind to” and a 24-year-old Indian man agreed that “nothing is impossible in the present world.” Conversely, the second most common focus on achievability response involved *identifying reasons* that peace is unachievable, which accounted for 5% of all responses and 24% of the focus on achievability responses. A 21-year-old woman from Pakistan disagreed that peace was achievable, saying, “People are too greedy and selfish for this to happen.” Another example comes from a 45-year-old man from Laos who said, “I don’t agree because leaders of people have their own ideas to run a country and someone will have an opposition towards that.”

Twenty-three percent of the response set were examples of the broad umbrella category of *philosophical principles*. Responses in this category most often expressed opinions related to *positive interpersonal values*, which accounted for 7% of all responses and 29% of philosophical responses. A 31-year-old Indonesian man stated that the best way for peace to be achieved is “mutual respect among fellow human beings,” and a 23-year-old Pakistani woman emphasized being “empathetic and compassionate towards other human beings.” A 22-year-old woman from Malaysia expressed a similar sentiment that peace can be achieved “if there are people with a good heart.” The theme of *understanding/acceptance*, which accounted for 6% of all responses and 25% of philosophical principles responses, was also common in the responses. For example, a 26-year-old Indian man responded that we have to “accept differences among one another” for peace to be achieved. Other responses, like that of a 22-year-old

Malaysian woman, highlighted “being tolerant” as important in achieving peace.

Fifteen percent of all responses were coded for an emphasis on *constructive government/political actions*. The response most commonly identified with these prerequisites was *diplomatic solutions*, which accounted for 5% of all responses and 34% of governmental actions responses. A 19-year-old Indian woman said that the peace can be achieved “if all nations freely communicate to find the solutions to various problems.” A 23-year-old Malaysian man said that the best way to achieve peace is to “generate good relationships between countries, not prejudice, do not misuse power.” *Global/political change* was the second most commonly identified category, accounting for 3% all responses and 24% of governmental responses. An example of this theme comes from the response of a 59-year-old Sri Lankan man, who said that peace can be achieved if we “try to understand, discuss, and share other people’s problems and issues as much as one’s own and open all borders and let the earth be treated as everyone’s village.” A 29-year-old woman from the Philippines suggested that the best way for peace to be achieved is “for governments everywhere to provide their citizens with quality services.”

The overall category of *antisocial actions* applied to the fewest responses of all the responses (1%). Almost half of these responses involved the belief that *force/control* (1% of all responses) is the best way to achieve peace. For example, a 22-year-old Indian man said that the best way to achieve peace is “to always be prepared for war,” and a 20-year-old Malaysian man advocated a “complete military structure.” For more examples of the coding categories discussed above, see Table 39.5.

Exploratory Analyses with Demographic Variables. Exploratory chi-square analyses were run to examine all possible associations between the demographic variables of gender, military service, relatives’ military service, and participation in a protest, and the various thematic focus on achievability and prerequisites for peace categories. As with the previous statistics, all group differences reported had statistically significant p values ($p < .05$); nonsignificant results are not

reported. It is important to reiterate that all of these analyses were exploratory in nature, and that generalizations cannot be made.

These analyses revealed that gender was significantly associated with the use of several thematic categories in responses to the prompts (see Table 39.6). Specifically, chi-square analyses revealed that a significantly greater proportion of women than men gave responses coded for the focus on achievability categories. Specifically, a significantly greater proportion of women than men provided responses that said peace is achievable but *difficult* to achieve. Additionally, a significantly greater proportion of women than men said that through *interaction*, peace can be achieved. Finally, chi-square analyses revealed that a significantly greater proportion of participants who have participated in a protest than those who have not provided responses coded for one or more of the *focus on achievability* categories.

Discussion

Agency

An overwhelming majority (90%) of the participants from South and Southeast Asia expressed agency regarding the achievability of and pathways to peace. This means that in addition to recognizing the possibility that peace is achievable (either explicitly or implicitly, by not denying this possibility), 90% of participants also gave examples of actions that can be taken to move toward peace. While the coding manual did not differentiate between actions to be taken on the personal, societal, or governmental level, each of the responses coded for agency did acknowledge the need for action to be taken on some level, rather than just passively waiting for peace to come to the world.

As a whole, the participants gave responses that were optimistic, as they recognized the possibility of peace, but were also realistic, as they recognized that actions need to be taken to further this goal. Though the countries included in the South and Southeast Asian sample have long

Table 39.5 Percentages and examples of focus on achievability and prerequisite for peace themes and subcategories most frequently identified in responses from the South and Southeast Asian region

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Focus on achievability</i>	23				
Achievable	7(31)	Pakistan	23	F	"Humans can achieve anything they put their mind to"
		Philippines	21	M	"Like an idea, <i>world peace can be achieved</i> , if enough people believe in it"
Unachievable	2(8)				
Identifying reasons	5(24)	Pakistan	33	F	"If United States with all the citizen pressure groups and a vibrant civil society can be an aggressor, then I have no hope for world peace. If education and awareness cannot help citizens of the most powerful country in preventing that country from acts of aggression then what can?"
		Sri Lanka	21	F	"There will always be fights between people"
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>	76				
Philosophical principles	23				
Positive interpersonal values	7(9)(29)	Philippines	21	M	"I have faith in humanity"
		Malaysia	29	F	" <i>Must be respectful, must trust each other, must work together</i> "
Understanding/acceptance	6(8)(25)	Indonesia	24	F	" <i>Understand others' needs, understand each other, not being self-centered</i> "
		Philippines	22	M	"By understanding and accepting that other's beliefs are different from my own"
Pro-social actions	35				
Interaction	10(13)(29)	India	37	F	" <i>To encourage people of various religions and cultures to get to know each other and learn about each other. It is impossible not to recognize the similarities. The more people from different cultures we get to know and love, the closer we get to where we can respect the differences as well as the similarities</i> "
		Laos	18	M	"I believe world peace can be achieved by <i>working together</i> to improve the quality of life of all people instead of trying to fight against each other"
Elimination of negative interactions	8(11)(23)	Philippines	64	M	"Cease the use of terrorism"
		Malaysia	28	F	"By stopping violence, war, bloodshed, and oppression in this world"
Constructive governmental action	15				
Diplomacy	5(7)(34)	Malaysia	20	M	"Each leader should form a discussion to avoid war"
		India	53	M	"If all countries are genuinely interrelated in peace making, it can be achieved. Particularly the super powers"
Global/political change	3(5)(24)	Pakistan	27	F	"More women in decision making positions"

(continued)

Table 39.5 (continued)

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
		Malaysia	20	M	“The UN must be restructured to reduce power of superpowers”
Antisocial action	1				
Force/control	1 (1) (42)	India	28	M	“War”

Note. Major categories are in bold. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total prerequisites for peace and achievability responses. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the major category. The third number (also in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the major prerequisites category. *M* male, *F* female

Table 39.6 Chi-square tests and percentages for achievability and prerequisites for peace responses per coding category

Category	Group 1 ^a		Group 2 ^a χ^2
	Men	Women	
<i>Focus on achievability presence</i>	43.9	59.2	11.44 ^{***}
Explicitly achievable			
Difficult	6.1	13.1	6.50 [*]
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>			
Pro-social actions			
Interaction	17	25.5	5.18 [*]
	No protest	Protest	
<i>Focus on achievability presence</i>	47.7	62.3	5.39 [*]

Note. If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference. “Presence” at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories

^{*} $p \leq 0.05$; ^{***} $p \leq 0.001$

^aThe numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

histories of oppression and both structural and direct violence, the people of these regions have clearly not adopted a fatalistic mindset. As mentioned earlier, these regions also have strong and thriving grassroots peace movements, with nationally and internationally known leaders. Despite the many instances of the governmental failure to address either the structural or direct violence affecting the population, there have also been governmental actions toward peace. The responses of the participants from South and Southeast Asia reflect these attempts.

Humanitarian Engagement/Disengagement

Disengagement. Importantly, only 12% of the codes given at the level of disengagement and humanitarian engagement were disengagement codes. The most common disengagement theme evident in the responses was attribution of blame. Many of these responses can be seen as reflective of the history of inequalities and power differentials in South and Southeast Asia. For example, several of the responses coded for attribution of blame mentioned the competing interests of religious or ethnic groups as some of the main barriers to achieving peace. Others made specific mention of hierarchies and social and economic injustices. Many of these hierarchies have their roots in those set up by European colonizers centuries ago. Clearly, these divisions still impact both the daily lives and the mindsets of many people in South and Southeast Asia. Some responses which were coded for attribution of blame also referenced global competition and conflicts between nations as major barriers toward peace.

The second most common disengagement code was destructive human nature. It is important to reiterate that, while this was the second most common disengagement code, it only made up a small percentage (3%) of the total disengagement and humanitarian engagement codes. The responses in this category referenced characteristics seen as innate in humans as a barrier to achieving peace. These characteristics included a hunger for power, selfishness/greed, hatred, anger, and jealousy, among others. It is probable that similar responses to these prompts would be present in most popula-

tions, as these human characteristics are recognizable across space and time. However, it is also possible that some of these themes may be more salient to participants living in countries that have experienced a great deal of conflict. As discussed above, many countries in South and Southeast Asia have histories of intercommunal violence, perhaps making negative human characteristics more accessible to some people.

Interestingly, other disengagement themes (ignoring consequences of harmful actions, attribution of blame to the government or politics, rationalization, displacement of responsibility, and displacement of responsibility to military/force) were not mentioned very frequently. Each made up 1% or less of the total disengagement and humanitarian engagement codes. Generally, these themes pertain to either (a) the lack of need for peace or (b) violent, forceful, or otherwise harmful means as the way to achieve peace. Thus, the fact that these themes were mentioned very rarely is heartening for the countries of South and Southeast Asia. It suggests that, in general, the participants surveyed desire peace and favor more positive and nonviolent means of achieving it. This is particularly encouraging as violence and force have often been the means of achieving desired goals, both in South and Southeast Asia and other countries around the world. A desire to move away from this norm and seek other solutions is apparent in the responses from this sample. However, it is important to remember that these attitudes may fluctuate during times of relative peace versus times of threat and violence.

Engagement. The most common engagement themes evident in the responses were interpersonal concepts/values, assumption of responsibility, and governmental responsibility. The responses coded for under the theme of interpersonal concepts/values often related to love, respect, tolerance, understanding, and unification. Given the presence of relatively homogenous subgroups in each of the countries of South and Southeast Asia (Beeson, 2002; Montiel, 2009; Noor, 2009b) and the structural and physical violence that has occurred in these communities, it is

unsurprising that calls for such values would be common among participants. Many of these values are major components of both the religious and philosophical moral codes of the regions, particularly because the association with collectivism involves a focus outside one's self. The difficulty lies in persuading people to widen their circle of moral regard, in order to extend feelings of love, respect, and understanding to people outside of one's distinct in-group, and see a larger collective (Opotow, 1990; Reed & Aquino, 2003). Reflecting the grassroots peace movements in many of these countries (e.g., the interfaith dialogues in the Philippines, see Rood, 2005; and in Indonesia, see Khisbiyah, 2009; Muluk & Malik, 2009; Pohl, 2009), the participants in this sample recognize the need for bottom-up approaches to peace building.

Reflecting the need for both top-down and bottom-up approaches to peace, assumption of responsibility as well as governmental responsibility were common codes. Noor (2009b) states that much of the violence in Asia is structural and thus needs to be addressed at the governmental level but that most peace building is actually happening at a grassroots level. Based on the responses from our sample, many people in South and Southeast Asia recognize the need to be proactive in their own lives and communities. Despite the governmental complications, due in part to legacies of colonialism, participants also note that their governments need to now be part of the solution, rather than part of the problem. Additionally, many respondents cited cooperation between governments on an international level as crucial in achieving peace. These participants recognize that, particularly in our globalizing world, peace cannot be a reality without widespread diplomacy.

While less prevalent than the aforementioned categories, other common themes included social equity, principles/beliefs, and the ineffectiveness of negative relations. The concern for social equity is reflective of the long history of structural violence evident in many of the South and Southeast Asian countries. Many groups have been denied social and economic rights and been extremely disadvantaged. Extending these concerns to the

global level, some participants expressed frustration with wealthy nations outside of the region that monopolize too much of the earth's resources. These participants advocated a redistribution of wealth and rights that would benefit South and Southeast Asia as a whole. This too is part of the legacy of colonialism, as the advantages given to colonizing nations at the expense of the colonized nations have not evened out over time.

The focus on principles/beliefs follows from the high importance placed on religion in many South and Southeast Asian countries (Montiel, 2009). Many of the responses coded for principles/beliefs simply referenced the importance of morality and moral codes generally, while others invoked specific religions (generally Islam or Christianity). Given the fact that religious tensions have played a role in conflict within the region (Noor, 2009b), the focus on religious principles and beliefs in the responses could be viewed as problematic. However, multiple scholars have pointed out that it is not religion itself that is problematic for peace, but rather the cultural, political, and identity struggles that are associated with religion. Engineer (2010) suggests, "mutual acceptability and respect for others' dignity is what is lacking and we often end up blaming the religion" (p. 25).

As mentioned above, religion has also been used as a regional tool for peace. Sharma (2010) discusses the Dalai Lama's fourfold paths to world peace as a major component of the Indian perspective on peace and notes that one of these paths involves "advancing humanistic views of world religions" (p. 246). The Dalai Lama notes that each religion focuses on the "ideal of love" and the "common goal [of] un-selfishness" (p. 246). Religious beliefs, even those of different groups, can be used to both divide and to unite people. Hopefully the people of South and Southeast Asia can use their strong focus on religion to continue moving together toward peace and away from violence. Promisingly, recognizing the ineffectiveness of negative relations was also a common theme in the responses. These responses included references to the futility of violence and weapons.

Prerequisites for Peace

Pro-social Actions. Pro-social actions was the most commonly invoked major category under prerequisites for peace. Within this category, the most common theme was interaction, which stressed cooperation and communication between groups, while the second most common theme was the elimination of negative interactions. As mentioned above, many of the countries of South and Southeast Asia house relatively homogenous subgroups separated by strong divisions that were either created or magnified by colonial powers. These subgroups often have a history of conflict between them. Given this background, it is not surprising that interaction between groups and the elimination of negative interactions emerged as the most common themes. These desires reflect the aims of many of the grassroots interfaith and interethnic dialogue movements in South and Southeast Asia as well as psychological theories aimed at reducing prejudice and promoting positive intergroup relations (e.g., the contact hypothesis, see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Interestingly, while the theme of unification was also evident, it was less common than interaction and elimination of negative interactions. Following psychological theories related to the need to maintain in-group distinctiveness (e.g., optimal distinctiveness, see Brewer, 1993; social identity theory, see Tajfel & Turner, 1979), it is possible that movements aimed at unifying all groups through eliminating differences would not be well received. Rather, many of the South and Southeast Asian participants advocate peaceful communication and cooperation between groups, something worked toward by many of the grassroots organizations in the region. As Varshney (1997) and Khan (2009) discuss in the Hindu-Muslim context, cultivating interdependence of groups may be one way to utilize interaction as a tool for peace.

Focus on Achievability. As one of the prompts specifically pertained to the achievability of peace, it is unsurprising that a focus on achievability was a commonly used umbrella category. The most common theme in this category was that peace was achievable. Despite a difficult

colonial legacy of communal divisions and structural violence, many of the participants from South and Southeast Asia have found reason to be optimistic that peace can be achieved. However, the second most common code in this category was recognizing reasons that peace is unachievable, which is somewhat sobering. Participants voiced a range of concerns, which have been largely addressed in the earlier section on the disengagement responses of attribution of blame and destructive human nature. The responses also included references to failed attempts at peace (see Table 39.5 for an example from a female Pakistani participant). Though some people did offer responses explaining why peace is not achievable, it is encouraging that many of the issues they brought up (such as intergroup differences in values) could be addressed by solutions offered by other participants (such as intergroup interaction and respect). Of course, varying conceptions of peace and conflict resolution always exist, which can give rise to intra-group conflict and political tensions over differing aims. Therefore, while these suggestions from participants are encouraging, it does not mean that implementation is simple or easy.

Philosophical Principles. Many participants provided responses that fell under the umbrella category of philosophical principles. Within this category, the most common responses were positive interpersonal values (such as compassion, love, and respect), and understanding and acceptance. The importance of these values in the South and Southeast Asian context is discussed above, in the section on engagement and positive interpersonal values. These values are especially likely to be crucial in achieving peace in a region which is made up of so many subgroups and to those who are thinking of a diverse global society as a whole.

Constructive Governmental/Political Action. The umbrella category of constructive governmental/political action was also present in South and Southeast Asian responses, though to a lesser degree. In particular, the themes of diplomacy and of global/political change were common. These responses often referenced specific international

bodies, such as the U.N. or governmental bodies globally. The governments of the “superpower” countries, particularly the United States of America, were also singled out as needing to do a better job of working toward peace. Many responses included the ideas that governments need to be truly committed to cooperation and working for peace (as opposed to their own interests) and that they must be held accountable for their role in peacemaking. These responses showed that while the participants from South and Southeast Asia recognized steps that can be taken toward peace in their own region, in order to be lasting, peace needs to be implemented on a larger scale. This is particularly important in the current times, when no country operates in isolation, and all can have a large impact on global peace.

Concluding Remarks

Future work on perceptions of the achievability of, and pathways to, peace should expand on the depth of the current project. For example, it would be worthwhile to investigate the relationships between the various themes present in the responses to the PAIRTAPS. Do people tend to focus on only one pathway to peace (e.g., governmental, personal) and neglect the others, or do they often recognize the need for peace to be built on different levels? These questions cannot be answered with the present analysis but should be looked at in the future, particularly utilizing the analysis of longer interviews or in-depth responses.

It would also be fruitful to investigate factors that contribute to the themes participants bring up in their responses. Due to the unequal distribution of participants across the countries in the South and Southeast Asian sample, we were unable to analyze the responses from each country separately. However, despite their similar issues, each country has a unique history and culture, which could differentially impact viewpoints regarding peace. For this reason, a multilevel of analysis of differences between countries, with individuals nested within the countries, would be promising direction for future research.

Though we did not have information about each respondent's religious beliefs, these are likely to affect participants' responses and thus constitute an important area of investigation for future work. Relatedly, a person's group affiliations in regard to ethnicity, religion, class, and political ideology likely affect his or her views regarding peace. This would be especially interesting to investigate in the context of South and Southeast Asia, where so many relatively homogenous and salient group categories exist, each of which have important implications for lifestyle and power.

In sum, through the analysis of the responses from the participants living in South and Southeast Asia to the prompts on the PAIRTAPS concerning peace, we can illuminate various themes that come to mind in these regions when thinking about both the achievability of peace and the methods and pathways used to achieve it. Overall, the participants expressed optimistic views and hope for the future. They also included realistic concerns regarding the barriers to achieving peace, as well as possible suggestions for overcoming those barriers. As a whole, participants recognized the responsibility of both the government and the general public in achieving peace. While concerns regarding international peace were often voiced, particularly in terms of governmental responsibility, many responses addressed steps that can be taken on the ground in their own regions to bring together diverse and historically conflicting groups to work together for a more peaceful future.

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Etsuko Hoshino Browne, Leia Saltzman, Sarah An,
Alice Murata, Hillary Mi-Sung Kim, Michelle Murata,
and Andrea Jones-Rooy

As reviewed and discussed in the chapter on East Asian Apology, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation in this volume, East Asian countries have experienced a number of international apologies for past wartime aggression, invasions, and colonization. Some of these apologies have been successful, at least at the national level, but not all apologies have achieved reconciliation.

E.H. Browne (✉)
Department of Psychology, Bryn Mawr College,
Bryn Mawr, PA, USA
e-mail: ehoshinobrowne@gmail.com

L. Saltzman
Graduate School of Social Work, Boston College,
Boston, MA, USA

S. An
Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston,
MA, USA

A. Murata
Department of Counselor Education,
Northeastern Illinois University, Chicago, IL, USA
e-mail: A-Murata@neiu.edu; alicemurata@hotmail.com

H.M.-S. Kim
School of Social Work, Rutgers University,
New Brunswick, NJ, USA
e-mail: mysongk@hotmail.com

M. Murata
Department of Psychology, American University,
Washington, DC, USA
e-mail: muratamh@gmail.com

A. Jones-Rooy
Department of Political Science, University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, MI, USA
e-mail: ajonrooy@umich.edu

Unfortunately there is still much animosity among citizens of East Asian nations against Japan's wartime aggression. Such unresolved feelings toward past conflict particularly flare up when East Asian nations face diplomatic or political disagreements and economic conflicts. It does not appear that genuine reconciliation or peace has been achieved in East Asia. How can reconciliation be reached and peace achieved? Do East Asians believe that world peace is achievable? What steps or factors do East Asians suggest or consider for achieving world peace?

In this chapter, we seek answers to these questions. First, the historical, diplomatic/political, economical, and sociological/psychological factors relevant to peace and reconciliation in East Asia are briefly reviewed. Then, responses to peace-related items from the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey are presented. Finally, the issues and the challenges of achieving and maintaining world peace are discussed.

Brief Review of Achieving Peace in East Asia

Historical Incidents of Achieving Peace in East Asia

One of the major relevant regional treaties was the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, marking the end of World War II (Lee, 2002). The peace treaty

redefined Japan's territories and its sovereignty. However, the treaty has also caused subsequent territorial disputes in which Japan has been in conflict with Russia over the Kurile Islands, with China and Taiwan over the Senkaku Islands, and with South Korea over the Liancourt Rocks. These three territorial disputes are still unresolved today, as each nation claims its sovereignty over the disputed area. Japan and China signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978 to normalize their relations, and for over 30 years since then, the two nations have been, in general, mutually cooperative (Gao, 2008). However, the territorial dispute over Senkaku Islands causes intermittent tension between the two countries.

In 1953, an armistice agreement was signed between the USA/South Korea, China, and North Korea to end the Korean War (King, 2011). However, even though these countries have normalized their relations with one another, except for North Korea, no peace treaty has been signed. Moreover, the nuclear weapons program that North Korea has been developing has presented a great threat to peace in East Asia (Bajoria, 2012). South Korea and Japan successfully reconciled at a state level following Japan's wartime aggression and colonization through a joint statement by South Korean President Kim and Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi in 1998 (Er, 2002). However, South Korean citizens today still express animosity toward the issues of unsettled compensation for Japan's colonization and forced sex slavery (Kim, 2010).

