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Sadism/Masochism

Darren Langdridge
Psychology, The Open University,
Milton Keynes, UK

Introduction

There has been a paucity of literature on sadism and masochism from a critical perspective until relatively recently. These sexual practices/identities continue to be misunderstood and the subject of considerable vilification with a history that is replete with medical, psychological, and legal opprobrium, alongside considerable confusion concerning their definition, role in sexual life, and aetiology. However, thankfully in recent years there has been a critical challenge to extant psychological and psychiatric understandings and the growth of a new and exciting critical stance, which seeks to understand rather than pathologize this intriguing example of human sexual behavior (Kleinplatz & Moser, 2006; Langdridge & Barker, 2013; Moser & Madeson, 1998; Taylor, 1997).

Definition

Sadism is a term first used by Richard von Krafft-Ebing, a psychiatrist writing in the late 1800s, derived as a result of the writings of the notorious French nobleman the Comte de Sade, born in 1740 (more commonly referred to as the Marquis de Sade), while Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, an Austrian novelist born in 1836, provided the inspiration for Krafft-Ebing's label of masochism. It was not until Freud, writing in 1938, however that the two terms were combined to produce the label: sadomasochism. Prior to that point early sexologists had considered the two "disorders" to be distinct "pathologies." In these early psychiatric terms, sadism referred to pleasure derived through the infliction of pain upon another, while masochism referred to pleasure derived from having pain inflicted. This definition is, however, deeply flawed for the way in which it fails to account for the broad range of activities that fall under the label of sadomasochism.

SM subcultures are replete with specific terms that carry considerable meaning for those involved, which are often misunderstood by others outside the subculture. To begin with, it is rare for people to use the term sadomasochism when referring to their sexual activities with most preferring to use the abbreviations SM, S&M, S/M, or the compound term BDSM (bondage and discipline, domination and submission, and sadomasochism). For some it is important to separate out the activities/identities of sadism and masochism, while others feel it is appropriate to bring them together (as SM) on the

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basis of the belief that one is not possible without the other. A variety of other terms are used to describe different participants or positions in SM. Generally, "sadist," "dominant," "dom/domme," and "top" are used for the person in the position of power or the one acting on the other (to dominate, inflict pain, etc.) and "masochist," "submissive," "sub," and "bottom" used for the person on the receiving end. A "switch" is used to describe someone who takes both roles. SM activities are frequently described as "play" or a "scene" and non-SM sex referred to as "vanilla." SM may involve more than people simply engaging in sexual practices but also refer to a sexual identity, as an "SMer." A key phrase adopted by very many people engaging in SM is SM as "safe, sane, and consensual" (SSC), describing the core conditions for SM play. More recently, use of the acronym RACK (risk-aware consensual kink) has grown in popularity, in recognition of the fact that no activity is 100 % safe (implied in SSC), alongside a move to question the need to warrant a person's sanity for choosing to engage in SM practices.

Contemporary understandings of sadism/masochism (and/or sadomasochism) have broadened and indeed challenged the earlier pathologizing position in quite profound ways. Denman (2004) makes a useful distinction between transgressive and coercive sex with transgressive sex concerning sexual activity that attracts social disapproval (and often consequent legal sanctions). Coercive sex is where one party has not consented to the sexual activities. This distinction has and continues to be blurred with regard to sadomasochism. In this piece the focus is on consensual sexual practice that falls under the sexual label of sadomasochism rather than nonconsensual acts of violence perpetrated by one or more persons against another. In these terms, SM is a sexual subculture involving participants engaging in a very wide variety of consensual activities including dominance and submission, bondage, humiliation, various forms of hitting or cutting to enhance sexual pleasure, and much more besides. SM practitioners invariably seek to ensure the physical safety of their partners, in stark contrast to the criminal sadist.

Keywords

Sadomasochism; SM; BDSM; sexual subculture; transgressive sex

Traditional Debates

Traditional psychological and psychiatric research and writing on SM has invariably involved an examination of aetiology, frequently from a psychodynamic perspective though with some behavioral and biological work. Much of this work fails to honor the experience of SM practitioners themselves, instead imposing theoretical frameworks of meaning that a priori treat SM as psychopathology in need of treatment and cure. In addition, much of this work conflates consensual SM practices/identities with coercive acts and/or draws on data from clinical populations to extrapolate to all people engaged in SM. Writers from these traditions have proposed a plethora of causal explanations for these seemingly inexplicable behaviors, many of which have limited empirical support. Psychoanalytic explanations have theorized SM as the result of punitive early childhood sexual excitation or as a neurotic distortion of the primary drives (for instance, fusion of the death instinct and libido). Object-relations theorists have focussed on mastery and the unification of love and hate in early childhood, for instance, through the anger produced by the withdrawal of the breast. Many other conflicting psychodynamic accounts have also been produced with no strong empirical support. Behavioral theorists have suggested SM is the result of learning and conditioning, beginning in early childhood, while some biological psychiatrists have suggested SM is the result of differential brain pathology. What all of these theories have in common is the way in which they construct SM in essentialist terms as psychopathology or ill health.

Sadism and masochism are still classified as psychiatric disorders in ICD 10, the medical diagnostic manual of the World Health Organisation (WHO), and until 2013 also in DSM, the diagnostic manual of the American Psychiatric

Association. Like homosexuality some thirty years ago, consensual SM has been considered alongside coercive sexual activities (such as nonconsensual exhibitionism) and attraction to children as individual psychopathology. The ongoing campaigns concerning the inclusion of SM as a psychiatric disorder appear to have had an effect, as the most recent edition of DSM (DSM – 5) now no longer treats consensual sadomasochistic activities as psychopathology in need of treatment and cure.

Opposition to SM has not only been medical but also legal with a number of high-profile cases (such as "Operation Spanner"and the development of legislation prohibiting 'extreme pornography' in the UK) serving to mark off what is acceptable and what is not acceptable sexual behavior within particular states. Legal battles continue and the position of SMers as abject citizens within both medical and legal systems has been the subject of considerable debate (see Langdridge, 2006).

Critical Debates

Critical psychological and psychiatric work on SM is relatively recent. The principal shift from more traditional work has been through a move away from an a priori assumption of psychopathology towards an examination of the experience of participants themselves, within the context of respect for SMers, their stories, and subcultures. Much of the early non-pathologizing work conducted in the late seventies and eighties was descriptive (often questionnaire studies) with a focus on describing the history, context, and array of sexual behaviors practiced. These studies found that people develop an interest in SM at a variety of ages, there is no clear point of onset, and the activities/practices are hugely varied within and between people, taking place in individual, couple, group, intimate, and professional contexts. The importance of SM, as part of a person's sex life, also varies enormously from those who see it as an adjunct to vanilla sex to those whose sex life is entirely focussed on SM. There is little evidence of psychological problems associated with practicing SM, with most having positive self-esteem, low reported rates of depression, and low rates of emotional, sexual, or physical abuse in childhood. Comparisons of nonclinical samples of people engaging in SM do not find any significant differences between them and people engaging in more mainstream sexual activities. In summary, there is nothing remarkable, deviant, or abnormal, from a psychological perspective, about people who engage in SM.

Within the last fifteen years or so, critical psychological work on SM has built on this descriptive foundation to explore the experience, discourses, and sociocultural context of SM in more detail (see Langdridge and Barker, 2013, for a good selection of this work). This growing literature has adopted a variety of different theoretical perspectives including phenomenology, social constructionism, and queer theory and addressed a wide variety of issues. These include critical debates about psychopathology; expressed experiences of different aspects of SM (such as pain and pleasure, dominance and submission); the relationship between SM, gender, feminism, and queer theory; the therapeutic potential of SM; SM subcultures and their history; embodiment, SM, and transcendence; and relationships and family. For many of us working in this area, there has been a welcome and progressive move away from the debates of yesteryear about pathology towards an awareness of how SM might offer fascinating insights into human sexuality, culture, and society that is of relevance to all.

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Online Resources

https://ncsfreedom.org/ - National coalition for sexual freedom
https://ncsfreedom.org/resources/kink-aware-professionals-directory/kap-directory-homepage.html – Kink aware professionals listing

Savage Versus Civilized

David Kritt
Department of Education, College of Staten Island/CUNY, Staten Island, NY, USA

Introduction

Historically, the use of the terms "savage" and "civilized" reflected prevalent European ideological assumptions of cultural and racial superiority. In defining indigenous peoples as less-than-human, colonizers justified their right to appropriate land and subordinate those who resided there. Such formulations are now abhorrent and decolonizing efforts question many accompanying assumptions.

Definition

Civilized societies are hierarchically organized, with complex political and economic systems. Commonly cited features of civilization include private property, division of labor, monetary systems of exchange, literacy, technologies, and codified legal systems.

Although relations of domination occurred within Asia and Africa, dichotomization that labeled and helped to create inequalities may have emerged when Western European societies first made contact with non-Europeans. Identifying "the other" and discussing differences implied comparison to Western culture. Indigenous peoples have been both glorified and, more often, demonized at various points in European history. The denigrative designations "savage" and "primitive" persisted through the majority of the twentieth century. This was predicated upon faith in progress and an unquestioning acceptance of the advanced features of modern Western cultures.

Keywords

Indigenous peoples; rational/irrational; emotion; mysticism; colonialism

Traditional Debates

The superior rationality of civilized peoples has been asserted as an article of faith, and held in juxtaposition to the biology-based, animal-like tendencies of "human nature." Savage behavior has been characterized by immediate, direct action. Emotions and mythical beliefs were thought to underlie the social life of primitive peoples, in contrast to the general logical concepts of advanced civilization, where the cognitive element is detached from affective factors.

This stance continues to influence psychological theory and practice. Thought and emotion are often dichotomized, with emotion routinely considered more primal and less advanced than instrumental rationality. In the past, lower levels of functioning have been attributed to women and tribal peoples, who were likened to immature children. A great deal of attention is devoted to the control of emotions, especially those related to anger and violent behavior.

The essential function of scientific rationality is to inform in an "objective" way. Anthropology has been more successful than Psychology in recognizing that the assumptions inherent in determining what is objective and what is not are themselves cultural. Typically, Western reasoning and scientific inference were the standard against which other cultural practices were measured.

Cultural artifacts and a greater degree of organization of social relations have been used as

a basis for attributing superior cognitive functioning. Civilization is characterized as ordered, logical, and objective. Agriculture, domestication of animals, and industrialization require prediction, control, and rational planning for the future. Simple thought processes such as perceptual relationships (e.g., distinctions or simple parallels) are considered lower process than those involving symbolization. Furthermore, concepts of causation differ, with primitive thought invoking spirits or focused upon contiguity. Sophisticated, scientific, concepts of causation tend to focus on physical, mechanical processes; when these are not visible to the naked eye, they are predicated on complex abstract systems of thought such as chemistry, physics, or psychological theory. Predominant models of cognition have been based upon logical sequences, sometimes likening human thought to machine thought. Alternately, models of cognition have focused upon the expertise of members of advanced societies.

The thought of non-industrialized peoples has been considered an earlier stage of development, and analogies have been drawn between ontogeny across childhood and societies. Such comparisons fail to acknowledge indigenous rationality (Cole, Gay, Glick, & Sharp, 1971; Evans Pritchard, 1976; Levi-Straus, 1973). The reasoning of so-called primitive peoples must be understood in relation to culturally relevant activities and purposes. A number of questions arise when complex interrelated systems of thought differing from our own are acknowledged. The same logic can be applied to different basic premises or within complex cultural belief systems. Or, there may be a fundamental difference in the logic and inferential paths used (e.g., not relying on mechanical or linear causality).

Critical Debates

Despite the use of biological language, interpretation of "human nature" and "instinct" and the social uses of the concepts are not always strictly scientific. Such terminology has often served political-economic interests, asserting universal standards or creating the "other" in a way that asserts superiority of one's own group.

In the cognitive literature, the focus is often simply on "difference". Theoretical distinctions between "intuitive" and "scientific" concepts (Vygotsky, 1987) or "intuitive" versus "schooled" thought (Gardner, 1995) embody value judgments. Symbolic rational thought, which is deliberate, efficient, and goal-directed is considered superior to intuitive or primary process thought, which has been characterized as involuntary, rich, and chaotic (Neisser, 1967).

Although many social problems are attributed to the barbarism of the uncivilized, so-called civilized societies are not immune to savage cruelty, including wars, police brutality, and severe economic inequality. Established authority requires obedience to laws and restraints upon behavior. Socially unacknowledged and repressed emotions, including sexual and aggressive tendencies, have been subordinated by society (Freud, 2002). Societal strictures can result in psychological alienation.

Civilized societies tend to mask brutality under the guise of civility, which is deployed as a rhetorical device to guarantee the advantage of those in power, who had a hand (directly or indirectly) in setting rules and a stake in upholding them. Politeness, manners, and other civil performances are sometimes claimed to have an ethical value that supports quality of life, blurring distinctions between cultural rules and morality (e.g., Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987).

Considering "savage versus civilized" has great implications for the future of humankind. The recent push toward globalization is justified by improved communication technologies and Western demand for cheap manufacturing and expanded markets. While proponents cite progress, democracy, and free markets, critics view it as an extension of Western imperialism.

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Schizophrenia

Eugenie Georgaca
School of Psychology, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece

Introduction

The diagnostic category of schizophrenia is possibly the most debated amongst mental disorders. As the hallmark of psychiatric classification, it has been vehemently defended by the psychiatric establishment and intensely challenged by various critical perspectives. It has also been subject to sustained research efforts and extensive clinical and theoretical discussions over more than a century. Despite these efforts, 'schizophrenia' remains elusive, as there is still no agreement over its etiology, clinical manifestation, course and prognosis.

Definition

In psychiatric terms, the diagnostic category of schizophrenia belongs to a group of disorders called 'psychoses' [see entry on *psychosis*]. Individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia are thought to suffer from pervasive cognitive, emotional and behavioural disorganisation as well as loss of contact with reality, at least during the crisis phases. Within the dominant medical model schizophrenia is understood as a syndrome, that is to say as a well-bounded unity, that is distinct from other syndromes and from mental health, the identification of which through diagnosis leads to safe predictions regarding its course and response to treatment [see entry on *diagnosis*].

The experiences associated with the disorder typically start in early adulthood and have a highly variable course, from complete recovery to chronicity and deterioration. Individuals who receive the diagnosis of schizophrenia tend to also experience chronic disability, low quality of life, unemployment, stigma and reduced life expectancy. In many ways the diagnostic category of schizophrenia comes the closest to the lay notion of madness, with the implications of irrationality, unpredictability, dangerousness and incurability that this notion carries, and those who come under its realm suffer the consequences.

Keywords

Madness; psychosis; medical model; psychiatry; users/survivors; anti-psychiatry; critical psychiatry; post-psychiatry

History

The disorder of 'schizophrenia' was first delineated in 1898 by the German psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin, who identified a condition which he named 'dementia praecox', that is to say 'early senility', because in his view it is characterized by early start and a deteriorating course, caused by a morbid brain process. In 1911 it was renamed by the Swiss psychiatrist Eugene Bleuler to 'schizophrenia', meaning 'splitting of mental processes', which he considered to be its distinctive feature. The description of the category has not changed much since. The early editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, published by the American Psychiatric Association, offered a descriptive clinical picture of the category, influenced by the psychosocial

model of understanding mental disorders that was prevalent in the first half of the twentieth century. This was replaced from the third edition onwards, published in 1980, with a supposedly atheoretical listing of symptoms and precise instructions for differential diagnosis, consistent with the biological turn in psychiatry in the latter part of the twentieth century, which continues today. A similar pattern can be detected in the numerous editions of the International Classification of Diseases published by the World Health Organization. Increasing criticism to the concept of schizophrenia coming from a variety of professions and theoretical orientations has led even the American Psychiatric Association in recent years to formally open up the question of 'deconstructing psychosis', with the stated aim of considering reconceptualising the diagnostic category (Tamminga, Sirovatka, Regier, & van Os, 2009), a process which is still ongoing, although it looks unlikely to take a particularly radical turn.

The classification, etiology, diagnosis and treatment of schizophrenia has been at the centre of psychiatric efforts since the late nineteenth century. From its inception, schizophrenia was assumed to be a heritable brain disorder, consistent with the biological orientation of psychiatry aspiring to establish itself as a medical specialty. Intense research has been and is being conducted on discovering the causes of schizophrenia in brain structure and neurochemistry and more recently on establishing its genetic markers. This orientation has been reflected in the treatments offered to people experiencing this form of distress. Individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia populated the asylums up to mid-to-late twentieth century and were subjected to rather crude physical interventions, which were initially hailed as breakthrough cures and subsequently considered at best controversial and at worst seriously damaging. The discovery of neuroleptic drugs in the 1950s, which seemed effective in eliminating or controlling the experiences which were understood as symptoms of schizophrenia by altering brain neurochemistry, was considered a major breakthrough, both in terms of cure and in terms of definitively establishing the biological etiology of the disorder. The rapid expansion of neuroleptic medication use ran parallel with the process of deinstitutionalization, the closure of asylums and establishment of networks of community based mental health services, taking place in most developed countries, and the relationship between the two is a matter of debate. Today, medication is the main and most often the only treatment offered to individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (Bentall, 2009).

Traditional Debates

A distinction between traditional and critical debates is not a straightforward task. In this entry, the section on traditional debates includes those arguments that, although critical of the medical model of schizophrenia, still retain the concept, while the section on critical debates includes perspectives which question the concept and existence of schizophrenia itself.

The medical model of schizophrenia, which postulates that schizophrenia as a syndrome is distinct from other disorders and from mental health, has been challenged on both counts. Firstly, the concept of commorbidity testifies to the fact that individuals frequently have experiences which can be classified as symptoms of different disorders, and the widespread existence of commorbidity has been documented both in community and in clinical population studies. Also, the central role of emotional processes in the experiences associated with schizophrenia has been increasingly discussed in clinical psychology literature, breaking up thus the traditional distinction between the diagnostic categories of affective psychoses, bipolar disorder and major depression, on the one hand and schizophrenia on the other. Secondly, the purported distinctiveness of schizophrenia from so-called normal states has been definitively challenged by population studies, which document the presence of milder forms of 'schizophrenia-like' experiences and personality traits in community samples. This has led to the well-established continuity theory of psychosis, according to which there is continuity in the general population between mild 'schizotypal' traits and experiences and marked psychotic states, implying that

individuals can pass from one state to another depending on environmental conditions and life experiences (Bentall, 2003).

A related debate is that concerning the etiology of the category of schizophrenia. According to the dominant psychiatric view, schizophrenia is a genetically and biologically determined condition, and psychological, interpersonal and social factors can have an impact on vulnerable individuals only as triggers or as factors influencing the content of symptoms and course of the disorder. This view has been challenged by numerous epidemiological studies, that have consistently demonstrated the role of environmental factors, such as prenatal and perinatal injuries, early trauma and abuse, urbanicity, migration, minority status and psychosocial adversity, in the frequency, manifestation and course of experiences associated with the concept of schizophrenia. The overwhelming evidence regarding the role of environmental factors has led to a shift to complex ways of theorizing the etiology of the category of schizophrenia, which, notwithstanding their differences, tend to coalesce in the view that genetic predisposition combined with early environmental damage produce neurodevelopmental impairments, mainly in the form of vulnerability to dopamine deregulation. This in turn, in conditions of accumulated psychosocial adversity, can lead to abnormal perceptual experiences that, if interpreted in biased ways, can escalate to the full-blown experiences which are considered symptoms of schizophrenia. These accounts treat genetic, biological, social and psychological processes as contributing etiological factors, and dopamine deregulation, once held as a central cause of schizophrenia, is relegated to a link in the causal chain leading to full-blown psychosis (Morgan, McKenzie, & Fearon, 2008).

The 'salience theory of dopamine', according to which the triggering by life events of dopamine hyperactivity leads to a distorted experience of self and environment, is lent support by phenomenological studies of pre-psychotic states, which describe the bewildering for the person alteration of their sense of self and reality before any of the experiences which would be recognizable as schizophrenic symptoms appear. These studies are part of a philosophical trend of studying the phenomenology of the 'schizophrenic world', the way individuals with experiences that would be diagnosed as schizophrenic symptoms experience and make sense of themselves and their environment (Sass & Parnas, 2003). The systematic description of this subjective perspective provides a refreshing and illuminating alternative to the objectifying psychiatric gaze.

Critical Debates

A different set of debates has emerged through the rejection of schizophrenia as a category that meaningfully describes and can contribute to understanding and dealing with severely distressing experiences. In her historical analysis, Boyle (2002) has convincingly argued that the clinical picture of the category of schizophrenia described in the early classification schemes does not correspond to that presented today and, moreover, that the initial construction of the concept of schizophrenia did not follow scientific rules, was not backed by appropriate evidence and was possibly based on different populations. A sustained critique of the notion of schizophrenia as syndrome shows that it does not fulfill any of the criteria for a psychiatric syndrome and that it lacks reliability and validity (Bentall, 2003). The demonstration of the unsustainability of the category of schizophrenia on both historical and scientific grounds begs the question of how and why the concept remains the core of psychopathology, and the answers given by various commentators implicate the social management of distress, the professional status of psychiatry as a medical discipline and the interests of the pharmaceutical industry as well as administrative and bureaucratic reasons. The rejection of the concept of schizophrenia has led to a symptom-based, or complaint-based, approach, which examines specific phenomena, conventionally conceived as symptoms of schizophrenia, in their own right, within a continuity model, using existing ways of understanding 'normal' psychological processes. Over the last two decades there has been a growing body of knowledge regarding hearing voices and delusions and this has been accompanied by the development of treatment approaches specifically tailored to helping people manage these experiences (e.g. Romme & Escher, 2000).

Historically speaking, the first sustained radical rejection of the concept of schizophrenia was anti-psychiatry in the 1970s. Anti-psychiatry condemned the biological model of schizophrenia and its associated psychiatric practices, but the alternatives it ended up proposing relied on individual freedom, personal development and spiritual growth. Although very influential in its time, anti-psychiatry did not have much impact on the management of distress and quickly lost its momentum. Critical psychiatry is a contemporary movement, carrying over anti-psychiatry's radical stance and complementing it with a critical examination of psychiatric knowledge and practice as well as their consequences on users of mental health services. Critical psychiatry highlights the political nature of psychiatric practice and, together with post-psychiatry (Bracken & Thomas, 2005), another contemporary critical approach, places emphasis on the role of context in mental distress, on ethics rather than technology in mental health knowledge and practice and on mental health practice as relationship (Double, 2006). These perspectives ally themselves with, draw upon and support the growing movement of users of mental health services, which has also articulated a radical critique of the concept of schizophrenia and the mental health practices it has been used to justify and have developed alternative ways of conceptualizing and dealing with distress, mainly through self-management and self-help (Wallcraft, Read, & Sweeney, 2003).

International Relevance

There has been considerable debate regarding the universality of the diagnostic category of schizophrenia, which is linked to debates regarding its genetic origin. A very large epidemiological study conducted in the 1960s by the World Health Organisation in several countries found that the experiences diagnosed as symptoms of schizophrenia and the percentage of the population with a schizophrenia diagnosis are similar in different regions of the world, which was taken as support to the argument that schizophrenia is a genetically determined biological condition. The striking finding of the same study, however, that the course and outcome of experiences diagnosed as symptoms of schizophrenia is better in non-industrialised in comparison to industrialized countries provided evidence for the role of culture and society in the development of the experiences associated with the disorder. In the last few decades, evidence of significant geographic, historical and demographic variation in the incidence, manifestation and course of experiences associated with schizophrenia has accumulated, fuelling theories and studies of environmental, social and cultural determinants of the category of schizophrenia.

Studies exploring the experience, understanding and dealing with phenomena that would be characterized as psychotic by Western medicine in different parts of the world have highlighted the considerable variation between cultures, but also within them. However, the expansion of Western medical science and mental health practice in the rest of the world has meant that the dominant medical model of schizophrenia and its associated practices of diagnosis and treatment have prevailed in most countries, at least in urban areas, and have displaced local forms of understanding and treatment of distress (Fernando, 2002). Given the debatable character of the notion of schizophrenia and the considerable ineffectiveness of current medical forms of treatment in alleviating distress, maintaining a critical stance and recuperating alternative forms of understanding and treating distress is an essential issue of relevance internationally (Watters, 2010).

Practice Relevance

The critique of the biological notion of schizophrenia has given rise to non-biological treatments which, although still in the margins, are increasingly gaining prominence. In the first half of the twentieth century the only non-biological theory of schizophrenia was psychoanalysis. However, the psychoanalytic treatment could not be applied large scale in asylums and was restricted to a few private clinics. In the latter half of the twentieth century a number of other perspectives have been developed, partly through

an engagement of the newly founded profession of clinical psychology with severe mental disorders. The application of humanistic and existential ideas to understanding the experiences associated with schizophrenia has led to the establishment of therapeutic communities for individuals in crisis. The exploration of role of the family in the etiology and course of experiences diagnosed as schizophrenic symptoms has led to the development of therapy for families with a member with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Finally, cognitive-behavioural approaches to understanding and treating the distressing experiences which are conventionally considered symptoms of schizophrenia are rapidly growing. The current official guidelines for the treatment of individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia consider medication as essential but also acknowledge the effectiveness of talking therapies, and especially family therapy and cognitive-behavioural therapy (Bentall, Read, & Mosher, 2004).

On the radical side, there are approaches that aim not to eliminate the so-called 'symptoms' but to assist the person in accepting, understanding and managing their experiences in ways which allow them to live a fulfilling life, with or without the 'symptoms'. These approaches, which broadly belong to the recovery movement and are run both by radical mental health professionals and by organizations of users/survivors, include retreats, where people in crisis can go through their experience in non-medicalised ways, social and narrative-based interventions and psychotherapy, interventions based on self-help, and finally, in Finland, the organization of mental health services on the basis of a systemic understanding and management of distress (Stastny & Lehmann, 2007).

Future Directions

The critique of the concept of schizophrenia have gone a long way from charismatic individuals proffering their radical truth to networks of survivor activists, mental health professionals and researchers deconstructing the concept and proposing various alternative routes for understanding and dealing with distress. The future lies, in my view, to the flourishing of three trends which are already apparent. Firstly, there has been a sustained investigation of the social determinants of distress with corresponding proposals for community action to counteract them, both at the level of management and of prevention. Secondly, the experiences conventionally diagnosed as symptoms of schizophrenia are understood as meaningful responses to life events and living conditions with the corresponding shift towards the subjective experience and meaning of distress. Thirdly, there is an emphasis on the voice of people in distress, both individual and collective, in terms of respecting their experience and giving credence to the ways of coping they find useful. All three presuppose that mental health professionals work collaboratively with people in distress, trust their expertise on their experience and facilitate them in finding their own ways of dealing with it.

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Online resources

British Psychological Society response to the American Psychiatric association regarding DSM-V development: http://apps.bps.org.uk/_publicationfiles/consultation-responses
Campaign for Abolition of Schizophrenia Label: http://www.asylumonline.net/legacy/casl.htm
Critical Psychiatry Network: http://www.criticalpsychiatry.co.uk/
Hearing Voices International Community – Intervoice: http://www.intervoiceonline.org/
Open letter to the DSM-V: http://ipeitions.com/petition/dsm5

Scientific Racism

Michele A. Paludi[1] and Shelley Haley[2]
[1]School of Management, Union Graduate College, Schenectady, NY, USA
[2]Classics and Africana Studies Department, Hamilton College, Clinton, NY, USA

Introduction

One of the basic tenets of the sciences, including psychology and other social sciences, is its insistence on objectivity. Scientists maintain they are detached from their topic and through the use of the scientific method only observe, control, measure, and analyze external events as they happen. Furthermore, science is assumed to be value-free; i.e., a scientist's personal biases are absent from the study and therefore do not interfere with the scientific process.

However, researchers are just as likely to be influenced by their cultural beliefs, values, and expectations as anyone else in society. These values and beliefs contribute to biases, termed "experimenter bias." Researchers may view a problem in only one way while avoiding other explanations (Dei & Johal, 2005). This has been especially the case with respect to research that seeks to assess racial comparisons, including comparisons of intelligence. For example, Thompson (2007) has noted that scientists who study race comparisons have biased results of studies because they used "...erroneous data to produce results favorable to their social agenda" (p. 1). Science has therefore been used "...as a justification to propose, project and enact racist social policies" (Dennis, 1995, p. 243).

Definition

Scientific racism describes ways researchers have justified inequalities between races by relying upon pseudoscience, i.e., methodologically flawed science. Scientific racism is an ideology based on the spurious assumption that biological race exists (Winston, 2004). Furthermore, scientific racism creates a hierarchy among races to support ideologies about racial supremacy (Richards, 2012). Thompson (2007) noted that scientific racism serves a purpose: "it is a deliberate attempt to justify and protect a system that allows the exploitation of 'inferior' people so that 'superior' people can reap economic and political rewards" (p. 1). More recently, Teo (2011) noted that "epistemological violence" aptly describes ways the sciences have misused methodologies to harm racial groups.

Keywords

Bell curve; epistemological violence; eugenics; experimenter bias; normal distribution; science as objective; science as value-free, scientific method; scientific racism; tuskegee syphilis study

Traditional Debates

Following the publication of Darwin's (1859) *Origin of the Species*, scientific racists used the theory of evolution to try to scientific justification to notions of racial superiority and inferiority. Brain size was used to justify not educating African Americans: they were identified as having smaller brains and consequently were perceived as

less intelligent. Galton (1869), credited with inventing eugenics, advocated that families should be evaluated for "fitness." He employed a grading system to indicate where each race in the classification system lay according to its range of intelligence. In his classification, Athenians had the highest intelligence; British citizens and descendants ranked two grades below Athenians. Africans were identified as two grades below the average English. He also suggested that genius runs in families. Galton's concept of racial superiority became popular in the United States as well as in Europe. As a consequence of these "scientific" findings, the United States passed legislation to restrict immigration to individuals of North European descent.

Terman (1916) regarded Blacks as unintelligent and consequently uneducable as a consequence of genetics and therefore claimed racial inferiority instead of addressing environmental factors. Ferguson (1916) described the implications of intelligence testing:

> The Negro's intellectual deficiency is registered in the retardation percentages of the schools as well as in mental tests. And in view of all the evidence it does not seem possible to raise the scholastic attainment of the Negro to an equality with that of the white. It is probable that no expenditure
> of time or of money would accomplish this end, since education cannot create mental power, but can only develop that which is innate. (p. 125)

The intellectual inferiority of Black people was firmly entrenched in European and American mentalities. In the 1820s John C. Calhoun, seventh Vice President of the United States, serving under John Quincy Adams, is quoted as saying, "If there can be found a Negro who can conjugate a Greek verb, I will give up my notions of the inferiority of the Negro." Furthermore, the most cited research was based on a distortion of epidemiological statistics (Thompson, 2007). In 1840, census data was interpreted as meaning that "insanity and idiocy" was approximately 11 times more prevalent in northern free Negroes than southern Negroes. This data was used by Secretary of State Calhoun (1844) to "prove the necessity of slavery" (cited by Thompson, p. 3). According to Calhoun: "The African is incapable of self-care and sinks into lunacy under the burden of freedom. It is a mercy to give him the guardianship and protection from mental death" (Thomas & Sillen, 1972, p. 17).

The growth of Nazi ideology was influenced by scientific racism, especially eugenics. According to Higgins (1994), serving science meant excluding (exterminating) those "unfit" or "unworthy" of life. Tucker (1994) noted: "The Nazis. . .merely designed and implemented the mechanisms to attain the goals proclaimed scientifically necessary by the geneticists and anthropologists" (p. 129). Nazis relied on social Darwinism to promote their discriminatory social policies. One policy of Hitler's administration was to protect the "superior race."

This policy was used to exterminate approximately six million Jewish individuals and four million individuals who represented "inferior races" according to German scientists.

In 1969, Jensen reported a statistically significant difference in IQ test scores between Black and white individuals. He discussed his finding that Black children may only make a small gain in school and recommended vocational training for their innate capabilities. His theory was used to support segregation of Black from white children in the educational system.

Scientific racism has also been used to interpret the research design and conclusions from the Tuskegee syphilis study (Crenner, 2011). This research, conducted from 1932 until 1972 in Alabama by the United States Public Health Service, studied the progression of untreated syphilis in rural African American men. These research participants were told they were receiving free health care from the United States government. Crenner (2011) has noted that advisors to this study ". . .favored the concept of a racial resistance to neurosyphilis and steered the early design of the study to help elucidate it" (p. 1).

In any discussion of intelligence and race, scientific racism still holds sway, but the terminology has changed. In the twenty-first century, Black intellectual inferiority is coded as "the achievement gap" and "stereotype threat." The publication of *The* Bell Curve (1994) furthered the myth of intellectual inferiority. And, in 2010, an editor

of the *Harvard Law Review* (a white female third-year law student) wrote the following in an email which was quoted by the legal blog, abovethelaw.com: "I absolutely do not rule out the possibility that African Americans are, on average, genetically predisposed to be less intelligent."

Critical Debates

Upon further investigation of these "objective" findings, researchers have found many errors in the scientific method used to derive these conclusions. Personal biases on the part of the researchers were noted. However, Morton, who studied the sizes of skulls from individuals from a variety of cultures, has been acclaimed as the "objectivist of his age" (Gould, 1993, p. 111). He is still highly regarded by some, despite his erroneous belief that intellectual capacity could be assessed by measuring skulls. In addition, despite the fact Jensen's work has been criticized for not being objective and value-free as well as based on faulty statistical analyses, his theory still is accepted today by scientists and lay audiences as well (Fairchild, 1991; Thomas & Sillen, 1972).

Jensen relied on IQ test scores without regard for the fact that IQ scores are subject to bias, e.g., language and class. In addition, Jensen considered IQ as a fixed quantity. In reality intelligence develops as people age. Several researchers (e.g., Lewontin, 1976) noted that Jensen's analysis was faulty. He confused the heritability of a character within a population (e.g., African Americans) with the heritability of the difference between two populations (i.e., African Americans and whites).

Furthermore, Jarvis (see Thompson, 2007) subsequently learned that errors were committed in analyzing and interpreting the census data upon which Vice President Calhoun relied. Following World War II, discovery of the misuse of scientific research (e.g., Mengele's ethical violations) contributed to individuals repudiating scientific support for racism.

In 1997 President Clinton apologized to the men harmed by the Tuskegee syphilis study. He stated: "What was done cannot be undone. But we can end the silence. We can stop turning our heads away. We can look at you in the eye and finally say on behalf of the American people, what the United States government did was shameful, and I am sorry...To our African American citizens, I am sorry that your federal government orchestrated a study so clearly racist" (Clinton, 1997).

Within the discipline of psychology, the American Psychological Association adopted nonsexist guidelines for conducting psychological research (e.g., Denmark, Russo, Frieze, & Sechzer, 1988). These guidelines are extended to research concerned with race. They ask researchers to:

Carefully examine the underlying values and assumptions in all research and state them explicitly.

Consider alternative explanations even if they have not been investigated.

Become aware of, consider, and devise studies of alternative an more complex models of causation.

Halpern (1995) also provided researchers with recommendations when planning, reading, and interpreting research. These recommendations include:

Are main effects being moderated by unidentified interactions? For example, is the main effect of gender or ethnicity really the effect of socioeconomic status on gender or ethnicity?

What other variables are confounded with gender and ethnicity? For example, African Americans in the United States take fewer college preparatory courses in high school than white students. Given the confounding of these variables would at least part of the differences that are found be attributable to differential course-taking patterns?

Are you careful to distinguish between research results and interpretations of research results?

Have you maintained an amiable skepticism? Do you scrutinize new research carefully and require independent replications before you are willing to place too much faith in the findings? (pp. 88–89).

These recommendations provide an alternative approach to the study of human behavior.

Research is viewed as taking place within a well-defined cultural and social context, not free from the concerns and values of the larger society (Campbell & Schram, 1995).

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Online Resources

Chronology on the history of slavery and racism: http://innercity.org/holt/slavechron.html

National association for the advancement of colored people: http://www.naacp.org

Racism and race in American law: http://academic.udayton.edu/race/

The anti-racist alliance: http://www.antiracistalliance.com

Self, Overview

Raya A. Jones
School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK

Introduction

Psychological inquiries into self or selfhood represent diverse and divergent schools of thought with different histories and practice applications. Topics overlap subjectivity, identity, personality, and consciousness. The ontology of the self is hotly debated in psychology as in philosophy, but debates are often entered as the assertion of standpoints endorsing research directions. Psychology prioritizes inquiries into how persons develop and maintain self-understanding and the role that particular self-perceptions may play in behavior or mental health. Despite their diversity, all theories refer to the reflexivity of the self, its

formation as personal adaptations to reality, and the role of the social environment.

The area of least controversy concerns awareness of oneself as an immediate subject of experience and the agent of own actions, which is related to sensory perception and depends on brain processes (not reviewed here). The area of most controversy concerns the formation of self-understanding. Most theories refer or allude to the distinction drawn by William James (1890) between "I," self as the knowing subject, and "Me," self as the known object. However, some frameworks emphasize a mental faculty involved both in monitoring own actions and states and in organizing information about oneself. Other frameworks emphasize selfhood as an emergent property of social processes and locate both agency and identity in discursive practices.

Definition and Conceptualization

"Self" and "ego" are often used as synonyms, pertaining to both the self-knowing subject and the self-as-known. Markus and Kitayama (2010) define the self as "the 'me' at the center of experience—a continually developing sense of awareness and agency that guides action and takes shape as the individual, both brain and body, becomes attuned to the various environments it inhabits" (p. 421). Yet, in Jungian psychology, *ego* is defined as the center of consciousness, *self* is defined holistically as an archetypal configuration of autonomous complexes that only partially touch the ego, and *persona* denotes a personal system of adaptation to one's social reality. Both cognitive and constructionist perspectives in social psychology define the self in ways that are closer to the meaning of persona. Whereas cognitive perspectives operationalize the general definition in descriptions of abstract mental representations, constructionist (as well as dialogical, narrative, and critical) perspectives operationalize it in analyses of how people position themselves in situated interactions or in self-narratives.

Since about 1950, psychologists of various persuasions have explored how self-beliefs unfold within norms, conventions, and challenges that characterize particular sociocultural milieus. Building upon Freudian theory, Erikson (1968) defined *ego* as "a central and partially unconscious organizing agency" which at any stage of life must deal with a changing representation of self "which demands to be synthesized with abandoned and anticipated selves," while *ego-identity* is the "result of the synthesising function of one of the ego's frontiers ... social reality" (p. 211). Following Erikson and also taking a cue from James, McAdams (1993) distinguishes between the ego (or "I") as an authorial process and self-identity (or "Me") as its product, a configuration of the self which takes the form of a story, complete with setting, scenes, character, plot, and theme. Similarly, Bruner (1986) defines the self as an abstract structure that is "like a text about how one is situated with respect to others and the world" (p. 130).

Postmodernists redefine selfhood in terms of construction, discursive practices, and power relations, in other words, as emergent properties of discourse. As Harré and van Langenhove (1999) put it, "selves emerge from complex bodies of knowledge that are organized like oral stories ... in which the indexical commitments of the speakers differ throughout the discourse" (p. 70). Taking this position to extreme, "self" is equated with speaking about oneself and is redefined as a grammatical operator utilized in the deployment of the first-person pronoun.

Keywords

I/Me; social cognition; social construction

History

Psychodynamic, humanistic, and social psychological perspectives have different histories. For most of the twentieth century, the former two (not reviewed here) had little contact with or impact upon social psychology.

"Psychological" social psychology is marked by the initial dominance of the cognitive

paradigm and subsequent emergence of an alternative paradigm, associated with social constructionism (Gergen, 1994; Harré 1998), which has aligned its approaches to the self with "sociological" social psychology. Sociological perspectives reflect the American pragmatists' redescription of the human subject as a "semiotic self" (Wiley, 1994), having rejected the "faculty" notion of the self. The conception elaborated by G. H. Mead and others in the early decades of the twentieth century picks up a thread from a philosophical tradition traceable to the eighteenth-century German philosopher Fichte, which emphasizes social processes into which human beings enter as selves. In contrast, the "faculty" conception originated in British empiricism. The seventeenth-century English philosopher John Locke identified the conundrum of identity (sameness) and discussed it in terms of the mind's sense of own continuity and unity, which is inwardly communicated in privately experienced sensations, feelings, and thoughts. A modern variant of this is arguably the social cognitive framework. Social cognition is the study of how individuals process information about self and others and how behavior is influenced by beliefs, perceptions, and attitudes.

The social cognitive framework came into its own since the late 1970s, although earlier precursors can be found. Some models developed in the 1980s are premised on the idea that (a) beliefs and feelings about oneself are organized into domains or dimensions that reflect typical contexts for comparing self and others (such as academic competence, social acceptance, physical attractiveness), (b) the domain structure is stable and the same for all members of a reference group, and (c) structural transformations correspond to enduring changes in normative experiences (e.g., a "romantic appeal" domain comes into play in puberty; Harter, 1999). The underlying epistemology maintains that the domain structure can be objectively described at the group level of analysis by identifying which responses are statistically associated with each other within a target population.

In addition to multidimensional models, the social-cognitive paradigm has generated a plethora of constructs that serve as predictors of behavior, such as self-esteem, self-enhancement, self-efficacy, self-deception, self-handicapping, self-presentation, self-image, and more. Markus and Nurius introduced the concept of "possible selves," denoting both desired and feared future selves. The concept of possible selves should be distinguished from concepts of self-actualization or self-realization in humanistic or transpersonal frameworks, which imply the active pursuing of reaching an ideal state of personal being.

Some social cognitivists in the 1980s developed theoretical models embodying more dynamic and functional conceptions. Markus and Wurf theorized a "working self-concept" which regulates intrapersonal and interpersonal behavior in given moments. Baldwin's relational-schemas theory postulates script-like cognitive structures that regulate individuals' patterns of interpersonal relatedness. Greenwald described "ego" as an organization of knowledge characterized by cognitive biases similar to totalitarian information-control strategies in society.

Since 1990, emphases have shifted. Greenwald and others have increasingly explored implicit associations (unconscious). Additional trends are a focus on agency and the relevance of neuroscience. Contemporary social psychology generally is marked by weakening ethnocentricity and increased sensitivity to non-Western cultural practices. Markus, Kitayama, and others have carried out extensive cross-cultural research into the different modes of self-construal in individualistic versus collectivist societies, noting that individualism is associated with "independent selves" (oneself is the unit of self-construal), whereas collectivism is associated with "interdependent selves" (the unit of self-construal is one's group). Contributions by psychologists from the Far East bring insider knowledge of the indigenous culture into the study of selves.

Meanwhile, since the 1980s, strong criticisms have been levelled at the cognitive paradigm. Many scholars contended that human experiences are organized meaningfully only within language-mediated social processes. The critique was historically part of a wider intellectual

movement in the human sciences, articulated in influential philosophical works published between 1984 and 1994. Citations of MacInytre, Charles Taylor, and Ricoeur, as well as Foucault, Bakhtin, Wittgenstein, and Derrida, amplified the truth claims of critical social psychology.

By the twenty-first century, critical scholars within the discourse-centered paradigm pointed out limitations of social constructionism. The understatement of embodied subjectivity has given impetus to integrations of ideas from psychoanalytical object-relations theory, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, and more. The rise of neuroscience (as a discourse) has given further strength to a nascent "turn" to affect.

Traditional Debates

Debates within the social cognitive paradigm concerned the precise structure of self-concept (its dimensionality and hierarchical arrangement) and the best statistical method for demonstrating it. Early preoccupations centered on whether there is a global self-concept. In some cases, the preference of multidimensionality reflects refinements by the same authors (e.g., the Marsh/Shavelson model) rather than debate per se. At a more fundamental level, critics contested the reduction of the social dimension to static perceptions of self-compared-with-peers in research utilizing self-reports. In the late 1980s, Baldwin and colleagues contended (with experimental evidence) that self-evaluation can be affected by internally represented significant others.

The idea of individualism versus collectivism dominated cross-cultural research in the 1990s. In the 2000s, some researchers have started to challenge the simplistic dichotomy. Recent research not only reveals complex subtleties, but also suggests that self-enhancement might be a universal human motive. The extent to which culturally diverse patterns of self-construal reflect divergent outcomes of universal psychological processes, as opposed to evincing fundamental differences, remains a matter for debate.

Critical Debates

The transition from "traditional" to "critical" debates is underpinned, firstly, by the contention that the classical criteria for objects of natural-scientific study do not apply for the self (since it is an object created in discourse). Secondly, viewing the self as a relatively closed cognitive system is peculiar to Western cultures (Geertz, 1974). The critical rhetoric of the 1980s and early 1990s deconstructed the Western ideal of the personality as a centralized equilibrium structure. In its place, then-new metaphors were deployed towards reconceptualizing personhood as a decentralized non-equilibrium system that is like a text without an author.

Three decades on, the reconceptualization has become a tradition in its own right. It generates new critical debates as well as perpetuates long-standing themes. It is now widely accepted that "having" a self requires belonging in a community of speakers, forming narratives about own past and future, and having an orientation in a space of moral questions (Taylor, 1989). Variations on the theme range from notions of selves as subject positions immanent in actual discourse to notions of an inner structure organized like a narrative. Theories of the latter kind are attacked by proponents of the former for perpetuating Cartesian dualism. In turn, the social constructionist's reduction of selfhood to speech actions has invited criticisms, prompting debates about embodied aspects of subjectivity and inarticulable sources of selfhood.

International Relevance

Most or all models of the self which have practice relevance are internationally applied, but their widespread applicability may reflect the globalization of Western psychology rather than necessarily relevance in other cultural contexts. The instruments associated with the Marsh/Shavelson model and Harter's Self-Perception Profiles are internationally applied in educational research. Yet, even if standardized for "local"

populations, the self-report methodology deploys a technology of self-management that might be alien in some cultures. Psychoanalysis has long been applied worldwide. Yet, the relevance of Freudian theory for understanding the Japanese psyche is questionable (Doi, 1971). In contrast, Jungian psychotherapy resonates well with Japanese practitioners (Jones & Morioka, 2011), suggesting perceived relevance in that country.

Although contemporary social psychology acknowledges indigenous psychologies, debates regarding the universality versus cultural specificity of self-construal are entrenched in (Western) ideologies of liberal individualism. Paradigms in social psychology either construe an individualism-collectivism antinomy or problematize individualism in favor of asserting the fundamental relatedness of selves. These preoccupations might seem irrelevant in non-Western psychologies. Buddhism, Daoism, and Hinduism place the emphasis on self-realization, which is construed as a purely personal matter (despite the collectivist ethos of the societies in which these systems of thought originate).

Practice Relevance

Perspectives on the self are applied chiefly in psychotherapy and education. The goals of formal education call for identifying aspects of students' self-concept that might be causally related to academic performance. Such research informs intervention programs. The goals of therapy call for conceptual models that describe and prescribe how persons may be helped towards well-being, personal growth, or self-realization.

Future Directions

At least three discrete, though potentially interrelated, directions may be identified. One is the increasing input of Eastern traditions, such as Buddhism, into theorizing about the self in psychology. This recently manifests under the label of mindfulness, though Eastern influences have a long history in transpersonal and Jungian psychotherapies. A second direction would extend the nascent affective turn regarding embodied subjectivity.

Thirdly, however, all twentieth-century conceptions of selfhood are increasingly challenged by advances in biotechnology, genetic manipulation, information technology, artificial intelligence, robotics, and nanotechnology. The convergence of these technologies might lead to human-machine hybrids, and consequently to posthuman and postsocial conceptions of the self.

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Self-Esteem

Ole Jacob Madsen
Department of Psychology, University of Oslo, Blindern, Oslo, Norway

Introduction

In psychology self-esteem basically refers to a person's assessment or appraisal of his or her own worth. From the perspective of critical psychology 'self-esteem' is a noteworthy case as self-esteem is currently considered a universal psychological quality of outmost importance for personal well-being within mainstream and popular psychology, while a genealogical recount reveals a contingent psychological concept that only recently emerged in the public mindset.

Definition

Self-esteem has traditionally been defined as a stable sense of personal worth and worthiness (Rosenberg, 1965). Self-esteem is related to similar notions like self-worth, self-regard and self-respect that all encompass the individual's beliefs about his or herself like "I am lovable person" etc. It is not uncommon however to distinguish between self-esteem and 'self-confidence' as the latter is more related to a person's sense of personal capacity rather than personal worth, and refers to the appraisal of one's competence, skill or ability often in a specific domain with more objective criteria and past results as determinants (Crocker & Major, 1989).

Keywords

Self-esteem; self-confidence; technology of the self; commodity; makeover culture; cosmetic surgery

Traditional Debates

Self-esteem first became a widely used conception within social-learning theory in the 1960s and 1970s. Pioneer researchers like Morris Rosenberg (1965) and Stanley Coopersmith (1968) was able to measure self-esteem along a continuous scale with questionnaires like The Rosenberg 10-item and The Coopersmith Inventory, in which participants indicated their level of self-esteem by agreeing to a range of statements and rating others as similar or dissimilar to themselves. In the following decades self-esteem went far beyond the scientific sphere and was broadly profiled as a key factor in educational success amid young Americans, spawned social self-esteem raising civil citizen movements like the California Task Force to Promote Self-Esteem and Personal and Social Responsibility (Cruikshank, 1999), and inspired prolific activists like Gloria Steinem (1993) vital in the 60s and 70s women's liberation movement to embrace the empowering appeal of self-esteem and redefine the quest of feminism in her book *Revolution from Within*: *A Book of Self-Esteem*.

Nonetheless, the widely held belief in self-esteem over the past decades has not gone unnoticed and has been met with criticism from several influential clinical psychologists. The famous American therapist Albert Ellis (2005) has for instance been highly critical of the concept of self-esteem as he believes it is essentially self-defeating and possibly destructive. Ellis maintains that self-esteem relies on an arbitrary definitional premise that rates and values humans in ways that really are unhelpful for predicting wanted behavior in clinical treatment. Whereas Roy Baumeister, Laura Smart and Joseph Boden demonstrated that high self-esteem (because of threatened egotism) rather than low self-esteem as previously believed was a far more reliable cause for violence and aggression given the available crime stats in America. Baumeister et al. (1996, p. 29) therefore concludes: "the societal pursuit of high self-esteem for everyone may literary end up doing considerable harm." In

his latest book Baumeister (together with John Tierney) (2011) has launched self-control as a more valuable quality in order to succeed in life than self-esteem.

Critical Debates

'Self-esteem' quickly materialized as the most sought after state in the present, as a psychologized emotional auxiliary to 'happiness' and looks to continue to do so. The front page of the February 2012 issue of the world's leading popular psychological magazine *Psychology Today* reads "If you want to boost self-esteem, read this. . ." Sociologists of psychology has pinpointed that 'self-esteem' until the 1970s was largely unknown to the general public, and largely confined to psychological research. Steven C. Ward (2002) maintains that after being introduced by William James in the 1890s 'self-esteem' largely lay dormant until the 1940s and 50s when self-psychology emerged. Then self-esteem first became part of the common knowledge of clinical and experimental psychology and then self-esteem evolved and was introduced outside to policy makers and educators in advanced Western democracies who looked for new ways of solving problems. From the perspective of governmentality studies 'self-esteem' is an important technology of the self under neoliberal government. For example Barbara Cruikshank (1996) maintains that 'self-esteem' becomes a highly effective means for the individual to govern themselves in order to become healthy citizens so that the police, judge or doctor do not have to. This conceptualization of self-esteem can be interpreted both as a way of controlling subjects, but also as a tool that genuinely ignites people to power by exercising control over their own bodies and souls. Nikolas Rose (1996, p. 195) points to 'self-esteem' as the most visible psy technique under neoliberal rule where people have ethical obligations to develop self-to-self relations in quest for personal fulfillment. However, Rose warns against simplistic readings that maintains that psychology and its experts are the sole origin behind this evolvement; it is rather the sum of subjectivation where life and its contingencies must become meaningful to the individual consumer. The therapeutic direction autonomy takes in present advanced liberal democracies through concepts like 'self-esteem' appears to suit this task perfectly. Kurt Danziger (1997, p. 36) tackles 'self-esteem' somewhat differently to the above as he enlists it as one of the categories which modern psychology could use a building block from an earlier period in creating twentieth-century psychology. Still the versatility of 'self-esteem' appears as the common denominator.

The transition from 'self-confidence' to 'self-esteem' as the foremost goal for the individual seeking happiness and well-being is illustrative of how the social surroundings becomes of less importance whereas the prominence of inner tranquility increases in the therapeutic culture. Self-confidence is a relational and contextual concept where low or high self-confidence is connected to a certain activity (doing math, dancing etc.) and others whom you compare to. Self-esteem is a much deeper psychological metaphor and less prone to be influenced from outside factors. This transition from outer to inner is celebrated in the present Scandinavian self-help literature and popular psychology as a humane development where how you feel about yourself is what ultimately matters as opposed to personal success and achievements. However, the downside to the thriving of self-esteem might be that the detachment from situations and other people creates an endless standard in accordance with the late capitalist makeover culture (McGee, 2005). When does one really know that one has gained enough self-esteem? Another consequence is that the promise of self-esteem becomes an important commodity in the consumer culture and is at the moment the foremost therapeutic spirit (*geist*) that supports the rise of cosmetic surgery in Western regions like Great Britain and Scandinavia (Madsen, 2011). In this way, cosmetic surgeons are able to make the claim that the

makeover of the body is not about how you look on the outside, but all about how you feel on the inside. With a psychological concept as elusive and flexible as 'self-esteem' it is of course hard to delimit where it applies and serves the best interest of mankind and where it does not apply. In this sense, the current status of self-esteem perfectly sums up the crucial dilemmas of psychology in general in late modernity.

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Self-Harm

Allan Brownrigg
Faculty of Health and Life Sciences,
Northumbria University, Newcastle, UK

Introduction

Understanding why people self-harm is a complex process. A range of psychological models exist which help to clarify why some individuals self-harm, and for those seeking help these models are used to devise and implement psychologist-selected treatment strategies. Despite the availability of different psychological models, the experience of people who self-harm is often misunderstood, misrepresented, and disempowering. An alternative approach to understanding self-harm would be to do as critical psychologists strive and see self-harm as a multidimensional, transdisciplinary, complex human behavior (Parker, 2006). What follows is a brief introduction to key debates, namely, the diagnosis, practice, and attitudes, held about self-harm.

Definition

Traditionally, psychology describes self-harm as a direct behavior which causes harm to body tissue, regardless of whether the individual has suicidal intent. Types of self-harm can include poisoning, overdosing, cutting, burning or branding the skin, interfering with wound healing, self-strangulation, suffocation, and breaking bones. Other behaviors which may be harmful to the body but not described as self-harm include smoking, eating distress, tattooing and body piercing, aesthetic enhancements, and substance use, for tissue damage, should it occur in these instances, is unintentional (Klonsky, 2007). Self-harm can occur when an individual has increased tension (Mangnall, 2008) or when overwhelmed by negative emotions (Ross &

Heath, 2003). Paradoxically, self-harm may also help to relive distress (Hawton, Harris, & Rodham, 2010), to provide opportunity for escapism (McRory, 2007), and to enable emotions to reduce (Warm, Murray, & Fox, 2002). Self-harm is also referred to as deliberate self-harm, self-mutilation, self-injurious behavior, and non-suicidal self-injury.

Keywords

Self-harm; self-mutilation; deliberate self-harm; non-suicidal self-injury; NSSI

Traditional Debates

Psychology has made some attempts to understand why people self-harm. Typically these models focus upon the underlying psychological mechanisms and individual vulnerability factors and highlight the self-harmer's inability to cope. For these reasons traditional psychology has a focus upon the psychopathology of self-harm, resulting in people being seen for what they have done to their bodies, not for who they are. For example Chapman, Gratz, and Brown's (2006) Experiential Avoidance Model (EAM) of self-harm highlights how people who self-harm use escape and avoidance to manage unwanted emotions, this being a strategy that keeps self-harm active rather than it dissipating. Further, Nocks (2009) proposes an integrated theoretical model of the development and maintenance of non-suicidal self-injury concludes self-harm exists due to the individual's difficulty regulating emotions, their limited coping skills underpinned by difficulties communicating distress to others. In these instances psychological models are used to suggest that an answer exists as to why self-harm occurs and the influences by which each individual is compelled to use this behavior. While critical psychologists do not profess to change theory, their approach to understanding the applicability of theory to individual circumstances can help situate people's experience within their own reality rather than relying upon a one-size-fits-all school of thought. Traditional psychology is often nomothetic, where knowledge is generated about groups rather than individuals within these groups. A more favorable approach respected by critical psychologists is to look beyond group-based findings towards a phenomenological view which seeks to understand the lived experience of an individual, where individual experiences are analyzed to provide accounts of each experience rather than generalizing findings to make truth claims. Phenomenological accounts of self-harm have reported people to have feelings of alienation with the self and body and with professionals (Schoppmann, Schrock, Schnepp, & Buscher, 2007), resulting in a wider appreciation of how self-harm is an individual experience. Brown and Kimballs' (2011) phenomenological study highlighted how individuals who self-harm feel misunderstood, resulting in others portraying their self-harm as a suicide attempt or comparable to people who have a drug addiction. The impact of other's negative portrayal if unrecognized can create a barrier to effectively understanding the role and function of self-harm.

Traditional psychology claims that self-harm is an act usually conducted in private, yet drawing upon wider social models of understanding helps to challenge this point, for example, Hall, Elliot, and Place (2010) found that rather than self-harm being a private act, it was through sharing accounts of self-harm with peers that individuals felt they belonged to a group. Yip (2005) also acknowledged the role peers play in shaping each other's self-harm behavior. In particular if a peer shares accounts of how self-harm helped, and it is viewed as a helpful strategy, there is an increased likelihood that self-harm will be used by others. Taking into account peer influence helps to situate self-harm beyond the individual and into the realms of their communities. If we maintain a traditional psychology view, we could miss this wider peer-related link for enhancing our understanding of self-harm.

Critical Debates

Moving towards a critical psychological approach of self-harm experiences can also help us move from a focus upon psychopathology, behaviors, and interventions towards attitudes and assumptions, in particular the role stigma, power, professional practice, and oppression can have in shaping the self-harmer's experience. A range of literature indicates that people who self-harm can be viewed as manipulative and attention seeking (McAllister, 2001) and impulsive (Redley, 2010) which results in stigmatizing attitudes being formed. Further research (Urquhart-Law, Rostill-Brookes, & Goodman, 2009) found professionals held stigmatizing attitudes, anger, and hostility towards people who self-harmed as they felt it should be under control. Adams, Rodham, and Garvin (2005) established that people who self-harm can hold negative beliefs about themselves which are reinforced due to the negative relationships professionals and others transmit onto them. Furthermore, Cresswell and Karimova (2010) questioned the way in which moral judgements are applied onto and about people who self-harm by professionals who negatively value self-harm in comparison to other experiences, thus resulting in discriminatory practice. They argue that responsibility should not lie with the self-harmer to change as in traditional psychological practice; instead, responsibility lies with professionals to adjust their thinking and to value what self-harm really means for people. Here, the contribution of critical psychology helps us to consider the wider societal impact for people who self-harm both in limiting opportunities to seek and receive effective help and in identifying the professional barriers that need to be addressed.

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Online Resources

Royal College of Psychiatrists. www.rcpsych.ac.uk
Mind – Mental Health Charity. www.mind.org.uk
American Psychological Association. www.apa.org

Self-Regulated Learning

Stephen Vassallo
School of Education, Teaching and Health,
American University, Washington, DC, USA

Introduction

Psychologists and philosophers have deliberated for many years over issues of control and causality related to what humans think and do. In educational psychology, this conversation is directed at understanding sources of students' academic achievement. The notion of self-regulated learning (SRL) implicates achievement as within the control of students. Given classroom demographics, economic conditions, technological advancements, and modes of knowledge dissemination, researchers agree that teaching students to regulate their learning is necessary for academic success and participation in a twenty-first-century world. Therefore, traditional debates almost exclusively center on a commitment to make SRL widespread in education by improving conceptualizations, measurements, and pedagogical interventions. There is inadequate consideration of the ethics, philosophical underpinnings, and cultural implications of SRL. SRL is typically treated as a neutral, value-free, and natural form of human engagement that is empowering for individuals. However, when considered critically, new debates emerge that invite reflections on ways that SRL is also entangled in politics of control, cultural norms, conformity, disempowerment, and oppression.

Definition

SRL can be defined as an iterative, self-steering process that targets one's own thoughts, emotions, and behaviors, as well as features of the environment in order to modulate learning goals (Boekaerts & Cascallar, 2006; Zimmerman, 2002). Those who self-regulate their learning strategically harness, direct, and adapt personal resources in order to overcome limitations resulting from their own cognitive mechanisms, instructional environments, and sociocultural conditions. Instead of being explicitly directed by others, self-regulated learners are believed to independently assess academic task conditions, set goals to master tasks, and employ strategies to complete tasks. Individuals who are self-regulated do not passively receive the environment; they do not rely on feedback or external instructions to formulate a course of action. Rather, they attempt to control and transform their environment, thoughts, and behaviors by planning a course of action that is geared towards task mastery.

Keywords

Self; agency; self-direction; self-control; adaptation; metacognition; empowerment

Traditional Debates

The conventional debates are conceptual, methodological, and pedagogical. Conceptual debates are framed in terms of the distinction between SRL as an event or a disposition. Researchers disagree whether one's academic self-regulation results from a specific set of contextual conditions or is an enduring personal

quality carried across contexts. Currently, educational psychologists are working to integrate these perspectives. Many now believe that SRL involves the interaction between dispositional qualities and environmental configurations. Methodologically, early inquiries approached SRL using self-report questionnaires and interviews. However, socioculturally oriented researchers raise concern that these methods capture SRL as people reflect on their experience and fail to capture SRL as it is actually performed. Therefore, research on SRL includes a variety of methods, such as running records, observations, analyses of body language, and discourse analysis. Pedagogically, researchers disagree about the best ways to support students' SRL. Some emphasize the need for teachers, parents, and other students to model exemplary SRL. Others emphasize the importance of crafting SRL environments by giving students opportunities for choice, control, self-evaluations, and task mastery. Some researchers argue that SRL must be supported with explicit instruction on how and when to use regulatory processes. Few scholars contest the terms of these debates and are almost exclusively focused on improving conceptualizations of, methods for studying, and interventions that support SRL. As a consequence, there is a general absence of critical debates related to SRL.

Critical Debates

Educational Contexts: The End of Academic Self-Regulation

A key critical debate must involve a consideration of the contexts in which SRL is employed. Critical scholars agree that schooling environments are rife with inequalities and contradictions that are protected and resistant to change (Freire, 1970; McLaren, 2007). For example, schooling curricula are interpreted as representative of White, middle-class men – resulting in the silencing and marginalization of identities and diverse ways of knowing. Some view standardized tests as biased, supportive of a neoliberal agenda, and aligned with a factory model of teaching and learning (e.g., Gorlewski, 2011). In addition, researchers consistently observe that curricula are different across class backgrounds in ways that help to reproduce class hierarchy. Critical theorists are concerned about these environments and the assumption that there are no differences across them.

Notwithstanding these contradictions and asymmetries in schooling environments, researchers are focused on improving SRL, which involves efficiently and effectively adapting to learning environments. In this regard, some researchers and practitioners implement pedagogical interventions to support students' regulatory efforts to learn state-mandated content and improve performance on standardized test scores (e.g., see Miller, Heafner, & Massey, 2009). Therefore, critical scholars may see the regulation of learning that is directed at institutionally mandated curricula to be in conflict with empowerment, social justice, and freedom because it validates problematic learning environments. Critical inquiry must involve close examinations of the contentious educational contexts in which SRL is encouraged, valued, and employed.

Agency: Autonomy and Compliance

Many treat SRL as an expression of agency. Agency can be defined as the ability to make choices and exert control in ways that make differences in one's life (Bandura, 2001; Martin, 2004). The notion of agency is presumed and foundational to SRL; yet, there is little explicit attention to agency in the literature. Agency is a complex and contested notion, with deep historical and philosophical roots. Therefore, this lack of attention is a concern as SRL and agency can be interpreted in a number of ways. For example, rather than unequivocally treating SRL as an expression of agency, Martin and McLellan (2008) suggest that much of what is interpreted as SRL may be a result of clever socialization that secures student cooperation on the false grounds that students are truly in control. In contemporary classrooms, Martin and McLellan note that the

amount of control that teachers exert over students' self-regulation is extensive. Teaching students to self-regulate their learning can be seen as a form of teacher control, whereby they are cultivating the cognitive and motivational scripts to encourage students to do what they are supposed to do without being told to do so. That is, SRL can be considered to involve dependence on others to learn cognitive and motivational scripts to dutifully follow a particular order. There are a number of other ways to challenge the assumptions about agency in SRL (e.g., see Vassallo, 2011). Therefore, a key critical conversation must include ways SRL affirms and disaffirms agency.

Social Class: Parents and Personhood

As SRL is typically considered a universal human characteristic of which all individuals are capable and attempt to enact, researchers operate as if there were nothing historical, social, and cultural about setting goals and implementing strategies to achieve those goals. As a consequence, researchers who conduct studies of SRL construct models and offer recommendations for practices that are intended to apply across socioeconomic class classifications and realities (Martin, 2004). For example, the literature on parent involvement and SRL development identifies a number of practices, dispositions, and structures that are necessary to teach SRL in the home. Facilitating SRL involves authoritative parenting, encouraging children's self-reflections, monitoring of children's learning, adjusting home practices to meet school demands, and interacting with school personnel. These recommendations and suggestions reflect middle-class culture, social arrangements, dispositions, and material reality (Vassallo, 2011). The literature on SRL endorses middle-class parenting and can contribute to the production of middle-class privilege.

Representations of effective academic SRL are underpinned by conceptions of self that are reflective of middle- and upper-class culture. Referring to Martin's (2007) taxonomy of selves within educational psychological research, the representations of SRL are characterized by both an "expressive self" and "managerial self" (p. 80). The managerial self is oriented towards self-mastery through its commitment to understanding its psychological characteristics and employing strategies to harness, change, or render irrelevant such characteristics in the pursuit of one's personal goals. Martin explicitly implicates research on SRL as endorsing this self. Also fueled by the powerful tendency of self-enhancement, the expressive self is guided by the imperative to identify the uniqueness and importance of psychological experiences. Though not explicitly associated with SRL, the expressive self is important for developing the necessary self-knowledge and dispositions for SRL. These selves are associated with children from middle- and upper-class backgrounds (e.g., Kusserow, 2004; Lareau, 2003; Schutz, 2008).

Class-based values and assumptions need to be explored in SRL. A critical conversation must include the assumption that SRL is not culturally neutral. Researchers recognize this in terms of international contexts, but ignore socioeconomic class. For this critical conversation, the key question is not whether individuals across class backgrounds are self-regulated or not. Instead, the question is how do contexts affirm or validate class-based practices that make it seem as though some are people are more or less self-regulated?

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Self-Stigmatization

Geoff J. Bathje and Holloway N. Marston
Counseling Psychology, Adler School of Professional Psychology, Chicago, IL, USA

Introduction

Self-stigmatization is a component of the broader social phenomenon known as stigmatization. The process of stigmatization involves labeling differences as undesirable and can result in social exclusion, disempowerment, and discrimination. While any aspect of human experience can be stigmatized if deemed abnormal or undesirable, recent research in psychology has focused primarily on stigmatization of "mental illness." In his foundational writing on stigma, Goffman (1963) identified the internal consequences for the stigmatized individual as self-devaluation. He explained that once labeled as "mentally ill," individuals may conclude that they must act accordingly and take on the label as an identity. Link (1987) developed Modified Labeling Theory to explain the consequences of interacting with the mental health system, which can include obtaining a label, being rejected or marginalized as a result, and potentially internalizing the social meaning of that label. While these writings focused on stigma in general, they also spurred research on the internal consequences of being stigmatized, which became known as self-stigma.

Definition

Self-stigma exists within the context of public stigma. Public stigma has been defined as the general public's reaction to persons with mental health diagnoses and consists of three components: stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination (Corrigan, Mueser, Bond, Drake, & Solomon, 2008). Thus, stigma can be viewed as a form of prejudice. Self-stigmatization has been defined as the process in which a person with a mental health diagnosis becomes aware of public stigma,

agrees with those stereotypes, and internalizes them by applying them to the self (Corrigan, Larson, & Kuwabara, 2010). The consequences of self-stigma include diminished self-esteem, self-efficacy, and confidence in one's future (Corrigan, 1998). While these definitions include a focus on mental health, stigma and self-stigma have also been researched with regard to physical health and attributes, such as obesity or HIV status.

Keywords

Self-stigmatization; self-stigma; stigma; stigmatization; public stigma

Traditional Debates

Much of the research on self-stigma has focused on how it acts as a barrier to seeking help from mental health professionals in the form of therapy or medication. To a lesser degree, self-stigma research has focused on the consequences of, and reactions to, self-stigma. This may include concealing one's diagnosis or history of treatment, social withdrawal, educating others about mental health diagnoses, involvement in mental health advocacy organizations, resiliency to self-stigma, and the emotional impact of self-stigma (e.g., feelings of exclusion, diminished self-esteem, and reduced self-efficacy; Corrigan et al., 2008). Research has been conducted to measure the prevalence and intensity of stigma across different cultures, and programs to reduce self-stigma have been developed. Self-stigma reduction programs are typically individualistic (e.g., cognitive-behavioral therapy to alter cognitions about the self), with public stigma efforts more focused at the social level (Corrigan et al.).

There has also been debate about how best to reduce stigma and self-stigma. Efforts to reduce stigma have been based primarily on providing different types of education about mental illness. Initially, there was a focus on defining mental illness as biological, as a consequence of chemical imbalances and abnormal brain structures. The rationale was that this perspective would reduce attributions of blame, which would potentially reduce social distancing and increase helping or help-seeking behavior. Less discussed is that this perspective promotes a medical model of mental illness, at the expense of social and psychological explanations. Research has shown that this biological perspective does reduce blame and desire to punish but can increase other stigmatizing attributions, such as social distancing and perceptions of dangerousness, unpredictability, poor prognosis, and family risk (Boysen & Vogel, 2008). However, these attributions have been found to vary based on diagnosis and corresponding assumptions about severity (e.g., assumptions that schizophrenia is more severe than depression) and personal responsibility for the problem (e.g., belief that people with addictions are more responsible for their problems than people with depression).

Critical Debates

While there is often an assumption that avoidance of treatment services is related to fear of stigmatization, it is also important to recognize that mental health service providers sometimes contribute to stigmatization. Clinical diagnosis, participation in treatment with non-recovery-oriented providers, and disempowering or paternalistic treatment experiences in particular (e.g., forced hospitalization) may actually reduce self-efficacy and increase feelings of self-stigma (Corrigan et al., 2008; Leff & Warner, 2006).

Empowerment has been described as one of the most promising paths for reducing self-stigma. This can include collaborative treatment planning, designing treatment programs based on consumer feedback, focusing on strengths rather than deficits, providing opportunities for consumers to become peer counselors, or the creation of consumer-operated alternative treatment settings (Corrigan et al., 2008). Similarly, more attention is needed in the area of resiliency to self-stigma, since awareness of stereotypes does not guarantee that they will be internalized.

Unfortunately, resiliency and empowerment are not often addressed in self-stigma research, despite findings that reactions of resiliency and empowerment are reported more frequently than self-stigmatization among individuals who receive highly stigmatized diagnoses, even though the vast majority are aware of public stereotypes (Fung, Tsang, Corrigan, Lam, & Wai-Ming, 2007).

Another area of concern with efforts to address self-stigma is that victim-blaming might result if social context (i.e., public stigma and mental health practices) is not also taken into consideration. Corrigan et al. (2008) emphasize that while there is value in helping individuals deal with the harm of stigma, efforts to help individuals will not eliminate stigma within the culture. Thus, the stigmatizing beliefs and discrimination that are perpetuated within a society must also be addressed to change the context in which self-stigma is created.

The literature on self-stigma has been criticized for being based largely on research conducted with college populations in the United States, which are disproportionately European American, young, educated, and financially secure (Vogel, Heimerdinger-Edwards, Hammer, & Hubbard, 2011). While stigma has been identified across cultures, it should not be assumed that public stereotypes or self-stigma will be homogenous across cultures. Cultural differences in understanding of the causes (e.g., biological, social, psychological, or spiritual) and meaning of mental illness will naturally lead to different beliefs, emotions, stereotypes, and behavioral responses. Cultural differences in gender roles and gender stereotypes will intersect with public stigma stereotypes and result in gender differences in the experience of self-stigma across cultures. For example, different stereotypes (e.g., that people with mental illness are "weak" or "dangerous") may be more or less threatening or salient for different demographic groups. As a result, the nature, intensity, and subjective experience of self-stigma should be expected to vary in relation to gender, culture, sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, age, and other important aspects of identity.

Cross-cultural research has challenged the view of self-stigma as a product of public stigma, since cultures identified as more collectivistic have been found to have lower levels of public stigma, without a corresponding decrease in self-stigma (Pederson & Vogel, 2007). Research has confirmed cross-cultural differences in the relationship between self-stigma and other constructs, such as masculine gender norms, attitudes toward help-seeking, and help-seeking behaviors. Self-stigma has also been found to vary by gender with heterosexual men, but not gay men, reporting higher levels of self-stigma as compared to women (Pederson & Vogel, 2007). Increased self-stigma and negative attitudes toward help-seeking have been associated with endorsement of traditionally masculine gender norms, though the strength and nature of those relationships have been found to vary across cultures (Vogel et al., 2011).

It is important to recognize that self-stigmatization is a product of social processes that ascribe meaning to human experiences. As such, those processes will vary by culture and the intersections of important aspects of identity. It is essential to recognize that there are many factors that will determine how or if an individual will experience self-stigma.

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Online Resources

Chicago consortium for stigma research. http://www.iit.edu/psych/people/profiles/ccsr.shtml
NAMI: National Alliance on Mental Illness – fight stigma. www.nami.org/stigma/.
SAMHSA's ADS Center – Substance Abuse and Mental Health. http://stopstigma.samhsa.gov/
National Empowerment Center. http://www.power2u.org
National Mental Health Consumers' Self-Help Clearinghouse. http://mhselfhelp.org
Mental Health Empowerment Network. http://www.mhepinc.org/

Semiotics, Overview

Sayyed Mohsen Fatemi
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA

Introduction

Semiotics is the scientific study of sign systems and is associated with American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) as the founder of the science of signs. In the meantime, semiology focuses on the science of signs too and is identified with the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913).

Semiotics is now used to incorporate both systems and explores the relationship between meaning and text in its broadest sense including television, movies, radio programs, works of art, painting, and magazines.

Semiotics appeared as an aspiration to bring about a scientific presentation of rules, codes, laws, and systems of human practices and interactions. In defining the task of semiotics, Saussure (1974) indicated the chief principles of semiotics as being concerned with the formulation and encoding of messages by sources, the transmission of these messages through channels, the decoding and interpretation of these messages by destinations, and their signification. The entire transaction, or semiosis, takes place within a context to which the system is highly sensitive and which the system, in turn, affects. Any living entity, or its products, can be either message sources or destinations. Humans are unique in being able to process both verbal and averbal messages (p. 69).

Definition

Semiotics is the study of signs. Texts are not merely used for written manuscripts but they can be used for any phenomena including films, fashions, foods, cinema, theater, and anything in general. For semiotics, anything can be taken as a text and semioticians are interested in discussing and exploring how meaning is generated and conveyed in texts. For semiotics, the relationships of signs are of great significance. The system of signs may not be obvious and needs to be examined and explored (Culler, 1976).

