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Gaze

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Keywords

Castration anxiety; clinic/clinical gaze; self; other; gaze/male; gaze/female; performativity; dichotomy/false dichotomy; Cartesian split; feminism

Introduction

Scholars have utilized the term "gaze" to mean multiple things throughout its history within criticism and clinical usage. The gaze has been used by Lacan to describe how an actual object contends with our imagination of objects, by Mulvey to problematize the lens of cinema, by Foucault to discuss the environment and techniques of modern medicine, and by Ettinger to unpack traditional methods of psychoanalysis.

Definition

In simplest terms, the gaze can be described as the act of looking at an Other. This simple definition gives way to complexities depending on the usage of the term (many scholars have used the term with a multiplicity of meanings), the context of the gaze, and the definition of the Other. The gaze therefore is better described as an elastic interweaving of subjects, objects, and placement(s) of attention.

Traditional Debates

Throughout the history of the term, several manifestations of the term have surfaced that deserve explanation. Jacques Lacan (1901–1981) described the gaze as containing an element of anxiety of being watched and also posited that through the experience of being gazed at, the human identity is "decentered." He also extended the gaze into something that one does towards "love objects," which is the beginning of the element of prurient intent that has become closely associated with the "gaze." In his 1963 work "The Birth of the Clinic," Michel Foucault (1926–1984) described the "medical gaze," a description of the gaze in medicine, which Foucault argued was the act of gazing at and observing patients. In feminist critique, the scholar most closely associated with the term gaze is Laura Mulvey (1941–), who discussed the gaze in her seminal "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" (1975). Mulvey posited that

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the camera lens is always utilized in cinema as a voyeuristic male gaze that serves to objectify female performers. Mulvey describes the man as an "active" "bearer of the Look" and woman as merely "passive" "image." Mulvey also states that "the woman as icon, displayed for the gaze and enjoyment of men, the active controllers of the look, always threatens to evoke the anxiety it originally signified (castration anxiety)." While Mulvey's work has certainly been influential and useful, it also denies the female any agency as an active participant or any control over the gaze of the watcher(s). This makes Mulvey's definition also incomplete.

Dance scholar Susan Leigh Foster further discusses the gaze in her book *Reading Dancing: Bodies and Subjects in Contemporary American Dance* (1986), expanding the discussion into the role of the gaze of the performer as a "framing device." These framing devices serve to define the parameters of the performance and the role of the audience.

Critical Debates

All of these definitions are useful, but taken on their own they are incomplete. Most troubling about many current definitions of the term is that they rely on two false dichotomies to function: the male/female gender dichotomy and the self/other dichotomy (the Cartesian split). Bracha L. Ettinger (1951–), in *The Matrixial Borderspace* (2006), describes the "subject and object" of the gaze as "as inseparable as the front and back of the same fabric." Ettinger posits that the gaze is traditionally phallocentric and problematizes the gaze as being complicated and interwoven, and consisting of many angles, viewpoints and information to be gleaned.

The gaze is constantly at work throughout the day-to-day life of all people. It is an ever-changing veil that surrounds and covers us all and includes the following possible aspects: we are constantly, especially in our modern society, "living in public" aware of the gaze of others towards us. This can encourage a manifestation of performativity of self. That is to say, we perform our "selves," constantly considering the gaze of others and adjusting how we present ourselves and behave. Secondly, we gaze at ourselves. Through gazing at and critiquing our selves, we separate our physical body from our mental body and become simultaneously more aware of our selves and less in our selves. Instead of fusing the two aspects of self (containing self and other), this manifestation of the gaze serves to other ourselves from our physical body and elevate the mind above the body. Thirdly, we possess the power to manipulate the gaze of others through our behavior, our mannerisms, our way of dressing. In this way the gaze can become a source of power rather than a source of objectification as Mulvey has posited. Particularly of use is Susan Foster's idea of the gaze of the performer as a framing device. This idea can extend into daily life as we consider how our gaze is utilized to frame our performances of self and to manipulate the gaze of others.

Considering Foucault's idea of medical gaze, this medical gaze contributes to the false dichotomy that our mind and bodies are separate (the so-called Cartesian split). If we are clinically observed, but other aspects of our selves are ignored, we are not treated completely as patients or people. This is a failure of medicine in many ways. If the patient's mind and soul is not included in an investigation of her well-being, then it is impossible to treat the whole person. The clinical gaze serves to Other the patient from her self and separate the body from the person.

Perhaps a better definition of gaze is the act of looking at an Other, which necessarily causes us to gaze at our self. The gaze is not a straight line from point A to point B, but instead a spider web of intricacies that are constantly shifting, adjusting, and changing focus. Through this shifting of foci, our selves also change as a constant element of self-reflection is brought into daily life.

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Online Resources

Feminist Aesthetics. Sections 3, 4 and 5. http/plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism/aesthetics
Lacan and the Gaze. www.cla.purdue.edu/english/theory/psychoanalysis/lacangaze.html
plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism/aesthetics
Self-consciousness. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-consciousness-phenomenological/
Way of Seeing 1972 film, BBC2. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LnfB-pUm3eI

Gender Bias, Overview

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Introduction

In the year 2012 gender bias is still thriving. It is generally thought to be a prejudice that often times turns into discrimination against a gender, usually the female gender. To change this bias it is something that our society needs to become aware of. Gender bias reaches into all sections of life from marital to career to sports and politics.

Benevolent Sexism

A form of gender bias that women often face is benevolent sexism. This is the idea that women are in need of assistance and care from a man. Benevolent sexism has become so embedded in many of the world's cultures that it often appears to be the polite way to interact. Chivalry as an example of benevolent sexism.

Modern Sexism

This form of sexism stems from a denial of sexism occurring in the modern age. Those who engage in modern sexism believe in a "post-sexist" society in which women and men are judged by the merit of their work and not on their gender. However, this belief fails to take into account the institutional sexism that infiltrates all aspects of modern society.

Occupational Sexism

Occupational sexism refers to any discriminatory practices, statements, actions, preferential pay, or promotions based on a person's sex that are present or occur in a place of employment. Occupational sexism is often difficult to combat. A form of occupational sexism is wage discrimination. In 2008, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) found that while female employment rates have expanded over the last 50 years and the gender employment gaps have narrowed, on average, women are still 20 % less likely to be hired for the same job as a man and are paid 17 % less than men. Although there are regulations in the United States to combat this, regulating this difference is extremely complex.

Gender Roles

These are attitudes and activities that a society links to each sex. A culture that defines males as ambitious and competitive encourages them to seek out positions of leadership and play team sports. To the extent that females are defined as deferential and emotional, they are expected to be supportive helpers and quick to show their feelings.

Definition

Gender bias is a preference or prejudice toward one gender over the other; it is often also referred

to as "sexism." Bias can be conscious or unconscious and may manifest in many ways, both subtle and obvious. Gender bias is not limited to the individual but is also deeply imbedded in institutions such as law, family, workplaces, and even language.

Keywords

Sexism; discrimination; stereotypes; prejudice

Traditional Debates

Gender bias can be subtle or overt and may result in small or large consequences. Men or women can be affected, but oftentimes women are targeted and this limits their chance for success in many different domains. For instance, the biased assumption that girl's school sports are less important than boy's school sports leads to an inequality in funding and access to facilities, which in turn leads in part to the creation of the Title IX section of the Equal Opportunity in Education Act of 1972, a United States law prohibiting gender discrimination in public education, including in sports.

Critical Debates

Gender bias is long standing and continues to affect our society. For example, gender stereotypes can facilitate and impede intellectual performance. Stereotype threats can lower women's performance on mathematics tests be due to the stereotype that women have inferior quantitative skills compared to men's. Stereotypes can also affect the assessments people make of their own competence. Studies found that specific stereotypes (e.g., women have lower mathematical abilities) affect women's and men's perceptions of those abilities such that men assess their own task ability higher than women performing at the same level. These "biased self-assessments" have far-reaching effects because they can shape men and women's educational and career decisions.

When considering gender bias and the law, it is important to understand that not all regions approve or desire gender equality under the law. In some countries, women are not allowed to drive, let alone vote. Studies of some regions have also showed tremendous gender bias in laws, with women being subject to severe penalties, including execution, for crimes such as adultery, whereas for men, adultery may not be considered a crime at all or may have lighter sentencing guides.

In other parts of the world, the complexity of gender issues and overall desire to create an equitable society has led legal systems with an interest in eliminating gender bias to institute laws prohibiting overt gender prejudice. The first law allowing women voting rights was passed in New Zealand in 1893, although earlier laws existed in Scandinavia that allowed limited female voting. England, the United States, and Ireland all have laws prohibiting pay inequity based on gender; however, these are not often strictly enforced.

It is important to note that gender bias exists in both directions. Although many historical examples and evidence suggest that bias has typically gone against women, there are certainly cases to the contrary. Abortion legality, for instance, is often a situation where gender bias claims against men are suggested, as some biological fathers insist they should have the right to prevent an abortion in order to raise their biological child.

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Gender, Overview

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Introduction

In the last few decades, gender has come into widespread use in English and many other languages to refer to a defining characteristic of human and, in some cases, nonhuman animals. It has at the same time developed as an interdisciplinary area of study and produced a considerable literature and numerous textbooks. According to Lynn Segal, "'gender' remains *a*, if not *the* pivotal point in the study of identities" (2010, p. 321).

Definition

Definitions are often grounded within the sex/gender distinction. This distinction is not peculiar to psychology and indeed has been made across bodies of work in the humanities and social sciences. The distinction made between "sex" and "gender" typically rests on the demarcation of the biological and the social/cultural. That is, the term "sex" is often used to refer to biological markers and "gender" to the socially/culturally located understandings of what it means to be a "woman" or a "man." The use of this distinction, however, is not universally agreed as different understandings imply a panoply of theoretical and political positionings. Thus, what constitutes "sex"/"gender" is multiple, contestable, and still a matter of debate.

Keywords

Difference; feminism; feminist psychology; gender bias; gender differences; gendered subjectivity; masculinity; poststructuralism; sex/gender difference; sexism; sexual identity; sexual liberation; sexuality; social constructionism; transgender; transsexualism

History

Historically, in the English language, the term gender has been used almost exclusively to refer to grammatical categories. It is also the case that there is a long history of scholarly work around the issues implicated in conceptualizations of gender. From the 1960s onward, however, there has been a transformation and reconfiguration of the field of debate and an exponential increase in the use of the word. Indeed, it has been argued that "gender" is one of the great conceptual devices of the twentieth century (Germon, 2009).

In the second half of the twentieth century, the term "gender" came into use in the field of sexology, in the literature on intersex and transsexuality, to distinguish the experience of psychological sex from that of biological sex (e.g., Money, 1955). By the 1970s feminist theorists had begun to use it to refer to those aspects of "being a woman" or "being a man" that were not biologically determined. This move was intended to both disrupt the power of biology and open up the question of "sex differences" to interrogation.

Running through the history of mainstream psychology is its focus on sex difference research which has largely been framed by an understanding of men/women as in binary opposition in which women become positioned as inferior to men. This was captured in Weisstein's classic analysis of the characterization of gendered capabilities in psychological theory (Weisstein, 1968). She noted that those traits classed as "feminine" had been generally characterized in psychology as "inconsistent, emotionally unstable, lacking in strong conscience or superego, weaker, 'nurturant' rather than productive, 'intuitive' rather than intelligent . . . suited to the home and the family. In short, the list adds up to a typical minority group stereotype of inferiority" (Weisstein, 1993, p. 221).

It was against a backdrop of gay, sexual, and women's liberation movements in the 1960s and

1970s that an increased problematization of sex difference research occurred. From that point forward, the history of the term gender became intimately interwoven with that of feminist and LGBTQ movements. There was a specific troubling of the sex/gender distinction which conceived of gender as a category of analysis as illustrated in Scott's (1986) consideration of the unpacking of gendered issues in historical analysis. By (re)formulating gender as situated in the social, it became possible to change the focus of research from what women did in particular historical/cultural periods to how particular historical/cultural contexts gave rise to particular masculinities, femininities, and gendered social arrangements.

In the 1980s, given the diversity of experience and identifications across differently positioned women, through class, color, ethnicity, sexuality, and others, the notion of gender became problematized in its ability to serve as a unifying category for all women. This became contentious both politically, with the rise of identity politics, and theoretically, as many feminists were drawn to constructionist and poststructuralist approaches which then became a theoretical frame for much critical psychological work on gender. Broadly speaking, social constructionist approaches suggested that neither gender *nor* sex was static facts of biology but was rather historically and socially situated phenomena that were produced in and through shared cultural knowledge/discourse. The idea of both sex and gender as socially located allowed for understandings of gender as fluid, shifting, and in flux.

To this point, research and theorizing of gender had been typically focused on women as the nonnormative gender. However, the 1990s saw the growth of masculinity studies and, exemplified in the seminal work of Judith Butler, queer theory. Masculinity studies primarily focused on "the construction of masculinity in everyday life, the importance of economic and institutional structures, the significance of differences among masculinities and the contradictory and dynamic character of gender" (Connell, 2005, p. 35). Queer theory engaged more explicitly with the "performativity" of sexed bodies and gender categories. Butler (1990) suggested that gender could be understood as a "social temporality" (p. 141) which was accomplished and maintained through its repeated performance or "performativity." It was through the repetition of gender that the appearance of gender as "natural" and "fixed" was (re)produced. In the words of Butler "There is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; this identity is performatively constituted by the very 'expressions' that are said to be its results" (1990, p. 25).

It is fair to say that such analysis of gender has not widely permeated either popular or mainstream psychological understandings. Although the term "gender" was intended as one of disruption and subversion and was initially positioned as part of the political arsenal against the reification of an array of sexisms and gender biases, the vocabulary of "gender" has lost much of its disruptive power. This has arguably been a result of its overuse and its conflation with the biological category of "sex" (e.g., the "gender" of a baby) (see also Haig, 2004). For Unger (2007) this conflation is due to the absence of feminist theory from understandings of the term.

The depoliticization of the term has similarly been coupled with notions of political correctness. As Scott (2010) has argued, "gender became a polite way of referring to anything that had to do with sex, while sex was reserved for physical acts of love-making and/or copulation" (p. 7). Furthermore, "gender" has become the socially acceptable shorthand for referring to women and women's issues. Arguably, this reinscribes the kind of biases it was initially set to challenge because it implicitly makes the sex of women prominent under the guise of equality.

Traditional Debates

As a multiple and contestable term, the concept of gender is itself a site for debate. As Connell (2005) has argued, it is ". . .historically changing and politically fraught" (p. 3). Attempts to clarify terminology have not yet been successful and, given the situated nature of our knowledge of

gender, it is unlikely that a resolution is possible. Moreover, the primary issue, and the one which underpins dominant uses of the term, arises around the very debate it was intended to address – that between nature and nurture.

Evolutionary theory provides a clear example of "natural" explanations of gender. It has attempted to theorize gender differences as well as similarities in terms of adaptations – products of natural or sexual selection. Buss (1995) suggests that evolutionary psychology provides a metatheory for the prediction of gender differences or similarities which are based on whether or not similar or different adaptive problems have been experienced over human evolution. Sex and sexuality are areas in which difference is to be expected according to evolutionary theorists who cite issues such as parental investment and sexual violence as examples. Perhaps unsurprisingly, evolutionary theory has been widely criticized for naturalizing and legitimizing traditional gender roles as well as a range of problematic gendered behaviors.

Psychoanalysis has occupied an intriguing position within the "nature/nurture" gender debate. Freud's psychosexual development of gender has been widely criticized as biologically reductionist as well as normalizing male-dominant heterosexualized gendered social arrangements (see Mitchell, 1974). However, feminist rereadings of psychoanalytic theory have pointed to how Freud did not attribute an intrinsic explanation to gender identity but rather located identity within social/psychological signification. In the words of Freud (1905), "in human beings pure masculinity and femininity is not to be found either in a psychological or biological sense" (pp. 141–142). Rereadings of Freud's work as antiessentialist and/or as a comment on cultural gendered arrangements have allowed psychoanalytic theory to be taken up in the theorization of gendered subjectivities (e.g., Hollway, 1998).

In a general sense, the nature/nurture debate hinges around the distinction between gender as natural or as naturalized. Jordan Young (2010) claims that deciding between "naturalized gender" and, for example, theories of brain organization by hormones cannot be simply based on evidence as both arguments are circular. For Segal (2010) the meanings of gender "are always on the move, with gender shifting from a primarily biological category to a near exclusively cultural process." (p. 335). Clarke and Braun (2009) address this debate by proposing three models for gender. The first two, "gender as nature" and "gender as nurture," they identify as essentialist models. Their third model, "gender as a social construct," they argue, is the most useful approach for a critical psychology.

Indeed, the notion of gender as a social construct has been critical to reconceptualizing the gendered body and, critically, gendered conceptualizations of the mind-body debate. Constructions of mind-body dualism have traditionally been conflated with gender – masculinity often becomes tied to the mind and intellectual rational capacities and femininity to the body. This, according to Grosz (1994), is central to women's subjugation to men as women become tied to irrational feminine bodily processes. The gendering of the mind-body dualism as well as reductionist explanations of the sexed body has been called into question by theories of embodiment which broadly examine the material/discursive/phenomenological production of the body (Stephenson, 2003).

Critical Debates

The location of gender as firmly in the social arena has allowed for analyses of power which move away from the more individualized explanations common in mainstream psychology. For example, the critical examination of false dichotomies has elucidated how women become positioned as the subordinate "other" when positioned as polar opposites to men. This has also been used to unpack power relations between those of the same sex but who differ along particular fault lines such as "race," social class, and "disabilities" to name but a few (e.g., Spivak, 1988). Mainstream psychology has conceptualized this as an issue of intra- versus intergroup variability. However, as mentioned above, within

critical psychological work, such points of difference are not seen as attributes of the individual. Rather, as with gender, these are positioned as relational – produced by social relations and arrangements.

As previously discussed, one of the issues that led feminists to take up the term gender was to open up the question of sex differences to interrogation. However, since that time, some feminists have argued that sex/gender differences are not a feminist question (e.g., Unger, 1998). When difference is the question, there is a tendency to reinscribe socially valued abilities to men over women which functions to legitimate men's position of social privilege. The critical questioning of gendered dichotomies has thrown into sharp relief the limitations of arguments focused on "sameness" and "difference." Both kinds of argument magnify their focus which invariably ignores social inequalities, constraints, and/or possibilities for equal standing. A body of feminist work has explored ways of transcending theorization based on sameness and difference by focusing on questions of the social production of gendered power (see, e.g., Fine & Addelston, 1996).

The critical study of gendered power has necessarily become infused with consideration of sex and sexualities. As Butler (1990) notes, it is "impossible to separate out 'gender' from the political and cultural intersections in which it is invariably produced and maintained" (p. 3). For Butler, the presumption of heterosexuality is embedded within normative notions of femininities and masculinities and becomes integral to what is permissible for each gender. In this sense heterosexuality is compulsory and renders "alternative" sexualities as other.

One of the most salient debates around gender in psychology involves the classification of "Gender Identity Disorder" (GID) in later editions of the DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders). The debate, while complex, hinges around the ways in which gender becomes normalized and variations thereof pathologized. Critical psychology has most often been critical of diagnoses of GID in which "successful" adjustment to fixed and deeply conservative heteronormative behaviors is held to be an indicator of mental health.

International Relevance

As a key term in the feminist lexicon, gender is commonly used in academic work in this area which is conducted internationally but published in English (e.g., Rutherford, Capdevila, Undurti, & Palmary 2011). There is inherent ambiguity in translation and the word "gender" does not exist in many languages. When it does, it is not always dichotomous. Hence, one might reasonably ask, to what extent it may be a Western, or even Anglocentric, concept. There is no question that the term translates more comfortably to some languages than to others. The term, however, is used internationally and has been explicitly recognized by key international bodies such as the United Nations and the World Health Organization who provide their own definitions of gender, based most closely on the biological/social distinction discussed above.

Future Directions

It is difficult to predict the future of a term that has, in the past, been such a powerful one for feminist thought but which has in recent decades become ever more normative. As stated in the definition, gender is multiple, contestable, and still a matter of debate, and different understandings are predicated by manifold theoretical and political positionings. Mainstream psychology continues to treat gender/sex primarily as a "thing" that explains the social world, while critical psychology has more often conceptualized it as an effect that itself requires explanation. For Scott (2010) gender remains a useful category of analysis, only as long as it retains its criticality. However, as Clarke and Braun have argued, "While critical psychology challenges frameworks which help construct gender, it does not inevitably or easily lead to meaningful social change" (2009, p. 245). Segal (2010) has suggested that "...feminists have been neither

able to retreat from nor resolve the many questions gender raises" (p. 328). Accurate as that assessment is, it could well be the case that the power of the term "gender" lies not so much in the resolutions it may offer but rather the questions it may raise.

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Gender-Based Violence

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Introduction

Gender-based violence (GBV) refers to violence directed towards an individual or group on the basis of their gender. Gender-based violence was traditionally conceptualized as violence by men against women but is now increasingly taken to include a wider range of hostilities based on sexual identity and sexual orientation, including certain forms of violence against men who do not embody the dominant forms of masculinity.

Definition

While most earlier sources take gender-based violence as synonymous with violence against women (United Nations General Assembly, 1993),

O'Toole and Schiffman (1997) offer a broad definition to include "any interpersonal, organisational or politically orientated violation perpetrated against people due to their gender identity, sexual orientation, or location in the hierarchy of male-dominated social systems such as family, military, organisations, or the labour force" (p. xii). This definition is useful in that it potentially includes not only violence directed at women because they are women but also hostility towards other gender minorities, while it also foregrounds the social context of inequality in which this hostility tends to occur.

Gender-based violence includes a broad spectrum of interactions, from verbal harassment and institutional discrimination to enslavement and murder. This continuum includes but is not limited to acts of physical, sexual, emotional, verbal, economic, and psychological violence by intimate partners or family members; sexual assault (including sexual assaults on children, stranger rape, acquaintance rape, marital rape, and any unwanted touching, kissing, or other sexual acts); sexual harassment and intimidation; and forced prostitution (Russell, 1984). Work on gender-based violence often focuses on one of three broad and widely overlapping areas: sexual assault, intimate partner violence, and sexual harassment.