In addition to North Korea's nuclear weapons program, China-Taiwan relations present another major threat to peace in East Asia. There have been at least four crises across the Taiwan Strait: 1954-1955, 1958-1959, 1995-1996, and 1999-2000 (Cycle Research Ltd. USA, 2005). During the 1954-1955 crisis, China declared its intention to liberate Taiwan and started military attacks on Quemoy and Tachen Islands, despite the USA's warning against it. Although the US Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a possible nuclear attack on China, President Eisenhower rejected American military involvement. The USA and Taiwan signed the Mutual Defense Treaty during this crisis. During the 1958-1959 conflict, China threatened invasion to liberate Taiwan by resuming military

attacks on Quemoy and Matsu. China also conducted aggressive anti-American propaganda and issued threats against US naval ships. The 1995-1996 confrontation involved Taiwanese President Lee Teng-Hui and his private trip to the USA, during which he repeatedly referred to Taiwan as "Republic of China on Taiwan." China interpreted this as a challenge to the "one China" policy and launched missile tests targeting Taiwan. Ending this crisis, China eventually declared that it would not invade Taiwan but expressed its commitment for one China. The 1999-2000 crisis involved Taiwanese President Lee Teng-Hui's statement that China's "one country, two systems" policy for Hong Kong and Macau does not work for Taiwan and that Taiwan is an independent state. The crisis was ended by the new Taiwanese president, Chen Shui-Bian, who stated that he would neither declare independence nor do anything that provokes China, as long as China does not use force against Taiwan. These past conflicts and the current state in East Asia suggest that reconciliation and peace are not yet truly achieved in the region.

The USA, and its relationship to each of the countries in the region, plays an important role in achieving peace in East Asia. The US military still maintains a strong presence in Japan and South Korea (King, 2011) and retains a great deal of influence on foreign affairs, domestic and international politics, the economy, and the security of the East Asian nations. Peace and reconciliation in East Asia cannot be considered or discussed without considering the involvement of the USA in the region, a theme which will be weaved throughout the following section.

Diplomatic and Political Issues for Achieving Peace in East Asia

South and North Koreas

Despite the Cold War ending several decades ago, the Korean Peninsula is still split into two nations; unlike East and West Germany, they have not been united (Bleiker, 2002). Granted, there have been several attempts at reconciliation (e.g., the Pyongyang summit meeting between the two heads of state in 2000), but no peace treaty or pact has been signed. Moreover, such

attempts have sometimes backfired, producing more antagonistic, confrontational attitudes between the nations. Although South Korea has repeatedly indicated that “the South has ‘no intention to undermine or absorb the North’” (p. 300), its goal of a unified nation would require that the North’s communist identity yield to democracy and capitalism. The USA’s relation to North Korea also complicates the matter. The intimidating American policy regarding the nation’s nuclear weapons program has been making North Korea more obstinate, hindering any possible reconciliation between the two Koreas.

The Six-Party Talks, which aims at the denuclearization of North Korea, involve the USA and the two Koreas, as well as China, Japan, and Russia (Bajoria, 2012). Since the beginning of the talks in 2003, the negotiations have faced a number of diplomatic obstacles, which in turn have affected a peace process in the two Koreas. To eliminate the nuclear weapons program in North Korea, Sigal (2008) agrees with Bleiker (2002) that pressuring North Korea is not effective. He points out that because of the mistrust among the parties involved, “hostile policy” (Sigal, 2008, p. 5) would not help and would actually be counterproductive. Sigal suggests three keys to denuclearization of North Korea. First, North Korea has long been interested in a peace treaty with South Korea. In 1954, North Korea invited South Korea to talks with the goal of establishing a permanent peace system in place of the armistice, but South Korea was not interested. By the mid-1970s, North Korea shifted its attention to the USA and called for the USA’s attention to a peace regime numerous times, only to be rejected. Thus, Sigal suggests that beginning a peace process would encourage North Korea to yield to denuclearization. Second, Sigal suggests starting a regional security dialogue, especially for the demilitarized zone and permanent borders between the two Koreas. Third, Sigal recommends active economic engagement that addresses North Korea’s needs in food, energy, and infrastructure. Because the two Koreas’ peace process and North Korea’s denuclearization go “hand in hand” (Sigal, 2008, p. 5), cooperation among the nations involved is essential.

Chang (2010) observes that the USA’s interest in peace between the two Koreas has in recent years been motivated by its intention to denuclearize North Korea. The USA has been passive in promoting peace between the two Koreas because of a fear that peace in the Korean Peninsula would interfere with the USA’s various interests in East Asia and particularly South Korea. For instance, the USA’s major concern regarding the Korean Peninsula until the late 1980s was to maintain the armistice while building sufficient military capability in the region to threaten North Korea. Chang argues that if the USA leads peace-building in the Korean Peninsula, it will increase its influence and power over the two Koreas. After several decades of alliance, the USA–South Korea relationship has been disturbed recently due to South Korea’s economic and political success and its enhanced status in the international community. South Korea’s positive economic relations with China, as well as recent divergent policies and attitudes toward North Korea, have also negatively affected USA–South Korea relations. The weakened USA–South Korea alliance could be adjusted under a US-led peace regime. On the other hand, China would not be happy with renewed American power and influence in the region and could react negatively to a peace regime. Thus, Chang cautions that strategies to achieve a peace regime “can be diverse and each approach will have its own merits and demerits” (p. 193) Thus, the region requires a comprehensive plan that “simultaneously implements multiple objectives including denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, arms control and disarmament, peace treaty, normalization of the U.S.–North Korea relations, and so on” (pp. 193–194).

South Korea and Japan

Relations between South Korea and Japan have gradually improved over several decades, but especially during 1997 and 2000 (e.g., Hundt & Bleiker, 2007; Rozman, 2002). For instance, in 1998, South Korea and Japan issued a joint statement of reconciliation over Japan’s wartime aggression and declared a partnership together. South Korea also agreed to remove restrictions on importing Japanese culture (Rozman, 2002). In 2000, South Korea asked Japan for investment

funds to address its economic problems. Legal discrimination facing Korean Japanese citizens has been reduced, and tourism between the two countries has increased exponentially in recent years. However, the positive relationship between the two nations may not be as solid and permanent as one may hope. Rozman observes that among the countries that suffered Japan's wartime aggression, South Korea experienced the worst because it was under Japanese rule longer than any other country and faced the most extreme assimilation policies. Moreover, South Korea has integrated its affliction into its national identity more than any other country. Because of its geographical proximity, economic reliance, and cultural affinity with Japan, it is important to note that, paradoxically, South Korea may feel most threatened by Japan (Park, 2008; Rozman, 2002). Thus, various threats that can undermine South Korea–Japan relations are constantly lurking. The threats include the Japanese history textbook controversy (see below) and Japanese prime ministers' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine where Japanese war criminals (as well as veterans and civilian victims of the war) are honored (Hundt & Bleiker, 2007). Other threats include each country's critical public opinion of the other and its people, lack of regionalism despite strong economic ties and cultural similarity, and divergent strategies in dealing with other Asian countries, such as China, in the post-Cold War era,

The Japanese history textbook controversy has been particularly acute in awakening the atrocious memory of Japanese wartime colonization among South Koreans (Hundt & Bleiker, 2007). During the early to mid-1990s, the Japanese history textbooks incorporated previously ignored historical facts of Japan's past aggression, such as the use of "comfort women." However, as soon as the very conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) returned to power in the mid-1990s, the textbook contents started reverting to the previous, less accurate, less critical descriptions of Japan's wartime actions. Hundt and Bleiker observe that even within Japan, there has not been consensus regarding how Japan's past imperialism and aggression should be represented, with the most vocal criticism of inaccurate representations coming from leftist politicians, liberal

intellectuals, and schoolteachers. For example, there has been much protest among Japanese schoolteachers in using the controversial history textbook that was published due to the LDP's influence. Nevertheless, the fact that the conservative Japanese government chose to publish the historically inaccurate textbook has disturbed South Korea–Japan relations.

The two nations have similar antagonistic feelings toward one another regarding economic rivalry. They tend to discount each other's contribution in developing and transforming the other country over two millenniums (Rozman, 2002). Rozman suggests that trust must be built locally and then spread to other parts of the countries in order to counter such antagonism. Newly emerging positive attitudes toward each other's language, including mutual promotion of studying each of them, presents hope for more positive future relations. South Korea's increased importing of Japanese mass cultural products such as movies, TV shows, video games, and music CDs may also help to develop further positive attitudes among citizens in the two countries.

Hundt and Bleiker (2007) recommend three measures to promote reconciliation and improve South Korea–Japan relations. First, reconciliation should be treated as an ongoing, open-ended process, rather than as a way to restore the pre-conflict state. Second, reconciliation needs to be achieved through bilateral dialogues about what happened in the past. Finally, reconciliation requires both nations to accept differences between them and in their historical representations, allowing for different versions of their shared history.

Rozman (2002) and Park (2008) believe that the USA has a critical role to play in solidifying the delicate South Korea–Japan relationship. Rozman suggests that the USA should take initiative in promoting a review of historical facts and increasing mutual understanding, for instance, by challenging Japanese nationalists' interpretations and appeasing grievances in South Korea and China. He also recommends that multinational corporations should play an active role in peacebuilding. They should work toward building trust between the two nations by bringing their citizens together in and forming networks across corporate branches in these countries.

China and Japan

Despite the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between China and Japan that normalized their relations (Gao, 2008), the relationship between China and Japan has not always been stable. The relationship deteriorated especially during the first 5 years of the new millennium, mainly over diverging views on history and over Japanese prime ministers' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (Hoshiyama, 2008). Japanese politicians' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine evoke much fear in Asian nations, many of whom are afraid of a resurgence of Japanese militarism and nationalism. However, China–Japan relations have been improving in recent years after Japanese Prime Minister Abe's visit to China in 2006 and Chinese Prime Minister Wen's visit to Japan in 2007 (Drifte, 2009; Hoshiyama, 2008). During this exchange, China expressed, for the first time, its full appreciation for Japan's apology and remorse for its wartime aggression and recognized Japan as a "regional political great power" (Hoshiyama, 2008, p. 74). This positive change on the Chinese side signifies their altered perceptions of Japan's postwar measures such as paying reparations and expressing repentance over wartime aggression and signals an alteration in Chinese fears of Japanese militarism.

According to Hoshiyama (2008), the changes on the Japanese side have also contributed to the improvement in China–Japan relations. He notes a shift in Japanese public opinion toward more realistic perception of Japan's security and defense, particularly due to the military threat from North Korea, the rise of China as a global power, and the threat of international terrorism. Previously, Japan relied heavily on the USA for its security and mainly concentrated on its economic development. In this new era, however, Japanese people have realized the need to change their attitude toward China.

However, because China and Japan have very different political regimes and basic values, improving and strengthening their relationship is not an easy task. Hoshiyama (2008) and Drifte (2009) raise three "structural problems" (Hoshiyama, 2008, p. 80) that present challenges to China–Japan relations: the Taiwan issue, the East China Sea issue, and the historical issue.

Because Japan had to give up Taiwan under the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan has stayed passive and respected China's stance toward Taiwan. At the same time, Taiwan is geographically close to Japan, and thus China's military expansion against Taiwan is a security threat to Japan. The East China Sea issue involves the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands, also a result of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The area also contains a gas development field, which China and Japan agreed to jointly develop. Consequently, the area raises economic as well as security concerns for both countries.

Moreover, as in the South Korea–Japan relationship, how China and Japan understand and represent the past is a thorny issue. According to Hoshiyama (2008), the opinion that "the Pacific War was not a war of aggression but a war of self-defense" (p. 85) is pervasive in Japan. Additionally, many Japanese feel that scholarly arguments on the Nanjing Massacre and the Japanese military's use of sex slavery are influenced by Chinese propaganda, and that these scholarly views do not conform to the generally accepted "facts" in Japan. Hoshiyama expects that the USA and China would both disagree with these Japanese historical views. He argues that whether they can be tolerant enough to understand and accept Japan's historical perspectives will be a key to their future relationships with Japan.

As with South Korea–Japan relations, Hoshiyama (2008) believes that the USA has a pivotal role to play in the relationship between China and Japan. Rather than being a passive third party, he argues, the USA must play an active role in the trilateral relation by reassessing the shifting Japanese public opinion and understanding Japan's historical view, and by having "a sense of ownership" (p. 88) over the structural problems of China and Japan. In order to build a strong, stable trilateral relation among China, the USA, and Japan, the USA needs to implement diplomatic policies that strengthen trust and mutual understanding.

Drifte (2009) argues that Japan needs to be assertive in its dialogues with China rather than avoiding conflict or procrastinating decisions.

Such Japanese tactics have not worked but rather have let China shift “from exploration to exploitation” (p. 67), for example, involving the energy resources in the East China Sea. He also argues that Japan needs to improve its economy in order to maintain equilibrium in the trilateral partnership due to increasing economic competition and political rivalry with China. In order to be a leading contributor to regional integration and cooperation, Japan should also strengthen its policy for Asia. Drifte observes that many Chinese underappreciated Japan’s goodwill that has helped China to cope with many problems. He presents a somber view that divergent social systems and political regimes in the two countries, along with economic competition and political rivalry, make reconciliation more challenging. How Japan will transform itself politically and economically seems to be a key to its relationship with China.

China and Taiwan

Hostile China–Taiwan relations present serious security instability in East Asia. Tsang (2000) argues that the two Chinese communities must first develop mutual understanding and respect to achieve peace and avoid war. While China insists that Taiwan accepts preconditions before they start a peace talk, Taiwan rejects any preconditions. China’s commitment to its “One China” policy and Taiwan’s goal of “independence” are so rigid that they have been stalling the negotiations. Tsang proposes that both communities should agree to proceed with the negotiation without defining the term “One China.” Its definition should be the result of the negotiations. Tsang also advises that Taiwan should not seek independence during the negotiation process and that both communities should avoid using force or causing military confrontation during the negotiations. Tsang further recommends that both parties make a formal commitment to the negotiations until they reach a mutually satisfactory agreement and that the negotiations should take place in China and Taiwan alternately without involving any third party.

Lijun (2002) believes that military confrontation between China and Taiwan is “neither inevitable nor imminent” (p. 94). He and Feng (2009)

observe that after the fourth military crisis during 1999–2000 in the Taiwan Strait, China’s military buildup has been symbolic, used to intimidate Taiwan and discourage its pursuit of independence rather than to actually exercise military force. He and Feng argue that peace is hinged on Taiwan’s provocation of China by its movement toward independence and on China’s retaliation choice between military confrontation and political intimidation. They contend that China is “the only actor who can directly determine peace or war across the Taiwan Strait” (He & Feng, 2009, p. 502). If Taiwan formally declares its independence, war is unavoidable, even if the USA intervenes. Considering this dire consequence of its independence, it is generally thought that even the most progressive Taiwanese leader would avoid such an outcome.

He and Feng (2009) argue that when China faces domestic demand as well as international threats, it is more likely to use military force against Taiwan in order to minimize losses. However, if China faces no serious pressure domestically or internationally, it is more likely to use political and diplomatic pressure against Taiwan in order to avoid any risks. Unlike Tsang (2000), who maintains that the peace negotiations between China and Taiwan should not involve any foreign power, He and Feng (2009) believe that the USA should use its political power to influence China in order to achieve peace between China and Taiwan.

China and Tibet

In addition to China–Taiwan relations, China–Tibet relations have also hindered achieving peace in East Asia. The main issue is the intractable disagreement between China and Tibet regarding the status of Tibet since the 1950s (Sperling, 2004). Tibet has inconsistently claimed its independence from China and its own sovereignty. On the other hand, China has insisted that Tibet has been an integral part of China since the thirteenth century. However, both claims have been shaped in the twentieth century when their conflict started and grew increasingly troublesome. For instance, until the Chinese Communist Party defeated the Nationalist Party in 1949 and

announced its foreign policy to “restore” Tibet, Formosa, the Pescadores, and Hainan Island as part of China (Shakya, 1999), Tibet did not appear to be a historically important part of China (Sperling, 2004).

The Tibetan claim that its relationship with China is a religious one of “priest–patron” without political subordination to China has also emerged recently in response to China’s “invasion” of Tibet in 1949 (Sperling, 2004). Historically, Tibetan monks have had religious and spiritual relationships with Chinese emperors of many dynasties, and these relationships were held sometimes under Tibet’s political subordination and at other times under its independence. Thus, the priest–patron relationship is not necessarily an indication of Tibet’s independence from China.

Another complicated issue is Tibet’s claim regarding China’s invasion in 1949 (Sperling, 2004). Before the 1980s, the invasion was recorded as taking place in 1950 when China’s People’s Liberation Army crossed with armed forces the border that separated the territory under the Dalai Lama’s government from other Tibetan land that was already under Chinese control. By claiming that the invasion occurred in 1949, rather than 1950, Tibet is alleging that the provinces already under the Chinese control before 1950 were part of Tibet.

According to He (2010), two separate discourses have exacerbated the China–Tibet conflict during the past decade: realism versus human rights perspective. China has been constantly assessing and adjusting its Tibet policy in accordance with its relation with the USA (Norbu, 2001). More recently, however, policy has become more aggressive with an intention of “isolating and silencing the Dalai Lama completely” (He, 2010, p. 219). He argues that China’s realism stance increases “dirty politics”, which aggravates the China–Tibet problem. On the other hand, discourse taking place in the West is from the human rights perspective, with the issue framed in terms of human rights. He further contends that such moral-based arguments neglect complex political issues and stray from practical solutions. These two separate discourses have created two closed knowledge systems, each

prejudiced against one another. Chinese realists consider human rights discourse as an attempt to upset China’s policy for unity. Those who advocate the human rights perspective on the issue regard realism discourse as a way to force political subordination to authoritarian China.

The China–Tibet conflict involves not only diverse historical representations held by each party but also involves political, diplomatic, and military issues (Sperling, 2004), as well as human rights issues (He, 2010). As He proposes, there is a strong need to develop a deliberative forum that breaks up the closed knowledge systems so that both parties can engage in a dialogue using the same language.

Economic Issues for Achieving Peace in East Asia

East Asia is an economically powerful region, and thus peace in East Asia is crucial to the world economy. According to Yue (2004), East Asia contains one third of the world’s population, two-fifths of the world’s foreign reserves, and about one quarter of the world’s gross national product. Economic interdependence in East Asia would lead to more stable diplomatic and political relations in the region, which would in turn contribute to world peace. However, to compete against the rise of China, Japan and South Korea started to cooperate with Southeast Asian countries, such as Singapore. At the same time though, they have also realized that cooperating with China would strengthen the East Asian economic bloc by utilizing their regional resources to address regional problems. Economic integration in East Asia would make the region competitive against European and North American economic blocs.

Countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) also recognize the importance of diplomatic and economic cooperation in their region. In the early 2000s, China, Japan, South Korea, and the ASEAN nations together proposed the formation of an East Asian Community, aimed at prevention of conflict and promotion of peace, closer economic cooperation, improvement of human security, and an

increase in common prosperity (Yue, 2004). Yue argues that these East Asian and ASEAN nations share a common destiny. The key to the region's prosperity is political and economic gain through regional cooperation and integration.

Kahler and Kastner (2006) critically observe that the benefit of active economic cooperation between any two countries that have been in conflict has been ignored as a way to change the relation between the two, as compared to the effectiveness of economic sanctions. These scholars argue that once bilateral economic exchange is established, its disruption, for example, through military conflict, would incur much cost to these nations. First, the disruption can lead to loss of assets that may not be easily obtained elsewhere. Also, to the extent that the bilateral economic exchange is extensive, finding the next best alternative partners would jeopardize the entire economy. Therefore, the greater the cost of military conflict, the less likely it is that economically interdependent nations start war. Furthermore, corporations, firms, and individual stakeholders in the economic interdependence would demand peace. This would lead to high political cost to politicians and heads of state who may undermine the stable diplomatic relations. Economic cooperation and exchange not only highlight the benefit of peace but also promote peaceful relations by making military conflict less attractive.

In realizing regional integration and cooperation in East Asia, North Korea cannot be excluded. After all, peace in East Asia cannot be achieved without politically and economically integrating North Korea. Haggard and Noland (2009) note that East Asia has lacked regional institutions thus far but that the Six-Party Talks, which include North Korea, may become an impetus for founding an integrated structure. They further suggest that forming a Northeast Asian Free Trade Area (NEAFTA) would be an important step toward regional integration. By establishing economic integration in the region, economic assets and physical infrastructure would be created, which would in turn create pressure on North Korea, which has recently emphasized reliance on military force. Additionally, economic integration may encourage North Korea to

participate in a security dialogue and eventual political cooperation. These scholars believe that without North Korea's denuclearization, the regional integration could not be realized.

Economic interdependence and cooperation not only promote peace by discouraging future armed conflict but also help reconciliation after past conflicts. Cui (2011) argues that cooperation to counter common environmental threats may aid reconciliation between China and Japan following Japan's wartime aggression. As the Chinese economy has developed rapidly, earlier environmental issues such as air and water pollution have become environmental security issues (e.g., transborder air pollution that involves yellow dust and sand). To tackle such environmental security threats, China, Japan, and South Korea have started joint research and actions. Environmental cooperation between China and Japan has been particularly facilitated by Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA). This cooperation may aid each nation to revise negative images and reconstruct negative collective memories of the other into more positive ones.

Cui (2011) also observes that this environmental cooperation has provided opportunities for civil exchanges. Strengthening the "people-to-people tie" (p. 52) through personally meeting, working together, and getting to know one another is critically important in increasing mutual understanding, which is conducive to peace and reconciliation between the two nations. Thus, environmental cooperation between China and Japan has not only provided opportunities to improve diplomatic and political relations at the state level, but it has also provided valuable opportunities for genuine reconciliation by promoting respect for one another at the citizen level.

Sociological and Psychological Issues for Achieving Peace in East Asia

Many of the arguments above suggest the importance of mutual understanding in improving diplomatic and political relations and in furthering peace and reconciliation. Hoshiyama (2008), in particular, has pointed out that Japan has quite a

different view of its wartime aggression than that of the USA and China. He has argued that the USA and China's willingness to try to understand Japan's perspective will influence future relations. Kelman (2008) insists that reconciliation "does not require writing a joint consensual history, but it does require admitting the other's truth into one's own narrative" (p. 29). He argues that confronting history and facing mutual "truths" are essential in the reconciliation process, especially through reexamination of both sides' historical narratives and myths. Through this process of taking the other's perspective, particularly as relating to historical representations, mutual understanding is increased.

He (2010) conducted an insightful study to promote mutual understanding and trust for China–Tibet relations. In 2008, as the Beijing Olympics approached, Tibet undertook a series of protests and demonstrations against China, which were met by Chinese students' counter-protests around the world. These incidents created a great deal of mistrust and suspicions between Tibetans and the Chinese people. In order to resolve the tension, He believed that mutual understanding and trust must be built through deliberation by citizens in both communities. He invited 14 Tibetans and 12 ethnic Chinese students who were studying at major universities in Australia to attend a 3-day democratic deliberation workshop. One month before the workshop, these Tibetan and Chinese participants were provided with a 275-page information packet that contained scholarly articles, official government documents, and newspaper articles to ensure that all participants had the same detailed information and balanced knowledge on the Tibetan issue. Before and after the workshop, the participants filled out identical surveys in order to assess any changes in opinions and attitudes. He found that not only the level of knowledge increased in both groups but also mutual understanding through the recognition of alternative views. Mutual trust was also increased through the workshop because each party could recognize that the other was reasonable in its arguments. The workshop also enhanced deliberative capacities by allowing

participants to develop divergent views, to take the other's perspective, and to change their own attitudes regarding the Tibetan issue. From He's study, it is clear that having a dialogue is essential in cultivating mutual understanding and trust in order to promote reconciliation and peace. This study also shows the importance of public discourse among citizens rather than limiting dialogues to scholars, intellectuals, and politicians striving for peace.

