

Critical Issues in Social Justice

Kjell Törnblom
Ali Kazemi *Editors*

Handbook of Social Resource Theory

Theoretical Extensions, Empirical Insights,
and Social Applications

 Springer

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ISSN 1572-1906

ISBN 978-1-4614-4174-8

ISBN 978-1-4614-4175-5 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-4175-5

Springer New York Heidelberg Dordrecht London

Library of Congress Control Number: 2012947400

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Foreword

I was enormously impressed when I first read Foa and Foa's Resource Theory of Social Exchange in 1980. It seemed to me that it opened up an area in social psychology which had largely been ignored. It shed new light on an important aspect of social interaction – the resources being exchanged – and it formulated many interesting, testable hypotheses. As I read their writings, I had various quibbles with it. For example, I did not think their list of categories of resources was exhaustive. I also thought “negative resources” was not simply the opposite of “positive resources” in kind or the reactions they would elicit, etc. Nevertheless, I thought it was an important and valuable theory, but I ignored it even though I now realize it was an important complement to some of the theoretical ideas I had developed (presented in Deutsch 1982; reprinted in Coleman 2011). Other social psychologists also largely neglected it. So I am delighted to see this rich volume of papers, by distinguished contributors, that take the Foa and Foa theory as the jumping off point for revising, amplifying, or absorbing into larger theories.

I will briefly indicate how my theoretical work on interdependence and psychological orientation could have benefitted from the work of Foa and Foa. My theoretical work here had two key aspects: characterizing the dimensions of social relations and characterizing the nature of psychological orientations. It postulated that one's psychological orientation had to fit the social relations one is in, and a lack of fit would produce change in the relation and/or one's psychological orientation. Thus, your psychological orientation when you are involved in love-making with your spouse is quite different than when you are bargaining with a used car salesman, and unless you change your psychological orientation as you move from one situation to the other, you will produce radical changes in the new situation.

I characterized social relations in terms of their location on five dimensions: cooperation-competition, power equality, task-oriented versus social-emotional, formal-informal, and importance. In my view, a psychological orientation was composed of the following interrelated components: cognitive, motivational, moral, and action. For details, see my paper in Coleman (2011). If you take a social relationship that is cooperative, equal, social-emotional, informal, and important, it is likely that the resource of *love* will be dominant in the interaction. On the other hand, if in the prior listing you change “social-emotional” to “task-oriented,” *information* will be dominant.

In preparing this foreword, and renewing my interest in the ideas of Foa and Foa, I have found that their ideas could have been an important contribution to

my work. In the many excellent chapters in this book, you will learn of the scholars who have been influenced by their work and the far-reaching implications of their ideas.

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Uriel G. Foa (February 25, 1916–January 15, 1990), born in Italy, was a professor and professor emeritus of psychology, 1971–1990, at Temple University, Philadelphia. He received his Ph.D. from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and prior to his tenure at Temple University he taught at the universities of Bar Ilan, Israel (1958–1965), Illinois-Urbana (1965–1967) and Missouri-Columbia (1967–1971). His many publications in professional journals and books covered a broad variety of topics in personality, social psychology, and methodology. The first paper of Professor Foa's resource theory of social exchange was published in *Science* 1971. He continued to develop this theory and conducted studies to examine its empirical validity with his wife Edna B. Foa. This work was culminated in a book entitled *Societal Structures of the Mind* they coauthored and published in 1974. This book is one of the most frequently quoted books in social psychology. Professor Foa founded the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, and was its executive director until 1965 when he moved to the USA. Dr. Foa received several awards for his work, and he was a fellow of the American Psychological Association, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and the New York Academy of Science.

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Kjell Törnblom received his Ph.D. from the University of Missouri-Columbia where Uriel Foa was one of his teachers at the doctoral program in social psychology. They have since collaborated on several publications, including *Resource Theory: Explorations and Applications* (1993), an edited volume that was published after Dr. Foa's untimely death. Törnblom has co-edited three additional books (e.g., *Distributive and Procedural Justice: Research and Social Applications*, with Riël Vermunt) as well as six special theme issues of *Social Justice Research* for which he and Ali Kazemi are now editors-in-chief. Törnblom's research on social justice, resource theory, conflict, intergroup relations, and theory integration has been published in a range of professional journals and as book chapters. He was awarded The Noel P. Gist Distinguished Alumni Award (University of Missouri-Columbia, 2004). Törnblom has served at universities in the USA (City University of New York, 1972–1974, and University of Colorado at Denver, 1990–2004), Sweden (the Universities of Göteborg and Umeå, 1976–1990), and Canada (University of New Brunswick, 1974–1976). He had a visiting appointment at the University of Washington in 1985 and is now affiliated as a guest researcher with ETH (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich). He is a Professor Emeritus at University of Skövde (where he taught and directed a center for justice research 2000–2010) and a member of the ISJR Executive Board (International Society for Justice Research). His Erdős number is 4.

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Social Resource Theory: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow

Kjell Törnblom and Ali Kazemi

The material and nonmaterial social resources that people in their interactions give and withhold or take away, receive and are deprived of or lose, exchange and distribute, produce and destroy were of explicit or implicit interest in the writings of many classical sociologists/economists/philosophers (e.g., Marx 1867; Veblen 1899; Simmel 1907; and Weber 1947) and anthropologists (e.g., Frazer 1919; Malinowski 1922; Mauss 1925; and Mead 1928; Lévi-Strauss 1949). Simmel (1907), for instance, wrote a book on the philosophy of *money*, and Veblen in his book on the leisure class (1899) focused on material *goods* as symbols of *status* in his discussions of conspicuous consumption. Expanding on the narrow materialistic resource focus of Marx (1867) and others on power as control over the means of economic production, leading to a stratified class society, Weber (1947) included three types of social “resources” that constituted a multidimensional basis for social stratification: class, status, and party. *Class* membership heavily influenced your opportunities to obtain money and wealth; *status*, prestige, or respect is a resource gained on the basis of your financial success or power; and *party* membership confers power and privilege. Others argued that additional resources were important to consider in any theory concerning social inequality.

Galbraith (1967) and Bell (1973), for example, argued that *information* in its various forms (e.g., expert knowledge, managerial and mass communicational skills) is a resource of critical importance in modern society and may even replace the economy as a dominant resource base.

Within the context of sociological treatments of social inequality, social stratification has often been conceptualized in terms of *resource possession* and lack thereof as contributing to the emergence and maintenance of hierarchies of prestige and power (e.g., Lenski 1966). Issues related to the possession, transaction, distribution, and exchange of positive and negative social resources (goods and bads, rewards and punishments, assets and liabilities) have been discussed by scholars in other sociological subareas as well (e.g., Homans 1961; Blau 1964; Emerson 1972a, b, 1976; Hechter 1987; Coleman 1992, 1994), and in psychology and social psychology (e.g., Freud 1921, 1949; Maslow 1941, 1954; Thibaut and Kelley 1959; Adams 1963, 1965; Leventhal 1976a, b; Lerner 1980; Deutsch 1985; Elaine Hatfield, formerly Walster (Walster et al. 1978)). Of course, there are numerous other eminent theorists within the various disciplines who are not mentioned here; neither are the many influential scholars of later generations who have made significant contributions. Issues related to resource transactions arise “naturally” within a few specific theoretical frameworks in those disciplines, notably social exchange, distributive justice, relative deprivation, and social dilemmas. Surprisingly, however,

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resources as units of analysis, as objects and components in their own right in contexts of exchange and distribution, were rarely the focus of attention – despite the fact that social resources of different kinds are always part and parcel of interpersonal transactions. Thus, most theoretical and empirical research in the social sciences has neglected to include explicit and systematic analyses of the nature of the transacted resources (except mainly for its scarcity, valence, and divisibility – for exceptions, see Blalock 1991,¹ and Galvin and Lockhart 1990²), their interrelationships, and their significance for the nature and process of social interaction.

However, that situation changed with the appearance of Foa's (1971) article on interpersonal and economic resources in *Science*, which was a first presentation of his resource theory of social exchange, and which was more fully elaborated in the well-received monograph *Societal Structures of the Mind* that he coauthored with his wife Edna Foa (Foa and Foa 1974). Now the social resource was explicitly designated as a primary unit of analysis and was defined as "any commodity – material or symbolic – which is transmitted through interpersonal behavior" (Foa and Foa 1974, p. 36) or "any item *concrete* or *symbolic*, which can become the object of

exchange among people" (Foa and Foa 1980, p. 78). A series of empirical tests were conducted by the Foas and their collaborators during the following two decades and before Uriel's untimely death in 1990. The chapter by Sabbagh and Levy in this volume provides an excellent historical account of the emerging interest in the role of social resources as objects of social interaction, and it provides a vivid description of Foa's framework from its first presentation in *Science* (1971) and its continued elaboration with his wife (e.g., Foa and Foa 1974, 1976, 1980).

Applications and developments of resource theory as well as theoretical integrations were presented in a posthumously edited book (Foa et al. 1993). Now several years have passed during which additional research using SRT has been produced. Previous research, as well as some of the research reported in this volume, has applied Foa's framework in various areas of inquiry such as quality of life and well-being (e.g., Blieszner 1993; Rettig et al. 1993); work satisfaction (Berg and Wiebe 1993); organizational behavior (Chap. 21 by Chiaburu, Byrne, and Weidert in this volume); interpersonal relationships (Berg et al. 1993; Chap. 14 in this volume by Gifford and Cave); development of close relationships (e.g., Törnblom and Fredholm 1984; Törnblom et al. 1987); personal development and competence (e.g., L'Abate and Harel 1993); consumer behavior (Chap. 20 by Dorsch and Brooks in this volume); responses to injustice (e.g., Donnenwerth and Foa 1974; Foa et al. 1972; Converse and Foa 1993); product positioning (e.g., Brinberg and Ganesan 1993); cross-cultural behavior and comparisons (Chap. 18 by Kraemer and Chen; Chap. 17 by Baumert and Schmitt, and Chap. 26 by Sabbagh and Malka in this volume).

In addition to the considerable amount of applied research, there has been several attempts at integrating and combining Foa's resource theory with other theories, for instance, distributive and/or procedural justice (Sabbagh et al. 1994; Törnblom and Vermunt 2007); fairness perceptions in social dilemmas (Chap. 12 by Markovsky and Berigan in this volume); social comparison theory (Kazemi and Törnblom 2010; Törnblom et al. 1993); exchange and interpersonal

¹ Blalock (1991) identified ten variable resource properties that must be taken into account when formulating a theory of allocation processes: Divisibility, once-and-for-all versus repeated allocations, retractability, generalized value, depletion and replenishment, the degree to which they are subject to devaluation, the degree to which recipients share future power with allocators, valence, the degree of secrecy for allocation decisions, and monopoly control of goods and competition among allocators. Not all of these are *properties* of a resource, as some (e.g., the last two) refer to "external" variables such as availability of information about allocation decisions and type of actor relationship.

² Another resource property, fungibility refers to "the characteristic of an item having value regardless of who possesses it" (Galvin and Lockhart 1990, p. 1183, and Chap. 22 in this volume). For example, "the value of currency derives from its ability to be exchanged for other goods, and its purchasing power does not vary according to its possessor." Other examples of fungible resources are air and water (cf. the notion of a "universalistic" resource within Foa's framework).

relationships (Chap. 6 by Mitchell, Cropanzano, and Quisenberry in this volume); morality (Chap. 9 by Folger in this volume); macro-sociology (Chap. 10 by Turner in this volume); biosocial development (Chap. 15 by Lewis and Houser in this volume); personality (Stangl 1993); volunteering (Kazemi 2007); social exclusion (e.g., Kazemi 2009); interpersonal evaluation theory (Chap. 14 by Gifford and Cave in this volume); and conservation of resources theory (Hobfoll 1989, 2002; Chap. 19 by Doane, Schumm, and Hobfoll in this volume).

The full potential of SRT and similar frameworks focusing on what exactly people provide to and take from each other, and what they receive and lose, has not been realized. The purpose of this handbook is to take steps to ameliorate this state of affairs as well as making recent theoretical, empirical, and applied work in this tradition more visible and available to a wider audience of scholars and students in different disciplines.

The Nature and Organization of This Handbook

The topic of this volume spans several disciplines, features both laboratory and field research from a number of different countries, addresses students and researchers as well as policy makers, and its application is potentially useful on different levels and in a variety of contexts (from interpersonal to global). There appears to be an increasing interest among researchers in incorporating into their own research insights about the social resources that people transact in their everyday interactions. We believe this handbook is a very timely contribution relevant to several disciplines.

Several additional features of our approach are worth mentioning: *First*, the chapters cover various levels of analysis, from micro to macro (i.e., from intrapersonal to interpersonal to group to societal to cultural levels). *Second*, most chapters contain an overview of theoretical and empirical research on a particular topic as well as an exemplary piece of relevant research. *Third*, we have selected contributions dealing with basic

research as well as applied research with regard to current and important societal issues. *Fourth*, we have included both international contributions (USA, Canada, Sweden, Israel, the Netherlands, and Germany) and interdisciplinary studies (psychology, sociology, social psychology, management, economics and marketing, political science, history, and applied ethics/philosophy).

This volume addresses some issues related to further developments of Foa's social resource theory, four of which are briefly mentioned here. *First*, inasmuch as the nature of the transacted resource, per se, has generated new rules of exchange, research indicates that the nature of the cultural, social, institutional, and interpersonal relationship contexts provide constraints that may modify those rules. For example, affection is provided in different ways to one's children as compared to one's work colleagues. *Second*, how shall fairness of exchanges between similar or different resource types be conceptualized and determined? For example, how much respect is a fair amount to give in return for aid in an emergency? The issue of justice and fairness is discussed by several contributors. *Third*, how adequate is the resource classification scheme. Do the two dimensions (particularism and concreteness) according to which resources are circularly arranged exclude the inclusion of some hitherto neglected resource type, and would other dimensions facilitate its discovery? *Fourth*, how may each of the six resource classes be subdivided? Research seems to indicate that intraclass differences (e.g., differences between different concrete instances of information) may be as large, or larger, than interclass differences (e.g., information as compared to status).

The Contributions to This Volume

Following a Foreword by Morton Deutsch and an Introductory chapter, this handbook presents five parts containing 26 chapters and concludes with an Envoi by Elaine Hatfield and Richard Rapson. The introductory Part I contains two chapters: In Chap. 2 Foa and Foa present the basic framework of their social resource theory, and Chap. 3 spells

out a number of issues that may need to be addressed for its further development. Part II contains seven chapters discussing various conceptual and theoretical elaborations of SRT. The five chapters of Part III describe attempts at theory integrations between SRT and other models and theories. Part IV features six chapters describing various applications of SRT on different levels, from the organizational to inter-cultural. Finally, the six chapters of Part V focus on various justice aspects in the distribution of different kinds of resources. This simplified characterization of the chapters conceals the fact that many of them would also fit under other parts of this book; the contents of each chapter are certainly more varied and richer than indicated here. The brief descriptions of each chapter that now follow are partly based on the authors' own abstracts.

Part I lays down the framework on which most of the contributions to this handbook are based. As Social Resource Theory was launched over four decades ago, the purpose of the two chapters in this section is to provide an accessible and relatively brief overview of the theory by its originators as well as a presentation of a number of problems and issues that need to be attended to further develop and refine SRT.

Chapter 2 is an abridged version of an extensive chapter that Edna and Uriel Foa published in 1976 in which the basic tenets of their resource theory of social exchange are outlined. The authors discuss a variety of details and issues such as the definition and classification of resources as well as the reciprocal relationship between the structure of resources and interpersonal behavior. A number of new exchange rules are proposed, and some consequences of inappropriate exchanges are analyzed. Foa and Foa conclude their chapter with an interesting account of many instances in which SRT is relevant to and useful for the analysis of social issues.

Chapter 3 by Törnblom and Kazemi discusses a number of issues in SRT which seem to benefit from further developments. Specifically, they ask whether Foas' resource classification meets the criteria for a typology, whether there are other dimensions than concreteness and particularism, and whether Foas' six resource classes can be

categorized into subclasses. Törnblom and Kazemi further discuss the validity of some of the exchange rules that the Foas formulated. They also extend the Foas' two basic behavioral modes of giving and taking into four basic modes of exchange (i.e., giving-giving, giving-requesting, requesting-giving, and requesting-requesting), and this opens up for a host of further distinctions when additional facets like resource valence and resource type are included. Additional issues discussed in Chap. 3 involve the production and acquisition of resources; different types of linkages between the production, acquisition, possession, and provision of resources; and finally the relevance of SRT to the topics of social justice, social exclusion, well-being, social dilemmas, social comparisons, and volunteering. Some of these issues are the focus of several chapters in this handbook.

Part II addresses conceptual and theoretical developments via seven chapters concerned with further extensions and elaborations of the original version of SRT.

Clara Sabbagh and Schlomit Levy build on insights from facet theory in Chap. 4 and refine the exchange rationale underlying the similarities and differences among resource classes by means of facet theory's mapping sentence. They suggest specifically that resource exchange is structured by a wide range of behaviors that can be classified via various facets. This facet analysis is based on the identification of seven facets (i.e., comparison targets, type of motive, mode of resource transmission, resource availability, modality, resource valence, and social realm) in addition to the particularism and concreteness facets suggested by SRT. On the basis of these theoretical distinctions, the authors finally show how Foa and Foa's theory can be systematically expanded from a circle (circumplex) to a more complex structure.

In Chap. 5, Barry Markovsky and Ali Kazemi provide a formalization of SRT. They initially state that the common focus of social science activity remains on empirical analysis and hypothesis testing, with relatively little attention paid to the internal structures of the theories motivating those hypotheses. Markovsky and

Kazemi provide a comprehensive and rigorous definition for theory and its components. Criteria for evaluating theories are also discussed along with a useful ten-step model for analyzing and improving theories. They then turn to a theoretical analysis resulting in a more parsimonious set of key terms, along with 18 propositions revealing the structure of the theory. Diagramming the structure of the theory further reveals a dearth of complete logical arguments, indicating SRT's lack of explanatory depth.

Taking a more empirical approach to theory development, in Chap. 6 Marie Mitchell, Russel Cropanzano, and David Quisenberry raise the question of what social exchange theory has contributed to organizational research. Scholars generally agree on the reciprocal nature of exchange patterns, but theories of social exchange differ in terms of their explanation of the resources exchanged and how those resources are perceived by exchange partners. Contemporary models of social exchange incorporate interpersonal relationships into their exchange theories, but these models differ in how they conceptualize relational patterns. Three broad conceptual paradigms are distinguished: models that emphasize relationship formation, attributes of the relationship as resources to be exchanged, and relationships as a social context that changes the rules by which exchanges are conducted. The authors integrate strengths of each approach to provide a research agenda that can extend social exchange theorizing by providing a better description of what is exchanged and how meaning is derived in exchange relations.

The derivation of meaning in social relationships is also the target in Chap. 7 by Kjell Törnblom and Eva Fredholm. Clark and Mills (1979) proposed that observers are likely to infer an exchange relationship between two persons when they give each other comparable (similar) benefits, while the presentation of noncomparable ones would indicate a communal relationship (e.g., friendship). From the perspective of Foa's resource categorization, results from a study by Clark (1981) seem to be misinterpreted as consistent with those predictions, due to the use of comparable resources in conditions of noncom-

parability. In this chapter, Törnblom and Fredholm examine the influence of comparability/noncomparability and nature of the resources involved in friendship attribution. Their findings suggest that comparability of resources is a less important cue than the nature of those resources. In addition, resource comparability does not seem to allow a distinction between communal and exchange relationships in terms of the perceived existence of friendship.

Status has been the focus of a large number of studies in sociology and social psychology. However, less attention has been devoted to systematic conceptual analyses of status. In Chap. 8, Kevin Binning and Yuen Huo apply social resource theory to gain insight into the meaning and uses of social status in everyday social experience. The authors present a taxonomy in which status is theorized to vary along the particularism and concreteness dimensions. Thus, status can be highly symbolic (e.g., politeness) or relatively concrete (e.g., military or societal ranking or position). It can also be held and distributed in universalistic fashion, without regard to personal or idiosyncratic features, or in a highly particular, targeted, and specific fashion. Combining the two dimensions, four distinct types of status are developed to understand status in a variety of manifestations: Status as a symbolic recognition of human dignity, status as respect and social deference, status as a concrete ranking system in a group or organization, and status as a broad, societal hierarchy. This chapter illustrates the possibility of distinguishing resource subtypes along the same two dimensions that are used to distinguish among Foa's six "major" resource classes.

In Chap. 9, Robert Folger focuses on the notions of status, authority, power, and morality. This chapter entails an integration between Fiske's (1991) social relations model and social resource theory. The latter refers to categories of resources, while the former refers to categories of social relations which, in turn, can be related to resources. Whereas the Foa framework conceptualizes different categories of resources as they relate to one another in an overall psychological space, Folger instead unifies them by focusing on a single quality that all types of resources (or

relationships) share in common, namely, their capacity to elicit moralized forms of social sanctioning when the norms regarding those resources or relations are violated. Fiske's work suggests four categories of such norms.

Jonathan Turner argues in Chap. 10 that the number of resource types in most psychological and sociological theorizing has been rather limited. In an attempt to remedy this, Turner emphasizes the structural bases of resource distribution and the range of key resources in social interaction at different levels of analysis. The institutional domains in complex differentiated society are built from corporate units. Within each institutional domain, generalized symbolic media are used as the symbols of discourse, theme-building, and ideological formation. These symbolic media are also the valued resources unequally distributed by corporate units in a domain. This unequal distribution causes the formation of a stratification system of classes. Furthermore, the possession of high shares of these symbolic media resources also allows individuals to claim and possess other highly generalized resources, most notably prestige, dignity, and positive emotional energy. Yet, when a larger set of resources is seen as part of the stratification system, there is typically less inequality than when only money, power, and prestige are considered.

Part III addresses theoretical integrations. As mentioned earlier, several attempts have been made at integrating SRT with various other models and theories. This section features five chapters that demonstrate different ways of combining SRT with other theoretical frameworks.

In Chap. 11, Kjell Törnblom and Riël Vermunt formulate a number of new predictions regarding behavioral reactions to distributive and procedural injustices via insights from resource theory. The three theories share focus on discrepancies between actual and ideal states of existence as well as on psychological and behavioral reactions to discrepancy. But they also differ in their conceptions of discrepancy: a perceived mismatch between inputs and outcomes in equity theory, a mismatch between expected and applied distribution and procedural rules, respectively, within multi-principle distributive justice and procedural

justice theories, and an inappropriate match between the nature of the provided and received resources in resource theory. Limitations of the theories are discussed, with particular focus on their inability to match specific discrepancies with appropriate behavioral reactions. An integration between the three theoretical frameworks allows behavioral predictions based upon established congruences between behavioral reactions and violated procedural rules as well as type of inequity, the congruences determined via their respective resource isomorphisms.

The purpose stated by Barry Markovsky and Nick Berigan in Chap. 12 is to link the social dilemmas and justice research areas with SRT. Situations in which individual and collective interests conflict are the focus in social dilemma theorizing, while justice situations involve judgments of fairness and responses to perceived unfairness. Studying justice within social dilemma situations allows the authors to examine how perceptions of fairness influence cooperative behavior. By incorporating SRT, they are able to study the nature of different dilemmas, given the social resources that are exchanged, and how social resources impact perceptions of fairness differentially. After translating SRT into exchange models via N-player game theory, Markovsky and Berigan use a justice equation from Markovsky's (1985) Multilevel Justice Theory to model evaluations of fairness. They conclude by proposing laboratory experiments that incorporate social resources with social dilemmas and justice.

In Chap. 13, Guillermina Jasso concludes that virtually all theoretical and empirical work in the social sciences incorporates one or another of Foa's six resources. One of these approaches, the new unified theory of sociobehavioral forces, posits that personal quantitative characteristics (such as wealth, skill, and other goods and bads) generate the primordial sociobehavioral outcomes (such as status, power, and the sense of justice) within groups formed by personal qualitative characteristics (such as citizenship and gender). Moreover, the theory indicates that further outcomes (e.g., love and social cohesion) arise from individuals' sociobehavioral outcomes (status, justice, etc.) and that the Foa resources are at work in all

corners of the new unified theory. This chapter initiates an analysis of the precise ways that goods, bads, and the Foa resources operate in the new unified theory and suggests that resource theory and the new unified theory might benefit from explicit theoretical integration.

Robert Gifford and Michael Cave examine how SRT and interpersonal evaluation theory (IET) might complement one another in Chap. 14. The authors ask which resources individuals prefer to trade with which sorts of persons and point out that SRT proposes six classes of resources and IET a set of prototypical person types. They propose that preferences for resource exchanges may vary depending on the particular resource and on the type of person with whom resources are exchanged. Thus, an integration of SRT and IET may improve our understanding of interpersonal exchange processes. Preferences of volunteers were analyzed when the six resources were offered to four IET person types (Boss, Friend, Employee, and Enemy). Some resources (especially status and love) were preferred more than others, and both resource and interpersonal source did matter. The results of this study suggest that an understanding of interpersonal resource exchanges calls for a consideration of both the types of resource and the types of person involved.

In Chap. 15, Scott Lewis and Jeffrey Houser attempt to link cultural aspects of SRT with evolutionary models. They argue that the exchange categories identified by Foa have their roots in the satisfaction of evolutionary forces that evolved to increase reproductive fitness. Lewis and Houser show how cultural forms have emerged from these evolutionary forces and elaborated upon them to create complex system of exchange that allows humans to navigate an increasingly complex social environment. Linking Parsons and Fiske to Darwinian approaches, they demonstrate how resource exchange theory can be understood and enhanced on the macro-, meso-, and micro-levels through an understanding of Darwinian principles linked to memetic change.

Part IV focuses on organizational, institutional, societal, and intercultural issues. In Chap. 16, John Adamopoulos presents a theory of action

construal with an emphasis on the emergence of social meaning. He reviews the theoretical framework within which models concerning the meaning of interpersonal behavior were generated. These models are based on the assumption that all social behavior involves the exchange of material and psychological resources, a process that is guided by a number of constraints operating on interpersonal interaction. Adamopoulos' analysis relies substantially on research findings and insights obtained in the context of social resource theory, and it thus constitutes in some ways an extension and application of the theory to the area of interpersonal structure in general, and, in particular, to topics like individualism-collectivism, human values, and sociality.

Chapter 17 by Anna Baumert and Manfred Schmitt features a triangulation of distributive justice theory, resource theory, and culture theory that sheds new light on cross-cultural differences in preferences for allocation principles. The authors propose that a culture's standing on power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity/femininity will determine the importance of status, information, material goods, money, services, and love in allocation decisions. They also propose that the distribution of a culturally important resource increases the preference for equitable allocations. Baumert and Schmitt found that available data from cross-cultural studies are inconclusive as they do not systematically combine justice principles and resources. Future tests of their proposed hypotheses might yield a reinterpretation of previously held views of culturally specific justice preferences.

In Chap. 18, Justin Kraemer and Chao Chen also take a cross-cultural perspective in their analysis of the importance of social resources in understanding social relationships. They point out several potential limitations of SRT, for example, that the dimension of particularism may confound the inherent characteristics of a resource with relational characteristics of the interacting parties. The authors also discuss how differences in general social relationships and social orientations may influence resource exchange across cultures, and they compare social exchange across three levels of relationships (peer, supervisor-subordinate, and

employer-employee relationships in the USA and China). The authors conclude with ideas for future research and offer a general comparative cross-cultural model of social resource exchange.

Hobfoll's Conservation of Resources (COR) theory was developed independently of Foa's SRT and is a motivational theory of stress focusing on the prediction of stress and resilience. In Chap. 19, Lisa Stines Doane, Jeremiah Schumm, and Stevan Hobfoll discuss ways in which the psychological economy of resources sustain and protect people, and how their work is related to and extends SRT. The authors present three principles and three corollaries of COR that are related to resource gains and losses. Hobfoll's notion of "caravan passageways" highlight the predicament that people's ability to build and maintain their resource reservoirs is largely dependent on factors outside their control. Those who possess few resources are, according to COR, not only more vulnerable to losses and less capable of gains but are also likely to get caught in a loss spiral where initial loss yields further loss. The opposite spiral further benefits those who are well off. Doane, Schumm, and Hobfoll conclude their chapter by discussions of the "positive" variables, namely, hope, optimism, resilience, and posttraumatic growth, asking how people who lack resources and face trauma can still be creative and hopeful.

Michael Dorsch and Colby Brooks analyze customer loyalty from a resource theory perspective in Chap. 20. More specifically, they examine how resource theory can be used to better understand how retailers may initiate customer loyalty through the investment of the six "Foa resources." Full profile conjoint analysis was used to determine whether the resource investments that retailers make to initiate a relationship with first-time shoppers can influence shopper intentions to revisit that retailer to make a product purchase. Findings from their study supported the applicability of social resource theory for understanding customer loyalty. Retailer resource investments were found to influence first-time shopper intentions to revisit a retailer, and first-time shoppers may be segmented in terms of the importance that they place on the resources when deciding to

revisit a retailer. Thus, retailers interested in initiating customer loyalty may be recommended to place greater emphasis on the development of customer relationship management programs that incorporate both social (particularistic and symbolic) and economic (universalistic and concrete) resources.

Dan Chiaburu, Zinta Byrne, and Janet Weidert argue that even though social resource theory has been used as a framework to increase our understanding of employee-organization exchanges, it has been applied mostly to the realm of explicit and transparent transactions. In Chap. 21, they examine whether the two dimensions of particularism and concreteness and whether discrete resource classes (i.e., status and information) are useful to explore transactions taking place in the so-called underworld of the organization, that is, instances when employees are likely to use unauthorized means, or obtain unauthorized ends, in their transactions with their organization. Via qualitative data analyses of interviews, the authors mapped the realm of resources and transactions in the organization's underworld and examined their possible consequences. This chapter offers novel ways to think about organizational resources, in addition to highlighting the "underlife" of organizational transactions, a dimension typically left unexamined in organizational behavior research.

Part V features analyses of justice conceptions and processes in resource exchange. In Chap. 22, Richard Galvin and Charles Lockhart distinguish among types of goods which have significant implications for theories of distributive justice. They provide a general account of two sets of properties on the bases of which goods can be distinguished: fungibility versus nonfungibility and divisibility versus indivisibility. Further, they contend that these distinctions entail complications for structural principles of distributive justice (i.e., principles such as maximin that distribute payoffs to positions). As an example, Galvin and Lockhart consider James Fishkin's (1983) discussion of structural principles, arguing that his view (1) that value, structure, and assignment are independent holds only to the degree that the goods considered are fungible and

divisible, (2) that structural principles face difficulties beyond those which Fishkin (1979) identifies and addresses with his principle of non-tyranny, since structural principles cannot accommodate highly nonfungible, indivisible goods, and (3) that these difficulties can be managed through the application of a value-sensitivity proviso. The authors show that two important goods, medical care and advanced education, are highly nonfungible and indivisible and thus support the distinctions drawn earlier. Finally, they specify the nature of complementary contributions as well as coordination problems between structural principles and the value-sensitivity proviso in their application to distributive justice issues.

Shifting focus from distributive to procedural justice, Chap. 23 by Ali Kazemi, Maedeh Gholamzadehmir, and Kjell Törnblom starts from the proposition that in a situation of procedural injustice, restoration of justice will be attempted via behaviors that are isomorphic with the resource with which the violated procedural rule is isomorphic. An empirical illustration corroborated in large this novel line of reasoning and showed that when the procedural rule of voice was violated, restoration of justice was attempted via status isomorphic behaviors. This is consistent with what Foa's proposal that people prefer to retaliate a loss via a resource class proximal rather than distal to the lost resource. The proposition that inaccuracy is isomorphic with information, that is, a universalistic resource received mixed support. The notion that procedural injustice has implications for discrete emotions was supported. Regardless of the resource of deprivation, the denial of voice had greater impact than inaccuracy of decisions which, in turn, suggests a greater impact of particularistic (i.e., status) than of universalistic (i.e., information) resource deprivation.

Both restorative justice and resource theory focus attention on harmful interactions whose resolution sometimes requires the involvement of a third party. Ronald Cohen, in Chap. 24, reviews recent work in both traditions and underscores the importance of identifying and examining three issues that have escaped systematic attention. First, the nature of the central roles of victim,

perpetrator, and "community" need to be clarified. Second, the complexities involved in shifting from a dyadic to a triadic social relation need to be addressed. And, third, the discursive dimension of status alignments and realignments need to be analyzed. Cohen offers suggestions about why these issues are important and how they might be addressed.