Signs and meanings are interconnected in that designation of meaning to something ascertains that the thing for which the meaning has been assigned is a sign.

A sign reveals the correlation between the signified and signifier (de Saussure, 1966, p. 66). A sign is not the signifier. The signifier is the sound-image which transports the signified and the signified is a concept which refers to

something. What the sign refers to is the referent. In other words, the signifier is the image or the concept which refers to something (signified) and the signified is what that image or the sound is referring to. The relationship between the signifier and the signified is called signification, and the accumulation of signifier and signified constitutes sign.

Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) expanded on the realm of signs and discussed their three different systems: icons, indexes, and symbols with their respective focus on resemblance, cause and effect, and convention.

In defining a sign, Peirce (1940) says, "A sign or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. . .not in all respects but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen" (p. 99).

The relationship of the signs needs to be examined while exploring the meanings. The meanings are not determined by "content" but by "relations" in some kind of system. The basic relationship is oppositional. Thus, one needs to always bear in mind the opposite of the concept.

Meanings in any text, therefore, are the main interests of semiotics and meanings need to be examined and explored in relationships.

Keywords

Sign; signifier; signified; semiotics; signification

History

Signs and their meanings, their contexts, and their communication have a long history which goes back to medieval philosophers. In the Western world, the first formal study on signs was presented by the Swiss semiologist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) and Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914). Early in the twentieth century, works on semiotics were done in Prague and Russia. Some of the names associated with these are Roland Barthes and Umberto Eco. In the Islamic world, prior to the presentation of semiotics as the science of signs, there have been scholars like Avicenna, Molla Sadra, Molla Hadi Sabzevari, and Akhond Mulla Kazem Khorasani who have presented views of signs, meanings, and their applications and implications in a context not necessarily bound by empiricism and positivism (see Fatemi, 2012).

Traditional Debates

According to Italian semiotician, Umberto Eco (1976), there are often cases and examples where the referent of a sign is not a real object or a subject, but the signified or signifier of another sign. Thus, the signified or the signifier of a sign correlation can, in turn, be either the signifier or the signified of another sign correlation. It is in the juxtaposition of signs that signification occurs.

On the other hand, with the progress of semiotics, the concept of reality and signs has been both expanded and revised. In terms of expansion of studies on signs, one may point out the works by Paul Ekman on facial expressions. He indicates that understanding the signs of facial expressions and examining their changes would help us find out if people are lying. With a focus on activation or inactivation of specific facial muscles, Ekman has presented anger, determination, disgust, fear, neutral, pouting, sadness, and surprise as universal signs for facial expressions.

In the meantime, postmodern thinkers, including Jean Baudrillard, suggest that signs are no more examined in the context of reality but hyperreality. Deep down the postmodern thinking of signs, there is a concentration on the significance of the sign and not what it stands for. Simulacrum and simulations are getting more important than the reality they were designed to represent. It seems that the

simulations, themselves, constitute their own independent significance and their own reality. Disneyland Hollywood constitutes a reality that may be considered the ultimate reality.

Critical Debates

Signs can be challenged and critiqued in their contexts of representation and re(i) presentation. Understanding signs and semiotics can take place within the mind-sets that define reality and sensibility in line with empiricism and positivism. The questions are here expanded in numerous psychological domains. If, for instance, DSM presents the signs of depression based on the perspective which lies into a dominant Western paradigm, can that perspective represent the reality of depression or may it merely illustrate some aspects of the so-called reality? If the concept of well-being and health is analyzed within the semiotics of medical model, can it offer a recondite understanding of health in its quintessential aspects? If psychological signs are merely embedded within one dominant discourse, does this not lead to marginalization or isolation of other systems of signs including cultural and indigenous perspectives? (see Langer, 2005, 2009; Spariosu, 2004; Teo, 2005).

In the Western world, the sovereignty of signs and its discursive implications came to rise mostly by virtue of the intellectual enlightenment and its outcry for rationality, positivism, control, prediction, and certitude. The rationality as defined by the intellectual enlightenment concentrated on the world of the visible and prescribed modes of knowing that are strictly embedded within the borders and constituents of the visible. Logical positivism, empiricism, and their expansionist clamor grew in the midst of such parades (see Fatemi, 2009, 2012).

Study on signs was, thus, inspired by the recursive patterns of rationality and its explicit prescriptive implications. Neither the semiotics nor the semiology of signs was given a chance to leap beyond the prescribed forms of rationality and sensibility, and therefore they constructed their rational-oriented approaches and celebrated their certitude of signs without deconstructing their own underlying ontological and epistemological constituents. In other words, the system of signs was ontologically and epistemologically encapsulated within the mind-sets that defined reality and being in terms of a relationship in a visibly plausible world (see Askay, 2001; Heidegger, 2000, 2001; Nasr, 2007; Ricoeur, 1970, 1976, 1981, 1991, 1998).

Illustrating the unreality of our reality, Tacey (2006) writes, "Our minds are conditioned to think that only what we can see and touch is real, but Jung questioned this view, and his psychology is a challenge to our understanding of reality. Jung was an unsettling thinker, because he introduced the notion that the evidence of our sense is illusory, and that common sense is nothing more than a construct of external conditioning" (12).

Ha'iri (1992) questions the ubiquitous implications of signs and challenges the entrenchment of the sign-oriented interpretation of knowing and their concentrated mobilization for searching the sensibility within the fences of linear form of thinking and logical positivism. He highlights the sensibility of mysticism as a way of understanding while substantiating and corroborating a wide spectrum of knowing. Ha'iri (1992) revolts against the Modern Western philosophy's exclusion of "claims of awareness from the domain of human knowledge" and substantiates the meaningfulness of what the Modern way of knowing brands "mere expressions of fervor or as leaps of imagination" (5).

Ricoeur (1991) does not submit to the pervasive discourse of signs and its clamorous quest for defining the reality in sign inducing exegesis. He says, "We could say that in scientific language there is an attempt to reduce as much as possible this polysemy, this plurivocity to univocity: one word-one sense. But it is the task of poetry to make words mean as much as they can and not as little as they can. Therefore, not to elude or exclude this plurivocity, but to cultivate it, to make it meaningful, powerful, and therefore to bring back to language all its capacity of meaningfulness" (449).

When knowing is not just a gerund in the air, when knowing turns out to be in the words of Ha'iri Yazdi (1992) "being" and language becomes an "action" in the words of Habermas (1979), we may better understand the ontological aspect of signs in terms of their creation. With a focus on knowing as being, Ha'iri (1992) indicates, ". . .the inquiry into the nature of the relationship between knowledge and the knower can lead to the very foundation of human intellect where the word knowing does not mean any thing other than being. In this ontological state of human consciousness the constitutive dualism of the subject-object relationship is overcome and submerged into a unitary simplex of the reality of the self that is nothing other than self-object knowledge. From this unitary simplex, the nature of self-object consciousness can, in turn, be derived" (1).

Along with the overarching power of the signs, "I" descended to be identical to "body" and "body" served as the main source of the interpretive inquiry. The idolization of the body and its tyrannical multiplicities ushered in the hollowness of "I" and the alienation of the self.

Johnston (2001, p. xvii) writes, "From Marilyn Monroe to the Spice Girls, from Arnold Schwarzenegger to O. J. Simpson, from William Taft to Bill Clinton, to your own naked form reflected in the mirror each morning, we are taught to read bodies as symbols displaying and revealing hidden "truths" about the individual and his or her behaviors. Any discussion of the body becomes complex and muddled as one tries to analyze how and why certain body types are attributed certain meanings."

The despotism of signs contained the definition of intelligibility and circumscribed the approaches to knowing. The subscription to sign-oriented patterns and paradigms became the criteria for sensibility, competence, and superiority.

Critiquing the authoritative presence of such sensibility, Shotter explains this well by saying, "In fulfilling our responsibilities as competent and professional academics, we must write systematic texts; we run the risk of being accounted incompetent if we do not. Until recently, we have taken such texts for granted as a neutral means to use how we please. This, I now want to claim, is a mistake, and now we must study their influence" (Shotter, 1993, p. 25).

The government of signs promoted exclusive interpretation for thinking, learning, and education and thus elbowed aside numerous other possible forms of understanding. The executive powers of such exclusion gave rise to a discourse of power where sensibility had to be ratified by specific channels.

The cultivation and socialization of the most available perspective on signs generated numerous forms of reliance on the established modes of knowing. Education, like other social sciences, tried hard to bring forth and lead out the clandestine yet constructive forces of the learner from within on the strength of the discourse of rationality and sensibility as prescribed by the intellectual enlightenment.

This, in turn, highlighted the establishment of a language and a generative metalanguage where the paradigmatic and syntagmatic analysis and assessment of thinking, pedagogical approaches, and practices borrowed their sensibility from the binding source of intellectuality based on the rational understanding of signs. The imperial power of signs and their inducing command of rationality turned out to be so inexorably linked to the community of both educators and learners. Michal Oakeshott had a notion of such implications when he writes that "Flattered by circumstance and linked with ancient heresy, an attempt was made to promote 'science' as itself a 'culture' in which human beings identified themselves in relation to 'things' and to their 'empire over things,' but it now deceives no body; boys do not elect for the 'science sixth' expecting to achieve self-knowledge, but for vocational reasons" (quoted in Barrow & Woods, 1993, p. 35).

The question of being, as Heidegger (2000) indicates, is concealed to oblivion in the technological age in that being and being of beings are no longer taken seriously. Consumerism, utilitarianism, and commoditization reign over the interactions. Semiotics gets ontologically entangled in a representation of things in a world where

ontology is already encapsulated by virtue of the hegemony of a project with an emphasis on materialism. Semiotics moves inside this project. Hodge and Kress (1988) indicate that semiotics was circumscribed in limited ways of beings and did not open up to study other forms including the social basis of sign systems.

Heidegger (2000, 2001) challenges the sign-laden psychology which tries to be bound by scientism. This will derail psychology from understanding the historic, cultural, and social components of human beings and their underlying role in numerous pathologies. The sign-oriented psychology with an emphasis on scientism searches for the so-called objectivity and falls in to a new form of dogmatism (see Heidegger, 2000, 2001).

Illustrating the emergence of a new religion by the name of scientism and its overarching endeavor in defining, controlling, and determining the legitimacy of signs, Heidegger (2001) indicates that science is, to an almost incredible degree, dogmatic everywhere, that is, it operates with preconceptions and prejudices which have not been reflected on. There is the highest need for doctors who think and do not wish to leave the field entirely to the scientific technicians (p. 103).

International Relevance

In view of the complexity of culture and its manifestations on negotiations in particular, the semiotics seems to be of great implications when it comes to analyzing numerous forms of negotiations, the nonverbal communication, the underlying signification of decision making, the semiotics of interpersonal and intrapersonal discourse, the media and its power to create messages, the marginal meanings of signs, the core meaning versus the associative, and the affective meanings.

Practice Relevance

World Trade Organization has reported that most of negotiations between people in China and people in the Netherlands have failed because of cultural misunderstanding. The distinction between signs and meanings can help the practitioners in different fields explore the possibility of understanding the semiotics in different contexts.

Future Directions

The future of semiotics can be enriched by a profound examination of the difference between signs and meanings in various cultural contexts. Semiotics can be culturally embedded within specific signification. Thus, understanding semiotics can be circumscribed within syntagmatic and paradigmatic analysis through the hegemony of particular cultural signification. Demonstrating the areas of differences, points of departure, and areas of agreement may facilitate the process of creating a semiotics of peace for international relationships. A mindless understanding of semiotics, on the other hand, can impose acting from a single perspective which may lead to limiting approaches in terms of understanding the human resources both in terms of cognitive and emotional signification.

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Online Resources

Semioticon | Open Semiotics Resource Center
Semiotics Institute Online : Semiotics Encyclopedia Online
Semiotics Encyclopedia Online
Virtual Symposia
SemiotiX New Series
Public Journal of Semiotics
Semiotic Review of Books

Sex/Gender Differences

Eva Magnusson
Department of Psychology, Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden

Introduction

When gender (see entries on "▶ Gender, Overview" and "▶ Sexual Identity") and psychology are discussed together, so usually are differences between men and women, or girls and boys. Mass media, advice books, and popular psychology books frequently focus on how women and men differ; and daily life provides many instances where such differences can be observed. There is often disagreement about the existence of differences, about the size of existing differences, about their origin, and about what observed differences ultimately mean. For the last 100 years, psychologists have eagerly researched differences between men and women, with a view to reaching generalizable answers about how they differ and to using those answers in education and other policy fields. Consequently, research about differences between men and women, or girls and boys, has distinct potential practice relevance.

Psychological gender difference research relies on quantitative measurements and a conventional realist or empiricist epistemology. The topics studied are wide ranging and include aspects of children's psychological development such as cognitive, social, and moral development, many kinds of cognitive abilities in adults, personality traits, academic achievement, self-esteem, communication abilities and styles, leadership

abilities, sexual behavior, aggressive behavior, health-related behaviors and attitudes, the frequency of various psychological disorders, and attitudes about gender equality. The observed magnitudes of practically all measured differences have decreased over time, and for many measurements differences have vanished. Research still finds fairly stable, though small, differences between men and women on spatial abilities such as mental rotation and some verbal abilities, and somewhat larger differences in social behaviors such as sexual behavior and aggressive behavior. Critical psychologists, especially feminists, have subjected psychological gender difference research to several kinds of criticism. These critiques are presented under the heading Critical Debates.

Definition

Within psychology, research comparing women and men was originally called sex difference research, "sex" being the term used to distinguish between men and women both biologically and socially. Over the last few decades, the expression gender difference research has become widespread. In line with the use, by feminist theorists, of the term "gender" to denote the social and cultural consequences and meanings given to a person's sex category, some psychologists have wished to use the term gender differences to refer to characteristics that are clearly influenced by social processes and the term sex differences for characteristics that are closely connected to bodily aspects. This distinction has proved impossible to uphold, though. First, psychologists do not use the terms sex and gender consistently. Thus, "gender difference" is often used for all kinds of comparisons between men and women, not just those that study "social" characteristics. Second, as feminist biologists have pointed out, it is logically and practically impossible to uphold a clear-cut distinction between the biological and the social, especially since "biology" itself is always interpreted through some kind of cultural filter (Fausto-Sterling, 2000). Third, as queer theorists have pointed out, sex difference-oriented research presupposes a two-sex model of humans that is increasingly being questioned. Thus, today there is no agreement about the terminology. An imperfect though workable expression used here is "differences between women and men." It is used to denote the findings of all kinds of psychological research that aims to draw conclusions about a generalizable difference between the sex categories, that is, "women" and "men" (or "boys" and "girls") on some psychological characteristic.

Keywords

Sex; gender; gender differences; sex differences; differences; differences between men and women; comparing women and men

History

The first phase of psychological research on the differences between men (or boys) and women (or girls) coincided with the period in which psychology established itself as an academic discipline. Not surprisingly, thinking about women and men in terms of "differences" was built into the discipline's ways of studying and thinking about men and women from its first beginnings. This focus on difference has been pervasive enough to warrant calling the typical approach in the discipline "the sex difference paradigm." The first emergence of this research, at the turn of the twentieth century, was heavily influenced by contemporary evolutionary theory, with its conception of the Western white man as the most highly developed, and therefore most intelligent, organism. White women were seen as lower on the evolutionary scale, and nonwhite men and women lower still. The results of much early sex difference research conformed with these ideas. Soon, however, and in step with the early women's liberation movement, feminist psychologists began carrying out empirical research that they argued disproved the evolutionist ideas about inherited sex differences (for an early

example, see Thompson Woolley, 1910). Sex difference research soon became a focus of debate among psychologists: researchers claimed contradictory findings, different researchers conceived of sex and gender in mutually incompatible ways, and there was also, from its inception, criticism of the potentially harmful uses of such research.

Traditional Debates

The early debates about psychological differences between men and women had several foci. First, there were debates about what real differences there were between women and men. Some psychologists claimed to have found substantial empirical differences between women and men in both performances, abilities, and personality variables, whereas others claimed to show that very few such differences existed. Second, there were debates about the origins of, and explanations for, observed differences. Some psychologists claimed that observed differences reflected innate traits based in evolution, whereas others argued that differences were due to education and socialization. Third, a few feminists in psychology criticized their male colleagues for methodological shortcomings such as biased selection of research participants that created samples in which male participants had higher education than female participants (Thompson Woolley, 1910). Fourth, feminists also pointed out that the selection of tasks and abilities to study tended to be biased in favor of men's socialization and educational experiences (Hollingworth, 1916). Fifth, feminists claimed that research into differences between women and men was exploited to explain and excuse social subordination of women.

Critical Debates

This section describes the current and recent critical debates by outlining the most prominent lines of critique of research into differences between women and men.

Falsely Inflated Claims of Difference Will Be Harmful

Feminists have pointed to the tendency among policy-makers, the media, and even some researchers to exaggerate and overinterpret findings of differences between men and women and to make claims that go far beyond what data justify. These overinterpretations invariably reaffirm established stereotypes, with potentially serious costs for the negatively stereotyped sex category. Mathematics and gender illustrate this tendency: the stereotypical view is that boys have better mathematical abilities than girls. This view was kept alive by research finding differences in mathematical performance of boys and girls in an era when boys typically took many more mathematics courses than girls. The view of mathematics as "masculine" kept many parents from acknowledging their daughters' actual performance and grades in mathematics and sometimes made parents actively dissuade their daughters from studying mathematics. In recent decades the mathematics performances by girls and boys have been increasingly equalized; in some countries no differences favoring boys are found (Guiso, Monte, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2008). Addressing both such diminishing differences and pervasive cultural sex difference stereotypes, the American psychologist Janet Hyde (2005) has argued that researchers ought to think in terms of a gender similarity hypothesis (rather than the typical gender difference hypothesis). Such a change in terminology, she argued, might decrease the tendency among researchers and policy-makers to over-interpret any findings of differences and downplay findings of similarities.

Reductionism: Other Difference-Producing Factors Are Confounded with "Biological Difference"

Research that compares men and women not seldom takes "biology" as its explanatory locus and causal mechanism. Doing this tends to shift other possibly contributing forces to the background and leave a number of questions unstudied and unanswered. The studies of mathematical performance mentioned in the previous section illustrate this effect. Mathematics tests measure

mathematical achievement. However, the results of such tests have often been taken to reflect mathematical ability, that is, intrinsic potential. Therefore, and in spite of the earlier asymmetries in exposure to mathematics courses, differences in achievement were assumed to reflect genetic differences between girls and boys. Claims about male "math genes" quickly followed. Later research has shown that boys and girls who take the same math courses show no or negligible differences in mathematical performance and that differences sometimes favor girls.

Biologically oriented explanations of differences tend to be based in a strategy called scientific reduction. This explanatory tool, long successfully used in the natural sciences, presumes that processes on one conceptual level (in this case, behavior) can be fully explained in terms of more basic processes or structures (genes, hormones, "evolution," "the brain," etc.). When using reductionist arguments, researchers invoke processes or structures on a biological micro level or on an evolutionary macro level in order to causally explain phenomena on the psychological level. However, not all ways of using reductionist explanations are equally meaningful or successful. For instance, for reduction to the biological level to be meaningful, the psychological experience (for instance, an emotion) must be expressed on the "level" of the targeted biological process (for instance, activity in a brain center). For this to happen, the terms used to describe the psychological experience must be independent of person, culture, and history; because person, culture, and history cannot be given meaning in the language of biology. However, most psychological experiences probably cannot be expressed, *as experiences that humans have*, in a biological or "brain" language, even if their correspondences in brain activity can be so described. Psychologically and experientially descriptive words and biologically descriptive words simply refer to such different conceptual levels that they cannot be converted into each other without losing too much meaning. The psychological and neurophysiological levels of meaning do not "talk" about the same things. These arguments have led critics to claim that there are spheres of psychological life for which knowledge about brain structures and brain functions does not increase psychological knowledge (Jordan-Young, 2010; Richards, 2010). These critics go on to argue that reductionist biological-neurophysiological explanations may blind researchers and decision-makers to the complexity and cultural specificity of the psychological phenomena under study (Robinson, 1995).

A Finding of a Male-Female Difference Has No Causal Meaning

Issues about causality have always been contentious in sex difference research. Today, there is agreement that a finding of a difference between men and women has no explanatory, or causal, power in itself. To be able to draw conclusions about cause and effect relations, researchers must be able to manipulate the variable whose effects they want to study. Such manipulations enable researchers to observe whether different values of that variable reliably produce differences in another variable. But researchers cannot manipulate the biological sex of individuals. It is not possible for a researcher to expose the same individual to different values of the "variable" sex category, or to randomly assign subjects to a sex category, and study the effects of this manipulation. Sex category is something other than a "variable." This means that sex difference research cannot claim explanatory legitimacy beyond the correlational level. That is, if researchers find that a certain ability or characteristic is more pronounced among their male than their female subjects, they can claim that there is a corelation between, for instance, belonging to a particular sex category and achieving high scores on a particular test. But this kind of research will not be able legitimately to claim that the corelation is *caused* by belonging to one or the other sex category (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1994).

A focus on Individual Differences Diverts Attention from Social Inequalities

It is a well-known fact that an exclusive focus on how individuals differ on personal traits and

characteristics tends to decrease the researcher's attention to how the external conditions of the same individuals may differ and how they may be unequal. Feminists have argued that psychological research into differences between men and women will keep the attention of researchers and policy-makers directed away from inequalities between the external conditions of women and men. In this way the search for male-female differences also buys into, and may strengthen, the common cultural tendency to locate the causes of social inequality within individuals. Sex difference research may thus come to function as an integral part of an unequal gender order and reaffirm that order through the spurious legitimacy of "scientific findings" of differences, all the while disregarding inequalities in external conditions: inequalities that would merit more attention.

Social Inequality May Produce "Sex Differences"

Feminist critics have questioned whether the societal divisions and hierarchies that have traditionally been justified by pointing to findings of differences between men and women actually do follow from differences between women and men. These critics argue that, on the contrary, the social processes involved in upholding gendered categories and hierarchies not only create and reaffirm ideas about differences between women and men but may also actually produce such differences. Thus, what sex difference research studies may in fact be the effects of an unequal gender order. Any socially "produced" differences can be invoked as the rationale for differential treatment of men and women. For the individual, such socially produced and socially supported differences both create and reaffirm subjective experiences of difference, thus effectively constructing individual gender identity as based in difference. This critique claims that culture and society continually impose distinctions and hierarchizations by sex category in both private and public lives and that therefore it is not possible to tease out the contributions of "sex category" from experience, hierarchy, or other ongoing contextual factors.

The Intersectionality Argument: Variations Among Women and Among Men

Women are not a homogeneous group, and neither are men. Women and men can be found in all sectors of society, including all social classes, ethnic groups, and racial groups; and women and men have different sexual preferences and are of different ages, levels of ability, and health. Variations in experiences, traits, abilities, and achievements among people in each sex category are as a rule much larger than the average differences between women and men. These caveats receive further support from research that challenges the two-sex model. Feminist researchers, especially those who study people who are not white, not of European descent, or middle class, have long pointed out the risks associated with researchers' use of the blanket categories women and men. In fact, these critics argue, there is seldom ground to consider "women" and "men" as two homogeneous categories that can be meaningfully compared. The intricate interactions between the different social categorizations that braid together over an individual's lifetime require richer and more complex models of explanation than those offered by sex difference research. Feminist theory in conjunction with intersectionality theory offers some promising models (Magnusson, 2011; Shields, 2008).

International Relevance

Academic, empirically oriented psychology had its origin in the west, and so did sex difference research. Both empirical academic psychology and sex difference research grew fastest in the Anglo-Saxon countries, especially the United States. Even today it is probably fair to say that the study of psychological differences between men and women remains more of a concern to psychologists in the west, especially the USA than in many other countries, especially countries outside of the west and north. There, such studies, when they occur, tend to be initiated by Western researchers who want to institute cross-cultural comparisons.

Practice Relevance

Several aspects of practice relevance have been mentioned in previous sections and will be briefly summarized here. Overall it can be noted that research into differences between women and men has often been exploited to explain and excuse social subordination of women. A historical example worth mentioning is how, in psychology's early history, ideas about differences between women and men had stark practical consequences for the women who tried to make their way in the discipline. In many universities, in many countries, women were not allowed to hold university positions in psychology. It was also quite common to exclude women from both undergraduate and graduate training in psychology.

In more recent times, feminists have noted the very practical consequences of viewing mathematics as "masculine": it has kept parents from acknowledging good mathematics performance by their daughters and led parents to dissuade their daughters from studying it. These arguments have been generalized beyond mathematics by Janet Hyde, who argues that such beliefs about differences "...cause harm in numerous realms, including women's opportunities in the workplace, couple conflict and communication, and analyses of self-esteem problems among adolescents" (Hyde, 2005, p. 590). In clinical psychology and psychotherapy, ideas of normative sex differences may have deleterious effects on treatment choice and therapeutic practice (Skoger, Lindberg, & Magnusson, 2011). On a policy level, feminists have argued that a constant focus on differences between men and women directs policy-makers' attention away from inequalities in their social conditions. Such redirection of attention also buys into general cultural individualizing tendencies of social problems.

Future Directions

There has been considerable debate among feminist psychologists about whether the study of psychological differences between women and men is worth pursuing in the future (cf. Kitzinger, 1994). Feminists who are in favor of such research argue that by comparing men and women, whether or not the studies find a difference, researchers would put any lingering, mistaken notions about male-female differences to rest. Also, some argue that it is important to pinpoint any real sex differences that may exist in order to take them into account in social planning. A shared basis among these psychologists is a view of "women" and "men" as categories that are homogeneous enough that it is possible to generalize about them and a conviction that psychological research can uncover real differences.

Other feminist psychologists argue that gender-biased practices of socialization and education have such foundational impacts on children that it is impossible to measure anything other than the effects of variations in such practices. Sex difference research could never uncover the "true" psychological differences, if they exist. These scholars see observed differences between men and women as a kind of "icing on the cake" produced by socialization. The "cake" consists of the unknown original psychological differences or similarities. According to these researchers, what sex difference research measures are the effects of differential socialization practices and unequal treatment of women and men, and there is little merit in continuing such research.

Yet other feminist psychologists have been influenced by intersectionality theory and constructionism and argue that it does not make sense to consider "women" and "men" as homogeneous categories that could be meaningfully compared in order to find out any real differences between them. These critics argue that any comparison between "women" and "men" has to be very explicit about *which* women and *which* men are being studied, under what conditions, and for what purposes. Otherwise, a difference focus in research will reaffirm the cultural image of women and men as homogenous groups, thus encouraging stereotypes about women and men, even when research

finds no differences (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1994; Shields, 2008). Therefore, these feminist psychologists argue, psychologists should stop studying sex differences and begin paying serious attention to inequalities and asymmetries in living conditions, as they play themselves out in the intersectional force fields within which people, of any sex category, live their daily lives.

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http://www.rebeccajordan-young.com/

Sexism

Julia C. Becker
Department of Psychology, Philipps-University Marburg, Marburg, Germany

Introduction

Around the world (white) men rule. Most obviously, this can be seen in objective indicators of gender inequality like the gender pay gap, or the small number of women represented in high-status positions or parliaments (e.g., United Nations, 2010). Moreover, many women experience direct gender discrimination in their everyday lives (see, e.g., Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995). Yet, there is remarkably little protest against gender inequality. From a critical-psychological perspective, this is an interesting phenomenon. It has been argued that among other things, unequal gender relations are perpetuated through subtle forms of sexism that are promoted by the high-status, dominant group but can be internalized and endorsed by the lower-status group. This entry provides an overview about subtle, contemporary forms of sexism and aims at explaining how sexist ideologies help to maintain gender inequality in societies at large.

Definition

Sexism can be defined as individuals' beliefs and behaviors or institutional practices that either reflect negative evaluations of individuals based upon their gender or promote gender inequality (Swim & Hyers, 2009). Thus, sexism can be directed at all genders, but is most often directed at women (for heteronormativity see Barker, and for LGBTQ psychology, see Peel in this encyclopedia).

Keywords

Modern sexism; neosexism; benevolent sexism; ambivalent sexism; collective action; social change; gender inequality

History

Research on sexism was inspired by the feminist movement that promoted dramatic changes in women's social status in the first half of the twentieth century in "Western" countries. For example, women rejected second-class citizenship and obtained the rights to vote and later the rights to seek divorce and to take legal action against abuse, to pursue higher education, etc. (Swim & Hyers, 2009). In 1954, Allport wrote only one page about "antifeminism" in his famous book "The Nature of Prejudice" (Swim & Hyers). Since then, research on sexism has increased to a great extent. Whereas more traditional forms of sexism were examined in the 1970s and 1980s, the focus shifted to new and subtle forms of sexism in the 1990s.

Traditional Debates

Before the 1990s, sexism has been traditionally defined as solely negative attitude towards women. Most psychological research on sexism has focused on endorsement of traditional gender roles and blatant sexism. For example, the "Attitudes Toward Women Scale" has been widely used to assess whether individuals believe that women and men should occupy different social roles. Longitudinal data indicated a decrease in endorsement of traditional gender roles over the years.

Critical Debates

In the 1990s, several new, more critical concepts of sexism have been distinguished. These concepts reflect critical debates, because in contrast to more blatant, obvious forms of sexism, contemporary subtle forms of sexism present legitimizing ideologies that support hierarchical gender relations by earning consensual collective endorsement among many men and women. This entry focuses on these subtle and more critical forms of sexism, namely, modern sexism, neosexism, and particularly on the concept of ambivalent sexism (for full reviews of different types of sexism see, e.g., Glick & Rudman, 2010; Swim, Becker, Lee, & Pruitt, 2009; Swim & Hyers, 2009).

The concepts of modern sexism (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995) and neosexism (Tougas, Brown, Beaton, & Joly, 1995) were developed simultaneously yet independently in order to measure hidden prejudice against women. They both derive from the concept of modern racism. Modern sexism and neosexism are characterized by (1) the denial of continued discrimination against women (e.g., "Discrimination against women is no longer a problem in the United States," Swim et al., 1995), (2) negative reactions to complaints about inequality (e.g., "Women's request in terms of equality between the sexes are simply exaggerated," Tougas et al., 1995), and (3) resistance to efforts addressing sexism ("Over the past few years, women have gotten more from the government than they deserve," Tougas et al.). Whereas the Modern Sexism Scale focuses particularly on the first component, the Neosexism Scale primarily measures the last two components. Modern and neosexist beliefs are considered to be sexist, because they blame women instead of sexism for inequality. Research illustrates that endorsement of modern and neosexist beliefs helps to maintain gender inequality. For example, modern sexism is associated with less endorsement of egalitarian values and greater endorsement of rape myths (for an overview, see Swim & Hyers, 2009).

Researchers who introduced the concept of *ambivalent sexism* took a major step forward in sexism research by taking into account that sexism is not ultimately negative (as has been suggested in earlier research) but can also appear under the guise of chivalry. Specifically, ambivalent sexism consists of hostile and benevolent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996). *Hostile sexism* is clearly negative and a blatant expression of sexism. Hostile sexism is grounded in the belief that men deserve a higher status and is accompanied by the fear that women use sexuality and feminist ideology to obtain control and power over men. Accordingly, hostile sexism is mostly directed at women who do not conform to traditional gender

roles. *Benevolent sexism*, on the other hand, appears in a seemingly positive light. Benevolent sexism comprises paternalism (the belief that women should be protected and financially provided by men), a characterization of women as wonderful, warm, and caring and an idealization of women as romantic partners. Though these beliefs appear to be considerate and positive, they have insidious downsides. The belief that women need protection characterizes women as being unable to take care of themselves. The belief that women are the "better sex" because they are warmer and more affectionate goes along with the belief that they are less competent, and finally, the idealization of women as romantic partners puts the concept of heterosexual love as one of the most desired goals people have to accomplish in their life. Moreover, this belief can be accompanied by the fear that women use their sexuality in order to control men. In sum, although benevolent sexist beliefs might appear to be subjectively positive, they promote an image of women as best suited for low-status roles.

According to Glick and Fiske (1996), ambivalent sexism derives from intimate relationships between women and men and the interplay of structural and dyadic power. Although men dominate, they are also dependent on women. Based on earlier theories, Glick and Fiske have argued that even the worst hostile sexist, heterosexual man probably desires an intimate relationship with a woman and offspring. Thus, according to the Ambivalent Sexism Theory, heterosexual men's structural power coexists with a strong dependence on women as romantic partners and mothers. This lends women some degree of dyadic power within intimate relationships and motivates men to behave benevolently and also reward women for exhibiting warm traits so that they fulfill their wishes without social conflict.

As mentioned in the introduction, sexism can be directed at all genders. In fact, the concept of ambivalence has been applied to attitudes towards men (Glick & Fiske, 1999). Hostility towards men is reflected in an unfavorable evaluation of men, for instance, in disparaging men's abilities in the female-gendered (low-status) domestic domain. This hostile evaluation is accompanied by the belief that gender relations are not changeable and that men will always remain the powerful group. Benevolence towards men is expressed in the belief that women need to take care of men in the domestic realm, in a positive evaluation of men as being the providers and protectors, and in the belief that without a husband a woman's life is not complete. These beliefs are system stabilizing because they support traditional gender roles.

From a critical-psychological perspective, it is interesting to explore why not only men but also women endorse sexist beliefs and why serious attempts to address gender inequality are rarely observable. It has been demonstrated that although women are more likely to reject hostile sexist beliefs compared to men, they often show a stronger endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs. Benevolent sexist beliefs appear to be flattering and many women like being cherished and protected by men, which also might include being complemented or being put on a pedestal. Accordingly, women and men are less likely to identify benevolent forms of sexism as a type of gender discrimination compared to hostile forms of sexism.

Related to this, many women endorse self-silencing beliefs. Self-silencing is the tendency to put other people's needs ahead of one's own needs in relationships. Although self-silencing beliefs are intended to protect harmony in relationships, they are problematic if only women are inclined to not express their thoughts and feelings in interpersonal interactions. Indeed, internalization of social role expectations can have negative consequences. For instance, the more women endorse self-silencing beliefs, the worse their psychological well-being and the less they confront sexism in their everyday lives (Swim et al., 2010).

International Relevance

Although women are disadvantaged compared to men all over the world, the degree of disadvantage differs among cultures. Therefore, research on sexism has a great international relevance.

However, most research on sexism has been conducted in the US and Western Europe, and only a few studies compared different forms of sexism in diverse cultures (e.g., Glick et al., 2000; see Swim et al., 2009). For instance, it has been demonstrated that hostile and benevolent sexism are positively correlated in at least 19 countries worldwide (Glick et al., 2000). Moreover, both concepts are related to objective indicators of gender inequality (e.g., the gender empowerment measure or the gender development index), indicating that people are more likely to endorse sexist attitudes in countries with high levels of gender inequality.

Practice Relevance

A critical concept of sexism that takes into account that sexism is not necessarily hostile but can be expressed in a subjectively positive manner has practical consequences regarding people's motivation to engage in collective action and resistance for social change. As noted above, the downside of benevolent sexism is that women are not only perceived as "wonderful and warm" but also as incompetent and weak. Thus, besides the positive aspects that benevolent sexism can entail for the individual woman, it can have harmful consequences for women as individuals (on a "micro"-level) and for women in general as a social category on a societal ("macro-") level.

With regard to negative effects on the individual level, research has indicted that women who are exposed to benevolent sexism decrease their cognitive performance (Dardenne, Dumont, & Bollier, 2007). Moreover, the more women endorse implicit beliefs of male partners as "knights in shining armor", the less they are interested in higher education (Rudman & Heppen, 2003). Thus, benevolent sexist behavior results in women's assimilation to the stereotypical views implied by benevolent sexism (Barreto, Ellemers, Piebinga, & Moya, 2010).

On a societal level, benevolent sexism supports gender inequality by decreasing women's resistance against gender discrimination. Precisely, it has been demonstrated that women are more likely to accept discriminatory behavior from their intimate partners if the behavior was justified in a benevolent way (Moya, Glick, Expósito, De Lemus, & Hart, 2007). Moreover, research illustrates that if people believe that there is not a single group in society who monopolizes everything "good," but that a group's advantages balance the group's disadvantages, the overall societal system is perceived to be fair. Hostile and benevolent sexism can be perceived as an example of these complementary ideologies: Women are not only treated in a negative way (i.e., with hostile sexism) but also receive ostensibly beneficial treatment (benevolent sexist behavior). Indeed, it has been shown that women exposed to benevolent sexism do not only perceive the gender system to be fair (Jost & Kay, 2005) but also lose their interest in engaging in collective action in order to change gender inequality (Becker & Wright, 2011). These research findings indicate that benevolent sexism is a subtle tool of oppression, the "iron fist in the velvet glove" (Jackman, 1994) that helps to explain why women are rarely involved in protests against sexism: As long as individuals believe that the gender system is balanced because they might receive benefits from benevolent sexist behavior, they lose interest in changing structural gender inequality. Thus, by blending affection with dominance, men can strategically use benevolent sexism as a means of reducing women's resistance against discrimination. Accordingly, to avoid the undermining effects of patronizing chivalry, it is important to heighten individual's awareness for subjectively positive forms of sexism and to challenge and confront these types of gender discrimination.

Future Directions

Based on the lack of international studies, more research should be done cross-culturally. For example, it would be fruitful to examine whether the concepts developed in the USA have the same meaning in countries outside Europe. Moreover, research on sexism has started to focus on how sexism can be reduced in individuals. Building on this, more research is necessary that points out

societal factors that need to be changed in order to promote more gender equality and social justice. Finally, from a critical-psychological perspective, it would be important that future research takes a stronger focus on identities that intersect with gender (e.g., ethnic identity, sexual orientation).

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Sexology

Meg Barker
Faculty of Social Sciences, Open University, Milton Keynes, UK

Introduction

Sexology has traditionally been undertaken by medics, biologists, and quantitative psychologists, and there is therefore significant overlap between sexology and the mainstream psychology of human sexual behavior. However, recent years have seen the emergence of a "critical sexology" movement which draws upon sociological, critical and queer understandings of sexuality and attempts an interdisciplinary dialogue with more conventional forms of sexology and psychosexual therapy. This emergence

has occurred in parallel with the development of critical psychological work on sexuality, with many of the same writers and academics involved in both projects. The "British school" of critical sexology (Noonan, 2010), the Psychology of Sexualities Section of the British Psychological Society (BPS) (formally the Lesbian and Gay Psychology Section), and the New View Campaign (Kaschak & Tiefer, 2001) have been key players in developing a more explicitly critical approach to sexology and the psychology of sexuality.

Definition

The term sexology refers broadly to the study of sexuality; however, it has traditionally been associated specifically with attempts to scientifically categorize and classify sexuality and with the related project of medically treating sexual "disorders" or "dysfunctions" with physiological and/or psychological interventions. Illustrating popular understanding, the Wikipedia entry on sexology explicitly defines it as "scientific" and distances it from "the non-scientific study of sex, such as political analysis or social criticism" (Wikipedia, 2012). Popular documentaries on the topic of "sex research" focus exclusively on the historical figures who have attempted to classify human sexual behavior and recent – mostly laboratory based – quantitative studies on the physiology and psychology of sex (e.g., Kemp, 2011).

Keywords

Critical sexology; Foucauldian; Heteronormativity; LGBT psychology; psychology of sexualities; psychosexual therapy; queer; sexology; sexual response cycle; social constructionism

History

Sexology is usually traced back to nineteenth-century writers such as Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Henry Havelock Ellis, and Magnus Hirschfeld: physicians who wrote texts categorizing human sexuality (Weeks, 2009), often attempting to distinguish pathological forms of sexual behavior and illustrating categories with extensive case studies. For example Krafft-Ebing proposed "sadism" and "masochism" as disorders, a pathological classification which exists to this day in psychiatric manuals. Havelock Ellis and Hirschfeld wrote some of the earliest medical texts on homosexuality and were key figures in distinguishing transgender and homosexual identities and in challenging the criminalization and pathologization of homosexuality.

Drawing on many of these writers, Sigmund Freud's theories of sexuality were also fundamental in sexology, although most mainstream modern day sexologists distance themselves from psychoanalytic understandings. Freudian theories were a major influence on the classifications of sexuality-related "disorders" in the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), and the related World Health Organization International Classification of Diseases (ICD) whose sections on "mental disorders" were written by APA psychiatrists. Many of those involved in writing these documents were psychoanalytically trained, as well as drawing on more biological understandings such as Kraepelin's system of classifications. While this psychoanalytic influence has decreased over the revisions of the DSM and ICD, particularly, following the cognitive revolution in psychology, psychiatry, and psychotherapy, the documents still retain some of the earlier terminologies and divisions.

Other key figures in twentieth-century sexology include Alfred Kinsey and his colleagues whose extensive interview studies in the 1940s and 1950s led to the publication of influential texts on sexual behavior in the "human male" and "human female." These emphasized diversity of sexual practice and located homosexuality and heterosexuality on a continuum rather than as binary opposites. The research of William Masters and Virginia Johnson, from the late 1950s onwards, was also key in maintaining the

close links between sexological research and psychosexual therapy and in developing a model of human sexual response (based on observations of sexual behavior) which became foundational to DSM (and other) definitions of "functional sex."

Traditional Debates

A key project of traditional sexology has been to distinguish normal from pathological sex and to determine ways of treating the latter. The World Association for Sexual Health (WAS, formally the World Congress of Sexology), for example, represents sexologists internationally and has the goal of promoting "sexual health" for all through "sexological science."

The DSM and ICD distinguish normal human sexuality in two main ways: functional/dysfunctional and normative/paraphilic. Functional sex is defined in relation to Kaplan's development of Masters and Johnsons' human sexual response cycle. Functional sexual response is constructed as involving desire, excitement/physiological arousal, and orgasm. Thus dysfunctions include absence of desire/aversion to sex, failure to become aroused/erect, and failure to orgasm/premature ejaculation, as well as pain during sex. The paraphilias include, in the current DSM (IV), sexual sadism and masochism, fetishism, exhibitionism, voyeurism, frotteurism, and pedophilia. Homosexuality was removed from the paraphilia lists in 1973 (DSM) and 1992 (ICD) suggesting, to more critical theorists, a basis in cultural norms rather than the objective science that is claimed to underlie these nosologies.

Mainstream sexology and psychology of sexuality, as exemplified in textbooks on human sexuality and psychology, tend to draw heavily upon the DSM categories in the understandings of sex and sexuality which are presented there. Sexuality is also overwhelmingly constructed in a dichotomous, and heteronormative, manner, viewed as being largely, or exclusively, about gender of attraction. Attraction to the "same gender" is presented as requiring of (usually biological) explanation in a way in which "opposite gender" attraction is not. Non-dichotomous understandings of sexuality, such as Kinsey's, are rarely given more than lip service, resulting in an erasure and/or pathologization of bisexuality and queer sexualities, as well as sexualities that are not related to gender of partner.

It seems that the key projects of traditional sexology, therefore, are to diagnose and treat sexual abnormalities and dysfunctions and to explain nonnormative forms of human sexuality. Prominent themes in current sexology are genetic research, neuroimaging during sexual experience, and large surveys of sexual behavior.

Critical Debates

Alternative, more sociological, theories have been around since the 1960s with the work of researchers such as Gagnon and Simon (Jackson & Scott, 2010) and have since been strongly influenced by the work of Michel Foucault in the 1970s and 1980s. Such thinkers question the psychoanalytic conflation of gender and sexuality (still underlying mainstream sexology) and reveal the social construction of sex and sexual categories and the power dynamics underlying these. Along with theorists such as Judith Butler, David Halperin, and Eve Kosovsky Sedgwick, Michel Foucault was one of the key influences on queer theory, which challenges heteronormativity and deconstructs sexual identity categories.

Foucauldian and queer perspectives have been key influences upon the related critical psychology of sexualities, critical sexology, and new view movements.

In Britain it took a decade of campaigning for a Lesbian and Gay Psychology Section of the BPS to be established in 1998 (whereas the American Psychological Association had Division 44 from 1984). Both the timing of this establishment (post-queer theory and critical psychology) and the battle against heteronormative orthodoxy that was required ensured that the

section was critical from its inception, and it has continued to be led by psychologists who are explicitly social constructionist and critical in approach (such as Celia Kitzinger, Peter Hegarty, and Lyndsey Moon). The shift in title to the Psychology of Sexualities Section reflects such influences. Key figures in the section have made international links to critical psychologists in other countries in joint projects, including Damien Riggs in Australia (Clarke, Ellis, Peel, & Riggs, 2010), academics at the University of Michigan (Peter Hegarty's LGBT Psychology Summer Institute), the editorial board of Darren Langdridge and Meg Barker's journal *Psychology & Sexuality*, or the authors in Victoria Clarke and Elizabeth Peel's (2007) collection *Out in Psychology*: *Lesbian*, *Gay*, *Bisexual*, *Trans and Queer Perspectives*.

Shortly after the establishment of the Lesbian and Gay Psychology Section, in 2002 the critical sexology seminar series was set up in London by clinical psychologist Lih-Mei Liao and humanities scholar Iain Morland. This was an interdisciplinary network for psychologists, psychoanalysts, medical doctors, literary and cultural studies scholars, philosophers, artists, lawyers, and historians with a critical interest in the construction and management of gender and sexuality in the medical, discursive, and cultural spheres. Continuing to be run by a practicing psychologist (Meg Barker) and humanities scholars (Lisa Downing and Robert Gillet), the critical sexology seminars and email list have become an international hub for critically informed work on sexuality.

Around the same time, the New View Campaign was formed in the United States in 2000 to challenge the constructions of women's sexuality which were appearing alongside pharmaceutical attempts to medicalize women's sexual experience and to produce drugs to treat supposed "dysfunction." A grassroots organization, the New View employs similar criticisms of conventional and medical constructions of sex as critical sexology and psychology (e.g., Tiefer, 1995; Boyle, 1993). Leonore Tiefer, the founder of the movement, has been involved in many academic projects with critical psychologists and sexologists, notably papers and special issues of the journal *Feminism & Psychology* which has been a key publication in promoting a critical psychology of sexuality.

Unifying features of the linked psychology of sexualities, critical sexology, and new view groups are a non-pathologizing and nonessentializing stance towards the diversity of sexual practices and identities which exist, a commitment to qualitative – as well as quantitative – methods of study alongside theoretical work, an ethics of accountability, attendance to multiple meanings of experience rather than searching for unifying explanations, and being informed by social constructionist and queer theoretical understandings of sexuality. There is also a commitment to interdisciplinarity. Many of those involved take an active role in influencing policy and practice in these areas, for example, by drawing up guidelines for health practitioners, developing training for psychosexual therapists, or writing textbooks.

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Online Resources

Hirschfeld Archive for Sexology. http://www2.hu-berlin.de/sexology/Entrance_Page/entrance_page.html
The Kinsey Institute. http://www.kinseyinstitute.org
The World Association for Sexual Health. http://www.worldsexology.org
Proposed sexuality and gender disorders, DSM V. http://www.dsm5.org/ProposedRevisions/Pages/SexualandGenderIdentityDisorders.aspx
Critical Sexology. http://www.criticalsexology.org.uk
BPS Psychology of Sexualities section. http://pss.bps.org.uk/pss/pss_home.cfm
The New View Campaign. http://www.fsd-alert.org

Sexual Harassment: Laws, Incidence, and Organizational Responses

Michele A. Paludi
School of Management, Union Graduate College, Schenectady, NY, USA

Introduction

Gender violence has been defined by the United Nations as "...any act that is likely to or results in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats or acts of...coercion, arbitrary deprivations of liberty...private or public...in the family, community" (1995). Forms of violence included in this definition are rape, child sexual abuse, intimate partner violence, genital mutilation, trafficking, state-sanctioned violence against women, discrimination in education and workplace, and sexual harassment, the latter being the topic of this paper.

Definitions

Legal

In the United States, workplace sexual harassment is legally defined as "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" when any one of the following criterion is met (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC], 1990):

(a) Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of the individual's employment.
(b) Submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting the individual.
(c) Such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.

The United States Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights (OCR, 1997), defined sexual harassment similarly:

> Unwelcome sexual advances, request for sexual favors, and other verbal, nonverbal, or physical conduct of a sexual nature by an employee, by another student, or by a third party, which is sufficiently severe, persistent, or pervasive to limit a student's ability to participate in or benefit from an education program or activity, or to create a hostile or abusive educational environment.

These legal definitions describe two types of sexual harassment: quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile environment sexual harassment. Quid pro quo sexual harassment refers to an individual with organizational power who either expressly or implicitly ties an academic or employment decision or action to the response of an individual to unwelcome sexual advances. Hostile environment sexual harassment involves a situation where an atmosphere or climate is set up by peers or individuals with organizational power that makes it difficult or impossible for a student to learn or an employee to work because they perceive the climate to be hostile, offensive, and/or intimidating and the behavior unreasonably interferes with their ability to do their work or study.

Both quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment of students are prohibited by Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments. Title IX is an antidiscrimination statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in any educational program or activity receiving financial assistance. Title IX extends to recruiting of students, admissions, educational activities and programs, course offerings, counseling, financial aid, health and insurance benefits,

scholarships, and athletics. Employed students, as are adults, are protected from quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment from Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC, 1999), sexual harassment of employees includes the following:

(a) The victim as well as the harasser may be a woman or a man. The victim does not have to be of the opposite sex.
(b) The harasser can be the victim's supervisor, an agent of the employer, a supervisor in another area, a coworker, or a nonemployee.
(c) The victim does not have to be the person harassed but could be anyone affected by the offensive conduct ("third party sexual harassment").
(d) Unlawful sexual harassment may occur without economic injury to or discharge of the victim.
(e) The harasser's conduct must be unwelcome.

Furthermore, sexual harassment may be physical, verbal, written, or visual.

Behavioral

Sexual harassment includes, but is not limited to:

- Unwelcome sexual advances
- Sexual innuendos, comments, and sexual remarks
- Suggestive, insulting, or obscene sounds
- Implied or expressed threat of reprisal for refusal to comply with a sexual request
- Pinching, patting, brushing up against another's body
- Sexually suggestive books, magazines, objects, email, photographs, screen savers displayed in the school/work area
- Actual denial of an academic- or employment-related benefit for refusal to comply with sexual requests

A research-derived definition of sexual harassment (Woods & Buchanan, 2008) includes the following:

Unwanted sexual attention, sexual coercion, and contrapower sexual harassment.

Unwanted sexual attention includes verbal and nonverbal unsolicited comments, gestures, or attempts at physical contact.

Sexual coercion describes job- or school-related threats or benefits that are contingent upon compliance with sexual demands.

Contrapower sexual harassment involves a subordinate sexually harassing a superior, e.g., a student sexually harassing a professor.

Keywords

Contrapower sexual harassment; equal employment opportunity commission; gender violence; hostile environment; posttraumatic stress disorder; quid pro quo; title VII; title IX; United States Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights

Vulnerable Populations

Although all students and employees are vulnerable to sexual harassment to some degree, for certain groups, the incidence of sexual harassment appears to be higher than for others (Levy & Paludi, 2002):

- Women of color
- Graduate students, whose future careers are often determined by their association with a particular faculty member
- Women in male-populated fields, e.g., engineering
- Economically disadvantaged women
- Lesbians, who are harassed as part of homophobia
- Physically and emotionally disabled students and employees
- Women who have been sexually abused
- Socially isolated girls and women

Impact of Sexual Harassment on Students and Employees

Research has documented impact on victims of sexual harassment in all areas of functioning, including emotional/psychological, physical or health related, career, interpersonal, and self-perception (e.g., Chan, Chow, Lam, & Cheung, 2008; Langhout et al., 2005), for example,

depression; fear; anger; isolation; fear of crime in general; helplessness; shock; decreased self-esteem; headaches; tiredness; respiratory problems; substance abuse; sleep disturbances; eating disorders; lethargy; gastrointestinal disorders; changes in work habits; absenteeism; lost wages and benefits; changes in career goals, including leaving college or a job in order to escape the sexual harassment; fear of new people; lack of trust; changes in social networks; and withdrawal from family and friends.

Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a consequence of sexual harassment/discrimination. Symptoms of PTSD include anxiety, physiological arousal, irritability, avoidance/denial, intrusion, repetitive nightmares, impaired concentration and memory, and acting-out behaviors. Immediately after the violent episode, individuals experience a sense of disbelief, shock, and psychological and physical numbing (Avina & O'Donohue, 2002). In the few days following the incident, individuals experience three different types of consequences:

(a) Reexperiencing consequences (e.g., dreaming, flashbacks)
(b) Withdrawal consequences (e.g., social withdrawal, absenteeism)
(c) Other consequences (e.g., irritability, sleep disturbances, anger, exaggerated startle responses)

Glomb, Munson, Hulin, Bergman, and Drasgow (1999) reported that the impact of sexual harassment on individuals persists after 2 years following the incident(s).

Organizational Responsibilities for Preventing and Dealing with Sexual Harassment

Sexual harassment demands that schools and workplaces intervene since under both Title VII and Title IX, sexual harassment is an organizational responsibility with respect to prevention and reactive measures (Paludi et al., 2010). It is generally recommended that schools and workplaces should:

(a) Establish and disseminate an effective antisexual harassment policy.
(b) Establish and disseminate an effective investigatory procedure.
(c) Offer training in sexual harassment in general and in the school/workplace policy and procedures specifically.

Additional educational programs for students include:

(a) Training on sexual harassment for new student orientation programs (including transfer students)
(b) Incorporating discussions of sexual harassment in courses
(c) Facilitating a "sexual harassment awareness week" and scheduling programs for students and teachers, including guided video discussions, guest lectures, and plays
(d) Providing educational sessions for parents about sexual harassment and the school district's policy and procedures

In keeping with the human resource management literature, employers should conduct audits of their policies, procedures, and training programs on sexual harassment. Audits provide information about how employers are preventing and reacting to sexual harassment complaints in their organization. For example, employers may inquire whether:

(a) Their policy is well publicized on the intranet, human resource office, and in employee handbooks.
(b) Remedies are clear and commensurate with the level of sexual harassment committed.
(c) Their company facilitates training programs on sexual harassment in general and the organization's policy and procedures specifically for new hires.

Following the completion of the audit, the employer must make the necessary changes to ensure their preventative and remedial strategies are effective.

Tolerance of sexual harassment by the campus and workplace is associated with a higher frequency of sexual harassment (Glomb et al. (1999). Preventative strategies, including the human resource audit, are therefore crucial.

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Online Resources

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. www.eeoc.gov

Feminist Majority Foundation. http://feminist.org/

International Coalition Against Sexual Harassment. http://www2.nau.edu/~pms/icash.html

Office for Civil Rights, United States Department of Education. http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/index.html

Safe Schools Coalition. http://safeschoolscoalition.org/RG-bullying_harassment_schoolbasedviolence.html

Recommended Reading

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Sexual Identity

Elizabeth Morgan
Department of Psychology, Springfield College, Springfield, MA, USA

Introduction

Identity consists of a personally significant, meaningful sense of one's goals, beliefs, values, and life roles (Erikson, 1968; Marcia, 1987). Among sexuality researchers, "sexual identity" typically refers to sexual orientation. However, more recently, researchers have adopted more inclusive and multidimensional conceptualizations of sexual identity (e.g., Dillon, Worthington, & Moradi, 2011). As with models of sexual identity, much of the theorizing on sexual identity has also specifically focused on sexual orientation and the "coming out process" for sexual-minority

individuals. Nonetheless, there is increasing evidence that rigid, dichotomous models of sexual identity fail to accommodate the true complexity and diversity of individuals' lived experiences. As a result, sexual identity researchers now acknowledge that conventional sexual identity models are in need of expansion, clarification, and further investigation (e.g., Savin-Williams, 2011).

Definition

Sexual identity is a cognitive and emotional understanding that individuals have about the meaning and significance of numerous aspects of their sexuality. This includes components such as their sexual attractions, desires, behaviors, values, and relationships. Together, this organized set of understandings helps form a sense of self. Sexual identity is historically and culturally specific, it can be altered over the life course, and it may not be internally consistent with other identity domains. It is important to distinguish sexual identity from *sexual orientation*, which can be defined as a biological predisposition toward patterns of sexual and romantic thoughts, affiliations, affection, or desires with members of one's sex, the other sex, both sexes, or neither sex. These predispositions may relate to a self-ascribed sexual orientation label drawn from existing social categories (i.e., heterosexual, bisexual, gay-lesbian) that frequently act as a conscious acknowledgement of one's sexual orientation. However, it important to clarify that while one chooses a sexual orientation label (or identity), it is widely understood that sexual orientation is not alterable because it is biologically determined (through genetics and/or prenatal environment). It is also important to note that one's sexual identity, sexual orientation, and sexual orientation label do not necessarily correspond perfectly (Savin-Williams, 2011).

Kinsey and colleague's seven-category continuum (where sexual behavior ranges from "0" representing "exclusively heterosexual" to "6" representing "exclusively homosexual," Kinsey, Pomeroy, & Martin, 1948) remains a prominent method of conceptualizing sexual identity. However, this model is viewed as incomplete both because it is a binary model that forces same-sex and other-sex sexual behavior to vary in relation to each other and because it is singularly based on sexual behavior, thus ignoring other facets of sexuality. As a result, many sexuality researchers recognize the importance of sexual attraction, fantasy, and behavior, as well as romantic, emotional, and social preferences, in understanding sexual identity. Dillon et al. (2011) describe a multidimensional model that incorporates one of the broadest conceptualization of sexual identity. They include a number of individual elements of sexual identity, such as recognition and acceptance of, and identification with, one's sexual needs, values, sexual orientation and preferences for activities, partner characteristics, and modes of sexual expression. Second, social identity elements include the recognition of oneself as a member of a group of individuals with similar sexual identities (i.e., group membership identity) and attitudes toward sexual-minority individuals.

To make sense of the development of sexual identity within an individual, social scientists from a variety of disciplines have proposed theoretical interpretations of sexual identity formation devoted to sexual-minority individuals and models of the coming out process. Although elaborations on identity processes have been based on various theoretical orientations, sexual identity models have been historically derived from Erikson (1968). Furthermore, sexual identity exploration and commitment, based on Marcia's identity status model (Marcia, 1987), are frequently emphasized as common mechanisms in sexual identity development and have resulted in the proliferation of developmental stage models.

One of the most widely cited models of lesbian/gay identity development is Cass's (1979) six-stage process of incorporating a lesbian/gay identity into one's self-concept. These stages included identity confusion, identity comparison, identity tolerance, identity acceptance, identity pride, and identity synthesis. Following Cass, many researchers have offered other versions of sexual orientation identity formation for gay

and/or lesbian populations (and to a lesser degree bisexual populations), almost all of which describe a linear path of coming to terms with homoerotic desire and subsequent changes in self-concept that are required to accept, act upon, internalize, and disclose that desire with regard to one's individual and social identity as a sexual minority (Reynolds & Hanjorgiris, 2000). While the historical significance of these models is great, recent research indicates that sexual identity development neither necessarily follows a consistent route nor is necessarily a stable phenomenon, leading researchers to question whether or not there is a predictable series of steps or static categorization system for sexual identity and suggesting the need to revisit and revise the prior models (e.g., Savin-Williams & Diamond, 2000).

Keywords

Identity formation; identity development; sexuality; sexual orientation; heterosexual; sexual minority; gender

Traditional Debates

The traditional models of sexual identity that put forth a predetermined developmental trajectory have been challenged by recent scholarship (e.g., Savin-Williams, 2011). A common criticism of traditional models has been that sexual identity development is more of a process than a series of discrete, universalized stages. In particular, individuals whose experiences of sexuality involve multiplicity and fluidity have been ill described by such models. For example, given that research on sexual identity development has identified significant inconsistencies between individual's sexual attractions, behaviors, and identities, the historically dichotomous and essentialist models of sexuality, in which individuals possess and seek to publicly embrace one "true" identity (heterosexual or gay-lesbian), are not empirically substantiated. Furthermore, it is now understood that identity labels – or individual's conscious acknowledgment of their sexual orientation – often shift over time, in addition to patterns of sexual behavior, that are not adequately captured by the established model. Instead, more flexible and inclusive models of sexual identity development are required in order to accommodate either a linear trajectory of identity development leading to a singular outcome or a more recursive identity development process that accommodates multiple or shifting identity states over time (e.g., Savin-Williams, & Diamond, 2000).

It is also important to note that the prevailing societal assumption of heterosexuality as a uniform and "natural" experience, unworthy of analytic attention, has led to limited research and theories about heterosexual identity development. Heteronormative privilege conferred on other-sex-oriented individuals has prevented thoughtful or empirical consideration of straight sexual identity. Considering that Erikson's (1968) conceptualization of a "healthy" identity is one that is significant, personally meaningful, and integrated with other aspects of the individual self in relation to the social world, establishing a heterosexual identity would require mindful thought and action about one's (hetero)sexuality and, likely, a consideration or recognition of possible alternatives. Several empirical studies have indicated that when compared to sexual-minority-identified participants, heterosexual-identified participants also are less likely to describe the process through which they formulated their sexual identity as salient or effortful.

Another important contemporary critique of traditional models of sexual identity surrounds the increasing normalization of sexual diversity among current cohorts of (western) youth. Younger generations are increasingly accepting of sexual diversity, making same-sex sexuality less remarkable and rendering the old sexual identity categories and coming out models less applicable. Indeed, it has been proposed that these changes have eliminated the need for sexual identity labels given that the creation of sexual categories reifies essentialist models that are overly fixated on sexual orientation and underemphasize

other facets of sexuality. Furthermore, given that most models of sexual identity development neglect to examine the role of multiple individual differences, such as race, ethnicity, nationality, and socioeconomic class, future understandings of sexual identity must consider the intersection of these sociocultural and individual forces. Ultimately, researchers in the field are in agreement that current understandings of sexual identity should necessarily be culturally and historically situated and be revised to account for more dynamic and complex experiences of sexual identity.

Critical Debates

Many of the traditional debates surrounding sexual identity offer a critical perspective given their focus on identifying social and historical factors that have necessitated revaluations of traditional ways of understanding sexual identity and sexual identity development. Contemporary sexual identity researchers consider how personal and social identities are historically and socially situated, as reflected by recent theoretical and methodological approaches that account for interpersonal and cultural contexts of identity development. Nonetheless, the majority of these discussions take place within western academic communities and rarely offer any comparative cultural analyses. Furthermore, current research on sexual identity continues to reify traditional sexual identity categories by reexamining contemporary meanings and manifestations of these categories, including cataloguing both within-group and between-group variation.

Deconstructionist and poststructuralist theories, such as Queer theory, offer critical counterpoints to the more traditional models of sexual identity. These theoretical perspectives are based on a performative perspective of identity, such that rather than being a fixed attribute representing an authentic inner "core" self, identities are viewed as shifting and changing in different social contexts and at different times. For example, according to Judith Butler (1990), our identities, gendered and otherwise, are what we do rather than who we are. As a result, Queer theory and other poststructuralist theories of sexual identity reject traditional sexual orientation or identity categories altogether. This results in not only challenging the validity of heteronormative discourse but also challenging standard gay, lesbian, and transgender theoretical perspectives.

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Online Resources

http://www.apa.org/helpcenter/sexual-orientation.aspx
http://www.indiana.edu/~kinsey/resources/FAQ.html
http://www.asexuality.org/home
http://www.cdc.gov/lgbthealth/index.htm

Sexual Violence

Nicola Gavey
School of Psychology, The University of Auckland , Auckland, New Zealand

Introduction and Definition

Sexual violence is an umbrella term that refers to an inclusive category of sexual acts and experiences that are imposed, coerced, or forced onto a person. Rape, attempted rape, sexual assault, sexual abuse, sexual violation, and so on are all included. While some forms of sexual violence involve physical violence or force, not all forms do. Some uses of the term include a wider range of acts of sexual exploitation or denigration, such as verbal sexual harassment. What ties all these phenomena together is the sexual or sexualized act upon or towards another without that person's consent. In this sense they all violate a person's rights to dignity, respect, and control over their own body.

Sexual violence is endemic within most, if not all, societies. Anyone can be subject to sexual violence, but it is most commonly carried out by men against women, girls, and to a lesser extent boys. Although it is difficult to measure, conservative estimates from carefully designed studies suggest that between one in four and one in six women in Western countries are likely to have an experience consistent with a legal definition of rape or attempted rape at some point in their lives, and around half of all women have had some form of unwanted nonconsensual sexual experience (Koss, Gidycz, & Wisniewski, 1987; Russell, 1984; Tjaden & Thoennes, 2000). More globally, the prevalence is variable, but can be even higher than this (e.g., Garcia-Moreno, Jansen, Ellsberg, Heise, & Watts, 2006). In addition to the harm caused directly to those who experience sexual violence, its presence is both a sign and a cause of the ongoing gender inequality and injustice within many cultures.

Psychology has played a complex role in relation to the recognition of sexual violence and steps towards its elimination. Feminist psychologists contributed to the early wave of interdisciplinary scholarship and activism in the 1970s and 1980s that lead to a progressive shift towards wider recognition of sexual violence as a social justice issue. They helped draw attention to the scope of the problem and the role of the sociocultural context in maintaining it. Although epistemologically and methodologically more conventional than most "critical psychology," the explicit feminist orientation of some of this research brought politics and values into the picture to highlight the gender politics of both the problem and social responses to it (e.g., Burt, 1980).

At the same time a large body of "mainstream" psychology assumed a more neutral role and focused on discovering individual factors that may contribute to the perpetration of sexual violence and to its effects. From the 1990s onwards critical psychologists, alongside scholars in women's and gender studies, have continued to raise questions about the way in which gendered cultural norms contribute to sexual violence as well as to argue for a more nuanced rendering of what have become new orthodoxies within both feminist and psy approaches to sexual violence.

Keywords

Rape; sexual coercion; sexual assault; sexual abuse; sexual victimization; gender; trauma; rape myths; gender politics; feminism

History and Traditional Debates

Sexual violence has existed for centuries, although psychology showed little interest in it until late into the twentieth century. Mirroring a wider cultural disposition within Western societies, it was either ignored or it was minimized, excused, and justified. Only the most heinous acts committed by a few "bad" men against a few "good" women drew wider public attention.

Victims were commonly blamed for their own fate or accused of fabricating the whole thing. Many of the more common forms of sexual violence were dismissed as "just sex" (Gavey, 2005). An aggressive male sexuality and submissive female sexuality were naturalized, so a man's forceful pursuit of sex could be dismissed as a normal part of heterosex even when met with a woman's resistance.

In the 1970s the women's movement was successful in many Western countries in mobilizing critiques of rape and other forms of sexual abuse. These lead to wider public recognition of the problem and more serious efforts to address it through the criminal justice system and to provide support for women who were sexually victimized.

Recognizing the Violence in Sexual Violence

Traditionally, the big debate around sexual violence has been the social contest over the very definition of *what counts* as rape or sexual assault. In response to wider feminist challenges to the "rape supportive" status quo, feminist psychologists, alongside other social researchers, began to research the scope of the problem. Their findings contributed to a radically different understanding of sexual violence, shaking up conventional wisdom about its low prevalence and unrecognized effects (see Gavey, 2005). Assumptions that it was rare, and not very serious, were the result of "rape myths," according to social psychologist Martha Burt (1980). Not only did she propose that these false, stereotyped, and prejudicial views about rape, rape victims, and rapists help to make rape possible, but she argued that they were closely supported by pervasive and strongly held beliefs about sex and gender. "Rape," she concluded, "is the logical and psychological extension of a dominant-submissive, competitive, sex-role stereotyped culture" (Burt, 1980 p. 229). This view was closely aligned with wider feminist praxis (e.g., Griffin, 1977) and posed a deep challenge to the conventional representations of heterosexual sex at the time, in which this dominance-submission dynamic was more likely to be celebrated than critiqued.

Issues and Debates Within Feminist Analyses

The feminist anti-rape movement in the 1970s and subsequent feminist theory and research were central in focusing public, professional, legal, and political attention on the issue of sexual violence. There has, however, been debate among feminists on questions of emphasis and representation.

The politics of race versus the politics of gender: In the United States in particular, the politics of rape have historically been closely tied with the politics of race. In the context of slavery, many Black women were sexually violated by white men with no recourse to justice (Davis, 1990). At the same time, innocent Black men were lynched in the name of "rape." Feminist author Susan Brownmiller noted that the typical liberal view of rape in the early 1970s was to see it as a false accusation by a white woman against a Black man (Bevacqua, 2000). Some Black scholars were critical of the way in which the anti-rape movement neglected the ways in which racism intersects with recognition of sexual violence. They argued that sexual violence and violence against women in general have to be seen within a broader weave of race, gender, and class oppression (e.g., Collins, 1991; Davis 1990; see also Fine, 2012).

Sex versus violence: Feminists have often been attributed with arguing that "rape is an act of violence, not sex." In fact, this is an oversimplification of feminist views on sexual violence. In the 1970s feminists had to argue that rape and sexual abuse were acts of violence in response to popular portrayals of common forms of rape as sexy or a "bit of fun." It was not at all sexy from a woman's point of view, they argued; the experience was a violation, more likely to lead to hurt, humiliation, and suffering than to sexual passion. However, this corrective is only part of the story. Feminists differed in whether or not they believed it was strategic to argue that consensual heterosexual sex had nothing to do with sexual violence (see Gavey, 2005). Some argued this was the case. Others argued that because sexual violence was an exaggeration of the gendered norms of heterosex rather than an abrupt aberration, it was important to also

critique the norms for heterosexual sex (e.g., MacKinnon, 1987).

Agency and victimization: Another issue that feminist debate has addressed is the representation of people who are subject to sexual violence. Psychology and law traditionally refer to "victims" of sexual violence. Feminists and community advocates often prefer the term "survivor" because the "victim role" can be seen to focus on only the subjection and harm of the experience, without recognizing the courage and strength that enables a person to come through it. Feminists in general are concerned to respect the "agency" of people who experience sexual violence. Some postfeminist writers (and antifeminist critics) have taken this as far as to complain that the whole concept of "date rape" is disrespectful to women because it denies their agency in appearing to treat women as passive victims of men's sexual aggression (for a discussion, see Gavey, 2005). Other feminists argue that we must not see agency and victimization as mutually exclusive (e.g., Lamb, 1999).

Critical Debates

Public rhetoric around sexual violence has shifted enormously over the past half century. Psy and legal professions, governments, and international bodies now mostly recognize sexual violence as a serious problem. It could be argued, however, that the progressive changes brought about by these efforts have stalled. While there is now wide recognition of the issue, the problem has not receded. The prevalence of sexual violence remains high in many parts of the world, and the way that victim-survivors are treated remains tainted with victim blaming and stigma. At this point a more expansive critical psychology still has much to offer.

Some feminist scholars, including critical psychologists, have become wary about the implications of new orthodoxies in understandings of sexual violence. With a commitment to social justice, critical psychologists welcome the growing recognition that sexual violence is a widespread and harmful social problem. However, from the perspective of a more social constructionist orientation to critical psychology, some of the progressive new claims can be seen to have double-edged implications. Two examples are (1) the way a gender analysis of sexual violence can be invoked and (2) the way the impact of sexual violence has become synonymous with trauma. Paying close attention to language and discourses, and the way they *create* (enable and constrain) different possibilities for being and acting in the world, invites us to reflect carefully on the unintended implications of our shared frameworks of meaning.

A Gender Analysis of Sexual Violence

There are at least three ways in which gender is invoked in understanding sexual violence. Feminist analyses in general point to the gendered nature of sexual violence. It is typically represented as an act that is perpetrated by men, against primarily women or girls. Research, as well as criminal justice system and health statistics, confirms that most sexual violence is committed by men, mostly against women and girls, although boys and men are also sexually violated, mostly by other men. Women are also capable of sexual violence, although this is reported only rarely by comparison. Some feminist approaches, as well as some socially conservative groups, emphasize the normative gendered pattern of sexual violence and highlight women's unique vulnerability within the heterosexual matrix. By contrast there has been a trend within some legal and research contexts towards gender neutral approaches that discuss sexual violence as if women and men are equally as able to be victim or perpetrator and as if the impact of sexual violence is the same for men and women.

Poststructuralist feminist scholars (including critical psychologists) accept the gendered dynamics of sexual violence, but argue the need to be careful in how this is represented (e.g., Marcus, 1992; Gavey, 2005). Marcus, for instance, argues that a "gendered grammar of violence" is critically important in sustaining sexual violence. It constructs women not only as the objects of (men's) violence but also as the

subjects of fear. To prevent rape, according to this logic, this normative social pattern must be recognized and critiqued without reinforcing it in the process. That is because the representational framework is not seen as a neutral description of reality, but an active producer of that reality. The dominant cultural norms that provide the building blocks for sexual violence (e.g., common depictions of men as having an overwhelming "need" for sex, masculine sexual practices that reveal a sense of entitlement to sex) must be challenged. But at the same time, it is important to also look for opportunities to recognize and celebrate women's strength and their active sexuality and even to recognize their capacities for violence, as well as recognizing men's vulnerabilities and male subjectivities that do not conform to gendered stereotypes. This is important, according to poststructuralist theories that emphasize the productive power of language, in order to help disrupt the dominant script for rape. Highlighting exceptions to the normative gendered pattern can be thought of as a political act, a discursive intervention, designed to avoid reinforcing problematic traditional discourses of gendered sexuality that at the same time introduces other discursive possibilities for alternative modes of being.

The Traumatic Impact of Sexual Violence

Public recognition of the harm of sexual violence has been crucial in helping to counter traditional discourses that minimize rape and sexual coercion. One act of rape can have dramatic and devastating effects on a person's life. However, this is not always the case. Critical feminist scholars have argued that we need to be cautious about seeing the impact of sexual violence only through the lens of trauma (e.g., Gavey, 2008; Gavey & Schmidt, 2011; Lamb, 1999; Marecek, 1999). The concept of posttraumatic stress can be useful for explaining the psychological impact of some kinds of sexual violence, particularly those that produce high levels of fear. However, it is a narrow model that squeezes the complex meaning of diverse forms of sexual violence in ways that possibly draw attention away from the more ordinary forms. Fear is not always central to the experience of sexual violence. In some cases hurt may relate more to the loss caused by betrayal or disruption of identity (Gavey 2005, 2008). In some cases a person can be grievously wronged through an act of sexual violence and yet not suffer lasting emotional damage.

There are several problems in too closely identifying the impact of sexual violence with traumatic psychological consequences. One is that it may preclude recognition of a wider range of different forms of hurt, not all of which are best captured within the frameworks of psychopathology. Another is that a focus on posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) biomedicalizes the problem of sexual violence. Research on the effects of traumatic experiences on the brain may help illuminate the neurobiological mechanisms associated with some kinds of experiences that can be associated with violence and abuse (e.g., hyperarousal, difficulties with memory, sensations of emotional numbing, and so on). However, the insights from this kind of social and affective neuroscience can be delivered within a reductive explanatory framework that implicitly, if not always explicitly, locates the causes and effects of sexual violence within deviant and damaged individual brains. In addition to the possibility that this leads to limited understandings that can be inappropriately generalized, it risks depoliticizing sexual violence, taking attention away from its sociocultural conditions of possibility. This opens the door to a focus on individual remedies (including psychopharmacological ones), at the cost of undermining a broader vision that calls for social change in order to effectively prevent sexual violence.

International Relevance

There is wide international concern about gender-based violence in general and sexual violence in particular (e.g., Sandis, 2006). Feminist critical psychology has a useful role to play in supporting moves to explain sexual violence as a social justice issue that disproportionately affects women, and at the same time to support nuanced analyses,

that avoid unhelpful oversimplifications that may end up reinforcing the original conditions of possibility for sexual violence.

