H

Habitus

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Introduction

Metaphysical philosophy and the (subjectivist) constructivist (constructionist) theories about human knowing and learning have given rise to conceptions of human practices as the result of rational cogitations. Underlying this approach is the presupposition that being in the world means being present to oneself. In other words, human competencies are explained in terms of representations of the world and the things that populate it, which people are said to manipulate as a basis for their actions. This approach, however, does not appropriately describe our everyday coping, which does not require cogitation and manipulation (interpretation) of representations at all: In competent practice, we hammer nails into the wall without manipulating representations of the hammer, the nail, or the process of hammering, and we *immediately* act upon traffic lights without creating representations to be interpreted first. Traditional psychology explains such competencies by means of concepts such as "tacit knowledge" acquired by means of individual "construction" or "rote learning." This does not explain, however, that

human practices have much in common independent of the individuals who enact them; that is, everyday practices are fundamentally cultural. The concept of (social) "conditioning" was to explain why individual actions fundamentally exhibit social character. Neither approach, however, overcomes the dichotomies between knowledge and application, theory and practice, or body and mind. The *habitus* concept was introduced specifically to overcome the dichotomy of individual and collective and to provide a dialectical theory that explains the nature of mundane, everyday practice (Bourdieu, 1980).

Definition

The etymology of the term *habitus* is important, as it allows Bourdieu, in his native French, to develop a language and associated imagery that explains and renders intelligible the nature of action and the ease of everyday coping in a world through and through characterized by human praxis and the practical knowledge that arises from it. The term habitus derives from the Proto-Indo-Germanic root *ghabh-*, to grab or take, which led to the Latin verb habēre, to have, hold, possess, and, in a reflexive sense, to be constituted. The noun form *habitus* also transformed to become *habit* in the sense of bodily apparel, attire, demeanor, deportment, and behavior. In French, the Latin verb also leads to *habiter*, to live in, inhabit, or dwell. This etymology is important because it allows

Bourdieu to develop a description in which the mutual constitution of habitus and the social and material world (field) finds a consistent verbal expression. Thus, for example, the social agent is said to practically know the world because "he inhabits it like a habit [garment, dress] or a habitat" (Bourdieu, 1997, p. 170); and the principle of practical comprehension is attributed to the "practical sense of a habitus inhabited by the world it inhabits" (p. 170). The same inclusive and mutually constitutive relations are repeated in the deployment of another word that relates understanding and being comprised by something: "The world comprehends [comprises, encompasses] me, includes me as a thing among things, but I . . . comprehend this world; and I do so *because* it comprehends [encompasses] me" (p. 157). Like animals and their habitats, which they inhabit, habitus and its habitat (the field) come to be adapted to each other as they mutually shape each other. This exposition to the world, as Bourdieu suggests in a play of words, is *disposition* – thereby making the same claim as activity theorists, who suggest that all higher psychological functions also exist as and emerge from societal relations that require the functions to be enacted (Vygotskij, 2005). The relation between these functions and societal relations, therefore, is consistent with the homologous relations between habitus and field.

Keywords

Field; dialectics; Marxism; praxis; power; rational actor; homologous structures; doxa; lex insita

Traditional Debates

Historical Background: Habits and Habitudes

Attempts to overcome the traditional dichotomy between the material world in which we act and the ideal world of human thought (ideologies) and to build a theory that explains the ease with which everyday practices (habits, habitudes) are enacted have existed for a long time. Thus, for example, working toward the end of the eighteenth and at the beginning of the nineteenth century, P. Maine de Biran established a theory about how the faculties of thought arise from sensation and the physical habitudes of the body. The theory explains the close connection between the physical and moral aspects of our being in terms of "dispositions, brought about by the *habitudes* of imagination, [that] become causes in turn, powerfully influence the faculties of thought, imprint a force, a direction, a uniform coloring to all their products" (Maine de Biran, 1841, p. 164, my translation). Though generally little known, the theory would eventually influence M. Merleau-Ponty (1964), who worked to establish a phenomenological theory of the mind as grounded in corporeal being. Although critical of Merleau-Ponty in his description and use of the habitus concept, Bourdieu takes up the philosopher's (a) idea about the embodied nature of knowledge and (b) language about how a bodily inclusion in the world leads to perceptual schemes. A more direct influence of phenomenological thought on Bourdieu's habitus concept can be traced to E. Husserl (e.g., 2004), who used the German word *habitus* in the sense of disposition to describe practices as the result of regularities that appear necessary and natural. This allows practitioners to grasp the world in a practical manner, monothetically, in real time, without time out, and fully appropriate to the instant. Habitus clearly is distinguished from habits and the habitual, as what has become customary, and refers instead to the dispositions that lead to the production of perceptions, practical actions, and opinions.

Habitus and Field

Historically there exist two fallacies, both of which are attributable to the scholastic vision of human knowledge. On the one hand, there is a certain mechanistic view of human actions, which are thought of as the results of constraints on external forces (Bourdieu, 1997). One the other hand, rational actor theories attribute actions to the free will of the agent who is fully present to him/herself. By introducing the habitus concept, Bourdieu intends to dispel both of these fallacies. Thus, against both theories it

has to be posited that social agents are endowed with habitus, inscribed in their bodies by past experience: "these systems of schemas of perception, appreciation, and action . . . enable them to perform acts of practical knowledge . . . without any explicit definition of ends or rational calculation of means" (p. 166). The habitus concept, thereby, contradicts both positivist materialism and intellectual (subjectivist) idealism by insisting on (a) the constructed nature of the object of knowledge and (b) the system of structured structuring dispositions as the principle of this construction. Habitus thereby come to constitute "systems of durable and transposable *dispositions*, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is to say, as generative and organizing principles of practices" (Bourdieu, 1980, p. 88). One can think of these habitus also as "representations that can be objectively adapted to their goal without supposing a conscious aiming at these ends" (p. 88). As a result, the mastery expresses operations that appear "objectively 'ruled [réglées]' and 'regular [régulières]' without being at all the product of a following of rules [règles]" (p. 88). The habitus therefore are generative mechanisms that produce practical action without requiring the conscious representation of the (social and material) world, body, tools, and so on.

Habitus is adapted to the field in which they generate practical action because of their "homologies" with the field. These homologies arise from the fact that habitus and the (social, material) field are mutually constitutive. As structuring structures, habitus generate the structured ways in which the field appears to the practitioner during practical action; as structured structures, habitus are conditioned in and through participation in the field. As such, habitus implements fundamentally Marxist ideas – as articulated in the theses on Feuerbach, which Bourdieu (1980) explicitly credits – that the reality, truth, and power of human thought prove itself in its this-sidedness, in concrete practice to which it is not only perfectly adapted but also from which it arises. This way of framing the origin of practices, therefore, overcomes

the idealist (constructivist) conception of practical action, which had separated body and mind. Because of the constituting nature of the field, individual habitus inherently are collective habitus of all those inhabiting the same field modified by a personal note: "'Personal' style, that is, this particular stamp that all products of the same habitus bear . . . is never more than a *deviation* with respect to the particular *style* of an era or class" (p. 101). Such personal styles arise from the unique position any individual takes in a given field, which allows making the mentioned connection between (social, material) position, exposition, and disposition(s). Despite the deviation, and perhaps precisely because of it, the personal style refers back to the common style not only because of its conformity with it but also by its difference.

Sociological theories note the immense coordination that occurs between the members of a group, culture, or society – such as when the spectators at a soccer game begin to produce coordinated movements (waves), shared emotional states, and affinities/antipathies (e.g., Collins, 2004). Such coordination is explained by means of the concept of entrainment, first developed by physicists to explain why two clocks hanging on a wall not too far apart come perfectly coordinate each other. Bourdieu (1980) uses precisely the same phenomenon to explain how, despite following their own laws, social actors come to accord with others even though they are not aware of it. This is so because "habitus is nothing other than this immanent law, lex insita, inscribed in the body by identical histories, which is the condition not only of the coordination of practices but also of the practices of coordination" (p. 99).

Sedimentation and Cultural History

A number of Bourdieu's ideas associated with the habitus concept can be tracked to E. Husserl even though Bourdieu is critical of phenomenology generally and Husserl specifically (Throop & Murphy, 2002). Thus, for example his description of the way in which historically stable practices and a doxic lifeworld arise has been anticipated in the phenomenologist's conception

of the origin and history of geometry as objective science (Husserl, 1939). Thus, habitus is culturally and historically contingent, theorized precisely along the lines of the origin and nature of geometry as objective science, which rests on the sedimentation of original experiences that are reactivated in concrete praxis: "Product of history, habitus produces individual and collective practices, thus history, according to the schemas generated by history" (Bourdieu, 1980, p. 91). The experiences, "deposited in each organism in the form of schemas of perception, thought, and action, tend to guarantee, more reliably than all formal rules and explicit norms, the conformity of practices and their constancy over time" (p. 91). In this way, as Husserl anticipated, knowledge, once created, is inherited as a living, productively advancing formation of sense (rather than being a dead legacy) that is organized and stabilized by cultural artifacts and tools. The social conditions that constituted the habitus come to be related to the social conditions that the habitus constitutes. This allows Bourdieu to argue that the relationship between these two social conditions is concealed and sedimented in practice, the concealment constituting a forgetting of history, because "all sedimentation also is in a certain way a 'forgetting'" (Husserl, 1939, p. 212). Habitus is historically constituted under the conditions of and as the ideal/ideological reflection the societal and material lifeworld. It therefore belongs to those determinations of everyday practice to which actors generally do not have access. This leads them to misrecognize the true societal relations that are the sources of their problems and instead internalize and attribute the problems to themselves and those closest to them (Holzkamp, 1983). Only a critical interrogation of the societal and historical origins of particular aspects of habitus can reveal the real, societal determinations that the habitus embody.

Practical Applications of the Habitus Concept

The habitus concept has been employed in very different areas to explicate the nature of practices, differences that can be observed, or different opportunities for descendants of different social classes. Thus, for example, the differences in the academic accomplishments – publication of books, articles in the prestigious daily Le Monde, interviews in the evening news – are due to social differences to such an extent "that they seem to be the retranslation into a specifically academic logic of initial differences of incorporated capital (*habitus*)" (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 76). Moreover, the very design and arrangement of artifacts have been shown to reproduce some fundamental Kabyle (Berber) oppositions, including fire and water, light and dark, and male and female (Bourdieu, 1980). A study of the trajectory of becoming a boxer shows that as the pugilistic habitus is forged, extraneous properties of the athlete – e.g., skin tone as the expression of ethnic descent – may be effaced, superseded by properties important to the sport: strength, speed, endurance, resistance to pain, or dexterity (Wacquant, 2004). In a similar manner, structured structuring dispositions (habitus) were used to explain the effectiveness of experienced teachers who act appropriately and often in advance of trouble; they thereby contrast novice teachers, who, through their bodily inclusion in the lifeworld of the classroom, develop habitus – and they do so especially quickly when they teach with someone else (Roth & Tobin, 2002). Just as described by Maine de Biran two centuries ago, the habitus concept, therefore, "erases the scholastic distinction between the intentional and the habitual, the rational and the emotional, the corporeal and the mental" (Wacquant, 2004, p. 98). Habitus also is a central concept in Bourdieu's (1991) theory of language and linguistic exchanges, explaining the connections between bodily features such as accent, intonation, and ways of speaking to social class and gender and to the symbolic power an individual may wield.

Critical Debates

The habitus concept has been subject to critique because it apparently represents a pessimistic view of the transformative powers of humanity

and human societies. While recognizing, for example, the ritualistic elements in the theory that reproduce and therefore stabilize cultures, societies, and economic fields, some sociologists suggest that it misses the cultural potential for creating new symbolic objects that change the field and, therefore, habitus and for generating the energies required for societal change (e.g., Collins, 2004). Some scholars suggest that the habitus concept leads to fairly stable practices, which would reduce social actors to cultural dopes; but others recognize that habitus is not fixed but allows "personal style" and therefore is fully compatible with agency | structure theories (e.g., Sewell, 1992). The main problem with the habitus concept is its totalizing nature, where there appears to be no way out of the homologous structures of habitus and the field. That is, whereas the theory is said to explain well the stability of cultures that have also been shown by other classical ethnographies – e.g., the work of R. Rosaldo or M. Sahlins – there appears to be a lack in the habitus concept to allow for the real, observed possibilities for cultural transformation such as the 1968 Prague Spring, the 1980 Berber Spring, or the 2011 Arab Spring. Yet there is recognition that habitus means stasis only if society is thought as monolithic; a fractured society, however, would lead to a habitus consistent with transformation: it is a determinate but not deterministic antecedent of practice. Moreover, there are also possibilities for changing habitus through conscious reflection (Bourdieu, 1997). Other scholars find the gender-related explanations of linguistic habitus as "confrontational, distinctly masculine in style," where "symbolic power is associated with authority and domination among people" (Smith, 2005, pp. 184–185). Such conceptions lead to the closing down rather than opening up of explorations of linguistic organization that the habitus concept presupposes. Other feminist scholars disagree, suggesting instead that there is a lot of potential in the habitus concept thought of as a fractured phenomenon. Conceived as such, habitus constitutes a source not only of patriarchal reproduction but also of feminist, emancipatory opportunities (Wade, 2011).

Though not without problems and controversy, the habitus concept, paired with that of the field, has shown tremendous potential for explaining the stability of social structures over time while also providing the possibility to use it for theorizing social change and transformation.

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Online Resources

http://www.umsl.edu/~keelr/3210/3210_lectures/habitus_field.html

http://tap.sagepub.com/content/19/6.toc

Harm Reduction, Overview

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Introduction

By the early 1900s, a range of psychoactive substances (e.g., opium, heroin, morphine, cocaine, and cannabis) that had been commonly used by laypersons for medical purposes came under attack by an emerging medical profession as holding the potential for addiction. Such substances came to be perceived as "demon" drugs in countries across the globe (White, 2004). These substances were thought to have the potential to precipitate dependence and addiction among individuals and susceptible populations, subsequently resulting in violence and crime while generating a range of other negative social and health consequences. In the USA, the perception that these demon drugs were associated with poorer, recent immigrant and minority populations – all considered "threatening" to the urban industrial order – in part spurred the regulation and outright prohibition of these substances in cities and states, as exemplified by the 1875 legislation that prohibited opium smoking in San Francisco (Acker, 2002; Courtwright, 2001). At the Federal level, a stiffening series of drug control acts was implemented throughout the 1900s to control

and regulate these substances. Beginning with the 1914 Harrison Narcotics Act and the 1937 Marijuana Tax Act, by mid-century, medical use of heroin and cannabis was prohibited. While the regulation or prohibition of drugs were important explicit aims of these legislative initiatives, they were also implicitly designed to control what was thought to be disorderedly, often poorer and minority immigrant populations. A change in who suffered from addiction thus influenced the changing view of drug use and policy responses. Specifically, between the 1880s and the 1930s, the profile of the typical drug user shifted from one that was primarily white and middle income to one that was primarily minority and lower income. Drug use became more and more associated with self-indulgent behavior that many came to associate with a larger decline in traditional morality. In this regard, migration, expanding racism, and class issues influenced the legal and scientific perspective on addiction, subtly or not so subtly (Acker, 2002; Bennett & Golub, 2012; Musto, 1987).

Significantly, these laws marked the beginning of the enactment of an ongoing series of legislative initiatives aimed at reducing the *supply* of illicit drugs. By the 1970s, punitive drug control and supply reduction efforts such as the Boggs Act (1951), which imposed mandatory minimum sentences for drug violations, were complemented by demand reduction efforts, aimed at reducing the *demand* for drugs, such as the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act, 1966 (treatment as alternative to jail), and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (Controlled Substances Act, CSA) which created a hierarchy of drug scheduling based on addiction potential and medical utility.

Since the 1970s, the US policy approach to drug use and misuse has rested predominantly on two frameworks, reducing the *supply* of drugs via law enforcement, interdiction, and incarceration, on the one hand, and reducing the *demand* on the other, via education, treatment, and other prevention measures. More broadly, the full landscape of drug policy initiatives includes policies

geared toward complete legalization or complete prohibition. While debates over reducing the demand for drugs versus reducing the supply of drugs were playing out in the USA, individuals in European countries were struggling to respond to the rising incidence of hepatitis associated with injection drug use by the early 1980s (Inciardi & Harrison, 1999). As Inciardi and Harrison suggest (1999), the Dutch recognized the importance of reducing the spread of disease as a more pressing public health issue than reducing drug use per se; drug users themselves organized to take care of their own health needs by establishing programs to provide clean needles and syringes to injection drug users (IDUs). Establishing the salience of harm minimization and a public health approach to reducing the harms associated with drug use rather than supply or demand elimination set the stage for the emergence of "harm reduction" as a viable drug policy framework. Syringe exchange programs (SEPs) have become the historic hallmark of harm reduction efforts, and with the HIV/AIDS epidemic, such approaches were adopted in countries across Western Europe; they also trickled in to the USA, appearing in the 1980s mainly on an underground basis before being sanctioned in several cities such as Tacoma, WA.; San Francisco, CA; and New York, NY, in response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic (Stoller, 1998).

Definition

Unlike demand reduction measures which locate the problem of drug use in the person, not the substance, or supply reduction measures that locate the problem in the substance, not the person, harm reduction locates the problem in the *relationship* between the person and the substance, which may change over time. This relationship was articulated by psychiatrist Norman E. Zinberg, in his classic analysis, *Drug*, *Set*, *and Setting*: *The Basis for Controlled Intoxicant Use* (Zinberg, 1984). His work suggests that the drug experience and associated harms are based on factors operating within three nested, interacting domains: drug, set, and

setting. The action of a "drug" describes the properties that affect an individual's body, often manifest across the dopamine pathway. "Set" includes a user's psychological expectations or mindset surrounding the consumption of a drug that further influence the experience. "Set" includes factors such as personality and internal states of mind (e.g., depression, happiness, stress, and anxiety). "Setting" includes the environmental, social, and cultural context in which substance use takes place. The substances available and the significance society and the individual come to attach to the substances influence both a person's experience and relationship with a substance. In this manner, the drug use experience is context dependent; recognizing the importance of setting or set can be as important as the drug itself and attendant health consequences. The context or setting is much more than a collection of distal antecedents. It is an organic system with its own internal logic based in a worldview that defines the prevailing gestalt as located in time and place (Acker, 2002; Bennett & Golub, 2012; Zinberg, 1984).

Both explicitly and implicitly, Zinberg's framework underpins harm reduction theory and practice. Drawing on his work and concepts of users' agency and potential for self-empowerment, harm reduction today includes a range of strategies and tactics to improve the health of drug users and the society in which they operate. Harm reduction aims to reduce the consequences associated with drug use as well as the consequences associated with punitive drug laws or coercive drug treatment programs (Reinarman & Levine, 1997). According to the Harm Reduction Coalition (one of the leading drug user advocacy organizations in the USA), harm reduction is a "set of practical strategies that reduce the negative consequences of drug use, incorporating a spectrum of strategies from safer use, to managed use to abstinence." Harm reduction programs recognize the interactions of drug, set, and setting and how one element or the other may cause a particular user unnecessary harm. For some individuals, the drug use is the most problematic; for others, the context in which drug use occurs creates the vast majority of problems.

In its basic philosophy, harm reduction accepts the reality of drug use across space and time and seeks to help individuals minimize the consequences of drug use and drug policies, both to themselves and the society around them. Harm reduction involves drug users themselves in defining their own drug-related challenges and developing the best practices and policies that impact their own health. In this manner, changing the context in which drug use occurs while simultaneously addressing the conditions that can exacerbate the negative health consequences of drug use or drug policy is as important as reducing drug use itself. Thus, challenging the reliance on incarceration is as salient as ensuring that each injection experience is safe and does not result in the transmission of disease. Importantly, harm reduction programs involve drug users themselves in the process of determining how best to alleviate the harms associated with drug policy and misuse.

While harm reduction is often thought of in relation to needle/syringe exchange, early incarnations included such measures as drinking and driving laws, seatbelts, morphine maintenance programs (1920s), methadone maintenance programs beginning in the 1970s, and labeling of psychoactive ingredients in beverage and pharmaceutical containers as specified by the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act. Users of methadone, for example, unlike heroin users, are not at risk for arrest, a reduction in potential harms. Similarly, for people who inject drugs, a clean syringe can prevent the spread of blood-borne disease, and for those who use too much, naloxone (Narcan) can be administered to reverse a potentially fatal overdose. By the early 1990s, harm reduction had become a viable policy both challenging and complementing traditional supply and demand reduction measures, illustrated by the convening of the first International Conference on Harm Reduction in Liverpool in 1990, 6 years after the Dutch implemented the first needle exchange program in 1984 (Acker, 2002; Hickman, 2004; Inciardi & Harrison, 1999). In the USA, the first National Harm Reduction Conference was held in Oakland, California, in 1996.

Keywords

Harm reduction; supply reduction; demand reduction; drug policy; needle exchange; overdose prevention; drug use and misuse; addiction; public health

Traditional Debates

While harm reduction programs have often been criticized for enabling drug use and promoting the legalization of drugs, harm reduction looks to reduce harm associated with drug use, misuse, and prohibition and can manifest as abstinence for some individuals or as moderate use for others. The main thrust of harm reduction is to treat drug use and its related consequences as a public health issue rather than a criminal justice one. Needle/syringe exchange is most commonly associated with harm reduction. However, despite its proven efficacy as a public health measure that saves lives and does not increase drug use, needle exchange, along with related harm reduction interventions such as overdose prevention and naloxone distribution, continues to face constant pressure (Bennett, Bell, Tomedi, Hulsey, and Kral 2011) from policy analysts and politicians (Cohen, 1999). Critiques of harm reduction often fail to recognize drug users as active agents who can determine their own health needs and continue to argue that needle exchange programs encourage drug use which is understood to be a moral failing rather than a consequence of larger social and structural inequalities. In contrast to harm reduction, policy makers and treatment/punishment proponents often advocate for treating individuals or punishing them, forms of behavioral modification, rather than directing energies toward the underlying conditions that may exacerbate individual and societal social and health consequences of drug use and misuse.

Critical Debates

While harm reduction organizations were initiated on an underground basis in the late

1980s and 1990s and did not receive any government funds, over the past two decades, more and more city and state agencies began funding harm reduction organizations. Funding sometimes came with regulations that individuals felt ran counter to the spirit of harm reduction. For example, some governments required strict 1–1 exchange of used syringes for sterile ones, rather than giving exchangers the number of syringes they reported they would need in order to not have to share. Organizations might be required to routinely refer every client to treatment each time they were seen, as opposed to meeting the client "where they were." Some individuals and organizations argued that it was better to forgo government funding to remain "true" to the low-threshold, client-centered underpinnings of the movement. Others within the movement believed that funding allowed essential services to reach more people and were worth the extra regulation. Many organizations receiving these funds were subsequently required to abide by regulations on syringe distribution, treatment referrals, and other state-mandated requirements. Some organizations facing bureaucratic mandates refused funding or created new groups, becoming underground organizations in order to maintain a low threshold of service delivery (Stoller, 1998). In this sense, the goal of meeting drug users "where they were" rather than imposing restrictions on their behaviors or on those trying to meet their needs has been a salient debate among harm reduction groups and individuals. City or state agencies can often mandate how an organization distributes syringes (e.g., 1-for-1; Bulk) and whether or not clients are referred to treatment regardless if they want it or not. In other cases, these funds can determine where a syringe exchange can locate. While harm reduction is often defined as a "set of practical strategies that reduce the negative consequences of drug use, incorporating a spectrum of strategies from safer use, to managed use to abstinence," city and state funding can stipulate quotas for reaching participants, referring them to treatment, and other aspects of service delivery. Programs across the country continue to deal with funding issues and reporting requirements in

different ways, and some have remained "underground" on a public health basis, arguing that city- and state-imposed requirements create high thresholds of service delivery and can exacerbate the negative consequences of drug use. There are now harm reduction groups and agencies that consist almost entirely of active drug users who distribute syringes and provide other services and operate largely without city/state funds, on the one hand, and others that are essentially state-run on the other.

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Online Resources

http://harmreduction.org/
www.nyhre.org
http://www.ihra.net/what-is-harm-reduction
http://www.drugpolicy.org/

Healers

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Introduction

There is historical and cultural context to the meaning of healers. Ancient understandings of health, promoted in the writings of Plato and Galen, indicate that healing requires the restoration of social political harmony, one's right place in the natural course of the cosmos, and balance of the humors. With the rise of church power through the Latin era, healing was associated with religious notions of sin requiring restoration of one's relationship with God through forgiveness, faith, hope, and counsel by way of encouragement, consolation, and empathy (Jackson, 1999).

Secular notions of what we would now consider psychological health and healing began to emerge in Europe with the Renaissance (Jackson, 1999). As the secular perspective developed, healing could be seen as needed without necessarily implying sinfulness. Psychological healing came to be understood as a kind of regeneration facilitated by fresh air, exercise, and controlled diet. It was considered an opportunity to creatively transcend difficulty and attain greater powers of resilience and fortitude. Presently, suffering and healing continue to be understood as typical of living and not necessarily due to sinfulness or personal fault.

Definition

Although healing and what counts as a healer is historically and culturally determined, there appear to be common aspects of healing (Koss-Chioino & Hefner, 2006). Generally, healing is part of the practice of various health providers and medicine people who engage a recovery process within the sufferer. In the many different cultural traditions of healing, all seem to involve technical expertise. The techniques work as a catalyst for healing and may take on more passive or active forms.

In shamanistic traditions, for example, medicine people engage healing through rituals, ceremonies, techniques, and relationships. This may involve incubation, purification, and symbolic transformation using herbs, songs, trance, dreams, and visions (Eliade, 1951/2004). In modern Western cultures, a strictly biomedical model prevails with more exclusive attention on mechanics and a decreased emphasis on relationship and symbolic meaning.

Keywords

Transformation; regeneration; restoration; empathy; responsibility

Traditional Debates

The term "healer" is generally not used in contemporary medical psychology. For many in clinical psychology circles, the term "healing" or "healer" with their psycho-spiritual connotations implies soft or unscientific thinking. Instead the healthcare practitioner is seen as providing treatments or services. Insofar as healing comes about by way of a relationship with another who has skillful interventions, the degree to which the relationship between healer and sufferer is necessary for healing is subject to debate.

Although healing is directed from healer to sufferer, there may be a synergistic event that heals those who help in the healing. Thus, the healthcare provider becomes both healer and

sufferer; likewise the patient may be both healer and sufferer in an event that is mutually transformative (Jackson, 1999). In this case, the empathy and vulnerability of the healer are understood as vital for the patient's healing. Someone who is empathic, possibly due to a history of personal suffering or because of an acute sensitivity to suffering, can intervene with practical advice, understanding, and sometimes judicious personal disclosure, using his or her own experience as a source of healing.

When technical intervention is viewed as the healing agent, the empathy and vulnerability of the health practitioner can be seen as interfering with authoritative and precise treatment. Alternatively, it is argued that technical intervention is merely a means of forming a therapeutic relationship and it is the relationship that is primarily responsible for a healing change.

A parallel but related debate deals with whether past, present, or future should be the focus of therapy. Within psychoanalytic circles, it is generally believed that recounting traumatic events is a necessary part of psychological healing. The narrating of childhood experience can allow one to see though the symbols generated in one's personal history. These symbols become disenchanted and lose their powerful hold on a person. Many versions of psychoanalysis promote the idea that one needs to remember one's trauma to work through conflict (Zaretsky, 2004).

One critical stance taken toward this assumption is that remembering is not a necessary part of healing. In this case healing focuses on increased rationality and problem solving in the here-and-now to achieve functionality. Other schools of thought focus on the future and the realization or actualization of one's whole self (Corsini & Wedding, 1973/2011).

In any case, whether empathic relationship or technical intervention, focusing on the here-and-now, personal history, or future potential, it is recognized that the proper degree of healing is crucial. Harm can be done by healers when there is incorrect intensity. Furthermore, any form of healing can have harmful effects due to improper management.

Critical Debates

Critical inquiry into whether psychological suffering may be understood as an expression of social political dissent and whether psychological healing means adjusting to the status quo is sometimes discussed under the rubric of "anti-psychiatry."

The term "anti-psychiatry" was first used by South African psychiatrist David Cooper (1931–1986) in the early 1960s with publication of his book entitled, *Psychiatry and Anti-psychiatry* (1967). When he moved from South Africa to London, he met R. D. Laing (1927–1989) and other psychiatrists who were outspoken in their criticisms of psychiatry. Like Thomas Szasz (1920–2012) and Michel Foucault (1926–1984), R. D. Laing is often associated with the anti-psychiatry movement although they all rejected this label except for Cooper (Cooper 1967).

Critics do not deny the value of treating mental distress but challenged the core values of contemporary psychiatry, which consider mental illness primarily as a biological phenomenon of no other intrinsic meaning (see, e.g., Hornstein, 2012). Originally what was meant by "anti-psychiatry" was the concrete practice of allowing psychiatric patients in hospital greater choice around attending meetings, taking periods of leave from hospital, and determining their daily schedule. Cooper and his colleagues set up therapeutic communities in houses around London, hoping the public would learn to tolerate different, nonconforming behavior.

Foucault's analysis (1965) contributed to a growing critical awareness that in the history of psychiatry psychological distress is not accepted on its own terms. "The mad" plays the role of the scapegoat, fortifying the status quo. Healing is questionable when it means functioning well within a dysfunctional society, making healers agents of the status quo. Furthermore, if healing is a techno-rational or physiochemical event, then it is divorced from notions of morality, values, ethical conflict, and choice (Szasz, 1960/1984). Instead, when healing, or lack thereof, is understood as a problem in living, it is not divorced from ethical implications

and social political responsibilities. Critical of twentieth century emphasis on biomedical treatments, there has been a move toward more holistic understandings of health and healing focussed on physical, mental, social, and ecological well-being (Ruether, 1996).

A major area of concern to critics of modern psychiatry is that of overdiagnosis. While some advocates argue that although serious mental illness does exist, currently far too many people are diagnosed as mentally ill when they or their speech or behavior is merely different from what is considered normal. Sometimes this nonconformity results in being detained involuntarily in mental hospitals.

A number of community organizations support one another in these critiques of modern healers. One of the first such organizations fighting for decent treatment, respect, and civil rights for patients was the *Mental Patients' Union* (MPU) set up in 1973; others include as follows: *Asylum*, a magazine for democratic psychiatry that has been in existence since the mid-1980s; *The Hearing Voices Network*, established in the late 1980s; and most recently *The Paranoia Network* established in 2003. *Mind Freedom* is an international organization that unites 100 grass-roots groups and thousands of members to win campaigns for human rights of people diagnosed with psychiatric disabilities.

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Health Psychology

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Introduction

Psychologists have been interested in psychological aspects of health and illness for over a century (e.g., Walter Cannon's 1930s work on stress and Franz Alexander's work on psychosomatics). In the late 1970s health psychology was formally established as a subdiscipline within psychology in North America and Europe.

Despite the early plurality of approaches, it quickly became dominated by the positivist orientation of mainstream psychology and to rely upon a limited range of reductionist theories. In the 1990s a series of publications emerged which began to critique this dominant approach and offer a range of alternative approaches in terms of theories, methods, and practices.

Although drawing upon a range of critical theoretical and methodological ideas, these alternative approaches are united by desire to develop a psychological understanding of health and illness that is socially, culturally, politically, and historically situated and that contributes to the development of a range of participatory and emancipatory approaches to enhancing health and well-being. This perspective connects with related critical approaches to the study of health and illness within other social science and humanities disciplines. It also connects with critical approaches to health and illness from within various cultures.

Definition

Health psychology has been defined as the contribution of psychology to all areas of physical health, but particularly to health promotion and maintenance, illness treatment and prevention, and the role of psychological factors in health and illness and to improving health-care services and policies (Matarazzo, 1980). It draws upon various ideas across psychology but particularly from mainstream social and clinical psychology. From social psychology it has actively taken up social cognition models with an emphasis on identifying various cognitions that might predict (un)healthy practices. From clinical psychology it has drawn on models of stress management and cognitive/behavior modification. Underlying these reductionist approaches is a metaphor of the human being as a machine whose actions can be explained by identifiable laws and who can be modified by appropriate psychological interventions.