As Riël Vermunt, Ali Kazemi, and Kjell Törnblom point out in Chap. 25, resource allocations may be judged on the basis of the resulting final outcome and/or the procedures applied to arrive at the outcome. The focus of this chapter is on how attention to the outcome or procedure is affected by the nature of the allocated resource (universalistic versus particularistic) and the direction of allocation (when P is a provider versus a recipient). Results from a cross-national survey study involving respondents from Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the USA showed that procedure was perceived as more focal in the allocation of universalistic as compared to particularistic resources. No differences were observed with regard to the salience of outcome. Interestingly, this held only true for resource providers; for resource recipients this pattern was reversed. These and other findings suggest that the meaning of resource classes (in this study money and love) differs for providers and recipients in their judgments of allocation events. The authors conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for SRT and for future research.

The study by Clara Sabbagh and Hila Malka reported in Chap. 26 examines justice perceptions with respect to different kinds of resources that are distributed to teachers. The authors ask to what extent resource-specific justice perceptions vary across two national groups of teachers (Jewish and Arab) in the Israeli population and educational system. Their findings indicate that Israeli teachers across sectors prefer differentiation (favoring equity over equality/need) and perceive more injustice when universalistic, rather than particularistic resources are at stake. At the same time, justice perceptions were found to vary across sectorial/cultural lines. For instance, Israeli-Arab teachers preferred differentiation of

particularistic resources more strongly than their Israeli-Jewish counterparts. Sabbagh and Malka suggest that cross-cultural and cross-sectional research may provide a clearer understanding of patterns of convergence and divergence in the meanings assigned to social resources, and of the corresponding distribution rules.

In Chap. 27, Guillermina Jasso notes that Foa's six resource classes play many parts, in social science as inputs and outcomes, in postulates and predictions, and, especially, in ideas about the way the world works and the way it ought to work. Factorial survey methods allow rigorous analysis of the two corresponding types of "equations inside the head" – the positive-belief equations and the normative-judgment equations – together with the determinants and consequences of those beliefs and judgments. Jasso's chapter presents a brief guide for using factorial survey methods to explore the resources, theoretical processes, and predictions of SRT. She points out that there is a growing body of research that examines individual-specific ideas about the determination of goods and bads (e.g., earnings and prison sentences) – both actual determination and just determination, formalized as actual reward functions and just reward functions. Jasso notes that some of the applications discussed in this chapter require only minor modification to existing research protocols, and that factorial survey methods may help accelerate progress in understanding goods, bads, and the Foa resources.

ENVOI. Finally, in Chap. 28 Elaine Hatfield and Richard Rapson provide an overview of the contents of this volume wrapped into a lively account of some of the historical and theoretical "forerunners" to resource theorizing. The "story" they are telling reminds us that justice theories and SRT are two developments in different directions, with a common origin in social exchange theory (and both finally merging in attempts at integration). Hatfield and Rapson discuss a few of the justice theories that were prominent in the 1950s to the 1970s with a special focus on Equity theory, including Morton Deutsch's commentaries about the diverse views of justice that exist, Uriel and Edna Foa's attempts to devise a taxonomy

for the resources involved in social exchanges, and J. Stacy Adams' attempts to predict how perceived injustices will be resolved. After some exciting peeks into the past and present, considering the advances that have occurred in the last 40+ years, Hatfield and Rapson speculate as to where we might expect scholarship to go in future years.

Although Foa and Foa's social resource theory of social exchange has been widely recognized by scholars working in different disciplines, we tend to think that it has not been as influential as it arguably should have been, despite the fact that SRT addresses and has important implications for the study of interpersonal relationships and processes. This volume features chapters that break new grounds and point to exciting prospects, and it is our hope that colleagues in various disciplines who are interested in understanding human relations and social interaction will find SRT useful for their own research.

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Part I

The Basic Framework

Edna B. Foa and Uriel G. Foa

Introduction

People tend to describe their interpersonal encounters in terms of emotions and attitudes. After a party, we may remark: “It was an interesting evening,” “I felt very much at home,” “It was a drag,” or “I felt left out.” These statements do not describe what happened at the party; rather, they refer to the effect the party had on us. Expressions of mood, important in themselves, encourage us to ask such questions as: What excites or bores us? When do we feel included in or excluded from the group? More generally, we ask: What happens when two or more people interact? Usually, exchanges of certain “commodities” take place, and our satisfaction or dissatisfaction with an encounter depends on the outcome of these transactions.

This chapter is an abridged version of Chap. 5 in J. W. Thibaut, J. T. Spence, and R. C. Carson (1976) (Eds.). *Contemporary Topics in Social Psychology*. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.

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In many situations, the exchange is quite evident. In a shop, the buyer gives money and receives merchandise. At work, performance is exchanged for money. In other situations, the transaction may be less obvious. For example, I analyze a political situation, and you listen with interest and remark admiringly, “I never thought about that aspect before.” In another exchange, I smile at you, seeking your company, and you say, “We really should get together more often.”

In the first example, information was exchanged for an expression of respect. This exchange led to the remark “It was an interesting evening.” In the second example, the exchange of personal affection makes us feel accepted and wanted. If expressions of friendship, admiration, and knowledge are commodities, then a party is no less a marketplace than is the stock exchange.

Extending the notion of exchange to include all interpersonal experiences, we offer an apparently simple framework for analyzing social behavior. However, new questions arise from this concept. We know what satisfies people in the stock market. If we buy and sell stock at a profit, we describe the transaction in positive terms. We also know that in order to obtain desired merchandise, we have to give the shopkeeper a certain amount of money. But what can we do to obtain love? Can we be happy when our love is repaid with money? What should we give in return for respect? In general, do rules of economic exchange apply also to interpersonal exchange?

Spurred on by the relative success of economists in predicting and controlling behavior in the marketplace, social psychologists have attempted to apply the economic model to noneconomic exchanges, using the same rules for *all* types of transactions. The assumption that every transaction, both economic and emotional, follows the same rules caused disinterest in the problems of specifying and classifying exactly *what* is exchanged. If one assumes the rules to be the same for every transaction, it becomes irrelevant to state what is exchanged, and the only meaningful parameter in an event is the *amount* of the exchanged commodity. Another interesting but unfortunate consequence of imitating the economic model is that negative exchanges have not been recognized as transactions. For some reason, exchanges of the type “I shop-lift – you pick-pocket” have traditionally been of greater interest to lawyers than to economists. Similarly, interactions such as “I interfere with a pleasurable activity of yours – you express dislike for me” have often been called “frustration – aggression sequences”; their transactional nature has been ignored.

In a radical departure from these trends, we suggest that while all interpersonal encounters may indeed be perceived as transactions, the rules of exchange vary systematically for different types of transactions. Recognizing the existence of qualitative differences among transactions, we offer a system for sorting them into homogeneous categories. Moreover, the notion that the rules of exchange vary *systematically* across types of transactions suggests that these types are organized into a distinct pattern, or structure, according to their relative similarity and dissimilarity. Thus, similar transactions will have similar rules of exchange, while dissimilar ones will follow a different set of rules. In this manner, economic and psychological exchanges, though not equated, are considered within the same framework. Hence, allowances are made for the study of their interplay.

In resource theory, both positive and negative encounters are considered. Mutual deprivation becomes as much an exchange as does mutual provision. The notion of exchange is then expanded to include aggressive behaviors that were previously considered under a separate theoretical framework.

We shall begin our presentation by defining classes of interpersonal resources. Next, we shall describe the structure of these classes, that is, the pattern in which they are related to one another.

Definition and Classification of Resources

A “resource” is defined as anything that can be transmitted from one person to another. This definition is broad enough to include things as different as a smile, a check, a haircut, a newspaper, a reproachful glance, and a loaf of bread. Obviously, all these things cannot be grouped together. Conversely, if each is considered separately, we find ourselves burdened with an unmanageably long list of social transactions. Clearly, some resources are more alike than others in terms of their meaning, their use, and the circumstances of their exchange. Saying “Hi,” for example, has more in common with a smile than with the handing out of a five-dollar bill. Exploration of similarities and differences among various transactions has led us to suggest that the resources exchanged in interpersonal encounters could be usefully grouped into six classes: love, status, information, money, goods, and service. “Love” is an expression of affectionate regard, warmth, or comfort. “Status” indicates an evaluative judgment that conveys prestige, regard, or esteem. “Information” includes advice, opinions, instruction, or enlightenment but excludes those behaviors that could be classed as love or status. “Money” is any coin, currency, or token that has some standard unit of exchange value. “Goods” are tangible products, objects, or materials. “Service” involves activities that affect the body or belongings of a person and that often constitute labor for another.

One may wonder why time has not been included as a resource class since interpersonal behavior is often expressed as a function of time. Psychologists ask parents how much time they devote to their children and adults “spend time” with one another. Time, however, is not a resource per se, although it is a prerequisite for giving and receiving resources. As we shall see, the time required for exchange varies for different resources.

Personal space constitutes another requirement for interpersonal exchanges since space assures the privacy needed to avoid unwanted exchanges while one engages in the desired ones. Thus, space, like time, is not a resource class in its own right; rather, it is a factor that influences resource exchange.

Another resource that appears to be missing in the present classification is sex. This important element of human life is a combination of love and services. In some sexual relations, love is prevalent, while other relationships are characterized by the mutual exchange of services. This characterization of sexual behavior indicates that a classification of resources is not identical to a classification of interpersonal behavior. The relationship between behaviors and resource classes will be examined later.

Obviously, the classification of resources proposed here is not the only possible one. Many other ways of grouping exchanges can be, and indeed have been, suggested. What, then, makes a certain classification more acceptable than another? A good classification should generate testable hypotheses that will be empirically supported and provide parsimonious explanations of interpersonal behavior that can be applied to practical problems. This unit constitutes an attempt to justify, using these criteria, the classification we propose. We shall begin by advancing hypotheses on the structure of the classes, the pattern in which the various resources are related to one another. This issue will be approached in two ways: first by identifying aspects of which classes are more or less similar to one another and then by considering how these classes become progressively differentiated in the social development process of the child. As we shall see, both approaches converge on the same structural pattern.

Differentiating Attributes of Resource Classes

Having defined six resource classes, it is natural to inquire about their relative similarity. Which of them are similar to one another and which are different? In order to answer this question, we must

determine the attributes or characteristics by which similarity will be judged. Various alternatives are possible, suggesting different patterns of organization. The choice made will be correct to the extent that it is later supported by empirical results.

The attributes we chose for ordering the classes were concreteness versus symbolism and particularism versus universalism. The notion of particularism is derived from the writings of Talcott Parsons (1951) and Longabaugh (1966) and is similar to Blau's (1967) notion of intrinsic and extrinsic rewards. This attribute indicates the extent to which the value of a given resource is influenced by the particular persons involved in exchanging it and by their relationship. Changing the bank teller will not make much of a difference for the client wishing to cash a check, but a change of doctor or lawyer is less likely to be accepted with indifference. One is even more particularistic with regard to a friend, a spouse, or a mother. Indeed, Harlow and Suomi (1970) showed that when the facial features of a surrogate mother are altered, the baby monkey reacts with fear, refusing to accept the change. In some animal species, certain communications are more target specific than other. Mating calls are more particularistic than status signals, and the latter are less general than distress or alarm signals (Johnsgard 1967, pp. 71–72).

Love, the most particularistic resource, is at one extreme of this coordinate. Money, the least particularistic resource, is situated at the other extreme. It matters a great deal from whom we received love, for its reinforcing effectiveness is closely tied to the person stimulus. Money, however, is the most likely of all resources to retain the same value and meaning regardless of the relation between, or characteristics of, the reinforcing agent and the recipient. Service and status are less particularistic than love but more particularistic than goods and information, which are more universalistic.

The concreteness attribute ranges from concrete to symbolic and suggests the form or type of expression characteristic of the various resources. Some behaviors, such as handing an object or performing an activity on the body or the belongings of another individual, are quite concrete. Other forms of expression, such as




Fig. 2.1 The cognitive structure of resource classes (Reprinted by permission of American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1971)

language, posture of the body, a smile, a gesture, or facial expression, are more symbolic. Services and goods involve the exchange of some tangible activity or product and are classed as concrete. On the other hand, status and information are typically conveyed by the more symbolic verbal or paralinguistic behaviors. Love and money are exchanged in both concrete and symbolic forms; thus, they occupy an intermediate position on this coordinate.

The plotting of each resource class according to its degree of particularism and concreteness produces the structure of resources presented in Fig. 2.1.

In Fig. 2.1, resource classes are shown as discrete and neatly separated from one another. It would be more accurate, but more confusing, to present each resource class by a segment that merges gradually into its neighboring class on both sides. We should remember that the resource classes assign meaning to actions but are not a classification of actions. Consequently, each class covers a wide range of actions that all convey the same resource. For example, one person can convey his liking for another by verbal means, by a smile, by a kiss, or by some other display of affection. Thus, for any given resource class, there are some forms of expression that are closer to one neighbor than to the other. A verbal expres-

sion of love, such as “I like you very much,” is symbolic and thus is more closely allied to status than to services. Conversely, fondling and kissing are concrete ways of expressing affection and are closer to services than to status. Services to the body are proximal to love, while services to one’s belongings are nearer to goods. A credit card can be considered a form of money, but it is more particularistic than currency; not every merchant will honor a credit card, and the card is not issued to everyone. This form of payment is also more symbolic than currency. While currency actually changes hands, nothing concrete is given in a credit card payment. Therefore, a credit card will be nearer to information than currency. In fact, the card provides information on the solvency and reliability of the holder.

Generally, the many different expressions conveying various resources can be seen as arranged along the circular continuum of classes depicted in Fig. 2.1. This continuity is responsible for the permeability of the boundaries among resource classes and for the structural relationship among them. But if the boundaries are so permeable, one might question the usefulness or the accuracy of the proposed classification. We may answer the question in empirical terms. As long as events of the class tend to be more like each other than like events of different classes, it will be possible to obtain empirical evidence for the categories we have established.

Structure of Resources and Interpersonal Behavior

Some colleagues of ours questioned the usefulness of resource classification noting that actual interpersonal behaviors can seldom be categorized into class. Usually, an expression of friendship conveys some implication of esteem. A gift brings both goods and love. Advice provides information, but it may at the same time deprive the advised one of status. Services often involve provision of goods, as, for example, changing parts while repairing a car. The physician or the lawyer gives not only information (on the state of your health or the strength of your case) but also

services – or the preparation of a legal document. Clearly, more than one resource can be given or taken away in the same act. What then is the relationship between the structure of resource classes and interpersonal behavior? To answer this question, we first need to remember that in the present context, classes represent the *meaning* of interpersonal behavior, rather than the actual musculoskeletal pattern of movement or the verbal manifestations involved in such behavior. Raising a clenched fist or an open hand involves similar movements, but their meaning is different, so they belong to different classes. Conversely, smiling and waving the hand differ greatly with respect to the movements and body parts involved, yet they share the same meaning – both convey liking.

In any interpersonal encounter, behaviors acquire their meanings through a process of categorization. John calls Sue and invites her to the movies. Sue receives the message and classifies it as an expression of admiration for her. Now, she must reciprocate by choosing an expression from the classes available to her. If she accepts the invitation, she has chosen an expression from the class “I like you”; if she rejects the invitation, she has selected from the class “I do not like you.” In general, a message received is assigned to one or more cognitive classes, and a message sent originates from one or more such classes. Since classes are related in the cognitive structure, it is likely that when one class is activated by a given behavior, other proximal ones will also be activated, although to a lesser degree. Therefore, classes are close in the structure when, in the previous experience of the person, they were frequently involved in the same behavior, and the more frequent the association, the closer the relationship. If, for example, past behavior brought love and status together more often than love and money, this earlier experience will be reflected in the structure by having love closer to status than to money.

With these considerations in mind, we can describe the relationship between resources and interpersonal behavior in the following two propositions:

1. Every interpersonal behavior consists of giving and/or taking away one or more resources.

2. Behaviors that involve closely allied resources occur more frequently than behaviors that involve less closely related resources.

In a way, the structure of resources can be compared to the table of chemical elements. Both reduce the great variety found in nature to fundamental structure of relatively few basic components and permit us to formulate rules about the manner in which they combine. Certain chemical elements, such as iron and copper, are always compounded with other elements in the natural state. Similarly, a resource such as love is most often found in combination with other resources. For example, the expressions “I am fond of you” and “You are a great guy” both convey love and status. The first expression emphasizes love, while the second one focuses on status. If we disregard these relative emphases and we concentrate only on whether or not a specific resource is involved in the behavior in question, it becomes simpler to compute the number of possible interpersonal behaviors. Given six resource classes, each of which can be given or taken away, the number of combinations possible in our scheme is 4,095 and includes behaviors that may never be found in practice. In fact, relatively few of these behaviors occur very frequently, and they involve resources that are close to each other in the structure (see Fig. 2.1). Behaviors that involve distal resources, on the other hand, occur less frequently. When three or more classes are involved in a single behavior, by necessity, some will be distal from one another; therefore, such combination will be rather infrequent in actual life. Indeed, it does not often occur that we receive love, respect, money, and goods, all in single act of behavior.

The structure of resources thus provides a framework for the systematic classification of interpersonal behavior and for predicting the frequency of occurrence of each act.

Structure-Related Properties

We shall now consider several variables on which resource classes differ systematically from one another. Once again, however, neighboring classes

will be more similar on these properties than distal ones. Some of these properties refer to the environmental conditions (or institutional settings) that aid or hinder the exchange. A small group, for example, is more suitable for exchanges of love; a large group facilitates exchange of money. Some other properties bear upon the effects of resource exchange on the motivational state of the individual. Giving to self and to another, for example, is related positively for love and negatively for money. Consequently, when one exchanges love, he becomes richer, while after giving money, he is poorer. This property reflects a cognitive state (self and other are less differentiated for love than for money), which, in turn, determines differential rules of exchange for the various resources.

In those properties that have so far been identified, love and money differ most. This suggests that the particularistic dimension may be the more relevant one, as love and money are at its opposite poles. By stating the values appropriate to love and to money on each characteristic, we shall provide also an approximate idea about the values of other resources. Services and status will be similar to love, while information and goods will have values closer to money.

Properties Affecting the Motivational State

We have identified six properties that influence the balance of resources after the exchange has taken place.

Relationship Between Self and Other

It is proposed that the relationship between the amount of resource given to the other and the amount left to self is positive for love and that it decreases and becomes negative as one moves along the structure toward money.

The relationship between giving love to self and to others (as well as between taking away from self and from others) is positive. The more we give love to the other, the more is left for ourselves. For status, the relationship is still positive but weaker. Giving information to another person does not appear to decrease or increase the amount possessed by the giver. It can be

argued, however, that sharing may reduce the value of the information if the situation is competitive, that is, if the information concerns industrial or military secrets. On the other hand, transmission of information may also result in some increase of information available to self, as when repressed information is brought to the surface during a psychotherapeutic session. Similarly, misleading another person (depriving him of information) does not change the amount of information possessed by the deceiver, except for the eventual knowledge that the victim has been duped. On the whole, it appears that the amount of information left to the giver is independent of the amount he has given so that information is characterized neither by positive nor by negative relationship between self and other. Strong negative relationship is characteristic of money and goods, where giving to another definitely reduces the amount left for the self. Service may show a more moderate but still negative relationship. Performing a service for another person usually results in physical discomfort for the performer as it involves expenditure of energy. In general, the relationship between giving to other and to self appears to change gradually for the various resources, varying with their positions in the structure. Love has the most positive relationship; status is less positive; information is independent; money and goods are most negative. Service is again less negative. In conclusion, giving to another will sometimes result in a gain for the person who gives and at other times will cause a loss to him, depending on which resource is transferred. The effect on the self of giving to another is shown for each resource class in Fig. 2.2. For taking away from the other, the effect on self will be opposite to the one depicted in the figure.

The Relationship Between Giving and Taking

A positive relationship between giving and taking, denoted by the term "ambivalence," usually refers to love exchange. It is not possible to describe money transactions as ambivalent. Indeed, the relationship between giving and taking is most positive for love. One can love and hate the same person simultaneously. Ambivalence regarding




Fig. 2.2 How much does one gain or lose by giving to others




Fig. 2.3 How often giving and taking go together

status, lower than for love, is well expressed when we say that we “pay respect grudgingly.” Still, less ambivalence is found in information, although some erroneous, misleading, or ambiguous item may be included in a given transmission of information. Likewise, information that is mainly erroneous may contain some correct items; sometimes, one tells “half the truth.” Money exchange allows no ambivalence since giving money appears to exclude taking it away. Ranking of resources by decreasing degree of ambivalence has so far followed the structural order. If this rule is valid for the remaining resources, ambivalence will increase as we approach the most particularistic resource, love, from the other side of circle. The extent to which giving and taking occur jointly may be slightly higher for goods than for money; defective goods may actually cause damage. The “ambivalence” of services may be higher than that of goods. It may happen that some damage is done in the performance of a service: The barber may cut the client’s skin, the physician may cause some damage to the patient’s body in the course of treatment, the mover may damage the furniture, and the housewife may burn the roast. These considerations suggest that the joint occurrence of giving and taking away will follow the circular structure of resources, being highest for love and lowest for money, in the manner depicted in Fig. 2.3.

It appears then that different resources *do not* follow the same rules of exchange. The unity of the system is, however, preserved by the fact that these rules change gradually along the structure and that they are similar for proximal resources. At one extreme, there is money, where giving to self excludes giving to another and taking away excludes giving. For money, then, each transaction can be described by a single value. If *A* gives five dollars to *B*, *A* has five dollars less and *B* five dollars more. As any accountant knows, the amount credited to an account should be the same as the amount debited to another account.

At the other extreme, there is love. Our accountant would probably tender his resignation if he were requested to keep books on love exchanges. Here, giving to the other often increases the amount left for self, but giving does not necessarily rule out a certain amount of taking away. It should be noted, however, that the same types of behavior, (giving and taking away, from oneself and from others) occur with money as with other resources. It is only the relationship among these behaviors that varies for different resources. When we understand the differing rules underlying interpersonal transactions, we can understand why attempts to extend the rules of money transactions to other resources have caused difficulties. The fact that one can give without reducing the amount in his possession

has been considered contradictory to the very notion of exchange (Cartwright and Zander 1968, p. 233).

Building on the notion that information, unlike goods, can be transmitted without loss to the giver, S. Rosen (1966) predicted that the monetary price demanded for information would be lower than for goods. To test this hypothesis, Rosen gave his subjects control of a box that contained three pieces of a jigsaw needed by another person in order to complete his picture and win points. Some subjects were given a key for the lock; others were told the combination for opening it. Both groups were asked to set a price for giving the key or the combination to the other person. The price demanded for the key was, on the average, higher than for the combination. This differential property of goods and information was neutralized in other experimental groups by stipulating that (a) the key would be used and then returned, and (b) the information on the combination would not be given to a third individual. Under these conditions, the prices for key and combination tended to equalize, particularly when the other person was expected to comply with these limitations.

Verbalization of Need

We propose that the easiest need to express is the need for money, and the most difficult is the need for love. Statements such as “I demand an increase in salary” or “I have raise the price” are commonly heard, particularly in times of inflation. But a straightforward bid for love is relatively rare, even among intimates. This difference may be related to the degree to which verbal communication is suitable for the various resource classes. Language appears quite appropriate for money transactions. Love, on the other hand, is more easily expressed by paralinguistic communication, that is, by touching, expressions of the face, eye contact, body posture, or physical proximity. We often say that we have no words with which to express our feelings. Indeed, only poets can find words to express emotion; for common mortals, a misty look is easier to manage. The property verbal communication affects reciprocation and substitution of resources. In expressing a need

or in bidding for a resource, there is a tendency to “skid” toward less particularistic ones. A child in need of love may ask for a toy or some candy or he may complain of pain. A lovelorn adult may settle for professional success, for information, or perhaps even for money. On the other hand, a person who needs money is unlikely to ask for sympathy. Thus, substitution of one resource for another is not a two-way street. A less particularistic resource is likely to be substituted for a more particularistic one, but the transaction is not likely to move in the opposite direction.

Reciprocation in Kind

A lonely individual who needs love will wish to meet another lonely person so that they will be able to exchange love. But meeting another pauper will not help the person who is short of money. Thus, the more particularistic a resource is, the higher the probability that it will be exchanged for the same resource, while nonparticularistic resource will tend to be exchanged for different ones.

In studying exchange preferences, it was found that choice of exchanging love for love was maximal – 96%. Following the structure of resources, the preference for same-resource exchange decreased gradually: Status was 81%; information, 75%; money, 66%; and goods, 54%; then the figure went up again for services to 75%. Although the data are restricted to exchanges in a specific social institution – friendship – they support the notion that exchanges within the same resource are more likely for particularistic than for nonparticularistic ones.

Range of Exchange

This property refers to the number of resources with which a given resource may be exchanged. It is related to the “reciprocation in kind” property but does not necessarily follow from it. A given resource, although not often exchanged with itself, may be traded mainly for one or a few specific others. We propose that the more particularistic a resource is, the narrower is the range of resources with which it can be exchanged. Few resources can be exchanged with love, but several can be obtained for money; consequently, money

constitutes an appropriate means of exchange in several social institutions, while love is suitable only in a few.

Relationship Between Interpersonal Setting and Exchange

Transmission of money does not require face-to-face interaction; it can be sent conveniently through a third person. Moreover, money may be kept for future exchange. Exchange of love, on the other hand, can hardly be separated from the interpersonal situation, and love cannot be kept for a long time in the absence of actual exchange or transmitted by an intermediary without incurring loss. This property is closely related to the *locus* of storage of the resource. Love is stored (but not for long) in the “heart”; money is kept at the bank or under the mattress. Some other resources can be stored either inside or outside the individual. Information, for example, can be memorized or recorded in writing or on tape or punch cards. Food can be stored in the refrigerator or inside the body as fat.

The relationship between the interpersonal setting and the resource to be exchanged influences the outcome of the exchange and, in turn, is influenced by the environment or, more precisely, by the level of technology. In cultures that do not possess a written language, information must be memorized, which is stored inside. Where food cannot be kept long enough to assure a steady supply, obesity is considered an advantage, but overweight constitutes a problem when freezing and canning are within easy reach. Thus, in a sense, this property mediates between the motivational states of the individual and his environment. Let us turn now to some of the properties that are more clearly influenced by environmental conditions.

Properties Affected by Environment

The following properties indicate characteristics of the environment or institutional setting that will enhance or inhibit the exchange of a given resource.

Time for Processing Input

Giving and receiving love cannot be done in a hurry: It requires time and even some leisure.

Money, to the contrary, can change hands very rapidly. In an environment providing an overload of stimuli, those resources that require a longer processing time are more likely to receive low priority. Such selection will thus favor the less particularistic resources.

An experiment done by Teichman showed that subjects who allotted 15 min for affective exchanges were significantly less satisfied than comparable subjects who had 25 min available for the interaction. The number and content of love messages received by the subject were the same in both conditions so that subjects who interacted longer did receive the same amount of affection as those in the other group; the remaining time was filled by neutral messages. By contrast, increasing the time available did not alter satisfaction when the resource exchanged was money. These results support the notion that time available is a significant factor in love exchanges but not in monetary transactions.

Delay of Reward

Love is a relatively long-term investment, with rewards being reaped only after several encounters; a friendship needs to be “cultivated,” and a girl needs to be courted. Therefore, exchanges of love require the possibility of repeated encounters and trust, that is, high expectation that the transaction will be completed. On the other hand, an exchange of money with goods can be consummated in a single encounter and, at least in cash payments, does not require trust in the buyer. In an environment where most encounters are with strangers and are nonrepetitive, the less particularistic the resource, the more likely it is to be an object of exchange.

Optimum Group Size

It has been noted that in animal species living in groups, such as monkeys and apes, there is an optimum group size (Carpenter 1963). When the group becomes too large, behavior that disrupts its normal functioning appears to increase (Calhoun 1962). The work of Bailey (1966) suggests that such negative effects are obtained even when the increase in group size does not result in higher density. In Bailey’s experiment, density was kept constant by increasing the space

available to the animals in proportion to their augmentation in number. The sheer effect of group size, as distinct from crowding, may be explained by limitations in the cognitive capacity of the animals to handle an overly large number of mates.

As for human beings, it appears that the more particularistic a resource is, the heavier are its demands on cognitive representation for the following reasons:

1. The very notion of particularism implies that the uniqueness of the exchange partner as an individual is important; hence, there is a desire to obtain a large amount of information about him and to provide him with information about ourselves. Indeed, the significance of self-disclosure, particularly in relationship with intimates, was stressed by Sidney Jourard (1964). One of the first things lovers do is to exchange intimate information, and Mowrer (1964) has held that avoidance of self-disclosure is a major source of alienation from the group. Perhaps not by chance, the verb “to know” is used in biblical Hebrew to indicate sexual intercourse, a highly particularistic form of behavior.
2. The more particularistic a resource, the less it is amenable to external conservation. Therefore, it depends more on internal, cognitive storage: The very idea of a lover taking notes on the self-disclosure of his beloved sounds ridiculous.

In summarizing results of studies on group size and particularistic exchanges, Goldstein et al. (1966, pp. 340–341) noted the following effects of large groups: (1) “Sense of belonging” decreased (Miller 1950), (2) affectional ties among members decreased (Coyle 1930; Kinney 1953), and (3) the tendency to form subgroups and cliques increased (Hare 1962).

Latane and Darley (1969) conducted a series of experiments to identify variables influencing the willingness to help or to safeguard the well-being of another individual in an emergency situation. In our classification, helping belongs to the class of services, a neighbor of love. Latane and Darley varied the number of persons present in the emergency situation; they consistently found

that the probability of helping behavior decreased when the number of bystanders increased.

All these investigations indicate that exchanges of particularistic resources are more likely to occur in a small group than in a large one. By contrast, economic transactions appear to be facilitated by larger groups: Access to a wide market is considered advantageous by businessmen, shoppers will tend to prefer a store where sales are brisk, and brokers will prefer a stock or commodity exchange where many people convene. We can thus expect that in an environment of large-sized groups, nonparticularistic resources will be exchanged more than particularistic ones.

The Effect of Structure on Exchange

We have seen that in the structure of resources, certain classes are neighbors, while certain others are distant. Love, for example, is a neighbor of status but not of money. In psychological space, proximity indicates similarity; love is more like status than like money, and goods are more like services than information. Similarity among resources has some notable consequences. It means, for example, that neighboring resources can be substituted for one another more easily and more efficiently than distant ones (see Fig. 2.1). A person who needs love and fails to receive it is more likely to try to become famous (to achieve status) than rich (to obtain money). Moreover, acquiring status will satisfy the person deprived of love more than the accumulation of money would. Similar resources are more likely to appear together in the same behavior, as well as in a given exchange situation, and in a specific social institution. Let us examine some empirical evidence for these propositions.

Similarity

In a study probing the notion of similarity, participants received a series of messages belonging to various resource classes. Their task was to return, from a prearranged array of resource messages, the message most similar, as well as

the one most dissimilar, to each message received. Experimental manipulation of their alternatives denied subjects the option of returning a message from the same resource class as the stimulus card.

The items used to represent the six resources consisted of short statements that were individually typed on 3×5 index cards. Examples of these items are as follows: I feel affection for you (love), you do things very well (status), here is my opinion (information), here is some money for you (money), here is a package for you (goods), and I ran that errand for you (services). Three messages were provided for each resource, giving a total of 18 different card messages.

All messages representing a given resource were pretested on another group of subjects to see whether they were perceived as belonging to the same class. These subjects (N=11) sorted the total deck of 18 cards into as many different categories as they thought appropriate. Only one subject used more than six categories in performing this task. Although several subjects initially used less than six categories, in each case, this was a result of combining neighboring resources into the same category. The most common tendency was to use six categories of unequal Ns. Here again, it was always neighboring resources that were combined. The most common “error” was to combine love with status and/or goods with money. When further instructed to sort the cards into six different categories of three cards each, there was substantial agreement across subjects that each triplet of messages belonged to the same distinctive class.

With only a few exceptions, messages belonging to proximal resources were judged as most similar. Furthermore, those belonging to resources opposite to one another in the structure were chosen as most dissimilar. In the post-session interview, a substantial number of subjects volunteered the information that judgments about which message was most similar were considerably more difficult to make than judgments about which message was most dissimilar. Since the circular order depicted in Fig. 2.1 suggests two neighbors for each resource but only one resource in true opposition, these subjective reports are

consistent with the circular order, and they lend credence to the relevance of the scheme as a model for the cognitive structure of resource classes.

Support for the notion that proximity in the structure indicates similarity was also obtained from a study on degree of preference for various resources. Specifically, we tested the hypothesis that the degree of preference will be similar for neighboring resources.