Violence against women is most commonly perpetrated by someone they know, such as an intimate male partner (Russell, 1984; Vogelman, 1990; Vetten, 1997). International research has consistently revealed that women are more vulnerable to being assaulted, injured, raped, or killed by a current or ex-partner than by a stranger (Ellsberg & Heise, 2005) Jewkes and Wood (1997). This is in contrast to the situation for men, who are more prone to being attacked by a stranger or an acquaintance than an intimate partner (Garcia-Moreno & Heise, 2002). Initially the terms wife battering, domestic violence, and family violence were used to describe these problems, but increasingly the term intimate partner violence is preferred as it is more inclusive and does not assume that intimate relationships exist exclusively within the institution of marriage or the conventions of heterosexuality.

Incidences of gender-based violence are seldom disclosed and many women and gender minorities keep their victimization concealed. In fact, the better acquainted a victim is with her/his perpetrator the less likely she/he is to disclose her experiences to others (Koss & Cleveland, 1997). Sexual violence is not only extremely under-reported, but often victims do not define their own experiences as illegitimate violence because only experiences that fit the popular ideas of violent assault by a stranger, or the often limited legal definition of rape, are understood as sexual assault. This tendency is often linked to the common practice of victims minimizing their experience, which is a common coping strategy for women subjected to gender-based violence within relationships (Koss & Cleveland, 1997). These researchers found, for example, that female University students believe that sexual aggression is common and therefore harmless as it is a normal feature of their dating experience Collins et al. (2009).

Gender-based violence also occurs outside of intimate relationships, and some writers (Jewkes, Levin, Penn-Kekana, Ratsaka, & Schrieber, 1991) have proposed a framework of three domains: (1) the family, (2) the community, and (3) the state. Violence occurring within the family may include domestic violence; marital rape; sexual abuse from a partner, spouse, or relative; and the sexual abuse of children. The second category, "community violence," includes violence such as rape by a person unknown or unrelated to the woman. Human trafficking and forced prostitution fall into this category. The third type, "state violence," includes gender-based violence perpetrated or condoned by employees of the state, including violence or rape committed by police, prison guards, soldiers, border officials, and others abusing positions of state power.

Keywords

Gender-based violence; violence against women; rape; sexual assault; wife battering; domestic violence; intimate partner violence; femicide; homophobia; heterosexism; gay bashing

Traditional Debates

The current interest in gender-based violence arose primarily with the growth of Western feminism in the 1970s, which drew attention to widespread violence against women. The social silence around rape was challenged and researchers identified Rape Trauma Syndrome (Burgess & Holmstrom, 1974) and Battered Women Syndrome (Walker, 1979) as common psychological conditions. Not only were high levels of sexual violence against women exposed, but this was theorized as an integral aspect of Patriarchy. Writers such as Brownmiller (1975), for instance, argued that rape was the means by which men as a social group maintained their dominance over women. While contemporary accounts are less conspiratorial, they nevertheless retain the fundamental insight that gender-based violence is inextricably linked to social structures of gender inequality. This is expressed through power imbalances in relationships, sexist ideologies, rape myths, and the vulnerable position of women and other gender minorities in society (Martin & Curtis, 2004; Vetten, 2000; Vogelman, 1990; Walker et al., 2004; Wood & Jewkes, 1997). Two major consequences of this social context of inequality are that the victims tend to have limited power to protect themselves and that they tend to be blamed for their own victimization. This victim blaming is frequently seen in cases of women whose rape is attributed to their own behavior rather than that of the rapist, the negative perceptions of people who remain in abusive relationships, and the idea that it is the responsibility of gender minorities to conceal their sexual difference in order to avoid discrimination and assaults.

The insights of Rape Trauma Syndrome and Battered Women Syndrome where assimilated into the concept of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in the DSM-III of 1980. While this offered a diagnostic tool for identifying the psychological responses to assault and rape, it was later argued that PTSD was not adequate for understanding the effects of long-term abuse such as that found in families and intimate relationships. Here the notion of Complex PTSD (Herman, 1997) has become an important clinical tool for understanding the affects of ongoing victimization. Proposals for the forthcoming DSM-5 (2013) recognize the widespread occurrence of intimate partner violence with specific category for Marital Abuse Disorder (Marital Conflict Disorder with Violence) falling under the new rubric of Relational Disorders. One of the motivations for this is the acknowledgement that intimate partner violence represents a major risk of injury and death for many women (National Advisory Council on Violence Against Women, 2000) and the need to respond to these risks. It has been argued that many earlier psychological formulations of the problem of intimate partner violence have a victim-blaming bias, defining women in these situations as masochistic or self-defeating (Herman, 1997). This can be seen as an example of the tendency of mainstream psychology to pathologize individuals by failing to grasp the significance of social conditions in which they exist and to default to the dominant ideology, specifically in this case the Patriarchal perspective on gender relations.

Critical Debates

As the notion of gender-based violence has evolved over the last 40 years, it has become more inclusive. The original idea of violence against women has expanded to include not only violent physical assaults but also social, emotional, and economic abuse. Sexual assault has come to include not only violent attacks by strangers but the sometimes less visible and subtle forms of violence at work in date rape and other forms of coercion between acquaintances. Some controversial commentators such as Camille Paglia have argued that the definition has become too broad and now includes trivial situations that dilute the significance of feminist work exposing rape.

There has been increasing recognition that gender-based violence not only affects women, but a wider range of sexual minorities, including

gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and transsexual people. There is also a growing awareness of violence towards men who do not conform to and support dominant stereotypes of masculinity, especially in their early development.

The major critical theoretical thrust of work on gender-based violence has been to move away from psychological accounts that simply pathologize either the perpetrator or the victim, and instead to locate the individual acts of violence within social systems of gender inequality and normative gender roles that encourage violence by some groups and render others vulnerable. This has allowed for identification of the underlying Patriarchal social system and shown how Patriarchal ideology has structured mainstream psychology by biasing it to toward the dominant masculine perspectives. This bias has resulted in victim-blaming theoretical accounts where the vulnerability and victimization of gender minorities has been attributed to their own psychological shortcomings rather than the aggression of the perpetrators or the systematic injustices and inequalities of the surrounding social environment. A wide range of critical gender-sensitive accounts have now challenged this historical bias and offer alternatives that reveal the widespread occurrence of gender-based violence, show how it arises within contexts of social inequality, and offer strategies for both assisting survivors and reducing the prevalence of this form of violence (Brown, 1992; Herman, 1997).

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www.unfpa.org/gender/violence.htm; www.who.int/topics/gender_based_violence/en/
www.who.int/topics/gender/violence/gbv/en/index1.html
www.un.org/womenwatch/directory/gender_training_90.htm

Gendered Subjectivity

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Introduction

The term "gendered subjectivity" signals a critical formulation by moving away from the idea of innate sexual identity characteristics that divide human beings, like other species, into male and female. Transgender Studies, queer theory, and the field of LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer) are developments, originating in the USA broadly since the early 1990s, fuelled by politics and social movements, which pose a challenge not simply to the essentialism of sexual difference but to heteronormativity and the idea of a stabilization of gendered subjectivity. Together, the terms gender and subjectivity pose the question "how do differences (and similarities) arise and have effects in the becoming subjects of women and men?"

Definition

The move from "sex" to "gender" started in the Anglo-speaking world (in many other languages, there is no terminological distinction) as part of the women's liberation movement challenging the idea of women's innate inferiority based on biological reproductive "sex differences." "Gender," by contrast, was socially constructed and could therefore be changed through political action. "Subjectivity" refers to what might in other theoretical traditions be called "self," approaching through a critical lens, based on post-structuralist theory. "Subjectivity" refers not to the rational, autonomous, unitary individual that was assumed by traditional, scientific psychology, but to an entity, even a distribution, more multiple, dynamic, and conflictual, where the conscious self is decentered, as in psychoanalytic or discursive theory.

Keywords

Difference; power relations; biology-society dualism; discursive positioning; embodiment; Transgender

Traditional Debates

Many accounts of differences between the sexes are caught up in a biology-society dualism. On one hand is posed the genetic, hormonal, and physiological origin of male and female, culminating in differences in reproductive organs, which determine appropriate personality characteristics for men and for women. On the other, for example, in 1970s social psychology, gender differences were largely accounted for by socialization theory, borrowing from learning theory, role theory, and cognitive-developmental theory. Another part of psychology provided the measurement of sex differences through psychometric techniques, the critique of which was a salient feature of American feminist psychology; the measurement of cognitive sex differences is a massive industry (e.g., Diane Halpern, 2008, in its 4th edition). While psychometric psychology is ostensibly atheoretical, an implicit assumption was that measured differences between the sexes were innate and the masculine norm was treated as superior. Early American feminist psychology, notably Sandra Bem's Sex Role Inventory (1974), adopted a psychometric methodology to produce "androgyny," in an attempt to unsettle the binary of sex differences. In the 1980s, evolutionary psychology, building on sociobiology, joined the fray, providing a revisionist account of Darwin's sexual selection, such that men and women evolved with different sexual psychologies. In its popularized

version, men's "mate selection" (impersonal, body-obsessed, and driven) is justified as evolutionarily inevitable (Buss, 2004). Between these ideologically driven positions, the psychological understanding of gendered subjectivity stultified.

Critical Debates

Within Western feminism, the question of how gendered subjectivity was acquired seemed crucial. If equal workplace opportunities did not change women's subordination overnight, if equality did not enable us to be just like men, what could explain our persistent differences? Psychoanalysis offered a theoretically searching developmental account of gendered subjectivity. Its reliance on the idea of penis envy caused enormous controversy. Was it a biologically determinist account (women were destined to envy men's possession of this defining anatomical feature of being a man) or was the penis/phallus a key symbol of men's power in a patriarchal world? (Mitchell, 1974). In the latter case penis envy afforded insights into women's femininity as an internalized mark of subordination which could gradually change. Crucially, this involved men's equal participation in childcare and domestic labor, because it was in the home that gender socialization took place (Chodorow, 1978).

In a world where masculinity was the norm against which femininity was judged and found wanting, it is not surprising that gendered subjectivity usually referred to women's gender. The term does however invite a wider perspective and, following feminism's insistent exposure of male violence against women, feminist-influenced men took up the topic of masculinity, often in relation to its most problematic aspects, namely, rape and domestic violence, and with an analytic focus on power (e.g., Connell, 1987).

Early British critical psychology used the concept of subjectivity to define its central problematic: how, following a critique of psychology's "individual" subject, could subjectivity be theorized to take account of its complex formation within discourses, practices, and power relations (these latter terms deriving their currency from Foucauldian post-structuralist theory) (Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn, & Walkerdine, 1984)? This was part of a wider "turn to language," which saw constructionist accounts of subjectivity gain dominance, for example, in discursive social psychology (Potter & Wetherell, 1987).

Since gender relations can never be external to subjectivity, gendered subjectivity was a key theme. Lacking a credible account from within traditional psychology, psychoanalysis was used, "socialized" by an emphasis on power relations, language, and discourses. An early example was Hollway's (1984, 1989) empirical study of the gendering of subjectivity in adult heterosexual relations, which identified the differential positioning of women and men in three discourses of sexuality – male sexual drive, have/hold, and permissive – with consequences for power relations, practices, and, through repeated positioning in discourses, the ever-changing acquisition of facets of subjectivity. To avoid a determinist positioning account (subjectivity as the sum total of positionings in socially given discourses), Hollway drew on the idea of unconscious defenses that move among people, through projection and introjection, and desires that motivate the momentary and fluid take-up of a particular discursive position among the plurality usually available.

The relative effectivity of social and psychic forces in the construction of subjectivity continues to be an area of debate. A recent expression of critical psychology in what is now called psychosocial studies continues to focus on subjectivity. For example, the *International Journal of Critical Psychology* was relaunched in 2008 as *Subjectivity*. In its first editorial it defined its approach as transdisciplinary and its subject matter as "the social, cultural, historical, and material processes, dynamics and structures of human experience" (Blackman, Cromby, Hook, Papadopoulis, & Walkerdine, 2008, p. 1). The editorial provides a useful historical account of the importance of the concept of subjectivity in effecting changes in the terms of debate across the social sciences. By this time, the focus on gender had been complicated, within feminism, by the political insistence that gender is always

accompanied by other powerful dimensions of social and identity difference, which are often specified as class and race or ethnicity (and age and sexuality, etc.). In other words, the debate about subjectivity has to engage with distributed identities and the intersectionality of social categories (Phoenix & Pattynama, 2006; Wetherell, 2008). Further notable features in more recent understanding of gendered subjectivity have been the emphasis on embodiment or corporeality and the insistence on sex and sexuality as inseparable from gender theory.

The reembodiment of gender through physical sex changes raises again the spectre of biological determinism. Different embodiment and the embodiment of a chosen but not originary gender are central in arguments in transgender theory and between transgender and feminist theory, notably who gets to be a woman, how can the gender binary be transcended to enable a "third" gender, how stabilized does gender need to be (through bodily sex difference), and whether to hold out for the sort of transgender tolerance that would prevail if there was a widespread lack of correspondence between bodies and gender identity (Elliott, 2010). The achievement, or not, of a different gender subjectivity through changes to the body shows up the need for a properly psychosocial theory that understands the articulations among embodiment, identity, and gendered subjectivity.

From a different "trans" perspective, matrixial theory, developed by Bracha Ettinger, a feminist psychoanalyst and artist in the French post-Lacanian tradition, redefines prenatal-prematernal experience to reframe the dominant assumption that separation at birth is the defining originary moment of subjectivity (see Pollock, 2008). Transsubjectivity, starting before birth with the presubject's transconnectivity to the becoming mother, setting in motion a process of subjectivization, is never erased and enables the continuation of originary intercorporeal connections better defined in terms of physics than biology: rhythms, intensities, pulses, resonances, and threads which communicate across a matrixial border that creates both spaces and links (Ettinger, 2006). Transcending the either-or binary of sexual difference (phallic logic), the matrixial is other to masculine-feminine opposition. In this paradigm we can think feminine^{M} (feminine to the power of the matrixial) as opposed to feminine^{P} (to the power of the phallus). This theoretical framework may succeed in realizing the aim of "gendered subjectivity," namely, to go beyond the binary logic of sexual difference with its devaluation of womanhood and oppressive image of masculinity.

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Genetic Counseling, Overview

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Introduction

The provision of "genetic advice" has been traced back more than 100 years to Charles Davenport (Harper, 2004). In this time, Novas and Rose (2000) identify three broad epochs of genetic counseling that are characterized by normative orientations, the technology available for detecting "defective" genes, and the methods employed to shape conduct. The first (1930s and 1940s) is characterized primarily by the ideology of eugenics. The second (1950s to early 1970s) is characterized by a preventive genetic health model and nondirective counseling. The third period (1970s and onwards) Novas and Rose describe as characterized primarily by concern with maximizing life expectancy and quality of life.

Recent developments including the completion of the Human Genome Project (HGP), an increasing number of genetic conditions for which tests are available, and a dramatic decrease in the cost of full genome sequencing have further important implications for genetic counseling. The increased availability and range of genetic tests means an increasing reliance of both lay individuals and other health professionals on the services of genetic counselors. There is also increasing pressure by commercial entities to provide genetic testing "direct-to-consumer" (i.e., outside of the purview of the medical profession), a development which is likely to increasingly involve genetic counselors in private and/or commercial roles. Finally, current predictions state that the availability of full genome sequences for US$1,000 or less is imminent (Markoff, 2012), which is likely to make individual genetic tests obsolete in the near future. Uncertainty with regard to the interpretation of these full genome sequences is further likely to drive demand for genetic counseling services.

Definition

Harper (2004), an influential and commonly used source for genetic counselors, provides the following definition: Genetic counseling is the process by which patients or relatives at risk of a disorder that may be hereditary are advised of the consequences of the disorder, the probability of developing or transmitting it and the ways in which this may be prevented, avoided, or ameliorated (Harper, p. 3).

In addition, it has been argued that while information provision and increased knowledge are important goals of genetic counseling, there is also a need for genetic counseling to provide emotional support and assistance with decision-making regarding issues related to the provision of genetic risk information (Bernhardt, Biesecker, & Mastromarino, 2000).

Keywords

Predisposition testing; genetic testing; genetic counselor; genetic risk; presymptomatic testing; predictive testing; nondirectiveness; clinical genetics; eugenics

Traditional Debates

Genetic Risk

Genetic risk is a central concept in genetic counseling, and its communication is a primary objective (O'Doherty, 2006). Genetic risk varies in its manifestation based on the specific disease for which a person is at risk. There is important variation in the probability of developing different diseases, the seriousness of the disease, and the options available for both the management of risk and the treatment of the disease itself. Nevertheless, genetic risk is characterized by certain common features. In particular, genetic risks are not only about individuals but also about their families (Sorenson & Botkin, 2003). Genetic risk is also distinctive in the relative lack of agency available to the individual compared to such risk factors as

an unhealthy diet, inactivity, and smoking (Croyle & Lerman, 1999).

Genetic counseling increasingly relies on the technological ability to identify genetic abnormalities at a molecular level. Diagnostic tests have been developed that can identify carriers of such deleterious gene mutations. Depending on the nature of the disease involved, either the carriers themselves, their offspring, or both are then considered to be at increased risk of developing the disease associated with that particular gene abnormality. The process of undergoing tests to assess genetic risk for a particular condition has been referred to as predisposition testing, predictive testing, and presymptomatic testing. Although the terms are often used interchangeably, the latter two have been criticized for implying a certainty that is not warranted. In most instances, a positive genetic test indicates a heightened predisposition to a particular disease, not its certain onset (there are exceptions, such as Huntington's disease, where a positive genetic test does imply certain onset of the disease).

Ethics of Predisposition Testing

Ethical dilemmas in the context of predisposition testing often revolve around the "right to know" versus the "right *not* to know" (Evans & Harris, 1996). Decisions that need to be made in this regard thus require consideration of the "advantages of knowing," such as the possibility of prevention of particular diseases, and "disadvantages of knowing," such as psychological distress and strained family relations. Importantly, one person's right "to know" may interfere with another person's right "not to know." This situation can arise, for example, when the son or daughter of a person who does not wish to "know" has tested positive for a deleterious gene mutation. In such an instance, the parent may be an obligate carrier. That is, it may be implicit from the positive gene test of the child that a particular parent is a carrier of the same deleterious gene mutation.

An important debate focuses on obligations to disclose risk to family. In particular, when a genetic mutation is identified in an individual that may predispose carriers to serious illness, questions arise whether there is an obligation of disclosure to other family members and whose responsibility is it to make decisions in that regard. In many jurisdictions, the duty of disclosure has been located primarily with the at-risk individual. However, Dugan et al. (2003) observe that in practice this informal process of disclosure does not always occur. It can be argued that there is a danger that many family members are not informed of their at-risk status, and that in such cases the obligation to inform them of their potential risk status falls to the genetic counseling clinic. The ethical dilemma passes to the clinician in the form of a slightly different set of conflicting ethical obligations. On the one hand, health professionals are obliged to respect their clients' privacy and maintain confidentiality. They are also faced with presenting medical information to individuals who have not sought it out and may not want to be contacted (Sachs, 1999). On the other hand, health professionals are obliged to prevent harm and promote welfare among other family members, which may require the breaching of confidentiality to inform them of their (potential) at-risk status (Suthers, Armstrong, McCormack, & Trott, 2006). Clinical policy in this regard varies across jurisdictions.

Psychological Consequences of Genetic Counseling and Testing

Genetic counseling is seen as having a role in relieving anxieties to do with perceptions of risk (Harper, 2004). This dimension of genetic counseling is evident, for example, in a concern with "correcting" individuals' faulty risk perceptions through genetic counseling, when these risk perceptions are seen as being "too high" (Hallowell, 1998). There is some contention as to the lengths to which one should go to relieve anxiety, particularly when risk management strategies, such as prophylactic surgery, are advised more for the purpose of relieving anxiety, rather than medical reasons (Hallowell, 1999).

It is also recognized that the provision of genetic information, which occurs in genetic counseling, can itself be the cause of increased anxiety or even distress (Marteau, 1999).

Research has therefore focused on whether there are adverse psychological consequences (such as distress and feelings of morbidity) that can be seen to follow systematically from receiving this information. Although there does seem to be the potential for adverse psychological impact associated with knowledge of increased genetic risk (Baider, Ever-Hadani, & De-Nour, 1999), conclusions vary as to exactly when and how this negative impact manifests. In a review of the literature on the psychological impact of predictive testing, Shaw, Abrams, and Marteau (1999) conclude that positive test results could lead to distress, anxiety, and depression but rarely for more than 4 weeks after receiving the result, whereas negative test results did not lead to any adverse affects whatsoever. In contrast, based on a qualitative study involving in-depth interviews with women who had been treated for breast/ovarian cancer and had undergone genetic testing, Hallowell, Foster, Eeles, Ardern-Jones, and Watson (2004) argue that individuals' responses to genetic testing need to be understood primarily in terms of their previous experience of disease. The authors suggest that the women's responses to genetic risk information depended largely on the degree to which they had incorporated cancer risk information into their self-identity following their previous diagnosis of cancer. Moreover, Hallowell et al. observe that for women who have had extensive personal experience with cancer, there seems to be a certain degree of contempt for cancer genetics. Not surprisingly, in contrast to witnessing a relative's death, losing a breast, or undergoing chemotherapy, the procedures involved in genetic testing may appear relatively trivial.

Critical Debates

Effectiveness of Risk Communication

Since genetic counseling is concerned with the communication of risk, debate has focused on whether it is effective in promoting "accurate" risk perceptions. Numerous studies on perceptions of genetic risk have focused on differences between individuals' ("subjective") risk estimates and "objective" estimates. In particular, many studies focus on whether genetic counseling is effective in "correcting" people's risk perceptions and leads to lasting "accurate" risk perceptions. Studies vary in their conclusions on this matter ranging from finding genetic counseling moderately successful (e.g., Sagi, Kaduri, Zlotogora, & Peretz, 1998) to not very successful (e.g., Lloyd et al., 1996). Importantly, a study by Roggenbuck, Olson, Sellers, and Ludowese (2000) suggests that genetic counselors themselves have biased risk perceptions with regard to estimating the likelihood of genetic problems, thus casting doubt on the reliance of genetic counseling as a mechanism to "correct" risk perceptions.

In contrast, several studies conducted on genetic counseling sessions from a discursive perspective have argued that rather than focusing on individualized risk perceptions, genetic risk is better understood as constructed in interaction between genetic counselors and clients (O'Doherty, Navarro, & Crabb, 2009; Sarangi, 2002; Sarangi, Bennert, Howell, & Clarke, 2003). These studies demonstrate the contingent nature of risk communication and highlight that the meaning of "risk," rather than being conceptualized as a number that is understood either correctly or incorrectly, may be better understood as a complex and situated manifestation of interpersonal interaction in the genetic counseling process. These studies also point to the conceptual conflation that is evident in clinicians' use of terms such as "risk" in genetic counseling sessions (Bharadwaj, 2002; O'Doherty, 2006).