Critical approaches within health psychology challenge these assumptions and adopt a range of other theoretical, methodological, and practice standpoints. These are informed by various strands of critical theory and support a range of research methods and forms of intervention. Along with other critical psychologists, critical health psychologists share a common dissatisfaction with the positivist assumptions of mainstream psychology and its obliviousness to broader social and political issues. They share an interest in various critical ideas (e.g., social constructionism, postmodernism, feminism, Marxism) and pertinent qualitative and participatory methods of research (e.g., discourse analysis, action research, ethnography) for their relevance in understanding health and illness. Further, they share an awareness of the social, political, and cultural dimensions of health and illness (e.g., poverty, racism, sexism, political oppression) and promote an active commitment to reducing human suffering and improving quality of life, especially among those most in need within society.

Keywords

Health; Illness; Bio-psycho-social model; Theory of Planned Behavior; Social cognition; Social constructionism; Phenomenology; Qualitative methods; Social action

History

Although interest in psychological aspects of health and illness can be traced back to ancient history, the area of interest was formally established and named in the 1970s. Psychologists had been drawn into the debate about the nature of health care in the 1960s. This was a time of growing popular challenge to the traditional biomedical dominance of health care and a search for alternative approaches (e.g., Engel, 1977). Other social sciences had established an interest in health issues at that time (e.g., medical anthropology, medical sociology, health economics), and psychology's growing interest can be considered part of this *zeitgeist*.

From the outset health psychology adopted a conservative orientation in terms of theory, research methods, and practice. The 1970s were typified by attempts by many western governments to reduce public expenditure, especially in health care. These fiscal moves were accompanied by a victim-blaming ideology, arguing that many health concerns were the result of injudicious behavior choices by individuals. Thus the focus of intervention should be on those individuals who needed to be convinced somehow of their wrongs and "educated" to make suitable behavioral changes. This was effectively a modern version of a moral crusade, aimed at creating a healthier society by convincing people of their wrongdoings and educating them to undertake better health practices. At its commencement, health psychology simply adopted this ideological perspective as unproblematic and readily appropriated the positivist, reductionist, and individualist approaches then dominant in psychology, alongside extant biomedical assumptions about disease, illness, and treatment, to the application of psychology to health. Thus, mainstream health psychology was established effectively as a servant to the dominant biomedical enterprise (Murray, 2013).

In the 1990s there was growing dissatisfaction with the theories and methods of health psychology (Crossley, 2000; Marks, 1996; Murray & Chamberlain, 1999; Yardley, 1997), and a more critical health psychology began to develop (Murray, 2004). Much of this early critique focused on the inadequacy of quantitative approaches to satisfactorily grasp the experience of health and illness. This critique mirrored the turn to language which was apparent across all of the social sciences at that time. The early social constructionist ideas on qualitative methods and discourse analysis were augmented with ideas from critical social and cultural psychology (Herzlich, 1978) and from critical social theory (e.g., Foucault, 1976). In particular, health and illness were viewed not as the property of socially separated individuals but as phenomena which develop in particular social relationships which are culturally and politically immersed (Radley, 1994). Further, critical health psychology was concerned not with developing new methods of surveillance and control but rather with enhancing the means for human emancipation.

Since that time, we have seen the rise of more critical health psychology research, evidenced in critical presentations at mainstream health psychology conferences and in research publications, largely based on qualitative methodologies, appearing in core health psychology journals. In the late 1990s, the first conference devoted to developing a critical health psychology perspective was held, and subsequently the *International Society of Critical Health Psychology* (*ISCHP*) was formed. This organization currently has over 600 members internationally and holds a biennial conference. It deliberately attracts critical scholars from outside the English-speaking world (e.g., Santiago Delefosse, 2002), from other disciplines (Tuhwai Smith, 2012) and various health activists.

Traditional Debates

Models: Mainstream health psychology enthusiastically adopted the biopsychosocial model of illness, originally suggested by Engel (1977), as a foundation for its work. The widespread use of this schematic model essentially masked the fact that health psychology has never effectively managed to theorize connections between the biological and the psychological or the psychological and the social (Spicer & Chamberlain, 1996). The model has been roundly criticized for its limited theoretical assumptions which do little to increase our understanding of the experience of illness or to threaten traditional biomedical dominance in health care (Stam, 2000; Santiago-Delefosse, 2011).

Another consistent focus of health psychology has been on the adoption and refinement of a range of questionably useful social cognitive "models" of health and illness. These bolstered a major agenda for health psychology on modelling and predicting behavior change. There has been a sustained interest in trying to identify the psychological causes of supposed unhealthy practices and the subsequent

development of interventions aimed at those psychological factors. Models, such as the Theory of Reasoned Action/Planned Behavior, were used to specify a limited number of psychological variables, certain beliefs, and perceived social norms, which were considered to predict or cause specific intentions, which in turn were held to cause particular behaviors. Much early research in health psychology was concerned with devising measurements to assess these variables and the extent to which they were associated with unhealthy behavior. Interventions were subsequently developed which targeted these psychological variables with the aim of reducing these unhealthy behaviors. When research failed to substantially validate these models, attention was turned to theory (actually model) development by expanding the range of variables incorporated in attempts to extend the fit of the models. Their use has brought substantial critiques, about the reliance on self-report measures and their ability to successfully assess the complexity of health behaviors (e.g., Mielewczyk & Willig, 2007).

Methods: Traditionally health psychology has used a range of quantitative methods, largely self-report questionnaires, and relied very substantially on statistical analyses to validate its findings. This has led mainstream health psychology to be dominated by methodological and statistical empiricism and to be weakly involved with theorizing. Theories are largely adopted as a product rather than being seen as a process, and the connection between theory and method, and the way that these determine knowledge, receives very little attention in mainstream health psychology. Further debate centers on how knowledge is a function of the methods used to determine it and how a focus on the "received view" of science, with its emphasis on standardized measurement and statistical analysis, constrains what can be asked, investigated, and known (see Danziger, 1990). Associated with this is the constructionist debate that knowledge is always provisional and historically, socially, and culturally located, making the empirical quest for generalizable laws inappropriate at best and worthless at worst.

Critical Debates

Epistemology: Perhaps the most fundamental debate is around epistemology and the nature of how we can research and understand human behavior and experience. Challenges to the mainstream positivist approach as an appropriate basis for critical health psychology have been strong and sustained, but there have also been debates about the utility and form of social constructionism as an epistemological framework for psychology. These debates underlie other critical debates in the field. The location of critical health psychology on the margins of the discipline provides it with the opportunity of learning from the theories and methods of neighboring disciplines.

Experience of Health and Illness: Mainstream investigation of illness experience has largely been confined to the mapping and measurement of various "illness cognitions". After initial research posited a set of illness representation dimensions, these were reified through the development of standardized questionnaires which have been widely used. Such an approach failed to capture the lived experience of illness and how it is socially and culturally shaped. Within critical circles, concern with understanding health and illness experience was reflected in the marked growth of interest in qualitative methods in the 1990s (e.g., Chamberlain, Stephens, & Lyons, 1997; Murray & Chamberlain, 1999; Yardley, 1997). While discursive approaches were preeminent, there has been a growing interest in various phenomenological approaches. There remains the need to shift the focus from innovation in methods to greater theorization of health and illness experience and practice (Chamberlain, 2000).

Health Behaviors and Cognitions: Much of mainstream health psychology has concentrated on identifying the cognitions associated with individualized behaviors, especially negative health behaviors (e.g., smoking, drinking, exercise, diet). Critical health psychologists consider these cognitive approaches to be mechanistic and asocial, and also critique the reification of these health behaviors. Instead, critical health

psychologists seek to explore the meanings and complexities of health-related practices and how these are socially and culturally located (e.g., Marks, 1996).

Context: Health and illness are often abstracted from their everyday social and cultural context in the empiricist quest for uniform predictive relationships. In contrast, critical health psychology emphasizes the importance of context and the variability of behavior in context. A sociocultural approach to illness is still relatively underdeveloped, as is an understanding of the role of power in everyday relationships and representations. Critical health psychologists have also become interested in wider social agendas for health, examining the role of groups, communities, institutions, and the media in shaping representations and practices of health and illness.

Methods: The dominant research approach within health psychology has been the positivist use of standardized questionnaires to measure a range of "psychosocial variables", with research generally designed to explore the relationships between these variables, often using elaborated statistical modelling to examine covariation. The early focus of critical health psychology was around developing alternative, qualitative approaches favoring interviews and focus groups as key methods of data collection. This remains the dominant approach and, although we see the emergence of new methods including visual and ethnographic techniques, there is an urgent need to explore new methods of research. Some critical health psychologists, especially those with a community health psychology orientation, have utilized the potential of participatory action research as a research framework.

Practices: A focus for mainstream health psychology practice has been on the development of individualistic and rationalistic education-type packages, designed by the expert to change individual behaviors. Critical health psychologists work under a very different model of praxis, considering knowledge as provisional and located within social and cultural contexts. They work with individuals, communities, and within broader social movements to promote human flourishing and to challenge unhealthy conditions, while remaining sensitive to issues of power, advantage, and benefit.

International Relevance

Health psychology developed within and is still dominated by the Anglo-Saxon world. Professional societies, journals, and training programs are firmly established in North America and in the UK. The expansion of health psychology into Europe and other regions has largely been modelled on the dominant approaches of the Anglo-Saxon world. The growing political influence of the Global South as well as the impact of globalization and the mass movement of peoples throughout the world have highlighted the cultural limitations of this dominant approach. In addition, major new social and environmental challenges are emerging throughout the world ranging from economic and financial crises to wars and major environmental issues. Critical health psychology has been to the fore in critiquing the limitations of classical individualistic models of health which are popular in the Western world. It continues to deconstruct these models and develop alternative approaches to understanding health and illness which connect with social and cultural changes. It is also aware of how social and political forces shape inequalities in health throughout the world and the need to work with others to expose these inequalities and to develop new social arrangements that can combat such inequalities. Critical health psychologists have begun to explore their potential contribution to promoting health in a variety of settings internationally (e.g., Lubek, Wong, McCourt, Chew, Dy, & Kros, 2002).

Practice Relevance

The application of health psychology in various settings brings to the fore not only practical issues but also ethical and moral issues. The use of psychology historically as a tool of control by the powerful is well documented, and critical

health psychologists are keen to develop a range of collaborations in the development of practice. In particular, they are keen to ensure that they work to advance peoples' well-being rather than colonizing them with psychological "expertise." Critical health psychology, on the one hand, draws attention to the experience of suffering and the forces that contribute to suffering. On the other hand, it works collaboratively with individuals, groups, and communities to challenge forces of oppression whether they be located in personal relationships or in wider society.

At the clinical level, critical approaches have contributed to enhancing our understanding of the illness experience and in developing innovative clinical interventions, for example, through the use of arts-based methods (e.g., Gray & Sinding, 2002). At the community level there has been considerable research exploring the character and value of community health action (e.g., Campbell & Murray, 2004; Stephens, 2008) and in developing participatory approaches which can challenge both local and wider social forces which contribute to ill health. At the societal level critical approaches remain underdeveloped, but they function to draw attention to health inequalities and also to link people into broader social movements to combat various forms of oppression and marginalization.

Future Directions

There is increasing interest in critical approaches within health psychology. This is apparent in the growing number of critical textbooks (e.g., Lyons & Chamberlain, 2013; Marks, Murray, Evans, & Estacio, 2011), journal articles, and conference presentations. As is often the case, many ideas raised initially by critical psychologists have been accepted into the mainstream. We see this particularly with the growing use of qualitative methods, although much of this research is descriptive or remains deductive, testing ideas from classic social cognition models. The need for ongoing critical reflection and critique of theories, methods, and practices continues.

Theoretical approaches used in critical research within health psychology have been adopted largely from critical social psychology. Recently, interest in psychoanalytic theory has arisen within critical psychology, but as yet these ideas have not been widely employed within critical health psychology. The dominant methodological approach within critical health psychology has been the use of interviews and focus groups, but there is a need to expand into other methods which have been developed in neighboring disciplines. Although critical health psychology has promoted the use of participatory methods in both research and practice, attention needs to be given to developing and extending the scope and reach of such transformatory methods.

The establishment of the *International Society of Critical Health Psychology* was a major initiative in linking critical thinkers and practitioners in health psychology worldwide. The growing number attending its conferences is one marker of its success but also of the need to develop further training opportunities for emerging critical scholars. The society promotes research and scholarship in critical approaches to health psychology and provides opportunities for debate and discussion in this field. It offers a forum for scrutinizing, challenging, and questioning what is said and done in the purported pursuit of promoting and improving "health" by health psychologists and others. It operates as a community of scholars (in the widest definition of that term and absolutely not restricted to people with formal affiliations to a university or other academic body), offering each other mutual support in the pursuit of critical approaches to health. In particular, it aims to nurture and help career-young and emerging scholars in the field, and engage with and learn from communities and groups conventionally excluded or underrepresented.

We should not lose sight of the need for critical health psychology to be continually critical of its own theories, methods, and practices and the extent to which these shape our field of interest. Such reflexivity should not be confined to researchers but involve others since the experience of health and illness is common to all of us. Finally, we need to be aware of the

broader social and political forces that shape the health agenda internationally and the need to form alliances to promote greater health and well-being.

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Online Resources

International Society of Critical Health Psychology: http://www.ischp.net/

Hermeneutics

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Introduction

Hermeneutics deals with the understanding and interpretation of the meaning of human verbal and nonverbal activities and products. The domain of hermeneutics encompasses everyday lay experiences, art, literature, religion, jurisprudence, the sciences, especially social and human sciences, and philosophy. Hermeneutics refers to processes of understanding and interpretation,

which are constitutive of the human way of existence. For human beings, from their birth, it is indispensable to be able to communicate with other members of the group through which a cultural transmission of acquired knowledge, norms, and values occurs. Thanks to the symbolic function, i.e., capabilities to produce, use, and understand signs, all human activities and their objectified products are potential subject matters of interpretation – baby grunts, Hamlet's monologue, Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, gestures and actions, Mozart's music, Picasso's paintings, Moore's sculptures, religious texts, laws, scientific texts, political doctrines, social orders, and even existential situations of human beings. Nevertheless, written texts have been the dominant objects of hermeneutics so far.

Everything that requires a reference to meaning and sense as a way to be described as a phenomenon needs hermeneutics as a tool for its understanding and interpretation.

Definition

Hermeneutics studies art, the theory and practice of understanding, and the interpretation of meaningful objects. "The process by which we come to know an inner picture (*ein Inneres*) through signs which are given from outside through the senses we call understanding (*Verstehen*) . . . *Such skilled understanding of permanently fixed expressions of life is called exegesis or interpretation* . . . in language alone the inner life of man finds its complete, exhaustive and objectively intelligible expression. Hence the art of understanding focuses on exegesis *or interpretation of those remnants of human existence which are contained in written works*" (Dilthey, 1900/ 1974, 1900/1978, pp. 105–106). Hermeneutics is then a second order understanding and interpretation of the processes of understanding. Hermeneutics is committed to a truth model which necessarily includes self-understanding and is therefore different from truth in objectifying natural sciences.

Hermeneutics expands its interest from theory toward practice. Practical interest is implicated in every process of understanding as the goal is to reach some kind of shared understanding. Shared understandings are presuppositions for building and maintaining communal life, which is the context of primary understanding and interpretation processes. The history of hermeneutics shows, however, that its practical context has been often ignored.

With a reference to art in the definition of hermeneutics, it is stressed that processes of understanding and interpretation cannot be reduced to discursive activities only – they also require tact, sensitivity, and skills which transcend the realm of formal procedures.

These aspects of hermeneutics are especially stressed by Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002), the most important proponent of the modern philosophical hermeneutics: "Hermeneutics is the practical art, that is a *technē*, involved in such things as preaching, interpreting other languages, explaining and explicating texts, and as the basis of all of these, the art of understanding, an art particularly required any time the meaning of something is not clear and unambiguous" (Gadamer, 2006, p. 29).

Keywords

Understanding; interpretation; hermeneutic circle; fusion of horizons; charity principle; rehabilitation of prejudice; tradition

History

Etymologically, the term hermeneutics has ancient Greek roots. The Greek word *hermeneuo* has different but still interrelated meanings: express, explain, and translate. The nominal form *hermēneús* and *hermeneutes* signified those involved in activities of announcing, explaining, interpreting, and translating. In this context Hermes, the Greek deity, who mediated between humans and Gods, is a good representative of hermeneutic activities. Therefore, there is no wonder that hermeneutics was seen as related in its roots to Hermes, until some doubts were

expressed in the late twentieth century about the direct link between the term hermeneutics and the figure of Hermes. As depicted by Homer, Hermes was the messenger who brought the messages of the gods to human beings. With his other services and capacities – god of language, speech, metaphors and prudence, fraud, wit and ambiguity, inventor of fire, the lyre, the alphabet, and numbers – Hermes is indeed symbolically related to a broad range of hermeneutic problems such as creativity of translation, tailoring of interpretation according to recipients, and practical normative implications of interpretation.

In addition to Greek mythology, etymological links of hermeneutics can be found in ancient Greek philosophy. In his dialogue *Ion* Plato (427–347 B.C.) ascribed hermeneutic activities *hermeneuein* to rhapsodists, who interpreted the poetry of poets, who, for their side, attempted to interpret the thoughts of gods. They were expected to understand not just the words, but the proper sense of the words. In his late dialogue *Epinomis*, Plato specified hermeneutic art – *technē hermeneutiké* as a means of explaining the will of the god, whereby practical consequences of requiring obedience are as important as the pure announcement of the will of the god. These double cognitive-practical aspects are seen as constitutive for hermeneutics in the modern philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer.

Aristotle (384–322 B.C.) devoted the second volume of his writing on logic *Organon* to interpretation. *Peri hermêneias* [Περὶ ἑρμηνείας] (367–344 B.C.) was rendered later in Latin by Boethius (480–525) as *De interpretatione* and printed in Latin translation for the first time in Renaissance Italy, between circa 1473 and 1478. Aristotle started his work on interpretation by defining spoken words as signs of the representations of the soul and written words as signs of the representations of the spoken words. While the signs differ among individuals, the mental representations are the same, argued Aristotle. To Aristotle it was clear that words derive their meanings from agreement among language users, not from nature.

These insights remained the core assumptions of hermeneutics, posing at the same time

challenges to the very process of interpretation. Thus, the necessity of raising methodological awareness of hermeneutics was on the agenda from the very beginning.

Further contributions to the hermeneutic agenda were made by Stoics with their myth interpretations and especially by Philo of Alexandria (20 B.C–40 A.D) with his allegoric interpretation of the Hebrew myths and the Old Testament. In this way Philo started a new tradition of interpreting religious texts, which has become one of the most fruitful sources for development of hermeneutics. Beyond the religious context, the question addressed by Philo on the relation between the literal and deeper, hidden meaning is of central importance for hermeneutics in general. Origenes (185–232), who is held in high regard in Ecclesiastic history, offered a different kind of interpretation to the Holy Scripture and distinguished between three levels of meaning corresponding to the body, soul, and spirit of the Scripture, whereby the understanding of the spirit (not just the word) is the highest interpretive goal.

During medieval times, interpretation of the Bible dominated hermeneutic interest, but at the same time some general hermeneutic issues were discussed within the religious framework. Saint Augustine's (354–430) argument by analogy was put forward to oppose solipsism, i.e., to justify the belief that other bodies which behave in similar way as my body have a similar mental life to mine. This has experienced a hermeneutic reinterpretation by modern thinkers such as Schleiermacher (1768–1834) and Dilthey (1833–1911). Gadamer praised Saint Augustine for addressing the universality claim of hermeneutics, the crucial point in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. It refers to an indispensable language mediation of thoughts, to the universal signifying capacity of language.

With the Renaissance and its enthusiastic interest in ancient languages and texts, the old hermeneutic realm of text exegesis whose first examples were interpretations of Homer's poems received a new impetus. Critical-philological procedures of text analysis were developed into an influential hermeneutic

tradition called *ars critica*. Critical analyses of texts have been later expanded into a broader critical approach of hermeneutics (in its relation to ideology critique and critical theory in general).

Additionally, a revival of interests in ancient legal tradition (Roman law) opened jurisprudence for the hermeneutic approach – *hermeneutica juris*. Interpretations of the word and spirit of the law and subsumption of individual cases under legal norms are constitutive parts of practice of jurisprudence.

Within religious hermeneutics an important shift was brought about by Martin Luther's (1483–1546) Reformation. In opposition to the monopoly of Bible interpretation held by the Catholic Church, Luther advanced the claim *scriptura sacra sui ipsius interpres* or abbreviated as the *sola scriptura* principle, meaning that scripture clarifies itself in the relation of a faithful reader to it (and consequently no institutionalized interpretation by the Catholic Church is needed). The hermeneutic principle *sola scriptura* could serve as a tool in the protestant battle against the authority of Catholic Church, demonstrating that the proper domain of hermeneutics is actually a domain of practical philosophy. As part of it, rhetoric, again with ancient roots in Aristotle's philosophy, has also become a fruitful hermeneutic field. Philipp Melanchton (1497–1560), Luther's student and collaborator, served as an intellectual leader of the Reformation by strengthening the *sola scriptura* principle. As exegete Melanchton insisted on authority of Scripture, on its literal sense, and a unity of sense derived from the main thesis (*caput*) of a text. He was concerned with the clarity and certainty of the words and generally with the method and the effects of God's word upon hearers. Though formulated in a religious context, these exegetical insights are hermeneutically relevant beyond the *hermeneutica sacra*, i.e., hermeneutics of holy scriptures. Melanchton also published methodological works on interpretation of text, for example, *Institutiones rhetoricae* (1521), demonstrating the shared modern concern with method as a necessary tool in attaining clarity and certainty of knowledge.

Another Lutheran Matthias Flacius (1520–1575) was the author of the first handbook on interpretation of the Holy Scripture *Clavis scripturae sacrae* (1567) with explicit rules for a proper Bible interpretation. These rules included in addition to language command also exegetic directions: a proper attitude (later formulated as a charity principle of interpretation, which means to assume that most of what a person says is intelligible and true), identification of the *scopus* (the main purpose of the text), analysis of effects of the different types of texts on readers, and mutual constitutive relation between the whole and the parts in interpretation, later known as the hermeneutic circle. In the history of hermeneutics, Flacius is the representative of a tradition which understood hermeneutics as a technique following defined rules in the interpretation of texts.

Though the Bible interpretations dominated the hermeneutic field for centuries, it is important to bear in mind some other trajectories in the development of hermeneutics, i.e., those dealing with more general problems of understanding language. In its Latin form *hermeneutica* was coined by Johann Konrad Dannhauer (1603–1666) and expanded to a philosophical discipline called *hermeneutica generalis*. In 1630 he published *Idea boni interpretis*, where he argued for interpretation as a necessary logical tool in revealing the true sense of authors' intentions expressed in dark, unclear text passages. Dannhauer adopted the ancient and medieval tradition of using techniques in interpretation, but he understood them as parts of his general hermeneutic project.

Dannhauer's project of general hermeneutics relied on an already accomplished epochal turn in understanding the world as a book – Paracelsus (1493–1541) already saw nature as a collection of books written by God; Galileo (1564–1642), who is acknowledged as one of the fathers of modern science, spoke of "the book of nature." Gutenberg's construction of the printing machine has also played its role in the turn toward text as a tool in understanding the world. Another contribution to development of the hermeneutic approach was made by Giambattista Vico

(1668–1744) who advanced a new model of science of man-made historical world, expressed in his famous dictum verum *ipsum factum* (the true is the made). In his *Tractatus theologico-politicus* (1670), Spinoza (1632–1677) anticipated future interpretive principles such as the inclusion of historical context and the mutual dependency of the whole and the parts.

A German scholar Martin Chladenius in his book *Einleitung zur richtigen Auslegung vernünftiger Reden und Schriften* (1742) [Introduction to the Right Interpretation of Reasonable Speeches and Writings] developed a theory of *Sehe-Punkt* (point of view) which addressed a hermeneutically important topic of perspectivity of understanding and interpretation.

The Enlightenment brought about a conception of understanding as a rationally guided activity founded on the understanding of signs and oriented toward universal application, under a necessary optimistic assumption of trusting the author. A good representative was Georg Friedrich Meier (1718–1777), whose starting point was interlinguistic relations among signs, not their reference to extralinguistic element of the intention of the author. In *Versuch einer allgemeinen Auslegungskunst*, (1757) [An attempt of a general art of interpretation], he adopted hermeneutic assumptions which were later elaborated under the name of the universality claim of hermeneutics and charity principle of interpretation.

Following the romantic turn at the beginning of nineteenth century, hermeneutics experienced a change away from rationalism and universalism toward individuality and historicism. There were also historically important changes in the focus of subject matter as the understanding of historical mind (*Geist*) objectivations has become the privileged subject matter of hermeneutics. Among the romantic hermeneutic authors as the most important in the history of hermeneutics has been regarded Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher (1768–1834). Though hermeneutics belonged to his teaching topic over many years, just two lectures on hermeneutics were published during his life. A student of his (Lücke) collected his manuscripts and notes and published them in 1838 under the title *Hermeneutik und Kritik*

mit besonderer Beziehung auf das Neue Testament [Hermeneutics and Critique, with a Special Relation to the New Testament]. Schleiermacher's point of departure was spoken language – understanding speech occurs as a process opposite to that through which thought became expressed in words of the speech. With his stress on communication and psychological understanding, instead of technical rules, Schleiermacher contributed substantially to the modern development of hermeneutics. Psychological understanding, empathy as a hermeneutic tool, was especially appreciated in Dilthey's reception of Schleiermacher, to whom Dilthey devoted a two volume biography. Schleiermacher was aware that the understanding of the general is needed in order to be able to understand the individual. A speech has to be understood, on the one hand, as derived from language and, on the other hand, within the context of the thought processes of the speaking subject. Correspondingly, there are two modes of understanding, grammatical and psychological, and both are subject matters of hermeneutics. By reconstructing from the expression back to the composing activity of the author and by explication of the assumed, it is possible for hermeneutics to understand the author better than he/she understood himself/herself. In this way Schleiermacher defined the highest quality of the hermeneutic epistemic reconstruction. Schleiermacher also reconceptualized the hermeneutic circle formulated by a student of Schelling and Professor of Classical Philology Friedrich Ast (1778–1841). Instead of circle Schleiermacher spoke of spiral, but in the further history of hermeneutics, the hermeneutic circle prevailed. Ast defined the hermeneutic circle as follows: "Das Grundgesetz alles Verstehens und Erkennens ist, aus dem Einzelnen den Geist des Ganzen zu finden und durch das Ganze das Einzelne zu begreifen" (The main principle of all understanding and cognition is to find the spirit of the whole in the individual and to understand the individual through the whole). Additionally, in his *Grundlinien der Grammatik, Hermeneutik und Kritik* (1808) [Outlines of Grammar, Hermeneutics and Critique], Ast expanded the scope of

hermeneutics to the historical world as a necessary reference point for every single act of understanding.

In Dilthey's (1833–1911) philosophical project of laying down foundations for *Geisteswissenschaften* through a critique of historical reason (*Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*, 1883 [Introduction to the Human Sciences]; *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften*, 1910/1927 [The Construction of the Historical World in the Human Sciences], which was about a century after Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), hermeneutics was ascribed a role as a specific method of *Geisteswissenschaften* (which was a translation of "moral sciences" as described by J. S. Mill (1806–1873) and included what is called social and human sciences nowadays). Dilthey insisted on a sharp division between natural and human sciences, as they differ in their subject matter and modes of cognition. This was formulated in his famous statement "We explain nature and we understand psychic life." The urgent task was for Dilthey to offer foundations for *Geistewissenschaften*, as Kant had for the natural sciences. For that Dilthey turned to psychology. The conceptual triad of *Erlebnis* (lived experience), *Ausdruck* (expression), and *Verstehen* (understanding) covers the realm of descriptive psychology as a *geisteswissenschaftliche* version of psychology. As the subject matter of descriptive psychology is the lived experience, which contains the experience of the beautiful, religious experience, etc., it is descriptive psychology which could lay down the foundations for all other *Geisteswissenschaften* (science of religion, art, literature). With Dilthey hermeneutics has advanced to a reflected methodological status, which was an important shift comparing to its previous rather auxiliary function as a technique serving philology or history.

Nevertheless, the understanding of hermeneutics as a specific method of social and human sciences was subjected to a sharp critique within an ontological turn in hermeneutics, triggered by Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) in his hermeneutic of facticity and elaborated further by Hans-Georg Gadamer who has been acknowledged as the most important hermeneutic philosopher.

The ontological turn meant an understanding of hermeneutics as a way in which human beings exist. Hermeneutics cannot be reduced to a method of acquiring scientific knowledge – it precedes and transcends the realm of science and cognition. The existence of human beings presupposes endless processes of understanding and interpretation of signs, utterances, texts, actions, artworks, etc. Hermeneutics as practice of understanding and interpretation is indispensable for maintaining and reproducing human life. For Gadamer, being that can be understood is language. Language not only mediates our understanding of the world and our self-understanding, but it makes these possible at all. We are formed by language, and language is objectified in traditions which build history. The ontological turn has decisive implications for human sciences, for understanding the specificity of their knowledge which cannot be modeled according to objectifying knowledge of natural sciences. Objects and subjects of human sciences mutually constitute each other. We are constituted by texts of tradition which we try to understand, and it is thanks to them that we can understand them all, in a fusion of horizon of its emergence and our horizon of its application. The truth of human sciences is not an objective truth; on the contrary, it is a truth of self-understanding. Such an understanding of hermeneutics as a fundamental mode of being has consequences for philosophy also as hermeneutics has become philosophical or philosophy has become hermeneutical, argues Gadamer.

In view of another great hermeneutically minded philosopher of the twentieth century Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005), whose starting point was tensions of human existence between material, bodily world, and world of free action, it is not philosophy, but rather poetic narrative which could provide understanding of the hermeneutic of self in the world. It is the narrative which can capture the temporality of self, claims Ricoeur.

Traditional Debates

As it is clear from its history, hermeneutics has developed through continuous controversies

regarding its status, procedures, and implications. There are three radical shifts in the history of hermeneutics: hermeneutics understood as a technique of text exegesis; hermeneutics developed as a specific method of human and social sciences, including the psychological method of empathy; and hermeneutics expanded to a mode of human existence. Contemporary controversies are between epistemological and ontological orientation of hermeneutics. The last ontological turn has not resolved the controversies, but rather exacerbated them.

Just few years after the publication of Gadamer's seminal work *Truth and Method* (1960), critical objections were published. Emilio Betti (1890–1968), who defended a methodological approach to hermeneutics in his voluminous *General Theory of Interpretation* (1955), responded in 1962 with *Hermeneutics as a General Method of Human Sciences*. His objections were directed against the Gadamerian ontological turn and specifically against the application of the interpretation to the present situation. Betti saw the task of hermeneutics as a way to recreate original intentions – *mens auctoris*, and this was possible through a Schleiermacherian re-creation of the original process of creation.

Critical Debates

There is an influential German philosophical tradition in which a relation between hermeneutics and the critique of ideology or more generally critical theory is discussed.

In this framework a critique of Gadamer was elaborated by Jürgen Habermas (b. 1929), who came from the tradition of the Frankfurt School of critical theory. The importance of this critique lies in the fact that Habermas shared Gadamer's antiobjectivist understanding of the human sciences, as demonstrated in his *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften* (1976) [On the Logic of the Social Sciences] and at the same time criticized the shortcomings of Gadamer's position. Habermas argued that Gadamer closed the possibilities of critically transcending existing pre-understandings. Gadamer's acknowledgment of authority of

tradition and its ways of understanding, pre-understanding (*Vorverständnis*), including prejudices (*Vorurteil*) as a condition of possibility of new understanding has been understood as conservative traditionalism. Therefore, Habermas argued for the critique of ideology as a necessary critical tool. Gadamer replied that he was missing in the critique exactly the ideology critique.

Both Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel (b.1922) expressed worries about relativistic implications of hermeneutics and argued for the necessity to define a kind of transcendental pragmatic conditions of validity of hermeneutic interpretations.

Gadamer's critical stance toward the scientific method as a warrant of truth and the disjunction of method and truth, which is the proper sense of the title of his book *Wahrheit und Methode* [*Truth and Method*] (1960), is still challenging. "Insofar as hermeneutics overcomes the positivistic naiveté resident in the concept of 'the given' by reflecting on the necessary conditions for understanding (pre-understanding, temporal priority of the question, the history of the motivation contained in every assertion) it represents a critique of the positivistic method-based mentality" (Gadamer, 2006, p. 46).