An instrument called a “Social Interaction Inventory” was devised and administered to 120 college freshmen. In this inventory, the subject is presented with six situations in which he presumably gives a certain resource to another person. For love, the following situation is described to the subject: “You convey to a person that you enjoy being with him and feel affection for him.” For status, the subject is told “You convey to a person your respect and esteem for his talents.” For goods, he is told “You give a person certain objects that you possess.” Similar descriptive statements were provided for the other resource classes. After each statement, a series of items pertaining to various resources was given, and the subject was requested to rate the desirability of the item in reciprocation for the resource he had presumably given on a scale ranging from very desirable to very undesirable.

The following are samples of the return items. For love, “The person indicates that he wants to be your friend” and “The person says he is fond of you.” For status, “The person praises you” and “You are told that the person has confidence in your abilities.” For information, “The person gives you the benefit of his familiarity with a certain subject” and “The person makes you familiar with new facts.” For each resource, three statements were rated on a five-point scale.

As expected, it was found that the closer two classes were in the structure, the more similar were the preferences for them. Conversely, there was little or no relationship between degrees of preference for distal classes. When love was most preferred, the next preference would go to status and/or services (two neighbors of love), while preference for money was low. On the other hand, when money was very desirable, there was also

high preference for goods and low preference for love or status. Although the interrelationship among degrees of preference remained the same, the preferences themselves changed. Whether or not this change depends on the resource previously given was explored in another investigation.

Exchange Preferences

When a person provides another with a certain resource, what resource will he prefer in reciprocation? Will his preference change according to the resource given by him? Will similar resources elicit similar preferences? In order to answer some of these questions, 160 freshmen at the University of Missouri, Columbia, were administered the "Social Interaction Inventory" in a slightly modified form. Instead of rating the desirability of each item, subjects were presented with pairs of items and instructed to choose in each pair the item preferred in exchange for the resource they had presumably given.

Once again, preference followed the structure, being similar for proximal classes and different for distal ones. Tendency to exchange within the same class was strongest for love and decreased as one moved along the structure toward money. Consequently, love was most likely to be exchanged for itself, while a wide range of preferences were expressed as exchange for money. It was further found that irrespective of the resource they "gave," subjects most preferred to receive love, while they least preferred to receive money. These results suggest that preference for a given resource depends not only on the resource previously provided but also on the institutional situation in which the exchange takes place; among friends or acquaintances (to whom the "Social Inventory" refers), love constitutes a more appropriate medium of exchange than does money. One does not expect to be paid when running an errand for a friend, but lack of appreciation expressed verbally will be resented. Conversely, a boss is expected to pay for work done by his employee; words of appreciation will not do as the sole compensation.

We have considered preference patterns in positive exchanges, where each participant gives something to the other. Will the same picture emerge when the exchange is negative, that is, when participants deprive each other of some resource? To answer this question, an inventory for negative exchanges was constructed. Subjects were presented with six situations. In each, they were presumably deprived of a given resource. Each situation was followed by presentation of alternative ways for retaliation. The subjects, 58 undergraduates at the University of Missouri, Columbia, were asked to indicate their preference for forms of retaliation.

The results were similar to those obtained for positive exchanges; thus, it seems that transactions of giving and taking follow essentially the same rules. The preference for particularistic resources that was already noted in positive exchanges was even stronger for negative exchanges. Regardless of the resource that was taken away from them, subjects preferred to retaliate by depriving their aggressor of love. In spite of this proclivity to withhold love, a tendency to exchange in kind was also evident: For each resource, the preferred form of retaliation was payment in kind. For example, the choice of misleading (taking away information) as a form of retaliation was most frequent when one had been previously deceived.

In the two investigations just described, subjects neither received nor were they actually deprived of resources; they were simply asked to state their reaction to hypothetical situations in which they could either gain or loss resources. A verbal report is not necessarily a reliable indication of what people do in *actual* situations. Indeed, many studies show that statements given by people regarding their reactions are not always identical with what they actually do. The next step, then, was to study actual exchange behavior.

Actual Exchange

Investigation of actual patterns of exchange had two goals: (a) to clarify the rules by which resources are exchanged in social encounters and

(b) to compare actual exchange behavior with verbal responses to hypothetical situations and to note similarities and differences between them.

An experiment that was quite similar in format to the hypothetical negative exchange was set up. This time, however, subjects were actually deprived of a resource and then were offered a choice between two different resources for retaliation: one similar to the resource of deprivation and the other quite different (i.e., distant from it in the structure presented in Fig. 2.1). Subjects were 90 male students at the University of Missouri, Columbia, randomly assigned to six groups, 15 subjects to each group. The resource of which the subject was deprived and the two resources available to him for retaliation differed in each group.

Subjects were introduced to a partner of the experimenter, who was presented as another subject. They were told that the experiment was designed to study the effects of stress conditions on learning that followed a brief interaction between the “stress giver” and the “subject.” A loaded lottery always designated the subject to be the “stress provider,” while the confederate of the experimenter was always the “stress receiver.” In the first part of the experiment, subject and confederate were asked to build a model brick house; this joint task provided an opportunity for interaction, thus giving the confederate occasion for aggressing against the subject. Upon completion of the construction task, the confederate was removed from the experimental room under the pretext of instructing him about the learning task to follow. The subject was then provided with a sheet of paper on which two stress conditions were indicated. He was asked to choose the stress he would deliver to the confederate in the ensuing learning experiment and was left alone to make this choice. The subject preferred to retaliate by taking away a resource similar to the one that had been taken from him. Thus, most subjects who had been personally rejected, that is, deprived of love, by the confederate chose to insult him, that is, to deprive him of status rather than deprive him of money. On the other hand, subjects who had been deprived of goods chose money over status as retaliatory resources.

The only deviation from the predicted behavior occurred for subjects deprived of services: While we predicted that the subjects would express dislike for our confederate (love deprivation), they tended to retaliate by misleading him (information deprivation).

The overall pattern of preferences followed once more the structure of resources. Misleading (taking away information) was chosen most often, while deprivation of services – its opposite in the structure – was chosen least. The frequency of choice of other resources varied systematically between these two extremes.

Comparison between verbal report and overt behavior reveals that in both cases the pattern of preferences follows the structure of resources. However, the tendency found in verbal responses to prefer love retaliation disappeared when actual choices were observed; the experimental situation manifested instead an increase in the propensity for retaliation in kind. It seems that this difference between questionnaire and experimental results is due to differential degrees of arousal and inhibition. In the questionnaire study, the subject was requested to indicate his preferences for retaliation against a hypothetical frustrator. Since he was not actually frustrated, his level of anger arousal could not be high. In addition, the possible consequences of retaliation were unspecified in the questionnaire, probably leading to higher inhibition. In the experimental investigation, on the other hand, the subject was actually deprived and thus was more aroused. Furthermore, he was permitted to retaliate in the relative safety and legitimacy of a psychological experiment, which reduced inhibition and alleviated the fear of being subjected to further deprivation in response to retaliation. Thus, the questionnaire situation created low arousal and high inhibition, while the experiment produced higher arousal and lower inhibition.

When inhibition is high and arousal is low, one is more likely to heed the demands of social norms according to which some forms of retaliation are more acceptable than others. Purloining of money and goods, even in small amounts, frequently constitutes a crime punishable by law. A similar, but sometimes lower, degree of

legal protection is provided against bodily harm (loss of services). Giving false information or causing loss of status are not considered crimes, except in special circumstances. In free societies, there are practically no legal restraints against expressing dislike for a person (loss of love), and this form of aggression appears to be most socially acceptable. This acceptability is reflected in the preference for causing loss of love expressed by questionnaire respondents. On the other hand, the higher arousal and lower inhibition produced by the experimental situation combined to reduce the influence of social norms. Consequently, retaliation in kind was more frequent here than in the questionnaire study. Nevertheless, in both situations, closely allied resources were similar in degree of preference.

Consequences of Appropriate and Inappropriate Exchanges

Respect for social values and fear of counterretaliation are instances of conditions that limit retaliation in kind and narrow the range of responses. The common experience of everyday life teaches us that we cannot always behave in the manner we would most prefer: One may find it advisable to refrain from pushing a strong fellow, arguing with a policeman, or insulting the boss. What happens, then, when one can retaliate only, with a resource that is quite different from the one involved in a previous deprivation? Will retaliation increase in intensity to compensate for inappropriate quality? If so, will this increased intensity effectively decrease residual hostility? These questions were explored in another experiment in which each subject was again deprived of a specific resource by a confederate of the experimenter, who pretended to be another subject. This time, however, instead of offering the subject a choice between resources, the resource available to the subject for retaliation against the confederate was predetermined by the experimenter. Some groups could retaliate with a resource similar to the one they had lost; for other groups, the available resource was quite different from the one they had lost. An occasion for retali-

ating was created by asking the subject to help the experimenter in another study in which the confederate was ostensibly a subject. While the resource itself was predetermined, subjects were free to set the intensity of retaliation. After the retaliatory act had been accomplished, residual hostility was measured.

Subjects were 120 female undergraduates recruited from introductory psychology classes at the University of Missouri, Columbia. They were divided randomly into six groups, 20 subjects to each group. The resource of deprivation differed for each group.

Half of the subjects in each group were then given the opportunity to retaliate against the confederate by subjecting her to expressions of dislike (taking away love); for the other ten subjects in each group, the available retaliation involved money. The opportunity to retaliate by deprivation of love was given under the guise of helping the experimenter to run an experiment investigating "behavior in conditions of deprivation." The subject was asked to set the intensity of an apparatus from which the confederate was to receive negative statements about herself. In money retaliation, the confederate was supposed to play against the machine and to lose money. The amount of loss was determined by the subject. In the love retaliation, the confederate would feed into the machine statements regarding her own behavior in a hypothetical group situation: The subject could then cause the machine to deliver negative responses to the confederate. These responses differed in intensity depending on the setting chosen by the subject. Twenty additional subjects who were not deprived provided a control group for ascertaining the effectiveness of the deprivation procedure. In summary, each subject was first deprived of a resource from one of the six classes; she was then given the opportunity to retaliate by taking away either love or money in the amount she wished. Hence, for some subjects, resources of deprivation and of retaliation were the same, or quite similar, while for others they were different. A measure of residual hostility was taken immediately following the retaliatory act.

The results indicated that the less similar the two resources were, the stronger the intensity of

retaliation was. The highest intensities were obtained for subjects deprived of love who could retaliate only by taking money and for subjects deprived of money who had love as the only resource of retaliation. We can conclude, then, that when a deprived individual can retaliate only in a resource that is distant from the one of which he has been deprived, his reaction is likely to be stronger than if he had a more appropriate avenue of retribution. It is not difficult to find practical applications of these results. They might explain, for example, the extensive destruction of property during riots and the decrease in this type of aggression as blacks are either given more status or become increasingly able to reciprocate in kind by taking away status from white people rather than by burning their shops. Since status and goods are opposite in the structure of resources, damaging goods is a rather inefficient form of retaliation for the deprivation of status suffered until recently by many black Americans.

When residual hostility was measured after retaliation had been completed, it was found that increased intensity of response did not compensate for retaliation with an inappropriate resource. Subjects who retaliated more strongly with an inappropriate resource were precisely those who exhibited the highest degree of residual hostility, thus reflecting a sense of dissatisfaction and imbalance.

We have seen earlier that the same exchange preferences hold for negative as well as for positive transactions. Does it follow, then, that the effect of inappropriateness in positive exchanges will be similar to that found for negative transactions? Imagine the reaction of a friend to whom you have confided intimate problems and who has expressed affection and care when he receives a check in return for his love; would this exchange satisfy your friend and preserve your relationship?

Some time ago, a graduate student came to the laboratory upset and angry. What had happened? A young professor with whom he maintained a close relationship had just moved to another house, and our student helped him pack his belongings. After they had completed the move, the professor insisted on paying him for his help. The student could not explain why this offer of

monetary reward upset him so. We thanked him profusely for bringing some evidence from the field for our ideas and explained to him that it was the offer of the wrong resource – money instead of love – that upset him.

Another case that we know of concerns a woman who had more than her fair share of personal problems and required a good deal of sympathetic attention from her friends. Busy as she was with her troubles, she could hardly reciprocate their affection. To make matters worse, she indulged in offensive remarks when her mood was bad. One of her favorite comments was that the color of our living room upset her stomach. After a number of these exploits, her friends would begin to desert her. At such a time, she would give a dinner party – she was an excellent cook – and invite the alienated friends. Then the game would start again. Was the good food a satisfactory exchange for the love she demanded and the loss of love and status she inflicted? Would her friends have been happier had she been able to reciprocate with affection?

These questions led us to conduct an experiment on positive exchange quite similar to the one described above on negative transactions. Again, the subjects were 120 undergraduate girls, but now the experimental design called for giving transactions rather than deprivation and retaliation. In this experiment, we encountered a new problem: While it is easy enough to deprive a subject of a resource, it is much more difficult to induce him to give a predetermined resource. Modeling on natural transactions, we instructed the confederate to bid for a specific resource, a procedure that created unforeseen difficulties.

Each participant met our confederate, ostensibly another subject, in the waiting room. While they were waiting, the confederate created a situation calculated to induce the subject to give him a specific resource. To elicit love, the confederate told the subject that she had just arrived on campus, did not know anybody, missed her friends back home, and left lonely. Most of subjects who were exposed to this situation invited the stooge to visit them and expressed the intention of establishing a closer relationship with her.

In the attempt to elicit the resource status, the confederate arrived in the waiting room with a folder of paintings, all with an "A" grade clearly visible. The confederate showed the subject her paintings and told her that she was taking a course in painting at the local art league. She wanted very much to become a painter but had no confidence in her abilities and therefore did not dare to major in art at the university. Most of the subjects who were exposed to this situation responded by praising the paintings (i.e., by giving her status). Appropriate situations were devised for the other resources as well. In each group, half of the subjects were later paid by the confederate with expressions of love, and the other half received money. Satisfaction with the exchange was then measured.

In general, the results were similar to those found in the previous experiment. Satisfaction was lower in proportion to the dissimilarity between resource given and resource received. Thus, the least satisfied subjects were those who gave love and received money or those who gave money and received love. However, subjects who gave either love or status and were repaid with love were not as satisfied as we had expected. Later work indicated that this surprising finding was probably due to two factors:

1. The bid for love or status devalued the confederate in the eyes of the subject so that reciprocation of love failed to restore balance. Indeed, affection is less valued when offered by a friendless, lonely person.
2. The time allotted to the confederate for reciprocating love was too short. As noted earlier, exchanges of love require more time than exchanges of less particularistic resources. Satisfaction following love exchanges increased when more time was made available.

Social Relevance

Is the resource theory of social exchange just another academic exercise or does it constitute a further step toward the understanding of society and the solution of its problems? We believe that this theory has provided a novel approach to the

investigation of social issues by offering a unified treatment of various resources and by establishing a framework for the study of their similarities and differences. This integrated framework clarifies a variety of behaviors that are incomprehensible when particularistic resources are ignored. Let us briefly examine a few examples.

- We are often confused by the following behavior patterns that have occurred among some black Americans: (a) preference for conspicuous consumption items like flashy cars and clothes, rather than more "solid" items; (b) demand for integrated facilities where there is separation and separate ones where there is integration; and (c) enrollment in black studies programs that do not provide training for specific future jobs. There seems to be little in common among these behaviors except that none of them appear oriented toward long-range goals. A meaningful picture emerges, however, when they are seen as different paths to achieving status, the resource of which black people have been most deprived. Conspicuous consumption goods are exchangeable with status. Refusal of social contract by insisting on separate facilities takes away status from the rejected ones; thus, the real issue is not integration versus separation, but who is taking away status from whom. The information gained in black studies may not be useful on the job, but it is a means to a needed increase in self-pride.
- Educators who are concerned by the existence of juvenile gangs advocate the creation of leisure facilities to keep the youngsters off the street. The function of the gang as the main, sometimes the only, institution available to prospective members for acquiring status is often overlooked. Alternative arrangements that do not allow for the provision of status are unlikely to prove attractive to gang members and will probably fail.
- There is a subtle loss of status in being overtaken by another car on the road and a gain in passing it. These gains or losses are too small for most drivers to risk the serious loss of services involved in an accident. But if a driver is short of status, he may be willing to

take the gamble. Thus, drivers who need status may be dangerous on the road.

- Politicians often quote the “striking economic gains” made by members of a national or racial minority to show that the minority members have no grounds for dissatisfaction. It is often forgotten that in addition to economic resources, satisfaction requires a sense of pride (status) and a feeling of belonging (love), which minority groups may find difficult to acquire.
- We have seen that when the resource available for retaliation is inappropriate, although the response is more intense, it is at the same time ineffective in reducing hostility. If a person who is deprived of status can retaliate only by destroying goods belonging to the insulter, he will inflict a great deal of material damage and still be left with a grudge. This might explain both the extensive destruction of property during riots and the decrease in this type of aggression as blacks are given more status or as they become increasingly able to reciprocate in kind. Once blacks can take away status from white people, they no longer have to burn their shops.
- Inappropriate exchanges generate dissatisfaction when resources are given as well as when they are taken away. A good example is provided by foreign aid. A “developing” country receives assistance mainly in the form of goods; the expected reciprocation is status – conformity to the policy line of the helping nation. But goods and status are opposites in the structure of resources and thus are inappropriate for exchange. Consequently, material aid is often paid with increased hostility. When, however, assistance consists of providing training (information), a neighbor of status, ingratitude is less likely to occur.
- A similar situation occurs when welfare institutions assist their clients with money and goods but create loss of status. The client loses a resource that is already scarce for him, a fact that further reduces his chances of autonomous performance as a resource exchanger in society.

- Disregard for the role played by particularistic resources in social functioning has led us to seek the solution of social problems exclusively in terms of a better distribution of economic resources. Improvement of education, for example, is considered almost equivalent to allocating more money for schools, in spite of the fact that evidence suggests that higher status improves educational achievement. Moreover, it is fairly common to see model housing projects that had been built at great expense only a few years earlier turning into model slums possibly because their dwellers were provided with houses but not with self-esteem and a sense of community. Here, status poverty produces waste of money.

The insight provided by these examples, a few of the many that could be drawn from a variety of situations, can be expressed as a three-part proposition:

1. The ability of an individual to function as a competent member of society is impaired when the resources he possesses, including particularistic ones, fall below a minimum level.
2. Economic and noneconomic resources intertwine in societal functioning: scarcity of particularistic resources often results in economic losses, and economic gains may produce particularistic losses. High-density population, for example, presents economic advantages but poses difficulties for intimate exchanges.
3. An adequate assessment of the quality of life should provide indicators that will cover the whole range of resources, since we have learned that quality of life can be poor even when the gross national product is high.

Summary

A main goal of this brief treatment of resource theory has been to spell out the properties and rules of exchange that apply to particularistic resources. There is nothing irrational about love exchanges; they just follow rules that are different from those that govern money exchanges. Moreover, these rules vary not only between love

and money, but for each class of resources; the change is, however, gradual, and it follows systematically the structure of resource classes shown in Figs. 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3. This structured pattern establishes a conceptual link between particularistic and economic resources that facilitates the study of their interdependence.

The new theory provides a framework for integrating seemingly disparate notions of social psychology and offers novel and relevant insights into societal problems.

Suggestion for Further Reading

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Some Conceptual and Theoretical Issues in Resource Theory of Social Exchange

3

Kjell Törnblom and Ali Kazemi

Introduction

Social resource theory (SRT) addresses a core focus of psychology and social psychology, namely, the study of human relationships (at interpersonal, intergroup, societal, as well as cultural levels). Like theories of social exchange, which provide the major foundation of SRT, it is a theory about processes involving the initiation, maintenance, and termination of different kinds of social relationships. SRT addresses several issues: the cognitive organization of interpersonal resources, the cognitive mechanisms that underlie resource exchange, their development in childhood, cross-cultural differences, and the pathology of exchange. What people in their daily lives provide and receive, withhold and are deprived of, with regard to positive and negative resources of various kinds (e.g., love, hostility, money, respect, humiliation, information, lies, services, material goods, and jobs) have important consequences for their health, happiness, status, and motivation.

A “*social resource*” refers to “any commodity – material or symbolic – which is transmitted through interpersonal behavior” (Foa and Foa 1974:36), “anything that can be transmitted from one person to another” (Foa and Foa 1976:101),

“anything transacted in an interpersonal situation” or “any item, concrete or symbolic, which can become the object of exchange among people” (Foa and Foa 1980:78). A “*social resource class*,” on the other hand, is a category of “the meaning assigned to actions and not a classification of actions” (Foa and Foa 1974:82). Thus, the social resource class designated as “love,” for example, encompasses a wide range of actions (e.g., kissing, hugging, verbal affective statements, gestures), all of which may *mean* the same, thus conveying a message of love. Conversely, a particular action may have several different meanings. A kiss may be provided as a sign of love or as a sign marking a death sentence. Thus, by viewing resource classes in terms of the meanings assigned to actions (or stimuli), we easily realize that “(a) different stimuli may have the same meaning; (b) the same stimulus may have different meanings; (c) response depends on the meaning ascribed to the stimulus” (Foa and Foa 1974:16–17). It is common knowledge, by now, that our assignments of meaning is affected by the social and cultural context, the interpersonal relationship, the content of the interaction, the actors’ values and attitudes, their emotional state, intentions and goals, the valence of the transacted resource, etc.

Most interpersonal and intergroup behaviors include and may be interpreted and partly understood in terms of the particular material and non-material, particularistic and universalistic classes of social resources that Foa (1971) distinguished and systematically related to one another. Indeed,

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social resources have assumed a central place in many scholars' research. However, several of them have provided definitions of resource that are slightly different than Foa's (see Box 3.1). Most definitions seem to encompass Foa's resources, but they are more general than Foa's definition of resource. They have also suggested different *designations* (names) for the same type of resource; for instance, Caplan's (1974) *social support* corresponds to Foa's (1971) *status*. And Sabbagh and Malka (Chap. 26 in this volume) concluded that the five types of resources used in a study by Randall and Mueller (1995) were identical or very similar to those in Foa's typology, but that they used other terms (e.g., opportunity for self-actualization rather than information and opportunity for altruism rather than services). Finally, the same resource type is sometimes assigned to different categories; for instance, knowledge/information is an *energy resource* for Doane, Schumm and Hobfoll (Chap. 19 in this volume) and a *social resource* for Foa.

Box 3.1 Definitions of Resource

Foa's definitions:

Any commodity – material or symbolic – which is transmitted through interpersonal behavior (Foa and Foa 1974:36)

Anything that can be transmitted from one person to another (Foa and Foa 1976:101)

Anything transacted in an interpersonal situation (Foa and Foa 1980:78)

Any item, concrete or symbolic, which can become the object of exchange among people (Foa and Foa 1980:78)

Examples of definitions suggested by other theorists:

An ability, possession, or other attribute of an actor giving him the capacity to reward (or punish) another specified actor (Emerson 1976:347)

Those objects, personal characteristics, conditions, or energies that are valued by the individual or that serve as a means for attainment of these objects, personal characteristics, conditions, or energies (Hobfoll 1989:516)

Those entities that either are centrally valued in their own right (e.g., self-esteem, close attachments, health, and inner peace) or act as a means to obtain centrally valued ends (e.g., money, social support, and credit) (Hobfoll 2002:307)

Those objects, personal characteristics, conditions, or energies that are valued in their own right or are valued because they act as conduits to the achievement or protection of valued resources (Diener and Fujita 1995:927)

Any property of an individual which he makes available to persons in his environment as a means for their positive or negative need-satisfaction (Levinger 1959:84)

Any positively perceived physical, economic or social consequence (Miller and Steinberg 1975:65)

Possessions or behavioral capabilities that are valued by other actors (i.e., they are resources in the context of that possessor's relations with other actors) (Molm 2006:26)

Commodity is defined to mean anything which has usefulness to the possessor and which can be conveyed from person to person (Brock 1968:246)

Anything that functions to sustain persons and a system of interaction whether or not they are valued, scarce, consumable, possessible, negotiable, leveragable, tangible, or even cognizable (Freese and Burke 1994:9)

It is not unusual that the inadequately designated and rather unspecific term “resource” is used by researchers, leaving it up to the reader to figure out what kinds of resources are at stake (i.e., under what category they may be subsumed), how the results of different empirical studies may be compared, and to what extent different resource models and theories may be integrated. Thus, attempts to relate existing research to Foa's framework are well advised to make sure they are on the same page, not only concerning how resource is defined, but also with regard to what category or class of resource that is investigated.

Hobfoll (2002:308–314) provided an excellent review and analysis of various kinds of resource models, theories, and empirical research studies in the areas of health and well-being (with particular emphasis on stress and coping). He distinguished among “key resource theories,”

“multiple-component resource theories,” “integrated resource models,” and “life span resource models.” These theories and models feature different resource classifications (designations) than the one proposed by Foa. Thus, all researchers are not (only) concerned with what is designated as *social* resources, as previously defined. There are other ways of partitioning and designating resources (see Box 3.2). Nuckolls, Cassel, and Kaplan (1972) and Harber, Einev-Cohen, and Lang (2008) dealt with psychosocial resources (e.g., interpersonal assets such as social networks and support; intrapersonal attributes like self-worth, personal control, and optimism; belief systems that are conducive to a sense of meaning, order, and fairness; and transitory affective states such as positive mood and feelings of well-being). Caplan (1974) included both psychological and social resources in his research (“sense of mastery” and “social support,” respectively); Gerson (1976) proposed a definition of “quality of life”

in terms of a minimum of four “resource classes and constraints”: money, time, skill, and sentiment. Hobfoll (2002) mentions status, material, social, and personal resources, and he also makes a distinction (Chap. 19 in this volume) among “object resources (those tangible resources necessary for survival or culturally highly valued; e.g., car, house), condition resources (those that directly or indirectly support survival; e.g., employment, marriage), personal resources (traits or skills central to survival or resilience; e.g., key skills and personal traits such as self-efficacy and self-esteem), and energy resources (those which can be used in exchange for other resources; e.g., credit, knowledge, money).” Buss (1983) made a distinction between economic and social resources (or rewards, to use his term). Social resources are of two kinds: process resources (presence of others, attention from others, reciprocity, initiation – and their negative counterparts isolation, shunning, boredom, no interaction) and content resources (deference, praise, sympathy, affection – and their negative counterparts disrespect, criticism, contempt, hostility). Lin (2001) groups resources into two major types, personal and social. Personal resources are those that belong to an individual (including “such ascribed and achieved characteristics as gender, race, age, religion, education, occupation, and income as well as familial resources”). Social resources are of two kinds: network resources (“resources embedded in one’s ongoing social networks and ties”) and contact resources (“resources associated specifically with a tie or ties accessed and mobilized in a particular action”). Stets and Cast (2007) distinguished between personal, interpersonal, and structural resources. Personal resources are those motivational processes within the self that lead one to act in ways that are efficacious and that either maintain or enhance the self (Gecas 1991); interpersonal resources are those processes that validate and support the self, the other, and the interaction; and structural resources are those conditions that afford individual’s greater influence and power in society. They also discussed what they termed “valued resources,” that is, “those material and non-material processes

Box 3.2 Different Types of Resource Designations

- *Social* resources (Foa 1971)
- *Psychosocial* resources (Nuckolls et al. 1972; Harber et al. 2008)
- *Psychological* and *social* resources (Caplan 1974)
- *Quality of life* resources (Gerson 1976)
- *Status, material, social, and personal* resources (Hobfoll 2002)
- *Object, condition, personal, and energy* resources (Doane, Schumm and Hobfoll, Chap. 19 in this volume)
- *Economic* and *social* resources. Social resources (rewards) are of two kinds: *process social resources* and *content social resources* (Buss 1983)
- *Personal* and *social* resources. Social resources are of two kinds: network resources and contact resources (Lin 2001)
- *Personal, interpersonal, and structural* resources (Stets and Cast 2007)
- *Valued* resources (Stets and Cast 2007)

that are important, given the culture, in maintaining and improving social actors' existence, for example, wealth, status, power, and esteem" (Stets and Cast 2007).

It should be noted that there are related bodies of literature in two areas that we will not discuss here. Social network theories focus on ties and relations among people and have recently started to explore the significance of the resources. The other area is represented by a number of capital theories emanating from Marx's (1849) economic theory of capital and expanded into additional forms of capital, namely, human, social, and cultural. Social capital theory is a very diverse area with ongoing attempts to strengthen conceptualization, integrate theories, and analyze dimensions and types. Much of the current popularity of the capital area emanates from the writings of Bourdieu (1986), Coleman (1988), and Putnam (1993). Examples of other theorists who have contributed to the area are Inkeles (2000), Lin (2001), and Turner (1999). Among the dimensions of social capital is "network resources" which hints at a direct connection between social capital and social resource theories. Also, different types of cultural capital (embodied, objectified, and institutionalized – see Bourdieu 1986:47) and human capital (i.e., skills, training, and experience acquired on the job that increase an employee's value in the marketplace) are resources of various forms that provide direct links between theories and research on different types of capital and social resources.

For the sake of conceptual clarity, consider the following distinctions (see Box 3.3): *resource designation* (e.g., social as in SRT, psychosocial, material, condition, energy), *resource classification criterion* or *dimension* (e.g., particularistic vs. universalistic and abstract vs. concrete as in SRT; managerial vs. nonmanagerial; personality-based vs. social, dividable, fungible, valence, internal-external), *resource class* (e.g., love, information, goods, status, money, services as in SRT, self-efficacy, self-esteem, optimism, resilience), *resource subclass* (i.e., categorizations of the concrete instances of each particular resource class), and *empirical/concrete instance*, or *resource subtype*, of each particular resource

class (e.g., knife, plate, hat, computer, book, boat, and wallet are all instances of the resource class *goods*).

Box 3.3 Terminological Distinctions

Resource designation (e.g., social as in SRT, psychosocial, material, condition, energy)

Resource classification criterion or *dimension* (e.g., particularistic vs. universalistic and abstract vs. concrete and personality-based vs. social, dividable, fungible, internal-external)

Resource class (e.g., love, information, goods, status, money, services as in SRT, self-efficacy, self-esteem, optimism, resilience)

Empirical/concrete instance, or *resource subtype*, of each particular resource class (e.g., knife, plate, hat, book, boat, and wallet are all instances of the resource class *goods*)

Resource subclass (i.e., categorizations of the subtypes of each particular resource class)

Further, and depending on the definition of terms, levels may "overlap." "Social," for example, may simultaneously signify a designation and a classification criterion: resources *designated* as "social" (within SRT) may encompass both "personality-based" and "social" resource *categories*. For instance, although "love" is an example of what within SRT is *designated* as a "social" resource, it may also be further *categorized* as a personality-based (as opposed to a *social*) type of social resource.

Partly due to the different properties of different types of social resources, the possession or lack of these may have different consequences, affecting people's life conditions and life courses differently. To merely state that resource loss increases our vulnerability to negative stress or diminishes our quality of life does not make us much wiser. Predictions of more specific consequences from resource deprivation require specific information about which particular resource(s) is missing (objectively and/or subjectively). For example, would not being deprived of love and affection

result in a different type of emotional and social predicament than would a loss of money? Would a rich but lonely person be happier than a poor but well-loved person? And which one of the following two person's "quality of life" is highest (all other conditions equal): (a) John has plenty of money, owns a luxurious home, has many business acquaintances, regrets missing out on higher education, but is not well respected in his neighborhood, while (b) Eric's financial situation is rather poor, he rents a small run-down apartment, enjoys several deep friendships, has an M.A. degree, and is well respected in his neighborhood? Although the latter question is considerably more complicated than the first two, the information provided by its analysis is likely to be more specific and useful. Thus, a full understanding of, say, an elderly or underprivileged person's life situation requires (among other things) a description and analysis in terms of the whole spectrum of social resources (not just money or services which is commonly the case). More detailed information, making explicit the patterns or configurations of resource possession and resource loss, would facilitate the planning of adequate social welfare programs focusing on health, quality of life, etc.

A related insight about the importance of resource patterns is provided by Stangl (1993) who explored relations between individual preferences for resources and personality traits. He found four types of persons: (a) persons characterized by a high preference for love but low for money, (b) those with low preference for love but high for goods and money, (c) persons with high preference for status but low for information, and (d) those with low preference for status but high preferences for goods and money. These different types could be characterized with respect to their self-rated personality profiles. Exemplified here only in terms of the connection between resource preference pattern and a couple of the associated positive types of personality characteristics, (a) was found to be interpersonally oriented and spontaneous, (b) was deliberative and purposeful, (c) was interpersonally oriented and self-assured, and (d) could be characterized as task-oriented and self-controlled.

The first part of this chapter will address a number of proposed developments of resource theory. Some of those issues are attended to by the authors contributing to this handbook. Our approach here is to raise a large number of questions and make several suggestions about what we think would be important elaborations relevant to Foa's theory. As we are confined in space to the length of a chapter, we will not attempt, or even pretend we would be able, to present solutions to the various issues we raise. However, this handbook contains chapters written by eminent scholars who have made contributions toward those ends.