Geneticization

Taking a broader societal perspective, criticisms have been levelled at the overemphasis and preoccupation with genetic causes of disease over environmental ones, in particular social determinants of health (Conrad & Gabe, 1999; Kerr & Cunningham-Burley, 2000; Petersen, 2003). These trends are captured in the notion of geneticization, a term coined by Abby Lippman and defined as "the ongoing process by which

priority is given to searching for variations in DNA sequences that differentiate people from each other and to attributing some hereditary basis to most disorders, behaviors, and physiological variations (including such things as schizophrenia and high blood pressure as well as the ability of children to sit still while watching television and of adults to quit smoking)." (Lippman, 1994, p. 13). The advent and increasing emphasis on predisposition testing and associated genetic counseling is seen by some as contributing to the geneticization of society and having much potential for harm. Turney and Turner (2000, p. 20), for instance, observe in the context of predictive testing for schizophrenia that

> It would be encouraging to believe that if we can test for the presence of genetic factors before a disease strikes, we can warn 'those who are susceptible to stay away from specific environmental triggers', but there is little reason to suppose that the lives of those who develop schizophrenia will lend themselves to such prescription.

Nondirectiveness

Contemporary genetic counseling is guided strongly by adherence to nondirectiveness. In a general sense, this manifests in genetic counseling being seen as a vehicle for informing clients, as opposed to an opportunity for counselors to influence clients to act in particular ways. In spite of wide variations attached to the term, nondirectiveness has been taken up almost universally as a guiding principle of genetic counseling (Weil, 2003).

Nondirectiveness is often presented as the key element that distinguishes genetic counseling from eugenics, which is typically seen to have been characterized by coercion. However, this distinction has been challenged on a number of grounds (Petersen, 1999; Resta, 1997), and Resta, in particular, argues that it is not possible to remove eugenic connotations from genetic counseling simply by advocating nondirectiveness. Resta argues that in spite of their role as *counselors*, who nowadays draw largely on the counseling theories of Carl Rogers, the work of genetic counselors is intricately connected to that of clinical geneticists. More significantly, counselors usually work directly under the supervision of clinicians, who control the clinic's goals, philosophies, as well as the employment of counselors. And regardless of the claims made for genetic counseling, Resta asserts that the origins of clinical genetics cannot easily be separated from those of eugenics. In particular, modern clinical geneticists trace their history to the work of geneticists in the 1950s (such as Clarence Oliver, Lee Dice, and Sheldon Reed). Resta demonstrates that while these geneticists clearly articulated a nondirective counseling policy, many of them simultaneously supported eugenics quite openly. Although they criticized eugenic programs, which they saw as being based on racism and coercion, they nevertheless felt that eugenic goals were compatible with genetic counseling goals.

In spite of the wide support for nondirectiveness in genetic counseling, there have been significant criticisms levelled against it. First, nondirectiveness is criticized for being used with only a vague definition, and even when clear definitions are supplied, these may vary quite substantially. White (1997) notes that the term "nondirectiveness" is used as a common description for a range of different counseling styles. Although the service provided by physicians, nurses, social workers, and Master's level genetic counselors is informed by very different traditions, virtually all of these professionals characterize their counseling style as "nondirective." Furthermore, nondirectiveness has been argued to be "ethically insufficient" as a central principle of genetic counseling (Weil, 2003). By setting nondirectiveness as an unchallengeable parameter of genetic counseling, important decisions are framed as relevant only to the individual. Hallowell (1999) and Hallowell et al. (2003) argue that the very nature of the subject matter of genetic counseling makes these decisions relevant to the family of the individual attending counseling. Moreover, White (1997) argues that decisions that involve abortion, for example, pose important dilemmas not only to individual clients

but also to society at large that should not be avoided by adhering to nondirectiveness. Finally, nondirectiveness has been argued to be unachievable in practice (Hallowell, 1999; Petersen, 1999; Weil, 2003). Reasons for this include (1) that counselors' values will inadvertently influence clients, (2) that there are inevitable choices the counselor must make regarding the information provided, (3) that there are institutional biases, such as state support for screening for certain conditions suggesting prenatal screening and abortion as appropriate courses of action, and (4) that nondirectiveness as an approach to counseling itself specifies a particular way that the client should think about a certain problem (Weil). Alternatives that have been suggested to the exclusive reliance on nondirectiveness as an ethical principle in genetic counseling include assessing the degree to which clients in genetic counseling can be seen to manifest agency, both personal and relational (O'Doherty, 2009).

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Online Resources

Factsheets on genetics and Genetic Counselling (New South Wales, Australia). http://www.genetics.edu.au/factsheet
National Society of Genetic Counselors (US). http://www.nsgc.org/
American Board of Genetic Counselors (US). http://www.abgc.net/ABGC/AmericanBoardofGeneticCounselors.asp
Assisted Human Reproduction Canada. http://www.ahrc-pac.gc.ca/v2/pubs/genetic-genetique-eng.php
Genetic Counsellor Registration Board. http://www.gcrb.org.uk/

Genius

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Introduction

Genius is a problematic concept to define – in fact, it resists any clear scientific psychological definition (Howe, 1999). However, in general, we can understand genius to be an individual who has achieved a high level of domain-specific expertise and who generates at least one product that is considered broadly to be both original and to have value (Simonton, 2009). Through the narratives of nineteenth-century philosophers (e.g., James, 1880; Kant, 1790/2000) and twentieth-century psychologists (e.g., Albert, 1975; Eysenck, 1995; Terman, 1925), genius has been claimed as a psychological construct. Whether the lens for study is intelligence (e.g., Gardner, 1997; Terman, 1925), creativity (e.g., Albert, 1969; Simonton, 2004), "madness" (e.g., Jamison, 1993), or some combination of these (e.g., Andreasen, 2005; Weisberg, 1994), psychology has made its mark on the study of genius.

Definition

An individual who has achieved a high level of domain-specific expertise and who generates at least one product that is considered broadly to be both original and to have value (Simonton, 2009).

Keywords

Genius; talent; creativity; intelligence; madness; nature versus nurture; gender

Traditional Debates

Within psychology, studies of genius have tended to focus on creativity, intelligence, or madness, or some combination thereof as the root cause. In recent years, however, psychological scholarship on exceptional abilities has turned more exclusively towards the issue of creativity (e.g., Albert, 1969; Kaufman, 2001; Simonton, 2004), with "genius" having been mostly replaced in the mainstream literature by the more measurable "high creativity." Yet, genius as a psychological construct continues to hold some fascination and relevance to empirical researchers. Some questions that continue to haunt the debates on this topic are the following: (1) how do we define genius? (2) is genius generic or specific? (3) is genius a product of nature or nurture? (4) is genius a product of madness? and (5) is genius best understood at an individual or group level? No consensus has been arrived at in the empirical literature on any of these topics, and an examination of any one of these would be beyond the scope of this entry. However, Simonton (2009) provides a short, accessible, yet in-depth review of these core debates in his book *Genius 101*.

These same debates have also filtered into and characterize the narratives in popular science writing on the topic. The question of whether genius is the product of nature or nurture has been taken up by journalist authors, most of whom have questioned the claim that genetics could play a role in exemplary talent (e.g., Gladwell, 2008; Shenk, 2010). Gladwell, in particular, popularized the research conducted by Ericsson and his colleagues on the effects of training on talent and expertise (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993), leading to a resurgence of the popular opinion that geniuses are made, not born.

Despite its sustained presence in modern empirical psychological scholarship, it is clear that the history of philosophical and psychological work on genius (e.g., Carlyle, 1841; Cox, 1926; Galton, 1869; James, 1880; Kant, 1790/2000; Lombroso, 1889/1905; Terman, 1925) has framed the current discussions of related terms, such as "gifted" and "talented," and also provides a high-end threshold for related concepts such as intelligence and creativity.

Critical Debates

In light of these traditional debates, there are three types of questions relating to the ontology and epistemology of genius which can be considered: what is genius, who can become a genius, and how is genius best studied in psychology? Each of these foundational questions has – and will continue to – benefit from critical psychological discourse.

With regard to the question of "what is genius," little work of a critical nature exists in the current literature. The debate has advanced little from the polarization of genius as the result of mostly social factors (e.g., Ericsson et al., 1993; Howe, 1999) or mostly individual or genetic factors (e.g., Eysenck, 1995; Galton, 1869). Some have tried to advance the discussion by suggesting that geniuses are the product of both (e.g., Simonton, 2009). Whatever the position, the dialogue has not transcended the "nature vs. nurture" binary. With regard to the critical psychological literature, the traditional debates which have been framed by the "nature vs. nurture" paradigm remain largely uncontested. New critically oriented work in this area is needed. A possible avenue of exploration would be to view genius as part of the power structures which develop, guide, and shape the world around us. Geniuses are often recognized as "Great Men" for their contributions to a particular discipline, art form, or society more generally. These individuals have essentially helped to form the conditions upon which the current *status quo* is based. However, while geniuses certainly stand as exemplars for the current *status quo*, new forms of genius continue to be recognized which establishes the new conditions of possibility within a given discipline or society. For example, within the discipline of psychology, it could be argued that the current conditions of possibility in developmental

psychology were set by the work of Jean Piaget and Lev Vygotsky. At a broader social level, it would be almost unthinkable to create a list of twentieth-century geniuses without including Bill Gates and Steve Jobs for their pioneering work in computing and software development. Interestingly, neither of these cases (Piaget and Vygotsky; Gates and Jobs) would fall within the traditional pantheon of Carlylian heroes and geniuses (see Carlyle, 1841), illustrating the sociohistorically dependent nature of genius. As such, it is important to apply a critical lens to the questions of who counts as a genius and how and when people are recognized as geniuses.

When we think about "who can become a genius," the resounding answer in the philosophical and psychological literature has been "men"; women are often problematized and portrayed as being deficient in a number of ways due to their perceived lack of achievement (e.g., Eysenck, 1995; Weininger, 1906). Derrida (2003/2006) has commented on the essentially masculine nature of the concept of genius (see also Hegarty, 2007) and has shown that this gender bias extends even into the etymology of the word. As such, Ball (2007) has argued that the literature on genius represents an example of *epistemological violence* (see Teo, 2008). Specifically, the exclusion of women from the category of genius lends support the variability hypothesis (see Shields, 1982) and reinforces the perception that women may have talent but can never reach the levels of genius attained by their male counterparts. This leads to a situation where women's works are systematically undervalued and they remain underrepresented at the top levels of their fields (see Barres, 2006; Spelke, 2005). Another line of inquiry which would benefit critical theoretical discussion would be to more fully map out how genius intersects with other social categories, such as sexuality (e.g., Hegarty, 2007), disability, and socioeconomic status, among others.

As a final line of inquiry, "how is genius best studied in psychology" has – and will continue to – benefit from critical dialogues. Recently, Ball (2012) has suggested that a historical psychology is a lens through which to examine genius that could lead to fruitful discussion. Without resorting to celebratory "great man" narratives, psychologists can draw on a number of historiographic methods such as historiometry, psychological factories, scientific personae, moral economies, multisited ethnographies, and biographies of scientific objects. In fact, historiometry is a method which is already routinely been employed by Simonton (2004). These methods can open up new possibilities for inquiry and critique, positioning genius as a concept best understood sociohistorically.

Critical narratives such as these have carved out a space for critical dialogue within the literature on genius. Hopefully, critical psychologists will continue to build on the works that have been done to develop a better understanding of the concept and psychologists' role in its study.

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Genocide, Overview

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Introduction

Lemkin's (1944) definition is perhaps the mostly widely accepted and encapsulates the objectives of disintegrating political and social institutions, culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups. In addition to the broader implications of genocide, the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and lives of individuals belonging to targeted groups may also be compromised. While these definitions offer a critical point of departure for understanding many aspects of genocide, they fail to represent specific types of genocide, such as cultural genocide and femicide. Continued critical discourse is warranted.

Definition

Genocide, a word with much emotional, political, and legal significance, refers to a "systematic, coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves" (Lemkin, 1944, p. 79). The 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide provides the legal framework for understanding genocide in noting that genocide includes any acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group by means of killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicting on the group's quality of life, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, or forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (UN, 1948). Recent definitions also note that genocide refers to "a form of violent

social conflict, or war, between armed power organizations that aim to destroy civilian social groups and those groups and other actors who resist this destruction" (Shaw, 2007, p. 154).

Keywords

Decimation; holocaust; mass execution; mass murder; race extermination; ethnic cleansing

Traditional Debates

Although not absolute, the act of genocide is typically understood as a counterpart of war or continued conflict. Shaw (2007) identified three primary elements to characterize the relationship between genocide and war including the identification of a particular social group as an enemy in a military sense as opposed to political, economic, or cultural opponents. Second, there is an intent to destroy the real or imputed power of the enemy group including its economic, political, cultural, and ideological power. Third, there is a deployment and threat of violence intended to destroy the power of the enemy group through physically harming and killing a significant number of its members. Beyond the articulated relationship between genocide and war, genocide has been explained as a process that develops in eight stages that are predictable but not unalterable as each stage can be prevented. Later stages must be preceded by the earlier stages, though earlier stages continue to operate throughout the unfolding of the process. These eight stages are classification, symbolization, dehumanization, organization, polarization, preparation, extermination, and denial (Shaw). Thus, it is evident that genocide is not a discreet or sudden event, rather it is a long-term political process in which a group utilizes power to dehumanize and ultimately destroy another group.

Critical Debates

While there is widespread agreement that genocide can occur in numerous ways given the systematic and differing approaches utilized, there is little literary attention given to more insidious aspects of genocide, namely, cultural genocide. Cultural genocide is perhaps the most pervasive and insidious of all forms of genocide. As Lemkin explains:

> cultural genocide extends beyond attacks upon the physical and/or biological elements of a group and seeks to eliminate its wider institutions. This is done in a variety of ways, and often includes the abolition of a group's language, restrictions upon its traditional practices and ways, the destruction of religious institutions and objects, the persecution of clergy members, and attacks on academics and intellectuals. Elements of cultural genocide are manifested when artistic, literary, and cultural activities are restricted or outlawed and when national treasures, libraries, archives, museums, artifacts, and art galleries are destroyed or confiscated. (1944).

Interestingly, the United Nations Convention on Genocide (1948) explicitly condemns physical and biological genocide yet makes no mention of cultural genocide except in the forcible transfer of a group's children (Nersessian, 2005); Wilson (1990) underscores the importance of this in noting that the "ultimate force in the world is the force of the mind. When that force is defeated all is lost" (p. 11). Wilson's declaration illuminates the importance of understanding the role of cultural institutions in exacting and perpetuating cultural genocide. To this end, many scholars have decried Western educational systems that serve to teach (White) revisionist history and socialize children into the same cultural value system. Educational psychologist Asa Hilliard (2000) addresses the far-reaching effects of genocide, particularly in utilizing education as a vehicle for cultural socialization in his declaration:

> A global system of power distribution has dictated and continues to dictate the nature of the education and socialization processes. Slavery, colonization, apartheid/segregation and the rationalizing ideology of white supremacy are centuries of old challenges, really aspects of a global hegemonic system. (n.p.).

Even the United Nations notes that "indoctrinating children into the customs, language, and values of a foreign group was tantamount to the

destruction of the [child's] group, whose future depended on that next generation" (UN, 1948). This emphasizes that the instigation of genocide is a calculated and long-term quest for supremacy, power, and in some circumstances resources.

Decimation, holocaust, mass execution, mass murder, race extermination, and ethnic cleansing are terms also used synonymous to genocide. These terms, while equally abrasive, lack the international legal designation (and its corresponding consequences) and may be typically understood as international problems and commonly used to illustrate historical crimes of genocide that occurred outside the United States.

Thus, a critical understanding of genocide necessitates increased attention not only to cultural genocide but also to other less discussed genocides such as femicide or female infanticide, an alarming issue resulting in the death or selective abortion of an estimated millions of girls (Ahmad, 2010; Azziz-Baumgartner, McKeown, Melvin, Dang, & Reed, 2010). Moreover, critical discourse is necessary around the "genocides" within the USA as well as covert participation of the USA in genocide abroad. The crimes such as those perpetrated against American First Nation people and through the enslavement and extermination of masses of African people in this country have yet to be designated *genocides*, which has far-reaching impact. Finally, critical discourse is needed around issues such as when the world community fails to act to prevent or intervene in the process of genocide, which is tantamount to crimes of omission. Moreover, the silence of the global psychological community arguably makes it complicit in such genocidal processes.

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Online Resources

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German Critical Psychology

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Introduction

Ironically, the term *German* Critical Psychology (GCP) coined for this handbook highlights its particularities in comparison to critical psychologies, whereas the entry itself intends to indicate its general value for the international dialogue on challenges intellectuals and practitioners encounter *vis à vis* human subjectivity.

Definition

GCP's founders, Klaus Holzkamp and his colleagues, developed an original conceptual framework ("categories") as a "new scientific

base for the entire Psychology" (Holzkamp, 1983, p. 19) in its material and methodological dimensions. Rooted in Marxist thought and methodology, this approach opens a way out of the pre-paradigmatic state of the discipline (Graumann, 1994; Maiers, 1991; Métraux, 1981, 1985) and of the chism between natural and social sciences within it by a trans-disciplinary approach (Maiers, 1988). The core category 'personal agency/action potence' is derived from historical-empirical research and mediates biological and social aspects of human subjectivity. It relates to individuals' actions and to psychological functions such as cognition, emotion and motivation. GCP's methodology and methods are derived from categorical assumptions, suggesting that objectivity is achieved by procedures adequate to their object rather than by compliance with an overgeneralized epistemology. Several generations of psychologists have, on this basis, reinterpreted traditional concepts, carried out empirical research, developed alternative professional approaches to psychological challenges. Last but not least, the categorical assumptions themselves have been refined and revised.

Keywords

Agency/action potence; first person perspective; grounded action; practice research; societal nature; subjectivity

History

Institutional History

GCP emerged from cultural transformations, which social movements of the 1960s across Europe sought to bring about in the post-Second-World-War constellation. In West Germany, the students' movement was a stronghold in this development. Based on critical theories of (capitalist) society and state students investigated how psychological theories and practices can serve as an element in the reproduction of domination. The branch later on called GCP (*Kritische Psychologie*) shared this view, yet argued furthermore for the necessity of a genuinely psychological level of analysis within Marxist theory and for developing psychological categories alternative not only to 'mainstream' but also psychoanalytic concepts. Driven by the fusion between critical students and an established professor for psychology, Klaus Holzkamp, this program was carried out at the Psychological Institute at *Freie Universität Berlin*. From an epistemological standpoint drawing on Dingler's constructionism Holzkamp (1964, 1968) had pointed out some shortcomings of scientific 'objectivity' in the experimental-statistical model. Making use of Habermas (1965) notion of 'technological' from 'emancipatory' relevance of social sciences, he expanded this critique of low external validity to discussing the societal relevance of psychological contributions. Ensuing vivid debates between contradicting psychologies, prototypically embodied in the foundation of the *Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie* by H. Feger (Experimental Psychology), C.F. Graumann (Phänomenology), K. Holzkamp and M. Irle (Mainstream) in 1970, ceased soon again (Maiers, 1979). Facing theoretical challenges and losing their political power in the process of the democratization of academic decision making the conservative staff eventually left the institute and founded the Institute for Psychology, while the critical majority remained within the Psychological Institute. At first sight GCP flourished in the following decade as curricula were established, as international congresses with thousands of participants took place and as the approach was received abroad (mainly in Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands). Yet, the Institute's coherence and reputation was undermined throughout its existence. A Yellow Press Campaign affiliated Holzkamp with sexual abuse, while he had in fact accepted formal responsibility for a students' project (Autorenkollektiv, 1971), in which sexuality was addressed as an issue of interest to the children visiting the after-school care club (Haug, 1971). Furthermore, the Senate of Berlin regularly appointed scholars to the Institute, who had been listed on second or third

place, positions were not prolonged and none of those on the short list (W. Maiers, O. Dreier, C.W. Tolman) for Holzkamp's chair (he retired in 1992 and died in 1995) were appointed until the chair was cancelled altogether. The Psychological Institute lost its autonomy in 1995. Its remnants, upheld by Holzkamp's students and colleagues such as Professor M. Markard, were buried under a wave of neoliberal governance in Germany. In historical oblivion and anti-marxist frenzy unleashed by the crumbling Eastern Bloc and the incorporation of East Germany into the West German State, the psychological monoculture was (re-)established in the department of psychology at the *Freie Universität Berlin*. Next to feminist, qualitative and other critical approaches Marxist GCP was excluded from the new B.A. and M.A. curricula. Yet, before and after its end as an academic institution GCP has been developed and taught in various settings: the journal *Forum Kritische Psychologie* publishes theoretical and empirical innovations, professors such as J. Held (Tübingen), K. Weber (Munich) and W. Maiers (Stendal) teach and do research on its basis just as numerous younger scholars do in academic and non-academic contexts. Also, through W. Maiers and O. Dreier, GCP has been introduced to the community involved in the *International Society of Theoretical Psychology* (ISTP). Students in German-speaking countries continue to study GCP and discuss it in self-organized Summer Schools. Recently, the *Klaus Holzkamp-Institut für Subjektwissenschaft* was founded at the *Freie Universität Berlin*.

Critical Debates

Conceptual Development

Facing the proliferation of massive problems individuals encounter in their individual reproduction in the context of a fundamental, multifaceted crisis of the capitalist formation around the globe, Psychologists are in great need of powerful emancipatory tools in theory and practice. GCP attempts to make contributions to this trans-national venture. While its set of categories full of neologisms hampers translation, its trans-disciplinary approach puts GCP into dialogue with anthropology, genetic research, sociology, education and the entire range of psychological sub-disciplines. We thus hope for a reader listening to the meaning rather than to the sound of GCP's conceptual, theoretical and methodological suggestions.