At the level of methodological understanding of hermeneutics, the old controversy on the unity of science or distinction between natural and human sciences still divides authors. But "method-based mentality" is not limited to scientific methodology; it is an expression of a more general instrumental attitude in relation to the natural, social, and subjective worlds. This is exactly the subject matter of critique in critical theory.

There is a version of critical hermeneutics founded on psychoanalytic theory called *Tiefenhermeneutik* (Depth hermeneutics), elaborated by German psychoanalyst Alfred Lorenzer (1922–2002). It is understood as a critical tool in encoding social constraints which produce subjective suffering.

International Relevance

Hermeneutics has been developed in the framework of continental philosophy, especially

German philosophy. In the twentieth century French poststructuralism best represented by Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) and American pragmatism represented by Richard Rorty (1931–2007) established a fruitful dialogue with Gadamer's hermeneutics. Other contemporary philosophers who defend hermeneutical positions include Charles Taylor (b. 1931) and Gianni Vattimo (b. 1936).

Practice Relevance

Practical relevance of hermeneutics derives from the fact that understanding and interpretation are constitutive elements of all human activity. It is only through mutual understanding and building of shared meanings that communality of life is possible.

In contemporary multicultural societies the problems in communication and understanding are becoming of the highest practical importance. The ethical stance of hermeneutics oriented toward openness toward others and acknowledgment of the fruitfulness of the perspective of another person can contribute to the development of a dialogical culture.

Future Directions

Changes in modern societies, for example, a shift from the primacy of production to the third sector of services, new technologies of communication which substantially contributed to globalization, theoretical insights into communicative foundations of subjectivity, social roots of meaning, to mention just few features of our contemporary sociocultural situation, require the further development of hermeneutic approach. This is necessary for the sake of human existence itself, as convincingly formulated by Günther Anders in his study *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen* [*The Obsolesce of Man*]: "It is not enough to change the world, we do this anyway, and it mostly happens without our efforts, regardless. What we have to do is interpret these changes so we in turn can change the changes, so that the world doesn't go on changing without us – and not ultimately become a world without us" (Anders, 2002, p. 5).

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Heteronormativity

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Introduction

Heteronormativity is the idea that heterosexual attraction and relationships are the normal form of sexuality. It is rooted in a linked essential, dichotomous understanding of sexuality (a person is either heterosexual or homosexual) and gender (a person is either a man or a woman) and the perception that these things are fixed and unchanging.

Mainstream psychology has a long history of heterosexism and homophobia (homosexuality was included as a "mental disorder" in the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual until 1974) and remains largely heteronormative. Conventional psychological textbooks overwhelmingly present relationships and attraction as heterosexual and consider lesbian, gay, and bisexual sexualities mainly in the context of (mostly biological) explanations of human sexuality (Barker, 2007).

In its attendance to the operations of power and its location of subjectivities within their societal context (rather than understanding human behaviour at an individual level), critical psychology has been well placed to expose the heteronormativity of more mainstream psychological approaches and to study the operations of heteronormativity itself.

Definition

The term heteronormativity was coined in 1991 by Michael Warner in one of the key collections on queer theory. It built on previous concepts such as Adrienne Rich's "compulsory heterosexuality" and Gayle Rubin's "sex hierarchy," Rich viewed heterosexuality as an institution which was imposed upon women, making them dependent on men. Rubin saw sex as operating on a hierarchy of acceptability, with the heterosexual married couple in a "charmed circle" of good, normal, natural sexuality, and other relationship forms and sexual practices relegated to the "outer limits." An important point here is that what is considered normal (heterosexuality) is also considered natural and morally preferable as well.

Heteronormativity is also influenced by the work of Michel Foucault in its understanding of the way in which power operates in the construction of sex and sexual categories. Attention has been paid to the marginalization, stigmatization, and silencing of sexualities and genders which fall outside of heteronormativity, such as lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, and queer (LGBTQ), either by not occupying the privileged position (heterosexuality), by not remaining fixed, or by falling somewhere outside dichotomies of sex and/or gender.

Judith Butler has been another key figure. She proposed the societal operation of a heterosexual matrix whereby people are perceived as having a fixed body onto which society reads a fixed gender and infers a certain sexual "orientation"

(towards "same"/"opposite" sex). She challenged each of these links and the fixity/dichotomies inherent in them, drawing attention to the performative nature of gender and sexuality (Butler, 1990).

The deconstruction of heteronormativity, and the identity categories upon which it rests, has been a major project of queer theory, which has drawn upon the work of many of these authors.

Heteronormativity can be distinguished from heterosexism, which is discrimination against anyone who is not heterosexual. Heteronormativity may be both more insidious and more pervasive and therefore closer to the concept of "mundane heterosexism" which is the heterosexism which is embedded in everyday language and practice to the extent that it goes unseen (Clarke, Ellis, Peel, & Riggs, 2010) and heterosexual privilege which is the – often unnoticed – privilege which go along with being heterosexual (see various heterosexual privilege checklists available online). For example, heteronormativity is often used to refer to the omnipresence of heterosexual images and representations and the assumption made that people will desire the "other gender" (e.g., in advertising, women's and men's magazines, movies) which confer the heterosexual privilege of not having to explain or justify one's sexuality.

There are a number of related concepts which may be considered inherent in heteronormativity but which have been proposed as terms in their own right in order to highlight the various privileges and exclusions which operate within heteronormativity.

The concept of bisexual invisibility/erasure draws attention to the fact that heteronormativity excludes bisexual people entirely (due to the dichotomous sexuality system involved). Cisgenderism refers to individual, social, and institutional attitudes, policies, and practices which assume that people who have not remained in the gender that they were assigned as birth are inferior, "unnatural" or disordered, and require explanation (Ansara and Hegarty, forthcoming 2012). Mononormativity refers to an assumption that (sexual/romantic) relationships will be monogamous and between two people (some have argued for an expanded word heteromononormativity to capture the way in which these

assumptions are intertwined). The sexual imperative, or compulsory sexuality, refers to assumption that people, and intimate relationships, are normally, naturally, and rightly sexual, and the related pathologization of asexual people (Carrigan, 2011).

The critique of heteronormativity has considered families and social structures as well as individuals and relationships, particularly attention has been paid to the heteronormative structures of marriage, the nuclear family, and the imperative to procreation. Attention has also been given to intersections of power and privilege, and there are close relationships between queer theory, critical race theory, and crip theory, in consideration of the bodies which are afforded heteronormative privilege, for example.

Finally, the concept of homonormativity has been used by writers such as Lisa Duggan and Susan Stryker to refer to the assimilation of heteronormative ideals into LGBT culture, for example, in acceptance of dichotomous gender roles or the fight for the right for "same-sex" marriage. Homonormativity has been criticized for simply drawing the "acceptability" line on the sex hierarchy in a different place (excluding those who do not fit) and for neoliberalism in failing to challenge the racism, mononormativity, cisgenderism, etc., which is bound up in heteronormativity.

Keywords

Bisexual erasure; bisexual invisibility; compulsory heterosexuality; compulsory sexuality; heteromononormativity; heteronormativity; LGBT; mononormativity; performativity; queer theory; the sexual imperative

Traditional Debates

Heteronormativity is not something that has been considered by mainstream psychology, which has generally restricted its understanding of prejudice and discrimination to the individual concepts of homophobia and heterosexism, rather than to more societal and cultural understandings.

Heteronormativity is also inherent within mainstream psychology. For example, Peter Hegarty and colleagues have drawn attention to the way in which graphs and tables in psychological journals present gender and sexuality as dichotomous and present data from male or heterosexual participants prior to that from female or lesbian/gay participants. Meg Barker's (2007) analysis of psychology textbooks revealed that "normal" intimate relationships and sexual functioning were almost exclusively depicted (in text and images) as heterosexual and that lesbian and gay sexualities were generally considered separately, often as something requiring explanation. Bisexuality was often erased due to an overwhelmingly dichotomous model of human sexuality.

Critical Debates

Critical psychology, however, has paid close attention to the operation of heteronormativity in both mainstream psychology and wider society, examining the ways in which heterosexuality is privileged and constructed as normal, and the various exclusions resulting from this and how these are negotiated by those involved. Examples of such research include Lyndsey Moon's examination of the emotion terms used by counselors to refer to their clients (which implicitly construct nonheterosexual clients in more problematic ways), Celia Kitzinger and colleagues' research on the daily emotional work required by lesbians to contradict heteronormative assumptions made about them (or to allow them to go unchallenged), and Victoria Clarke and Elizabeth Peel's research on reproduction of, and resistance to, heteronormativity on talk shows and in diversity training, respectively (see Clarke et al., 2010).

Importantly, critical psychology has investigated the restrictions of heteronormativity both for those who are excluded from it and for those who are included within it. A good example of the latter kind of work would be Nicola Gavey and Annie Potts' examinations of the normative constructions of hetero(sex), as involving active masculinity and passive femininity, and the implications of this for sexual experience and sexual violence.

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Online Resources

What is heteronormativity? http://www.genderandeducation.com/issues/what-is-heteronormativity

What's wrong with heteronormativity? http://rewritingtherules.wordpress.com/2011/08/17/whats-wrong-with-heteronormativity

Heterotopia, Overview

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Introduction

The term "heterotopia" is sometimes used to refer to strange or ambivalent places – places that defy

the normal logic of ordering. Routinely, many spaces and places in a given culture or society tend to be understood as ordered by a certain overarching logic. Oftentimes, this logic is quite straightforward for a culturally competent observer. For example, a suburban big box store in the USA is a shopping place par excellence: there are few things that a visitor to a Walmart could do except buying stuff and transporting it to the trunk of their car. Correspondingly, Walmart employees are expected to perform their assigned duties, while the rest of their lives should take place elsewhere (e.g., "at home"). The social and cultural logic of space prescribes the physical features of anthropogenic environment, regulates the appropriate behaviors, and guides adequate feelings and thoughts pertaining to the location.

Numerous debates in contemporary critical geography and urban studies revolve around the issue of space and the logics of its production, particularly the phenomenon of homogenization. Homogenization has been related, for instance, to the onset of modernity and rationalization, with the modern bureaucratic way of organizing lives and spaces responsible for the increased clustering of life into well-segmented spheres. Correspondingly, boundaries solidify between, for example, private and public or work and home. These processes have only intensified with the rise, in the late twentieth century, of globalized neoliberal capitalism, ubiquitous consumerization, and the corresponding emergence of "non-places" of non-belonging, such as international airports. As Bauman (2000, Chap. 3) has noted, late modernity gives rise to a pedigree of new spaces that all act to contain, purify, isolate, and disable differences. A shopping mall is a quintessential example of this kind of spatial ordering: one that comes "as close as conceivable to the imagined ideal 'community' that knows no difference" (Bauman, p. 100).

Of course, neither modernity nor neoliberalism has thus far led to a completely seamless fabric of uniformity and dedifferentiation. Space and place continue to be produced in multiple and sometimes conflicting ways. One of the concepts developed in social theory (and virtually ignored in psychology) to account for these conflicts and tensions and their emplaced manifestations is the notion of heterotopia.

Definition

Originally, "heterotopy" is a medical term designating abnormal (but sometimes benign) misplacement of tissues and organs in the body (see Sohn, 2008) and cerebral cortex (Mugg & Malhotra, 2011). The notion of heterotopia as understood here originates in the work of Michel Foucault (1967/2008). Outlining a short "history of space" in the Western culture, Foucault discussed the role of space in particular with reference to "other" spaces. In each culture, there are sites "that have the curious property of being in relation with all the other sites, but in such a way as to suspend, neutralize, or invert the set of relations designated, mirrored, or reflected by them" (pp. 16–17). He suggested that there are two kinds of such spaces. One is utopia – a space that does not exist as physically real, but reflects and inverts in itself the culture in question. The other is heterotopia – literally "other place." Heterotopias are real sites that represent, invert, and contest "all the other real emplacements that can be found within culture" (p. 17). As Dehaene and De Cauter note in their commentary on their new translation of Foucault's piece, Foucault used this notion to refer to "various institutions and places that interrupt the apparent continuity and normality of ordinary everyday space" (2008, pp. 3–4). Foucault's own examples of heterotopias include places where rites of passage (such as transition to adulthood or defloration) happen in traditional cultures and the theatre where different facets of culture are represented and contested through recreation of different and incompatible places. He listed six principles of "heterotopology" (Foucault, 1967/2008), systematic description of heterotopias. These are as follows: heterotopias are present in all human cultures; heterotopias have a defined function in society's culture, though this function can change historically; heterotopias juxtapose in single real place several places that are by themselves

incompatible; heterotopias are related to certain modes of time; heterotopias presuppose a regime of opening and closing vis-à-vis the rest of culture or other places in culture; and heterotopias are related functionally to other sites in society.

Keywords

Apartheid; contradiction; discourse; difference; heterotopia; language; place; space; transgression

Critical Debates

The use of the term "heterotopia" in human sciences began in 1960s, predominantly in European and North American critical theory and human geography (while being practically absent from psychology until very recently), and it has a troubled history in these discourses. To start with, it occupies a decidedly marginal position in the oeuvre of its originator. Foucault has only used it once in his "authorized" written corpus, in the preface to the *Order of Things* (Foucault, 1966/1973, pp. xviii ff), where he cursorily referred to strange literary "spaces" in which orders of meanings and syntax are somehow upset or incommensurable. His best-known exposition of "heterotopia" is a 1967 lecture to a circle of French architects, unpublished until 1984, and never edited for publication by its author (see Johnson, 2006; Dehaene & De Cauter, 2008, for histories of the concept). Soja famously called Foucault's "heterotopologies" "frustratingly incomplete, inconsistent, incoherent" (1996, p. 162). Indeed, with the absence of a thoroughly worked out definition by its originator (who in his original lecture listed, among other things, cemeteries, prisons, ships, Persian gardens, and mirrors as examples), the concept of heterotopia and the notion of heterotopology have been applied to a dizzying array of social and geographical phenomena, to highlight a wide range of different traits of interest to particular studies (see Dehaene & De Cauter, 2008, for a recent representative sampling;

see Philo, 1992, 2011, on reception of Foucault's ideas in human geography).

It should be noted that the famed Marxist sociologist Henri Lefebvre has introduced, apparently independently from Foucault, the term "heterotopia" in his discussion of urbanization and urban revolution (Lefebvre, 1970/2003; Foucault's lecture was not yet published when this book was written). As the society, globally, has become urban, the very notion of the urban, according to Lefebvre, can no longer be used in a homogeneous way, in opposition to "rural," but only in a differential, or differentiated, way. To account for this differentiated character of space, Lefebvre introduced three concepts: isotopy (a particular place and its immediate neighborhood), heterotopy (a place different from isotopy and marked in this difference), and utopia (a nonexistent elsewhere which, nevertheless, "seeks a place of its own," being thus a virtual locus). Interestingly, for Lefebvre, before the forces of urban revolution clicked into blur the distinction between the urban and the rural, "urban space as a whole was heterotopic" (p. 129). As Neil Smith observed, Lefebvre's discussion of heterotopia is marked by "much more critical register, rooting [heterotopia] in a sense of political and historical deviance from social norms" (Smith, 2003, p. xii). However, Lefebvre's use of "heterotopy" never gained hold, and he himself all but abandoned it in his later work.

The common intuition running through applications of Foucault's idea of heterotopia is the way it can shed light on the kinds of spaces that run against well-demarcated logics of stably ordered spaces and institutions. Thus, for example, for Soja, heterotopia, along with related notions in the work of other theorists including Lefebvre's three "moments of social space" (1974/1991), Hooks's (1990) locating on the margin, and Bhabha's (1990) third space, is a key to "an alternative envisioning of spatiality... [that] directly challenges (and is intended to challengingly deconstruct) all conventional modes of spatial thinking" (1996, p. 163, italics removed). Correspondingly, Soja himself uses heterotopology as an approach to

making sense of the quintessentially postmodern city of Los Angeles: charting its contradictions, its tensions, its ruptures with the very essence of the urban, and its power to overwhelm spatial imaginations and theoretical thinking.

The authors in a recent collection on heterotopia and the city (Dehaene & De Cauter, 2008) examine a range of spaces and places in the city that somehow break with the traditionally assumed ordering of space. These spaces include newly popular "themed" shopping streets and "lifestyle centers" (Kern, 2008), in which tension arises between public space – and the corresponding notions of access, freedom, openness, and inclusion – and privatized space of organized consumption. In such places, a pseudoprivate space is created in which an illusion of openness and freedom is a façade for the organized and secured process of controlled consumption that only includes those who come to these places for "shopping experience." Another kind of heterotopia is visible in the new dwelling spaces, such as gated communities (Low, 2008; Hook, 2007, Chap. 5), in which life is protected from outside intrusions and regulated according to models commonly associated with holiday resorts rather than actual homely spaces.

A yet different application entails examining those spaces in which different social and cultural worlds, distinct cultures or economic classes, contact and clash. Thus, Lou (2007) indicates how a revitalization effort aimed at managing the visual appearance of Washington, DC's Chinatown ended up creating a mixture of traditional and contemporary ways of expressing the Chinese culture (e.g., through the different linguistic features associated with different Chinese writing systems) that fits the notion of heterotopia.

Sometimes the idea of heterotopia is used to excavate literary and media phenomena akin to Borges's famous "Chinese encyclopedia" (Foucault, 1966/1973, pp. xv–xxiv). However, the concept has really gained currency only after the publication of Foucault's 1967 lecture on "Other Spaces." Consequently, literary analysis in most cases takes into account the spatial intuitions that can be derived from this lecture.

Many of these intuitions follow the track of discussing how in different arts some kind of "space" is conceived or constructed in which incommensurability is manifest. It can be the metaphorical "space" of language with different kinds of (im)possibilities. It can also be the space of representations that explicitly construct a spatial and emplaced vision on various scales, such as the spaces of nations and cities. For example, Meerzon (2007) discusses both these dimensions of spatiality in relation to the narratives of exile in Joseph Brodsky's play *Marbles*.

One particularly salient way of interpreting heterotopia is through relating it to resistance and transgression. Heterotopias thus emerge as sites in which marginalized and othered individuals and groups challenge the dominant cultural and sociospatial orders. Among places analyzed through this lens are, for example, beaches in Tel Aviv that can function as spaces of manifestation of alternative sexualities and masculinities, including homosexual identities (Allweil & Kallus, 2008). Not surprisingly, the idea of heterotopia has gained popularity in feminist and queer studies in relation to real and imaginary spaces in which the repressive gender and sexual orders of society can be upset and reversed. Thus, Voela (2011) examines the literary heterotopia conjured up in the novel *Eleni or Nobody* by Rhea Galanaki as a space which has potential for radical reflection of feminist subjectivity.

However, as Johnson remarks, this "persistent association with spaces of resistance and transgression" (2006, p. 81) is often unsubstantiated: it serves as a point of reference and critique rather than a systematically applied analytic framework, and furthermore, it may have little grounding in Foucault's own intuitions. Foucault, indeed, was more concerned with the kinds of heterotopias that channel and regulate resistance rather than allow or foster it in a way that runs counter to the dominant social institutional order. According to Genocchio, it is misleading to understand heterotopia as an absolutely "other," differentiated space, completely removed from the existing orderings. "Heterotopia does represent a space of exclusion within [Foucault's] writings, but, knowing full well the impossibility

of its realization, it comes to designate not so much an absolutely differentiated space as the site of that very limit, tension, impossibility" (Genocchio, 1995, p. 42). This, of course, is what ultimately makes heterotopias "functional" in a culture in a way that Foucault described in his second and sixth "principles of heterotopology" (1967/2008). Salter (2007) critically examines airport security and border checkpoints in Canada as exactly this kind of heterotopia: a functional institutional complex set up to hide the dynamics of governmentality, policing, and control of body and identity while projecting an appearance of smooth unrestrained global mobility.

As Johnson (2006) and Dehaene and De Cauter (2008) underscore, Foucault's piece can be read as a critique of at least a certain version of utopianism, one that conceives utopias as fictional blueprints for idealized societies and their unreal spaces (of the kind that Thomas More famously envisioned). Foucault's heterotopia is an antidote to these spaces, a way of showing how real social, cultural, and spatial life is ultimately much more complex and entangled in relations of power than such utopianisms can grasp. Heterotopology is also a spatial rendering of Foucault's archaeology of power and discourse, focused on the real social ordering rather than groundless dreams.

Practice Relevance

There is very little unity in the interpretation of heterotopia and the term is seldom employed as a systematically developed concept. Rather, it is used to pin down the basic intuition that some places and spaces manifest a certain tension between different and contradictory organizing logics, patterns, and meanings. In this vein, Derek Hook suggested that "we should apply the notion of the heterotopia *as an analytics* rather than simply, or literally, as place; it is a particular way *to look* at space, place, *or text*" (2007, pp. 185–186, italics in original). This indicates a possible direction of practically applying the idea of heterotopia in various contexts: to nurture a critical sensibility to the potential of "deconstructing" demarcated places, that is, of showing how even the seemingly tightly controlled and homogenized spaces (such as airports) can be appropriated or excavated to find fissures, ruptures, and niches through which difference and resistance can seep. Mobilized in such way, "heterotopic imagination" can be used to find present or potential heterotopic properties and possibilities in virtually any real or imaginary place but also to reflect radically on the impossibility of full and effective transgression.

Future Directions

The concept of heterotopia has received practically no attention within psychology, with the exception of rare and cursory commentary in literature inspired by critical Lacanian psychoanalysis with its topological repercussions (Vakoch, 1998; Voela, 2011). Symptomatically, Derek Hook's proposal (2007) to use heterotopia to explore, from a Foucauldian standpoint, the interconnections between space, discourse, and power follows the logic of critical geography even as it is positioned within critical psychology. This is evident from his illustrative discussion of South African gated communities. He shows with clarity how the ostensible purpose of creating secure space is in fact a pretext for justifying the otherwise inadmissible (especially in postapartheid context) claims for spatial privilege, entitlement, and segregation (Hook, p. 203). However, this conclusion is versed in traditional terms of critical urban geography and sociology, and there is little in his argument that yields readily to connections to the more psychological concepts or psychological levels of organization. His discussion of "crime paranoia" in the gated community, presumably related to the affective and behavioral state of a particular individual, pertains first and foremost to the community and cultural level. The key pitfall of such framing is that the individual

person and the processes pertaining to their inhabiting spaces, communities, and cultures effectively disappear – conceptually and methodologically – behind supraindividual domains of discourse and power. This framing comes dangerously close to completely disconnecting from "traditional" psychology and its topics, concepts, and methods, instead of productively critiquing them.

Despite the almost complete absence of psychological work on the idea of heterotopia, critical psychology can fruitfully draw on its intuitions. On the one hand, it is possible to employ it as a way of drawing psychological attention to the opportunities for change and resistance that are potentially present in the very spatial fabric of quotidian life (as well as imaginative and virtual "spaces" such as literature or the spaces of computer-mediated communication). On the other hand, critical psychology can contribute specifically psychological conceptual frameworks to highlight the dimensions of human life in spatial settings that can be opened up to heterotopic imagination.

Specifically, it is conceivable to use heterotopia to bring a critical perspective to the very basic psychological concepts: perception, emotion, learning, memory, cognition, and of course the prime stuff of psychology – behavior and interaction in all their varieties. The analytics of heterotopia can be used to explore the distinct ways in which human experience, and especially, emplaced, spatial experience, can become heterotopic. Critical potential of the idea of heterotopia can show the conditions under which it is possible for the crystallized, routinized experience of everyday life to be upset and transformed. This can relate both to locations in which this is possible and to conditions under which "normal" locations can be upended heterotopically. For example, urban consumption scapes (such as globalized chain department stores) can be excavated – analytically and practically, through interventions and performances – for potential conditions under which routine order of mass consumption can

be suspended or displaced for a specific person. The key unexplored issue is how specific meanings, affects, or behaviors can lead, on part of the person, to a transgressive relation to a disruption or suspension of normal order. In other words, how is it possible for a person, psychologically, to break with the routine and to notice and relate to the unexpected rather than blocking and ignoring it? It is also possible to think of heterotopic experience as transgressive experience that challenges the clearly demarcated, totalized, and normalized kinds of experiences associated with demarcated institutions and social and cultural categories. The common psychological obsession with method and measurement can also be mobilized critically to avoid excessive romanticizing of heterotopias. That is, it is crucial to discern the settings and situations in which incongruities and contradictions amenable to heterotopic analytics are indeed performative and constructive of new possibilities and to detect those occasions in which discourse of critique can be subverted to mask and obscure the underlying realities of contradiction, inequality, and oppression.

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Online Resources

Peter Johnson maintains a website specifically on Foucault's ideas on heterotopia. http://www.heterotopiastudies.com/

Historiography

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Introduction

In her reflection on politics and the writing of history, feminist antiracist scholar Himani Bannerji has noted, "The writing of history…is not only not a transparent affair, but it is not innocent either. Since at all times it is an epistemological and intellectual project, it also has an ideological-political dimension to it" (Bannerji, 1998, p. 290). The writing of psychology's history also has an ideological-political dimension, whether acknowledged or unacknowledged by those who write these histories. Although not transparently ideological, historians who view their task as collecting a comprehensive set of historical data to tell an objectively "true" account of the past engage in a form of history sometimes known as empiricist, didactic, or expository history. This approach is based on a certain set of assumptions about the nature of the past and the historian's role in uncovering and presenting it. Specifically, empiricist historians assume that one can uncover an objective truth about selected aspects of the past and that the historian is impartially engaged in the pursuit of these facts that will then reveal the "true" story of history. From a critical perspective, this view rests on numerous problematic assumptions about the nature and function of historical knowledge and practice. Critical historiography

rejects these assumptions. Although critical historiography encompasses a range of diverse critical perspectives (e.g., Marxist, feminist, antiracist, postcolonial; see Teo, 2005), it rejects impartiality as a possible, or even desirable, function of history.

Definition

As a general term, *historiography* can refer both to a body of historical work and the theory, history, and methods of writing history itself. What is *critical* historiography specifically? Critical historians acknowledge that their choice of historical subject matter, the historical question itself, the way they formulate this question and approach it, and the way they interpret historical data are intimately connected with their own values, agendas, and social locations. The evolution of the dominant subject matter and methods of academic history in North America and Western Europe over the course of the twentieth century can elucidate the emergence of critical historiography.

Up until the 1970s, when academic history in this context was dominated by upper-middle-class white European or Anglo-Saxon men, military histories, political histories, and economic histories of Europe and the Americas and biographical studies of "Great White Men" tended to predominate. As people of more heterogeneous backgrounds (ethnicities, genders, classes, ideologies, geographies, etc.) have gradually gained access to professional history writing and positions of influence in the academy, historiography (in both senses) has also changed. Academic history now incorporates more diverse interests and agendas, and in some cases whole new fields of history have emerged. Consider, for example, that women's history, gender history, Black history, diaspora studies, mad peoples' histories, and "subaltern studies" have emerged only in the last 40 years or so in the wake of global liberation struggles and other forms of political reaction and resistance.

Critical historians recognize that historical accounts themselves are never value neutral, on many levels. The historian always chooses some method of data collection, organization, and interpretation over another. History is always a representation or reconstruction of some aspect of the past perceived through a particular lens and relying on only a portion of the data that could, theoretically, be retrieved. *Whose* facts these are and *what counts* as historical evidence are also openings for interrogation and critique. It was only fairly recently, for example, that oral histories and non-textual materials have begun to gain legitimacy as data with which to represent and analyze the past. It was only recently that the perspectives of mad people, colonized people, working class people, and others living outside hegemonic power structures came to be seen as legitimate and important in reconstructing history, contributing to a genre of critical history known as "histories from below."

Critical historiography attempts to undermine the "rightness" of the present by asking questions of the past that get at *why* and *how* certain knowledge products arose and gained acceptance in lieu of others and *why* and *how* certain groups of people or movements gained professional authority in given times and places. Critical historians analyze the past on its own terms, without necessarily seeking to glorify or justify the present, with the acknowledgment that any analysis is inescapably influenced by contemporary interests: the historian cannot escape his or her present. This is an approach that Teo (2005) refers to as "presentist historicism" (p. 11). This is in contrast to traditional histories, sometimes referred to as Whig histories, in which the past is used to buttress the rightness of the present. Whig histories often tell a tale of linear progress from dark and misguided beginnings towards an intellectually and morally superior present.

Finally, critical historiography often goes beyond the question of what *was*, to the question of what *could be*, using an analysis of the past as a way of challenging false hegemony and encouraging consideration of alternatives in the present. As Jill Morawski has put it: "Critical thinking, whether initiated through historical reflection or some other method, enables us to identify what psychological images of human nature are

actually perpetuated and marketed, and to contemplate what images are ultimately possible" (Morawski, 1984, p. 120). Similarly, Nikolas Rose, influenced by Michel Foucault, argues that there is a difference between history as *critique* and *critical history*. History as critique is concerned with delegitimizing the current authority and status of psychology by exposing the political, ideological, moral, and methodological obstacles that have blocked its trajectory towards a more morally and conceptually virtuous present. History as critique does this by exposing the ways in which psychology has been used as an instrument of social control: "Psychology here is seen as an example of, and an instrument of, a general process of domination at the service of powerful economic interests" (Rose, 1996, p. 106). While posing interesting questions concerning relations between knowledge and society, truth, and power, as Rose acknowledges, history as critique nonetheless does so at the risk of reducing psychology to a relatively generic tool of manipulation and adaptation to the *status quo*.

Against the idea of critique, Rose (1996) proposes the notion of critical history. Critical history, he argues, is "critical not in the sense of pronouncing guilty verdicts, but in the sense of opening a space for careful analytical judgment" (p. 106). It provides a careful contextual analysis of the historical and cultural conditions under which our current forms of psychological "truth" have been made possible. Such an analysis allows us to reimagine the present, because it interrogates and unravels that which was previously taken for granted by exposing its culturally and historically contingent truth status. Critical history concerns itself with the constitutive relations between the psychological, the social, and the subjective, without reducing psychology to a mere sign, symptom, or effect of power relations. It is treated as an active agent in the creation of a particular social imaginary.

To summarize, critical historiography, in its most general definition, (1) poses analytic questions rather than offering purely descriptive accounts; (2) interrogates the past on its own terms with an eye to gaining increased understanding and promoting contemporary reimaginings of psychology; (3) employs contextualism and social constructionism and attends to the role of extrascientific factors in the constitution of psychological objects and practices; and (4) is inclusive of a diversity of historical actors and contributors, especially those marginalized in traditional histories such as women and people of color. It is worth pointing out that not all critical histories can possibly exemplify all of these characteristics and not all critical historians share exactly the same views on what constitutes critical historiography.

Keywords

Social constructionism; contextualism; inclusivity; historicism; presentism; origin myth; race; gender; postcolonialism

History

Histories of psychology began to appear in the very early years of the discipline's development (e.g., Hall, 1912). Many of these histories were written about the great men and ideas of psychology and were often celebratory or ceremonial in nature. It was not until the late 1960s that the limitations of an exclusive reliance on this kind of history began to be discussed with reference to the history of psychology. This was spurred on, in part by the increasing professionalization of history of psychology (see Watson, 1975), in part by developments in academic history and history and philosophy of science more generally (Thomas Kuhn's, 1962 work being influential here), and in part by the rise of liberation struggles of all kinds internationally. In 1966, historian of science Robert Young surveyed the historiography of the behavioral sciences and proclaimed it presentist, repetitive, and concerned almost exclusively with great men, great ideas, and great dates (Young, 1966).

As Furumoto (1989) has noted, it was not until the mid-1970s that historians of psychology began to act on Young's critique and produce

scholarship that could appropriately be called critical history or critical histor*ies* to reflect the diversity of the genre. She explained that critical histories tended to be more contextual, inclusive, and historicist than traditional histories. Furumoto also noted that practitioners of the new, critical history were also more likely to use archival and primary documents in order to avoid repeating anecdotes and myths that had a tendency to pass from one textbook generation to the next. Samelson (1974) had recently highlighted the origin myth process – the retrospective selection of great thinkers and classic experiments to buttress the legitimacy of present views and to impart a sense of continuity and tradition about the development of psychology.