To achieve reconciliation and peace, prejudice and in-group favoritism must also be reduced or eliminated through mutual understanding and cooperation. Riek et al. (2008) argue that in many value-ridden arenas such as religious or political contexts, when one group's beliefs appear to violate or conflict with another group's, symbolic threats occur. This may contribute to the strained China–Taiwan relations. Taiwan's goal toward independence, whether it is successful or not, violates China's "One China" policy. This not only creates diplomatic and political tension between the two but also a great deal of psychological threat to both of them, hindering peace-building.

Riek and his colleagues (2008) contend that to address such psychological threats, the creation of a common in-group identity is a key. Through this process, previous in-group favoritism is extended to benefit the former out-group. This psychological process presents much hope in improving China–Japan relations. If they are able to revisit their collective memories and negative images of one another, for example, through their environmental cooperation (Cui, 2011), the two nations can develop a newly shared in-group identity. This would not only promote mutual understanding and reconciliation following the contentious past, but it would also increase cooperation into the future. Moreover, the environmental security threat that China, Japan, and South Korea face together creates a "superordinate goal" (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961) for these nations. A superordinate goal is a task that requires intergroup cooperation for its successful completion. The environmental threat is transborder, so none of the three countries can solve it alone. Rather, they must cooperate and work together. Such superordinate goals have been shown to

facilitate peace-building and improved intergroup relations (Sherif et al., 1961).

In order to work toward peace-building, it is important that stakeholders understand the meaning of peace and the role of agency in its creation. Deng and Shih (2009), who examined perceptions of peace among Taiwanese children and adolescents (ages between 4 and 18), found that 77% of the 60 children and adolescents perceived peace as good. Interestingly, however, 20% of them mentioned that peace is both good and bad. Deng and Shih consider that this duality in their perception of peace is a reflection of the ancient Chinese philosophy of yin and yang. In addition, while 95% of the participants described what peace is, 80% of them also described what peace is not (i.e., absence of war). Other major themes in their responses included descriptions of peace as prosocial behavior (62%) and explanation involving the importance of positive emotions toward peace (70%).

Researchers also asked the Taiwanese children and adolescents about their role in peace-making. About 48% of them mentioned specific strategies for peace-making, such as refraining from fights or arguments and engaging in prosocial behavior. Deng and Shih (2009) point out that these strategies emphasizing interpersonal relations rather than international relations, such as preventing war between nations, reflect the collectivism and interpersonal harmony that are particularly valued in Chinese culture. However, 52% of the participants, especially the adolescents (ages between 13 and 18), reported that they did not know what they could do to help or that they did not feel capable of making a contribution to, peace-making. Deng and Shih theorize several possible reasons for the more pessimistic answers, including the lack of formal peace education in the Taiwanese school system. Their speculation suggests the crucial role of peace education from an early age in achieving peace.

Atsumi and Suwa (2009) studied Japanese university students' historical understanding of the twentieth century, especially China–Japan relations, which they deem important for future peace-building. The researchers found that Japanese university students identified with Japan and the world, but not with the Asian region, and that they were relatively indifferent to Asian his-

tory and political issues. Atsumi and Suwa call this phenomenon “Naïve Universalism” (p. 246). Young Japanese people appear to be interested in contemporary world issues, but are disconnected with their nation's and the Asian region's historical representations.

How can young Japanese generations participate in reconciliation processes with Asian nations over Japan's past aggression if they are indifferent to their past? Interestingly, Atsumi and Suwa (2009) propose two ways to harness this Naïve Universalism to peace-making in Asia. One is that the naiveté can be sophisticated and nuanced to create a deeper understanding through education, media, and grassroots exchanges between Chinese and Japanese citizens. The other way to take advantage of Naïve Universalism is in humanitarian actions, particularly following natural disasters. Without knowledge of past conflicts and the negative relationship between China and Japan, younger generations may be more active in helping victims in China. Such humanitarian actions would certainly be conducive to reconciliation and peace-building between the two nations.

As briefly reviewed above, East Asian nations must deal with a number of issues in achieving reconciliation and peace. These issues include historical, diplomatic, political, economic, sociological, and psychological concerns. East Asian governments have been making efforts toward reconciliation and peace through various peace treaties, diplomatic negotiations, and economic cooperation. Given these problems and attempted solutions, how do citizens of these nations view world peace? Do they think that world peace is achievable? What steps do they think are necessary for achieving world peace? These questions are addressed below.

Methods and Results

Sample

The East Asian sample consisted of 245 participants from three countries in East Asia: (a) Japan, (b) China, and (c) South Korea. Respondents

ranged in age from 18 to 79 years old ($M=29.75$, $SD 12.84$). The largest proportion of the sample, 12%, was 19 years old. The majority of the sample, 53.2% of respondents, identified themselves as female (female, $n=130$; male, $n=112$). A moderately large subset of the sample, 22% ($n=54$), reported that they had served in the military, and almost half of the sample, 48.6% ($n=119$), reported having a relative who had served in the military. Lastly, 20.4% ($n=50$) of respondents reported participating in at least one protest against war or in favor of peace. This data was collected from a convenience sample that did not utilize random sampling methods. Therefore, the generalizability of these results is limited, and the data obtained from respondents is not representative of the entire population of this region, culture, or of individual countries. However, the data allows general themes regarding the achievability of peace to be identified.

Procedure

The Personal and Individual Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006) was administered between 2004 and 2008. The survey was completed in either paper or online format and focused on respondents' perspectives regarding the possibility of achieving world peace. Respondents completed basic demographic information and were asked to rate their level of agreement on a 7-point Likert scale, from 1 (total disagreement) to 7 (total agreement), with the statement "I believe that world peace can be achieved." They were also asked to explain their rating in a few short sentences. Respondents were then asked to describe the "best way to achieve world peace."

Grounded theory and deductive qualitative analysis were both utilized in the development of the coding manual for the current project. Deductive qualitative analysis is a methodological strategy that applies an overarching theoretical model or framework to qualitative data and analyzes the data in the context of that model (Gilgun, 2005). Grounded theory is an alternate method of qualitative analysis. Grounded theory

does not apply an established theory to the data but rather develops a model building from the themes presented in the qualitative responses obtained during data collection (Glaser, 1992).

Responses were separated into codable units, which were primarily classified by the number of ideas represented in the entire statement. The codable units were then classified into subcategories based on matching themes. The one exception to this coding procedure was the application of the code *agency*; this code was applied to the entire response (as a whole) regardless of the number of ideas contained within the response.

Coding System I: Agency, Humanitarian Disengagement, and Engagement

Coding system I is rooted in Bandura's (1999) model of moral disengagement. Using Bandura's theory, two broad categories, *agency* and *disengagement/humanitarian engagement*, were established. It is important to note that codes refer to responses, not participants. It would be inappropriate to leap from the occurrence of those themes to judgments concerning the moral character of participants. Accordingly, in describing our coding system and patterns in the responses, we refer to *humanitarian engagement and disengagement* or simply *engagement and disengagement*, rather than "moral disengagement" and "moral engagement."

Agency Coding

Bandura's (1999) theory suggests that morality based solely on cognitions is insufficient. Individuals must also use personal agency, or actions, to connect their moral thoughts with congruent behaviors. Bandura states that agency is reflected in two systems: proactive and inhibitive. Proactive agency requires that individuals behave in a manner that is congruent with their cognitive morality (i.e., engagement). Inhibitive agency occurs when one's sense of morality is blocked so that actions, which are not consistent with one's moral beliefs, can be tolerated (i.e.,

disengagement). As such, responses were categorized as reflecting the *presence of agency*, the *absence of agency*, or as *not applicable agency*. A response was coded as exhibiting the *presence of agency* if it identified specific actions that would facilitate the achievement of peace. These actions could reference individuals, communities, institutions, governments, or countries. If a response did not identify an action, or denied the achievability of peace, it was coded as displaying an *absence of agency*. Responses that did not address the prompt were coded as *not applicable agency*.

Frequency of Agency Themes

Seventy-nine percent of all responses were coded as displaying a *presence of agency* ($n=191$). These responses indicated that peace was achievable and specified actions that could be taken to achieve peace. A 61-year-old Japanese woman wrote that peace could be achieved through “mediation, early education, and an absence of war.” This statement implies that peace is possible and suggests three steps that can be taken to achieve it. Similarly, a 21-year-old South Korean man stated, “We should make the world peaceful by building a peaceful country.” He also suggested several steps that could be taken to achieve this goal including “helping each other... no violent demonstrations, and then correcting errors one by one.”

Alternatively, 21% of all responses were coded for the *absence of agency* ($n=50$). These responses did not identify specific actions that could be taken to achieve peace, or claim that peace was unachievable. A 21-year-old South Korean man stated, “There is no way to achieve peace in the world.” This statement was coded for the *absence of agency* because it reflects a belief that world peace is unattainable. Similarly, a 21-year-old Chinese woman stated, “There will always be conflict because people are naturally competitive.” This response does not explicitly deny the possibility of peace but identifies an obstacle for attaining peace without suggesting tangible steps that could correct this problem.

Disengagement and Engagement Coding

A code within the category of *humanitarian engagement* could only be applied to a response if the response displayed the *presence of agency* and recognized the achievability of peace. Responses that were coded under the category of *humanitarian disengagement* were not required to meet these criteria. Given the multiple ways in which a response could reflect *engagement* or *disengagement*, statements were divided into several subcategories.

Disengagement responses were organized into five categories: (a) *rationalization*, (b) *displacement of responsibility*, (c) *ignoring consequences of harmful actions*, (d) *destructive human nature*, and (e) *the attribution of blame*. *Rationalization* was applied to statements that suggested that peace was not necessary. Alternatively, the *displacement of responsibility* implies that peace is necessary but assigns the responsibility of achieving peace to something external to the self. If a response specifically indicated that the military should utilize force to achieve peace, the unit was given the additional code for the theme *military/force*.

Responses that suggested harmful actions that could result in peace, but denied or ignored the negative consequences of these actions, were coded under the third category, *ignoring the consequences of harmful actions*. *Destructive human nature* was applied to responses that identified negative internal human attributes or actions as barriers to achieving peace. The last category, the *attribution of blame*, emphasized external events or entities, which function as barriers to achieving peace. In addition, if a response coded for the *attribution of blame* indicated that the blame should be assigned to the government, leaders, or nations, it was coded for *government/political blame*.

Engagement responses were also organized into categories: (a) *justification*, (b) *assumption of responsibility*, (c) *humanization*, and (d) *removal of blame*. The category *justification* pertained to an explicit rationale for the achievability of peace. If responses referenced morals, philosophy, or religion as a method of achieving peace, they were coded for the *principles/beliefs* categories.

The second category, *assumption of responsibility*, captured responses that assigned responsibility to the general population for achieving peace. Two subcategories emerged from this category. Some responses referred to general *practical strategies* that would facilitate world peace, while others indicated that the *government was responsible*, and identified specific strategies that the government could utilize in order to achieve peace.

The category *humanization* contained responses that identified positive internal human attributes that facilitate peace. This category had two subcategories. Responses that focused on unifying global principles, such as love, were coded for *interpersonal concepts/values*. Responses that highlighted social and economic equality or general human rights received an additional code of *social equity*. Finally, the category *removal of blame* was noted in responses that referred to reconciliation or forgiveness.

Frequency of Disengagement and Engagement Themes

Humanitarian disengagement statements accounted for 24% of total responses. Of the disengagement responses, 28% were categorized as representing concepts regarding *destructive*

human nature. These responses indicate that human and institutional actions are motivated by negative characteristics (e.g., greed or selfishness), which inhibit the achievability of peace. For example, a 34-year-old South Korean man stated, “It [peace] is impossible because of people’s greed.”

The most common category was *attribution of blame*, comprising 37% of all disengaged responses. These responses highlighted external factors or interpersonal conflicts as barriers to achieving peace. An example of such statements was made by a 19-year-old Japanese woman, who stated that peace is “impossible as long as there are religions, and as the nature of human beings, it is unavoidable to envy others.” This response identifies two concepts that hinder the achievability of peace: religion (external) and envy (interpersonal). More examples of *disengagement* responses are presented in Table 40.1.

Humanitarian engagement statements comprised 65% of all responses. Sixteen percent of engagement responses emphasized the responsibility of the general population to find a way to achieve peace (*assumption of responsibility*). A 38-year-old Japanese woman suggested that “to be able to think of others as if they are ourselves” would facilitate the attainment of world peace. This statement reflects the notion that responsibility must be

Table 40.1 Percentages and examples of humanitarian disengagement themes most frequently identified from the East Asian sample

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Disengagement</i>	24				
Destructive human nature	7(28)	China	27	M	“Humans are, by their very nature, greedy and want what they don’t have. Sometimes they will fight for it”
		Japan	18	F	“You may be able to decrease conflicts, but it won’t cease. Human beings seem to like conflicts”
Attribution of blame	9(37)	Korea	27	M	“Race and religious conflict”
		Japan	19	F	“I think it is very difficult since there are various differences such as religion and ethnicity”

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total disengagement/humanitarian engagement codes. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the disengagement responses

M indicates male; *F* indicates female

assumed by the individual in order to achieve peace.

On the other hand, 19% of engagement responses cited the government or other institutional agencies as responsible for achieving peace (i.e., *governmental responsibility*). A 20-year-old South Korean man wrote, "It would be best for each country to keep watch on other countries through a coalition system." This statement highlights the role of nations, rather than individuals, in the development of peace. Because the response looks at the role of larger entities beyond the role of the individual within society, it was coded as an indication of *governmental responsibility*.

Ten percent of engagement responses identified the cessation of *ineffective negative relations* such as violence and hatred as a strategy to achieve peace. For example, a 21-year-old South Korean woman stated that world peace could be achieved if people were "prohibited from carrying weapons." This response identifies a negative action (i.e., carrying weapons) that impedes peaceful relations and suggests that peace could be achieved if this practice was removed. Although these responses cited examples that assigned responsibility to the individual, or to government agencies for the establishment of peace, they were distinguished by their emphasis on the removal of negative practices. Therefore, they were coded independently under the *ineffectiveness of negative relations* subcategory.

Twenty-five percent of engagement responses cited *interpersonal values* as the mechanism for achieving peace. This category contained responses that referred to broad global concepts, such as love. One response written by a 22-year-old Chinese woman stated, "If everyone believed in loving each other unconditionally," world peace would be achievable. This response identifies the construct love as a potential pathway for achieving peace.

Lastly, 11% of engagement responses indicated that increasing *social equity* such as equalizing social and economic status would help achieve peace. For example, a 19-year-old Chinese woman stated that the best way to achieve peace is to

"break down racism, sexism, classism, oppression, prejudice, and discrimination." This is particularly illustrative of the subcategory *social equity*, as the response identifies several arenas in which societal and economic inequalities exist, and advocates that the equalization of these areas will result in peace. Additional examples of engagement responses are included in Table 40.2.

Demographic Differences for Agency, Humanitarian Engagement, and Disengagement

Chi-square analyses were run for each codable unit using four demographic categories: (1) gender, (2) military service, (3) relatives in military service, and (4) protest participation. Responses to these categories were coded for the presence or absence of affirmative responses. Each demographic variable was run against all codes for *agency*, *engagement*, and *disengagement*. All comparisons were completed using Pearson chi-square coefficient, with the exception of those analyses in which the expected cell count was less than five, which led to the utilization of Fisher's exact test. Only results that were found to be statistically significant ($p \leq .05$) or marginally significant ($0.05 < p \leq 0.1$) are reported.

These analyses reveal that proportionally more men than women *assumed responsibility* in their responses.

Group differences emerged between participants with military experience and those without it. A proportionately greater number of respondents who had not served in the military displayed the *presence of agency*. Also, a greater proportion of nonmilitary-serving participants indicated explicit *practical strategies* for achieving peace and highlighted the *ineffectiveness of negative relations* in the achievement of peace. Moreover, a proportionately greater number of participants who had not served in the military gave responses coded for one or more of the *humanitarian engagement* coding categories than those who had served in the military.

Table 40.2 Percentages and examples of humanitarian engagement themes most frequently identified from the East Asian sample

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Engagement</i> 65					
Assumption of responsibility	10(16)	Korea	21	M	“Helping each other, which would make a country with no violent demonstrations, and then correcting errors one by one, which would make a peaceful country”
		Japan	61	F	“I believe that great effort and mutual trust are important and needed”
Governmental responsibility	13(19)	Korea	57	F	“Negotiation, discussion, mutual concession”
		Korea	52	M	“Improve leader’s mind”
Ineffectiveness of negative relations	6(10)	China	24	F	“Perfection is not possible, though a relative reduction in conflict worldwide must always remain a goal to be hoped for”
<i>Humanization</i> 3(4)					
Interpersonal values	16(25)	China	21	F	“Love all”
		Japan	25	F	“I believe we can come closer to achieving world peace as each one of us, as well as each country, has such awareness to achieve this goal and by understanding that we are all different and understanding such differences and realizing them”
Social equity	7(11)	Korea	22	M	“All persons should believe that freedom, life, responsibility, and love are the most important things than anything else”
		China	20	F	“Absolve differences between people and governments”

The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total disengagement/humanitarian engagement codes. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the humanitarian engagement responses
M indicates male; *F* indicates female

Alternatively, the number of responses coded for the *absence of agency* and *humanization* was proportionately higher among respondents who had served in the military than those that had no military experience.

Group differences were also found between respondents who had a relative in the military and those who did not. Proportionately more respondents who did not have a relative serving in the military than those who did mentioned *practical strategies* for achieving peace and *destructive human nature* as a reason why peace is unachievable.

Lastly, proportionally more respondents who had participated in a protest mentioned *social equity*. Similarly, a significantly greater proportion of respondents who had participated in a protest gave responses coded for one or more of the

humanitarian engagement presence categories, compared to respondents who had not. Alternatively, proportionally more respondents who had not participated in a protest provided responses that were coded for an *absence of agency*, compared to those who had. Table 40.3 presents these statistical results.

Coding System II: Focus on Achievability and Prerequisites for Peace

The second portion of the coding scheme was developed using a grounded theory approach. This approach develops categories by grouping the data into themes rather than using a preestablished theoretical model to organize responses

Table 40.3 Responses to agency, disengagement, and engagement: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values from the East Asian sample

Categories	Group 1 (%) ^a		χ^2
	Male	Female	
<i>Humanitarian engagement</i>			
Assumption of responsibility	23.1	10.7	6.41**
	Military	Nonmilitary	
<i>Agency</i>			
Presence of agency	59.3	83.9	14.62***
Absence of agency	35.2	15.5	9.9**
<i>Humanitarian engagement presence</i>			
Assumption of responsibility	59.3	80.5	9.99**
Practical strategies	1.9	10.3	3.89 ^b
Ineffectiveness of negative relations	5.6	15.5	3.58 ^b
Humanization	11.1	3.4	4.85 ^b
	Relative military	No relative military	
<i>Disengagement</i>			
Destructive human nature	5.9	14.6	4.56*
<i>Humanitarian engagement</i>			
Assumption of responsibility			
Practical strategies	5.0	12.5	3.85*
	Protest	No protest	
<i>Agency</i>			
Absence of agency	10.0	23.9	4.53*
<i>Humanitarian engagement presence</i>			
Humanization	86.0	71.8	4.14*
Social equity	22.0	8.6	6.64**

If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference. "Presence" indicates that the participant provided a response that was coded for that category and/or one of its subcategories

* $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$

^aNumbers in the columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^bExact sig (2-sided)

(Glaser, 1992; Strauss, 1987). From this analysis, two predominant themes emerged: a focus on the achievability of peace and prerequisites for achieving peace.

The first part of the coding system, *focus on achievability*, was divided into four categories: (a) *achievable*, (b) *indeterminate achievability*, (c) *ideal*, and (d) *unachievable*. The *achievable* category contained all responses that indicated a belief in peace as a possibility. The *indeterminate achievability* category encompassed responses that referenced peace from a historical perspective or in connection with past events. To capture responses that expressed

hope regarding the achievability of peace, a third category, *ideal*, was created. Lastly, the *unachievable* category was comprised of responses that expressed a belief that peace is not possible.

Subcategories were created to capture the nuances in the diverse responses within the *achievable* and *unachievable* subcategories. *Work in progress*, a subcategory within *achievable*, was applied to responses that described the achievability of peace as a lengthy and effortful process. Some responses indicated that peace was achievable but provided a reason as to why it was difficult to achieve. Such responses were given the code

difficult, the subcategory of *work in progress*. Lastly, if responses specifically indicated that peace was unachievable and a rationale for this belief was provided, the code *identifying reasons*, the subcategory of *unachievable*, was applied.

The second part of the coding system, *prerequisites for peace*, contained responses that specified actions or steps to achieving peace. This category was divided into four categories: (a) *philosophical principles*, (b) *prosocial action*, (c) *constructive government/political action*, and (d) *antisocial action*. The *philosophical principles* category contained statements referring to moral or ethical philosophies as a pathway for achieving peace. This category was further divided into five specific philosophical principles: (a) *positive interpersonal values* referring to global principles such as love, trust, or mutual respect; (b) *understanding/acceptance* (a subcategory of *positive interpersonal values*, e.g., tolerance), (c) *inner peace*, (d) *religion/spirituality*, and (e) *equality*, particularly focusing on social equality.

Similarly, the category *prosocial action* was further divided into themes that exemplify behaviors that are intended to help humanity, such as (a) *pragmatic solutions*, (b) *elimination of global obstacles* (a subcategory of *pragmatic solutions*), (c) *interaction*, including communication and cooperation, (d) *elimination of negative interactions* (a subcategory of *interaction*), (e) *unification* (i.e., bringing people together), (f) *social justice*, (g) *human rights* (subcategory of *social justice*), (h) *economic fairness* (subcategory of *social justice*), and (i) *elimination of social injustice* (subcategory of *social justice*).

Constructive government/political action was divided into several subcategories meant to capture governmental changes that would bring about world peace, including (a) *diplomacy*, (b) *global political change*, (c) *equality among nations* (subcategory of *global political change*), and (d) the *elimination of negative political motivations*.

Lastly, the category *antisocial actions* included responses that emphasized actions that are harmful to some but are believed to ultimately result in peace. The subcategories include (a) *force/control*, including military or government actions;

(b) *population adjustment*, referring to a subset of the general population as needing to be changed or removed; and (c) *violent elimination*, a subcategory of *population adjustment* that suggested a violent method of removing a portion of the population.

Focus on Achievability

Responses that referenced the *achievability of peace* accounted for 38% of all responses. Of all achievability responses, 14% stated that peace was *explicitly achievable* and 13% stated that achieving peace was not certain but that peace was the *ideal* state for humanity. A 32-year-old Chinese man exemplified the belief in the explicit achievability of peace by simply stating, “Peace can be achieved.” When compared to a response written by a 47-year-old Japanese man who stated that peace is a “faraway dream, but should be” the distinction between the *explicitly achievable* and the *ideal* categories becomes more evident.