The specific approach of GCP is related firstly to the debate, whether or not a critique of the genesis and function of Psychology would suffice (Rexilius, 1987). GCP holds that this approach is unable to identify the potentially relevant insights of traditional concepts (Maiers, 1979) and concluded that an alternative conceptual framework for such a differentiated assessment was needed. Secondly, GCP objected to combining Marxist Sociology with Psychoanalytic Psychology (Adorno, 1955; Lichtman, 1986) because of the latter's anti-social concept of drive, yet reinterpreted psychoanalytical notions (Holzkamp-Osterkamp, 1976). The task was to create concepts rendering insight into human subjectivity under historically specific conditions (Holzkamp, 1976, p. 248) within an emancipatory project. This could be reached by reconstructing historically how 'subjectivity' became problematic in a way that would bring the discipline of Psychology into existence (Jaeger & Staeuble, 1978) and by reconstructing the genesis of the human psyche in evolutionary and socio-historical processes. GCP focused, thirdly, on the latter (Tolman, 1991).

Understanding the human psyche as a composition of natural, social and individual dimensions this historical reconstruction results in an empirically grounded understanding of the relation between them: The concepts (categories) relating to historically earlier phenomena are general, those relating to historically later developments are specific characteristics of the human psyche. Thus, the set of categories can serve to avoid an "organismic anthropology" (Holzkamp, 1972, p. 62) implicit to the (mis-) understanding of subjectivity as strictly determined by external conditions as in experimental psychology, or, vice versa, overgeneralizing or humanizing animals' behavior. The period of special interest is the one, in which the human

species evolved (*Tier-Mensch-Übergangsfeld*). GCP holds, that the human species became and is social by nature (*gesellschaftliche Natur*), giving it the potential of co-creating nature and to produce its social surrounding as well as enabling the human individuals physio-psychologically to socialization into historically and regionally varying societies (Holzkamp, 1973, 1983, 1991; Holzkamp-Osterkamp, 1975; Schurig, 1975a, 1975b, 1976). Still determined by laws of evolution, early forms of cooperation allowed for providing prospectively for the collective reproduction. Furthermore, the laws of evolution steering the development were gradually superposed by the socio-historical logic. As this transformation in the logic of development occurs and as the link between contributing to and using the means of (re)production loosens with respect to a certain individual, its reproduction is not dependant on its immediate contribution anymore, and neither are its actions strictly determined by the socio-natural surrounding. Rather, the individual takes action with respect to the surrounding's social meaning. It is free to adopt given options or to expand the surrounding's options by transforming it (collectively). As a result of this "possibility relation" between societal and individual reproduction the human individual's actions cannot be understood in terms of evolutionary functions or of "stimulus and response."

The "possibility relation" implies that human action and subjectivity is neither strictly determined nor completely in-determined. Rather, the individual's reproduction depends/on its – socially mediated – appropriation of relevant means of reproduction, in short: personal agency/action potence (*Handlungsfähigkeit*). This term marks the essence of the human psyche and is regarded as the "psychological core category" (Holzkamp, 1983, p. 20). For the individual, socio-natural and socio-historic surroundings bear the meaning of a set of potentials and obstacles with respect to personal agency/action potence. Human actions and subjectivity are *subjectively grounded* in the surrounding and its meaning, as the individual *in actu* necessarily stresses certain aspects of them, turning them into premises (*Prämissen*) for specific actions (cognitions, emotions, motivations) intended to serve subjective grounds (*Gründe*) (Maiers, 1995). GCP holds, that essential psychological phenomena can be adequately analyzed only in terms of "premise-grounds-relations," not in terms of "stimulus–response-relations."

While the concepts introduced so far are meant to be valid for the entire human species in any socio-historical context, the category of "restrictive and generalized agency" seeks to specify the "possibility relation" with respect to the socio-historical context of the capitalist formation. "Restrictive agency" characterizes actions on the premise of accepting given forms of domination and of resigning from attempts to enhance personal agency by overcoming them (collectively); "generalized agency" refers to seizing this option. If "restrictive agency" implies harm to oneself (*Selbstfeindschaft*), yet nobody consciously harms oneself, this mode of action unleashes the dynamic unconscious (Holzkamp-Osterkamp, 1976, p. 255ff). The category "personal agency/action potence" contains psychological functions (cognition, emotion, motivation), which have been differentiated with respect to the "restrictive" and "generalized" mode. Also, the categories have been developed regarding the process of human ontogenesis. Finally, with respect to research on particular forms of agency, there are five levels of analysis to be considered including sociological and biological-physiological dimensions (Holzkamp, 1983, p. 356).

Using the set of categories, traditional psychological concepts have been re-interpreted, such as attitude (Markard, 1984), learning (Holzkamp, 1994) and volition (Maiers, 2007). The categories also served as a base for a variety of empirical research resulting in theories on relations between parents and children (Dreier, 1980; Markard, 1985; Ulman, 1987), on the meaning of high-tech-based production for workers (Projekt Automation und Qualifikation, 1980, 1981a, 1981b), on gender relations (Haug, 1980), on how the state of academic psychology affects emancipatory psychological practice (Markard & ASB, 2000; Markard & Holzkamp, 1989),

on racism (Held & Spona, 1999; Osterkamp, 1996; Weber, 2001) and on *Lebensführung* (Osterkamp, 2008).

Methodology and Methods

In the tradition of action research, GCP's research aims at overcoming (subjectively) problematic forms of agency by reconstructing 'premise-grounds-relations', suggesting theoretical alternatives and investigating their practical value (Markard, 1985, 2000). Rather than being a research object as in the case of a test person, the stakeholders are (in the ideal case) involved in the process as co-researchers; as the dialogue between researcher and co-researcher refers to subjective premises and objectives it is qualified as "discourse on grounded action" (*Begründungsdiskurs*), as opposed to the "discourse on conditioned behavior" (*Bedingtheitsdiskurs*) in the traditional model (Holzkamp, 1983, p. 509ff). By identifying the discourse on grounded action in the midst of experimental psychology, Holzkamp (1986) demonstrated that this approach cannot be confined to a hermeneutic exclave but is constutitive for the entire psychology. Since premise-grounds-relations are constituted by reasoned action mediated by meaning, empirical data cannot test a theory. Rather, they exemplify it. Also, theories and data do not inform about frequency and dissemination of the relation they refer to. Yet, generalizations can be developed theoretically as well as practically (Geffers, 2008; Holzkamp, 1983, p. 545). GCP's methodology and methods are situated beyond the dualism of quantitative and qualitative approaches (Markard, 1991).

Baller (1995) opted for incorporating postmodern sociology into GCP's implying methodologically to give up categories specific to socio-historical contexts, while Kaindl (1998) argued for updating categories according to historical developments within the capitalist formation; Markard (2009, p. 180ff), upholding the Marxist approach and the idea of historically specified categories, pointed out some historically specific traces within categories and concluded that futher theoretical and empirical research is needed in order to avoid such conflations. In Osterkamps's theory on racism Fried (2002) missed a sociological contextualization, which Reimer (2011) tried to render. The assumption that agency within the restrictive mode implies necessarily harm to oneself has been criticized for not being able to understand apparent benefits of exerting power (Markard, 2009, p. 200), turning this assumption into a categorical hypothesis for empirical research. Theories on female subjection into ideological gender relations hold, that this process results from choice, while others argue that the implicit concept of 'free will' is valid as a sociological, not a psychological concept (Schmalstieg, 2006). According to Haug (2003), Holzkamp's concept of learning underestimates the relevance of teaching, collective learning and emotions (Forum Kritische Psychologie 48, 2005; Markard, 2009, p. 254ff). Lux has formulated the program of updating the fundamental assumption, that the human species is social by nature with respect to recent developments in the field of genetics (Lux, 2012).

International and Practice Relevance

The comprehensive claim of integrating natural and social dimensions holds true against concepts, which neglect either the bio-physical or the social character of humankind. GCP can help to avoid vain controversies and identify the dimensions, aspects and levels of the human psyche, which specific concepts, theories and findings relate to. The venture of developing fundamental categories empirically in the historical dimension, opens an entirely new level of discussion within Psychology, because theoretical terms are usually defined, not derived from historical data. Thus, GCP is an attempt to make grounds for a truly paradigmatic (Kuhn, 1962) stage of Psychology. It stresses the perspective of the individual against sociological views on motifs of action and it overcoming continues to make use of Marxist thought for psychological challenges. Its answers may not hold true, but the questions raised are still valid for any discipline

dealing with human agency and subjectivity. Contemporarily, theoretical and practical alternatives to traditional approaches found to be stabilizing forms of domination or failing to understand the subjects' problems comprehensively have been developed in various fields by numerous young scholars (Huck et al., 2008; Markard & ASB, 2000). Thus, GCP's categories and research concepts have been and continue to be put into practice in the perspective of an emancipatory global project.

Future Directions

The trans-disciplinary character of GCP necessitates its permanent dialogue with debates and findings in the social and natural sciences in order to reevaluate its own stance as well as to renew a Marxist voice in the global realm of Psychology. Its objective is to contribute with psychological means to strengthening forms of generalized agency, which may lead to emancipation from domination within the global formation of capitalism. The scattered intellectuals contributing to this project will need to establish and strengthen their networks. Also, the dialogue between GCP and critical psychologies around the globe will be intensified. English publications of selected writings of Holzkamp (Schraube & Osterkamp, 2013) and on basic notions of GCP (Painter, Marvakis, & Mos, 2009) should stimulate this process. And the recently founded *Klaus Holzkamp-Institut für Subjektwissenschaft* at *Freie Universität Berlin* may serve as a step toward re-establishing GCP's original institutional base.

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[1] Im vorfindlichen Literaturverzeichnis ist der Band ziemlich fehlerhaft angegeben (wie das ganze Literaturverzeichnis). Offenbar übernehmen die die Korrekturen einfach nicht.

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German Political Psychology

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Introduction

German political psychology emerged in Germany in the 1950s as a critical psychoanalytically oriented psychology in the tradition of Freudo-Marxism and the social psychology of critical theory. Its inception happened against the backdrop of the defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War and the exposure of its crimes and in view of the economic boom, which was accompanied by conservativism and reverberations of national socialist ideologies. German political psychology belongs to the major strands of critical psychologies that

developed in the German-speaking countries from the 1950s and 1960s onwards, but despite its relevance in the German-speaking countries, it is hardly known to an international audience as of yet. It tackles many questions that are still of relevance for any critical psychology today.

Definition

The term *German Political Psychology* refers to West German debates between the 1950s and 1980s that followed up on the social psychological studies and reflections of critical theory. First, political psychologists analyzed pressing questions of their respective times and critically interrogated diverse aspects of late capitalist and post-fascist West German society. Second, they conducted systematic reflections on the relation between psychoanalysis and social theory. Third, they inquired how psychoanalytic knowledge may aid in political activism. Significant proponents were Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, Alfred Lorenzer, Helmut Dahmer, Klaus Horn, and Peter Brückner. Later, feminist authors critically took up these debates.

Keywords

Psychoanalysis; critical theory; social psychology; Marx; Freud; feminism

History

Two different strands bred this kind of psychoanalytically oriented political psychology in West German postwar society:

First, Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer remigrated from the American exile they had been driven into by the National Socialist rise to power. Horkheimer directed the *Frankfurt Institute of Social Research* (IfS) in the late 1920s when Adorno was a member there, too. Already then, the institute had started to seize psychoanalytic insights for critical social research with significant contributions by Erich Fromm and in the context of the Freudo-Marxist debates of the time. During Horkheimer's and Adorno's stay in the USA, these efforts gave way to their major study on authoritarianism "authoritarian personality." Once returned to Germany, they started another large-scale research project "group experiment" which analyzed the post-fascist mentality of the German population of the early 1950s in more than a hundred group interviews. The group experiment would be the last empirical social psychological research project of the early critical theory. Herbert Marcuse, a former member of the IfS who had not returned to Germany after the war but was much read there, would prove to be significant for the following theoretical discussion in Germany.

Second, psychoanalytic social psychology in Germany developed in close alignment to clinical practice. Psychoanalysis had been integrated into the National Socialist health care system under the name of "deutsche Seelenkunde" ("German study of the soul"). The heteronomous determination of therapeutic goals such as "combat capability" led to a "moral de-contextualization" and to the loss of the socio-critical potential of psychoanalysis (Schneider, 1993, p. 761): Thus, it became necessary to establish psychoanalysis with a special focus on its political and moral dimensions. It was Alexander Mitscherlich who promoted a political re-contextualization of psychoanalysis. The IfS kept a close dialogue with the "Sigmund Freud Institute" (SFI), founded at Adorno's and Horkheimer's suggestion, among others, and directed by Mitscherlich.

In the context of the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, both roots of political psychology were read widely and brought to bear fruit for the analysis of political conflicts.

Traditional Debates

The research themes and questions of political psychology were truly innovative in their time as they were not tackled at all by traditional psychology. Academic psychology in the former

Federal Republic of Germany was dominated by a kind of holistic psychology that was succeeded by the mathematically and experimentally oriented empirical psychology predominant in the USA during the 1960s. Psychoanalysis was included neither in mainstream academic psychology of the time nor in most critical approaches in psychology that developed somewhat later. The major discussions in political psychology did not aim at psychology, however. The majority of political psychologists were philosophers, social scientists, or psychoanalysts, which usually had received medical training. Traditional debates relevant to political psychology were on the one hand the humanities in the Federal Republic of Germany which had retreated to some sort of intellectual inwardness after the Second World War. On the other hand, political psychologists took issue with the psychoanalysis that had been integrated into the National Socialist health system and was discredited and theoretically tame since then.

Critical Debates

Alexander Mitscherlich continuously took a moral and political stand on social changes in (West) Germany from 1945 until the 1970s, drawing both from his *clinical* psychoanalytic work and from psychoanalytic theories. This already shows in his early works that were not even thoroughly psychoanalytic (Mitscherlich, 1946; Mitscherlich & Mielke, 1948/1960; Mitscherlich & Weber, 1946). In 1948 he founded the journal *Psyche*, dedicated to keep up with the Freudian tradition of cultural and social critique. *Psyche* would become one of the most significant publication organs of political psychology. In his major writings *On the Way to a Fatherless Society* (1963), *The Inhospitableness of Our Cities* (1965), and *The Inability to Mourn* (1967, together with Margarete Mitscherlich), Mitscherlich offers social psychological diagnoses of West German postwar society in which he – not unlike the critical theorists of the IfS – draws a dreadful picture of an anonymous, de-individualized mass society. Mitscherlich diagnosed an "ego-depletion in our society" (A. Mitscherlich & M. Mitscherlich, 1967, p. 20) which becomes apparent as an impaired ability to act upon social institutions actively and willfully. His major contribution to psychoanalytic social psychology lies in the fact that he always analyzed the conditions of this ego-depletion against the backdrop of the clinical study of individual life histories.

Together with *Margarete Mitscherlich*, he traced the ego-depletion in society back to the defense mechanisms against guilt and against remembering the atrocities of the National Socialists that prevailed in many Germans (A. Mitscherlich, & M. Mitscherlich, 1967). Almost at the same time, Mitscherlich (1963) proposed another explanation focusing on the consequences of the historic changes in work conditions on family and political structures: Social structures and relations that are handed down to children by their parents are hardly concrete and imaginable. By contrast, they are "inaccessible and erratic" (ibid., p. 200) to the individual. For Mitscherlich, this impression grew even stronger in the face of political transformation processes that confront the dominated with "faceless systems," bureaucracies and functional machineries of domination, which produce anxiety, aggression, and prejudice (see Mitscherlich, 1953, 1962/1963; 1969; 1977). Despite this dark picture that reminds of Marcuse's and Adorno's analyses of a "one-dimensional" world, his work is remarkably optimistic. Again and again, he intervened in social debates with concrete suggestions for change. He demanded the development of a *constructive disobedience* and stood up for "the *obligation* for dissent or even resistance" (Mitscherlich, 1963, p. 356).

Mitscherlich was always at pains to be up to date and to provide critical cultural diagnoses of his time and political engagement. However, he does not draw on the social theories that distinguished the works of the Freudo-Marxists and critical theory. For a critical social psychology, this is not only a deficit: His efforts "to reconstruct the imprints of society on the biographies of individuals" contain a "political

as well as specifically psychological quality" (Krovoza & Schneider, 1988, pp. 135f.) that were missing from the grand social theoretical reflections of his successors. This characteristic of Mitscherlich's work complies with the socio-critical re-contextualization of psychoanalysis mentioned above.

It was younger scholars from Mitscherlich's circles who took up the debate on the relation between social theory and psychoanalysis on this basis and against the backdrop of the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Helmut Dahmer, Klaus Horn, and Alfred Lorenzer coined the notion *critical theory of the subject* to account for these debates. Klaus Horn and Peter Brückner would later use the term *political psychology* for their theoretical and practical efforts.

Helmut Dahmer (1973, 1975), editor of Psyche from 1968 until 1992, analyzed psychoanalysis as to its potential for a critique of ideology. Furthermore, he has conducted valuable work in rediscovering Freudo-Marxism and critically unveiling Freudo-Marxists' reductive readings of both Marx and Freud. Critically taking up the so-called *culturalism* or *revisionism debate* of the 1950s, *Alfred Lorenzer* (1973) reformulated psychoanalysis as a materialist socialization theory. This argument between Adorno and Marcuse on the one hand and Fromm and Karen Horney on the other hand had targeted drive theory. Fromm and Horney called it biologistic and reactionary, while their opponents saw in it the critical impulse of Freudian theory. The proponents of drive theory maintained that Fromm's social characterology, too, made recourse to the ontologizing idea of a sort of "true essence" of the "unalienated human being" in order to make room for the concept of subjective resistance against social demands and forces. Lorenzer, by contrast, tried to capture the development of drive structure as an ambivalent and interactive process instead of plainly biologizing or otherwise ontologizing it. His concept starts from the level of drive development: According to Lorenzer, drive structures develop as inner reflections of the satisfying relationship between the child and its bodily needs (so-called "first nature") on the one hand and the caregiver, representing sociocultural practices, on the other hand. Lorenzer calls these reflections of real interactions *specific interaction forms*. They structure the expression of the infant's bodily needs, that is, human inner nature only appears in socially mediated form. Without losing sight of the embodiedness of psychological processes, Lorenzer conceptualizes drive structures as social and historic factors.

Specific interaction forms are related to linguistic and nonlinguistic (e.g., pictorial) cultural symbols (Lorenzer, 1970b, 1972, 1981). It is only with these symbolization processes that consciousness and the unconscious are made possible – albeit in a historically specific social form. Lorenzer considers language to be more than an ensemble of words (Lorenzer, 1970a, 1974): According to Lorenzer, language is conceptualized as "a unified whole of language use, life practices, and understanding of the world" (Morgenroth, 2010, p. 50). Social discourse infiltrates the child via symbolizations and (co)determines his or her consciousness. Socially tabooed interaction forms are deprived of consciousness by non- or de-symbolization; this, however, does not always succeed entirely. Lorenzer continues from here with two ideas: *First*, the subject's resistance is tied to the de-symbolized or that which is not yet symbolized and constitutes the dark side of social discourse. It is only by the conflictuous friction between individuals and discourse that subjectivity emerges (see Lorenzer, 1972). *Second*, Lorenzer accounts a particular relevance to ideologies in the socialization process (see Lorenzer, 1981). As linguistic and nonlinguistic templates, ideologies offer a symbolic framework for the recurrence of suppressed contents which cover up the de-symbolized and at the same time make it accessible to consciousness and to action, albeit dressed up in false symbols (re-symbolization). Ideologies literally lead to false consciousness and substitute clinical symptoms: They even contribute to the prevention of pathologies. Even if Lorenzer's approach has remained fragmented, it remains a productive re-conceptualization of psychoanalytic social psychology which has sparked rather little attention until now.

Klaus Horn struggles to find a psychoanalytic answer to the question regarding the social significance of subjectivity (Horn, 1972, 1973). He analyzes remains of suffering and resistance within the subject under conditions of late bourgeois society. Both theoretically and contentwise, he mostly summarizes the insights gained by Mitscherlich and critical theory. He deepens these earlier reflections with the help of a theory of narcissism but hardly offers innovative results. Nevertheless, his methodical reflections on psychoanalytic social research are of vital significance: It was Horn who first devoted systematic attention to psychoanalytically oriented methods of data analysis and collection ("scenic interview") (Horn, Beier, & Wolf, 1983; Horn, Beier, & Kraft-Krumm,1984).

Peter Brückner's political psychology reaches way beyond the mere analysis of the subjective factor of social processes: Brückner radicalizes Mitscherlich's strategy of reconstructing social encroachments in individual life histories by conceiving of political psychology as both a scientific *and* a political activity. The core idea is that there is a "relationship between the life histories of individuals and the historic harms they inflict on one another" (Brückner, 1968, p. 94). Brückner (1966) noted a concrete aspect of this general idea under the keyword *pathology of* obedience: On the basis of the psychoanalytic theory of culture and structure, he describes ego ideal and superego as "bridgeheads within the interiority of the governed individuals," thanks to which social authorities can rule (Brückner, 1970, p. 19; see 1968, p. 100). He conceptualizes the superego as a function that not only codetermines the vicissitudes of the drive but can also suppress nonconformist perceptions of society and political reflective processes. She or he who has internalized too many social imperatives gets afraid when criticizing, doubting, thinking, and questioning normality.

This insight builds *one* core of what is maybe the most careful analysis of the antiauthoritarian current of the student protests of the 1960s: Brückner's reflections on *The Transformation of Democratic Consciousness* (Brückner, 1970). With their antiauthoritarian protest, the students collectively engaged in a deconstruction of the inner "bridgeheads" of authority. By projecting these (back) onto authority figures, they perceived them as a part of reality that could be provoked and attacked. They produced social situations in which they could change their superego structures and, thus, their thought blocks and their feelings of fear, helplessness, and shame in the process of a social interaction with authority figures (see Brückner, 1970). Brückner is convinced, however, that this "organized self-liberation" (Brückner, p. 47) and the alteration of superego structures can only succeed within the context of political practice. Brückner showed solidarity with the protest movements of the 1960s and accompanied the movements of the 1970s up until the RAF with critical reflections (see Brückner, 1973, 1976a, 1976b; Brückner & Krovoza, 1972b). He did not want to *legitimize* but to *understand* them against the backdrop of the historical development of society. Official politicians as well as the university directorate of his home university in Hannover did not comprehend this difference between understanding and legitimating: In their eyes, Brückner had not distanced himself from the armed groups decidedly enough; he was suspended from his service as a lecturer and barred from university.