The rise of social constructionism as a meta-theoretical position (the position that knowledge is produced or constituted by social processes), exemplified in psychology in the work of Kurt Danziger (1990, 1997), enabled historians to generate increasingly analytic questions and highlighted the problem of continuity versus discontinuity in both our understanding of the nature of psychological constructs and their historical representations. Other critical historians (e.g., Morawski, 2005; Smith, 2005) have since exhorted historians of the human sciences, and historians of psychology in particular, to seriously consider the reflexive character of the discipline and the implications of reflexivity for scientific *and* historical practice. Smith (2007) goes so far as to propose that the history of human beings' attempts to understand and construct themselves (via the human sciences) constitutes both historical knowledge and psychological knowledge, or stated more strongly, the history of human's investigations into being human *is* psychology, and vice versa. Critical historians differ with respect to their convictions on these matters, but suffice it to say that social constructionism and considerations of reflexivity have catalyzed provocative lines of historical inquiry in the human sciences (e.g., Hacking, 1995; Rose, 1990).

As part of the general turn towards critical historiography in psychology, the categories of gender and race began to receive more attention.

In 1976, African American psychologist Robert Val Guthrie wrote the first history of Black psychology in the United States. He drew attention not only to African American pioneers who were absent from traditional histories but also exposed the racist practices of white psychologists and the counter-narratives provided by Black psychologists (Guthrie, 1998/1976). At about the same time, feminist psychologists began to turn their attention to histories that had erased the contributions of women and began to recover the "lost" women of psychology (e.g., Bernstein & Russo, 1974; O'Connell & Russo, 1990). Other feminist historians analyzed how sexist social beliefs permeated and were reinforced by scientific psychology, uncovering early feminist attempts both to dislodge these beliefs with science (e.g., Shields, 1975), and women's personal and professional strategies to work against them (e.g., Johnson & Johnston, 2010; Scarborough & Furumoto, 1987).

More recently, critical historians have investigated how psychological scientists have participated in reifying and reinforcing the essentialism of race, sexuality, and gender (e.g., Morawski, 1985; Tucker, 1994); how science has been used to support and maintain sexist and racist beliefs (e.g., Richards, 1997; Winston, 2004); and how psychological research has frequently been used to reinforce, and less frequently challenge, oppressive social practices in the past and present (see Kevles, 1985). Notably, it is recognized by critical historians that since science is itself not value-free, scientific research can be wielded for either oppressive or emancipatory aims. Henry Minton (2001), for example, has provided an illuminating historical analysis of the use of the science of sexuality to reduce the stigma of same-sex love, to de-pathologize homosexuality, and to advance homosexual rights.

Traditional Debates

It has been argued that a critical historiography of psychology faces an uncertain place in the discipline of psychology itself. Some critical historians see a vital role for this scholarship

within the discipline proper, arguing that when positioned as a subfield of psychology (rather than a subfield of the history of science), it can have heightened disciplinary impact. For example, Danziger (1994) argues that critical histories of psychology have significant contemporary relevance and critical history should be included within the boundaries of the discipline. He suggests that exposing the historically contingent nature not only of psychological categories but also of investigative practices can help move psychology beyond its "methodological gridlock" (p. 480). He also argues that a heightened critical historical sensibility might help psychologists conduct more socially relevant science and enrich the cultural life of their societies. Vaughn-Blount, Rutherford, Baker, and Johnson (2009) urge more psychologists to recognize the relevance of history to the psychological project, writing that "Found in the history of psychology are a host of questions, assumptions, hypothesis, biases, beliefs, and practices that illuminate what it means to be human and to be a psychologist" (p. 123).

Other historians argue that this intradisciplinary positioning is untenable given the sharp division of interests between the historian and the practicing scientist (see Forman, 1991). They argue that by its very nature, critical history operates to destabilize and alienate science and scientists. As perceived by those psychologists who adhere most strongly to a positivist tradition, the history of science, ergo, and the history of psychology should be "rated X" (Brush, 1974). Lovett (2006) has argued that, in part because of this function of critical history, if critical historians of psychology wish to remain useful within psychology departments, they must embrace the dual role of the historian of psychology: to socialize psychology students into the discipline and to train critical thinkers. He also argues that critical histories of psychology are themselves beset by some of the failings that are said to characterize traditional histories. For example, he asks whether critical history, in its claim to be an "improvement" over traditional accounts, is therefore Whiggish in its own way.

Critical Debates

Among critical historians of psychology, there are varying degrees of acceptance of many of the postmodern critiques of science, including the degree to which psychological science is an inherently social and historical process (see Gergen, 1973). Although there is general agreement among critical (and traditional) historians that the conduct of science is affected by a host of extrascientific factors (such as funding priorities, politics, prestige), the degree to which science is fundamentally social, producing socially constituted (rather than rationally constituted) knowledge remains a point of debate.

Finally, the degree to which critical historians should embrace an overtly political, social justice orientation in their work is also debated, with some arguing that in history, as in science, this political orientation undermines the quality and authority of the historical account and confuses presentist with more presentist-historicist aims. Others argue that the history of psychology should be more politicized, at least to the extent that critical history should aim to uncover the political motivations and entanglements of many of psychology's past projects and historical actors (Harris, 1997).

International Relevance

Critical historiography exists all over the world and has very high international relevance. In fact, it was in part the experiences of psychologists who travelled throughout the world and witnessed the highly varying meanings both of psychology and its subject matter in different contexts that gave rise to a social constructionist position that remains at the heart of critical history (for Danziger's account, see Brock, 2006b). There is increasing attention being paid by critical historians to the processes of indigenization that result in the differing forms and functions that psychology assumes in different countries and regions (e.g., Danziger, 2006; Pickren, 2010). There is also a burgeoning international historiography of psychology, which is informed in varying degrees

by the tenets of critical history (see Brock, 2006a; Baker, 2012). Not surprisingly, critical historiography is particularly strong in regions where critical psychology has relatively high institutional prominence, such as in South Africa (Swartz, 1995; van Ommen & Painter, 2008).

Future Directions

The critical historiography of psychology is thriving both inside and outside the discipline. In part this is due to the fact that the human sciences are gaining increasing attention from the history of science community, a community that has traditionally focused its attention on the natural sciences. This has increased the body of critical historical scholarship in psychology, since professional historians seem more likely to turn a critical, externalist gaze on the discipline and may be better positioned to consider psychology's complex relationships with other social sciences in a multidisciplinary historical landscape. Its continued relevance in psychology, however, is anything but assured. History of psychology is a very small specialized field within the discipline, and only some psychologist-historians practice critical history. Continued advocacy is required to keep the pedagogical and institutional presence of critical history in psychology (see Bhatt & Tonks, 2002; Rutherford, 2002). The critical historiography of psychology could also move forward by incorporating historiographic developments in other areas, such as feminist history, queer history, race studies, and postcolonial studies.

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History of Psychology

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Introduction

History of psychology is an unusual field. We can broadly categorize the various specialties within psychology in terms of those that are thought to be central or core and those that are relatively peripheral. The former might include neuropsychology, cognitive psychology, social psychology, and developmental psychology. Some examples of the latter are cultural or cross-cultural psychology, community psychology, theoretical/philosophical psychology, and critical psychology. History of psychology does not fall neatly into either of these categories. The subject is widely taught in psychology departments, and there is a substantial market for its textbooks. History of psychology is also a formal requirement in degrees that are approved by professional organizations like the American Psychological Association and the British Psychological Society, though neither of these organizations requires that it be offered as a separate course. The requirement can be met by including historical material in other courses.

In spite of this situation, history of psychology is not usually recognized as an area of specialization or research. There is only one university in the whole of North America which offers a postgraduate specialization in history of psychology and that is York University in Toronto, Canada. There was until recently a smaller program in the area at the University of New Hampshire in the United States, but it has since been discontinued. Given that it is not usually considered to be as an area of specialization or research, there are few academic positions in the field, and most of the courses on the history of psychology are taught by specialists in other areas of psychology. Only a small minority of the psychologists who specialize in the history of their field did their postgraduate training in this area. The majority were originally specialists in another area and developed an interest in history of psychology later in their careers, often after getting academic tenure, and are usually self-taught.

Definition

The term "history of psychology" requires little explanation. It is the story of psychology from its earliest beginnings to the present day. Some debate has taken place over when the story begins. In spite of the well-known adage attributed to Ebbinghaus that "psychology has a short history and a long past," textbook writers have usually started the story with the ancient Greeks. A well-known example is the textbook by Robert Watson titled *The Great Psychologists*: *From Aristotle to Freud* (1963). In the 1980s, two British historians of psychology took issue with this view (Richards, 1987; Smith, 1988). They argued that it was inappropriate to consider the work of someone like Aristotle as "psychology" since there was no special area of knowledge that went under that name at the time that he lived. The word itself is of relatively recent origin. The earliest surviving manuscripts that contain it were written in the sixteenth century, but the term did not become popular in Germany and France until the eighteenth century, and it was not adopted by the English language until well into the

nineteenth century (Lapointe, 1968). To consider the work of earlier writers as "psychology" is to commit what many historians consider to be the sin of "presentism," which consists of projecting the views of the present onto the past. Like the anthropologists who study people in remote corners of the world, historians study the past because it is different, and we will often miss the subtle differences that exist between the present and the past if we insist on viewing the past through the categories of the present.

Most historians of psychology are of the view that psychology is a product of the second half of the nineteenth century on the grounds that this is when a specialist area of knowledge that went under the name began to emerge. Thus, they have come back to the view that psychology has a short history and a long past, albeit for different reasons than the one that is usually associated with that view. The traditional explanation is that psychology emerged in the nineteenth century because that was at that time when the field distanced itself from philosophy and became an empirical science.

In recent years, the view that psychology first appeared in the nineteenth century has been challenged, though it has been challenged on the grounds that it dates back to the sixteenth century (Vidal, 2011). Few people nowadays would maintain that it can be traced back to the ancient Greeks. That was more about conferring legitimacy on the field by providing it with a distinguished ancestry, and Aristotle is one of the most distinguished ancestors that any field can have.

Keywords

History; historical; presentism; celebratory; critical; revisionism; progress

History

The situation that was outlined up the start of this piece where history of psychology is widely taught in psychology departments without being

regarded as an area of specialization or research can be traced historically. Textbooks on the history of psychology are almost as old is the discipline itself (e.g., Baldwin, 1913; Dessoir, 1912; Klemm, 1914). This situation might seem strange but the field had historical antecedents in subjects like philosophy, education, medicine, and biology. This is what Ebbinghaus considered to be its long past, and the earliest textbooks were devoted to examining that past. The appearance of several American textbooks on the history of psychology in the 1920s would suggest that the field was already being widely taught. The most famous of these textbooks is E. G. Boring's *A History of Experimental Psychology* whose first edition was published in 1929 (Boring, 1929). Boring had been a student of Edward B. Titchener at Cornell University, and he mentions in the preface that much of the book is based on Titchener's lectures on the history of psychology. Although Boring's textbook came to be regarded as the authoritative work on the history of psychology, it was only one of three textbooks that were published in 1929. The others were by Gardner Murphy and Walter Pillsbury (Murphy, 1929; Pillsbury, 1929). This situation continued after World War II as new editions of the textbooks by Murphy and Boring were produced (Boring, 1950; Murphy, 1949). It should be noted that none of these authors considered history of psychology to be their main area of specialization. Boring, for example, had over 500 publications in experimental psychology and tended to do his historical work during his summer vacations (Young, 1966).

This situation began to change during the 1960s. Within the space of a few years, most of the institutions that are associated with history of psychology in the United States were established as the field was turned from a purely pedagogical subject to an area of specialization and research. Conferences are a common way of presenting the results of research, and the changes included the establishment of a new division devoted to history of psychology within the American Psychological Association. This was Division 26. Psychologists were not the only academics who were taking an interest in this field. A small number of historians of science had moved away from the traditional emphasis of their discipline on the natural sciences and had begun to take an interest in what are variously known as the behavioral, social, and human sciences. Around the same time, an interdisciplinary organization, the International Society for History of the Behavioral and Social Sciences, known as Cheiron for short, was established. Another important forum for research is journals and a new journal, *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, was also established. A great deal of historical research involves the use of archival material, and yet another important development around this time was the establishment of the Archives for the History of American Psychology at the University of Akron in Ohio. Finally, a graduate program in history and theory of psychology was established at the University of New Hampshire. As mentioned earlier, this program no longer exists but all of the other institutions that were established in the 1960s have continued to the present day.

It is important to avoid a triumphalist account of these developments. As noted earlier, the number of psychologists who consider history of psychology to be their main area of specialization and research is very small, and it continues to be widely regarded as an exclusively pedagogical field. Textbooks are generally the only kind of literature in this field to which many psychologists are exposed, and some do not have even that degree of exposure.

Critical Debates

One of the consequences of these developments was that the kind of history that was being written began to change. This was to be expected in some respects. In 1966, the historian of science, Robert Young, published a devastating critique of the field. His main complaint was its lack of professionalism and the absence of the scholarly standards that it brings (Young, 1966). Most psychologists who publish on the history of psychology were (and are) self-taught. Many of them were not aware of the most basic standards of

scholarship that exist among historians, such as the need to consult primary sources, preferably in the language in which they were written, instead of relying on secondary accounts. This situation is less of a problem nowadays, largely due to the interaction of psychologists and historians in organizations like Cheiron, but it was a major problem prior to the 1970s.

It was largely due to this situation that a great deal of revisionist history began to appear. One of the authoritative sources on the history of social psychology up to the point had been Gordon Allport's historical introduction to the *Handbook of Social Psychology*. It had originally appeared in 1954 and was reprinted in the second edition of 1968 (Allport, 1954, 1968). In a famous paper of 1974, Franz Samelson took issue with Allport's claim that Comte had "discovered" social psychology and dismissed it as "an origin myth" (Samelson, 1974). Yet another example of the genre was a paper by Benjamin Harris in the *American Psychologist* in which he took issue with the standard accounts of J. B. Watson's work with Little Albert (Harris, 1979). The problem was always the same: successive writers had relied on secondary sources without bothering to look at the original work. The result was similar to the old children's party game where a message is passed on along the line of people and is totally unrecognizable at the end. Harris' work did not go without criticism and, in his reply, he made a distinction that was to become popular in subsequent years. The distinction was that of "ceremonial" and "critical" history. Traditional history of psychology had been the former and he was producing the latter (Harris, 1980).

Although the terms "celebratory" and "critical" were more popular, the distinction remained. Traditional history of psychology was concerned with celebrating the achievements of the past, and these were often considered to be the achievements of "Great Men." It also tended to embody the assumption of progress and, in doing so, helped to reinforce the status quo. Critical history took a different approach. Rather than celebrating the achievements of the past, it took a critical stance towards much of psychology's history

and it found plenty to criticize. Scientific racism, the traditional views of women that it endorsed, and the view that homosexuality is a mental illness are some of the more obvious examples. Given that the traditional accounts of the history of psychology offered a different view of psychology's past, it took issue with these accounts as well, and it generally did so on the basis of a more scholarly approach involving the use of primary sources.

The rise of critical history coincided with what was widely considered to be psychology's centennial in 1979. It was largely due to the influence of Boring's textbook that this view came about. Boring had famously traced the history of psychology back to the establishment of Wilhelm Wundt's laboratory for experimental psychology at the University of Leipzig in 1879. Although this account is still widely believed, no serious historian of psychology would endorse it. The history of psychology cannot be traced back to a single person, a single place, or a single date. It was a gradual process that occurred in several countries over a long period of time. In spite of this, the American Psychological Association declared 1979 to be psychology's centennial, and the International Congress of Psychology, which takes place every 4 years, was held in Leipzig to mark the occasion.

The widespread international interest in Wundt that accompanied these events provided an opportunity for historians of psychology to gain a readership for their work that was unusual and possibly unique. Most of the accounts of Wundt that were published around this time were revisionist in their aims. A central figure in these developments was Kurt Danziger (e.g., Danziger, 1979, 1980). In an interview that I conducted with him in 1994, he compared his experience to that of a subject in an Asch conformity experiment in that the views he was reading in Wundt's original works bore little or no relationship to the views that had been traditionally attributed to him by Boring and others. At first, he wondered if he was misunderstanding things, but it eventually became clear that there really was a discrepancy between the primary and the secondary sources (Brock, 1995).

Critical history continued to be popular throughout the 1980s, and several discussions of what it involved were published during this decade (e.g., Danziger, 1984; Woodward, 1980). The changes that had taken place were famously summarized by Laurel Furumoto in an invited address that she gave to the American Psychological Association with the title "The New History of Psychology" (Furumoto, 1989).

International Relevance

The developments that took place in the United States during the 1960s were replicated in Canada and Europe in the 1980s. It was during this decade that the professional organizations for psychologists in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany established branches devoted to history of psychology. Their Spanish counterpart came slightly later in 1991. It was also during the 1980s that the graduate programs in history and theory of psychology at York University in Canada and the University of Groningen in the Netherlands were established. Other important developments during this decade include the establishment of a European equivalent of Cheiron, which was originally called "Cheiron-Europe" but which is now known as "ESHHS" (European Society for the History of the Human Sciences), and the British-based journal, *History of the Human Sciences.*

Although there is not the same degree of organization in other countries, historians of psychology can be found all over the world. Unsurprisingly, they tend to be more common in countries like Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Japan, and Australia where psychology itself is well established. The growth of psychology outside its traditional heartland of North America and Europe is likely to continue, and this will inevitably have an impact on its historiography. Indeed there is a current trend to move the history of psychology away from its exclusive focus on North America and Europe in order to include places like Asia, Africa, and Latin America (e.g., Baker, 2011; Brock, 2006). This trend is likely to continue in future years.

Future Directions

Many historians of psychology have been concerned with what they see as a decline in the field, and some have implicated the rise of critical history of psychology in this perceived decline (e.g., Bhatt & Tonks, 2002; Lovett, 2006; Rappard, 1997). The argument runs along the lines of the expression "biting the hand that feeds you." It states that psychologists are unlikely to continue supporting research and courses on the history of psychology if it only results in criticism of the field. This argument, which is sometimes supported by anecdotes, assumes a degree of familiarity with contemporary historical scholarship among specialists in other areas of psychology that may be unwarranted.

The problems run much deeper than that. Psychology has found a niche for itself in society by claiming to be useful in areas like medicine, education, industry, law enforcement, and the military. It is largely due to this perceived usefulness that psychologists are able to obtain financial support for their research from external sources, and this type of funding has become increasingly important as governments have become less willing to support their universities with money raised through taxation. History of psychology is not likely to succeed in such an environment since it is not usually considered to have any practical uses.

Yet another aspect of the situation is that psychologists have usually sought legitimacy for their field by claiming that it is a science and history does not conform to this self-image. Psychology is a microcosm of a wider situation where the natural sciences are well supported, while the humanities are relatively neglected (e.g., Nussbaum, 2010). There is consequently a noticeable trend in the United States for history of psychology to be pursued by professional historians rather than psychologists. While there are no universities where the psychology department has a graduate program in history of psychology, there are several universities where it can be pursued within history of science.

This development is hardly surprising since history of psychology, as the name implies, is

history, not psychology. By making common cause with historians of science, psychologists who specialize in history of psychology are becoming increasingly isolated from their field. One way of taking history into the heart of the discipline is through historical psychology which as the name implies is psychology, not history. Historical psychology is concerned not with the theories and practices of psychologists but with historical changes in what psychology considers to be its subject matter. A recent example of this kind of work is Kurt Danziger's book on the history of memory, *Marking the Mind* (Danziger, 2008). It is only partly about the history of psychology since much of the book is concerned with historical periods when the modern discipline of psychology did not exist. Danziger has also been explicit in his desire to see the growth of historical psychology (e.g., Danziger, 2003). Ultimately, history is about historicization and psychologists who do historical research are missing a golden opportunity to historicize the subject matter of their field.

Historical psychology is well established in Continental Europe, but it is virtually unknown in the English-speaking world, and the small amount of literature on this subject in English has been largely forgotten (e.g., Barbu, 1960; van den Berg, 1961). A notable exception is Kenneth Gergen's paper, "Social Psychology as History" (1973), which is one of the most widely cited papers in the history of psychology. It led to a great deal of discussion but very little research. A subsequent volume on historical social psychology that Gergen coedited with his wife has disappeared from the radar as well (Gergen & Gergen, 1984).

No one should be under any illusion about how difficult it will be to promote this field. The comments made earlier about the support for the natural sciences and relative neglect of the humanities apply equally here as well. Psychologists have common interests with many subjects but these common interests are differentially pursued. Exploring its common ground with neurology or computer science is like marrying into a higher social class, something that is almost universally approved. Exploring its common ground with history or philosophy is like marrying into a lower social class, and it often happens in such cases that the family of the partner from the higher social class will boycott the wedding.

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Online Resources

Several professional organizations and university departments have a "resources" or "links" page which leads to a large number of websites. Instead of giving these websites individually, I would advise the reader to consult these pages. Some of the best are:

http://historyofpsych.org/historyresources.html : Maintained by the Society for History of Psychology, aka American Psychological Association Division 26.

https://www.uakron.edu/cheiron/links/ : Maintained by Cheiron (International Society for History of the Behavioral and Social Sciences).

http://www.yorku.ca/gradpsyc/field5/moreinfo.html : Maintained by the Graduate Program in History & Theory of Psychology at York University in Toronto, Canada.

http://www.eshhs.eu/wordpress-3.3.1/wordpress/?page_id=2 : Maintained by ESHHS (European Society for the History of the Human Sciences).

Holocaust

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Introduction

Has the Holocaust left an indelible mark on contemporary consciousness? Or do we remain to be convinced of its significance? Is the Holocaust unique? Or is it better understood within the broader historical context of genocide? While scholars across multiple disciplines have described the Holocaust as one of the central events in modernity, representing a "rupture and break with tradition" (Bernstein, 2002, p. 4) – an event that challenges us to rethink our rendering and understanding of the parameters of being human – many educators have simultaneously noted that we currently suffer from Holocaust fatigue or overexposure to the educational and moral lessons of the Holocaust such that the original rupture has lost its salience and force (Schweber, 2006). Hence, for contemporary culture, the Holocaust may exist in a kind of paradox or dialectic, wherein its significance is both simultaneously recognized and rejected.

For some, the Holocaust challenges our preconceived assumptions of human responsibility, the structures of society and civilization, and even the nature of evil (Bernstein, 2002). The Holocaust constitutes what Giorgio Agamben (2002) calls a "state of exception." It raises both the question of how extreme circumstances impact individuals and the question of how individuals respond to these "limit" experiences. The

Holocaust also compels us to seek its implications and continuing reverberations for modernity (Améry, 1980). In this case, as Zygmunt Bauman (1991) notes, the Holocaust has more to say about our disciplines in the behavioral sciences than these disciplines can say about the Holocaust. Yet as much as the Holocaust appears to challenge the very grounds of our understanding, it also simultaneously seems to fall prey to assimilation, categorization, marginalization, and ultimately neutralization. In our view, this is the paradox or dialectic in which the Holocaust is currently suspended.

Definition

The Holocaust refers to the Nazi genocide of Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, and others deemed racially unfit, including the mentally handicapped and the mentally ill in the period between Hitler's coming to power in 1933 and the collapse of the Third Reich in 1945 at the end of World War II. The term "Holocaust" itself derives from the Greek, meaning "a burned offering" or "a burnt sacrifice offered solely to God" (Bergen, 2009, p. vii). While the term Holocaust is used almost ubiquitously to refer to the slaughter conducted by the Nazis and their collaborators during World War II, the Hebrew term *Shoah*, meaning "catastrophe," is sometimes preferred to refer more specifically to the policies resulting in the Final Solution and the ultimate murder of approximately six million European Jews (Bergen, 2009).

Keywords

Intentionalism; functionalism; genocide; social conformity; instrumental rationality; eliminationist anti-Semitism

Traditional Debates

As the eminent historian Saul Friedländer (2007) makes clear, no single conceptual framework can encompass the Holocaust. Nevertheless, most contemporary historiography that seeks to understand the origins of the Holocaust aligns itself with one of two schools of thought, either Intentionalism or Functionalism (Browning, 1992). While contemporary historiography has problematized any simple dichotomy, more complex or "modified" forms of intentionalism or functionalism nevertheless continue to provide the tacit-organizing structure for many historians in their approach to understanding the Holocaust.

In general, an intentionalist frame of reference tends to underscore the importance of Hitler and Nazi ideology to the unfolding of the Holocaust and the Final Solution. Indeed, some intentionalist scholars highlight the role of Hitler as the "mastermind of mass murder" and emphasize the consistency of Hitler's racially motivated exterminationist policies (Bergen, 2009, p. 30). As Ian Kershaw (2003) notes, "without Hitler and the unique regime he headed, the creation of a programme to bring about the physical extermination of the Jews of Europe would have been unthinkable" (p. 38). According to the intentionalists, very early in his career, Hitler put an eliminationist anti-Semitism at the center of the National Socialist program and the party's electoral appeal. Once in power he "intentionally" set out to murder the Jews, waiting only for the opportunity when most European Jews were under his direct control. This opportunity came with the initial successes of Operation Barbarossa and the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941.

One of the most extreme forms of intentionalism can be found in the work of Daniel Goldhagen (1997), who argues that perpetrator behavior sprang from an eliminationist anti-Semitism. Goldhagen elaborates, "'ordinary Germans,' were animated by anti-Semitism, by a particular type of anti-Semitism that led them to conclude that the Jews *ought to die*" (p. 14, italics original). In the development of his argument, Goldhagen examines the records of Reserve Police Battalion 101. Goldhagen is particularly interested in these reservists, because they were "ordinary Germans," most of whom had little or no previous party or military experience.

Nevertheless, these reservists (along with other battalions and special killing squads) were responsible for the "methodical genocidal decimation" of the Jewish population in southeastern Poland (Goldhagen, p. 265). Indeed, Goldhagen emphasizes the reservists' brutality and sadism and the inextricable relationship of these factors to a preexisting and pervasive German anti-Semitism. Goldhagen states, "these ordinary Germans appeared not as mere murderers, certainly not as reluctant killers dragged to their task against their inner opposition to the genocide, but as 'two-legged beasts' filled with 'bloodthirstiness'" (p. 257). Hence, Goldhagen argues forcefully that the German people chose to participate in the destruction of the European Jewish population – indeed the Germans became Hitler's "willing executioners" (p. 454).

As the counterpoint to intentionalism, the functionalist frame of reference tends to downplay Hitler's immediate impact on the Holocaust and emphasizes social, economic, and institutional factors. Some functionalist-inclined scholars view Hitler as a weak dictator who was as much controlled by, as in control of, the military maelstrom he unleashed, and the complex, and often chaotic, institutional forces in Germany and the larger Nazi empire in Europe. Functionalists criticize a "Hitlerocentric" interpretation and argue that the Final Solution was not a premeditated goal, but rather the result of Nazi bureaucratic mechanisms (Browning, 1992, p. 87). How these mechanisms coped, or failed to cope, with the initial successes of the invasion of the Soviet Union became the catalyst for radicalization and ultimately the implementation of the Final Solution (Mommsen, 1997).

A "modified" version of this argument has taken shape in the work of the noted historian Christopher Browning. Browning (1992, 2007) agrees with intentionalists that Hitler was the indispensible participant in the development of Nazi Jewish policy. At the same time, Browning agrees with functionalists that the Final Solution was not the result of Hitler's long-held premeditated plan. Rather, from Browning's (1992) perspective, Hitler's participation was "usually indirect" (p. 120). While Hitler set the agenda for Nazi Jewish policy, he appeared to depend upon others such as Heinrich Himmler or Reinhard Heydrich to provide concrete proposals for action. Indeed the very ambiguity of many of Hitler's statements was a license for the Nazi bureaucracy initially to improvise and, ultimately with the Final Solution, to innovate.

Browning (1998) illustrates his understanding of the origins of the Final Solution by an examination of the same Reserve Police Battalion 101 that plays the central role in Goldhagen's (1997) *Hitler's Willing Executioners*. Like Goldhagen, Browning (1998) emphasizes the ordinariness of the men of Police Battalion 101 – but ultimately comes to very divergent conclusions regarding their evolution from "ordinary Germans" to brutalized killers. Browning rejects a host of traditional ideological explanations for Police Battalion 101's murderous behavior. Instead the factor that appeared to play a pivotal role in the behavior of these perpetrators was group conformity. As Browning explains: The battalion had orders to kill Jews, but each individual did not. Yet 80-90 % of the men proceeded to kill, though most of them – at least initially – were horrified and disgusted by what they were doing. To break ranks and step out, to adopt overtly nonconformist behavior, was simply beyond most of the men. It was easier for them to shoot (p. 184).

The effects of group pressure on social conformity can be traced to the pioneering work of social psychologist Solomon Asch in the 1950s, and his general findings are in part applicable here. When faced with group pressure, a considerable number of persons will conform to group consensus (Asch, 1955). Perhaps even more instructive to understanding perpetrator behavior, as Browning (1998) himself notes, is social psychologist Philip Zimbardo's classic prison study (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973).

In attempting to understand "unusual" behavior, Zimbardo (2007) rejects forms of explanation that focus on dispositional traits such as personality types, genetic makeup, or other "internal" or individual dispositions (p. 7). Rather, he emphasizes the importance of the situation and context in shaping unusual behavior, in addition to power mechanisms that reside within systems

(e.g., roles, organizations, or institutions). Browning (1998) views Zimbardo's (Haney et al, 1973) work as instructive for understanding the escalating brutalization of the men in Police Battalion 101, particularly given the constraints of the social context in which the men were embedded. Just as the men in Police Battalion 101 were subjected to a particular psychosocial context which may have provided the framework and impetus for their increasing brutality, so too were the research subjects in Zimbardo's (Haney et al., 1973) simulated prison subjected to a particular psychosocial context in which "sadistic behavior could be elicited in individuals who were not 'sadistic types'" and "acute emotional breakdowns could occur in men selected precisely for their emotional stability" (p. 89). Additionally, Browning notes that the behaviors of Police Battalion 101 bore an "uncanny resemblance" to the guard roles that emerged in Zimbardo's simulated Stanford prison (i.e., some guards were enthusiastic killers; some were tough but fair; and some attempted to refrain from killing altogether).

Browning (1998) also cites Milgram's (1963) classic studies on obedience to authority when attempting to understand the behavior of Police Battalion 101. In his study of noncoercive obedience, Milgram demonstrated that, when ordered, a majority of subjects were willing to administer increasingly severe punishments to a learner via a shock generator even though engaging in such behavior created extreme distress in the subjects. Browning (1998) examines the possibility that the men of Police Battalion 101 were responding out of obedience to noncoercive authority, but ultimately views this explanation as a partial one. Milgram (1963) himself recognized the unique limitations and therefore limited generalizability of the original study of obedience. These limitations included (among others) the credibility that scientific authority lent to the study as well as the presupposed voluntary nature of the research subjects (i.e., both teachers and learners) within the research context, none of which are applicable to the context of the Polish massacres in which the men of Police Battalion

101 were acting. Ultimately, Browning (1998) views conformity as a stronger variable than authority in understanding the perpetrators' behavior. Of course, Browning is a historian and not a behavioral scientist, and he can only loosely hypothesize as to the role or mechanism of action that conformity played in perpetrator behavior.

Nevertheless, some of Milgram's (1963) observations are consistent with the Police Battalion 101's behaviors including what Browning (1998) describes as the men's decreasing compliance the more they were in "direct proximity to the horror of the killing" (p. 175). In other words, the less close the proximity to the victim, the easier to comply with direct orders of obedience and marginalize responsibility for the killing. Alternatively, when the men in the battalion had direct contact with their Jewish victims as in the early Polish massacres, many of the battalion men became agitated, physically ill, and asked to be relieved of their execution duties, partially paralleling the agitation of Milgram's punishing teachers in the obedience experiment.

Critical Debates

Combining this social psychological perspective with a critical perspective, Zygmunt Bauman (1991) argues that the Holocaust and the Final Solution depended upon the successful application of instrumental rationality and the "social suppression of moral responsibility" (p. 188). Whereas some traditional explanations view the Holocaust as a lapse of rationality and descent into barbarity, Bauman paradoxically insists that the Holocaust is consistent with the "principles of [instrumental] rationality" (p. 17). He notes that the Holocaust "*arose out of a genuinely rational concern*" and only became a *possibility* within the context of a modern civilization that provided scientifically driven institutionalization, bureaucratization, industrialization, and technological innovation, all of which were applied to the "Jewish problem" and ultimately to the killing centers (Bauman, p. 17, italics original).