Alternatively, 13% of all achievability responses referred to achieving peace as a *difficult* task. As one 25-year-old Japanese woman stated, “I want it [peace] to happen, but I think it will be very difficult.” Conversely, 38% of achievability responses *identified reasons* to explain why peace was unachievable. For instance, a 34 year-old South Korean man wrote that peace is “impossible because of people’s greed.” This response is illustrative of the category *identifying reasons* because the respondent identifies that peace is not possible and provides his rationale for why it cannot be achieved.

Prerequisites for Peace

As stated, the second part of this coding system, *prerequisites for peace*, was divided into four categories: (a) *philosophical principles*; (b) *prosocial*; (c) *governmental*; and (d) *antisocial action*. The first category, *philosophical principles*, contained responses that refer to moral or ethical principles as a pathway for achieving

peace. The *philosophical principles* category comprised 17% of all responses. Responses that highlighted *positive interpersonal values* accounted for 29% of all *philosophical* responses. One 38-year-old Japanese woman exemplified the notion of *positive interpersonal values* by writing that the best way to achieve peace is “to be able to think of others as if they are ourselves.” Similarly, 39% of the *philosophical principles* responses referred to the importance of *understanding and acceptance* in the development of peace. A 29-year-old South Korean woman provides an example of this subcategory, stating “I think that it [peace] would be possible if we understand each other.” This response emphasized the importance of understanding and suggested that increasing our tolerance toward each other would facilitate world peace. The last theme that emerged in the *philosophical* categories pertained to the role of *religion and spirituality* in developing peace, which accounted for 18% of the *philosophical* responses. A representative statement in this theme was provided by a 68-year-old Japanese man, who wrote that the best way to achieve peace is through “a belief in God that encompasses all religions.”

The second category of prerequisites for achieving peace is *prosocial action*. *Prosocial* responses comprised 26% of all responses. Responses coded as *pragmatic solutions* comprised 12% of the *prosocial* responses. These responses were characterized by their references to practical steps that could be taken to achieve peace. One example of *pragmatic solutions* was given by a 19-year-old Chinese woman, who suggested that the best way to achieve peace is to “educate people.”

Similarly, responses that referred to communication and cooperation were classified under *interaction*. These responses comprised 25% of the *prosocial* responses. A 22-year-old South Korean man wrote that the best way to achieve peace is “through mutual conversation.” A distinction should be made regarding responses that advocated for *prosocial communication* and those that advocated the *elimination of negative interactions*. Specifically, responses that high-

lighted the importance of reconciliation and the elimination of hatred and violence were coded as promoting the *elimination of negative interactions*. A 42-year-old Japanese man stated that the peace could be achieved “through a relative reduction in conflict worldwide.” These responses comprised 33% of the *prosocial* responses.

Lastly, *unification* encompassed responses that referenced bringing people together. These responses comprised 12% of the *prosocial* responses. A 20-year-old Chinese woman highlighted the theme of unification when she suggested “absolving differences between people and government” as the best way to achieve peace.

The third category in prerequisites for peace is *constructive government/political action*, which contains three subcategories focusing on responses that suggest methodologies to utilize political or governmental agencies in the development of peace. The three themes that emerged most commonly were (a) *diplomacy*, (b) *global and political change*, and (c) the *elimination of negative motivations*. *Diplomacy* accounted for 26% of the governmental responses. These responses were characterized by references to diplomatic relations as a pathway for achieving peace. A particularly poignant response was given by a 19-year-old Chinese woman, who wrote that the “best way to achieve world peace is to have groups solve problems diplomatically instead of warfare.”

Global and political change captured responses that highlighted the benefits of global government action in an attempt to create world peace, which comprised 37% of the governmental responses. For example, a 20-year-old South Korean woman wrote that peace could only be achieved when we “stop interfering with other countries’ affairs and start concentrating on our own.” This statement reflects the notion of *global/political change* because it identifies a strategy that is currently utilized (interfering with other countries’ affairs), and it is suggested by the respondent that it should be changed (concentrate on our own).

Table 40.4 Percentages and examples of focus on achievability and prerequisites for peace themes and subcategories most frequently identified from the East Asian sample

Category	Percent	Country	Age	Gender	Response
<i>Focus on achievability</i>	38				
Explicitly achievable	5(14)	China	19	F	“Anything is possible”
Work in progress					
Difficult	5(13)	Japan	45	M	“A stable world of peace is difficult to achieve”
Ideal	5(13)	China	18	F	“This is wishful thinking”
Unachievable					
Identifying reasons	15(38)	Japan	20	F	“As long as different ethnicities exist, conflict will exist as well”
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>					
Philosophical principles	17				
Positive interpersonal values	5(8)29	Korea	24	M	“All individuals have positive mind”
Understanding and acceptance	7(11)39	Japan	68	M	“All acknowledge values, and tolerate what others believe in”
Religion/spirituality	3(5)18	China	19	F	“Peace will not be achieved until the second coming of Christ”
Prosocial actions	26				
Pragmatic solutions	6(11)12	Korea	28	M	“Reducing the population of the world, expanding life-expectancy, development of quicker ways of communication and movement”
Interaction	6(11)25	Japan	32	F	“By creating harmony with people around us and starting from such small efforts, the circle of harmony can grow larger”
Elimination of negative interactions	9(15)33	China	20	F	“Stop fighting”
Unification	3(5)12	China	21	M	“Consolidation of the nations in the world”
Constructive government/political action	12				
Diplomacy	3(5)26	Japan	19	F	“Strengthen the authority of the UN and make each country promise not to engage in invasion or war”
Global/political change	4(7)37	Korea	33	F	“On condition that each country follows the international rules well”
Elimination of negative motivations	2(4)18	Korea	42	M	“Get rid of capitalist exploitation”
Antisocial action	0				
Population adjustment	2(3)50	China	32	M	“Have someone commit genocide or abolish religion”

Major categories are in bold italics and major subcategories are bold. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total prerequisites for peace codes. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the major category (i.e. achievability or prerequisite) and the bold percent value represents the percentage of responses within the major subcategory (i.e. philosophical, prosocial, or governmental) *M* indicates male; *F* indicates female

Lastly, *elimination of negative motivations* accounted for 18% of the government/political action responses. This category applied to responses that advocated for the need to remove negative human characteristics as a motivating force of leaders in order for peace to be achieved. For example, a 49-year-old South Korean woman wrote that the best way to achieve peace is to “rid powerful nations of greed.”

The final category in prerequisites for peace is *antisocial action*. Overall, this category did not significantly represent responses coded for the prerequisites categories. Within this category, however, *population adjustment* was identified in 50% of responses. One such response, provided by a 19-year-old Chinese woman, stated, “If everyone died on earth, then world peace can happen.” This response suggests that peace is attainable but only through harmful actions. Additional examples of responses coded for the achievability and prerequisites for peace categories are listed in Table 40.4.

Demographic Differences in Achievability

Chi-square analyses were run for the achievability of peace and prerequisites for peace categories in the same way as for the agency, humanitarian engagement, and disengagement categories.

Although no statistically significant gender differences were found for the achievability categories, group differences were found based on individuals’ military service status. A significantly higher proportion of respondents in the military than nonmilitary respondents gave responses coded for one or more of the *focus on achievability* categories. Alternatively, a significantly higher proportion of civilians than veterans referenced historical events in regards to the achievability of peace (*indeterminate achievability*).

Similarly, proportionally more participants who did not have relatives serving in the military gave responses coded for one or more of the *focus on achievability* categories, as well as peace as *ideal*, compared to participants who had a relative serving in the military. Lastly, proportionally

more participants who had not participated in protests *identified reasons* as to why peace could not be achieved in their statements as compared to participants who had.

Demographic Differences in Prerequisites for Peace

The chi-square analyses revealed that proportionally more women than men gave responses coded for general *prerequisites for peace*. As a logical extension of this finding, proportionally more women than men gave responses coded for (a) *constructive government or political action*, (b) *global political change*, (c) *population adjustment*, and (d) one or more of the *antisocial actions* categories.

Group differences were also found between participants with military experience and those without it. Proportionally more participants who did not serve in the military gave responses coded for one or more of the *prerequisites for peace presence* categories, compared to those who had. On the other hand, compared to participants without military experience, proportionally more participants who served in the military mentioned *global and political change* and *equality among nations* than responses provided by participants who did not serve in the military.

Furthermore, proportionally more respondents with relatives in the military identified *global and political change*, *equality among nations*, and *constructive government and political action* as pathways for achieving peace, compared to respondents without a relative in the military. In line with these results, proportionally more participants with no relatives in the military mentioned being *uncertain of ways* to achieve peace, compared with participants who did have a relative in the military.

Lastly, proportionally more respondents who had participated in protests identified *inner peace*, *social justice*, and *economic fairness*, as pathways through which peace could be achieved, compared to participants who had not participated in protests. Table 40.5 presents these statistical results.

Table 40.5 Responses to achievability and prerequisites for peace: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square values from the East Asian sample

Categories	Group 1 (%) ^a		χ^2
	Male	Female	
<i>Prerequisites for Peace</i>			
	0.8	5.4	4.51 ^{*b}
Constructive Government/political action	0.8	5.4	4.51 ^{*b}
Global/political change	5.4	13.4	4.67 [*]
Antisocial action presence	3.8	10.7	4.35 [*]
Population adjustment	1.5	7.1	4.78 ^{*b}
	Military	Nonmilitary	
<i>Focus on achievability</i>			
Indeterminate achievability	3.7	16.7	5.89 [*]
Explicitly achievable	25.9	10.9	7.50 ^{**}
<i>Prerequisites for peace presence</i>			
	63.0	85.1	12.49 ^{***}
Constructive government/political change			
Global/political change	18.5	5.7	8.4 ^{**b}
Equality among nations	7.4	1.7	4.47 ^b
	Relative military	No relative military	
<i>Focus on achievability presence</i>			
	58.8	71.9	3.96 [*]
Ideal	5.0	21.9	13.7 ^{***}
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>			
Constructive government/political action	30.3	17.7	4.5 [*]
Global/political change	13.4	2.1	8.94 [*]
Equality among nations	5.9	0.0	5.84 ^{**}
Uncertain of ways	0.8	11.5	11.37 ^{**}
	Protest	No protest	
<i>Focus on achievability</i>			
Unachievable			
Identifying reasons	12.0	28.2	5.46 [*]
<i>Prerequisites for peace</i>			
Philosophical principles			
Inner peace	0.6	0.0	9.92 ^{**b}
Prosocial actions			
Social justice	6.0	0.6	6.03 ^{*b}
Economic fairness	10.0	2.5	5.38 ^{*b}

If there is a blank row, there were no significant differences at that level; however, we listed the major category because one of the subcategories had a significant group difference. “Presence” indicates that the participant provided a response that was coded for that category and/or one of its subcategories

^{*} $p \leq 0.05$; ^{**} $p \leq 0.01$; ^{***} $p \leq 0.001$

^aNumbers in the columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified categories

^bExact sig (2-sided)

Discussion

When the survey responses were analyzed with a deductive approach by applying Bandura’s (1999) moral engagement/disengagement theory, the majority of responses indicated a belief that peace

is achievable, as well as various suggestions of actions to be taken to realize world peace. About one-fifth of the responses included a disbelief in the achievability of world peace or refrained from suggesting specific actions for making world peace. These passive attitudes were more preva-

lent among people who had served in the military or those who never participated in an antiwar or pro-peace protest.

When the survey responses were examined in terms of humanitarian engagement or disengagement, a quarter of the responses indicated disengagement. East Asians tended to blame ideological differences such as religion or intergroup conflict such as racism as the reasons why world peace would not be achievable. They also mentioned negative human characteristics such as greed as a reason for difficulty in achieving peace. These pessimistic views were more prevalent among East Asians who did not have any relatives serving in the military. The majority of survey responses, however, were more optimistic about achieving world peace. East Asians most frequently suggested that love, tolerance, and understanding for others would promote peace. This type of suggestion was especially frequent among people who have served in the military. Participants also frequently recognized governments' involvement such as diplomatic negotiations as an important factor in achieving peace. Moreover, they were willing to assume responsibility of citizens to realize peace, such as spreading peace education and developing nonconfrontational skills. They also often suggested the importance of eliminating violence and hatred, promoting social and economic equality, and resolving past social injustice to achieve peace. These suggestions of engagement in humanitarian conduct were particularly prevalent among East Asians who had never served in the military or who had participated in an antiwar or pro-peace protest.

When the survey responses were examined by an inductive approach using a grounded theory (Glaser, 1992; Strauss, 1987), several important themes emerged as steps toward achieving peace. The most prevalent recommendations pertained to prosocial actions. For instance, East Asians suggested that eliminating negative international relations and emotions such as hatred and promoting positive international interactions through cultural exchange and cooperation as essential steps for peace-building. They also frequently mentioned pragmatic solutions such as ending poverty, pre-

venting hunger, and making education available to those who are underprivileged. This tendency of recommending prosocial actions as a way to achieve peace was especially frequent among people who had participated in protest against war. East Asians also often mentioned moral principles, such as recognizing differences and having tolerance to accept such differences, as well as having respect, compassion, and trust, as the best way to achieve world peace. This tendency was particularly prevalent among people who had served in the military or those who had relatives in the military. Another prominent theme in the responses was governmental actions as a prerequisite to achieve peace. Many East Asians appeared to believe that governments' active engagement in diplomatic dialogues is an important way to realize world peace. This tendency was stronger among women than men, among those who had served in the military than those who never had military experience, and among those who had relatives in the military than those who did not.

Examining these beliefs and recommendations East Asian presented, it is interesting to note that there is one stark difference from the arguments made by scholars reviewed earlier. While many scholars argue for the involvement of the USA as critical in building peace in East Asia, East Asians did not specifically refer to the US's role. Scholars believe the USA will be important in peace-building efforts due to the political and diplomatic ties the nation has with East Asia countries. Perhaps, East Asian citizens may not feel the need for the USA or any individual country to be involved in peace-building other than the United Nations.

Otherwise, the East Asian responses parallel what scholars have observed and argued for building peace in East Asia. East Asians have recognized that government needs to play an active role promoting diplomatic dialogues for achieving peace, just as scholars have argued (e.g., Bleiker, 2002; Drifte, 2009; Hoshiyama, 2008; Hundt & Bleiker, 2007; Lijun, 2002; Rozman, 2002; Sigal, 2008). Furthermore, East Asians have also recommended promoting international cooperation and cultural exchanges for building peace, as many scholars have suggested

(e.g., Cui, 2011; Kahler & Kastner, 2006; Rozman, 2002). Rozman (2002) and Cui (2011) have particularly emphasized the critical importance of promoting positive exchanges among citizens through tourism and business collaborations. Such civil exchanges should be greatly conducive to reducing hatred and anger about past conflict and victimization and to building mutual understanding, respect, and trust, which the East Asians in our sample have suggested as important prerequisites to world peace. They also recognized the significance of developing tolerance to accept differences in political and historical views, which corresponds with scholars' (Hoshiyama, 2008; Kelman, 2008) argument that each nation should be allowed to have different perspective on historical representations while recognizing the other's view.

An important question that emerges is how East Asian nations and citizens can actually implement these recommendations and steps to achieve world peace. Some of the prerequisites for world peace that East Asians suggested, such as increasing social equality, ending poverty, preventing hunger, and making general education accessible to everyone, may require macro-level governmental involvement, policy-making and policy change, and diplomatic negotiations for promoting economic cooperation, increasing financial aid, and establishing democracy. On the other hand, spreading peace education and developing nonconfrontational skills that East Asians suggested may be carried out more easily by citizens at the micro-level as part of the grassroots peace-building efforts. The effectiveness of holding a democratic deliberative forum in enhancing mutual trust and understanding among Tibetans and ethnic Chinese people was addressed by He (2010). The importance of providing peace education and developing conflict resolution skills is signified by the speculation that Deng and Shih (2009) have made about helpless feelings that Taiwanese adolescents showed toward peace-building. Also, the indifference that the young Japanese generation showed regarding Japan's past aggression in Asia (Atsumi & Suwa, 2009) points to the significance of disseminating peace education. After all, without learning and under-

standing the historical truth about Japan's past, Japan and its citizens can never truly achieve reconciliation and peace with other Asian nations and their peoples.

As part of peace education, especially to develop skills for reconciliation, learning intergroup processes and related issues seems critically important. Gaertner and Dovidio (2011) insightfully argue that merely reducing prejudice against out-groups is neither sufficient nor effective. Although there is much antipathy toward one another among East Asian nations because of past wars, invasions, and conflicts, many people would avoid being explicitly prejudiced to the other citizens face-to-face. People desire to believe that they are non-prejudiced to their out-group members. They would avoid engaging in overt discriminatory behavior because such discrimination would violate their egalitarian values. However, Gaertner and Dovidio argue that without being prejudiced, discrimination can still take place by favoring one's in-group members more than out-group members. Thus, according to them, rather than prejudice reduction, cultivating positive attitudes and promoting interest in out-groups would be more fruitful. These researchers propose a strategy of recategorization in which the concept of one's in-group and group membership is changed to be more extensive by forming common in-group identity that includes out-group members (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005). For example, rather than considering oneself as a Chinese or Korean, one can reidentify herself into a more inclusive group such as the East Asian region and identify as an East Asian. Once the perception of group category is expanded and includes out-group members, previous positive attitudes and favoritism toward in-group members will also be extended to the former out-group members (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2011), which should lead to more peaceful relationships. Theoretically, by expanding this common in-group identity from one nation to one region, then to one continent, and eventually to the entire world, people could eventually form one identity as "humans" or "Earthians." People could live in a globally harmonious, interdependent society, where peace is a norm.

Lindner (2009) argues that “global interdependence” through a creation of “a new culture of global cooperation” (p. 292) is the only way to achieve world peace. Through “global interdependence,” she emphasizes unity of human societies and cooperation among different peoples. However, such unity does not sacrifice cultural diversity. On the contrary, Lindner insists that cultural diversity is as critical as biodiversity for humankind’s survival. However, she cautions not to let cultural identification, which tends to create intergroup biases, undermine unity. The idea she puts forward is unity in diversity. She suggests that the new culture of global interdependence is cultivated by first closely examining all human cultures and gathering unifying elements such as cultural worldviews, practices, and social-psychological skills, and then by using these unifying elements to change the world and the human psyche. Lindner’s suggestion may also be very helpful to form a common in-group identity that Gaertner and Dovidio (2005, 2011) propose.

As more cultural and civil exchanges take place through collaboration and cooperation among nations and people, the opportunity for citizens to learn and experience cultural diversity physically and psychologically in positive, peaceful context increases. Through such grassroots cultural learning, we hope that more inclusive common in-group identity will be developed and the unity in diversity strategy will be truly implemented to realize world peace. We hope to remain optimistic about humanity’s capacity to pursue moral principles and our continuing endeavor for building sustainable world peace.

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Abram Trosky and Tristyn Campbell

“Peace’ serves as a means of obtaining verbal consensus,” writes pioneering peace researcher Johan Galtung, but “[f]ew words are so often used and abused” (1969, p. 167). In peace and conflict studies, in political theory, and in political practice, language matters—it is the tongs by which we handle swords and plowshares. As another proverb states, tongs are made by tongs; peace studies employ language and concepts from international relations, sometimes to examine laypersons’ opinions on these matters.

Discourse on international relations is pervaded by the language and concepts of foreign policy realism, which asserts that nations are motivated by material, economic, and geopolitical factors and deviate from these criteria at their own peril. Peace is thought to come through strength, by preparing for war. This orientation is usually contrasted with the liberal paradigm, with its emphasis on international cooperation and the authority of transnational institutions in achieving peace. However, neoliberal fidelity to the sovereignty of markets belies a competitive and unequal worldview akin to realism, descriptively

and prescriptively. Therefore, judgments and judgments of judgments in international relations often proceed from this basic frame of reference (Lakoff, 2002).

Lying between these two traditional poles of international relations analysis are constructivist theories, which are characterized by attending to the ways in which collective perceptions and misperceptions of war, peace, and the nation state are self-fulfilling, determining the possibilities and constraints of international cooperation and competition. Despite constructivism’s seeming neutrality, it too is implicitly normative insofar as it claims to best describe the actual practice of international politics. However, neither realism’s hawk-like focus on the principle of national interest, liberalism’s “softer” use of shared values to serve that interest, nor constructivism’s detached awareness of the mutability of those values takes adequate account of that oldest and most venerable “foreign policy” orientation, cosmopolitanism. Its foundational insight, evident in the name, is that the world’s order rests not on self or national interest but on other interest—recognition of the universal, egalitarian values informing the modern human rights regime (Appiah & Gates, 2006).

The marginalization of cosmopolitan voices in contemporary international relations gives impetus to critical peace education, revisionist histories, and other decentralizing approaches to international relations that restore the ability of individuals to recognize their interdependence, by either reconceiving the role and rights of

A. Trosky (✉)
Department of Political Science, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA
e-mail: atrosky@bu.edu

T. Campbell
Psychology Department, Boston University, Boston,
MA, USA
e-mail: ttcams@gmail.com

nation states or being empowered to act independently of them (Habermas, 2001; Tarrow, 2005). However, critical approaches are not univocal; they differ on crucial, long-standing issues in the morality of violence, the use of force in achieving peace, and their status in international law.

Lay opinion on international ethics is often lost amid the theorizing of these various paradigms' partisans and critics. We suggest that in a democratic age, perhaps global public opinion, rather than the post facto and abstract "judgment of history," could rightly be regarded as normative. Research that accurately represents existing views on peace and its achievability is needed before determining the weight public opinion ought to have in policy formation. Generating and analyzing data that enable meaningful worldwide comparisons is a crucial but neglected first step in facilitating dialogue among the various schools and their discontents. It is to this end, both self-reflective and holistic, that this chapter and text address themselves. We first summarize the state of scholarly debate on key topics in the contemporary study of aggression, conflict, and peace.

The Two Consensuses

Beginning with the construct of peace, we return to Galtung, whose chief contribution to peace studies was to challenge commonsense assumptions about peace and violence—namely, that "peace" refers simply to the absence of war or direct violence. His revolutionary notion of positive peace—which describes the absence of structural forms of violence, inequality, and social injustice—is now widely accepted (Zinn, 1990; Farmer, 2003). With this new consensus, however, comes the need for further clarification. Proponents of positive peace see the chronic lack of resources and respect in certain populations as driving civil and international conflicts and, in turn, exacerbating these inequalities (World Health Organization, 2004). Such deprivations are also thought to provide fertile ground for radicalization and recruitment, as heads of state frequently assert when discussing the dangers of underdevelopment and the imperative of

growth. From this perspective, group violence is akin to a public health problem; with greater distributive justice, poverty reduction, and good governance (Gerring & Thacker, 2008), achieving both varieties of peace is only a matter of time (Fukuyama, 2006).