Brückner does not halt at these insights into the pathology of obedience but uses them to reflect on psychology and psychologists in a science critical manner (see Brückner, 1966; Brückner & Krovoza, 1972a): Socially induced thought blocks can also be found in (political) psychologists (see Brückner, 1968). For this reason, political psychology can only gain valid insights into social reality "when it destroys its everyday occurrence by means of critique" (ibid., p. 94). Political and psychological activity (Brückner, 1968, p. 95) is part of its method of knowledge; "it understands phenomena by trying to change them" (Brückner, 1968, p. 95). This attempt to change society allows the researchers to experience that which cannot be thought of and to analyze when feelings of fear, shame, guilt, insufficiency, and helplessness occur. It is only the political and psychological reflection of this experience against the backdrop of its social basis

that makes emancipative knowledge of social power structures possible: "Experiencing who we are and who really rules in society is part of the *same process*" (Brückner, 1968, p. 98). Brückner's methodological call for radical reflexivity aims at the abolition of the separation between "value-neutral" scientist and "concerned" person.

Regardless of the fact that Brückner's hopes for a far-reaching social change remained unfulfilled, the following must be noted: It was only in the course of its further development in the context of the protest movements that critical psychoanalytic social psychology gained a "reference point beyond theory and, as a consequence, a specific approach to its subject that mediates psychological and political thought. In this regard, this phase marks both the end and the new beginning of political psychology in Western Germany" (Krovoza & Schneider, 1988, p. 34).

International Relevance

The debates in the field of political psychology were conducted in German and have hardly transgressed this language barrier. It is only the works of Mitscherlich that have been translated into other languages. The theoretical debates, Lorenzer's theory of interaction forms, Brückner's interventionist political psychology, and Dahmer' ideology critical reflections on psychoanalysis were completely ignored. Marcuse, however, who followed the German debates and political activities from the USA, played a significant part in the US-American student movement.

Practice Relevance

Political psychological debates were taken up by the student movements of the 1970s that provided fruitful soil for social critique and for a critical account of National Socialism and the role of the parent generation in Nazi crimes. They influenced essentially discourses on the emotional heritage of National Socialism. The social movements of the 1970s also gave way to a psychoanalytically oriented critical pedagogy and the kinderladen movement with its antiauthoritarian educational concept. Many of these ideas were developed in tandem with the political psychological critique of the way in which socialization structures reproduced authoritarian power relations. In the student movement of the 1960s and 1970s, the reception of psychoanalysis (especially W. Reich) also fueled ideas of sexual liberation and sexual revolution. Finally, political psychological perspectives influenced the practical work of many psychoanalysts who were thus sensitized to the social conditions of inner-psychic conflicts of their patients.

Future Directions

The decline of the social movements in the 1990s also led to a decrease in debates in political psychology. It had then already succeeded in becoming institutionalized in some places, e.g., in Hannover, Frankfurt am Main, and Bremen. However, all of these venues were affected by more or less severe cutbacks.

One of the most vivid developments of political psychology was furthered by its adaptation by the women's movement and by attempts to adapt psychoanalysis for a feminist critique of society: The "Hannover approach" by the Adorno disciple Regina Becker-Schmidt and her colleagues differed from others in its emphasis on the significance of mediation between the structure of society and the structure of the subject rather than deductive thinking. Taking up discussions on social characterology, feminists criticized the concept of a rigid male and a female social character as ideology, and contradictions in gendered subjectivity became more evident (Liebsch, 1994): Actual women and men are not as is expected of them by social norms. Hannover feminists in particular have analyzed how the objective contradictions of women's "double socialization" (Becker-Schmidt, 1987), i.e., women's place in both paid labor and family, are reflected psychologically as

subjective ambivalences. However, this side branch of political psychology had to witness institutional drawbacks, too. The chairs in Hannover do not exist anymore, and psychoanalysis is hardly received at all in German gender studies.

Political psychology, like many other critical science project, is trapped in a process of institutional decline. On the other hand, especially on the younger generation of psychoanalytically oriented political psychologists, the edging away of political psychology from the universities has also had an activating and (re-)politicizing effect, visible in a multitude of new cooperations, conferences, and publications particularly in the field of gender studies and studies on right-wing extremism, nationalism, culture of remembrance, and anti-Semitism. Outside of the universities socio-critical groups increasingly turn to political psychology in order to explain current social phenomena.

Debates around the concepts of drive and social character are currently being taken up again and furthered. Pivotal in this regard are attempts to link these discussions to poststructuralist, difference theoretical, and interaction theoretical reflections.

The institutional eradication revealed the lack of inclusion of other advanced strands of critical theories. It is no wonder, then, that the desire to open up and to create dialogue, discussions, and alliances, as well as to transgress the boundary of the German language and to establish international exchange is very evident at the moment.

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Geropsychology, Overview

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Introduction

Geropsychology is an increasing field of clinical practice within professional psychology. Due to the rapid increase in the proportion of older people across countries, a growing number of psychologists work with older adults, their families and caregivers, and aged-care systems concerned. Historically, the origin of the study of the psychological ageing is often credited to A. Quetelet who initiated the first collection of psychological data in examining human development and ageing and published the book *On Man and the Development of His Faculties* in 1935 (Cook, Herson, & Van Hasselt, 1998). Although afterwards more research had investigated psychological functioning of adults, including older adults, and scholars recognized the need for the scientific study of older people, at the beginning of the twentieth century, most clinicians were unwilling to extend psychological treatment to older individuals. For example, Freud (1905) suggested that psychological treatment of patients over 50 years of age would be ineffective. In the clinical domain, K. Abraham (1927) was regarded as the first psychoanalyst to recognize and express optimism for the psychoanalytic treatment of older individuals. Later in 1929, the first psychotherapeutic program for older adults, the San Francisco Old Age Counseling Center, was founded in the USA. Following this developmental trend, S. L. Pressey (1939), as the first psychologist to publish a book on psychology of ageing, focused on the development of adulthood and ageing. Despite the increasing scholarly interests in older adults, the field of geropsychology remained in its infancy. It was until after World War II the field of psychology and ageing attracted substantial

systematic investigation. The books *Psychological Aspects of Aging* (Anderson, 1956) and *Handbook of Aging and the Individual* (Birren, 1959) remarked the rapid development of geropsychology. Despite exponential growth of geropsychology, it has been criticized being data rich and theory poor, which indicates the need of theoretical development in contemporary geropsychology (Cook et al., 1998).

Definition

Geropsychology is the specialized field of psychology concerning the psychological, behavioral, biological, and social aspects of ageing. The science of geropsychology regards that these ageing processes are iterative and interactive, taking from within a context and environment that influence the outcomes and experiences of ageing (American Psychological Association, 2009). Geropsychology is widely conceived of as a clinical field within professional psychology, the application of psychological and gerontological knowledge and skills in the assessment of and intervention with older adults and their families (Karel & Hinrichsen, 2010). Clinical geropsychology services are provided within a range of health care, residential and community settings.

Keywords

Psychology of ageing; Pikes Peak Model; cultural competency; positive and successful ageing

Traditional Debates

Many discussions in geropsychology are centered on or around clinical training and professional competence. The earliest formal training of clinical geropsychologists started at Washington University and the University of Southern California, both of which continue to provide scientist-practitioner models in geropsychology training. Eisdorfer and Lawton's (1973) work *Psychology of Adult Development and Aging*, which directly addressed broad issues concerning the clinical psychology of ageing, is considered as clinical geropsychology's formal debut. During the past three decades, conferences and journals have been devoted to sharing research pertaining to geriatric care and geropsychology training. The Cube Model, which is the conceptual framework for considering the development of both foundational and functional competencies across a psychologist's training career, was introduced in the *2002 Competencies Conference: Future Directions in Education and Credentialing in Professional Psychology*. Drawn upon the Cube Model, the Pikes Peak Model for Geropsychology Training was produced in the *2006 American National Conference on Training in Professional Geropsychology*. The Pikes Peak Model outlines attitude, knowledge, and recommendations for training at graduate, internship, postdoctoral, and postlicensure levels. The Pikes Peak Model identifies the specific attitude, knowledge, and foundational and functional skill competencies recommended for working with older adults. The Pikes Peak functional competencies focus on assessment, intervention, and consultation skills (Karel & Hinrichsen, 2010).

Critical Debates

Several issues have been identified in geropsychological practice and training. First, as is typical in general psychology and Western clinical training which are Eurocentric and homogenous (Kim, Yang, & Hwang, 2006), geropsychology seeks to discover decontextualized, mechanical, objective, and universal principles that apply to all cultures (Yoon & Hendricks, 2006). This endeavor assumes that current geropsychological theories are universally applicable. Many indigenous and cultural psychologists contend, however, if general psychology is universal, it would not be necessary to argue that psychological theories and practice are culturally bound and value laden (Kim & Park, 2006).

Although the importance of considering age as a key component of diversity has been noted in a number of key ageing policies in the world, age is not explicitly identified as a component of diversity in most discussions of cultural competency for clinical practitioners. Critical health psychologists urge that aged-care training should not ignore the very concepts germane to particular cultural groups. For example, one distinctive feature of the family relationship in the Chinese culture is the centrality of the relationship between parents and their children, rather than that between the husband and the wife in many Western cultures (Gow, Balla, Kember, & Hau, 1996). As a result, the Confucian concept of filial piety has traditionally governed the parent-child relationships in Chinese families (Ho, 1996) and is a dominant feature of the Chinese family life and aged care (Li, Hodgetts, Ho, & Stolte, 2010b). Therefore, filial piety, as the natural backdrop and starting point for the discussion of ethnic dimensions of ageing for Chinese older adults, should not be omitted in geropsychology training, in particular for those who work with ethnic Chinese older persons in Western countries. It is heartening to see that the APA Committee on Aging and its Working Group on Multicultural Competency in Geropsychology (2009) launched a report on multicultural competency in geropsychology. The report explores the key issues regarding the infusion of multicultural competence throughout geropsychology; makes recommendations for future action addressing practice, research, education and training, and public policy issues; and informs psychologists of existing resources to improve their own multicultural competence in working with older adults.

Second, there is a tendency, in traditional geropsychology, to construct older adults as passive recipients of care due to the negative views that the "greying of humanity" is considered as a threat to world budgets and that gains in longevity can bring a worldwide economic crisis (Socolovsky, 2002). Such pervasive views have been criticized because they ignore that older people have skills, knowledge, and experience to contribute to society and that the expected growth in the proportion of older people provides society with a valuable resource. Critical geropsychologists argue that older adults should not be portrayed as an unwanted burden on society and as welfare dependents (Li, 2013). Rather, from a positive and successful ageing perspective, geropsychology should draw attention to the phenomenon that many older persons actively engage with their families, neighbors, and communities (Li, Hodgetts, & Ho, 2010a). They age positively in place to which they belong and make contributions. These positive aspects have a strong association with fewer depressive symptoms in old age and can act as a stress buffer integral to coping with the stress caused by ageing and life transitions (Mossakowski, 2003). Consequently, a more positive view of ageing has become a framework of ageing policies in many countries. Emerging from this positive view are entreaties to promote "active," "healthy," "robust," "productive," "successful," "optimal," or "positive" ageing. Four psychological dimensions have been proposed in geropsychology for promoting healthy, positive, and successful ageing: behavioral health and physical fitness; cognitive functioning; affect; control and coping; and social functioning and participation (Fernandez-Ballesteros, 2006). Therefore, promotion of a positive view on ageing is a pressing need in the geropsychology training.

Third, traditional geropsychology has grown significantly in its ability to diagnose and treat mental disorders. This clinical-oriented diagnostic approach often results in the phenomenon that geropsychologists lack the human capacities to recognize the plights of their clients, to extend empathy toward those who suffer, and to join honestly and courageously with clients in their struggles toward recovery, with chronic illness and/or mental disorders, or in facing death. Clients lament that their psychologists do not listen to them or that their psychologists seem indifferent to their suffering (Charon, 2006). Thus, from a critical perspective, along with their growing clinical expertise, geropsychologists need the expertise to listen to

their clients, to understand as best they can the struggles of illness, to honor the meanings of their clients' narratives of illness, and to be moved by what they behold so that they can act on their clients' behalf (Charon, 2006; Frank, 1995; Kleinman, 1988; Li, 2012; Mehl-Madrona, 2007). Echoing the view of narrative medicine by Charon (2006) and Mehl-Madrona (2007), narrative training in geropsychology can be defined as unifying designation to signify a clinical geropsychological practice informed by the theory and practice of reading, listening, telling, receiving, and interpreting of stories.

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Online Resources

AgeSource/AgeStats. http://www.aarpinternational.org/database/

Alzheimer's Disease Research. http://www.ahaf.org/alzheimers/

American Psychological Association Office on Aging. http://www.geron.org/Resources/Web%20Links

The Geropsychology of American. http://www.geron.org/

Ghostwriting

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including medications such as Vioxx, Avandia, Paxil, Zoloft, Zyprexa, hormone replacement therapy, and fen-phen (McHenry, 2010). Recently, a public dialogue on ghostwriting has emerged, with public advocacy organizations and some medical journal editors, practicing physicians and bioethicists voicing their perspectives and calling for reform.

Keywords

ICMJE authorship guidelines; Study 329; Paxil; medical writer; honorary authorship

Introduction

One of the hidden secrets of the medical literature is that the named authors on a paper's byline, particularly in the case of clinical trials, are not necessarily the individuals who wrote the paper. It is not uncommon for pharmaceutical companies, or medical product manufacturers, to write their own papers and then find university professors to agree to be the named authors of the paper. The company employees are then invisible to the readers. Presumably, the suggestion that a certain medication or medical product is safe and efficacious will carry more weight if it comes from a supposedly unbiased source a key opinion leader (KOL), rather than a company representative (Leo, Lacasse, & Cimino, 2011).

Definition

Medical ghostwriting is the practice of pharmaceutical companies secretly authoring journal articles published under the byline of academic researchers. This allows pharmaceutical companies to use the peer-reviewed literature as a venue for promoting their products. Much has been learned about ghostwriting from the release of internal pharmaceutical company documents. For instance, in their marketing plan for Lexapro, Forest Pharmaceuticals succinctly summarizes their use of the peer-reviewed literature for marketing purposes: "Bylined articles will allow us to fold Lexapro's message into articles into depression, anxiety, and comorbidity developed by (or ghostwritten) for thought leaders." Alleged ghost authors haunt the clinical trial literature of virtually all the recent blockbuster drugs,

Traditional Debates

It is generally acknowledged in the medical literature that the most egregious example of ghostwriting is Study 329 which was published in the *Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry*. The study examined the use of Paxil in adolescents and concluded, "Paroxetine is generally well tolerated and effective for major depression in adolescents." Several years after the paper was published, court proceedings revealed internal company documents admitting that the study found that Paxil was not any better than placebo on the preregistered outcome measures and that the company was primarily concerned about how to manage the negative findings.

A series of documents, all available on the web, reveal the steps involved in Study 329's transformation from an initial idea to a final draft. Sally Laden, an employee of Scientific Therapeutics, was hired by GlaxoSmithKline, which makes Paxil, and wrote the first draft. After each draft was submitted, she incorporated suggestions from some of the listed authors into each subsequent draft. But, rather than be listed as one of the 22 academic coauthors listed on the byline, Laden was only acknowledged for editorial assistance (Jureidini, McHenry, & Mansfield, 2008).

Study 329 was prominently featured in the recent Department of Justice's report on GlaxoSmithKline's illegal marketing practices

(Department of Justice [DOJ], 2012). The report resulted in GSK being fined three billion dollars. While the DOJ treats GSK as the sole author of Study 329, only two of the named authors were actually GSK employees. All of the other named authors were affiliated with universities. In their complaint about Paxil and the role of Study 329, the DOJ did not mince words: "The United States argues that, among other things, GSK participated in preparing, publishing and distributing a misleading medical journal article that misreported that a clinical trial of Paxil demonstrated efficacy in the treatment of depression in patients under age 18, when the study failed to demonstrate efficacy." They also note that the article, "... misstated Paxil's efficacy and safety for children and adolescents" (Basken, 2012).

Charges of ghostwriting have also surrounded several scientific papers that reported positive findings regarding the use of Vioxx, a medication pulled from the market in 2004 due to safety concerns. In response to questions about a paper in the *Annals of* Internal Medicine, Jeffrey Lisse, the lead author, stated, "Merck designed the trial, paid for the trial, ran the trial. . . .Merck came to me after the study was completed and said, 'we want your help to work on the paper.' The initial paper was written at Merck, and then it was sent to me for editing" (McHenry, 2010).

In 1997, an employee of GSK wrote an internal company memorandum discussing two letters to the editor about Paxil. The memo stated, "We've written two draft letters to the editor regarding the Lilly discontinuation supplement." The memo goes on to discuss the fact that the references are the same for both letters and suggests that, "...complete duplication will look fishy if we decide to submit both. At the very least we can't have the references appear in the same order" (McHenry, 2010).

Critical Debates

A recent case of alleged ghostwriting involves the textbook "Recognition and Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders," published by the American Psychiatric Press (APP) in 1998. The named authors are Charles Nemeroff, current chairman of psychiatry at the University of Miami, and Alan Schatzberg, former chairman of psychiatry at Stanford and former president of the American Psychiatric Association. Documents recently released as part of discovery in a lawsuit against GlaxoSmithKline have led to allegations that the textbook involved ghost authors employed by the manufacturer of Paxil. The APP's trade journal, *Psychiatric Times*, defended the textbook's use of medical writers and declared that they stand behind the authorship line because Drs. Nemeroff and Schatzberg signed off on the final copy. James Scully, medical director for the APA, stated: "The book was reviewed for any potential bias (among other things) by eight independent reviewers, and there was no undue influence on the content from industry or any other outside source" (Moran, 2011). The idea that it is acceptable for papers to have misleading bylines, as long the paper is reviewed by outside experts, is debatable (Leo & Lacasse, 2012).

The International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE), a group of medical editors who have developed policies related to the medical publishing process, has proposed three criteria for determining who should be given a byline as author on scientific papers. These criteria are "(1) substantive contributions to conception and design, acquisition of data, or analysis and interpretation of data; (2) drafting the article or revising it critically for important intellectual content; and (3) final approval of the version to be published." While these are now the traditional, oft-cited criteria for authorship, they do not address the contemporary concern of ghostwriting. Consider this hypothetical situation: An industry-funded medical writer authors a paper in conjunction with academic researchers. The medical writer authors the first draft of the paper and makes many substantive edits, eventually writing 99 % of the paper. Before the absolute "final" version is reached, the medical writer turns it over to the academic researchers and never approves the final version; the medical writer is acknowledged for editorial

assistance. Although the byline is not an accurate representation of who contributed to the article, the paper meets the ICMJE guidelines. Several groups, including some medical writers, have pointed out that this is a loophole in the ICMJE guidelines (Matheson, 2011).

As ghost authoring gains more notice, some journals have adopted policies stricter than the ICMJE guidelines. For instance, the journal *Neurology* has instituted a much more stringent policy. Rather than asking who is an author per ICMJE criteria, they ask, "Who influenced the content?" and require that any paid medical writer be included in the author byline, accompanied by full disclosure. In their authorship standards, they define a ghostwriter as "an undisclosed person (paid or unpaid) who has made an intellectual contribution in writing the submitted manuscript".

The concepts of ghostwriting and honorary authorship are often confused in the medical literature, but importantly, are different concepts. Honorary authorship involves an undeserving person being listed on the byline, whereas ghostwriting involves a deserving person not getting credit. The two do not necessarily go together. It is possible for the contributions of named authors on a paper to warrant authorship, but if someone else deserving of authorship credit did not appear in the byline, the paper has still been ghostwritten. The extent of the named authors' involvement in the paper is immaterial in determining whether the paper was ghostwritten; the extent of involvement of unnamed authors is of key importance.

The Purpose of the Acknowledgement Section

Traditionally, the acknowledgement section of a paper is reserved for people who do not rise to the level of the byline – laboratory assistants or copyeditors, for instance. Several groups in medicine including the European Medical Writers Association (EMWA) endorse the practice of thanking medical writers for providing "editorial assistance" in the acknowledgment section of the paper instead of listing them on the authorship byline. Recently, eight pharmaceutical companies and several medical journals formed a committee titled, Medical Publishing Insights and Practices (MPIP) and published a statement in *Mayo Clinic Proceedings* on how to close the credibility gap in industry-sponsored clinical trials. They had ten recommendations, one of which was to: "Improve disclosure of authorship contributions and writing assistance, and continue education on best publication practices to end ghostwriting and ghost authorship." It is unclear from their document whether the committee believes that medical writers who make substantial contributions to the text should be listed on the byline or in the acknowledgement section. In e-mail correspondence with the lead author, who is a senior editor at *Lancet*, it was confirmed that the committee believes that it is acceptable to leave medical writers off the byline and to instead mention them in the acknowledgement section.

However, there are others who do not sanction the practice of moving writers from the byline to the acknowledgement section. As one example, in a report from the Senate Committee on Finance titled, "Ghostwriting in the Medical Literature," Senator Charles Grassley stated, "Despite its acknowledgement of medical writers for 'editorial assistance,' the role of pharmaceutical companies in medical publications remains veiled or undisclosed." Others have pointed out that "editorial assistants" are not listed in PubMed, are not listed in the abstract, are not cited, and are not called by the media to talk about the importance of a study. Therefore, there is one, and only one, criterion to determine whether a scientific paper has been ghostwritten: If a deserving author has been left off the byline, then the paper should be considered ghostwritten (Leo et al., 2011).

Consequences to Ghostwriting

A recent article in the *Chronicle of Higher Education* titled "Academic Researchers Escape Scrutiny in Glaxo Fraud Settlement" pointed out that none of the academic authors of Study 329 have faced any scrutiny from their universities or other journals. In fact, shortly after the DOJ report was released, two of the named authors of Study 329 had articles published in *Psychiatric*

Times, the main trade journal for the psychiatry profession. One of Study 329 authors published an article giving advice to new psychiatry residents, and a second 329 author had a review article on the use of antidepressants in children, which concluded that the SSRIs do not contribute to an increase risk of suicidality. In addition, the journal that published Study 329, *The Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry*, has never retracted the paper.

Jay Amsterdam, a professor of psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania, recently charged several colleagues with ghostwriting. A committee at Penn exonerated the professors primarily based on the fact that in 2001, when the study was published, ghostwriting was considered acceptable. In their words, "While current Perelman School of Medicine policy and journal practice call for acknowledgement of the assistance of a medical writer, the committee concluded that guidelines in place in 2001 did not." It is interesting that under Penn's new policy, it is acceptable for medical writers who write the majority of the paper to simply be listed in the acknowledgement section; this is how Study 329 was handled, and Study 329 is widely accepted as an example of ghostwriting in the medical literature. The Office of Research Integrity, which reports to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, is still investigating the complaint (Leo & Lacasse, 2012).