Some relatively common issues that arise in the context of empirical and theoretical research based on Foa's (1971) theory concern the adequacy of his classification system or resource typology¹ and to what extent it satisfies the four criteria of (1) parsimony, (2) testable hypotheses generation, (3) mutual exclusiveness, and (4) exhaustiveness (which is partly dependent on the appropriateness of the dimensions along which the six resource classes are differentiated). A fourth issue concerns the problem of how to conceptualize and categorize into *subclasses* the myriad of concrete instances that may represent each resource class - an issue that will be discussed in depth later in this chapter.

Some Comments on Foa's Resource Typology

Based on the realization that different types of resources appear to follow different rules of exchange (particularly when comparing economic to noneconomic or social resources), Foa's ambition was to develop a conceptual framework, a resource classification system, that would allow the construction of a more adequate social

¹We use the terms "typology" and "classification system" interchangeably in this chapter. However, see Doty and Glick (1994) for distinctions among the terms "classification system," "typology," and "taxonomy," the frequent confusion among which "has helped to conceal important differences among these tools" (p. 232). They also argue that typologies meet the criteria of a theory.

exchange theory than existing ones based on economic models (see Sabbagh and Levy's vivid historical account of the development of Foa's framework in Chap. 4 of this volume). The validity and usefulness of this new exchange theory is primarily contingent on the adequacy of the typology of resources on the basis of which new insights about interpersonal exchange were generated.

We examine below some important aspects of Foa's resource typology, namely, the extent to which it is exhaustive, whether or not its resource categories are mutually exclusive, whether other dimensions than those on which the classification is based (i.e., particularism and abstractness) might be more fruitful, and how the huge variety of possible concrete instances representing each of the six resource classes might be accounted for and accommodated in the typology as well as categorized into subclasses. One may also ask whether the new exchange rules and the circular order among the six resource classes might be affected by the particular concrete instances chosen to represent each resource class.

Does Foa's Resource Typology Satisfy the Four Criteria?

By assuming that the same exchange rules can be applied to all exchanges, most hitherto existing models of social exchange did not need to pay particular attention to what is exchanged. The qualitative differences among different resources (objects of exchange) were frequently overlooked – only their quantity was deemed theoretically important. Foa recognized the significance of conceptualizing and differentiating among qualitatively different resource transactions and saw the need for a systematic theory that extended beyond the purely economic domain. To enable predictions about “which resources share more similar rules and to anticipate conditions under which certain resources will be valued and exchanged and what exchanges will not take place,” he based his classification “on those resource attributes which account for behavioral variance so that similarity of attributes correspond

to similarity of behavior” (Foa 1971:346). Because interpersonal behavior varies from concrete (e.g., providing food) to abstract (e.g., saying “I love you”), and because the value of different resources varies with the significance of the providing person, it was possible to plot six different types of resources in a circular order on the two coordinates of concreteness and particularism². Foa offered three predictions based on the structural ordering of the six resource classes: “...resources proximal in the order will (1) be perceived as more similar, (2) be more substitutable for one another, and (3) elicit similar resources in social exchange” (Foa 1971:347).

A well-constructed and useful typology (taxonomy, classification system) should satisfy at least four criteria: (1) *parsimony*, (2) generation of *testable hypotheses*, (3) *mutual exclusiveness*, and (4) *exhaustiveness*. To what extent does Foa's typology meet these criteria? Well aware that there are several ways in which resources may be classified, Foa and Foa (1976) justified their typology on the bases of its *parsimony* in providing explanations of interpersonal behavior and its *ability to generate testable hypotheses*.

1. *Parsimony*, in the context of theory evaluation, refers to explanation and prediction of events via the smallest number of terms and propositions (for more details, see Chap. 5 in this volume). In Foa's case, parsimony was accomplished by using only two dimensions (one ranging from concrete to abstract and the other from particularistic to universalistic) along which the six resources were classified. The resulting circular arrangement of resources provided a framework for understanding interpersonal relationships, their initiation, maintenance, and termination. As already mentioned, this framework allowed SRT to focalize several specific issues, notably, the cognitive organization of interpersonal resources, the

²“Concreteness ranges from concrete to symbolic [abstract] and suggests the form of expression characteristic of each resource class” (Foa and Foa 1974:91). “Particularism indicates the extent to which the value of a given resource is influenced by the particular persons involved in its exchange” (Foa and Foa 1974:91).

cognitive mechanisms that underlie resource exchange, their development in childhood, cross-cultural differences, and the pathology of exchange.

2. *Generation of Testable Hypotheses.* The typology should facilitate the generation of theory that includes *testable hypotheses*. The richness of propositions and hypotheses generated by SRT is impressive. This is evident in the Foas' own research as well as in the work of numerous other scholars, several of whom are represented in this volume. A description of this research would require more space than available for this chapter. Overviews are provided in several of the Foas' own publications (e.g., Foa and Foa 1974, 1976, 1980). More recent theoretical and empirical developments of SRT are featured in a volume edited by Foa, Converse, Törnblom, and Foa 1983 as well as in the present volume. Also, a complete bibliography of Uriel Foa's publications is published in the 1993 volume.
3. *Mutual Exclusiveness.* Does Foa's resource classification meet the criterion of mutual exclusiveness? The categories of a classification system are mutually exclusive if no concrete instance can be classified in terms of more than one resource category. However, if a box of chocolate presented as a gift may be sorted into more than one resource class, that is, goods and love, or if a particular behavior, say, sexual intercourse, may simultaneously convey different meanings (e.g., be interpreted as a manifestation of love, the provision/reception of a service, and perhaps, the conferring/granting of status), then resources are not mutually exclusive.

The potential problem posed by the myriad of concrete instances of each resource class for the structural order among the six classes had already been recognized by the Foas:

In general it appears that *for each resource class some specific forms are more similar to one neighbor while other forms are nearer to the second neighbor [italics added]*. These similarities are responsible for the permeability of the boundaries among resource classes, and for the structural relationship among them. *However, one might question the usefulness or the accuracy of the proposed*

classification if the boundaries are so permeable [italics added]. The answer is an empirical one: as long as events of the same class tend to be more similar one to the other, than to events of different classes, it will still be possible to obtain empirical evidence for the order. (1974:83)

The extent to which Foa's resource classification meets the criterion of mutual exclusiveness has been assessed by a number of empirical research studies. In some of those studies, subjects sorted items describing various acts involving resource transactions into six piles representing the six resource classes (e.g., Foa, Foa et al. 1982, Foa, Salcedo et al. 1987; Turner et al. 1971). Items representing giving and taking for the six resource types that have been included in instruments used in various studies can be found in Appendices B–E in Foa and Foa (1974:397–417).

4. *Exhaustiveness.* It is difficult to judge the extent to which exhaustiveness (completeness) has been reached. A typology is maximally exhaustive if its constituent categories can account for all possible empirical instances. Thus, in Foa's case, all empirical instances of social resources should be classifiable in terms of his typology's six resource classes. It seems that Foa was unclear about how he arrived at the six resource classes. Although he offers a convincing account within a coherent framework of how these classes are sequentially differentiated as the child develops and learns to distinguish between self and others and between giving/receiving and taking away, it seems possible to think of additional resources that are missing or not classifiable in Foa's system.

Blau (1964), for example, discusses six types of resources (rewards): compliance (power), respect, personal attraction, social acceptance, social approval, and instrumental services. Compliance, respect, acceptance, approval, and attraction are all different types of status (as defined by Foa), and the remaining resource, service, is included in Foa's typology as well. Gerson (1976) suggested that *time* is one of four important classes of resources (the others are money, skill, and sentiment) in the analysis

of quality of life, and for Heirich, (1964) time is a resource in its own right with various social meanings and significant implications for the study of social change.

When students are asked to come up with additional resources, they, too, frequently mention time. It is certainly possible to receive or devote/give time to a person. However, Foa and Foa (1976) maintain that time is a *prerequisite* for resource transaction (but not a resource, per se); resources vary in the amount of time required for their provision or deprivation. For instance, less time is required to hand over money to a person as compared to repairing his/her car.

However, even though time may be conceived as a prerequisite, in that different resources require different amounts of time for their transaction, it seems possible to think of time as a resource in its own right. For example, a superordinate may grant a subordinate extra time to complete a task, or a parent may allow a child to stay up a bit later than usual. These two examples do not necessarily have to be interpreted as events where the provision of time represents or is equivalent with status (i.e., esteem, respect, and the like, or their negative counterparts) or love. The notion of an individual “time budget” certainly appears to allow a view of time as a bona fide resource. It is at least theoretically possible to provide time and status simultaneously as well as independently, unconfounded of one another. Time is, in the view of Heirich (1964), valuable in its own right as a resource (as indicated by the sayings “Time is money,” time can be spent, used well or wasted, and we can “buy time”). Thus, time is a fixed-sum scarce resource that cannot be regained once spent. Further, time is differently valued cross-culturally: “the value of time as a resource varies according to the relative emphasis placed on Being and Becoming” (Heirich 1964:387). Regardless of how time is evaluated, “it will be allocated for a variety of purposes” (Heirich 1964:387), and, if *less* time is spent on an activity, “other activities will have *gained* in relative importance” (p. 387). Time can be

transmitted from one person to another, and it can become an object of exchange. Thus, it seems that time qualifies as a resource according to Foa’s definition and should therefore perhaps be considered a seventh resource along with the original six in his typology.

Interestingly, and recalling that a social resource class is a category of the *meaning* assigned to actions, the meaning of giving/receiving/stealing/loosing time may vary. In Heirich’s (1964:387) words, “specific moments of time acquire a social meaning of their own” (e.g., time *sequence* may indicate priority – “homework before computer games” – as well as social distance, “important persons always arrive later than others” or “rank and file soldiers eat when their officers are done”). Finally, time may be interpreted on the basis of its quantity, quality, duration, speed, intensity, etc.

Buss (1983) discussed a different kind of social resource that he termed *process rewards*. These “occur naturally as people interact, and such rewards are simply part of the process of such interaction” (p. 556); “these rewards are an intrinsic part of social contact” (p. 554). There are four types of process rewards (and each one can be negatively valent as well): presence of others (isolation), attention from others (shunning), responsivity (boredom), and initiation (no interaction) – as listed in the order of increasing activity on the part of the provider. The reinforcing part of each resource is in the middle, as too little or too much of any one of the four may be aversive (but not always). These rewards do not seem to be covered by Foa’s typology, unless they are intentionally provided to meet the needs or desires of the recipient, in which case they would be classified as instances of status.

But can (and, if so, how can) *clean water*, *clean air*, and *energy*, for example, be classified in Foa’s system? They are increasingly scarce items that are likely to become (or already are, at least to some extent) expropriated and used as objects of selective distribution and exchange. Water (like food) would most likely be classified as goods by Foa, while an individual’s energy reserves might

presumably be conceived as a function of the nature, quality, and quantity of the various resources the person possesses. The classification of some other types of energy resources (e.g., electric, nuclear, water, wind) appear to be more problematic. Additional examples of resources that can be transacted and that appear to be missing in Foa's typology are social influence (e.g., authority and power) and sex. However, social influence may (like a person's energy level) best be understood as a function of the amount and type of resources a person possesses³, resources that may be used strategically to attain more of the same resource, or other types of resources which, in turn, may further increase his/her influence (see Lenski 1966, for a similar standpoint). Social influence (e.g., power) may also be conceived in terms of resource liquidity or exchangeability. Money can be exchanged for a greater number of different kinds of resources as compared to love or information. Thus, a rich person has more exchange options, and thereby more influence, in social exchanges than does somebody who can only offer love. For Foa, *sex* is a concrete physical form of love (proximal to service in the resource circle) as compared to affection and "romantic love" which represent the abstract form of love (more proximal to status than to service).

Contributors to this volume have suggested additional resources that do not seem to fit into Foa's typology. Turner (Chap. 10), for example, argues that "...by using more sociology in conceptualizing resources, the list of resources can be extended beyond six 'classes.'" This can be done if we realize that the interpersonal level (which is the major focus of Foa and Foa) is "...*embedded* in socio-cultural formations that reveal their own operative dynamics" which, in turn, allows a reconceptualization of resources as "general-

ized symbolic media of exchange." Turner argues that this is an advance over Bourdieu's (1984) four-part distinction among "social," "economic," "cultural," and "symbolic" capital as the resources indicating that "...social networks, cultural symbols and legitimating ideologies, and aspects of culture (language, arts, aesthetics, education, credentials, and many other dimensions of cultural capital) are used as resources" (p. 7). Granting that these are very general "resource classes," how do Foa's more "specific" resource classes compare to Bourdieu's? May, for example, all six of Foa's resource classes be conceived as "subclasses" of each one of Bourdieu's "social," "cultural," and/or "symbolic" categories, while Foa's classes of money, goods, services, info, and status – but not love – be viewed as different kinds of Bourdieu's "economic" category? If so, would that mean that a particular resource, say status, as defined in Foa's framework, can be further delineated into four kinds – social status, cultural status, symbolic status, and economic status (cf. Binning and Huo's typology of four kinds of status, Chap. 8 in this volume)? We will return to the issue of resource subclasses in section "[May Each of Foa's Six Resource Classes Be Subdivided into Subclasses?](#)" below. It might be more correct to state that Bourdieu's categories specify the context within which status, in our example, is provided or received or the "criterion" in terms of which status is ranked or evaluated. Thus, a person may enjoy high status due to financial success, due to cultural contributions, or due to incumbency of an important social position.

Folger (Chap. 9 in this volume) focuses on a special kind of resource: a moral "second-order" or "higher-order resource" and a "supra-" or "meta-resource," namely, the moral order, "a unique type of resource [that] grew out of group-based conditions of living," and that constrains social conduct. This is an interesting and important level of abstraction providing a backdrop against which more concrete social-cultural resources and exchanges may be understood and evaluated. However, as such, resources do

³Foa and Foa (1974) defined power as "the amount of a given resource that is available to an individual for eventual giving" (p. 135), thus generating six types of power, one for each resource class.

not appear to be amenable to distribution or exchange between actors, they seem to be neither social resources (i.e., commodities which can be transmitted through interpersonal behavior) nor a social resource class (i.e., a category of the meaning assigned to actions) as defined by Foa. Instead, Folger's supra-resource may perhaps be understood in the context of the capacity of all types of resources or relationships "to elicit moralized forms of social sanctioning when the norms regarding those resources or relations are violated." Thus, these "moral norms and emotions operate as a higher-order resource possessing a quality of 'status'" (not to be mistaken for Foa's "status" resource).

As a resource class refers to the *meaning* assigned to an act (behavioral, verbal, written, mimicked, etc.), what might be viewed as another type of "higher-order" resource are items (acts, resources) that may be understood as combinations or composites of two or more resource classes. A "groupie" may understand the act of a passionate kiss from an idolized rock star as expressing his love to her as well as a status conferring act (i.e., the well-known phenomenon of "status by association"). Similarly, a bouquet of flowers may by its recipient be valued both as good and as a symbol of love.

If two (or more) different resources may be provided via the same act (what might be called a "composite-" or "higher-order" resource), the mutual exclusiveness of Foa's resource typology would have to be questioned. In addition, the problem of dealing with a huge number of composite types would arise. Even if additional terms designating those new resource types would be coined, a practically limitless proliferation of instances of resource combinations would open up, setting the stage for ambiguities and arbitrariness similar to what happened in the days, now long past, when an endless number of instincts were named, robbing the concept of theoretical and practical value. We may also recall some typologies of emotion, consisting of primary emotions combining to produce higher-level complex secondary and tertiary emotions (e.g., McDougall 1908).

Are Other Dimensions than Particularism and Concreteness Desirable?

A cautionary note regarding the concreteness-symbolism dimension seems in order. There is a potential terminological confusion among the concepts of "symbolic," "abstract," and "intangible" as they are used in various writings. The words symbolic and abstract may have more than one meaning, and it seems that Foa's choice of "symbolic" rather than "abstract" may create some confusion. (1) According to Foa and Foa (1974:81, 1976:102, 1980:79), status and information are *symbolic* resources, while love and money can be both symbolic and concrete. In the case of love, saying "I love you" is symbolic, while sex is concrete behavior; in the case of money, stock is symbolic, but coins are concrete. Goods and services are concrete – thus nonsymbolic – resources. However, it seems to us that all six resources may have symbolic value; the provision of each may, for example, symbolize (convey to the recipient) the provider's affection. (2) Similarly, status and information are *abstract* resources, while love and money can be both abstract and concrete. In the case of love, saying "I love you" is abstract, while sex is concrete behavior; in the case of money, stock is abstract, but coins are concrete. Goods and services are concrete resources. Thus, while all six resources may be *symbolic*, only status and information as well as some forms of love and money are *abstract*.

Could it be that Foa used the term symbolic rather than abstract by mistake? Would Foa's intentions, then, be better represented by an abstract-concrete rather than a symbolic-concrete dimension? Unfortunately, however, the term abstract may create more confusion than clarity (which might be the reason that Foa avoided that term) due to its various meanings, for example, having conceptual rather than concrete existence, ideal, theoretical, transcendent, and indemonstrable (the Merriam-Webster Thesaurus 1989). Symbolic, on the other hand, is a less ambiguous term meaning "representative of" or "representing," as when a book provided as a gift is meant to symbolize or represent love and

affection for the recipient (although, as noted, that term is unable to distinguish among the six resources, as all of them may be symbolic). Perhaps, Foa's intentions are better represented by an *intangible-tangible* rather than an abstract-concrete dimension. (3) Status and information are *intangible* resources, whereas love and money can be both *tangible* and *intangible* resources. Goods and services are *tangible* resources.

Do the two dimensions (particularism and concreteness) exclude the recognition and inclusion of hitherto neglected resources? Would alternative dimensions facilitate the discovery of additional resource types or yield significant theoretical insights? Foa and Foa were well aware that there are many other possible ways in which resources may be classified. And other theorists, as well, have discussed this issue and proposed alternative and/or additional dimensions. Stangl (1989), for example, found in his study with Austrian participants that Foa's two-dimensional structure as verified in American studies must be complemented by an *evaluative* dimension. Sabbagh and Levy (Chap. 4 in this volume) propose seven additional dimensions (or facets) that together yield a more complex structure than Foa's circumplex (i.e., the circular order among resources derived from the particularism and concreteness dimensions): *comparison targets, type of motive, mode of resource transmission, resource availability, modality, resource valence, and social realm*. Blalock (1991:28–41) identified a number of resource properties that he thought should be taken into account when formulating a theory of allocation processes. Some of these appear to allow alternative arrangements regarding how resources are related to one another: divisibility, retractability, generalized value, depletion and replenishment, the degree to which they are subject to devaluation, the degree to which recipients share future power with allocators, and valence. In their comprehensive paper on the concept of status, Bothner, Godart, and Lee (2010) argue that status and quality (i.e., the skills an employee brings to a job) differ in their *stickiness*, that is, the speed by which they fluctuate. Unlike quality, status sticks longer to a person as it is a function of opinions and affiliations, both of which evolve slowly. It

seems that stickiness is a dimension on which the remaining five Foa resources may be characterized as well, for example, love, information, services, goods, and money. Turner (Chap. 10 in this volume) maintains that "...the issue of particularism can be recast as variable degrees of resource circulation across social structures and the interpersonal relations in these structures." Galvin and Lockhart (Chap. 22 in this volume) suggest a two-dimensional arrangement of resources (or goods, to use their term) based on their *divisibility* and *fungibility* (a resource is fungible when its value is not dependent on the identity of its possessor – cf. Foa's notion of a universalistic resource). Obviously, some of the mentioned dimensions are suggested by more than one researcher.

Törnblom and Nilsson (1993:82) suggested that just like Foa's, six resource classes can be described, distinguished, and ordered on the basis of their degree of particularism or universalism, so can each separate resource class as well. As particularism and universalism are opposite extremes of the same continuum, any particular resource class may be characterized as partly particularistic and partly universalistic (rather than either or), the more of one property, the less of the other. Also, the particularistic value of a given resource may be salient in certain conditions, while its universalistic value may be focal in others. For example, the particularistic property of affect received from one's fiancé is likely to be salient, while affect expressed by a bank teller might be interpreted in universalistic terms.

Binning and Huo (Chap. 8 in this volume) take this idea further to suggest that both dimensions along which Foa ordered the six resource classes can be used to distinguish between subtypes of *status*. Thus, status may be represented by instances or in forms that can be either symbolic or concrete as well as either particularistic or universalistic, yielding four different subtypes: symbolic/universalistic, symbolic/particularistic, concrete/universalistic, and concrete/particularistic (while the meaning of them all are status). This "typology" allows for predictions regarding exchanges among the four kinds of status and may yield ideas to be explored that are related to exchanges between types of status and types of love.

Of course, different types of status may also be distinguished on the basis of other properties. In their paper on the nature of status and how it compares with six cognate concepts, Bothner, Godart, and Lee (2010) distinguished between “soft” and “hard” types of status (the first is based on deference to, and the other on dominance by, a focal actor). The ideal, however, addressed elegantly by Foa for his classification of the six resource classes, is to find dimensions along which all subtypes (i.e., all items representing all resource classes) may be sorted. If that turns out to be unlikely or outright impossible, it is desirable to find dimensions on which to base a classification of the items *within each* separate resource class, even though those classifications may be unique for each class.

May Each of Foa’s Six Resource Classes Be Subdivided into Subclasses?

We hinted earlier at the possibility that Foa’s resource classes could perhaps be conceived as “subclasses” of Bourdieu’s social, cultural, and economic categories. Whether or not this is possible or theoretically interesting, each one of Foa’s resource classes can be operationalized in several ways, that is, exemplified by a large number of concrete instances. The literature is rich with examples of different kinds of resources, each of which would fit into one of Foa’s six resource classes. To be theoretically manageable, this large variety of concrete instances of each resource should preferably be sorted into subclasses on the basis of some meaningful criteria.

The variety of empirical research studies using resources as independent or dependent variables reveal various ways in which Foa’s resource classes have been operationalized (see Foa and Foa 1974, and Foa et al. 1993, for overviews of the first two decades of this line of research effort; regarding more recent research, see, e.g., Chaps. 20, 21, and 26 in this volume). This research hints at the fact that (a) each resource class encompasses a nearly endless number of different items, that is, concrete instances (operationalizations into acts, facial expressions, verbal statements, utterances, etc.). In addition, (b) one particular

item may have a *meaning* that is classifiable in terms of several resource classes (e.g., a pat on a person’s back may be interpreted as a sign of friendship, hostility, encouragement, giving status, or a piece of information). Thus, for example, just like the resource class of goods encompasses a huge number of items, so may the concrete item bouquet of flowers be not merely a good but also a sign of love or status – or even convey some information.

It appears likely that *intra*class differences (i.e., differences between the various items of a particular resource class) may be as large, or larger, than *inter*class differences. A bicycle and a bouquet of flowers (i.e., two instances of the same resource class goods), for example, seem more dissimilar than sexual intercourse and a massage (i.e., two instances of *different* resource classes – love and services, respectively). As Foa’s framework includes no provisions for the possibility that within-resource-class differences between specific resource items might be larger than between-resource-class differences, it would be useful to find criteria on the basis of which intra- or within-category resource classifications may be constructed. This, in turn, would most likely yield more precise predictions.

Foa’s New Exchange Rules Revisited

A large number of new exchange rules emerged from Foas’ work. They concern variables or properties with regard to which resource classes differ systematically, such that some resources will be more similar to each other than to others. We have included a number of occasional comments and additions (below and in Box 3.4) related to the meaning and plausibility of some statements by the Foas. As the Foas often restricted their illustrations of the new rules to the resources of love and money, we need to ask whether reference to all six resource types will modify some of the rules. We have attempted to fill in the gaps, as shown in Box 3.4. However, the extent to which the considerable variety of different concrete items that represent each one of the six resource classes might modify these rules cannot be systematically examined here.

Box 3.4 Order-Related Properties of Resource Classes

Resource class	Relationship between self and others		Relationship between giving and taking		Reciprocation in kind/exchangeability		Range of exchange	Interpersonal relationship and exchange	Time for processing input	Delay of reward	Optimum group size	Resource optimality	Locus of storage	
	Gain	Loss	Positive	Negative	Verbalization of need	Very likely								Most narrow
<i>Love</i>	Some gain	Positive	Positive	Difficult	Difficult	Likely	Likely	Narrow	Inseparable	More time	Long	Smaller	Less narrow	Internal/external
<i>Information</i>	Neither gain nor loss	Negative	Negative	Less difficult	Less difficult	Likely	Less narrow	Less narrow	Conditionally separable	More/less time	Long/short	Larger	Narrow	Internal/external
<i>Money</i>	Loss	Negative	Negative	Less difficult	Less difficult	Not likely	Least narrow	Least narrow	Separable	Less time	Short	Larger	Least narrow (broadest)	External
<i>Goods</i>	Loss	Negative	Negative	Less difficult	Less difficult	Likely	Less narrow	Less narrow	Conditionally separable	Less time	Short	Larger	Less narrow	External
<i>Services</i>	Neither gain nor loss	Negative	Negative	Less difficult	Less difficult	Very likely	Narrow	Narrow	Inseparable	More time	Long	Smaller	Narrow	External

This is a selective presentation of Foa and Foa's new exchange rules (order-related properties of the six resource classes). The table includes our own additions to and modifications, as Foa and Foa usually addressed only the resource classes of love and money

1. *The relationship between giving resources to other and to self* changes with the positions of the resources in the circular structure. The relationship is positive for love and becomes increasingly negative the closer the resource is to money. One's supply of love does not decrease when giving it to other, but "For resources closer to money, the amount lost by the giver tends to approach the amount gained by the receiver" (Foa and Foa 1980:93). Information is described as independent, that is, giving it to another results in no loss or gain for the provider (Foa and Foa 1976:107). For example, a teacher sharing his/her knowledge with students does not lose or gain information. However, whereas the amount of some types of information (e.g., secrets) does not decrease when providing it to another, its *value* to the provider might very well be lost.

Service, a particularistic resource in Foas' framework, seems to represent a special case. When we provide services to others, what happens to our own amount of service possession? Törnblom and Kazemi (2007) argued that service does not exist before it is provided. Service is produced in the same act by which it is provided. The provider does not possess the resource service before it is produced. Moreover, the provider does not retain service for himself subsequent to the act of giving service to others.

2. *The relationship between giving and taking away* is most positive for love (a condition called "ambivalence"). It is possible to simultaneously love and hate. And we can give and take away status in the same act. However, this is not the case for money – "the joint occurrence of giving and taking away will follow the circular structure of resources, being highest for love and lowest for money" (Foa and Foa 1976:108) – giving money excludes taking it away and vice versa. Likewise, services, information, and goods cannot be provided and taken away in the same act.

3. *Verbalization of need for resources* seems to vary in difficulty with the extent to which

verbal communication is suitable for each resource class. Foa and Foa (1976:109) suggest that it is less difficult to express one's need for money than one's need for affection. However, ease of verbalization might be mostly determined by the social context and interpersonal relationship, for instance, rather than by some assumed inherent characteristic of the resource, per se. It is not difficult to think of situations when one would be more ashamed of asking for money as compared to affection or kindness.

4. *Exchangeability*. The statements in (a–d) have been corroborated by empirical research.

(a) "The nearer two resources are (in the structure), the more likely they are to be exchanged with one another" (Foa and Foa 1980:93).

(b) Reciprocating the receipt of a given resource with an identical or similar resource is more likely for particularistic than for universalistic resources (Foa and Foa 1974:109). Providing money in return for money makes little sense, while affection is likely to be more welcome than \$10 in return for love.

(c) "The nearer to love a resource is, the more likely it is to be exchanged with same resource" (Foa and Foa 1980:93).

(d) "When a resource is not available for exchange, it is more likely to be substituted by a less particularistic than by a more particularistic one" (Foa and Foa 1980:94). For love, this is of course inevitable, as a more particularistic resource does not exist in Foa's typology. However, what if status was received but is not available for exchange? Following this rule, the recipient should reciprocate with information, goods, or money (all three being less particularistic). However, would not a kind word of affection (love) be a more likely response to praise (status), in which case the opposite rule is valid? Similarly, would not praise or friendly words of gratitude in return for a rendered (and particularly unsolicited) service be

equally (or sometimes more) likely than monetary payment, particularly if the servicing person is a friend or lover!

5. *Range of exchange.* Universalistic resources (money, in particular) can be exchanged for a wider range of resource types as compared to particularistic resources. “The nearer to love a resource is, the narrower the range of resources with which it is likely to be exchanged” (Foa and Foa 1980:93).
6. *Resource optimality.* “The optimal range (neither too little nor too much) of a resource is most narrow for love, and increases progressively for resources closer to money” (Foa and Foa 1980:94). Thus, the optimal range for goods (which is proximal to money) should be wider than that for love. However, a person will only have usage or room for a very limited number of dinner tables, while she might welcome unlimited love from her lover and/or signs of affection from as many friends and acquaintances as possible. Also, the value of each increment of \$10 for a love-starved millionaire is trivial, while each hint of affection from the opposite sex may be of substantial value. Thus, the declining marginal utility (or level of satiation) for a resource will vary according to its scarcity, the amount possessed, its value, its significance, etc. Of course, the lack of a common scale according to which different types of resources may be evaluated presents a veritable obstacle to comparable assessments of optimality. And even if a standardized scale were available, the notion of optimality yields limited information. Imagine a 100-point scale along which the amounts of two different types of resources may be validly measured and that 10 represents the least tolerable amount for resource A and 60 for resource B. Also, imagine that too much of A lies at 45 and too much of B at 95. Thus, the ranges for A and B are equally wide, 35 for both. However, 35 as a measure of the range width or optimality (designated as narrow, wide, or whatever) provides a limited amount of theoretically interesting information, in comparison to information of the

points of lowest and highest acceptance or tolerability regarding one’s possession of a resource. Also, the intervals (ranges) for different resources may extend differently – in both directions for some, upward for some, and downward for others. In addition, it is important to distinguish between *amount* and *value*; a large amount may not necessarily be highly valued, while a small amount may be worth a great deal. As we shall see, substituting amount for value in seven below yields opposite rules/propositions.

7. *Resource amount.*

- (a) “The larger the amount of a resource possessed by a person, the more likely it is to be given to others” (Foa and Foa 1980:93). The conditions under and extent to which this claim might be valid would surely be interesting to study! However, (a) the greater the *value* of a resource possessed by a person, the *less* likely it is to be given to others, and (b) the smaller the value of a resource, the more likely it is to be given to others – regardless of its amount.
- (b) “The smaller the amount of a resource possessed by a person, the more he is likely to take it away from others” (Foa and Foa 1980:93). Again, the conditions under which and the extent to which this claim might be valid would be interesting to study! However, taking from others is probably unlikely when the value of the small amount is considerable.
- (c) “Taking away any resource (other than love) produces a loss of love” (Foa and Foa 1980:94). Surely, it would be difficult to like a person who takes my money or disrespects me, for example, as he is likely to be perceived as unfriendly with negative intentions.
- (d) “In the absence of exchange, the decrease in amount of love possessed decreases (*it seems likely that the authors intended to say “increases” – our comment*), and is greater for resources closer to love” (Foa and Foa 1980:94). However, in the absence of love exchange, both the

- amount of love (see point 10 below) and its *value* and/or intensity may very well increase.
8. “The simultaneous transmission of love and another resource increases the value of this other resource, or facilitates its transmission” (Foa and Foa 1980:94). Is it the value of the resource, per se, or the “extra” resource of love that provides a feeling of increased value of the act?
 9. *Physical proximity and exchange.* As opposed to love, “transmission of money does not require face-to-face interaction” (Foa and Foa 1976:109). Is it not equally possible for love to be conveyed from a great distance via a love letter, telephone call, internet contact, or even via another person?
 10. *Storage.* “...Love cannot be kept for a long time in the absence of actual exchange” (Foa and Foa 1976:109). However, we have all heard of the proverbial spinster who never again entered into another love relationship after being abandoned by the man she never ceased to love and want. It is also quite possible to keep loving someone even after a person’s death. These statements refer to love conceived as an emotion. However, if love is understood as an act or behavior by which love is provided (e.g., sexual behavior), then the Foas’ new rule does not make sense or is irrelevant, and different propositions are in order. In addition, and as discussed below in section “Resource Production and Its Distribution May Coincide,” some resources (i.e., love in its concrete forms and services) do not exist before they are produced, thus cannot be possessed or stored. Not until I make love, engage in physical sexual intercourse, does that form of love exist, and not until I perform a service (e.g., repair your car) does the service exist. Thus, there is nothing that can be possessed and/or stored (except as images of future acts, prepotent stimuli, or intentions).
 11. *Locus of storage.* “Love is stored.....in the “heart”; money is kept at the bank or under the mattress” (Foa and Foa 1976:109). Some resources can be stored both inside and outside the person, for example, information and food. “The more particularistic a resource the less it is amenable to external conservation ...it depends more on internal cognitive storage” (Foa and Foa 1976:111). However, a medal (and other material symbols of status, i.e., instances of a particularistic resource class) can be externally stored indefinitely.
 12. *Interpersonal relationship and exchange.* Interpersonal relationships may exhibit typical resource profiles. Love in its various forms is typical for close particularistic relationships, while money, goods, services, and information are dominant in business and other universalistic relationships. The match between type of resource and interpersonal relationship is probably less specific for particularistic relationships, particularly long-term ones. A wider range of resources are provided and exchanged within those, as compared to more formal relationships. Not only is the nature of exchange affected by the type of relationship between the partners: “Other conditions being equal, the probability of occurrence of a given exchange is contingent upon the institutional setting in which it may take place” (Foa and Foa 1980:94).
 13. *Time for processing input.* Giving, receiving, and taking away love take more time than that for money (Foa and Foa 1976:110). However, this “rule” is probably more typical for the development of love and affection, as one’s affection for a person may certainly be conveyed instantly. And the transaction of money in its various forms may require an extended period of time, particularly if it has to be transferred long distances.
 14. *Delay of reward.* Love is less likely to be exchanged in nonrepetitive encounters with strangers than what is the case with universalistic resources (Foa and Foa 1976:110).
 15. *Optimum group size.* “The probability of love exchange is higher in small groups. The opposite is true for money” (Foa and Foa 1980:94). However, some religious groups, for instance, often stage mass sermons/

meetings during which love is shared among the congregational members and between them and the preacher. Further, in which sense is it typical for money to be exchanged in large groups?