There are several complications with this "teleological" account of peace as the eradication of direct and structural violence. The first regards persistence of historical memory regarding the actors most responsible for creating and/or sustaining conditions of dependency, which invite the collapses that require intervention. Former imperial and colonial powers rarely acknowledge their role in inaugurating legacies of injustice and inequality or take responsibility for laying the cartographical fault lines of many contemporary conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, and Central and South Asia (Huntington, 1998). Blanket apologies for sins long past are seen as a poor trade of domestic political capital among an electorate that does not see themselves as connected to this narrative. However, there is a rich and growing literature in restorative/reparative justice highlighting the centrality of this admission in reconciliation as more than symbolically important (Griswold, 2007). Technocratic approaches to violence prevention that cite contemporary factors such as demographics, mismanagement, and/or resource insecurity as the salient triggers of violence can appear callous to the victims of the historic structural violence, resource expropriation, human commodification, and conquest that fed the development of the Global North.

The anarchic conditions resulting from state failure can represent a genuinely urgent scenario. Increasingly, however, foreign incursions into "lawless" areas are undertaken not to defend the host population but because they act as safe havens for terror operations—a "preventative" measure stemming from a climate of national insecurity (Malley-Morrison, Corgan, & Castanheira, 2007), which is itself of questionable legality. Protracted interventions aimed at stabilizing whole regions have proven inadequate to that end, in some cases increasing threat

levels by the occupying government's own estimates (Mazzetti, 2006). As the burgeoning theory of *jus post bellum* recognizes, only in extreme cases of failure, as in the post-genocidal regimes in Japan and Germany, is "nation-building" justified (Orend, 2006a, b, 2007).

State failure and terrorism often go together, as illustrated in the cases of Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen, but terror planners and participants consistently cite foreign occupations abroad, rather than poverty or poor governance at home, as their primary grievance (Abadie, 2004). Additionally, the majority of these individuals are relatively affluent and well educated (Benmelech & Berrebi, 2007), coordinating and executing terrorist acts to protest the oppression of dispossessed others. As deplorable as their tactics are, these ideologues bring attention to deficits in respect of human rights. The group right of recognition is the prerequisite to negotiation, which the designation "terrorist" has often impeded. Moralistic, rationalistic, and scientific biases can blind statespersons, peace and conflict researchers, and well-intentioned aid workers alike to this psychological need, especially prominent in so-called shame and honor cultures (Fukuyama, 2006; Gibson, 2011; Malley-Morrison & Trosky, 2011).

The obverse of the peace consensus that Galtung identifies is a long-standing agreement regarding the irrationality of war. The fact that war obstructs economic cosmopolitanism and free trade inspires the liberal creed that the spread of republican institutions expressing that consensus would bring "perpetual peace" (Kant, 1983 [1795]). However, the relative militancy of liberal nations has revealed flaws in "democratic peace theory" that seem to lend credence to Galtung's claim of abuse: peace-loving democracies fight with each other less frequently but are the most likely regime type to initiate international conflict against those they perceive as illiberal (Doyle, 2011 [1986]).

Even where a just cause exists, it is difficult to name one of these hundreds of invasions and interventions that was both initiated and executed justly. Both covert efforts at regime change and

overt actions paying insufficient attention to the prevention of civilian casualties have fanned embers of resentment that continue to result in "blowback" against Western interlopers, well intentioned or ill (Johnson, 2004; Kinzer, 2006). The end of the Cold War saw the emergence of a world system in which more than three-fourths of the world's nations espouse some form of democracy, but as with the recent revolutions in Arab states, some of these democratic transformations might have come in spite, rather than because, of Western influence.

Regardless of origin, civil and international conflicts, from the world's newest democracy in South Sudan to its oldest in Greece, can represent either obstacles to peace or its slow realization. The difference seems to turn on the lawfulness of tactics, but in both the domestic and international context, the force of law can be co-opted to serve the side of an oppressive, unjust peace. The persistence of injustice and growing inequalities in the age of democracy has been attributed to the tenacity of government, military, and corporate elites who profit from war and the distraction and disempowerment of the populace, whether through mass media and consumer capitalism or simply the daily challenge of securing subsistence.

The Role of Social Psychological Peace Research

Since its inception, social psychology has addressed how those who benefit from existing political and economic regimes perpetuate institutions with a fundamentally competitive worldview that socialize individuals into cultures of violence, convincing them to act against their self-interest (Lakoff, 2002; Frank, 2005, 2012). Such analyses are crucial to diagnosing pathological elements in democratic functioning, but like the major foreign policy orientations discussed at the outset, top-down/structural accounts of opinion formation militate against the sorts of self-efficacy beliefs, collective confidence, and trust-building needed to reinvigorate democratic systems from the bottom up. The original pur-

pose of political liberalism, by contrast, was to “liberate” citizens from patronage, prejudice, and the weight of tradition, providing a window for progressive social change from the inside out. Reclaiming rights discourse from the relativistic tendencies of social science and constructivist camps is a fitting first step in this process (Malley-Morrison & Trosky, 2011).

Debate lingers over whether political liberalization leading to positive peace should be fostered by intervention from citizens of nations further along in that process or must grow organically in developing and underdeveloped populations, despite their suffering violence at the hands of entrenched interests resistant to that change (Mill, 1987 [1859]; Moyo, 2009). Corrupt governments’ co-option of aid, dereliction of protective duties, or more aggressive encroachment on their and other citizens’ human rights returns us to the question behind the original peace consensus: Is the use of military force ever justified to help replace the negative peace of dictatorship with the possibility of positive peace?

The relative ease with which powerful nations risk the horrors of war when it suits narrowly defined national interests, and the willingness of the same nations to avert their eyes from genuine atrocity when it does not, seems to confirm the realist suspicion that nation states are less prone to fight for the possibility of peace than to ensure their own place in the international system (Waltz, 1979). The historical record of great power jockeying is punctuated by rhetorical abuses of moral principle, just war rationales, and the idea of national security (Burke, 2005; Fiala, 2008; Malley-Morrison et al., 2007), which have in the last decades stoked fears of a new “human rights imperialism” (Kinzer, 2010). Presuming that any state-sanctioned use of force is a fig leaf for national aggrandizement, many activists on the political left and scholars in peace and conflict studies judge noninterventionism and nonviolence to be the surest path to peace (e.g., McAlister, 2001; Cohrs & Moschner, 2002; Cohrs, 2003; Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005; McAlister, Bandura, & Owen, 2006).

An alternative approach suggested by the “linguistic turn” in social psychological peace

research (SPPR) “might be to suspend – even if only momentarily – our inclination to come up with definitions, and to explore how people define ‘peace’ themselves [and] take seriously the arguments . . . that discourse is fundamentally action-oriented. That is, people perform social actions through discourse” (Gibson, 2011, p. 244). Rather than assuming peoples’ heartfelt responses expressing desire to help the afflicted will inevitably be manipulated by statespersons, our SPPR approach remains agnostic about end use and evaluates such speech acts as demonstrative of solidarity. This includes affirmations of the fledgling Responsibility to Protect doctrine (United Nations General Assembly, 2005), which reflects the principle from common morality that those who can help should (Orend, 2006a; Appiah & Gates, 2006).

From this perspective, affirming the possibility of peace may be less a statement on the objective likelihood of eradicating war or violence (as per realism) than an individual’s expression of her commitment to the ideals of building positive peace. Contradicting neoliberal conceits regarding the immanence of the end of history, the endlessness of peacebuilding is not the occasion for pessimism; it is, rather, an affirmation of freedom (Fukuyama, 2006). This “zetetic” or “Pyrrhonic” philosophy of hopeful skepticism opens the analytic space that had been closed by more scientific social psychological approaches. Under such practical pacifism (Fiala, 2004), individuals can be extremely reluctant to consent to war, yet unwilling to relinquish the collective use of force as means to reach a world in which coercive action becomes less necessary and positive peace becomes the norm. With its commitment to open-minded, informed, case-by-case inquiry in the casuistic spirit of the just war theory, prudential peace seeking is less prone to the criticisms and contradictions of the “textbook” foreign policy orientations.

The paradoxical relationship of positive to negative peace captures the ideal relationship of theory to practice: for humans, believing in a thing has proven to be an important ingredient in its realization. Cognitive psychologist Albert Bandura corroborated this insight of “folk” psychology in

his influential principles of self-efficacy and collective efficacy (Bandura, 1977, 1994a,b, 2000a). These efficacy principles describe the cognitive effects of beliefs on personal affect and outcomes and are central not only to the concept of individual agency (Bandura, 1982, 1992, 2000b) but to the political prospects of groups as well (Bandura, 1994c, 1995, 1998). According to Bandura, “[i]n social cognitive theory, people are neither driven by inner forces nor automatically shaped and controlled by the environment [...] they function as contributors to their own motivation, behavior, and development within a network of reciprocally interacting influences.”

One stable, internal cause that can obstruct personal agency is the perceived biological basis of human aggression. The signatories of the Seville Statement on Violence (1986) concluded that there was no scientific basis for this belief, writing, “Just as ‘wars begin in the minds of men’, peace also begins in our minds. The same species who [sic] invented war is capable of inventing peace. The responsibility lies with each of us” (UNESCO, 1986). Subsequent research by the former head of the World Health Organization’s Centre for Violence Prevention, neuropsychologist Victor Nell, among others, has found evidence of a propensity toward violence in primates’ evolutionary psychology (Nell, 2006). Though Bandura disagrees with this etiology of human cruelty, both offer hope that these features of human behavior can be mitigated by control of environmental (read cultural and political) stimuli.

By postulating human freedom from (internal) biological and (external) cultural determinisms, sociocognitive theory helps dismantle the most commonly invoked barriers to achieving peace: humans’ “natural” aggressiveness and/or acquisitiveness, societal conformity, and political oppression (Ozer & Bandura, 1990; Bandura, 1992, 1997). As with the humane standards constituting moral engagement, agency is not a “given” and must be “activated” through efficacy beliefs (Bandura, 1988). Stated conversely, individuals’ and groups’ potential to exercise agency toward the goal of achieving peace can be diminished through cynical beliefs regarding leaders,

fellow citizens, foreigners, and/or themselves, as well as through general moral skepticism. The failure of individuals and groups to believe in their (eventual) liberation from factors limiting their development can be as much of an obstacle as the factors themselves.

Existing applications of sociocognitive theory to the study of peace, aggression, and conflict do not marry its two major parts: moral dis/engagement and self and collective efficacy. Our frameworks use both agency/efficacy and moral engagement/disengagement principles to code qualitative statements concerning peace and its achievability. The second system gauging beliefs about achievability and opinions on the prerequisites for achieving peace balances efficacy beliefs in the political and psychological realms against the commonly acknowledged barriers presented by economic, national, and religious institutions.

Methods

The previous eight chapters in this section have analyzed the responses of participants from Western Europe, the UK/Anglo region (the United Kingdom and its former Anglophone colonies excluding India), Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, the Middle East and Gulf States, Africa, Latin America, South and Southeast Asia, and East Asia to questions concerning world peace. This chapter considers the voices of participants from these eight regions regarding the achievability of world peace, as well as the best way to achieve it.

As explained in earlier chapters, responses to the two world peace items from the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, & You, 2006) were coded using a moral disengagement/engagement coding manual developed by members of the Group on International Perspectives of Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP). The manual was researcher-developed using a deductive qualitative analysis approach (Gilgun, 2004) based on work by Albert Bandura (e.g., Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996;

Bandura, 1999). It was further refined using grounded theory, which allows thematic categories to emerge from responses (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The first item directs survey respondents to indicate their level of agreement, on a 7-point Likert scale, with the item: “I believe world peace can be achieved” and then to explain the reasoning behind their rating. The second statement asks respondents to recommend ways of achieving world peace by completing the statement: “The best way to achieve world peace is ...”

For more information about the methods for the perspectives on achieving peace section of this volume, readers can refer to Chap. 32.

Moral Disengagement Theory as a Basis for Coding

Albert Bandura’s sociocognitive theory (2002) posits that individuals develop ethical standards which guide social conduct, promote self-esteem and worth, and protect against self-sanction as long as the individuals act in accordance with these self-imposed standards. There are times, however, that the self-regulation of conduct is suspended as the individual convinces himself/herself that these standards no longer apply to a particular situation, thereby impeding self-censorship of reprehensible conduct. According to Bandura (2002), the sociocognitive processes that allow such diversions are best conceptualized as forms of moral disengagement. Conversely, individuals can exhibit moral engagement by exercising agency on behalf of their moral standards.

In his theory, Bandura has identified several sociocognitive mechanisms by which self-condemnation for inhumane behavior is disabled; his conceptualization of these mechanisms served as the basis for many of the major coding categories in our manual. Following pioneering studies by fellow social psychologists Stanley Milgram and Philip Zimbardo, Bandura highlighted the role obedience and expectations play in mediating personal agency by disengaging the moral standards that allow people to self-regulate their behavior. In his view, core disengagement mechanisms that deny, diffuse, or displace individual

responsibility shift individuals’ locus of control from internal to external factors (Rotter, 1954, 1966). In addition to the disengagement processes acting upon personal agency, there are antecedent sociocognitive mechanisms contributing to the cognitive reconstrual of injurious behavior through various rationalizations (moral justification, euphemistic language, and advantageous comparison). The final two disengagement categories minimize the detrimental effects of agents’ actions (ignoring consequences) or the moral agency of the victims themselves (devaluing the victim).

Bandura’s theory of moral engagement shaped several of our major coding categories as well, including those intended to operationalize the concept of agency. Bandura (2002) identifies two forms of moral agency: (a) inhibitive and (b) proactive. When a person refuses to act inhumanely and instead acts in accordance with his or her moral standards, he or she is exhibiting inhibitive moral agency. Proactive moral agency is empathic, exhibited when a person acts out of feelings of responsibility for others, or resists pressures or incentives to aggress out the same feeling. Coders were reminded that when applying these principles to the coding of participant responses, they were not thereby passing judgment on the respondents’ morality but, rather, categorizing their responses into thematic categories informed by the theory.

Coding System I: Agency and Sociocognitive Mechanisms

Bandura’s construct of agency and his elucidation of sociocognitive mechanisms underlying tolerance for inhumane behavior provided the basis for the first coding system applied to achieving peace coding responses. The forms of reasoning he identified provided most of the major coding categories, with grounded theory methods contributing to many of the subcategories. All responses to both items were coded using this coding system.

This framework builds on past moral disengagement manuals by limiting its focus to four categories (Cohrs et al., 2005), rather than

attempting to operationalize each of the eight disengagement mechanisms and invent analogous engagement mechanisms that do not yet have a firm empirical grounding in sociocognitive theory for the sake of symmetry (Cohrs & Moschner, 2002; Cohrs, 2003; Jackson & Sparr, 2005).

Agency Coding Categories

The three agency coding categories were (a) *presence of agency*, (b) *absence of agency*, and (c) *not applicable agency*. *Presence of agency* was used to capture responses that explicitly or implicitly demonstrated action contributing to peace or abstinence from actions impeding it. Conversely, *absence of agency* was used to code responses that did not show any intention to undertake action to achieve peace or denied the achievability of peace. Finally, *not applicable agency* captured responses that did not address the prompts.

Disengagement and Humanitarian Engagement Coding Categories

When conceiving this portion of the coding system, we identified five major disengagement categories that paralleled forms of the sociocognitive mechanisms identified in moral disengagement theory. The first disengagement category was *rationalization*, which was used to code responses indicating that peace, even if possible, might be undesirable. The next major disengagement category was *displacement of responsibility* (subcategory *military or force*), whose responses shunted responsibility for achieving peace to other entities. The third major disengagement category, *ignoring consequences of harmful actions*, was used to code responses that failed to recognize the potential detrimental effects of the recommended ways to achieve peace. *Destructive human nature*, the fourth category, was applied to responses that referenced humankind's inherent evil or otherwise devalued humanity. The final major disengagement category was *attribution of blame* (subcategory *governmental or political blame*), which captured responses that blamed external events or ideologi-

cal differences as reasons why peace could not be achieved.

Four major humanitarian engagement categories were identified as counterparts to the disengagement categories. The first major category was *justification* (subcategory *principles or beliefs*), used to code responses that provided general explanations as to why world peace is achievable. The second major category, *assumption of responsibility*, aggregated responses that emphasized the duty or effort of the general public to achieve peace (subcategories *practical strategies*, *governmental responsibility*, and *ineffectiveness of negative relations*). *Humanization*, the third major category, was used to categorize responses that described positive characteristics of the world's population (subcategories *interpersonal concepts and values* and *social equity*). The final major category was *removal of blame*, which was used to code responses that mentioned reconciliation or forgiveness. Finally, a category, *not applicable mechanisms*, was created to capture responses that did not address the prompts.

Patterns of Responses for Bandura's Mechanisms

Agency. Across all of the regions, over 65% of responses were coded for a *presence of agency*. South and Southeast Asian responses showed agency at the highest frequency with 90% of responses being labeled *agentic*. Over 80% of responses from the Middle East, Latin America, and Western Europe proposed some form of action to achieve peace. Seventy-nine percent of responses from the UK/Anglo region and East Asia were coded for *presence of agency*, and just under 70% of responses from Africa and Russia and the Balkans *demonstrated agency*.

Frequencies of *absence of agency* responses ranged from a low of 10% in South and Southeast Asia to a high of 32% of responses from Russia and the Balkan Peninsula. Often, a great majority of the responses coded for *absence of agency* simply denied the achievability of world peace. In Africa, 31% of responses *lacked agency*, whereas 21% of responses from the UK/Anglo

region and East Asia *lacked agency*. In Latin America, Western Europe, and the Middle East, *absence of agency* responses accounted for between 14 and 17% of all responses.

Disengagement and Humanitarian Engagement. Less than 40% of all responses across the regions showed reasoning consistent with the *disengagement* categories. African responses showed the highest level of disengagement, with 35% of all responses being coded into these categories. Russia and the Balkans, the UK/Anglo region, and Western Europe also had fairly high rates of *disengagement* responses (around 30% of all responses). Comparatively, the other regions had lower percentages of *disengaged* responses: just under 25% in East Asia, 17% in the Middle East, 15% in Latin America, and 12% in South and Southeast Asian responses.

In every region but Latin America, the most commonly used disengaged argument was *attribution of blame*. This category ranged from 35% of disengaged responses in Russia and the Balkan Peninsula to 48% of disengaged responses in South and Southeast Asia, with the other regions falling somewhere in between. The most common form of disengaged reasoning in Latin America was *destructive human nature* (40% of the disengaged responses), which was the second most commonly coded disengaged category in all of the other regions. *Governmental and political blame* was seen frequently across regions, as was *ignoring consequences of harmful actions*. The other three disengagement categories were identified at much lower frequencies, or not at all.

A majority of responses across regions were coded for the *humanitarian engagement* categories. Percentages of engaged responses ranged from 52% of all responses in Russia and the Balkans to 78% of all responses in South and Southeast Asia.

Latin America was just behind South and Southeast Asia, with 77% of all responses coded for the *humanitarian engagement* categories. East Asia, Western Europe, and Africa all had more than 60% of all responses coded for reasoning consistent with the humanitarian engagement categories. In the UK/Anglo region, 55% of all responses were coded into these categories.

Interpersonal concepts and values was the most commonly seen humanitarian engagement reasoning in responses from Western Europe, the UK/Anglo region, Latin America, South and Southeast Asia, and East Asia, with over 20% of engaged responses coded into this category. In Russia and the Balkans and Africa, *interpersonal concepts and values* and *governmental responsibility* were the two most coded humanitarian engagement categories, accounting for 26% and 24% of engaged responses, respectively. *Governmental responsibility* accounted for 21% of engaged responses from the Middle East, making it the most commonly coded engagement category for that region. Across all regions, responses coded for *social equity*, *ineffectiveness of negative relations*, and *assumption of responsibility* were also fairly common. Reasoning consistent with each of the other humanitarian engagement categories was seen across all of the regions, albeit at a much lower frequency.

Exploratory Statistical Analyses for Agency and Sociocognitive Mechanisms

Respondents provided demographic information in addition to their responses to the PAIRTAPS. The demographic responses allowed us to undertake some exploratory analyses to assess the extent to which, in our international sample, the frequency of particular forms of reasoning concerning the achievability of world peace varied as a function of gender, military service, having a relative in the military, and involvement in at least one antiwar protest activity. As explained in Chap. 32 of this volume, the sample was a convenience sample, not a probability sample. Therefore, the results discussed below are purely exploratory, meant only to inform future research, and should not be generalized to other populations.

Gender. Gender proved to be a fairly robust predictor of responses, with significant gender differences found in the use of eleven of the coding categories. Proportionately more women than men (a) demonstrated a *presence of agency* in their responses in Latin America; (b) provided at

least one response falling into a *humanitarian engagement* category (i.e., they received a score of 1 for the superordinate *humanitarian engagement presence* variable) in the Latin American and the UK/Anglo region responses; (c) cited *interpersonal concepts and/or values* as the best way to achieve peace in the UK/Anglo region, Latin America, and Russia and the Balkan Peninsula; and (d) *assumed responsibility* for achieving peace in South and Southeast Asia and Middle East. Conversely, proportionately more men than women (a) *lacked agency* in the Latin American responses, (b) *ignored the harmful consequences* of the ways they recommended to achieve peace in Western Europe and the UK/Anglo region, (c) suggested using *military or force* to achieve peace in the UK/Anglo region, (d) offered *justifications* in the African responses, (e) *assumed responsibility* for achieving peace in East Asia, and (f) stated that we need to *remove blame* from people and/or organizations before peace can be achieved in the Middle East.

Military Service. There were group differences in responses based on participation in armed forces in the use of 14 of the coding categories. Proportionately more veterans than civilians (a) *showed agency* in the Russia and Balkan Peninsula responses, (b) *lacked agency* in their responses in East Asia and the Middle East, (c) gave responses coded for one or more of the *disengagement* categories in the Middle East (i.e., received a score of 1 on the superordinate *disengagement presence* variable), (d) *ignored the harmful consequences* of action they suggested to achieve peace in the Middle East and the UK/Anglo region, (e) wanted to utilize the *military or other force* in order to establish world peace in Russia and the Balkans, and (f) *attributed blame* to outside forces for why world peace is unachievable in the Middle East. In contrast, proportionately more nonmilitary respondents as compared to military respondents (a) gave *agentive* responses in the East Asia and Middle East samples, (b) *did not demonstrate agency* in their responses in Russia and the Balkans, and (c), in the Middle Eastern responses, *blamed the government and politics* as the reason why peace is unachievable.

In terms of reasoning coded for the humanitarian engagement categories, proportionately more civilians than veterans (a) gave answers coded for one or more of the *humanitarian engagement* constructs in the UK/Anglo region, the Middle East, and East Asia; (b) cited *practical strategies* for achieving peace in East Asia; (c) *humanized others* in the UK/Anglo region; and (d) showed an *assumption of responsibility* in the Latin American responses. Proportionately more military respondents than nonmilitary respondents (a) said *practical strategies* were the best way to achieve peace in Russia and the Balkans and the Middle East, (b) gave responses demonstrating *humanization* in East Asia, and (c) *assumed responsibility* for achieving peace in the Middle Eastern responses.