As of 2010, only about a third of US medical schools had a policy in place concerning ghostwriting (Lacasse & Leo, 2010). It is expected that over the next several years, an increasing number of medical schools will implement policies that ban ghostwriting.

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Global Justice

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Introduction

The interdisciplinary field of Global Justice Research originates in Political Philosophy, with Thomas Pogge (2002, 2010) being the founding

father of the contemporary Western academic debate on this issue. The term is often interchangeably used with work on global citizenship, the anti-globalization movement and (the consequentialists' and human rights defenders' concept of) cosmopolitanism. Global Justice Research is based on the concern that the global institutional order, comprising institutions like the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European Union, to name only a few, is considered to be unjust and avoidably and foreseeably produces inequalities on a global scale: in 2011, although people living in high-income OECD member countries, including Europe, the USA, Canada, Australia, and Japan, represent only 15 % of the world population, people make 68 % of the gross global income. One example of the consequences of this asymmetrical power distribution would be the persistence of severe poverty, with its most extreme effect that it causes the premature death of 18 million people per year. This represents one third of all contemporary human deaths. It is estimated that since the end of the Cold War in 1991, more than 370 million people have died due to poverty-related reasons. These deaths transgress ethical principles on which the majority of people would agree, and in the international discourse they violate Articles 25 and 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself [sic] and of his [sic] family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care [. . .]." "Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realised." The occurrence of these deaths is interpreted in a wider context: although general agreements exist that citizens are only responsible for the contemporary global economic order, the origins of the power asymmetries are considered to find their foundation in a historical process including events like colonialism, slavery, and exploitation. This construction of causes determines not only the choice of methods for tackling inequalities but also the political will.

Definition

Global justice means to work towards a global institutional order under which everyone's basic needs can be fully realized. In the twenty-first century, humankind experiences unprecedented global affluence. However, according to conservative estimates 48 % of the world's population (3,085 million people) live under the "$2.50 a day" poverty line as defined by the World Bank (2005). According to this narrow poverty threshold, a household is considered to be poor if the local cost of its entire consumption has less purchasing power than $2.50 a day in the United States in 2005. The necessary distributional shift in global household income to lift these 48 % of people above this poverty line amounts to 2 % (Milanovic, 2008).

Keywords

Justice; postcolonial theory; identity; race and racism; whiteness; self-other; positioning

Traditional Debates

Global justice is not a visible category in mainstream psychology. Outside of psychology the field of research which places the solution for global poverty in the hands of high-income countries and their policies is dominated by economists, political scientists, sociologists, and philosophers, who, according to their respective disciplines, develop concepts for reforms of global institutions, new taxation systems, and changed ethical demands, to mention but a few examples. However, many scholars' work is based on psychological assumptions, e.g., about self-other constructions, moral emotions, and a sense of solidarity or lack thereof, without explicitly treating them as such. Or they engage in normative theorizing on what citizens from high-income countries ought to do without taking people's

subjectivity into account. And this is where a social-psychological account is useful because Global Justice Research is a field where questions of race/racism and the notion of whiteness in a postcolonial world come together. Furthermore, it is where legal implications of the global institutional order and an individual's social and political positioning towards it – questions of identity construction – emerge.

Critical Debates

Psychological contributions to this field are rooted in a genuinely critical psychological tradition. Research is conducted first and foremost in order to support the political agenda aiming for justice. That is to develop an understanding of people both who are concerned and who are not concerned about global inequalities, in order to convince opponents and to make allies. Although the power of the institutional nature of the global economic order is not denied, people are conceptualized as agents who design, support, and benefit from this system. Accordingly, psychologists explore how people endorse or resist and challenge dominant discourses and also what hinders them in taking action. The overarching research interest is driven by the question: What are the psychologically necessary conditions for the identity of a person to be actively engaged in the world and exercise her or his global responsibilities – to live one's life as a global citizen (cosmopolitan)? Psychological properties of someone living as a global citizen in a high-income country are defined as the following: (a) to acknowledge one's benefits from a global institutional order which foreseeably and avoidably produces severe inequalities; (b) to experience corresponding moral emotions including outrage, anger, guilt, and shame; and (c) to engage in subsequent action (Park, 2012).

Research is based on two theoretical assumptions. (a) Unequal systems are inherently conservative and have built-in mechanisms (e.g., socioeconomic and psychological ones) to sustain themselves and to smooth over ideological contradictions. And the power of dominant discourses is to create an invisible normality. (b) Individual constructions of the world and structural inequalities are interdependent. Just as global phenomena like severe poverty and discourses of dominance intersect historically and geopolitically, these phenomena also intersect within a collective and in an individual's mind. And psychological research addresses both dimensions: firstly, with reference to (a) above, to dismantle reified ideas and institutionalized discourses which help maintain the system, and secondly, with reference to (b) above, to gain a better understanding of how these interplay with intraindividual psychological mechanisms. Critical psychologists pursue research questions situated at the interface of Justice Research and Postcolonial Theory. Although the latter proposes the application of discursive methods, also strong references to quantitative research insights can be found (Slovic, 2007).

Justice concerns are not universal, in the sense that not all individuals judge fairness as their most important moral virtue. But at the same time, they have to be interpreted as an important aspect of human nature with prominent social and psychological functions. In the social field of the symbolic order, there are inscribed which practices are considered to be just or normal. This means that conceptions of justice provide a sense of meaning and control. They stipulate the guidelines by which a person as an individual but also as a member of a social group assesses what oneself and others materially and psychologically deserve. Just behavior is interpreted according to the Belief in a Just World Theory as a means of gaining approval and respect from oneself and others. Violations of conceptions of justice present a threat and bring into question the evaluative framework that provides a foundation for individual and social action. The belief that a group is unfairly advantaged is threatening. Significantly, this is not so much about the idea of the "other" group having less, but about the

ability to bear that one's own group has more than it should and must therefore be considered to be unfairly advantaged. This may trigger emotions like existential guilt or defense mechanisms, e.g., dehumanizing "the other" (Montada & Lerner, 1998). Critical psychologists pay special attention to the notion of emotions, as these are conceptualized as expressions of an epistemic, moral, and social positioning, since they also stand in a systematic relation to social conditions and are a direct mode of domination (Park, 2011).

People construct their identities from a web of conflicting and/or mutually reinforcing forces. These construction processes are always based on an interplay of similarities and differences, and Postcolonial Theory (Said, 1978) provides the analytical tools to show how this does not only apply to an individual but also on a collective level. Westerners have a long tradition which can be summarized under the expression "developing countries": dealing with formerly colonized countries in a manner which constitutes them as a particular place, not in an imaginary form, but rather as a contrasting image, as an integral part of the Western material culture and identity. This helps the Western self to define itself through differentiation from the "other" as a kind of subliminal ego. Defined as the "other," the so-called developing countries can be ascribed all the negative characteristics such as primitive, backward, poor, and traditional which are considered as having been transcended in supposedly modern societies. Taking a postcolonial theoretical stance puts the research focus onto issues of race/racism and the notion of whiteness. In Critical Whiteness Theory (Frankenberg, 1994), a subfield of Postcolonial Theory, whiteness is not conceptualized in an essentialistic way but as an analytical category: in order to unveil (a) how ideological contradictions intersect in an asymmetrical web of racial relations, (b) how these inscribe themselves in a (white) individual, and (c) what kind of effects this has. Critical Psychology engaged in Global Justice targets questions of material as well as immaterial privileges, how these are maintained and their existence disavowed or justified. It raises questions on the historical production of becoming white and how certain groups and/or individuals are in- or excluded. These analyses are necessary to target the racial color line which divides the high-income part of the world from low-income countries: a salient color line which can also be found in so-called multiracial societies, e.g., Brazil and the USA.

Although critical psychologists have studied Global Justice-related topics like racism, discrimination, and inequalities, their contributions to Global Justice issues per se have been peripheral. Since 1995 only two edited books have been exclusively written on the topic of poverty and psychology on a global level (Carr & Sloan, 2003; Shields, 1995). However, the body of articles and engaged psychologists is growing. In fact, the first conference entitled Moral Psychology and Poverty Alleviation, part of the 1-year anniversary of Academics Stand Against Poverty (ASAP), took place at Yale University in 2012. ASAP is an international network of academics devoted to applying their expertise to target severe poverty. One of the main aims of critical thinkers in high-income countries is to raise awareness that educational institutions also have the pedagogical responsibility to prepare students to become engaged global citizens, to teach students to think critically and how to put this thought into successful action. For example, the so-called Millenium Development Goals, established by the United Nations in 2000, are supposed to address until 2015 the most serious issues referring to poverty, health, and education. But these eight goals have been identified to be grotesquely under-ambitious and to represent not more than only detached aspirations. They do not specify tasks or responsible agents so that an actual person could have implemented, regulated, or monitored them.

Pogge (2012) proposes eight new post-2015 institutional reforms to target the extreme poverty. These problems include taxation on trade-distorting subsidies, greenhouse gas emissions and arms exports to developing countries, closing of bank accounts of unknown owners and beneficiaries, and only allowing minimal representative rulers to take on debt burdens. These reforms are tailored in a way that specific targets and

agents could be identified and responsibilities could be allocated. What global citizens need to do is to acquire knowledge, foster their motivation and sharpen their skills to contribute to reforms and work towards supranational institutions which cause less harm and to compensate for the harm these institutions do.

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Globalization, Overview

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Introduction

The process of globalization is nearly a ubiquitous phenomenon, affecting economies, politics, cultures, and lifestyles in almost all parts of the world. Globalization is also an intimate force of change, impacting psyches, relationships, and how we communicate. Globalization even influences how we imagine, as we must balance localized, lived experience with knowledge of peoples, places, and social movements seemingly disconnected from everyday concerns, but nevertheless influencing how we feel about own lives. Through communication technologies like the Internet and mobile phones, possibilities to connect and collaborate are greater than ever before – as well as our capacity to become aware of one another. While the world continues to suffer from extreme disparities in wealth and resources, some people and populations that once were disenfranchised are now emerging as global economic leaders, instilling a sense of hope in many parts of the world. As Dominique Moïsi (2010) argued, "Globalization may have made the world 'flat,' to cite journalist Thomas Friedman's famous metaphor, but it has also made the world more passionate than ever" (p. 9). Nevertheless, globalization is also criticized for causing increased psychological distress, environmental degradation, loss of traditional ways of life to Western (if not American) cultural hegemony, as well as geopolitical instability. Both its promises and its pitfalls contribute to the passionate discourse that often surrounds discussions of globalization.

Definition

The term globalization is perhaps most commonly used to describe the expansion of

capitalism around the world and, in particular, the outsourcing of Western businesses to developing economies. However, globalization is a process of integration that extends beyond the marketplace and also influences cultures, individual identities, and the social imaginary. Furthermore, the ongoing shift from disparate nations to a transnational world has created specific concerns about globalization's impact, and these concerns influence how globalization is defined. For example, the term globalization has come to signify the compression of time and space associated with the accelerated introduction in the latter half of the twentieth century of new communication technologies and opportunities for travel (Harvey, 1989). The prospect of relatively inexpensive communication and travel across great distances have been described as foundational for the current globalized world, making possible the flow of people, ideas, and goods (along with communicable diseases, criminal networks, and trafficking of vulnerable people) across great distances and in a relatively short amount of time – if not instantaneously – when the Internet is the medium used.

Still others use the term globalization to focus on changes in individual identities and cultures, in terms of both their formation and expression, which occurs when distant lands and peoples begin to impact local practices and beliefs. Advanced communication technologies, such as mobile phones and the Internet, have altered relationships, replacing face-to-face contact with ample opportunities to connect across borders and time zones through text, voice, and video. Social scientists, including critical psychologists, have been particularly interested in globalization's impact on cultures; identities, as well as the social imaginary; and with reason (Appadurai, 1996). As Anthony Giddens (1999) observed, "When the image of Nelson Mandela maybe is more familiar to us than the face of our next door neighbour, something has changed in the nature of our everyday experience."

Some have expressed concern that globalization reduces intimate, reliable connections as well as kinship and communal ties, which historically required physical presence to foster and maintain (Turkle, 2011). Others belabor the increased preoccupation with foreign cultures and people, including celebrities, who often have high standard of living and access to resources limited to a small segment of the population. Giddens remarked, "Celebrity itself is largely a product of new communication technology" (Giddens, 1999). The term globalization has thus also been associated with the increase in status anxiety and the correlated health problems associated with this form or social-based stress (Marmot, 2004).

In a globalized world, the exposure to many different communities, ways of life, ideas, and goods, along with the compression of time and space, quickens the process of identity construction. According to Giddens, "Self-identity has to be created and recreated on a more active basis than before" (1999). Giddens associated this change with the increased interest in, if not need for, psychotherapy and counseling, which in the West has become a mainstay for dealing with stressors and identity confusion, and the desire for psychotherapy and other mental health services has increased in non-Western societies, including China and Japan. Giddens wrote, "Freud thought he was establishing a scientific treatment for neurosis. What he was in effect doing was constructing a method for the renewal of self-identity, in the early stages of a detraditionalising culture. After all, what happens in psychotherapy is that the individual revisits his or her past in order to create more autonomy for the future" (Giddens, 1999). Similarly, Dominique Moïsi (2010) associated globalization with replacing twentieth century concerns for ideologies (particularly since the end of the Cold War) with twenty-first century preoccupation with identity, which impacts not only individuals but also corporations and businesses, for whom their brand is increasingly as important as the products they sell.

Keywords

Colonization; Communication; Cosmopolitanism; Cross-fertilization; Cultural hegemony;

Depression; Fundamentalism; Identity; Psychotherapy; PTSD; Transnational

History

One could argue globalization is a phenomenon as old as humankind. Evidence of trade dates back at least 150,000 years (Watson, 2005). Yet the term globalization is usually reserved for modern, transnational movements. According to American journalist Thomas Friedman (2005), there have been "three great eras of globalization" (p. 9). The first, "Globalization 1.0," Friedman correlated with the period from 1492 to 1800. He claimed this era was marked by the establishment of trade between Old World and New World nations. "Globalization 2.0," stretching from 1800 to 2000, is distinguished by the emergence of multinational companies. Finally, "Globalization 3.0," which Friedman described as beginning in 2000, harnesses the potential for individual collaboration and expression made possible by the World Wide Web. According to Friedman, the shifts with each period of globalization are due to a predominant, dynamic force emerging in each era: "while the dynamic force in Globalization 1.0 was countries globalizing and the dynamic force in Globalization 2.0 was companies globalizing, the dynamic force in Globalization 3.0 – the thing that gives it its unique character – is the newfound power for individuals to collaborate and compete globally" (p. 10).

The current era of globalization has also been associated with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. When America emerged as the world's only superpower, its model of democracy, which weds political freedom to free markets, rapidly became the dominant model for political, economic, and cultural norms around the world. The American president William Jefferson Clinton also did much to promote globalization. Following the Mexican Peso crisis in 1994, his administration based their international policy on economic development, promoting globalization as the basis for world peace as well as economic sustainability (Zeiler, 2002). However, President Clinton did not seem to anticipate the charges of economic, political, and cultural hegemony thrown at America, which are often identified as the ugly underbelly of globalization.

Critical Debates

The process of globalization has been accused of causing rapid shifts in identity as well as deteriorating cultural traditions that historically stabilized the process of identity construction (Gottschalk, 2000). Globalization contributes to feelings of uncertainty, if not fear and humiliation. According to Moïsi, "globalization causes insecurity and raises the question of identity. . .. Identity is strongly linked with confidence, and in turn confidence, or the lack thereof, is expressed in emotions—in particular, those of fear, hope, and humiliation" (2010, p. 12). Furthermore, the expansion of Western markets into developing countries has coincided with increased numbers of people thought to have mental disorders (Ustiin, 1999). Along with increased psychological distress, the increase in mental disorders may result from aggressive efforts by multinational pharmaceutical companies to expand market exposure; the increased numbers of nongovernmental organizations committed to mental health, including educating about the symptoms of mental disorders; and in general, the exportation of Western notions of mind and mental illness (Watters, 2010).

An example of the Westernization of psychological distress comes from the widespread diagnosing of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Although depression is considered a leading cause of disability around the world, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) may be the most commonly diagnosed disorder. In refugee camps and conflict areas, PTSD is the diagnosis most often assumed to apply to victimized and traumatized populations. PTSD symptoms such as nightmares, flashbacks, and intrusive memories are viewed as universal response to trauma. Yet critical psychologists have argued symptoms of a mental disorder do not necessarily dictate the correct treatment, or take into account how culture influences

the expression of psychological distress (Horwitz, 2002). When well-meaning Western mental health workers descend on non-Western social groups, they risk replacing local customs for addressing trauma with Western models for healing PTSD.

Trauma and its aftereffects have been with humans throughout our history. Yet Western notions of PTSD, like all conceptions of mental disorders, were developed in response to particular social needs and conditions. In the case of PTSD, the diagnosis was developed in response to the experiences of US war veterans who were extricated from the location of their trauma – war on foreign soil – and returned to their own social groups in America. For many veterans, the people they returned to were unable to comprehend (and sometimes unwilling to hear) their personal tragedies. In this context, and for other social contexts where trauma is silenced, attention to psychological states through counseling and support groups has led to great strides in regaining mental well-being.

In contrast, a study of persons detained and tortured during Apartheid in South Africa revealed the presence of PTSD symptoms; however, the people in the study were more concerned with rebuilding their community than addressing their psychological wounds (Kagee, 2004). Furthermore, individuals were often more plagued with somatic symptoms than psychological symptoms, which Kagee and Naidoo (2004) associated with the African tradition of relating psyche and soma that contrasts with the Western tradition of assuming a mind-body dichotomy. Furthermore, depressed persons in non-Western countries and populations in general are more concerned with somatic symptoms than their Western counterparts (Kerr & Kerr, 2001). According to Bulhan (1985) efforts to apply Western notions of mental illness to non-Western populations are akin to other forms of oppression typically associated with colonization.

International Relevance

By its very definition, globalization has international relevance. Yet two changes – loss of tradition and increasing standardization according to Western lifestyles – have emerged as near-universal outcomes of globalization in the twenty-first century. As far back as the seventeenth century, the Enlightenment in the West loosened dependency on tradition (including religious rituals) as a precursor to building a society based on rationality and science. Traditional forms of society were further dismantled with the Industrial Revolution, when rural communities, and their extended kinship networks, were eroded by the exodus of their members to work in factories in cities. Today, people in the developing world accelerate this developmental trajectory. When Western industries relocate to their countries, they must often quickly adapt to the breakneck pace and inherent instability of the competitive global market. Like modernity in its infancy, they too have experienced threats to traditions as well as to kinship and community bonds. Giddens (1999) claimed, "traditions are needed, and will always persist, because they give continuity and form to life." When traditions have been threatened, a common response has been compulsive attempts to regain tradition, including religious fundamentalism. The resurgence of fundamentalism is most prominent when perceived options for the future are cast as a choice between Western cosmopolitanism and traditional modes of living.

The resistance to Western cosmopolitanism is not surprising, particularly given the extent that many societies attempt to reproduce Western standards of living. Artifacts of Western lifestyles – ranging from the plumbing put in houses to the food put on plates – are not only seen throughout the world, but they are also what many aspire to. Shifts in food consumption are especially revealing of the impact of Western standards on developing countries. The Western diet is exceptional for its high amounts of meat, dairy, and processed sugars, which contribute to obesity and related diseases. The World Health Organization now identifies obesity as a global health threat (calling it "globesity"). The Westernization of diet has also altered traditional eating habits. For example, the introduction of fast food restaurants such as McDonald's and KFC into East Asia introduced the opportunity for young people to choose what they

would eat – an option initially not available to youths in this part of the world. Such opportunities for self-empowerment can ignite desires for self-expression and individualism outside of traditional norms, which in turn can lead to a preference for Western styles of living that are already adapted to individualism and the creation of identity through the consumption of goods and services (Watson, 2006).

Future Directions

While a primary critique of globalization has been the expansion of Western standards across the globe, less attention has been given to the cross-fertilization of the West by non-Western ideas, goods, and practices. This cross-fertilization will likely increase as the so-called BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) gain economic and cultural influence. As Zeiler (2002) pointed out, "At the time anti-globalization demonstrators were protesting in Seattle against the WTO in December 1999, children throughout America were gripped by the Japanese fad game Pokémon. Film industries in India and Hong Kong presented competition to Hollywood, and MTV discovered the need to vary its formula in the world's various regional markets – providing, for example, Chinese music in China and Hindi pop in India. True cultural globalization, not just Americanization, was in effect." Rather than focusing on cultural hegemony, it may become more relevant to explore the meanings people are making with, and contributing to, the ideas, goods, and practices they absorb from other cultures and societies.

The emphasis on identity formation in the twenty-first century has also impacted how multinational corporations and nations leverage power. Where once people were expected to adapt their identities to the needs of institutions and nations, now companies and countries must adapt to individuals' ever-changing identities, alliances, consumption patterns, and needs. Not only must multinational corporations contend with well-connected and increasingly vocal consumers, nations are less able to protect a diverse population, who through global travel, the Internet, and other communication technologies, regularly transcend national borders. Centralized power is loosening, as both a reality and an idea. Envisioning how to govern a global village has become a major concern.

Cities could become the model for envisioning how to govern an increasingly interconnected world. In 2010, approximately half of the world population lived in cities, and about 100 cities were responsible for 30 % of the world's economy (Khanna, 2010). Like the globalized world, major world cities contain diversified populations and crucibles for the creative consumption of goods and services. They also suffer from the disparities in wealth that also characterizes the current state of globalization. Whereas cities may not displace nations as arbiters of sovereignty, they may nevertheless become the model for how nations and transnational corporations attempt to remain relevant to populations driven more by the construction of identities than the maintenance of ties to institutions and nations.

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Governmentality

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Introduction

The concept of *governmentality* (French original *gouvernementalité*) was first introduced by the French philosopher Michel Foucault in a series of lectures held at Collège de France in 1978 and 1979. The notion derives from the French word *gouvernemental*, meaning "concerning government" (Lemke, 2007). However, Foucault generated a novel concept of what he would call "the conduct of conduct" – meaning the Western liberal advanced state subtle way of controlling its citizens through a set of empowering techniques like autonomy, self-actualization, self-realization, and self-esteem.