Practice Relevance

Feminist critical psychology analyses are relevant to designing prevention initiatives, particularly in promoting the relevance of interventions that challenge rigid gendered norms for sexuality and intimate relationships. They also offer relevant insights for constructively guiding ways of best supporting people who have experienced sexual violence. These include an emphasis on recognition of the potential for serious harm, beyond universalizing, prescriptive, and stigmatizing assumptions about the form this might take or its inevitability.

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Sexualization

Ngaire Donaghue
School of Psychology, Murdoch University, Perth, Australia

Introduction

Since around the turn of the twenty-first century, Western cultures have featured increasingly explicit references to sex and sexuality across a range of media and popular culture, often termed sexualization. Many of the images now common in Western media feature tropes from

pornography, leading this cultural shift to be labelled by some as "porno chic" (McNair, 2002) or "raunch culture" (Levy, 2005). Current debates around sexualization concern the extent to which these changes can be understood as a form of liberation (especially for women) from the oppressive regulation of respectable sexuality versus the charge that these representations fail to address the underlying sexism in these cultures and thus simply provide new forms for the regulation and disciplining of (especially women's) sexuality.

Definition

Sexualization includes both the representational practices of the media and the material practices of women and men in their own lives. Sexualization of culture refers to the dramatic increase in the appearance of sexualized images in advertising, mainstream media, and other venues of popular culture in Western societies across the first decade of the twenty-first century. In relation to media, much work has investigated the shift from images of women as passive, "sexy" objects draped over car bonnets to a new style of representation featuring actively desiring, always "up for it," playful, and confident women who are presented as understanding and deploying their sexuality for their own pleasures and purposes (Gill, 2003, 2008). In terms of personal behavior, scholarly attention has been directed towards a range of practices including personal "grooming" practices such as Brazilian waxing; cosmetic surgery procedures involving sexual characteristics, such as breast enlargement and female genital cosmetic surgery; the rising popularity of recreational pole dancing and burlesque; engagement with pornography and erotica; and sexual behavior and sexual mores.

Keywords

Agency; Choice; Empowerment; Neoliberalism; Postfeminism; Porno chic; Raunch culture

History

Sexualized images of women were a major target of second wave feminist activism (in the 1960s and 1970s). At the heart of this critique was the notion that the sexual objectification of women directly undermined women's ability to claim a place for themselves as subjects within social life and thus restricted women's access and recognition as full members of society. More recently, however, Western cultures have become increasingly characterized by neoliberal values of personal autonomy and self-responsibility, which present a view of people as choice-making individuals, full of agency and options, whose position and experiences in life must be understood as the result of the priorities and values reflected in their choices. With the rise of neoliberalism, feminist analyses of the sexism inherent in the objectification of women's bodies have shifted to a postfeminist concern with understanding women's sexuality in terms of agency and choice (McRobbie, 2009).

Traditional Debates

Traditional critiques of sexualized representations of women have focused on the ways in which these objectify women, as passive objects of male desire. Self-objectification theory (Frederickson & Roberts, 1997) posits that exposure to these images leads women and girls to internalize this objectifying gaze and to come to relate to themselves (at least in part) as objects whose worth is determined by their attractiveness and sexual desirability. Self-objectification is posited as a risk factor for a wide range of adverse consequences, including low self-esteem, body dissatisfaction, depression, and eating disorders. In particular, there has been considerable concern about the ways in which young girls are being drawn into a more sexualized world and the potential effects of being addressed in this sexualized way on their well-being and development. In 2007, the American Psychological Association (APA, 2007) produced a report examining the effects of sexualized culture on young girls and

concluded that both the indirect exposure of young girls to sexualized media and the incorporation of sexualized tropes into products designed for children (such as g-strings and bra-style tops for young girls, the use of playboy bunnies or sexual slogans on girls' clothing, and the increasing sexualization of entertainment products and toys marketed to children) create a range of potential harms for young girls. Critics of this concern argue that children are not passive recipients of the messages and products directed towards them and that it is important to respect girls' abilities and rights to use these products, deliberately and sometimes ironically, to construct and express their developing identities (Lerum & Dworkin, 2009).

Concern has also been expressed about the increasing sexualization of men's bodies and the potentially harmful consequences of exposure to images of idealized male bodies for adolescent boys and young men. Some scholars have argued for a connection between the growing sexualization of men's bodies and the increasing body dissatisfaction among boys and men in Anglo-American societies that has been associated with eating disorders, overexercising, and the use of anabolic steroids for increasing muscle mass (Olivardia, Pope, Borowiecki, & Cohane, 2004). However, although concerns about the effects of sexualization of culture on men and boys should not be overlooked, a simple "reversal" analysis misses the profound ways in which the sexualization of culture is gendered. In particular, simply pointing out the presence of sexualized images of men in popular culture runs the risk of losing sight of the far greater prevalence of sexualized images of women and misses how these images draw on and reinforce key aspects of existing gender roles and sexual politics in which women's identities and cultural capital are tied much more tightly to the possession of a sexually desirable body than are men's.

Critical Debates

Critical debates around the sexualization of culture revolve around how to balance an appreciation of the powerful (and potentially oppressive) effects of cultural practices with respect for people's ability and rights to make choices about their own actions (e.g., Braun, 2009). The central debate within critical psychology around the sexualization of culture concerns whether the increasing emphasis on women as active, desiring sexual subjects represents a further step forward in the liberation of women (and others) from oppressive regulation of their sexuality, or whether these changes can be better understood as a continuation of the disciplining and regulation of sexuality (and of sexism) that has simply shifted its form. On the one hand, access for women to a greater range of possibilities for their sexual self-expression can be seen as progress away from the pernicious double standards and narrow paths along which respectable feminine sexuality has traditionally been allowed to travel. Given the many ways in which women's displays of sexuality have historically been punished, the freeing up of standards around sex and sexuality and the greater acceptance of women as desiring sexual subjects can be understood as a key source of liberation from oppression. In one of the early, influential texts documenting the rise of sexualization, Brian McNair (2002) argues that the emerging cultural frankness about sex heralds the "democratization of desire." According to this view, greater openness and frank exploration of sexuality and sexual desire in their many forms is a mark of maturity of a society and a measure of progress towards real freedom for its citizens. Exploration of sex and sexuality is thus seen as a key means of empowerment, particularly for those who have traditionally experienced more strict social controls on expressions of their sexuality (most forms of feminine sexuality as well as queer sexualities).

However, these celebratory responses to the sexualization of culture have been tempered by scholars who take a more skeptical attitude to its purported freedoms. While there are many ways in which raunch culture does relax some of the restrictions on women's (and others) sexuality, scholars such as Rosalind Gill and Ariel Levy argue that it does not so much break the narrow mold of acceptable feminine sexuality as replace it with a newer, raunchier, but ultimately just as

proscriptive version that "... isn't about opening our minds to the possibilities and mysteries of sexuality. It's about endlessly reiterating one particular – and particularly saleable – shorthand for sexiness" (Levy, 2005, p. 30). Rosalind Gill argues that in contemporary and sexualized culture, traditional sexual *objectification* has been replaced with new forms of sexual *subjectification* (Gill, 2003). She argues that the idea that the increasingly sexualized self-presentations of (some) young women are the simple reflection of personal choices that they are now free to make obscures the power of the cultural discourses that promote this version of "new femininity." Moreover, the emphasis on agency and autonomous choice requires women to understand their actions as freely chosen and makes any critique or expression of uneasiness about the normalized requirement for "empowered sexuality" seem out of touch and prudish. In this way, the values and practices of sexualized culture are internalized and experienced not as "pressures" but as personally chosen responses to the ("natural") feminine desire to be found desirable – a "subjectification" that represents "a higher or deeper form of exploitation than objectification" (Gill, p. 104). Furthermore, with its emphasis on women attracting male sexual attention and provoking male desire, raunchy displays of sexiness seem to reproduce the traditional sexual politics of men as desiring sexual agents and women as desiring to be desired (Gill, 2009).

The particular version of sexiness promoted in sexualized culture is marked by its exclusions: young, thin, able-bodied, conventionally attractive, middle class, and usually white bodies are welcome, while others mostly remain marginalized as either invisible or abject. Efforts to appear "sexy" made by those not deemed desirable are often mocked and reviled. Scholars have argued that the always present possibility of the "failure" of a performance of sexiness accounts for the presence within sexualized culture of a lighthearted, ironic, parodic element; it matters less for a performance of sexiness to "fail" if it can be claimed that it was never meant to be serious (Donaghue, Kurz, & Whitehead, 2011). But this implicit acknowledgement within raunch culture discourse itself that not everyone will "succeed" at "sexiness" is at odds with the idea of sexualization of culture as an inclusive, freeing, and "democratization of desire" (McNair, 2002).

International Relevance

Most work examining the sexualization of culture to date has been focused on Western countries. The focus on women's agency in participating in sexualized culture is primarily directed at the relatively legally protected and economically powerful middle class Western women; for the most part these discussions of sexualized culture studiously ignore the intersections of this changed cultural sensibility with the massive exploitations of the global sex trade. Some attempts have been made to extend the neoliberal lens of self-responsibility and choice to understanding the positions of women in the sex trade, arguing that a focus on exploitation denies the agency of these women, relegating them to a passive and weak position as victims (e.g., Agustin, 2007). This analysis has been strongly critiqued on the grounds that it obscures the structural and ideological factors that are crucial to producing and sustaining the conditions that allow the global sex trade to thrive (Jeffreys, 2009).

Future Directions

Recently, scholars working in this area have argued that "sexualization of culture" is a too broad concept with which to examine the myriad changes in sexualized representation, sexual practices, and sexual identities that are occurring in different ways and at different rates for groups of people across contemporary Western societies (Gill, 2009). Scholarly attention is now turning towards the nuances of "sexualization" as a broad cultural trajectory, and considering the intersections of sexualization with gender and sexuality as well as race, class, age, able-bodiedness, to provide a richer and more complex picture of the changing cultural discourses that shape and constrain sexual identity and experience. Some work is also exploring issues around the

increasingly sexualized popular culture in many non-Western societies, and although much of this work is conceptualized as examining the "effects" of "Westernization" within these societies, there is also increasing recognition of the particularized ways in which increasing sexualization intersects with cultural values and practices. Continuing scholarly efforts to understand the many impacts on citizens of the dramatic changes in the representations of sexuality face the challenge of holding open a space that is large enough to allow for the possibility that some new forms of sexual representations may have emancipatory potential (Attwood, 2006) while continuing to analyze and critique the disciplining and regulatory aspects of cultural discourses of desirability and desire.

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Online Resources

American Psychological Association, Task Force on the Sexualization of Girls. (2007). *Report of the APA task force on the sexualization of girls*. Retrieved from, http://www.apa.org/pi/women/programs/girls/report-full.pdf

Shame

Gavin Sullivan
School of Social, Psychological and Communication Sciences, Leeds Metropolitan University, Leeds, UK

Introduction

Shame is a negative affective or emotional state which is identiable in terms of hiding one's self or identity from others. The feeling is often accompanied by a strong desire to avoid the gaze and presence of other people. There is usually a distinct sense that one's whole being – rather than just a specific action – is wrong *and* an experienced certainty that one's status as person is fundamentally diminished in a way that cannot be easily repaired or restored. Shame is typically viewed as the extreme of a continuum of emotional intensity, with shyness and embarrassment at one end and feelings of self-disgust at the other. It is also contrasted with guilt where the principal difference is that guilt, although unpleasant, can be reduced through acts of apology or reparation (see entry on Guilt and discussion below about whether shame also has a prosocial function). Shame also appears to be opposite of positive pride in terms of valence and behavior (see the entry on Pride), although shame and pride have

complex dynamic relations which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, individuals and groups can be vulnerable to criticism and, therefore, shame at moments of great personal and collective triumph. Furthermore, a person may foster pride in an attempt to overcome the negative impact of shame; this can occur regardless of whether the latter emotion occurred as a result of their own actions or is a feature that they have little or no control over (such as class membership or being on the losing side in an intractable conflict). Pride may appear to diminish or even cancel out the effects of previously shameful actions or experiences of humiliation even though rejection, and responses by the specific or general "other" may not be reversed (e.g., no group-based apology may be forthcoming). Despite the view that shame is a pervasive and very unpleasant emotion, some accounts emphasize the positive impact that shame can have on interpersonal and intergroup behavior. At the interpersonal level, it appears to motivate personal transformation, especially where the rejection by others is recognized as unreasonable or is itself immoral. Group-based shame (or guilt) can encourage individuals to support group reparation (e.g., through formal apologies provided by political leaders) and afford moral recovery when past wrongdoing is acknowledged and reconciliation occurs; however, high levels of group identification may lead to angry rejection of collective responsibility for past group wrongdoing in order to maintain a positive view of the in-group. Collective shame requires investigation not just because of its complex phenomenology but also its discursive and extra-discursive features are underexamined (e.g., such as when defeat in a conflict is institutionalized and the defeated group is subjected to practices of control, surveillance, and physical exclusion which may be passively accepted; Pettigrove & Parsons, 2012).

Definition

Shame is regarded in mainstream emotion theories as a negative self-conscious emotion that occurs when individuals are conscious of themselves as the cause of or agent responsible for an event that is profoundly negative (Tracy & Robins, 2004). Although both shame and guilt are negative, they are thought to have distinct cognitive, phenomenological, and expressive behavioral or action forms (see entry on Guilt). An indication of the transgressions that generate shame (or ground the view that shame should be felt by a given individual or group) includes taboos discussed by Freud (1950) such as incest. In recent work on reintegration of criminal offenders, acknowledging shame and engaging in shame-producing and shame-confronting practices plays a central role in addressing the damage to personal and group relations (e.g., by making crimes such as rape committed during military conflicts public by informing the families of perpetrators and thereby completely undermining any prior boasting to military colleagues about these crimes; Braithwaite, 2006). Meeting with victims of crime and/or their representatives has been emphasized as the means towards reconciliation after conflicts and as a way of potentially reintegrating perpetrators and victims into their communities. Collective shame might have similar dynamic features but could potentially last for generations. For example, Germany's reintegration into the international community after the shameful consequences of Nazi rule and the Second World War has taken several generations, and the reintegration coexists with taboos against national pride and explicit collective acknowledgement and remembering of this past.

Keywords

Shame; self-conscious emotions; negative self-evaluation; social control; alienation; group-based shame; collective shame

Traditional Debates

An ongoing debate in psychology and related disciplines is about how distinct the features of shame are in contrast to other unpleasant

self-conscious emotions, particularly guilt and embarrassment. With regard to shame and guilt, one might feel ashamed to be gay on the basis of actual parental reactions (e.g., revulsion, rejection) or other direct or indirectly communicated general group or societal judgements (a state of affairs which has been challenged through gay pride movements and positioning of the intolerance that is now associated with homophobia as shameful itself). However, it does not make sense to feel guilty about being gay because a person would probably feel guilty only for failing to do or say something in a given situation (e.g., failing to defend gay people in circumstances when such an action would have been consistent with their own sexual orientation and values). Although shame is regarded as a positive emotion when its embodied expression and appearance (e.g., gaze avoidance, hiding one's face, visible reduction of body size, slumping posture, chronic shyness, and social avoidance) highlights a sense of one's diminished, marginalized or excluded status, it is important to remember that there are many situations in which shame prevents individuals from engaging in social and healthy behavior. For example, stigma about mental illness, sexual, and other problems and diseases (e.g., current and former addictions) functions to isolate individuals from social support and sources of psychological and medical assistance.

A further traditional debate with contemporary relevance is whether the failure to acknowledge or express shame is a cause of a wide range of antisocial individual and group behavior. Scheff (2007) proposes that hatred "is the commonly used word for hidden vulnerable emotions, particularly grief, fear, and shame" (p. 431). Scheff's view of shame is broad, incorporating what might typically be described as a more fleeting or specific experience of embarrassment. This position appears to be consistent with cultural theorists such as Probyn (2005) whose analysis focuses mostly on the phenomenon of the "blush." In many cases, feeling shame or being shamed or humiliated by a specific and actual or generalized and potentially imagined other leads to rage and a desire for revenge; this can even occur when the other person or group is only making the individual aware of a personal deficit or reminding marginalized or diminished status and is not necessarily the direct cause of this state of affairs). Externalizing blame is one way of coping with the sometimes intolerable features of shame (e.g., in the regulation of everyday conduct or in connection with membership of a disgraced group). According to Probyn, however, attempting to manage or get rid of shame – whether through repression, avoidance, or attempting to create positive alternatives – fails to "embrace the sometimes painful ways shame makes us reflect on who we are – individually and collectively" (p. 8). This can, in turn, preclude a thorough analysis of numerous effects that are "felt at a physiological, social, or cultural level" (p. 15).

Critical Debates

The individualistic focus of cognitive theories of shame is similar to treatments of pride and guilt in failing to account for important features of the discursive and extra-discursive context of given emotional occurrences. Individuals not only are ashamed of their own actions but can also be ashamed of others with whom they have identified connections. In this respect, vicarious shame may be said to spread through a group such as a family or community. An account of the means by which shame can spread and become part of the practices of a group is therefore required which includes the embodiment of individual or group rules, standards, and values. Because shame is a very unpleasant and distressing emotion, situations and topics that might generate the feeling are avoided in self- and other regulation of relevant actions and conversations. Shame can be extremely difficult to verbalize, and due to repressive and other processes, it can be unconscious. On this view, Narcissistic feelings and hubristic representations of oneself are not necessarily extreme expressions and displays of fundamentally positive emotion, but rather can be affective reactions and identity positions that are defenses against anxiety and shame which are, ultimately, difficult to sustain in many

interpersonal contexts (i.e., viewing oneself and/or one's group as superior often conflicts with discourses of equality, respect for others, advancement through hard work, and multicultural plurality).

The dynamic relations between shame and its opposite, pride, are important to consider not just because shame may be prefigured discursively by evocation of a lack of pride (e.g., a politician says of his or her shameful behavior, "It's not something that I'm proud of"; Sullivan, 2007) but people and groups may be judged, somewhat harshly and in an overgeneral manner, to be "shameless." An important dynamic feature of shame is that defensive anger is often felt when even just the possibility of criticism or public revelation occurs in a given context. This dynamic interplay between shame and pride indicates ambivalence (e.g., in relation to one's own past and in relation to other people) and involves processes of identification and deidentification. In contrast to contemporary social identity and other theories, the features and processes of affective investment in available or novel identity positions have both cognitive and unconscious features (e.g., acknowledging past actions, failures may be too threatening to one's sense of self-coherence and self-image). For example, Braithwaite (2006) describes how reintegrative shaming works for perpetrators of rape during war when shameful acts are revealed to family members and the perpetrator has to confront the hubristic pride of rape in the "militaristic domination of a space and a people" (Braithwaite, 2006, p. 10).

Contemporary forms of social control and self-management are, of course, culturally and historically variable; in the West they may reflect broader social changes towards the informalization of social structural relations – such as between class-based groups – from external to internalized forms of self-regulation (e.g., to accord with aspirations and affiliations that are appropriate to one's geographical and social "place"). Changes in the nature of shame may also reflect historical developments which are consistent with Foucauldian analyses in which public practices of shaming are no longer required or, indeed, successful in governing people's actions. A thorough understanding of the relations between power, governance, and emotions appears necessary to flesh out the otherwise affect-free account of self-governance provided by theorists such as Rose (1996). Although public practices of shaming are no longer prominent in Western societies, discourses of shame and shaming still play an important role in, for example, the rehabilitation of offenders. Shame may only be partially acknowledged, however, because the individual wants to defend him or herself against the full realization that their reduced status is deserved. Larocco's (2011) analysis of shame suggests that the origin of rejection or reparation with "assertion and recognition of the other as other" (p. 88) originates in early childhood: "... this experience of emotional misalignment, shame and the attendant desire for affective reattunement and repair begins the process of the child's subjection to and subjectivation by the social order" (p. 88). On this view, shame is intimately related to but sometimes against the needs of capitalist ideology, privileging "deep attachment as a primary aim of relating, rather than the efficiency of exchange" (p. 89).

Group-based shame is an emotion that appears to have very different dynamic features to group-based pride because shame can disorganize individuals psychologically and interpersonally. On this account, it is not until collective action challenges a previously humiliated, powerless, or wronged group and identity that the individualizing and isolating effects of shame can be reduced. Britt and Heise (2000) also note that affective shifts from shame to anger may only begin once engaging in the opposite actions to those which appear to flow naturally from shame are engaged in (e.g., such as displaying one's identity openly and confronting hostility through public protest action). Shame can, however, also be experienced in dominant groups where there is a deep sense of one's group as failing in the eyes of imagined others, such as how some Americans felt ashamed when the pictures of human rights abuses at Abu Ghraib US military prison were shown internationally. Shame can therefore also

occur in the feelings of some members of a dominant group towards in-group minority and out-groups who have been unjustly treated. Here the ideology of attachment to the nation creates ambivalence and dilemmas about who to care for and whether to engage in reparation in relation to groups whose interests contrast only with symbolic rather than material or national or other group interests (e.g., images that challenge the self-image of one's nation as moral and benevolent but do not affect economic or military power).

Collective shame is a genuinely widespread sense that one's group has a diminished identity which may have been implicitly accepted in practice. For example, Pettigrove and Parsons argue that collective shame occurs in the context of Palestinian defeat by Israel and subsequent occupation. They describe a pervasive but often unacknowledged shame in which the humiliating conditions and controls imposed by Israelis are compounded by recognition of capitulating in the initial military conflict with Israel. Shame can motivate a powerless group to aggression, the expression of nationalist fantasies and revenge, especially in intractable conflicts, but equally a dominant group can manifest forms of collective narcissism in national narratives and the unregulated enjoyment of dominance and superiority over the defeated or controlled group. An ideological analysis of collective shame shows that rage is not only destructive and divisive: there are forms of rage in revolutionary collective actions that "can direct its energy into revision" and reattunement between groups "even if it arises in humiliation or nonrecognition" (p. 90).

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Sin, Overview

Todd DuBose
The Chicago School of Professional Psychology, Chicago, IL, USA

Introduction

A reflection on sin has much to offer critical psychology and can provide interesting interdisciplinary bridges between psychology, religious studies, and philosophy on this topic. In spite of the many interpretations and assumptions about what sin really is, or *if* it is, it is rare indeed to see sin as a topic of discussion very much anymore in academic circles, and this discussion is particularly absent in the field of psychology – except when pointing out sin as an archaic word used to describe psychopathology. The movement away from discussions of sin was noted by

Karl Menninger (1978) in his now well-known book, *Whatever became of sin?*, when he argued that the slow dismissal of sin as a topic of concern and reflection has led consequentially to multiple destructive troubles in society. Paul Ricouer' s (1986) foundational study of evil in his book, *The Symbolism of Evil*, takes up the discussion of sin as historically and symbolically being seen as forms of tainting. Thomas Szasz (1974, 1988) has written much about the secularization of the tradition of sin among mental health practitioners but as a critique of its continuing presence in the unnecessary pathologization of human nature by therapists as "secular priests" for moral agendas. Historically, much energy has been exercised in the typification and classification of sin*s* (as various kinds of unwanted behaviors), a process that is genealogically embedded in diagnostic classifications today. Whatever the differentiations between various kinds of sins, what is common to all forms of sin is a struggle with our incompleteness, our finiteness, in light of infinitude, a point that rests closer to a more accurate understanding of sin as *hamartia*.

Sin, originally understood as *hamartia*, is defined as "missing the mark." Missing the mark has often been misunderstood as behavioral violations of moral codes, or falling short of essentialist impositions of right or moral comportment, often established by those in power in order to secure compliance and support for collective identities of various sorts in various contexts. Accompanying this definition of sin as *hamartia* have been numerous kinds of moralizations of behaviors, which in turn are predicated on gnostic perfectionism aimed at eradicating all tainting impurities. This very thinking still enframes any kind of treatment planning that seeks to target and extinguish unwanted behaviors. But this stance significantly misses the original meaning of *hamartia* and its implications for critical psychology.

Hamartia as a formal concept originates with Homerian mythology and Aristotle's *Poetics* to describe the nature of the tragic. "Missing the mark" was not intended to describe behaviors that do not reach targeted moral expectations, but describes a process where one intends one kind of outcome with one's comportment, but unknowingly or unwittingly leads to tragic results (McKeon, 1941). *Hamartia* in its truest sense holds that the agent is not aware of the pending or consequential impact of his or her comportment, perhaps due to some kind of hubris, but more commonly due to a lack of foresight or understanding regarding the full implications of one's actions on others, which ends up in tragic and unwanted ways for all persons involved. Familiar examples include hurting someone with tough love, or disempowering another through taking over-responsible possession of a person's life decisions, or wanting an ordered community of togetherness by imposition hegemonic requirements and ending up excluding uniqueness. The gnostic illusion embedded in *hamartia* is that one can eventually "get it right," or gain enough knowledge to correct one's oversights or imperfections.

What is central to *hamartia*, however, is that it is not a quality of existence that is correctable or remedied through education, training, or any other means; it is not a deficit or damage to be repaired, but is a part of the human condition. In fact, much of the destructive damage that is done occurs when we try to circumvent, rather than accept, this reality. Acceptance of our *hamartia* does not mean that we cease bettering ourselves and our ways of caring for others through agentic and collective responsibility, but that we realize there still remains, paradoxically, an excess of capacity to harm others without intending to do so, even though we better our lives, gain more extensive training in caring for others, and correct unloving patterns. There are times, of course, when others intend harm to someone; this is different from *hamartia*, but even in this situation, the goal that justifies harming others remains myopic in terms of what is presumed it would supply. The question also arises as to whether destructive outcomes can occur without authentic, agentic intention of some sort. But *hamartia* is not disowned intentionality nor is it the unknowing an unknowing of unconscious intent that has yet to come into awareness. *Hamartia* is a finite, situated, limited condition of existence

that simply cannot process, discern, and accomplish totality in any intended action: loving, knowing, discerning, planning, or any other comportment. *Hamartia* is not remedied, but lived.

Homerian mythology furthered the idea of *hamartia* as a fated condition by noting how the gods would often cause the very unknowing conditions leaving a protagonist fated with *hamartia*. The debates of whether or not sinfulness as *hamartia* is inherent or eradicable originate with these classic stances. When Soren Kierkegaard (1846/1941) noted that the most painful thing we can do is take ownership of our sin, we must understand that given this larger, historical clarification of *hamartia*, we understand his challenge not as a focus on achieving virtuous perfection through accountability of correcting particular behaviors, but was encouraging us to accept an aspect of our human condition that cannot be changed, to accept our incompleteness. The tragic nature of *hamartia* itself, though, includes the inability to fully come to terms with *hamartia*, as if fully coming to terms with it would somehow erase it. Martin Heidegger's (2008) work on the factical nature of our existence, our thrown falleness and inherent and unremedied inauthenticity, echoes the heritage of *hamartia* and of this *aporia*.

Keywords

Hamartia; Kierkegaard; Menninger; Ricouer; Szasz; finitude; incompleteness

Debates

In terms of critical psychology, *hamartia* raises many questions and challenges. The genealogical impact of misunderstandings of *hamartia* as differentiated kinds of unwanted behaviors still resides in typification in diagnostic and assessment criteria and in practices of correcting unwanted behaviors in therapeutic care. Moreover, any kind of therapeutic theory of change is a type of soteriology in which we presume agentic capacity for deliverance and elimination of the oppressive structures of situations from which we are seeking liberation. These stances misunderstand and perpetuate their own missing of the mark regarding the nature of sin as *hamartia* and actually perpetuate it.

In congruence with *hamartia*, contemporary responses will have to address how much about our destructiveness is irreparable and unavoidable given who we are as human beings. Our more humanistic leanings promote a high agentic capacity to eliminate oppressive situations. Indeed, much has been done and should continue to do so toward this shared critical psychological value. At the same time, there can be a tendency for critical psychologists to wax into a type of righteous utopianism and presumptiveness about our capacities to eradicate oppression that we enact hubris unaware of its own *hamartia*. Although critical psychology's emphasis on shared power and interdependency is a way to embrace the historic wisdom about *hamartia*, we should also engage the hard questions regarding what we cannot change about our shared existence no matter how hard we try to shape it to how we prefer it.

Ownership of our individual and collective falleness and finitude may indeed be the basis for partnership toward forgiveness and reconciliation when destruction occurs, an area still wanting for further research in critical psychology, including an exploration of how the decision not to forgive as possibly exhibiting a refusal to accept another's and/or one's own *hamartia*. At the same time the phrase "we are all human beings" can become an excuse to justify oppressing others. Hamartia is not a license for irresponsibility but a condition of inherent and unremedied incompleteness that, if not embraced, can wreak havoc. Our challenge is to engage in the never finished task of neither forfeiting our agency and shared collaboration toward liberation nor reinforce our hubris in presuming that in doing good deeds we can escape our fate as limited beings who unwittingly harm each other, most particularly when involved in the very task of liberating oppression.

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Situatedness

Matthew Costello
Department of Psychology, Indianna University South Bend, South Bend, IN, USA

Introduction

Situatedness is a theoretical position that posits that the mind is ontologically and functionally intertwined within environmental, social, and cultural factors. As such, psychological functions are best understood as constituted by the close coupling between the agent and the environment. Situatedness is frequently understood in contradistinction to a traditional cognitive science approach that characterizes the mind as an essentially interior entity, one that is conceptually separated from the environment but can interact with it through computational manipulations of mental representations. In contrast, situatedness argues against a strict dualism of mind and world. This anti-dualistic stance is, perhaps, what most marks situatedness from traditional cognitivist models of the mind. The term has been used by a wide range of contemporary theorists, including psychologists, philosophers, education theorists, cognitive scientists, and roboticists. Although increasingly accepted within mainstream psychology, situatedness is still considered a nontraditional position, perhaps chiefly because it is typically cast as oppositional to conventional cognitivist approaches.

Definition

Situatedness is not easily defined, given that it is an expansive term whose exact usage can vary based on the particular field of inquiry. However, there are general characteristics that are commonly recognized as essential to its thesis. Situatedness posits that the activity of the mind (in all its cognitive, emotional, perceptual, and social capacities) is the causal product of bodily, social, environmental, and cultural interactions and that these factors serve as both the implicit causal backdrop and ontological basis for the mind. In this regard, the mind is best understood not as a static entity anchored in interiority, but rather as an expression of the complex and dynamic interaction between the agent and the environment.

Situatedness is typically understood as centered around three key arguments (Robbins & Aydede, 2008). First, the mind is not a discretely interior cognizing agent. Rather, the mind is "embodied," meaning the physicality of the body (including its physical dimensions, sensory receptivity, and motor intentions and actions) is determinative in the mind's agency (Gallagher, 2005). The term embodiment, in fact, is sometimes used as a nearly synonymous term for situatedness, and the distinction between the two terms can be merely a matter of emphasis. Whereas embodiment typically refers to the influence of the body and motor actions upon the mind's agency, situatedness emphasizes the role of extra-bodily factors (e.g., social, environmental, and cultural) as equally influential towards the co-constitution of the mind. Second, situatedness posits that the mind is always "embedded" within a natural, social, and cultural environment. The mind, in other words, not as an interior presence that may, on occasion, interact with an outside world.

Rather, cognitive, perceptual, and emotional activity inherently implicates a complex interaction with the world. Finally, situatedness posits that the mind is ontologically "extended" into the world insofar as social interactions, technological innovations, and cultural artifacts can blur the lines between the internal mind and the external world. This final argument of situatedness (generally regarded as the most controversial to mainstream cognitive theorists) echoes the phenomenological theory of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, who similarly argued that the ontological status of consciousness is always tied directly to bodily, environmental, social, and cultural engagements with the world.

Taken together, the mind as an embodied, embedded, and extended agency offers a theoretical alternative to traditional cognitive science approaches to the mind, an alternative grounded in a rejection of a Cartesian dualism that conceptually separates the mind from the body and the world (Rowlands, 2010). Situatedness posits that the individual agent, unto itself, is not a meaningful unit of investigation and that the activity of the mind must be conceptualized as always in relation to contextual and environmental factors. In this regard, situatedness may appear similar to traditional social psychology, which has long argued that the mind is heavily influenced by social, contextual, and environmental factors. However, situatedness represents a more radical theoretical stance. Traditional social psychologists typically conceptualize the mind as an interior entity that is heavily influenced by social pressures. Situatedness, in contrast, posits that bodily, social, environmental, and cultural factors are not discretely separable from psychological function, but are theoretically inseparable from the ontological status or definition of the mind.

Situatedness is best understood as a theoretical stance rather than a theory per se, given that it lacks the specificity needed to generate explicit hypotheses, predictions, or statistical models. The term has increasingly been used in adjectival form, as in situated learning, situated cognition, situated artificial intelligence, and situated robotics. What links these disparate fields of study is the theoretical awareness that the principle causal determinant in form and function is the tightly coupled and dynamic interaction between the agent and the environment.

Keywords

Dualism; embodiment; extended mind; embeddedness; connectionism; dynamic systems; cognition; perception

History

Despite its nontraditional status in contemporary psychological theory, the seeds of situatedness were sown in the early years of psychology. Functionalist psychologists such as William James and John Dewey emphasized the role of active adaptations as key to psychological function. The conscious mind, according to James (1890), was in fluid relationship with the world, rather than a static and interior presence with only indirect access to the world. Dewey's critique of the reflex arc showed a similar tendency to reject the mind as an interior presence. In his seminal paper "*The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology*," Dewey (1896) objected to the traditional view of the reflex as a closed-circuit mechanism, finding it unable to account for the adaptive function of reflexes. Dewey argued instead that the reflex reflects the adaptive equilibrium of the nervous system to the agent's purposive relationship with the world. This functionalist focus on consciousness as an adaptive response to the environment established the mind as inherently linked with body, world, and action; a position that anticipates later situatedness theory.

The first half of the twentieth century gave rise to new psychological theorists who advanced proto-situatedness positions. Lev Vygotsky, a Russian psychologist working in the 1920s and 1930s, saw the mind as fundamentally embedded within the world. Vygotsky argued that cognitive development is the outcome of an embodied and biological agent that interacts within a social world (Vygotsky, 1978). Moral

thinking, for instance, was characterized by Vygotsky was intimately linked with inner speech and as such represents the intermingling of cognition, language, and *social factors*. Vygotsky's work has been viewed as a highly influential precursor to contemporary social situatedness theory (Lindblom & Ziemke, 2003).

Gestalt theory, also largely operative in the first half of the twentieth century, has been cited as another early precursor to situatedness. Gestalt theorists such as Max Wertheimer, Kurt Koffka, and Wolfgang Kohler argued that psychological functions are best understood holistically as emergent properties subject to field dynamics. Kurt Lewin, working within the Gestalt tradition, extended the field theory into the study of social dynamics. Lewin (1951) argued that the individual psyche always reflects the influence of what he called the situation. The individual mind, Lewin argued, always reflects a totality of factors that are mutually codependent. In this view, it becomes impossible to understand the single subject outside of the social environment. Both Lewin's development of situational dynamics and the Gestalt tradition of holistic field theory have served as theoretical precursors to contemporary situatedness theory.

Even in the middle of the twentieth century, during the height of classical behaviorism and cognitivism, the essential situatedness position was being extended and refined. J.J. Gibson's ecological theory of visual perception (Gibson, 1979) posited that perception is not mediated by internal representations, but rather is a direct pickup of environmental invariances that serve to guide and motivate the agent within the environment. Gibson's emphasis of active and direct perception stands in direct contrast with the traditional cognitivist theory of indirect and representation-mediated perception and thinking. His ecological theory emphasized the role of situational factors, given that the agent is always active and embedded within an information-rich environment. Gibson's notion of object affordances, in which environmental objects are conceptualized always in relation to what actions they afford the perceiver, similarly emphasizes the dynamic and action-based nature of Gibsonian perception. The correct study of perception, argued Gibson, requires that the agent be understood as actively situated within an environment.

Perhaps what links these early precursors of situatedness together is their focus on psychological function as operative at a systems level. Systems thinking posits that individual agents are best conceptualized as always operative within a larger system, with complex causal interdependencies across system levels serving to define the function of individual agents within the system. Systems thinking argues that the study of an isolated agent, outside of the complex network, is an artificial construction that fails to grasp the structured coupling between agent and environment. When applied to psychology, systems thinking is in general opposition to the predominant Western tradition of the autonomous and independent self whose actions are directed by the rational decisions of a central executive mind. Systems thinking models the agent-environment relationship as inherently interactive, rendering the line of demarcation between "internal" and "external" factors blurred. As such, the individual agent is never casually isolated and is defined by its dynamic and complex relationship with multiple environmental, social, and cultural factors (von Bertalanffy, 1968). Although general systems thinking is not explicitly equivalent to situatedness, the differences between them are minimal and reflect the differing academic domains to which they apply (e.g., systems thinking is generally utilized within the study of physical and biological complexity (Laszlo, 1996)).

Traditional Debates

Situatedness is best understood in contradistinction to the traditional cognitivist view of the mind. According to the cognitivist position, the psychological function of the individual mind is an internal operation that interacts with the exterior world through information processing mechanisms. Under this cognitivist position, perception is conceptualized as an inferential deduction of sensory stimuli, and cognition is

understood as computation of symbolic representations. The mind serves as a central executive, receiving sensory inputs from the exterior world, processing these inputs through symbolic representations and rule-based procedures, and ultimately executing cognitive or behavioral actions based on computational formulas. The cognitivist stance argues that perception is always indirect (the exterior world separated from internal cognitive processes), and cognition is the outcome of computations of symbolic representations or schemas. Such representations are considered both abstract and stable and generally instantiated in the brain or nervous system. At its simplest, this cognitivist stance essentially argues that the mind is akin to a computer.

Cognitivism dominated psychological theory from the 1950s to 1970s. Since the 1980s, classical cognitivism has been assailed by a variety of sources, most of which either implicitly or explicitly endorse the central tenets of situatedness. Theorists ranging from biologically oriented theorists (c.f., Edelman, 1992; Maturana & Varela, 1980) to phenomenologically inspired philosophers of mind (c.f., Gallagher, 2005; Noë, 2004) have rejected the basic dualistic presupposition of classical cognitivism. The critique against classical cognitivism was perhaps most strongly registered in the area of computational modeling, neural networks, and robotics. Connectionism (also known as parallel distributed processing) served as a theoretical and practical counterpoint to traditional symbolic representational approaches to artificial intelligence. According to connectionist theory, intelligence (artificial or natural) is rarely a result of explicit top-down computationally based commands from a central executive. Rather, connectionist networks consist of multiple computational nodes structured within a multilevel architecture. The connectionist network gradually settles into equilibrium over time across multiple training sessions, with the resulting order of the network a "best fit" between the initial design parameters of the program and the desired environmental outcome. The connectionist challenge to traditional artificial intelligence (AI) modeling reiterated many of the central tenets of situatedness: heterogeneous causal agents, increasing role of contextual factors, the lack of a discretely modularized central processor, and the absence of representational schemas (Rumelhart, McClelland, & The PDP research group, 1986).

Currently, cognitive scientists and roboticists inclined towards the situatedness position have largely moved away from connectionist modeling and moved towards dynamic systems modeling (Beer, 2000). The relationship between connectionism and dynamic systems modeling is intimate, and there are strong similarities between the two. Briefly, a dynamical system is one whose structure and function emerges from the evolution of multiple systemic parts over time. Dynamical systems are built upon the theoretical foundation in which the agent and environment are in continuous interplay, and the established of a settled equilibrium within the dynamical model merely reflects the current state space of the model. Broadly speaking, dynamic systems theory appears compatible with several themes that are central to situatedness, such as the close coupling of agent and environment, the recognition of nonlinear relationships between heterogeneous causal factors, and the rejection of mental representations or cognitive schemas.

Critical Debates

Within the field of situatedness, theorists have debated the extent and scope of the overall concept. This is, perhaps, not surprising, given the open-ended definition of situatedness and its wide application to disparate fields of study. Much of these debates have centered around the specificity of the concept. For instance, including environmental, social, and embodied factors into quantitative analysis can disqualify standard statistical models based on linear modeling techniques. Accordingly, many situatedness researchers have emphasized nonlinear modeling in data analysis. Dynamic systems modeling has been frequently cited as well suited to capturing the complexity and dynamism inherent in agent-environment coupling. However, dynamic

systems analyses are technically challenging and can pose a practical challenge to researchers trained solely in general linear modeling statistical analyses. An open question remains within the field as to whether dynamic systems analyses must be incorporated into studies exploring situated dynamics.

Situatedness theorists also disagree about the extent to which the mind should be regarded as "extended" into the world. Some theorists have argued that the mind ontologically lacks an interior character and that basic psychological faculties such as perception and cognition are best conceptualized as fundamentally exterior events. Such a position has close ties with phenomenological theorists, such as Edmund Husserl's concept of the lifeworld (Lebenswelt) and Martin Heidegger's understanding of Dasein as a fundamentally exterior being. However, the absolute exteriority of the mind does appear to be necessary to situatedness, and some theorists argue that the causal linkage with exterior things does not necessitate a co-instantiation by external factors (Adams & Aizawa, 2008). Similarly, theorists have argued over whether situatedness should necessitate the elimination of mental representations. Those who oppose representationalism generally fall within the dynamic systems and/or phenomenological camp and represent the more radical wing of situatedness theory insofar as they seek a complete rejection of traditional cognitive models of the mind (Chemero, 2009). In contrast, other theorists influenced by situatedness seek a limited but definite role for mental representations and typically view situatedness and embodiment as compliments to existing cognitive science theory (Clark, 1997).

Practice Relevance

One practical consequence of situatedness has been the development of new statistical and computational approaches to data analysis. Given that situatedness argues for heterogeneous causal factors operative at multiple levels (e.g., bodily, personal, social, environmental, cultural), traditional linear statistical models can be of limited value. Dynamic systems approaches to data analysis have centered around nonlinear modeling methods, and such innovative analyses have resulted in surprising discoveries. For instance, the study of cognitive and motor development in infants has been strongly impacted by the dynamic systems analyses of Esther Thelen and Linda Smith. Their work revealed that many developmental milestones can be seen as emergent properties of complex interactions of multiple local bottom-up systems. For instance, infant walking has been shown to be dynamically related to the stepping reflex, and the classic Piagetian A-not-B error appears due to motor control rather than object permanence (Thelen & Smith, 1994). Other researchers grounded in situatedness theory have made new discoveries in a vast range of empirical topics, including emotions, language comprehension, problem-solving, memory, and perception.

Future Directions

Research in situatedness studies has been steadily increasing, with innovative studies exploring embodied and situated cognition, perception, and social dynamics. Perhaps the greatest avenue for future development lies in situated robotics, a field that generally acknowledges the limitations of classical cognitivist models. Situated robotics is grounded in the notion that cognition, perception, and action are emergent properties of the structural coupling between the agent and the environment (Morse, Herrera, Clowes, Montebelli, & Ziemke, 2011). Situatedness offers a general theoretical framework for robot designers to engineer autonomous agents that can flexibly adapt to changing environmental conditions, a real-world capacity that has proven to be a tremendous challenge to cognitivist models relying on algorithmic computations.

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Online Resources

The Cambridge handbook of situated cognition. http://www.cambridge.org/gb/knowledge/isbn/item1172577/?site_locale=en_GB
The society for phenomenology and existential psychology. http://www.spep.org/
Special issue of artificial life on embodied and situated cognition. http://informatics.indiana.edu/rocha/embrob/
The international society for gestalt theory and its applications. http://gestalttheory.net/
Society for the scientific study of embodiment. http://www.ssse.org/
Articles on dynamicist cognitive science. http://www.phil.mq.edu.au/staff/jsutton/CogSciDynamicism.html

Situationism

Alexander John Bridger
Division of Psychology and Counselling, University of Huddersfield, Huddersfield, West Yorkshire, UK

Introduction

There is a clear lack of radical and political analyses of space and place in the disciplines of psychology and critical psychology. In this encyclopedia entry for situationism will be presented an argument for why critical psychologists should draw on French situationist theory in order to study modern environments. A review of the French section of the Situationist International will be provided, which will then be followed with how some critical psychologists have recently drawn on that work in conceptualizing new approaches to the study of space and place.

Definition

The term "situationism" was developed by a group of radical French artists, intellectuals, and poets who called themselves the *Situationist International*. First of all, it should be noted that it was never the intention of the situationists to turn their work into a fixed paradigm of knowledge or to create an ideology or perspective. Indeed in the first issue of the *Situationist International* journal, they explained that the

term "situationism" was "A meaningless term . . . There is no such thing as situationism, which would mean a doctrine for interpreting existing social conditions. The notion of situationism is obviously designed by anti-situationists" (International, 1958). In many articles and films produced by Debord (1967), he refuted that there was such a thing as situationism, situationist theory, or any use of situationist means. One key reason as to why the situationists took this position about their work was they were concerned that their theories and practices would become recuperated into established canons of art and corporate and academic knowledge and that situationism would become a specialism, would be part of the elitist systems of art and academic and corporate knowledge, and would then be diluted of all radical potential (Debord, 1967).

Keywords

Situationism; situationist; situations; anti-situationists; spectacle; everyday life; Marxist

Traditional Debates

In recent year, traditional and critical psychologists such as Dixon and Durrheim (2000), Hook (2007), and Reavey (2011) have studied the experience and signification of spaces and places. However, within the majority of traditional psychology research, there has been a lack of consideration of the extent to which research should try to create political social changes (Bridger, 2011). Traditional psychology research has tended to steer away from addressing politics in research. One of the benefits of drawing on situationist theory is that it brings together intellectual, artistic, and activist insights to consider the critique of spaces and places in contemporary society (Bridger, 2011). It should be noted that there has been a lack of empirical and theoretical work on situationism in disciplines such as psychology. The argument made here is that there is potential value in drawing on situationist theory to consider the analysis of environments in modern society.

Critical Debates

"Situationism" is a new concept that has emerged in recent years in the paradigm of critical psychology (Bridger, 2010, 2011, 2013; Burnett, Cudworth & Tamboukou, 2004 and Precarias a La Deriva, 2005). In that research, these writers have theorized the effects of gentrification and neoliberalization in towns and cities by using "psychogeographical" walking methods, by creating artistic maps and using photographic methods. While the phenomenological focus of studying meaning can be useful as a way to understand people's lived experiences of the world (Langdridge, 2007), situationists such as Vaneigem (1967) argued that a revolution is needed to take place in everyday life. Whereas cultural theorists such as Lefebvre (1961) studied "moments" and qualitative phenomenological psychologists such as Langdridge (2007) studied people's "experiences," the situationists aimed to "create new moments" which would lead to revolutionary social change (Unattributed, 1959: n.p). Therefore the aims of the situationists were not only to interpret and understand social processes and issues but ultimately to use these understandings to begin to create situations which could lead to radical social change (Chtcheglov, 1958). It is arguable that the point of academic research should also be to create social change, though the extent to which this is possible to do is difficult to answer. Writers such as Bridger (2010, 2011, 2013) and Hodgetts et al. (2011) have argued for a "turn to place" in psychology where mobile qualitative methods such as walking can be used to study environments. Bridger's (2011, 2013) work draws on situationist theory and psychogeography to study the gentrification and neoliberalization of environments and to begin to envision what future noncapitalist towns and cities could look like. Therefore the analysis of everyday life is central to beginning to create situations that could lead to social change. Indeed, following the mass strikes,

sit-ins, and demonstrations during May 1968, the situationists believed that they "shared the same fragments of a single revolutionary consciousness" as the "population at large" (Sadler, 1998, p. 157). In the aftermath of the Occupy Movements across the globe, "situationist" commentators such as McKenzie Wark (2011) have discussed how situationist theory could be drawn on to understand not only the Occupy Movement but also the crisis in capitalism as evidenced through the banking and Eurozone crises.

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Online Resources

Situationist International Online http://www.cddc.vt.edu/sionline/

Not Bored http://www.notbored.org/SI.html

Bored in the City Collective http://boredinthecity-collective.blogspot.com/

Skin Bleaching

Christopher A. D. Charles
University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica

Introduction

Skin bleaching is not only a controversial and global practice but also an old one. The Ancient Egyptians and Greeks used white lead on their skin, as did the Japanese Geishas in recent history. Skin bleaching occurred in medieval Europe and the European Colonies in Africa and the Caribbean; it was practiced in the United States in the early 1900s. It still exists today in North America, Latin America, the Caribbean,

Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific region. People of all ages, races, ethnicities, genders, social classes, incomes, and education levels lighten their complexion (Blay, 2007; Charles, 2010).

Definition

Skin bleaching refers to people's use of homemade, cosmetic, or dermatological products over time to remove the melanin from the skin. This process which is also known as skin whitening, skin lightening, and skin toning can be done *formally* by a dermatologist or *informally* by nondoctors. People who bleach may do so for a duration of only several days, to upwards of 20 years. Some people bleach their skin for special events, others as a more everyday practice. Some people bleach the skin on parts of their bodies, while others bleach their faces alone (Blay, 2007; Hall, 1995).

People bleach their skin for one of several reasons: the skin is perceived to be too dark; preference for light skin, because light skin is seen as beautiful; the practice is seen as fashionable and modern and facilitates social mobility; a response to peer influence; and to attract potential spouses (Blay, 2007; Jablonski, 2006). These reasons have been theorized within the frameworks of *self-hate, colorism*, *miseducation*, *identity*, and *complex personhood*.

The motivations for skin bleaching are used by cosmetic companies to market their skin bleaching products globally. These products contain mercury, hydroquinone, or corticosteroids, which cause health problems. Some people who informally bleach their skin experience neurological deficits such as insomnia, irritability, neuropathies, and loss of memory; eye problems such as glaucoma and cataracts; and skin problems such as fragile skin, scabies, pitch black pigmentation, and colloid milium ochronosis. Other medical problems include adrenal insufficiency, kidney damage, Cushing's syndrome, vulval warts, immunosuppression, and hypertension. Lactating mothers who bleach their skin and who breast-feed their babies transfer mercury to their babies. Bleaching of the skin can delay the diagnosis of leprosy. The global popularity of skin bleaching among nonwhites despite the myriad health problems is taken as evidence of *self-hate* (Charles, 2010; Jablonski, 2006).

Keywords

Racism; colorism; miseducation; self-hate; complex personhood; skin bleaching; identity

Traditional Debates

Europeans colonized North America, Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia-Pacific region through the use of military force and the subjugation of the local populations. Europeans exploited the resources of their colonies to meet their needs and accelerated this process by importing captive Africans to work on plantations in the Americas. The racist ideology that Europeans were "superior" to the "savage" and "backward" races that they subjugated justified their exploitation as "civilizing missions." The ideology of *colorism* accorded light-skinned people in the colonies societal privileges over dark-skinned people. *Racism* discriminated based on race and *colorism* discriminated based on complexion and created a *racial-complexion hierarchy* with Europeans at the zenith and nonwhites below. The institutional consensus projected that Europeans had "superior" culture, history, societies, intelligence, education, aesthetic physicality, values, and moral worth over nonwhites. The oppression and exploitation of the nonwhites for centuries socialized these people to hate themselves, which is revealed today in their yearning to be like their white masters (Fanon, 1967). This *self-hate* thesis received empirical "support" from the famous doll study conducted in the United States. Black and white children were asked to select the doll that looks like them. Some 14 % of the children in the total sample made antiblack statements. This finding was interpreted to mean that the oppression of racial segregation caused blacks to

hate themselves (Clark & Clark, 1950). Since then there have been numerous "replications" of the doll study in many countries. The self-hate thesis explains skin bleaching within this framework of self-hatred: Blacks embrace the bleaching syndrome because they internalize the negative messages about blackness, thereby hating themselves, and so desire to be like whites (Hall, 1995). However, high self-esteem scores of many people who bleach their skin suggest that the self-hate explanation of their behavior is wrong, and numerous subsequent theories have challenged the self-hate thesis as the reason for skin bleaching.

Critical Debates

The *colorism* perspective argues that the privileges given to people with light complexion in society influence other people to bleach their skin. The body becomes a site of survival in response to the *complexion and racial hierarchies* in the society that impacts people's life chances. Nonwhites experience *racism* across multiple domains, such as during housing purchases, securing loans and jobs, and in the criminal justice system. The influence of *colorism*, which has its origins in colonialism, can be seen in the reasons given for skin bleaching such as beauty, spousal attraction, social status, and social mobility. Light-skinned nonwhites earn higher incomes because it is said that they are more intelligent, beautiful, dependable, hardworking, and trustworthy; they also possess greater marriage potential and social mobility compared to dark-skinned nonwhites. Therefore, the *colorism* thesis argues that dark-skinned nonwhites lighten their complexion to access some of the societal benefits associated with lighter complexion, rather than because of *self-hate* (Hunter, 2007).

The *miseducation* framework theorizes that nonwhite people bleach their skin because they have been educated about Europe and *miseducated* about their own culture, history, and the achievements of their race. Skin bleaching is linked to colonialism through *miseducation* rather than *self-hate*. The *miseducation* about nonwhiteness can be seen in the white curriculum that nonwhites are given in societies dominated by Caucasians and in the former European colonies. The *miseducation* of nonwhites is reinforced by the white-owned media that negatively frame the news about nonwhites and the white-controlled churches that disseminate the view that God is white. *Miseducation* is pervasive because it has a long history, and the views expressed are often now considered normal. This position then situates yearning for light skin by nonwhites in society as resulting from *miseducation* rather than *self-hate* (Woodson, 2006).

The *identity* thesis argues that people who alter their complexion do so because they define themselves as light-skinned people in the society. This identification with, and attachment to, light-skinned people in society is not understood as *self-hate*, because they use light skin values to make sense of themselves and understand the world. These persons also transact or express their *identity* with people they interact with daily. This *identity* transaction occurs through the processes of buffering, bonding, and bridging. People who tone their skin confidently buffer against critics by humoring them, cursing at them, or ignoring them; people who offer compliments for the bleached skin are treated with warmth. Those who alter their complexion bond with the people who compliment them and bridge with strangers by finding common ground. The *identity* construction and transactions of people who bleach are theorized not as deficits but as psychological strengths (Cross & Strauss, 1998).

The *complex personhood* explanation posits that nonwhites who bleach their skin are sophisticated, integrated, and multidimensional people who display strengths, resilience, weaknesses, confidence, fears, and ambiguities as they go about their lives daily. It understands nonwhites as having the will and desire to forge their own destiny. This will and desire was seen in slave rebellions, the strikes, riots and liberation wars in the European colonies, and the strong motivation of nonwhites to succeed after emancipation and political independence. The oppressed peoples were not understood as *self-haters*, because they

constantly resisted their oppression. In the contemporary era, the people who bleach their skin do not see the definition of themselves as fixed; they see themselves as changeable. The people who modify their complexion are understood as strong and sophisticated people who see light skin as a shade of nonwhiteness and who make strategic and rational decisions to accrue the societal benefits of light skin. Skin lightening is seen by the people who do it as modern expressions of body fashion and style. Persons who bleach live wholesome lives by having intimate-partner relationships, working, raising children, engaging in recreation, interacting with friends, attending religious services, and serving their communities (Charles, 2010).

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Online Resources

http://www.jpanafrican.com/archive_issues/vol4no4.htm
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/pr/pr008-05.shtml
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/16/health/16skin.html?pagewanted=all
http://www.youtube.com/user/IvoryCapscouk?v=08zSrwGIfME&feature=pyv
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kyMVgsHazQ4
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kQgSB2E9S_o

Social Change

Kevin Durrheim
School of Psychology, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Scottsville, South Africa

Introduction

Social change is ubiquitous. It is often taken for granted as it happens around us all the time as new events and issues gain attention and as people find themselves in new circumstances, make decisions, and act differently from day to day. It is influenced by and manifest in political, economic, technological, environmental, and other changes that shape the way people think about and live their lives. It unfolds slowly, almost imperceptibly, but it can also happen suddenly and with great force, e.g., end of cold war, the Arab spring.

The concept of social change has less central to the discipline of psychology than other social sciences. Mainstream psychology has often ignored the social context as it sought to identify universal laws of individual mental functioning (Sampson, 1989). Psychological interest in social change emerged as members of the Frankfurt School attempted to develop Marxist theories personhood (Jay, 1973). More recently, community and social psychologists have been studying social change as part of their work on collective action, leadership, and social movements.

Definition

Social change refers to an alteration in social structure, which encompasses the institutions, values, and routines of practice and thinking in that society. The concept describes fundamental alterations in how people live, what they do, and the whole social and psychological infrastructure that makes social life possible, including the laws, technologies, forms of exchange, and subjectivities.

The process may be illustrated by the changes in attitudes toward homosexuality that occurred in latter half the twentieth century. Up until 1973 homosexuality was classified as a mental disorder in the DSM-II. The normative status of homophobia at the time allowed Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950, p. 241) to use the item "Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals and ought to be severely punished" as "indirect measure" of anti-democratic trends that purportedly struck a "balance between rationality and objective truth." In many societies today, social attitudes and norms about sexual orientation have changed, and discrimination based on sexual orientation has been outlawed. The associations of homosexuality with pathology and criminality have receded both in popular consciousness and the media, as well as in institutions such as the law, psychology, and the military. And subjectivities have altered in response, so that members of the GLBTQ community face different challenges today than they did in the past, and have different aspirations, desires, and hopes for the future (Hammack & Cohler, 2009).

Analyses of social change are seldom limited to descriptions. Social change is a teleological concept that is underpinned by explicit or implicit aspirations, politics, and values. In general, therefore analyses of social change are less concerned with understanding the world than with changing it; and analysts typically have a sense of what progress would involve.

Three different models of change have been counterposed:

1. Evolutionary change takes place in gradual linear manner as society evolves from one form to another. Scientific progress and technological development are often viewed as occurring as a progressive evolution (Godin, 2006).
2. Dialectical change occurs as the product of the sequenced interaction of opposing forces, which can include ideas (e.g., conservatism and liberalism) in the Hegelian model or social classes in the Marxist model.
3. Revolutionary change involves sudden discontinuous breaks in which the foundations of a one order are replaced to produce radically new ways of thinking and acting (e.g., Kuhn, 1970; Foucault, 1970) that (unlike the previous two) do not confirm to a fixed path of development.

Keywords

Social change; ideology; collective action; mobilization; participatory action research

History

The critical psychology of social change has its origins in the attempts by Marx-inspired psychology to show how human potential could be unlocked by transforming the material conditions of human lives. Vygotsky advocated revolution as a means of producing a classless society that would bring into being a new system of values and activities, new social experiences, and new cultural artefacts that in turn would reshape human nature (see Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991). Later, members of the Frankfurt School sought to develop a Freudo-Marxist analysis of the failure of historical materialism to explain the resilience of capitalism. Marx had predicted that revolution would be precipitated by expanding inequalities that would accrue as capitalism advanced. Authors such as Fromm (1941) and Horkheimer and Adorno (1944) attributed the stability of monopoly capitalism to the irrational psychological dynamics which prevented magnified social contradictions from entering consciousness and for motivating a turn to fascism in an effort to escape from freedom. Rather than acting in terms of their collective interest, oppressed groups and marginalized people elected to submit to authoritarian leaders and institutions that were instruments in their oppression. Freud had provided a psychodynamic theory of the desire to submit to and even sacrifice oneself for religious and political institutions and charismatic leaders (Civilization and its Discontents, Moses and Monotheism, and Totem and Taboo). The

Frankfurt School developed this line of thinking into an interactive account of how the social order produced subjects with investments in that order. Thus the problematic of a critical psychology of social change was formulated: how to produce the social and psychological conditions to mobilize collectives to recognize the need and to fight for social change.

The psychological foundations of support for the status quo became the focus of many progressive writers. Althusser (1971) argued that ideology worked through the mechanisms of identity by producing individuals as subjects of oppressive regimes. Fanon (1963) and Biko (1978) argued that the development of a revolutionary class in Africa required the formulation of a revolutionary consciousness by shedding the subjectivity of oppression which had reduced the black man, in Biko's (1978, p. 29) words, to a "shell, a shadow of a man, completely self defeated, drowning in his own misery, a slave, an ox bearing the yoke of oppression."

The critical psychology of social change was taken forward in the 1970s in Latin America under the banner of liberation psychology. Ignacio Martín-Baró (1994) suggested that the discipline and practice of psychology was part of the apparatus of oppression. Imported Western psychology pathologized individuals rather than diagnosing the sociopolitical causes of human misery, thereby contributing to tolerance of oppression. The aim of liberation psychology was to de-ideologize reality by developing a bottom-up psychology *from* rather than *for* oppressed people, rooted in the conditions of their oppression. Martín-Baró drew on the writings of Paulo Freire to suggest that the goal of liberation psychology is "concientización," promoting an understanding of the circumstances of oppression as a means of mobilizing the oppressed as agents of change.

Participatory action research was developed as the method by which concientization and mobilization could be effected. This involved a process of critical dialogue between researchers and communities in which problems that communities face were identified and targeted for change in a collaboration and in which communities serve as coresearchers in taking action to solve the problems (Montero, 2000).

Traditional Debates

Critical psychology theories understand that social change involves a dynamic interaction between changing minds and changing circumstances. As such, the traditional debate between materialism and idealism gains a foothold in this field. Since individuals are products of their social contexts, how can they get sufficiently outside of their contexts to gain a critical purchase as agents of social change? Marx provides a materialist answer. The development of capitalism made available new possibilities for social connection (the shop floor then, social media now) from which new forms of alliance and class consciousness could develop. Social change depended on political action aimed at mobilizing the social class who could be the agent of change. Social change activists like Martin-Baro, Fanon, and Biko were Marxist in the sense that they recognized the necessity for conscientizing the oppressed, but by doing so through political mobilization.

In contrast, psychology has focused on individuals rather than collectives and has been idealist in attempting to change perceptions and attitudes. The fate of contact theory – arguably the primary theory of social change in the discipline of social psychology – can well illustrate this orientation. Early research on intergroup contact was used as evidence to support institutional change in the landmark 1954 case of *Brown versus Board of Education* (Clark, 1953). The Supreme Court Justices wanted to know whether school desegregation could be implemented swiftly, or whether social change needed to wait for racial prejudice to change first. A group of critical psychologists associated with SPSSI argued that racially separate school systems be eliminated immediately, reasoning that "there is a magical ease with which the profoundly organized attitude patterns are to be swept away" (Gardner

Murphy, in a letter to Kenneth Clark, cited in Jackson 1998, p. 168). In contrast, the subsequent work on intergroup contact has focused almost entirely on prejudice reduction, shifting focus away from changing social institutions and structures to changing individual minds, attitudes, and perceptions (Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2005).

A related debate concerns the agents of change. Marxists have long debated the respective roles of ideological elites or organic intellectuals in formulating a vision for change. Marx's argument that the working class must mobilize, organize, and ultimately free themselves was underscored by Luxemburg's (1918) insistence that "the struggle for socialism has to be fought out by the masses, by the masses alone." These democratic aspirations were often at odds with authoritarian tendencies of political and bureaucratic elites who advanced a socialism from above. A similar tension arises in participatory action research and other critical psychology interventions where the needs, imperatives, and perspectives of researchers sometimes supersede those communities (Fals Borda & Rahman, 1991).

Finally, there is debate about the model of history that the concept of social change rests on. The evolutionary and dialectical models both assume that history has a purpose in the sense that it is progressing in a specifiable direction. They both entertain the possibility of progress, and to do so they must have a totalizing theory of universal interests. In Marx, these are the interests of the proletariat – as articulated by Marxist intellectuals – which aim to destroy capitalist exploitation, bringing about liberation for all. In contrast, Foucault (1980) entertains a Nietzschean skepticism about a singular truth and reason in history. His analyses of knowledge/power draw attention to institutionally specific and historically discontinuous discourses and practices that provide the parameters for multiple truths. Foucault argues that it is from these "specific knowledges" that that social change should take its bearings. This theory of social change has been criticized by feminists and Marxists because it undermines a clear politics, but Foucault's rejection of a universal notion of progress does not mean the abandonment of politics. Resistance is redirected from the social order at large to particular institutions of knowledge/power as embodied, for example, in prisons, schools, and hospitals. The aim of developing "counter-knowledges" is social change: "The problem is not changing people's consciousness – or what's in their heads but the political, economic, institutional régime of truth" (Foucault, 1980, p. 133).

Critical Debates

The central concern in the field is how to effect change. Mainstream psychology typically seeks to promote change by reforming individuals, changing their attitudes and beliefs. In contrast the critical psychology approach is often distinguished by attempts to mobilize collective action. There are a number of loosely defined ways of achieving these goals. In the tradition of community psychology and participatory action research, concientization and mobilization are set in motion through dialogue. Interventions seek to actively incorporate affected communities as coresearchers who are empowered to make inquiries and effect changes to themselves and their world.

A second approach focuses more directly on identity. Critical social psychologists working in the tradition of social identity theory have had a long-standing interest in understanding the dynamics of social change (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Mobilizing for change depends fundamentally on the ability of groups and leaders to construct (1) a sense of shared identity and (2) cognitive alternatives to the status quo and a belief system that makes change both justifiable and viable (Subašic´, Reynolds, Reicher, & Klandermans, 2012).

The differences between these two traditions make some of the tensions and debates in this field evident. The participatory action researchers have been much more interested in making change happen than studying it; but in so doing, they also much more likely to let privileged

perspectives of researchers direct the change process. Instead of adopting an activist role, critical social psychologists have tended to theorize the change dynamics as they unfold in natural and experimental contexts.

International Relevance

Social change theory, research, and activism have often been more readily embraced by marginalized communities who have direct interests in social change. It is not surprising therefore that important developments in the field come from South America, Asia, and Africa, where activists have attempted to develop indigenous psychologies as instruments of social change. The "relevance" of mainstream psychology has been debated as its theories, and methods are seen not only as Eurocentric imports but also as forces against social change.

Practice Relevance

Psychologists working for social change have always sought its practical relevance. They have criticized mainstream psychology for its limited relevance to marginalized and oppressed peoples. Applied work in psychology primarily aims to help individuals adjust to adverse circumstances rather than change these circumstances. In contrast, community and liberation psychology have sought to impact on the lives of ordinary people by means of community-based interventions, empowerment strategies, program-centered consultations, collaborative research projects, and advocacy. In so doing, they have sought to produce a world that nurtures human well-being, equity, justice, and participation in civic life.

Future Directions

We are living in a rapidly changing world that is riven with deep inequalities. New technologies have enabled new trajectories of alliance among marginalized and oppressed people, promoting innovative forms of mobilization and resistance. These provide avenues for critical psychologists in different contexts to establish connections between themselves and with other social movements. By this process of democratic participation and solidarity building, critical psychologists may be able to devise methods, technologies, and theories to promote social change.

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Online Resources

http://www.apa.org/monitor/2011/06/social-change.aspx
http://www.publicsciencemproject.org/

Social Constructionism

Kenneth Gergen
Department of Psychology, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA, USA

Introduction

Emerging with the Western Enlightenment is a conception of knowledge as "justified true belief," in which the justification for an individual's belief is based on empirical evidence. The image of Galileo is iconic in this case; the single individual – informed by observation and engages in rational thought – successfully challenged the dogma of the church in proving that the earth rotated around the sun. In the twentieth century this empiricist view of knowledge came to be known as logical positivism and was – and continues to be – used as a foundational justification for certain practices of science. However, in the late twentieth century, several bodies of scholarship not only provided lethal criticism of the empiricist view but provided the basis for a social epistemology. This view of knowledge, commonly known as social construction, embodies the central elements of these critiques.

Definition

Social construction is typically defined as an account of knowledge in which all assertions about what is the case are traced to negotiated agreements among people. Knowledge on this account is not driven by empirical fact, but what counts as fact depends on assumptions, logics, practices, and values specific to culturally and historically situated communities. Thus, observations support or disconfirm a theory, only if one accepts the a priori assumptions underlying the theory and methods of research. Social constructionism is often conflated with the term constructivism, although major contributors to constructivism frequently place the locus of knowledge within the mind of the individual person, while constructionists trace the origins of knowledgeable assertions within the social sphere.

Keywords

Social construction; logical positivism; constructivism; discourse; deconstruction; ideology; truth; objectivity

History

Although one may trace certain roots of social constructionism to Vico, Nietzsche, and Dewey, scholars often view Berger and Luckmann's *The Social Construction of Reality* as the landmark volume. Yet, because of its lodgment in social phenomenology, this work has largely been eclipsed by more recent scholarly developments. These developments in social constructionist thought are located in three, relatively

independent movements: ideological critique, linguistic and literary theory, and the social constitution of science. As described in Gergen (1994), the convergence of these movements provides the basis for social constructionist inquiry today.

Ideological Critique

Central to the positivist/empiricist movement is the view that empirically grounded descriptions of the world carry no ideological biases. As proposed, properly supported scientific accounts of the world do not reflect the values, moral prescriptions, or religious beliefs of any particular group. This view met an early challenge from Marxist theorists, who argued that capitalist economic theory – despite all the research and analysis in its support – was essentially a mystifying means of fortifying the existing class structure. Or more broadly put, scientific descriptions are not mirrors of the world; based on one's particular interests, certain accounts are preferred over others. This logic subsequently became the basis for an enormous body of scholarship in which the taken-for-granted realities of various knowledge-making groups were found inimical to one or another social enclave (e.g., women, people of color, gays and lesbians, the working class, environmentalists, communalists, the colonized). Many critics have found their work galvanized by the writings of Michel Foucault (1978, 1980). In Foucault's terms, claims to knowledge function to build and sustain structures of power.

Linguistic and Literary Theory

A second major challenge to the empiricist account of knowledge emerged from linguistic and literary theory. The empiricist concepts of accuracy, objectivity, and truth all depend on the assumption that certain words correspond to what is the case. On this view, certain utterances are truth bearing, while others are exaggerated or untrue. Linguistic theory, however, argues that the relationship between a word and its referent is fundamentally arbitrary. Thus, in principle, any utterance could be used to represent any state of affairs. What privileges any particular arrangement of words as being "true" is simply social convention.

Equally significant, literary theorists began to demonstrate that language functions as a system in itself. If language use is determined by a logic of its own, then reports on the nature of the world will necessarily be driven by this logic. This line of thinking subsequently has led to substantial scholarly study of the ways in which scientific accounts are governed by linguistic devices such as metaphor and narrative. In the latter case, for example, evolutionary theory is only intelligible by virtue of its drawing from narrative traditions of storytelling (Landau, 1993). Such work has been further innervated by the works of Jacques Derrida (1976) and particularly his writings on linguistic deconstruction. As Derrida proposed, language meaning depends on a system of differences or binaries. That is, the meaning of a word depends on a simple split between "the word" and "not the word." Word meaning depends, then, on differentiating between a *presence* and an *absence*, which is designated by the word against what is not designated. To give an account of the world is thus to speak in terms of presences, what is designated, against a backdrop of absences. In effect, the presences are privileged; they are brought into focus by the words themselves; the absences are suppressed. Or in effect, truth is only intelligible if one suppresses its implicit negation.

Social Constitution of Science

These preceding critiques, emerging in separate scholarly traditions, begin to coalesce in the third and perhaps most essential contribution to social construction. The origins may be found in the sociology of knowledge, with Berger and Luckmann's *The Social Construction of Reality* a formative influence. However, the landmark volume is Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Most importantly, this work represented a frontal challenge to the long-standing presumption that scientific knowledge is progressive and that with continued research – testing hypotheses against reality – we

come ever closer to the truth. Rather, proposed Kuhn, scientific propositions about the world are embedded within *paradigms*, roughly a network of shared commitments to a theory, conception of a subject matter, methodological practices, values, and the like. Thus, even the most exacting measurements are only sensible from within the paradigm. A look into a microscope tells you nothing unless you are already informed about the nature of the instrument and what you are supposed to be looking at. What we call progress in science is not then a movement from a less to a more objectively accurate paradigm. Rather it represents a shift in paradigm, a new way of thinking and observing.

In recent decades this social view of science has been buttressed by an enormous body of scholarship centered on the cultural and historical contingency of scientific knowledge. As broadly acknowledged, the philosophical search for foundations of empirical knowledge is now moribund. Rather, summarizing these three critical movements, it is more fruitful to understand scientific knowledge as a by-product of negotiated agreements among people concerning the nature of the world. Whatever exists makes no fundamental requirements regarding our attempts to describe and explain. But, once we have entered into a particular tradition of understanding, as represented in a shared language, this tradition will provide both direction and limits on our explanations, descriptions, and observations. Further, following Wittgenstein (1953), all such traditions will be wedded to particular ways of life, which is to say they will carry certain implicit or explicit values or desired goals.

This social constructionist conception of knowledge is not at all fatal to the empirical tradition. Rather, it simply removes the foundations for such a tradition, viewing it as one possibility among others. Thus, the primary questions to be asked of any knowledge-making community are first pragmatic and second valuational. What is the utility of various claims to knowledge, and for whom are the outcomes of such claims valuable or not? In this sense, social constructionism constitutes a critical pragmatism.

Traditional Debates

Although fully insinuated into many sectors of scholarship and practice, constructionist ideas remain highly controversial – if not avoided altogether – in mainstream, empiricist psychology. Psychologists are scarcely alone in their resistance, and indeed constructionist ideas are centrally implicated in what have come to be known as "the science wars" and the "culture wars." Polarization has resulted, in part, from the way in which constructionist-based critiques have often demonized their targets and in part because traditionalists fail to understand key constructionist arguments. Traditionalists typically view constructionist ideas as empirical truth claims, without realizing that constructionist ideas are themselves constructions. In this sense, constructionism approximates a non-foundational foundation.

Among the more pointed critiques of constructionism are its nihilism and its ontological relativism. In the first case, for traditionalists, the deconstructive critiques seem to discount all that science has contributed to the world. For them, constructionists seem to be saying "science is *just* a social construction," or, in effect, equivalent to fairy tales. And if just a set of stories, then why bother? In contrast, they argue, the fact that diseases have been cured and men have set foot on the moon seem obvious outcomes of solid science. Yet, repeating the earlier refrain, constructionist arguments are not antiscience. That science yields pragmatically valued outcomes does not, however, make its assumptions or theories true. Its outcomes are valuable for certain ends for certain people. Thus, constructionists open the door to multiple orientations to the world, to multiple offerings for multiple purposes. This is not nihilism, but an invitation to broad enrichment.

In terms of ontological relativism, traditionalists chide constructionists for what they see as an "anything goes" mentality, which is to say that all accounts of the world are equal. This is largely a straw man critique, wholly undocumented. What constructionists do propose is that there are many perspectives for understanding, and whatever criteria one might use to judge among

them will issue from one of these perspectives. Thus there is no ultimate measure for judging among perspectives. From an empiricist perspective, prediction may be a valued criterion; however, from other perspectives a high value might be placed on equal rights, ethics of sustainability, world peace, beauty, or spiritual well-being. In sum, constructionism invites a pluralist world.

Critical Debates

Although critical psychologists have made extensive use of the deconstructive logics so central to social constructionism, many have also turned critical attention to constructionism itself. Chief among these criticisms is the way in which constructionism removes the essential grounds for their critique of various inequities, such as gender, race, and class. Although the dominant discourse can be subverted with constructionist logics, these same logics then point to the constructed character of the "fight for justice." In turn, constructionists suggest that by lodging critique in foundations, the stage is set for recrimination and escalating antagonism. By recognizing the constructed character of all positions, new and more promising forms of dialogue may be envisioned.

Others within the critical movement embrace many constructionist views, but wish to hold on to one or more essentialisms. "Everything is constructed," for example, "except power," "the body," or "sense data." Constructionists reply that the revolutionary implications of constructionist ideas are undermined by such piecemeal salvaging attempts. And too, as a metatheory, constructionism does not reject such terms. All are valuable for some purposes. The primary questions, again, concern the ends achieved by the use of such discourse and the value implications of what follows.