In sum, it seems obvious that some of the above “new exchange rules” warrant closer scrutiny and reformulation and, above all, need to be empirically tested. In addition, most of the new exchange rules are restricted to the provision and exchange of positive resources. This may require reformulations of some of the rules as well as formulation of additional rules to accommodate negative resource exchange. Of course, this should not in any way detract from the theoretical value of the many insights generated by SRT.

Additional Issues

Resource Origin

Mode: Giving and Taking

Foa and Foa (1974) distinguished between two basic modes (i.e., allocation directions) – giving and taking away. They defined *giving* as “increasing the amount of resources available to the object” (p. 40) and *taking away* as “a decrease in the amount of resources available for the object” (p. 40). Adamopoulos (Chap. 16 in this volume) uses the two modes giving and *denying* (rather than taking away). And, as Stangl (1989) points out, *receiving* and *losing* are the counterpart modes from the perspectives of the person to whom something is given and from whom a resource is taken, respectively.

Foa’s mode of “giving” (i.e., the act of increasing the available amount of resources) encompasses but does not identify or discriminate among the various possible ways of, or motives behind, increasing a person’s amount of resources. A person may, for example, give freely and spontaneously, give in return for a resource received, give as a response to a request, give as a response to a need, or as a response to being coerced to give. And she may give disrespectfully, give with great hesitation, give strategically to create

indebtedness or create status superiority, etc. The “kind” of giving that takes place will certainly matter in a variety of ways for both the provider and the recipient with regard to its perceived purpose and, subsequently, its consequences for the relationship and the possible ensuing interaction between the provider and the recipient.

It seems that *mode* is insufficiently developed in most theories involving social resource exchange. There are additional notions than giving, taking away, and denying that describe the way in which resources are distributed and exchanged and that are likely to yield different kinds of psychological and behavioral implications. For example, a conceptual framework proposed by Törnblom (1988) for positive and negative outcome allocation differentiated among three modes: *delivering*, *withdrawing*, and *withholding*. The latter mode, *withholding* (akin to *denying*), refers to a situation in which (an expected) resource is not forthcoming – that is, there is neither an increase nor a decrease in the amount of the resources possessed by the potential recipient. Thus, an existing (positive or negative) situation is maintained. The first two modes correspond to giving and taking away or denying, respectively.

A second component in Törnblom’s framework is *resource valence* which, when combined with mode, generates several alternative outcomes of positive or negative valence. For example, a positive outcome (i.e., the result of an allocation) may be accomplished in three ways: by presenting a positive resource (e.g., praise), by withdrawing, and by withholding a negative resource (e.g., a reprimand). Taking resource type into account yields 36 types of outcome allocation: 2 (positive and negative valence) × 3 (delivering, withdrawing, and withholding) × 6 (Foa’s six resource types). Each type of outcome allocation will convey different messages and may result in different responses by the recipient, depending on the meanings attributed by the provider and recipient. This was demonstrated by Gamliel and Peer (2006) who designed studies on the effect of framing on justice judgments, based on the four-dimensional conceptual framework proposed


by Törnblom (1988). They found that “participants judged non-egalitarian principles...as more just when allocation of a resource was presented in the positive framing manner (e.g., to deliver goods or to withhold bads) relative to presenting the exact same resource allocated in a negative framing manner (e.g., to deliver bads or to withhold goods)” (p. 307).

For instance, a person whose amount of money decreased due to an unsuccessful poker game will react differently and more strongly negatively than somebody who gave the money to charity. Punishment through delivery of blame will elicit different feelings than withheld praise or services. Receiving a medal may elicit stronger feelings of pride than being awarded a bottle of whiskey. Also, an interesting distinction was made by McLean Parks, Conlon, Ang, and Bontempo (1999). They added a special case of taking away (withdrawing, denying) denoted by the term *recovery*, defined as a situation “where allocators take away *previously distributed* [italics ours], positively valued resources” (p. 726). People are assumed to react more negatively to

recovery than when a negative resource is presented and, presumably, than when something that was *not* previously given is taken away (see also Conlon et al. 2004). There is a Swedish saying that illustrates the particularly negative act of recovery, freely translated as “The one who gives and takes it back (i.e., recovers) is the devil’s best friend.”

Obviously, the notions of giving and taking away are far too general to be of much predictive value as each encompasses a wide range of different ways in which giving and taking may be executed. In addition, various meanings may be assigned to each type of outcome created by giving or taking: a positive outcome may be interpreted as a reward, a gain, profit, benefit, etc., while a negative outcome may be understood as a punishment, a burden, a loss, cost, a retribution, etc. (Törnblom 1988). These (and other) ways of interpreting and labeling the outcome will result in different behavioral, cognitive, and emotional reactions (see Törnblom and Ahlin 1998, and Gamliel and Peer 2006, for empirical implications of Törnblom’s framework) (Box 3.5).


Box 3.5 A Conceptual Framework for Positive and Negative Outcome Allocation^a




^aBox 3.5 is reprinted with kind permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited: Törnblom, K. Positive and negative allocations: A typology and a model for conflicting justice principles. In E.J. Lawler & B. Markowsky (1988). (Eds.), *Advances in group processes: Theory and research*, Vol. 5. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Studies reported in Chap. 7 and a series of related (but unpublished) studies found that different “modes of exchange” of similar and different resources between two parties had different consequences for the type of social relationship that respondents attributed between the exchange partners. It should be noted that Foa’s theory focuses on resource exchange rather than distribution, which is why these studies are particularly relevant analyses of the impact of mode. Four basic exchange patterns were distinguished and ranked according to the degree of friendship each was perceived to reveal: *giving-giving* (P gives a resource to O, and then O gives a resource to P), *giving-requesting* (P gives a

resource to O, and then P asks O for a resource and receives it), *requesting-giving* (P asks O for a resource and receives it, then P gives a resource to O), and *requesting-requesting* (P asks O for a resource and receives it, and then O asks P for a resource and receives it). These exchange patterns are illustrated in Box 3.6. Two of these, the first and the third, were used in the studies reported by Törnblom and Fredholm in Chap. 7. Data from unpublished studies yielded a descending order among the modes of exchange in terms of what they signaled to observers about the degree of friendship between P and O: giving-giving, requesting-giving, giving-requesting, and requesting-requesting.



Box 3.7 Modes of Dyadic Exchange of Positively and Negatively Valent Resources



Adding complexity by specifying (a) the *valence* of the resources provided, received, and requested generates 4 variants of the giving-giving exchange pattern, 8 variants for each one of the giving-requesting and requesting-giving patterns, and 16 variants of the requesting-requesting pattern. Allowing for nonresponse (i.e., nothing is given in return or as a response to a request, as depicted in Box 3.7) expands the number of variants even more. Introducing further complexity to these four modes of exchange by varying (b) the *manner* of giving and (c) the *nature of the resources* changing hands will considerably increase the repertoire of possible attributions and will likely modify the above stated order among the four basic modes. A researcher interested in analyzing and comparing the processes of exchange over time for each of these exchange patterns, for example, how two exchange partners react to each other's responses as the various relationships develop, would require access to considerable resources. Box 3.7 shows the eight variants of giving-requesting when resource valence is specified and varied and four additional cases when nonresponse to a request is added.

A more extensive and detailed discussion of the psychological and behavioral implications of the various directions in which mode may be further developed is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, even though the nature of the transacted resource is rarely analyzed systematically, there is a considerable amount of relatively

recent relevant literature focusing on reactions to aid (e.g., Gergen et al. 1973), helping (e.g., Greenberg and Saxe 1975), giving and receiving (e.g., Mills and Clark 1982; Törnblom and Fredholm 1984), interactional justice (e.g., Bies and Moag 1986), volunteering (e.g., Clary et al. 1998; Kazemi 2007), gifts (e.g., Heath 1976), and prosocial behavior (e.g., Eisenberg et al. 1981).

Production Versus Acquisition

In the study of language, especially the emergence of language, researchers typically focus on the three processes of language: production, comprehension, and language acquisition (e.g., Hammarberg 2001; MacDonald 1999). MacDonald notes that the prevailing isolationist strategy within each area hampers a needed cross-fertilization of interrelated findings, as "...the puzzling results in one field appear to have solutions in another" (p. 177). And if "The intricate relationships between these puzzles hold important implications for the nature of the human language faculties..." (p. 177), might it also be likely that some hitherto unattended relationships between the nature and dynamics of the two processes of production and acquisition of social resources have hitherto neglected implications for resource transactions, social exchange, people's distributive and procedural fairness conceptions, attitudes and emotions, product positioning, and other phenomena and issues?

Would, for example, the nature and amount of social influence (power and authority) accruing the owner of resources differ due to whether, when, why, and how resources were *produced* or manufactured by their owner or *acquired* by the owner from somebody else (e.g., via inheritance, theft, or purchase)? The manner in which they were produced or acquired and, if acquired from somebody else, what the identity of that person is, for instance, are often likely to make a big difference. Some types of resources may certainly be produced and acquired in a multitude of ways, while the production and acquisition of others are more restricted. Further, some resources can be produced and acquired in ways in which other resources cannot. For example, information containing industrial secrets may be acquired through espionage, while affection or services cannot. An example of possible relationships between production and acquisition is that the socially accepted manner of acquisition of a social resource is frequently affected by how the particular resource was produced. It is against the law to acquire illegally manufactured alcohol (“moonshine,” “white lightni’n”), while the acquisition of the same kind of product brewed in a legitimate state-controlled facility is permitted.

The distinction between production and acquisition brings our thoughts to research on public good social dilemmas concerning how members of a collective create or maintain a common resource through individual contributions (i.e., social resource production) from which all can benefit. Certainly, collectively owned resources (called public goods within this research tradition) may be produced and acquired in a variety of ways. Once public goods are produced, the question of their distribution and acquisition arises. The ways in which a particular type of resource was produced do very likely have a bearing on the manner in which they are shared and acquired among eligible recipients. An adequate analysis of the relationship between the *origin* of a resource and, say, its allocation (in terms of its fairness, for instance) may require information about the way in which the resource was produced as well as acquired (see Törnblom and Kazemi 2007, for more details).

Also, the kind of resource that results from production activity or acquisition needs to be specified, lest we are content with speaking about production and acquisition in a vacuum. Analyzing resource production and acquisition without specifying what is produced or acquired makes no more sense than analyzing resource allocation without specifying what is allocated. Several studies indicate that resource type may moderate distributive justice judgments (e.g., Törnblom and Foa 1983). Further, Törnblom and Kazemi (2007) suggested that resource type may moderate the relevance of manner of production as well, such that manner of resource production is more relevant for universalistic than for particularistic resources (p. 42, Proposition 1). As we also know that resource valence may affect justice conceptions (e.g., Törnblom and Jonsson 1985, 1987), theoretical statements need to focus on the production, acquisition, and distribution of negatively valent resources as well (e.g., hate, misinformation, disservice, insult), in addition to positive ones.

Mode of production and resource type may also affect procedural (justice) aspects of resource allocations. Indeed, the process by which resources are allocated seems even more likely than the resource distribution to be affected by several of the factors that are associated with resource production. Resources produced collectively may result in endorsement and application of the representativeness rule as the most just procedural principle. Further, if unethical and unjust procedures were used in the production of resources, restoration of justice may very well take place via just allocation procedures that meet the criteria of ethicality, consistency, representativeness, etc. (Leventhal 1980).

Finally, as will be discussed below, *production and distribution may coincide* for some resources, as in the case of physical lovemaking which does not exist before it takes place. And as the distribution of a service or lovemaking is accomplished via a process or procedure, we realize that it is equally true that *production and procedure may coincide* as well. However, this is not true for other, particularly universalistic, resources.

Do We Usually Know How Resources Are Produced and Acquired?

In order for mode of production to have an impact on acquisition, for example, availability and salience of information about the process of production is crucial. However, availability and salience are not to be taken for granted. Perhaps most of the time, people are ignorant about, or at least temporarily do not think about, how the various resources they encounter and acquire in their daily lives are produced, manufactured, acquired, or made available. As Olsen (1978) noted, production is usually hidden. Such lack of information works in the favor of manufacturers and merchants when goods and food have been produced by methods that people would object to had they been informed. As suggested above, knowledge and awareness about the origin of a resource often influences people's attitudes and evaluations of it and may, at least partly, determine their use of it, their willingness to purchase it, or flaunt it as a status symbol. Our resource possessions often hint at the nature of our tastes, morality, fashion awareness, identities, financial status, etc. Thus, some people would not consider wearing a fur coat made from an endangered species, from animals who are kept as pets, or from animals who are mistreated or imposed great pain when extracting its fur. Less dramatic examples of how knowledge about a resource's manner of production may influence our cognitive conceptions and behaviors easily come to mind. People increasingly prefer ecologically and biodynamically produced food, while questioning and avoiding genetically modified staples and food stuff whose production has involved pesticides, chemical fertilizers, and hormones.

If ignorance or unawareness about manner of production is common (but nevertheless relevant and important), may possibly some kind of heuristic operate in situations where knowledge is lacking? Research has shown that heuristics may be activated to allow the fairness and favorability of an outcome to be inferred from knowledge about the procedure, or to allow the fairness of a procedure about which information is lacking to be inferred from the fairness or favorability of the outcome (Lind et al. 1993; Törnblom and Vermunt

1999). Particularistic resources are more likely to be relatively unambiguous with regard to the purpose of their provision. For example, receiving a hug signals that the provider wants to convey affection for you. However, receiving a universalistic resource – let say a book or a piece of information – is not equally unambiguous. The book gift might be the provider's way of saying that s/he likes you, but the gift might also have been given for other reasons (see Chap. 25 for a similar line of reasoning). Of interest for our purpose here is that using heuristics may be more prevalent in the case of universalistic than particularistic resources as the significance of the former is more ambiguous with regard to the purpose of their provision.

Research on issues like the ones mentioned above should be guided by questions like the following: for what resource and under what conditions does what category of people have access to what type of information about its production, and under what conditions do people care about and are affected by how what types of resources are produced and acquired? Further, and more generally, how might the manner in which a specific resource was produced affect the ordering, proximity, and exchangeability with other resources, and how might it affect people's cognitive, emotional, and behavioral reactions to the resource, to exchanges with it, and to gains and losses of the resource? If, for instance, people's emotional reactions to the manner in which a resource is produced influences their evaluation of the resource (see Törnblom and Kazemi 2007:42, Assumption 1), how would people's reactions to the gain or loss of a liked and disliked resource be affected?

Linkages Between the Production, Acquisition, Possession, and Provision of Resources

May determine and characterize the process of exchange transaction. There are certain possible, but so far seemingly unrecognized, "resource transformations" that might occur due to certain linkages among the production, acquisition, possession, and provision of social resources,

linkages that may characterize and affect exchange transactions. These insights reveal relationships among resource classes that have implications beyond the common focus on resource exchangeability. We can merely hint at some of them here, and their role and significance will have to await future exploration.

“Resource-of-Origin” and “Resource-of-Possession” Linkage


A resource possessed by a person may emanate from a similar (identical) or a different kind of resource, that is, be produced/acquired via the same kind of resource or via a dissimilar type. For example, the code for a safety box (information) may be obtained via written instructions in the manual (via information), purchased (via money),

or forcefully extracted by inflicting pain on the owner (via disservice) (Box. 3.8).

“Resource-of-Possession” and “Resource-of-Distribution” Linkage

A resource possessed by P may be transformed into another when it is provided to O. More precisely, it may be presented in the form of an identical as well as in the form of a different kind of resource. For example, a person’s landscaping know-how (information) may be written down and provided to someone as instructions (information), or it may be transformed into a physically provided resource (service – i.e., activities that affect a person’s body or belongings and that often constitute labor) by actually doing the hard labor.

Box 3.8 Resource Linkages



(i) “Resource-of-Origin” → “Resource-of-Possession” Linkage:

Production/acquisition of a resource of possession may occur via an identical or a different resource. For instance, car repairing instructions (i.e., information) may be found on the web for free or be purchased in a store (i.e., money).

A(a) → B or A(b) → B

(ii) “Resource-of-Possession” → “Resource-of-Distribution” Linkage:

A resource of possession may be provided (distributed) in the form of an identical or a different resource. For instance, car repairing knowledge (i.e., information) may be conveyed via written instructions (i.e., information), or via actual repair of the car (i.e., service).

B → C(a) or B → C(b)

Resource Production and Its Distribution May Coincide

It usually does not enter our mind that production and distribution often happen in one and the same process, they are the same, one phenomenon designated by two terms. For example, when a service is provided, it is simultaneously materialized, that is, the service does not exist before it is provided; it cannot be produced before it is provided. The message I give does not exist before I give it. We can, perhaps, claim that a service may exist in a prepotent form as information or knowledge concerning how to perform the service. However, a service does not exist and has not been produced (and cannot be possessed) before it is provided. Only a “prepotent service resource” in the form of information is available. Thus, *production is sometimes identical with distribution*; the two may constitute one process, rather than two separate processes. This seems equally true for status and is partly true for love in its physical forms. However, money, goods, and information resources must be produced before they can be allocated.

Whether or not the impact of mode of production on justice conceptions or on some other dependent variable is moderated by:

1. Whether or not the resource of possession and the resource from which the resource of possession originated are identical or dissimilar.
2. The form in which the produced resource is allocated (i.e., identical or dissimilar form).
3. Instances in which production and distribution constitute one process (rather than two separate processes) are interesting topics for future investigations, and these considerations seem to lack previous theoretical and empirical attention.

Actual and Potential Contributions of Resource Theory to Different Research Areas and Theoretical Frameworks

We know enough now to be sure that no one theory is going to encompass all the complexity of human relationships. It is therefore important to establish links with other theories in the field. ... Resource theory will develop in its own right, but it must also establish links with related endeavors.

(Hinde 1993:274)

Unfortunately, social resource theory has not been as influential as it arguably should have been. However, the previous volume on developments of SRT (Foa et al. 1993) did feature some chapters discussing the relations between SRT and a handful of other theories. The relevance and potential of the SRT framework for providing an integrative perspective on research in a number of areas is pretty obvious, and a continuation of this effort is documented in this handbook, where several chapters suggest how SRT may contribute to, and be integrated with, several other models and theories. There are, for instance, important aspects and properties of outcomes (i.e., resources) that justice and other theories have overlooked. Some of the areas that may benefit from various insights generated by SRT are social stratification, power (e.g., Ng 1982), status (in)consistency and crystallization, social comparison (e.g., Törnblom et al. 1993), personality (e.g., Stangl 1993), interpersonal and social conflict (e.g., Bierbrauer and Klinger 2005), aggression, prosocial behavior, social dilemmas (e.g., Dawes 1980; Poppe 2005), relative deprivation, quality of life and work satisfaction (e.g., Gerson 1976), and stress (e.g., Hobfoll 1989), to mention a few. The contributions by the prominent scholars in this handbook will hopefully make the (heuristic) value of SRT obvious to researchers who may hitherto be unfamiliar with it. In the following, we briefly discuss the relevance of SRT to the topics of social justice, social exclusion, well-being, social dilemmas, social comparisons, and volunteering.

Social Justice

Focusing on the two major types of justice judgments discussed in the literature, that is, distributive and procedural justice, more research efforts have been devoted, in general, to mapping the connections between social resources and distributive justice (Hatfield and Rapson, Chap. 28; Törnblom and Vermunt 1999; Törnblom and Foa 1983; Törnblom and Kazemi 2007). Integration or cross-fertilization attempts concerning procedural justice and resource theories were made very recently (Törnblom and Vermunt 2007; for

theorizing and empirical findings in this field, see Chaps. 11, 23, and 25). In the following, we will briefly address the usefulness of the SRT framework in the area of distributive justice.

Three features of social resources are relevant in the discussion of distributive justice, namely, the nature or the type allocated resource, resource quantity (i.e., whether the resource is abundant or scarce), and resource valence (whether the allocated resource is positive or negative).

As discussed earlier, based on the locality of the resources in the circular order along the two dimensions of particularism and concreteness, resources are assumed to have different characteristics. This assumption has a very crucial implication for lay justice conceptions of allocation events, that is, an allocation principle may be perceived as fair in the allocation of a specific type of resource and unfair for a different social resource. For example, research indicates that people usually prefer a merit-based allocation of monetary resources such as money or securities, while the distribution of socio-emotional resources such as love and care is considered fair if the distribution is accomplished according to equality or need (Martin and Harder 1994). Furthermore, the more particularistic a resource is, the greater the expectation that the investment answered with the same type of resource. If not, we tend to perceive the exchange as unfair (Foa and Stein 1980).

Another attribute of social resources is their quantity. Research shows that scarce resources are allocated according to merit or need. When resources are in abundance, distributive justice becomes either irrelevant or is established by egalitarian allocations. Interestingly, the more particularistic the resource is, and the more it is exchanged in more abstract or symbolic ways, the more difficult, if not impossible, to determine its quantity. Thus, the relationship between resource quantity and preferred or just allocations is far from unambiguous as the quantity of less particularistic (more universalistic) and less abstract (more concrete) resources is easier to define and determine than more particularistic and abstract resources.

Resource valence is another crucial factor for gaining a deeper understanding of people's

fairness conceptions of allocation processes. Research results are far from conclusive in this respect though. One line of research shows that resource valence does not affect resource allocation, that is, gains and losses are distributed in the same way. This research shows that the preference for equality is greater than for merit principle (e.g., Griffith 1989; Utz and Sassenberg 2002). Another line of research indicates that positively valent resources (e.g., profits or surplus) are distributed according to the principle of equality and loss or deficit in accordance with the merit principle (e.g., Mannix et al. 1995; Törnblom and Ahlin 1998). Kazemi and Eek (2007) explained the conflicting results of how gains and losses are distributed by proposing and showing that positively and negatively valent resources are allocated according to different criteria or principles to the extent that these principles are perceived as conducive in realizing different types of collective goals. As this research has mainly used positive and negative valence of money (i.e., allocation of gains/profits/surpluses and losses/deficits, respectively), future research should more closely look into the dynamics and processes governing allocation decisions by taking into account Foa's six positive resources together with their negative counterparts to see whether the degree of particularism and/or concreteness of resources at hand makes any difference in people's reasoning and decisions.

Social Exclusion

Opatow (1990) defines exclusion as "when individuals or groups are perceived as outside the boundary within which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply." However, the objects of moral values and rules of fairness have been remained unspecified. Drawing on SRT, objects can be conceived of in terms of different types of social resources. As mentioned earlier, people's life conditions may be conceived and described in terms of resource configurations. Losses of various social resources are a source of social exclusion – that in turn may cause stress and feelings of injustice. Perceived in terms of

Foa's classification of social resources, some people may experience losses of goods, money, and information, while others may suffer losses of services, status, and love. As the latter's losses include particularistic resources, the values of which are determined by the identity of the provider, and the former's losses are composed by impersonal resources, it is reasonable to assume that their respective emotional reactions might differ in kind and intensity. Furthermore, the different patterns of losses produce different kinds of social exclusion, and the consequences of which are likely to vary with a number of different factors, such as type of comparisons, locus of control, and social support. These and other related dynamics form the basis for several lines of research.

Kazemi (2009a) found that people with universalistic resource preferences (i.e., money, goods, and information) reported a higher level of social exclusion and a lower level of life satisfaction, whereas people with particularistic resource preferences (i.e., love, status, and services) reported a lower level of social exclusion and a higher level of life satisfaction. Drawing on Stangl (1993) stating that people with particularistic and universalistic preferences differ in social skills with the former type scoring higher than the latter, Kazemi (2009a) explained that people with particularistic preferences experience social exclusion to a lesser extent than people with universalistic preferences, as the former knows more about how to handle his/her social environment.

Subjective and Social Well-Being

Well-being has traditionally in the psychological literature been defined and measured in terms of the three components of life: satisfaction, positive, and negative affect (Diener 1984). Kazemi (2009b, 2011) argued that this current conceptualization and measurement of well-being was inadequate for the very simple reason that humans are social creatures and many of our needs are satisfied via, or in interaction with, other people and that the notion well-being therefore

should also consider the social aspects of human life. Kazemi (2011) proposed and validated five dimensions of social well-being in the context of the workplace. According to this framework, each and every individual has to handle five different types of challenges or questions in social encounters and groups, that is, (1) am I included and do I have something in common with other people? (called social integration); (2) will they accept my way of thinking and trust me? (called social acceptance); (3) do I have something to contribute to the group? (called social contribution); (4) does the social context provide room for personal growth and improvement? (called social actualization); and (5) do I understand the how things are organized and operate in the social environment? (called social coherence). These dimensions were then found to be positively related to overall life satisfaction, positive affect, job satisfaction, and organizational commitment and negatively related to work tension and negative affect. Interestingly, Kazemi (2011) concluded that the study identified dimensions of *conditions* contributing to social well-being and *not* the *sense* of social well-being per se and suggested that insights from SRT would be of great help for future theorizing in this area. Specifically, different types of resources tap into different needs, and need satisfaction is fundamental to the sense of well-being; thus, resource exchange should prove to be a fruitful concept in well-being research. SRT is a very powerful and useful theoretical tool as it has an explicit emphasis on the social aspect of personal functioning. As SRT conceives interpersonal exchanges in terms of different resource classes, using SRT might help us mapping the social nature of well-being by focusing on the cognitions (i.e., being satisfied with one's life) and emotions (i.e., experiencing positive or negative emotions) in exchanging various types of resources in different domains of our social life (e.g., family, work).

Social Dilemmas

The ecological validity of social dilemma research has been criticized. The major argument has been

that one cannot generalize from experimental laboratory research to real-life dilemmas. What this criticism has not considered is that real-life social dilemmas involve more than just money which is the resource type that is most frequently studied.

Social dilemmas are formally defined as situations in which individual outcomes for noncooperative behavior are larger than outcomes for cooperative behavior, regardless of how other members in the collective behave, but if all members adhere to this behavior, all members will acquire a lower payoff than if all had chosen to cooperate in the first place (Dawes 1980). Social dilemmas can be categorized according to different criteria (e.g., Komorita and Parks 1994). A common distinction is based on the focus of the dilemma, that is, whether one is harvesting from a common resource (a common resource dilemma) or contributing to the establishment of a common good (a public good dilemma). In a typical resource dilemma experiment, each individual is allowed to take *money* or *goods* (using Foas' terminology) from a collective resource once or on successive trials. Participants are informed that they can keep their harvests, usually operationalized as points exchangeable for money, as long as the total amount harvested by the whole group does not exceed the total size of the pool or its rate of replenishment. Participants in public good dilemma experiments are instructed to contribute some or all of their endowments (i.e., to cooperate) in order to establish a common resource or to keep them (i.e., to defect). The endowments (almost always *money*⁴) contributed to the public good are multiplied by a con-

stant larger than one. This means that the value of the contributed endowment is larger than the value of a noncontributed endowment.

Poppe (2005) argued that not only are the decision structures of social dilemmas important but also the content or the context of the particular social dilemma situation. Poppe concluded that a classification of daily real-life social dilemmas is very important for research in this area. This call is in agreement with not forgetting the reality aspect of social dilemma research but also with our proposal focusing on the nature of resource as the basis for the conflict between individual and collective interests. This suggests a new classification of social dilemmas based on Foas' resource typology. Furthermore, by considering insights from SRT, the basic concepts, propositions, and empirical findings have to be revisited and revised in the light of different characteristics of the resource classes and the rules that govern their exchange (see also Chap. 12 in this volume).

Social Comparison

Festinger's (1954) social comparison theory posits that people acquire self-evaluative information by comparing one's own opinions and abilities to those of others'. Schachter (1959) added emotions, relative deprivation theorists focused on different outcomes, while Adams (1965) and other equity theorists included a variety of both inputs and outcomes as objects of comparison. Masters and Keil (1987) noted that "...the focus of research and theory about comparison evaluations is constrained to a relatively small range of comparison objects [...]. Conclusions about comparison processes drawn from research must be made with an awareness of how the objects of comparison in that research may limit generalization." They concluded that "attention should be given to the classification of what may constitute object of comparison." Levine and Moreland (1987) reasoned in the same vein and stated that "At this point, little if anything is known about how the desire to evaluate a particular type of outcome [object of comparison] influences the

⁴For exceptions, see Eek, Biel, and Gärling (1998) investigating child-care *services* (see also Eek and Biel 2003); see Kimmerle, Cress, and Hesse (2007); Cress, Barquero, Schwan, and Hesse (2007); and Cress and Kimmerle (2008) for social dilemmas involving *information* sharing/exchange. However, despite that these studies make use of other types of resources than money and goods (i.e., universalistic and concrete resources), the research lacks an overarching framework, and the research has thus not been designed to test any predictions concerning the impact of resource type on the cooperation rate in social dilemmas.

selection of a comparison target. ... A typology of outcomes must first be developed.”

The appearance of social resource theory provided a classification of the various types of inputs and outcomes in terms of which comparisons might occur, namely, the social resources love (e.g. warmth, comfort), services, status (e.g., ability), information (e.g., opinions), goods, and money. Thus, the *variety of objects* in terms of which comparisons may take place was greatly expanded. In addition, the objects of comparison (i.e., resources) are systematically classified along two dimensions, and the ways the objects relate to each other are specified.

Drawing on insights from SRT, Kazemi and Törnblom (2010) modified some basic propositions of social comparison theory and reformulated them in a new set of propositions. Festinger (1954) argued that social comparisons are made when objective standards are unavailable. However, he did not elaborate this argument into propositions about the conditions under which objective standards *are* available. Kazemi and Törnblom (2010) proposed that objective comparisons are more likely for universalistic comparison objects (e.g., money, goods), partly because they have a standardized value in an exchange market (in contrast to particularistic resources). They also reformulated another of Festinger’s basic propositions (“The tendency to compare oneself with some other specific person decreases as the *difference between his opinion and ability and one’s own* increases”). Kazemi and Törnblom assumed that “the tendency to compare oneself with some other specific person decreases with decreasing particularism of the resource that is the object of comparison” (i.e., *social distance*). They also proposed that “Given a range of possible persons for comparison, the more particularistic the resource of comparison, the more likely someone part of one’s close relationships will be chosen for comparison” (i.e., *affective resource-relationship similarity*).

Volunteering

According to the functional theory of volunteer motivation (Clary et al. 1998), volunteer work is

initiated and maintained for different reasons or motives (e.g., to express or act on important core values, to gain career-related experience through volunteering, to grow psychologically). Thus, according to this theory, volunteering behavior is not motivated by only altruistic motives but also egoistic motives. Kazemi (2007) examined for the first time whether the type of motive that drives volunteer work may predict the weight that is assigned to different types of volunteer work in terms of resources invested. Analyses showed that universalistic resource investment was more associated with “egoistic” motives (e.g., career, feeling good about yourselves) and that particularistic resource investment was more associated with more “altruistic” motives (e.g., act on important core humanistic values).