Relatives' Military Service. Although there were no significant group differences in *agency* shown in responses based on relatives' military service, particular forms of reasoning associated with nine of the sociocognitive coding categories varied as a function of a relative's military service. Proportionately more respondents without a relative in the military than their counterparts (a) gave responses code for *destructive human nature* in East Asia, (b) mentioned *principles and beliefs* as the best way to achieve peace in Western European responses, (c) cited the *ineffectiveness of negative relations* in Africa, and (d) recommended *social equity* in Latin America. Proportionately more respondents with a relative in the military as compared to respondents without a relative in the military (a) *blamed the government and/or politics* in responses from Africa and the Middle East, (b) gave examples of *interpersonal concepts and values* and *principles and beliefs* in South and Southeast Asia, (c) *assumed responsibility* for achieving peace in Africa, and (d) gave reasoning consistent with recommendations of *social equity* in the UK/Anglo region.

Protest Participation. Participation in an antiwar, pro-peace protest proved to be the most influential predictor of responses, with group differences found on 17 of the coding categories. Proportionately more protestors than non-protestors (a) exhibited *presence of agency* in the

Russia and the Balkans, Western European, and Middle Eastern responses; (b) *blamed the government or politics* in the African responses; (c) gave responses coded for one or more of the *humanitarian engagement* categories in Russia and the Balkans, Western Europe, the UK/Anglo region, the Middle East, and East Asia; (d) said the best way to achieve peace is through *interpersonal concepts and values* in Western Europe, the UK/Anglo region, and the Middle East; (e) mentioned *governmental responsibility* to achieve peace in Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, the UK/Anglo region, and the Middle East; (f) *assumed responsibility* for achieving peace in the UK/Anglo region and the Middle East; (g) gave examples of *social equity* in the UK/Anglo region, East Asian, and Latin American responses; and (h) cited the *ineffectiveness of negative relations* in Western European responses.

Conversely, proportionately more non-protestors than protestors (a) gave responses coded for an *absence of agency* in Russia and the Balkans, Western Europe, and the Middle East; (b) gave responses coded for one or more of the *disengagement* categories in Western Europe and the UK/Anglo region; (c) mentioned an innate *destructive human nature* in the world's population; (d) *ignored the consequences* of their suggested methods to achieve peace in Russia and the Balkan Peninsula and the UK/Anglo region; and (e) cited the *ineffectiveness of negative relations* in their responses in Latin America.

Coding System II: Focus on Achievability and Prerequisites for Peace

Themes related to judgments of achievability and prerequisites for peace formed the second coding system applied to achieving peace responses. This coding system was developed using grounded theory and applied to all responses to both items, first to code responses that focused solely of the achievability of world peace and then to code responses that specified prerequisites for achieving peace.

Coding Categories for a Focus on Achievability

In addition to simple affirmative and negative responses, this part of the coding system focused on common themes addressing the duration and degree of difficulty of the process involved in achieving peace, the extent to which respondents portrayed humanity as progressing toward this goal, and whether they viewed its pursuit as endless. Responses falling into the endless pursuit camp often alluded to peace as an ideal, which is in keeping with literature underlining the active, process nature of peacebuilding. Thus, the idealistic nature of peace was not seen as compromising its achievability (as an end goal) but a motivation for its constant pursuit.

The major focus on achievability categories were (a) *indeterminate achievability*, used to code references to the past without explicit indication as to whether peace would be achieved in the future; (b) *explicitly achievable*, which captured responses agreeing that world peace is achievable (subcategory *work in progress*, sub-subcategory *difficult*); (c) *ideal*, used to code responses that described peace as the optimal condition for the world; and (d) *unachievable*, for responses stating that world peace is not achievable (subcategory *identifying reasons*).

Coding Categories for Prerequisites for Peace

The second part of this coding system captured what is arguably the most interesting element of efficacy beliefs—those that move beyond the “useful fiction” of peace to identifying its specific precursors and qualities. This analysis added substance to the “agency” metrics, allowing GIPGAP to ascertain personal and regional differences in worldview. Consensus on these antecedents might well prove useful in future policy formation and in deconstructing popular prejudices about cultural or civilizational impediments to unity, facilitating collective efficacy on a global scale.

The *prerequisites for peace* coding system identified several main prerequisites: (a) *philosophical principles*, (b) *pro-social action*, (c) *constructive government/political action*, and (d) *antisocial actions*. There was also a *general prerequisites for peace* major category for responses mentioning steps to achieve peace that could not be coded into any of the following categories or subcategories. Finally, we created two more major categories: (a) *recognition of multiple possibilities* for responses that said there were many ways of achieving peace and (b) *uncertain of ways*, which was used to code responses that were unsure of the path to peace.

The major category, *philosophical principles*, applied to responses mentioning moral or ethical principles as the best way to achieve peace. This category had several subcategories: (a) *positive interpersonal values*, which captured responses that referenced principles such as love or trust (subcategory *understanding/acceptance*); (b) *inner peace*, which was used to code responses that mentioned the need to find peace within oneself first; (c) *religion/spirituality*, used for coding responses that mentioned specific religions or religious teachings; and (d) *equality*, which was used to code responses that mentioned equality among individuals.

Pro-social actions applied to responses stating that positive actions are the best way to achieve peace. There were four pro-social subcategories: (a) *pragmatic solutions*, used for responses recommending practical strategies of achieving peace (subcategory *elimination of global obstacles*); (b) *interaction*, used to code responses that mentioned communication, cooperation, etc. (subcategory *elimination of negative interactions*); (c) *unification*, for responses referencing bringing people together, building a community, etc.; and (d) *social justice*, for responses with themes of solidarity or fairness. This category had three subcategories: (a) *human rights*, (b) *economic fairness*, and (c) *elimination of social injustice*.

The major category of *constructive government/political action* applied to responses that suggested utilizing government or governmental agencies to achieve peace. The first subcategory, *diplomacy*, was used to code responses that recommended diplomatic solutions among

countries or nations. The next subcategory, *global/political change*, captured responses referring to beneficial governmental or global actions that work toward attaining peace (subcategory *equality among nations*). The final subcategory was *elimination of negative political motivations*, which was used to code responses that referred to ending governments', countries', or leaders' greed, corruption, and hunger for power.

The last major prerequisite category, *antisocial actions*, was for responses that suggested harmful means of achieving world peace. The first subcategory, *force/control*, was used to code responses that stated the best way to achieve peace is through the use of power, strength, the military, etc. The other subcategory, *population adjustments*, was designed to capture responses that stressed the need for either subsets of a population or all of humankind to be subject to change or removal (subcategory *violent elimination*).

In addition to these categories, responses that could not be coded using the manual or did not address the prompts were identified as *uncodable* and *not applicable achievability and prerequisites*, respectively.

Patterns of Responses for a Focus on Achievability and Prerequisites for Peace

Focus on Achievability. Across regions, between approximately one-quarter and one-half of all responses analyzed with this coding system were coded for the *focus on achievability* categories. South and Southeast Asia had the lowest frequency of responses focusing on the achievability of world peace, with 23% of all responses coded for these categories, while Africa had the highest frequency of these responses, with 44% of all responses coded for the focus on achievability categories. The other regions had varied percentages of about 30%–40% of all responses coded for these categories.

Identifying reasons why peace is unachievable was the most commonly seen focus on achievability theme in all of the regions except for South and Southeast Asia, where it was the second most com-

mon achievability response. In Africa, this category accounted for 64% of the focus on achievability responses. Percentages of response coded into this category fell as low as 32% of all responses in Latin America, with all of the other regions falling somewhere in between. The most commonly identified focus on achievability category in South and Southeast Asia was *explicitly achievable*, which accounted for 31% of these responses. *Explicitly achievable* was a fairly common response across all of the regions, except the UK/Anglo region and Russia and the Balkans. Peace as *ideal* was another fairly common response, as well as the idea that world peace is generally *unachievable*.

Prerequisites for Peace. A majority of the responses analyzed with this coding system were coded for the prerequisites for peace categories, with percentages ranging from 55 to 76% of all responses. In every region, answers coded into the *pro-social actions* categories were the most commonly seen ways to achieve world peace, and the *antisocial action* categories were the least common.

Philosophical Prerequisites. The *philosophical prerequisites* categories were the second most commonly identified prerequisites for peace, following the *pro-social action* prerequisites. In the Middle East, the *philosophical* categories were tied with the *constructive governmental change* categories, at 16% of all responses. In the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and South and Southeast Asia, the most commonly seen *philosophical prerequisite* was *positive interpersonal values*. *Understanding and acceptance*, a subcategory of *positive interpersonal values*, was the most commonly recommended way to achieve peace in Western Europe, the UK/Anglo region, Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, and East Asia.

Pro-social Actions. As the most commonly used prerequisites category, *pro-social actions* accounted for percentages of responses ranging from just about 25% of all responses in the UK/Anglo region, Russia and the Balkans, Africa, and East Asia to about 35% of all responses in the Middle East, Latin America, and South and

Southeast Asia. *Interaction*, such as communication or working together, was the form of *pro-social action* mentioned most frequently in South and Southeast Asia and Russia and the Balkans. In Western Europe, the UK/Anglo region, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and East Asia, the most commonly recommended *pro-social action* was *elimination of negative interactions*, a subcategory of *interaction*. Although this was not the most common *pro-social action* response in Russia and the Balkans and South and Southeast Asia, it appeared quite frequently in all regions.

Constructive Governmental Change. These categories were the third most commonly recommended way to achieve peace in every region except for the Middle East, where they were tied for second. In most regions, slightly over 10% of responses were coded for these specific prerequisites categories. Across all regions, the two most commonly mentioned *constructive governmental prerequisites* were *diplomacy* and *global or political change*.

Antisocial Actions. These categories were the least often identified prerequisites for peace. Russia and the Balkans had the highest rate of *antisocial action* responses, with 5% of all responses. *Adjusting the population* was the most common antisocial prerequisite for peace in Western Europe, the UK/Anglo region, Russia and the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia. In Latin America and South and Southeast Asia, reliance on the *military or force* was the most commonly identified *antisocial action* prerequisite.

Exploratory Statistical Analyses for a Focus on Achievability and Prerequisites for Peace

On an exploratory basis, we assessed the extent to which, in our international sample, the frequency of particular forms of reasoning concerning the achievability of world peace varied as a function of gender, military service, having a relative in the military, and involvement in at least one antiwar protest activity. These analyses were done for purely exploratory reasons, meant only to inform

future research, and should not be assumed to be generalizable to other populations.

Focus on Achievability

Gender. Proportionately more men than women from Western Europe gave responses coded into one or more of the *focus on achievability* categories (i.e., they received a score of 1 for the superordinate *focus on achievability presence* variable) and specifically mention that peace is *achievable*. Conversely, proportionately more women than men (a) from Latin America, the UK/Anglo region, South and Southeast Asia, and the Middle East gave responses coded for one or more *focus on achievability* coding categories, (b) agreed that peace is *achievable* in the Latin American responses, (c) from the Middle East and Latin America stated that they believed world peace is the *ideal* state for the world, (d) thought that world peace will be *difficult* to achieve in South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and (e) *identified reasons* why peace is unachievable in the Middle Eastern responses. The inconsistent and somewhat surprising findings regarding the use of some of the *focus on achievability* categories may reflect sampling issues rather than reliable differences across regions.

Military Service. Military service did not prove to be a strong predictor of achievability responses across the regions, although there were some interesting anomalies. Proportionately more respondents with military experience as compared to their counterparts (a) stated that world peace is *achievable* in the East Asia responses, (b) considered world peace a *work in progress* in the Russia and Balkan Peninsula responses, and (c) said that peace is *unachievable* and *identified reasons* why they believed that to be true in the Middle East.

Relative's Military Service. Proportionately more respondents with civilian relatives than respondents with veteran relatives (a) gave responses coded for one or more of the *focus on achievability* categories in the Russia and the Balkans and East Asia samples, (b) described

world peace as *ideal* in Latin America and East Asia, and (c) asserted that world peace is *unachievable* in the Russian and Balkan responses. Consistent with the experience of military personnel in the region reported above, proportionately more respondents with veteran relatives as compared to their counterparts from the Middle East stated that world peace is *unachievable*.

Protest Participation. Proportionately more non-protestors than protestors (a) gave responses coded for one or more of the *focus on achievability* categories in Russia and the Balkans and Western Europe; (b) stated that world peace is *unachievable* in responses from Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, Western Europe, the UK/Anglo region, and the Middle East; and (c) *identified reasons* as to why they believed world peace cannot be achieved in the UK/Anglo region, Western Europe, and East Asia. In contrast, proportionately more protestors than non-protestors (a) gave responses coded for the *focus on achievability* categories in the South and Southeast Asia sample, (b) said that world peace is *achievable* in the *Western Europe* sample, (c) stated that world peace is *ideal* in the Middle Eastern responses, and (d) said that world peace is a *work in progress* in the UK/Anglo region and the Middle East.

Prerequisites for Peace

Gender. Gender proved to be a fairly robust predictor for responses coded for the prerequisites for peace categories. Proportionately more women than men (a) from Latin America gave responses coded for one or more of the *prerequisites for peace* categories, (b) from East Asia gave *general prerequisites* that must happen before peace can be achieved, and (c) from Western Europe were *uncertain of the best way* to achieve world peace.

In regard to philosophical prerequisites, proportionately more women than men (a) gave responses coded for one or more of the *philosophical principles* categories in the Western Europe, Latin America, and UK/Anglo samples; (b) said that people needed to demonstrate *understanding and acceptance* before peace can be achieved in the Western Europe, Middle East,

and UK/Anglo samples; and (c) espoused *positive interpersonal values* in the UK/Anglo and Latin American samples.

There were also gender differences on several of the *pro-social prerequisite* themes as well. First, proportionately more women than men (a) from the UK/Anglo region and Russia and the Balkans gave responses coded for one or more of the *pro-social action* categories, (b) from Russia and the Balkans and South and Southeast Asia said that peace can be achieved through *interaction*, (c) from Western Europe and Africa stated the world must become *unified* before peace can be achieved, and (d) stated that *human rights* need to be respected in the Western European responses. Contrariwise, proportionately more men than women (a) from Russia and the Balkans and the UK/Anglo region mentioned that *global obstacle must be eliminated* in order to achieve world peace and (b) from the Middle East referenced *human rights* in their responses.

With regard to *governmental* prerequisites, proportionately more African men than women stated that the *government needed to change constructively* before world peace can be reached. In East Asia, the opposite was true with proportionately more women than men referencing *constructive political change/political action* in their responses. Additionally, in the Middle East and East Asia, proportionately more women than men believed that broad *global and political changes* were needed if peace is to be achieved.

As predicted from peace studies literature, proportionately more men than women (a) from Western Europe, Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, and the UK/Anglo region gave responses coded for the *antisocial action* categories; (b) from Russia and the Balkans and the UK/Anglo region suggested using *force or control* to achieve peace; and (c) from the UK/Anglo region and Western Europe suggested negatively *adjusting the population* to achieve world peace.

Military Service. Military service was shown to be a fairly strong predictor of responses for these coding categories. Proportionately more veterans than civilians in Russia and the Balkans gave responses coded for the *prerequisites for*

peace coding categories. Additionally, proportionately more Middle Eastern military respondents than nonmilitary respondents were *uncertain* of how to achieve world peace. By contrast, proportionately more civilians than veterans from the Middle East and East Asia gave answers coded into the *prerequisites for peace* categories.

In regard to philosophical prerequisites, proportionately more military respondents than nonmilitary respondents (a) from Russia and the Balkans gave reasoning coded for the *philosophical principles* coding categories, (b) from Russia and the Balkan Peninsula and the Middle East offered *general philosophical principles* in their responses, (c) from Russia and the Balkans gave responses coded for *positive interpersonal values*, and (d) from Western Europe mentioned *religion and other spiritual ideas* in their responses. Proportionately more nonmilitary respondents than military respondents (a) from the UK/Anglo region gave responses coded for the *philosophical principles* categories; (b) from Western Europe and the UK/Anglo region said that through *understanding and acceptance*, peace can be achieved; (c) mentioned *positive interpersonal values* in the responses from the UK/Anglo region; and (d) from the Middle East said that peace can be achieved through *religion and spirituality*.

Proportionately more civilians than veterans in Latin America gave responses coded for the *pro-social actions* categories. Proportionately more veterans than civilians (a) from the Middle East offered *pragmatic solutions* in their responses as the best method to achieving peace, (b) in Russia and the Balkans said that peace can be achieved by *eliminating global obstacles*, (c) from the UK/Anglo region said that peace can be achieved through *unification*, and (d) in African sample espoused *economic fairness* as the best way to achieve peace.

Response frequencies in only three of the constructive governmental action coding categories varied as a function of military service. In the UK/Anglo region, it was the veterans who more often identified the need for *constructive governmental/political action* in their responses than the civilians. Proportionately more East Asian veter-

ans than civilians said that there needs to be *equality among nations* and *global and political change* before peace can be achieved.

In the UK/Anglo region and the Middle East, proportionately more military respondents than nonmilitary respondents gave responses coded for one or more of the *antisocial action* categories or specifically said they would negatively *adjust the population* in order to achieve peace. Proportionately more veterans than civilians from Africa and Russia and the Balkans stated that through *force and control*, peace can be achieved. *Relatives' Military Service*. There were also a few group differences related to having a relative who had served in the military. Proportionately more respondents with civilian relatives than military relatives (a) were *uncertain of the best way* to achieve peace in the East Asia sample and (b) referenced *positive interpersonal values* in the Russia and Balkans sample. Conversely, proportionately more respondents with military relatives than nonmilitary relatives (a) stated that *positive interpersonal values* are the best way to achieve world peace in the Latin America sample and (b) offered *general antisocial actions* in the UK/Anglo sample.

For the pro-social prerequisites, proportionately more respondents with a relative in the military than those without a relative in the military (a) from Latin America gave responses coded for one or more of the *pro-social action* categories, (b) gave *general pro-social actions* as the best way to achieve peace in the African responses, and (c) in the Western European and Middle Eastern samples espoused *economic fairness*. In contrast, proportionately more respondents with civilian relatives as compared to their counterparts from the UK/Anglo region suggested *general pro-social actions*.

In regard to governmental action, proportionately more respondents with a relative in the military as compared to their counterparts (a) gave responses coded into the *constructive government/political action* coding categories and specifically mentioned that *equality among nations* would help peace efforts in the East Asia sample and (b) stated that peace will be achieved through *general constructive governmental*

changes and political action in the Russia and Balkan Peninsula and Middle East samples. In the UK/Anglo region, proportionately more respondents with a civilian relative than veteran relative said *nations must be equal* before peace can be achieved.

Protest Participation. Once again, protest participation proved to be a fairly robust predictor of participant responses. In Western Europe, the UK/Anglo region, the Middle East, and Russia and the Balkans, proportionately more protestors than non-protestors gave responses coded for one or more of the *prerequisites for peace* categories. In Western Europe and the Middle East, proportionately more non-protestors than protestors were *uncertain of the best way* to achieve peace.

Proportionately more protestors than non-protestors (a) from the Middle East, UK/Anglo region, and Western Europe gave responses coded for the *philosophical principles* categories; (b) from the UK/Anglo region and the Middle East stated that *understanding and accepting* others is the best way to achieve world peace; (c) in Western Europe and the UK/Anglo samples offered *interpersonal values* in their responses; and (d) from East Asia and the UK/Anglo region said that *inner peace* is the best way to attain world peace.

In Russia and the Balkans, Western Europe, the UK/Anglo region, and the Middle East, proportionately more protestors as compared to their counterparts gave responses coded for one or more of the *pro-social actions* categories and offered *pragmatic solutions* as the best way to achieve peace. Proportionately more protestors than non-protestors from the UK/Anglo region and the Middle East stated that *interaction* will lead to world peace. Finally, proportionately more protestors from East Asia, Russia and the Balkans, and Western Europe said that *social justice* was the best way to achieve peace as compared to their counterparts.

We also found that proportionately more protestors than non-protestors (a) from Russia and the Balkans, Western Europe, the UK/Anglo region, and the Middle East gave responses coded for one or more of the *constructive government*

actions coding categories; (b) offered *general constructive government and political changes* that need to happen before peace can be achieved in the Russia and Balkans and UK/Anglo samples; and (c) stated that there must be *equality among nations* for peace to be achieved in the Russia and Balkans and Middle East samples. In Latin America, proportionately more non-protestors than protestors mentioned the need to *eliminate negative political motivation* in their responses.

The UK/Anglo sample was the only one in which there were significant group differences in the use of the antisocial action categories as a function of involvement in antiwar protests. Specifically, proportionately more non-protesting respondents than protesting respondents gave answers coded for one or more of the *antisocial action* categories and referenced *force or control* as the best way to achieve peace.

Discussion

Scientific luminary Linus Pauling wrote in 1965, “This period...is the unique epoch in the history of civilization when war will cease to be the means of settling great world problems, or civilization will come to an end . . . The problem to be solved is a tremendous one . . . Its solution will require contributions from all sides . . . and perhaps most importantly, from those scientists who make a study of man himself and of the relation of men with one another” (2003, p. v). Notwithstanding many world historical changes in the intervening 50 years before the PAIRTAPS began to be administered, our findings suggest a similar optimism exists among people around the world concerning the achievability of peace. The fact that the preponderance of responses demonstrated some form of humanitarian engagement and agency—the intent to act on behalf of one’s beliefs—is further reason for encouragement.

Percentages indicating agentic beliefs are upward of 80% in Western Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, and South and Southeast Asia—regions that have a history of revolution and political action, both failed and successful. Regions scoring lower in this category and higher

in absence of agency, namely, Africa and Russia/the Balkans, instead share a history of repeated invasion, privation, and disenfranchisement with few examples of political success or resisting imperial/colonial conquest. The UK/Anglo countries have rarely been invaded and enjoy several examples of positive social change in their domestic histories yet were situated in the middle of this regional skew of agency. Interestingly, their score is identical to that of the East Asian nations, which benefit from similar geographic protections, more homogenous societies, and a rising economic star.

In contrast to previous social psychological peace research concerned with the measurement of moral disengagement (McAlister, 2000, 2001; Cohrs, 2003), we were pleased to find that only a minority of each national population exhibited susceptibility to disengagement mechanisms in their responses, with under one-quarter of respondents in the Middle, South, and Far East (areas previously not well represented in the literature). Although lower overall ranges might be expected on questions relating to the possibility of peace, many respondents interpret this question negatively, as if they were being asked about the permanence of war. With their minimal priming, these questions function as a fascinating Rorschach test of individuals’ relative optimism or pessimism on the personal, political, historical, or cosmic level.

Our operationalization of *attribution of blame* and *destructive human nature*—the most frequently used disengagement mechanisms—picked up responses that might also have been identified as diffusion of responsibility, which explains the relatively low levels of that mechanism. *Rationalization* responses were also rare; these applied to responses that attempted a moral argument *against* peace similar to those William James addressed in his turn of the century essay, “The Moral Equivalent of War.” We believe that the lower level of this and other moral disengagement mechanisms across regions more accurately reflects the public’s actual disposition toward international cooperation, which has been consistently misreported, even before the September 11 attacks (Kull & Destler, 1999). This is confirmed in the large majorities of respondents demonstrat-

ing the mirroring *humanitarian engagement* categories across regions—over three-quarters in the cases of South and Southeast Asia and Latin America. The slimmer majorities in Cold War antagonists Russia and the Anglo regions could be read as another indicator of this coding system's internal consistency and validity.