Hannah Arendt (1963/2006) makes a similar point in her portrait of the trial of Adolf Eichmann. Arendt describes Eichmann as a committed bureaucrat, not a vicious, murderous monster or anti-Semite. Eichmann was a "normal," indeed "banal," functionary, performing his assigned task mindlessly and without question (Arendt, 1963/2006, p. 25). Arendt (1963/2006) elaborates, "Eichmann was troubled by no questions of conscience. His thoughts were entirely taken up with the staggering job of organization and administration..." (p. 151). For Bauman (1991), the Eichmann case exemplifies the manner in which a bureaucratizing "social organization" and the "social production of distance" emblematic of instrumental rationality essentially "neutralizes" moral behavior through means/end calculation, cost-benefit analysis, and dehumanization (Bauman, 1991, p. 215). Bauman's point is that the social structures of organization and bureaucratization evolved within a modern context of instrumental rationality and neutralization and indeed allowed for "Holocaust-style phenomena" to emerge (p. 18).

In the end, Bauman (1991) wishes to broaden the scope of the Holocaust's significance beyond Jewish history, emphasizing our shared responsibility for the Holocaust and the ethical challenge its legacy presents. The Holocaust, Bauman argues, is not a problem that may be confined to the historical past or that may be assigned to someone else's, presumably less developed, culture. Rather, according to Bauman, the Holocaust was "born and executed in our modern rational society, at the high stage of our civilization and at the peak of human cultural achievement, and for this reason it is a problem of that society, civilization, and culture" (p. *x*). To be sure, Bauman resists a facile anti-modernism, in which instrumental rationality or intensifying bureaucratization leads irrevocably to genocide. Nevertheless, for Bauman, the Holocaust represents an ever-present *potential* of *our* modern culture and civilization. Thus the Holocaust invites us to a continuing reflection on, and vigilant resistance to, the manner in which contemporary social structures work to diffuse moral responsibility and reduce us all to the banality of an Eichmann.

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Online Resources

http://www.ushmm.org/
http://www.yadvashem.org/

http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/holo.html
http://jewishhistory.huji.ac.il/Internetresources/holocaust
   studies.htm
http://www.holocaust-history.org/
http://www.lucifereffect.com/

Homelessness, Overview

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Introduction

Homelessness is an important phenomenon for critical psychologists as it reflects the sharp edge of social stratification and class politics. Further, imaginings of homeless people are particularly evident in popular culture, research publications, public deliberations, and policies regarding the use of public spaces and poverty.

Definition

No existing definition fully captures the complexities of homelessness. As a result, attempts to enumerate homelessness are partial and often problematic. A continuum of housing situations, ranging from the absence of a dwelling to inadequate and insecure housing, provides the basis for official definitions of homelessness. For example, the United Nations (2009) uses a two-stage, place-based definition of homelessness: (1) Primary homelessness is defined by a state of rooflessness and incorporates those living without a private abode. (2) Secondary homelessness refers to people lacking secure and regular domestic dwellings. More expansive conceptual categories have been developed (Statistics New Zealand, 2009), and these include being "without shelter" (living on the streets and inhabiting improvised shelters, including shacks and cars) or in "temporary accommodation" (hostels for homeless people, transitional supported housing, women's refuges, and long-term residency in motor camps and boarding houses), "sharing accommodation" (temporary accommodation for people sharing someone else's private dwelling), and "uninhabitable housing" (people residing in dilapidated dwellings).

Official definitions provide rudimentary understandings of "houselessness." There is an increasing acknowledgement that homelessness is not simply about the presence or absence of a material shelter but is also a complex psycho-social, political, and economic issue that spans social, legal, and physical domains (Statistics New Zealand, 2009).

Keywords

Homelessness; houselessness; civic participation; abjection; social distancing; place; urban poverty

History

Early social research embraced the tension between individualistic and structuralist explanations for understanding and addressing homelessness (Mayhew, 1861). Emphasis placed on particular explanations has differed across contexts (Daly, 1997). For example, US-based research has tended to privilege individualistic explanations (e.g., personal choices or deficiencies), which position the role of the individual as central in the occurrence of homelessness. This individualized understanding of homelessness intersects with conceptualizations of the "undeserving poor" and "deserving poor." Consequently, some researchers contend that for the "undeserving poor" homelessness is due to personal failings and choices. A concurrent view is that for the "deserving poor" homelessness is the product of personal deficits (e.g., mental illness) that are outside of a person's control, and thus, associated responses to homelessness come mainly in the form of intensive case management

and social work interventions. Conversely, European research has tended to focus more on structural explanations (e.g., family poverty). Here, the causes of homelessness have been situated beyond the individual and instead in macro-socioeconomic factors, including housing and labor markets and governmental policies. Emphasis placed on structural explanations has meant that responses are more often orientated around broad societal interventions alongside housing subsidies and the provision of affordable accommodation.

Increasingly, emphasis is placed on the complex interplay between individual and structural explanations for homelessness (Daly, 1997). This shift reflects the realization that social structures (e.g., underemployment, lack of affordable housing, social stratification, and deinstitutionalization) and personal lifeworlds (e.g., poverty, death of loved ones, domestic violence and abuse, mental illness and substance misuse, and eviction from tenancies) are inseparable. The interwoven nature of the personal and the social is particularly evident in discussions on the role of substance misuse among homeless people. Individualistic explanations positing that homeless people are on the streets due to addictions can be supplemented with a consideration of wider situational factors. Poverty and homelessness are unpleasant, so substance misuse can act as a coping strategy and offer temporary relief from day-to-day difficulties and painful life histories. These complexities are often lost when authorities only respond once the presence of inebriated bodies on the streets causes offence (Laurenson & Collins, 2007). The realization that homelessness can be an outward symptom of "antisocial" economic, political, and societal relations is also often lost on people living more ordered and assured middle class lives (Hodgetts et al., 2011; Hodgetts, Stolte, Nikora, & Groot, 2012).

Traditional Debates

The long history of the issue of homelessness means that there is now a vast interdisciplinary literature on this topic. The topic of homelessness has not provided a sustained focus for theory or research in the discipline of psychology. Throughout much of the interdisciplinary literature, there is a general acceptance that homelessness is a complex problem and that there are numerous pathways into and out of homelessness. In most traditional psychological debates, however, homelessness often tends to be viewed from an overly individualistic perspective, particularly in Anglo-American contexts. Consequently, the social problem of homelessness is assumed to stem from issues related to personal and behavioral, substance misuse, motivational, and mental health issues. An exception is the field of community psychology where this individualistic perspective is complemented by a focus on structural inequalities in society which render certain groups of people more vulnerable to becoming homeless (cf., Toro, 2007).

Critical Debates

Homelessness remains an intractable social problem despite the effort expended in understanding and resolving the issue. Critical debates are emerging that question the tendency in much traditional research to focus on "psychologizing" both homelessness and poverty. Moreover, traditional "solutions" to homelessness that focus primarily on addressing individual and family needs or deficits are also seen to be too limited, especially in the context of rising inequalities in society.

Critical debates are also directed at the definition and measurement of homelessness since these can oversimplify and/or misrepresent the complexity of homelessness. One issue with definitions and categories is that they are typically static whereas the daily lives of homeless people involve constant movement and uncertainty. Another concern is that notions of home and being housed are largely equated with middle class assumptions, values, and life experiences (Hodgetts et al., 2012). Increasing the number of people being housed does not necessarily ensure a pleasant sense of home, belonging, and wellness. In more unequal societies, poverty, misery, and dysfunction largely remain hidden

behind closed doors, which can make some households very unhealthy and stressful places to reside. People residing in domestic dwellings can lack a sense of home, while those residing on the streets can have a strong sense of belonging and home (Groot, Hodgetts, Nikora, & Leggatt-Cook, 2011). Although rough sleeping does cause sickness and early death, being housed and poor may not be much of an improvement.

In understanding homelessness, it is also important to acknowledge the broader socioeconomic and cultural contexts that shape people's lives. By exploring the everyday lives of homeless people, researchers can develop rich understandings that reflect situational and cultural variations shaping experiences of home and homelessness. Complexities surrounding efforts to define homelessness and issues of "home," "place," and "belonging" are particularly apparent in emerging research on indigenous homelessness, which also contributes to the broader agenda of decolonizing psychology (Groot et al., 2011). Indigenous peoples are overrepresented in the homeless populations in North America, Australia, and New Zealand. The concept of "spiritual homelessness" reflects an effort to explain situations in which Indigenous people are displaced from ancestral lands, knowledge, rituals, and kinship relationships. Throughout precolonial history and into the present, for aboriginal peoples in Australia, "home" is not necessarily associated with a domestic dwelling. Home denotes affiliation with a cultural landscape, a repertoire of places, and one's belonging within a tribal group (Memmott, Long, & Chambers, 2003). Spiritual homelessness can occur when one is living in a house while being separated from one's ancestral land, family, and kinship networks. Briefly, work in this area problematizes the application of conventional Eurocentric notions of home and homelessness to Indigenous peoples (Groot et al., 2011).

International Relevance

Homelessness has periodically become a prominent issue in different parts of the world for various reasons. These include conflict, economic imbalances and crises, poverty, rapid population increases, forced migrations, epidemics, and natural disasters. Today, global issues such as climate change, resource depletion, trade imbalances, and foreign debt have a disproportionate impact on developing and poorer countries, which have fewer resources to deal with the occurrence of homelessness as a result of such issues. Homelessness has also become an increasingly entrenched societal issue in "wealthier" OECD nation states, such as the US and UK (Toro, 2007). These developed countries have a relative advantage over developing countries in preventing and responding to homelessness. However, homelessness is rising alongside increasing social divisions, economic recessions, privatization, and welfare "reform." Social security policies established following WWII that have prevented homelessness in the past are being eroded. There is a strong political agenda in the OECD for reducing taxes and state interventions, which has resulted in fewer resources available for governments to prevent or mitigate homelessness. Additionally, the global economic crisis has resulted in more people facing greater susceptibility to homelessness. In the United States, which was once viewed as the global paragon of prosperity and freedom, for example, job losses and home foreclosures have resulted in increased homelessness.

Practice Relevance

Homelessness costs both homeless people and the broader community. Costs to the broader community have intensified calls to end homelessness. This issue was particularly apparent in relation to an article in *The New Yorker* titled "Million-Dollar Murray" (Gladwell, 2006). The article reviews the cost of Murray Barr, a homeless man in Reno, Nevada, living on the streets for 10 years. Costs incurred included medical treatment, detox, social service interventions, police time, and court costs. This case exemplifies how it cost over a million US dollars not to do something with Murray to change his

situation. It is better to resource humane interventions than to merely ignore or displace homeless people.

Homelessness is a serious and lethal health concern (Hodgetts, Radley, Chamberlain, & Hodgetts, 2007). There is an overriding consensus that city streets are a particularly unhealthy place to reside. The hardships and practical challenges of rough sleeping range from exposure to cold, dampness, pollution, and noise to a lack of sanitation, privacy and personal safety, and the inability to store food and possessions. Such hardships significantly increase the risk of disease, sleep deprivation, malnutrition, stress, injury, and death. Beyond such physical health issues, homeless people face stigma and abuse and often lack adequate social supports. These factors can erode relational, physical, emotional, and psychological aspects of health (Hodgetts et al., 2007).

Public concern regarding the presence of homeless people in city centers has contributed to increased regulation of public space by local governments (Laurenson & Collins, 2007). Civic responses to the presence of homeless bodies in public space include the introduction of CCTV systems to make housed citizens feel safer and the hiring of security guards to remove homeless people from shopping districts and public libraries. In these settings, the claims of homeless people to belong and their rights to participate are increasingly publicly questioned, and consequently they face barriers to social participation and are placed at increased risk of illness and injury (Hodgetts et al., 2007).

Responses to the presence of homeless people vary according to the prescribed status of the target person as "undeserving" (unsavable) or "deserving" (savable) poor (Mayhew, 1861). Public deliberations and policies carry a polarizing tendency where undeserving homeless people are often constructed as strange and unlike us (as abjects) or conversely as deserving people just like us who have suffered trauma and misfortune. The latter more sympathetic and less socially distant accounts arise when the degree of hardship and suffering endured by homeless people is acknowledged. Unsympathetic accounts arise when emphasis is placed on difference and the unease some domiciled citizens feel about sharing public spaces with homeless people (Mitchell & Heynen, 2009). The tensions between individualism and structuralism, and the overlap with the undeserving and deserving poor debates, generate a vacillating social climate. Responses to homelessness can, therefore, involve punitive measures to displace vagrants and/or advocate tolerance and social inclusion (Laurenson & Collins, 2007; Hodgetts et al., 2008).

A key distinction that is often overlooked when the nature of homelessness and appropriate responses are considered is the class of origin of homeless people. Research conducted alongside social service providers (Hodgetts et al., 2012) indicates two broad class-based groupings of homeless people, which have been termed *droppers* (middle class) and *drifters* (underclass). The first, and smaller of the two groups, includes people who come from mainstream, domiciled (read middle class) backgrounds but who have "dropped" into homelessness due to traumatic events or serious health and/or personal issues. Existing services are primarily orientated towards helping such people reintegrate into domiciled lifeworlds to which they are accustomed. In contrast, drifters are people from lower class backgrounds who have never enjoyed a "normal" (read middle class) domiciled life. Homelessness is yet another hardship in their lives, which have been characterized by deprivation, disruption, and disjuncture. This means that resolving the homelessness of the growing numbers of drifters is a far more complex task and involves much more than simply "rehousing" or the amelioration of these peoples' "personal problems."

Although most social service organizations set out with the intent to assist the homeless people with the greatest needs, funding and bureaucratic requirements often make this difficult to achieve. Most funding is linked to the principle of "conditionality" (Standing, 2011) and narrow outcome criteria, such as street counts or snapshot measures of successfully rehoused individuals. This situation risks generating the "inverse care law"

(cf, Hart 1971 cited in Hodgetts et al., 2012), whereby the homeless people with the fewest challenges in their lives (i.e., the droppers) are rehoused first. The practical inability to assist homeless people facing the most complex life challenges (i.e., the drifters) is largely born out of administrative demands, but it also aligns with the more conservative views of "undeserving" homeless people as being unwilling to "help themselves" despite the existence of services purportedly meeting their needs.

Future Directions

Although housing is important, homelessness is not simply a housing issue. Homelessness is also a relational issue (Hodgetts et al., 2011). It is important to extend the focus of theory, research, and practice beyond housing to consider both *how* and *why* people enter and exit homelessness. The interwoven nature of personal, relational, regulatory, and structural dimensions of homelessness requires further conceptualization (Hodgetts et al., 2012). Scholars have also raised the importance of fostering homemaking and experiences of belonging among homeless people (Hodgetts et al., 2011). Homeless people can be resilient and make homes for themselves on the streets that are more homely than when they were housed. Such relational processes are being are reflected in the efforts of service providers to create judgement-free environments in which people can engage safely in homemaking (Trussell & Mair, 2010). Rather than simply "rehousing," there also is a need for more holistic support systems that include social participation and/or employment and the cultivation of social networks. The reintegration of homeless people should not, however, be conducted as a stand-alone objective. There is a need to consider what homeless people are being integrated into. Simply reintegrating homeless people into low-quality and exploitative housing markets, into low-paid, casualized jobs, and into divisive or alienated communities is unlikely to bring the desired benefits for homeless people in the longer term. Consequently, addressing homelessness requires us to address wider societal defects stemming from the entrenchment of neo-liberalism and the increased socioeconomic inequalities in society today.

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Online Resources

Research Group on Homelessness and Poverty. http://sun.science.wayne.edu/~ptoro/index.htm

St. Martins Housing Trust. http://www.stmartinshousing.org.uk

The Homeless Guy. http://thehomelessguy.blogspot.com

Homophobia, Overview

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Introduction

While attitudes toward homosexuality have become more accepting over the past 50 years, it is clear that gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals still routinely encounter discrimination and hostility due to their sexual orientation. For example, in 2010, the FBI reported 1,470 hate crime offenses motivated by sexual orientation, ranging from vandalism to murder (United States Department of Justice, 2011). More subtle expressions of bias, called "microaggressions," are commonly experienced by lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) individuals through assumptions and stereotypes, language, policies, and other forms of denigration of those who are not heterosexual and/or do not conform to traditional gender roles (e.g., Nadal, Rivera, & Corpus, 2010). These expressions of homophobia have been shown to contribute negatively to the mental health of LGBTQ individuals (e.g., Meyer, 2003).

Definition

Homophobia is the term generally used to describe negative attitudes toward gay, lesbian, bisexual, and queer individuals. This term is believed to be coined by psychologist George Weinberg (1972), who described homophobia as "the dread of being in close quarters with homosexuals" (p. 4).

Although the term *homophobia* contains the root – *phobia*, referring to an intense, irrational fear, many homophobic persons simply have an aversion to homosexuals and homosexuality. It has been argued that homophobia does not meet the qualifications for a phobia in the clinical sense, and it has never been listed as a pathological condition in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) or the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD). Many scholars prefer to use alternative terms, such as homonegativity, which connotes a negative attitude toward homosexuality; *heteronormativity*, which consists of attitudes and beliefs that normalize heterosexuality and considers other sexual orientations deviant; or *heterosexism*, which is defined as power and prejudice toward nonheterosexual people.

Keywords

Homophobia; homosexuality; heterosexism; LGBTQ issues; discrimination; bias; prejudice

History

Although same-sex sexual activity has been common in societies dating back at least as far as Ancient Greece and Rome, the word *homosexual* "entered Euro-American discourse during the last third of the nineteenth century – its popularization preceding, as it happens, even that of the word 'heterosexual'" (Sedgwick, 1990, p. 2).

> In the 1950s and 1960s the position that dominated the American psychoanalytic literature was that everyone is constitutionally heterosexual and that homosexuality is a pathological, defensive, phobic retreat from castration fears. Homosexuality was viewed variably in terms of preoedipal fixation, arrested development, narcissistic dynamics, binding mothers, detached fathers, and so on. Analysts were urged to employ a directive/suggestive approach...insisting that homosexual patients

renounce their sexual orientation and actively directing the process of conversion to heterosexuality. (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 223)

In the 1960s, George Weinberg criticized this perspective, referring to his colleagues as *homophobic*. He first used the word in print in 1972, in his groundbreaking book, *Society and the Healthy Homosexual*.

Traditional Debates

Homosexuality as Pathology

Until 1973, homosexuality was listed on the official list of mental disorders of the American Psychological Association (APA). However, in 1975, the APA urged mental health professionals to "take the lead in removing the stigma of mental illness that has long been associated with homosexual orientations" (Conger, 1975). The APA stated that it "deplores all public and private discrimination in such areas as employment, housing, public accommodation, and licensing against those who engage in or have engaged in homosexual activities and declares that no burden of proof of such judgment, capacity, or reliability shall be placed upon these individuals greater than that imposed on any other persons."

However, as queer theorist Eve Sedgwick (1993) later wrote: "a boy can be treated for Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood if he merely asserts 'that it would be better not to have a penis' – or alternatively, if he displays a 'preoccupation with female stereotypical activities as manifested by a preference for either cross-dressing or simulating female attire, or by a compelling desire to participate in the games and pastimes of girls.' While the decision to remove 'homosexuality' from the DSM-III was a highly polemicized and public one...the addition to DSM-III of 'Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood' appears to have attracted no outside attention at all – or even to have been perceived as part of the same conceptual shift" (p. 156–157). Additionally, it has been noted that the inclusion of Gender Identity Disorder in the DSM provides the basis for the ongoing ban of transgender persons from United States Military service.

The APA has proposed the deletion of the category of classifications on psychological and behavioral disorders associated with sexual development and orientation (F66) from the next edition of International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, in order "to better reflect current scientific knowledge, to better reflect current practice, and to reflect changes in the social understanding of sexual orientation and homosexuality" (Anderson, 2010). They note that "F66 diagnoses are historically rooted in and support continuing unscientific stigmatization of homosexuality by health professions."

Roots of Homophobia

Psychodynamic theory attributes homophobia primarily to a process Freud termed reaction formation, in which an individual combats impulses that he or she finds deeply troubling by endorsing an opposing impulse. For example, in 2006, vocal antigay evangelist Ted Haggard was exposed for having had an affair with a former male prostitute. Haggard himself suggested that his aggressive antigay rhetoric was "because of [his] own war" (Ryan & Ryan, 2012). Research (e.g., Weinstein et al., 2012) has provided support for the notion that homophobia is often correlated with same-sex attraction and suggests that males who espouse very negative attitudes toward homosexuality are more likely to become sexually aroused in response to homosexual pornographic images (Adams, Wright, & Lohr, 1996). Research (e.g., Weinstein et al., 2012) also supports a social learning perspective, such that those with homophobia parents are more likely to endorse antigay attitudes themselves. It has also been noted that homophobic attitudes are most pronounced during adolescence, a time when conformity is emphasized.

Critical Debates

Internalized Homophobia

Internalized homophobia is "the gay person's direction of negative social attitudes toward the self" (Meyer & Dean, 1998, p. 161). Because all

people are socialized to believe that homosexuality is bad, lesbian, gay, and bisexual people (even those who may later live their lives as out-and-proud nonheterosexuals) may have learned to develop negative and damaging images about themselves. For certain individuals, sexuality may be experienced as ego-dystonic or inconsistent with one's self-image. This condition is associated with poor self-esteem or self-hatred. Research has linked internalized homophobia to negative mental and physical health outcomes and difficulties with romantic relationships (Frost & Meyer, 2009).

Homophobia and Religion

A positive correlation between religiosity and homophobia has been established in the literature (e.g., Wilkinson, 2004). Religious fundamentalism, in particular, is a significant predictor of antigay attitudes (Laythe, Finkel, Bringle, & Kirkpatrick, 2002). According to the Catechism of the Catholic Church, homosexual acts "are contrary to the natural law. They close the sexual act to the gift of life. They do not proceed from a genuine affective and sexual complementarity. Under no circumstances can they be approved." Orthodox Jewish interpretations of the Torah indicate that homosexuality is unacceptable, although other sects of Judaism reject this view. Popular interpretations of the Qu'ran also prohibit homosexuality. Recent research suggests that LGBTQ individuals feel more pressure to conceal their sexuality among members of their religious communities than in other settings, including among family members and in the workplace (Davis, 2012).

State-Sanctioned Homophobia

Laws criminalizing same-sex sexual activity, commonly known as *sodomy laws*, are perhaps the most obvious form of state-sanctioned homophobia. Until 1963, sodomy was a felony in every one of the United States. Many states repealed these laws in the 1970s. In 1986, the US Supreme Court ruled in *Bowers v. Hardwick* that Georgia's statute criminalizing sodomy was constitutional. At the time, 25 states had sodomy laws of some sort. It was not until 2003, with their ruling in

Lawrence v. Texas, that the Court ruled sodomy laws unconstitutional on a federal level.

Homophobia in the Schools

Schools, particularly middle schools and high schools, are institutions in which homophobic attitudes are routinely expressed by both students and faculty. In 2009, the Gay, Lesbian, and Straight Education Network (GLSEN) conducted a survey of more than 7,000 American teens and young adults in which 44.1 % of LGBTQ students reported being physically harassed at school. Most students reported routinely hearing the word "gay" used in a derogatory manner, and 60.8 % of responding LGBTQ students reported feeling unsafe at school as a result of their sexual orientation. Many students who were harassed because of their sexual orientation did not report the harassment to a teacher or administrator because they believed nothing would be done. About one-third of those students who reported an incident of harassment reported that no actions were taken. These trends were echoed in The First National Climate Survey on Homophobia in Canadian Schools (Taylor et al., 2008), which indicated that three-quarters of LGBTQ students felt unsafe at school, compared to just one-fifth of straight students. One-quarter of LGBTQ students had been physically harassed about their sexual orientation, and 60 % of LGBTQ students reported being verbally harassed. Furthermore, data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health indicated that students who reported same-sex attraction were significantly more likely to have been expelled from school (Himmelstein & Bruckner, 2011).

International Relevance

It has been estimated that approximately 80 countries consider homosexuality illegal, and in five of them – Iran, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Yemen – homosexual activity is punishable by death (Ottoson, 2009). It is worth nothing that in several nations, such as Belize, India, and Jamaica, sexual activity between men is prohibited, while sexual activity between women is permitted.

In 2010, Nobel Peace Prize winner Desmond Tutu wrote: "A wave of hate is spreading across my beloved continent. People are again being denied their fundamental rights and freedoms. Men have been falsely charged and imprisoned in Senegal, and health services for these men and their community have suffered. In Malawi, men have been jailed and humiliated for expressing their partnerships with other men...Uganda's parliament is debating legislation that would make homosexuality punishable by life imprisonment, and more discriminatory legislation has been debated in Rwanda and Burundi. These are terrible backward steps for human rights in Africa. Our lesbian and gay brothers and sisters across Africa are living in fear."

Despite rising public support for the cause, only six states in the United States currently allow same-sex marriage, and few public officials are openly homosexual or bisexual. Only 11 countries – Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, South Africa, and Sweden – have legalized same-sex marriage. As a continent, Europe leads the way in number of countries that permit same-sex marriage, and an additional 14 European nations have some form of legal recognition for same-sex couples.

Practice Relevance

Sexual orientation change efforts (SOCEs) are sometimes sought out by LGBTQ individuals who hold more conservative views about sexuality and gender. In 2009, the American Psychological Association Task Force on Appropriate Therapeutic Responses to Sexual Orientation concluded that these efforts are unnecessary, as LGBTQ orientations are not harmful or pathological, and SOCEs are unlikely to be effective in bringing about a true change in sexual attraction and potentially harmful to individuals who undergo them. The World Health Organization (WHO) has also recently denounced so-called "curative" therapies for homosexuality on the same grounds.

It is also important for clinicians to be aware that homophobia is one of the social stressors that can aggravate or engender negative emotionality and a variety of mental health conditions, including anxiety, depression, and poor self-esteem. Research also suggests that minority sexual identity is associated with a heightened risk of suicide, particularly among youths. The APA Task Force report (2009) indicates that the LGBTQ clients benefit most from client-centered therapeutic interventions that emphasize acceptance, support, and relevant concerns.

Future Research

Research on microaggressions investigates subtle expressions of homophobia and their effects on the individuals who encounter such experiences (Nadal, 2013). For example, hearing subtle, often unintentional homophobic language (e.g., someone saying "that's so gay" to connote that something is bad or weird) may be damaging for any LGBTQ person, but particularly damaging to those still developing their identities. LGBTQ individuals with multiple oppressed identities (e.g., LGBTQ people of color, LGBTQ people with disabilities) seem to have unique experiences, due to the multiple levels of discrimination they may encounter (Balsam, Molina, Beadnell, Simoni, & Walters, 2011; Nadal et al., 2011). Child-rearing and adoption by same-sex couples is another area of research that is currently receiving more attention. The APA has stated that same-sex couples are no less qualified to raise children, but urged researchers to pursue longitudinal study of the subject.

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Online Resources

APA Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Concerns Office. (http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/index.aspx)

Answers to your questions: For a better understanding of sexual orientation and homosexuality. (www.apa.org/topics/sorientation.pdf)

Bowers v. Hardwick (APA Amicus Brief). http://www.apa.org/about/offices/ogc/amicus/bowers.aspx

Lawrence v. Texas (APA Amicus Brief). http://www.apa.org/about/offices/ogc/amicus/lawrence.aspx

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Homosexuality, Overview

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Introduction

What do we talk about when we talk about homosexuality? The anachronistic character of word itself rankles; in an era when gay, lesbian, or queer are the self-appellations, "homosexuality" evokes the clinic, the courtroom, or the clergy. The term is also an inelegant mash-up of Greek and Latin, evoking "man sex" as much as "same sex" (maybe because women's sexuality has been a footnote until so recently). But it is the *it* in *homosexuality* that is at the core of past and current debates: the idea that *it* defines a class and type of persons – essentially or perversely, proudly or furtively – different from, and the defining other of, heterosexuals. Since the late nineteenth century, homosexuality has meant – with a few exceptions like anthropologists or Kinsey – something more and other than same-sex sexual behaviors. Whether one viewed *it* as pathological or as normal variation, homosexuality has meant a *condition*, an orientation, a personality, and even a culture. One irony, and there are several here, is that how one understands *it* – as essence or choice; born, made, or

made up; nature or, well, any of the things we oppose to nature; a cause or effect of discourse; truth or fiction of subjectivity; universal trope or minority trait; affirming or challenging of gender categories; and so on – does not predict a position on the question of whether "there's anything wrong with *it*." The construct of homosexuality, as a way of constituting, organizing, and interpreting "facts" – and often "truths" of subjectivity – does a lot of heavy conceptual and political lifting (Halperin, 1993).

Definition

Defining the subject matter is the central problematic of studying sexuality. That people can be sorted into categories of sexuality is an enduring assumption in contemporary mainstream psychology, as is the idea that certain personality characteristics can be related to sexuality (e.g., Bem, 2000). In psychology textbooks, definitions invariably refer to discrete and enduring *orientations*: "The most common sexual orientation is **heterosexuality**, in which the attraction is to members of the other sex. When attraction focuses on members of one's own sex, the orientation is called **homosexuality**; male homosexuals are referred to as *gay men* and female homosexuals as *lesbians*. Bisexuality refers to people who are attracted to members of both sexes. Sexual orientation involves feelings that may or may not be translated into corresponding patterns of sexual behavior" (Bernstein, Penner, Clarke-Stewart, & Roy, 2008, p. 433, emphasis in original). Homosexuality, then, is one of three *kinds* of sexuality and is defined not by behaviors but by *desire* or attraction (to one of two sexes).

That homosexuality refers to a type of person leads to and is underwritten by a preoccupation with etiology. That research is almost exclusively biological, focusing on prenatal hormones, brain structure, or genetics related to characteristics like emotionality, aggressiveness, or gender conformity (Bailey, Dunne, & Martin, 2000; Bem, 2000; Bocklandt & Vilain, 2007; Hines, 2009; Kendler, Thornton, Gilman, & Kessler, 2000).

It is hard to avoid reading this research as a continuation of the tradition of the nineteenth-century "invert": the psyche or brain or nuclei of one sex in the body of its opposite, a "psychic hermaphroditism." Homosexuality, then, is not really homosexual at all: basic heterosexuality and sex/gender binaries are preserved by a transposition. Rather than posing a challenge to heterosexuality and gender categories, this way of constructing homosexuality actually serves to reinforce their fundamental naturalness. Furthermore, the conflation of object choice and gender identity makes it unclear what is really being researched – or policed – in much of the research, particularly research on children (Fausto-Sterling, 2012).

By contrast, historians, anthropologists, and sociologists often use the term homosexuality to refer to same-sex sexual behaviors and discourses through history and across cultures, in order to avoid any presentist or ethnocentric framings or the implication of a timeless and placeless meaning, performance, or identity of (homo)sexuality. In fact, even those in mainstream psychology seeking the "origins" of homosexuality – and it is invariably the origin of *homo*sexuality; heterosexual origins presumably require no explanation – have had to acknowledge that there is no generally accepted system for defining what is meant by sexual orientation, nor any agreement on whether categories are meaningful or useful (American Psychological Association, 2002; Cohler & Hammack, 2007; Diamond, 2008; Savin-Williams, 2008).

Keywords

Biology; discourse; sex/gender system; pathology; power relations

History

Sex may not have a history, but sexuality as we know it now does have a short one (Halperin, 1993). The homosexual as a type of person with a distinctive character, biology, even a separate gender – and homosexuality as that condition defined by desire – can be dated and located in the nineteenth-century West and the confluence of psychiatry, law, and economics. The term homosexuality was coined and first applied to individuals by the German minister of justice, Karl Maria Kertbeny, in 1869 (predating the invention of the heterosexual). Kertbeny went beyond the observation that some individuals were sexually attracted to those of the same sex to link sexuality to defining aspects of personality, an idea that was fairly radical at the time (Katz, 1995). But the notion of sexological types was in the late nineteenth-century Western air. It has been linked to the Victorian fixation on taxonomizing all things and to the rise of (and competition among) academic disciplines and expert knowledges. It is surely linked to social concerns about criminality, productivity, population control, the family, race, and eugenics, as well as to increasing governmental concerns about the individual twinned with psychiatry's drive to medicalize – and claim authority over – any aspect of personal and social life (e.g., Bristow, 1997; D'Emilio & Freedman, 1997; Foucault, 2003; Rubin, 1993).