Summary and Conclusions

This chapter presented a number of issues related to various aspects of SRT which would seem to benefit from further developments. Subsequent to discussing some definitional and conceptual matters, we raised the question of to what extent Foas’ resource typology meet the criteria of parsimony, generation of testable hypotheses, mutual exclusiveness, and exhaustiveness. The first three criteria appeared to be largely satisfied, while exhaustiveness may require further elaborations of SRT.

We also asked whether dimensions (other than concreteness and particularism) that have been suggested by theorists in various contexts might be theoretically fruitful. Another issue concerned the possibility of finding dimensions or criteria on the basis of which the large variety of specific items that represent each of Foas’ six resource classes, that is, resource subtypes, can be categorized into subclasses. It seems that the Foas did not discuss the possibility that within-class differences may sometimes be larger than between-class differences. Next, we listed 15 new exchange rules that Foa and Foa had formulated on the basis of their theory. We discussed the validity of some of these, as it seems somewhat unclear how they were derived.

The Foas distinguished between giving and taking away as two basic “behavioral” modes. The predictive value of this distinction can easily be improved by specifying the wide range of different ways in which giving and taking may be enacted. Also, various meanings may be assigned to the outcome depending on the manner and nature of giving or taking (e.g., a positive outcome may be understood as a reward, a profit, a lucky draw of fate, etc., and a negative outcome may be interpreted as a punishment, a loss, a cost, etc.). A third mode not discussed by the Foas is withholding, that is, an act resulting in neither an increase nor decrease of the amount of a resource – status quo is maintained, although when an increment is expected, withholding might be as frustrating as a withdrawal. A large number of additional allocation patterns and dynamics could be distinguished as based on four basic modes of exchange (i.e., giving-giving, giving-requesting, requesting-giving, and requesting-requesting).

Additional issues concerned the production and acquisition of resources, how the way a resource is produced or acquired may affect our attitude toward the resource, and the ways in which this knowledge might affect exchange. Different types of linkages between the production, acquisition, possession, and provision of resources were distinguished, and we proposed that they might affect the process of resource exchange in various ways. These linkages may provide insights concerning relationships among resource classes that have hitherto been neglected and that have implications beyond the usual foci of exchange theories. Finally, we briefly addressed the relevance of SRT to the topics of social justice, social exclusion, well-being, social dilemmas, social comparisons, and volunteering.

The intention of this chapter was to highlight some issues that we think deserve attention in future developments of SRT. It is encouraging and gratifying to see that many of these issues have been addressed by the contributors to this handbook.

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Part II

Conceptual and Theoretical Developments

Toward an Expansion of Resource Exchange Theory: A Facet Approach

4

Clara Sabbagh and Shlomit Levy

In his writings about the history of the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research and its scientific contributions to the social sciences (including facet theory), Louis Guttman (1973), who was the founder and scientific director of the institute, tells about the beginnings of his collaboration with Uriel Foa, who immigrated with his wife Milena to Palestine in the 1940s, as a young Zionist pioneer from Parma, Italy. Guttman and Foa first met in the framework of the Hagana (i.e., the underground army of the Jewish population before Israel's foundation in 1948) when Guttman, who set up a volunteer research unit on morale in the Hagana, sought interviewers with a social science background for his study. At that time, Foa, who held a degree from the University of Rome, had begun his Ph.D. studies at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and volunteered for this study. After completing his doctoral thesis (in 1947) on Shabbat observance among the Yemenites in Jerusalem, Foa, who was interested in social psychology and new techniques of data analysis, continued to collaborate with Guttman as

executive director of the institute. He was also involved in designing and conducting surveys on issues related to the problems of the Israeli Jewish population. In 1965, Foa immigrated to the United States and taught at the universities of Illinois and Missouri as well as at Temple University until his retirement in 1982. In 1990, he passed away at the age of 74 (Triandis 1991).

We introduced this short personal note to indicate that in the earlier stages of his career, Uriel Foa was closely acquainted with Guttman's idea of facet theory (Guttman 1982, 1991; Levy 1994, 2005) and participated in the early stages of its development (Foa 1961, 1963, 1965). As suggested below, Foa's resource exchange theory borrows notions from facet theory (for earlier ideas, see Foa 1961), though it does not further develop it within its general framework (Borg and Shye 1995; Levy 1985, 2005). This chapter attempts to disentangle and further elaborate the exchange rationale underlying the similarities and differences of resource classes by means of facet theory's mapping sentence which provides a general conceptual framework for simultaneously classifying the various aspects of interpersonal resource exchange.

We thank Kjell Törnblom and Ali Kazemi for their insightful comments.

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Resource Exchange Theory: An Overview

Many scholars across the social sciences have assumed that interpersonal relations can be understood in terms of the mutual exchange

(giving and receiving) of a social resource. Yet, they have differed in their assumptions regarding the nature and dynamics of resource exchange. Leaning on rational premises, the most prominent social exchange model has conceived people in interpersonal relations as economic actors who make contributions in return for which they expect to receive rewards; that is, they are likely to consider resource exchange with others if it maximizes their outcomes at minimal costs (Adams 1965; Blau 1967; Homans 1958; Thibaut and Kelley 1959; Walster et al. 1978). This model, however, has mainly focused on the interpersonal exchange of economic resources and actors' perception and redressive (reciprocal) behavior that is connected to the *amount* of the (economic) resource that is being exchanged. For instance, when benefits are perceived to be too small or too great in relation to others in a similar exchange, the result is perceived as inequitable exchange (Homans 1961). Thus, it has been implicitly assumed that the rules of exchange pertaining to economic resources can be similarly applied to other kinds of resources.

Foa's resource exchange theory, however, suggests that the above (self-interest) model of interpersonal exchange, which is characteristic of economic behavior (exchange) in advanced societies' specialized institutions, cannot be extended to different kinds of resources and institutions (Foa 1971). In other words, the rules of social exchange and their behavioral implications (including problem solving) cannot be determined solely by the *amount* (intensity) of economic resources that are being exchanged, but rather the *quality* of resource in kind that is being exchanged should also be considered (Donnenwerth and Foa 1974; Teichman and Foa 1975). For instance, whereas the self-interested view is applicable to money (giving away money implies a loss), it is not necessarily applicable to love (giving away love may imply a gain rather than a loss). It is worth noting that the idea that the kind of resource may play different roles in social exchange is not new (see, e.g., Galston 1980; Walzer 1983; Weber 1968), though authors have paid little attention to the patterns of relationships among these classes of resources (for an exception, see below, Parsons 1951).

Foa and Foa's (1980) resource theory defines a resource as "any item *concrete* or *symbolic*, which can become the object of exchange among people" (p. 78). Moreover, it identifies six classes of resources which can become the object of exchange among people (Foa and Foa 1980, p. 79): *love* is "an expression of affectionate regard, warmth, or comfort"; *status* is "an expression of evaluative judgment which conveys high or low prestige, regard, or esteem"; *information* "includes advice, opinions, instruction, or enlightenment"; *money* is "a coin, currency, or token which has some standard unit of exchange value"; *goods* are "tangible products, objects, or materials"; and *services* are "activities on the body or belongings of a person which often constitute labor for another." Rather than classifying resource classes in terms of individuals' actions, the theory suggests that resources refer to a (subjective) *meaning* that is ascribed to actions in interpersonal exchange (Foa and Foa 1974, p. 81). Specifically, each resource class can be classified by means of two quality "dimensions" (hereafter, "facets" –): concreteness/symbolism and particularism/universalism. With regard to the concreteness/symbolism facet, money (and goods) involve the exchange of a tangible activity or product and hence are concrete resources, whereas love and information are more symbolic. The latter particularism/universalism facet, which was borrowed from Parsons (1951), signifies the degree to which the resource value is determined by the specific individuals and relationships involved in the exchange. Love, services, and status are largely particularistic resources because their value is context- and person-bound. In contrast, learning opportunities and money are universalistic because they retain the same value regardless of the context and persons involved in the transaction. It is worth noting that in this classification resources are represented as ideal types, that is, hypothetical constructs. In reality, resources may combine different characteristics. For instance, money can appear as an abstract resource (e.g., stocks and bonds) and love can be expressed in a concrete form (e.g., physical lovemaking).

Foa and Foa (1974) suggest that the above classification generates a circular structure of resources that implies behavioral hypotheses pertaining to interpersonal exchange. Specifically, it reflects not only the similarities and differences of resources but also the degree of their exchangeability; rather than exchanging each resource separately, individuals are conceived as exchanging resources in a holistic form. That is, it is expected that a person will more frequently exchange resources that are adjacent to each other in the structure than resources that are distant. For instance, love and services are adjacent and therefore exchangeable because they share the properties of “concreteness,” and “particularism”; money and love, however, are distant in terms of the a priori classification of contents facets, that is, they have no shared content properties and are therefore not easily exchangeable: The first kind of resource can be characterized by an instrumental modality, whereas the second is of an affective one. Moreover, the behavioral reactions resulting from an exchange, such as being satisfied or hostile and willing to retaliate, are assumed to be more similar for resources that are close to each other in the circular ordering than for resources that are distant (Donnenwerth and Foa 1974; Teichman and Foa 1975). Specifically, a behavioral reaction resulting from a resource exchange (e.g., satisfaction) can be ordered in a circular fashion (see the discussion section) so that it increases (or decreases) as one moves from the least to the most universalistic resource (see also Schwartz and Bilsky 1990). It is worth noting that this structural hypothesis was found to be valid for both positive and negative exchanges – when people receive or are deprived of a specific resource (Donnenwerth and Foa 1974). Thus, resource theory accommodates different classes of social resources and their respective rules of exchange within a single conceptual framework.

In sum, Foa and Foa (1980, p. 79) stress that their conceptualization specifies different classes of social resources and their respective rules of exchange “within a single framework that accommodates the differences as well as their similarities.” This view corresponds to Guttman’s (1954b, 1982, 1992) mapping sentence, that is, a concep-

tual definitional framework for a universe of contents – which in our case refers to the universe of interpersonal resource exchange (see also Levy 1976, 1985, 2005). In other words, the above conception makes it possible to analyze resource exchange pertaining to different kinds of resources in a parsimonious yet comprehensive way (Foa and Foa 1974). However, as shown in the following sections, the above Foa and Foa’s facets for organizing the contents of the different resource classes (i.e., degree of concreteness and particularism) are not exclusive – one may identify additional facets which might elicit a different structural pattern of resource classes.

About Facet Theory: A General Overview

Facet theory, developed by Louis Guttman, is a systematic approach to coordinating theory and research. It integrates the constituents of scientific endeavor: the formal definition of the research problem in the form of facets (a facet is a set classifying research issues) and the hypotheses of relationships between the definition and aspects of empirical observations as expressed by the correspondence between the faceted definitional system and the empirical structure of the observations defined by the facets. Thus, facet theory comprises the population of respondents, the definitional framework of the research question, and the construction of hypotheses which link the definitional system with aspects of the empirical data.

Most social-behavioral concepts are multivariate, and therefore, their study requires a systematic design for the definition of observations. Moreover, if the definitional design is to lead to cumulative results, it should be in a form that aids perception of systematic relationships with the empirical data. For defining concepts, the facet approach places the emphasis on the universe of the observations of the concept. To define the observations, Guttman introduced the mapping sentence device which is intended to guide the construction of observations in a fashion that allows the formulation of hypotheses. Each facet

in the mapping sentence has a specific role in partitioning the space of the empirical observations. The general hypothesis of facet theory is that specifying formal roles to the facets in a mapping sentence provides a rationale for structural hypotheses which ultimately lead to the establishment of empirical structural laws, thereby contributing toward cumulative social science. A detailed description of the concept of a mapping sentence is to be found in the following section. Particular multivariate nonmetric data analysis methods, such as similarity structure analysis (SSA) and partial-order structure analysis with base coordinates (POSAC), were developed by Guttman to test these structural hypotheses.

The facet approach, together with its nonmetric data analysis procedures, has been found useful in a wide variety of scientific disciplines and has provided new insights primarily in the social sciences (intelligence and testing issues, attitudes, social indicators, social values, ethnic identities, marketing, clinical and social psychology, multitrait-multimethod, and so on) but also in other scientific disciplines, such as technological disciplines, life sciences, and medical issues. The power of facet theory in locating problems and its use as a tool for policy making should also be mentioned. Indeed, when discussing the complex problem of defining domain boundaries in the social sciences, Clyde Coombs (1982, p. 78) states that he believes that Guttman's facet theory is "the only substantial attempt to provide a general theory for characterizing domains; in this sense it is a metatheory. As behavioral science advances, so will the need for such theory."

The Concept of the Mapping Sentence

For the purpose of theory construction and research design, it has been found useful to define concepts through the universe of items with which the theory is concerned (Guttman 1982). In previous studies, the mapping sentence has been effectively applied as an integrative definitional framework for a variety of concepts (see, e.g., Bloombaum 1999; Cohen and Levy 2006; Elizur and Sagie 1999; Guttman 1965, 1992; Guttman and Levy 1991;

Halevi 1976; Waks 1995). In the following, we adopt facet approach's notion of the mapping sentence for expanding the conceptualization of interpersonal exchange of resources.

The mapping sentence is a definitional framework for the universe of content of a given issue that provides a basis for stating and testing hypotheses and thus facilitates systematic theory construction (Borg and Shye 1995; Guttman 1959, 1982; Levy 1976, 1985, 2005). The mapping sentence generalizes R.A. Fisher's (1935) design of experiments to the design of any observations. It incorporates formal facets with informal verbal connectives needed for actual empirical work. Each facet is one way of classifying the research variables, according to some rule. Since any research content is usually classified in more than one way, the mapping sentence includes several content facets, ten in our case (see below). Each facet appears in the mapping sentence as a set of elements in bracketed columnar form. The elements match the name (rule) of the facet. Verbal connectives are added to the facets to make the mapping sentence readable in ordinary language like the one presented below for defining the universe of content of interpersonal resource exchange.

The name (rule) of each facet (underlined) appears right before or after its list of elements, depending on the verbal structure of the sentence.

A mapping sentence includes three kinds of facets. The first – usually symbolized as X – designates the *population* under study. The second kind classifies the *contents* of the variables (facets A–I in the mapping sentence below). These two kinds together define the *domain* of the mapping sentence. The third kind is the *range* (designated by R), namely, the set of response categories specified for the universe of items under study. The research design is expressed by the mapping sentence as a whole which calls for assigning to each respondent (in the population facet X) a value in the range facet R for each item classified by the contents facets (A–I).

Background traits of the respondents are also part of the study, though not part of the universe of content. This fact is indicated in the text that follows the range facet of the mapping sentence

implying further classifications of the population (resource providers – facet (X) and the recipients (Y)) into categories of background traits, such as gender, age, ethnic origin, etc., which may play an important role in the process of the interpersonal resource exchange.

The number of derivable sentences from a mapping sentence may be very large, depending on the number of facets and the number of elements within each facet. Though in practice, it may be impossible to carry out the total design, it is possible to systematically construct a sample of items that will nevertheless suffice to yield the essential information about the facets. Apart from constituting a definitional framework for observations, the mapping sentence also serves as a basis for constructing empirical structural hypotheses (a general discussion on the role of a mapping sentence can be found in Guttman 1982; Levy 1985, 2005). Moreover, the mapping sentence helps to ensure clarity and reliability and also facilitates formulation of empirical lawfulness.

The specification of formal roles to facets in a mapping sentence provides a rationale for constructing structural theories concerning the correspondence between the definitional framework (the mapping sentence) and an aspect of the empirical data, thereby facilitating the formation of scientific lawfulness in cumulative fashion. Indeed, the regional lawfulness to which the similarity structure analysis (SSA) is a partner supports this general hypothesis about structural theories. SSA, which is an intrinsic data analysis technique for viewing a similarity (correlation) coefficient matrix, looks at content regions in the space of variables rather than at coordinate systems (Borg and Lingoes 1987; Guttman 1968; Lingoes 1968). The moment one speaks about lawfulness linking a definitional framework with empirical structure, one is already speaking about theory.

Specifying the Facets of Resource Exchange Theory

As suggested above, Foa and Foa's (1974) resource exchange theory became known mainly by the circular ordering of resources that is obtained by

plotting them according to the two content facets of concreteness and particularism. However, as discussed below, literature identifies additional facets that are needed for the conceptualization of interpersonal exchange resources in order to establish a structural theory for interpersonal exchange of resources. In the following, we present the facets for describing the universe of contents of interpersonal resource exchange and then integrate these facets into a mapping sentence. As suggested above, the mapping sentence requires specification of both the universe of contents (or items) and the population to be observed.

The Population Facet (X): The Provider

When considering an interpersonal exchange of resources, it is necessary to distinguish between a provider (X) ("who") is the person responsible for the action and recipient (Y) (to "whom") toward whom the action is being directed (Foa 1965; Foa and Foa 1974). While facet (X) specifies the resource providers (research population), the specified recipients in facet (Y) are the target groups to whom the resource exchange is oriented. In this understanding, however, the individuals/groups involved in resource exchange – that is, a provider (X) or a recipient (Y) – may change roles in accordance with research's design. That is, X may give to herself as well as receive from Y in return for her provision to Y. In this regard, it is important to note that the SSA technique enables revelation of the structure of interpersonal resource exchange in a single space relating simultaneously to the respondents as providers and as recipients of resources (Levy 2005; Levy and Amar 2002).

As indicated above, both providers (facet X) and recipients (facet Y) may be characterized by different intrapersonal and social background traits (e.g., degree of resource's neediness), which are likely to shape the form of exchange (Foa and Foa 1974). For instance, Törnblom and Nilsson (1993) found that both particularistic and universalistic resources are perceived as more sufficient and valued for one's life when they are provided by a particularistic (i.e., closer relationship) rather than by

with their personal (material) interests, expecting others to do the same (Binmore 2005; Burnham and Kurban 2005; Mansbridge 1990).

This conventional wisdom, however, has been challenged across the social sciences and economy in particular (Fehr and Gintis 2007), creating a wider perspective to social exchange and the motivation forces underlying its dynamics. It has been suggested that self-interest cannot account for social exchange that is guided by a wide range of nonrational considerations. These considerations include (a) internalized “normative” motives which refer to the willingness to act appropriately, that is, to conform to social norms (homo sociologicus), (Durkheim 1938; Fetschenhauer et al. 2006; Parsons 1937); (b) “hedonistic” motives which are short term goals related to ones effort to improve his/her physical (hunger, pain, thirst) and psychic (sense of loss and anxiety) states (Fetschenhauer et al. 2006; Millar and Tesser 1992); (c) “justice” motives which are a primary concern among actors and are meant to regulate social exchange according to principled (moral) criteria that may not necessarily correspond to self-interest (Donnenwerth and Foa 1974; Montada 2002; Ross and Miller 2002); (d) the reciprocity motive generally refers to “a feeling of obligation we have to help those who had helped us and not to injure them” (Foa and Foa 1974, p. 244). Recently, a group of researchers have identified the “strong reciprocity” motive which suggests that social exchange is conditional in the sense that it depends upon the action of other relevant agents like relatives or neighbors (Gintis et al. 2005; Henrich et al. 2004). Specifically, people guided by this motive reward acts of generosity (behave unselfishly) as long as others are doing so as well, and they are willing to punish/retaliate (i.e., are altruistic punishers) even at the price of being exposed to material disadvantage or transgressors who act opportunistically; and (e) “altruist” or self-sacrifice motive whereby actors are guided by the attempt to help and or benefit others, even if the action implies a disadvantage for them (Batson 2006; Elster 1990; Hoffman 1981; Kohli and Kunemund 2003; Piliavin and Hong-Wen 1990).

Furthermore, actors in interpersonal exchanges are not necessarily guided by a single motive but rather may simultaneously have different motives

and weigh them according to the situation at stake (Fetschenhauer et al. 2006). Accordingly, it is plausible to assume that when considering the exchange of different kinds of resources, actors are guided by different kinds of motives. For instance, when economic resources are involved, self-interest motives may be at the foreground and others (e.g., altruism) at the background. In another situation, such as an exchange of love, an altruistic motive that was in the background may be brought to the foreground while one that was in the foreground may be brought to the background (e.g., self-interest). Future research, however, should ascertain to what extent this kind of approach is empirically supported.

Facet C: Mode of Resource Transmission: Interpersonal exchange is a form of transmitting resources. Accordingly, a provider can increase or decrease the resources possessed by a target person or recipient by different modes of transmission (Foa and Foa 1974, p. 36). These include (a) *delivery* which refers to the “act of presenting, transferring, handling, or giving something”; (b) *withholding* “is done by refraining from presenting something”; and (c) *withdrawing* “is the act of taking away or removing something that the target person possesses” (Törnblom 1988, p. 149). Based on Törnblom’s ideas (1988, p. 149), one may conclude that all types of resource transmission, including those with positive or negative outcomes for the target person, may be accomplished by one of these modes. For instance, transmission of love to a friend may be accomplished by different modes: one may send him/her a flower (delivery), refrain from visiting him/her as respect of his/her privacy (withholding), or taking some old furniture away from him/her (withdrawing). As shown below, these modes are also applicable for negative exchanges – that is, when resource transmission implies negative outcomes for both providers and target actors or recipients.

Facet D: Availability of the Resource: Törnblom and his colleagues (1993) suggest that the comparison processes characterizing interpersonal exchange comprise not only the choice of a comparison target but also an assessment of resource availability (see Brinberg and Castell 1993). That

is, a comparison referring to the actor's evaluation of the amount of a resource (e.g., money) they possess (i.e., *resource possession*) with their ability to acquire a given resource (e.g., money) (i.e., *acquisition ability*). Accordingly, the actors' transmission of resources is likely to be affected both by the comparison target they choose and by the evaluations they make with respect to the amount of resources they possess and with respect to their ability to acquire these resources, respectively. That is, interpersonal exchange refers to both the kind of resource that is being exchanged and to different kinds of (within) comparison objects.

Facets E and F: Resource Characteristics: As discussed above, Foa and Foa (1974), suggested two facets for classifying different kinds of resource characteristics: (1) concreteness/symbolism, namely, the resource concrete or symbolic (facet E) and (2) particularism/universalism of a given kind of resource (facet F).

Facet G: Modality: Foa's six classes of resources can be described by means of a further facet, namely, the modality involved in the resource exchanged. (see Foa 1971, p. 346). This distinction, which has been made since ancient times in a variety of areas, coincides with the three modalities of human behavior: affective ("with the heart," such as love) cognitive ("with the head" such as information and status), and instrumental ("with the hand," such as services, goods, and money), namely, "doing" of any kind and in any way. This trio may take different forms and sometimes are even referred to by different names. For instance, the instrumental modality is often labeled "motoric activity," "active participation," or "experience." This distinction is widely used in the social sciences (to mention but a few Andrews and McKennell 1980; Bloom and Krathwohl 1956; Guttman and Levy 1982; Levy 1985; Levy and Guttman 1975; McKennell and Andrews 1980; Ostrom 1969).

Facet H: Resource Valence: Resource exchange is meaningless if its differential benefit or harm is not taken into account; thus, the positively or negatively valued outcomes of resource exchange constitute an additional facet of the objects that are being transacted. In other words, social resources are seldom

neutral in terms of value: Each specific class of resource (money) is accorded a positive or negative value as determined by its expected outcomes (e.g., earnings have a positive value, whereas taxes have a negative one) (Törnblom 1988).

Foa and his colleagues (Donnenwerth and Foa 1974; Foa and Foa 1974; Foa et al. 1993b; Teichman and Foa 1975), as suggested above, have assumed that the dynamics of relations among different kinds of resources, that is, resources' circular structure and its implications on a wide range of behaviors, is similarly applicable for positive and negative exchanges. For instance, the authors have found that resources closer to one another in the circular order are more frequently exchanged for one another. Similarly, when an actor is deprived of a resource, he/she will tend to retaliate with a resource in kind. Moreover, preference for different forms of retaliatory behavior is a function of resources' similarity/dissimilarity.

In a related study on distributive justice judgments, Sabbagh and Schmitt (1998) showed, however, that examination of this resource valence facet corresponds to social psychological findings that have pointed to an asymmetry between positive and negative outcomes (e.g., Jasso 1993; Meeker and Elliot 1987; Mummendey and Otten 1998; Törnblom and Jonsson 1985; Tversky and Kahneman 1987). Specifically, negative justice judgments seem to be simpler and more strongly experienced than positive ones, reflecting the primacy and high emotional intensity of negative experiences. By means of the similarity structure analysis method (Borg and Lingoes 1987; Guttman 1968), which represented justice judgments' item intercorrelations on a multidimensional space, these dynamics were empirically portrayed in a concentric plane representing a structural hypothesis, whereby the negative justice judgments are located in the "inner," more "central" circle while positive ones are in the "outer" circle.

Facet I: Social Realm: In his earlier works, Foa (1971) indicated that interpersonal resource exchange features, such as the occurrence of an exchange, the motivational states of participants, and so on, are differently facilitated and constrained by the specific characteristics of institutional realms. Specifically, exchange of universalistic resources, like money, is more efficiently carried

out in specialized institutional realms such as those characterizing market societies. Moreover, in this type of realm, the exchange of particularistic resources, such as love, is likely to be disregarded (Foa 1971). That is, a resource class may be assigned different meanings depending upon the nature of those institutional spheres in which interpersonal resource exchange is taking place. Moreover, the patterns of exchange and their frequency profile of resources that are being exchanged are realms-specific (Foa 1971, p. 19). It is thus important to conceptualize exchange as a context-bound phenomenon in which resources meaning and patterns of exchange may vary across different spheres (see also Berg et al. 1993).

The idea that the dynamics of resource exchange may vary across different social realms (e.g., education, family, religion, leisure, and so on) is also implied in Michael Walzer's (1983) seminal book *Spheres of Justice*. The author suggests that in democratic societies, particularly liberal ones, it is possible to identify distinct spheres of resource distribution in which different classes of social goods (resources) are distributed according to a group of justice principles that corresponds to each sphere. Moreover, a given resource can be assigned different socio-cultural meanings and hence different preferred distributive rules, both within and between realms (Sabbagh 2003; Törnblom et al. 1985).

Facet R: The Common Range of Interpersonal Resource Exchange

When describing how interpersonal resource exchange is structured, Foa and Foa (1974, p. 40) explicitly referred to some of the above facets as integral components yielding different classes of interpersonal behavior: the mode of transition facet C, specifying two modes of resource transmission (giving and taking away), two facets specifying two characteristics of resources (facets F and G) – concreteness/symbolism and particularism/universalism, and the three modalities involved in resource exchange (facet H): affective, cognitive, and instrumental. (Foa 1971, p. 346). The Cartesian product of these facets elicits at least 24 forms ($2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 3 = 24$) of interpersonal

exchange. Each of these forms may differently affect providers and recipients and elicit different behavioral responses. In the previous section, we suggested that these basic forms of exchange may be expanded through the consideration of additional facets that structure interpersonal exchange. These different facets and their respective elements are formally represented in the mapping sentence presented above.

Though striving for formality by its formal facets, the mapping sentence is at the same time a flexible device. It enables fruitful strategies for systematic theory development because it lends itself easily, but systematically, to corroboration, correction, deletion, extension (adding elements to a facet), and intension (adding content facets).

The 10 content facets (A–I) of the mapping sentence classify the content of the variables. They specify both similarities and differences in the universe of contents of interpersonal resource exchange. However, something must hold all these aspects together. This commonality is sought in terms of a common range, which deals mainly with the similarity among items, specified in the *range* facet (R). This facet is located to the right of the arrow in the mapping sentence, whereas the population facets (X and Y) and the content facets A–I, which constitute the *domain* of the mapping sentence, are located to the left of the arrow in the mapping sentence.

The concept of the common range is sought here in terms of a respondent's (provider or recipient) evaluation of the outcomes pertaining to the interpersonal resource exchange. Based on Törnblom (1988), we suggest that these outcomes can be classified according to the degree of benefits vis-à-vis harm created by a specific resource exchange, that is, respondents' evaluations of the extent of beneficial or aversive exchange (negative) outcome (Foa et al. 1993a). Hence, the range facet (R) refers to the response categories to the items defined by content facets (A–I). Though the wording of a response may differ from item to item, depending on the specific content, it must be interpreted in each case as ranging from "benefit" to "harm" outcome regarding the interpersonal resource exchange. The arrow in the mapping sentence indicates the mapping of the *domain* into the *range* facet (R) of

possible responses. An actual observation is made by choosing one and only one element (response) from the range (facet R) for each sentence (item) that is generated by the domain facets (facets A–I) (Guttman 1991).

This mapping sentence yields an enormous number of possible sentences (profiles) – that is, 21,600 sentences which is the result of the multiplication: $2 \times 5 \times 3 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 3 \times 2 \times 5$, where each number corresponds to the number of elements of each of the 10 content facets. Each sentence represents a different form of interpersonal resource exchange and is the basis for formulating more than one research question that can be systematically examined on the empirical level (for a similar approach, see also Törnblom 1988). As indicated by Guttman (1992, p. 597) “Carrying out such a total design is generally impossible in practice, and – following R. A. Fisher – ways are sought in each case in practice to make only a small sample of observations that will nevertheless suffice to yield essential information desired about the facets.” Actual item construction has to conform to the research topic, which may result in placing different emphasis on certain facets, and within facets on certain elements (Levy and Guttman 1989). Endeavor usually lies in (a) representing the facets – all or part – depending on the foci and the aims of the study in constructing the items and (b) replicating the study either by the same items or by constructing new variables according to the same facet design of contents (Guttman 1992).

Discussion

As discussed above, the suggested mapping sentence expands Foa’s framework for analyzing resource exchange on the basis of existing analytical distinctions of resource exchange into more detailed and explicit aspects of interpersonal resource exchange. The suggested mapping sentence can thus guide future research aimed at further mapping of interpersonal resource exchange.

Foa’s theory is based on the contiguity principle which states that variables sharing the same

facet element will be more highly correlated and hence should appear closer together in the space than variables not sharing the same element (Foa 1971). This should hold only if one variable of each kind is used (Guttman 1965, p. 176). One example is Foa’s circumplex of six resources where each resource is represented by only one point, the circularity being determined by their content as classified by the facets (E and F).

A circumplex configuration is a circle on which the items are placed *equally distant* from the origin as schematically presented in Fig. 4.1a. The circular arrangement corresponds to some content of a facet playing a *polarizing* role (i.e., a




Fig. 4.1 (a) Foa and Foa’s (1974) schematic representation of the circular structure of social resources. (b) Graphic representation (SSA of Table 4.1) of the correlation coefficients among preferences of goods when different resources are given: a circumplex

Table 4.1 Intercorrelations among preferences for goods when different resources are given

Resource given	Love	Status	Information	Money	Goods	Services
Love	–	67	53	42	45	49
Status	67	–	74	52	42	45
Information	53	74	–	69	55	54
Money	42	52	69	–	65	61
Goods	45	42	55	65	–	77
Services	49	45	54	61	77	–

Published in Foa and Foa (1974, p. 88)

facet that partitions the space into wedge-like regions emanating from a common origin). Technically, within a correlation matrix, a circumplex is expressed by having the larger coefficients next to the main diagonal, and the coefficients become gradually smaller as their position departs from the main diagonal until they start growing again. The existence of such circularity for the data can be easily checked directly from the coefficients matrix – no computer needed, as in Foa and Foa (1974, p. 88) (see this example in Table 4.1). However, we submitted this coefficients matrix to a similarity structure analysis (SSA), and the empirical circumplex is presented in Fig. 4.1b.

As expected, there is a perfect fit (coefficient of alienation = .00000) between the intercorrelations among the resources in Table 4.1 and their graphic presentation as points on the two-dimensional SSA map in Fig. 4.1b. The six points, one for each resource, lie on an approximate circle (a circumplex) ordered according to Foa's suggested facets (symbolism/concreteness and particularism/universalism) as portrayed schematically also in Fig. 4.1a.

Based on Parsons' (1967) social system theory relating to means of exchange, Sabbagh and her colleagues (1994) suggested that resource exchange can be further regulated by a cybernetic hierarchy of control that orders them according to their capacity for convertibility. In this understanding, the resources can be ordered from the easily converted resources such as money to the least convertible resource, such as love. Hence, as Sabbagh and her colleagues pointed out, one could expect a concentric structure whereby the more convertible and central

resources (the affective resources) are located in the inner bands of the concentric circle, while the more convertible (the instrumental resources) are located in the more peripheral bands (for the multiple roles of the modality facet, see discussion in Levy 1985).

Hence, while Foa and Foa's two facets E (symbolism/concreteness) and F (particularism/universalism) determine the circular order of the resources, the convertibility rationale suggested by Sabbagh and colleagues (1994), gives rise to the hypothesis that the modality of the resource (facet G), determines the distance of the resources from the common origin, conforming to their order according to the rationale of extent of convertibility. Thus, the theory is expanded from a circle (circumplex) (see Fig. 4.1a) to a two-dimensional radex structure (Guttman 1954a) (see Fig. 4.2), given that there are more items corresponding to the resources. Of course, this structure can be further expanded in light of the distinctions provided by the mapping sentence.