International Relevance

Social constructionist ideas and practices are shared around the world, with translations and original contributions found in all major languages. There are many reasons for this rapid proliferation. In Third World nations there is a high degree of skepticism of the empiricist orientation, as it bears the marks of American imperialism. Constructionist ideas help to subvert the intrusion and offer a pluralist alternative. In cultures with a strong communal tradition – in Latin America, Asia, and Scandinavia – the constructionist emphasis on the collaborative creation of meaning is more congenial than Western individualism. And, for the indigenous psychology movement, constructionist ideas lend strong support. Rather than "one unified psychology," constructionists point to the benefit of multiple traditions. Finally, many see constructionist ideas as the key to global peace, as they remove all fundamentalisms (including science and constructionism itself), thus inviting more positive dialogues on future possibilities.

Practice Relevance

Constructionist ideas have found an enthusiastic audience in many fields of practice. In psychology this is especially so for developments in therapeutic practice, counseling, community psychology, education, and organizational behavior. For the most part, practice relevance stems from the constructionist emphasis on collaborative meaning making. Because all our beliefs and values rest on social tradition, it should be possible at any point in time to engage in collaborative and creative constructions of alternatives to these traditions. Thus, for example, in narrative therapy, clients are helped to "re-story" their lives in ways that are more functional and fulfilling. Other constructionist-oriented therapies shift the conversation from "the problem" to future building. Organizational behavior specialists set in motion dialogues that enable organizations to generate new and more inspiring conceptions of their future. Educational specialists have used constructionist ideas to develop collaborative and dialogic teaching practices. Constructionist ideas also inform a wide range of practices outside psychology. They are used, for example, in

such wide-ranging areas as health care, regional planning, mediation, and peace building.

Future Directions

Although constructionist logics have played a pivotal role in the critical movement, many see their function in this movement as limited in potential. Most important, many believe it is more important at this juncture to use constructionist ideas to build alternative futures. In other terms, the deconstructive or liberating phase of constructionist efforts is being replaced by a reconstructive phase. This phase is reflected in many of the activities discussed in the preceding section. However, these activities are also limited in potential as they so often limited to the grassroots level. Future efforts must increasingly be devoted to major decision making groups, in government, business, and religion. Constructionist-based movements to build a United Religions Organization and to organize businesses around practices of world benefit now lead the way.

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Social Distance

Darrin Hodgetts and Ottilie Stolte
School of Psychology, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand

Introduction

Within diverse societies, people from different groups experience connection and solidarity in some social situations and distance and alienation from members of different groups in other situations. The concept of social distance was developed to advance understanding of processes of acceptance and estrangement between groups of people in cities where people who belong to different groups come into regular contact with one another.

Definition

Social distance refers to the extent to which people experience a sense of familiarity (nearness and intimacy) or unfamiliarity (farness and difference) between themselves and people belonging to different social, ethnic, occupational, and religious groups from their own. Social distance is not a static cognitive attribute of acceptance. People can shift and change their sense of affinity or dissonance with particular groups across different contexts. Accordingly, it is more accurate to think of *social distancing* as a dynamic social practice played out in the mutable midst of *everyday life* (Hodgetts et al., 2011).

Keywords

Social interactions; prejudice; abjection; ethnicity; groups; everyday life

Traditional Debates

The concept of social distance gained particular prominence with increased urbanization and disparate groups coming to live in closer proximity in early nineteenth-century cities. Georg Simmel's (1908/1950) work on "the stranger" and metropolitan life provides an intellectual foundation for this conceptual development. For Simmel, the stranger constitutes an ideal type of individual or group that is distanced socially from others, who is only partially a member of society, and who often transgresses social conventions. The stranger is not here one day and gone the next but remains in our midst. For Simmel, the physical proximity of the stranger does not necessarily equate to social proximity. "Distance means that he, who is close by, is far, and strangeness means that he, who also is far, is actually near" (Simmel 1950, p. 402). The stranger comes into contact with members of other groups but is excluded from membership to these groups. He or she embodies social distance through a "combination of the near and the far" (Park and Burgess, 1921, cited in Hodgetts et al., 2011). Simmel considered social distancing as a social process, rather than as a simple fixed level of perceived difference/distance between groups. When overlaid with a strong impulse of revulsion, strangers become not only more socially distant but also dehumanized, delegitimized, and *abjectified*.

The concept of social distance has been applied to investigations of experiences of estrangement, acceptance, and intimacy between different groups (Hodgetts et al., 2011; Rockquemore & Brunsma, 2001; Triandis & Triandis, 1962). There has been an emphasis on the measuring of social distance to establish the extent to which people's perceptions of distance are related to their unwillingness or willingness to interact with members of a particular group. Emory Bogardus (1925) was asked to create a scale for measuring social distance by his supervisor Robert Park, who drew the concept from his own teacher Georg Simmel. The Bogardus scale constitutes a continuum with nearness, intimacy, or familiarity at one end and farness, difference, and unfamiliarity at the other end. The strength or weakness of the social distance on this scale is determined by people's responses to a range of statements such as whether or not they would like to have dinner with a person from another ethnic group or if they would like to have them as a neighbor (Triandis & Triandis, 1962). The reasoning behind the Bogardus scale is the contention that individual preferences, based in a person's membership to a specific ethnic group, influence their acceptance of and relations with people from other groups.

Critical Debates

The Bogardus social distance scale, as a unidimensional and cumulative form of the Guttman scale, projects a linear and fixed view of how near or far a person believes any social group to be from their own position in society. While such an established scale is arguably useful in providing a snapshot of a person's social perspective at one time, this definition of social distance is more limited than the one on which it was originally based. The social distance scale has come to reify social distance as a rigid, fixed, and static attitude held by individuals (cf., Wark & Galliher, 2007). Recently, psychologists have argued that this individualizes and oversimplifies the complexity of cross-group interactions and can gloss heterogeneity and movement in terms of feelings of proximity held across groups (Hodgetts et al., 2011). Further, the social cognitive approach to social distance underlying the use of such scales relies on a Cartesian mind-world dualism. This dualism contributes a focus on intrapsychic exchanges between individuals and reproduces dualisms between individuals and society and individuals and objects (including other people) in society.

Critical psychologists look beyond the separation of the mind and world because human thought and experience involves much more than individual cognitive processes (Jovchelovitch, 2007). Social distance is embedded in places, in shared social practices, and is overlaid with collective histories and experiences (Hodgetts et al., 2011). People live somewhere and their thoughts and actions are often based on shared norms, values, and practices of their social groups in overlapping social spaces. Ideas, social categories, and experiences exist in language, physical actions, and institutions such as mass media. This critical shift in focus allows for an engagement with the discursive, material, and spatially located nature of social distancing between groups in particular locales, including ethnically diverse neighborhoods (Hodgetts et al., 2010).

The concept of social distancing provides a useful conceptual guide for research into intergroup dynamics across contact sites, which may be direct (when people meet physically in city streets) or indirect (when different groups are experienced symbolically via various media). A key focus is on how such direct or indirect encounters manifest in terms of experiences of proximity and distance (Hodgetts et al., 2010). When exploring such processes, it is important to view urban spaces and binaries of inclusion and exclusion as negotiable and mutable, rather than fixed (cf., Lefebvre, 1991). Social distance is more fluid and context sensitive than is typically reflected in research into cross-cultural relations (cf., Triandis & Triandis, 1962). Social distancing is situated within dynamic social relations that enable people to manage their relationships with other "different" people in their urban environments. From this perspective, social distancing is one of many processes through which human beings make and conduct their lives, their relationships with others, and their cities (Lefebvre, 2000). These constructions and associated daily practices take shape across both physical and representational spaces (Hodgetts et al., 2010, 2011).

Briefly, a critical approach to social distancing can inform explorations of spatially located bodies and encounters between members of social groups. Rather than use social distance as a static cognitive construct, recent research explores social distancing as an everyday practice that manifests through material and discursive acts and which can have positive or negative implications for particular people and groups (Hodgetts et al., 2010; 2011). Because social distances between groups are not fixed or absolute, there is scope to close gaps between groups. A critical agenda for the future is to map and explore the complexities of social distancing between social groups in different contexts. This should be done with a view to extending present understandings of estrangement between groups and how distance can be transcended.

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Social Dominance Theory

Gazi Islam
Grenoble Ecole de Management and Insper Institute for Education and Research, Grenoble, France

Introduction

Social Dominance Theory (SDT; e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) is an attempt to combine social psychological theories of intergroup relations with wider social process of ideology and the legitimization of social inequalities. SDT begins with the premise that most societies contain status hierarchies, with some groups systematically privileged over other groups. Thus, SDT has been used to explain the persistent inequalities of groups based on gender, race, and other marginalized social categories.

Definition

SDT is a theory of social and intergroup relations that focuses on how people develop hierarchy supporting belief structures as a support for institutional dominance. It involves studies of who is likely to hold such attitudes, how they come to do so, and what are the ramifications for thought and action.

Keywords

Legitimizing myth; ideology; hierarchy; social psychology of prejudice

Traditional Debates

According to SDT, a combination of political conservatism, prejudice, a belief in meritocracy, and the assumption of the inferiority of marginalized groups leads to the formations of persistent ideological myths, which Sidanius and Pratto (1999) term "legitimizing myths." These myths become codified and institutionalized and serve to convince people that existing structures of inequality are just and desirable, despite their unequal outcomes with respect to low-status groups.

The focus on the social psychological processes by which ideological structures become internalized in individual attitudes and beliefs distinguishes SDT from other theories of ideology and makes SDT more amenable to psychological research (e.g., Huddy, 2004). Although such beliefs benefit high-status members, their internalization by low-status groups also serves to prevent such groups from engaging in social action to prevent prejudice and inequality. SDT also assumes that all members of society are not equally socialized into hierarchical attitudes (Kravitz, 2004); this individual variability makes possible research into the sources of individual variance in adoption of legitimating beliefs, as well as into the impacts of such beliefs on individual and social processes.

The "psychological" aspect of SDT is found in the individual difference variable social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius, Pratto & Mitchell, 1994), which reflects the degree to which dominance-maintaining social institutions color personal beliefs about intergroup relations. Sidanius, Pratto and Mitchell (1994) summarize SDO as an individual tendency to view groups in hierarchical terms and such that people high in SDO will support social policies promoting the social stratification of groups. Subsequent research supports the claim that SDO is positively related to negative attitudes toward low-status groups and is correlated with sexism and ethnic prejudice (Pratto et al., 2000).

Empirical findings have tended to support the link between SDO and the tendency to promote policies that disadvantage low-status groups (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Pratto et al. found support for a relationship between SDO and support for punitive criminal policies, as well as support for war, opposition to civil rights, and programs to benefit disadvantaged groups, such as affirmative action.

SDO has been linked with lowered cooperation and increased social distance from out-group members (Sidanius, Pratto, & Mitchell, 1994), as well as to lower level for help for out-group members, offering help only in ways that reinforce previous status hierarchies (Halabi, Dovidio, & Nadler, 2008).

Because SDO capitalizes on previous psychological motives for in-group enhancement, using legitimizing myths to justify motivated positive self-views, one would expect high-status groups to score higher on SDO than low-status groups. Indeed, empirical research has confirmed that social position does correlate positively with SDO; for example, men tend to score higher than women (e.g., Pratto et al., 2000), although such results may vary across cultures. However, low-status group members can also exhibit SDO, leading to counter-in-group attitudes. Some research shows that while high-status members increase in-group favoritism when high in SDO, low-status member increase out-group favoritism, meaning that their high SDO leads them to disfavor their own group (e.g., Jost & Burgess, 2000). Jost and Burgess (2000), for example, found that women high in SDO were more ambivalent with regard to women victims of discrimination, suggesting that their in-group supportive attitudes were being counteracted by their beliefs in the low-status of their group.

Critical Debates

Because of their link with social inequality and hierarchy attitudes, SDT and SDO provide an important link between theories concerning individual attitudes development and social psychological processes, on the one hand, and the political and ideological ramification of such processes, on the other hand. This link is an ambitious one that attempts to span individual-, group-, and collective-level variables. As noted above, the majority of research in the SDT tradition has focused on SDO, the more micro-level aspect of the theory, but to the extent that bridges can be drawn between this aspect and wider political and social structures, SDT will fulfill its theoretical ambitions.

In light of this, although SDT attempts to bridge psychological and social perspectives on the legitimation of dominance, it has natural affinities with concepts from critical theory such as hegemony and ideology. One criticism of SDT, therefore, might be that, despite these affinities, little cross-disciplinary work has been done to create dialogue between these two perspectives, perhaps due to underlying methodological differences (SDT remains largely quantitative, reflecting a tradition of positivistic psychology less central to critical theory). Similarly, by discussing dominance structures primarily as questions of the reproduction of belief, critical scholars might fault SDT as overly "psychologizing" social and structural systems of oppression. Indeed, SDT does not deny structural factors, and actively engages the question of how these structures become internalized by actors. Yet, the conditions under which such structures can be shifted, resisted, or modified by individual actors remains an open area of research around SDT.

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Online Resources

http://scholar.harvard.edu/sidanius/
http://www.psychology.uconn.edu/people/Faculty/Pratto/Pratto.html

Social Identity Theory

Gazi Islam
Grenoble Ecole de Management and Insper Institute for Education and Research, Grenoble, France

Introduction

Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) begins with the premise that individuals define their own identities with regard to social groups and that such identifications work to protect and bolster self-identity. The creation of group identities involves both the categorization of one's "in-group" with regard to an "out-group" and the tendency to view one's own group with a positive bias vis-a-vis the out-group. The result is an identification with a collective, depersonalized identity based on group membership and imbued with positive aspects (e.g., Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987).

Definition

SIT is a classic social psychological theory that attempts to explain intergroup conflict as a function of group-based self-definitions.

Keywords

Intergroup relations; out-group discrimination; social psychology of groups; group dynamics

Traditional Debates

SIT grew out of Henri Tajfel's early work, which attempted to apply cognitive grouping and gestalt phenomena to social groups (Hogg & Williams, 2000). Cognitive grouping involves "judgmental accentuation" where cognitive categories lead to the increased salience of distinguishing features between categories, exaggerating category differences. Applied to social groups, this principle could be used to explain biased and exaggerated perceptions of difference between groups. Tajfel (Tajfel 1970; Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) used a minimal group paradigm to test this effect. They divided people into two groups based on arbitrary criteria and showed that even this "minimal" group basis led people to form psychological groups, exaggerating the positive qualities of one's own group while exaggerating the negative qualities of the out-group. Subsequent studies have attempted to demonstrate the wide range of socially important phenomena that result from such categorization, such as negative evaluations of the out-group (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Validzic, 1998), stereotyping (Smith, 1999), and failure to allocate resources to out-group members (Sidanius, Pratto, & Mitchell, 1994). However, more recent research has called into question whether social identification leads to out-group degradation and tends to emphasize positive in-group regard more than out-group degradation (e.g., Reynolds, Turner, & Haslam, 2000).

Positive in-group bias can be explained because the in-group comes to take on a self-relevant role, where the person defines him/herself through the group. Thus, comparisons between groups are emotionally laden and equivalent to self-other comparisons, with group threats interpreted as threats to the self (Smith, 1999). Turner (1975, p. 10) describe the

in-group-out-group relationship as entailing a "competition for positive identity," out-group categorizations strategically framed to maximize self-evaluations. Thus, treatment of out-group members is directly related to the motive to protect or enhance the self (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Because social identity effects are based on protection and enhancement of self-concepts, threat to the self-concept would intuitively be related to the strongest identity effects. Several laboratory and field studies have empirically confirmed that when groups pose a threat to one another, the effects of identification increase. For example, negative out-group characterizations can result from perceptions of out-groups as competing for resources (e.g., Cooper & Fazio, 1986) and when groups view the out-group as having a history of tense relations (e.g., Duckitt & Mphuthing, 1998), a factor which has made SIT useful in political psychology.

SIT opened up a wide variety of areas for research, regarding the structure of social identities, the motivations behind identification, the fluidity between different social identities, and identity's effects on individuals, groups, organizations, and wider social collectives. As these research areas grew, they branched into a variety of theoretical perspectives, including self-categorization theory, self-enhancement theory, and self-verification theory, among others. These perspectives do not always agree; for example, self-verification theory (Swann, 1983) argues that epistemic motives for self-uncertainty reduction are a primary motive for identification such that people will sustain even negative social identities if these identities provide epistemic stability. On the other hand, self-enhancement theory (e.g., Jones, 1973) holds that individuals strive for positive selves and will thus discount or underplay negative self-information. Both of these theories, although contradictory, can be interpreted in the light of SIT perspectives, in which social identity contains both an epistemic and a positive self-regard component. Subsequent research has attempted to tease apart relative effects of self-enhancement and self-verification.

In addition, the question of social identification opened up important research into which groups people identify with, when they identify with one group versus another, and how consistent and enduring are such identifications. Because a person can be a member of a family, a neighborhood, a city, a country, etc., simultaneously, the groups a person belongs to must be supplemented with information regarding which of these groups is cognitively salient at a given moment and why. A large body of research (e.g., Brewer & Gardner, 1996) has attempted to deal with the multiple social identities that people inhabit and how they psychologically organize these identities.

Critical Debates

From a critical psychology perspective, SIT offers important insights regarding the social identity bases of discrimination, prejudice, and intergroup conflict, by locating these phenomena as resulting from group-based categorization and self-enhancement motives. However, the historical evolution of the theory itself also offers an interesting case in which intergroup conflicts become redefined as aspects of individual identity. As SIT became more focused on self-verification as an epistemic need (e.g., Hogg & Williams, 2000), rather than self-enhancement as a motivational driver of identification, the conflictual bases of social identity became less central to the identity literature than the formation of a stable self-concept. While both of these bases were apparent in the original theory, critical scholars may question whether such a development leaves SIT less able to unpack the psychological bases of conflict and more focused on an individual psychology of concept formation. In this respect, SIT may have developed increasingly in the direction of an individualist cognitive approach at the cost of its sociological origins. Yet, the diversity of current approaches using the term "social identity" belies simply diagnoses, and the story of the theoretical evolution of the social identity concept is far from over. This evolution reflects wider concerns over

the role of the "social" in social psychology more generally, a question which is central to critical psychologists' concern to link issues of cognition, attitude, and emotion with larger social phenomena.

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http://www.bbcprisonstudy.org/resources.php?p=59
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bgarc9vSj5I

Social Justice, Overview

Michael Arfken
Department of Psychology, University of Prince Edward Island, Charlottetown, PEI, Canada

Introduction

Human history bears witness to a wide range of social institutions that have been established in the name of social justice. One striking feature of these different institutions is the extent to which they often diverge from one another. For example, while some argue that the cause of social justice is advanced by ensuring that individuals are able to engage in unfettered economic exchange, others view the rise of the calculating economic agent as the very embodiment of social injustice. This suggests that the struggle for social justice ultimately begins in a struggle over the meaning of justice itself.

Definition

At the most basic level, the idea of social justice highlights the social, political, legal, and institutional arrangements that characterize particular forms of social organization. One reason why

this definition is so broad is that what one group takes to be a defining feature of social justice (i.e., rights, recognition) may be viewed by another group as a symptom of social injustice. This makes any comprehensive definition of social justice exceedingly elusive.

Keywords

Social justice; morality; ethics; utilitarianism; deontology; duty; virtue ethics; recognition; redistribution; feminism; libertarianism; communitarianism; character

Traditional Debates

Scholars and activists interested in social justice often focus on the social, cultural, political, and economic institutions that shape a society. To the extent that these institutions promote the ideals of equality, liberty, cooperation, and the tolerance of differences, such a society is deemed to be socially just. Yet it is important to note that this definition of social justice is itself heavily indebted to a range of social, historical, and philosophical developments (Sandel, 2007). By focusing on these developments, it will become clear that critical psychological scholarship has a unique and important role to play in many of the debates surrounding social justice.

One approach to social justice takes its point of departure from a basic observation about human behavior. All other things being equal, people tend to pursue those things that give them pleasure and avoid those things that give them pain. It was from this observation that Jeremy Bentham (1789/1970) and John Stuart Mill (1861/1968) developed what they referred to as the principle of utility. According to this principle, the moral worth of an action can be established by calculating the extent to which an action promotes happiness and prevents its opposite, namely, pain or displeasure. Put simply, if an action produces pleasure, it is to be recommended; if it produces pain or displeasure, it is to be avoided. While Bentham tended to see pleasure and pain exclusively in quantitative terms, Mill argued that there are also qualitative differences between what he refers to as higher and lower pleasures. In Mill's view, a proper education ensures that individuals are in a position to choose the higher pleasures over the more primitive and animal indulgences. The principle of utility is the defining feature of what has come to be called utilitarianism. To understand how utilitarianism approaches social justice, it is necessary to see how a society guided by the principle of utility would organize its social institutions.

For utilitarianism, when members of a society must decide which of a number of interests to pursue, their calculation not only takes into account individual interests, it also looks to the interests of the entire society. This means that given competing pursuits, one can establish the moral superiority of a particular pursuit by calculating the pleasure produced for the society as well as the individual. All other things being equal, a course of action has moral worth if it produces the greatest amount of good for the greatest number of people. In this way, utilitarianism suggests that social justice can be fostered by determining how a particular action benefits the greatest number of people within a society. Mill goes so far as to suggest that in an ideal society, the interests of all the members of that society will be homogenous so that the satisfaction of any individual member of that society will necessarily benefit the society as a whole.

Within a utilitarian framework, the moral worth of an action is established by focusing on the consequences that follow from that action. This means that if social institutions are structured so that they provide the maximum benefit to the greatest number of people, those institutions will necessarily be just. It is important to stress that for utilitarianism, neither the motive nor the character of the social actor has any bearing on the moral worth of a particular action. It is also important to note that societies organized around the principle of utility require that such a society have a particular goal, purpose, or common good. In this way, utilitarianism represents a teleological approach to morality and social justice.

For Immanuel Kant (1785/1997), the most important step in providing a foundation for morality – and by extension social justice – is the elimination of any and all contingency. In his view, to identify the moral worth of an action with the consequences that follow from that action introduces a measure of contingency that is ultimately lethal to moral theory. For utilitarianism, the moral worth of an action is calculated by the pleasure it produces. Kant felt that the emphasis on pleasure and consequences fails on a number of fronts. To begin with, social actors are not in a position to understand all the consequences of their actions. To the extent that our actions have reverberations that escape us, our calculations of utility will always be limited by our own awareness. Moreover, Kant notes that people often have competing ends. While it may appear desirable to treat what is common to each of these ends as a standard for evaluating moral action (i.e., happiness), such a standard will always remain open to modification based on the prevailing attitudes of the day. What Kant proposes instead is that we focus not on the particular ends that we choose and the consequences of our actions but instead on the capacity each individual has for choosing his or her own ends. In other words, it is not happiness but the freedom of the will that provides a proper foundation for a metaphysics of morals.

By emphasizing our capacity to choose rather than the ends that are actually chosen, Kant hopes to distinguish moral action from action that follows from inclination. To be compelled to action through inclination leaves one a slave to his or her passions. Authentic freedom – the driving force of both morality and social justice – stems from obedience to a supreme principle. One behaves morally when one's actions follow not from inclination but from duty. In contemporary moral theory, this position is often referred to as duty ethics or deontology.

There is something striking about Kant's claim that the essence of human freedom lies in obedience to a supreme principle. After all, freedom and obedience appear to be on opposite ends of the spectrum. Moreover, if the essence of freedom is to be driven by something from within, it seems strange to invoke something like duty which traditionally identifies an external influence on social action. Kant's emphasis on duty appears to sacrifice the very freedom that makes anything like moral action possible. Yet what Kant proposes is that the duty one follows in authentic moral action is in fact a duty that the social actor has created. By making social actors supreme legislators of the duty governing their actions, Kant secures individual freedom against the contingency of inclination and consequence. Within a deontological framework, social justice can be measured by the extent to which individuals are treated as ends in themselves rather than means to a further end. Social institutions that permit individuals to pursue their own interest further the cause of social justice.

While there are important differences between utilitarianism and deontology, there is also something that they share in common. Since at least the Enlightenment, one of the principle tasks of moral theory has been to forge a relationship between the individual and the community. Of central importance in this effort is the notion of obligation. By arguing that individuals have certain obligations to their communities, it is possible to celebrate individual liberty without descending into an isolated, alienated egoism. For utilitarianism, moral actors have an obligation to consider what consequences their actions have for the larger community. Similarly, deontology emphasizes that duty is itself contained in the very notion of rationality – a notion that connects each moral actor with the rest of humanity. As we have seen, this means that the individual guided by duty is obligated to treat all rational creatures as ends in themselves rather than a means to an end.

In contrast to utilitarianism and deontology, virtue ethics asserts that we need not rely on something like obligation to link isolated individuals with larger communities. What we call individuality or selfhood is itself embedded within a particular community. Thus, when Aristotle claims that "Man is by nature a social animal," he is asserting that the very notion of individuality is only intelligible within the context of a particular community. To rely on obligation as

a means for establishing a relationship between individuals and communities is to treat an alienated state of human relationships as a natural feature of human existence rather than a contingent feature of modern life.

So while utilitarianism and deontology emphasize the obligations that individuals have to their communities, virtue ethics emphasizes the role that character plays in all moral action (Swanton, 2001; van Hooft, 2006). To possess a strong character is to possess the virtues (courage, honor, charity, etc.) that a particular community takes to be the defining features of human excellence. For virtue ethics, without a particular conception of human excellence and a view of the good life, morality necessarily descends into an atomistic expression of individual preferences (MacIntyre, 1984). The fact that contemporary moral theory requires something like obligation to link isolated individuals with a larger community is itself symptomatic of the alienated state of modern existence.

Critical Debates

During the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century, social justice was often approached in utilitarian terms. Particularly with the development of Darwin's theory of evolution, social programs and institutions increasingly focused on the general welfare of society. In accordance with utilitarian principles, the needs of individuals were often sacrificed for what were deemed to be greater benefits for the entire community. Such sacrifices had a significant impact on traditionally marginalized groups. The development of statistics and psychometrics, especially within the context of eugenics and social engineering, expressed an underlying commitment to the principle of utility (Rose, 1990). Even contemporary discussions of a variety of issues from research ethics to globalization point to the utilitarian dimensions of much modern psychological inquiry.

During the second half of the twentieth century, the dominance of utilitarianism began to be challenged. In *A Theory of Justice*, John Rawls (1971) argues that utilitarianism's emphasis on the common good fails to appreciate the fact that in contemporary society, individuals often have different views of the good life. Given the pervasiveness of value pluralism, Rawls argues that an emphasis on the collective good inevitably marginalizes those who do not share that vision of the good life. Social justice requires that we give priority to the right over the good so that individuals are in a position to pursue interests of their own choosing. Rawls acknowledges that his approach to social justice draws heavily on Kantian deontology. Yet he suggests that the way forward requires an integration of Kant's emphasis on duty with a revised understanding of the social contract.

Rawls claims that it is possible to identify the principles that guide a just society by imagining a hypothetical situation where individuals are brought together to create a new society. In this hypothetical situation – what Rawls refers to as the original position – individuals are tasked with developing social institutions that distribute wealth, resources, and other social goods in various proportions. In this hypothetical situation, individuals stand behind a veil of ignorance such that they are unaware of their own characteristics (i.e., race, gender, class). Rawls argues that behind the veil of ignorance, individuals will establish equitable institutions since they will not be able to determine where they will end up in the hypothetical society that they have created. The result is that any existing society can be judged by the extent to which existing social arrangements would have been chosen in the original position. Rawls' thought experiment holds the promise of identifying the principles of justice that are embodied in the structure of a just society.

For Rawls (1971), the principles of justice that individuals in the original position would use to organize the structure of society reflect what he calls justice as fairness. According to the first principle of justice as fairness, members of a society are entitled to the equal assignment of fundamental rights and duties. This has the effect of securing individual liberty against the collective desires of a larger community. The second principle of justice as fairness posits that while

social and economic inequalities may be permitted, such inequalities must work to the benefit of the least advantaged members of society. This makes it possible to put individual talent in the service of developing a more just society.

There are a number of reasons why Rawls' approach to social justice altered the trajectory of modern social and political thought. By challenging what he viewed as utilitarianism's failure to respect the difference between individuals, Rawls made it possible to acknowledge and address the value pluralism that permeates modern society. Moreover, the clarity, depth, and scope of Rawls' work made it necessary for nearly every scholar interested in social justice to respond at some level to his innovative integration of deontology with the social contract tradition. Indeed, the range of issues raised in response to Rawls' work provide us with not only a more comprehensive understanding of social justice but also a unique opportunity to see how modern psychology informs many of the ways we approach social justice.

For libertarians such as Robert Nozick (1974), Rawls places too much emphasis on the particular distribution of wealth and resources within a just society and too little emphasis on the principles that govern the free exchange of wealth and resources. For Nozick, a society is just to the extent that its social institutions enable the members of that society to participate in unfettered economic transactions. There is no reason to expect that these economic exchanges should produce any particular distribution of wealth and resources. Indeed, any attempt to impose a particular configuration ultimately works against the cause of social justice. It is clear that in the context of this debate, certain ideas surrounding human motivation are playing a pivotal role in supporting very different approaches to social justice. For critical psychological scholars, this presents an opportunity to reframe these issues in a number of exciting ways.

Communitarian critics of Rawls argue that his deontological approach to social justice presupposes that a distance can be inserted between individuals and their social and cultural bonds and that their ends are preferences rather than ontologically rich dimensions of their existence (Sandel, 1982). Drawing on many of the same ideas that inform virtue ethics, communitarians suggest that Rawls' priority of the right over the good itself expresses an underlying good that makes anything like the right intelligible in the first place. In these debates, issues of identity and selfhood are central. Given the voluminous psychological research on identity and selfhood, the potential exists for critical scholars to make important contributions to this debate. By the same token, many of the issues raised in communitarian critiques of liberalism have important consequences for psychological research and practice.

Feminists draw attention to both the rational assumptions that lay at the foundation of Rawls' original position and the structure of the family that plays an important role in normalizing gender roles (Nussbaum, 2003). Many have noted that Rawls' use of rational self-interest as a basis for deriving principles of justice relies on androcentric assumptions that ultimately work in the service of patriarchy. These debates are particularly exciting since a number of critical psychologists have made similar observations in a wide range of contexts.

Rawls' work also engenders further reflection on whether social justice should be approached as an issue of recognition or redistribution (see recognition vs. redistribution in this volume). Briefly, to see social justice as a matter of recognition is to treat the failure to recognize personal, social, and cultural identity as the central injustice. Under the politics of recognition, social justice aims to facilitate diversity, celebrate difference, and cultivate a more multicultural world. On the other hand, to see social justice as a redistributive issue draws attention to injustices surrounding the distribution and concentration of wealth and resources. Under the politics of redistribution, social justice emerges through the organization of labor, the destruction of class, and the development of new forms of economic and political organization (Fraser, 2003). This is particularly relevant to psychological approaches to social justice since orthodox as well as critical approaches have tended to focus

almost exclusively on the politics of recognition (Arfken, 2012).

Challenges to Rawls' work raise important issues for critical psychological scholars. For the most part, psychologists interested in social justice have treated modern psychology either as a means for achieving social justice or as an obstacle to and an example of social injustice. By focusing on Rawls' and his interlocutors, it becomes clear that ideas surrounding psychological mechanisms and human motivation play a central role in our very understanding of social justice. At their core, utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics take for granted a particular conception of the person. By keeping this in mind, critical psychological scholarship has the potential to make a number of innovative contributions to moral, social, and political engagements with social justice.

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Social Movements

Jordi Bonet Martí[1] and Barbara Biglia[2]
[1]Escuela de Psicología, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, Viña del Mar, Chile
[2]Departament of Pedagogy, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Tarragona, Spain

Introduction

Social movements (SMs) are means of organizing for social change, one of the most important forms of contentious politics in the modern world. Their origins can be traced to the Enlightenment era (eighteenth century), when, for the first time, society was conceived as a human product that could be transformed. Nonetheless, SMs in themselves did not attract the interest of scholars until the second half of nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the first use of the expression "social movement, by the German sociologist Lorenz Von Stein, dates back to 1850, when the use of it was just within a nominative aim and there was little interest in the phenomenon itself.

Psychologists began to be interested in the topic at the end of nineteenth century, through the study of crowd behavior by Gabriel Tarde, Gustav Le Bon, and Sigmund Freud. However, it was only in second half of twentieth century that SMs gained recognition as social actions and became a proper subject of study. That brought on the rise of a great richness in approach and theories, including mass society, collective behavior, resource mobilization,

new social movements, and framing and social construction theories.

SMs are living processes that change in time and space, therefore this entry will summarize their genealogy, making explicit their relation to social and cultural changes. Therefore, the strict relations between the changes in social protests and in their theorization will be traced, and theories will be analyzed from a critical psychology approach. In accordance with the fact that most SM theories have been developed by European and American scholars, the attention in this article will be centered around mobilization in these countries. In the critical debate section, special attention is given to Eurocentric biases in literature.

Definition

Social movements are groups or networks of individuals, collectives, and organizations that interact with the aim of producing or resisting changes in society, cultures, and/or social systems. Distinctive characteristics of social movements include a certain continuity of (inter)action in time; the general adoption of not completely fixed or hierarchical forms of organization; the preferential use of nonconventional forms of political participation, and the importance given to actions and processes.

Keywords

Social movements; collective action; crowd behavior; mass society; resource mobilization theory; new social movements; grievance; political opportunities structure; framing process; transnational activism; NGO; environmentalism; feminism; institutionalization

History

According to historians, we can trace the origins of SMs to England and France in the second half of eighteenth century. In that context, marked by political revolutions and social unrest, the expression of protest changed from local turmoil to sustained campaigns that made collective claims to authorities. The modernization and democratization processes of post–Industrial Revolution capitalist societies strongly influenced these new forms of organization and rebellion. Following (Tilly, 2009) protest groups assumed a worthy, unified, numerous, and committed appearance that become a specific trait of all recognized social movements.

During the nineteenth and first part of the twentieth century, the expression SM was mainly adopted to describe the labor movements and their struggle for wages, working conditions, and expansion of civil and social rights. Psychologists, initially not interested in the study of protests, turned their attention to them when rebellions began to threaten social order, coinciding with the events in the Paris Commune in 1871.

The first psychological theories in that area were developed in Europe and were related to theories on crowd behavior (Le Bon, Tarde). Some authors interpreted SMs as the result of irrational masses, in which subjects adopt dangerous behaviors through imitation and suggestion, becoming predisposed to exercise violence masked by anonymity (Neveu, 2000). Alternatively, for Sigmund Freud the irrational crowd behavior had to be understood in relation to the relaxation of internal mechanisms of autorepression when one person takes part in a mass action.

On the other side of the ocean, in an epoch in which North American society was concerned with the economic depression that began in 1929, Blumer, a symbolic interactionist sociologist, suggested that SMs can be understood as attempts to restructure social disorders provoked by personal disorganizations. Despite the fact that this approach marked a turn in understanding SMs, because it did not conceive collective action only in negative terms, it still maintains a pathologizing understanding of protesters. After the Second World War, however, mass society theories (Adorno, Arendt) return to a negative understanding of social protest,

analyzing the massive support observed at totalitarian, fascist, Nazist, and Stalinist regimes.

Many psychological theories on social movements developed during the 1960s attempted to maintain the focus on the individual. Activists were thus described as alienated, frustrated, inconsistent or relatively deprived subjects, and SMs were considered the result of social disorder. At the end of this decade, new sociological approaches to the study of SMs (resource mobilization theory and new social movements) overcame the former collective action negative interpretation (Staggenborg, 2011). In Europe and North America, a new cycle of contention, characterized by innovative forms of protest and organization, had its climax in the events of 1968. Many of these groups were directly or indirectly inspired by previous Latino American mobilizations (and revolutions) from which they learned a variety of urban guerrilla tactics.

Moreover, academia itself was involved in the protest process, while activist scholars enlarged the ranks of SM theorists, the understanding of protest became less derogative. Within social psychology it was particularly relevant to break down SM's demonization, such as in the works of Moscovici on group and minority influences on SMs. His approach opened the door for a more benevolent and nonindividualized study of protests and protesters.

In the 1970s, the consolidation of these new social actors was affected by the Cold War, when antinuclear and antiwar protest became prominent in European and North American society. The contemporary protests in South American and Asiatic countries, initiated by the anti-imperialist struggles and the vindication of land rights by peasant movements, have many points of contact with the current definition of social movements, unlike protesters in different countries that interacted more than in previous periods.

During the second half of 1980s, we witnessed a decline of social protests in Europe and North America due to the combined effect of repression and institutionalization of SMs, and the hegemony of neoliberal counter-revolution. At the same time, the collapse of socialist regimes reinforced capitalist systems, which seemed to be the only suitable option, and therefore were unquestioned.

Social movements continued to exist and influence culture and beliefs; for instance, in that epoch many counter-cultural movements and groups were born. However, during the late 1980s and the early 1990s, SMs' direct political influence became low profile compared to the previous decade, and control policies become much more refined. The 1990s are definitively characterized by the strengthened peasant and indigenous movements in the so-called southern countries, by the internationalization of fighting, and by the intent to construct new struggle collective subjects. One milestone was the beginning of the Zapatista rebellion in 1994, which transcended the local level and became a symbol of protest featured in oppositions to neoliberalism, which crystallized at the end of the decade in the alter-globalization movement. Preexisting social movements and groups (such as feminist, ecologist, autonomous, and neighborhood) offer breeding grounds for protests characterized by innovative recombination of actors, in which new information and communication technology play a key role in coordinating international actions to create collective counter-knowledge and amplify visualizing the protest. Scholars are therefore faced with the difficult task of explaining movements that do not correspond to any of their classical definitions. Networking, alliance, intersections, post-identitarian interactions, and intersectionality are some of the keywords used to understand the new meanings and forms of protest. Nonetheless, it appears that none of these sufficiently explain the complexity of the new millennium SMs.

Two very recent episodes, the Arab revolutions of 2011 and the Indignados/Occupy Movement (2011–2012), revealed new scenarios that will deserve special attention in the coming years. Time will decide whether these experiences can be understood as the most recent forms of SM expression, and therefore changes in the concept's definition will need to be implemented or new terminology will need to be invented.

Traditional Debates

Social Movements: Rational or Irrational Actors?

There is no agreement between scholars on the agency of the activist. At one extreme we find crowd behavior and mass society theories, which present a strong negative view of collective action, shared by the structural-functionalists who understand the subject as completely irrational. On the other extreme, rational action theory scholars (such as Buchanan and Becker) consider SM participants as rational actors that make decisions in order to maximize their benefits. In between, there are many theories that focus more on process, resources, and collective identities, instead of the subjects, and do not assume that all activists act in the same way or for the same reasons (Klandermans, 2009).

Grievances Versus Efficacy

Collective behavior scholars consider that people agglutinate around social movements because of a sense of grievance or relative deprivation when there is a discrepancy between what one has and what one thinks one can get (Snow, 2010). On the contrary, resource mobilization theory scholars (such as McCarthy and Zald) argue that if grievances may be an explicative factor of participation in a mobilization, it will not provide a sufficient explication for the involvement in a larger SM process (Davis, Mc Adam, & Zald, 2005). They suggest that people's commitment is strictly related to their perception of a SM's efficacy. Therefore, people will tend to be engaged if they belief that social problems could be solved by collective efforts (group efficacy) and/or they consider that political actions will produce impact on political process (political efficacy) (Mc Adam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001).

Conservative Versus Progressive Social Movements

While European scholars tended to identify SM as merely progressive and leftist organizations, North American traditions include both conservative and progressive movements. One of the origins of this difference could be traced to the Marxist heritage in European traditions that perceives conservative movements as countermovement in response to progressive SM's actions (see, for example, the antiabortion movement). Another reason can be the strong effect of the Second World War, which prompted US scholars to attempt to understand the southern states' racist movement.

New Versus Old Social Movements

Melucci's new social movements (NSM) theory was developed in order to make sense of movements that cannot fit with the previous definitions based in worker groups' form of organization and actions. It suggests that the main difference between worker movements and those that emerged in the 1960s (feminism, environmentalism, the student movement, etc.) is that the latter is associated with a shared identity (Diani & Della Porta, 2006). Furthermore, NSMs are not organized in rigid structures and their participants do not have a shared ideology. Instead, they are characterized by the adoption of new kinds of protests. Despite the fact that this theory was extremely innovative and useful for a broader and more in-depth understanding of SMs, the alleged differences between old and new social movements have been largely contested. In fact, it fails to explain the relations of continuity between the movement and the hidden existence of "identitarian" movements before the 1960s (e.g., environmentalism, feminism, etc.). The newness probably lay more in the conceptualization and understanding of the movement than in their own characteristics.

Psychological Versus Sociological Approach

Traditional psychology tended to analyze individual processes as allegedly residing below collective action, without taking into consideration the social and political factors (Stryker, Owens & White, 2000). That approach has frequently led to the psychopathologization of activists. On the other hand, classical sociological and political approaches rejected the importance of psychological factors in understanding collective actions. Nowadays, the differences between sociological and psychological traditions are

less noticeable, and constructionist and critical scholars generally give attention to both aspects and engage in interdisciplinary debates (Taylor, 2010). For example, frame analysis (Gamson, Snow and Benford) aims to bridge the gap between cognitive-emotional elements and social factors (Gamson, 1992).

Critical Debates

Eurocentric Biases

The study of SMs has been traditionally centered around the so-called Western societies. Only in the 1970s did Western scholars began to take other geographic regions into consideration, but on many occasions they simply transferred their analytic assumptions onto other cultures, colonizing the protest. Postcolonial studies (Chackrabarty, Sousa Santos) and "black" feminism (Spivak, hooks) warn us about this type of cultural assimilation and stress the need to avoid Eurocentric biases.

Gender Biases

Traditional SM theories often obscure their genderization (Ferree, 2006). On the one hand, both scholars' and activists' narratives about what has been considered political have frequently exalted the most physically violent and public activities, excluding those actions more associated with femininity (caring, support, organization, managing, etc.). On the other hand, gender relations within mixed social movements have been analyzed only recently, assuming that sexism will automatically dissolve once the revolution succeeds. Very good accounts and analyses of women's movement practices have been produced by feminist theorists, however, they have been used as examples of other SMs.

Institutionalization Versus Autonomy

Some scholars, among them the RMTs (Resource Mobilization Theory), consider that SMs succeed only when they tend towards a phase of professionalization, learning to channel their demands and achieving status recognition. However, critical and/or social movement scholars, like many activists, argue that this expectation has been to the detriment of movement autonomy and, through the cooption of human capital and discourses, are often brought to reduction though not neutralization of SMs' subversive claims.

Political Versus Cultural

There have been suggestions that new social movements (NSMs) are inherently cultural rather than political, because they only pretend to achieve social change, transforming cultural codes and collective identities (Taylor, 2010). Therefore, targeting identitarian movements as culturalist is a power practice and, in fact, identitarian claims are not political only for privileged subjects that are part of a recognized identity. Moreover, from a feminist perspective, defining NSM claims as cultural projects implies a reduction of activism and politics in the public arena and the misrecognition that the personal is also political.

International Relevance

Social movement theories and actors have different international relevance. As we suggested above, SM theories have suffered from ethnocentric biases. In fact, despite the fact that non-Western approaches were cultivated, for example, by Fanon's analysis of colonization, Freire's psychology of the oppressed, and Baró's liberation psychology, these analyses were not used to define a more comprehensive understanding of SMs.

Alternatively, a larger relation can be traced between protesters of Western and non-Western countries. Moreover, in some epochs, anti-imperialist revolts in Southern countries have been taken as models by Western protesters, for example, by the new left movement. Other Western movements have been created in solidarity within the underdeveloped countries, pioneering the United States' Vietnam anti-war movement and the French solidarity with Algeria. However, geopolitical changes that followed the fall of socialist countries marked the crisis of most of the solidarity movements

and their conversion into nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), whose role has been controversial. On the one hand, they fostered criticisms against the North–south inequalities and the politics of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. On the other, they sometimes (in)voluntarily cooperated in the development strategy of the same agencies that they criticized.

Recently, the emergence of an alternative globalization movement strengthened the political relations between the SMs of different countries. A transnational network was consolidated around world social forums, and the use of new technology facilitated the exchange between Northern and southern movements. Finally, the capacity to internationalize protests through a strategic use of mass media combined with information technologies has been demonstrated in the rapid expansion of the Arab Spring in 2010 and the Occupy Movement in 2011.

Future Directions

The changes provoked by the neoliberal globalization, the hegemony of financial markets, and the expansion of information technologies has modified our forms of living and protesting alike, the control of which we are subject to. Therefore, in the network society (Castells), social movements frequently use networking as a form of organization (Diani). Indeed, SM scholars must adopt new interpretations in order to understand virtual mobilization (Anonymous), new repertoires of technological actions (e.g., hacktivism and streaming), and new forms of coordination and spreading of information (e.g., Twitter and blogs). Furthermore, in keeping with globalization, social movements frequently address their petitions to international agencies and search out new alliances with international actors so that transnational networks (Tarrow) become extremely important subjects to be studied. Finally, the relatively recent appearance of conservative movements like the Tea Party in the United States and the anti-immigrant movements in Europe also deserve special attention.

However, there is also a danger in theorizing about SMs, in that, instead of collaborating with progressive social movements for the reduction of discrimination and learning from SMs' collective process of knowledge production, it may tend to produce new forms of control over their practice.

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Online Resources

Journals

Mobilization is a review of research about social and political movements, strikes, riots, protests, insurgencies, revolutions, and other forms of contentious politics. http://www.mobilization.sdsu.edu/

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Women and Social Movements, International http://alexanderstreet.com/products/women-and-social-movements-international
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Social Psychology

Athanasios Marvakis[1] and Mihalis Mentinis[2]
[1]Department of Primary Education, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece
[2]Interdisciplinary Centre of Intercultural and Indigenous Studies-ICIIS, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile

Introduction and Definition

It is almost mandatory for an introductory text to begin by providing a definition of the particular field of discussion. Such a definition would conventionally contribute toward a synoptic introduction of the reader to what social psychology is and what it is concerned with. It is the case, however, that given the state of the discipline in question what a definition would actually do would be nothing but presenting one's own acceptation of social psychology's subject matter, thus overlooking and, at the same time, obscuring the problematic character of the definition as such. In fact, the terrain of *social psychology* is a field of dispute and antagonism of competing versions of social reality, of conflicting views of what it means to be a person, and of various sociopolitical agendas. In this antagonistic and conflictive field, what eventually comes to prevail as the most widely used, hegemonic, and generally accepted perception of what social psychology is – marginalizing in effect other possible trends – is much less related to the correctness of certain positions, presumptions, and hypotheses. Instead, it has much more to do with relations of power, economic interests, investments in certain kinds of knowledge instead of others, and, of course, on who actually has "the upper hand" (see Wetherell, McGhee, & Stevens, 1998). Social psychology exists only in the plural form, only as a "plural science" characterized by a plethora of competing models, trends, methodologies, programs, directions, and manifestations.

Gradually, in the twentieth century, under the sway of behaviorism – tightly linked to particular industrial organization of production as demonstrated by the close affinity between behaviorism and Taylorism (see Ebbinhaus, 1984; Kvale, 2003) – social psychology was effectively severed from its substantive theme, society, and was limited to the study and measurement of individual behavior; a trend that represents a technocratic technology of control aiming at the appeasement and the smoothing of conflicts; and a social mechanics at the service of the status quo as this was configured during and after the end of the Second World War. In contrast to the social psychology in the discipline of psychology, the sociological social psychology even though it lacked an emancipatory program did offered an ameliorative social program, and George Herbert Mead criticized intensively the reductionism of Watson's behaviorism in relation to a range of issues concerning the formation of the nature of mind, of the self, and of consciousness. However, while his ideas were well received by sociologists who saw in them an anti-positivism and an emphasis on the social with which they were also congruent, the psychologists followed Watson, whose ideas were much more simple and easy to understand than those of Mead. As a result, the psychological social psychology followed the steps of behaviorism with Floyd Allport (Farr, 1996).

In the past decades, particularly from the 1970s onwards, critical social psychologists have given great emphasis to the study of the history and the historicity of social psychology, in an effort to shed light to the relationship of the latter with the broader social, political, and economic sphere within which it arises and

acquires its form at any point in time and its affinity with the broader societal context in which it exists and functions as a specific social practice. However, we have to avoid drawing any simplistic and simplified causal relation between a given socioeconomic formation and social psychology that would view the one as a product of the other. Although the economic, political, and social conditions play an important role in the development of a particular kind of (social) psychology and often precede such development, the relation that is formed between them is not a linear or, to be sure, a deterministic one.

Keywords

Hegemonic practice; historicity of social sciences; contextualisation of mind; social movement and social psychology

History

Historicity of Society: Historicity of Social Psychology

Similarly to what was said in relation to the definition, the way one approaches and presents the historicity (and history) of social psychology depends on how one views the subject matter of the scientific area in question, on the theoretical and research agenda she/he promotes, and, of course, on one's own position within this process. It is natural, therefore, to come across different kinds of "histories" and narratives in social psychology – narratives which differ on a range of points, as, for example, on which were the social conditions that have contributed to the development and formation of the field, on which trends are brought forth as important, and, even, on *where* and *when* these narratives locate the original conception of the field. It is indicative, for example, that Gordon Allport (1954/1985), following up the clear-cut positivistic agenda of his older brother Floyd Allport, who wanted to impose the simulation of social psychology with the natural sciences, and formulating a typical history void of any historicity, located the origin of social psychology in the work of Auguste Comte – founder of sociology and of the positivist doctrine in the social sciences. In contrast, other historiographers, critical of the attempt toward the confinement of social psychology in experimental laboratories and the shackles of quantitative methodology in general, locate the operative onset of the area in the nonexperimental social psychology of Wilhelm Wundt or otherwise in *Völkerpsychologie* ("psychology of the people").

The birth of social psychology cannot be traced in a specific or, even more so, in a single isolated moment in time and a specific place, since its emergence is tightly linked to the emergence of the social sciences as a whole. Social psychology's emergence should instead be understood through the examination of important social and political processes and upheavals which produced specific "questions" and "needs" that required attention and demanded solutions. The broadening in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the up to then known geography and the contact of the Europeans with the "new populations" – initially with those in the Americas – created for the dominant powers of that period a series of questions regarding, for example, the "befitting" relations among populations of different origins like how these populations could be "liberated" (from their "local" ties) and be controlled in order to serve the needs of their conquerors (Apfelbaum, 1986).

Similar questions concerning control and discipline of the population would reappear in different epochs and would influence the character of social sciences in general and social psychology in particular. With the gradual weakening of the feudal system and the emergence and formation of capitalist conditions – the phase of *primary accumulation*, according to Marx – the dominant class in Europe was faced with an additional (this time, domestic) problem: the unruliness of the working class, since, as explained by Federici (2004), many people preferred to risk finding themselves in the gallows rather than subsuming to the new forms of the organization of labor. During both the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Europe was the terrain of

hundreds of peasant uprisings who opposed their exclusion from the common natural resources (land, forests, rivers, etc.) and their gradual proletarianization. The working out of ways to control the population, to tame its unruly part, and to transform people into an exploitable and productive working machine was, therefore, necessary for the ruling elites. In the work of the philosopher Thomas Hobbes, for example, we come across one of the loudest attempts of that period to find solutions to the problem of controlling the population. The need for the homogenization of social behavior – in order for it to be more easily controlled and put into the service of the new working conditions – led to a gradual "de-characterization" of the individual and to an effort to transform it into a work machine whose basic abilities and skills would be understandable in a standard way.

The French Revolution and the generalized turmoil in Europe and its colonies were another political incidents that created new preconditions for the birth of the social sciences. As stated by the Gulbenkian Commission: "many started to claim that the solution was probably lying in the organisation and rationalisation of the social change, which now seemed inescapable in a world where the "peoples'" sovereignty was rapidly becoming the rule, hoping, apparently, that this would be a way for them to limit its extent" (1996/1998, 16 – quoted from the Greek translation).

From the nineteenth century and thereafter, the Industrial Revolution created, in its turn, a new range of questions pressing for "social scientific" answers. The Industrial Revolution brought about a significant change in the human geography through the massive aggregation of the population in the large industrial cities and its parallel rapid increase. The new questions concerned organization and maintenance of an "efficient" discipline in the context of the new organization of production and the need for the management of all the available spare time (rest, entertainment, education/training, tourism), the production and maintenance of the working (and today we would also add "the consuming") power of the subjects (which included health, welfare, work safety), as well as the social relations necessary for the establishment of the capitalist economy and the maximization of profit.

The so-called crisis of social psychology in 1960s and 1970s resulted from the questioning of the scope and purpose of the discipline. However, most of the emerging trends managed to only slightly break the epistemological distinction between individual and society. As Greenwood (2004) argues, the transformation of the dominant social psychology into the paradigm of social cognition, as well as other attempts by European social psychologists – such as the *social identity theory* of Henri Tajfel, the *social representation theory* of Serge Moscovici, and, of course, the *cultural* or *cross-cultural psychology* – was only partially able to achieve their goal in producing a *social* psychology. The reason for this is that they kept on maintaining, each at a different degree, an external relationship between the individual and society, a relationship, that is, which defines the individual and society as two different entities that simply come into some form of relation to each other. Furthermore, the risk of individualism, in a general sense, is also lurking in the so-called postmodernist approaches as a result of the relativism that permeates them and their substantial lack of a social theory. And as Parker (2003) argues, social constructionism too, with its emphasis on flexible and volatile concepts and identities and its capability to interpret and reinterpret situations and things, constitutes the *psychotechnology* through which there takes place the production of individual consumer worker of our era.

Traditional Debates

A paradox characterizing social psychology is that where as one would expect that the heterogeneity of the filed would make a coherent presentation of traditional debates in the field a difficult task, it appears that such presentation is less than difficult. One has only to randomly choose any mainstream introductory textbook in

social psychology published in a North Atlantic country and will be astonished by the uniformity of the same limited number of themes he or she will come across: attitudes, attribution theory, interpersonal attraction, social cognition, identity, and so on. These are the themes that are actually "allowed" to exist as "social psychology" pushing out of the picture other interesting topics and approaches. Bearing in mind the mutually exclusive "opponents," during the whole twentieth century, of the psychological social psychology and the sociological social psychology, one should not expect to find approaches, perspectives, and theories of the latter in any psychological social psychology introductory text and vice versa.

Critical Debates

Contextualization of the Mind

The adjective "social" in the title "social psychology" signifies and distinguishes the need to comprehend and to analyze the psychical, the mind, not as a separate mechanism which can be affected, delayed, or pushed forward from the outside. It has to be analyzed as an entity which is *produced* and which is *formed* from within its various contexts. From such an epistemological and philosophical point of view, one could postulate that the theoretical consideration and empirical investigation of the mind "out of context" would not suffer only of a *quantitative lack*. Moreover, the conceptualization of the psychical itself would be different – *qualitatively* – and incompatible. Therefore, it is proposed that the scientific domain of social psychology should be considered as the need for the *contextualization* of the psychical, of the mind. In other words, the adjectival complement "social" stresses the need for the positioning of the mind in the "world," for a positioning in its various *societal* contexts, i.e., positioning in the context of place and time; stressing on the historicity, the temporality, and the locality of the psychical, the mind; and positioning in the context of the class structure of society but also positioning in the various possible cultural and anthropological manifestations. In other words, one needs to investigate the historical, geographical, and cultural class-related, linguistic/discursive, and gender components and particularities which function as mediators in the transformation of the psychical, in the transformation of the mind, from a "natural potentiality" to a "factual societal entity."

Furthermore, the existence of more than one context, which has to be taken into consideration, forces us to question how we conceptualize the relationship between the various contexts, moreover how we conceive and conceptualize the "thing," which probably integrates all the various contexts, which we call "world" or "society." Do we conceive it as a big "family," a sum of individuals with contradictory and incompatible interests, an impersonal "system/structure," or something else? The possible differences and divergent points of view about how the "world," the "society," as the "integrative," "all-embracing context" has to be conceived and about the specific contexts that are useful to differentiate in the "world," in the "society," exemplify the interest for a more complete and proper understanding in social psychology. It exemplifies as well as the need to recur to relevant discussions, which presently are carried out in other social sciences. It means that if we want to acquire a more complete and richer knowledge of social psychology – in order to employ it as an intellectual and political tool – we need to "transcend," to go beyond the concrete boundaries of our academic discipline. The subject matter of social psychology itself demands "interdisciplinarity."

International Relevance

As was mentioned earlier, the dominance of the North Atlantic "paradigm" in the psychological social psychology is reflected in the homogeneity, uniformity, and narrowness of the topics covered in the field across the globe. The hegemony of the aforementioned paradigm is so

powerful that the only escape routes out of the suffocating milieu of the largely positivistic and cognitive in orientation milieu seems to be the addition of an extra adjective before the words "social psychology" so that a research and theoretical endeavor would be differentiated by the mainstream approach: clinical social psychology (or sociopsychology, clinical sociology, or psychosociale clinique – in French), psychoanalytical social psychology, political social psychology, community, intercultural, cultural, experiential, environmental, discursive, feminist, gay and lesbian, and critical.

Practice Relevance

Social Movements as a Discrete Perspective on/for (Social) Psychology

The mass social movements that emerged in Europe and North America from the nineteenth century onwards played a very important role in shaping the conditions which led to the development of (social) psychology. Due to the existence of these movements – organized on the basis of political, labor, or even religious ends and demands – there ensued new questions for the rulers that concerned the nature and the control of the masses (Apfelbaum, 1986). Seeing the whole thing from a different angle, however, that of the subjects' emancipation (e.g., the demand for participation in the social and political process, the struggle for social and public goods, but also the resistance to the dominant form of administrating/governing the social and political process), there also arise a series of new "needs" in these same movements for "special" knowledge and possibly for another kind of social science, in the context of which the research and theoretical process must now take into account: the subjectivity of all the involved subjects and the im-/explicit *values* of the research process and interventions. In general, we can say that the conditions we live in and the emergence of the social movements require a social psychology that will formulate different questions and will carry out a different kind of research and theoretical work.

Future Directions

If one thinks of the different and various definitions of social psychology in a "cumulative" or "summative" logic, then it is easy to get the impression that all of human behavior falls within the domain of social psychology. Such an impression is obviously supported by the widespread and classic definition from Gordon W. Allport: "With few exceptions, social psychologists regard their discipline as *an attempt to understand and explain how the thought*, *feeling*, *and behavior of individuals are influenced by the actual*, *imagined*, *or implied presence of others*. The 'implied presence' refers to the many activities the individual carries out because of his position (role) in a complex social structure and because of his membership in a cultural group" (Allport, 1985, 3).

Allport was well aware of the fact that from that kind of widening of the boundaries of social psychology himself performed arose an additional theoretical problem. In the same paragraph, he goes on adding: "some writers argue that since personal mental life is always influenced by 'the actual, imagined, or implied presence of others' then all psychology must be social" (1985, p. 3). We can take this last statement by Allport as a powerful clue concerning the question of the subject matter of psychology as a whole. The fact that the human being is first and foremost a social entity means that social psychology is the only psychology that is possible to exist. This is also the position of the Soviet historian and psychologist Porshnev, who, in a discussion concerning the difficulty that exists in defining the relation between social psychology and general psychology, explains that the fact that the individual a such is a social entity weighs with social psychology, which might one day be proven as more fundamental and more 'general' than the 'general psychology'. It may be that, some day, only . . .[social psychology] will conform to the name of psychology (1975, 12).

Furthermore, and expanding on what was said in the previous section, taking seriously the adjectival specification *social* means that social

psychology cannot continue to be a cutout piece of research distant from the other social sciences. This inevitably means that social psychology should attempt to create the conditions for the reunion of the social sciences and humanities. Of course, such a reunion can never be complete or conclusive. The different social and political agendas, as well as the contravening and irreconcilable with each other ontological, epistemological, and methodological presumptions characterizing social sciences and humanities, make it impossible to accomplish any closed and definitive unity. Nonetheless, social psychology is capable of creating the conditions for the findings of the various social sciences to be capable of coexisting within one conceptual and explanatory context, within a context oriented toward a broad understanding of the psychosocial, a context which will examine, connect, and interlock a range of dimensions (e.g., class, historicity, gender, political economy, cultural and anthropological characteristics, language, and gender). That would be, in the words of Moscovici (1989), "a subversive attack against the existing division, a challenge to the fragmentation of reality" (1989, p. 412).

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Social Representations

Gordon Sammut[1] and Caroline Howarth[2]
[1]Department of Psychology, University of Malta, Msida, MSD, Malta
[2]Institute of Social Psychology, London School of Economics, London, UK

Introduction

In the last 50 years, social representation (SR) has become an established field within social, cultural, and political psychology and has attracted extensive numbers of students and scholars from around the world (with particular clusters in Europe, South America, and Australasia). Developing Durkheim's collective and individual representations, the concept of social representations was presented by Serge Moscovici in 1961 in his study of the different understandings of psychoanalysis in different social groups in France. Research has gone on to examine the ways in which knowledge and social practices develop from any socially significant issues (see the list of applications below) in different public spheres (Jovchelovitch, 2007). As a whole, this research demonstrates that social representations are systems of communication and social influence that constitute the social realities of

different groups in society. They serve as the principal means for establishing and extending the shared knowledge, common practices, and affiliations that bind social members together (Duveen, 2001, 2008) and thereby act to support systems of identity, community, inclusion, and exclusion.

Definition

In the most common definition, Moscovici (1972) explains that social representations are "a system of values, ideas and practices" that serve (a) to establish a social order that enables individuals to orientate themselves and master the material and social world they live in and (b) to enable communication among members of a community through a shared code for social exchange and for naming and classifying various aspects of the social world including their individual and group history (p.xiii).

This highlights the primary function of social representations: the purpose of making "something unfamiliar, or unfamiliarity itself, familiar" (Moscovici, 1984, p. 24), as is evident in Moscovici's study on psychoanalysis (1961), Jodelet's classic study on social representations of madness (1991), and more recent studies on the public understanding of science (Bauer, Durant, & Gaskell, 2002).

Social representations thus enable the achievement of a shared social reality; they are ways of world-making (Moscovici, 1998). On the one hand, they are created to conventionalize objects, persons, and events by placing them in a familiar context. On the other hand, once established, they serve to influence social behavior and the negotiation of social identities, imposing themselves in social interaction and limiting socio-cognitive activities.

SR theory allows for the coexistence of competing and contradictory forms of knowledge in one and the same community, culture, and individual (Wagner, Duveen, Verma, & Themel, 2000). *Cognitive polyphasia* implies that different and potentially incompatible systems of knowledge can coexist within one social group and can be employed by one and the same individual. In these knowledge encounters, social representations are created and transformed through processes of anchoring and objectification. *Anchoring* is a process of classification which locates the strange or foreign within the familiar. *Objectification* is a process of externalization by which representations are projected outwards into the world through images or propositions (Moscovici, 1984).

Through anchoring and objectification, we take on particular "presentations" of socially significant objects and reinterpret them to fit with what we know "already." That is, we take on "presentations" and represent them. In this process the social representation may be reinforced or perhaps rearticulated or reenacted in various ways. These processes are dynamic – existing *only* in the relational encounter, in the in-between space recreated in dialogue and social encounters. Representations are not simply templates that relate to cognitive schemas. As Jodelet (1991) argues, a representation can be "used for acting in the world and on others" (p. 44), as well as for reacting, rejecting, or reforming a presentation of the world that conflicts with one's stake, position, and identity.

Social representation research has been applied to many different practical areas, such as the public understanding of science (Bauer et al., 2002), legal innovation (Batel & Castro, 2009), citizenship (Andreouli & Howarth, 2012), gender (Duveen & Lloyd, 1986), religion (Wagner, Sen, Permanadeli, & Howarth, 2012), participation (Campbell & Jovchelovitch, 2000), intelligence (Carugati, Selleri, & Scappini, 1994), HIV/AIDS (Joffe, 1995), acculturation (Sammut, Sartawi, Giannini, & Labate, in press), and human rights (Staerklé, Clémence, & Doise, 1999).

Keywords

Social knowledge; social identity; inter-objectivity; cognitive polyphasia; anchoring; objectification

Traditional Debates

An important debate within SR research concerns the relationship between knowledge and practice or action (Marková, 2000). Social representations define what possible responses to certain events within a particular context are seen to be reasonable by different communities (Wagner et al., 2000). They describe how a particular response chosen by a particular individual to a particular stimulus is sensible in the conditions in which it has been generated. Hence rationality is contextually determined.

Another debate concerns the extent to which representations are collectively shared. The theory has been critiqued on the basis of the presumption that every mind needs to be infiltrated with the same images and explanations to develop a consensual view of reality. Rose et al. (1995) argue that social representations are shared but not consensual, meaning that a level of sharedness is involved in a common code for communication but that social interaction is nonetheless characterized by fragmentation and contradiction (Chryssides et al., 2009).

Increasingly there is significant interest on the relationship between representations, identities, social positioning, and intergroup relations (Sammut & Gaskell, 2010). Different representations relate to, defend, or challenge different social identities (Howarth, 2002) and are institutionalized in social and cultural practices (Jovchelovitch, 2007). Hence representations are *consequential*: they have social effects, support (unequal) social relations, and maintain ideological discourses. However, there is always room for representations to be contested and transformed (Duveen, 2001).

Finally, Moscovici (1961) distinguished between reified (scientific knowledge) and consensual (commonsense) universes. Howarth (2006) argues that science itself is not asocial and that the difference between the consensual and the reified points to a process of reification that privileges certain social representations as "expert knowledge."

Critical Debates

Howarth (2006) has argued that SR theory should be understood as a critical theory that is fundamentally about the "battle of ideas" (Moscovici, 1998), the ways in which particular representations defend certain interests and protect certain identities as well as the possibilities for agency, contestation, and transformation. Hence it is important to consider the ways in which representations are consequential (in determining how realities are constructed and regulated) as well as contestory (in social psychological mechanisms for critical debate, critique, and social change). Elcheroth et al. (2011) demonstrate the ways in which SR research is valuable for political psychology and addresses questions of intergroup conflict, contested ideologies, and political agency. As Moscovici asserted, it is vitally important to address the politics inherent within social representations as otherwise social researchers will be guilty of the claim that we "calmly ignore social inequalities, political violence, wars, underdevelopment or racial conflict" (Moscovici, 1972, p. 21).

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Online Resources

Papers on Social Representations: http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/psr/
European PhD programme on Social Representations: http://www.europhd.eu

Social Reproduction

Mark Burton
Research Institute for Health and Social Change, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK

Introduction

Social reproduction is a concept little used in mainstream psychology. In contrast, the concept of socialization is widely used and explored. Yet the two processes are closely related. An analysis of social reproduction is important for a critical understanding of the relations between individual and society, how through the action of people, the social system is perpetuated, yet its nature is not reducible to those actions. Understanding its limits helps us understand the scope for social transformation. The way in which these questions are tackled influences the way in which

individuals and society are each construed for social psychological theory – a fundamental question, especially in the search for nonindividualistic approaches to psychology.

Definition

Social reproduction is the process by which a society reproduces itself from one generation to another and also within generations.

Keywords

Social reproduction; biological reproduction; Marxism; labour; feminism; socialisation; transformation

Traditional Debates

There appear to be no traditional debates about social reproduction within psychology. Psychology has the concept of socialization, but that is only part of the relationship between individual and society (the formation of persons capable of functioning within established social rules and norms). Social reproduction deals with the way the actions of social actors pass on ideology, culture, knowledge, social technologies, and so on, as part of a system of social relations societally rather than as individually based behavior, cognition, and emotion. It is perhaps because psychology is established on the false premise of individualism that it has been silent on the question of social reproduction.

Critical Debates

Since social reproduction is little discussed in psychological works (an exception is Leonard, 1984), the following discussion concerns debates beyond the disciplinary boundary. Social reproduction is a concept used in some Marxist and Marxian work. As Marx (1868) had pointed out, "every child knows that a social formation which did not reproduce the conditions of production would not last a year." From the point of view of Capital, two elements, Capital itself and the labor force, must be reproduced in order for the system to continue. However the reproduction of the workforce is not just a matter of biological reproduction but also requires the reproduction of social understanding, attitudes, expectations, skills, and knowledge in order that the system may have compliant workers.

The concept of reproduction then is a crucial one for understanding how a system of domination based on production extends into the other institutions of society: education, the family, civil law, culture, and so on, structuring human beings from cradle to grave. Bordieu (1990) uses the concept, along with the allied concept of cultural reproduction and his theorization of social capital, to explore how social and economic disadvantage is reproduced from generation to generation (see also Willis, 1977, for an earlier ethnographic treatment).

However, as Barrett (1980, p. 20) noted, in a review of the concept in relation to the origins of women's oppression, there is a potential problem in assuming that women's significant role in social reproduction arises "naturally" from their role in biological reproduction – the use of the term reproduction in relation to social reproduction can seem like a bad pun. However, clarity about the different forms of reproduction (cultural and ideological reproduction, reproduction of the labor force, and biological reproduction) and their linkages could avoid such naturalistic assumptions.

Seen simply in terms of Capital's needs, reproduction can appear to be a functionalist concept, with the ends of Capital's perpetuation causing the fact of social reproduction, or similarly it can appear to be an automatic process where the many mediations (relational, symbolic, emotional, cognitive) are elided. Bhaskar (1979, pp. 117–122) considers social reproduction in relation to the theorization of the society-individual relationship. He notes (p. 120) that "Men (sic) do not create society, for it always pre-exists them. Rather it is an ensemble of structures, practices and conventions that individuals

reproduce or transform, but which would not exist unless they did so." So considering first the direction of causation from individual to society, the reproduction of society is one possibility (and perhaps "replication" would be a more accurate term here), while transformation (social change) is another. This pair of processes is balanced in the other direction by socialization, whereby society provides its members with its stock of skills and knowledge, as appropriate to various contexts.

An understanding of the dialectical relationships between socialization, reproduction, and transformation, grounded in an understanding of the dynamics of capitalist forces and relations of production, together with other systems of domination (patriarchy, racism, ableism, etc.) is likely to be essential for an understanding of the dynamics of conflict in the collective, interpersonal, and intrapersonal domains. If a key task of psychology is to understand the construction of experience, then it is of critical importance to understand the person as part of a system, not just of interpersonal relations, nor just (as in certain distortions of Marxism) within relations and forces of production, but as an active part of systems that reproduce the very premises of social life – the society itself.

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Online Resources

http://www.slideshare.net/elma22/cultural-reproduction-and-social-reproduction

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n-1vmvNuO0E

Social Therapy

Lois Holzman
East Side Institute, Brooklyn, NY, USA

Introduction

Social therapy (and the broader practice/theory of social therapeutics) is an approach to human development and learning that challenges many of psychology's and psychiatry's presuppositions: about persons; therapy, the therapeutic relationship, and therapeutic discourse; illness, cure, and treatment; emotions and cognition; and mind, body, and brain. This orientation locates social therapy within the diverse grouping of nonmedical model approaches that identify as postmodern, discursive, collaborative, and/or social constructionist.

Most critical psychologies fault mainstream psychology for having misidentified its subject matter in one of three ways: (1) by treating a privileged subset as normative (identity-based critique); (2) by being based in and biased by a capitalist, sexist, Eurocentric world view (ideology-based critique); and/or (3) by misappropriating the natural and physical science method and its epistemological presuppositions (epistemologically based critique). Social therapy takes another route. It adds an ontology-based critique based in the philosophy of language and of science. Among the many "critical psychology" philosophers, Ludwig Wittgenstein has had the most influence on current trends in psychology, particularly those with a postmodern sensibility, including social therapy.

As social therapy has evolved since the late 1970s, several intellectual traditions have informed the approach, but none more than

those of Wittgenstein, Karl Marx, and Lev Vygotsky. Their writings contribute to an understanding of the potential for ordinary people to effect radical social change and the subjective constraints that need to be engaged so as to actualize this potential. Social therapy has evolved as an unorthodox synthesis of these three seminal thinkers.

Keywords

Marx; Vygotsky; Wittgenstein; practical-critical activity; human development methodology; group therapy; emotions; individual-group dualism

History

Created in the 1970s by American philosopher and social activist Fred Newman, social therapy is a practical-critical psychology, in Marx's sense of "revolutionary, practical-critical activity" (Marx & Engels, 1974). Revolutionary, practical-critical activity – the social, communal, and reconstructive activity of human beings exercising their power to transform the current state of things – makes individual and species development possible.

In its early years, social therapy could be described as an ideology-based critical psychology; its reason for being was that living under capitalism makes people emotionally sick and the hope was that therapy could be a tool in the service of progressive politics. Like other radical therapies of the time in the USA and Great Britain, social therapy engaged the authoritarianism, sexism, racism, classism, and homophobia of traditional psychotherapy. However, from its beginning, social therapy also rejected the conceptions of explanation, interpretation, the notion of an inner self (that therapists and clients need to delve into), and other dualistic and otherwise problematic foundations of traditional psychology.

Newman's study of the philosophy of science and language, the foundations of mathematics, and Marxian dialectics were critical to the development of social therapy. So too was the "tool-and-result" methodology of Lev Vygotsky (Vygotsky, 1978) and his insights into human development, learning, language, thought, and play as fundamentally social activities. These ideas were contributed by Newman's collaborator, developmental psychologist Lois Holzman, who was active in the nascent field of cultural-historical psychology in which Vygotsky was playing a major role.

Inspirations

Social therapy draws on the radically social humanism and methodology in Marx's early writings (e.g., *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* and *The German Ideology*). For Marx, human beings are first and foremost social beings. The transformation of the world and of ourselves as human beings is one and the same task: "The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood only as *revolutionary practice*" (Marx & Engels, 1974, p. 121).

Vygotsky brought Marx's insights to bear on the practical question of how human beings learn and develop. The unique feature of human individual, cultural, and species development is human activity (qualitative and transformative) and not behavior change (particularistic and cumulative). Human beings do not merely respond to stimuli, acquire societally determined and useful skills, and adapt to the determining environment. The uniqueness of human social life is that we ourselves transform the determining circumstances. Newman and Holzman found Vygotsky's writings on cognitive development, play, and language in early childhood relevant to emotional growth at all ages. According to Vygotsky, children learn and develop through being related to as beyond themselves, and being supported to play or perform, "a head taller" than they are. Thus, human development is not an individual accomplishment, but a *sociocultural activity*. Vygotsky was

a forerunner to a new *psychology of becoming*, in which people experience the social nature of their existence and the power of collective creative activity in the process of making new tools for growth.

Wittgenstein challenged the foundations of philosophy, psychology, and linguistics with his method of doing philosophy without foundations, theses, premises, generalizations, or abstractions (Wittgenstein, 1965). He exposed the "pathology" embedded in language and in accepted conceptions of language, thoughts, and emotions. Some see his work as therapy for philosophers. For Newman and Holzman, his method is relevant for ordinary people as well – versions of philosophical pathologies permeate everyday life and create intellectual-emotional muddles. As they wrote in *Unscientific Psychology*: *A Cultural-Performatory Approach to Understanding Human Life* (1996/2006):

> His self-appointed task was to cure philosophy of its illness. (Ours, as we will try to show, is closer to curing "illness" of its philosophy). We are all sick people, says Wittgenstein. No small part of what makes us sick is *how* we think (related in complicated ways to what we think and, even more fundamentally, to *that* we think or *whether* we think), especially how (that or whether) we think about thinking and other so-called mental processes and/or objects—something which we (the authors) think we (members of our culture) do much more than many of us like to think! It gets us into intellectual-emotional muddles, confusions, traps, narrow spaces; it torments and bewilders us; it gives us "mental cramps." We seek causes, correspondences, rules, parallels, generalities, theories, interpretations, explanations for our thoughts, words and verbal deeds (often, even when we are not trying to or trying not to). But what if, Wittgenstein asks, there are none? (p. 174)

Today, social therapy can best be described as a human development methodology at the leading edge of the critical and postmodern movements in psychology. It is a relational approach with a focus on emotional development and group creativity. Participants are related to as creators of their culture and ensemble performers of their lives – revolutionaries (with a small "r") participating together in transformative practical-critical activity (Newman & Holzman, 2006/1996).