Definition

Foucault defines *governmentality* in brief as "the conduct of conduct" or "the art of government" where "government" includes a wide range of control techniques that makes subjects governable. Therefore, one might approach governmentality basically as a regulated field of power in the overlay between "self" and "society" where the ideas of *government* (*gouvernement*) and *mentality* (*mentalité*) coalesce. Yet Foucault in characteristic style also provides a much longer, fairly intricate explanatory outline of governmentality in his original Collège de France lecture on the 1st of February 1978:

> First, by "governmentality" I understand the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument.
>
> Second, by "governmentality" I understand the tendency, the line of force, that for a long time, and throughout the West, has constantly led towards the pre-eminence over all other types of power – sovereignty, discipline, and so on- of the type of power that we can call "government" and which has led to the development of a series of specific governmental apparatuses on the one hand [and, on the other] to the development of a series of knowledges.
>
> Finally, by "governmentality" I think we should understand the process, or rather, the result of the process by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually "governmentalized." (Foucault, 2007, pp. 108–109).

Keywords

Governmentality; conduct; power; subjectivity; neoliberalism; social history of psychology

Traditional Debates

Mitchell Dean (2009) maintains that idea of collective mentalities and the idea of history of mentalities have been used for a long time from sociologists like Emile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, and the Annales School of historians in France. Thomas Lemke (2007) credits French literary theorist Roland Barthes for using the concrete term in the 1950s to denote an ideological mechanism where government is perceived as the origin of social relations. But Foucault's innovation "governmentality" signals a shift in the traditional understanding of power. Foucault invites us to think of power not only in terms of the hierarchical, top-down power of the state. He broadens our understanding of power to include the forms of social control in disciplinary institutions (schools, hospitals, psychiatric institutions, etc.), as well as different forms of knowledge. This means that power no longer can be interpreted in the sole terms of repression as power in fact can manifest itself positively by producing knowledge and certain discourses that get internalized by individuals and guide the behavior of populations. This leads to more effectual forms of social control, as knowledge permits individuals to govern themselves. For example, Barbara Cruikshank, Osborne, and Rose (1996) demonstrates how "self-esteem" from this perspective becomes a highly effective technology of the self and means for the individual to govern themselves, to become healthy citizens so that the police, judge, or doctor does not have to. Governmentality has therefore excelled as one of the foremost analytical tools for understanding neoliberal governing. Lemke (2001, p. 203) maintains that the theoretical strength in the concept of governmentality lies in the fact "that it construes neo-liberalism not just as ideological rhetoric or as a political-economic reality, but above all as a political project that endeavors to create a social reality that it suggests already exists."

Critical Debates

Governmentality has evolved into a branch of research inspired by Foucault, yet assessing much more empirical means to study how it unfolds in current advanced liberal democracies around the world. Studies of governmentality have thrived in a range of domains including psychology and the "psy" disciplines, education, poverty and welfare, social insurance and risk, ethics and sexual politics, economics and accounting, political theory, space and architecture, and law (see Dean, 2009 for a comprehensive overview).

London School of Economics-based sociologist Nikolas Rose (1996, 1999) has written several books on the social history of psychology in which he maintains that psy and psychology in particular grows into the professional status it receives today because of its utility as a technology of expertise. Psychology is specially effective and penetrative in measuring, controlling, and manipulating the subject's desires and needs in line with the state's goals. Thus the whole neoliberal tradition of governmentality becomes an important political-economic basis for psychology's advanced position in Western liberal democracies. This affinity with neoliberalism is seldom reflected upon in mainstream psychology as professional ethics rarely troubles itself with the political and moral causes of professional power. In this light, governmentality as an explanatory cause of the recent rise of psychology highlights the needs of professional psychologists throughout Western democracies to continuously question whether an increase in the demand for their services is necessarily a good thing. Foucault's unique comprehension of power represents a thought-provoking challenge for critical psychologists, as governmentality both highlights the continual relevance of traditional ideology critique of mainstream psychology for sustaining status quo (see, for instance, Prilleltensky, 1989) and

also renders psychology's share in power as seemingly unavoidable.

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Grief

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Introduction

Grieving is considered to be one of the few affective experiences that all human beings will experience at some point in their lives. While the experience of grieving a loss is universal, *how* we grieve, *who* we grieve with, and *how long* we grieve is culturally and historically contingent. As such, it is important to understand not only our current modern definitions of grief but also the historical trajectory in which we have come to understand grief in this particular way.

While anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists have contended that grieving is one of the few rites of passage that is cross-culturally and cross-historically consistent, the emergence of grief as a topic worthy of psychological study is an early twentieth-century invention (Granek, 2010). Up until the late nineteenth century, grieving in North America used to be a public affair, a marked process that involved community and a network of rituals and ceremonies elaborately constructed to support mourners. Towards the turn of the century, grief begun to move from the public to the private sphere.

Definitions

There is a distinction between "grief" as a psychological concept and grieving as a reaction to the loss of someone who has died (Granek, 2010). Grieving as a universal phenomenon is the experience of a person who is responding to the death of another human being whom he or she has loved or felt an attachment too. One definition is that "bereavement refers to the loss of a loved one by death and grief refers to the distress resulting from bereavement" (Genevro, Marshall, Miller, & Center for the Advancement of Health, 2004, p. 498).

Bereavement then is defined as the objective event of some type of loss and grief is defined as the reaction to that loss. Grief can include thoughts and feelings, as well as physical behavioral and spiritual responses to the loss. Mental manifestations of grief can include disbelief, confusion, anxiety, tension, or pain. Emotional manifestations of grief can include sadness, longing, loneliness, sorrow, guilt, anger, and sometimes relief. Physical manifestations of grief can include shortness of breath, tightness in one's throat, feelings of emptiness, muscle weakness, and changes in appetite and sleep. Behavioral manifestations might include crying, talking about the deceased, irritability, or over- or underactivity.

Mourning is another closely related term and is frequently used as a synonym for grief. Some researchers make a distinction between defining grief as "a reaction to loss" (DeSpelder & Strickland, 2005, p. 268) and mourning as the "process by which a bereaved person integrates the loss into his or her ongoing life" (DeSpelder & Strickland, p. 269).

Keywords

Grief pathological grief; complicated grief; history of grief; social construction of grief

History

Psychoanalytic Conceptualizations: In 1917, Freud published *Mourning and* Melancholia (1917) where he proposed that the mourner had the task of detaching their libido/emotional energy from the deceased and sublimating it into other areas of their lives. Emerging from this view are several Western assumptions that have remained central to psychological research on grief, including the idea that grief is an active process that involves a struggle to give up the emotional attachment to the person who has died and that this struggle is a process that involves time and energy on the part of those mourning. Freud (1917) never intended to pathologize grief. He clearly stated in his famous essay:

> although mourning involves grave departures from the normal attitude to life, it never occurs to us to regard it as a pathological condition and to refer it to medical treatment. We rely on it being overcome after a certain lapse of time, and we look upon any interference with it as useless or even harmful. (p. 252)

Another aspect of Freud's essay that is often misrepresented in contemporary grief research is the conflation of grief as a result of becoming bereaved (which Freud called mourning) and grief that came from other losses (which Freud called melancholia), including the loss of a relationship. Freud emphasized that although mourning and melancholia *look* the same symptomatically, they are *distinct* because they are context specific. Many early twentieth-century studies of grief followed from Freud's theoretical analysis (Abraham, 1924; Deutsch, 1937; Klein, 1940), but all changed radically with the shift from psychoanalytic conceptualizations of grief to psychiatric ones.

Psychiatric Conceptualizations of Grief: Lindemann's publication *Symptomatology and the Management of Acute Grief* (1944) was a transitional point in the development of grief as a psychological object of study. Lindemann's paper was the first to present an empirical study of bereaved patients. Its novelty was in its scientific and "objective" approach to documenting the grieving process. By interviewing 101 subjects who had recently been bereaved, he claimed to produce a systematic, objective, and accurate representation of what the grieving process entailed and, further, argued that psychiatrists could and *should* play a role in aiding the mourner in their grief work (Lindemann). By listing patterns of grief in his paper, Lindemann described the process of grief as a disease with an etiology that could be predicted, managed, and subsequently treated by professionals. He believed that psychiatrists should not only treat grief like a medical and psychological disease, but that patients should also be monitored for normal grief reactions to see if they were doing their "grief work" properly. Finally, he implied a distribution of responsibility to the mourner to do their grief work "properly." He emphasized the idea that the duration of the grief reaction depends on the success with which a person does their grief work. The idea of "successful versus unsuccessful" grief later becomes popularized in mainstream culture resulting in a new kind of self-consciousness and clinical anxiety for the mourner.

Grief Studies in the United Kingdom: In a series of clinical studies, Colin Parkes (e.g., 1970) was largely concerned with atypical patterns of grief. He interviewed bereaved patients in psychiatric hospitals and bereaved widows in the general community and provided detailed descriptions of the grief process that were perceived as "empirically sound" and grounded in science. His contributions were

significant for a number of reasons that parallel Lindemann's (1944) work. First, he provided a further rationale for the pathologization of grief and set in motion what was about to become an explosion of research into the "illness of grief." His second major contribution was in justifying the use of psychiatry to treat this illness, and the third major achievement had less to do with content and more to do with methods. He provided an empirical *method* in which future psychologists could begin to study the phenomena. He published his articles largely in medical journals – the majority in the prestigious *British Medical Journal* – and included numerous scientific charts and statistics to make his points. He also focused heavily on the somatic aspects of grief in his studies and was the first to suggest that the bereaved had higher morality rates and physical problems, thereby turning grief into a physical *and* mental disorder to be treated by medical doctors (Parkes, Benjamin, & Fitzgerald, 1969). Finally, in all his articles, Parkes referred to grief as a complex process requiring professional intervention. In this way, he firmly established grief as a *psychological construct* within the discipline by offering both the "problem" (pathological grief) and the "solution" (psychiatric intervention).

Contemporary Grief Studies: The study of grief as a psychological construct had transitioned from a psychoanalytic, to a psychiatric, to a mostly quantitative, empirical endeavor in less than 30 years within North America and Britain. In 1988, a special issue of the *Journal of Social Issues* on the study of grief was published. By this point, grief theory had become decontextualized from experience and had been psychologized completely. The focus was entirely on symptoms and the ability to measure, diagnose, and manage grief. The authors of the special review conclude that (a) grief may be a pathology; (b) that it needs the help of the experts to solve the problem; (c) that grief should be studied by the experts, using expert methods that are based on an empirically sound foundation; and (d) that psychologists will be doing a great service to their clients by helping them with their grief work (Stroebe et al., 1988). Grief had become so completely ingrained into the psychological purview it no longer required a justification to be studied or treated like a psychological object.

By the early 1990s, the focus on grief was almost entirely on its dysfunctional nature. Having defined the pathological griever and created questionnaires to identify him/her, the psychologist could now study the griever in new ways and create even more categories of pathological grief to address, including those "at risk" for the condition. The majority of psychologists researching grief today are quantitative in their orientation.

Traditional Debates

While the current debates in the field center around what constitutes pathological grief, it is essential to note that *all* grief has become *potentially* pathological in twenty-first-century North America (Granek, 2010). By virtue of its inclusion as a psychological object of study, what was once considered to be a natural reaction to death has fallen under the purview of the psy-disciplines and has, therefore, become monitored, understood, and experienced in a way that previous generations could not have conceptualized. *The specific criteria of what constitutes pathology are less important than the notion that one can evaluate oneself on a continuum of normality/abnormality at all* (Granek, 2010). Regardless of *how* grief has become pathologized within the discipline, the very inclusion of it as a psychological/psychiatric subject has had a drastic effect on the way people understand their experience of bereavement (Granek, 2008, in press-a).

In this frame where all grief is considered *potentially* pathological, some grief is described as "excessive," a "disease," "out of the norm," and a "mental disorder" (Forstmeier & Maercker, 2007; Horowitz, 2005–2006; Prigerson & Jacobs, 2001; Prigerson et al., 2009; Shear & Frank, 2006; Shear et al., 2011).

Bereavement is currently listed in the DSM-IV-TR as a V code, which indicates that it is a disorder that needs further research and clinical attention. The extreme end of pathologizing grief is the diagnosis of Complicated Grief (CG),

sometimes referred to as traumatic grief, prolonged grief, or pathological grief (Stroebe & Schut, 2005–2006). CG was a proposed diagnostic category for the DSM-V that was set to come out in 2013 (Forstmeier & Maercker, 2007; Horowitz, Siegel, Holen, & Bonanno, 1997; Prigerson et al., 1995, 1997a, 1997b; Shear et al., 2011). Although CG is currently *not* an official diagnosis and will not be included in the DSM-V, it is widely used diagnostic category by researchers and clinicians and is often diagnosed in patients and clients alike.

The second debate in the context of grief in the DSM-V centered around the bereavement exclusion, or the caveat that a client should not be diagnosed with Major Depressive Episode (MDE) or Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) if they are within two months of a major loss. In the next iteration of the DSM-V, these exclusion criteria have been removed so that anyone who experiences symptoms of MDE or MDD regardless of the reasons for these depressive feelings, including having a reaction to a major loss, can be diagnosed with a major clinical disorder (APA, 2013).

The debates about the inclusion of CG in the DSM continue, and it is highly likely that the next version of the DSM will include Complicated Grief.

The determination of prevalence of CG depends on the definition, for which there is currently no professional consensus. The leading proponents of including CG in the DSM-V are Prigerson and her colleagues (Prigerson et al., 1995, 1997a, 1997b; Prigerson & Jacobs, 2001). In their view, the main diagnostic components of CG include the following: (a) "chronic yearning, pining, and longing for the deceased"; (b) four out of eight symptoms such as "inability to trust others," "uneasy about moving on," "numbness/detachment," "bleak future," and "agitation"; (c) the symptom disturbance must cause marked and persistent dysfunction in the social and occupational domain; and (d) the symptom disturbance must last at least 6 months. In order for CG to be diagnosed, all criteria must be met.

Horowitz et al. (1997) and his colleagues also proposed criteria for the DSM-V and differentiate between three categories of symptoms including the following: (1) intrusion such as unbidden memories, emotional spells, and strong yearnings for the deceased; (2) avoidance such as avoiding places that are reminders of the deceased and emotional numbness towards others; and (3) failure to adapt symptoms such as feeling lonely or empty and having trouble sleeping. The main difference between Horowitz et al. (1997) and Prigerson and Maciejewski (2005–2006) is the criteria for duration and the number of symptoms necessary for diagnosis. While Prigerson stipulated that a diagnosis can be made 6 months post loss, she also indicated that all four criteria categories must be met. Horowitz, on the other hand, proposed that diagnosis should be made 14 months after loss; he also has a fewer number of criteria to be met in order to be diagnosed.

More recently, Shear and her colleagues (2011) have come forth with a new set of criteria for Complicated Grief. As with Prigerson, Shear suggests that there is little difference between the symptoms of acute grief and complicated grief but it is the duration and intensity of the symptoms that distinguish pathology. She notes that grief becomes complicated when the symptoms of acute grief last for longer than six months and therefore become persistent. According to Shear complicated grief includes the following: (1) persistent intense yearning or longing for the person who has died; (2) frequent intense feelings of loneliness; (3) recurrent thoughts that it is unfair, meaningless, or unbearable to have lived when the loved one has died; and (4) preoccupying thoughts about the person who has died. In addition, she includes a range of other symptoms in which two of the following criteria are necessary to be diagnosed: rumination, disbelief about the death, shock, feeling dazed, anger, or bitterness about the death, and hearing voices or having visions of the deceased among others (Shear et al., 2011).

Critical Debates

In 1999, Ian Parker noted that one of the goals of critical psychology is to study the ways in which

psychological phenomenon is culturally and historically constructed and how this deep understanding of the context can serve to confirm or to resist ideological and practice assumptions in mainstream psychological models.

In the case of grief, it is the critical psychologists who have challenged the conversation around the pathologization of grief not only to ask whether these definitions of complicated grief have scientific merit but also to question the benefits, motivations, and agendas behind viewing grief as a psychological object of study and practice (Granek, in press-a).

By looking at the historical trajectory by which grief became part of the psychological canon, critical psychologists have been able to shed light on both the future of the field of grief studies *and* the impact of these disciplinary understandings of grief on the way that the public experiences and understands their own feelings of grief and loss (Granek, in press-b).

Moreover, this viewpoint that originated from critical psychologists introduced many of the debates discussed throughout this entry into the public domain. For example, the question of grief going into the DSM-V either through the bereavement exclusion criteria or through the inclusion of CG has been widely debated in mainstream media and academic circles. It has been covered in the Canadian Medical Association Journal, The Lancet, Psychology Today, The New York Times, The Guardian, and The Boston Globe. In 2011, the Society for Humanistic Psychology, Division 32 of the American Psychological Association, put out a petition challenging the diagnostic criteria for grief and other disorders proposed for the new DSM-V. Over 15,000 psychologists had signed this petition calling for more transparency on the decision making process of the DSM-V. While not every psychologist who challenged the DSM-V or who writes critically about the inclusion of grief can be considered a critical psychologist, it is important to emphasize that it is the field of critical psychology that introduced these debates, these ways of thinking, and that offers alternative understandings to the mainstream psychological ideologies about mental disorders such as grief.

From this critical viewpoint, the theme in all of these understandings of CG is the trend towards inclusiveness and pathologization, and reining-in even the mildly impaired patient as diseased. Most proponents of CG as a disease category concede that there is a fuzzy line between normal grief and pathological grief, but argue that this is not significant in making a diagnosis of CG. Researchers in the field claim that while normal grief and pathological grief *look* the same, it is a matter of *duration and intensity* that marks the distinction between them and, further, that psychologists and psychiatrists should err on the side of caution by overdiagnosing rather than missing a case.

A difficulty with this conclusion and where the debates tend to circulate is that it is hard to determine what is dysfunctional or "complicated" when it comes to grieving. For some people taking a year off to grieve a major loss is "normal" and culturally appropriate. For others, taking more than a few days off from work to grieve would be considered dysfunctional and in need of professional help. What qualifies as disordered seems laden with value judgments, and while some theorists have argued that these distinctions are made depending on the cultural context (i.e., Horwitz, 2002), I (Granek, 2010) have argued that psychologists and psychiatrists have an active role in constructing cultural expectations about what is deemed normal or abnormal. In the case of grief, it is the psy-disciplines that have determined what is "too long," "too short," "too intense," or "too absent" when it comes to pathological/complicated grief.

International Relevance

Current research on grief is mostly focused on its pathological nature. While Complicated Grief is *not* a formal diagnostic category and is currently a *proposed* disorder for the proposed disorder for the next edition of the DSM, it is a widely used diagnostic in North America and around the world. A search on Medline or Psycinfo will yield tens of thousands of publications with the keywords "prolonged grief disorder" or "complicated grief."

Pathological grief, as with other "mental disorders," has also been widely exported around the globe. Recent published studies using the construct of Complicated Grief can be found in Germany, Australia, France, Japan, and Norway. The construct has also been used to measure pathological grief among Bosnian refugees (Silove, Momartin, Marnane, Steel, & Manicavasagar, 2010), among African Americans in the United States (Cruz, Scott, Houck, Reyonolds, Frank, & Shear), and, most recently, among orphaned or widowed survivors of the Rwandan genocide (Schaall, Dusingizemungu, Jacob, Neuner, & Elbert, 2012). The exporting of pathological grief as a psychological construct has created new notions of what is deemed normal and abnormal when it comes to mourning in international communities.

Practice Relevance

The pathologization of grief has had an impact on the way in which mourning is understood and managed in day-to-day life. The vocabulary of grief has been thoroughly psychologized. Terms such as "coping," "recovery," "healing," "denial," and "grief work" or "grief process" are all constructions of the psy-professions, and today psychotherapy and medication are common ways in which grieving is dealt with (Granek, 2008). The boundary around pathological grief is ambiguous and, therefore, inclusive of almost anyone who is grieving. The psychological construction of grief has enforced the idea that grief can be pathological and that the best way to avoid this, or to cope with grief that has gone awry, is to turn to a professional who has the tools and the knowledge to help one overcome their sadness and return to normal as quickly and efficiently as possible. There is thus a closed circle whereby the psy-disciplines both problematize grief and then offer a solution to the problem.

The questionable act of turning grief into a disorder has reduced the diminishing range of what is considered acceptable human emotion by the psy-disciplines. To pathologize grief is to claim that the widespread response to feeling sadness over a loss is a disorder that needs to be treated. The outcome is that people are afforded less compassion, less time, and less space to grieve their losses. Another outcome of thinking of grief as pathological is that the mourner feels shame and embarrassment over their sadness and is encouraged to seek professional help so as to cope with their loss.

Future Directions

The future of grief research within the field of psychology will largely depend on whether grief goes into the DSM. Should CG be included in the future, it is likely that grief will continue to be considered and researched within the biomedical frame. While there have been some recent online critiques (see links below) about its potential inclusion, the future of the diagnosis remains unknown.

However, the recent removal of the bereavement exclusion in the MDE and MDD criteria in the DSM-V despite widespread critique and concern about its inclusion is a strong indication that the field of grief studies is moving towards a biomedical, noncritical frame.

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Online Resources

Dr. Leeat Granek, Critical Psychologist on Grief

Mourning madness. http://www.slate.com/articles/life/grieving/2012/03/complicated_grief_and_the_dsm_the_wrongheaded_movement_to_list_mourning_as_a_mental_disorder_.html

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Dr. Joanne Cacciatore http://drjoanne.blogspot.ca/2012/03/bereavement-and-snorting-seaweed.html
Dr. Allen Frances, DSM 5 in Distress http://my.psychologytoday.com/blog/dsm5-in-distress/201203/turning-point-dsm-5

Grounded Theory Methodology

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Introduction

The grounded theory method was introduced by sociologists Glaser and Strauss (1967) to describe how they studied the care of terminally ill patients by hospital staff. The method is an early and prominent approach to what has come to be known as qualitative research and has been taken up in many disciplines in addition to sociology, including psychology.

Definition

As a protest against conventional methodology in sociology, the grounded theory method was developed as a way of generating explanatory theory from data rather than using data to test hypotheses derived from rationally developed theory. Social phenomena whether experiences, actions, or events are addressed at the level of either the individual, groups, or institutions. The phenomena are accessed variously through field observations, interviews, reports, documents, and the literature. Glaser has applied the method to quantitative data as well, but he has had few followers in this regard. The meanings of the data – often called *incidents* – are coded wherein the term *coding* is used broadly to mean the creating of codes, the assigning of incidents to them, and even the creation of categories (Dey, 1999). Meanings of the data are compared and represented as codes, the codes are compared and abstracted as categories, the relations among the categories are abstracted into higher-order categories, and the relations among them are abstracted into a core category that organizes the theory (although conceptualizing a core category is often not done today). This procedure of engaging in comparison at the various levels is referred to as *constant comparative analysis*.