The idea of contiguity in facet theory is thus extended to contiguous *regionality*. Each region consists of variables that share the same element, but their intercorrelations within the region may vary greatly. The regions are defined by content considerations which determine their contiguity and thus the shape of the space. Regions are indicated by – and usually share – boundary points and are usually not “clusters” that are discernible by “empty space” around them. Regional hypotheses are for a space that in principle has points everywhere. This means that some variables in one region may correlate less with other variables of the same region than they do with variables from other regions. Such variables are substantively




Fig. 4.2 Schematic representation of a hypothesized radex structure of social resources

dissimilar yet statistically *closer* to each other than to similar variables (from the same region). This is a relatively new principle initiated by facet theory and enables detection of lawfulness in data that has hitherto been unobserved or misinterpreted. Thus, a circular arrangement of regions (or any other arrangement) does not mean that there will be circularity for any subsets of points picked from the circular space that in principle may have points anywhere; the points must be picked to lie in a plane and at equal distances from the origin.

Finally, applying the facet approach in future research may thus prove to be fruitful in examining the structure and dynamics of resource exchange in different domains of social life. Moreover, the development of the mapping sentence can thus be seen as a first step along a route toward a more comprehensive conceptualization, leading to a systematic design, and evaluation of different kinds of resource exchange.

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Formalizing Foa's Social Resource Theory of Exchange

5

Barry Markovsky and Ali Kazemi

Background

Although inclusiveness is generally regarded as a positive quality when it characterizes social groups, this is not necessarily the case when it comes to the definition of *theory*. This term is used to denote a wide variety of writing styles in the social and behavioral sciences, from conjectural stream-of-consciousness discourses on empirical phenomena to highly abstract systems of mathematical equations. Although we have no consensus on methods for building theories or criteria for evaluating them, all forms seem to have found safe havens under the big tent of the social sciences. In a similar vein, we see very little attention devoted to *theory analysis*, most likely due to the absence of any widely agreed-upon theory construction standards. Thus, we find that neither discussions of theoretical methods nor systematic analyses of actual theories are routine components of our scholarly training, presentations, or publications. This is a serious problem. In addition to emphasizing the need for higher standards of theory construction, the aim

of this chapter is to apply such an analysis to Foa's resource theory of social exchange (RT).

First, we will review the basic components of theories and discuss how they encourage the development of sound theory-building practices. Following this, we will analyze RT in light of these components and criteria.

Theories Are Terms, Propositions, and Arguments

Theories are structured arrangements of terms and propositions that are designed to transfer sets of abstract and general ideas from the minds of theorists into the minds of interested others. They are partial translations of the theorist's perception of reality and still the best way we know to convert subjective insights into objects of collective inquiry. As such, they are tools that help us to understand selected aspects of complex phenomena. In order to achieve its goals, science is oriented toward the production of theories as repositories for state-of-the-art knowledge. These works are disseminated among the members of relevant scholarly communities and become the objects of intellectual and empirical inquiry.

At its core, a theory is "a set of general, parsimonious, logically related statements containing clearly defined terms, formulated to explain accurately and precisely the broadest possible range of phenomena in the natural world" (Markovsky 2011, p. 647). Theories also are unified in their

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possession of certain abstract properties. It is these properties that distinguish scientific knowledge from all other kinds.

Terms

When a theory is offered as a collective resource to a community of scholars, it is important to maximize the chances that its *terms*—the actual words or symbols chosen to express its abstract concepts—are understood in a uniform way by members of that community. That is the ideal situation, but it is probably unachievable because a theorist cannot fully control every reader's interpretations of his or her terms and statements. Nevertheless, the theorist can go a long way toward achieving this goal by explicitly defining terms that are likely to be problematic and by building more specialized and sophisticated terms (and definitions) on the backs of other terms whose meanings are already well understood or already explicitly defined for members of that intended audience. This implies that the *terminological system* embedded within a theory ought to have a hierarchical structure, with "primitive" undefined terms at the base, and increasingly specialized terms as one moves up the hierarchy. To avoid circularities, the hierarchy must also be transitive in the sense that the definitions of any "higher" term must contain only "lower" terms and/or primitive terms.

If definitions are the basic currency of theories, we might say that they come in two denominations. *Connotative definitions* are by far the most desirable in that they assert a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for any object to be classified as an instance, or not an instance, of the defined term. Connotatively defining a term minimizes opportunities for misinterpretation. In contrast, *denotative definitions* are less desirable but better than nothing. They provide illustrations, examples, or exemplifications of a theoretical term. Thus, a connotative definition for group would be of the form "X is a 'group' if and only if it manifests properties *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*." A denotative definition would be of the form "*m*, *n*, *o*, *p* each is an example of 'group'." The denotative definition

is much more open to interpretation, as when the researcher must decide whether or not *q* qualifies as a group by virtue of having some degree of similarity to *m*, *n*, *o*, or *p* on one or more unspecified dimensions of comparison.

If a theory were to consist only of a set of primitive and defined terms—even an elaborately defined set of terms such as a typology—something important still is missing. The terminological system is assembled at the discretion of theorists and does not make testable knowledge claims. That is, we could define "exchange" one way, someone else could define it another way, and so long as each of us is clear, neither of our definitions could be deemed to be wrong. Definitions can be more or less useful for a given theoretical purpose, but there is no sense in which they can be true or false.

Propositions

Whether we call them assumptions, postulates, axioms, or something else, propositions in a theory make assertions by establishing conditions between an *antecedent* substatement and a *consequent* substatement—a subject and a predicate—each consisting of theoretical terms. The logical form may vary, depending upon whether predicate logic, differential equations, or some other logical system is employed. As a simple example, consider the following statement in which *i* and *j* represent social actors:

If *i* has a positive attitude toward *j*, then *j* will experience positive emotions.

The "If ... then ..." structure of the statement establishes the condition asserted to hold between antecedent and consequent. Assume that we have defined all of the statement's terms sufficiently to operationalize and test this statement. If *i* does not have a positive attitude toward *j*, the statement is irrelevant. If *i* has a positive attitude toward *j* and *j* in fact experiences positive emotions, then the statement is verified. If *i* has a positive attitude toward *j*, but *j* does not experience positive emotions, then the statement has been falsified. It may be that the abstract theoretical idea is wrong, that the terms

were ill chosen (perhaps defined too narrowly or too broadly), or that something in the translation of the theoretical terms into observable measures went awry. Whatever the case, the falsification is a signal that there is more work to be done.

Arguments

A theory consisting of a single proposition, or a set of unconnected propositions, would be relatively uninteresting, disjointed, and arguably not a theory at all. Contrast this to a theory having a system of interrelated propositions from which new propositions can be derived by applying logical rules. Individual propositions cannot provide explanations. *Arguments* explain. A trivial example—but one that fully illustrates the point—is the case of a two-proposition theory of the form “(1) If x , then y . (2) If y , then z .” Whether it was planned from the outset or only discovered upon subsequent analysis, treating these overlapping conditional statements as a logical argument permits one to derive something new: “(3) If x , then z .” Using richer sets of statements and/or higher-level systems of logic (e.g., algebra, calculus, probability theory, graph theory, computer simulation), it quickly becomes possible to develop a theory whose logical implications are not at all evident from the outset. A point is reached where the theory seems to embody wisdom—a depth and breadth of understanding—that surpasses any of the individual theorists that helped to develop it.

Theory Building

Much of the theoretical activity that actually occurs in science is not the creation of new works but rather the systematic modification of old ones. We thus conceive of *theory construction* or *theory building* as a process of suggesting or modifying one or more theoretical components for the purpose of improving knowledge in a substantive area. “Improving” knowledge implies reference to established criteria, and these will be summarized shortly.

Theory Analysis

In contrast to theory building, *theory analysis* entails the application of logical and semantic criteria for the purpose of evaluating a theory, distinct from (and preferably before) bringing empirical evidence to bear.

There are two equally important kinds of theory analysis: logical and semantic. To analyze a theory logically means to evaluate the coherence of its statements, that is, whether or not they combine to form valid arguments. A theory without a logically valid argument at its core could hardly be called a theory at all. Short of having an explicit and unbroken chain of reasoning leading the reader to its inevitable conclusions, such a “theory” would demand no more and no less than a leap of faith. That is not science. More to the point, an invalid argument offers *no reason* for the reader to believe its conclusions.

Whereas logical analysis generally can be performed mechanically, semantic analysis requires mixing a little art with the science. When terminology is not standardized, the same term can mean different things to different people. It then becomes necessary to apply some judgment when it comes to using terms appropriate for communicating a theory to a given scientific community. Once a set of terms is chosen, however, we can analyze its internal coherence by checking for three things: (1) that synonymous and other redundant terms have been eliminated, (2) that all terms in all theoretical statements are either defined explicitly or else deemed to be primitive, and (3) that the terminological system forms a transitive hierarchy.

Before analyzing Foa's theory, we will briefly review some general criteria that should be manifested in any good scientific theory and which are promoted by the use of explicit terms, propositions, and arguments.

Good Theories, Better Theories

Theories should be evaluated both in relative and in absolute ways. For instance, it is an *absolute* necessity that a theory be logically coherent.

A good theory cannot be logically invalid, and any invalid argument within a theory is demonstrably worthless. However, given two logically valid theories attempting to explain the same phenomena, one is likely to be more successful than the other if, for example, one is *relatively* more precise or *relatively* more parsimonious than the other. We thus favor the more successful theory provisionally. The more favored theory may be flawed in any number of ways, but if its performance relative to any alternative theory is superior, we accept it as the state of the art—and continue trying to rectify the flaws. From Markovsky (1996), we identify eight criteria that help us to decide if a theory is good, and if it is better than alternatives within its domain of application. Notably, some of these criteria intersect and reinforce one another, but taken together they formulate a reasonable and defensible basis for promoting higher standards for the construction and analysis of theories in the social sciences.

No Contradictions

Science abhors contradictions. A theory whose statements contradict one another or that permits one to derive mutually contradictory statements (e.g., “*j* likes *i*” and “*j* does not like *i*”) cannot be saying anything meaningful or true. Perhaps the best thing one can say about contradictions is that they provide a loud-and-clear signal that the theory is not to be trusted until further work is done to resolve the problem. For instance, if the theorist believes that *sometimes j* likes *i* and *other times j* does not like *i*, then it is up to the theorist to resolve the contradiction by conditionalizing those statements, for example, “If *a*, then *i* likes *j*. If *not a*, then *i* does not like *j*.”

No Ambivalence

Logically, a contradiction asserts that *x* and *not x* are true simultaneously. Replace the “and” with an “or” and you have the essence of ambivalence. Unlike the contradiction, it is both meaningful and true. As such, a theorist may be tempted to

assert that either something leads to something or else it does not—albeit dressed in scholarly rhetoric designed to cover up the utter vacuousness of such a claim. Regarding the importance of ridding theories of ambivalence, it should be sufficient to note that such statements cannot be tested. It is logically impossible ever to falsify them.

Communicability

A privately held theory is as worthless to science as one that is self-contradictory or ambivalent. Scientific theories are community property and benefit from the concerted efforts of multiple community members. Therefore, it is essential that the theorist takes steps to ensure that the theoretical ideas *in readers’ minds* match the ideas in his or her own mind to the greatest extent possible. The need for explicitness is obvious: Readers cannot be expected to read the theorist’s mind directly. Other theoretical qualities discussed here—especially *parsimony*—also facilitate the communicability of theories.

Generality

To say that a theory is *general* implies two qualities. First, a large number and wide variety of specific cases fall within the theory’s purview. All else equal, the theory with many applications is certainly preferable to the theory with few. Second, it is not sufficient that a theory merely be applicable to many and varied cases but must also prove its worth by surviving empirical tests. All else being equal, the theory that offers correct predictions and correct explanations is preferable to the theory that generates false predictions and false explanations.

Abstractness

This is the property that allows theories to be general. Theories explain the nature of phenomena in the concrete world, but they do not refer to specific things. To presume otherwise is to

commit *the error of reification*. Theories employ *abstract* terms, that is, they are conceptual and idealized rather than empirical. In a way, a theory constructs an imaginary, perfect, abstract world whose elements and operations map onto the empirical world with greater or lesser success (Freese 1980). It may be discomfiting to let go of the notion that theories describe reality in any direct sense, but this is also their power. The same property of theories that can make their terms and statements seem unfamiliar and even counter-intuitive is also the property that allows us to view the empirical world in new ways and to notice things that we have not noticed before. Theories are not to be judged on whether they “ring true” intuitively or whether their terms are being used in familiar ways. They are judged on the precision and breadth of their explanations when applied to the empirical world. Sometimes this can mean using some very odd constructs that also just happen to enhance the power of the theory.

Theories connect abstract terms to the real world through specialized statements that bridge the gap between theoretical terms and concrete phenomena—variously called “operationalizations,” “instantiations,” “interpretations,” or “initial conditions.” A theory that refers only to concrete objects and events is no different from a historical account. Such accounts are valuable, but theories have a different purpose: They are designed to explain *classes* of phenomena, perhaps never before observed, rather than to describe particular cases.

Precision

Derivations from a theory vary in their information content, with the more informative theories preferred to the less informative. The reasons are simple. First, a theory that asserts “*x and y*” takes a bigger risk, and so is more falsifiable, than a theory that asserts only “*x*.” Falsifiability—which is to say, testability—is a highly valued quality of theories. The theory that is more falsifiable, all else being equal, is the preferred theory. Second, more precision is preferable to less precision

simply as a practical matter. Clearly it would be useful to be able to calculate that a train moving at a particular rate in a particular direction will not merely *arrive* at the next station but will arrive at a *specific time*. More to our purpose, we would prefer a theory that predicts more than the likelihood *that* two actors will exchange but also *when* and *what* they will exchange.

Parsimony

This criterion is perhaps the most abused of all when it comes to theorizing in the social sciences. It boils down to just this: If theory A and theory B have the same power to explain and predict phenomena, but theory A does so with fewer terms and fewer propositions than theory B, then we accept A and reject B. Excessive wordiness only muddies the theoretical waters. The only terms that are really needed are those which express the key theoretical statements. Upholding the criterion of parsimony also alleviates a little-discussed but serious problem in social science theorizing: the inability for readers to distinguish the theory itself from the quasi-theoretical discussions surrounding it. Such is the case whether we call such discussions metatheory, empirical generalizations, frameworks, approaches, orienting strategies, sensitizing conceptualizations, or something else. We would venture to guess that when a theory is misinterpreted, 99 times out of 100, it is not the reader's fault for misunderstanding but the theorist's fault for not being as simple and clear as possible. We would all benefit greatly if referees and editors were to begin applying moderate pressure on authors to push their theories in more parsimonious directions.

Conditionalization

Cohen (1989) discussed three different ways that theories are conditional. First, as already discussed, propositions are conditional statements that form the core arguments of theories. Second, also mentioned above, operationalizations are *initial conditions* that bridge between theory

and reality. Though not actually part of the theory, they nevertheless permit its application to objects in the empirical realm via empirical hypotheses obtained by substituting abstract and general theoretical terms with concrete and specific operational terms. Finally, *scope conditions* are provisional and abstract statements that delimit the kinds of empirical settings to which an author is willing to commit the theory (see Walker and Cohen 1985). To not express scope conditions suggests that a theory is intended to be applicable universally. Although it may be expedient to give the impression of universal applicability for the purposes of getting work published, a more realistic and modest tack is to start with a relatively limited scope and to relax scope conditions as the theory proves its breadth by surviving empirical tests under increasingly diverse circumstances.

As a consequence of the diligent application of the above criteria, scientific theories are imbued with a crucial quality that distinguishes them from other ways of understanding the world: They improve demonstrably over time. Freese (1980) referred to this as the property of *cumulation*. Philosophers of science call it *evolutionary change* (Campbell 1974). Successful theories in science literally *evolve*, sharpening in precision, broadening in scope, improving vis-à-vis their stated purposes, and surviving critical tests against competitors that are inferior with regard to one or more of the above key properties. In the social sciences, many scholars abide by the myth that the longer a theory remains unchanged, the better it must be. There even are concerted efforts to preserve old theories for contemporary application. The truth is that this is a hallmark of pseudosciences where theories are accepted on faith, and if the faithful evoke any evidence at all, invariably it is distorted or selective. Consequently, we find that astrological theories (if we may call them that for just a second) remain essentially unchanged, even while astronomical theories continue improving on many fronts. Cognitive psychology has gone through revolutions and refinements, while parapsychology has produced nothing but unverified conjectures in its 130-year history. The contrast between

evolving theories and stagnant theories is stark, and advocates for any social science theory that remains unchanged across decades ought to be wary of the distinction.

Analyzing a Theory

Theory analysis focuses mainly on terms and propositions. Although this can be accomplished in a number of ways, here we suggest a simple method that is easy to learn.¹ Whether or not the analysis of any particular theory is “easy,” however, will depend on the degree to which the theorist was self-conscious about being logical, clear, parsimonious, etc., when writing the theory. Unfortunately, most social science theories were not written with the above criteria at the forefront, and so even a basic analysis is likely to reveal logical gaps, semantic ambiguities, and other fixable problems.

Step 1: Extract Key Statements and Terms. Carefully read the theory sentence by sentence, noting what would appear to be key assertions and definitions. These are not to be statements *about* the theory, for example, its general approach, the history of its ideas, what it hopes to accomplish, and so on. Rather, these assertions should be candidates for the definitions, propositions, and derivations that comprise the theory’s central argument(s).

Definitions and propositions are similar but not identical in form and very different in function. They are so different, in fact, that confusing one with the other is sufficient to completely undermine the utility of a theory. Nevertheless, the distinction between definition and proposition is far too often muddied in practice. Essentially and ideally, propositions assert causal relationships

¹Different books on theoretical methods have proposed different ways to organize the components of theories. Although there are some small deviations, the present method owes a debt to Cohen (1989), whose influences, in turn, can be traced back at least to Zetterberg (1965) and Homans (1967).

among key terms.² As such, they should be translated into conditional forms such as "Increases in X cause decreases in Y ." In contrast, definitions tell us what those key terms *mean* by asserting a set of properties that any instance of a given term must possess. Given a theoretical term X and a set of abstract and general properties p_i , then we can say that definitional statements have this general structure: " X exists if and only if it manifests the properties $p_1, p_2, p_3, \dots, p_n$." For example, one could define *group* as "A set of persons sharing a social identity and interconnected by social ties." Here, *group* is the " X ," and properties include "set of persons," "shared social identity," and "interconnected by social ties." It should go without saying that some of the terms used to express these properties also may require explicit definitions in their own right. The point is that the defining properties do not *cause* the defined object to exist or to change. They merely help us to identify instances of it and to rule out instances of other things. Other factors, as asserted in propositions, are the presumed agents of existence or change.

Step 2: Simplify. To the greatest extent possible, try to reduce the verbiage of the key statements from step 1 without substantially changing their meanings. This is likely to involve some interpretation and judgment because the analyst is attempting to capture the author's intended meanings and arguments, and/or to clarify his/her own thinking, while simplifying the language.

Step 3: Abbreviate. Create shortened versions of the key statements using minimal phrases, mnemonic expressions, or symbols. The idea is to be able to see all of the theory's key assertions "at a glance" and to determine whether and how the statements relate to one another. Once laid bare,

² Many theorists are content merely to assert that x and y are related, without committing to any causal direction. Although correlational statements assert *something*, they should be regarded as an admission of ignorance and the focus of immediate attention. Establishing which entity leads to changes in the other—whether x , y , or *both*—and under what conditions, is crucial knowledge for proceeding with any deeper and broader understanding.

discursive arguments almost always reveal themselves to have been relatively simple ideas overdressed in excess verbiage.

Step 4: Eliminate Redundant Statements. If two or more statements express the same idea in different ways, choose the one simplest way of expressing the claim and eliminate the others. The service to parsimony is self-evident.

Step 5: Eliminate Redundant Terms. If an author appears to have used multiple terms interchangeably (e.g., "impact" and "influence") and has not drawn *and* capitalized upon any specific distinction between the two, choose one of the terms and substitute it for all instances of the other.

Step 6: Identify Logical Contiguities. In other words, try to find instances where the "If ..." (the *antecedent*) part of one statement matches the "then ..." (the *consequent*) part of another statement. Reshuffle the list of statements to reflect this ordering. For instance, if one statement is structured "If a , then d ." and another statement is of the form "If d , then g ," it makes sense to list the former above the latter. They provide potential ingredients for a logical argument from which may be derived, in this illustration, "If a , then g ." There may be situations where it seems that a logical argument was intended by the author, but not completed. The analyst is obliged to identify the gap as such. Whether or not the analyst also wishes to don the "theory builder" hat and take the creative leap necessary to fill that logical gap is up to him or her. Importantly, doing so gives the analyst partial ownership of the resulting hybrid, and it should be credited as such.

Step 7: Establish and Diagram the Argument. Having identified in the previous step all of the intersections among prospective key statements, the next task is to determine the "shape" of the theoretical argument. At this point, there should be a network of intersecting propositions that may range from simple to complex. If any proposition fails to intersect any of the others, then it necessarily resides outside the logic of the theoretical argument unless, as discussed above, the




Fig. 5.1 A simple theory diagram

analyst chooses to connect it. It may play a useful role in *some* theory, but not in this one unless the gap is filled.

At this point it should be possible to diagram the structure of the argument, for example, by boxing each statement's antecedent and consequent, appropriately connecting those that are presumed to relate causally, and displaying the directions and valences (+ or -) of the presumed effects. Expanding on the previous illustration, if it is assumed that "increases in *a* cause increases in *d*" and "increases in *d* cause decreases in *g*," this can be captured by a simple diagram such as that shown in Fig. 5.1.

Step 8: Analyze Terms. To this point, we have been concerned with the theory's terminological system only insofar as eliminating its blatant redundancies. However, that is not enough to ensure the existence of the sort of transitive hierarchy described earlier. It requires a careful look at the theory's key terms, a process that we will next describe via a series of substeps.

Step 8.1: Create a list of all terms that appear in the list of propositions, excluding simple articles and logical connectives.

Step 8.2: Examine the author's prose to see whether there are any explicit definitions for any of the terms in the list. Ideally, connotative definitions provide a set of abstract and general properties that must be manifested by an empirical entity in order for it to be deemed an instance of the term. Denotative definitions only provide some examples and so are not as desirable.

Step 8.3: For the remaining terms, judge whether or not each might serve as a reasonable primitive term, that is, whether there is virtually no chance that the term will be misunderstood by members of the theory's intended audience if it remains undefined. Move primitive terms to the top of the list.

Step 8.4: Define the remaining terms. In doing so, take care to introduce a minimum number of new terms. These new terms also will need to be counted among either the primitive or defined terms and dealt with accordingly.

Step 8.5: Check to ensure that, moving down the list of defined terms, each definition includes only terms that were previously defined or that are in the list of primitive terms. This ensures that the terms form a transitive hierarchy, with primitive terms laying the semantic groundwork and subsequent terms building upon those meanings and on the definitions of subsequent terms.

In general, the process for building the terminological system is often easier said than done. There can be a great deal of trial and error as one explores alternative ways to express the ideas behind the propositions and the concepts behind their terms and at the same time minimizes their number and complexity. The goal of this sometimes tedious activity is not perfection, however, and knowing this relieves some of the analyst's burden. Rather, the goal is to leave the theory demonstrably better than the way it was before. If a critical mass of us put *some* effort into analyzing and repairing our own and others' theories according to the above criteria, the cumulative impact would be profound.

Step 9: Scope Conditions. Some theories, albeit relatively few, come with explicit scope conditions. When this is not the case, authors sometimes provide clues regarding the kinds of empirical domains in which they intend their theories to apply. Other times we can only speculate. It is always a good idea to express provisional scope conditions but also to bear in mind that their terms must be fully comprehensible to readers via well-chosen primitive terms and well-crafted definitions.

Step 10: Presentation. Ideally, the presentation of a theory should start with terminology. After all, propositions expressed without first defining their terms will not be particularly meaningful to the reader. First, show the primitive terms that provide the foundation for the theory, and next, show the defined terms. It then makes sense to state

scope conditions in order to provide the reader with a sense of context—an idea about the domain to which the theory applies. Finally, the propositions of the theory should be listed or presented in visual format, along with derivations and, ideally, proofs showing how derivations were obtained from propositions.

Juggling

The trial-and-error nature of theoretical analysis cannot be overemphasized. “Juggling” may be an even better characterization of the process. The scope conditions, propositions, and defined terms work together as a system, and decisions about each invariably affect the others. This entails not merely listing defined terms but considering which of them are actually needed in scope conditions and propositions. Choice of scope conditions can affect definitions, for example, including or excluding some potential domains of application may warrant broader or narrower sets of defining properties for terms. Scope choices also affect propositions in that allowing a broader domain of application may necessitate a more complex set of theoretical propositions in order to manage the added conditions that a broader domain is likely to entail. It should be evident to the reader that propositions—what we wish our theory to assert as true—play a critical role in determining the set of terms that must be defined. Modifying propositions invariably requires modifying terms and definitions.

We now turn to our analysis of Foa's theory.

Analysis of the Resource Theory of Social Exchange

About the Theory

The first publication of the resource theory of social exchange (RT) appeared in *Science* (Foa 1971). Subsequent publications offered some refinements, and so we also will draw RT elements from three other publications: selected passages from the book *Societal Structures of the Mind* (Foa and Foa 1974), a chapter published

6 years later (Foa and Foa 1980), and an abridged chapter by Foa and Foa in the present volume.

RT offered an alternative to the dominant economic perspective of the 1960s and 1970s. It employed a classification scheme for resources, both material and nonmaterial, to help explain certain facets of human interpersonal behavior. Furthermore, the theory offered specific propositions to explain the consequences of possessing different types and amounts of resources for the actors in social exchange relationships.

RT does not come neatly preassembled according to the tenets of theory construction provided earlier. Definitions for key terms are not always clear, propositions are not typically identified as such, and metatheoretical statements and empirical statements are not always clearly distinguished from the theory. However, the cited references did provide a significant amount of material for us to work with.

Before we continue, we need to make two disclaimers that apply to any theoretical analysis: First, the terms, definitions, scope conditions, propositions, and arguments at which we arrive in our examination of RT are all provisional. We have tried to maintain the spirit of the original work. However, because many key statements of the theory contain some degree of ambiguity, different analysts are likely to generate different interpretations of exactly what the theory is asserting, particularly in its crucial details. Our attempt to formalize the theory is incomplete, but these efforts will make it easier for others to introduce further refinements, preferably making our work obsolete sooner rather than later as the theory evolves. Second, we do not assess the empirical validity of any of the theory's claims. So while this exercise is intended to explicate those claims, we make a sharp distinction between theoretical analysis and empirical analysis and leave the latter to others.

Key Terms

Primitive Terms

Technically, any undefined term that appears anywhere in the theory is classifiable as primitive. At the same time, we must keep in mind the criterion

of parsimony and try to minimize their number. This means that we need to take as much care selecting and minimizing the primitive terms as we do the terms that we choose to define. To leave a theoretical term undefined means taking a leap of faith, that is, trusting that the term will evoke in the minds of the theory's readers approximately the same connotations that it evokes in the mind of the author. That is not a small leap. Take even the most familiar social psychological term, ask ten social psychologists what it means, and you are likely to get close to ten different answers, each implying operationalizations that would be deemed invalid by one or more of the others. The problem is worse to the degree that more esoteric and ambiguous primitive terms are used.

A very disproportionate number of the RT's terms are primitive more because they are simply undefined than because they were carefully chosen to serve as the foundation for the theory's terminological system. Our analysis reduces the number of primitive terms, but not enough. That will take a more concerted effort over a longer period of time. Many, but not all, of our primitive terms are simple and conventional. Others could prove to be problematic when researchers attempt to operationalize derivations into testable hypotheses. To begin, we will introduce two very crucial primitive terms and characterize their use (but not actually define them) in order to enhance clarity.

Human social actor: the theory's basic unit of analysis

Entity: anything that actors may refer to, as concrete as a material possession or as abstract as an idea

Defined Terms

To provide clear and useful definitions of subsequent key terms, we first define some of the more basic terms upon which later definitions will depend for *their* meanings.

p (*person*), *o* (*other*): human social actors

Value: actor's perceived desirability or undesirability of an entity

Object: an entity that is valued by *p*, either positively or negatively

Activity: a behavior that is valued by *p*, either positively or negatively

Transfer: movement of an object or activity from *p* to *o* by any means

This first set of defined terms provides a specialized language for making theoretical claims about people exchanging social resources. Although the definitions may seem a bit strange, they are crafted in a way that is intended to balance the need for precision with the need for generality. For example, the definition of *transfer* requires *something* of value to move between two human beings, but it does not put constraints on the kind of object or activity nor whether it is given, taken, forced upon, bartered, etc.

Although it is arguably the most important term in the theory, we found multiple definitions for *resource* in Foa's major publications, for example, "any commodity—material or symbolic—which is transmitted through interpersonal behavior" (Foa and Foa 1974, p. 36); "anything that can be transmitted from one person to another" (Foa and Foa 1976, p. 101); "anything transacted in an interpersonal situation," and "any item, concrete or symbolic, which can become the object of exchange among people" (Foa and Foa 1980, p. 78). Each of these definitions establishes a set of criteria for what may or may not count as an instance of a resource, with each set intersecting the others to varying degrees. There is no one "right" or "true" definition; however, the different versions and their illustrations in context do give us a sense of what Foa probably had in mind. Here, we use a fairly simple definition that works quite well in our propositions, captures some important properties, and is not inconsistent with Foa's:

Resource (*r*): an object or activity that can transfer from *p* to *o*

Here it is also useful to define the following:

Exchange: a set of associated transfers of resources from *p* to *o* and from *o* to *p*

Having already clarified and narrowed the meanings of the terms "object," "p," "o," and "transfer," we have simplified and clarified the meaning of the key concepts of *resource* and *exchange*—although the term "associated" could eventually prove to be problematic.

Readers familiar with the original theory will have noticed by now the absence of any reference

to “resource class,” a key term defined somewhat cryptically by Foa and Foa (1974) as “the meaning assigned to actions.” In our reinterpretation, the role played by this concept in the original theory is now adequately handled by our concept of *resource*. This and other simplifications may cause some discomfort for those who are accustomed to using RT in its original form. The critical question, however, is not whether a revised and simplified theory feels comfortable and familiar but whether any explanatory power at all is lost as a consequence of its simplification.

The theory goes on to offer a two-dimensional classification scheme for a wide range of resources, with the location of a given resource in this theoretical plane having implications for the social exchange. In order to maximize the theory's communicability and testability, the terms used to establish these dimensions ought to be crystal clear in their meaning. The two dimensions are *concreteness-symbolism* and *particularism-universalism*. If each dimension is in fact unitary, that is, a continuum indicating greater or lesser degrees of some underlying property, then it is not necessary to introduce two new terms for each dimension. Without any loss of meaning and with an obvious increase in parsimony, we may refer to the dimension as *particularism* (high vs. low) as opposed to (*high*) *particularism* versus (*high*) *universalism*. The same is true for the *concreteness-symbolism* dimension, and so we will refer to this simply as *concreteness*. This means that we need only establish definitions for one of each pair of anchors.

In the original work, the definitions of the terms establishing the two-dimensional resource plane are not explicit in the sense of providing connotative listings of definitive properties. For instance, “...concreteness ranges from concrete to symbolic and suggests the form or type of expression characteristic of the various resources” (Foa and Foa 1974, p. 80). The definition for *particularism* given in Foa and Foa's chapter in this volume is a bit more informative: “... the extent to which the value of a given resource is influenced by the particular persons involved in exchanging it and by their relationship.” However, it is not a good sign that the meaning of *particu-*

larism depends partly on the meaning of the term *particular* appearing in its definition. Fortunately, Foa and his collaborators have offered numerous hypothetical and empirical illustrations of resources located at different positions in the 2-D resource plane. Together, these illustrations provide denotative definitions for these key terms. As discussed earlier, denotative definitions are less than ideal, but they do give us a sense of direction. With those denotative illustrations in mind, we will offer the following provisional connotative definitions:

Particularism: degree to which a resource's value depends upon its source

Concreteness: tangibility of a resource

High versus low particularism can be illustrated by contrasting emotional versus economic transactions. At least some of the value of a new pair of shoes is independent of the retail outlet from which they were purchased. The value of a kiss is vastly different depending on whether it is received as a casual greeting from an acquaintance versus as an expression of love from a spouse. Although the two dimensions do not necessarily coincide, they happen to do so in this illustration: The shoes are higher on the concreteness dimension than the kiss. The value of the shoes resides mainly in their physical properties, whereas the value of the kiss resides in its more ephemeral qualities. This is not to say that the shoes have no symbolic components (e.g., their status value) or that there is nothing physical about a kiss (happily, there is), but instead, the theory is most concerned about those properties that dominate from the perspective of interactants engaged in social exchanges.