A Practical-Critical Psychology

Similar to other critical psychologies, social therapy challenges the conceptions of inner life and self that are foundational to mainstream psychology. In creating and glorifying the isolated individual as its unit of analysis, mainstream psychology adopted the philosophical position that particulars are what is "real" and that totalities are an abstraction. Social therapy contends that a major source of people's emotional pain is the socially constructed notion and experience that emotions are particular mental states of isolated individuals (Holzman & Mendez, 2003). Therefore, in social therapy, helping people therapeutically means challenging them to relate to emotions as other than private mental states and to themselves as other than "particulars."

The primary modality of social therapy is group because of its greater potential to challenge particularism and individualism than "individual" (one-on-one) psychotherapy. In social therapy, the group is the therapeutic unit. This is different from most group therapies, in which the group serves as a context for the therapist to help individuals with their emotional problems, but is not itself the therapeutic unit. Clients who come together to form a social therapy group are given the task to create their group as an environment in which they can get help. This *group activity* is a collective, practical challenge to the assumption that the way people get therapeutic help is to relate to themselves and be related to by others as individuals, complete with problems and with inner selves. It is in groups that a person's felt experience of being the center of the universe (that nothing else is going on in the world except how one is feeling) can be most effectively and helpfully challenged.

The social therapist's task is to lead the group in discovering/creating a method of relating to emotional talk relationally rather than individualistically. Talk becomes a collective meaning-making activity rather than a representation of reality or expression of inner feelings. In this process people come to appreciate what (and that) they can create and simultaneously to realize the limitations of trying to learn and grow

individually. Group members, at different moments, realize that *growth comes from participating in the process of building the groups in which one functions*. The typical traditional therapeutic question "How are you [each individual] feeling?" transforms to "How well is the group performing its activity?

This shift in focus from the individual to the group is not a denial of the individual, but rather a reshaping and reorganization of what is traditionally related to as a dualistic and antagonistic relationship into a dialectical one. Mainstream psychology has tended to negate and disparage the group or reduce the group to the individual. Orthodox Marxism has tended to negate and disparage the individual or reduce the individual to the group. In recognizing and relating to the groupness of human life, social therapy does neither. The group is engaged in producing something collectively. As is the case with many life activities, individual members contribute to different degrees and in different ways.

As a social therapy group creates itself as a group, it is generating new ways of talking that expose the more typical ways of talking, ways that perpetuate the experience of being individuated products. These social therapy groups thus become makers of meaning and not merely users of language; they play with language, as Wittgenstein says, as a form of life. To make more explicit the contribution that Wittgenstein's critical psychology has made to social therapy, social therapy can be reframed in Wittgenstein's terms. Social therapy is a method to help "ordinary people get free from some of the constraints of language and the conceptual confusions that permeate everyday life" (Newman & Holzman, 2006/1996).

Like Wittgenstein, Vygotsky challenged the expressionist, representational, or correspondence view of language. Speaking, he said, is not the outward expression of thinking, but part of a unified, transformative process. The relationship of thought to word is not a thing but a process, a movement from thought to word and from word to thought. Thought is not expressed but completed in the word. Any thought has movement. It unfolds (Vygotsky, 1987).

With his conception of language and thought as dialectical process and unified activity, Vygotsky makes the psychological divide between inner and outer disappear. There are no longer two separate worlds, the private one of thinking and the social one of speaking. There is, instead, the complex dialectical unity, speaking/thinking, in which speaking completes thinking.

If speaking is the completing of thinking, as Vygotsky says, if the process is continuously creative in sociocultural space, then it follows that the "completer" does not have to be the one who is doing the thinking. Others can complete for us. And when they do, they are no more saying what we are thinking than we are saying what we are thinking when we complete ourselves. What people are doing when they speak in a social therapy group is not saying what's going on but creating what's going on, and "understanding each other" comes about by virtue of engaging in this activity. In psychotherapy, whatever the modality, talking about one's inner life is therapeutic because and to the extent that it is a socially completive activity and not a transmittal of private states of mind. The human ability to create with language – to complete, and be completed by, others – is a continuous process of creating who we are becoming, a tool-and-result of the activity of developing (Holzman, 2009).

Understanding language in this way as a socially completive activity raises questions about "the truth" of people's words and, by extension, the concept of truth itself. There are different ways to question the concept of truth. One is to reject an expressionist view of language and with it the notion of objective truth. For those psychologists and psychotherapists who do so, talk therapy is not done in order to discover some hidden truth of someone's life, to find the true cause of emotional pain, or to apply the one true method of treatment, because truth in that form (Truth) does not exist. Instead, they construct subjective theories of truth and devise practices consistent with them. For example, social constructionists search for relational forms of dialogue as an alternative to

objectivist-based debate and criticism; narrative therapists work to expose the "storiness" of our lives and help people create their own (and, most often, better) stories, and collaborative therapists emphasize the dynamic and co-constructed nature of meaning.

However, from the social-therapeutic, practical-critical point of view, these critical psychology proposals are lacking. To posit truth as subjective, with the existence of multiple truths (all with a small "t"), does not escape objective-subjective dualism but rather merely flips it over. Truth may be socially constructed in these approaches, but dualism remains intact, as there must be something about which it can be said, "It is true (or false)." In contrast, relating to therapeutic talk as playing language games as a form of life in Wittgenstein's sense, and as socially completive activity in Vygotsky's and Newman and Holzman's sense, is a rejection of truth and its opposite, falsity. The social therapeutic shift to activity is a way to transform therapeutic talk from being an appeal to or about both objective, outer reality truth and subjective, inner cognitive or emotive truths. As socially completive activity, therapy talk is a consciously self-reflexive engagement of the creating of the talk itself. In performing therapy the fictional nature of "the truth" of our everyday language, our everyday psychology, and our everyday stories gets exposed as people have the opportunity to experience themselves as the collective creators of their emotional activity.

Future Directions

Social therapy has generated a fair amount of controversy, as might be expected of a philosophically informed postmodern Marxist practice developed outside of academia. Much of the controversy, however, stems from decades-old political attacks on Newman from the US Left, which tried to use the charge of "cult" leader to discredit his and others' attempts to transform partisan politics in the USA. Neither the substance of social therapy's critique of mainstream psychology nor the specific ways in which social therapy is political have yet to be adequately studied or critiqued.

In the meantime, social therapy is practiced in social therapy centers, clinics, schools, hospitals, social service organizations, and NGOs in the USA and abroad. Newman and Holzman's East Side Institute provides training to many hundreds of psychologists, social workers, health and mental health providers, researchers, educators, and community activists across the globe. As a method for social-emotional growth and learning, the social therapeutic approach has been a model for innovative practices in education in school and outside of school and youth development, training and practice in medicine and healthcare, and organizational development and executive leadership. In addition to dozens of academic books and book chapters devoted to social therapy, numerous articles on the topic appear in such journals as *Theory & Psychology*, *Journal of Constructivist Psychology*, *Annual Review of Critical Psychology*, *Journal of Systemic Therapies*, and *New Ideas in Psychology*.

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Social Values

Stavroula Tsirogianni
London School of Economics,
Methodology Institute, London, UK

Introduction

Social values essentially describe our ideas about good life. A social psychological study of values aims to take into account the role of individual choices as well as that of social forces in their formation, structure, and function. Values are socially shared and binding and thus more than mere conscious preferences that can instantly change. There is growing evidence that individuals are able to endorse multiple value systems and identities across different fields of interaction. Despite these concerns, much study of social values is undertaken by collapsing them into relationships that are binary (either/or) and rigid, removed from specific contexts. These approaches prioritize questions about universal validation and consistency in value systems. Reintroducing the "social" in the conceptualization and research of values is crucial in addressing the issue of variability in their formation, function, and structure.

Definition

Social values are standards that people use to evaluate goals, entities, behaviors, and state of affairs as desirable, non-desirable, acceptable, unacceptable, and so on. Values delineate order states of the world but also ways of living and provide long-term motivation for people's actions. They influence judgements of ourselves and others and are closely connected to aspects of personal and collective identity. The prefix social denotes that they are intersubjectively constituted but can be individually expressed (Tsirogianni & Gaskel, 2011).

Value is a multidimensional concept interwoven with other constructs such as attitudes, norms, and morality. While values contain an "ought" dimension, they differ from norms by pertaining to personal desires and not always demanding a specific course of action. In relation to attitudes, values have a more general character of values, while attitudes are an organization of beliefs about specific objects, entities, or situations that prompt individuals to act preferentially towards an object, entity, or a situation. While they have the capacity to influence preferences, they do not act as standards for evaluating general modes of behavior and goals. Finally, morality is a concern about social facts to which people have to position themselves in a way that overrides their immediate self-interests (Park, 2012). Values can be moral and immoral.

Keywords

Social Values; conceptualisation; measurement; pluralism; context

Traditional Debates

Early theorists conceptualized values in relation to personality. Inspired by Spranger's (1928) theory of personality, Allport and Vernon (Allport & Vernon, 1931) found five universal personality types (theoretical, economic, political religious, and aesthetic), which occur in individuals in different degrees. In terms of measurement, participants had to rank order different occupations and activities. However, the use of rankings did not allow to study the comparative importance of values. Moreover, their Study of Values instrument proved to be a questionnaire on vocational preferences rather than values. Nevertheless, they were innovative in grounding values' conceptualization and measurement in specific situations.

Charles Morris (Morris, 1956), an American philosopher, took a more abstract approach in

defining and measuring values. He defined them as life orientations (13 Ways to Live) that guide good living rooted in three basic personality types: the Dionysian, Promethean, and Buddhist personality. He employed qualitative (interviews and evaluations of art pieces) and quantitative (questionnaire) methods and used ranking and rating to measure their importance. However, the questions in the 13 Ways to Live questionnaire have been criticized for being too abstract and leading. Conceptually, he distinguished between conceived (values as concepts of the desirable) and operative values (values as enacted) yet without empirically pursuing this distinction. However, with his distinction between conceived and operative values, he explained how values may function as guiding principles in people's lives in principle but without actually guiding their actions. This idea also touches on the explicit and implicit dimensions of values.

In the aftermath of World War II and during the Cold War era, many social scientists were preoccupied with questions about economic development, cultural conflicts, and prejudice. Kluckhohn with Strotbeck (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961), two American anthropologists, took on the topic of cultural variation in their study of value orientations. They saw values as giving direction to human acts and thoughts as these relate to five universal human problems. These relate to questions about the ontology of human nature, the relationships between humans and nature, the temporal focus of human life, the modes of human activity, and interpersonal relationships. Their questionnaire, as it arose from their fieldwork with Spanish-American communities, aimed to capture the variant solutions people give to these five problems. However, the use of rankings did not allow to examine their interrelationships. Their theory is important in prioritizing questions around the variant importance of values as dictated by different behavioral contexts (e.g., occupational sphere, familial sphere, religious sphere). Differentiation was important for them, which cannot be conceived only in terms of a unitary system of dominant values but rather in terms of "an interlocking network of dominant and variant value orientations" (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961, p. 364). However, due to the impractical methodology and unsuccessful operationalization of their theoretical tenets, their instrument has not been incorporated into full-scale studies. This inevitably resulted in the waning of their ideas on variability and plurality.

Milton Rokeach (Rokeach, 1968) provided us with the first simple instrument on values and value systems. He distinguishes between twelve values as means (instrumental values) and as twelve as goals (terminal values) and asks respondents to rank order them as guiding principles in their lives. He locates personal values against social values and morality values as conflicting with competence values. Emphasizing universality, all 24 values are claimed to be found in all societies with differences in their patterns. With regard to the implicit facet of values, Rokeach advances our knowledge by calling our attention to value processes and how values associate with self-concept by focusing on the associations between one's values and people's attitudes, behavior, and self-concept. In an age where theories of cognitive consistency, reasoned action, and central and peripheral processing dominated social psychological research, Rokeach's work was prompted by similar concerns. His theoretical and empirical efforts to study value systems were important, which yet failed – due to the use of rankings – to provide insights into how certain value priorities affect others.

Schwartz tried to develop Rokeach's work and became interested in the motivational goals that underpin social values and value patterns. He defines values as "concepts or beliefs about desirable end states or behaviors that transcend specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behavior and events" (Schwartz & Bilsky 1987, p. 551). Similar to his antecedents, he is preoccupied with questions about universality, taxonomy, and validation and develops a list of ten universal values which are claimed to exist in all societies yet with variant importance. These are collapsed into four higher-order value domains, which are mapped on a circumplex,

depending on whether they compliment or oppose each other. Openness to change opposes conservation values and self-transcendence comes into conflict with self-enhancement values. The circumplex has been validated in more than sixty-seven countries. Initially, he measured values through the Schwartz Value Survey, which became the basis for the Portrait Value Questionnaire, a more refined and simpler instrument, which for that reason has been integrated in the European Social Survey and World Value Survey. It is more focused and targets values implicitly through the use of portraits that respondents need to state the degree of identification with each one. While Schwartz's use of portraits and rating system is an advancement in the measurement of value systems, his theory of the circumplex forwards an abstract and unitary account of value systems that ignores their situational underpinnings and excludes the possibility of people endorsing a mixture of values. In the context of late modernity, the proliferation of different constellations of social contexts necessitates the existence of a hybrid and heterogeneous value system, thus revealing the restrictive scope of such unitary and universal accounts of values.

Critical Debates

Western democracy and individualism, juxtaposed to Eastern European communism and collectivism, constituted the predominant background against which value theories were formulated. Scholars sought to create integrative theories that would explain societal problems and provide universal solutions and promote the vision of an orderly, peaceful, and moral global state of affairs.

Moreover, the parallels between personality and values paved the way for theories and research on values. In an attempt to increase reliability and validity in the measurement of values across different societal contexts, theorists settled for more static and abstract definitions. The overuse of quantitative measures resulted in grounding the concept of values in notions of properties, objectivity, and conscious awareness. In essence, the post-Rokeachean landscape of studies in values assumed coherence, stability, homogeneity, and universality in value structures and ignored individuals' capacity to draw on different value systems.

But values are clearly more than states of existence and psychological properties which people consciously subscribe to and adopt invariably that can be measured through quantitative measures. Values also refer to processes of making sense of one's existence and how the world works and should work for oneself, others, and society. The ways in which people express, negotiate, justify, and use their values to express particular points of views about themselves, others, and social events have not been given adequate attention in this line of research (Tsirogianni, 2009).

The traditional psychometric approach fails to appreciate the specific forms and functions values serve in different fields of interaction and emergent individual-social relations. Insofar as social order is defined by a plurality of values, looking for universals overlooks their complexity. Different values come into play depending on the circumstances. As Foucault (1972) notes, social order is rooted in clashes of statements. Morris's distinction between operative and conceived values can be proved useful in the study of variability. Such distinction would allow researchers to understand better the role of situational factors accounting for the fit or clash between holding and implementing values (Harding, 1948) and how their interrelationship contours individuals' identities, an important area for the study of social movements and ideologies. Future research could also revive Kluckhohn and Strodbteck's idea of value differentiation to investigate values in the context of behavioral spheres.

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Social Work

Kenneth McLaughlin
Department of Social Work and Social Change, Manchester Metropolitan University, Faculty of Health, Psychology and Social Care, Didsbury, Manchester, UK

Introduction

Social work endeavors to help people to live more successfully within their local communities by helping them find solutions to their problems. In doing so, social workers work not only with individuals but with their families, neighbors, and friends, as well as with other organizations such as the police, medical professions, and schools. While predominantly concerned with the care and protection of those in need or at risk, it often involves the use of statutory powers over individuals, for example, in the removal of a child from its parents due to it being considered to be at risk of significant harm or the detention of someone against his or her will under mental health legislation.

The exact forms such interventions take, and the values that underpin them, will vary both historically and from country to country as sociopolitical and other cultural factors influence attitudes to, and provision for, the distressed and disadvantaged within a given society. With explanations and solutions for individual and social problems varying widely across the political spectrum, it follows that the role of social work and the nature of social work intervention are subject to much debate. Social work therefore occupies a position that makes it a highly politicized and contentious sphere of work.

The level of state regulation and registration of social workers varies across the globe. In some countries, there is very little formal regulation, while in others, there is a high level of state regulation of both social work and social workers. For example, in the United Kingdom (UK), regulation is coupled with "protection of title," meaning that only those registered with their professional regulatory body are legally entitled to call themselves a social worker. In the United States of America, "protection of title" exists in some states but not in others.

For information and discussion of social work internationally, please access the link below to *The Journal of Global Social Work Practice*.

Definitions

Social work is not a static activity but responds to both social need and social change. Attempts at defining it will therefore be partial and open to dispute (see Payne, 2006 for a range of historical and international definitions).

The definition drawn up by the International Association of Schools of Social Work and the International Federation of Social Workers states that social work is a profession which "promotes social change, problem solving in human relationships and the empowerment and liberation

of people to enhance well-being. Utilising theories of human behaviour and social systems, social work intervenes at the points where people interact with their environments. Principles of human rights and social justice are fundamental to social work" http://ifsw.org/resources/definition-of-social-work/. The emphasis on theoretical knowledge has been criticized. Jacqui Smith, who, when the UK Minister for Health commented that "Social work is a very practical job. It is about protecting people and changing their lives, not about being able to give a fluent and theoretical explanation of why they got into difficulties in the first place" (Department of Health, press release 22/5/2002) http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release?id=85537.

This tension in getting the necessary balance between theory and practice permeates social work. The training of social workers therefore incorporates both academic study (e.g., elements of sociology, psychology, theories of risk, and social difference) and professionally supervised practice placements. The most academically gifted student also needs to practice in a competent and professional manner. The most competent and professional student also requires a certain level of theoretical knowledge if they are to comprehend and intervene effectively in order to improve the lives of those with whom they will work.

In this sense, it could be argued that social work, rather than traditional psychological practice, is best placed to understand the internal mental life of its clientele, as it encounters them at the nexus of their material and subjective worlds.

Keywords

Social work; radical social work; anti-discriminatory practice; anti-oppressive practice; regulation, professionalism

Traditional Debates

Three general perspectives around which social work coalesces have been identified (Payne, 2006):

Social Order (Individualist-Reformist)

This view focuses on the role of social work as an aspect of welfare services to individuals in societies. The main purpose of social work is to meet individuals' needs, but there is also a role to reform and improve services of which social work is a part, so that social work and the services can operate more effectively.

Therapeutic (Reflexive-Therapeutic)

From this perspective, social work seeks to achieve the best possible well-being for individuals, groups, and communities by promoting and facilitating personal growth and self-realization. They do so in a constant process of interaction with others – reflexivity. In this way, people gain power over their own feelings and way of life and, through this, are enabled to overcome or rise above suffering and disadvantage.

Transformational (Socialist-Collectivist)

This standpoint sees social work as part of a system which seeks to promote cooperation and mutual support in society so that the most oppressed and disadvantaged people can gain power over their own lives. The role of social work is to empower, facilitate, and take part in a process of learning and mutual cooperation which creates institutions which all can own and participate in. It ultimately seeks the development of an alternative form of society with a more egalitarian set of relationships among people. This more critical perspective was, and remains, the subject of much debate. While this perspective would appear to emphasize the influence of psychology over social work, it could also be taken as indicating that any form of critical psychological practice needs to contain an element of social work if it is to truly understand the mental life and subjectivity of its clients.

Critical Debates

The more critical approaches to social work coalesced around what became known as the radical social work movement, although the "movement" did not represent a homogenous group in

terms of either strategy or theory. Three different, but at times interconnected, approaches to political activity within the radical social work movement have been identified: the *revolutionary approach* which emphasized the social control aspect of the state, which by implication included social workers; the *reformist approach* to welfare, which campaigned for socialist change while defending the gains of welfarism; and the *prefigurative strategy*, heavily influenced by feminism and the notion that "the personal is political" which "favoured changes that prefigured the future and transformed present relationships of dependency. . .by working both *In and against the state*" (Langan & Lee, 1989, p. 14, emphasis in original).

The 1980s saw social work increasingly taking on board issues around race, gender, sexuality, and disability which coalesced around "anti-discriminatory" and "anti-oppressive" practice. Anti-discriminatory practice (ADP) works to a model of challenging discrimination at the personal, cultural, and structural levels (Thompson, 1997), while anti-oppressive practice (AOP) has been defined as:

"A form of social work practice which addresses social divisions and structural inequalities in the work that is done with people whether they be users ('clients') or workers. AOP aims to provide more appropriate and sensitive services by responding to people's needs regardless of their social status. AOP embodies a person centred philosophy; an egalitarian value system concerned with reducing the deleterious effects of structural inequalities upon people's lives; a methodology focusing on both process and outcome; and a way of structuring relationships between individuals that aims to empower users by reducing the negative effects of social hierarchies on their interaction and the work they do together" (Dominelli, 1996, pp. 170–171). While some argue there is little to distinguish between ADP and AOP, others differentiate them in that "Anti-discriminatory practice will work to a model of challenging unfairness. Anti-oppressive practice, however, works with a model of empowerment and liberation and requires a fundamental re-thinking of values, institutions and relationships" (quoted in McLaughlin, 2008, p. 36).

ADP and AOP have themselves been criticized for, paradoxically, giving social workers more power over their clientele as they police and censure what *they* regard to be discriminatory or oppressive language or behavior, as was highlighted in the "political correctness debate" (Philpot, 1999), or of being used mechanically as a cloak to disguise aspects of social work that some consider unjust, for example, its role in the implementation of internal immigration controls (Humphries, 2004).

The 1990s and 2000s saw social work take on a more businesslike approach in many countries, including the UK. The rise of new managerialism and neoliberal economic policies increasingly saw social workers become brokers of care packages. In some service settings, for example, work with older people, the job title "care manager" was favored over social worker as the role concentrated on assessment of need and the commissioning of services rather than with their provision. There has also been an increase in bureaucratic procedures and the management of the social worker by way of stringent target setting and performance indicator measurements. These procedures have been criticized for bringing market economics into social care, reducing the professional autonomy of the social worker, and allowing governmental and organizational targets, rather than service user need, to drive the service. This has led to the paradox that while UK social workers now have protection of title and a newly established College of Social Work and are therefore arguably a more recognized profession than in the past, the increase in state direction and preset targets undermines the professional autonomy of the social worker and calls into question the professional status of social work (Rogowski, 2010).

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Online Resources

British Journal of Social Work. http://bjsw.oxfordjournals.org/
College of Social Work. http://www.collegeofsocialwork.org/
Community Care. http://www.communitycare.co.uk/Home/
General Social Care Council. http://www.gscc.org.uk/
Journal of Global Social Work Practice. http://www.globalsocialwork.org/
International Federation of Social Workers. http://ifsw.org/
Social Work Action Network. http://www.socialworkfuture.org/

Socialism, Overview

Fernando Lacerda Jr.
Faculty of Education, Federal University of Goiás, Goiânia, GO, Brazil

Introduction

Socialism is a concept which is often the subject of polemical discussions. Like other concepts, ideology and alienation, it has been influenced by Marxist thought. Developments within and difficulties with different types of Marxism have left their mark on discussions concerning socialism. However, it is important to note that the concept of socialism precedes Marx and is a much broader concept than Marxism.

Every concept develops historically. This is especially important when a concept directly tackles practical matters. Because of that, the approach adopted here is a historical one. The historical development of socialist movements will be highlighted in order to show the development of socialist ideas. Just after that it will be possible to raise debates about psychology and socialism.

Definition

The broadest definition of socialism presents it as a theoretical-political doctrine which guides and lies behind organized social movements. In this sense, it is a regulatory ideal, involving concepts about society and human beings, which seeks to overcome the shortcomings of capitalism such as the dominance of the market, prejudices, nationalisms, and social injustices (Bronner, 2001). In spite of the differences between the different strands of socialism, they have some common features: (a) opposition to capitalism and to individualism, (b) a concern with overcoming the limits of merely formal equality, and (c) the development of discussions about theory guided by practical and political concerns (Bronner; Walker & Grey, 2007).

In a strict sense – taken directly from readings of Marxian thought – socialism is conceived as a phase of transition between capitalism and communism (Lenin, 1917/1964; Paolucci, 2007; Walker & Gray, 2007). This distinction was made by Marx (1875/1989, p. 87) who described the differences between the "first phase of communist society" and the "higher phase of communist society."

In the Marxist tradition, capitalism is rejected because it is a system in which generalized commodity production takes precedence over production for human needs; i.e., it is marked by a contradiction between the means of production which become ever more social and the private acquisition of social wealth that leads to barbaric degradations of social life and the destruction of nature (Engels, 1880/1989; Mandel, 1982; Mészáros, 1995).

The overcoming of bourgeois social relations would become permanent under communism,

a society in which all the potentials created by capitalism would not be held back by social barriers. Marx did not spell out in detail how communism would function, but he did describe some general characteristics: (a) there would be abundance; otherwise, the egalitarian distribution of social wealth would merely be the distribution of scarcity, which would lead to a struggle to satisfy basic needs and a return to competitive social relationships; (b) the development of social relations would be distinguished by people's conscious and collective control of the productive process in its entirety; and (c) the processes of the destruction of nature would be eliminated (Engels, 1880/1989; Mandel, 1982; Marx, 1875/1989).

For Marx, the shift from capitalism to communism is mediated by a period of transition characterized by a political offensive on the part of those who want to destroy capitalism and make possible the emergence of new social relations (Marx, 1875/1989). This transitional society is necessary because the alienation of labor, private property, and the bourgeois state apparatus will not disappear automatically (Lenin, 1917/1964; Mészáros, 1995; Paolucci, 2007).

In this way, socialism (a) begins with the victory of the exploited classes seizing political and economic power from the dominant minority, (b) develops through measures taken by the new dominant class seeking to overcome the exploitation of labor and to abolish private property, and (c) results in the disappearance of the capitalist alienations, of the State, and of social classes by means of creating fundamental social conditions for the functioning of a society in which dead labor (capital) does not rule over living labor.

Keywords

Alienation; anarchism; capitalism; emancipation; social change

History and Traditional Debates

The first bourgeois societies were built up through revolutionary processes. The French Revolution, the first victory of the bourgeoisie over the aristocracy, was seen as a victory of Reason. The construction of a bourgeois world did not, however, abolish social inequalities. After taking power, the bourgeoisie failed to put into effect their promises of liberty, equality, and fraternity. The masses who had been mobilized in the struggle against the aristocracy were set free only in the limited sense of being free to sell their labor power, and they saw fraternity replaced by a fight of all against all in a society fractured by competition; equality was guaranteed formally, but not in practice (Bronner, 2001; Engels, 1880/1989; Mandel, 1982).

It was against this state of affairs that rebellions and socialist projects arose. The term "socialism" was coined in France in 1832. Prior to that, in 1827, Robert Owen – a Welsh industrialist who set up cooperatives in order to alleviate the social issues resulting from capitalism – used the term "socialist" (Walker & Grey, 2007). First socialist ideas considered social inequalities as irrational manifestations of bourgeois society which would be overcome through the development of new forms of social organization. For proposing ideal models of society which would create a reality better suited to the world of Reason, these authors became known as utopian socialists. Owen's cooperatives or Fourier's phalansteries are examples of such ideal models of society (Mandel, 1982; Engels, 1880/1989).

The emergence of Marxism was influenced by utopian socialism but went beyond it. Marx argued that there was a difference between political emancipation and human emancipation. The former was the product of bourgeois revolutions which freed the State from religion and the aristocracy, but which did not free the people. Human emancipation seeks to overcome this. However, in order to come about, human emancipation must be preceded by social conditions which make the abolition of the current social order possible and indicate the necessary steps for this to take place (Bronner, 2001; Paolucci, 2007).

During the twentieth century, the two main strands of socialist movement were social

democracy and East-bloc socialism. The former separated reform and revolution. It placed priority on a concept of social transformation which proposed a gradual accumulation of reforms – above all, through parliamentary measures – and it abandoned the revolutionary struggle for the abolition of the State (Bronner, 2001; Mészáros, 1995).

East-bloc socialism had many theoretical and political expressions, which are impossible to detail here. However, a description of Stalinism – the most influential and pervasive ideological expression of Soviet socialism – offers a glimpse of the historical significance of East-bloc socialism. Stalinism was the product of the failures of the Russian Revolution in 1917. It can be understood as the political-ideological expression of the brutal exploitation machine which styled itself as the "official spokesperson" of Marxism and which was established by a bureaucracy dependent on the exploitation of surplus labor in the Soviet Union (Mandel, 1982). The central concern of Stalinism was not to study objective reality but to present as "Marxist" everything useful to the ruling of the "Communist Party."

This strand put forward a concept which transformed the term "socialism" into a synonym of the nationalization of a country's economy, the concentration of political and economic power in the hands of a bureaucracy, and the abolition of democratic liberties. In this way, the regimes of Stalin, Pol Pot, and many others which killed and exploited millions of people were termed socialist or communist (Mandel, 1982).

At the present time, the two mentioned versions of socialism have lost the importance they had in the twentieth century. On the one hand, social democrats managed to come to power in several countries but completely abandoned any attempts to "reform capitalism." On the other hand, the post-capitalist regimes which existed in Eastern Europe and the USSR disappeared, and this resulted in the restoration of capitalism (Mészáros, 1995). Since the late twentieth century, socialist ideas and struggles have fallen into disrepute and have become demoralized. However, the capitalist societal relations criticized by socialist movements have not disappeared. The virulent dominance of finance capital in a globalized world maintained and intensified societal relations characterized by precarity, exploitation, destruction of nature, and human suffering. It is this historical situation that maintains blooming discussions on the need of a politically and theoretically renewed "socialist offensive" that can challenge a new world order (Bronner, 2001).

Critical Debates

Objections to Socialist Transition

The idea of socialism as a transitional society has been rejected by several trends of political thought. There are at least three criticisms of this concept of the construction of communism.

The first was made by anarchists, council communists, and autonomists. In brief, these schools of thought are opposed to the idea of the gradual withering away of the State, emphasize the workers' control and self-management, and argue for the immediate abolition of the State. In order to achieve this, it is not enough to struggle against the power of the bourgeoisie; the struggle must be against power itself (Lenin, 1917/1964; Walker & Grey, 2007).

The second criticism was inspired by the utopian socialists. After the "socialist" experiments of the twentieth century, many people argued that it was necessary to begin the transition with a reinvention of daily social relations through the promotion of workers' cooperatives. The creation of alternative communities or networks of "solidarian economies" would result, in the long term, in a socialist society.

The third criticism claims that the idea of a "higher phase of communism" (Marx, 1875/1989), that is, a society without a State or social classes, is a utopian goal. The socialist project should be replaced by more realistic objectives: the construction of a fairer world, using and radicalizing democracy in the present-day society and State.

Supporters of Marxian conception emphasize the impossibility of a victory on the part of

socialist movements without the transcendence of private property, the State, and alienated labor (Mészáros, 1995). However, such a transformation would require a period of transition in which the working class would use the State to nationalize existing goods and services, accelerate the process of the dismantling of private property by distributing the wealth concentrated in the hands of the dominant class, and anticipate and combat bourgeois counterrevolutions (Lenin, 1917/1964; Paolucci, 2007).

Human Nature, Individualism, and Mainstream Psychology

A large number of the arguments against socialism assume that human nature, selfish as it is, is an insuperable barrier against the construction of societies without private property (Mandel, 1982). This idea has been dramatically present in the field of psychology. Danziger (1998), for example, noted how the legend of Robinson Crusoe (the idea of the individual as a self-sufficient being) contributed to the consolidation of a nascent psychology by reproducing widespread ideological assumptions in American society.

Critical psychology has tackled this mystification of human nature. German critical psychology has criticized bourgeois psychology for taking as its starting point an abstract anthropology of the isolated individual (Holzkamp, 1991). In the same way, Parker (2007) was critical of the process of the psychologization of human nature. To psychologize means to transform subjectivity and human nature into a false entity, which reflects the conditions of alienation created by capitalism.

Socialism and Critical Psychology

There are ideas in critical psychology which contribute to socialism, and there are works which, while not dealing with socialism directly, criticize and oppose capitalism. The liberation psychology of Martín-Baró (1996) proposed a reflection on the chains of oppression which have to be cast off by human beings. Sloan (2005) analyzed potential contributions made by psychology to opposition movements against global poverty and in the construction of social relations governed by participation, solidarity, and social justice. Ratner (2006) developed the idea of macro-cultural psychology in order to identify how culture organizes psychological phenomena and to support processes of social change (transformation of capitalist relations, promotion of new political ideologies, and the diffusion of new cultural concepts) with the goal of overcoming psychological problems.

There are also works which explicitly link psychology and socialism. Some of the first attempts tried to link psychology and Marxism by seeking to explain working-class passivity or possible contributions of psychological knowledge to strengthen socialist struggles. Fraina (1915), for example, believed that socialist ideas could be enriched by psychological studies. He thought that Marxism revealed the development of history, but psychology offers a better way to understand humankind, both under capitalism and in the future.

Similar ideas about the importance of psychology for socialism were put forward by Sève (1978). For this author, psychology could contribute to socialism by questioning ideological mystifications about human beings and by studying the complex mediations between general trends in society and the constitution of concrete individualities.

Parker (2007) also wrote about psychology from a socialist and anti-capitalist stance. He put particular emphasis, however, on how psychology functioned as a barrier to human emancipation because it individualized political phenomena; it reinforced gender, class, and race divisions; it elaborated false explanations about human nature; it pathologized militants who fought against capitalism; and it promoted happiness at the heart of capitalist anarchy.

Finally, it remains to highlight the pioneering link between psychology and socialism made by Vygotsky. Concerned about the issue of "socialist alteration of man" at the heart of the Russian revolution, Vygotsky (1930/1994) argued that human beings are historical and social, so all misery and human limitations stem from processes which can be modified, destroyed, or

overcome. When a society is marked by social class divisions, the development of personality is limited and one sided with human capabilities emerging in a distorted fashion. Thus, Vygotsky (1930/1994, p.182) concluded that "Only a raising of all of humanity to a higher level in social life, the liberation of all of humanity, can lead to the formation of a new type of man."

The historicity of human development discussed by Vygotsky opened the way for the development of a theory where human activity, development, and societal relations are strictly related. Through this approach, Leontyev (1977, 2009) argued that changes in the relations between senses and meanings, i.e., the development of human consciousness, are possible only through the development of concrete human activities in societal relations.

Later, Holzkamp (1991), working out the ideas of Soviet psychology and Marxism, provided a great contribution highlighting the historical tendency and possibility of the increase of control and conscious participation of subjects in the general development of the societal reproduction of human life.

International Relevance

If socialism is a societal project which guides social movements and seeks the abolition of capitalism and the construction of an egalitarian and free society without exploitation, then its relevance is global – especially in a world in which financial capital increasingly destroys people's potentials.

Practice Relevance

Socialism is an interdisciplinary concept, and its relevance to psychology is multisided and complex. Many concepts and strands of critical psychology are deeply related with socialism. Subjects tackled by socialism are present in every critical theory that aims to change the world beyond capitalism, and its practical relevance can be found in discussions about social change, emancipation, oppression, individualization, and others.

However, in order to briefly summarize some practice relevance of socialism to critical psychology, the importance of the following issues raised by socialist concerns can be highlighted: (a) the critical reflection on how psychological practices can reinforce labor exploitation and alienating processes, (b) the debates on how psychology can empower struggles against the exploitation and oppression which mark capitalist society, and (c) the construction of new societal relations characterized by cooperation, solidarity, and freedom.

Future Directions

The failure of attempts in the twentieth century to globally transform capitalist society led to the socialist project falling into great disrepute, and this has persisted until the first years of the twenty-first century. Not only has the term "socialism" been rejected but so too has the global project of seeking an alternative to capitalism.

In the same way, the failures of socialist movements have affected the relations between psychology and socialism. Today, there are just a few scholars who clearly link proposals of critical psychology with socialist projects (Parker, 2007; Ratner, 2006), just as many theoretical proposals of critical psychology that do not elaborate global projects of social transformation.

A strengthening of the socialist standpoint in the field of critical psychology implies the elaboration of a theoretical-practical arsenal capable of a radical critique of the contemporary capitalist order and of responding to the current refractions of social issues. Some important topics for future debate can be mentioned:

- Critique of the hegemonic concepts of the individual in the field of psychology and demonstration of their instrumentality in the reproduction of capitalist societal relations
- Analysis and critique of the new societal conditions of capitalism in the twenty-first century, along with their new ideologies, alienations, and reifications

- Proposals for actions capable of linking the reconstruction of societal relations in daily life at a local level with global projects of social transformation

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Online Resources

Annual Review of Critical Psychology. http://www.discourseunit.com/annual-review

Anticapitalist Initiative. http://www.anticapitalists.org

Counterpunch. http://www.counterpunch.org

Envisioning a Post-capitalist order. http://www.postcapitalistproject.org

Marxism & Psychology Research Group. http://discoveryspace.upei.ca/mprg

Marxists Internet Archive. http://www.marxists.org

Monthly Review. http://www.monthlyreview.org

Occupy Movement. http://www.occupy.com

Radical Psychology Network. http://www.radpsynet.org

Revolutionary Left Forum. http://www.revleft.com

Socialist Register. http://www.socialistregister.com

Socialist World. http://www.socialistworld.net

Socialization

Jill Morawski
Department of Psychology, Wesleyan University, Middletown, CT, USA

Introduction

Socialization refers to the developmental processes through which individuals acquire the values, behaviors, and motivations necessary to become competent members of a culture. Postulated in this form in the mid-twentieth century, socialization remains a central concept in psychology. As a theoretical entity, it has been the subject of extensive empirical examination and debate. It is a normative concept that distinguishes between normal and non-normal ways of being in the social world. As a normative as well as broad conceptual category, socialization has entered into lay discourse and is regularly applied to explain and manage practical affairs; it has been influential in education, parenting, and political affairs. Socialization has been advanced to explain a plethora of psychological matters,

including race relations, gender roles, moral decision-making, citizenship, self-control, affect management, and self concept, among others. While it once had a distinctly different meaning, psychologists appropriated the term to explain processes within individuals. This essentially psychological definition has borrowed liberally from extant psychological theories with the result that socialization consists of a bricolage of psychodynamic, behaviorist, cognitive, and sociological theories. So constructed with a variety of theory perspectives, socialization evolved as a capacious entity, one that has been repeatedly refined and reconfigured in accord with psychology's changing conceptual priorities. Given this theory hybridity and given the sociopolitical significance of understanding how individuals come to be competent members of sociality, socialization persists and has survived even recent nativist critiques of nurture models.

Definition

Socialization is a common term in sociology, political science, education, and anthropology as well as psychology where it is used to describe the processes whereby individuals attain the behaviors, norms, beliefs, and ideologies that are needed for competent participation in society. Socialization is utilized to explain both behaviors of individuals (how persons become successful members of a society) and societal conditions (how social, political, and cultural practices are continued). From its earliest appearance in psychology, socialization processes have been explained by drawing upon and frequently combining a set of theories that posit distinctly different conceptions of human nature. These include psychoanalysis, behaviorism, motivation theory, personality theories, ethology, and culture theory. Emerging as a means to explain how individuals are intimately and ontological linked to the social world – how they acquire the know how to successfully participate in complex social events – socialization harbors a paradox in assuming that individuals are individuals only in terms of their social existence (a paradox recognized by William James and George Herbert Mead). Further, owing to its multiple theoretical origins, socialization is a capacious idea that can be (and has been) used alternatively to demonstrate individuals' conformity to social demands or their independence from such demands. Socialization similarly is extended to explain the central importance of either parenting techniques or peer interactions. As a plastic concept, socialization has been deftly incorporated in the research programs of cognitive psychology, behaviorism, psychoanalysis, object relations theory, ethology, and comparative psychology. In these utilizations, socialization stands as a normative concept, assuming that individuals are either effectively or ineffectively socialized (Maccoby, 2007). These various utilizations share as well as focus on early development, tacitly or explicitly presuming that early childhood to be a critical time in the formation of social knowledge and skills necessary for adequate functioning in the social world. Less attention has been given to socialization across the life span and to "resocialization" of individuals who were poorly socialized. Research on socialization periodically shifts focus, sometimes attending to environmental conditions and sometimes to the cognitive or innate capacities requisite for socialization and at other times to the dynamic interactions between agents and objects of socialization (usually to parents and children). Researchers has submitted these various and varying dimensions of socialization to rigorous experimental testing, yet throughout these studies socialization itself is nearly always assumed not empirically tested.

Keywords

Socialization; Development; Individual; Society; Parenting; Internalization

History

Socialization is generously used across the social science in reference to the elaborate processes

whereby individual development is influenced if not shaped by social forces. Prior to this usage, the term had a markedly different meaning, one still registered in some dictionaries. Until the twentieth century, socialization was used to refer to acts of establishing social affairs or a socialistic basis of society (Morawski & St. Martin, 2011). This prior meaning is found in Charles Fourier's utopian writings where socialization refers to that stage of societal development when "competitive industrialization" would be replaced by cooperative social and economic systems (Anon, 1841, p. 505). Karl Marx and Frederich Engels similarly defined socialization as the complex coordination of labor and production in order to realize conditions of common profit, not individual gains. Sociologist George Simmel conceptualized socialization in terms of the "overthrow of the individualistic view" and unambiguously defined it as "the sum of . . . the manifold interactions between individuals" (1896, p. 169).

Early twentieth-century psychology produced a quite different definition. Whereas *A Student's Dictionary of Psychological Terms* published in 1928 defines socialization as the processes of "bringing industry or any institution under social control for the welfare of the group," it also includes a definition of socialization as "learning to get along with others (English, 1928, p. 116). An edition of the dictionary published just 6 years later, while still providing both definitions, gives more attention to the latter one, describing socialization as "the processes by which individuals acquire socially desirable habits and become able to live as members of a social group" (Warren, 1934, p. 254). This new alternative definition, quickly acquiring conceptual elaboration, might have been influenced by sociologist Franklin Giddings' rejection of Simmel's social-organizational conception and his replacement of that conception with an individualist one in which socialization transpires as a process within individuals. Giddings defined it as "the development of a social nature or character – a social state of mind – individuals who associate" (1897, p. 2). Yet Giddings' evolutionary commitments also led to the assertion that socialization did not begin with individuals; rather, society is a precedent for the production of individuals. It was in the spirit of Giddings' individualist perspective that Floyd Allport widely circulated this "modern" sense of socialization as the means by which individuals' habit is modified to enable them to participate in group life.

Allport's definition of socialization was quintessentially psychological in being an individualist and positivist one: it was clearly modern in its behaviorist commitment, and historical reviews would laud his conception of socialization as the environmental modification of potent reflexes as an enduring one (Clausen, 1968). Soon other researchers would join in and their definitions brought more than behaviorism to explain the socialization process. In their groundbreaking work on aggression, Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mower and Sears (1939) featured a chapter on socialization, uniting learning theory and Freudian psychoanalysis to describe how socialization produces conflict: it frustrates basic bodily and emotional desires, notably that of aggression. Therefore, frustration is an unavoidable effect of successful socialization. Some psychologists married culture and personality theories and behaviorism, and psychoanalysis and cognitive concepts. Many, like Floyd Ruch and Philip Zimbardo (1967), combined theoretical notions borrowed from psychoanalysis, learning theory, and culture and personality theory, along with constructs like identification and imitation. Still other researchers utilized a single theory; for instance, a consistently behaviorist perspective underlies Fred Keller and William Shoenfield's definition whereby the environment functions to socialize persons "by reinforcing the behavior it desires and extinguishing others. . . . It teaches the individual what he may and may not do. . ." (1950, p. v).

After the Second World War, socialization rose to become a central concept in psychology. Otto Klineberg did not include the term in the 1940 edition of his social psychology textbook, but in the second edition, he asserted that socialization to be "an essential characteristic of human

nature" (1954, p. 64). Socialization soon came to be understood as a distinctly psychological phenomenon that accounts for a significant portion of human life. Even sociologist Talcott Parsons conceded the importance and psychological nature of socialization, claiming "human personality is not 'born' but must be 'made' primarily through families, the socialization 'factories' which produce human personalities" (Parsons & Bales, 1955, p. 16). Socialization, therefore, is the origin of appropriate behavior, felicitous social interaction, self-control, moral decisions, political attitudes, identity, personality, gender roles, and citizenship.

In the postwar political atmosphere, it was marshaled to help explain the functioning of fascism, communism, and democracy alike, and considerable research equated good parenting with adopting democratic styles (Maccoby, 2007). Socialization research during this period lucidly demonstrates how the "relation of the individual to the social is a political and moral as well as a scientific subject" (Smith, 1997, p. 747). Psychologists were expressing deep concerns about coercive state powers and deployed socialization to show the connections as well as conflicts between necessary social control and individual freedom (largely discussed as the freedom to escape undemocratic powers). Given its normative dimension, socialization became linked with anxious questioning about human nature. How vulnerable is the individual to coercive socialization? Is there anything about human nature that enables individuals to resist oppressive social and political structures? Can they revolt? Or will they identify with pathological social systems? These sorts of questions also guided ontological queries about whether human nature was simply whatever a social system produced and, if so, how we can avoid dystopic societies. In sum, does being socialized differ from being civilized? The ferment surrounding socialization's normative and inescapably political implications motivated critique and ultimately led some researchers to make conceptual modifications. Sociologist Dennis Wrong (1961) chided social scientists for their rendering of an "oversocialized" individual who reflexively internalizes norms, adopts a positive self-image, and consistently conforms to social expectations. What is more, the oversocializaed individual apparently depicted in socialization research is amazingly disembodied, desexualized, and nonmaterial. Whereas Wrong proposed reconsideration to Freud's conceptualization of human nature, other researchers turned to close examination of underappreciated biological and cognitive components of socialization process. For instance, greater attention was given to the agency of the individual who is undergoing socialization, seeing her as "transactor," "processor," and "transformer" (Zigler & Child, 1969). Children's capacities to self-regulate, self-socialize, and even resist socialization forces became the subject of empirical studies as did the bidirectional exchanges between the socializer and individual being socialized (Maccoby, 2007). Influenced by the nascent cognitive sciences, psychologists analyzed the mental structures purported to enable and limit socialization processes. Notable among these investigators, Lawrence Kohlberg hypothesized that socialization proceeds not through passive or observational learning but with "active processes of attention, information-gathering strategies, motivated thinking, and so forth" (1969, p. 349). Soon researchers were positing that crucial to successful socialization were processes of self-actualization, internal self-system, self-monitoring, and self-regulation along with evolutionary mechanisms. Although many lauded such reconceptualizations as a victory of cognitive and nativist perspectives over the presumed naiveté of nurture or "blank slate" perspectives, this analytic juxtaposition erroneously depicts prior socialization research by overlooking how that research acknowledges biological and cognitive components of socialization. As Dennis Bryson (2002) found, postwar social scientists' "pacification of the social," including work on socialization, was deeply informed by biological precepts and discourses.

Research on socialization remains attentive to self-regulatory processes and cognitive capacities. In addition, substantial work is being committed to deciphering the different strategies used

by those who socialize the young and to the varieties of socializing forces, including parents, educators, peers, and the media. Prominent in contemporary research are debates over which social forces are most determining of socialization outcomes, specifically debates over parental versus peer group socialization (Harris, 1995). Also under scrutiny is the extent to which actions like moral decision-making are hardwired (and hence universal) or are meaningful influenced by environment factors.

Traditional Debates

With conceptual roots in a range of theoretical perspectives, socialization has been the subject of numerous controversies over theory. Most common among the criticisms is the argument that socialization holds to a "blank slate" model of mind (nurture model) and hence denies any influences of biology or genetics (nature model). Wrong (1961) panned what he perceived as the "oversocialized" individual posited by socialization, noting that it ignored bodily and material conditions. Others have defended socialization against such bald critiques, claiming that socialization involves more than environmental factors and is not a behaviorist, concept, adding that many formulations incorporate biological and cognitive factors. Among the critical claims that socialization is a blank slate notion have been concerns that socialization represents individuals as passive and conforming; however, even early research appreciated the active involvement of the objects of socialization and by the late 1960s researchers considered how socialization involves regulating and decision-reference systems. Similarly, evolutionary thinking has long been part of socialization research and continues to be so (Hastings, Utendale & Sullivan, 2007; Maccoby, 2007; Morawski & St. Martin, 2011). Yet another criticism tied to perceptions of socialization as a purely nurture perspective asserts not only that individuals are depicted as passive learners but also that strategies of socializing agents are underappreciated (Waksler, 1991). However, there exists ample evidence of long-standing empirical work on the various strategies of socializing as well as on the active involvement of all actors (Maccoby, 2007).

The periodic conflation of socialization with idealized nurture models has generated enduring controversies that pit concepts of humans as autonomous and cognitively complex against notions of humans as more or less passively shaped by environmental forces. Diligent researchers have identified the false dichotomies underlying such controversies; for example, Gibbs and Shell (1985) found this to be the case in moral development research. The historically based ambiguity or bricolage of socialization's base assumptions about human nature fuels these persistent debates.

A second notable source of debate ensues from socialization's normative premise. From its inception, socialization has been assumed to have an optimal outcome: competent social performance. Individuals, therefore, are either adequately or inadequately socialized. This normative premise ultimately implies an instrumentalist view that appropriate socialization produces competent if not optimal functioning in a given social environment. Research on gender roles illustrates serious problems, conceptual and empirical, with this normative premise. Until the late 1960s, psychologists believed that individuals should be socialized to perform gender roles consistent with their assigned gender (male or female). In other words, such gender socialization is a desired process. Some researchers challenged this assumption by demonstrating not only the ways in which these normative gender roles are not optimal and sometimes are dysfunctional but also the ways that gender roles constitute ideologies that sustain sexist practices and mask actual gender-related behaviors. Presumed appropriate gender role socialization, it was observed, did not produce optimally functioning individuals (Bem & Bem, 1970; Chesler, 1972). An eventual result of these conceptual and empirical reassessments, contemporary studies of gender role socialization no long cleave to normative assumptions about appropriate or optimal gender roles. Yet concerns surrounding the normative premise of socialization continue, and

one proposed solution involves identifying evolutionary bases of socialization. For instance, prosocial behaviors can be seen as not relative to specific environments or as ideologies but, rather, as evolved strategies that are advantageous to survival (Hastings et al., 2007). Such evolutionary claims, however, still need to account for cultural and context-specific variations in the behaviors valued as prosocial ones.

Other disputes have arisen from researchers' emphases on different agents of socialization, and the debates have practical as well as theoretical implications. Most recent among these arguments is research suggesting that peer or group socialization has far greater effects than parental forces (Harris, 1995). This recent debate echoes an earlier one over the relative socializing influence of the media, notably television.

Critical Debates

Within psychology's current intellectual focus on the biological or unconscious bases of human thought and action, socialization survives and quietly circulates as a residual concept though without substantial theoretical or empirical attention. In other words, socialization serves as a handy, commonly understood tool for explaining individuals' exhibiting of socially dominant beliefs or behaviors. Perhaps owing to this auxiliary usage, socialization has not gained notable attention within critical psychology. This abeyance also might be underscored by the emergence and modest flourishing of cultural psychology, which emphasizes the cultural contexts that influence psychological experiences, thoughts, and behaviors. As such cultural psychology research sometimes engages critical questioning of mainstream assumptions of normative social behavior and presuppositions of autonomy, agency, and relation of the individual to the social group. Future critical inquiries could importantly contribute by exploring how socialization concepts have remained in the background of contemporary psychology, how institutional practices still aim for properly socializing individuals to fit normative goals, and how psychological science has yet to generate satisfactory understandings of the relation of the individual to the social world.

International Relevance

Socialization is an established concept around the world, most often related to child development and education. The contemporary, distinctly psychological understanding of socialization was largely developed in North America, whereas its more social and socialist meanings were developed in Europe, and some researchers have found continued national differences in conceptions of socialization (Brezinka, 1994). More common are cross-cultural studies that compare differences in childhood and family structure related to socialization (Georges, in Berry). When employed to examine culture-bound phenomena, the socialization concept sometimes retains a western ethics that twins individual autonomy and social belongingness.

Practice Relevance

From its nineteenth-century usage in social science and political economics, socialization has been extensively used to explain and reform social life. Twentieth-century understandings of socialization as psychological processes that transpire within individuals to produce their productive social participation have been applied extensively to education, child development, citizenship, immigration, and prosocial behavior. Recent research has focused on the strategies that increase the probability of desired normative behaviors.

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Solipsism

Kazushige Shingu
Graduate School of Human and Environmental Studies, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan

Introduction

Solipsism has been constantly referred to in philosophical and religious traditions when the question of truth was at stake. Whether or not the experience of the individual subject is enough in order for a truth to be established has been a crucial question.

Definition

Solipsism is a kind of conception of the world through which one considers that there exists only one thing that is the subject who is watching the world.

Keywords

Wittgenstein; Pascal; monadology; Bodhisattva

Traditional Debates

As a corollary of the general definition mentioned above, solipsism has also been understood loosely as an attitude which denies any other subjective position than oneself. What is important in solipsism, however, is not so much the

question as to whether another world exists or not, as the question of whether one's belief that the world being watched really exists is true or false. What is really at stake is the truth of the very existence of the subject watching the solipsistic world in question. In this respect, Wittgenstein (1961: 117) comments, "The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it." It is true that the world is "my world" and "what the solipsist *means* is quite correct," but "it cannot be *said*, but makes itself manifest."

Critical Debates

The comment by Wittgenstein cited above is the clearest modern achievement of a long tradition of reflections upon solipsism. It can be regarded as part of his argument against the possibility against a private language: for a solipsist, there could be no public language, since there are no others in the world. Wittgensteinian solipsism consists of two poles opposed to each other. When going back to Pascal, however, we can find that this precise structure of solipsism had already been adumbrated by him. Pascal offered us a famous model of the thinking subject: a weak and vulnerable piece of reed that nevertheless contains the universe by the very act of his or her thinking. On the one hand, the thinking subject is nothing and can die; on the other, the subject can know a whole universe which knows nothing of her or his thinking (Pascal, 1966). When the subject is thinking and becoming a wrapping of the universe itself, a solipsistic position is surely taken. This might be considered to be characteristic of the modern mind, the mind that cannot rely on the existence of God. However, a similar structure can also be seen in the "monadology" of Leibniz in which it was supposed that God is a name of the immense pole of the thinking subject. Each monad seems to be solipsistic in that it has no perspective that can manifest itself as a reflection of the harmony that Providence would establish between monads. From this perspective, solipsism is not a peculiar thinking of the lonely subject secluded as isolated island unto itself but a necessary structure of the thinking subject that alternates between nothing and the whole.

Moreover, solipsism cannot be restricted to the modern mind or even to the Western mind. There is a well-known Eastern legend that when Bodhisattva had been born, he walked seven steps unaided to each of the four quarters of the earth, while he announced, "In the heavens above and on the earth below, I am the sole Honoured One! From now onwards I shall have no more rebirth" (Tripṭaka, 1996: 180). Also well-known is the Buddhist saying that there must be no "I" in the Law. These two positions of the "I" – one is the equal to the whole universe and the other is a nonexistent – may seem to be an opponent to each other, but in fact they do not make a contradiction but represent a truth. They are not separated from each other, like people in their own prison cell, instead they alternate with each other. They stand in a relationship like the two surfaces of the Moebius strip, the two being one and the same thing in reality. In Zen, one can be a butterfly or a fish, but one can also train oneself to be a pure gaze which is contemplating the entire universe, which is itself now reduced to being a small garden. If you can find an invisible spot in the garden-universe which you cannot see from your position, that spot is saying to you that "whatever you see could be other than it is", or that "nothing *in the visual field* allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye" (Wittgenstein, 1961: 117). You would then go back to your position of the butterfly or fish that you formerly were. Thus you can show the truth of the solipsistic being in the infinite alternation, instead of saying it.

Solipsism has some potential relevance to critical psychology because of its implications for our understanding of conscious awareness. Psychology in a usual sense tends to presuppose the subjective self-consciousness as a steady and active pole of the mind. Solipsism that consists of active and passive extremes, on the other hand – as in Buddhism – can supply a critical position counterpoint to this kind of psychology. Moreover, it can give a new meaning to popular, traditional sayings such as "Life is a dream" and

incorporate them into a more rigorous critical psychology of our everyday life.

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Online Resources

Thornton, S. P., *Solipsism and the problem of other minds*. http://www.iep.utm.edu/solipsis/

Soviet Psychology

Manolis Dafermos
Psychology Department, School of Social Sciences, University of Crete, Rethymno, Greece

Introduction

Soviet psychology is a unique theoretical tradition which emerged and developed in a "special way" during the twentieth century in Soviet Union. Concepts, theories, and approaches emerged in the context of soviet psychology (cultural-historical psychology and activity theory) had significant influences on the development of psychology and scientific discussions in different countries yet again after the collapse of the Soviet Union (see International Society for Cultural and Activity Research website).

Definition

The term "Soviet psychology" refers to a wide range of diverse approaches and trends in the field of psychology which despite significant differences between them have some broad common theoretical and methodological orientations, situated within a specific sociocultural-historical context – in different periods in the USSR's history. Soviet psychology does not mean merely a geopolitical space, but, mainly a conceptual space created by an attempt to overcome concepts and opposition of the traditional psychology and reconstruct the psychology in accordance with the theoretical framework of Marxism (Payne, 1968).

Keywords

Soviet psychology; Marxism; cultural-historical psychology; social transformation, activity theory; historicity; crisis of psychology

History

Soviet psychology emerged and developed in a time of radical social transformation connected with the October Revolution. The new forms of social practice required new theoretical approaches from the social sciences and radically different forms of their organization. Luria (1979) argued that the atmosphere immediately following the revolution stimulated incredible levels of activity to systematic, highly organized scientific inquiry.

Prerevolutionary Russian psychology developed in the context of strong social and ideological contradictions that found their expression in the tension between objectivist and subjectivist psychology (McLeish, 1975). Ivan Mikhailovich Sechenov (1829–1905), the author of the book *Reflexes on the Brain* (1863) is the founder of objective physiological psychology in Russia. Sechenov suggested that psychic activity could be analyzed by objective methods. He considered physiological and psychical reactions as reflex actions. Sechenov's reflex theory influenced the formation of I. Pavlov's (1849–1936) and V. Bekhterev's (1857–1927) research programs. In contrast to objectivist trends in Russian psychology, many Russian philosophers and psychologists as N. Grot (1852–1899), A.I.

Vvedensky (1856–1925), L. Lopatin (1855–1920), and G. Chelpanov (1862–1936) believed that "the method of introspection is the primary and necessary means for studying psychic and inner experience" (Umrikhin, 1997, p. 19).

Soviet psychology is formed mainly but not only under the influence of objective psychology. V. Bekhterev attempted to construct a reflexology, a complex science focused on the objective study of man from the biosocial viewpoint. Bekhterev's view of "nervous energy" as a unifying concept of all biological phenomena was presented as a theoretical foundation for an interdisciplinary study of human beings (Valsiner, 1994). Another strong scientific school in Soviet psychology was founded by I. Pavlov. Although Pavlov did not accept Marxist or communistic ideas and frequently criticized the new regime, the Soviet government supported him in continuing his scientific investigation. Pavlov elaborated his "doctrine of higher nervous activity" (McLeish, 1975). Higher nervous activity is the activity of the higher centers of the central nervous system of organisms allowing complex relations between the organism and the external environment.

P. Blonsky (1884–1941) carried out the first serious attempt at reconstruction of psychology. Blonsky in his works *The Reform of Science* (1920) and *An Outline of Scientific Psychology* (1921) suggested a reorientation psychology which would become a science of studying behavior (Umrikhin, 1997). In contrast to American behaviorism, he proposed that behavior can be understood only as a history of behavior.

K. Kornilov (1879–1957) suggested another way to create a new psychology based on Marxism. Kornilov rejected not only idealistic psychology but also reflexology, promoting a "dialectical synthesis" of subjective psychology and objective psychology in the framework of his "reactology." In fact, the concept of reaction was an eclectic, mechanistic combination both of mental and physical components.

In the 1920s many attempts to introduce and apply diverse approaches and trends in the field of psychology (introspective psychology, psychoanalysis, reflexology, reactology, the doctrine of higher nervous activity, etc.) were made in the light of social challenges of that era. New applied disciplines developed, for example, pedology (the complex science of childhood and child development), psychotechnics (engineering psychology), mental hygiene (the science of enhancing mental health, prevention, and control of neuropsychiatric diseases), psychotherapy, and defectology (a branch focusing on the study of anomalous development and correctional education).

In 1929 over 600 books within the subject area of psychology were published in the USSR. Russian psychological literature ranked third in the world after psychological literature in English and German. Many significant works in psychology were translated into Russian. There was a very lively scientific discourse and dozens of scientific journals were published (*Psychology*, *Pedology*, *Journal for the Study of Early Childhood*, *Journal of psychology*, *neurology and psychiatry*, *Psychiatry*, *Neurology and Experimental psychology*, *Issues of defectology*, *Psychological Review*, etc.) (Bratus, 2000).

Radical transformations in the social structure, such an industrialization and collectivization, which occurred in the Soviet Union changed the psychological agenda and influenced the production of psychological knowledge. L. Vygotsky (1997) analyzed the crisis in psychology not only as a result of fundamental philosophical tensions in the domain of psychology but also as a product of the tension between existing psychological theories and rapidly growing practice. Vygotsky (1896–1934) introduced his cultural-historical psychology as a means of overcoming the crisis in psychology. Vygotsky and Luria (1902–1977) were interested in what happens with psychological functions, when a transformation from traditional to modern society occurs. In the early 1930s, Luria (1976) investigated the cognitive development of different groups of people living in the hamlets and nomad camps of central Asia.

During the period 1930–1950, new theories and scientific schools in the field of psychology appeared and developed (Vygotsky's cultural-historical psychology, Leontiev's (1903–1979) activity psychology, Rubinstein's (1889–1960)

activity psychology, Uznadze's (1886–1950) theory of set). At that same time, the basic theoretical and methodological principles of Soviet psychology were formulated by S. Rubinstein in his monumental work Fundamentals of General Psychology (1940): (1) the principle of psychopsychical unity, (2) the principle of development, (3) the principle of historicity, and (4) the principle of the unity of theory and practice. Rubinstein regarded these principles as an expression of the basic principle of the unity of consciousness and activity (Payne, 1968).

During the same period (1930–1950), many directions in the field of psychology were suppressed (pedology, psychoanalysis, psychotechnics, cultural-historical psychology, etc.); the publication of many scientific journals was stopped (*Psychology*, *Pedology*, *Soviet Psychotechnics*, etc.) and caused great damage especially in applied psychology. After a decree of VKP (b) Central Committee "On Pedological Perversions in the Narkompos System" (July 4, 1936) "...great numbers of psychologists were forced to leave the applied branches of psychology" (Van der Veer, 1990, p. 216).

In the context of the "second wave" of persecution which occurred in the later end of the 1940s (Petrovkii & Jaroshevsky, 1996), whole scientific disciplines (Genetics, Cybernetic, etc.) were declared as "pseudosciences" and persecuted. Between June 28–July 4, 1950, a scientific session on the Physiological Teachings of Academician Ivan P. Pavlov was organized by the Academy of Sciences and Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR. The main task of this session was the further development of Pavlov's teaching in the understanding of behavior and in the foundation of medical sciences. At this session, L. Orbeli (1882–1958), P. Anokhin (1898–1974), and other scientists faced a devastating criticism of deformation of the fundamental principles of Pavlovian reflex theory (Graham, 1987). One of the errors of the "Pavlovian session" was the reduction of psychology to physiology of the nervous system and neglect of the active character of reflection by Man. Scientific meetings and conferences which were held in the coming years (1952, 1962, etc.) focused on the boundaries of psychology as a subject matter and that underscored how it was not possible to reduce it to physiology. It is worth noting that the limitation of the Pavlovlian theory of reflexes was to a large extent recognized by physiologists, who had developed new approaches: the theory of functional systems of P. Anokhin (1898–1974) and N. Bernstein's (1896–1966) theory of movement behavior.

In mid-1950 the ideological control over science weakened. In 1955 the journal *The Issues Relevant to Psychology* (*Voprosy Psikhologii*) began circulating. In 1956 one volume on Vygotsky's works was published. In 1966 the psychological faculty at Moscow University was founded. In the same year the *XVIIIth International Congress of Psychology* was held in Moscow (Bratus, 2000). After two decades of isolation, Soviet psychologists started reconnecting with their colleagues of other countries. A "cultural shock" was experienced by the first Western psychologists connecting with Soviet psychology. "Coming upon Soviet psychology and psychological physiology for the first time is a little like Darwin first visiting the Galapagos. Different forms of species have evolved, as a result of isolation and interbreeding" (Cole & Maltzman, 1969, p. 37).

In the mid-1950s the basic theoretical and methodological principles of Soviet psychology had been formulated and the application of those principles to specific areas came into the foreground. During the next decades an extensive development of Soviet psychology was carried out: the separation and the development of new branches of psychology (developmental psychology, pedagogical psychology, social psychology, psychophysiology, psychology of work and engineering psychology, psychology of creativity, psychology of sport, etc.), and a quantitative accumulation of a wide range of experimental data took place. The use of psychological knowledge to solve practical problems and applied psychological research was reinforced (Koltsova & Oleinik, 2004). Significant new ideas, approaches, and applications in the field of psychology appeared. Examples are A. N. Leontiev's theory of the development of psyche;

the psychophysiology of individual differences of B. Teplov (1896–1965) and V. Nebylitsyn (1930–1972); the neuropsychological theory of A. Luria (1902–1977) and his students; Elkonin's theory of child development; theory of developmental learning activity of V. Davidov (1930–1998); Galperin's (1902–1988) theory of systematic formation of mental actions; various personality theories (V. Myasishchev (1893–1973), L. Bozovitsch (1908–1981), B. Ananiev (1907–1972), etc.); A.A. Leontiev's (1936–2004) theory of psycholinguistics; etc. Meshcheryakov's (1923–1974) "experiment" of education of blind and deaf children which was based on cultural-historical psychology and activity theory provoked intense discussions involving psychologists and philosophers (E. Ilyenkov (1924–1979), F. Mickailov (1930–2006), D. Dubrovsky (1929–), etc.).

One of most important characteristics of Soviet psychology was the close connection of practical and applied psychological questions with the consideration of fundamental theoretical and philosophical issues (Budilova, 1972; Payne, 1968). In the late 1950s, in the Soviet Union the opportunity to deal independently with issues of history and methodology of science appeared. Of great interest are the discussions that developed during the 1960s and 1970s on the methodology of Marx's Capital (M. Rozental (1906–1975), E. Ilyenkov (1924–1979), V. Vazioulin (1932–2012), etc.). Many Soviet psychologists and philosophers concerned themselves with the application of Marx's methodology in the field of psychology. However, the attempts of Soviet psychologists (A.N. Leontiev, S. Rubinstein, B. Lomov (1927–1989), etc.) to solve the problem of systematization of psychological concepts did not lead to a truly satisfactory solution.

The death of the founders of the classical trends of Soviet psychology (A. Luria, 1977; A.N. Leontiev, 1979; A. Zaparozets, 1981; D. Elkonin, 1984; P. Galperin, 1988) created on irreplaceable vacuum. In the period between 1970 and the early 1980s, the tendency to limit research in theoretical and methodological issues dominated the field of psychology and a shift to applied psychology was reinforced (Zdan, 2008).

The collapse of the Soviet Union directly influenced the development of Post-Soviet Psychology. Vassilieva (2010, p. 157) argues that psychology's position in the post-Soviet era is being refigured "in the context of a free-market economy, anticollectivist cultural politics, and the overriding value of consumerism".

Traditional Debates

Attempts have been made to study Soviet psychology from different perspectives (Payne, 1966; McLeish, 1975; Kozulin, 1984; Budilova, 1972; Valsiner, 1988; Bratus, 2000), yet Western psychologists have confronted serious difficulties in broaching the subject matter. This is due to the different historical, sociocultural, and divergent philosophical underpinnings of Soviet psychology as compared with other Western psychologies. Moreover, Western scholars often have limited knowledge of Russian terminology (Mecacci, 1974).

Traditionally, Western scientists considered the main focus of scientific activity of Soviet psychologists their research on the "higher nervous activity." Even today some handbooks of the history of psychology refer only to Pavlov and V. M. Bekhterev as prominent Russian psychologists and physiologists.

In the past decades, Vygotsky became the Soviet psychologist who attracted the attention of many psychologists and educators in the English-speaking context. Jerome Bruner, one of protagonists of the cognitive turn, incorporated some discrete concepts of Vygotsky's theory in his learning theory (Papadopoulos, 1996). With the publication of the eclectic compilation of different works by Vygotsky entitled *Mind in Society* (1978), the "Vygotsky Boom" started in the North America. Vygotsky's concept of the zone of proximal development (ZPD) became one of the most popular concepts in contemporary pedagogical literature. However, the concept of zone of proximal development in isolation from other concepts of cultural-historical psychology could easily be misunderstood. The contemporary reception of Vygotsky is "highly

selective, distorted and perhaps over-simplified in its apparent coherence" (Gillen, 2000, p. 184).

In recent years, many Western scholars and practitioners engaged in various versions of cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT) as a theoretical framework which unified three "generations": Vygotsky's theory of cultural mediation, Leontiev's activity theory, and some contemporary approaches such as Engeström's analysis of activity systems. The concept dubbed activity has transcended the boundaries of psychology and has been relegated to an interdisciplinary concept. The confluence of diverse disciplines on activity theory has created many questions regarding a cohesive and comprehensive theoretical framework to be used in research. For instance, Engeström's version of CHAT has been criticized for neglecting essential aspects of dialectics which connected with the understanding of contradictions (Langemeyer & Roth, 2006).

Many researchers are concerned with the challenge of reevaluating and rewriting the history of Soviet psychology (van de Veer, 1990). Kozulin (1984), in his book *Psychology in Utopia*, argues that Soviet psychology is characterized by an attempt to create a society based on a utopian conception. Valsiner (1996) also argues that social utopias affect both the direction and contents of knowledge construction in Russian (Soviet) psychology.

In post-Soviet historiography, Soviet psychology is treated as a "repressed" and "ideologized science." Bogdanchikov (2008) in his analysis of the tendencies of post-Soviet Russian historiography in the study of Soviet psychology highlights that post-Soviet monographs and textbooks are dominated by a rejection of the term "Soviet psychology" and a preference for the ideologically neutral expressions, such as "Russian psychology in the Soviet period," "psychology in Russia in the 1920s–1930s," and "national psychology in the 1920s–1950s." Bogdanchikov (2008) suggests considering Soviet psychology as a general psychological concept that evolved under the influence of Marxist ideology, included a scientific component, and served as a starting point and the methodological basis for all theoretical constructs in psychological science during the Soviet period.

Although utopian components could be found in Soviet psychology, if we focus exclusively on these components, it would be extremely difficult to adequately explain the knowledge produced and the constructions such creative theories as cultural-historical psychology and different versions of activity theory brought about.

Critical Debates

Many concepts and ideas of Soviet psychology have been further developed within the context of German critical psychology. Klaus Holzkamp was inspired by Leontiev's activity theory and attempted to reconstruct psychology. He reconceptualized the basic categories of psychology by modifying activity theory. Holzkamp accepted Leontiev's approach to the development of human psyche and suggested the consideration of psychological concepts in the context of natural history, prehistory, and history of humanity (Teo, 1998). Holzkamp criticized conceptual foundations of traditional psychology and proposed the foundation of psychology from the perspective of the subject. Critical psychologists in Germany discussed the advantages and limitations of Leontiev's and Rubinstein's versions of activity theory.

The "Archival Revolution" in Vygotskian studies which started in 1990 contributed to the reconsideration not only Vygotsky's legacy but also the history of Soviet psychology. The canonical approach of the "school of Vygotsky-Leontiev-Luria" has been criticized and has highlighted the differences between Vygotsky's research program and that of Kharkov's school (Leontiev, Luria, Galperin, etc.). New critical reconstructions of the history of Soviet psychology focused not on "Great Mans" as it did the traditional historiography but in personal networks, group dynamics, schools, etc. (Yasnitsky, 2011).

Soviet psychology was not a uniform, homogeneous theoretical corpus, but a field of coexistence and problematization of different

theoretical approaches, perspectives, and scientific schools. It is interesting to mention that the establishment and development of Soviet psychology was carried out by scientific schools. These were research and learning communities of psychologists who worked on the basis of specific research programs (Vygotsky's school, Leontiev's school, Rubinstein's school, Uznatze's school, Tepvov's school, etc.) (Budilova, 1972). In the context of Soviet psychology, a great diversity of views, approaches, and scientific schools emerged simultaneously with strong, unifying characteristics and common orientations.

Critical discussions on interpretation and application of Soviet psychology's ideas and concepts take place in different parts of the world. The reception of implementation of Soviet psychology in different regions and countries takes place through the lenses of each region's social and cultural agenda.

Soviet psychology was introduced in Latin American countries through three main avenues: through Marxist circles, through a group of Cuban psychologists who did their studies in the Soviet Union, and through North American Psychology (CHAT). Cultural-historical psychology is presented by critical psychologists and critical educators as an alternative to traditional psychology. Critical psychologists criticize the reduction of cultural-historical theory to a neutral position centered on psychological instruments and individual actions with objects. Critical psychologists suggest the reintroduction of the topic of subjectivity which was ignored by both Soviet and Western psychologies (González Rey & Martínez, 2013).

International Relevance

Many fundamental issues of psychology as a science have been raised and examined in the scientific discussions that were carried out at the different stages of development of Soviet psychology: the problem of the nature of psyche and its relation to the world, the issue of social and cultural mediation of psychological processes, the connection between reflection of the world and man's activity, the problem of discovering the moving forces and the historical development of the psyche ("psychika"), etc. (Budilova, 1972).

Soviet psychologists had to deal with the challenge of the radical social transformations taking place during and after the October 1917 Revolution. Moreover, Soviet psychologists attempted to overcome the crisis of traditional psychology by creating original theories (cultural-historical psychology, Leontiev's activity theory, Rubinstein's activity theory, Uznadze's psychology of set, etc.).

Many concepts and ideas of Soviet psychology have been incorporated and transformed in world psychology. Scholars and practitioners from different parts of the globe are involved in discussions on cultural-historical psychology and activity theory. Indicatively, it is possible to mention the *Journal of Russian & East European Psychology* which publishes and comments on the works of Leontiev, Luria, Uznadze, Vygotsky, Zaporozhets, and other prominent Soviet and Russian psychologists. The *International Society for Cultural and Activity Research* (ISCAR) supports scientific communication regarding different aspects of sociocultural, cultural-historical, and activity theory.

Practice Relevance

Many Soviet psychologists have given great importance to the establishment of close relationships between theory and practice. Vygotsky discussed the perspective of the foundation of *the philosophy of practice* as means to overcome the crisis in psychology and the reconstruction of its theoretical and methodological foundations. For Vygotsky, practice serves both as the deepest foundation for the development of psychological knowledge and "the supreme judge of theory" (Vygotsky, 1997, pp. 305–306). However, from the 1930s to 1950s, many applied branches as pedology and psychotechnics were exterminated.

During the 1960s, rehabilitation of applied and practical psychology started. Many Soviet

psychologists were engaged in various kinds of practical interventions in different settings. Luria developed methods of neuropsychological assessment and rehabilitation of patients with brain damage. Meshcheryakov was involved with the education of children with multisensory impairment. Davydov organized interventions of developmental teaching and learning in schools (Sannino, Daniels, & Guitierrez, 2009).