Not that the nature of homosexuality went undebated: The prominent sexologists, Ulrichs, Ellis, Hirschfeld, Krafft-Ebbing, Bloch, Weininger, and, as a special and complicated case, Freud, took different positions on the social dangers or value, naturalness, normality, and universality of homosexuality. (And it was primarily male homosexuality; lesbianism was not a focus of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century politics as women's sexuality was problematized along different lines).

Science was employed – and yoked with law and politics – in the interests of tolerance and of criminalization, of normal variation and of pathology. Whether you characterize the period as one of great sexual repression or of "sexual anarchy" (Showalter, 1990), the late nineteenth and early twentieth century saw the proliferation of discourses, the formation of special knowledges, and incitements to speak about and generate sexualities. It is, as Foucault (1978) put it, when the "homosexual became personage, a past, a case

history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology...The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was a species" (p. 43). The homosexual's appearance in psychiatry, jurisprudence, and in a range of discourses advanced social controls, not just of perversity but of private and family life more broadly. Yet, even as homosexuality was induced to reveal and perform itself to law and psychiatry, a "reverse discourse" was made possible: "homosexuality began to speak on its own behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or 'naturality' be acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary, using the same categories by which it was medically disqualified" (Foucault, p. 101). The irony of the reverse and reversible discourse is the hallmark of homosexuality in the twentieth century. Freud was generally benevolent toward homosexuality. Seeing it in itself as no indicator of pathology, he advocated for homosexuals as psychoanalysts, while American Psychoanalysis took up a thoroughgoing pathologization and pogrom of homosexuality (Abelove, 1993). Havelock Ellis and Magnus Hirschfeld campaigned for tolerance on the basis of a congenital condition, and the Nazi policy was based on the same idea. In the mid-century US, homosexual rights organizations like the Mattachine Society used the rhetoric of psychiatry to argue for minority rights, and the US Government and law enforcement justified purges and incarceration on the same rhetorical grounds. Behavior therapists made it, as a kind of failed heterosexuality, learned and so unlearnable (primarily through punishment).

In the 1960s and 1970s, there was factionalization within the gay/lesbian liberation movement over whether or how gays and lesbians were really different from anyone else: the idea that complete and polymorphous sexual and gender liberation for everyone would dispatch the question competed with the argument that "we" are just like "you" except for whom we sleep with (D'Emilio & Freedman, 1997). Coming out, gay and lesbian pride, and the work of discovering or creating "authentic" sexual identities, seem to both rest on and reject elements of the scientific construction of homosexuality. The political pressures that pushed homosexuality as psychiatric pathology out of the *DSM-III* (in 1973) became political pressure *within* psychology and psychiatry to use "good science" to normalize homosexuality and homosexuals and to create a gay and lesbian psychology. In the 1980s and 1990s, the AIDS epidemic in the West troubled the easy welding of behaviors to identity, leading to constructions like "Men who have Sex with Men" (MSMs) in public health and a surveillant interest in male bisexuals, particularly in communities of color; such sexual rogues posed a problem for public health categories as well as a threat of AIDS reaching the "general population" (e.g., Patton, 1995). During the same period, in psychology and in new disciplines like lesbian and gay studies, critical fire came from feminist, social constructionist, and queer theorists who viewed gay and lesbian psychology, and identity models in general, as reifying, normalizing, as furthering of positivist/empiricist epistemologies, individualism, and timeless, placeless, and power-neutral constructions of sexuality and gender (e.g., Fausto-Sterling, 2012; Garber, 2000; Kitzinger, 1997). But, questioning the reality of homosexuality and of gay and lesbian identities was viewed by many as an attack on the people and communities who had made meaningful political and scientific advances in the name of homosexuals as a (natural) minority group. From criminal or sinful act to congenital trait, to pathology of character or society, to affirmative political and personal identity, to an empty category – something everywhere and nowhere at once – homosexuality has gone from behavior to identity to a social construction. Notably, however, *it* has served as a versatile and polyvalent public and political discourse (Bristow, 1997; D'Emilio & Freedman, 1997; Foucault, 1978; McIntosh, 1981; Rubin, 1993).

Traditional Debates

It is something of a question now which debates are traditional and which are (still) critical. What may be *the* traditional debate, and one that persists in many quarters, is whether or not

homosexuality is pathology or simply normal and natural variation. Mainstream psychology and psychiatry may have settled their debates, but not without long and hard-fought battles, and not without some lingering holdouts (Kitzinger, 1997). Both the American Psychological Association and the American Psychiatric Association have adopted "gay-friendly" policy positions and often provide supportive court briefs and public statements. In most of the West, homosexuals (well, some) are now fit parents, teachers, soldiers, and politicians; homophobia is the pathology. LGBTQ youth, however, are still a focus of considerable scrutiny in the clinical literature. While their maladjustments and mental health problems are usually attributed to victimization and discrimination, the net impression is still one of disordered homosexual youth (Savin-Williams, 2008). Another traditional debate has been about the "cause" of homosexuality, a question that has and has not been settled. As discussed above, etiology is a persistent concern in mainstream psychology, and this too is something of a reversible discourse. A biological cause for homosexuality is still thought by many people to be key to greater acceptance and political leverage, and biology is the focus of nearly all current etiological research (Bernstein et al., 2008). Environmental causes of homosexuality have largely been abandoned, except as accessory variables (Savin-Williams, 2008). So, as a *traditional* debate, etiology appears also to have been settled in favor of some genetic/hormonal pathway (still oddly evocative of the invert model). Homosexuality, then, is inborn, likely involves some kind of sex or gender cross-up or nonconformity, but it does not imply pathology (once adolescence is survived).

Critical Debates

It is not clear where the boundaries of "homosexuality" properly belong; much of the current critical debate can be located within and between LGBTQ psychology and queer theory (and bisexuality and so on), addressed elsewhere in this volume. Certainly, there has been critique of the etiological research as methodologically and conceptually flawed, as relying on unexamined assumptions about biology and sex/gender (e.g., Fausto-Sterling, 2012; Garber, 2000), along with questions about sampling, operational definitions, and base rates (e.g., Cohler & Hammack, 2007; Savin-Williams, 2008). As Simone de Beauvoir asked, "What is woman?" it is important to ask, "what is homosexual?" It also has to be asked how those two questions relate to one another. There are serious and challenging debates about how (homo) sexuality can be understood apart from gender, race, class, age, disablement, power, culture, and history. Arguably, we have only slightly inched the lines of normalization over a bit to include some "good" (and mostly white) homosexuals, but have left intact the binaries and hierarchies of linked and fairly traditional sex/gender, race, and economic systems (Johnson & Henderson, 2005).

International Relevance

Homosexuality was removed from the World Health Organization's list of mental illnesses in 1993. Since 2000, laws criminalizing homosexual acts between consenting adults have been repealed in over a dozen nations including, lately, the United States. The criminalization of private consensual homosexual acts constitutes a breach of international human rights law, as violating an individual's right privacy and nondiscrimination. Nonetheless, 76 countries retain colonial-era laws that criminalize people on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. These laws, including sodomy laws, prohibit either certain types of sexual behavior or any intimacy between persons of the same sex. But, it is difficult to understand homosexuality in an international context apart from colonialism, including missionary work. Laws and conceptualizations about homosexuality are often colonialist exports to those places many in the West consider "backwards" about gender and sexuality (Cruz-Malave & Manalansan, 2010). But, as

with any civilizing mission, there are serious questions about how the West/North should now understand, respond to, and intervene in the rest of the world, including the export of Western ideas about sexuality, liberation, and identity (e.g., Alexander & Mohanty, 1997; Spivak, 1990; Venn, 2000). Cherished Western ideals like the individual, privacy, and consent may not travel well or at all; certainly, their meaning and effects are not entirely clear in the global West and North. Particularly when combined with raciology and lingering colonialist anxieties about the sexuality of the Other, there are many reasons to be cautious about defining the sexual liberation of others. There is no reason to believe that the categories, science, self-understandings, and political strategies that developed under the regime of homosexuality in the West will be coherent, useful, or liberating elsewhere, particularly if imposed as part of the coercive and pastoral power of economic and health development programs.

Future Directions

The future, for now, is probably best delineated by efforts and arguments developed within and between LGBTQ psychology, queer theory, bisexuality, and (trans)gender perspectives (and so on), particularly in an intertextual engagement of those critiques and possibilities, and all of these need to be subjected to scrutiny of their enduring whiteness, class, and global biases (e.g., Johnson & Henderson, 2005). What used to be termed the "essentialist versus constructionist" debate is likely exhausted and due for recasting in terms of the practices of everyday life. A history of (homo)sexuality indicates that it is hard to predict what positions and constructions will ultimately prove to be radical, affirmative, or exploitative and for whom. The imperative that one's sexuality must be radical (and malleable) may be as oppressive as the dictate that it must be normal (and natural). What might be most radical is to be free from having to scrutinize, worry, and speak about the "truth" of one's sexuality.

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Hope, Overview

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Introduction

Since the mid-twentieth century, academic enquiry into hope, including within psychology, has markedly increased. Nonetheless, scholarly reflection on hope has a long historical lineage, much of which still influences how hope is understood and experienced in the present day. Partly because of this, hope is a contested entity with ongoing variation evident regarding the origin, action, nature, effect, and significance of hope, often reflecting differences in the academic disciplines addressing hope (Eliott, 2005).

Definition

The multiple lenses brought to bear on hope correspondingly produce diverse definitions, ranging from the abstract: "hope is for the soul what breathing is to the living organism" (Marcel, as cited in Eliott, 2005, p. 8) to the concrete: hope is "a positive motivational state that is based on an interactively derived sense of successful (a) agency (goal-directed energy) and (b) pathways (planning to meet goals)" (Snyder, Irving, & Anderson, 1991, p. 287) and the expansive: hope is "a *multidimensional* dynamic life force characterized by a *confident* yet *uncertain* expectation of achieving a *future* good which, to the hoping person, is *realistically* possible and *personally significant*" (Dufault & Martocchio, as cited in Eliott, 2005, p.23, italics theirs). Nonetheless, within the health and social sciences, hope is consistently understood as an inherent and valued personal characteristic: something that individuals (must) have in order to thrive. For example, Bloch described hope as "a basic feature of human consciousness" (as cited in Eliott, p. 9), Erikson viewed hope as one of the "basic human qualities" encoded in and essential to successful human psychosocial development (as cited in Eliott, pp. 14–15), and Farran, Herth, and Popovich (1995) similarly deemed hope as an essential experience of the human condition, necessary for human well-being.

Keywords

Hope; discourse; individual; quantification; critical

Debates

Not surprisingly, given the purported necessity of hope for human well-being, much hope research has occurred within the disciplines of medicine and psychology and is often associated with implicit or explicit calls to "increase," or at least, not "decrease," an individual's hope. Thus, for example, within the medical domain, clinicians are instructed on how to maintain a patient's hope or alerted to the dangers of either damaging or destroying a patient's hope, and of a patient's "false" hope (Eliott & Olver, 2009). In this context, however, hope typically references "hope of cure," where cure is deemed possible through medical knowledge, practices, and products developed through scientific endeavor: "false hope" is thus hope neither offered nor sanctioned by medical clinicians (Eliott & Olver). Danforth, posing a postmodern critique, has argued that "[f]rom this perspective, hope lies in the gradual, scientific production of improved approximations of 'truth' and the development of intervention technologies, practices, programs, and instruments 'that work' according to the truth-clarifying research" (1997, p. 94). This "modern" discourse of hope, dominant in many developed industrialized countries, has further been identified as working to endow science and health professionals with agency and responsibility regarding hope, arguably acting to disempower all patients, and, as particularly problematic for those for whom medical science cannot provide cure, including the terminally ill and the disabled (Danforth, 1997; Eliott & Olver, 2009).

Writing within a critical discursive psychology framework, (Eliott & Olver 2007) have examined the sociolinguistic properties of hope, considering how hope functions in the speech of dying patients. They noted that the dominant discourse of hope for cure emerged linguistically in the form of hope-as-noun (e.g., "no hope," "the hope") and was typically focused on the biological aspects of experience and positioned the patient with limited agency and an inescapable negative future. This was countered somewhat by an alternative discourse characterized by hope-as-verb (e.g., "I hope," "I'm hoping") which focused on psychosocial-spiritual aspects of experience, positioning the patient as agentic, with positive possible futures, and connected in time and space to others (Eliott & Olver, 2009). Consideration of how hope is made manifest in speech may thus have implications for health-care professionals, as exploitation of "hope-as-verb" seems likely to facilitate a strength-based approach within a clinical or therapeutic encounter.

Hope has been observed to have powerful rhetorical and sociopolitical functions. For example, hope features as a "dominant symbol" within American oncology, operating at the individual level to sustain the mandate that the patient "resist" and "fight" their disease, at the clinical level to justify practices of information disclosure, and at the institutional level, to justify considerable financial investment in research into or provision of treatments promoted as likely to cure – all linked in what Delvecchio-Good, Good, Schaffer, and Lind have identified as a "political economy of hope" (1990, p. 60). In addition, an overtly ideological use of hope as both a symbol and call for action has been identified as central to the political success of several American politicians, including John. F. Kennedy, Jesse Jackson, and Barack Obama (Atwater, 2007). Both of these examples represent and reconstruct a "rhetoric of hope," incidentally confirming Bloch's observation that any political movement, indeed, any ideology, that fails to harness the motivating power of hope will not succeed (as cited in Eliott, 2005, pp. 9, 23).

Within psychology, the transformation of hope to a quantifiable factor enabled investigation of the properties and correlates of hope, with a predominance of research based upon Snyder and colleagues' *Hope Theory*. Such research typically asserts the benefits of hope: high levels of hope, manifested through goal-directed behavior, appear consistently associated with a wide range of psychosocial and physical benefits, including positive psychological adjustment, physical health, and superior academic achievement (Snyder, Lopez, & Pedrotti, 2011). Although

these findings are often interpreted as indicating a causal relationship between hope and psychosocial well-being, thus justifying development of hope-based interventions, a 2011 meta-analysis of "hope-enhancement strategies" concluded that evidence was weak or lacking that such strategies positively impacted well-being, arguing that hope may be "a by-product, rather than a determinant, of goal attainment" (Weis & Speridakos, 2011, p. 13). Most research, moreover, has been conducted in laboratories or with relatively high-functioning populations (e.g., tertiary-educated), with further research necessary to explore hope within "real-life" settings, and specifically within clinic-referred or at-risk populations (Weis & Speridakos).

Research predicated upon a measurable and individualized hope, moreover, reflects and reinforces a view of hope as "both the motivation and explanatory cause in an individual's achievement of some goal" (Eliott, 2005, p. 12). A corollary of this is that low levels of hope and goal failure are correspondingly attributed to fault in the individual, "with any social, political, [or] educational contributors . . . viewed as marginal or irrelevant" (Eliott, p. 13). While still affirming the value and power of hope, Weingarten has criticized this dominant western concept, suggesting that hope is not just located within the individual, but is "something people do," further arguing that "Hope is the responsibility of the community" (as cited in Eliott, p. 28). With increased migration and melding of cultures within the global community, further exploration of how hope is made manifest within different communities and cultures may be indicated (see, e.g., Averill and Sundararajan's chapter in Eliott, 2005).

Reflecting upon the different depictions of hope in the academic literature, Eliott observed that "Hope is, or can be, positive, negative, divine, secular, interpersonal, individual, social, ideological, inherent, acquired, objective, subjective, a practice, a possession, an emotion, a cognition, true, false, enduring, transitory, measured, defined, inspired, learnt . . . and the list goes on" (2005, p. 38). Further research must account for the multiplicity of voices of hope.

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Online Resources

Hope Foundation of Alberta. http://www.ualberta.ca/HOPE/

Housework

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Introduction

Domestic labor (and housework as a part of it) was not a subject of study in the social sciences until

the late 1960s since only "paid work" was considered as "work" and the concept of "unpaid work" was not available. It required a great effort by feminists to identify women's housework as "work" and "unpaid work" and to thus render it visible (Acar-Savran, 2003). Housework became a valid subject of study in social sciences, thanks to the first feminist theorizations that aimed to provide the recognition of women's activities at home as "work," to show that their not being present in public life and in the labor market was not women's individual choice, to show the meaning of women's reproductive labor for economy as a whole, to reveal the material basis of women's oppression, etc. (Himmelveit, 2000a, p. 102).

Definition

Domestic labor encompasses both housework and care labor. It embodies a complex set of social relationships which position women as mothers as well as wives. VanEvery (1997, p. 417) argues that "... the possibility that women's responsibility for domestic work results from being wives rather than mothers is part of a naturalizing of the power relations of marriage."

Obviously caregiving work is not limited to dependent children but also includes dependent adults. In fact it is not easy to distinguish these two categories of labor because the care of children and ill and aged persons includes both physical and emotional labor. Acar-Savran (1992) argues that what distinguishes these is not the nature of the work involved but who the target group of the work is. For her it is crucial to distinguish the labor for dependent persons from physical and emotional labor for adults who refuse to take care of themselves. She asserts that even in a gender-equal society, the former will still be a problem.

Housework is defined in housework studies as "a series of unpaid work that is performed in order to meet the needs of family members or to maintain home order" (Lachance-Grzela & Bouchard, 2010, p. 769). The chores involved are listed in empirical studies as follows: housecleaning, meal planning, cooking, dishwashing (or loading dishwasher), cleaning up after meals, grocery shopping, laundry, caring for sick family members, yard work, car maintenance and repairs, outdoor and household maintenance, taking out the garbage, paying bills, and transporting family members (Lachance-Grzela & Bouchard, 2010, p. 769). VanEvery (1997) argues that the communality assumption underlying the empirical definition of household chores as a list is problematic. The problem here is that certain tasks, regardless of under which circumstances they are performed, are seen as housework. Similarly, Delphy (2003) argues that accepting household chores as a list of work to be done implicitly means that the boundaries of that work are drawn by a particular condition, which is the household of the heterosexual and nuclear family. Moreover, according to VanEvery, it is problematic that the tasks have a single meaning as either "housework" or "leisure."

Acar-Savran (1992) argues that using the concept of domestic labor (which includes housework) as a descriptive term causes the loss of theoretical specificity. According to Acar-Savran, the power of this concept lies precisely in its conception of patriarchal relations and in it revelation of the contradiction in these relations. The basic nature of patriarchal relations that introduces the concepts of domestic labor and housework into the analysis is the invisibility of that labor. There are several reasons for domestic labor's being invisible. The first is that this labor is perceived as natural. The second is multitasked nature of domestic work that occludes the amount of domestic working and makes it invisible. Through this multitasking, work and recreation, leisure time and working time, and job and love become intertwined. Thirdly, and most importantly, this form of labor is altogether unpaid. Whether they perform wage labor full time or are full-time housewives, women's labor spent for husbands, children, and husbands' relatives is economically unrequited (Acar-Savran, 1992, p. 11).

Keywords

Domestic labor; housework; unpaid labor; care labor

Traditional Debates

Debates about housework in the social sciences focus on who does the housework, why and how it has changed, and what this change means (Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, & Robinson, 2000). One of the most important economic and social changes in the West at the end of the twentieth century was the dramatic increase of women's participation in the labor market. Progress in this area has pushed social scientists – especially economists and sociologists – to do research on whether the distribution of household chores has also changed in the domestic arena in the last 30 years. Indeed, social scientists assumed that women's participation in paid labor, on its own, would reduce the traditional division of labor in the domestic arena. Studies of heterosexual couples in the West, however, show that, in general, the traditional division of labor largely continues intact (Coltrane, 2010; Lachance-Grzela & Bouchard, 2010; Sayer, 2010). Although the amount of time women spend on domestic work has decreased and time men spend for the same has increased since the 1960s (Bianchi et al., 2000), women still do most of the domestic work. Based on the results of this research, some social scientists, even though they believe that inequality between the sexes gradually decreased, are still not very hopeful that full equality will be achieved. Feminist scholars, on the other hand, are not willing to concede that housework distribution is getting better. For them, women's wage labor market participation does not help to decrease the burden of women housework. On the contrary, women's workload has increased and, as Hotschield says, has become a "double shift" (Acar-Savran, 2003; Bianchi et al., 2000.

There are different perspectives on how to meaningfully explain these trends in the division of labor in the domestic arena as well as diverse explanations for the change. Approaches based on the theory of exchange in the economy explain the domestic division of labor by households' use of resources in a rational and efficient manner: one of the partners specializing in unpaid work and the other one in paid work. One variant of economic approaches is time availability and the other one,

relative resources. The first variant suggests that the time spent at paid work determines which partner will do the housework. The other variant suggests that possession of resources such as education and income increases the bargaining power of the partner. These gender-neutral approaches thus predict that with an increase in women's education and participation in paid work, the degree of inequality will continue to decrease (Bianchi et al., 2000; Crompton, 2006; Lachance-Grzela & Bouchard, 2010; Sayer, 2010).

A "full sharing" of housework is much more plausible when both couples are full-time paid workers and their statuses are similar (Acar-Savran, 2003). Yet, the fact that even in such cases, women do more housework than men reveals the inadequacy of economic approaches to explaining gender inequality. Most importantly, feminist critics of this approach suggest that this gendered distribution of housework itself creates and legitimizes the unequal distribution of power between men and women (Sayer, 2010).

As these structuralist approaches became insufficient to explain the unequal distribution of housework, social scientists once again turned toward more normative/cultural explanations and, especially in the USA, toward sociopsychological explanations (Sullivan, 2004). In this context, gender ideology perspectives based on socialization approaches came to the fore. Gender ideology perspective proposes an inverse relationship between the egalitarian distribution of housework and traditional gender attitudes. Research has found in general a positive relationship between gender egalitarian attitudes and the egalitarian distribution of housework (Lachance-Grzela & Bouchard, 2010; Sullivan, 2004). Research on trends in gender attitudes shows that rejection of traditional gender roles increased in the 1980s, but in the 1990s, this change tended to slow down (Sullivan, 2004). Lastly, the gender ideology perspective has more power in explaining the participation of women in housework than the participation of men (Bianchi et al., 2000).

Another subjective explanation of the persistence of the unequal distribution of housework to the disadvantage of women, despite the increase

in the participation of women in paid jobs and the existence of more egalitarian gender attitudes, is women's sense of fairness toward housework. The distributive justice approach suggests that women's sense of fairness varies according to (a) how they value equity or alternative outcomes (e.g., caring) in domestic life (b) with whom they compare their domestic work – with their husbands' or with other women's – and (c) the extent to which they are convinced by the available justifications of inequality in housework. This approach is supported by an empirical analysis of the variation in these factors (Thompson, 1991).

Dixon and Wetherell (2004), while appreciating the distributive justice approach for positing the issue of social injustice into the domestic arena, for paying attention to the meaning and value attributed to housework by those who do housework, and for its celebration of women's choices, criticize the approach for regarding women's accounts of housework as resulting from individual mental processes. Instead, the writers propose a discursive or social constructionist approach which focuses on how couples construct justice/injustice in their own domestic environments (Dixon & Wetherell, 2004).

VanEvery (1997) criticizes housework studies on two basic points. The first is the understanding of equality in housework research. This perspective, though not explicitly, defines inequality in the distribution of housework with reference to an ideal notion of equity where the housework is fully shared. Or inversely, "egalitarian household" is conceived as one where there is the absence of a gender-based division of labor (VanEvery). Delphy (2003) argues that one cannot even talk about "sharing of housework," let alone accepting it as an ideal. According to Delphy, housework becomes domestic labor when the work is done for someone else. The work that a person does for himself or herself (such as ironing her own clothes) is not domestic labor. As it is performed to satisfy his or her own need, this is not unrequited labor. For Delphy, unrequited labor is a form of exploitation. Thus, instead of "a full sharing," the ideal must be the abolition of unrequited labor.

The second major point of criticism of housework studies concerns the way in which gender is conceptualized. VanEvery (1997) suggests that in quantitative housework studies, gender has been tackled as a variable, so that gender is assumed as a property owned by individuals rather than as a principle of social organization.

Critical Debates

Drawing on a feminist critique of orthodox Marxism, feminist approaches to domestic labor have argued that in industrialized capitalist countries, the household is not only a unit of consumption but also one of production and that this production is beneficial for capitalism. However, these approaches have assumed (but not explained) that domestic work is done by women, and so they have ignored the gendered nature of this work (see Himmelveit, 2000b).

The dual system theories that take up this "ignored" issue consider the relationship between women's domestic labor and capitalism as well as the gendered nature of housework, as objects of analysis. According to the general framework that these theories share, patriarchy and capitalism are articulated in such a way that they feed and reinforce each other. Both capitalism and patriarchy benefit from women's unpaid labor (Acar-Savran, 2003; Gardiner, 2000). For Delphy (2003), the important issue is the "relation of production" between men and women. In this context, the "chief enemy" of women is men, not capitalism (Acar-Savran, 2003). These approaches have been subject to the same criticisms as those addressed to system theories more broadly.

Housework today has moved away from being the subject of feminist theorizing. This is partially the result of the fact that the time devoted to housework has been reduced through availability of market substitutes and the use of domestic technology in industrialized countries. But a more important fact is that, in these countries, the term "care labor," which includes emotional labor, has become more central (see Himmelveit, 2000b). However Acar-Savran (1992) criticizes

the use of the term care labor as if it includes all domestic labor. She argues that "to problematize only care related issues will result in overlooking of the serving an adult man which most blatantly reveals the fact that unpaid labor is a form of hegemonic relationship" (Acar-Savran, 1992, p. 14).

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Housing First

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Introduction

Housing is a critical social determinant of health and one that is closely linked with other determinants such as employment and income (Nelson, Goering, & Tsemberis, 2011). For people with disabilities, including individuals with serious mental illness, housing discrimination is an everyday reality that can make finding and keeping a place to live very challenging (Carling, 1993). Actions at the systems level have greatly affected the milieu of housing options as the neoliberal social policies of many developed countries have eroded the housing and support services for numerous vulnerable populations, creating drastic increases in the rates of homelessness (Nelson et al., 2011). One population that has been severely affected by this deterioration of housing is people with mental illness. Among the homeless population, as many as 40 % of people have a mental illness (Kirby & Keon, 2006); hence, the importance of adequate housing for people with serious mental illness cannot be overstated. Adequate housing does not simply mean a roof over one's head; it refers to a home that is affordable, safe, in good shape, and either provides or enables access to needed supports. Without this, people are at heightened risk of homelessness, mental health problems, chronic health conditions, hospitalization, and malnutrition.

Following a surge in homelessness among people with mental illness from deinstitutionalization during the 1960s and 1970s, a focus was placed on developing housing for this population. Over the last 50 years, numerous models have been implemented and evaluated to curb this problematic trend, one of the most recent of which is Housing First.

Definition

Housing First is an approach to reducing homelessness through the provision of adequate housing to people with serious mental illness who are homeless or living on the street. The Housing First approach was developed as a social policy option and supported housing model by *Pathways to Housing* in New York City in 1992. The approach's fundamental premise is that stable housing is the highest priority for people with serious mental illness who are homeless. On the principle that housing is a human right, Housing First utilizes a harm reduction approach wherein tenants are not required to be "housing ready" (i.e., abstinent or engaged in treatment at the time of housing entry). Furthermore, in line with a recovery-oriented program approach, tenants of supported housing are given a choice as to whether they want to receive services or not. As a whole, the program immediately assists consumers in resolving their most pressing problem – housing – without any strings attached (Nelson et al., 2011). It should be noted that Housing First's core principle of providing housing up-front, regardless of whether tenants are "housing ready," can be applied to nonsupported housing models (e.g., supportive housing, custodial housing; Aubry, Ecker, & Jette, in press); however, this entry will continue to focus on the originally intended and primary use of Housing First as a supported housing model.

Keywords

Homelessness; mental health; supported housing; pathways to housing

Traditional Debates

Deinstitutionalization commenced a period of transition in housing for people with serious mental illness. Following in the footsteps of housing models for people with nonpsychiatric disabilities, early approaches to meet the growing level of need included custodial housing (e.g., board-and-care homes) and semi-institutional facilities that offered few opportunities for community integration or development of independent living skills. To rectify the restricting nature of custodial housing, new models were developed that offered rehabilitation programs focused on life and social skills, independence, and vocational training (Nelson, 2010). Initial efforts intended to build a continuum of residential housing with varying levels of support lacked consensus on the components of an optimal continuum and were criticized for forcing people to accept treatment in order to access housing (Carling, 1993; Nelson, Aubry, & Hutchison, 2010). To address the criticisms of the residential continuum model, Paul Carling argued for supported housing, wherein supports are linked to the individual, not the home (Nelson et al., 2010). Should tenants of supported housing move, the supports can be carried over to their new housing. Furthermore, the supported housing approach places greater emphasis on prioritizing consumer choice of housing (e.g., location, roommates) and supports (e.g., type, intensity) than does other models (e.g., supportive housing; Nelson et al., 2010).

Housing First, a type of supported housing, was developed in response to traditional housing programs that require residents to be "housing ready," which entails being abstinent and/or willing to accept treatment prior to admission to housing (i.e., treatment-first). Unlike in treatment-first approaches, if tenants of Housing First programs experience a substance or psychiatric relapse, their housing status remains stable (i.e., they are not forced to leave their apartment to seek treatment; Tsemberis, 1999). A longitudinal study of housing stability over a 5-year period found that 88 % of tenants in the Pathways Housing First program remained

housed, compared to only 47 % of residents in city-run, treatment-first housing programs (Tsemberis & Eisenberg, 2000). Not only does the Housing First approach avert jeopardizing tenants' housing situations, it is also not associated with increased substance use (Padgett, Gulcur, & Tsemberis, 2006) . A randomized controlled trial conducted by Greenwood, Schaefer-McDaniel, Winkel, and Tsemberis (2005) found that rates of substance use did not differ between tenants of a Housing First model and residents of a treatment-first housing program. New research by Tsemberis, Kent, and Respress (2012) now suggests that Housing First may be effective in reducing alcohol dependence. The 2-year evaluation found that tenants of the Pathways Housing First program experienced significant reductions on the impact of alcohol (including level of use) in their lives at 1- and 2-year follow-up time points. While Housing First appears promising for individuals with serious mental illness and substance use problems, the effectiveness of the approach for other homeless populations is only beginning to be investigated (e.g., persons with HIV/AIDS; Hawk & Davis, 2012).

As a social policy, the Housing First approach is an economically viable option for reducing homelessness. A cost-benefit evaluation of a Housing First program in Denver, Colorado, found that the city saved over $30,000 per tenant as a result of reduced emergency service usage (Pearlman & Parvensky, 2004).

Critical Debates

As a relatively new model with demonstrated effectiveness in promoting stable housing, Housing First has few critics. In fact, one researcher in the field has even remarked that "it is virtually impossible to find solid criticism of the Housing First model anywhere" (Falvo, 2008). However, an in-depth review of the model finds that challenges are beginning to emerge. The implementation of Housing First in the current socioeconomic climate brings unique positive and negative factors to the approach. While the immediate provision of housing, regardless of whether tenants are

"housing ready," is immeasurably valuable given present socioeconomic conditions, the extreme housing shortages in many urban areas create challenges related to the delivery of housing support. As a result of the shortages, housing is often developed or available in remote areas of cities that are located far from services and poorly served or inaccessible by transit (Gaetz, 2011). With few, if any, options for people to select from, a central component of the Housing First approach, consumer choice, becomes compromised. Aggravating the problem further is a supported housing principle that support services are to be off-site and disconnected from housing in order to allow for individuals to transition in and out of housing without a loss of supports. Ultimately, geographical isolation from support services can undermine housing stability and security of tenure (Gaetz, 2011). In an evaluation of tenants' satisfaction with a Toronto-based Housing First program, a minority of tenants said they had considered giving up their housing and returning to the streets. Findings showed that one reason for this was due to the location of the housing, with one participant reporting that they thought about moving "occasionally, just to get back to the [other side of the city] and see friends more often" (Raine & Marcellin, 2009). Additionally, because the Housing First approach replicates the North American emphasis on individualism (i.e., with the use of private apartments), tenants are vulnerable to loneliness and isolation. This is an even greater issue among Housing First tenants who relocated and left their communities and social networks. As a result, the case can be made for the creation of more communal living environments to prevent such challenges in Housing First programs.