Predictably, regions such as Africa and the Middle East whose development has been impeded by resource expropriation, exploitation, and poor governance rank *governmental responsibility* highest among engagement mechanisms, with *assumption of responsibility* and *social equity* also high. Relatedly, veterans of military service in the Middle East most often *lacked agency* and *blamed the government and politics* for peace's elusiveness; those who *did* suggest action was prone to *ignoring harmful consequences*. Tellingly, veterans in the UK/Anglo sample demonstrated a similar ignorance of consequence, but in those same regions that have been embroiled in conflict, civilians more frequently cited *humanitarian engagement* as desirable.

Promising as well is the comparatively weak effect of a relative's military service as a predictor. This could indicate a new willingness of individuals to forge their own identities and opinions independent of the pressures that often exist in military families, whose emphasis on service on nation can serve to minimize the consequences of war. The most commonly perceived environmental or external causes of group violence are political corruption, corporate greed, and military warmongering. In collusion with one another, these actors are often seen as wielding irresistible influence in brainwashing civilian populations and promoting group violence (Burke, 2005; Curtis, 2009). However, subsequent research also shows that conspiratorial fears of the military-industrial-financial complex threat are often inflated and can militate against political participation (Kay, 2011). Certain forms of religious belief, including the perceived beliefs of others, are equally capable of mitigating agency both internally and externally by diminishing trust (Kay, Shepherd, Blatz, Chua, & Galinsky, 2010).

In keeping with our understanding of the centrality of proactive personal agency, the most

reliable predictor among the demographic factors was protest participation. Even in the relatively dour Russia/the Balkans sample, the embattled Middle East, and economically sluggish Western Europe, protest participants exhibited greater *presence of agency* than their more sedentary peers. Participation also proved to be a robust indicator of resistance to moral disengagement mechanisms and to the belief in an innately *destructive human nature* in the influential Western Europe and Anglophone sample. Respondents in this latter group were also more mindful of the consequences of political actions in pursuit of peace, as were their protesting peers in Russia and the Balkans. In both these key geopolitical regions, those who had participated in protest were also more likely to recognize *governmental responsibility* in achieving peace—having a similar salience to the Middle East and Africa where citizens are more distrustful of government but equally aware of the need for reform.

This geographical convergence demonstrates a sort of solidarity—a widespread recognition that self and collective efficacy work in lockstep. Citizen participation is necessary for change, and whether through institutional reform or revolution, peace must be both the means and the end.

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Afterword: A Living Tapestry of Peace and Reconciliation

42

Alan O'Hare

*I want to portray you
not with lapis or gold,
but with colors made of apple bark
I want, then, simply
to say the names of things.*

– Rainer Maria Rilke
from Bowaers & Macy, 19

We invite you to see the following voices as you begin the final leg of your journey through this volume and allow the images that call out to you to be your guides:

- Leonard Bernstein conducting Beethoven's Ninth Symphony with a new world orchestra in Berlin at the 1989 Fall of the Wall.
- The release of Aung San Suu Kyi to the loving embrace of the people of Myanmar after many years of unjust house arrest.
- A joyful celebration of the life and courage of Archbishop Romero in El Salvador Cathedral where he had been assassinated in 1980.
- A circle of victims and perpetrators from the 1994 genocide sitting on the grass (gacaca) while confessions are offered to the community in reconciliation.
- Afghan children and women celebrating their voices and visions in creating new schools of learning, hope, and peace.

A. O'Hare (✉)
Expressive Therapy Program, Lesley College,
Cambridge, MA, USA
e-mail: bridges95@aol.com

Let Rilke be your guide now as you “simply say the names of things” that whisper to you from each of these touching images. Allow them to be with you as we reflect on the responses of the thousands of people from over 40 countries that have spoken about peace and reconciliation. They have been our guides, showing us how to cocreate an international community that dreams of a lasting peace. Their words and insights gathered through interviews and surveys evoked painful memories of personal tragedy laced with terror, as well as hope.

In examining their words and the insights we gather from their voices, we are also able to join in the companionship of griots, seanchies, anancies, jongleurs, and other storytellers from around the world. They invite us to gather with them by a shared fire of learning in reflection and dialogue. Here we can sit in stillness and recall the courage and commitment of all that has been involved in the bringing together of these voices. And in this stillness, we can begin to hear and see the voices of all who have been part of this journey. Each of the voices that were shared in this research invited us into their classrooms, villages, countries, and lives, as well as into their memories and histories through an embracing rainbow palette of fears, hopes, and dreams.

Journey with the researchers welcomed openly by people living in nations of freedom who shared their visions enthusiastically – yet think of what it means that even in presumed bastions of liberty and democracy such as the United States, many

participants wanted reassurance that their responses would be anonymous. Follow the researchers also into lands of oppression where freedom and open dialogue are largely a secret, unspoken wish, but where small groups of willing participants spoke in passionate whispers about witnessed injustices and dreams of peace. We found them among the small cafés and tables on Middle Eastern boulevards and in refugee camps in Africa and in Russia and former Soviet countries, where the quests for peace and reconciliation grow like hidden flowers in the desert and mountains. And follow them on a spirited train ride through Northern Ireland where echoes of “the troubles” still haunted visions of a lasting harmony.

Listen to and see also those women and men who thoughtfully completed the written surveys and celebrated their good fortune in living in lands of peace, as well as those where the simple act of responding to every question evoked memories of family and friends lost in the struggles. For them, each movement of a pen across the terrain of these questions opened unhealed wounds, and “the disappeared” faces of those crying out against lifelong injustices.

When we become their sisters and brothers by opening our hearts and minds to each response, they are no longer disembodied voices located in survey results, but they have life and freedom through our listening. We can actually begin to see them and their histories, as well as hear their voices in songs of hope. Each of these questions calls forth a stream of images that flows through their life story as experienced in their memories, as well as that of their families, ancestors, friends, neighbors, and strangers.

For thousands of years, each culture’s storytellers have been honored to witness, revere, and celebrate the mysteries and miracles of its people as revealed through life’s feast of experiences. This has been true for all events that have affected the lives of a community, including homemakers, farmers, hunters, artists, guardians, teachers, explorers, merchants, witnesses, elders, children, and wanderers. The story of each person’s unique experience is of immense value, and contributes to the life and future of our world community beginning with moments of discovery, exploration, and wonder, and even to those tragic experiences of suffering, war, destruction, and chaos. In each of these instances, there lies the pos-

sibility of finding unique ways to create harmony, resolve crises, and find peace.

Our responsibility as readers, teachers, storytellers, and dreamers is to join together with the same commitment and dedication as those who constructed, administered, analyzed, and reported on responses to these surveys in witnessing the courage of those respondents. It is also our responsibility to follow the path of the tellers as they awaken us to a belief in a world of possibilities.

The role and task of all of us is not only to listen to experiences recounted by a small group of people but also to attend to all voices and all that they express. Additionally, it is to learn from the visions of each voice, including that of silence. Recall Gandhi as he sat at his loom spinning threads of harmony, independence, and resistance to a tyranny that rippled across the nation of India. Even now we can see the echoes of his voice of peace, a voice that became a rolling thunder continuing to resonate throughout the world today, especially in lands of oppression. Recalling Gandhi should be more than just imagining him; it should be truly seeing him through all those millions of people whose lives have been affected in the search for peace and reconciliation. We can then appreciate more fully the voices that carry on his mission, and the art, music, movement, and fragrance hidden in the beauty and power in each of their words.

As you reflect upon the visions of peace and reconciliation presented in this book, I invite you to cocreate with the participants a living tapestry that celebrates their voices and serves as a beacon of life to share with others. For thousands of years tapestries have been a co-creative expression of people and their communities’ legacies and dreams as followers would listen to them, and more importantly acknowledge their lives by celebrating them. This act of imagination and passion would be expressed through weaving tales together, using the elements of earth, water, fire, and air. Larger than life artistic expressions would be then cherished not only as lasting remembrances of their history but also as visions to be passed on to future generations. Every member of the community would pause to reflect on these sacred moments from their ancestral inheritances, and in that stillness, those voices from times

long gone by would still be heard and seen. This witnessing would also inspire further dialogue, research, education, music, dance, and other forms of expression, and thus the cycle of life and learning extended over the centuries.

Come now and cocreate with them a living, breathing tapestry of peace that can give birth to the full expression of their words and dreams. Look more closely to see how this gift of life becomes a three-dimensional, interactive soundscape where every image springs to life when reached out to by the viewer. Its boundaries extend beyond what we can initially see, thus inviting us to pause frequently to receive each gift the images offer, and uncover what they teach us about a world at peace and harmony.

Look closely and see how its borders are embraced by the more than 5,000 multicolored and textured hands of the book's cocreators, interviewers, and respondents, reaching out to all visitors in appreciation of their dreams. Feel the rhythm and harmony of hearts that invite us all to join them in songs of celebration and possibility. Witness every part of the earth and its people, finding in each other new ways of seeing, hearing, and learning – not as age-old enemies or threatening strangers, but as sisters and brothers who can nurture a peaceful future. Focus now on the center of this limitless tapestry, where visitors from across the ages are eavesdropping on the conversations of teachers of peace. In their midst is a floating multidimensional puzzle that each person is thoughtfully working on with another, occasionally pausing in the realization there is another piece missing that only you, the observer, can add.

What a meditative gathering it becomes as Thich Nhat Hanh, Elise Boulding, and Bishop Tutu move gently and playfully among the guests, offering pieces of the puzzle that have fallen to the floor. With each piece added, a relieved sigh floats among them, followed by smiling recognition of how effortless a task becomes when it is shared. As a band of international roving musicians begin playing, Nelson Mandela joins hands with Aung San Suu Kyi and invites other guests standing in wonder on the periphery to join their dance of celebration and reflection. In moments, a circle of once alienated sisters and brothers are singing so joyfully that puzzle solvers stop and watch. Not surprisingly, it is only moments before they are playfully whirled into

the midst of the dance. Wondrously, from the each side of the tapestry, a tree of silent meditation bends its branches slowly to the floor, inviting anyone seeking solitude to be lifted into a world of silence, a silence to be shared by all who long for it.

On the rooftop reaching into the heavens is the entrance to an endless museum of art, cocreated by prisoners of war and oppression, celebrating the human dream and spirit. In the museum's midst is a courtyard bedecked with magical colors and wildlife, where children, birds, and butterflies gather with renowned musicians, artists, and dancers to learn from each other about innocence, wonder, and creation. In this world of peace, reconciliation, and harmony, standing alone in a corner are reminders inside a dumpster waiting to be emptied and converted into mulch for growing new possibilities of learning, creating, and healing. It is sealed tightly lest its contents spill on to the floor with its toxic images from history contaminating all that touch them. Stored inside with the hope that they will serve to grow new life of caring and compassion are photos, drawings, and scrapings of:

- Fenced in, starving prisoners from an endless corridor of concentration camps
- Leftover scraps of images leftover from ages of horrifying massacres
- Bombed out images from Rwanda, Hiroshima, Dresden, Vietnam, China, and more than can ever be counted
- Endless reams of plans and designs for weapons of destruction, cruelty, and subjugation
- Sadly, more than can ever be imagined

From all of these terrifying remnants, we are reminded once again about the tragic, dehumanizing echoes of the past that can serve to teach us a new way to be or not to be with one another. In this worldview, the voices of those haunting specters can serve us by becoming fodder and manure for new growth as humans, lest we forget. In regard to whether this vision is realistic, possible, or even desirable, the mission of the griots and other storytellers is give witness to the voices of promise with all their possibilities.

It is in the dreams of peace and reconciliation that we discover new paths, and we hope all of you will join all of us who have carried out this

study in pursuing a path to world peace and reconciliation. We invite you to join your voice to this vision of peace and reconciliation, and together we can cocreate a new world. Share with us your stories and dreams at engagingpeace.com.

We began this journey with Rilke, who invited us simply to name things that portray us, as they spring to life in our hearts. Now, as we travel on, the poet invites us to continue sharing the voices we have met in this book for peace and reconciliation. We can join them and all that follow with a commitment to see their words, and in this simple act continue their story.

*There will be a book that includes these pages,
and she who takes it in her hands
will sit staring at it for a long time,
until she feels that she is being held
and you are writing.*

– Rainer Maria Rilke

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Perspectives on Peace and Reconciliation: A Final Integration

43

Kathleen Malley-Morrison, Chelsea Cogan,
Lauren St. Germain, and Andrew Potter

Peace is “being able to drink a cappuccino in a street café without fear.” (37-year-old German man)

“Peace is a basic human right. If that peace is compromised, individuals have every right to demand a restoration of that peace.” (19-year-old Kuwait man)

Peace is “the absence of war or terrorism, and the respect of international human rights for all.” (60-year-old British man)

Reconciliation is “A decision by two or more groups to set their differences aside and agree to disagree.” (31-year-old Canadian woman)

“Reconciliation is about forgiveness, making peace, and moving forward.” (25-year-old Chinese woman)

When the Group on International Perspectives on War and Peace (GIPGAP) first launched this international collaborative project, the year was 2002, and we were still reeling from the 9/11 attacks on buildings in the United States. The preliminary team consisted mostly of international students, both graduate and undergraduate, and their mentor, Professor Kathie Malley-Morrison. We were hard at work on cross-national studies of

perspectives on family violence but, like much of the rest of the world, were caught up in the post 9/11 furor. We watched in horror as the President of the United States rushed to invade first Afghanistan and then Iraq. We thought the world had changed forever. We lauded the protests, both in the United States and elsewhere, against those invasions. We found it as easy to put ourselves in the shoes of the innocent civilians being killed in Afghanistan and Iraq as of the civilians killed through the attacks on the towers in New York. We saw dismay at US aggression spreading in many other parts of the world. We wanted to do something so we used the tools with which we were most familiar – that is, research methods. We wanted to find out what ordinary people around the world thought about war, torture, and terrorism, and about apology, reconciliation, and peace. We thought how grand it would be to develop a survey that could be translated into many languages and administered around the world. We began work on that survey, and spent nearly 3 years generating open-ended items, pilot testing the early versions, and preparing it for translation. We began recruiting collaborators from around the world through word of mouth, peer networking, and notices in international bulletins.

Praeger International Security published our first four volumes, organized by country, while we were still in the process of collecting data from more than 40 different countries. In 2012, Springer is publishing our last two volumes, the *International Handbook of War, Torture, and*

K. Malley-Morrison (✉) • C. Cogan • L. St. Germain
Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston,
MA, USA
e-mail: kkmalley@comcast.net

A. Potter
School Psychology Program, UC, Berkeley, USA
e-mail: apot75@gmail.com

Terrorism, and the *International Handbook of Peace and Reconciliation*. These new books are organized by region and informed by Albert Bandura's theory of moral disengagement and engagement (see Chap. 1 of both volumes). In 2011, 10 years after the 9/11 attacks, the world was once again stunned by a sea change – the Arab Spring. In some countries, like Tunisia and Egypt, corrupt dictatorships were overthrown by largely peaceful demonstrators wanting more freedom, democracy, and social justice. In other countries, the entrenched power structure has proven capable of overwhelming aggression against their own people.

Between 2001 and 2011, we organized our project, collected and analyzed our survey responses, and have reported in these two volumes on the perspectives of people from established democracies, emerging democracies, autocracies, dictatorships, and a variety of other forms of government. We have collected data from participants far away from any armed conflict and participants who have been directly involved in armed conflict; from civilians and from individuals who are or have served in the military; from members of families who have lived for many generations in the same area and from refugees in refugee camps; and from residents of aggressor nations and residents of nations under attack from outside or inside. Some of our collaborators have worked comfortably within university settings in peaceful countries; others have chosen to undertake some risk to collect survey responses. Our purpose has been to gather the voices of peoples from around the world and to give you the opportunity to read their words. We have provided hundreds if not thousands of quotes from participants so that you can analyze for yourself the kinds of themes that emerge from their words. We have also conducted some exploratory analyses to determine the extent to which there appear to be patterns in response related to gender, military experience, having a relative in the military, and antiwar protest experience. In the next section, we provide a summary of what we have found in examining participants' definitions of peace and reconciliation, their

views on the right to protest, their beliefs on the role of apology in achieving reconciliation among nations that have engaged in armed conflict, and the extent to which they believe world peace can be achieved. Extended information on each of the coding systems used can be found in the introductory chapters of each section of this book and to a lesser extent in the final integrative chapter for each section.

The View Across Regions

Definitions of Peace and Reconciliation

Peace is “that there is no war, torture, or terrorism between nations.” (61-year-old Japanese woman)

Peace is “gift from God, a way for development and prosperity.” (50-year-old Angolan man)

Reconciliation is “natural state after the war.” (71-year-old Russian man)

Reconciliation is “Acknowledging wrongs in the past. Brokering understanding, peace, reparations, and moving past blame.” (25-year-old woman from the United States)

Table 43.1 summarizes the percentages of responses across the regions to two questions: “What is your definition of peace?” and “What is your definition of reconciliation?” Definitions of peace fell into three major categories: *negative peace*, *positive peace*, and *question of achievability/ideal*. A large plurality of definitions (percentage of total responses varied from 40% to 69%) across regions identified peace with the elements of *positive peace* (e.g., prerequisites for lasting peace such as fairness, equality, and democracy, plus the outcomes of such an achievement) rather than negative peace (i.e., removal, absence, or end of some aggressive act or dangerous situation). The only region in which the major portion of definitions did not fall into the *positive peace* category was the UK/Anglo region, which had the lowest percentage at 40%. Among the more popular themes in different regions were several prerequisites for *positive peace*: (a) *access to resources* in Africa, (b) *security* in the Middle

Table 43.1 Most common thematic categories for definitions of peace and reconciliation across regions

Item	Most common definitions	
	Peace	Reconciliation
	What is your definition of peace?	When is your definition of reconciliation?
<i>Region</i>		
Africa	Negative peace 33% (<i>rejecting violence 14%</i>)	Process 63% (<i>healing/reuniting 16%</i>)
	Positive peace 48% (<i>access to resources 7%</i>)	State 16% (<i>peace 8%</i>)
	Question of achievability 16%	Question of achievability 16%
East Asia	Negative peace 38% (<i>rejecting violence 15%</i>)	Process 65% (<i>come to terms 17%</i>)
	Positive peace 48% (<i>Positive emotions 9%</i>)	State 28% (<i>peace 11%</i>)
	Question of achievability 11%	Question of achievability 4%
Latin America	Negative peace 15% (<i>rejecting violence 7%</i>)	Process 61% (<i>come to terms 17%</i>)
	Positive peace 69% (<i>calm/tranquility 20%</i>)	State 28% (<i>peace 14%</i>)
	Question of achievability 13%	Question of achievability 9%
Middle East	Negative peace 14% (<i>rejecting violence 7%</i>)	Process 46% (<i>come to terms 15%</i>)
	Positive peace 68% (<i>security 10%</i>)	State 28% (<i>peace 13%</i>)
	Question of achievability 17%	Question of achievability 21%
Russia/Balkans	Negative peace 15% (<i>rejecting violence 6%</i>)	Process 57% (<i>come to terms 19%</i>)
	Positive peace 53% (<i>unspecified 13%</i>)	State 24% (<i>peace 8%</i>)
	Question of achievability 17%	Question of achievability 16%
South/Southeast Asia	Negative peace 35% (<i>rejecting violence 16%</i>)	Process 62% (<i>come to terms 14%</i>)
	Positive peace 51% (<i>unspecified 9%</i>)	State 27% (<i>peace 18%</i>)
	Question of achievability 13%	Question of achievability 8%
UK/Anglo	Negative peace 49% (<i>rejecting violence 28%</i>)	Process 78% (<i>come to terms 18%</i>)
	Positive peace 40% (<i>acceptance/tolerance 6%</i>)	State 24% (<i>peace 8%</i>)
	Question of achievability 9%	Question of achievability 4%
Western Europe	Positive peace 45% (<i>prerequisites for peace 6%</i>)	Process 64% (<i>come to terms 18%</i>)
	Question of achievability 13%	State 24% (<i>end of conflict 13%</i>)
	Negative peace 40% (<i>rejecting violence 27%</i>)	Question of achievability 9%

Figures indicate the percentages, by region, of definitions falling into the most common thematic categories (those with the largest percentage of responses out of all the definitions of that item (peace, reconciliation) in that region) Italicized words and percentages indicate the subcategory having the largest proportion of responses within the major category

East, and (c) general unspecified *prerequisites* in Western Europe. In some regions, the most popular *positive peace* definitions focused on its outcomes: (a) general *positive emotions* in East Asia and (b) *calm and tranquility* more specifically in Latin America.

Responses that fell into the *negative peace* category equated peace with the absence of some form of violence or aggression. The percentage of definitions of peace falling into the *negative peace* category ranged from lows of 14% in the Middle East and 15% in Latin America and the Russia/Balkans region to highs of 35% in South and

Southeast Asia, 39% in East Asia, and 49% in the UK/Anglo nations. In every region, the most commonly found theme among the *negative peace* definitions was *rejecting violence* (accounting for 6–28% of all *negative peace* definitions). The third category, *question of achievability/ideal*, was the least commonly used definitional category across regions (totaling between 9% and 17% of all responses to the request for a definition of peace).

Thus, overall, there was an extremely strong tendency across regions to provide positive peace rather than negative peace definitions and to focus on *prerequisites for peace* and the positive *outcomes*

of peace; however, there was also considerable variation across regions in the specific prerequisites and outcomes emphasized.

Table 43.1 also summarized the responses to “What is your definition of reconciliation?” These definitions were sorted into three separate categories: reconciliation as a *process*, reconciliation as a *state*, and *question of the achievability* of reconciliation. Across all regions, defining reconciliation as a *process* was the most common thematic response (accounting for 46–78% of all definitions of reconciliation). In the majority of regions, the most frequently used *process* definition was *come to terms* – which accounted for 14–17% of all definitions of reconciliation across regions, with the exception of Africa. The only region that did not have *come to terms* as their leading subcategory was Africa, where the most commonly mentioned reconciliation process was *healing/reuniting* (16% of the *process* definitions).

The second most common thematic category defined reconciliation as some sort of end *state* (with percentages ranging from 16% to 28% of total definitions of reconciliation). In all of the regions except for the Western Europe, the subcategory with the highest percentage of responses was *peace*; that is, they equated reconciliation with peace. In Western Europe, the *state* subcategory with the highest number of responses (13%) was *end of conflict*. The *question of achievability* category accounted for only 4–21% of definitions of reconciliation across regions.

Overall, across regions, participants appeared to be more consistent in their conceptualizations of reconciliation than of peace, viewing it more as a process than as some form of final outcome or end state – although when reconciliation was described as an end state, that state was peace.