Cultural-historical psychology and activity theory have also inspired many Western scholars to develop theories with multiple practical applications: Bruner's concept of scaffolding, Engeström's theory of expansive learning, etc. Multiple practical applications of the concept zone of proximal development by many Western scholars and educators could be found (Chaiklin, 2003; Hedegaard, 2005).

In the context of German critical psychology, conferences and discussions took place on practice research from a critical psychological perspective in which Leontiev's and Ilyenkov's ideas had been used (Nissen, 2000). One of the main questions from a critical standpoint is how cultural-historical psychology and activity theory could promote (and/or could be used as tools for) social transformation and personal growth.

Future Directions

The paradox is that despite "Vygotsky's boom," Vygotsky and other prominent Soviet psychologists remain undiscovered (Veresov, 2010). Rethinking Soviet psychology's legacy and elaborating a theoretical and methodological strategy for its contextualized and historical study from a critical standpoint remains an open question.

Moreover, cultural-historical psychology and activity theory and other trends of Soviet psychology face new challenges connected with "travelling" and being transformed and applied in so many parts of the globe. Their reflection and further development should take into account both the context of their formation in the Soviet Union during the twentieth century and the multiple contexts of their reception and application in different parts of the globe (Daniels, Cole, & Wertsch, 2007). The future of cultural-historical psychology and activity theory depends on scholars' and practitioners' ability to grasp adequately the ongoing societal and cultural transformations at the national, international, and local level and redevelop these theories.

Many concepts and ideas of Soviet psychology crossed the boundaries of psychology as a discipline and started developing at an interdisciplinary level. However, the mainstream approaches for integrating cultural-historical psychology and activity theory in interdisciplinary research are based on an eclectic rather than a dialectical framework. Building a dialectical meta-theoretical framework for further development of cultural-historical psychology and activity theory and narrowing the gap between theory and social practice remain tasks for the future.

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Online Resources

International Society for Cultural and Activity Research (ISCAR). http://twww.iscar.org/
Journal of Russian and East European Psychology. http://www.mesharpe.com/mall/results1.asp?ACR=RPO
Lev Vygotsky Archive. http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/

Space, Overview

Wendy Li
Department of Psychology, James Cook University, Townsville, Australia

Introduction

Space attained special prominence in early modern philosophy because of its importance in the new science. Immanuel Kant, for example, discussed space and spatiality in his early works on physics and metaphysics. Kant regarded spaces as the appearance of the external relations of unitary monads (Hatfield, 2006). In psychology, the study of space can be traced back to the nineteenth century. William James (1887), in his work *The Perception of Space*, argued that sensations were directly experienced as spatial in nature. James, in his later reviews, considered that spatial relations

were directly experienced as sensations (Farrell, 2011). Since then, the study of space perception developed rapidly. This field within psychology is concerned with how recognition of an object's physical appearance or its interactions is perceived, for example, by exploring the concepts of visual space, depth perception, movement, form, color, and their interactions. More specialized topics studied include a modal perception and object permanence. More recently, from a constructionist perspective, research in space has tended to stress upon the fundamental role of space in the construction of subjectivity and the regulation of social interaction.

Definition

The word space, derived from the Latin spatium, means "racetrack." It designates either an empty expanse among objects (e.g., the gap between plants) or a boundless, three-dimensional extent in which objects and events occur and have relative positions and directions vis-a-vis each other. These three dimensions are commonly understood to be the axes of length, width, and depth (or height). From a cognitive point of view, Mark (1993) proposed a model of three fundamental and distinct concepts of space, differentiated according to the perceptual of cognitive source of that information. In this model, haptic spaces are defined in the first instance by touching and bodily interaction; pictorial spaces are understood through the visual experiences; transperceptual spaces are learned primarily through inference during wayfinding.

Keywords

Perception of space; spatial cognition; spatial thinking; spatial identity; time-space compression; inbetweenness

Traditional Debates

From a traditional cognitive perspective, there are three spatial contexts within which humans can make the data-to-information transition: behavioral spaces, physical spaces, and cognitive spaces. Notwithstanding the different cognitive sources (e.g., haptic spaces, pictorial spaces, and transperceptual spaces), space provides an interpretive context that gives meaning to the data. Behavioral space involves spatial thinking which is a means to perceive the spatial relations between the self and the object(s) in the physical environment. This is cognition *in* space and involves decisions about the world in which humans live. Physical space focuses on a scientific understanding of the nature, structure, and function of space. This is cognition *about* space and involves thinking about the ways in which the "world" works. Cognitive space is concerned cognition *with* space and involves thinking with or through the medium of space in the abstract. In each case, space provides the essential interpretive context that gives meaning to the data. The concept of spatial cognition has been guided by a Piagetian framework, the influence of which is most evident in investigations of the conceptual development of large-scale space by emphasizing on orientation, wayfinding, route learning, spatial memory and capacity, and spatial problem-solving skills (Gauvain, 1993). Such an orientation results in the direction that spatial cognition is usually studied as an end in itself instead of as a component of the practical problems and goals of people's everyday actions. This direction ignores the influence of social and cultural information that is used to facilitate spatial problem solving. Traditionally, many physical space theorists remain fairly uninterested in problematizing the idea that space is straightforwardly empirical, objective, and "mappable."

Critical Debates

There are a number of critical debates with respect to the concept and research of space. The first is the "spatial turn." Across the social sciences and humanities, including psychology, the past three decades have witnessed a "spatial turn" which shifts away from structural or

categorized explanations. The spatial turn is referred to a move toward more culturally and geographically nuanced work, sensitive to difference and specificity, and therefore to the contingency of event and locale (Cosgrove, 2004). This move questions the need for categories such as "behavioral space," "physical space," and "cognitive space" (Thrift, 2006) by challenging the concept of spatial cognition which considers spatial thinking as a psychological given and hence can only exist as an independent, objective, and universal reality. In fact, the psychological process that operates during spatial thinking should not be automatically assumed to be essentially the same for all cultural groups. The spatial turn also marks the difference between physical space and geographical space that considers space as geographical container that is filled in by human activities. Tuan (1974, 1977), for example, stresses that space is created and maintained through "the fields of care" that result from people's emotional attachment. This notion of geographical space emphasizes the sensual, aesthetic, and emotional dimensions of space. Such a humanistic approach conceptualizes space as subjectively defined.

The second debate is associated with the development of technology and communication which creates virtual spaces such as the Internet. The virtual space brings the traditional assumptions associated with space-specific identity into question. Appadurai (1996) identifies technoscape (technology) as one of the "mediascapes" of the "global cultural flow." Technoscape constitutes a new way of conceptualizing the virtual relationship between people and landscapes, which has confronted normative notions of physical space. The dynamics of virtual space involve a shaping and reshaping of spatial thinking and the relationships that people have with it. In a sense, technology not only influences social networking but also transcends physical localities. The social phenomenon of virtual space provided by the technological development reflects Harvey's (1990b) concept of time-space compression. According to Harvey, time-space compression refers to the way the acceleration of economic activities leads to the destruction of spatial barriers and distances. Harvey contends that the production, circulation, and exchange of capital happens at ever-increasing speeds, particularly with the aid of advanced communication and transportation technologies, and results in capital moves at a pace faster than ever before. Such time-space compression characterizes an essential reality of social life in a technological era. Similarly, Harvey (1990a), in his study of the historical geography of concepts of space and time, argues that the roots of the social construction of the concepts of space and time lie in the mode of production and its characteristic social relations. As a result, different societies produce qualitatively different conceptions of space and time. Space thus is a historical and social construct.

The third is concerned with the concept of space identity. Recent research in social and environmental psychologies has devoted a great deal of attention to this concept. Spatial identity posits that a person's identity is intimately connected with a localized culture, firmly linked with a space or a locality. Spatial identity encompasses a varied set of approaches to the social construction of spaces. Of particular interest is its investigation into the meaning of spatial discourse in the regulation of social relations. Building on the idea that personal experiences are unavoidably located, the main point made is that social relations between the person and others in spaces are imbued with notions of power that shapes the creation of particular spatial identities within specific localities (Van Blerk, 2005).

Fourth, the globalization of immigration has facilitated the fluid movement of people between different cultures, thereby allowing them to frequently maintain homes in different countries, in order to pursue economic, political, and cultural interests that require their presence in multiple localities. Living in different countries, the development of the spatial identity can be anchored inbetweenness these cultures (Li, 2013), which represents the inbetweenness of the spatial identity (Li, Hodgetts, & Ho, 2010). The concept of inbetweenness moves away from static, stage-like conceptualizations of the

psychological processes that are involved in spatiality and spatial thinking, thus contributing to an understanding that spatial thinking is a process of identity-construction.

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Online Resources

Spatial Cognition Priority Programme. http://spp.cosy.informatik.uni-bremen.de/

Spatial Cognition Research Centre. http://iqn.cosy.informatik.uni-bremen.de/index.html

Centre for Spatial Studies. http://www.spatial.ucsb.edu/index.php

Spatial Thinking Lab. http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/~hegarty/

Spectacle

Luis Gregorio Iglesias Sahagun
Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro, México

Introduction

Two general possibilities in relation to "the spectacle" should be distinguished: when something is prepared or arranged to be displayed, and when anything that occurs or appears is worthy of being viewed. In the former, the decision and deliberated actions of a person or group to do something appealing to other people should be highlighted, and, in this case, about it would be called a show or scene. In the latter, the phenomenon or event is unexpected; it simply happens in the surroundings. This type of event or thing is exhibited while it is happening, then and there, in front of an individual, a group, or a collectivity, and it would be described as a spectacular thing or event.

There are numerous examples for both connotations of the word *spectacle*, but the second type, when something alien to any human grabs the collective attention, will be addressed first. Examples include natural phenomena, such as a meteor, a storm, a raging sea, a heavy snowfall, a sunset, northern lights, the eruption of a volcano, or Niagara Falls. In the same vein, we could include the shapes in the sky or the flames in a bonfire. In all these cases of natural phenomena, we are talking about events that have not been touched by any human hands, yet they are spectacular, they summon our stares and captivate our attention, and, in such way, they generate an audience.

Definition

The etymology of the word *spectacle* derives from the Latin root *spectare*, which means "to view or to watch" and from *specere*, which means "to look at." The spectacle is deployed when somebody and/or something grabs the attention of an audience; it is something that concentrates the stares. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, "It can also be seen as the situation in which a person is set before the public gaze as an object to be regarded either (a) with curiosity or contempt, or (b) with marvel or admiration."

Keywords

Spectator; society; culture Industry; mass media; media multure; reality; fiction

History

With greater or lesser devotion, different societies through history have attended a variety of events that we can gather into the category of spectacle. Consider, for example, how the astrologer Ptolemy in the second century, starting from the zodiac's astrological knowledge, summarizes the observations performed by his ancestors over more than 3000 years' time. Or think how, before, in cave paintings at various latitudes of the planet, primitive humans expressed their passage through the territories and what they looked at and faced there. As scholars have come to reveal, ancient civilizations had recorded the attendance and even forecasted a range of natural phenomena and weather events, information that can be seen on steles, temples, papyrus scrolls, and codex.

Going back to the first kind of spectacle, when something has been arranged to lure attention from people, we can find examples from ancient cultures, such as the ancient Olympian games (Swadling, 2000), Greek theatre, or The City Dionysian Religious Festival in Athens (Scott, 2010). In another vein of shows are the bloody activities at the Coliseum during the Roman Empire (Fagan, 2011). Later, in the medieval Europe, examples of activities and spectacular events are the knightly tournaments, the solemn ceremony of consecration of a king, or the marriage or burial of members of the nobility (Huzinga, 2001).

With the proliferation of urban conditions of life that began in the nineteenth century, a new stage for the spectacular display became possible due to industrialization and markets' new modes of action. Certainly, the second half of the nineteenth century saw significant changes in the physiognomy of the cities in which industrialism gave rise to a vigorous mercantile capitalism. The Crystal Palace, an emblematic building of London's Great Exhibition in 1851, can be considered a landmark announcing the imminent transformation of the world that was to come. It seemed to sum up the British industrial mightiness, while announcing the set of arcades, dressers, and cabinets determined to reproduce and proliferate, something that represented the beginnings of the intimate modern alliance between trade and spectacle.

Trade and spectacle can be distinguished as the two combined ingredients that take part in what Marx conceptualized as the "commodity form." In an economy based on money, a necessary and even indispensable component for commodities is their display due to the fact that commodities are things and services produced to be sold. This means that the commodity form has, as part of its process' essential moment, the need to enter into circulation in the public domain; that is, it must be proposed to the scrutiny of the collective gaze. The destination of the goods and, more importantly, the destination of the community whose social relations are verified under the preponderance of the commodity form is not other but to become the spectacle themselves. As Walter Benjamin states:

> World exhibitions glorified the exchange value of the goods, they created a framework in which its use value became a background. Inaugurating a phantasmagoria in which people went to distracting themselves. The spectacle industry made it easier, raising them to the level of the

> merchandise. Those (people) undergoing their manipulations, while they enjoyed their alienation from themselves and others. (Benjamin, 1979, *Charles Baudelaire*, p. 165)

The mere fact of a continuous display of commodities and their prices was becoming a spectacle, which turned into a key aspect of the new consumer's society that was emerging.

Traditional Debates

As a first approach to the topic, an article by George Elliot Howard written in 1912, entitled "Social Psychology of the Spectator," provides timely reading of the phenomenon, positioning it within social-psychic life. With an interesting Hegelian vein, Howard outlines the relationship between spectator and spectacle. He writes that, although the desires of the viewer are decisive for the nature of the spectacle, "The spectacle which the spectator molds, in its turn molds the spectator." Talking about the psychology of the viewer, Howard makes the distinction between an experienced single show and another who is attended by a massive audience. Howard's analytical suggestion presents the viewer as a composite social-psychic personality. But his underlying suggestions are bolder than those stated today, as he posits the viewers themselves each as a society in miniature, a microcosm of the wider society of which, in fact, they are a psychic part.

Actually, Howard was replacing the figure of the crowd, as it was appearing at that moment in the approaches of the theory of the psychology of crowds, with the spectator's figure. "The viewer's traits" or the characteristics assigned to viewers that he proposes in his work are the same as those that great theorists of the crowd had assigned to its object of study (Le Bon, Orano, Sighele, Squillace, and others). The viewer is driven by emotions, which are the most powerful source of social action and are also the most readily influenced; this idea of "suggestion-imitation" clearly resonates with the theory of Gabriel Tarde. Likewise, he stresses the social atmospheric vector, which can be also understood as the series of characteristics of the situation or context, critical to the performance and execution of the beholder. Having this in mind, he proposes using the suggestibility of the spectator-crowd in favor of social well-being. Howard regards the city as a prototype stage, a locus displaying all sorts of spectacles:

> A city is the mightiest of all spectacles, and as such it both reflects and moulds the psychology of its people – its spectator, it makes a vast difference, for instance, whether the city be a thing of beauty or a thing of ugliness. (Howard, 1912, p. 39)

As Meyer (2003) says in Wordsworth Prelude's reading, "In a large urban society, the individual and the crowd are both spectator(s) and spectacle(s) at the same time."

At the end of his article, Howard utters a conspicuous concluding statement: "By Nature's law, recreative pleasures are essential to sound body, sound mind, sound character and sound social living. Why longer suffer them to be monopolized for commercial exploitation – often for vicious ends?"

Similarly, the sociologist Simmel emphasizes the sight's dominance in big modern cities, wherein he identified an increased nervousness in the population, mainly derived from the multiplication and intensification of stimuli, all of which generated an atmosphere conducive to overstimulation nervosa.

With regard to the link between the psychology of crowds and spectacle, Sigmund Freud's *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, written in 1922, should be mentioned as well. In this work, Freud puts into perspective the strategic role that certain figures, people, and ideas can play in relation to large groups of people, which may occur in the relationship established between situations of entertainment and entertainment figures and their audiences. Certainly, unlike Howard and Simmel, who emphasize the aspect of the collectiveness and the objective culture, Freud puts the weight of agency on the psychic dynamics of the subject. Through this, Freud tries to understand the formation and the respective qualities of the masses, not only as disruptive but also as organized human masses, for instance, the church and the army. Here, one of the fronts of

the debate seems to be expressed: on the one hand, the approaches that emphasize the formation and collective dynamics of the objective culture (including the figure of the viewer) to understand the effects of the show and its own dynamics, and, on the other hand, the approaches that privilege the determinations and performances of the psychic or psychological subject to understand the spectacle's psychology.

Critical Debates

It was not until after World War II that some analytical and critical studies on communication and propaganda were published. Indeed, the experiences under totalitarian regimes in Germany, Italy, and the USSR were crucial to the emergence of such studies (e.g., the 1953 essay *La Fausse Parole* by Armand Robin). However, it is important to mention two magnificent stories written during the first third of the century, which, in regards to the conditions and effects of the spectacle, are very worthy of attention because they exhibit several key aspects that might allow a critical comprehension of the articulations between spectacle and politics and, more precisely, the articulations between spectacle and domination. These narratives are the 1924 work *Josephine, die Sängerin, oder Das Volk der Mäuse* (*Josephine the Singer, or The Mouse Folk*) by Kafka and the 1929 work *Mario und der Zauberer* (*Mario and the Magician*) by Thomas Mann.

Another debate that actually derives at some extent or at least is already insinuated within the above mentioned is expressed in the following positions:

(a) More psychosocial approaches/perspectives take into account the social and historical context, the institutional frameworks, and the social practices. Approaches of a psychosocial-located knowledge see the spectacle as an instrumentalization or as an instrumental means through which certain practices are displayed and seek particular effects on behalf of several social, political, and economical actors (Adorno, 1979; Billig, 1992, 1995; De Vos, 2012; Debord, 2002; Kellner, 2004; King, 2004; Postman, 1985).

(b) Some perspectives, although contextualized (taking into account certain aspects about everyday contemporary life), insufficiently offer a critical analysis of the context. These are the type of studies of empirical design testifying of an extreme methodological individualism, the latter facilitated through the psychological language used in their discourse. Consider those approaches that address certain kinds of spectacles to learn how consumers (spectators) receive them and the possible effects that the spectacle has over them, for example, studies on violence and aggression in the media or on consumers of mediatized violence (Goldstein, 1998; Grimes Anderson & Bergen, 2008; Haugen, 2007).

In the mid-twentieth century, studies by authors of the critical theory, mainly Adorno and Horkheimer, set up a discussion agenda about the cultural industry. Theodor Adorno's essays on the cultural industry as well as his work with Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, are critical milestones regarding the role that spectacle was playing, and was being called to play, while the technological media and market economy were developing during that century. Horkheimer and Adorno laid the foundation of an interpretation or critical reception of what they called the cultural industry, which is, precisely, the set of conditions, technical tools, and technological devices, as well as the practices associated with their operation, creating the spectacular display of power of the industrial capitalism of the twentieth century. Horkheimer and Adorno showed, as early as the 1940s, how behaviors and simple and ordinary expressions, such as gestures or tones of voice, were being adapted to models imposed by the cultural industry and advertising.

Likewise, Bell (1973, p. 21) pointed out that, in modern society, a post-industrial "function 'mediator' is being developed by the mass media – the mentors of behaviour are movies, television, and advertising." According to Adorno, media content is adapted to mass consumption. Is it not true that, in order to achieve

public appeal, mass media combines high and low culture and mixes the boundaries between them? For Adorno, the masses are perceived by the cultural industry as objects for calculation; whereas the consumer is certain that the media are adapted to his/her needs, the cultural industry rather produces this sentiment and enhances its influence in this way.

Objections have been raised against critical theory for missing the ability of the public to react, forming their own opinion, and resisting critically the ravages of the systems of domination. Especially popular is that lower classes are almost invariably presumed to be mere puppets following the dictates of what should be consumed and thought. Nonetheless, time has shown the robustness of some of Adorno's critical remarks, especially those regarding the consumption trends in postindustrial capitalist societies. Consider, for example, the following quote:

> amusement under late capitalism is the prolongation of work. It is sought after as an escape from the mechanized work process, and to recruit strength in order to be able to cope with it again. But at the same time mechanization has such a power over man's leisure and happiness, and so profoundly determines the manufacture of amusement goods, that his experiences are inevitably after-images of the work process itself. (1979, p. 137)

Afterwards, during the turbulent 1960s, *The Society of the Spectacle*, by Guy Debord – at the time, leader activist of the Situationist International – was published. Although the book is a powerful tool constructed with Marx's critique of the commodity and the value form, and the Lucaksian sight about alienation, its chief aim was that of bolstering the realm of praxis. Debord sees the mass media as just a limited aspect of spectacle, "its most glaring superficial manifestation, seems to be invading society." He describes it as a technical apparatus, yet this device is not neutral, but has been developed according to the logic and dynamics of the spectacle. Debord thinks of the spectacle as a sort of capitalist economy's stage in which the economy, through the shape of the spectacle, reflects, at one and the same time, the production of things and a distorted objectification of producers. Separation is an essential moment in the process by which the capitalist economy becomes itself the performance of the spectacle. That is, the separation between the workers and the product of their work is their only realm of accomplishment and communication. It is the triumph of the world's proletarianization; the workers are just a replaceable cog in the machinery of the system. The spectacle becomes a mighty device, a portentous generator of isolation. For Debord, the spectacle is the producer of loneliness.

Debord's work has shown the absolute complicity among economics, politics, and spectacle in advanced industrial societies. Since 1967, when Debord published his book, although the theoretical approach continues to show its value to generate an important understanding of social dynamics and individual experiences, what has changed in remarkable ways is the technological platform, expanding and diversifying the range of possibilities that the spectacle can offer.

For Debord, the "show" is contemporary society, and we are the cast of spectators, sometimes knowingly and other times unwittingly. So, according to Crimeth Inc. (2001, p. 145), the spectacle immobilizes spectators, it grasps their attention and keeps them occupied "without making them active, it keeps them feeling involved without giving them control." However, in recent years, often, the spectacle is people itself. Consider how funny and entertaining it is to watch what people do. Even though we know that much of such programming is staged and rehearsed, this does not seem to matter to us because we answer the key injunction of the spectacle: entertainment. Entertainment is not just a political and social managing keyword, it is, indeed, a key activity. Such seems to have been the apprenticeship that governs all ages, and that people interested in influencing, control or manipulate others have acquired.

Future Directions

Since the age of electronics, media has shown an increasing power of influence and effectiveness,

which can be seen through its driving, indoctrinating, or merely persuading of groups and individuals. The culture of the image comes to reveal itself as a useful tool, used by the hegemonic forces, to manage the public opinion, even to the extent of diversifying and improving of the technological gadgets to pursue its purposes. However, it seems that this is happening in quite new subtle ways. Neil Postman (1985) shares structural estimations with Adorno and Debord related to the location of the show business in the late twentieth century society, yet he is rather concerned with the changes in the consistency of public discourse. Postman argues that the central feature of public discourse has become "amusement" and its potential to entertain people. This has come to represents a major task of today's journalists, politicians, teachers, and others.

The hegemony of the image and the increasingly sophisticated technical conditions opens up a wide range of choices, many of them involving the users themselves. This hegemony even came to alter the subject-object opposition. Or as King puts it, "the spectacle is not the domination of the world by images or any other form of mind-control, but the domination of a social interaction mediated by images" (King, 2004, p. 19). That is, in addition to the passive contemplation of the screens, there is the activity motivated and organized from the screens, turning fiction into reality in different ways. Is it not precisely the psychological discourse, spread in the culture of the image, the vehicle that enables the tragic participation of the subject?

> Debord's concept of the spectacle is integrally connected to the concept of separation and passivity, for in submissively consuming spectacles, one is estranged from actively producing one's life. (Kellner, 2004)

Although the subject strives to actively participate and show its way of being (for example, in TV reality shows), the consequences of its actions imprinted in the world are not certain, such is the tragic element. "The screen provides a safe distance between the viewer and the world" (De Vos, 2012, p. 65). However, according also to De Vos' opinion, perhaps the efforts and actions of the subject can be exhausted in the psychotainment, hence the question is still relevant, who is defending the subject from the screens? What is the secure distance between the spectator and the show?

At the least it is certain, considering the effects of spectacular society and the overwhelming development of its technological platform, that a critical psychology has much to learn from the works of Baudrillard (1981), Postman (1985), Gubern (1987, 1989, 1996), Gómez de Liaño (1989), Kellner (2003, 2004), Crary (1990, 1999), and Fagan (2011).

The emerging culture of media spectacle and its potential to focus the attention of masses of spectators, and to intervene in the economical, political, social, and quotidian "agendas," make it such that the spectacle constitutes a domain of crucial practical importance for the contemporary societies.

Kellner correctly formulates the challenge to psychology thusly:

> Media culture proliferates ever more technologically sophisticated spectacles to seize audiences and increase their power and profit. The forms of entertainment permeate news and information, and a tabloidized infotainment culture is increasingly popular. New multimedia that synthesize forms of radio, film, TV news and entertainment, and the mushrooming domain of cyberspace, become spectacles of technoculture, generating expanding sites of information and entertainment, while intensifying the spectacle-form of media culture. (Kellner, 2004)

"To govern is to make to believe," said Machiavelli. Five hundred years later, this has reached a very high level of realization.

In view of the wide range of situations in which individuals, groups, and crowds are engrossed watching the show, it seems appropriate to diversify psychological research. That is, to go beyond the psychology of attention, thresholds, and selectivity in attentional processes and, rather, seek to work on the cultural and social *ways of seeing* (as John Berger entitled his book), on the diversity of objects, images, and performances that societies are producing to be watched, and, furthermore, on the variety of scenarios, supports, vehicles, and practices through which contemporary imageries are displayed.

The spectacle gathers enough features to be considered an appropriate object of study and critical analysis to be elucidated by psychology. Both in its aspect of event and in its aspect of single spectator, small group, or mass event, it is important to recognize the content or plot and theme of the spectacle, to elucidate the relationship of this to the context in which it is presented, and, finally, to consider the specific weight of the spectacle in terms of an experience of social interaction that encompasses a variety of patterns of socialization.

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Spirituality

Betty M. Bayer
The Martin Marty Center, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA

Introduction

To many, any history of the modern subject absent spirituality is, if not misbegotten, then certainly incomplete. That is, to investigate modern spirituality is to inquire into the *nature* of human nature, including debates on subjectivity, inner experience, ontology, affectivity and human consciousness writ large. At its best, scholarship on spirituality moves beyond reductive accounts of human consciousness to mind or

brain to remind scholars in any number of fields – religion, sociology, biology, neurology, physics, philosophy, neuropsychology, cognition, and psychology – of the complicatedness of consciousness, and, by extension, of how we imagine what it is to be human from the inside out and the outside in. "The range of Spiritualist views," writes Ann Taves (1999), "fell along a continuum with Nature as the (sole) source of all revelation at one end and the Bible as the sole source of revelation at the other" (p. 184). To invoke nature was to locate the source of spiritual experience in the interior realms of private mental life. However, this naturalism of spirituality posed its own paradox. Science and spiritual experience – whether of religious belief or of spirits of the dead – were not entirely at odds with one another. Spiritualists as scientists often sought and even worked with one another to validate their experience or claims seeking to demonstrate the workings of spirituality in materialist terms. Writing in the nineteenth century, William James (1902) invoked the idea of "more" to counter such twinned reductionism operating in science and religion; by this term he meant "actually and literally more life in our total soul than we are at any time aware of" (p. 501).

This Jamesian "more" can be said to lie at the heart of several centuries of study of and debate on spirituality: is spirituality all in the mind? Is it an expression of the inexpressible? Is it a way to signal "more" outside of claims of religious doctrines or institutions or secularity? How does one reconcile spirituality's manifestations in religious, secular, and scientific settings? Or, its assumed role in equations of modernity with secularization and rationality with disenchantment? On what bases are experiences of spirituality confirmed or disconfirmed? What sustains continuing interest in spirituality and debates on it in science, religion and psychology? On what do these ongoing histories and revisitings of spirituality offer revelation – the nature of the human, the nature of "more" (the divine or transcendent) and/or the nature of nature itself?

Such questions bring one to spirituality's ontological and epistemological terrain; they direct one as well to the split of epistemology and ontology as one assumed to be fundamental to secularization, to repositioning knowledge and knower, mind and world, world and wonder (Bayer, 2008; Wingrove, 2005). Psychology's disciplinary history bears the traces of its own divided self on this matter, cleaving to spirituality as a matter of epistemology, for the most part, leaving to religious studies more matters of ontology (though science of religion or psychology of religion do not forgo epistemology). Larger questions and the longer history of spirituality thus haunt science, psychology, and religion, as disciplinary ghosts standing epistemologically and ontologically on the thresholds of disenchantment and enchantment.

Definition

Broadly conceptualized, spirituality covers that vast terrain of relations between matter and spirit. Even as spirituality enjoys (or suffers) a surfeit of definitions, many concur on at least one historical shift in meaning from a quality of the divine residing outside the self to (at least since the Enlightenment) subjective inner forces of spiritual significance. This shift is often, in turn, aligned with fashioning the Western modern self. To define spirituality as religion's "sloppy shadow" or to contrast it with religion by seeing spirituality as outside institutions and formal structures is to misunderstand both terms (Bender, McRoberts, & Omar, 2012). Said another way, "take away the theistic God of religious tradition, and there is little left. . .take away the God of theism, and New Age spiritualities of life remain virtually intact" (Heelas, 2006, p. 46). Secularization is thus not explained by a decline in religion and rise in spirituality, and spirituality does not indicate the last gasp of the sacred. To define spirituality as either an accompanying feature of secularity or a sign of secularity's rise is to diminish seeing spirituality as itself productive of theories of the secular and of the mind, theories of affect and of mind-body relations, modalities of authority, and scientific method and practices (most especially around ideas of suggestibility,

deception and skepticism). Spirituality may also be defined as the media through which relations between interior and exterior life were forged and reforged, and, therefore, "mediation as Spiritual practice itself" (McGarry, 2008, p. 20). Definitions of spirituality need therefore concern themselves with spirituality's ontological influence and as an epistemic agent in modern science, including psychology.

Keywords

Spirit medium; new age; animal magnetism; hypnosis; mesmerism; religion; trance; secularism; skepticism; subliminal self; divided self; dissociation; influence; suggestibility; supernormal

History

Modern spirituality is today considered more central than outer fringe of social, political, and cultural life for Victorians and for Americans (Kontou & Willburn, 2012; Owen, 1989). Contrary to relegating modern spirituality to some "ghost story of the long nineteenth century" (McGarry, 2008), historians and religious studies scholars alike are plumbing the vast archives and reaches of what is loosely gathered under the sign of modern spirituality. Modern spirituality's emergence is itself said to have arisen from the cultural medium of mesmerism and animal magnetism. During the nineteenth and twentieth century in North America, this inner quest or spiritual seeker became understood most prominently through Transcendentalism (e.g., Emerson, Whitman, Fuller, and also James), Modern Spirituality and the New Age (Schmidt, 2005). Today's resurgence of interest in the spiritual corresponds to several trends. Increasing attention is being paid to growing numbers of people claiming to be "spiritual-not-religious" or to fall into what is deemed the "religious nones" (those who uphold a belief in "some kind of divinity" even as they do not hold any religious affiliation) (Bender & McRoberts). Attention to evident increases in people claiming to be spiritual but not religious is heightened by challenges this self-same trend brings to long assumed correspondences between modernism and secularism, including notions harboring some sense of spiritual secularism. Running parallel to the long ghost story of the nineteenth century is the long spirituality story, two stories whose twinned influence is formative in conceptualizing relations between matter and spirit in the making of the modern self.

Two mid-nineteenth century markers instance spirituality's emerging history and role in notions of the self and of the founding of the discipline of psychology (Coon, 1992). One is found in phrenologist Orson Fowler's discovery in 1842 of the faculty of Spirituality "located 'on each side of Veneration' in 'the middle of the top of the head,'" "securing an 'interior perception of TRUTH'" (cited in Modern, 2011, p. 121). A second, in the United States, is what is considered the 1848 founding of the Spiritualist movement when two young girls, Kate and Margaret Fox, heard a series of rappings from beyond the grave by a murdered peddler in their upstate New York home. The girls came to discover ways to become themselves a "spiritual telegraph" to decrypt messages from and communicate with the dead. 1848 also marks the formative year of the women's movements with the July reading in Seneca Falls at the Wesleyan Chapel of the "Declaration of Sentiments" re-envisioning the Declaration of Independence on which it was modeled to say "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and women are created equal." Coincident with this moment, writes McGarry (2008), was the publication of the "Communist Manifesto" by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, introducing its revolutionary call with "A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of Communism." To these one might well add Frederick Douglass's 1852 speech "What is July 4th to the Negro." From charting interior faculties of mental life through to an alteration in who could speak with the dead or channel the divine and to the political economics of labor and class and of Native American rights, modern spirituality emerges in a context of revolts around class, suffrage, and abolition.

Growing interest in the history of spirituality spans centuries of debate in science, medicine, religion and psychology; its ontological and epistemological reach extends to theories of the mind, brain, soul, self, nature, culture and politics. Contrary to turning away from science, spiritualists and scientists "both used the language of empiricism to establish the truth claims of their respective belief systems," giving rise, in part, to what is termed Spiritualists' "ethos of democratic skepticism" and "its radical redefinition of the congregant as 'spiritual investigator'" (McGarry, pp. 153, 124). Spiritualists mediated debates between religion and science much as they did between religion and medicine. Spirit mediums, as hysterics, and both principally female, performed a "psychic double play of fractured subjectivities" – active, speaking subject and passive object. They both "confounded and informed men of science" (p. 126). New York neurologist Frederic Marvin's 1870s term "mediomania" connected Spiritualism and insanity, pinpointing its source (yet once more) in the disordered female body. Though not his intention, Marvin's term "mediomania" stands as useful signifier of the inner necessities of this age marked as it was by communicating across "land and water via wires and cables to a link across time itself"(p. 20). Even new emerging media technologies of the day (telegraph, print, photography and) have been deemed "haunted media." Science and spiritualism thus became co-producers of the age, taking up the discourses of electrical inventions and communication alongside skeptical attitudes and empiricism.

Spirituality thus illuminates entanglements of science (including technology), religion, medicine and psychology in different ages. To William James, study of spirituality, whether of trance, automatic writing, conversion, the reality of the unseen or mysticism, offered one and another window on the sometimes twinned dogmatism operating in science's medical materialism and the emerging science of religion. Their universalism, he argues, including universalistic supernaturalism, "surrenders. . .too easily to naturalism. It takes the facts of physical science at their face-value, and leaves the laws of life as naturalism finds them, with no hope of remedy in case the fruits are bad" (1902, p. 511). There is, he commented, a "sad discordancy" marking medical materialism's measure of moments of "sentimental and mystical experience" and of genius as signs of disease alike. Medical materialism, he continues, "finishes up Saint Paul by calling his vision on the road to Damascus a discharging lesion of the occipital cortex, he being a epilectic. It snuffs out Saint Teresa as an hysteric" (p. 14). Science, says James,

> . . . means first of all a certain dispassionate method. To suppose it means a certain set of results that one should pin one's faith upon and hug forever, is sadly to mistake its genius, and degrades the scientific body to the status of the sect (1, p. 132)

That both science and religion may assume their authority and orthodoxy in ways duplicative of one another led James (1892) to propose, tongue-in-cheek, perhaps, the Society for Psychical Research as "a surprisingly useful mediator between the old order and the new" (p. 100).

James's reflections well characterize the history of modern spiritualism as mediator between the old order and the new, whether of consciousness, unconscious life, mind, brain, soul, body, self, scientific skepticism, or what some term more broadly productive spaces of matter and spirit. Spirituality inspired countless works of fiction and poetry, stirred new imaginings of the workings of the mind, and revealed itself as more than convenient foil to ideas on rationalism and dispassionate inquiry alike. The current resurgence in scholarship, which some date to the 1970s, figures Spirituality as one of the key actors in fashioning the modern self, as foundational to notions of a dynamic mind, rationality, consciousness, spirit, affect, self, and science as it was and continues to be to science, medicine, neurology and psychology.

Critical Debates

While modern spirituality reads as a history often mired in debate, one preeminent and continuous

swath cuts through the centuries – the question of material reductionism, and, not unrelated, the matter of nature and the real. Echoes of James's insights into the twinned reductionism operating in science and religion alike populate religion, science and neuropsychology debate today, or what has been deemed the science-religions wars. Related to these matters of medical or scientific reductionism are those advancing a kind of what has been termed a New Naturalism, an approach, most especially as found in the cognitive sciences, relying on philosophical reductionism in epistemologies of the "real" (Herrnstein Smith, 2009). This latter effort to naturalize limited notions of the mind in religion recalls mid-twentieth century revisions to making religion newly psychological – from "mere existence to *essence*" (Ellwood, 1997) – as well as that found in nineteenth century of religion as an "option rather than an obligation" (Modern). As counterpart to these mounting forms of reductionism in study of mind and spirit are emerging forms of scholarship interested less in the religion-secularity debate than in the wide-ranging and formative effects of spirituality.

Ann Harrington (2008) addresses each of these debates in her work on the "cure within," a history of mind-body cure and medicine. Challenging reductions of the mind to the brain, Harrington asks how changes in "ideas and theories over time. . .also involved changes in the sorts of experiences people had. . .that one might need to make room for culture and history inside the body" (p. 251). Her approach carries a certain resonance with James's (1902) concern with how "the unseen region . . . produces effects in this world. . ..that which produces effects within another reality must be termed a reality itself, so I feel as if we had no philosophic excuse for calling the unseen or mystical world unreal" (pp. 506–7). James draws on lovers as offering instructive analogy on the reality of the unseen and the power of ontological imagination: the lover "uninterruptedly affects [one] through and through," a relation in which one experiences continuously a habitual sense of presence, by which "each is haunted, of the other being in the world" (p. 71). What makes Harrington's work so compelling is how she re-envisions the place of the power of suggestion, the body that speaks, positive thinking and meditation, Buddhism and eastward influences in current psychological research, including recent revisitings to research on placebo effects. Marilyn Robinson (2010) plumbs current science-religion debate for their histories of philosophical and epistemological reductionism, their "parascience," reducing, by one and another turn, the mind to the brain and the brain to a material nature of fairly limited parameters. As she argues, "'the material' itself is an artifact of the scale at which we perceive" (p. 126). "Let us say," she ventures, "the mind is what the brain does. This is a definition that makes the mind, whatever else, a participant in the whole history and experience of the body" (p. 3113). These critical histories of material reductionism bear significance for the realm of the psyche; they reveal the critical significance of science-religion-spirituality-psychology debate as one of forming a medium in which is cultured what counts as the mind or a rational life; debates amongst science, religion and psychology are the medium that becomes us.

It is not simply that here in these debates we find the age-old question of modern spirituality. Rather, new approaches to modern spirituality are opening the ground of understanding of what appear to be age-old debates and offer themselves as well to current interest in ontology and affect studies. These debates as critical histories of them provoke new questions of what forms of the psyche, of rationality or of experience or life were foreclosed by psychology's gathering of the terms encapsulated by modern spirituality under rubrics of suspicion, skepticism and madness (Bayer, 2008). What did it mean to render rational life as the sign of secularism and affect a sign of spirituality or disorder? What does it feel like, as Modern asks, to live within a secular age? Debates on modern spirituality today thus pose anew questions of the modern subject, of individualism, autonomy, and freedom as well as

tackling the political economy of affect or inner happiness, healing, – all key concerns of a critical psychology.

International Relevance

Debates featuring the expanse of modern spirituality span the globe. While the history presented here latches on to its emergence in the Western world and more specifically with how modern spiritualism served to engage Christianity as science critically, the terms of this debate are especially relevant as science, religion and experience are being brought to bear on gender, reproductive rights and freedom. As well, the spiritual renaissance, if one may call it that, brings with it newfound interest in eastern spiritual influences and healing practices, understandings of mind-body relations and spiritual life, and what transpires under the sign of religion and/or spirituality.

Practical Relevance and Future Directions

Spirituality has not held a prominent place in critical psychology or psychology for that matter. Just as histories of modern spirituality are seeing it as playing a more central role in histories of the mind and so on, so one might anticipate a more central and critically engaged space within critical psychology. Spirituality is relevant to the field's questions of the formation of the human subject, of neoliberalism and of mind and body; as well, critical psychology has itself often concerned itself with matters of subjectivity and epistemology while forgoing those of ontology. To see spirituality's formative role in so many psychological concepts and theories is to open the way to critical psychology engaging the area to open new avenues of critical psychology and understandings of the place of modern spirituality in the field. Certainly recent emphases in the discipline of an evolutionary or neuropsychological direction call theoretical and critical psychology to investigate relations of matter and spirit and of ontology, now largely examined by historians, philosophers and religious studies scholars.

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Statistics, Overview

Brett Stoudt
John Jay College, The City University of New York, New York, NY, USA

Introduction

Quantitative research is the dominant paradigm in psychology and, thus, the primary way the discipline judges "truth" and creates new knowledge. Like any privileged standpoint, the use of aggregated numbers to understand individual psychological processes, attitudes, or behaviors is rarely questioned. Debates and critiques about statistics are often held at the level of what techniques are most appropriate to use technically and mathematically. Rarely are theoretical discussions had about why, when, or even *if* quantification can accurately model human experience. Thus, while psychology students get trained in statistics, often very sophisticated statistics, they are seldom offered an opportunity to approach the subject from a critical perspective; nevertheless, a critical quantitative tradition does exist in the social sciences.

Definition

Though "critical statistics" is an uncommon topic in psychology, the occasional article, chapter, or book has accumulated over the years into a respectable body of work. Collectively, five themes emerge from this literature.

1. A "critical statistics" is not an outcome or an achievement but a way to approach the entire research process involved with quantifying psychological and social experience. Applying a critical perspective to statistics includes a critical awareness at all the stages along the way: the questions, the research designs, the types of instruments, the strategies for measurement, the questions that are asked, the sampling, how the data are "cleaned" in a dataset, how the variables are disaggregated and aggregated, what statistical procedures are used, how the data are explored, how and with whom the analyses are discussed, how the analyses are visualized, how the findings are presented/written, where and with whom the analyses are presented/written, and many more small and large pivot points that evolve as research unfolds.
2. A "critical statistics" acknowledges that quantitative methods can both distort and enlighten, has strengths and weaknesses, and therefore is in conversation with not in opposition to qualitative methods. The divide between qualitative and quantitative techniques is an unproductive debate that can prevent researchers from using methods that more fully address their research questions as well as divert researchers from much more important ontological and epistemological discussions (i.e., what exists of human psychology and behavior to be studied and what evidence will we trust as "truth," "fact," or "knowledge"). Methodological pluralism, also known as mixed methods or triangulated methods, has garnered significant momentum and support. Therefore, quantitative research is *a* useful method for understanding social experience, but it is not *the only* useful method for understanding social experience.
3. A "critical statistics" is a principled and action-oriented approach to the social sciences in the larger pursuit of democratic participation, equality, and justice. It is in service of marginalized communities to reveal oppressive systems, institutions, and policies. A critical approach to quantitative methods is connected with critical theories including critical race theory, feminist theory, indigenous theory, queer theory, and any other theories that help reveal social inequality and help promote activism, emancipation, and justice. A quantitative criticalist, as described by Stage (2007), has two primary responsibilities. The first is to use quantitative data to represent "processes and outcomes on a large scale to reveal inequalities and to identify social or institutional perpetuation of systematic inequalities in such processes and outcomes" (p. 96).

The second is to "question models, measures, and analytic practices of quantitative research in order to offer competing models, measures and analytic practices that better describe experiences of those who have not been adequately represented" (p. 96).

4. A "critical statistics" understands quantitative approaches as a sociopolitical practice that is historically and contextually situated. Professional statisticians and researchers are not objective and nor are their decisions as to what should be researched, what questions to ask, how the data are interpreted, and what should be presented. Counting is a fundamentally exclusionary human activity. To count is to make a choice about what is included and what is excluded: not only what to count and how to count but who to count. Statistical methods and analyses, while potentially informative, are tools to convey a sense of authority and persuasiveness. This is true of an academic publishing numbers to garner support for a statistical model or politicians using numbers to garner support for proposed legislation. Therefore, the production of knowledge through quantitative research cannot be separated from the distribution of power at multiple layers of social experience.
5. A "critical statistics" promotes statistical literacy and critical participation throughout the quantitative process. Quantitative methods are gatekeepers to participation, separating expert from layperson. The necessary critical conversations the numbers should facilitate are too often reserved for "professionals." And even among professional researchers, the complexity of mathematics can inhibit fruitful dialogue. A critical approach to quantitative methods should promote democratic participation among colleagues and among all citizens, particularly those who are most affected by unjust policies and oppressive systems, by demystifying the too technical complexity of quantification while at the same time insisting on troubling the too simplistic interpretations of human experience. A movement called "Barefoot Statisticians" embodies this ethic – inspired by China's "Barefoot Doctors" where locally trained medical intermediaries within poor and rural communities are trained to handle the community's basic health needs; barefoot statisticians are trained to serve the local community's basic quantitative needs for the purposes of critical democratic engagement and activism.

Keywords

Critical statistics; radical statistics; quantitative criticalist

History

Before the twentieth century, the earliest applied materialization of quantitative social research began in service of governments (i.e., England, Germany, France) and the political elite. "Political arithmetic," as it was called, collected social facts about the population for the purposes of governing, though occasionally in the name of democracy, largely in the name of state control (Desrosieres, 1999). Since then, quantitative social science research, especially psychology, boomed and became part of the public's consciousness. For example, the modern social scientific surveys of the twentieth century had profound influence on American society. The use of statistical procedures such as frequency counts, aggregated majorities, and averages to represent the survey findings informed and continues to inform what is considered normality, morality, identity, and democratic participation in our country (e.g., through the United States Census to measure the population, Gallup Polls to capture public opinion, the Kinsey Report to learn about private sexual activity, Myers-Briggs to reveal internal personality structures). Igo (2007) noted, "In the concrete techniques of the questionnaire and the interview, in public debates over survey findings, and in encounters between researchers and the researched, a new mode of knowing "ourselves" took shape in the twentieth–century United States" (p. 282).

The establishment of statistics and psychology as academic fields was closely related. One particularly important development in the history of quantitative psychological research was the move from individual to statistical aggregate. The origins of modern experimental psychology started in Wilhelm Wundt's laboratory studies of self-observation. Psychologists were looking to distinguish the field of psychology from philosophy and as a "real" experimental science like physics. Early attempts at psychological experimentation by Wundt and his early followers were heavily focused on repeated trials of a small sample of individuals rather than the aggregation of many individuals. The experimenter and the subject were often colleagues in the same lab and thus interchanged their roles. The individual was so clearly present in the data that even the names of the experimenter and the subjects were included in the published analysis. To many early psychologists, learning about the individual from the group seemed fundamentally in opposition to their goals. However, through the pioneering work of Francis Galton, quantitative aggregation would soon become the more dominant approach in psychology (Danzinger, 1990).

Galton and those influenced by his approach used large samples to examine aggregated psychological processes. This approach allowed claims to be made about the individual from numerical patterns found in the collective. Thus, learning about the individual involved comparing the extent to which personal responses deviated ("error") from statistical norms derived from large samples of responses. Through probability, general inferences were then made from the statistical aggregation to the theoretical population of interest. The influence of this new logic based on the statistical regularities of large numbers and probability could eventually be found across the field of psychology from the aggregated scores of experimental and control groups to the psychological attributes measured from multiple survey items then collapsed into a single score through factor analysis. The statistical approaches influenced by Galton were increasingly seen as useful to advancing practical questions and in retrospect were also, like political arithmetic of the nineteenth century, useful in social control and administration (e.g., IQ testing to manage the influx of immigrants entering public school or managing the distribution of soldiers into the military hierarchy of WWII). Ultimately this approach became and has remained the dominant research paradigm in psychology (Danzinger, 1990; Stigler, 1999).

Statistics has profoundly influenced the logic of psychology. Throughout the twentieth century, inferential statistical procedures became firmly understood, mainstream, increasingly sophisticated, associated with "real" science, and seen as objective. Statistical conventions such as statistical significance were adopted and routinized, binding psychologists together in a standardized quantitative language spoken across the field. Much of modern statistics taught to psychology researchers today has a lineage from such pioneers as Quetelet (the Newton of statistics) and emerged directly from the efforts *and assumptions* of Galton, Yule, Pearson, and Fisher, among others (e.g., ANOVA, correlation, regression, factor analysis). Their approaches were not derived from neutral space. They were developed with applied purposes and informed by their sociopolitical theories, especially eugenics, social evolution, and biology (Dorling & Simpson, 1999; Yu, 2006). Therefore, the critical question to ask is: what did psychologists lose by applying to psychological problems a set of quantitative methods and statistical procedures that were not, in their fundamental assumptions, developed to specifically address the theoretical concerns of psychology?

It is also important to remember the forgotten possibilities of past psychology, like Wundt's individualized experiments, *or* the radical strands of early social psychology, like the use of social statistics to pursue social justice. For example, consider the nineteenth-century amateur and localized quantitative efforts that began to flourish independent of the official statistical collection of the state. Now known as the Social Survey Movement, these multi-methods studies (e.g., community surveys, mapping, interviews) tended to be explicitly conducted for the purposes of social justice, reform, or human rights.

Usually with the help of local volunteers and grassroots organizations, extensive data on many layers of social and economic factors were collected within a relatively defined community. In the early twentieth century, a distinction was made between "Sociological Survey" and "Social Survey," the former for the purposes of advancing the objective pursuit of knowledge through sophisticated statistics and probability sampling, while the latter a nonscientific-biased pursuit of activism. The amateur-driven Social Survey Movement fell out of favor as the definition of social scientific expertise matured (Bulmer, Bales, & Sklar, 2001). Though the commitments of the Social Survey Movement still continues in some areas of psychology today through such organizations as the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI), these early amateur pursuits force us to ask important questions of the dominant assumptions underneath modern research: why is expertise (e.g., quantitative analysis) defined narrowly within the university-educated academic researcher, why are community members not included in the entire research process (including the statistical analysis), and why must "good" science exclude public and political engagement?

Critical Debates

The appearance of precision and the illusion of neutrality can make the products of statistics seem somehow magical: facts above critique. The complexity of mathematics makes the discipline of statistics seem settled: ancient proofs solved long ago. It may surprise many that even the most common practices in quantitative methods and statistics were once fiercely debated and many are still sources of tension. There are several debates or, rather, tensions that exist in the critical statistics literature. Three are briefly described below.

CFA Versus EDA

John Tukey was one of the most influential statisticians and mathematicians of the twentieth century. Tukey drew a distinction between what he called confirmatory data analysis (CDA) and exploratory data analysis (EDA). Traditional introductory statistics courses devote most of the time to CDA. CDA tends to be a deductive, hypothesis-driven approach with heavy guidance from predetermined theories. At its most conservative, all of the analyses are preplanned so as to not capitalize on chance or random fluctuations (i.e., type I error, familywise error). CDA models also tend to be interested in using a sample of data in order to estimate (infer or generalize to) the population of interest using statistical probability. For example, the sample mean is used as a proxy to estimate the true population mean. Tukey contributed heavily to advancing CDA and acknowledged its importance. However, he worried that the myopic pursuit of CDA facilitated a "specific mental rigidity" that can come from fitting complex data into a set of very restrictive assumptions.

Tukey's critique of CDA was especially focused on social science's use of statistics. More recently, other prominent statisticians have also cautioned the social sciences at their overreliance on complex modeling, controlling for covariates, and unwarranted causal claims. The general concern is that the complexity of social and psychological experience is often inadequately captured by quantitative approaches. The proposed remedies often involve what David Freedman called "shoe leather research": greater awareness of the boundaries of quantification, more varied use of research methodologies, uncovering patterns across multiple studies over time, and, as Tukey suggested, a greater willingness to explore one's data (Freedman, 2010; Lieberson, 1985). Tukey and his colleagues developed an approach to statistical analysis in contrast though complimentary to CDA: what they called exploratory data analysis (EDA). EDA, as most clearly articulated by Tukey and others in the mid-1970s to early 1980s, was an iterative, descriptive, graphical approach to statistics: one that was less concerned with using the data to statistically generalize to a population but instead took seriously the data for what those individual responses might reveal

collectively through exploratory probing. Tukey explained, "Exploratory data analysis is detective work—numerical detective work—or counting detective work—or graphical detective work" (1977, p. 1). He was "Looking at what data seems to say" (Tukey, p. v) rather than confirming or testing previously stated hypotheses from predetermined theories.

Many of Tukey's exploratory strategies stayed close to the original data, minimizing statistical abstraction by using techniques that were largely descriptive. He wrote, "We ... regard simple descriptions as good in themselves" (Tukey, 1977, p. vi). As part of these descriptions, he worried about using statistical techniques like the common average that were very sensitive to outlier (i.e., unusual) values and therefore susceptible to distorted interpretations. He in fact, worried about any single value, like the average, used to describe a set of data points without also exploring the entire variability of those data points (i.e., the distribution). In other words, instead of using probabilistic standards of $p = <.05$ to determine "if he had something significant," he sought strategies that would most clearly and with the least distortion allow the stories within the data to emerge. His approach was particularly well suited to discovering insightful questions one should ask of the data and the topic of interest. Indeed he frequently wrote, "Finding the question is often more important than finding the answer" (Tukey, 1980, p. 24).

Therefore, EDA was not only a set of techniques; *it was most importantly* a state of mind, an attitude, and a way of perceiving the data. Tukey (1980) argued, "No catalog of techniques can convey a willingness to look for what can be seen, whether or not anticipated. Yet this is the heart of exploratory data analysis" (Tukey, p. 24). This attitude was an open-ended approach that stressed iteration and flexibility – seeing what the data revealed rather than imposing rigid assumptions onto the numbers. At the time, EDA was a radical shift as both a technique and an epistemological stance.

Of particular importance to the field of psychology is the co-optation of some techniques in traditional introductory statistics texts but an absence or removal of the philosophy. Hoaglin (2003) explained of EDA, "within a few years, the basic techniques, particularly displays, were available in statistical software. By now a number of those techniques have become part of statistical instruction at all levels. So, at the level of tools, the impact of EDA has been broad and lasting. I am not sure about the attitudes, which require more effort to teach and more reflection..." (p. 313). It is this exploratory attitude towards statistics using a set of techniques designed to find the right questions that is a forgotten alternative deserving a second look by current quantitative and critically oriented psychologists.

NHST

The renowned statistician Karl Fisher invented the null hypothesis and set the socially constructed p value (cautiously) at $p = <.05$, though by his own admission, there is nothing sacred about that number. The p value is used to test the extent to which the results derived from the observed data are consistent with the null hypotheses. The null hypothesis, as it is most commonly practiced, assumes that *in the population* there is no difference or relationship between your variables of interest. When the relationship produced from the data is very unlikely (e.g., a small p value), given the assumption of no relationship in the population is held as true, the null hypothesis is then rejected. However, for Fisher, it stopped there. He did not invent a mechanism to thereby accept the alternative hypothesis: in other words, the hypothesis that *in the population* there likely *is* a difference or relationship between your variables of interest. Though this is the current convention in psychology and why we say something is "statistically significant," Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson (the son of Karl Pearson) did not make an argument for the alternative hypothesis until years after Fisher developed the null hypothesis. Fisher was vehemently opposed to the use of the alternative hypothesis, and it ignited a bitter feud with Neyman and Pearson. Yet, these procedures, what in

combination are called Null Hypothesis Statistical Testing (NHST), have become cemented into the conventional practices of research psychologists. They are one of the most important indicators by which knowledge is defined in psychology and the social sciences in general. However, the procedures and assumptions attached to NHST most notably signified through the p value (i.e., $p = <.05$) continue to be highly critiqued (Morrison & Henkel, 1970).

Indeed, Cohen argued, "NHST has not only failed to support the advance of psychology as a science but also has seriously impeded it" (1994, p. 997). Rozeboom (1997) was less kind; he argued that "The Null-hypothesis significance testing is surely the most bone-headedly misguided procedure ever institutionalized in the rote training of science students" (p. 335). The problems with NHST are multiple. It facilitates dichotomous, true-false decision-making around a socially constructed cutoff point ($p = <.05$) that should be more appropriately determined depending on the context. The p value indicates the likelihood of collecting data that produced the relationship of interest, given the assumption that no relationship in the population actually exists. However, the p value is often misinterpreted to mean the opposite: the probability that the null hypothesis is *true* given the data collected and relationship found. The null hypothesis further assumes *no relationship at all*. Thus, even miniscule and irrelevant deviation from zero in the population will be statistically significant with a large enough sample size. Further, the null hypothesis does not indicate strength of relationship, though small p values are often misinterpreted as numerical estimations of how strong the relationship between the variables are (i.e., effect sizes). What can p values do? They can simply indicate how confident one is that there is enough power to detect whatever difference (whether small or large) inevitably exists in the population. Thus, given appropriate sampling, NHST *can* lend confidence to what direction the population relationship is in (Morrison & Henkel, 1970).

Categorization and Measurement

The politics of categorization is a hotly debated topic. Categories such a race/ethnicity or gender are politically charged social constructions, despite appearing as naturally occurring groups. Though consistently being resisted and queered, the process of categorization aided substantially by quantification can make rigid and standardize individual and group identities in a way that looks objective. Making the decision to collapse a race/ethnicity variable into "white or nonwhite" or examining gender as a male versus female without including the category of transgendered has critical implications for reflecting accurate statistical representations of lived experience produced by researchers. Quantitative methods communicate a false sense of unbiased precision that can erase the politics and assumptions that are inevitably attached to any pursuit of knowledge. This is particularly true of the quantitative researcher's pursuit of measurement (Porter, 1995; Saetnam, Lomell, & Hammer, 2010).

Rating scales are one of the most common tools in the quantitative method toolbox. Rating scales are used to measure everything from depression to intelligence to personality traits. The historical development of scales coincides with the pressure and desire of the emerging psychological field to be seen as a "real" science, one that could objectively quantify its subjects on par with the natural sciences. Scales, such as asking "to what extend do you agree or disagree with the following" using five options (i.e., strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree), are so settled as a psychological instrument that their usefulness is seldom questioned. However, the assumptions that researchers must make of their respondents when using scales are quite lofty. Rosenbaum and Valsiner (2011) outlined this list: "During the rating process, the respondents are assumed to (a) have direct access to their personal and stable meanings of the given scale endpoints and (b) accept the assumption of the continuous nature of the linear space between the points. Perhaps most importantly, researchers then assume that (c) the different respondents' personal understanding of the questions to be

similar to those of all other respondents, making it possible to aggregate the ratings from a single participant to a sample of participants" (p. 51). This is a tall order.

Furthermore, multiple questions in the form of rating scales are often used to measure complex psychological constructs (e.g., intelligence) not able to be captured with a single item. It is hoped that the series of questions aggregated together measure all of the theorized qualities that make up the construct of interest. The series of measurements produce a score, and that score is a more or less flawed representation of something thought to be real and meaningful. However, it is seldom considered if this hypothesized psychological construct is actually a quantity or are we just forcing quantification onto it through artificial rating scales. In statistical speak, does it have interval or ratio properties such as temperature or height (i.e., a one-point difference between 32 and 33° or 60 and 61 in. are the same one point difference throughout the temperature and height scales) or does it have ordinal properties such as personal perception of social class (i.e., one's perceived difference between middle class and upper class has rank order in that one has more money than the other but lacks continuous precision in that we do not know how much the difference is). This is not an issue of how it is measured, but an ontological argument about what exists to be measured. Michell (1999) argues that when statistics are used to measure quantifiable things in the world, it provides a set of highly powerful and predictive procedures. His proof is that there are bridges that have not crumbled and rockets that landed on the moon. This is because things that are quantifiable have a structure that can be accurately described by statistics. However, he argues that most socially constructed psychological concepts are at best ordinal. If true, this has huge implications for the field of psychology since most commonly used statistical techniques require the dependent variable to have interval or ratio properties. Furthermore and even more pervasive, averages are not appropriate calculations with ordinal variables.

International Relevance

If critical statistics has an active home in the field of psychology or the broader social sciences, it is not in the United States. If it lies anywhere, it lies in England with the Radical Statistics Group (i.e., Radstats). The Journal of Radical Statistics was developed in 1975 as part of the establishment of the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science. The society has since become defunct; however, Radstats continues to function as an organization, release its journal, hold yearly conferences, and publish books. They are a diverse group with varied political perspectives united by a commitment to building a freer, democratic society, and they believe that the critical use of statistics can contribute to this effort. An early policy statement explained that they sought to provide "free access to, and free discussion of, the information, political and commercial criteria, and procedures used in decision-making, by all those affected by the decision" (Thomas, 2001, pp. 66–67). Radstats concerns itself with the use and misuse of statistics in the service of hegemony, government power, and privileged groups. Their early policy states that "Although statistics sometimes helps to create the conditions of change, it is usually used to protect the status quo" (Thomas, pp. 66–67). As a result, they are interested in "the production and publication of statistics needed by the disadvantaged groups in society, e.g. on wealth, income, prices, housing, social services, education" (Thomas, pp. 66–67). This group continues to inspire new generations of critically minded quantitative researchers and activists.

Practice Relevance

Faith in statistical evidence not only continues to grow in psychology but throughout our culture as well. Terms such as "business analytics," "big data," "infographics," "predictive modeling," "political forecasting," and "Wall Street Quants" are commonplace in our public consciousness. Public institutions like police

departments and private institutions like Google are increasingly numbers driven. And the 24 h news cycle is saturated with social media polling, economic markers, and government budgets. Griffiths, Irvine, and Miles (1989) argued that "Radical statisticians may succeed in quantifying the world in new ways, but what really counts is whether they succeed in helping to change it" (p. 367). If our dependence on statistics remains as pervasive into the future as it was throughout the twentieth century and into the first decade of the twenty-first century, then an organized countermovement of critical statisticians, critical researchers, and citizens with critical quantitative perspectives will be equally important to radically question what impact the use of numbers has on our lives.

Future Directions

There are many future paths for critical statistics. One particularly fruitful and fast developing area is called "participatory statistics." It is often an illusion that statistics is an individual process. At each point in the quantitative process, the potential for social engagement is possible and common. And at each moment along the way, important conceptual and theoretical decisions are made that ultimately effect what knowledge is produced: in other words, what questions to ask in a survey, how to categorize or combine variable responses, who to include in the sample, what questions to ask, how to interpret the numbers, and which findings should be presented as "the story." Who is in the room when it comes time to make these numerous choices represent the dynamic processes of quantitative social research (though largely invisible to outside audiences and rarely written about). Given how important these decision points are, it is important to find ways to fill those moments with a diverse group of experts – particularly experts who are most closely connected to the research topic (e.g., community members). Participatory action researchers consider this an issue of validity, epistemology, and ethics. The quality of the research is thought to be hindered to the extent that those engaging in the research design and analyses are not able to fully and intelligently participate in critical thinking and discussion because of, for example, the technical aspects of developing a survey or running statistics.

"Stats-n-Action" bridges the epistemological and methodological commitments of participatory action research with the framework of exploratory data analysis. It is a growing set of collaborative techniques and strategies designed to take seriously the quantitative process as democratic group work. Stats-n-Action is an iterative, flexible, participatory, and critical approach applied to four explicitly quantitative moments throughout the PAR process: the development of quantitative instruments, the discussion of who and how to sample, the analysis and interpretation of data, and the communication of quantitative stories to the public. "Stats-n-Action" seeks to apply a principled approach to quantitative and mixed methods research with the larger goal of activism for social equality.

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Online Resources

Online resources that specifically engage in and promote critical statistics are few. The three most prominent include:
Radical Statistics Group. http://www.radstats.org.uk/
Public Science Project. http://www.publicscienceproject.org/
DataCrítica: International Journal of Critical Statistics. http://datacritica.info/
In addition, the following are online resources that do not exclusively promote all the values of critical statistics but often include articles that are related:
The Joy of Stats. http://www.open.edu/openlearn/whats-on/the-joy-stats
Chance. http://chance.amstat.org/
Significance. http://www.significancemagazine.org/view/index.html

Status Quo Maintenance

Helen Lee
Faculty of Health Sciences, Psychology, Staffordshire University, Stoke-on-Trent, UK

Introduction

The argument that psychology maintains the status quo comes from critical psychology and is important for critical psychologists who are concerned with addressing social inequalities. A key paper by Prilleltensky (1989) maps out this concern by drawing attention to, and calling for an inquiry into, psychology's ideological functions. However, status quo maintenance is not debated in traditional psychology, in part, because historically, mainstream psychology has adopted an apolitical stance.

Definition

Status quo maintenance refers to the ways in which psychological knowledge supports the status quo, that is, the existing state of affairs or dominant ideology.

Keywords

Ideology; individualism; individual-society dualism; inequality

Traditional Debates

Traditionally, psychologists have not addressed the relationship between psychology and the status quo because they claim to adopt an apolitical stance. This stance stems from an epistemology that does not explicitly acknowledge the impact of nonepistemic values in shaping research and theory. Nonepistemic values refer to sociocultural and political beliefs (Howard, 1985). Historically, the claim of value neutrality has meant that psychology is presented as

apolitical. However, while many psychologists no longer claim that their research is purely objective and free from values, an examination of the relationship between psychology and ideology remains largely within the bounds of critical psychology as traditional psychology, in the main, still claims to be apolitical.

Individualism, that is, the individualist focus in psychology, plays a central role in maintaining the status quo. This refers to the traditional tendency in psychology to produce person-centered explanations, for example, in producing and theorizing concepts such as personality, intelligence, self-esteem, motivation, emotion, and many other psychological concepts as processes, traits, or abilities that are taken as located within the person.

In addition, status quo maintenance is evident in the ways in which particular social groups have been researched and theorized in psychology and through assumptions made which have positioned some social groups as inferior, deviant, and/or pathological. Owusu-Bempah and Howitt (2000) discuss how this occurs in relation to people of Black and minority ethnic origins.

Critical Debates

Different areas of psychology have been critiqued as supporting dominant ideology as the titles of papers attest, for example, "cognitive psychology as ideology" (Sampson, 1981) and "psychology and the status quo" (Prilleltensky, 1989). Prilleltensky maps out how an individualist focus prevails throughout different areas of psychology and consequently supports dominant ideology: a behavioral perspective in focusing on persons' actions and movements, a cognitive perspective that analyzes internal processes, an organic perspective in promoting an understanding that problems are a result of a deficient organism, and a humanistic psychology perspective that promotes human potential as a means of overcoming even the most adverse circumstances. Each of these psychological perspectives separates the person from the social world (individual-society dualism) and locates explanation (and therefore treatment or resolution) at the level of the individual. This means that all sorts of "problems" addressed by psychology are viewed as problems within the person. For example, traditionally, in psychology, collective action has been theorized as crowd behavior, as a primitive instinct or individual pathology that causes deindividuation and violent behavior when basic needs are threatened; sexual violence/rape has been explained in terms of the specific characteristics of men and women. Such individualist explanations work to maintain the status quo precisely because the focus is exclusively at the level of the individual. Consequently, traditional social psychological research on crowd behavior has excluded any consideration of the history that leads up to the action; also it fails to consider the role played by authorities such as the military or police in contributing to violence (Drury & Reicher, 2000). This has meant that heavier policing tactics to suppress the crowd are legitimized and also that ignoring the reason for the action is justified. As a result, the existing state of affairs remains unchallenged. In terms of sexual violence, individualist explanations mean that the sociocultural and historical conditions which support gender inequalities and contribute to a climate in which sexual violence is permissible are left unquestioned as it is the individual people involved in sexual violence that are held accountable. In sum, this is problematic for critical psychologists who are concerned with addressing social inequalities because it is the individual person or members of a social group that are called upon to change while the social and political system is not held to account, and consequently, wider social change does not occur.

There is another aspect of psychology, or rather, psychologists, that works to support the status quo. Prilleltensky (1989) argues that psychologists have sociopolitical interests aligned with dominant ideology and that they rarely learn to question this (either within psychology or wider society); hence, along with psychology's individualist and seeming value-neutral apolitical stance, psychology is deemed an ideal instrument to support dominant ideology. One specific example of this is the way in

which IQ testing creates and perpetuates social inequalities. Andersen (1994) argues that historically, IQ testing represents and therefore provides an advantage to people from higher social classes, therefore rendering people from other social backgrounds as of inferior intelligence and disadvantaged in selection processes which utilize such assessments.

However, some critical psychologists have come from social backgrounds marginalized by, for example, gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, disability, sexuality, and religion; or they have personal histories that have meant they are acutely aware of the marginalization of others on these grounds, and as such, they have sought to question what has previously been left unchallenged. Moreover, some psychologists are aligned with feminism and Marxism (both concerned with social inequalities) and have brought these political standpoints into critical psychology to question the way psychology maintains dominant ideology concerning gender and class inequalities.

There are different ways in which critical psychology has challenged status quo maintenance. One way is to reframe existing research which creates/perpetuates social inequalities, that is, reframing previous research which does a disservice to people from a particular social group. For example, Walkerdine and Lucey (1989) reframe and, in so doing, challenge research on sensitive parenting that deems working-class mothering pathological for not responding to children in the ways thought optimal for child development. They argue that whereas middle-class mothers (many who employ domestic help in the home) have more time to play with their children and can often attend to their needs immediately, working-class mothers often have to juggle different tasks, and consequently, their children are more likely to play without mother or have to wait for her attention. Walkerdine and Lucey argue that although working-class mothering is different to the middle-class norm, it should not be taken as pathological; rather it is a way of adapting to differing circumstances.

Another way in which some critical psychologists have sought to challenge status quo maintenance in psychology is by actively working to bring about some form of change/action that addresses inequalities in the lives of people who are in some way excluded, marginalized, and oppressed. Critical community psychology has this as an aim and often uses participatory action research (PAR) to work from the perspective of members of a specific community (Kagan, Burton, Duckett, Lawthom, & Siddiquee, 2011).

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Online Resources

Dennis Fox provides an overview and links to book chapters and papers including work with Isaac Prilleltensky at. http://www.dennisfox.net/papers/introducing.html

Stereotypes, Overview

Florence L. Denmark and Deborah Williams
Pace University, New York, NY, USA

Introduction

Stereotypes are a form of categorization which helps to simplify and streamline information so

the information is easier to be identified, recalled, predicted, and reacted to. The most widely accepted conceptualization of stereotypes is that they are a way in which people form biased perceptions of their social contexts. From this perspective, it can be understood that people use stereotypes as shortcuts to make sense of their social and cultural environment, and this makes comprehending one's world less cognitively demanding (Shih, Pittinsky, & Ho, 2012).

Definition

Stereotypes are a simplified and standardized conception or image invested with special meaning and held in common by members of a group. There are two categories of stereotypes: between-group stereotypes and within-group stereotypes. When referring to between group stereotypes, objects or people are as different to each other as possible. In within group stereotypes, objects or people are as similar to each other as possible (Allport, 1954).

Keywords

Ingroup; outgroup; stereotype threat; discrimination

Ingroup, Outgroup

Stereotypes are often used to separate one's own group from another group. This is often referred to as ingroup, outgroup differentiation. It often relieves a person's anxieties to associate positive activities and beliefs with their own "ingroup" while believing that the "outgroup" engages in radically different, and often negative activities than their own. This distinction often leads to further stereotyping and negative beliefs of those in the "outgroup" (Allport, 1954).

Attributional Ambiguity

Attributional ambiguity refers to the feedback members from a group receive from an "outgroup" and how they interpret it. Meaning, members of minority and/or stigmatized groups are often not aware if the feedback they receive (be it for grades, work reviews, or general interactions) can be attributed to their own merit or personality, or if it is because of the minority status they are associated with (Allport, 1954).

Stereotype Threat

Stereotype threat occurs when a member of minority group is aware of a negative stereotype about their group and experiences anxiety or concern that they might confirm the stereotype. Stereotype threat has been shown to undermine performance in a variety of domains and often limits members of minority groups. Many different areas of a person's life can be affected by stereotype threat, including academics, sports, business and family life (Allport, 1954).

Traditional Debates

The development of stereotypes varies greatly depending on which field one is a part of. For the field of psychology, the majority of those studying stereotypes tend to focus on an individual's experience. This person's experience with their own "ingroup," their experiences with "outgroups," and if there was any conflict between the two, will influence how to stereotype others. Psychologists often work towards deconstructing stereotypes that are harmful by targeting irrational beliefs that have stemmed from these previous individual experiences (Denmark & Paludi, 1993).

Stereotypes function as time-saver, allowing people to act more efficiently. By categorizing a person or object into generalized ideas or conceptions, it is often easier to respond quickly to that person or object. It is comforting to the general population, and relieves unnecessary anxiety, when people or objects are in a category because they have distinct characteristics, often different from the "ingroup." This categorization allows people to make decisions quickly on how to act, or respond to, an "outgroup" member (Shih et al., 2012). Quick decision making has helped individuals escape dangerous situations for centuries, but at what cost?

Unfortunately, the downside to the cognitive simplicity that stereotypes provide is that

stereotypes also lead people to members of "outgroups" to behave in a certain way. This has also led members of minority groups to believe certain things about their "ingroup." Both of these cases can lead to self-fulfilling prophecies. In this instance, one's false beliefs about a person's behavior, through social interaction, prompt that person to act in stereotype-consistent ways, thereby validating the stereotype and their false beliefs (Shapiro, Williams, & Hambarchyan, 2012).

Critical Debates

Stereotypes are present in all aspects of our world, and are often so prevalent that they impact people at an unconscious level. Project Implicit, a program created by a collaborative research effort between researchers at Harvard University, the University of Virginia, and University of Washington, measures the small time differentials in implicit associations between neutral, positive, and negative words and items like sexism, racism, and homosexuality. This project is demonstrating that implicit bias still exists (Project Implict, 2011).

Recent studies have implied that the relations among categorization, stereotyping, and prejudice are more flexible than was previously assumed. Automatic stereotyping is not inevitable, constituently and there can be a number of interventions that reduce automatic stereotyping including repeated exposure to "outgroups" (Lepore & Brown, 1997).

Moving forward, psychologists and others in the mental health field should address the number of possible stereotype threats that minority group members face, and find successful ways to incubate individuals from these threats. By gaining a better understanding of stereotype threat, there can be more thorough interventions to aid in ensuring better performances from those individuals who may be targeted. Recent studies have found that a motivation to act and think in a way that is not prejudiced decreases the likelihood that stereotype threat occurs in certain instances (Fehr, Sassenberg, & Jonas, 2012).

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Stress

Dana Becker
Bryn Mawr Graduate School of Social Work and Social Research, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, PA, USA

Introduction

Ideas about what is stressful, the toll stress takes on body and mind, and how to manage stress seem omnipresent in the West, particularly in the USA. Stress is a protean concept that can represent a situation or event, a psychological or physiological state, or an emotion, and this diffuseness gives it great versatility as a vehicle for explaining human dilemmas. Contemporary ideas about stress hearken back to the nineteenth century when George Beard (1881), the "father" of neurasthenia, made an alarming connection between the pressures of middle-class life and nervous illness, insisting that the amount and

character of the stress Americans experienced was exceptional (Gosling, 1987).

Definition

Centuries ago, stress stood for what was difficult and had to be suffered. The image was often that of a ship tossed about by the stress of bad weather, neither challenging the forces outside it nor wholly separate from them (Kugelmann, 1992). Facing stress demanded strength and fortitude, but stress was occasional, like the wintery blasts that assailed that metaphorical ship. These days, particularly in the middle class, people "work" to overcome stress, presumably so they won't have to suffer it. And in contemporary Western societies, stress is not occasional; it is believed to be constant. In 1949, the *Merriam Webster Collegiate Dictionary* defined stress completely without reference to human beings. Today, although stress is defined both as a force outside the person and an inner state, it is the inner state that receives the primary emphasis when stress is studied and discussed.