The Housing First approach has also faced criticism on the assertion that it can end homelessness. As the Housing First model primarily targets chronically homeless, single individuals with a history of mental illness and substance abuse (Pearson, Locke, Montgomery, & Buron, 2007), other populations are often neglected, including the hidden homeless (i.e., people who reside temporarily with family, friends, or others because they have nowhere else to live) and homeless families. An examination of tenant

characteristics of three Housing First programs in the United States found that most had lived previously in homeless shelters or on the streets (Pearson et al., 2007). Only 16 % had been previously living in an arrangement that was not on the streets, in a homeless shelter, in prison, or in a psychiatric hospital. The finding suggests that the hidden homeless population is often not reached by Housing First programs. Similarly, Housing First has traditionally not targeted homeless families. While programs for families exist (e.g., Beyond Shelter in Los Angeles), they are few in number presently with little to no evaluative research on their effectiveness.

Conclusion

The Housing First approach is a promising supported housing model and social policy option for reducing homelessness among people with serious mental illness. By immediately providing housing, regardless of whether tenants are "housing ready," the model effectively gets individuals off the streets or out of the cycle of homelessness. Two of the central components of the approach, consumer choice and privacy, have led to some difficulties. The former is sometimes compromised by the growing affordable housing shortages while the latter, through the use of private apartments, has created a vulnerability to loneliness and isolation among tenants. Overall, current evidence demonstrates that the Housing First approach is successful in stably housing a very difficult population of chronically homeless individuals with mental health and addictions issues; however, it is only beginning to be implemented with other homeless populations (e.g., veterans, persons with HIV/AIDS, homeless families).

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Online Resources

Mental Health Commission of Canada's *At Home/Chez Soi* Project (the largest research demonstration project addressing homelessness with a Housing First model in the world). Retrieved from http://www.mentalhealth-commission.ca/English/Pages/homelessness.aspx

Pathways to Housing's Research Library. Retrieved from http://pathwaystohousing.org/content/research_library

SAMHSA's National Registry of Evidence-based Programs and Practices: Pathways' Housing First Program. Retrieved from http://nrepp.samhsa.gov/ViewIntervention.aspx?id=155

Human Rights

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Introduction

Perhaps no other topic better captures W. B. Gallie's notion of an "essentially contested concept" than human rights. Abstract yet evaluative, the concept "inevitably involves endless disputes about . . . proper uses on the part of their users [which] cannot be settled by appeal to empirical evidence, linguistic usage, or the canons of logic alone" (Gallie, 1956). Human rights discourse is nonetheless foundational to the theory and practice of international law and the laws of war.

The discursive character of human rights, commonly used as a mass noun, gives it no discrete historical origin, rationale, or definition. We refer instead to its various codifications in religious texts, moral philosophy, founding national documents, and the international treaties, charters, conventions, covenants, declarations, and protocols that outline the duties corresponding to these rights. Regarding the objects of human rights, Philosopher Brian Orend (2002, p. 62) speaks of a "foundational five": (1) personal security, (2) material subsistence, (3) elemental equality, (4) personal freedom, and (5) recognition as a member of the human community.

Despite or perhaps because of its multivalence, the concept of human rights has been criticized as "foundationalist," "essentialist," or "ethnocentric" – its universalism being used as a weapon against itself by those wary of Western-led globalization and cultural imperialism (Prasad, 2007). However, the tolerance discourses popular in critical theory gain their normative force from the same menu of individual or group rights, though they tend to prioritize the value of "recognition" over liberal conceptions of liberty and equality. Illiberal and intolerant groups, including increasingly prominent Islamist factions, also criticize the international human rights regime and nations privileging egalitarian individualism.

Withstanding dissent, the concept of human rights has proved legally, politically, and philosophically robust. Though universal, it accommodates a diversity of justifications and supports diversity as a value (Appiah, 2006). Human rights represent pluralism in practice and serve to ground the basic "goods" agreed as necessary for human development the world over (Taylor, 1989; Malley-Morrison & Trosky, 2011).

Definition

The rights we call "human" are those whose most salient features are universality and equality – "universal" because they are owed to humans (though potentially to other sentient beings) and

"equal" owing to the recognition that all such beings posses basic moral worth. These qualities are conjured in the familiar praise words, "humanity" and "dignity." Though this linguistic designation does not by itself serve as a justification for human rights, their frequent appearance in founding political documents and legal decisions gives some indication of their force and breadth in the "opinion of mankind."

While the frequency of appeals to dignity and shared humanity might make them seem self-evident, "self-evidence" and "inalienability" are tempting but tautological grounds for human rights (McCudden, 2008; Etzioni, 2009). The notion of rights as "entitlements" better withstands scrutiny. "Entitlement" here does not indicate that rights are *properties* that human beings *have*, but refers to the compelling *reasons* humans have to treat each other in particular ways.

These rights entail reasons for decency that go beyond familiar formulations of reciprocal self-interest in private/interpersonal morality, such as the golden rule or the no-harm principle, to the heart of political or "public" morality. Such civil or procedural rights ensure familiar legal protections such as freedom of conscience, expression, movement, association, and due process, but also make possible the many secondary goods that come from human society.

A second tier of "substantive" social and economic rights have more concrete objects: health care, education, housing, work, subsistence wages, and basic utilities. These can be thought of as necessary complements to, even prerequisites of, the former tier (Vincent, 1986).

Human rights, therefore, come in both negative/inhibitive and positive/proactive varieties and are sometimes formulated to include a third, "cultural" tier encompassing elements of dignity and identity like the right to recognition and freedom from humiliation (Rorty, 2002; Taylor, 1994). As I discuss later, conflicts can arise when a proactive stance on recognition valorizes exclusionary identities or ideologies, such as those expressed in hate speech.

Though violators of the law can justly be seen as forfeiting their freedom for a time, the rights to life and liberty generally represent every individual's immunity from being treated as a means to a social or political end, no matter how noble or urgent. Because they are moral as well as legal, human rights claims act as a trump against unjust laws (Dworkin, 1984). Transcending cultural, religious, and national boundaries, human rights are the closest thing humans have to moral absolutes (against the intentional harm of innocents, for example). Their diversity, the exigencies of war and politics, and the elusiveness of human intention all raise issues of interpretation and enforcement that remain the source of controversy.

Keywords

Human rights; right; duty; dignity; justice; morality; international law; ethics; essentially contested concept

History

Rights are the modern, individualistic expression of an older conception of moral obligation focused instead on duty – the obligation to do what is right, good, or just. In East and West alike, these desiderata have historically been defined by the religious, political, and/or familial entities that constitute individual identity (Taylor, 1989). The identity-giving unit could be rooted in tribe, class, country, empire, ethnicity, civilization, religion, or some combination of these, but without neutral arbiter.

The historical confluence of duty-giving institutions into individual and/or familial obligations in East and West inspired not only traditions of inquiry, but their great works of art and drama, starting with Sophocles' Antigone and the Mahabharata. Are there obligations that trump local custom, parochial power, religious injunction, blood loyalty, or common law? If not, what principles should determine priority?

The emergence of such "natural law" philosophy and jurisprudence in the West was halting and imperfect and eventually gave way to the sturdier formulations of positive international

law. The advent of the nation state, with its division of public and private spheres, facilitated the development of the values that have come under the heading "human rights" but also raised new dilemmas of authority and jurisdiction (Bellamy, 2008, 2001; Habermas, 1991).

In the modern, rights-based normative framework, individuals are responsible for choosing or fashioning their own identity but retain a reciprocal duty to respect others' (Foucault, 1984). However, conceptions of duties that extend to the entire human family originated long before the Enlightenment era in the various religious traditions of the axial age and were gradually secularized. This process was anticipated by the meeting of Christianity and Stoic philosophy in the Roman Empire, which, despite global aspirations, balanced a respect for local custom with a rigorous and coherent legal code.

The cosmopolitan tendencies of these traditions, reincarnated in Renaissance humanism, Reformation conscience, and British common law, each setting the stage for the modern conception of right as moral possession: the idea that individuals are entitled to property aiding their survival, including their own person (Locke, 1980/1689). The ability to self-govern was to be granted irrespective of social status and/or religious affiliation – though not yet race and gender – as reflected in the ideas of the legal contract and political declaration.

In international law, jurists of this era developed an approach to natural right that also treated nations as sovereign individuals, though they retained imperfect duties to right wrongs in pursuit of justice (the so-called *ius gentium* or "law of peoples"). These scholars and statesmen sought to ground the transnational bonds between peoples in natural philosophy, thereby putting morality on more solid scientific, legal, and secular footing (Pufendorf, 2005/1672). The view that nations were moral entities with correlative duties proved difficult to enforce. Though there was some reduction in the number of religious wars, the Hobbesian world of anarchic international relations remained dominant until the twentieth century.

While positive international law long deferred to nation states to guarantee the civil and political rights of citizens, the expansion of war through increasingly lethal weapons technology spurred the development of the human rights claims that citizens and soldiers have against governments, foreign and domestic. These include *jus in bello* proscriptions of torture and killing of noncombatants and prisoners of war that were incipient in the centuries-old just war tradition. International humanitarian law found its first positive formulation in the American Civil War-era Lieber Code (1863), and the First Geneva (1864) and Hague (1899) Conventions which provisioned for the care and quarter of captured and wounded soldiers, and protection of civilians and their property from despoliation.

These conventions were repeatedly revisited and refined, but convulsive violence of World War II led to the adoption of in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948. Its 30 articles canvass all "tiers" of rights: *basic rights* to life, liberty, and security of person; the *civil* and *political rights* to speech, assembly, affiliation, and trial guaranteed in several national constitutions and legal codes; and *social/cultural/economic rights* instrumental to recognition, dignity, and development, including rights to health, education, work, and recreation. The fact that this range of rights came out of war is an acknowledgement that their respect is cumulatively constitutive of peace (Trosky & Campbell, 2013).

In 1966, the UN General Assembly approved separate International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. After their ratification 10 years later, these became the most influential, if underappreciated, documents of their kind, creating accountability structures in international human rights law that could punish noncompliance. These advances have been accompanied by special treaties prohibiting genocide (1966) and torture (1984) and protecting individual and group rights against discrimination on the basis of race (1966), gender (1979), age (1989), ability (2007), or indigenous status (2007).

Traditional Debates

Even after the postwar flowering of an international human rights regime, debates persist regarding origin, authority, and enforcement. Add to these more recent accusations of "humanitarian imperialism," whereby cynical politicians use human rights principles as cover for geopolitically motivated violations of national sovereignty, and you get Gallie's "essentially contested concept." I will discuss the dual challenges of enforcement and misrepresentation in the following two sections.

The provenance of human rights law relates directly to the charge of ethnocentrism and abuse: International law deals with the nation state, which is a Western invention, and, with the exceptions to national sovereignty granted under humanitarian law, has become the plaything of the most powerful states, especially in the developing world. Furthermore, the norms of humanitarian law have their basis in just war theory, which is a product of Catholic Church fathers – another demerit for its putative universalism and impartiality.

Proponents argue in response that it is precisely the combination of these two – the spirit of natural law and the letter of positive international law – that give the human rights framework its necessary combination of venerability and adaptability (Bellamy, 2008). The geographic, cultural, and historical situatedness of ideas, the counterargument goes, does not automatically compromise their truth or universality. As for that idea's misrepresentation, a Catholic maxim puts it best: *Abusus non tollit usus* (abuse does not destroy a thing's usefulness, but confirms it).

Critical Debates

Critical theorists and other postmodern observers remain dissatisfied with the long-standing effort to ground rights and duties in human dignity – that "shibboleth of all empty-headed moralists" (Schopenhauer, 1965 [1839]) – or in natural law that "brooding omnipresence in the sky" (Holmes, 1917). Broader appeals to human biology or rationality or to simple consensus as the basis of human rights also strike moral skeptics as invalid arguments from authority or tautologies. They beg the questions: What exactly constitutes "human" or "rational"? And why should a majority get to decide?

Adhering to the fact/value distinction, science does not provide any definitive answers, but does provide evidence of the sociobiological value of humans' empathic capacity from growing research in neuroscience, anthropology, and peace psychology. These findings have the potential to bolster the claim that respect for rights is an indicator of the health and progress of human civilization, but this functionalist explanation does not differ greatly from the consensus argument. By its own standards, however, science cares more about the utility of a theory than its truth.

This leads back to the traditional debate over human rights' enforcement. Less fighting and more agreement seems good for any group, but has the consensus around the human rights regime led to less fighting? The disappointment of democratic peace theory – that liberal societies have in the past centuries been the most belligerent (though not with each other) – seems to indicate not (Doyle, 2011). There is a qualitative consideration, however, of *how* that consensus has been achieved nationally – with what level of coercion or violence – that is at least as significant as this quantitative measure. Additionally, lower levels of coercion or conformity manage to preserve diversity, which is survivally advantageous.

Extending the biological analogy to politics leads to less tractable debates over the reality (read universality) of moral norms generally. Are they, can they be, and do they need to be something more than successful memes? Much of social and critical psychology assumes not. Regardless of truth claims, the communitarian thinker Amitai Etzioni argues persuasively that the *normativity* of human rights is self-evident (2009). The salient feature of the human rights framework is that it represents an axiomatic "core principle . . . for the construction of international

law and norms" (2009, 193) and, as such, need not be defended. There *is* no alternative principle – be it states' rights, divine rights, or raw power – nearly as compelling for creatures that wish to live together in peace.

International Relevance

Given the selectivity in application of human rights law, skepticism of it in critical theory and social psychological peace research is warranted. The prevalence of "prudential" realist rationales and competing national interests often stultifies Security Council. Leaders that circumvent the United Nations mechanism sometimes do so under the guise of the same principles they violate: The Cold War and the so-called War on Terror have themselves been occasion for atrocious violations of human rights, including torture, massacres, and mass displacements (Kinzer, 2006; Trosky, Salmberg, Marcucci, & O'Neil, 2013). Critics of such dissimulation nonetheless find themselves using the same vocabulary and concepts from human rights to condemn these actions (Bellamy, 2008; Kinzer, 2006; Walzer, 2006). Human rights' supporters argue that this critique confuses (lack of) enforcement for (lack of) justification and that right and duty to aid remains justified even – indeed, especially – where government does not respect it (Orend, 2002). Equal protection under the law is what human rights demand, not what defines them.

Since militant nationalism is most often to blame for frustrating the international legal process, some critics advocate strengthening oversight of human rights law by compelling large nations like China, India, and Pakistan to become signatories to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and for signatories like Iran, Syria, Russia, and the United States to ratify the Rome Statute transferring jurisdiction for human rights violations and war crimes from the Security Council to the ICC. The USA has also denied accession to the United Nations' International Court of Justice in The Hague to prosecute aggression since 1986. Even with the charter of the ICC in 2002, the absence of a comprehensive transnational executor to apply humanitarian law and prevent atrocities still serves as an excuse to disregard human rights as useful fiction or pure idealism.

The supporter might retort that human rights mostly concern the "lower limits on tolerable human conduct" rather than "great aspirations and exalted ideals" (Shue, 1996). Or, one could plausibly argue, the *belief* in human rights – in human equality – long before their formal codification led to tangible progress toward those ideals in the abolition of slavery, achievement of women's suffrage, and victories of the Civil Rights movement. In this narrative, such landmarks are all part of the same struggle, the inconclusiveness of which does not serve as a disproof of the reality of its objectives, but an imperative to realize them. The Nobel Foundation and the League of Nations; the Nuremberg Trials and the Marshal Plan; the extradition and conviction of war criminals, civil and military; and the establishment of more respectful regimes from Japan to Germany and Liberia to Serbia: these are also part of this narrative, countering skeptics' objections that human rights' imperfect enforcement evidences the subjugation of ethical considerations to powerful institutions. Ideas, too, have power, and the idea of human rights has proven to be among the most powerful (Crawford, 2002).

Practical Relevance

If the preceding arguments against the hegemony of human rights, real or imagined, prove to be moot in relation to the most obvious rights – to life, for example, or freedom from fear – a more exacting critique exists in relation to secondary rights, such as freedom from discrimination or, positively, recognition. In either case, if these rights truly are universal, wouldn't they already exist in some form in every developed moral and legal code? "Why not just enforce or elevate the norms that we have?" communitarians and libertarians might ask.

As specific claims on governments and institutions supported by strong reasons, human rights are qualitatively different from, and superordinate to, ordinary interpersonal moral norms.

They prohibit private as well as public forms of discrimination, though, in most cases, they complement and support existing law. Individuals seeking to define themselves outside of customarily recognized categories might require an additional layer of protection from an insufficiently inclusive majority or state.

These cases can present an additional problem when individual or group expression of freedom of speech or religion is used to deny other rights – like those to health, life, or recognition. The rubric of "rationality" is of little help here, as part of what rights permit is the prerogative of individuals, families, and certain groups to balance identity against risk and, within limits, harm to themselves and those in their care. In the collision of rights claims, liberal democracies usually choose to accord religious communities similar exemptions, despite the fact that the right to self-determination sometimes endangers not only members, but, potentially, society at large, as in the right to refuse vaccination. Thresholds of tolerance of this tension between identity and safety are determined in nations' highest courts, with the cases decided differently depending on the weight accorded to contested categories such as "property," "self," "good," and "harm."

The occasional messiness of this process and persistent absence of consensus can polarize the political spectrum. Dissensus drives some to the relative certainty of religion or other rightward havens and others on the Left to anarchical recalcitrance or smug cynicism. Constructivism and critical theory are among those camps that tend to view liberal consensus skeptically, though historicist lenses. Viewed from the poles, it is tempting to trivialize the international human rights regime as a postwar curiosity – a residuum of Western hegemony whose days are numbered in light of the apparent shift in geopolitical inertia to the East.

Perhaps we are coming full circle, to an era in which local law or norms are sovereign, and the reach of international law or norms' is merely theoretical. Prescriptive moral relativism claims that even where enforceable, international norms should defer to tradition and actual cultural practice (MacIntyre, 1988). Controverting this view, human rights aspire to a moral and legal expression of the core principles that are shared by any successful ethical code and therefore outrank particularistic mores that violate humane treatment of individuals in the name of group identity (Orend, 2002; Walzer, 2006).

At all events, cultural relativism is becoming less palatable in the post-positivist intellectual and political climate. Rather than a liability, the degree to which communities allow and preserve space for contestation can be seen as a confirmation of human rights – a rubric of the Rule of Law and health of a liberal polity. The negotiation of these rights' content and application is potentially endless, but the rules by which civil discourse takes place are more fixed – a small comfort amidst globalization's constant flux.

Future Directions

Whatever perils viral communications technology present in an age of mass democracy and inequality, the biological, cultural, and geographical determinisms promulgated in popular social psychology represent an equal threat, undermining self-efficacy and adaptability. These tend to discount the individual's ability to judge, to change, to improve, and to become freer and more open. Worse, these memes have a self-fulfilling quality.

Contrary to this facile account of socialization, it seems to be in the very nature of rights to *not* depend on – in fact to protect *from* – majority will. Thus, the same principle that putatively enthrones democracy also shields individuals from it. Consensus may shift, for instance, from those who would wish to trade privacy for security in the wake of terrorist catastrophe – but human rights guarantee the perpetuation of community and preservation of liberty; however the political winds may blow.

Debate over the universality of human rights will affect the outcome of another contemporary conundrum, the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. Interventions of questionable necessity (most recently Iraq 2003) have made the use of

force to halt widespread human rights violations in Darfur (genocide) and Syria (war crimes and crimes against humanity) more difficult. The challenge remains to educate populations, elevate debate, and keep leaders accountable, including in nations that have become the de facto (NATO) and de jure (UN Security Council) custodians of human rights.

The primary challenge in critical psychology remains squaring the value-free character of scientific inquiry with the substantive demands of human rights, which respect no such epistemological boundaries. Psychologists are among the best in respecting the rights of test subjects and client confidentiality but still face dilemmas in the application of their skill. Members of the American Psychological Association acted in an advisory capacity during the US government's adoption of "enhanced interrogation techniques" that were later categorized as torture. Others renounced their membership in protest. Knowledge and respect for human rights determine how psychologists and citizens balance personal, professional, and patriotic obligations.

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Humanism

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Introduction

Contrary to prevailing misconceptions, humanism is not a singular or coherent philosophy nor simply a movement within philosophy. Humanism is best defined as a sensibility shared by people of widely differing philosophical orientations who diverge sharply on political and religious issues (Fromm 1966). The humanist outlook has two main sources in the pre-Christian world. The first is the Biblical insistence that all human beings are made in the image and likeness of God. This ancient theological motif conveys the fundamental unity of the human species and the singularity and worth of each and every human being. Add to this the Prophetic insistence on justice, mercy, and a truth-loving disposition, and you have all the essential values that the Hebrew tradition bequeathed to the West (Fromm, 1966).

Among the Greek and Roman philosophers, the Stoics probably contributed most to the humanist outlook. They embraced and espoused the unity of the human species and the importance of cultivating inner freedom and rational self-mastery (or *wisdom*) as a response to the manifold injustices of the world. Status and ethnicity, which count for so much in the minds of most men, do not sway the judgment of Stoic philosopher. Thus Epictetus, a Stoic philosopher of the first and second century, was a slave and yet also a preceptor to the Emperor Marcus Aurelius. The Roman playwright Terence had one of his characters says, "Homo sum; nihil humani me alienum puto" or "I am a man; nothing human is alien to me." The broad implication of this remark is that Terence's hero refused to identify with one particular ethnic group. He regarded himself as what the Stoics called a *cosmopolite* – a citizen of the universe, and not the representative of a particular race, nation, or religious orientation. He embraced a *panhuman* identity that transcends the vagaries of ethnicity and religious belief (Cassirer, 1947; Bloch, 1961).

During the Italian Renaissance, humanism denoted the revival of pagan – and especially Stoic and neo-Platonic – learning by Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola, among others. These scholars stressed (1) the need for well-rounded people who study "the humanities," in addition to Scripture and (2) the essential compatibility between neo-Stoic and neo-Platonic philosophies and the Christian faith. Later, during the Reformation, the term "humanism" was used to describe the sensibilities of nondogmatic and ecumenically minded Christians like Petrarch and Erasmus, who felt that Christianity is as germane to the problems of living in *this* world as it is to seeking salvation in the next.

Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola, who sought to emulate the ancients, gave humanism a somewhat "backward looking" character, and in due course, the term "humanism" was attached to the work of conservative historians like Jacob Burckhardt, who looked back at the Renaissance as a period worthy of veneration (Baker, 1961; Kristeller, 1979). But by the mid-nineteenth century, the term humanism took on a decidedly different inflection, being

embraced by left-wing Hegelians like David Strauss, Ludwig Feuerbach, and Karl Marx. Following the Enlightenment tradition, they used the term "humanism" to describe an explicitly *atheistic* outlook that explains belief in the supernatural and longings for transcendence as the result of the (unconscious) projection of the "human essence" into an otherworldly realm, which is conjured up by the faithful as a consolation for (or legitimation of) an unjust social order that constrains or deforms our latent sociability and capacity to reason. Unlike Burkhardt, whose humanism centered on the study or emulation of the past, Feuerbach and Marx made humanism a task for the future. Marx summed up this attitude nicely when he said that we are still caught up in the era of human *prehistory*. By his reckoning, real human history has yet to begin and will not commence until exploitation, oppression, and the ideologies that serve to justify or disguise them all cease to exist (Bloch, 1961; Fromm, 1965).

In the twentieth century, the word "humanism" often denoted a resolute refusal to ground ethics in any supernatural or transcendental framework, which was sometimes coupled with an uncritical faith in the ability of science to illumine and improve our collective lot. Unfortunately, then – and indeed, to this day – the more facile, unreflective forms of atheistic humanism verge on sheer scientism or an uncritical reliance on science to provide solutions to existential problems. Humanism of this skeptical and/or ethical persuasion is simply an extension of old-fashioned Enlightenment rationalism and, despite obvious points of similarity, is generally quite wary of Marxism, which it regards as a kind of a secular religion.

Definition

The preceding reflections demonstrate that however passionately they argue for or against it, no one actually *owns* the term "humanism" and with it, the right to prescribe how it ought to be used or precisely what it means. Judging from history alone, humanism in the broadest sense may be religious or irreligious, contemplative or activist, or forward or backward looking. But despite its religious/political colorations, which are extremely varied, there is also a lucid, intelligible core to the humanist outlook that is evident in all of its diverse manifestations. Whatever form it takes and whenever it appears, humanism always emphasizes the fundamental unity of the human species, the singularity and worth of persons, and our duty to defend and promote human dignity and welfare in *our* time, rather than in kingdom come. Furthermore, humanism (in all its forms) emphasizes that human beings are not just the passive playthings of Fate – or of language, ideology, and so on. It allows for the existence of a degree of self-determination which is not trivial and must never be overlooked. By the humanist account, people can (and must) take an active role in shaping their own destinies and their own identities, if they wish to be truly free. Freedom, by this account, is not the mere absence of external constraint or something that someone else can bestow on you. It is something that is earned or achieved through reflection and diligent self-development.

Keywords

Anti-humanism; atheism; colonialism; cosmopolitanism; The Bible; freedom; racism; self-determination; singularity; stoicism

Traditional Debates

In light of historical reflection, it is imperative that psychologists differentiate clearly between "humanism" in the broader, encompassing sense and "humanistic psychology." The former began as a movement *within* Christianity that fostered a revival of pagan learning, and a bookish, multilingual tradition of reflection on history and the human condition that stretches backwards to the Bible and the Stoics, and forwards to politically engaged (post-Christian) intellectuals like George Orwell and Albert Camus. By contrast, humanistic psychology began as a specifically

American response to a specifically American problem – the dominance of behaviorism and psychoanalysis over the mental health field in the Cold War era (Burston, 2003b). Back in the 1950s, these rival orthodoxies had complete hegemony over psychology and psychiatry, respectively. While it has changed and developed considerably since then, the relationship of humanistic psychology to the older, European philosophical psychology was often problematic and actually quite tenuous at times.

Critical Debates

Because of Europe's dismal record of exploitation and genocide vis-a-vis non-European peoples, humanism's roots in European culture have prompted critics to dismiss it as a hypocritical ideology that made many back-handed concessions to colonial powers. And on reflection, humanist tropes have been used to justify imperialist and colonialist territorial expansion, going all the way back to Roman times. But as Paul Gilroy demonstrates eloquently in *Against Race* (2000), there is a danger that our critical zeal may prompt us to throw out the baby with the bath water. Gilroy calls for a new cosmopolitanism or "Planetary Humanism" or "Strategic Universalism" that is cheerfully eclectic, drawing on all the world's cultural and artistic traditions, to replace the invidious forms of identity politics that stress victimization at the expense of solidarity and lock people into different forms of exclusionism and mistrust.

Sadly, Gilroy's proposal has not received the attention it deserves, possibly because of the lingering impact of the anti-humanist onslaught that took place in the twentieth century (Soper, 1986). The first installment of explicitly anti-humanist rhetoric appears in Max Scheler's book on social psychology called *Ressentiment*, published in 1917, where he commended Nietzsche heartily for his unrelenting anti-humanism. Scheler was referring to Nietzsche's scathing and vitriolic attacks on (1) "the Jewish slave revolt in morals" that he believed underscored the Christian message (and the modern trade union

movement) and (2) the Stoic/Hellenistic emphasis on the natural equality of all "races," which Nietzsche deemed dangerous and delusional (Burston, 2003a). Look forward to 1946, and we find Scheler's erstwhile friend and admirer Martin Heidegger writing "A letter on Humanism" to his French follower, Jean Beaufret. Heidegger's anti-democratic sentiments were as strong as Scheler's, though less in evidence here (Rockmore, 1995).

Through a series of events too complex to describe in detail here, the ideas of Nietzsche and Heidegger start informing many structuralist, post-structuralist, postmodern, and deconstructionist theorists, whose strident denunciations of humanism gain increasing currency after 1968. It is profoundly ironic that many of the leading left-wing intellectuals who denounced humanism in the last quarter of the twentieth century drew heavily from the thought of Nietzsche and Heidegger, whose aristocratic, fascist, and racist attitudes are all well known and documented. Many of us have yet to fully grasp the intriguing oddity of this situation, much less resolve the manifold contradictions that stem from this strange state of affairs.

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Humanistic Psychology

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Introduction

Humanistic psychology is often discussed as "third force" psychology to distinguish it from "first force" (psychoanalysis) and "second force" (behaviorism) psychology. Humanistic psychologists hold that these prior paradigms have a limited view of humankind – psychoanalysis because of its focus on unhealthy behavior and behaviorism because of its mechanistic reduction of human beings to stimulus – response organisms. Two axiomatic assumptions undergird humanistic psychology theory and method – holism and the self-actualizing tendency. Holism is the belief that each person is a unified whole (mind, body, spirit) rather than a fragmented conglomeration of parts; human existence is a reciprocal relationship between individual subjectivity, interpersonal and social relationships, and the material world. The

second assumption, self-actualization, refers to the inherent movement of human beings toward the fulfillment of their potential. Both Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers hypothesized that the normative biology of the human organism is one that propels human beings toward self-actualization. It was the belief in the fundamental potential of humankind that swept in the era of humanistic psychology and helped make Maslow and Rogers two of the most influential psychologists in the history of psychology (Haggbloom et al., 2002).

Keywords

Humanistic psychology; human science

History

Abraham Maslow

Maslow's inspiration can be traced to psychologists such as Gordon Allport, Henry Murray, Gardner Murphy, Andras Angyal, and Kurt Goldstein who called for a holistic approach to personality. Maslow and, subsequently, Carl Rogers, Sidney Jourard, and Fritz Perls elaborated on these early ideas of person-centered psychology to develop the theoretical and praxis base of humanistic psychology.

Maslow's most notable contributions were the concepts of the self-actualizing person, peak experiences, and the hierarchy of needs. For Maslow, a self-actualized person is characterized by acceptance, spontaneity, problem centering, solitude, autonomy, fresh appreciation of experiences, humility and respect, healthy interpersonal relationships, means/ends integrity, humor, creativity, resistance to enculturation, clearly held values, and the ability to embrace imperfections and resolve dichotomies (Maslow, 1970). A central characteristic of self-actualized people is their ability to have peak experiences – moments of ego transcendence characterized by feelings of extreme bliss, interconnectedness, and wholeness.

The second conceptual contribution of Maslow is a motivational theory of human

potential encapsulated in his hierarchy of needs. Maslow theorized that human needs are comprised of physiological needs, followed subsequently by safety needs, loving/belong needs, esteem needs, and finally the need for self-actualization. Toward the end of his career, Maslow noted that in powerful peak experiences, the self dissolves into a transcendent experience of deep awareness of cosmic unity and wholeness. This latter development established the foundation for transpersonal psychology that focuses on transcendent and spiritual states of consciousness as well as mystical and sublime experiences.

Less known is Maslow's development of Eupsychian management that describes a future when companies will be managed by self-actualized individuals whose management style facilitates the self-actualization of those whom they manage (Maslow, 1962). Maslow's ideas of enlightened management are reflected in current management practices such as that of Total Quality Management (Payne, 2000).

Carl Rogers

Rogers' client-centered therapy is founded on a basic trust in each person's ability to move toward a constructive and realistic fulfillment of his/her potential. Rogers believed that even under the most adverse conditions, human beings strive to actualize their potential and that the key to moving through discouraging life experiences is to engage in a relationship which provides the interpersonal container from which to grow toward wholeness. For Rogers, an effective therapist is one who is genuine, listens empathically to the client, and unconditionally accepts the client as he or she is. Such a relationship encourages the client to develop his/her own unconditional positive regard, thereby eliminating the anxiety and inner incongruence which result from internalizing conditions of worth (Rogers, 1951, 1977, 1980).

Rogers developed the Basic Encounter Group as an extension of the client/therapy relationship and used the structure of the Basic Encounter Group to facilitate community workshops throughout the world. In 1987 he was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in acknowledgment of his work on intergroup conflict in South Africa and Northern Ireland.

Rollo May

May is known for his development of existential psychology and drew attention to the importance of people understanding the reality of their own experience. Existential psychologists understand the human experience as characterized by freedom and the polarities associated with either the dread of freedom itself or of the limitations on freedom. Psychophysiological resilience is therefore a result of the integration and confrontation of these polarities (Schneider & May, 1995). The literary and philosophical roots of existential psychology range from the mythical traditions of Rome and Greece to the literary and philosophical traditions of Camus, Socrates, Lao Tzu, Pascal, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre. The writings of both May and Maslow on human creativity spawned humanistic research in the area of creativity (i.e., Richards, 2010).