In the interest of being open to the phenomenon under consideration, researchers are encouraged to keep tentative any assumptions about it until they are borne out by the data. The analytic (i.e., generalizing) work begins with the activity of *open coding* of incidents, i.e., the reduction of the language depicting an incident into pithier language or codes. Occasionally research participants themselves provide such language (in vivo codes), which the analyst borrows. The gathering of incidents and their analysis is carried out concurrently. The coding of incidents calls for other incidents reasoned to be judged potentially relevant, which are then sought. Named *theoretical sampling*, this activity continues until the conceptualization of codes, categories, and the relations among categories accounts for the variation among incidents. At this point the categories are considered *saturated*. While engaged in these activities, the researcher writes *theoretical memos*, recording his or her thinking about the phenomenon under study as the analysis proceeds. Reviewing and sorting the memos aids categorization. In the interest of parsimony, those categories judged most important

are selected. In the view of Glaser and Strauss, what they call substantive theory derived from the original site of the study may be raised to a formal/general theory consequent to theoretical sampling from other sites.

Keywords

Constant comparative analysis; induction; deduction; concept-indicator model; theoretical sensitivity; objectivism; pragmatism; symbolic interactionism; hermeneutics; perspectivism; epistemology; ontology

History

The history of the method is marked by a debate between its originators on the best procedures to use. Meanwhile, other researchers have developed variants of the method. Thus, the term "grounded theory method" now encompasses a family of methods. Elsewhere, aspects of the method can be seen, for example, in thematic analysis (e.g., Braun & Clarke, 2006), the consensual qualitative research method (Hill, Thompson, & Williams, 1997), and the interpretative phenomenological analysis method (Smith, 1996). Thus, in one way or other, the grounded theory method has had a large impact in the qualitative research community. This is a community that challenges the natural science methodology normative in the social and health sciences; hence, as a member of that community, the grounded theory method contributes to this aspect of the critical psychology movement.

Traditional Debates

Since their introduction of the method, Glaser and Strauss have grown apart in their conceptions of the method. Glaser has emphasized that it is inductive and has elaborated on the importance of theoretical sensitivity (e.g., Glaser, 1978). In his view, this sensitivity benefits from the application of *theoretical codes*, which help to model the core category, and these theoretical codes can be taken from anywhere. In the above work, he suggested 18 families of them and over the years has expanded the list to 53. First and foremost among them is the Basic Social Process family constituted of causes, contexts, contingencies, consequences, covariances, and conditions. Other theoretical coding families are, for example, degree, dimension, and system parts. Glaser has emphasized indefatigably that although theoretical codes are crucial aids to the development of theory, they must earn their way into the data, not force them.

In contrast, for Strauss (1987) deduction is used not only when deciding which kind of incident to sample next, as held by Glaser, but also more fundamentally to test hypotheses. Procedurally, he adopted the above Basic Social Process and modified it to consist of causal conditions, phenomenon, context, intervening conditions, action/interaction strategies, and consequences, wherein the conditions element of the process is elaborated into a *conditional matrix* or network of potentially relevant conditions that needs to be taken into account when analyzing a given incident of the phenomenon. This amended Basic Social Process is called the *coding paradigm*. He also adopted the dimensions coding family. In order to reduce the complexity of the analysis, the coding paradigm and dimensions are applied to one category at a time (*axial* coding) while keeping in sight the relation of that given category to other categories. To facilitate the analysis, the questions who, where, what, when, how, and with what consequences are microanalytically applied to the given incident under focus. The coding paradigm and dimensions applied in this way are deemed to yield validation of the resulting theory and are made mandatory for the method (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

In response to Strauss and Corbin, Glaser has lodged several criticisms: First, the grounded theory method properly understood is exclusively inductive except for the role deduction plays in theoretical sampling. Second, only those incidents sufficient for generation of the theory are necessary; the rest are ignored to avoid getting bogged

down in them in a misguided attempt to validate the theory. Third, although the resulting theory thereby is not validated, it is workable, relevant, and fits, making it plausible. Fourth, rather than seeking multiple incidents to validate the theory, it is more efficient and effective to conduct standard experiments and/or survey research. Fifth, this validation need not be conducted by the grounded theorist; it can be done by someone else. Sixth and finally, Strauss's and Corbin's selection of just two coding families and making them mandatory forces the data (Glaser, 1992) whereby the result is full-conceptual description, not grounded theory (Glaser, 2001).

The dispute between Glaser and Strauss can be traced to their intellectual histories. The former took his PhD at the Department of Sociology, Columbia University where faculty members there like Paul Lazarsfeld and Hans Zetterberg were developing both qualitative and quantitative methods of generating theory inductively "...based on a latent structure analysis approach using a concept-indicator model yielding emergent theoretical frameworks that the researcher must stay open to" (Glaser, 2005, p. 5). Dey (1999, p. 66) has commented that in this model, "Meanings are treated rather like objects which can be reduced to (or assembled from) their constituent parts." This objectivism can also be seen in Glaser's depiction of categories as emerging and the analyst as *emerging* them, which implies that social phenomena are existent, awaiting identification and explanation.

In contrast to Glaser, during his training Strauss was affiliated with the Department of Sociology of the University of Chicago where the school of thought was influenced by the philosophical pragmatism of Peirce, James, Dewey, and Cooley, which places a high value on problem-solving experimentation. Also influential on Strauss was symbolic interactionism. Its originator, Herbert Blumer, held that social psychology is interpretive, whereby generalizations and propositions "have to be assessed in terms of their reasonableness, their plausibility, and their illumination" (Blumer, 1940, p. 719; cited in Hammersley, 1989, p. 149). Strauss studied under Blumer and took the grounded theory method to be an expression of symbolic interactionism. In contrast, although Glaser acknowledged Blumer's critique of conventional method (see Glaser & Strauss, 1965), lately he has dismissed any claim that symbolic interaction is the root philosophy of the method (Glaser, 2005). Meanwhile, even though Strauss and Corbin (1998) have rebutted Glaser's charge that they force their data and Glaser has recently recanted the primacy of the Basic Social Process coding family (see Charmaz, 2006), on the whole the dispute between Glaser and both Strauss and the latter's close associates is unsettled.

Critical Debates

Charmaz (2006) and Henwood and Pidgeon (2003) have criticized conventional grounded theory methodology for its inherent objectivism. Charmaz has advanced an alternative methodology that combines objectivism with constructivism, with an emphasis of the latter. She has also challenged the claim that the method is explanatory, observing, "Early grounded theory studies stressed causal relationships but now scholars aim for interpretive understandings. Such understandings remain contingent on contextual conditions" (Charmaz, 2006, p. 120). Since Strauss' death in 1997, in the third edition of their book (Corbin & Strauss, 2008), Corbin agrees with Charmaz that data can be interpreted in multiple ways and that the method produces understandings rather than causal explanations. Meanwhile, in Glaser's opinion ontology and epistemology are irrelevant to the grounded theory method. For him, as he has been fond of saying, "All is data" (e.g., Glaser, 2001, p. 44).

Elsewhere, Bryant (2002) has remarked that there is role for hermeneutics in the grounded theory method; and (Rennie, 2000; Rennie & Fergus, 2006) has developed a methodical hermeneutic methodology of the method, a methodology that is now proposed for all methods of qualitative research (Rennie, 2012). Advanced as an upgrade of methodical hermeneutics entailing the hermeneutic circle method (i.e., understanding the meaning of parts of a text

in terms of the meaning of the whole of it and vice versa), in this methodology it is proposed that educing (i.e., drawing out) meanings of text and representing the meanings as concepts modifies application of Peirce's (1965, 1966) cycling of abduction, a kind of deduction, and induction. The result is a claim to understanding made rhetorically, but in a demonstrative rather than merely sophistical way. It is further proposed that the demonstrative rhetoric is enhanced when the researcher discloses reflexively his or her perspective on the phenomenon under study. Epistemologically, this methodology is cast into what Morton (1993) has called an accommodation of realism and relativism (see also, e.g., Coffey, 1958/1917; Drake et al., 1920; Putnam, 1990). It is important to note that this epistemology, sometimes called critical realism, contrasts sharply with Bhaskar's (1990) critical realism in which realism is reserved for ontology and epistemology is made relativist.

Generally, most critical psychologists favor a relativist epistemology because it supports the social constructionist view that reality is constituted of discourses, a view held to promote social emancipation. But the accommodation of realism and relativism endorsed either explicitly or implicitly by the above second-generation grounded theory methodologists among other like-minded thinkers holding out for a place for realism in epistemology can be seen to serve as a check against what has been called the postmodern predicament (see, e.g., Roseneau, 1992). Namely, when it is asserted that all knowledge is a relativist social construction, paradoxically the same applies to the assertion undermining it.

In summary, the grounded theory method has been a site of both an internal controversy and a larger epistemological debate. Meanwhile, as indicated the method is allied with critical psychology in its criticism of conventional method in psychology and related disciplines.

International Relevance

The method in and of itself in one form or other has been used in the United States and Canada more than other countries, but increasingly is being used in the United Kingdom, Europe, and Southern Hemisphere countries. Indeed, compared to 31 other methods of qualitative research, it has been shown that in journal publications it is behind only content analysis in frequency of use (Carrera-Fernandez, Guàrdia-Olmos, & Peró-Cebollero, 2012).

Practice Relevance

In business administration and political science, the sociological focus on groups and systems has been preserved. In other disciplines such as nursing, education, and psychology, the method has been extensively used to study the experience of a given phenomenon among small aggregates of sources and even single persons. In psychology the method has been used in fields such as psychotherapy research, gender studies, and exercise psychology among others.

Future Directions

Given that the number of topics to which the method may be applied is endless, up to now a plethora of substantive grounded theories (or understandings, depending on one's viewpoint) has been produced, and there is need for order. To a certain extent research reviews have helped and could help further if they were to entail metasyntheses, but perhaps a better solution would come from a different direction: Too many researchers have taken the recommendation that they do not read relevant literature prior to their analyses, in the interest of discovering something new, to mean that they should not pay attention to prior theorizing on the topic they are addressing. The result so often is yet another theory (or understanding), cast in its own language. An alternative approach would be to treat extant theory as a store of sensitizing concepts. Should such theorization earns its way into conceptualization, the result would be a collegial program of research fulfilling more effectively the method's potential.

More broadly, it has been remarked that those critical psychologists who endorse postmodern relativism have taken over the moral high ground (Parker, 1990) despite, one could add, the postmodern predicament. As indicated, the element of realism in the epistemology in which the grounded theory methodology is embedded, as seen by some, serves as a hedge against that predicament. On the other side of the coin, postmodern relativism reinforces the contemporary movement in grounded theory methodology toward seeing the method as yielding understandings supported rhetorically. Thus, an increased dialogue, between those critical psychologists who epistemologically are relativist and grounded theory methodologists along with other like-minded thinkers who epistemologically make a place for realism, could be fruitful on both sides.

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Online Resources

Introduction to grounded theory. www.anlytictech.com/mb870/introtoGT.htm
Grounded Theory Institute (official website of Dr. Barney Glaser and Classic Grounded Theory). www.groundedtheory.com
The grounded theory method of qualitative research. www.cprjournal.com/documents/groundedtheory.pdf

Guilt

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Introduction

Guilt is a negative emotion or affective state that may be manifest also in ways that characterize a person or group. Guilt is regarded as an emotion that occurs when individuals who have internalized the norms of a given group evaluate their actions for which they are responsible (or imagine that other think they are responsible for or connected with). The phenomenology of guilt is a felt preoccupation with one's wrongful action (or the actions of one's group) and a feeling that one should engage in some form of repair. Recognition of responsibility and wrongdoing in individual, group-based, and collective forms is thought to motivate repression and defensive stances as well as positive responses such as acts of reparation and moral recovery. Like pride and shame, guilt occurs in individual, group-based, and collective forms (see entries on Pride and Shame); that is, when a shared identity is salient and there is a real or imagined negative judgement or reaction from another person or group, the emotion can be felt in immediate, embodied terms.

Definition

Guilt is conceptualized in mainstream psychology as a negative self-conscious emotion (Tracy & Robins, 2004). The object of guilt is thought to be one's own actions, specifically what a person should have done or could have done differently, while the target is be the person or group who has been "wronged." On the causal appraisal model of self-conscious emotion, the causes of guilt are the event that made the person aware of themselves (i.e., activation of implicit or explicit self-representations) *and* an appraisal of the identity-goal relevance (i.e., incongruence) of the event for his or her identity goals (Tracy & Robins). An important difference between guilt and the emotions of pride and shame is that one can also feel guilty about one's own actions (i.e., "something I did") but not guilty of or about oneself (i.e., guilt is not felt about one's whole self). A further distinction between guilt and shame is phenomenological; guilt is private and may not be revealed publicly, whereas shame occurs when there is a public revelation of one's behavior, actions or character. A distinction in appraisal theories is made between shame-producing appraisals of stable and general internal "causes" of events which are identity incongruent with regard to goals (i.e., not acts that one considers to be either personally or generally desirable) and guilt-producing appraisals of unstable and specific personal causes. Although guilt is predominantly an emotion, repeated occurrences or a "deep" guilt may come to define a person's actions or character. With regard to

both group-based and collective guilt, widespread, shared, and collectively organized and experienced occurrences of guilt need to be carefully examined to ensure that they are correctly understood in relation to, and compared with, other collective emotions.

Keywords

Guilt; self-conscious emotion; moral responsibility; group-based guilt; apologies; collective guilt

Traditional Debates

As described by Freud (1930/2002) in Civilization and Its Discontents, guilt is the result of introjected or internalized aggression. The superego turns harsh aggressiveness against the ego, and it the resulting tension "is what we call a 'sense of guilt'; this manifests itself as a need for punishment" (p. 61). On Freud's view, guilt is a fear of being found out, usually by general society, that has grown out of an earlier fear of loss of love if one's bad acts are discovered. Internalization of interpersonal judgements in the superego is a key process that explains the intrapsychic dynamic relations between the ego and superego. Freud's account gives us an agentic account of the superego (rather than something resembling causal cognitive appraisal theories) in which the internal relations appear to be more important than any focus on or feeling of obligation to the injured party. A more important contribution from Freud is the potential for guilt to be unacknowledged and not expressed, although a person or may admit to feelings of guilt almost as a substitute for admitting to the relevant act or acts themselves that precipitated it. Such unconscious guilt might persist in verbal and nonverbal behavior, but it also seems that confession (as well as reparation in some form) will result in an exteriorization and reduction of what Freud called feelings of conscience. Freud's emphasis on primary ambivalence in a child's relationship with his or her father might also inform contemporary psychosocial work to discover unconscious features of guilt in collective forms: "What began in relation to the father is brought to fruition in relation to the mass" (p. 69).

As with any emotion that appears to be discrete, guilt has specific features that cannot be reduced to basic emotions (e.g., a fear, in Freud's case, of discovery or loss of love). Often it is possible to distinguish typical ways that the emotion syndrome is experienced and expressed (ultimately helping to identify differences such as those between guilt and shame where, in the latter case, one's self-exclusion or rejection by others may not be reversed by offering an apology). For example, Parkinson, Fisher, and Manstead (2005) report that being the object of another's blame can produce feelings of guilt (i.e., I feel guilty) *even without* personal responsibility (e.g., such as a child feeling guilty about a sibling's general feelings of being neglected even though the parents are most likely to be responsible). Similar to problems identified with cognitive appraisal theories of the emotions of pride and shame, it appears that immediate reactions to what can be called linguistic acts of blaming and positioning can produce guilt (i.e., rather than guilt always being the product of a complex and overintellectualized causal process of appraisal and reappraisal) a process of complex cognitive appraisal. A further important point here is that people feel more guilt when they accidentally cause harm to another person (Parkinson et al.). In such specific cases, it does not seem plausible to explain feeling guilty about unintentional harm as the result of a need for punishment; it is enough for the person to realize that they have been self-centered, thoughtless, or immature.

Critical Debates

The problems of individualism that beset accounts of other ostensibly self-conscious emotions occur here in accounts of guilt that emphasize cognitive appraisals as the key feature and underplay social, relational, discursive, and embodied features of the emotion. The emphasis

on cognitive processes does not account for complex practices in which children internalize as well as externalize feelings and related thoughts of obligations and commitments to themselves, other people, and groups. The individual experience of guilt can occur even when anticipating acts that fail to consider others or which a person is not able to repress successfully. The types of ambivalence mentioned between pride and shame also hold for guilt as the relationship to other emotions reveals complex patternings drawn from knowledge of local prohibitions and failings (e.g., the notion of a guilty pleasure). The traditional psychological account of emotions like guilt is also predicated on clear boundaries between the individual and others, boundaries which are, in fact, permeable in practice and occasionally demonstrated to be fictions when, for example, a person experiences their guilt as inseparable from their experiences of other people (e.g., signs of their guilt are evident everywhere and the person feels that others must be able to see through their attempts to conceal the truth). Other aspects of the embodiment of guilt are also worth exploring. For example, do intense negative feelings that are experienced repeatedly over time affect one's health (i.e., in part because the person is powerless to find anyone other than themselves to blame and may not find ways to alleviate their feelings)? Why are feelings of depression and guilt so closely linked?

Dialogical and narrative approaches appear to have much to contribute to understanding private and public features of guilt. Guilt might include multiple voices of judging others that are internalized and reenacted either in condensed moments of immediate and spontaneous reaction or in more considered and elaborate dialogical positioning (e.g., of accepting or denying responsibility). The phenomenology of grief could address the manner of pangs and intrusions of guilty thoughts and feelings as well as feelings of being persecuted or punished. In contrast to cognitive appraisal accounts in which goal incongruence suggests that guilt is inconsistent with personal progress and moral development, a sense of agency connected with guilt may be discovered through initiating admissions and apologies. It is quite possible that fear connected with potential rejection plays a key role in preventing people from making full admissions of guilt (e.g., of a sort that might lead to relief). It would be worthwhile also to examine the completing discourses that may be available to guide people's selections of discursive positions surrounding individual and group-based guilt (e.g., in terms of rights, obligations, and commitments).

Competing discourses may also help to explain how group-based guilt emerges and, when widely shared, has a critical role in addressing past wrongs committed by current or past members or groups within one's group. Considerable experimental work in social psychology has been devoted to understanding the manner in which the degree to which individuals identify with a group (e.g., such as a nation) and perceive their group as responsible will determine further behaviour such as helping a disadvantaged outgroup. For example, van Leeuwen, van Kijk and Kaynak (2013) found that appealing to people in terms of group-based or collective pride (e.g., to describe the Dutch role in the second world war in proud terms by emphasizing resistance) rather than group-based or collective guilt (e.g., to describe the Dutch role as one of collaboration with the occupier) lead high-identifiers, in particular, to be more likely to help a disadvantaged outgroup. There are, of course, considerable ethical and political problems associated with appeals to collective pride as a basis for good behaviour in international affairs. For example, feeling proud that one's nation is so generous in giving to other nations suffering from disasters can reinforce feelings of superiority and hide global economic inequities. In the critical social psychology literature, more attention has focused on the ideological dilemmas that may result in acknowledging or angrily rejecting claims made about harm done to in-group minorities or out-groups (presumably also minority groups might come to feel guilty about harm that they are responsible for in majority groups also). In relation to guilt that occurs because of

inequities between groups (i.e., group-based guilt), it is conceivable that in many postcolonial societies, for example, white subjects experience a mixture of guilt about their wealth and opportunities in contrast to those of indigenous groups and migrant groups (Hook, 2012). One small example of this from South Africa in 2011 was the controversial act of creating and wearing t-shirts with the slogan "I benefitted from Apartheid." This ellipted expression of guilt – in the sense that it can be assumed that the wearer should wear it *with guilt* and not, for example, pride – indicates how articulation of a private position can confront other widely shared, but largely unspoken personal stances. However, this guilt may combine ambivalently with a sense of entitlement to or enjoyment of this privileged condition. The management of guilt and the limitation against any deeper sense of shame have a potential pairing, interpersonally, with anger on the part of any member of the wronged group. The decision to call an instance of group negative emotion collective shame rather than guilt will reflect the degree of the feeling that the group has committed a shameful act or actions towards another group and the degree of the damage caused by one's own group (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; one can imagine here that the connection might be personal through the role of a family member such as a grandparent).

The t-shirt example shows how guilt may rupture the surface of existing group relations and manifest what could be called latent, circulating affects. Genuinely collective guilt (in the sense of widely shared and organized in discursive and extra-discursive features of affective practice) contrasts with similarly widespread feelings of pride and positive feelings of joy and group-related solidarity which can spread by contagion and sharing. In this regard, collective guilt appears to be like collective guilt in its individualizing effects unless assembling to express or assent to collective guilt encourages widespread relief and feelings of being righteous (e.g., through spontaneous respectful clapping following a formal apology and anger directed towards those in one's in-group who do not approve of such ceremonies). When mobilized, such collective guilt seems inappropriately expressed through spontaneous individual interactions between members of the respective groups (e.g., specific white Australians apologizing to specific rather than symbolic representatives of the indigenous peoples of Australia).

However, interactions rituals between representatives of groups may provide the focus of attention necessary for collective emotion (Collins, 2004), and stories of the ongoing effects of harm can elicit empathic tears from audience members. For example, Augoustinos, Hastie, and Wright (2011) analyzed a political *and* personal apology by the Prime Minister of Australia to the indigenous peoples of Australia for the "laws and policies of successive parliaments" (p. 515). The example shows how a highly mediated event is worked up in discursively to balance demands for rationality, emotionality, authority, and sincerity. The example also highlights the process through which the collective guilt of one group for another dissipated, replacing this with feelings of solidarity and potentially a form of collective moral pride (i.e., as demonstrated by sustained applause after the speech in parliament and public viewing sites). While the dynamics and time course of collective guilt may dissipate more quickly than positive collective emotions, feelings of solidarity might still be generated (despite low levels of energy and bodily manifestations of participation by crowds in such ceremonies) amongst the guilty group, while inclusion (along with a desire to see genuine reparation) and acceptance can be generated in groups linked with past, recent, or current harm.

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