From a cultural standpoint, the American discourse of stress is one that mingles pride in the fast pace of life with concerns about the effects of social and technological change. But some anxieties about stress occupy more space in the public forum than others. For instance, there is more public handwringing over the stresses of middle-class life than over stresses of a life in poverty and more worry about the stressful nature of mothers' attempts to balance work and family life than about fathers.' Some ideas perform what Mary Poovey (1988) calls "ideological work," managing or containing contradictions in ways that make for the widespread acceptance of those overarching ideas as common sense. Stress frequently performs this ideological work, containing societal tensions by individualizing and medicalizing them.

Viewed by some as the "father of stress," Walter Cannon (1932) believed that rage and fear were gradual evolutionary adjustments that had prepared the body of the Stone Age man or woman for fight or flight. Cannon's original focus was not on the relationship between disease and the fast pace of life but on the external forces that influenced the body's homeostasis (e.g., heat, hunger, oxygen deprivation). It was not until Hans Selye broadened the stress concept and popularized it that it attained its present eminence. Selye, who until the 1940s had used the term much as Cannon had done, described stress a decade later as a response or condition brought about by stressful events (Selye, 1956). Although many of his fellow scientists criticized his theories and research methods, Selye used his considerable energy to popularize the stress concept, attempting to elevate stress to the position of one of the most important problems to be tackled by sociology and psychology in his time. It was, in the end, Selye's insistence that stress could cause health problems and disease that put the concept of stress on the map (Viner, 1999). Ever since the 1940s and 1950s, the idea that stress can alter immune resistance and that immunity can be "built up" from inside the body has become widespread (Martin, 1994), although a review of 300 studies researching the relationship between psychological stress and the immune system did not find a strong association between "stress-related immune change" and vulnerability to disease in healthy individuals (Segerstrom & Miller, 2004, p. 60).

Keywords

Immune system; discourse; stressor; coping; Type A; vulnerability; poverty

Traditional Debates

The 1960s brought with it a new representative of stress in the form of the hard-driving "Type A" man, and although sociologists were examining the contribution made by American ideas about success and achievement to the relationship between drivenness and coronary heart disease, it was the entrance of psychologists into the debates about the "Type A personality" that marked a critical juncture in American thinking about stress (Riska, 2000). Indeed, the Type A concept may have been among the first

attempts to quantify the social and psychological nature of society in terms of the individual (Aronowitz, 1998).

In their influential 1984 book, *Stress, Appraisal and Coping*, Richard Lazarus and Susan Folkman defined psychological stress as "a particular relationship between the person and the environment that is appraised by the person as taxing or exceeding his or her resources and endangering his or her well-being," stating that "our immediate concern must be with what causes psychological stress in different persons" (p. 19). Lazarus was moved to focus on individual differences in the way people appraise and cope with stressful situations as a response to what he saw as sociology's failure to account for those differences. As he focused increasingly on the person in the person/environment equation, some researchers accused Lazarus of going too far, questioning, for example, his assumption there is no such thing as an objectively stressful environmental event (Costa & McRae, 1990). At the same time, instruments that measured stressful life events without reference to individuals' subjective judgments were roundly criticized on the grounds that life events are structured by social circumstances (Gore & Colten, 1991).

Critical Debates

When, in the early 1990s, Lazarus embraced the position that stress was "a subset of emotion" (1993), it was his definition of stress that was assailed. This is not surprising; debates about the definition of stress, not the stress concept, and about the merits of different techniques for measuring it have been many, but critiques of the concept of stress itself have been few. In considering stress as a subset of emotion, Lazarus defined stress principally in terms of individual vulnerability, and he has not been alone; these days it is common for research on the psychosocial aspects of stress to give more weight to the *psyche* than to the *social*. At times researchers make reference to "the environment" as if it were only one among many factors that affect health and mental health, rather than as an aggregate of systems and institutions – social, economic, and political – that can influence health outcomes for better or for worse (Becker, 2013).

As philosopher Ian Hacking (2002) has noted, certain ideas play a part in how we are "made up" as people, both at a particular time in history and in a culture that subscribes to certain ideas and practices that themselves have a history. For denizens of a country grounded in the tenets of liberal individualism and an unwavering faith in the power of scientific explanation, the obligation to guard our health has become a significant ethical value (Rose & Novas, 2005), and we are encouraged to practice behaviors, adopt attitudes, and purchase products that will decrease our level of stress. At this time in the USA, individuals experience themselves in the way that stress both describes and delimits.

Media accounts concerning the effects of stress often suggest that humans are at the mercy of potentially lethal and uncontrollable physiological and psychological forces: stress can "kill," "shrinking" our brains and "unraveling" our chromosomes. There is endless advice on managing stress through diet, exercise, meditation, and the like, much of it directed at middle-class women, who are often seen as needing help in "juggling" family and paid employment. In a society in which women continue to perform the lion's share of domestic work and childcare, helping women to reduce the "stress" that arises in the effort to combine work life and family life seems to offer a means of resolving what is now termed "work/life conflict" and achieving the ever-elusive "balance." The discourse of stress papers over the need for changes in workplace policies or in the gendered nature of care work in our society (Becker, 2010, 2013). When the "stressor" is a social condition such as poverty, the discourse of stress reduces social pressure to reckon with the inequities that create obstacles to the universal attainment of a "healthy lifestyle."

The stress concept fosters the illusion that human vulnerability must be battled one person at a time and fear of psychological and physiological damage from exposure to stressful conditions has played a large part in the middle-class

embrace of stress. But, as legal scholar Martha Alberston Fineman (2008) has suggested, the term vulnerability need not be equated with weakness and illness; it also has the potential to describe "a universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the human condition that must be at the heart of social and state responsibility" (p. 7). To accept the notion of universal vulnerability can lead to the creation of greater protections for everyone living in a society. At the same time, however, recognition of vulnerability implies an acceptance of risks, uncertainties and dangers that cannot be vanquished through reengineering ourselves to "manage" stress.

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Subject

Oliver Harrison
School of Social Sciences, Nottingham Trent University, Nottingham, Nottinghamshire, UK

Introduction

The subject is a perennial issue in the social sciences (Williams, 2001) and certainly one of the most debated. Following the work of René Descartes, its modern philosophical conception attempted to secure a scientific basis for knowledge. In social and political theory, attention shifted to a variety of issues, particularly the liberal concern regarding the relationship between the individual and the state. Psychologically, too, notions of the subject were frequently combined with social and political analysis. After outlining these foundational philosophical, political, and psychological debates, this entry will consider the critique of the subject characteristic of late twentieth century thought, culminating in its so-called "death." Finally, it will outline contemporary post-Marxist attempts to rethink the notion, particularly with respect to its collective-revolutionary form.

Definition

According to Michel Foucault (1988), there are two meanings of the word *subject*: (i) "subject to someone else by control and dependence" and (ii) "tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge" (Foucault, 1988, p. 781). As we will see below, all the major disciplines that have sought to understand the notion of the subject will vacillate between these two forms. In the most general sense, the classic social science debate concerning the relationship between "structure" and "agency" would explore this tension, without, however, ever fully resolving it (see McAnulla, 2002).

Keywords

Subject; philosophy; knowledge; social and political theory; psychology; contracts; freedom

History

The modern conception of the subject has its origins in the work of René Descartes (1596–1650). Descartes set out to problematize exactly what it is possible to know and, from that, establish a scientific basis for the structure of knowledge. To do this he employed a "sceptical method," one that saw him cast away any belief or form of knowledge that he himself could not be certain of. This enquiry would proceed until either he found at least one thing he could claim to be true or indeed establish that "there is nothing in the world that is certain" (Atkins, 2005, p. 12). Descartes' "definite conclusion" affirmed the former, for, according to him, the one thing he could indeed be sure of was the fact that he was a living *thinking* being, or as he famously put it in his *Discourse on Method* (1637), *cogito ergo sum* ("I think, therefore I am"). This separation of the mind (or soul) from the body – what became known as the "Cartesian dualism" – established the basis for the modern philosophical notion of the subject, one that was conscious of its own existence in a purely unmediated fashion (Sedgwick, 2001).

An alternative to Descartes' dualistic subject was advanced by Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677). According to Spinoza, epistemology had to start from the unity of mind and body with knowledge understood in terms of its immanent relation to an underlying "systemic, rational order"; what he called "substance." The consequence of such a "monist" understanding of the subject was that the primacy Descartes accorded to consciousness was disbanded, laying the basis for a more structuralist account that emphasized the latter's constraints as opposed to its supposed autonomy (Williams, 2001, pp. 18–27).

Descartes' theory of the subject also laid the basis for a different form of critique, this time from the empiricist approach associated with David Hume (1711–1776). Hume argued strongly that any notion of the "self" or "personal identity" was a highly contingent phenomenon, based not on the capacity of abstract thought but, in fact, the confused reality of human sense experience. As such, according to him there was "no single power of the soul which remains unalterably the same." Rather, the human subject was governed by the experience of sensation, or in his words, by "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions" (Atkins, 2005, p. 38).

Hume's attack inspired Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who attempted a synthesis of both rationalism and empiricism. While Kant agreed that all knowledge began with experience, he believed also that not all knowledge derived from experience alone. There is, in other words, an a priori realm of knowledge independent of experience. What became known as the "transcendental subject" in Kant's thought refers not to a concrete or empirical living person but rather a belief in the existence of something extra-sensual; a structure within the mind and consciousness itself that makes the empirical subject an actual possibility (Sedgwick, 2001).

Kant's formalism was countered by Hegel (1770–1831), who aimed to situate the subject in a more concrete, social, and historical manner. In his *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1977), Hegel

provided a logical development of human consciousness in a way that emphasized its continued practical engagement with the world around it. Instead of being a self-enclosed introspective entity, of crucial importance to Hegel's theory of the subject was the necessity of its interaction with other independent self-conscious beings. Genuine self-consciousness, he argued, emerged through a process of mutual recognition; a process that must be both "social" and "intersubjective" (Hegel, 1977).

Traditional Debates

The modern conception of the subject was tied closely to philosophical questions concerning epistemology. Yet, these early debates would quickly translate into social and political theory, particularly with respect to interrelated issues such as contracts and rights, submission and consent, and sovereignty and freedom (Williams, 2001).

Debates concerning contracts and rights usually stem back to Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and John Locke (1632–1704), and are insightful for outlining a particular understanding of the subject, especially in the Liberal political tradition. Locke, for instance, believed that human beings had a number of God-given "natural" rights, all of which without some form of governmental authority would constantly be at threat. In consequence, Locke argued that individuals – understood as asocial beings driven by their own rational self-interest – entered a voluntary "social contract," whereby their respective individual rights could be protected from transgression.

Central to Locke's theory, then, is the idea that legitimate political power must be based on some form of consent. On the basis of the protection of their natural rights, the individual subject consents to governmental or state authority. Yet, this consent is never absolute. In the Liberal tradition, submission to authority depends wholly on whether that authority retains its end of the deal (i.e., protects individuals' natural rights). It is legitimately possible, then, that the individual subject may withdraw their consent and exercise their right to rebellion. In the case of Thomas Hobbes, however, one finds a much harder-edged notion of the social contract. According to him, individuals' submission to authority – what he called the "Leviathan" – should be total, for the alternative would only ever bring conflict.

In their own way, both Locke and Hobbes had a very particular understanding of the human subject, and this view was the basis for their respective social and political theories. First and foremost, this subject was an *individual* subject, one whose very nature was essentially pre-social – or in the case of Hobbes, *anti*-social. In the Liberal tradition, this view was balanced somewhat by John Stuart Mill (1806–1873). Straddling what became known as "classical" and "modern" liberalism, while Mill accepted the sovereignty of the individual, he also situated it socially. In *On Liberty* (1989), for example, Mill accepted infringements on individual liberty on the basis that it prevented a behavior restricting the liberty of others (Mill, 1989).

Individualism was, and remains, the hallmark of liberal political theory. Yet, it is clear that this theory is based on a very particular understanding of the nature of human beings. In general terms, individuals are deemed rational, competitive, and self-interested. Their nature is also essentially pre-social; first and foremost human beings are individuals. Other forms of social theory, however, emphasize the collective nature of human beings, and in consequence notions of what constitutes a "subject" are fundamentally re-thought. A different understanding in this sense was advanced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In *The Social Contract* (2012), Rousseau argued that authentic "civil" freedom could only be established once the individual subordinated themself to the collective, the political expression of which he called "the general will." Central to this contract, then, is not the sovereignty of the individual but, in fact, the sovereignty of "the people."

Despite this key shift in emphasis, Rousseau shared with the likes of Locke and Hobbes an emphasis on a "natural" state for human beings;

one that posited the human subject as, at base, an abstract individual. The strongest critique of this belief came from Karl Marx (1818–1883). For Marx, the liberal propensity for employing "state of nature" arguments were nothing but an ideological tool, one that transposed into the past the (individual) subject characteristic of bourgeois society as a means of making it appear natural. While Marx argued there was indeed something distinctive about human beings–namely their ability for consciously determined creative activity–he believed that, historically speaking, this activity was intrinsically social. Despite this, capitalism made this power appear as private and individualized, attributing it not as the result of a relation between human beings but as a relationship between "things" (Marx, 1990). Ultimately, Marx believed in the collective and revolutionary capacity of a very particular historical subject. Referred to interchangeably as the "proletariat" or the "working class," Marx inscribed this subject with particular redemptive qualities and ultimately believed it would liberate not only itself but humanity too.

Critical Debates

For latter-day critical debates on "the subject," alongside Marx, Fredrick Nietzsche (1844–1900) and Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) would prove incisive (c.f. Ricoeur, 1970). Nietzsche was highly critical of the Enlightenment-based conception that had proved central to the philosophical debate outlined earlier. Although he did not abandon the notion of the subject completely, what he considered a "fiction" was the overbearing emphasis on reason and the self-certainty of human consciousness. In contrast, then, according to Nietzsche human beings were driven by irrational and instinctive urges, at one point of which he famously referred to as the "will to power" (Nietzsche, 1967).

A similar emphasis on such primordial urges was advanced by Sigmund Freud. As the founder of psychoanalysis, Freud's work was incisive for undermining the internal coherence of the "ego." Consciousness, Freud claimed in one of his early essays, was in fact a rather "transitory" phenomena, consistently confronted with both preconscious and unconscious states. Whereas ideas, memories, and so on in the former could be brought back into a conscious state, the latter were dynamically "repressed," hidden from the subject's conscious awareness and yet still having a profound effect on their life (Freud, 2001).

In the mid-twentieth century Freud's notion of the unconscious was synthesized with the Marxist critique of political economy. The various members of what became known as the "Frankfurt School" would be particularly influential, perhaps most notably Eric Fromm (1900–1980) and Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979). In works such as *Eros and Civilization* (1955), for example, Marcuse argued that, against Freud, a nonrepressive form of society was indeed possible only when, however, "surplus repression" was destroyed alongside the overcoming of alienated labor. Although the marriage of Freud and Marx was a novel one, it did not seriously question the subject's status as a concept that articulated purposeful and meaningful agency. Despite the pessimism of later works such as *One Dimensional Man* (1965), and his subsequent appeals to the revolutionary subjectivity of those at the margins of society (students, etc.), for Marcuse the working class remained the subject of social and revolutionary change.

Other schools of psychology, however, would seriously undermine the status of the subject. The principles of behaviorism, for example, believed that human behavior was governed more by environmental factors than free will. To establish this, behaviorists such as B.F. Skinner (1904–1990) believed that psychology had to adopt the methods of the natural sciences, reiterating the empiricist principles of Hume outlined above. For Skinner, the task of psychology was to study observable behavior, and this behavior was governed – or "conditioned" – by both positive and negative reinforcement. The human subject, in other words, in a similar way to the emphases' of psychoanalysis, is only ever the

subject to forces out of their control. With the rise of existential and humanist psychology in the mid-twentieth century, however, a more affirmative notion of the human subject emerged, one that emphasized the importance of human experience and the ability for "self-realization." The work of Maslow (1908–1970) and Rogers (1902–1987) was particularly influential in this respect.

The work of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud brought into question the classical understanding of the subject, either in its philosophical, political, or psychological form. From the middle to late twentieth century, the critique of the subject became much more pronounced, culminating in its so-called "death." Contextually, this was due to a number of reasons. Politically, the power of the international workers' movement was dwindling, and combined with the decomposition of the industrial working class (in the West) there emerged new social subjects with identities qualitatively different from the former. Alongside this there also emerged new and innovative forms of social critique that could only establish themselves once they had taken to task the assumptions and methods characteristic of the past. One such assumption was the notion of "the subject" itself, particularly that associated with the enlightenment. At this point emphasis shifted away from emphasizing the subject's constitutive but alienated "essence" to understanding the repressive and undisclosed mechanisms responsible for its social construction.

In his essay *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses* (2008), for example, Louis Althusser (1918–1990) argued that the "subject" was a mere effect of ideology, "interpellated" into its various roles by both ideological and repressive state apparatuses. In consequence, and in contradistinction to the humanist Marxism he famously derided, Althusser concluded that history was a "process without a subject." The work of Michel Foucault (1926–1984) criticized the (humanist) subject from a variety of different angles, this time in relation to knowledge, truth, and power. In his *Order of Things* (2002), for example, Foucault argued that "man" was "an invention of a recent date," a discursive production characteristic of a particularly modern "episteme," one that, if its constitutive conditions disappeared, would dissolve "like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea."

In the realms of psychoanalysis, finally, the work of Jacques Lacan (1901–1981) continued Freud's decentering of the ego, this time in relation to the formative role of language in structuring the unconscious. Lacan's notion of the subject of "lack" continues to be influential today, particularly in social and political theory.

Future Directions

Contemporary international debates concerning "the subject" have built on the ideas above as a means of rethinking the practice of emancipatory and revolutionary social change. Hostile to the liberal belief that, with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, liberal democracy and the global market economy have negated all possible alternatives, various thinkers have sought to salvage what was left from what was seen to be a largely discredited revolutionary tradition, particularly – although not exclusively – Marxism. Here I will discuss two examples.

In their *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (2001), Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe produced a particularly blunt account of the failures of a particular strain within Marxist thought. On the one hand, Laclau and Mouffe argued that aspects of Marx's thought were always problematic, especially those that were associated with his Hegelian heritage. Of particular importance was his notion of "the subject," embodied in the proletariat and its supposed propensity for unity and strategic revolutionary coherence. On the other and, Laclau and Mouffe proposed that if one abandoned this Hegelian logic if one could retain the notion of the subject, not as an "essence" but as a hegemonic construction.

In recent years – in the English-speaking world at least – the work of Alain Badiou has

also been a major point of interest, and he has explicitly noted how the notion of "the subject" has guided his work from early until late. For Badiou, in a similar way to Laclau, there is no "subject" that preexists the moment unto which it potentially becomes one. In his terms, every subject requires the occurrence of a highly unpredictable "event," one that an individual may or may not decide to claim "fidelity" to. It is this fidelity – or what he calls a "truth procedure" – that constitutes the subject, which according to him can occur in four realms of human existence: love, art, politics, and science (Badiou, 2007).

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Subject Matter of Psychology

Ute Osterkamp
Psychology, Free University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany

Introduction

The establishment of psychology as an empirical discipline was closely linked with "scientific management" approaches as they had evolved at the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century. The leap forward in technological developments in industry stimulated manufacturers' interest in achieving similar gains in manpower. The first efforts made in this direction were the time and motion studies of F.W. Taylor (1856–1915). By eliminating all unnecessary movements he determined the shortest possible time to perform a distinct task which was then set as a norm: those who fulfilled it, received full pay, while underachievers were paid less and overachievers more. To prevent the workers from developing opposition to such strategies – as, for instance, demanding agreements on restriction of output – a "*social* engineering" was required, and psychologists seemed to be best qualified for this task. They had the additional asset of obscuring the exploitative character of such measures by qualifying them as being consonant with the workers' "human nature" – while smoothly adjusting the images of this nature to fit the particular requirements of production. While early Taylorism, for instance, was based on the homo oeconomicus theory, the human relations movement, which was booming in the 30s and 40s, saw the workers' needs for social recognition as the key to their motivation, and the "humanization of work" movement of the 70s suggested that work enrichment was an essential factor in accommodating the workers' needs for self-realisation. The growing interest of industry in "human resources" had effects also on other areas in society, especially on educational research (see, for example, Danziger, 1990, pp. 118–135; Dean, 1999; Herman, 1995).

Definition

As revealed by a glance at the standard textbooks, psychology generally defines itself by its qualification for investigating, predicting, controlling and modifying human behaviour and experience. The questions as to the historical and societal contexts in which such a qualification is required or whose interest it serves, do not arise. Psychology's scientific identity is not based on a particular knowledge interest but results from the quality of its methods which seem to be beyond doubt since they are borrowed from natural sciences. The questions as to whether natural science methods are applicable to human problems and if so, what qualifies them for this task, are not raised and are, indeed, pointless/irrelevant so long as the individuals are seen as "objects" to be analyzed as to their particular usability for other-directed purposes. This "methodologism" has been criticized from various sides – though largely to no avail (see, for example, Danziger, 1990, 1997; Giorgi, 1970; Holzkamp, 1996, 2013; Rose, 1990, 1996).

Keywords

Meta-subjective quality of human agency and subjectivity; social self-understanding on the groundedness of individual thought and actions; paradigm change: psychology from the standpoint of the (generalized) subject; subjective reasons for action; generalized agency; universality/particularity

History

The establishment of psychology as an empirical discipline is generally dated to the year 1889 when W. Wundt's "Psychological Laboratory" was integrated into the University of Leipzig. Wundt (1832–1920) was mainly interested in developing a psychology which was centred on "*immediate experience in its totality*" (1897, p. 7) in contrast to the usual focus on isolated cause-effect relations. Although he explicitly distanced himself from philosophical doctrines of the soul, he nonetheless emphasized that psychology must remain integrated in philosophy if it did not want to eschew all self-reflection and degenerate into a mere expertise which tends to define the problems in terms of the particular means at hand (1913).

However, psychology proceeded to do precisely what Wundt had warned against, that is, to dissociate itself from philosophy. The advantages to be gained by defining psychology as a natural science evidently outweighed any doubts about the implications of this orientation. This development took place mainly in the United States of America, where psychology was less philosophically and more practically oriented from the start (c.f. Danziger, 1990, pp. 40–42). Thus, classical behaviourism as developed by J. B. Watson (1878–1958) at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century was based on the conviction that only observable behaviour could legitimately be subjected to psychological research. Although the neo-behaviorist turn in the 1930s brought "mentalistic" notions such as intention, expectation, etc., which had originally been excluded, back into theory building, the natural science orientation was maintained with its goal of establishing universal laws. In this nomothetic perspective, the individual was reduced almost entirely to a mere source of data, captured in relation to an average which simultaneously served as a benchmark for actual performances. Viewed in isolation from the concrete circumstances of its occurrence/emergence, individual behaviour was rendered "worldless", in an attempt to maintain the fiction of the universal applicability of psychological methods. This wordlessness is, as Holzkamp has argued, characteristic not only of behaviourism, but also of cognitive psychology (Holzkamp, 2013, pp. 253–254).

Traditional Debates

In opposition to the natural science orientation of mainstream psychology, there have always been

efforts to develop psychology as a human science. A prominent representative of such an approach was W. Dilthey (1833–1911). Like Wundt he defined psychology as an empirical science *within* philosophy and not dissociated from it. Dilthey held that human behaviour can only be understood in relation to the context it is embedded in; this requires a shift from merely gathering isolated data to striving to understand their subjective meaning, that is, as it was later termed, from a nomothetic to an ideographic approach. This meaning does, as Dilthey emphasizes, not originate directly from the individuals, but from their relations to the world or, more precisely, from the culturally offered interpretations of these relations. Thus, Dilthey himself was primarily concerned with analyzing the cultural meaning patterns as a crucial determinant of individual actions (cf. Teo, 2009, pp. 77–85). Allport (1937) was later to incorporate the distinction between nomothetic and idiographic approaches into psychology. However, he interpreted the two approaches as complementary and not as mutually exclusive, thus divesting this distinction of its critical import (cf. Danziger, 1990, p. 188).

Approaches which draw on Husserl's (1859–1938) phenomenology are in many respects akin to Dilthey's concern with understanding behaviour in connection with the context to which it relates. Here, too, the situatedness of all activities is seen as an indispensable key to understanding them. However, as Giorgi (1970, p. 126), for instance, emphasizes, it follows from this that the researcher's preconceptions of the problem must also be subjected to scientific analysis and that the fiction of an unbiased observer position must be replaced by collective efforts to comprehend the complexity of the problem as well as the standpoint dependency of any view on it.

Following Giorgi, Graumann (1988, p. 42) concludes that phenomenological psychology is "not based on the presumption of its presuppositionlessness, but aims at becoming aware of the presuppositions entering uncritically one's own notions of the issue in question". In this sense, he emphasizes, phenomenology is not a particular philosophical school or theory but "a methodological attitude for looking at problems in the human sciences, for reflecting and for asking questions accordingly." (1988, p. 35; see also Giorgi, 1970, p. 126).

Similarly, Misgeld and Jardine (1989) argue that interpretative or hermeneutic approaches are not merely methods among others, but imply a fundamentally different knowledge interest: This knowledge interest "has to do, not with the anonymous production of information, but with the question of how one lives one's life in interplay with others" (p. 272). Understanding others and understanding oneself are, as they underline, inextricably linked with each other: "It occurs in the midst of living my life as this particular individual, in community with these particular others, within the particular constraints in which we already find ourselves as belonging together" (1989, p. 268). Following Gadamer (1977, p. 25), they simultaneously emphasize that hermeneutic analyses are only required where mutual understanding has broken down and needs to be restored by those involved – "without obliterating the real differences between human beings which call for this effort" (ibid, 268).

In the same vein, Packer and Addison (1989) hold against mainstream psychology's understanding of objectivity that, "detachment is not an essential prerequisite to objective, undistorted description and explanation. On the contrary, it is a distorting move that removes or covers up the practical involvements – cultural, social and personal – that enable us to understand people in the first place" (1989, p. 12). Investigating the interrelationships between social structures and individual activities would help to understand how we are constituted by the social world and, simultaneously, "contribute to sustaining it as what it is (or changing it); it made us what we have become" (ibid, p. 20). The interrelations can, as they point out, best be described by Heidegger's concept (1927/1962) of circularity: "we inevitably shape the phenomenon to fit a 'fore-structure' that had been shaped by expectations and preconceptions, and by our life-style, culture and tradition" (ibid, p. 33). Having such a preconception of the problem, "means that we

both understand it and at the same time misunderstand it" (ibid).

Starting from the same theoretical assumptions, Richardson, Fowers, and Guignon (1999) talk of a part-whole dialectic, which "always includes the possibility that additional readings of specific examples of the subject of interest will require shifts in the overall interpretation or that a better articulation of the global perspective will lead to alterations and improvements in the partial readings". (p. 303). Taking these reciprocal influences on each other into account is, as Martin and Sugarman (2001, p. 197) add, "a matter not of empathically reconstructing the other's mental processes and private experiences, but of being open to, and integrating, another's horizons in such a way that one's own perspective is altered in the process" and a "greater degree of critical penetration of one's own background of pre-understanding and prejudice" is reached.

Critical Debates

Undeniably, integrating the socio-cultural impact on individual behaviour into psychological theory construction is an important step towards overcoming the individualistic viewpoint. Given, however, the function of the individualistic view in sustaining given power relations and securing one's own position within them, it becomes clear that the mere awareness of the scientific and moral narrowness of this approach will hardly suffice to overcome it. If the dualism of society and individual is to be transcended we need to consider not only the impact of societal conditions on the individuals, but also the question as to how, in turn, the individuals can gain the power to overcome the conditions of their subjection. To address this question we need a concept of human agency that is not restricted to the individual but includes a meta-subjective quality which refers to the fact that it is only possible to gain control over the conditions of one's life rather than being controlled by them on a supra-individual level, i.e., together with others and in agreement with them. An essential task of human science psychology will then be to analyze the manifold hindrances that operate to prevent people from realizing this meta-subjective level; this includes the question of how people come to lapse into the usual practice of blaming each other for their situation instead of grasping their joint responsibility for overcoming conditions which impose such a reciprocal disempowerment on them. The expanded concept of human agency therefore necessarily includes an expanded concept of responsibility. It is no longer restricted to the demonstration of one individual's superiority over others in line with social standards and expectations, but embraces the question of the justifiability of these standards and expectations themselves and hence also the justifiability of the individual's submission to them.

Such expanded concepts of human agency and responsibility require, as Holzkamp (2013) argued, not only the assumption of cultural meaning patterns as an intermediate level between societal structures and individual behaviour, but also the integration of a second mediating level: the level of subjective reasons for actions (2013, especially pp. 282–296). It deals with the question of the reasons why one selects particular readings of cultural meaning patterns as premises for one's actions and to what extent this selection is influenced by one's anticipation of one's capacity to follow the implicit precepts of these meaning patterns. Reasons *are*, *as*

Holzkamp points out, always "first-person"; they are neither observable from an external standpoint nor can they be experienced by mere introspection; they can only be clarified in processes of "social self-understanding" in which each individual voices/shares her or his experiences of the structural constraints that have influenced her or his actions. Holzkamp referred to this dependency of an individual's thoughts and actions on his or her concrete standpoint in the societal power structures as "groundedness". In this context Holzkamp defines the acknowledgement of the groundedness of all behaviour as the sole a priori of a human science; to deny the groundedness of the others' views and actions is tantamount to denying their subjectivity and excluding them from the area of one's own

responsibility. This emphasis entails a fundamental rethinking of psychology itself: instead of considering individuals as objects of research to be assimilated within given power structures, it focuses on the subjective meaning of prevailing societal structures and whether and how individuals can anticipate being able to change these conditions in line with their own insights and interests. Such a shift in emphasis would be akin to the paradigm change in psychological research that Giorgi (1970) called for more than 40 years ago. Seen from this perspective, the problem to be analyzed is not the other's irrationality but one's own tendency to irrationalize others when their behaviour contradicts one's own notions and interests and could challenge one's assumptions of the universal validity of one's own forgone conclusions.

Since the subjective meaning of a situation is essentially determined by an individual's capacities to deal with it, research from the standpoint of the subject will be concerned mainly with exposing the many ways in which these capacities are being obstructed and undermined so that countermeasures can be developed. This requires the development of a psychology that does not limit its responsibility to solving predefined problems but sees its main task in the development of a scientific language that brings to bear those aspects and coherences of reality that are ignored in traditional psychology. The main void in psychology arises from the dissociation of theory and practice: it systematically hampers the recognition of the various constraints which constantly lead us to act against our better judgement and conscience and simultaneously to deny the impact of these pressures on our own thoughts and actions. Including the processes of human self-understanding as an essential knowledge interest and method in a human science approach, fills this void with a growing knowledge of the subjective meaning of given conditions and of how they work. In such a view, their different perspectives on the problem do not divide individuals but help them overcome their imprisonment in the narrowed world view and the isolation and powerlessness inherent in it. Such an approach also differs from the traditional one in that it has no clear end but proceeds, as Holzkamp puts it, not so much in a circular fashion, but in a spiral, approaching the problem from an ever deeper awareness of its complexity and contradictoriness. "One talks, in the end, about the same problem as at the beginning, but on a higher level of self-reflection and object-relatedness." (2013, p. 338).

Practical Relevance

In everyday practice the split between theory and practice is commonly associated with a tendency to conflate one's intentions to act with the concrete effects of one's actions – with the particular bias of taking one's own (good) intentions for the reality of what one is doing, while assuming that the effects of others' actions are their intentions. Yet by denying the constraining effects of limiting conditions on one's own thoughts and actions, one inevitably takes the "observer" or "third-person" standpoint from which, by definition, the necessity of change lies with the others while one's own role is confined to showing them the ways to go. The restrictive nature of such a research has been shown by the example of studies on racism which, as a matter of course, seem to free those who do research on it from any suspicion of harbouring racist thoughts themselves. Such an idea, in turn, can only be upheld when one claims for oneself the right to define what racism is, so that one implicitly displays exactly the same behaviour as that which one purports to fight (c.f., for example, van Dijk, 1992; Wrench, Brar, & Martin, 1993).

Thus, as a result of their comprehensive studies on the role of psychology in conveying racist ideologies, Howitt and Owusu-Bempah (1994) state that psychologists will hardly be able to contribute substantially to clarify the problem as long as they see themselves as people who investigate racism, but do not practice it. Under these premises their endeavours will be reduced to "strengthening victims, or, indeed, to hardening them up for more racism" (p. 168). Citing

Freire and Fanon, Howitt and Owusu-Bempah make clear that a solidarity which is not grounded in the shared need to overcome limiting conditions but oriented towards emancipating others will degenerate into acts of mercy which can be stopped at any time if those meant to benefit from it fail to prove worthy.

International Relevance and Future Directions

Generally, in a human science perspective the dualism of universal and particular is misleading in so far as the universal can only emerge out of the particular. If it is defined in contrast to the particular, it is merely a particular interest in the guise of universality, i.e., an interest of those who have the power to define how the "universal" must be read. In contrast, in a human science "universality" is not a fixed entity, but a never-ending process which does not take place over the individuals' heads but evolves from their everyday activities and experiences and their endeavors to gain a more comprehensive perspective on them in order to find out how far that which they are doing meets their own claims and expectations on life and their own part in it. This is in line with the concept of a generalized agency which is not "owned" by single individuals but can only be achieved on the meta-subjective level and in recognition of the self-curtailing, system-stabilising implications of all "spontaneous" tendencies of individuals to assert their own interests at the expense of others.

On the international level, this relationship between universality and particularity is discussed particularly in the context of development aid and human rights. Thus, for example, Gronemeyer (1992) and Escobar (1997) emphasize the repressive implication of all "aid" in which the development targets are fixed a priori as measuring up to Western standards/interests. The connection between development policies and psychological theories of development has also been discussed by Burman in many contexts (see, for instance, 2008).

While the individual right to self-determination is usually no issue in the context of development aid, it takes centre stage in the discussion of human rights. Thus, for instance, Bielefeldt (2004) highlights the crucial importance for civilisation in general of adopting the human rights by declaration in 1948 as inalienable and fundamental rights for all individuals. However, this was, as he emphasizes, not the endpoint but only the starting point of further discussions which since then essentially revolve around the question as to how the universal has to be defined against the particular or how cultural pluralism can be defended against a globalisation which entails the elimination of all differences. Bielefeldt stresses that the tension between the claim to universality, inherent in the human rights, and cultural pluralism cannot be dissipated once and for all, either theoretically or in political practice. Yet it is possible and expedient to transcend this opposition in the interest of a general humanisation of the world, thus opening up a space for intercultural dialogue and political actions. This requires to define both "universality" and "particularity" in such a way that their fundamental coherence remains visible – and thus also the inhumanity of conditions where individuals are instrumentalized by "society" and society by individuals. The universal can, as Bielefeldt concludes, realize its emancipatory potential only to the degree that it takes its "embeddedness in different cultures" (2004, p.23) into account.

In contrast to the defensive, self-centred view, which largely characterizes traditional psychology, human science research focuses critically on the concrete settings which require such a defensive attitude. This will open up alternative fields not only for scientific investigation but also for professional and political practice in which people are no longer determined by attempts to gain the upper hand over one another, but – based on their experiences of the dehumanizing and self-humiliating effects of such practices – oriented towards conditions where "the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all" (Marx/Engels, 1976, p.513).

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Subjectification

Eric Stewart[1] and Ariel D. Roy[2]
[1]Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences, University of Washington Bothell, Bothell, WA, USA
[2]Cultural Studies, University of Washington Bothell, Bothell, WA, USA

Introduction

Almost as soon as it was born as foundational to modern politics, philosophy, and the human sciences, *the subject* was cast into crises of meaning. Contemporary social theory, particularly structuralism, has performed varieties of postmortem on the universal subject, challenging not only its stability, its unity, its totality, its individuality, and its interiority but the uses to which constitutions of the subject and subjectivity have been put. Yet the "death of the subject" has coincided with an intense proliferation of activity around

invoking, animating, regulating, defining, fulfilling, finding, and acting upon the self and subjectivity. In politics, in work, in domestic arrangements, in consumption and marketing, in the arts and media, in medicine and health, in "lifestyle," and in all of the diverse forms and applications of psychological technologies, human beings are acted upon, addressed, and incited to constitute ourselves *as if we are selves* and selves of a particular type: We are more tied to and preoccupied with our subjectivity or "selfhood" than ever before (Rose, 1998, p. 169). But what do we speak of when we speak of the subject? What have we called into being and how?

Definition

Michel Foucault, the theorist most closely associated with the concept of subjectification, provides two meanings for the word *subject*: subject to another by control and dependence, and *tied to one's own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge* (1983, p. 212). Both meanings imply a form of power that subjugates or *makes subject to*, and while the two are interrelated, it is the latter set of processes to which *subjectification* most often refers: the constitution of the subject *as an object for himself or herself*. Subjectification refers to the procedures by which the subject is led to observe herself, analyze herself, interpret herself, and recognize herself as a domain of possible knowledge: "the way the subject experiences [her]self in a game of truth where [s]he relates to [her]self" (Foucault, 1998, p. 461; gender inclusion added). It operates as a form of power that applies itself to immediate and everyday life, which categorizes individuals and attaches them to their own identity, imposes a law of truth on them that they and others must recognize in them – a form of power that makes individuals subjects – and submits them to others in this way (Foucault, 1983, p. 212). The concept provides a framework for analyzing the relations, connections, multiplicities, and surfaces that form the singularities and stabilizations that we subjectivize, and carefully tend and practice, *as self*: a process by which the "inside" – subjectivity – is constituted as depth but also as an available object of knowledge, care, and mastery by practices of self and others (Rose, 1998).

Building on Foucault, Gilles Deleuze (1988) employed the metaphor of *the fold* to elaborate the ways that forces and relations of the exterior come to form an "inside," an interiority – and an other in one's self – to which an outside can make reference. This singular depth is no more (or less) than that which has been *folded in* to create a "space" or series of fields that exist only in relation to the forces, techniques, inventions, and truths that sustain them: "It is as if the relations of an outside folded back upon themselves to create a doubling, to allow a relation to oneself to emerge and to constitute an inside which is hollowed out and develops its own unique dimension" (Deleuze, p. 100). These foldings (and unfoldings and refoldings) of subjectification – along the "lines" of body, discipline, truth, or transcendence – are not passive; they are created and sustained by various practices and relations, notably those that entail incitements to knowing and telling the truth of one's self.

Keywords

Governmentality; Individualization; Power/Knowledge; Signification; Veridiction

Traditional Debates

One might begin with the Greeks ("know thyself"), the Christian care of the soul, Descartes' cogito, or the Enlightenment's rational knowingness – they are not properly gone or even past but continue to haunt contemporary formulations of the nature of the self, of its proper relations to self and others, and the relationship of the subject to truth and to power. But Hegel can be credited with historicizing consciousness and the subject, while also positing a primary longing for transcendence of the conditions of existence (and troubling the promise of enlightenment rationalism) (Butler, 1997; Hegel, 1977). In Hegel, self-consciousness emerges from the dialectical

relationship of slave and master, but in throwing off the seemingly external master, Hegel's bondsman "emerges as the unhappy consciousness through the reflexive application of ethical laws" (Butler, 1997, p. 32). It is possible to trace, as Judith Butler does, a line from Hegel through Nietzsche to Freud, in that a dialectical reversal in which longing (or will, desire, or "the drive") is bent back on itself through prohibition (or repression): "The drive turning back on itself becomes the precipitating condition of subject formation, a primary longing in recoil that is traced in Hegel's unhappy consciousness as well" (Butler, 1997, 22). This interiorization of the Other, of power-relations, and of Truth – the constitution of conscience – along with the importance of history and historical conditions remain influential. Foucault, however, rejects Hegel's dialectical logic in favor of disjunction and multiplicity, along with the traces of a transcendent and universal subject. Perhaps most important is the rejection of the "repressive hypothesis," the idea that power works primarily in negative ways, through prohibition or censorship. Rather than longing, will or drives preceding regulatory imperatives that repress them, power-relations and regimes of truth produce or incite longing and will, as well as their visibility and articulation – their availability to power/knowledge (Foucault, 1990). Not an interior turned back on itself by an exterior power, but a folding of the exterior to create that interior. As Jacques Lacan (1977) argued, the unconscious is a historical artifact which psychoanalysis "taught" subjects to take on as his own history and normalize as the personal truth of self. Lacan's analysis of the relationship between games of truth and formations and regulation of the subject is further developed in Foucault's conceptualization of subjectification (e.g., 2005, 2008).

Phenomenology also posits a preexisting in the form of intentionality: consciousness is directed toward "the thing" and gains significance through experience in the world. Intentionality is meant to "surpass" any founding psychologism or naturalism, but as Deleuze (1988) argues, it creates a new psychologism and a new naturalism "to the point where…it can hardly be distinguished from a learning process" (p. 89). Intentionality "synthesizes consciousness with significations," seeing (or experiencing) and saying – the seen provides something to speak – and never fully escapes a "naturalism of the 'savage experience' and of the thing, of the aimless existence of the thing in the world": it is "the same world that speaks itself in language and sees itself in sight…as if signification haunted the visible which in turn murmured meaning" (p. 90-91; see also Merleau-Ponty, 1969). For Foucault, intentionality is knowledge and this is why there is no "savage experience," there is nothing beneath or prior to knowledge; phenomenology is converted into epistemology (Deleuze, 1988). But for Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Being (Sein) offered the surpassing of intentionality: The fold of Being, from being to Being, from phenomenology to ontology, and the extent to which ontology was inseparable from the fold, since Being was precisely the fold that it made with being. Heidegger's inquiries into ontology, and into questions of what thinking signifies – what is it that we call thinking and how does thought affect itself – continued to engage and inform Foucault's work on knowledge and the subject. Ultimately, however, phenomenology is "too pacifying and ended up blessing too many things" (Deleuze, 1988, p. 93). What it blessed, the ramifications of its pacifism and its originary intentionality, can be seen in Sartre's existentialism, the psychology of Carl Rogers, and the contemporary constructivism of, for example, Gergen and Bruner (Rose, 1998).

Critical Debates

A contemporary influence and key point of departure for Foucault was Louis Althusser (1971), whose concept of interpellation is relevant here:

> [T]he individual *is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall freely submit to the commandments of the Subject*, i.e., *in order that he shall (freely) accept his subjection*, i.e., in order that he shall make gestures and actions of his subjections 'all by himself' (p. 182; emphasis in original)

Clearly there is the legacy of Hegel, Marx, and Freud, along with a critique of classical political and economic liberalism: One is subjected in order that one can come to act and govern oneself as a "free" subject. For Althusser, the "commandments of the Subject," refer to some absolute meaning-giving structure or entity – God, the Law, capitalism, or imperialism – and the promise it makes of deliverance from the basic human experience of anxiety and fragmentation (1971). This leads to critical distinctions. One is that Foucault would likely view the experience of fragmentation, anxiety, or uncontrollability as themselves modern forms and effects of subjectification, which in turn further authorize forms of power and knowledge. Second, Foucault does not view power as possessed or centralized but as transversal, dispersed in varied and variable power relations. Subjection is not derived from, say, forces of production or class struggle. Foucault's concept differs from concepts like hegemony and interpellation because of the way he situates subjectification in relation to truth and power, and its relationship to concepts of governmentality and normalization. Subjectification involves:

> the analysis of complex relations between three distinct elements none of which can be reduced to or absorbed by the others, but whose relations are constitutive of each other. These three elements are: forms of knowledge, studied in terms of their specific modes of veridiction; relations of power, not studied as an emanation of a substantial and invasive power, but in the procedures by which people's conduct is governed; and finally the modes of formation of the subject through practices of the self. It seems to me that carrying out this triple theoretical shift—from the theme of acquired knowledge to that of veridiction, from the theme of domination to that of governmentality, and from the theme of the individual to that of practices of the self—we can truly study the relations between truth, power, and subject without ever reducing each of them to the others (2008, p. 9)

The subject is not produced secondarily or simply as strategy of some more primary site or form of power (the state, political economy, or science), but in a complex circularity with other, varied and variously instantiated, relations of power. Subjectivity is an *effect* only in Deleuze's (1990) sense of the term: "it is strictly co-present to, and co-extensive with, its own cause, and determines this cause as an immanent cause, inseparable from its effects" (p. 70). Subjectification then is an individualizing operation that characterizes a series of powers – those of the family, medicine, psychology, education, labor, law, economics, and so on – which must be studied *in relation* to those sites and fields; it is not ultimately reducible to them, but neither is it exclusive of them, or of capitalism, or of colonialism, or of state domination (Athanasiadou, Canakis, & Cornillie, 2006; Buhrmann & Ernst, 2010; Venn, 2000; cf). Nor can it be understood simply as an effect of language, as purely grammatical, because it arises out of a "regime of signs rather than a condition internal to language," a regime of signs bound up with an organization of power, an "enunciative assemblage" (Cuyckens, Vandelenotte, & Davidse, 2010; Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, p. 130; cf). It is not so much language itself, as the "primacy of the signifying semiology," and the specific conditions of *veridiction* and relations of power that must be analyzed in relation to subjectification (Guattari & Zahm, 2011).

Subjectification refers to processes and effects that are not produced once and for all but repeatedly and variably, as such it is never complete, perfect, without contradiction, or possibility of reversal. Judith Butler (1997) can, because of that repetition, identify a "proliferation of effects which undermine the effects of normalization" so that the "subject is never fully constituted in its subjection" (pp. 93–94). The "way out" of subjectification, then, is not a matter of identifying another truth of the self, a politically progressive framework of signification. On the contrary, it is a matter of transversal resistances, of *dis*claiming, of refusal, of proliferation, and even of mistakes. If veridiction and signification are tactics of subjectification, then resistance would involve what Guattari calls strategies of *a-signification*: "And this isn't something that is given up to a transcendent, undifferentiated subjectivity. It is something that is worked at. This is art, this is the unnameable point, this point of non-sense that the artist works" (Guattari &

Zahm, 2011, p. 47). Foucault suggested that the contemporary target should not be to "discover what we are, but to refuse what we are" (Foucault, 1983, p. 216). Or, as Butler put it, the one who offers the critique must be "willing, as it were, to be *undone* by the critique that he or she performs" (1997, p. 106, emphasis added).

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Subjectivity, Overview

Valerie Walkerdine
Cardiff University, School of Social Sciences, Cardiff, UK

Introduction

Subjectivity is a term which entered critical psychological work in relation to debates within European social theory in the 1960s and 1970s. In particular, it signaled the complexity of production of what it means to be a human subject as part of the production of the social and not the pregiven individual subject of traditional psychology, e.g., socialization theories' assumption of a pregiven psychological subject made social. It is also to be contrasted with the term identity, which signals a socially given category.

Definition

The condition and experience of being a subject, including the process of production of subjects through subjectification or subjection.

Keywords

Subjectification; psycomplex; power/knowledge/desire; discourse; experience; affect

Traditional Debates

The human subject in traditional psychology is assumed to be an object (rational unitary subject)

(Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn, & Walkerdine, 1984), which can be studied and defined separate from any understanding of the production of the social world, defined by sociology. These are traditionally understood as two separate fields of study, and the individual is understood as acted on by the social not created as part of it. The subject as itself a "bundle of perceptions" comes from the work of the philosopher David Hume. It was German Idealism which sought first to understand how as such a subject comes to experience themselves as a single subject. This led to work, especially by Kant and Hegel, to understand the processes by which a subject is constituted out of the flow of sense impressions. The subject for Hegel becomes a split subject only through negating the diversity it has produced, rendering it as other to itself. This split subject appears in Freud in relation to the realm of the unconscious. In the development of phenomenology, the sensory engagement of perception as experience (e.g., in the work of Merleau-Ponty) again refuses to separate subject and object. Merleau-Ponty demonstrates how Hume's bundle of perceptions cannot be studied separately, which is what traditional academic psychology continues to do. Thus, we may understand that debates about subjectivity within critical psychology come from this continental tradition of work, inflected through a radical politics which has attempted to understand that inseparability of subject and object but which also argues that subjective experience must be understood as produced within a field of complex social forces.

Critical Debates

The 1960s was a time of huge social upheaval across the world. It was during this time that liberation movements were beginning take place in relation to race, gender, and sexuality, for example. But there were also uprisings in communist countries in Eastern Europe against a Stalinist hegemony and in support of more indigenous forms of communism. The crushing of popular uprisings by the Soviet Union produced a wave of defection from communist parties across the West. Meanwhile, in the 1960s wave of student uprisings, the events of May 1968 in Paris came to a head when workers refused to join students in a general strike. For many people, these events, taken together, suggested that existing approaches to social change which argued that the economy was paramount and needed to be the first object of revolt needed some rethinking. In particular, this led to the approach to Marxist politics which became known as Eurocommunism, which stressed the importance of ideology. Perhaps the best-known work to English-speaking audiences at that time was the famous ISA's essay of French communist philosopher Louis Althusser (1971). In that essay, Althusser argued that the economy was causal only in the "last instance" and instance that, in fact, "never came." This was almost scandalous in Marxist circles at that time but hugely important because he argued that what was crucial to understand was the relation of ideology to the creation of subjects. It became a watchword that what was needed was a "theory of the subject." Althusser's approach to such a theory was to link Lacanian psychoanalysis to the idea that subjects recognize themselves not so much through their place in the economy but through their ideological interpellation within ideological state apparatuses (ISAs), such as the school, church, and army. Being hailed as Mary Smith slow learner, in school, for example, created an identity which was ideological in character to which the subject was committed through the production of the unconscious as "structured like a language" (Lacan, 2002). Thus, the signs though which ideology and the Symbolic Order worked were not simply fictions which could be seen and brushed off as in a camera obscura, but worked in the very creation of the unconscious of the subject from before birth onwards.

At this time, radical traditions in Anglo-American psychology focused mostly on the science/ideology distinction, with psychology posited as an ideology and not a science and on the central importance of liberation (see the magazine *Red Rat* and the journal *Ideology and Consciousness*). The continental traditions of work shifted

the emphasis onto the development of work that challenged the boundaries of what psychology was in a different way, that is, by arguing not for a correct science but for a new way of thinking about subjectivity; by refusing to peel away ideological layers to find the real subject beneath, they sought instead to understand how subjectivity is produced through social forces.

This approach created a huge and important intellectual current in the English-speaking academy. It was also hugely important in relation to second-wave feminism's dictum on the centrality of the politics of the personal and considerable debates about the usefulness and efficacy of psychoanalysis to feminism ensued (e.g., Mitchell, 1974, and also see debates within the journals Ideology and Consciousness, m/f, and Feminist Review during the late 1970s). There was a huge academic turn to this writing and to its successors in post-structuralism. The work of Derrida on deconstruction (Burman, 2007; Derrida, 1974) and particularly Foucault began to develop, expand, and critique the work of structuralist approaches. In particular, Foucault argued for the specifically historical character of knowledge and truth, produced in regimes of population regulation and care of the self (Foucault 1975, 1986), presenting the psy sciences as having a productive effect in creating regimes of truth which form the basis of the regulation of day-to-day technologies and practices of population management. This approach does not see the necessity of one theory of "the subject" for all time, so much as historically specific (and thus changing) regimes and practices of subjectification in which what the subject is taken to be is produced in practices designated as true (e.g., the psy sciences). Thus, we have moved away from a simple account of ideology to one in which what it means to be a subject is created in historically specific practices and discourses, which "position" subjects. This approach paved the way for a recognition that, as one of the psi sciences, psychology had an important role to play in the production of subjectification. In this analysis, psychological knowledge was part of a diffuse and amorphous power, which acted not from on high but which suffused everyday practices, making the idea of liberation an impossible goal (Rose, 1999).

Within psychology, one strand of critical work used a variety of approaches to analyze discourses and practices in order to understand modes of power and subjectification both historically and in the present (Parker, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). However, while such approaches worked to understand the discursive production of subjects, subjectivity as the experience of being a subject was neglected (Henriques et al., 1984).

However, the primacy of the discursive was challenged in a number of quarters from the 1990s onwards. The later work of Foucault, with its stress on "the care of the self" and biopolitics (Foucault, 1986), placed emphasis on the body (Blackman, 2012). This in turn led to a reawakening of an interest in experience, agency, and the possibility of understanding subjectivity as part of an assemblage (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987), in which subjectivity is assembled out of the action of forces and affects operating on bodies in a territory, rather than semiotics or discourses (Blackman Cromby, Hook, Papadopoulos, & Walkerdine, 2008; Stengers, 2008; Walkerdine, 2007). In some sense, this signals a return to an interest in perception and sensory experience. In this context, the contribution of psychoanalysis is reworked to encompass a forward movement through time and space, a becoming (Guattari, 2000), while the understanding of experience may be revitalized through an interest in the traditions of empiricism and vitalism (e.g., Bergson, 2001; James, 1976; Whitehead, 1979). Thus, the central importance of bodies, neural networks, places, movement, and change takes us beyond the importance of disciplinary power and a sense of absence of agency towards and account in which subjectivities emerge within an ever-moving global assemblage in which possibilities come and go. How do we think the psychical in this context? How is the "fictional unity of an I" (Braidotti, 2002, p. 40) lived amidst these forces and movements? How is it felt across the body, imagined, experienced? These issues bring a new set of concerns for the engagement with subjectivity

which attempts to make sense of a new conjuncture, not the global politics of the 1960s, but that of the early twenty-first century, in which neoliberalism and globalization play such a central role. The challenge then is to develop the tools through which to understand not only the present but its inexorable movement into the future.

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Suffering

Frank Richardson
Department of Educational Psychololgy,
The University of Texas at Austin,
Austin, TX, USA

Introduction

Ubiquitous, inescapable, often intense human suffering is an overlooked or outright denied reality, an "elephant in the room," in 20th and 21st psychology. To put it another way, a theoretically sophisticated understanding of suffering has largely been absent from twentieth and twenty-first century psychology. Surely this neglect reflects the obscuring of suffering in modern culture. Indeed, we enjoy relative freedom from many kinds of pain and suffering. But such relief can easily breed a compulsive "forgetting" or denial of these ultimately unavoidable realities of loss, despair, accident, crushed hopes, death, and threats of meaninglessness.

Definition

The term suffering refers to the many kinds of physical and emotional pain, including such things as fear, despair, loneliness, anguish, sorrow, misery, etc., many forms of which find their way into every human life at one point or another. Miller (2004, p. 26) points out that much modern medicine and psychology obscure the reality and importance of *suffering* in human life by objectifying it as *disease* to be viewed in

a detached manner and a problem to be solved, if possible, by technical means.

Keywords

Eradicating suffering; acceptance and confrontation; transforming suffering; virtues of acknowledged dependence

Traditional Debates

Clifford Geertz (1973, p. 90) describes how in traditional societies myth or ritual tune "human action to an envisioned cosmic order and project images of cosmic order onto the plane of human existence." The sense of self in such a society is one of playing a small but meaningful role in a both a human community and a wider cosmic drama. We moderns are often acutely ambivalent about such ideals. We tend to view them as moralistic, confining, or elitist. But we also often look back at them with real nostalgia when we become disturbed by the degree of shallow hedonism and directionlessness of much modern life. For example, the Israeli sociologist Anton Antonovsky (1979, pp. 123 ff.) wonders if individuals can cope with stress at all well in modern circumstances without something like the "sense of coherence" a traditional sense of self affords, one that helps make "affectively comprehensible" the uncontrollable and tragic aspects of any human life. In the contemporary world, individuals and communities can draw on a variety of traditional and modern perspectives in dealing with human suffering. There seem to be three broad approaches available to us.

Eradicating Suffering and Its Causes

This prototypical, modern approach to suffering seems to have three overlapping features. The first is a commitment to eradicating the physical conditions and social arrangements that cause undue physical or emotional pain and suffering, including physical pain, emotional illness and distress, inhospitable environments, and arbitrary barriers to personal and intellectual development.

The second feature comprises modern ideals of equal worth, indelible human rights, and human dignity that inspire our often fierce commitment to eradicating human suffering. Unfortunately, by themselves, these ideals may leave us relatively clear about what we want to be "free from" with little sense of what we want to be "free to" or "free for," something Erich Fromm (1975/1947) termed the "ambiguity of freedom" in a modern context. He argues that such ambiguity leaves us with little defense against being led by the nose by the shallow, fickle influence of what "sells" in a widespread "personality market" that dictates what counts for success and social approval. Fromm felt this cultural condition, breeding depersonalization and emptiness, was in fact the major source of emotional problems in living in our kind of society.

Third, however, despite these difficulties, there are distinctive resources for finding integrity, direction, and a sense of wider connectedness in a secular age. Many of us, reaching beyond a static and legalistic conception of merely "negative liberty," are animated by a drive, shared with others, to work for the freedom of all, every living person, and to reduce the suffering of any and all individuals to the fullest extent possible. Such a drive or purpose can lift people beyond trivial concerns, make hardships more bearable, and help to inspire noble sacrifice for others and future generations. This can afford a sense of solidarity and common fate with others that can make pressing human limitations more bearable, dissolve interpersonal rivalry and antagonism, encourage forgiveness, and mute pain.

Nevertheless, this response to human suffering, by itself, seems to have real shortcomings over the long run (Richardson, 2005; Sandel, 1996). A heavy or one-sided emphasis on minimizing inescapable and often intense suffering tends to lead to obsessive denial, inexplicable despair, the fetishizing of control, and related ills. Modern individualism downplays social ties and obligations in a way that tends to undercut

even its own best ideals. Commitment to social reform can breed its own addiction to control and a growing sense of emptiness in the absence of other compelling sources of identity and purpose that do not depend entirely on eradicating inescapable pain, disappointment, failure, and difficulty. Without them, a side into a culture of narcissism and victimhood is hard to avoid.

Confrontation and Acceptance

A second distinctive approach to suffering emerging in modern culture appears as a reaction against what it sees as modern humanism's naïveté about the dark side of life, its utopian dreams of ever-expanding control and perfect justice, and its self-righteous confidence in the unquestionable rightness of its moral outlook, which only serves to mask its blind spots and shortcomings. Instead, this approach calls for the courageous facing of suffering and the threats of meaninglessness and death and living with them in full view.

In the field of psychology, Rollo May and Irwin Yalom (May & Yalom, 1989; Yalom, 1980) articulate "existential psychotherapy," which seems to represent a version of this approach. In their view, the key in a modern context to personal integrity as opposed to disintegration and a sense of direction as opposed to being overmastered by the whims of others is to face the inevitability of death, acknowledge that our cultural and moral values are ultimately groundless and relative, and accept the fact of life's meaninglessness in a universe quite indifferent to our aims or well-being. This means exercising a kind of radical, ungrounded choice of ideals and projects in living that come to have meaning and authority for us just because we choose them. Only if we come face to face with our freedom and responsibility in this way – which is what "authenticity" usually means to existentialist thinkers – can we effectively reject the complacent drifting and timid conformism of everyday life or effectively dissolve the internalized fears and guilt trips of therapy patients.

Existentialism seems to incur difficulties that may undermine its ability to sustain courage, vitality, and a sense of direction or purpose in the face of human limitations and suffering. It has been pointed out (Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999, pp. 114 ff.), for example, that Sartre's (1995) philosophy provides no reason as to just why we should exercise what he calls our "ontological freedom" or "terrible freedom" rather than opt for a life of short-term hedonism, sadism, or drug-induced stupor. May and Yalom's (1989) central idea of "commitment" for its own sake would seem to treat all ethical ideals and ends in living as mere means to pregiven or purely arbitrary ends, as adventitious and presumably dispensable. That erodes the very meaning of "commitment" and its benefits.

Also, there are neo-Nietzschean or "anti-humanist" (Taylor, 2007, p. 636) viewpoints that seem to represent another version of this approach to human suffering. Foucault (1980), for example insists that *all* conceptions of the good or right life should be seen as imposed orders of domination, as what termed ultimately arbitrary "regimes of truth." This includes modern liberal ideals of universal and equal respect and even existentialism's impassioned celebration of a radical, context-free freedom to choose our own ideals and projects in living. This kind of anti-humanism may simply try to remain austerely detached from all contingencies of history and culture, or it may revert to some more or less muted version of Nietzsche's ideals of the superman, will to power, or unreserved yea-saying.

A thorough-going neo–Nietzschean outlook that aims at detachment from all ethical ideals would seem to be quite impossible. Perhaps it really masks the anti-humanist's own tacit vision of the good life, which in fact may not be all that original. In Foucault's (1987) stimulating essay "What Is Enlightenment," he urges us to challenge "every abuse of power" and in this way "to give new impetus to the undefined work of freedom" (p. 46). But this sounds like he is reverting to the very sort of liberal or "negative" notion of the effects of power, as being free or not from domination and repression, that his own theory of power argues is entirely inadequate. Thus, Beiner (1993) persuasively characterizes Foucault as a kind of "hyper-liberal."

There would seem to be no good reason to reject core liberal values of human rights, dignity, and equal worth just because some in modern times elect to make a fetish of their freedom, succumb to narcissism, or promote bizarre conceptions of "political correctness." It makes more sense to search for additional ways to face and sometimes even flourish in spite of unavoidable suffering.

Critical Debates

Transforming Suffering

Jonathan Sacks (2005) employs the term "transforming suffering" to describe a third approach to this matter. A wise critical psychology that wished to move beyond the limitations of seeking to eradicate suffering or confronting it with existential fortitude might wish to consider some version of this approach. In his recent book *Dependent Rational Animals*, Alasdair MacIntyre (1999), following Aristotle and virtue ethics, argues that part of human maturity is to acquire virtues like courage, temperateness, and truthfulness so that one can function as an "independent practical reasoner in deliberative communities." But, in MacIntyre's view, Western moral philosophy including Aristotle has been colored by a certain "illusion of self-sufficiency." This obscures the great amount of frailty, dependence, disability, and limitation in human life, giving rise to ongoing, periodically urgent needs for physical assistance and support, belonging, respect, and guidance from others. To take account of this, we need to revise our conception of human flourishing or the good life and the skills needed to participate in it to include "virtues of acknowledged dependence" (p. 125). He calls for an "education of dispositions" such as a sense of unalloyed grief or sorrow over someone's else's distress – as opposed to looking away from the affliction of others or shame about our own – in order to be able to "sustain relationships of uncalculated giving and graceful receiving" (p. 121). Somehow those *relationships* need to be seen as a central and enduring part of the good life.

Sacks (2005) illustrates another facet of this approach to suffering with Victor Frankl's (1985) idea of human life as a "call" or "task." The meaning of life, writes Frankl, is to be found "in the world rather than within [one's own] psyche ... human existence is essentially self-transcendence rather than self-actualization" (quoted in Sacks, 2005, p. 221). In Sacks' (2005) words, "whether we are religious or irreligious, there is something we are *called on to do*, something no one else can do ... not in these circumstances, for this person" (p. 219). As Frankl puts it, "Suffering is an eradicable part of life." In a strange way, he feels, "Without suffering and death, human life cannot be complete." So, "if there is a meaning in life at all, there must be a meaning in suffering" (Frankl, 1985, p. 88). Such meaning would presumably reside in part in the relationships of belonging and caring in distress MacIntyre (1999) speaks of, or in the kind of remarkable service to others in the midst of acute suffering, in the death camps and elsewhere, that Frankl richly narrates. Frankl suggests their quality is such that it is not from the "length of its span" or any other ordinary measure of success or well-being that "we can ever draw conclusions as to a life's meaningfulness" (Frankl, 1985, p. 53).

A significant challenge for critical psychology in the twenty-first century may be to find ways to preserve its commitment to social justice and eradicating human suffering and its causes where possible while broadening its view to incorporate insights from other approaches to facing human limitations, dependence, and distress.

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Surveillance

David Harper[1], Darren Ellis[2] and Ian Tucker[1]
[1]School of Psychology, University of East London, London, UK
[2]School of Law and Social Sciences, University of East London, London, UK

Introduction

Surveillance has been of interest to critical psychologists in two distinct ways: as a matter of practical; and political concern in relation to civil liberties and as a theoretical concern in relation to the construction and policing of societal norms and the ways in which subjectivity is shaped in the context of these norms.

Surveillance has often been conducted by governments against people seeking reform or overthrow of repressive regimes – people often from marginalized communities. All states conduct surveillance on their citizens, at least indirectly through the gathering of personal data (e.g., a population census), but, generally, the more repressive the regime, the more intrusive the level of surveillance. The former East Germany's secret police – the Stasi – managed to recruit, by some estimates, a sixth of the population as informers. This level is perhaps even higher in North Korea and this has obvious implications for subjectivity – the ways of being produced in such societies. However, not all surveillance is so intrusive. The intelligence communities in Western liberal democracies gather huge amounts of digital information (e.g., telephone, Internet, and other data) and then store it in case it is of investigatory interest in the future. Thus, while most citizens will not experience intrusive surveillance, if they become of interest to the security establishment, huge amounts of data about them are potentially available. There are ongoing debates in many countries about how to balance competing moral imperatives (e.g., privacy versus security). Not all surveillance is nonconsensual, and there is often public support for crime-related surveillance. States are not the only actors who engage in surveillance – people can engage in it themselves or hire private investigators to conduct surveillance on their behalf, and, more recently, data gathering by multinational Internet corporations like Facebook and Google has become a concern for civil liberties activists.

Surveillance has been of theoretical concern for critical scholars. In *Discipline and punish*, Foucault (1979) discussed Jeremy Bentham's design for an architectural structure called the panopticon. This structure was so designed that observers were located at a central station with cells or rooms located in an outer ring. As daylight reached the central station by coming through window slits in the rooms located in the outer ring, this meant that those at the central station could easily observe those occupying these rooms or cells. This had obvious

implications for subjectivity since surveillance derived its power from its potentiality since the occupants could never be sure when they were being observed, and, thus, Foucault contended, they were induced into behaving as if they were continually watched, hence regulating themselves without the need for external intervention. Foucault argued that this design represented a new way of thinking about governing people – not by a threat of direct force, but indirectly by recruiting people into the notion that they needed to govern themselves due to the omnipresent fear of being observed and punished if one transgressed some societal norm. Rabinow (1984) notes, in a resumé of a Foucauldian view of surveillance in culture, that "through spatial ordering, the panopticon brings together power, control of the body, control of groups and knowledge ... it locates individuals in space, in a hierarchical and efficiently visible organization" (p. 19). The cultural and spatial organization of society means that we are continually surveyed, constantly regulated by a panoptical gaze. The notion that culture can be panoptical has been a useful conceptual resource in explaining how societal norms are constructed and how people are recruited into comparing themselves against these norms and regulating their behavior accordingly. However, as we will see later, more recent theoretical developments have drawn on Deleuzian rather than Foucauldian scholarship.

Surveillance has become an increasingly important topic, especially following the September 11, 2001, World Trade Center attacks in New York which led to an international increase in surveillance by states in order to prevent further terrorist attacks. Over the last 20 years, the cross-disciplinary academic specialism of surveillance studies has seen rapid growth with networks like the Surveillance Studies Network (http://www.surveillance-studies.net/), specialist journals (e.g., Surveillance and Society: http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/), conferences, and key texts (see Ball, Haggerty, & Lyon, 2012 and Hier & Greenberg, 2007 for a good overview).

We will discuss both political and theoretical aspects of surveillance throughout.

Definition

David Lyon, a leading surveillance studies scholar, has defined surveillance as "any collection and processing of personal data, whether identifiable or not, for the purposes of influencing or managing those whose data have been garnered" (Lyon, 2001, p. 2). Such personal data can be gathered visually (e.g., via closed-circuit television or CCTV) and via audio recording (e.g., over the telephone or via bugging devices). In the past letters considered to be of interest would be opened by security services. However, nowadays, with communication happening much more over the Internet, much surveillance is of a digital nature. With the increasing amount of personal data stored in large digital databases, the term "dataveillance" has been coined to refer to the surveillance of information (Clarke, 1988). It has been argued that dataveillance is a form of "new surveillance" in that categories of data in specific contexts are the target of surveillance rather than individuals. This development illustrates how the scope of surveillance has broadened in relation to technological growth.

Surveillance can vary along a number of dimensions. For example, it may be overt – as with the installation in public space of closed-circuit television cameras (CCTV). Alternatively it may be covert – a CCTV camera may be hidden from public view. Similarly there can be variation in how active it is – from a bug hidden inside a person's home by a covert operative to the use of information passively gathered and stored in government or commercial databases where it may be subject to data mining by algorithm-driven computer programs.

Keywords

Civil liberties; CCTV; dataveillance; panopticon; personal information; surveillant assemblage

History

It is possible to delineate a history both of the concept of surveillance and also of surveillance practices, and so we will distinguish between the two here.

The History of the Concept of Surveillance

The French word "surveillance" derives from the verb surveiller and appears to date from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. It was a term used during the Great Terror in the French Revolution (1793–1794) – the Paris Commune created a Committee of Surveillance aimed at uncovering counter revolutionaries. In popular culture, surveillance is often seen as a technology used by repressive regimes – see novels like Zamyatin's *We* and Orwell's *1984*. *1984* opens with a description of a telescreen in Winston Smith's room which both receives and transmits all that is audible and visible in a room.

The History of Surveillance Practices

Of course, people engaged in the practice of surveillance long before the French term came into wider use and a range of different terms like eavesdropping, espionage, and so on have been used to describe it. Cuneiform tablets dating back some 3,000 years describe Assyrian agents being sent to report on the king's subjects and the condition of border states (Laidler, 2008). Throughout most of human history, surveillance has been relatively local and parochial. However, the growth of the modern nation state saw a simultaneous growth in surveillance driven both by the needs of the state to gather information on the population (in order to govern and collect taxes) and by the availability of new technologies like the survey (Ball et al., 2012; Hier & Greenberg, 2007). The centralized recording and storage of information on events like births, marriages, and deaths and regular census surveys led to the development of centralized bureaucracies and also meant that governments increasingly had access to large amounts of information on their populations. This information provided a condition of possibility for the development of new ways of looking at people. For example, states could now view people at a population level and so the identification of groups and trends became possible (Hier & Greenberg, 2007). Moreover, increasingly surveillance has been targeted at categories of people (e.g., criminals, young people, mental health service users).

In the twentieth century, the availability of technologies of mass surveillance meant that totalitarian regimes were able to exercise repression in new ways (e.g., the "great firewall of China" where websites containing content seen as threatening to the government are systematically blocked). However, the existence of surveillance also gave rise to a range of forms of resistance to this surveillance – for example, in the Cold War Soviet Union, people often spoke in coded language and told political jokes, while dissident activists wrote and distributed "samizdat" (i.e., clandestinely published) literature.

Surveillance has increased in Western liberal democracies driven both by the availability of technology and the information needs of governments. Apart from the information needed to plan public services, governments also seek to monitor populations because of concerns about health, crime, and, especially after the September 11, 2001, attacks, terrorism (Ball et al., 2012; Hier & Greenberg, 2007). The late twentieth and early twenty-first century has seen the rapid growth of the Internet and other digital technologies, and personal information has increasingly become commodified with multinational corporations like Facebook, Apple, and Google collecting large amounts of data and using it to sell advertising or develop new products.

Traditional Debates

Traditionally oriented research on surveillance tends to accept the legitimacy of surveillance and is characterized by quantitative research on topics and technologies which can be used to evaluate and optimize surveillance. A dominant topic in the evaluation of surveillance has been

the efficacy of CCTV. The results of psychological research can also be used to optimize surveillance – thus, insights into how humans recognize faces have enabled the development of computer software to more accurately identify faces (Ball et al., 2012; Harper, 2007). However, other mainstream researchers have conducted research examining surveillance as an independent variable, examining how people respond to being observed (or thinking they are being observed), identifying if their behavior is different, and, if so, attempting to identify causal variables (e.g., White & Zimbardo, 1980).

Critical Debates

Critical scholarship and research on surveillance has tended to question the legitimacy of surveillance practices and has focused on two broad issues. Firstly, critical researchers have examined surveillance practices in relation to power. Secondly, scholars and researchers have discussed how best to conceptualize surveillance.

Power has a huge influence on surveillance. For example, the choice of who is targeted for surveillance by, for example, law enforcement agencies has been a concern particularly since some of the groups most likely to be targeted (e.g., young black men from poverty-stricken neighborhoods) are those who are already most marginalized. Moreover, both surveillance and dataveillance lead to a social sorting where certain categories of people are assigned certain socially related values (e.g., risk, threat, valuable customer). Often these values follow the contours of social inequality such that those who are marginalized in society (e.g., psychiatric patients) are seen as posing a risk or threat. Of course the influence of power can perhaps be seen more starkly when political dissidents are subject to intrusive state surveillance. Critical scholars have also attempted to develop critiques of mainstream psychological research which has been applied to surveillance (e.g., Harper, 2007).

Much early critical work in surveillance studies drew heavily on Foucault's panoptical reading of surveillance and on Orwellian views of surveillance as inherently repressive and hierarchical. However, these approaches have recently been supplemented by models elaborating nonhierarchical definitions of surveillance, pointing to the fragmentary and multiple nature of many modern surveillance practices, such as computer databases and online tracking through software cookies for advertising purposes. Rather than conceptualize surveillance in relation to a particular kind of technology (e.g., CCTV) or actor (e.g., the state), the concept of the "surveillant assemblage" (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000) has been adapted from the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987) to focus on the ways in which information technologies deal with multiple flows of information. According to Haggerty and Ericson, this assemblage "operates by abstracting human bodies from their territorial settings and separating them into a series of discrete flows. These flows are then reassembled into distinct 'data doubles' which can be scrutinized and targeted for intervention" (2000, p. 606). They argue that this leads to a "rhizomatic leveling of the hierarchy of surveillance, such that groups which were previously exempt from routine surveillance are now increasingly being monitored" (p. 606). The assemblage is best understood as a potentiality "that resides at the intersections of various media that can be connected for diverse purposes" (p. 609).

These theoretical resources enable ways of looking at surveillance differently. For example, people are not simply subject to surveillance; they can engage in it themselves – for example, activists can film police activity at public demonstrations or wear their own surveillance devices and engage in sousveillance – literally surveillance from below – or coveillance (Mann, Nolan, & Wellman, 2003). Moreover, with the growth of social media like Facebook where members regularly post detailed and intimate information about themselves, people are both engaging in surveillance of others while simultaneously being subject to it themselves. This illustrates how the potential for surveillance in society has increased beyond traditional understandings focused solely on state and organizational surveillance and has led to a broadening of the definition

of surveillance away from solely visual methods like CCTV. However, the way in which such surveillance is experienced depends hugely on the social and political context – in liberal democracies people may be willing to share information about themselves as there may appear to be little cost. Once again this has implications for subjectivity in that the construction of personal identity is, now more than ever before, a public achievement. Moreover, under conditions of neoliberal consumerism, identity has become commodified.

International Relevance

Surveillance is of concern in many countries though the particular way in which it is conducted and experienced varies from country to country as a result of different economic and political contexts and histories (Zureik, Lynda Harling Stalker, Smith, Lyon, & Chan, 2010). For example, it is possible that people living in countries which have emerged from totalitarian governments may have a different experience of surveillance compared with citizens of well-established liberal democracies. The use of CCTV, computer databases, Internet monitoring, and biometric identification at national borders has become more widespread with common justifications including the prevention of terrorism and crime and managing immigration (Ball et al., 2012; Hier & Greenberg, 2007).