Key Women in Humanistic Psychology

Laura Perls and Virginia Satir were both well-known therapists in the humanistic psychology tradition; Perls expanded the experiential process of therapy and Satir was the founder of conjoint family therapy. Natalie Rogers extended the person-centered approach to include expressive arts and social change (Rogers, 2011). Jean Houston, a pioneer in human potential research, works as an advisor to both UNICEF and the United Nations Development Group and trains people throughout the world in the field of Social Artistry which places the work of enhancing human capacity within the context of global and social complexity (www.jeanhoustonfoundation.org).

Methodological Contributions

Humanistically oriented researchers espouse dialogue between various research traditions and hold as a central value understanding and promoting the welfare of all human beings

(Greening & Bohart, 2001). Although not opposed to quantitative methods, humanistic researchers typically embrace qualitative human science approaches. The phenomenological research method developed by Amedeo Giorgi is the method most closely associated with humanistic psychology. For phenomenologists the life-world, as conceptualized by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, is the container for human experience and encompasses the social, political, cultural, and historical environment within which the individual resides; consciousness is the relationship between the perceiving mind and the objects within the life-world. The fundamental goal of a phenomenological approach is to capture the essence of human experience within the context of the totality of any one individual's life-world; such a rich description is a necessary precondition for the exploration of human experience using any other form of scientific inquiry (Giorgi, 2001, 2009).

The heuristic method developed by Clark Moustakas (1990) systematically exploits the richness of self-reflection to allow the researcher to develop a complete understanding of his/her insights and experiences regarding a particular phenomenon of interest. The heuristic method seeks neither to predict outcomes nor to uncover causal relationships but to use the researcher and his/her coinvestigators as human instruments bridging the gap between problem posing and discovery.

Traditional Debates

A critique of both Maslow and Rogers is their concept of the self as a foundational core of the person characterized by an innate striving toward wholeness (Geller, 1982). Neher (1991) critiqued the idea that self-actualization can be considered an intrinsic need in the same way as is the need for food or water, pointing out that such a position neglects the cultural context of human motivation. Moss (1999a) acknowledged that in a postmodern constructivist era, Maslow's ideas of an inner nature that is there to be discovered, rather than created, seem naïve. Gambrel and

Cianci (2003) discuss Maslow's hierarchy of needs within the cultural framework of collectivism versus individualism and point out that the hierarchy of needs reflects the cultural assumptions and norms of the United States such as individualism, productivity, and the continual quest for improvement; they posit that in collectivist cultures such as China, service to society may be the epitome of self-actualization rather than elements of individual striving (see also Alsup, 2009; Shaw & Colimore, 1988).

From an empirical perspective Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) state that humanistic psychology, though successfully spawning a popular culture movement, has not developed a solid body of empirically based research, a point criticized by Greening and Bohart (2001).

Critical Debates

Several authors have critiqued Maslow's motivational model and Rogers' client-centered approach on the basis that neither explicitly links health, empowerment, and individual freedom to the social, political, and economic structures of society. Rountree (2011) calls for the expansion of the humanistic concept of freedom (i.e., that of Erich Fromm and Rollo May) to include the ideas of freedom espoused by economic development theorists such as Sen and Max-Neef in order to address the struggles of developing countries throughout the world. Diaz-Laplante (2007) challenges humanistic psychologists to link dialogue to political action to ensure that all human beings have their basic physiological needs met (see also Nord, 1997). Rice (1995) discusses how humanistic/existential therapy can be relevant to African Americans in the United States if it is tied to the psychological insights of Frantz Fanon pointing out that for African Americans, consciousness and meaning are not individual processes but ones that unfold within the power dynamics of racialized relationships. Serlin and Criswell point out the limitations of humanistic psychology's traditional notions of agency, control and self-sufficiency, its theoretical neglect of the body

and of nature, and a privileging of the experience of the "alienated, urban, white European male" (2001, p. 29). At the heart of all of these critiques is the belief that a concept such as self-actualization is meaningless for cultural groups whose power rests in the hands of others.

Practice Relevance

For humanistically trained therapists existential and self-actualizing categories of interpretation take the place of traditional psychoanalytic interpretations and the focus of therapy becomes the "here and the now" (Moss, 1999b). Client-centered approaches for active listening, empowerment, and self-actualization undergird community work as well. The National Coalition Building Institute (NCBI) has a humanistically inspired growth-oriented model with regard to both leadership development and group facilitation (Brown & Mazza, 1996). The Center for Humanistic Change, founded in 1975, is explicitly based on the holistic view of the person developed by humanistic psychology (www.thechc.org).

Humanistic education emphasizes the need to engage the physical, affective, as well as cognitive aspects of learning. In the humanistically oriented classroom, the teacher facilitates student choice, identity development, and connection with self and other; the felt concerns of the students are the guideposts for learning and assessment (Patterson, 1977). Humanistic education develops and uses the learning community as a central pedagogical tool.

An important area of praxis is that of dreamwork and the use of myths and symbols to guide healing, the most recent application being to the area of post-traumatic stress disorder (Paulson & Krippner, 2007). Transpersonally oriented humanistic psychologists study mystical spiritual traditions throughout the world in order to gain a deeper understanding of the human experience. Most notable is the work of Stanley Krippner who, in 2002, received the American Psychological Association award for Distinguished Contributions to the International Advancement of Psychology.

Future Directions

The potential future directions of humanistic psychology are many, particularly since humanistic psychologists and the principles of the discipline can be identified with various strands within psychology writ large – Gestalt therapy, mind/body practice, human science, positive psychology, and emotional intelligence, to name a few (Cain, 2003). Within the realm of clinical practice, therapists continue to develop existential-humanistic therapy (Schneider & Krug, 2008) and discuss how client-therapy approaches can work within a managed care system (Watson & Bohart, 2001). Aanstoos (2003) and O'Hara (2010) challenge humanistic psychologists to bring the ideas of the discipline to bear on the pressing concerns of the world – environmental destruction, violence, and injustice. Ecopsychology, which addresses the relationship between human beings and the natural world, is closely affiliated with humanistic psychology and helps expand the traditional focus of humanistic psychology to such broader concerns. Pilisuk (2001) discusses the implications of humanistic psychology for the work of peace and conflict resolution, and Diaz-Laplante (2007) outlines the applicability of humanistic psychology to the work of community development. The future is also in the application of human science methods within the context of liberation and empowerment (Wertz, 2011).

Program initiatives at key humanistic psychology institutions indicate that these developments are under way. Saybrook University, a humanistically oriented private graduate school founded in 1971 by Eleanor Criswell, recently developed a Master of Arts Degree in Transformative Social Change to accompany its ongoing program in Leadership of Sustainable Systems. The University of West Georgia, one of two public universities in the United States established within the humanistic psychology tradition (the other being Sonoma State University), recently inaugurated a PhD in Psychology that draws from the traditions of humanistic, critical, and transpersonal psychologies.

The extent to which humanistic psychology can address broader social concerns is, in many ways, the extent to which it is able to address the critiques of the discipline outlined above. If it achieves this objective, it is certain that humanistic psychologies will remain potent forces for the foreseeable future and beyond.

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Humor

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Introduction

As a topic, humor has long attracted the attention of psychologists. For example, both Sigmund Freud and Herbert Spencer made important contributions to the psychology of humor. Sometimes humor is equated with laughter, so that psychologists have examined humor by seeking to find the causes of laughter. For critical psychologists, it is not sufficient to try to isolate the psychological causes of laughter. A critical theory of humor should attempt to explore the relations between humor and the social order and to examine critically the place of humor in contemporary society.

Definition

However, it is too simple to equate humor with laughter, for people do not always laugh at humor and also people can display laughter in the absence of humor. Accordingly, it is better to define humor as that which people find funny, rather than that which makes people laugh. Such a definition, it should be noted, avoids the danger of stipulating that certain matters are objectively humorous or funny. Critical psychologists, in particular, would wish to avoid an objective definition, because it would place them in difficulties with respect to sexist and racist humor. They would not wish either to deny that such humor exists or to concede that, because they are forms of humor, racist and sexist humor must be objectively funny or humorous.

Keywords

Laughter; jokes; incongruity; superiority; release; disciplinary

Traditional Debates

There have been three principal psychological approaches to the study of humor: incongruity theory, superiority theory, and release theory (Morreall, 1983). All three approaches have a long history. Incongruity theorists have tended to examine the objects of humor and laughter. They claim that we tend to laugh at incongruities, such as at dignified persons in incongruously undignified positions, or at trivial matters being treated as if they were of the utmost seriousness. Modern incongruity theorists point to the way that jokes depend on the use of two contradictory

codes of interpretation. The joke teller uses one semantic code to build up the body of the joke and then suddenly switches to a different, or incongruous, semantic code in the punch line. To understand the joke, recipients have to switch codes suddenly and reinterpret the body of the joke before the punch line.

In contrast to examining the object of humor, the superiority theory concentrates on the personal dynamics of the person finding something funny. The classic superiority theorist was Thomas Hobbes who claimed that we laugh at anything that makes us suddenly feel superior to another person. For example, we might laugh at a dignified figure slipping over in the snow, because we suddenly feel superior to that person. This sort of theory points out that humor may be appealing to discreditable motives. For instance, men might enjoy sexist humor, because sexist jokes demean women and allow men to feel superior to them. According to the superiority theory, the sense of enjoyment derives from the feeling of superiority. In this theory, humor is not something intrinsically desirable, but it is to be distrusted. However, it seems implausible to explain all humor in terms of a motive to feel superior. Do puns and wordplay really reflect a feeling of superiority?

The release theory, which historically owes much to Herbert Spencer's early psychology, posits that people find in humor a sudden release from tension. For example, we will find something funny if it breaks the tension of a very formal situation. If someone were to fart loudly during the silent moments of a serious ceremony, onlookers would be likely to find it enormously funny. The more formal the situation, the funnier they would find it, because they are being momentarily released from the restraint of the occasion.

Critical Debates

On their own, none of these three theories provides a critical approach to humor. Each provides a limited view, seeking to understand what causes an individual to find something funny, rather than seeking to ascertain the role of humor, or laughter, in the social order. Freud's theory of humor, which he outlined in *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious* (1905/1991), combines all three theories and provides the basis for a more socially critical view. In essence, Freud claimed that society makes demands on its members: they have to curtail and repress their instinctive desires, otherwise society is impossible. What is repressed can return in jokes. Hence so many jokes express topics that are matters of taboo, such as jokes relating to sex, violence, and lavatorial functions. The joke, then, becomes a means of evading social restrictions. We can express a forbidden thought as a joke, claiming that it is "just a joke." Although some jokes are just jokes, or what Freud called "innocent jokes," far more are tendentious jokes: they rebel against social restrictions.

Freud's theory is very important for critical psychologists for it points the way towards a critical way of viewing humor. First, it provides a theoretical basis for criticizing unacceptable humor. Those who tell racist or sexist jokes will often justify themselves by saying that "it is just a joke" and that those who criticize them lack a sense of humor. Freud's theory stressed that we tend to find tendentious jokes funnier than innocent ones, even if they are based on the same verbal play. That means that people laugh because the tendentious joke expresses their hidden desires. Because the recipients are liable to claim they are only laughing at the cleverness of the joke itself and not the fact that it is racist or sexist; they do not properly understand why they are laughing. In consequence, if we take Freudian theory seriously, we should suspect the motives of those who claim that jokes about women, ethnic minorities, or disabled people are just harmless fun (Lockyer & Pickering, 2005; Critchley, 2002).

The second contribution of Freud to a critical view of humor is that his theory links humor to the restrictions of society. Joking, then, can be a way of rebelling against the social order – a way of escaping the restrictions placed on

members of society. Freud certainly viewed Jewish humor, which he personally loved, as a means of mocking mainstream gentile society and its prejudiced restrictions on Jews. Bakhtin took a similar view with his ideas of the carnivalesque. He suggested that the powerless in society use the humor of the carnival to mock the powerful and thereby to subvert the established moral order.

A problem with seeing humor as being essentially a way of rebelling against the social order is that it can lead to an overly optimistic view of humor. Today, there is a cultural value for humor and for having a sense of humor. Some psychologists tend optimistically to assume the goodness of humor, seeing it as possessing curative powers (e.g., Lefcourt, 2001). Not only does this entail overlooking, or downplaying, the importance of retrogressive forms of humor, such as racist, sexist, or antiprogressive humor, but it also overlooks the role of humor in maintaining, rather than subverting, the social order.

One critical view of humor stresses the disciplinary nature of humor. All societies have moral codes for everyday social behavior. These codes need policing. Most societies have systems for embarrassing those who break the small codes of social behavior. However, onlookers often find the embarrassment of others funny. This is why much fictional humor, whether in film, television, or prose fiction, depicts reactions to embarrassing situations. If onlookers laugh at the embarrassment of others and if people find being laughed at to be unpleasant, this would suggest that humor has a disciplinary role, as well as a rebellious one. It would suggest why humor is culturally universal: all societies would need the disciplinary sanction of laughter and embarrassment to maintain daily codes of order (Billig, 2006).

Whatever theory of humor an analyst might accept, ethical dilemmas would still remain. There will continue to be controversies whether we should categorize an individual act of humor as being disciplinary or rebellious. We will still be faced with ethical decisions about whether it is morally right to find certain forms of humor funny or not. In this sense, humor is not just

essentially problematic but also, as Freud recognized, deeply moral and political.

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Hybridity

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Introduction

Hybridity is one of the most popular concepts in (*post*)*colonial theory* and grew up together with the *cultural turn*. In this context the "term" is taken for thinking along different cultural and social borders: between the center and periphery, black and white, oppressor and suppressed, rich north and poor south, and self and the other and between races, genders, bodies, and the resulting identities.

Definition

There is no predominant definition of hybridity found. The discourse on hybridity is manifold and is not to be forced into one single term or theory. Hybridity rather includes all terms and theories that deal with processes of identity and construction of otherness as a result of cultural

contacts. The concepts of border(line) and boundary as marker of difference play a very prominent role; they are called into question, transgressed, relocated, displaced, suspended to be wildered, and call into question essentialist categories like race, gender, nation (state), and body. Hybridity serves as an umbrella term for *creolization*, *bastardization*, *mestizaje*, *bricolage*, *pastiche*, *patchwork*, *mélange*, *liminality*, *mimicry*, *third space*, *mixture*, *syncretism*, and *hybridity* itself.

Keywords

Hybridity; (post)colonial theory; Stuart Hall; Homi Bhabha; Gayatri Spivak

Traditional Debates

According to Ha (2010, pp. 109ff.) *hybridity* shares its meaning with the German word bastard that was first used in the fourteenth century. It signifies children of a noble and a non-noble wife that are married. During the centuries it changed to signifying illegal children of a noble and a non-noble wife that are not married. In succession the ideology of the "pureness of noble blood" (one significant characteristic of the later term *race*), the bastards have been more and more excluded and became pejorative: an inferior and worthlessness person.

After the discovery and the ongoing conquest of the "new world," the clergy in Europe debated what kind of existence an indigenous is. The thesis of polygenesis concluded that the indigenous could not be a human being, because he does not descend from Adam; the others argued with the thesis of monogenesis that the indigenous is of course a human being, but a degenerated one. In the process of colonialization, the clergy, who accompanied the conquerors, transferred the idea of "pureness of noble blood" upon the children of European man and indigenous woman – the ideology of "pureness of race" was born (for the history of colonialism, see Young 1995, 2001). Comparing

the behavior of the indigenous with the European, its nakedness, its color and physiognomy, and its different cultural patterns and social structures, the conquerors legitimized their own behavior in stressing differences and generalized observed individual imperfectness to the whole population. In literature other differences were invented and believed to be real. In sum the differences have being translated into biological and psychological traits of different races. This mixture produces a hierarchy of races that was described scientifically at first time by Carl von Linné. In his hierarchy of humankind, the *Europaeus albus* is on the top followed by the *Americanus rubesceus*, the *Asiaticus luridus*, and at the end the *Afer niger*. Because the Negro was the most inferior, he/she could be deported and uprooted to other places to work for other races. As Robinson points out "[n]o free Africans were called negroes; they got the name only after being enslaved" (2001, p. 332). At the end, the former taxonomic characteristics of biology and psychology have been transferred in social order – white on top, black at the bottom.

It was this colonial practice that bears the idea of hierarchy between humans and came from there into scientific thinking with the movement of enlightenment and its idea of educability, equality, and equal rights for everyone – everyone was surely the European white man, not a person of color. Not to have any problems with the colored, they have been labeled as degenerated, underdeveloped (prehuman), or natural slaves, like Voltaire did. After the enlightenment the term *hybrid* was used scientifically for the first time and finally replaces the notion *bastard*. It was Linné – inspired by Johann Gregor Mendel – who introduces *hybridity* into botany, while he experiments with different sorts of pea. It was Robert Park (1974/1928), who introduced the term into social science – cleared of its history of racism, degeneration (dilution), and colonial heritage. Park observed that immigrants persist in elements of their home culture. But the pressure of the new culture and the following taking over of elements of that culture raises doubts on their identities. The Second World War hinders the further adoption and development of Park's

ideas and reappears after the war into (post) colonial and migration discourses.

In these days the racist connotations are no longer part of the concept of hybridity, but refer on it in form of colonial experience. This experience has developed a potpourri of concepts that is summarized in the term *hybridity*. All concepts start with the body (e.g., skin color, hair) and problematize its importance for identity-making processes. In doing so, they deconstruct ontological or essentialist ideas of identity in favor of ideas of strategic use of identity attribution.

Critical Debates

(Post)colonialism key thinkers on hybridity are Stuart Hall, Homi Bhabha, and Gayatri Spivak. This "holy trinity" deals with processes of identity making through difference. According to Hall this "entails the radically disturbing recognition that it is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks [. . .] that the 'positive' meaning of any term – and thus its identity – can be constructed" (1996, p. 4f.). The other is anytime part of the own identity and not strictly separated. Globalization produces hybrid identities: People "belong to more than one world, speak more than one language [. . .], inhabit more than one identity, have more than one home [. . .] negotiate and translate between cultures [and] live with, and indeed to speak from, difference" (Hall, 1995, p. 206). Upcoming from this background, Bhabha (1990, 1994) pleas for a "third space" of hybridity rather than a simple merging of the self and the other or colonizer and colonialized. This "space between" gives both encounters the possibility to translate their own cultural contents into the language and practice of the other. During the transit through the "third space," no meaning will remain the same on the other side. Thus, the essentialist ideas of pure identity or pure culture are no longer acceptable, because both are built in between by inscription and articulation of culture's hybridity. To enter this space bears the possibility to find words for the self and the other that elude politics of polarity and exclusion,

because the colonialized takes part into the colonizer's authority. Spivak (1988, 1990, 1996) contributes three additional insights: (1) colonialism is still continuing; (2) the subaltern is a blind spot in history of colonialism that "doesn't speak," but must be recognized; and (3) besides the deconstruction of essentialist identities, there is the political need and individual requirement for "strategic essentialism." Strategic essentialism allows representing and acting as an entity (e.g., culture, minority group) within politics of recognition without neglecting the breaklines and differences within collective identities.

As critique of the critique, some thinkers blame these third-world-born thinkers of intellectualism, because they now live in the first world, making big money, and jet around the world, while the real subalterns suffer of starvation, oppression, and exploitation. The occupancy of the concept of hybridity by pecunious intellectuals like Homi Bhabha is problematic, because it reproduces a romantic idea of a "hybrid" and serves primarily to profile and stabilize the own identity and position (Dirlik, 1997, pp. 328–356; Parry, 2004, pp. 13–36).

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Hypothesis-Testing, Overview

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Introduction

The term "hypothesis-testing" is usually identified with that of statistical hypothesis-testing, which in general refers to the application of probability as an aid in decision making about the truth or falsity of one or more conjectures. Since the early twentieth century, hypothesis-testing has been, for the most part, associated with the names of Jerzy Neyman (1894–1981) and Egon Pearson (1895–1980), while the phrase significance testing, a closely related statistical concept, is usually linked with the likes of Ronald Aylmer Fisher (1890–1962). These men are generally considered to be the modern pioneers of hypothesis-testing methodology, though the distinctions among these statistical giants and their philosophical approaches are not always appreciated, nor are the differences between their methodologies always relevant in the practical application of statistical hypothesis-testing.

A third and competing approach to testing hypotheses is the Bayesian paradigm, named after Presbyterian minister Thomas Bayes (1701–1761). In the field of psychology, the majority of empirical research is dominated by a hybrid of Fisherian significance testing and Neyman-Pearson hypothesis-testing, though the Bayesian paradigm is of increasing popularity among quantitatively oriented scientists (e.g., see Gill, 2007). In the Bayesian approach, one first assigns what is called a prior probability to the research hypothesis of interest. Once data is obtained from the investigation, the scientist revises this prior into what is known as a posterior probability. If the data are strong and support the research hypothesis, one would expect the posterior probability to rise relative to the prior as to express the relative increase in belief in one's theory. Bayesian statisticians usually hold that probability is best conceived as a degree of belief in a theory and often endorse a subjective interpretation of probability. Those who espouse a Fisherian or Neyman-Pearson approach usually assume probability to be a relative frequency (so-called frequentists) and are often at odds with the Bayesian choice. The reason for this discord is that the Bayesian paradigm requires the initial prior probability of the research hypothesis as a starting point to express one's degree of belief in the theory under investigation. This is something that frequentists usually hold to be methodologically and philosophically weak, unsound, or even impossible to obtain.

Definition

Hypothesis-testing is not universally defined in the literature. The most common definition of the term is that which revolves around a null hypothesis, which is the hypothesis usually assumed to be true until evidence contradict it (e.g., see Clapham & Nicholson, 2005). Should evidence contradicts this hypothesis, one usually infers an alternative hypothesis to account for the rejection of the null. The substantive alternative hypothesis inferred is usually some sort of explanation as to why the null was rejected and is typically housed in the very purpose that the investigator had in carrying out the experiment or nonexperimental study. For instance, in a study

where the effectiveness of a treatment might be compared to a control condition, a null hypothesis might be that the mean weight loss in both groups is the same over a 4-week period. In conducting a classic significance test, one seeks to reject this null hypothesis and infer that the treatment condition contributes to greater weight loss than does the control. If the difference between the treatment and control sample means is not easily explained by chance (or sampling error) and given a properly conducted experiment with requisite experimental controls, one usually infers that the corresponding population means are unequal and will usually attribute this inequality to the fact that one group received the treatment while the other group did not.

Keywords

Null hypothesis; alternative hypothesis; significance testing; Fisherian; Neyman-Pearson; Bayesian

History

Hypothesis-testing, even considered as a concept or logical progression for evaluating the plausibility or truth of a statement, surely dates back to antiquity. At minimum, the cognitive processes of contemplating a hypothesis then rejecting it given observed evidence likely have deep historical roots. More current examples where modern hypothesis-testing logic is evidenced include the infamous Trial of the Pyx where quality-control standards were imposed on coinage produced by the Mint in Britain, an event that spans its origin in the twelfth century to present day. The process was originated to evaluate whether newly minted coins met a minimal standard of quality before being put into circulation. If deviations from what would be considered the standard or expected existed, a null hypothesis would be rejected and the coin production process would be called into question (Stigler, 2002). The Trial of the Pyx remains a classic example of where hypothesis-testing logic appears, even if not formalized into an exact statistical science.

The modern and more formal treatment of hypothesis-testing procedures can be said to have had their genesis with the advent of probability in the 1700s and were formally conceived for the most part by R.A. Fisher and Neyman-Pearson in the early twentieth century. Fisher's seminal books Statistical Methods for Research Workers published in 1925 and Design of Experiments in 1934 are usually considered to be the landmark texts that merged the use of statistics and probability into a significance-testing framework, especially for experimental designs. However, it would be incorrect to conclude that ideas of hypothesis-testing, generally considered, had their true origins with the works of these men, since the very essence of hypothesis-testing logic can be found in earlier examples in the development of probability. The contributions of the Fisherian and Neyman-Pearson approaches were to provide a general framework and "package" for how probability and statistical inference could be used as a tool for the practicing scientist.

Fisher's methodology was that of testing a null hypothesis set up by the researcher and rejecting that null should the obtained evidence be improbable under that hypothesis to the extent where the researcher would deem it unlikely that such a hypothesis could have reasonably generated the observed data. For Fisher, the rejection of a null hypothesis did not constitute any sense that a select or specific alternative hypothesis was necessarily true or even that the null was definitely false. Fisher held that one conducts significance tests for the purpose of scientific exploration rather than necessarily being faced with a decision between competing hypotheses in an absolute confirmatory sense. His approach is usually labeled as significance testing to decipher it from Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson's competing approach, which, though a hybrid with the Fisherian paradigm, is historically most identifiable with how hypothesis-testing is carried out today. In Neyman and Pearson's model,

a researcher was to make a decision between two or more competing hypotheses such that the decision usually informed a course of action to be taken by the investigator, instead of one of simply rejecting a null hypothesis. Neyman and Pearson, in contrast to classic Fisherian significance testing, were more interested in using statistics to aid in decision making and using that information to choose a suitable course of action such as would be required in quality-control experiments.

As a classic example of the Neyman-Pearson approach, consider a manufacturer of a product who after 1,000 rounds of production finds that only a single error in production has been made. A null hypothesis for this situation might be that the production facility generating the product is working fine and, overall, is turning out quality products. That a single failure occurred out of 1,000 rounds of production would likely not be enough for the supervisor of such a production process to halt the manufacturing mechanism and call it into question. One could easily chalk up the one error out of a thousand as being due to chance. However, if, for instance, more than 50 products turned out to be deficient, then the manufacturer may very well decide to halt production and review the entire product-generating mechanism. The first ratio corresponds to 1/1,000, which is 0.1 %, while the second ratio corresponds to 50/1,000, which is a proportion of 0.05 or a percentage of 5 %. A typical level of significance used is 0.01, which in this case would suggest that if 1 % or more products were deficient, the null hypothesis that the production mechanism is to be retained would be rejected in favor of an alternative hypothesis that the mechanism needs to be reviewed and potentially overhauled and corrected. Note that the Neyman-Pearson approach is a methodology in which the researcher chooses a course of action based on the evidence at hand, rather than merely rejecting a null hypothesis as is the case in the Fisherian paradigm.

The Neyman-Pearson approach features two kinds of errors an investigator could make in rejecting a null hypothesis in favor of an alternative. The first kind of error, a Type I error, occurs when the researcher rejects a null hypothesis when in reality that null hypothesis is not false. Referring to our previous example regarding the weight loss, if sample data suggested that the observed mean difference between groups was not due to chance, the researcher could reject the null at some level of significance (e.g., 0.05). In doing so however, that researcher risks the chance that the null hypothesis is in fact not false (i.e., that mean population weights are equal) and risks committing a Type I error. The Type I error rate is typically equal to the significance level used in the given experiment. A second kind of error could also occur, which is that of failing to reject a false null hypothesis. This typically would occur if the researcher deemed the data as sufficiently probable under the null and hence failed to reject the null hypothesis in favor of an alternative. In making this decision, it may nevertheless be the case that the null is actually false and that the sample data failed to detect its falsity. In this situation, the researcher would have been said to have committed a Type II error. Historically, it has been found that while psychologists pay very close attention to minimizing Type I error rates, they do so with little regard to the potential costs of ignoring Type II errors, which, depending on the research context, can be just as important as minimizing the first kind of error.

Traditional Debates

The way that probability is to be used to test hypotheses in the sciences is by no means agreed upon, and hence efforts to come up with a universal general hypothesis-testing framework for all circumstances and contexts usually fail. Debates among proponents of the Fisherian, Neyman-Pearson, and Bayesian perspectives abound, and no individual approach should be considered best for all scientific contexts. One of the most heated topics of debate concerns the argument over which hypothesis should be the focus of investigation. For the Fisherian camp, the testing of a null hypothesis is of

prime interest, while in the Neyman-Pearson camp, one wishes to choose between a null and an alternative hypothesis. In the Bayesian paradigm, the testing of a straw-man null is usually seen as an exercise in futility. More efficient, argue Bayesians, is the testing of the research hypothesis. However, to do so, one needs to assign a prior probability to this hypothesis before witnessing obtained data, something frequentists such as those found in the Fisherian and Neyman-Pearson camps are generally hesitant to do in most circumstances.

Other classic debates have centered around the misuse and misunderstanding of hypothesis-testing procedures such as the historical dogmatic use of the 0.05 level of significance while usually paying minimal attention to Type II error rates. And though Fisher himself referred to the 0.05 level as "usual and convenient" for a researcher to employ, he specifically recommended that a common significance level not be used across all research paradigms and empirical situations. Researchers, especially psychologists, have misunderstood the 0.05 significance level to be somewhat "sacrosanct" in their work, without necessarily holding a firm understanding regarding why they are using it or even understanding what it really means (e.g., see Cohen, 1994).

Critical Debates

Authors such as Gigerenzer have argued that today's use of hypothesis-testing procedures constitutes an inappropriate hybrid of Fisherian, Neyman-Pearson, and Bayesian ideas and that historic rituals such as the routine setting up of null hypotheses and the use of 0.05 significance levels constitutes an epidemic of the "mindless" use of statistics across the social sciences (Gigerenzer, 2004). The utter and seemingly complete reliance on adhering to the often inappropriate customs of hypothesis-testing is often practiced, says Gigerenzer, because of a fear that a refusal to adhere to these practices and routines might result in professional consequences to those who choose to challenge such misguided

customs. Many have pointed out such misuse and misunderstanding of hypothesis-testing procedures. Since Fisher's advent of the significance test, a wealth of criticism directed toward null testing has appeared (e.g., see Bakan, 1966; Cohen, 1990, 1994; Loftus, 1991, 1993; Meehl, 1967; Wilson, Miller, & Lower, 1967).

A concept in hypothesis-testing that continues to receive relatively little attention, but is of paramount importance, is the distinction among alternative hypotheses that can be posited for a given rejection of the null hypothesis. When an investigator rejects a null hypothesis, he or she then moves on to infer what is known as the statistical alternative hypothesis, which is merely a statement that the null is not true. Inferring this hypothesis is relatively straightforward and comes automatically and logically from the null's rejection. However, the statistical alternative does not provide the methodological "substantive" ground for why the null was rejected. This latter hypothesis is contained in the substantive alternative hypothesis and holds, presumably, the scientific explanation that accounts for the rejected null. Given that there could be numerous (practically, an infinite number) of potential substantive alternatives for a rejected null, the job of the scientist is to infer the correct substantive alternative, and this is usually achieved, in the case of an experimental design, by isolating the correct manipulation on the independent variable. Too often in practice, the inference of the substantive alternative is mistakenly equated with an inference of the statistical alternative.

Practice Relevance

Adopting an epistemologically correct philosophy and methodology for rejecting or accepting hypotheses is crucial to the advancement of science and thus to the practice of mainstream psychology. For experimental findings that are relatively pronounced and exhibit large effect sizes, whether one adopts a Fisherian, Neyman-Pearson, or Bayesian approach to detecting, these

should not mean the difference between declaring an effect to be present versus not finding one. However, most research in psychology and general social science does not reveal clear-cut indisputable findings. Rather, most findings require the probabilistic elimination of chance as having generated the outcome, and hence for all such investigations, adopting the correct hypothesis-testing structure plays a significant role in the decision-making process, especially over the course of many replicated investigations. Hence, the relevance of understanding hypothesis-testing procedures and appreciating the differences between them should be requisite knowledge in the mind of every psychologist.

Future Directions

For many years, methodologists, philosophers of science, and some of the best mathematical/statistical psychologists have recommended that psychology adopt the Bayesian methodology of hypothesis-testing and abandon or at least minimize the Fisherian/Neyman-Pearson paradigms. However, classic null hypothesis significance testing, for all the criticisms directed toward it, remains as the dominant statistical methodology by which hypotheses are evaluated in psychology, though Bayesian approaches are coming to fruition in some areas of the discipline. The future of hypothesis-testing in psychology should continue to see the debate between null testing and Bayesian approaches. However, as noted by Gigerenzer, for there to be a successful "shift" from null testing to Bayesian statistics in psychology would require "some pounds of courage to cease playing along in this embarrassing game" (Gigerenzer, 2004, p. 604) that is the blind adherence to statistical rituals at the cost of effective statistical thinking.

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