Views on Protest Participation

[Individuals have the right to stage protests] “in the framework of a Western modern democracy!” (30-year-old Israeli man)

“Everyone is free to express their views without being violent towards others when expressing their views.” (22-year-old Turkish woman)

[If police were beating peaceful protestors, I would want to...] “take photos and send it to the media.” (30-year-old Afghan woman)

Table 43.2 provides information on the most frequently used categories (derived from Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement and engagement) and subcategories in each region for views on the right to protest. The overwhelming response to the statement “Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace” was agreement. The majority of responses in every region were arguments affirming the right to protest, with total percentages ranging from 82% to 97%. Within the *pro-protest* set of responses, Western Europe and the UK/Anglo region had similar percentages of answers in the subcategory *socially sanctioned rights* – 27% and 26%, respectively. Responses in this subcategory assume that protesting is a right only if it has been declared to be so through a legislative or other governing body. The only other region in which *socially sanctioned rights* constituted the most popular subcategory was the Middle East, with 16% of their *pro-protest* responses falling into that subcategory.

By contrast, in the East Asia, South/Southeast Asia, and Latin America regions, the subcategory with the highest percentage of *pro-protest* responses was *human rights* (at rates of 21%, 16%, and 17%, respectively), which is the subcategory for responses emphasizing that protesting is an inherent human right rather than a right established through some form of legal action. Finally, the regions of Africa and Russia/Balkans had two different most common subcategories within their *pro-protest* responses. The responses from Africa indicated that it was ones’ *moral responsibility* to protest a war if one was against it, with a rate of 14% of responses in this subcategory. The response most commonly occurring within the Russia/Balkans region was of *indeterminate status*, with 14% of *pro-protest* responses falling into this subcategory; responses in this subcategory expressed general agreement with a right to protest but provided no indication of the reasoning behind this agreement.

Table 43.2 The right to protest and responses to police beating peaceful protestors across regions

	Right to protest	Responses to scenario: police beating peaceful protestors
Item	Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace	Police are beating peaceful antiwar demonstrators. What would you want to do?
<i>Region</i>		
Western Europe	Pro-protest 96% (<i>socially sanctioned rights 27%</i>)	Pro-social 83% (<i>personal initiative 29%</i>)
	Anti-protest 1% (<i>denial of personal responsibility 1%</i>)	Antisocial 7% (<i>unlawful activism 6%</i>)
UK/Anglo	Pro-protest 90% (<i>socially sanctioned rights 26%</i>)	Pro-social 80% (<i>personal initiative 30%</i>)
	Anti-protest 2% (<i>distorting consequences 2%</i>)	Antisocial 11% (<i>unlawful activism 8%</i>)
		Lack of agency 7% (<i>lack of initiative 6%</i>)
Russia/Balkans	Pro-protest 84% (<i>indeterminate moral status-yes 14%</i>)	Pro-social 68% (<i>personal initiative 34%</i>)
	Anti-protest 3% (<i>moral reasoning 2%</i>)	Antisocial 14% (<i>unlawful activism 14%</i>)
		Lack of agency 12% (<i>lack of initiative 8%</i>)
Middle East	Pro-protest 89% (<i>socially sanctioned rights 16%</i>)	Pro-social 75% (<i>personal initiative 29%</i>)
	Anti-protest 4% (<i>distorting consequences 2%</i>)	Antisocial 10% (<i>unlawful activism 7%</i>)
		Lack of agency 14% (<i>lack of initiative 10%</i>)
Africa	Pro-protest 89% (<i>moral responsibility 14%</i>)	Pro-social 58% (<i>activism 18%</i>)
	Anti-protest 3% (<i>distorting consequences 1%</i>)	Antisocial 7% (<i>unlawful activism 6%</i>)
		Lack of agency 33% (<i>lack of initiative 31%</i>)
Latin America	Pro-protest 97% (<i>human rights 17%</i>)	Pro-social 83% (<i>activism 43%</i>)
	Anti-protest 1% (<i>moral reasoning 1%</i>)	Antisocial 6% (<i>unlawful activism 6%</i>)
		Lack of agency 8% (<i>lack of initiative 6%</i>)
South/Southeast Asia	Pro-protest 88% (<i>human rights 16%</i>)	Pro-social 83% (<i>activism 23%</i>)
	Anti-protest 5% (<i>distorting consequences 3%</i>)	Antisocial 8% (<i>unlawful activism 6%</i>)
		Lack of agency 7% (<i>lack of initiative 6%</i>)
East Asia	Pro-protest 82% (<i>human rights 21%</i>)	Pro-social 76% (<i>personal initiative 33%</i>)
	Anti-protest 2% (<i>distorting consequences 1%</i> <i>-moral reasoning 1%</i>)	Antisocial 12% (<i>unlawful activism 9%</i>)
		Lack of agency 9% (<i>lack of initiative 7%</i>)

Figures indicate the percentages of occurrence for the most common arguments used in each region for each item. Italicized words and percentages indicate the most common subcategory within the major category.

Although there was overwhelmingly strong endorsement of the right to protest, a small percentage of responses in each region disagreed that there is such a right (ranging from 1% of responses to 5%). There were three commonly occurring *anti-protest* themes. In South/Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the UK/Anglo regions, the *anti-protest* subcategory with the highest rates of response was *distorting consequences* (e.g., arguing that there is no right to protest during times of war because it could hurt the country’s cause). In East Asia, Latin America, and the Russia/Balkans regions, responses coded into the *anti-protest* subcategory of *moral reasoning* (arguing, for example, that protests are immoral because they hurt the

troops) were most common. Western Europe was the only region where the most common anti-protest argument was *denial of personal responsibility* (e.g., the assertion that it is the job of the government, not the people, to end wars).

Again, in regard to protest, we see on the one hand enormous agreement on the right to protest, but some variation across regions in the principles seen as underlying such a right. There was very little evidence across regions of endorsement of arguments commonly expressed by people in power that protests are unpatriotic or harmful to the country or armed forces.

Table 43.2 also provides the percentages of responses indicating what respondents would

want to do in the following situation: “Police are beating peaceful protestors. What would you want to do?” Based on Bandura’s construct of moral agency, responses to this item were coded into *pro-social agency*, *antisocial agency*, and *lack of agency* categories. In each region, a majority of these scenario responses (ranging from 58% to 83% of all the responses) were coded into the *pro-social agency* category, meaning that the respondent would want to take some form of action in the event of witnessing police brutality. The Western Europe, UK/Anglo, Russia/Balkans, Middle East, and East Asia regions had the highest rates of responses in the *personal initiative* subcategory, while the regions of Africa, South/Southeast Asia, and Latin America had the highest rates of responses in the *activism* subcategory.

The next most common category of responses was *lack of agency*, which accounted for 7–33% of all the scenario responses, with South/Southeast Asia having the lowest rate. In all regions, the most commonly occurring *lack of agency* subcategory was *lack of initiative*.

The *antisocial* category (e.g., recommendations to take aggressive actions against antiwar protestors) had the fewest responses coded into it, accounting for 6–12% of all scenario responses, with the subcategory of *unlawful activism* (wanting to harm the police) having the most responses across all regions.

Apology and Reconciliation

“Of course [apologies can lead to reconciliation], but not until 20–25 years after the invasion.” (41-year-old Icelandic woman)

“It [apology] can’t undo the past, but it can generate a feeling of good faith amongst the later generations.” (33-year-old Pakistani woman)

“There are no activities that will give us back lost lives.” (20-year-old Russian man)

“Apologizing is the best for the world’s peacefulness.” (21-year-old Malaysian man)

Table 43.3 summarizes the percentages across regions of views on the effectiveness of apology and the achievability of reconciliation. The responses from participants across regions to the statement “If

one country has in the past invaded, colonized, or exercised control over the governmental affairs of another country, an apology by the invading/colonizing/controlling country can improve the chances for reconciliation between the countries” were sorted into three groups: “yes/agree,” “no/disagree,” and “it depends”; each of these major groupings had multiple categories and sometimes subcategories.

In each region, the largest percentage of responses was coded into one of the “it depends” categories – with percentages ranging from 44% in Latin America and 46% in South and Southeast Asia to 55% in the UK/Anglo countries and the Middle East, 59% in the Russia/Balkans region, and a high of 68% in Western Europe. In Western Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, and South/Southeast Asia, the depends category with the highest percentage of responses was the one indicating that apology is a *good beginning/only one step*. In the UK/Anglo region, the Russia/Balkans, and East Asia region, it was the category *may be possible/worth a try/possible to some degree* that had the largest portion of “it depends” responses. In Africa, the two categories with the highest percentages of responses (with each constituting 16% of all “it depends” responses) were (a) *change behavior/respect and tolerance/positive outlook* and (b) *material reparations*.

The two categories of responses for “agree” or “disagree” (that an apology by an aggressor can lead to reconciliation) were fairly closely tied in their percentages across the regions. The group of “disagree” categories constituted 13–27% of total responses to the apology statement. The categories into which these responses fell varied somewhat across regions, but not to the degree that the “it depends” categories did. In the majority of regions, the main reasons given for why an apology would not work fell into the category *irreversible wrongdoings/does not erase the past*. The only region to differ in their most common disagreement argument was the UK/Anglo region, where nearly a quarter of the “disagree” responses simply asserted that reconciliation after apology for wrongdoing is *not possible* (totaling 24% of responses in the “disagree” category). Responses from all the regions that were placed into the “agree” categories accounted for

Table 43.3 Cross regional views on effectiveness of apology and achievability of reconciliation

	Effectiveness of apology	Achievability of reconciliation
Item	If one country has in the past invaded, colonized, or exercised control over the governmental affairs of another country, an apology by the invading/colonizing/controlling country can improve the chances for reconciliation between the countries	The steps that should be taken to achieve reconciliation are...
<i>Region</i>		
Western Europe	Agree 9% (<i>yes 67%</i>)	Achievable 96% (<i>sincerity 41%</i>)
	Disagree 13% (<i>irreversible wrongdoings/does not erase the past 25%</i>)	Unachievable 1% (<i>impossible 100%</i>)
	Depends 68% (<i>good beginning/only one step 20%</i>)	
UK/Anglo	Agree 14% (<i>yes 64%</i>)	Achievable 90% (<i>sincerity 42%</i>)
	Disagree 21% (<i>not possible 24%</i>)	Unachievable 3% (<i>impossible 34%</i>)
	Depends 55% (<i>may be possible/worth a try/possible to some degree 17%</i>)	
Russia/Balkans	Agree 13% (<i>yes 40%</i>)	Achievable 90% (<i>repair relations 78%</i>)
	Disagree 22% (<i>irreversible wrongdoings/does not erase the past 26%</i>)	Unachievable 4% (<i>impossible 37%</i>)
	Depends 59% (<i>may be possible/worth a try/possible to some degree 23%</i>)	
Middle East	Agree 21% (<i>yes 69%</i>)	Achievable 93% (<i>provide monetary goods or services 43%</i>)
	Disagree 19% (<i>irreversible wrongdoings/does not erase the past 39%</i>)	Unachievable 4% (<i>impossible 50%</i>)
	Depends 55% (<i>good beginning/only one step 20%</i>)	
Africa	Agree 24% (<i>repair relationships 52%</i>)	Achievable 93% (<i>repair relations; provide monetary goods or services 75%</i>)
	Disagree 13% (<i>irreversible wrongdoings/does not erase the past 36%</i>)	Unachievable 1% (<i>unrealistic 100%</i>)
	Depends 57% (<i>change behavior/respect and tolerance/positive outlook, 16%; material reparations 16%</i>)	
Latin America	Agree 22% (<i>yes 63%</i>)	Achievable 95% (<i>repair relations 54%</i>)
	Disagree 27% (<i>irreversible wrongdoings/does not erase the past 35%</i>)	Unachievable 3% (<i>impossible 63%</i>)
	Depends 44% (<i>good beginning/only one step 27%</i>)	
South/Southeast Asia	Agree 30% (<i>yes 44%</i>)	Achievable 97% (<i>provide monetary goods or services 43%</i>)
	Disagree 17% (<i>irreversible wrongdoings/does not erase the past 40%</i>)	Unachievable 2% (<i>only works superficially 67%</i>)
	Depends 46% (<i>good beginning/only one step 26%</i>)	
East Asia	Agree 20% (<i>yes 72%</i>)	Achievable 94% (<i>sincerity 45%</i>)
	Disagree 14% (<i>irreversible wrongdoings/does not erase the past 40%</i>)	Unachievable 3% (<i>unrealistic 55%</i>)
	Depends 56% (<i>may be possible/worth a try/possible to some degree 16%</i>)	

Figures indicate the percentages of occurrence for the most common themes observed in each region for each item. Italicized words and percentages indicate the most common subcategory within the major category.

9–30% of all responses given to the statement. The largest proportion of these “agree” responses were of the most general nature – for example, the word *yes* across all of the regions except for Africa. Africa was the only region in which a substantial portion of responses held that in this situation, an apology would work because it would *repair relationships*.

Thus, in regard to the possible role of apology in achieving reconciliation among nations where one of them has previously been an aggressor (e.g., an imperialistic power), strong arguments for and against such a possibility were greatly outnumbered by responses indicating that “it depends.” Although in some regions, the “it depends” responses were very noncommittal (e.g., “it’s worth a try”), the most popular recommendations across regions (*change behavior/respect and tolerance/positive outlook* and *material reparations*) are very consistent with research findings regarding the elements of a successful apology.

Table 43.3 also summarizes the response patterns across regions in regard to the statement, “The steps that should be taken to achieve reconciliation are...” There were two major groups of responses: (a) arguments indicating that steps could be taken that would make reconciliation achievable and (b) arguments why reconciliation was unachievable by any means. All of the regions and countries included in this survey stated that they believed there were specific steps to be taken that could make reconciliation achievable, with the percentages of responses in the achievable categories ranging from 90% (UK/Anglo and Russia/Balkans) to 97% (South/Southeast Asia). Although there was enormous consensus across regions concerning the achievability of reconciliation, the specific steps recommended to achieve this goal varied a great deal. The three most commonly identified requirements for ensuring that an apology could lead to reconciliation were (a) the need for *sincerity* in reconciliation (UK/Anglo, Western Europe, and East Asia regions), (b) the need for steps to be taken to *repair relations* (Russia/Balkans, Africa, and Latin America regions), and (c) the need to *provide monetary goods or services*

(Middle East, Africa, and South/Southeast Asian regions).

Although the percentages of responses asserting that reconciliation is unachievable account for only 1–4% of all answers to the item, the specific arguments made to justify judgments of unachievability varied somewhat across regions: (a) reconciliation is *unachievable* because it is *impossible* (Western Europe, UK/Anglo, Russia/Balkans, Middle East, and Latin America), (b) believing that reconciliation is *unrealistic* (Africa and East Asia), and (c) *only works superficially* (South/Southeast Asia).

Achievability of Peace

“Maybe (world peace is achievable) in a very distant future, if humans still exist. In our times, human nature will not allow this to happen.” (26-year-old Brazilian man)

“Groups are inherently pretty psychotic, and trying to get groups (nations, religions, etc.) to behave reasonably or peacefully is extraordinarily difficult.” (44-year-old Iranian woman)

“Perhaps it’s idealistic or silly, but it’s the only way I can keep working here in Afghanistan.” (30-year-old Afghan woman)

“[To achieve world peace,] The big empires must understand the significance of social justice.” (22-year-old Costa Rican woman)

Table 43.4 provides a summary, by region, of *humanitarian engagement* and *disengagement* responses to the item “I believe that world peace can be achieved.” Overall, based on a coding system derived from Albert Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement, the majority of responses across all regions were coded into one of the *humanitarian engagement* categories, with percentages for *humanitarian engagement* ranging from 52% to 78% of all responses to this item. These responses were characterized by sociocognitive reasoning supportive of world peace, plus expressed agency on behalf of world peace. Across almost every region (Western Europe, UK/Anglo, Africa, Latin America, South/Southeast Asia, and East Asia), the *engagement* category with the highest percentages of responses

Table 43.4 Cross regional views of achievability of peace and prerequisites for peace

	Can world peace be achieved?	Achievability of peace
Item	I believe world peace can be achieved...	The best way to achieve peace is...
Region		
Western Europe	Engaged 64% (<i>interpersonal values</i> 15%)	Focus on achievability 37% (<i>recognizing reasons</i> 19%)
	Disengaged 28% (<i>attribution of blame</i> 12%)	Prerequisites for peace 61% (<i>pro-social actions</i> 31%)
UK/Anglo	Engaged 55% (<i>interpersonal values</i> 13%)	Focus on achievability 40% (<i>recognizing reasons</i> 22%)
	Disengaged 31% (<i>attribution of blame</i> 12%)	Prerequisites for peace 56% (<i>pro-social actions</i> 26%)
Russia/Balkans	Engaged 52% (<i>governmental responsibility</i> 14%)	Focus on achievability 39% (<i>recognizing reasons</i> 18%)
	Disengaged 32% (<i>attribution of blame</i> 11%)	Prerequisites for peace 58% (<i>pro-social actions</i> 25%)
Middle East	Engaged 74% (<i>governmental responsibility</i> 15% = <i>interpersonal values</i> 15%)	Focus on achievability 26% (<i>recognizing reasons</i> 13%)
	Disengaged 17% (<i>attribution of blame</i> 7%)	Prerequisites for peace 72% (<i>pro-social actions</i> 38%)
Africa	Engaged 61% (<i>interpersonal values</i> 15%)	Focus on achievability 44% (<i>recognizing reasons</i> 28%)
	Disengaged 35% (<i>attribution of blame</i> 16%)	Prerequisites for peace 55% (<i>pro-social actions</i> 26%)
Latin America	Engaged 77% (<i>interpersonal values</i> 18%)	Focus on achievability 29% (<i>recognizing reasons</i> 9%)
	Disengaged 15% (<i>destructive human nature</i> 16%)	Prerequisites for peace 69% (<i>pro-social actions</i> 35%)
South/Southeast Asia	Engaged 78% (<i>interpersonal values</i> 21%)	Focus on achievability 23% (<i>indeterminate achievability</i> 7%)
	Disengaged 12% (<i>attribution of blame</i> 6%)	Prerequisites for peace 76% (<i>pro-social actions</i> 35%)
East Asia	Engaged 65% (<i>interpersonal values</i> 16%)	Focus on achievability 38% (<i>recognizing reasons</i> 15%)
	Disengaged 24% (<i>attribution of blame</i> 9%)	Prerequisites for peace 59% (<i>pro-social actions</i> 26%)

Figures indicate the percentages of occurrence for the most common mechanisms used in each region for each item. Italicized words and percentages indicate the most common subcategory within the major category.

(ranging from 13% to 23% of all *engagement* responses) was *interpersonal values*. Only in the Russia/Balkans region did the most popular *engagement* response fall into the *governmental responsibility* category, suggesting that it's the role of the government to produce peace. In the Middle East, *interpersonal values* and *governmental responsibility* were tied as the most popular categories, with each accounting for 15% of all *engagement* responses.

While the percentages of *disengaged* responses were lower than the *engaged* responses in all

regions, the percentages were slightly higher than those given in regard to the right to protest across regions (ranging from 12% to 35%). In all of the regions except for Latin America, it was the *attribution of blame* category that accounted for the largest percentage of *disengaged* responses. Only in Latin America did *destructive human nature* account for the largest percentage of *disengaged* responses (16%).

Table 43.4 also summarizes across regions the percentages in major coding categories and subcategories of responses to the sentence comple-

tion item “The best way to achieve peace is...” The category with the highest percentages of responses across regions was *prerequisites for peace* (with percentages from 55% in Africa and 56% in the UK/Anglo countries to 72% in Africa and 76% in South and Southeast Asia). Thus, when participants were asked about the best way to achieve peace, more than half the responses in every region provided specific recommendations. Within this category, recommendations for *pro-social actions* constituted the most common theme across regions.

The next major category for responses concerning the best way to achieve peace is *focus on achievability* (accounting for 23–44% of total responses). In each of the regions except South/Southeast Asia, the subcategory with the largest percentages of responses was *recognizing reasons* (responses in this subcategory accounted for 9–28% of the answers within the category of *focus on achievability*). South/Southeast Asia was the only region to have responses coded for *indeterminate achievability* (unclear as to whether peace could be achieved or not) constitute the most common subcategory at a rate of 23%. It is interesting to note that overall, across regions, there is considerable consensus about the extent to which peace is achievable and how to achieve it.

The Importance of Peace and Reconciliation

All one needs to do in these modern times to hear of violence and war is turn on the television or surf the internet; destruction, violence, and war are all around us. With numerous wars involving various countries occurring all around the world at the same time, the concepts of peace and reconciliation can seem elusive and overly idealistic. However, with the threat of nuclear war and advances in warfare technology, achieving peace and coming to terms with one another through reconciliation become critically important to survival of human life on the planet.

Even in an environment in which violence and war are commonplace, participants in our collaborative project from all regions of the world stated

that they would want to intervene in some manner if they saw police brutalizing peaceful anti-war protestors. With this degree of consensus as to the right of people to engage in peaceful protests, the stage appears to be set for monumental change – and movement in this direction may be precisely what we are seeing in the various Occupy movements around the world.

The findings in this book suggest that despite nuclear threat, terrorism, and the tearing apart of many countries by armed conflict, a substantial percentage of people throughout the world, even those currently involved in war, view world peace as *achievable* and are quick to recommend some steps for achieving it. Moreover, the steps they recommend are pro-social rather than antisocial; few of them accept the myth that war is needed to achieve peace.

For peace to be lasting, two things are probably necessary: (a) the achievement of a positive peace characterized by social justice, equality, and democracy and (b) reconciliation among warring parties. It is very interesting that in all of the regions of the world except the UK/Anglo cultural region, the major portion of the definitions of peace did indeed equate it with positive peace. Could this be just a sampling issue or are a large portion of the citizenry of the UK/Anglo countries, the offshoots of the once globally pervasive British Empire, really convinced that peace will never be more than an absence of violence (at least on their own shores) rather than a product more of expanding democracy and equality than of capitalist markets?

And how can reconciliation be achieved? There was wide consensus among our participants that the movement toward apologies being offered by previous perpetrators of violence and injustice could be helpful, but words are not enough to facilitate real reconciliation. There was even a common consensus among regions as to the various steps that could be taken to achieve reconciliation, such as *sincerity* in reconciliation attempts, *proving monetary goods or services* as a form of reconciliation, and also *repairing relations* as playing a crucial role in reconciliation.

The majority of responses received in this book were from citizens around the age of 30,

with some of the regions having especially high numbers of college-aged participants. This means that the responses to the ideas of peace and reconciliation given in this book may potentially be the views of future world leaders. Even if these views do not belong to future leaders, they belong to the world at large, and demonstrate that reconciliation between countries involved in conflict and world peace as a whole are a possibility due to the sheer number of people who believe this to be so. In a world in which the nightly news details

war and violence, the fact that there are people from all countries and regions of the world, no matter their cultural differences, who believe that peace, as well as reconciliation, are still achievable is something that can give all of us hope for a brighter future. The Occupy Wall Street movement of 2011 quickly expanded to include Occupy the Pentagon, Occupy Veterans, and a variety of antiwar groups around the world – many of whose demands are precisely the elements of positive peace.

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