Practice Relevance

Surveillance is becoming an increasingly ubiquitous aspect of personal and professional life. Many forms of emotional distress include as a dominant theme a comparison with an idealized societal norm. For example, for those experiencing varieties of eating disorder, the circulation of idealized body images in culture can lead to a literally embodied experience of surveillance, an experience that may be worsened as contact with mental health services and a concern with food intake can increase the feeling of surveillance. Narrative therapists have collaborated with service users to develop innovative ways of resisting such surveillance – in the forming, for example, of Anti-Anorexia Leagues (Madigan & Epston, 1995). In panoptical cultures, self-surveillance is another consequence and this can be expressed as a debilitating anxiety (Smail, 1984). There are implications for practitioners too in that the monitoring, assessment, and management of risk, for example, have become a focus of concern (Rose, 1996).

Future Directions

With the advance of digital technologies, surveillance and dataveillance are likely to become even more enmeshed in everyday activities. How this is experienced by people – for example, how it reshapes subjectivity – may become an important area for future research (e.g., Harper, Tucker, & Ellis, 2013).

The collection and storage of personal information is no longer the preserve of states and is increasingly engaged in by multinational corporations. The social networking site Facebook, for example, had over a billion users in 2012 – larger than every national population apart from India and China. Moreover, we are likely to see increasing "function creep" with surveillance and dataveillance systems which have been set up for one purpose subsequently being used for other purposes.

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Surveillance Threat

Michelle Billies
Kingsborough Community College,
City University of New York,
Brooklyn, NY, USA

Introduction

Since 9/11, discourses of terrorist threat and national security have fueled expansions in global surveillance funding and technologies while promoting cultures of suspicion. Law and border enforcement practices in many countries are being critiqued for disregarding civil liberties and human rights in their discriminatory treatment of overlapping groups of Muslims, Arabs, South Asians, and immigrants. At a societal level, these processes are "breaking down boundaries between the inside and outside, (casting) the homeland in a state of constant emergency from threats within and without" (Kaplan, 2003). New attention to terrorism reinforces old ideologies of criminal threat, providing further warrant for preemptive criminal profiling. At an individual and community level, surveillance poses a range of everyday psychological and material challenges to targeted groups who must manage their identities and their safety.

Broad studies of police and border surveillance have not paid close attention to the agent-civilian interaction from the civilian perspective. Surveillance threat offers a means to study this dynamic in which those portrayed as a threat to society are themselves potentially subject to physical, legal, verbal, and sexual harm by agents of the law.

Policing in New York City (NYC) offers a powerful case for studying and theorizing ST. From 2003 to 2011, the number of stops increased sixfold, to a high of 684,000. Not only has the NYC Police Department (NYPD) been disproportionately profiling of groups by perceived race, gender, age, religion, class, sexuality, and ability, it is one of many settings in which entwining immigration, counterterrorism, and criminal justice policies are increasing risks to many. The case has also been the site of critical research on policing among racially diverse NYC subpopulations including youth; low-income lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) communities; and those living in drug trade locations, offering rare data that contributes to a feminist, intersectional critique of everyday law enforcement practice. One participatory action research (PAR) project found that 84 % of 570 youth who had encountered the police in the previous 6 months reported a -negative interaction (Stoudt, Fine, & Fox, 2011/2012). Another PAR project found that 19 % of

the 171 low-income LGBTQ people surveyed had been assaulted by police in the prior 2 years (Welfare Warriors Research Collaborative, 2010). Though being developed based on NYC policing, the concept surveillance threat can be applied widely across global settings of police practice and internal and external border enforcement such as security check points and customs and immigration.

Definition

Surveillance threat (ST) defines the problem of everyday potential harm faced by targeted communities when stopped or screened by law or border enforcement. ST takes three interrelated forms: (a) the potential for verbal, physical, sexual, and legal harm; (b) the threatening attitude of law and border enforcement officers; and (c) the civilian's perception of immanent harm. As a description of the social psychological experience, surveillance threat focuses on how practices of harm and intimidation create a psychological problem for civilians who perceive and must negotiate these threats before, during, and after they occur.

Keywords

Terrorism; anti-terrorism; counterterrorism; provocative policing; coercive policing; police-civilian encounter; surveillance; threat; risk; risk management; racism; oppression

Traditional Debates

Most research on the police-civilian interaction in social psychology and criminology examines issues of procedural justice, or fairness in the encounter, and its effect on police legitimacy in the public eye. This literature reflects a debate between civil liberties and public order, that is, whether the infringement on civilians' rights is worth the increase in public safety (Johnson, 2003). Researchers find when members of the public perceive they have been treated fairly, they tend to obey, cooperate, and accept officer decisions (Tyler & Huo, 2002). In contrast, if the public perceives unfair treatment by police, support for policing erodes (Gau & Brunson, 2010; Watson, Angell, Vidalon, & Davis 2010). However, this analysis fails to address whether public safety is actually being achieved, and if so, for whom and at whose expense, raising questions about the impact of stops and other distributive justice issues.

A second debate entails responsibility for police aggression. This turns on the question of whether officers, or those they stop, are seen to instigate police behavior, implicitly asking who is responsible for the officer's use of force. While it is well accepted that outcomes of stops depend on perceptions involving both officers and civilians (Shon, 2002; Weitzer & Brunson, 2009), officer behavior is often cast as a response to the conduct of those they stop, reflecting a lack of conceptual clarity that tends to blame civilians. Civilian disrespect purportedly "leads to" police aggression but researchers do not explain how, externalizing the locus of officer self-control by holding those stopped accountable for officer behavior and naturalizing officers' responses (see Shon, 2002). However, critical research reveals that officers rather than civilians often initiate and sustain antagonistic relations.

Critical Debates

ST relies on research from the civilian perspective about provocative and coercive policing. A number of studies have generated a core typology of police harassment and violence including verbal (disrespectful, derogatory, intimidating, abusive language and tone), physical (throwing civilians against a wall or to the ground, breaking bones), sexual (extorting sex to avoid arrest, public strip search), and legal (fabricated violations, arrest without reasonable suspicion or cause). Some studies explain officer behavior as a reflection of departmental socialization into biased treatment of civilians, the

negotiation of job requirements, tough-on-crime ideology, and public scrutiny (Gatto, Dambrun, Kerbrat, & De Oliveira, 2009; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). Most critical perspectives underline the problem of racism in policing.

Some critical researchers challenge the notion of civilians as (only) victims, focusing on the agency of those stopped. Weitzer and Brunson (2009) found that young people manage "adversarial and provocative" police behavior by using "strategic aversion," "noncompliance," "overt resistance," and "verbal resistance." The youth PAR project above found young people hold powerful knowledge and opinions about policing in NYC. Not only is it crucial to learn about surveillance threat from civilians, they can also offer insight from their proactive responses, resistance, and ideas for justice.

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Sustainability

Felix Munger and Manuel Riemer
Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON, Canada

Introduction

Defining a particular relationship between nature and society, sustainability is closely linked to the social construction and social use of nature because humans require an ecosystem (i.e., limited areas of interaction between all living organisms and nonliving components such as water, rocks, air, minerals) that supplies sufficient renewable resources (e.g., clean air, water) to survive and nonrenewable resources (e.g., minerals, natural gas) for the production of goods. Through the advent of modernization, industrialism, and the development of capitalism (especially in the neoliberal form it has taken since the late 1970s), the social construction of nature has shifted from a perspective of a living organism with which humans live in harmony (e.g., mother earth) to an instrumental view (i.e., nature as machine). At the same time, the social use of nature has shifted from local sustainable utilization such as subsistence farming (although there are some historical examples of unsustainable/exploitative agricultural practices such as overgrazing and deforestation leading to natural disasters such as desertification) toward commodification and exploitation of nature (Huckle, 1996). This development interacts in a multiplicative way with worldwide population

growth, which is projected to add over two billion world citizens to the existing seven billion within the next 40 years (United Nations, 2011a). Population growth inherently increases the use of natural resources and thus puts more strain on the planet's ecosystem, but it is most impactful in highly industrialized countries where the per capita use of natural resources is especially high.

Today, neoliberal economic development and capital accumulation have become the primary criteria for economic decision making in most cultures, with little consideration for present and future environmental costs. Socialist attempts (in particular productivist socialism) to organize societies (e.g., Russia, China), as societal and economic alternatives to capitalism, have also applied a primarily instrumental view of nature with significant negative environmental impacts (Huckle, 1996; Kovel, 2007). While various indigenous cultures have maintained more holistic views of nature, neoliberal economic globalization is increasingly threatening these final frontiers of alternative, or rather traditional, constructions of nature (The Council of Canadians, Fundación Pachamama, & Global Exchange, 2011).

Over the last several decades, sufficient scientific evidence has been gathered to demonstrate with a high level of certainty that current levels of natural resource depletion (e.g., deforestation, overfishing) and environmental degradation (e.g., biodiversity loss, pollution) are unsustainable and pose an imminent risk to the planet's capacity to sustain future generations (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; Rees, 2010). According to the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005), for example, forests are declining at a rate of approximately 9.4 million hectares annually, while 23 % of all mammal species and 32 % of amphibian species are threatened with extinction.

Early international efforts to address these developments include the 1972 United Nations Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm (United Nations Environment Programme, 1972) and the 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development. The latter resulted in the Brundtland Report, which introduced the idea of sustainable development to simultaneously address the needs to address poverty and environmental sustainability, which has been the dominant approach to sustainability ever since (United Nations, 1987). In 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio Earth Summit) resulted in Agenda 21, a comprehensive document listing sustainable development strategies for the twenty-first century (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1992), followed 10 years later by the United Nations World Summit on Sustainable Development, which led to the Johannesburg Declaration (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2002). In 2012, the United Nations will hold the Rio 2012 (or Rio +20) Conference on Sustainable Development to evaluate progress and implementation of Agenda 21, identify new challenges, and attempt to secure ongoing commitment to sustainable development (United Nations, 2011b).

There are clear human dimensions related to the causes, impacts, and reactions to climate change and environmental degradation, which include mitigation and adaptation. Consequently, there are also important relevant psychological aspects (Swim et al., 2009; Riemer & Voorhees, in press). There has been a long tradition within psychology of exploring psychological issues related to these three dimensions, especially since the foundation of the subfield of environmental psychology in the 1960s (Gifford, 2008) and the advent of the *Journal of Environmental Psychology* in 1981 (Canter & Craik, 1981; Winkel, Saegert, Evans, & Uzzell, 2009). Several authors have reviewed this body of literature including books by Bechtel and Churchman (2002), Gifford (2007), Harré (2011), Koger and Winter (2010), Moser and Dilling (2007), and Nickerson (2003) and review articles by Abrahamse, Steg, Vlek, and Rothengatter (2005), Clayton and Brook (2005), Kaplan (2000), Kolmus and Agyeman (2002), Kurz (2002), Oskamp (2000), Riemer (2010), Stern (2000), Swim et al. (2009), and Vleg and Steg (2007).

Definition

There is no commonly agreed upon definition of sustainability and sustainable development. In fact, it has been argued that the idea of sustainability provides more a set of guidelines or general principles that need to be tailored to the specific context in which it is applied. However, the Brundtland Report's wording of "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (United Nations, 1987) seems to be the most popular definition of sustainable development. From a critical perspective, sustainability should be defined as the attempt to maintain the planet's ecological capacity while considering the rising world population, as well as ethical and geopolitical dimensions, and emphasizing the elimination of poverty and hunger and the promotion of economic sustainability, sustainable development, equity, and justice.

Keywords

Sustainability; sustainable development; environmental protection; global poverty; worldwide population growth; capitalism; ecosocialism

Traditional Debates

Overall, public environmental discourse since the 1970s has moved from conservation toward sustainable development due the goals of eradicating poverty and hunger, which highlight the connection between nature and worldwide population growth. This convergence of issues has generated several important debates. First, the goals of natural conservation and economic development to alleviate poverty and hunger may conflict because conventional approaches to economic development frequently result in depletion of natural resources, while the eradication of hunger commonly requires an increase in agricultural production which either results in modification of the environment such as converting forests into arable land or results in attempts to increase efficiency by using nonrenewable resources such as oil for farming equipment.

There is also a lack of clear, agreed upon definitions of sustainability and sustainable development, which raises questions such as what to sustain/develop, for whom to sustain/develop, and for how long to sustain/develop (Parris & Kates, 2003). The advantage of a lack of a concise definition is that it leaves space for multiple stakeholders to relate to sustainability and thus can unify diverse stakeholders. This is useful because the sustainable development movement consists broadly of two main areas: environmentalists (those who want to conserve nature) and poverty activists (those who want to alleviate poverty). One disadvantage, however, is that such a vague definition can increase the difficulty of developing common visions and goals among diverse stakeholders. A second disadvantage is that it allows for potentially opposing ideas to take up the issue of sustainability such as free-market ideologies, sustainable modernization through eco-efficiency (i.e., a form of production of goods and services that reduces ecological impacts through utilizing fewer natural resources and producing less waste and pollution), or more radical ideas such as ecosocialism (i.e., the creation of an alternative to the capitalist system that includes social justice coupled with material production and services that remain within ecological limits).

Strongly linked to the discussion above is the question of how to situate and prioritize economy, society, and the environment – which are often seen as the three main dimensions of sustainable development. The link between the three dimensions has traditionally been represented as pillars where each of the three dimensions carries equal weight or overlapping circles (e.g., triple bottom line) where sustainability is often conceptualized as being located in the overlapping area. Increasingly, however, the environment is recognized as the center in a nested or embedded system that is the core for all social life in which economic systems exist.

This shift toward recognizing the centrality of the environment speaks to the increasing use of language such as strong sustainability and weak sustainability. In part rooted in ecological economy, strong sustainability claims that mainstream economics devalues natural resources and proposes that natural capital cannot be substituted by capital made by humans. Weak sustainability, on the other hand, proposes that market forces, innovation, and technological improvements can lower the need for natural resources and/or replacing it.

Finally, most of the traditional research in environmental psychology has been focused on studying such issues as perceptions, attitudes, behaviors, motives, and portrayals and benefits of nature and the environment (Canter & Craik, 1981; Gifford, 2008; Saunders, 2003). Today, much of the psychological work focused on sustainability emphasizes finding effective ways of getting people to behave and act in pro-environmental and sustainable ways. This includes multiple theories and strategies that are focused on simple behavior change (e.g., recycling) using mostly social psychology and social marketing approaches.

Critical Debates

While there is little to no opposition to the concepts of sustainability and sustainable development per se, sustainable development nevertheless has resulted in multiple critical debates. First, sustainable development is considered a contradiction among proponents of the no-growth and degrowth movements, as both movements argue that an economy based on growth is not sustainable (e.g., strong sustainability) because economic development (as described above) essentially necessitates growth, which inherently requires natural resources, environmental modifications, and produces increased waste (Fournier, 2008; Victor, 2008). The difference between the two movements is that no-growth aims to stop growth, while degrowth aims to reduce overall levels of growth and consumption. Second, contemporary views of sustainable development are entrenched in at least two different philosophical orientations that create significant tensions. On the one hand, the ecocentric orientation has its origins in anti-industrialist sentiments such as the Romanic movement and focuses on conservation of nature and a moral code that includes the protection of all living things (e.g., the universal declaration of the rights of mother earth). The technocentric orientation on the other hand has its origins in modernism and focuses on instrumental approaches to solving environmental issues (e.g., carbon storage) (Huckle, 1996). From the perspective of sustainability, the first risks a romanticized view that advocates a return to a simpler time of less consumption (e.g., back to nature), while the latter runs the risk of a progressive view of history that encourages solving environmental and sustainability problems by applying technological inventions to increase the environmental sustainability of the current level of consumption (i.e., weak sustainability) which has the potential for further unintended negative consequences (e.g., as in the case of producing biofuels which have increased food prices sharply in the past).

Third, sustainable development is strongly entrenched in a north/south divide. There is clearly an unequal distribution of consumption, given that 20 % of the people in the highest-income countries in the Global North make up 86 % of total worldwide consumption, while the poorest 20 % in the Global South consume a mere 1.3 % (United Nations, 1998). Consequently, in order to achieve worldwide sustainable consumption, the Global North would have to drastically reduce its level of consumption. Not surprisingly, many proponents of environmental protection tend to come from the Global North, while the majority of those interested in equity (e.g., ecological debt of the global north, fair resource distribution) tend to come from the Global South (Agyeman, 2005). Moreover, since the 1990s, the powerful governments of the Global North have increasingly narrowed the definition of sustainability to environmental protection, and discussions regarding the global economic system and adjustments to consumption in the

Global North have almost completely been excluded (Hossay, 2006).

Finally, despite the existence of alternative approaches to sustainability such as deep ecology (i.e., the attempt to encourage a profound regard for all other things – not just other humans – coupled with removing human domination over nature), ecofeminism (i.e., combing the struggles of feminism and environmental justice), environmental justice (i.e., promoting equal treatment and meaningful involvement of all peoples in regard to environmental laws, regulations, and policies), and the degrowth/no-growth movements, the vast majority of conventional approaches to sustainability and, more significantly, sustainable development are framed by neoliberal political ideology, free market values, and individualized lifestyles (Huckle, 1996, Hossay, 2006; Speth, 2008), something that many argue is in fact a co-optation of the language of sustainability by neoliberal interests. This mainstream neoliberal political ideology of free market values and individualized lifestyles has two significant drawbacks. First, any future development in the Global South that is mirrored on the economic development and consumption of the Global North is predicted to have devastating global environmental effects (Hossay, 2006). Second, the idea that neoliberal political ideology is considered the only viable option toward achieving sustainability hinders deliberation of the negative role capitalism may have in causing current levels of unsustainability and environmental degradation (Kovel, 2007), something thinkers critical of capitalism such as Karl Marx, Karl Polanyi, and Jürgen Habermas have long predicted.

Within psychology there have been some recent critical developments. First, Stokols (1995) argued almost 20 years ago to conceptualize environmental psychology not as a subdiscipline of psychology but rather as a multidisciplinary field of diverse studies "that are linked by a common focus on people's relationships with their sociophysical surroundings" (p. 822). Second, Bonnes and Bonaiuto (2002) introduced the idea of the "environmental psychology of sustainable development," which studies psychological processes and behaviors that affect the local and global ecological processes and natural resources, moving the attention of (environmental) psychology toward issues of environmental sustainability. Similarly, based on the propositions of scholars such as Smith, Shearman, and Positano (2007) that environmental problems are in fact behavioral problems (e.g., overconsumption), scholars such as Koger and Du Nann Winter (2010) made a case for what they call "psychology for sustainability," while Saunders (2003) called for a super-discipline (i.e., an overarching, inclusive discipline as opposed to a subdiscipline) called "conservation psychology."

Furthermore, there is a small group of psychologists trying to promote comprehensive and transformative changes rather than simple behavior changes by engaging people in community and political action through critical consciousness raising and development of action competence (Riemer & Voorhees, in press). Kenis and Mathijs (2012) point out that researchers who focus on this approach (e.g., Courtenay-Hall & Rogers 2002; Clover 2002, 2003; Dittmer & Riemer, 2013; Harré, 2011; Hickman, Riemer, & Sayal, 2012; Jensen 2004; Jensen & Schnack, 2006) often have divergent conceptions of the root causes of the problem, power, of change, and of the type of knowledge that is required for realizing change. A common criticism, according to Kenis and Mathijs (2012), is that traditional psychological behavior change strategies seem to consider people as objects to be conditioned and manipulated rather than taking them seriously as subjects and agents of change. In a recent handbook chapter, Riemer and Voorhees (in press) have also stressed the importance of linking psychology to environmental justice, which stresses the fair distribution of environmental burden and benefits along with meaningful participation in environmentally relevant decision making.

In the future, dialogues on sustainability and sustainable development would benefit from including more critical discussions of topics such as the North/South divide, what kind of world economy can protect and restore natural

resources, and how consumption can be limited. This discussion is likely to be fueled by accumulating evidence that, despite unprecedented wealth and prosperity, countries of the Global North are finding that materialism and consumption are no longer increasing happiness and well-being, but rather are creating increased mental and emotional suffering including perceptions of loss of values, family, and community (Layard, 2005; Speth, 2012; Willkinson & Pickett 2010). It is not unlikely, then, that a deep systemic, transformative change based on creating more equity between the Global North and the Global South, coupled with a decrease in both consumption and stockpiling wealth in the Global North, other ways of conceptualizing the relationships between nature and society (e.g., deep ecology, ecofeminism), and an alternative system of political economy such as eco-capitalism (i.e., combining economic reforms with the use of new business models that that are more eco-friendly), state capitalism (i.e., state-guided economic activity and/or state-owned means of production managed in a capitalist fashion), or ecosocialism, will create the foundations of a truly sustainable, equitable, and prosperous future for this finite planet.

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Online Resources

United Nations and Sustainability: www.un.org/en/sustainability/
United Nations: Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform: http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/
United Nations Millennium Development Goals: www.un.org/millenniumgoals/environ.shtml
Journal of Environmental Psychology: www.journals.elsevier.com/journal-of-environmental-psychology/
Global Footprint Network: www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/page/calculators/
WWF Footprint Calculator: http://footprint.wwf.org.uk/
Psychology for a Better World: www.psych.auckland.ac.nz/uoa/home/about/our-staff/academic-staff/niki-harre/psychologyforabetterworld
Conservation Psychology: www.conservationpsychology.org/
Environmental Justice Foundation: www.ejfoundation.org/
Community-based social marketing: www.cbsm.com

Symbolic Interactionism

Johannes I. Bakker
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Guelph, Guelph, Canada

Introduction

Psychologists have frequently ignored the sociological approach known as "Symbolic Interactionism" even though the study of everyday life interaction and exchange is an important aspect of social psychology, and no critical psychology can afford to ignore the interactionist dimension of human lived experience. Anthropological and sociological insights concerning various aspects of the general phenomenon of symbolic interaction such as ritual and inequalities are useful for critical psychologist open to other paradigms, especially research paradigms which are not narrowly empiricist or rigidly "positivistic."

Definition

As indicated, the term "symbolic interaction" can refer to the object of study as well as the theoretical and methodological approach to that subject matter. Sometimes the phenomenon is differentiated from the research paradigm by the use of capitalization for the theory. That practice is helpful, but it is not universal. Rather than examine relatively unchanging "structures," they have emphasized the importance of interaction as an ongoing process. Societies are thought of as based on a continuous process of construction and reconstruction of all aspects of human life. Therefore, human beings, who are considered to have a high degree of agency, can fundamentally change as individuals and as members of subcultures or ethnic groups. Since it is not "structures" that determine behavior but, instead, interactions that determine patterns, the Symbolic Interactionist sociologist attempts to study such interaction patterns. Most Symbolic Interactionist research utilizes qualitative methods like participant observation. The main theoretical figure in the history of Symbolic Interactionism is George Herbert Mead (1982). Mead had a solid background in German philosophy, although he never obtained a Ph. D. Mead was hired by Dewey and he was an academic philosopher and not a social scientist. His analysis of German idealist philosophers (Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) is astute (Mead, 1936). He did not do empirical research, but he influenced many of the graduate students at Chicago, many of whom were required to take his course. He wrote many articles and book reviews but did not publish any books during his lifetime. (For example, he wrote a book review of G. Simmel's *Philosophy of Money* the year it was first published, in German in 1900; see Simmel, 1978). Nevertheless, his lectures have become major posthumous books (based on student stenographic lecture notes) which are still frequently cited by Symbolic Interactionists (Blumer, 2004). Despite the fact that in everyday English we do not distinguish between exchange and interaction, Symbolic Interactionism is clearly differentiated from Exchange Theory in

social science, in part because Exchange Theory is often limited to economic exchange or forms of exchange that are very limited in scope. Interaction takes many forms in many different settings. The simplest interaction is between two individual human beings and is of relatively short duration. Interaction takes many forms in many different settings. The interaction of relatively long duration among three human beings is often extremely complex; hence, when we start to study small groups, the interaction patterns become even more complicated. A key aspect to the study of any small group is the use of group jargon.

Keywords

Everyday life; interaction; definition of the situation; participant observation; ethnographic fieldwork; deviance; sub-cultures; George Herbert Mead; signs; qualitative sociology; social psychology; Chicago school; Pragmatism; R. Park; H. Blumer; interpretivism; ethnicity; gender; class

Traditional Debates

Sociological studies tend to emphasize symbolic interaction among deviant or unusual subgroups, with an emphasis on characteristics of subcultural aspects of a way of life different from the mainstream. For example, one author has studied dumpster diving by the poor. The degree of deviation from ordinary norms may not be that great. It may simply be based on age, such as studies of senior citizens engaged in shuffle board. How any person chooses to interact with one or more other persons depends a great deal on the "definition of the situation" (Bakker, 2007; Thomas, 1923). Even the most ordinary interaction has a "definitional" frame, and the study of such alternative perspectives is part of what can make research on symbolic interaction of everyday life experience fascinating. What does it mean for the husband to change the baby's diaper and the wife to take the car to the garage to get repaired? What does it mean for an African American man and a Latina woman to marry? Even minor kinds of differentiation from the mainstream can be interesting. But deviant subcultures such as motorcycle gangs or erotic dancers have also frequently been the object of study. Of course, what was once highly deviant (like women wearing pants to work) can become quite ordinary and widely accepted. Symbolic Interactionists have sometimes neglected some of the mundane, everyday life experiences of the mainstream (like washing the dishes and taking out the garbage) and emphasized the unusual or highly deviant interaction patterns of small subgroups (like indulging in heavy drugs or living off welfare). They have been accused of not paying enough attention to class, status, and power (Athens, 2011), but at the same time there is also frequently a good deal of attention paid to ways in which those who are stigmatized should probably be more widely accepted. For example, societal norms tend to involve the stigmatization of the use of marijuana, but those norms are changing. Anthropologists tend to not use the sociological formulation of the theory, but they nevertheless do very similar ethnographic fieldwork. What traditionally made anthropological fieldwork distinctive was an emphasis on other cultures, particularly indigenous societies with low levels of industrial and technological development.

Some have argued that Symbolic Interactionism is biased by a specific philosophical outlook not accepted by many other social scientists. The philosophical roots of Symbolic Interactionism can be traced to "pragmatism" as a general outlook that dates back to ancient Greek philosophy and to the American Pragmatism of the 1865–1914 period in particular. In the period after the American Civil War, a number of major thinkers, shocked by the loss of life on both sides, rejected more dogmatic approaches to politics and religion and took up a pragmatist philosophical epistemology. William James and John Dewey influenced American pragmatism significantly, albeit in slightly different directions. Symbolic Interactionism is associated with the Chicago school of sociology, which went through

two stages (1890–1920, 1921–1940). After World War II the presence of Herbert Blumer as the Chair of the sociology department at the University of California, Berkeley, meant that some contributors to the study of Symbolic Interactionism tended to work on the West coast.

Critical Debates

To some extent the boundaries of the Symbolic Interactionist research paradigm have shifted since the early days of the first stage of the Chicago school. Textbooks often discuss the work of researchers who have digressed from the original Pragmatist formulations by Mead, Blumer, and others. For example, Erving Goffman is often discussed as a key representative of Symbolic Interactionist thought, but his theory was a blend of several different philosophical perspectives.

Goffman, known for his "dramaturgical" approach to interaction, is often considered a Symbolic Interactionist, but he was also strongly influenced by anthropological ethnography and by Alfred Schutz' phenomenological sociology.

Symbolic Interactionists have critiqued various forms of essentialism in the discussion of racial, ethnic, class, status, sex, and gender aspects of human social life. In general the Chicago school represents a social psychological view of human beings as not driven by fixed biological traits. Immigrants coming to the United States from Eastern Europe and Mediterranean countries, as opposed to Northwestern European countries, like the United Kingdom and Sweden, were at one time considered racially and ethnically inferior by the mainstream members of society. Such Social Darwinist beliefs were opposed by Franz Boas, the founder of cultural anthropology in the USA, especially for indigenous people like the Northwest Coast Indians (e.g., the Kwakiutl). The point was elaborated for ethnic groups coming from countries like Poland and Greece. Such groups were studied through qualitative observation and fieldwork in neighborhoods. William F. Whyte's *Street Corner Society* is well known as a similar research study in a North Boston Italian-American "slum" neighborhood, but there were many such studies by the Chicago school Symbolic Interactionist sociologists. A key early text was W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki's (1917–1919) multivolume *Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (Wiley, 2011). Those social scientists who consider themselves primarily "Interactionists" reject social Darwinism and all forms of positivistic "scientism." The basis for interaction is thought to be fundamentally some means of communication through symbols.

Charles Sanders Peirce emphasizes the importance of "signs" (in the most general sense) as the basis of communication, especially symbols. He developed many typologies of "signs," with the most well known being the icon, the index, and the symbol. Yet Peirce's semiotic theory and triadic epistemology are not studied in depth by most sociologists. There is a clear intellectual link between Peirce and Mead. Mead argues that it is the "significant symbol," shared by two or more people, that allows for "symbolic" interaction. Without significant symbols of some kind, it is very difficult for human beings to interact at a higher level of sophistication. Gestures can also be considered significant symbols if they are commonly understood. Gestures may also have been at the root of language. However, in historic times, if not before, words have served a very important function in communication. But Peirce's conceptualization of signs goes beyond words used in speech. Hence, Mead's notion of significant symbol can include "sign languages" like American Sign Language for the deaf. Some gestures are symbols and are more or less universal. But most significant symbols are learned and are not universal. The words used in one language (e.g., Mandarin) are different from the words used in another language (e.g., Arabic). But it is not just a matter of words as symbols. It also involves the notion of all aspects of grammar and syntax as aspects of the "significant." This is loosely based on Charles S. Peirce's notion of the semiotics of signs, but few Symbolic Interactionists have developed the semiotic approach at a deeper philosophical level.

Nevertheless, we can speak of an implicitly "semiotically based interactionism" (Bakker & Bakker, 2006). Symbolic Interactionist research is not primarily concerned with conceptual subtleties. Instead, the main thrust of a research study tends to be an attempt to unlock secrets of interaction from a deviant or otherwise remarkable subcultural group in the broader society. The perspective is usually American or, at the least, contemporary modern capitalism. There are many empirical studies of sex workers like "taxi dancers" and strippers. Deviant groups like certain motorcycle gangs or drug users have been studied, often with the conclusion that amidst the seeming randomness of behavior, there is actually an underlying pattern. Symbolic Interactionists have traditionally tended to not attempt fieldwork in settings which are dramatically cross-cultural. But there is considerable overlap between anthropological fieldwork methods and qualitative research methods in Symbolic Interactionism. Ethnographic fieldwork among deviant subcultures in one's own society still represents the bulk of research on Symbolic Interactionism in North America, but indigenous societies outside of the United States can be studied in terms of similarities and differences from standard American society.

The study of taken-for-granted assumptions about interaction is also characteristic of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, but the three research paradigms have somewhat different networks of researchers. The dyad engages in an action and a reaction. A sequence of actions constitutes an interaction. Sometimes the notion of an "internal" dialogue within the self is regarded as a form of interaction as well. That leads to the notion of a dialogical or "semiotic self" (Wiley, 1994). While most symbolic interaction involves the use of language, "signs" can involve gestures and musical beats (Bakker & Bakker, 2006). Simmel (1980) examines macroeconomic forces in terms of symbolic interaction involving the use of money as a significant symbol. Athens (2011) argues that all of the forms of "Interactionism" are under threat of intellectual extinction due in part to the lack of careful attention to the social and political implications of the approach. He would like to see the emergence of a "radical" Interactionism. There are many who disagree with him, although there is no logical reason the more "liberal" views of the founders cannot be translated into a more radical approach to social change. Many social problems viewed as the end result of economic factors may indeed have more to do with subcultural conflicts exacerbated by unexamined assumptions concerning biologically determined "race" and "sex." A more radical approach tends to emphasize ethnicity and gender, which are often viewed as more malleable. Social class background may also not always be as important as many members of elite groups may pretend. A critical analysis of the social construction of reality and the labeling of the "other" can contribute to the improvement of the lives of many people. In part because of the importance of social constructionist ideas, there are some Symbolic Interactionists who accept postmodern epistemological assumptions. Those, it can be argued, tend to be quite far from the original intent of the Chicago school in the 1890–1920 period (Athens). But the study of all forms of symbolic interaction is changing with the times. Some lament the changes, claiming that a postmodern approach to the study of symbolic interaction deviates from the original research paradigm so much that a truly valuable approach is in danger of being lost. However, others welcome postmodern approaches and extend the paradigm to such themes as "performance studies" and "communication studies." Critical psychologists can benefit from all of the various approaches to Interactionism, but so far few academic psychologists have systematically used an approach that is often considered by outsiders to be strictly sociological. Psychologists who do social psychology often reject qualitative research, but sociologists interested in social psychology often ignore quantitative psychological research and sometimes emphasize the approach pioneered by G. Simmel and G. H. Mead. Debates concerning the "true" nature of symbolic interaction are common in Symbolic Interactionist research networks, but many

sociologists continue to do empirical research that sheds light on taken-for-granted assumptions about the nature of the relationship between individuals and societies. Most Symbolic Interactionists do not consider mere "methodological individualism" to be an adequate conceptual, epistemological basis for sociological research on the underlying dynamics of social psychological processes. Blumer (2004), who coined the phrase, continues to be a thinker who is viewed quite differently by different Symbolic Interactionists (Athens, 2011). Some argue that he is entirely true to his teacher, Mead, while others believe that he has distorted Mead's true intent. One way around that debate is to emphasize the dual role of Mead and Simmel. Simmel was one of the first German sociologists to be translated into English. Simmel (1980) was clearly an interpretive sociologist. Interestingly, Mead attended his lectures at the University of Berlin and started a dissertation project with the philosopher W. Dilthey, Simmel's colleague at Berlin. Park, one of the key figures at Chicago, did his dissertation with W. Windelband. The philosophical roots of Symbolic Interactionist sociology are sometimes ignored in favor of a commonsense approach which frequently does not differ much from good journalism. Indeed, Robert Park considered Chicago school of sociology to be a form of investigative journalism that allowed the writer to spend more time pursuing a topic. Beyond any internal squabbles, almost all Symbolic Interactionists believe in an approach to sociology that avoids "scientism" and "quantophrenia." The general trend over the last few decades has been for a broadening of the definition of the Symbolic Interactionist approach, with the new generation favoring an eclectic choice of research methods and techniques. At one time the Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction (SSSI) thought of itself as the "loyal opposition" to mainstream sociology, as represented by the American Sociological Association (ASA), but that is no longer quite as characteristic of the SSSI. The main SSSI conference is still held in conjunction with, but just outside of, the ASA annual meetings.

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Synchronicity, Overview

Laura K. Kerr
Mental Health Scholar and Psychotherapist, San Francisco, CA, USA

Introduction

The Swiss depth psychologist Carl Gustav Jung (1875–1961) introduced the term synchronicity to describe circumstances that appear

meaningfully related yet lack a causal connection. The concept synchronicity grounds Jung's analytical psychology, which is concerned with transcendental aspects of the human psyche and the collective wholeness of all life. For Jung, synchronicity was evidence of the mutual interdependence of psyche and the physical world. Along with space, time, and causality, Jung saw synchronicity as one of the basic organizing principles governing the universe.

Definition

There are three identifying aspects of synchronistic events: (1) meaningful coincidence, (2) acausal connection, and (3) numinosity. (See Traditional Debates below for further discussion of numinosity.) Meaningful coincidences occur when events that otherwise seem random, and thus lacking causal connections, nevertheless share a common symbolism, which Jung perceived as evidence of a collective unconscious uniting all life. A popular example of meaningful coincidence comes from Jung's work with a patient he deemed as overly rationalistic. As the patient shared with Jung a dream of a golden scarab, which is a prominent symbol in Egyptian mythology, a beetle of the Scarabaeidae family scratched on Jung's office window, which he caught and then offered to his patient. Jung claimed the coincidence was not lost on his patient, who was able to move on to a more expansive appreciation of psyche and life.

Jung aligned synchronicity's property of acausal connection with Eastern thought. He described synchronicity as complimenting causality much in the way the East compliments the West: "The East bases much of its science on this irregularity and considers coincidences as the reliable basis of the world rather than causality. Synchronism is the prejudice of the East; causality is the modern prejudice of the West" (1984, pp. 44–45). Jung also found validation of synchronicity in the *I Ching* (Wilhelm & Baynes, 1967), which he saw as the "experimental foundation of classical Chinese philosophy" (1960, p. 35). The *I Ching's* system of divination, and the belief that a psychic state can be represented by a physical situation, parallels the acausal connecting principle identified through synchronicity.

Jung also believed Eastern philosophy confirmed his hypothesis for the unity of all nature. In particular, the interpretation of the Eastern notion of Tao as "nothing" – or as "no-thing," according to Jung – validated the universal principle of synchronicity. According to Jung, " 'Nothing' is evidently 'meaning' or 'purpose,' and it is only called Nothing because it does not appear in the world of the senses, but is only its organizer" (1960, p. 71).

Jung also looked to modern physics to understand the nature of synchronicity and attempted to adapt many ideas in this field to accommodate his conception of synchronicity, including the property of numinosity. He worked closely with the Nobel Prize–winning physicist Wolfgang Pauli (1900–1958) and also consulted with Albert Einstein (1879–1955). The notion of synchronicity shares with modern physics the idea that under certain conditions, the laws governing the interactions of space and time can no longer be understood according to the principle of causality. In this regard, Jung joined modern physicists in reducing the conditions in which the laws of classical mechanics apply.

Keywords

Acausal; collective unconscious; emergentist theories; new age; numinosity; out-of-body experiences; paranormal; physics; taoism; uncertainty principle

Traditional Debates

The idea of numinosity as a principle characteristic of synchronistic events is perhaps the most controversial aspect of Jung's formulation of the concept. The notion of numinosity originated with Rudolf Otto (1869–1937), a German Lutheran theologian and scholar of comparative literature. Otto used the term to describe the inexpressible quality of religious experiences. The

term numinous identifies the experience of transcending the boundaries of corporeality that supposedly occurs when joining with God in an ecstatic moment. Jung used the term to identify the emotional stirrings associated with the quality of expansiveness beyond the sense of oneself as an isolated psychological being, which is also implied by his concept of the collective unconscious. The term numinosity allowed Jung to extend the influence of psyche outside the body and into the universe as a regulating principle, much like time, space, and causality.

Jung's emphasis on numinosity as a key element in synchronicity was due in part to his work with psychiatric patients and the analysis of dreams. He also had a lifelong fascination with paranormal activity and as a child attended séances. To support his conception of synchronicity, he turned to the work of parapsychologist J. B. Rhine (1895–1980) and conducted a dubious experiment on the role of astrology in marriages to prove that an experimenter's emotional state influenced outcomes – a move Pauli opposed and one that Jung believed was supported by the laboratory experiments that led to Werner Heisenberg's (1901–1976) formulation of the Uncertainty Principle. According to Jung, "when an event is observed without experimental restrictions, the observer can easily be influenced by an emotional state which alters space and time by 'contraction'" (Jung, 1960, p. 30). Ultimately, it was Jung's limited understanding of modern physics that led him to apply its results in ways that were neither intended nor supported. Furthermore, it has been the property of numinosity that has led to the greatest criticism, including assertions that Jung's analytical philosophy is more New Age mysticism that a scientific, albeit theoretical enterprise (Combs & Holland, 1996).

Critical Debates

Despite the unsubstantiated properties of synchronicity (namely, meaningful connection and numinosity), scholars and researchers in several disciplines share Jung's acausal understanding of natural phenomena. Joseph Cambray noted, "[Jung's] collapse of space and time together with the disappearance of the principle of causality is remarkably congruent with the best theories in physics for the origins of the universe" (2009, p. 20). The concept of synchronicity has also been compared to emergentist theories used in many disciplines to explain the capacity for a large group of individual "parts" – including insects, animals, groups, and specific properties within an individual organism – to collectively organize into complex adaptive systems and exhibit holistic properties (Cambray, 2009).

Jung's interest in the paranormal led him to identify out-of-body experiences as synchronistic events. He believed these phenomena supported his view of a holistic, absolute knowledge that did not depend on sense organs and the causality-based form of knowing associated with body experiences. Although such a view resulted for many in skepticism about the concept of synchronicity, researchers have attempted to produce out-of-body experiences in the laboratory (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007). The results, however, are thought to prove that conflicting visual and somatosensory input leads to sensations that mimic out-of-body experiences rather than the presence of an absolute knowledge transcending the boundaries of the human body as Jung believed.

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Online Resources

Inner Explorations. http://www.innerexplorations.com/catchmeta/mys3.htm
The Jung Page. http://www.cgjungpage.org/

Systemic Family Psychotherapy

Eleftheria Tseliou
Department of Early Childhood Education, University of Thessaly, Volos, Greece

Introduction

Systemic family psychotherapy constitutes a body of different but related and constantly evolving approaches, which belong to the "family" of the "talking cures," in Freudian terms, namely, treatments of mental distress by means of talk. Upon its appearance, it is claimed to have introduced a "paradigm shift" in the field of mental health practices, for juxtaposing a systemic, that is, a relational and of circular causality perspective to mental distress as opposed to the dominant linear and individually oriented one; it also retained an affiliation with the anti-psychiatric movement of that era, as expressed, e.g., in the work of Laing (Dallos & Draper, 2010). Its radical past is currently survived in a number of innovative, critical approaches and practices, which have evolved out of developments in systemic family therapy models and approaches. On the other hand, systemic family therapy constitutes part of the psychotherapeutic establishment, which plays a significant role in the maintenance of normalizing and controlling practices in relation to mental distress. This paradoxical quality and this location at the margins between the "mainstream" and the "revolutionary" terrain in mental health practices, along with a constant process of evolution, have been part and parcel of its "identity," from the early days of its appearance and up to date.

Definition

Systemic family psychotherapy, family therapy or systemic therapy, constitutes terms, which are deployed interchangeably at times, making the task of definition a hard one to pursue. Furthermore, the term is often deployed to refer to the Milan model of family therapy and its developments, often termed as post-Milan approaches. In this entry, the discussion of the term will exclude approaches like behavioral family therapy and will focus on those linked with systemic theoretical perspectives.

Perhaps, a first radical constitutive element of systemic family psychotherapy is the influence of nonpsychological theories originating in various disciplines like biology, computer science, sociology, or linguistics. For example, it is argued that the systems theory of the initial era arose out of the synthesis of von Bertalanffy's General Systems Theory from biology and the mathematician's Norbert Wiener's theorizing on cybernetics (Goldenberg & Goldenberg, 2008).

Instead of locating the understanding and treatment of mental distress in the intrapsychic realm of an individual, systemic family therapy prioritizes a systemic, interpersonal, transactional perspective, resulting in a nonessentialist approach to psychological and psychiatric symptoms. All behavior or meaning is assumed to constitute part of recursive chunks of events, organized in patterned sequences, with every part constituting simultaneously both a beginning and an end. Consequently, the person's suffering is approached as interdependent with the communicative matrix in which it occurs, an orientation reflected in the initial choice of the term "identified patient" to refer to the person who is *identified* as a patient in a certain context but should not be considered as *being* a patient. By adhering to such a holistic and non-pathologizing perspective regarding the sufferer, the therapist's task becomes to contribute to the decoding of the meaning of the

suffering in the context of the person's significant system and the facilitation of change in behavioral or semantic relational patterns, with the expectation that this will lead to the relief of distress.

A second element related to the field's radical side is a constant process of self-reflexive, critical appraisal of models, theories, and relevant practices, a quality vividly captured in the frequently deployed metaphor of a patchwork-type texture: a vibrant field characterized by diversity, controversies, and debates. As a consequence, there is no single, unitary approach to the understanding and treatment of mental distress and the appraisal of the role of the psychotherapeutic institution. Instead, the existing diversity in theorizing and practice is related with the particularities of each model or approach, its location in the field's historical development across time, and the relevant epistemological perspective. Thus, for this entry, definition is closely interrelated with history and discussed accordingly.

Keywords

Systems theory; cybernetics; Milan systemic therapy; structural therapy; strategic therapy; MRI strategic therapy; reflecting team; collaborative language systems approach; narrative therapy; open dialogue approach

History

The advent of systemic family therapy cannot be attributed to a single contribution. Instead, it has been argued that its origins are closely related with research on schizophrenia conducted by different groups and with theorizing by clinicians, attempting to link the family with the experience of mental distress, in the 1940s and 1950s (Carr, 2006). Some of the pioneers of the first group include Lidz, Bowen, Wynne, and Bateson, whereas some of the second include Ackerman, Bell, Bowlby, Satir, Whitaker, and Jackson.

The origins of systemic family psychotherapy, however, have been largely associated with the work and thinking of Gregory Bateson, an anthropologist, who espoused an ecological, holistic perspective for human phenomena and the human mind (Bateson, 1979). In the early 1940s, Bateson engaged in a fruitful and generative interplay of ideas with scientists, like Norbert Wiener, in the context of a series of interdisciplinary conferences, funded by the Josiah Macy Foundation in New York. Subsequently, he is reported to have significantly contributed to the foundation of the field of systemic family therapy by applying cybernetic ideas to the study of human phenomena (Goldenberg & Goldenberg, 2008). From 1952 to 1962, together with Watzlawick, Haley, Weakland, Jackson, and Fry, he run a research project on the study of communication and schizophrenia, culminating in the development of one of the most debated proposals for the understanding of schizophrenia, the double bind theory (Bateson, Jackson, Haley, & Weakland, 1956). In 1959, Don Jackson founded the Mental Research Institute (MRI) in Palo Alto, and in 1960 Nathan Ackerman founded the Family Institute in New York. At the other side of the Atlantic, in 1967 Mara Selvini-Palazzoli, together with Luigi Boscolo, Gianfranco Cecchin, and Guliana Prata, founded the Milan center for family therapy in Italy, thus marking the "birth" of the Milan model of systemic family therapy.

The ongoing development of the field is usually narrated by means of drawn distinctions between separate phases, known as the "first-order cybernetic phase," the "second-order cybernetic/constructivist" phase, and the "social constructionist" one (Dallos & Draper, 2010). In the second, the influence of the constructivist thinking of the cybernetician Heinz von Foerster, the Chilean biologist Humberto Maturana, and the cognitive scientist Francisco Varela gain dominance in relation to systemic and first-order cybernetic theories of the previous phase. Subsequently, the third phase is marked by the swapping effects of social constructionism, and the resulting "turn to language" approached as

the arena for the construction of all human phenomena including knowledge, with further influences by the poststructuralist theorizing of Foucault and the dialogic approach of Bakhtin and Volosinov.

The "first-order" cybernetic phase, roughly located between the 1950s and the 1970s, is marked by the dominance of the metaphor of the system and a pragmatic approach to communication. The main models of that era include Minuchin's structural model, Haley's strategic model, and MRI's brief strategic therapy model. Mental distress is approached by drawing from either the metaphor of a dysfunctional family structure, a problematic power hierarchy, dysfunctional communication patterns, or the family's attempted solutions to the "problem," respectively. Dominant explanatory frameworks of the era include the cybernetic homeostatic metaphor and the developmental family life cycle model. In this context, psychological symptoms arise as a reaction of the family system to stress in its attempt to maintain equilibrium, while faced with the challenges for change, as it moves across time.

For the Milan model of that phase, mental distress is a communicative message, a move in the context of a "family game," and a kind of a "communication trap," in which family members become entangled, as they adhere with rigidity to epistemological errors, like the acceptance of linear causality and the fight for control. A unique therapeutic setting is introduced, so as to facilitate the conducting of the therapeutic session in accordance to the systemic principle of circularity. A therapeutic team observing the conduct of the session from behind a one-way screen serves as a "systemic mind" and engages in a constant hypothesizing about the role of the distress, in the family's communication context. The therapist engages into a certain type of questioning, known as circular questioning, so as to test the developing hypotheses and attempts to maintain a neutral position vis-à-vis the family members, a stance experienced by them as the therapist "not taking sides." A positive connotation, a reframing of both the identified patient's symptoms and the family members' behavior, assigning them a constitutive, functional role in relation to the family system's equilibrium, is fed back to the family at the conclusion of the session (Boscolo, Cecchin, Hoffman, & Penn, 1987).

The uncritical acceptance of the therapist of this era as an external observer to a dysfunctional family system, intervening to "restore" its proper function, is shaken by the rise of the "second-order/constructivist phase." The Milan model undergoes significant transformations signified by the split of the original team of four associates. From Cecchin's theorizing on the therapist's prejudices, namely, his/her preset ideas and values which inevitably enter the therapeutic dialogue, to Bertrando's dialogical therapist, the field witnesses a gradual building of a more reflexive practice (Bertrando, 2007). The notion of the therapeutic system becomes reconceptualized so as to include the therapist, who is considered an active participant in the discursive construction of mental distress. Subsequent innovations in practice (e.g., Friedman, 1995) include Tom Andersen's reflecting team format, where the therapeutic team's dialogue about the family becomes transparent to family members, as they listen to it behind the one-way screen, following the reversal of lights in the mirrored room.

The following constructionist phase welcomes a "snowball" of innovative practices like Anderson's and Goolishian's collaborative language systems approach, Hoffman's collaborative practices, White and Epston's narrative practice, and the open dialogue approach of Jaakko Seikkula and his associates (e.g., Anderson & Gehart, 2007). The metaphors of linguistic or dialogic systems become central, and this is accompanied by a gradual acknowledgment of the sociopolitical and cultural context as a marker delineating therapeutic practice. "Therapy" is acquiring the quality of a dialogic setting in which the long-standing, established barrier between therapist and sufferer(s) becomes gradually demolished, with practices favoring the sufferers' empowerment, collaboration, transparency, and respect.

Traditional Debates

Debates over the practice and theorizing of systemic family therapy are inherently related to the field's evolution over time and range from those aiming at improving psychotherapeutic practice to those challenging its very notion. This section will address the first, whereas the section of critical debates will address the latter.

Traditional debates reflect both wider debates regarding psychotherapeutic practice overall and issues related to the particularities of the field. In the first category, one can locate debates over the locus of change, with the gaining of insight opposed to behavioral change and the search in the past with an emphasis on meanings opposed to a focus on behavioral transactional patterns of the here and now. An example is the contrast between Haley's fervent polemic against psychoanalysis and recent or older voices advocating the incorporation of a psychoanalytic perspective (Hoffman, 2002) or the coexistence of more pragmatically oriented models, like the MRI. Brief therapy model and more psychodynamically oriented ones, like Bowen's approach. A related debate concerns the issue of preference for model purity or for eclectic synthesis.

In the second trench, one can locate debates, which arose mainly out of the feminist critique of the first-order cybernetic models in the 1980s, for their mechanistic, reifying, ahistorical, non-culture, and non-gender-specific conceptualization of family systems. Luepnitz (2002) was keen to note that even the dominant narrative of the birth of the filed subjugated the story of the crucial role of female social workers in the USA and attributed everything to white males. In a similar vein, the notion of neutrality of the Milan model was attacked by the feminist critique for neglecting power differentials between family members, especially in cases where violence or abuse was the issue (Hoffman, 2002).

In this context of this era, the discussion of power issues remained restricted in a theoretical debate reflecting Bateson's argument for it constituting an epistemological error and Haley's conviction of its existence as an organizing principle of any human system (Dallos & Draper, 2010). In relation to the therapist's role, the relevant discussion reflected the dilemma of choosing either a more directive style of a "structural type" or a more distanced "Milan style".

Such initial debates may have contributed to developments towards a more "historically, culturally, and power-sensitive," reflexive practice (e.g., McGoldrick & Hardy, 2008). However, they did not challenge systemic family psychotherapy on sociopolitical or ideological grounds, in relation to its affiliation with the institutional establishment.

Critical Debates

The rise of constructionist and deconstructive approaches in the late 1980s signalled the emergence of debates, which centered around the very notion of the institution of psychotherapy, the power differential between the therapist and the sufferer(s), and the role of the wider historical and sociopolitical context in the construction not only of mental distress but also of dominant ways for its relief, like psychotherapy. Uncritical acceptance of the benign nature of therapy was gradually replaced by critical voices promoting collaborative and empowering practices.

The notion of the "collaborative therapist" (Anderson & Gehart, 2007) has lead to heated discussions regarding his/her expertise in relation to whether he/she should be an intervening expert or a collaborative, conversational partner. In a different line of argumentation, it can be claimed that the therapist's power is not simply eschewed by means of promoting better therapeutic practices, as they result in its further establishment, in a paradoxical way. Furthermore, the "postmodern therapist" does not necessarily escape the exercise of power in the discursive context of a therapeutic session, as limited so far discourse analytic research has shown (Kogan, 1998).

Finally, the recent replacement of the system metaphor by more psychoanalytically oriented ones, like subjectivity or embodied practice, has triggered debates related to the field's identity.

This shift along with the field's gradual establishment has fuelled further debates in relation to whether systemic family therapy has lost its revolutionary perspective and has become part of the establishment it initially fought against.

International Relevance

Since its "birth," systemic family therapy has been international in its "nature," given its simultaneous development in both the USA and Europe. However, its growth on international grounds is reported to have taken place in the 1980s (Goldenberg & Goldenberg, 2008). This is now evident, for example, in the existence of several associations, like the International Association for Family Therapy (IFTA) or the European Association for Family Therapy (EFTA); relevant international scientific conferences, e.g., the EFTA conference organized biannually; a plentitude of training programs in many countries around the world; and several scientific journals, like the Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, the Journal of Family Therapy, and the Australian and New Zealand Journal of Family Therapy. Family Process, the leading journal of the field founded in 1962, has recently started publishing paper abstracts in Spanish also.

Practice Relevance

Since its appearance systemic family therapy has been applied in various settings, like adult and child psychiatry, clinical psychology, and psychotherapy including individual psychotherapy, social psychiatry, and social work. Further areas of application include general medicine, education, and organizational contexts of any type, where systemic ideas are deployed both for the understanding of "problem situations" and for their management.

Perhaps one of the most radical fields of application concerns the theorizing and treatment of psychosis. From Bateson's initial "groundbreaking" proposal to the Finnish open dialogue approach, systemic family therapy has retained a continuous thread of connection with alternative practices as compared to the psychiatric establishment. The first claimed that schizophrenia is a communicative, interpersonal phenomenon and not an intrapsychic entity (Bateson et al., 1956). The latter has located its management in the dialogic context of a social network, including professionals, sufferers, and community members, and operating with the principles of transparency, respect, and collaboration, as no dialogue in relation to the crisis is allowed outside this context, until its final resolution (Seikkula & Arnkil, 2006).

Finally, the narrative practices of the community-based Anti-Anorexia/Anti-Bulimia Leagues, where ex-sufferers offer their support and expertise and Hoffman's collaborative networks (Hoffman, 2002), constitute further examples of applying radical ideas in practice.

Future Directions

The ongoing journey of systemic family therapy from the initial era of focus in the family context to the contemporary collaborative and social networking practices is both predictive and unpredictive of future directions. In a paradoxical way, systemic family therapy currently seems to be moving "backwards towards the future." On the one hand, it is increasingly becoming a treatment of choice in the psychotherapeutic arena, with a variety of research methods deployed rigorously with the aim to explore its potential in relation to treatment (e.g., Sprenkle & Piercy, 2005). On the other, it is nurturing practices, which demolish the very notion of psychotherapy at least in its traditional form, by relocating the management of mental suffering back into the social arena, with experts constituting one among the many different potential contributors. One direction seems to "pull" systemic family therapy away from its original, marginal place towards becoming more and more part of the establishment in the field of mental health practices. Another seems to "bring" it closer and closer to radical practices in the mental

health field, although a further meeting could be mutually beneficial. Perhaps it will continue escaping an "either/or" type of choice, thus contributing to a critical perspective from a position of within. In one way or another, its past can probably only allow for a certain type of "prognosis": systemic family therapy has been and still is a constantly evolving field, moving towards unpredictable and unforeseen directions and always retaining a paradoxical affiliation with radical, deconstructive practices.

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Online Resources

European Family Therapy Association. http://www.europeanfamilytherapy.eu/

International Family Therapy Association. http://www.ifta-familytherapy.org/

Mental Research Institute. http://www.mri.org/

Gregory Bateson. http://www.interculturalstudies.org/Bateson/index.html/

Social Constructionism-TAOS Institute. http://www.taosinstitute.net/

Radical constructivism. http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/

Narrative approaches. http://www.narrativeapproaches.com/

Systems of Critiques

Thomas Teo
Department of Psychology, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada

Introduction

Psychologists might assume that the critique of psychology is a recent intellectual development that emerged with the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s in Western Europe and North America. What these psychologists may refer to is Western *critical psychology* that questioned the relevance of a given mainstream psychology for underprivileged groups, challenged the power that is expressed in traditional theories and practices, and expressed alternative perspectives within an ethical-political or moral-practical imperative. Thus, the *critique of psychology* could be distinguished from *critical psychology*, with the former having long historical and theoretical traditions. However, it should be noted that the distinction is not perfectly clear and this encyclopedia provides evidence for the critique of psychology as well as critical psychology. This entry provides a heuristic overview of systems of critiques of academic psychology, mostly in terms of "theories," whereas important critiques of practice and application of psychological science in therapies, application, assessment, and so on, are left out.

Definition

Systems of critique of psychology refer to organized discourses that have challenged the ontology, epistemology, practice, and politics of traditional academic psychology at certain points in time. Such critiques stem from within or from outside the mainstream. Systems of critiques of psychology have emerged within natural-scientific and human-scientific discourses, within Marxist, feminist, postmodern, and postcolonial debates.

Keywords

Critique; Kant; human science; Marxism; feminism; postmodernism; postcolonial theory; indigenous psychology; liberation psychology

History

Critical comments on topics of psychology have been expressed in classical philosophy when, for instance, Aristotle (384–322 BCE) challenged Plato's (427–347 BCE) conceptualization of the psyche (Teo, 2005). During the Middle Ages extensive discussions took place on psychological topics such as the primacy of will or reason and the controversy surrounding universals, to mention a few prominent ones. Later, Descartes' (1596–1650) thoughts on innate ideas were criticized by Locke (1632–1704), who in turn was criticized by Leibniz (1646–1716). Despite the importance of these critiques and controversies, such critics did not systematically challenge an independent field of psychological research, which did not exist at the time.

The history of systematic critiques of psychology begins with Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who provided a critique of the field of *rational psychology* (e.g., discussions regarding the immortality or substantiality of the soul) and of empirical psychology (e.g., discussions regarding the various empirical faculties of the human mind). Kant's critique of psychology had a significant influence on the development of psychology in the nineteenth century, mostly in stimulating research *against* his critiques. Neo-Kantians such as Johannes Müller (1801–1858) and Hermann Helmholtz (1821–1894) adopted Kant's epistemology and rejected his ideas on psychology, while at the same time they excelled in natural-scientific research on psychological topics.

Kant's critique of psychology was twofold (see Teo, 2005): Kant's critique of rational psychology was based on his epistemological reflections. He argued that reason could not be applied to abstract ideas without encountering problems. In dealing with the soul, reason was trapped in *a paralogism* (a logical reasoning error). Kant concluded that rational psychology did not produce a systematic body of knowledge. Because rational psychology went beyond the powers of human reason, researchers were restricted to study the soul from an empirical point of view. But according to Kant, empirical psychology was not a science but provided only an accumulation of psychological knowledge pieces.

For Kant, empirical psychology was divided not only from a real natural science such as physics, which was able to systematically organize a complete body of knowledge according to principles, but also from chemistry, an inauthentic natural science, an experimental doctrine, because psychology was only able to develop into an empirical doctrine of the soul which contained organized facts. According to Kant, psychology could never become anything more than a historical, systematic natural description of the soul – not a science of the soul or even a psychological experimental doctrine. Yet, empirical psychology, banished from the field of metaphysics and understood as applied philosophy, was too important to be neglected. Instead, it was included in Kant's anthropology that covered a variety of psychological topics.

The first systematic critique, formulated from the perspective of natural science and combined with an extensive alternative program, was expressed in one of the most influential books of the nineteenth century, F. A. Lange's

(1877/1950) *The History of Materialism and Criticism of Its Present Importance*. In this philosophical text, Lange challenged psychology from the perspective of the natural sciences and suggested an alternative *psychology without a soul*. Lange originally planned the section on psychology as a separate book with the title *Critique of Psychology*.

Lange passionately criticized philosophical psychology, its subject matter, and methodology and outlined a program for an objective psychology nearly half a century before J. B. Watson (1878–1958) expressed his ideas. Contemporaries of Watson were well aware of that fact and that Watson's ideas were not new, referring to Lange's writings. Lange argued that instead of a vague terminology, psychology needed concepts derived from physiology – concepts such as the notion that the subject matter of psychology was not the soul or consciousness, that psychologists should focus on actions and other manifestations of life (behaviors), and that psychologists should study animal and infant psychology. Methodologically he rejected introspection as subjective and he recommended the observation of others, as such a method could be controlled. He also favored the use of statistics in psychology and argued that the field could learn much more from experiments than from books based on speculative reflections.

Auguste Comte (1798–1857) formulated the development of thought from the theological state (natural phenomena were produced by supernatural beings), to the metaphysical state (abstract forces produced phenomena), and finally to the positive state, which included the study of natural laws and the observation of facts, accompanied by some reasoning and academic specialization (Teo, 2005). For psychology, Comte recommended the application of scientific methods, specifically the experiment, but argued that psychology should be excluded from the positive sciences. He identified philosophical psychology as the last phase of theology and suggested that mental phenomena could be studied sufficiently within anatomy, physiology, and his own program of a positive philosophy. He targeted introspection because this method did not lead to any consensus.

Traditional Debates

Teo (2005) argued that the accusation of speculation was a common tool for criticizing other psychologists' work. Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) characterized Johann F. Herbart's (1776–1841) understanding of feelings, emotions, and impulses from the interaction of ideas as a hypothesis that did not allow for a scientific analysis of human experience. But then Willy argued that Wundt's psychology was full of speculation, from which he derived the notion that psychology was in a crisis. Similarly, J. B. Watson challenged the idea that the subject matter of psychology should be consciousness and that the method should be introspection. He argued that such a perspective was caught in speculative questions that could not be tested within experimental scientific studies. B. F. Skinner (1904–1990) intended psychology as a true science, transformed psychology into radical behaviorism, and criticized human-scientific psychology for being imprecise regarding what understanding, interpretation, intuition, and value judgment meant and for its lack of practical relevance. Skinner's behaviorism, particularly his theory of language development, was criticized by Chomsky for its speculative character, but Chomsky himself was criticized for the speculative nature of his language acquisition device.

A critique of psychological theories from within the mainstream of the discipline is still common and should be distinguished from a critical assessment of academic psychology. For instance, the critique of psychoanalysis has become part of the identity of mainstream psychology and can be found in many introductory textbooks of psychology. A traditional debate also focuses on the critique of popular psychology, which has been accused of working with outdated myths of psychology. More recently, some authors have criticized the reception of neuroscientific research in the public.

Critical Debates

One needs to make a distinction between systematic critiques emerging from human-scientific philosophies and those emerging from social epistemologies. Within the human-scientific tradition, mainstream psychology is understood as misrepresenting the unique human qualities of mental life. Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) argued that due to the unique subject matter of psychology, it would be wrong to emulate the natural sciences and that causal explanations as provided in those sciences could not be used satisfactorily in the domain of mental life. According to Dilthey, the subject matter of psychology was experience in its totality, which could not be adequately dealt with by natural-scientific experimentation and measurement. He proposed a human-scientific psychology in which the totality of mental life and not elements were used for description and analysis. He considered *understanding* the most adequate method for psychology. He did not exclude other methods of psychology and acknowledged, besides understanding, a variety of auxiliary approaches to psychology, including introspection, comparative methods, experimentation, and the study of abnormal psychology. In the German-speaking context, one needs to discuss Eduard Spranger (1882–1963) who applied Dilthey's ideas of a human-scientific project to personality and developmental psychology. He understood that a general, universal depiction of adolescence would be impossible and that psychological research cannot rely solely on physiology but needs to incorporate culture and history when it comes to psychological phenomena.

In the United States, Gordon Allport (1897–1967) considered the subject matter of psychology to be more complex than reducible to biology and criticized the exclusion of the individual from mainstream psychology. Abraham Maslow (1908–1970) outlined a critique of natural-scientific psychology, which he characterized as mechanistic and *ahuman* and as focusing wrongly on prediction, control, certainty, exactness, and organization. For Maslow, knowledge produced in traditional psychology was limited as it did not allow for individual experiences. Giorgi (1970) expressed most clearly that psychology should not be a part of the natural sciences, while at the same time he suggested that a human-scientific psychology could hold on to its scientific character.

One of the most influential critics was Sigmund Koch, who early in his career had worked within the natural-scientific approach to psychology and who turned into one of its fiercest challengers. One of Koch's (1981) main criticisms was the idea that the scientific promises of psychology were not kept and could not be kept. He suggested that psychologists do not provide scientific laws in natural-scientific sense nor in the sense that they would be universally valid. On the other hand, he argued that psychology needed to be open to all phenomena, including those that cannot be captured within a traditional methodology. He also claimed that psychology should give up the notion of a unified science, which it never was, and instead should claim a field of *psychological studies* (similar to *cultural studies*).

With the term "social epistemologies," we refer to approaches in knowledge production that argue that social characteristics such as class, gender, and culture play a role in what and how something (such as mental life) is studied. The first philosopher who systematically analyzed and applied this idea to the social sciences was K. Marx (1818–1883). Marx also commented on consciousness and psychology from a critical point of view (Teo, 2005). For Marx, the human senses were not only natural objects; he argued that the development of the five senses depends on history as well. He suggested that the meaning of sensory objects changed according to sociohistorical contexts and according to one's own position in these contexts. This can easily be demonstrated by suggesting that the hearing of music and what music we consider pleasurable has changed significantly over time and cannot be reduced to the physiology of our senses, but requires an understanding of culture and history. Marx also suggested that psychology needs to include the objects of our labor as material for understanding

mental life. For instance, the development of weapons could teach us something about our mind in our society.

The notion of the cultural-historical dimension of mental life was picked up by Lev Vygotsky (1896–1934), who identified the lack of theoretical integration as one central feature of the crisis in psychology. Vygotsky (1997) complained that the ongoing practice of collecting facts without theoretical integration would be a meaningless activity. He also identified the incommensurability of existing research programs in psychology (psychoanalysis, behaviorism, subjective psychologies, Gestalt, etc.) as a major problem in mainstream psychology. He suggested that different psychologists uncritically expanded their theories to areas where they were no longer valid. His famous zone of proximal development is a tool for criticizing traditional assessment in psychology that focuses on abstract individuals without taking context, activities, and development into account.

Klaus Holzkamp's (1927–1995) critique of psychology took different shapes. Early in his career, he suggested that there is no direct relationship between theory and experiment and that the interpretation of experimental results was to a certain degree arbitrary. He attributed the problems to a misguided philosophy of science. Later in his neo-Marxist phase, Holzkamp argued that traditional psychology did not have any emancipatory relevance; that mainstream psychology is operating with hidden, ideological assumptions; and that the subject-object dichotomy which may make sense in the natural science does not apply to psychology. In his Marxist phase, Holzkamp (1992) criticized mostly the arbitrariness with which psychological categories and concepts are developed, a critique from which he developed his own system of psychology.

Instead of favoring capitalism or class as the most important social category on which social knowledge including psychological knowledge is built, many feminists have drawn their attention to the concept of gender. The feminist critique of psychology is extensive and multifaceted, which makes it impossible to provide a complete overview. From a feminist point of view, the development of psychology is male-dominated because women had been excluded from the institutions of psychology and because their contributions have been neglected. As a consequence, the subject matter, methodology, and practice of mainstream psychology are all gender biased. According to some feminist critiques of psychology, the preference for variables, the celebration of quantification, the usage of abstract concepts, the focus on separation and compartmentalization (as opposed to the study of interaction and interdependence), and the rigid objectivism of science might reflect a socially constructed masculine way of control and worldview.

Feminist empiricism, informed by liberal feminism, which aims at gender equality by providing women and men with the same rights and duties, seeks change but not radical change in research because it is dedicated to the accepted standards of science that appear genderless. Feminist empiricism assumes that a rigorous application of scientific methods will demonstrate the gender bias and gender prejudice in psychological theory. The notion that men are very different from women has been rejected using traditional methods, while at the same time the purpose and the damage based on the notion of substantial gender differences are disclosed. Feminist empiricist psychologists identify the problems of prejudicial psychology but not of psychology itself (Hyde, 2005).

From the perspective of feminist standpoint theory, which radically challenges the role of gender in the production of knowledge – including the choice of method that is used in mainstream research – discovery and methodology are biased through male standpoints. Carol Gilligan's (1977) deconstructed Kohlberg's theory of development when she argued that women appear deficient in Kohlberg's theory of moral development. According to Gilligan, women's voices of morality were unheard and constructed as inferior in mainstream research. In addition, feminists have adopted postmodern and postcolonial perspectives in psychology.

Postmodern psychology is based on the assumption that our culture and time provides unquestioned assumptions that appear obvious

and natural to the participants of this culture and time. One of the problematic metanarratives of our time is the concept of progress. Is psychology progressing or are we accepting different theoretical fads at different times? Some critics of psychology have argued that natural-scientific psychology has adopted a methodological metanarrative that can be described as *methodolatry* (David Bakan) or *methodologism* (Teo, 2005). Such terms suggest that methodology provides for the foundation or unification of psychology and that if one followed the strict rules of psychological methodology, particularly statistics and experimental design, then one would automatically contribute to knowledge, truth, and progress in the discipline.

Kurt Danziger (1985) called this phenomenon a methodological imperative that rules psychology (domination of psychology by methodology) while he showed that the relationship between researchers and subjects/participants has undergone historical and cultural changes. For instance, in the historical German model of science (Wundt), the experimenters (often students) were less important than the subjects (often professors), whereas in the British model (Galton), the subject was not important as a source of information but the population was. Danziger (1997) also showed that the important categories of psychology have a history and a culture. In that sense psychological concepts are constructed and become a social reality (e.g., IQ has been invented but is now "real" as a practice and in terms of identities). Danziger rejects a representational theory (mainstream psychology) that assumes a reality of the self as a natural object that remains the same independent of how one describes it; instead, he favors a *formative theory of language* that suggests that the way one conceptualizes the self cannot be separated from what the self is. In that sense the introduction of new conceptualizations of the self will lead to new organizations of experiences of the self. What one does with words affects what one is.

One of the most prominent postmodern critics of psychology is K. Gergen (1985), who does not believe in an independent subject matter of psychology because objects are constructed according to conventions and rhetorical rules of a time and culture. The dominance or acceptance of an existing form of understanding does not primarily depend on empirical validity but on social processes. Gergen criticized traditional methods for separating subject and object and producing alienated relationships and does not believe that empirical evidence constitutes an understanding of the world. Instead of focusing on methods, Gergen (1985) advocated for a focus on language. Psychological concepts are not derived from ontology, they do not correspond to real psychological entities, but they relate to the historical process and develop meaning in social contexts. Researchers observe objects and events that depend on language, which is embedded in culture and history. Rather than analyzing psychological language with the tools of positivism, psychologists should rely on disciplines such as ethnopsychology that show the historical and cultural situatedness of concepts. Those concepts are sustained in a particular context as long as they are useful. As a consequence, for instance, emotions are not real objects but rather are socially constructed in the context of language use, and anger is, according to Gergen, not a mental state but a social role.

Postcolonial psychology has noticed that in the context of Western colonialism, an interest in "understanding" non-Western groups of people has emerged. This sociohistorical process gave rise to the construction of the "Other" as well as to the concepts of *race* and the practice of *racism* (Richards, 2012). The *Third World* diasporas in Europe and North America are the results of colonization, imperialism, and slavery. On this background the number of ethnic minorities has increased and will continue to augment over the next years in many European countries, the United States, Canada, and Australia. This social reality and the increasing global nature of psychology have led to the emergence of a *multicultural psychology* (acknowledging diversity within a multicultural society such as Canada), *cross-cultural psychology* (often applying and testing Western theories around the world), cultural psychology (acknowledging the importance of culture for psychological theories and practices), *indigenous psychology*

(marginalized local psychologies that compete with mainstream imported Western psychology), and *postcolonial psychologies* (psychologies that problematize the colonial nature of Western psychology).

Postcolonial psychology, for example, challenges the Eurocentric character of mainstream psychology and questions the relevance of concepts, theories, methods, and practices for persons outside of the West. An early pioneer was Frantz Fanon (1925–1961) who challenged the psychiatrists and health experts of the time who suggested that North Africans were primitive creatures or that Africans make little use of frontal lobes. Fanon (1963) understood that biological, medical, and neuroscientific explanations can be used to perpetuate racism and paternalism. He instead provided a political and economic explanation that could be used for a postcolonial liberation psychology and an indigenous psychology.

In general, the critique concerns the fact that the "Other" was often problematized instead of examining the problems that the "Other" encounters in a given society. Problematizations can occur using empirical methods, which are not immune to racism and may even support racism. The notion that group "B" scores lower on IQ tests than group "A" can be an empirical fact that can be repeated and tends to lend itself to a specific interpretation that is to the disadvantage of group "B." Empirical methods can contribute to the problematizations of the "Other," as can theoretical arguments and speculations.

International Relevance

The critique of psychology often emerges from contexts that have been marginalized and that have developed an understanding or an intuition about the limitations of mainstream psychology that has been synonymous with American psychology. Thus, it is not surprising that one of the fiercest critiques of American psychology has emerged in Germany, which lost its international standing in psychology after WWII (Teo, 2013).

In Latin America Martín-Baró (1942–1989) suggested that liberation psychology should free itself from the perspectives of Western Europe and North America. Martín-Baró (1994) advocated for focusing on Latin American realities rather than on problems that Europeans and Americans encounter. The Latin American reality consists of the need to liberate itself from social structures that are oppressive. In consequence the task of psychology becomes participating in those struggles and learning about life from the perspective of the oppressed. This entails a shift in psychology's orientation from the powerful to the dominated. Mental health can be studied from the standpoint of a farmer, development from someone who lives in a shanty town, and so on.

Primacy is given to praxis and not to research for the sake of research. Psychologists need to begin their theoretical or practical work not by using Western theories but rather from the problems that are encountered by the people of Latin America. Such an analysis shows that the individualism of British and American psychology does not apply or work within realities of severe oppression. Suffering is not just an individual problem but a shared experience, and sharing this experience on the background of social analyses contributes to liberation. Thus, psychologists are asked not to restrict themselves to clinical tasks but to become a source for community intervention, economic development, and the fight against poverty.

In Asia, in the Philippines, Enriquez (1992) criticized the fact that Western psychology had dominated the teaching and practice of Filipino psychology. Rather than using American psychology, he suggested that in order to understand Filipino thought and experiences, one needs to take a Filipino perspective. This would include participant observation and the need for researchers to embrace the culture of the group by making frequent visits to that culture. Such a practice could avoid the characterization of Filipino culture as fatalistic, as one that avoids personal responsibility, as American psychologists have done. From an indigenous perspective, Filipinos are not giving up personal responsibility, but they encourage themselves to deal with problems from a perspective of strength. Other

critiques of psychology have been developed in Africa, India, and other countries.

Practice Relevance

The critique of academic psychology has practical relevance in terms of reflexivity, which allows students, academics, and professionals to understand the limitations of psychology and that critical thinking means more than applying rigorous methods. The critique of psychology emphasizes the social, historical, and cultural embeddedness of psychological theories and practices from which better approaches can be developed. As suggested, an individualistic Western view of psychology can have real implications for the mental life of people. Another example is the issues of disability, which mainstream psychology tends to individualize and pathologize while focusing on impairment and exclusion (Goodley & Lawthom, 2005). On the other hand, critical disability studies focus on challenging the line between normal and disabled, which has enormous consequences for the practical life of people with disabilities.

Future Directions

The shift of academic psychology to neuroscientific research with some of the same problems as outlined above (e.g., individualization of a problem to a person's brain), as well as the new identities that brain discourses elicit and reinforce, requires a new set of critical analyses that have started in critical neuroscience (e.g., Rose, 2003).

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