Resource Types

Without claiming to have exhausted the possibilities, Foa and colleagues identified six kinds of resources and devoted most of their research attention to their implications for social exchanges. A mixture of denotative and connotative definitions provided in RT provides the basis for the interpretations given below. Recall that implicit in these definitions is their subjectivity: each only exists to the extent that *p* and/or *o* perceive it to exist (see Scope Condition 3 below.):

Love: affection, regard, warmth, and/or comfort

Status: esteem and/or prestige

Information: advice, opinions, instruction, and/or enlightenment

Money: tangible objects with standardized nonintrinsic value

Goods: tangible objects with intrinsic value

Service: activity conferred by p to o

These definitions seek to clarify and simplify those in the original statements of the theory, without departing too much from what we infer to be their intended meanings. In some cases, such as with love, information, and status, we used denotative properties similar or identical to those used in RT. In the case of money, goods, and service, we have attempted to sharpen connotative implications suggested in RT. For example, the value of coins or currency is virtually never inherent in the metal or paper carrying monetary denominations but is fixed by a governing agency. In contrast, the value of ice cream to the consumer resides in this good's inherent qualities, for example, its flavor, texture, and temperature. We have also dropped some excess verbiage that did little to clarify meanings, such as identifying something that would *not* constitute an instance of a term or excising denotative elements from an otherwise connotative definition.

The two-dimensional resource plane provides a scheme for distinguishing and organizing the six kinds of resources, along with any other kinds that one may wish to so classify. Although it is conceivable that each and every person has a unique configuration of resources in his/her resource plane, research indicates that there is a good deal of consistency across people. This makes it possible to use empirical measures to draw a kind of shared cognitive map indicating the location of each resource type on the *particularism* and *concreteness* dimensions. A considerable body of empirical research has done just that—the now-familiar circular configuration of resource types that has been reproduced multiple times elsewhere in this volume. It is worth noting here, if it is not already obvious, that the circular diagram is not part of the

theory in the sense of embodying definitions or propositions. It merely summarizes a set of frequently observed empirical relationships among resources.

A consequence of constructing the resource plane is the capacity to define the closeness of a pair of resources r_1 and r_2 as a spatial property. Informally,

Similarity: distance between r_1 and r_2 in the *particularism-concreteness* plane

Assuming that the particularism of a resource, p_r , and its concreteness, c_r , are independent quantifiable properties, then the location of r_1 and r_2 along the particularism and concreteness dimensions can be represented by the ordered pairs (p_1, c_1) and (p_2, c_2) . The distance d , or *dissimilarity*, between them is then given as $d_{12} = \sqrt{(p_1 - p_2)^2 + (c_1 - c_2)^2}$. *Similarity* could then be modeled a variety of ways, perhaps the simplest being $1/d$.

Scope Conditions

Recall that scope conditions are provisional, abstract statements that delimit the kinds of empirical settings to which an author is willing to commit the theory. Foa does not identify scope conditions; however, the following may serve as such:

The theory applies to situations in which there is:

1. A minimum of two people, p and o
2. A minimum of one resource
3. Access to p 's and o 's perceptions of resources

These three conditions appear to provide the minimal elements of situations in which resource exchange may be predicted to transpire and subjected to empirical testing. Other interpreters of the theory may feel that additional scope conditions are needed. It is also possible that the theory's authors had other scope restrictions in mind, or that other scope conditions may be required to protect the theory from general types of unintended applications or other factors known by other researchers to undermine resource transfers. Note, however, that the applicability of the theory is also constrained by the way that basic terms were defined and primitive terms were selected. As a simple example, we do not require

a scope condition constraining the theory to *human* interactions because of the way *p* and *o* were defined.

Propositions

The RT offers quite a large number of propositions (see especially Foa 1971; Foa and Foa 1980; Foa et al. [this volume](#)); however, to date, there has not been a systematic analysis of their nature and logical structure. Here, we will not attempt to enumerate the majority of the propositions that have been expressed in connection with the theory. Note that all of the propositions we identify, along with terms, definitions, and scope conditions, are summarized in the Appendix at the end of this chapter.

Most of the propositions are not difficult to restate using the terms defined above, and doing so simplifies them and enhances their parsimony. Caution is needed in deciding what statements are actually propositions, however, because some that look proposition-like are not worthy of the label. For example, Foa and Foa (1980, p. 94) asserted the following: "Other conditions being equal, the probability of occurrence of a given exchange is contingent upon the institutional setting in which it may take place." The statement is undoubtedly true but largely due to its ambivalence rather than its explanatory power. Is the probability of exchange positively or negatively contingent on the setting? What kinds of institutions did the authors have in mind? More importantly, to what properties of institutional settings are exchanges presumed to be sensitive? Some of these questions may have been answered to some extent via illustrations, but the presence of illustrations does not provide a sufficient reason to leave the theoretical statement itself in such an ambivalent state.

One final note: We noticed that many of the theory's propositions do not pertain to social exchange per se but rather to unilateral transfers that may or may not be part of bilateral exchanges. Thus, when appropriate, the propositions refer to resource *transfer* rather than exchange.

We will use the notation $r(p)$ to indicate that "actor *p* possesses resource *r*," and the abbreviations r_i and r_j will refer to different resources *i* and *j*.

Proposition 1: The greater $r(p) - r(o)$, the more likely *r* transfers from *p* to *o* and the less likely *r* transfers from *o* to *p*.

Proposition 2: The more similar r_i and r_j , the more likely r_i and r_j are (a) exchanged for each other and (b) substituted for each other.

Proposition 1 combines and generalizes two propositions from Foa and Foa (1980). The original propositions stated essentially that the more of a resource someone possesses, the more likely it will be given to others; the less that is possessed, the more likely it will be taken from others. Without contradicting the original propositions, our version places no a priori constraint on the meaning associated with the movement of a resource from one person to another and also "relativizes" them by taking into account the relative amount of the given resource held by each party in a potential exchange.

Proposition 2 also neatly captures several related ideas from the original theory. Based on Foa and Foa ([this volume](#)), "The more proximal two resource classes, the more likely one will be activated when the other is activated." Rather than introducing a new term, "activated," we have simply linked *similarity* directly to the relevant actions of exchange and substitution. Foa has also posited (e.g., Foa and Foa 1980) that (1) resources closer to each other in the two-dimensional resource plane are more likely to be exchanged than two dissimilar resources and (2) when unable to transfer a preferred resource, an actor will substitute another resource as similar as possible to the preferred one. These ideas are also covered by this proposition.

The vast majority of the theory's remaining propositions invoke the *particularism* dimension, but not *concreteness*. Although the latter is introduced as a central concept, it is probably safe to say that it is underutilized from that point forward. Thus, the remaining propositions will focus on particularism. The first of these, proposition 3, is based on Foa and Foa ([this volume](#)) and focuses on the implications of positive resources (r^+)

versus negative resources (r^-) on gains and losses for those involved in the exchange:

Proposition 3

- (a) The more particularistic r^+ , the more p gains when it transfers either from p to o or from o to p .
- (b) The less particularistic r^+ , the more p loses when it transfers from p to o and the more p gains when it transfers from o to p .
- (c) The more particularistic r^- , the more p loses when it transfers either from p to o or from o to p .
- (d) The less particularistic r^- , the more p gains when it transfers from p to o and the more p loses when it transfers from o to p .

The following series of propositions (based on Foa and Foa [this volume](#)) assert various consequences for different levels of particularism. When necessary, we will first introduce and define new terms.

Ambivalence: extent to which r^+ and r^- transfer simultaneously to or from the same p

Proposition 4: The more particularistic r , the more ambivalence.

Personalize: Internalize r upon receipt. (e.g., information stored in the mind, food stored in the body, love stored “in the heart”)

Proposition 5: The more particularistic r , the more it is personalized.

Proposition 6: The more particularistic r_p , (a) the less r_j will substitute for r_p , and (b) the less r_i will substitute for r_j .

Proposition 7: The more particularistic r_p , the more similar r_j for which it is exchanged.

Proposition 8: The more particularistic r , and the less the available time to transfer r , the lower its priority.

Proposition 9: The more particularistic r , the less likely p will transfer r to an unfamiliar o .

Proposition 10: The more particularistic r , the more r is cognitively demanding.

Proposition 11: The more particularistic r , the smaller the group in which r is exchanged.

Expressible: ease with which a thought can be expressed in words

Proposition 12: The more particularistic r , the more expressible the need for r .

Finally, the theory contains a number of proposition-like statements expressed in terms of specific resources. Again, these are based on Foa and Foa (1980) but expressed in our revised terminological system.

Proposition 13: The more similar r is to money, the less r 's optimal range.

Proposition 14: The more similar r is to money, the less the difference between p 's loss and o 's gain when r transfers from p to o .

Proposition 15: The more similar r_i is to love, the fewer the r_j with which to exchange it.

Proposition 16: If r is transferred with love, the value of r increases or the transfer is facilitated.

Proposition 17: If p takes a non-love r from o , then p loses love from o .

Proposition 18: The smaller the group, the more love and the less money is transferred.

A few comments are warranted regarding this last set of propositions. First, it is unclear whether propositions about *love* and *money* were intended to suggest more general assertions about *particularism*. That is, rather than “The more similar r is to *love*, ...,” perhaps we could make the more general claim “The more *particularistic* r , ...” The implications are important because the former implies taking into account *love*'s values on both the *concreteness* and *particularism* dimensions, whereas the latter places no constraints on *concreteness*. It would be odd for these propositions to ignore the *concreteness* dimension, as they appear to do, given that elsewhere in the theory *love* is tied explicitly to a moderate position on that dimension. Given that this is not a theory of love per se, perhaps it is safe to assume that it is the extremely *particularistic* nature of *love* that is of real theoretical import. Thus, if *concreteness* is irrelevant, then the propositions should have been expressed in terms of *particularism*. Alternatively, if *concreteness* is relevant but its effects uncertain, then it can be held constant in conditional statements about particularistic resources, for example, “For moderate levels of *concreteness*, the more *particularistic* r , ...” Either form would eliminate the ambivalence in the original theory.

The original work also is not very clear about some of the terms that are introduced in these




Fig. 5.2 Structure of the theory

statements and in other statements not included here. No theorist should be expected to create a perfect theory, but we do have a collective responsibility either to improve the theories we have, term by term, statement by statement, or else to supplant them with better ones.

Structure of the Theory

We have now presented the major components of our reformulated resource theory, and it is time to step back and consider the logical pattern formed by its propositions. To diagram the structure of

the theory, we retain the proposition numbers but reduce their antecedent conditions and their consequents to alphabetic symbols.³ The results appear in Fig. 5.2.

Much earlier in this chapter, we wrote the following:

A theory consisting of a single proposition, or a set of disjointed propositions, would be relatively uninteresting, at least when compared to a theory having a system of interrelated propositions from which new propositions can be derived by applying logical rules. Individual propositions cannot provide explanations. *Arguments* explain.

Because RT relates a variety of terms via propositions and because it defines a variety of resources and other concepts, the theory imparts a *sense* of having explained some things. In conjunction with some of the informal discussions that surround its propositions and terms, it actually does offer some explanations of the “loose” variety. Nevertheless, the diagram of the structure of RT is striking for its lack of even the simplest of logical arguments, such as the one illustrated in Fig. 5.1. When RT has been tested, it is through hypotheses based on operationalizations of individual propositions, rather than any logical derivations from multiple propositions. Certainly, it is important to be confident about the veracity of a theory’s propositions; however, theoretical *knowledge* is more than just an inventory of empirically verified claims (Cohen 1989). To explain something theoretically means going deeper, revealing the underlying mechanisms beneath observed relationships (e.g., Hedström 2005), or laying out sequences of sufficient conditions by which one phenomenon leads to another. Logically, this can mean (1) explicating antecedents for existing antecedents, or (2) using existing consequents as antecedents for developing further propositions, or (3) refining existing propositions by postulating intervening factors that conditionalize the relationship between antecedent and consequent. In other words, further

³ For visual simplicity, the multiple antecedent conditions in propositions 3 and 8 are collapsed into a single symbol in Fig. 5.2.

developments might sharpen theoretical answers to questions such as (1) What causes a resource to appear more or less particularistic to an exchanging actor? and (2) Is there a more singular consequent that unifies the proliferation of *particularism* effects enumerated in propositions 3–12, and what subsequent impacts might it have on the exchange relationship? There are some directions for answers to these questions that may be found in Foa's writings. However, they have yet to be clarified, systematized, and integrated at anything approaching the level of rigor of the existing terms and propositions—which themselves took a good deal of effort to tease out. Until that is accomplished, the theory's explanatory potential remains esoteric.

Original statements of RT devote a great deal of attention to the six types of resources or "resource classes." In the bigger scheme of things, our analysis reveals that these are merely terms in the theory, exemplifications of positions in the two-dimensional plane created by variations in particularism and concreteness. It is clear that the true contribution—still more potential than realized—lies in the way that the "resource plane" (or higher-dimensional "resource space") is defined and what propositions are offered as to its genesis and ramifications.

Discussion and Conclusion

Experience tells us that readers who already were comfortable with the original form of Foa's RT may not find much value in our analysis. After all, the theory has been the focal point of research for more than four decades, and it appears to have survived just fine the way it is and always has been. The analysis offers some insight into why that comfort may be deceptive. First, we do not approach the theory as critics but rather as social psychologists who are interested in what the theory *really* has to offer. Looking closely at what a theory's terms mean, what its propositions assert, and what its arguments explain is an utterly *reasonable* endeavor in a scientific field. In this case, however, doing so turned out to be a difficult and complicated process that raised as many questions about the theory as it answered. It

should not have been so difficult. Theories are supposed to be intersubjective in the sense that all qualified users need to understand them in the same way, to know whether or not a given operationalization is appropriate, and to know whether or not the outcome of a study supports or falsifies its claims. To the extent that terms are not so clear, or that propositions are not so easy to extract, or that the validity of arguments cannot be verified, intersubjectivity is threatened along with the fundamental requirement of testability. It is not appropriate or expedient to require users of the theory to develop their own interpretations. The burden of clarity is squarely on the theorists who develop the theory, and the necessity for clarity should not even be a debated topic in twenty-first century social sciences.

Second, the theory has not changed much over a span of decades. Earlier we noted that this is not generally a good quality for scientific theories to possess. Naïve pseudoscientists want to preserve the original forms of their theories because they believe in their perfection with a faith that can only be regarded as religious. Scientific theories, in contrast, change and evolve as their terms become honed, their propositions sharpened, and their arguments deepened and broadened. Some progress has been made in successive versions of RT, but greater attention to its formal properties should only accelerate that progress.

We do not maintain that our analysis captures every nuance and insight that has been published in conjunction with RT. We do claim that the kind of analysis we performed allows us (and others) to see more clearly which elements might be deemed to be *parts* of the theory versus what writings might be deemed quasi-theoretical or extratheoretical language, what is clearly within the theory versus what remains obscure or merely conjectural, where the logic is sound versus where corrections are required or gaps need plugging, and where the logical boundary of the theory resides in order that precursors or extensions might be forged.

In this case, our analysis reveals a theory that is conceptually quite broad, with a relatively small number of terms providing a lexicon sufficiently rich to undergird its terminological system. At the same time, there is a marked

absence of explanatory depth in the form of sets of logically related propositions. We also find a tremendous imbalance in the attention paid to the two resource dimensions, with *particularism* garnering a vastly disproportionate amount of theoretical and empirical attention. Finally, we have not dealt at all with the occasional introduction of special provisions. That is, at times, the relationship between some x factor and some y outcome is positive, but exceptions are noted. Rather than viewing these special cases as weakening the theory, our advice is to regard them instead as suggesting yet-to-be theorized processes that intervene under certain conditions. In a similar vein, there is the notion that giving *love* increases the amount of this resource that one possesses (proposition 3a). There is a kind of magical, romantic appeal to this statement, but it leaves too much to the imagination. It seems to imply that giving *love* sets off a chain of events, the *last* of which is an increase in the amount of *love* possessed. What are the steps in this process? Having filled that gap, we will have improved our knowledge of how *love* works in particular and how particularistic resources work in general. We hope that our analysis stimulates such efforts.

Appendix: Resource Theory Analysis

Key Primitive Terms

Human social actor: the theory's basic unit of analysis

Entity: anything that actors may refer to, as concrete as a material possession or as abstract as an idea

Defined Terms

p (*person*), o (*other*): human social actors

Value: an actor's perceived desirability or undesirability of an entity

Object: an entity that is valued by p , either positively or negatively

Transfer: the movement of an object from p to o by any means

Resource (r): any object that can transfer from p to o

Exchange: a set of related transfers of resources from p to o and from o to p

Particularism: the degree to which a resource's value is tied to a specific p or o

Concreteness: the tangibility of a resource

Ambivalence: extent to which r^+ and r^- transfer simultaneously to or from the same p

Personalize: Internalize r upon receipt. (e.g., information stored in the mind, food stored in the body, love stored "in the heart")

Similarity: the distance between resources r_1 and r_2 in the particularism-concreteness plane

Expressible: ease with which a thought can be expressed in words

Resource Types

Love: affection, regard, warmth, and/or comfort

Status: esteem and/or prestige

Information: advice, opinions, instruction, and/or enlightenment

Money: tangible objects with standardized nonintrinsic value

Goods: tangible objects with intrinsic value

Service: activity by p that confers value to o at a cost to p

Scope Conditions

The theory applies to situations in which there is:

1. A minimum of two people, p and o
2. A minimum of one resource
3. Access to p 's and o 's perceptions of resources

Propositions

Proposition 1: The greater $r(p)-r(o)$, the more likely r transfers from p to o and the less likely r transfers from o to p .

Proposition 2: The more similar r_i and r_j , the more likely r_i and r_j are (a) exchanged for each other and (b) substituted for each other.

Proposition 3:

- (a) The more particularistic r^+ , the more p gains when it transfers either from p to o or from o to p .
- (b) The less particularistic r^+ , the more p loses when it transfers from p to o and the more p gains when it transfers from o to p .
- (c) The more particularistic r^- , the more p loses when it transfers either from p to o or from o to p .
- (d) The less particularistic r^- , the more p gains when it transfers from p to o and the more p loses when it transfers from o to p .

Proposition 4: The more particularistic r , the more ambivalence.

Proposition 5: The more particularistic r , the more it is personalized.

Proposition 6: The more particularistic r_i , (a) the less r_j will substitute for r_i , and (b) the less r_i will substitute for r_j .

Proposition 7: The more particularistic r_p , the more similar r_j for which it is exchanged.

Proposition 8: The more particularistic r , and the less the available time to transfer r , the lower its priority.

Proposition 9: The more particularistic r , the less likely p will transfer r to an unfamiliar o .

Proposition 10: The more particularistic r , the more r is cognitively demanding.

Proposition 11: The more particularistic r , the smaller the group in which r is exchanged.

Proposition 12: The more particularistic r , the more expressible the need for r .

Proposition 13: The more similar r is to money, the less r 's optimal range.

Proposition 14: The more similar r is to money, the less the difference between p 's loss and o 's gain when r transfers from p to o .

Proposition 15: The more similar r_i is to love, the fewer the r_j with which to exchange it.

Proposition 16: If r is transferred with love, the value of r increases or the transfer is facilitated.

Proposition 17: If p takes a non-love r from o , then p loses love from o .

Proposition 18: The smaller the group, the more love and the less money is transferred.

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Social Exchange Theory, Exchange Resources, and Interpersonal Relationships: A Modest Resolution of Theoretical Difficulties

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Social exchange theory has provided organizational researchers with an influential framework for explaining work behavior (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005). According to the theory, individuals engage in a series of interdependent interactions that generate obligations among the exchange parties (Blau 1964; Emerson 1976; Homans 1958). When one party provides another with a valued and beneficial resource, an obligation is generated to return a beneficial resource. A series of mutual exchanges strengthen the quality of the relationship between the exchange parties, which thereby produces beneficial and productive behaviors (Blau 1964). Empirical evidence supports this pattern. High-quality social exchanges reduce workplace conflict (Nelson 1989) and destructive work behavior (e.g., Colbert et al. 2004; Liao et al. 2004). They also improve beneficial work behavior, such as

knowledge sharing (Hansen 1999), job performance (Cropanzano et al. 2002), and citizenship behaviors (Masterson et al. 2000; Wayne et al. 1997). Conversely, exploitive or abusive exchanges imbalance social exchange relations (Gouldner 1960). In so doing, they negatively influence employees' attitudes (e.g., Tepper 2000; Tepper et al. 2004), psychological well-being (e.g., Harvey et al. 2007; Tepper 2000), and performance (e.g., Harris et al. 2007; Zellars et al. 2002) and promote destructive work behavior (e.g., Mitchell and Ambrose 2007; Thau et al. 2009).

The term social exchange "theory" is a bit misleading. Social exchange does not involve a solitary conceptual model but rather refers to a family of related theoretical frameworks. While social exchange theorists agree on the reciprocal nature of social exchange patterns, not all models explicate the same principles about resources or how they are perceived. Traditional models of exchange suggest that resources are *objects to be exchanged* (e.g., Adams 1965; Gergen 1980; Homans 1961, 1974; Thibault and Kelley 1959). Parties within the exchange are said to be driven primarily by individual self-interest, maintaining calculations on what was received versus what is to be given in return. By and large, this view of exchange has been criticized partially because it ignores the importance of interpersonal interactions (Cropanzano and Rupp 2008) and because these models assume a universal self-interest (Cropanzano et al. 2007). In response, contemporary theorists have incorporated interpersonal

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relationships into their exchange theories (e.g., Mills and Clark 1982; Organ 1988, 1990). Some of these newer models allow the possibility for individuals to fulfill their obligations toward others even when it is not necessarily in their personal interest to do so (Fiske 1991).

An important caveat, however, is that while virtually all contemporary researchers believe relationships are important, their models tend to conceptualize them in different ways. There is much to learn from each perspective, even though they are not precisely the same. Three broad conceptual paradigms can be identified from the literature. The first approach emphasizes *relationship formation* (e.g., Blau 1964; Lewicki and Bunker 1996; Lewicki et al. 2006; Masterson et al. 2000). The second approach focuses on *attributes* of the relationship as *resources to be exchanged* (e.g., Foa and Foa 1974, 1980; Sternberg 1985). The last approach considers *relationships as a social context that changes the rules by which exchanges are conducted* (e.g., Clark and Mills 1979; Fiske 1991, 1992; Hollander 1958).

We argue that each of these perspectives has unique strengths and insights. Considering them together can provide for a better description of what is exchanged and how meaning is derived from these interactions. Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to review historical and interpersonal approaches to social exchange theory and describe the three dominant theoretical paradigms for understanding the role of interpersonal relationships in exchange transactions between individuals. This chapter will further suggest some integrative ideas that combine the strengths of the various models; we also point out some needs for future research directions.

Historic Models of Social Exchange Theory on Exchange “Resources”

Traditional models of exchange give high focus to the “Economic Man” (for reviews, see Cropanzano and Rupp 2008; Ekeh 1974), wherein social exchange relations are based on self-interested motives about rewards and punishments.

The structure of rewards and costs in relationships influence the pattern of interactions that emerge from the exchange. Interactions among social exchange parties are an exchange of goods (Homans 1958). Accordingly, social exchanges are based on the following conditions: (1) actors are dependent on one another for valued resources, (2) actors behave in ways to increase positively valued resources and decrease negatively valued resources, and (3) actors engage in recurring exchanges with specific partners over time. Parties within the exchange are motivated to maximize personal gains at minimum cost, and, therefore, they make specific calculations about which objects are received and which are given. Gergen (1980) summarizes this exchange reasoning: “To say that people behave in such a way as to achieve maximum rewards at a minimum cost indeed has the ring of universal truth about it... people are bent on achieving what to them is valuable and desirable” (p. 266). In short, the traditional view of social exchange is embedded in economic rationality and considers resources that are exchanged as objects to maximize self-interests.

Thus, traditional exchange theorists suggest rationale and economic principles are the primary motive in exchange. For example, Homans (1958) maintained social behavior can be explained through economic calculations of exchange and emphasized the importance of distributive justice (or fair perceptions of exchange resources received) and balanced contributions among the exchange parties. Thibault and Kelley (1959) asserted that social exchange relations were based on interdependent interactions, wherein contributions are based on the level of dependence on the other as compared to others. Similarly, Adams (1965) suggested that people make calculations about the resources they give to and receive from the exchange partner, and compare their treatment to referent others to gauge whether the social exchange is mutual or equitable. If calculations suggest that more is given than received, individuals become motivated to balance the exchange and restore equity perceptions. In short, the traditional view focuses on the quid pro quo nature of the exchange pattern in terms of balanced benefits and costs.

These traditional theories are useful in that they provide a baseline understanding of how reciprocal patterns emerge. However, they are limited in that they treat individuals as if they were interacting in a “context-free” environment, without regard to the larger social and relational meanings of their interactions (Lind and Tyler 1988; Tyler and Blader 2001; Tyler and Lind 1990). In this regard, a number of scholars have proposed alternative theoretical positions that take into account the types of interpersonal relationships that could be formed between exchange partners (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005; Cropanzano et al. 2001). These models propose that, at least in close relationships, individuals will sometimes behave in a manner that is in response to the needs of others. Recent research provides evidence to support these contentions. For example, Korsgaard et al. (2010) found citizenship behavior is not always driven by self-interest and, instead, can be motivated by aspirations to help others. Likewise, Thau and Mitchell (2010) found retaliation is not always motivated by self-gain.

Consequently, we review various social exchange models that focus on the importance of the interpersonal relationship and describe them within three broad categories: (1) models that emphasize how relationships form, (2) models that emphasize attributes of the relationship, and (3) models that feature the relationship as a social context under which exchange commodities are defined. We review each of these below.

The Relationship-Formation Paradigm: Models that Emphasize Relationship Formation

According to social exchange theories, reciprocity is one means by which close relationships develop (Gouldner 1960). Various authors suggest that the act of giving a social exchange commodity should generate an obligation in the other to return a similar commodity at some point in the future (Homans 1961, 1974). This generalized principle gave way to models of exchange that focus on specific forms of exchange relationships

that emerge from reciprocal patterns. We review some of these perspectives below.

Blau on Economic and Social Exchange Relationships

Blau (1964) distinguished between *economic exchange relationships* and *social exchange relationships*. Economic exchange relationships are shorter term, quid pro quo, and involve weaker interpersonal attachments. Social exchange relationships are longer term, more open ended, and associated with stronger interpersonal attachments. Compared with those in economic exchange relationships, individuals engaged in quality social exchanges demand less immediate payback and are more generous. Given this distinction and patterns of reciprocity, individuals who develop mutual and beneficial exchanges over time often move from economic exchange to social exchange, as reciprocal, mutual patterns engender trust, loyalty, and commitment among the parties.

Many organizational models of social exchange have been influenced by Blau’s (1964) work. For example, Bishop and his colleagues (Bishop and Scott 2000; Bishop et al. 2000, 2003), Organ and colleagues (1988, 1990; Organ and Konovsky 1989), and Porter et al. (1974) give particular attention to how work relationships form. Research suggests that once social exchange relationships are created, workers not only reciprocate via work performance but also engage in beneficial activities that go beyond their formal job duties in order to benefit their employers (for evidence, see Eisenberger et al. 1986; Masterson et al. 2000; Settoon et al. 1996; Sluss et al. 2008; Wayne et al. 1997).

Negotiated Versus Reciprocal Exchanges

Building from Blau (1964), Molm and colleagues (e.g., Molm 1994, 2003; Molm et al. 1999, 2000, 2003) suggested there are two forms of exchange relationships: *negotiated* and *reciprocal* relations. As their names suggest, these two types of relationships come about in different ways. Negotiated exchange relations are based on bargained and binding arrangements, wherein both parties agree upon the terms of a discrete, bilateral transaction

(Molm 2003). Reciprocal exchanges, in contrast, are nonnegotiated and are engaged in voluntarily without specific assigned arrangements in terms of what is exchanged or the time by which the exchange should be transacted. Reciprocal relationships tend to result from a successful series of interactions between two parties.

Consistent with Blau's arguments, Molm and her colleagues have found that the dynamics of each type of relationship differs. Their research shows that reciprocal exchanges produce lower levels of power use and inequality (Molm et al. 1999), stronger engendered trust and affective commitment among the parties involved (Molm et al. 2000), and stronger perceptions of fairness (Molm et al. 2003). In essence, their research shows that reciprocal exchanges involve a willingness to be vulnerable to another for future obligations (i.e., trust), which promotes an overall level of commitment. Negotiated exchanges highlight assurances – or expectations of incentives based on stated agreements – and, therefore, an assessment of risk (i.e., trust) is unnecessary. Like Blau's theorizing, their work suggests beneficial negotiated exchanges may evolve into reciprocal exchanges if partners display trustworthy characteristics. These thoughts were empirically studied by Lawler and Yoon (1993, 1996, 1997) and are described below.

Relationship Formation During Negotiation

Lawler and Yoon (1993, 1996, 1997) empirically tested the idea of whether economic (or negotiated) exchange relations can evolve into social (or reciprocal) exchange relations, and gave close attention to the exchange process. They argued that negotiated arrangements based on inherent cooperativeness can develop affective commitment among the parties involved. An especially noteworthy example can be found in their series of experimental studies (Lawler and Yoon 1997), which found that after a series of negotiated agreements, the act of repeated and successful exchanges produces positive affect. The produced positive affect enhanced relational cohesion among the parties, which generated committed and trusting relationships (Lawler and Yoon

1993; Lawler et al. 1999; for a related discussion, see Molm 2003). Lawler (2001) concluded that two elements are essential for negotiated exchanges to evolve into reciprocal relations: (1) parties must be jointly responsible for the outcomes of a task, and (2) parties must share a sense of responsibility for the results of the exchange arrangement. In short, negotiated exchanges transform when each party's outcomes depend on the other's outcomes via mutual cooperation and an appreciation for the consequences of the exchange. This work highlights the importance of the evaluations made within exchanges that evolve trust and mutual cooperation. We believe models of trust can shed light on when and why some relationships evolve to social or reciprocal exchanges, while others fail, and highlight the work of Lewicki and colleagues (Lewicki and Bunker 1995, 1996; Lewicki et al. 2006) below.

Trust Formation in Exchange Relations

There are a number of models of trust formation in exchange relations (e.g., Butler 1991; Deutsch 1973; Lewicki and Bunker 1995; Mayer et al. 1995; Rousseau et al. 1998; Shapiro et al. 1992). Consistent with the focus of this section, we review a transformational model that suggests different forms of trust emerge as exchange relations develop. In particular, Lewicki and colleagues (Lewicki and Bunker 1995, 1996; Lewicki et al. 2006) presented a developmental model that describes how trust *transforms* as relationship quality strengthens. Specifically, they describe three forms of trust: calculus-based, knowledge-based, and identity-based trust. The three forms of trust are not mutually exclusive; they must occur in order as the exchange relationship develops. We describe each below.

At the initial stage of the relationship, partners emphasize *calculus-based trust* (CBT), which involves economic calculations associated with creating and sustaining the relationship relative to the costs of maintaining or severing it. At this stage, neither of the two partners has an understanding of the other and so no trust has been established. Instead, CBT assesses one's vulnerability in the relationship. Consequently, parties

engage in “arms-length encounters” to test the other to see if a more complex relationship is warranted (Lewicki et al. 2006, p. 1011). Exchange partners who engage in a series of mutual and beneficial interactions over time are better able to predict the other’s behavior, which means trust can evolve. Yet, some relationships never develop past CBT. Four reasons are offered: (1) there is no need to develop a more complex relationship, (2) the interdependence among the parties is heavily regulated and so feelings of vulnerability are fairly low, (3) parties understand enough about each other and understand developing a relationship is unlikely, or (4) some type of trust violation occurred, breaching any expectations of commitment toward the other.

Relationships that do emerge grow to *knowledge-based trust* (KBT). KBT involves assessments of the exchange partner’s predictability or knowledge about the other person’s expected future behavior. The exchange history generates boundaries of acceptable and forgivable behavior. Because of this sense of predictability, members become more tolerable to inconsistencies if such inconsistent behavior can be adequately explained. Thus, KBT does not necessarily denote full affective commitment. Members may still feel as though they can affordably “bail out of the relationship” if need be. Hence, KBT is less calculated than CBT but is still restrictive. Mutual interactions that continue over time develop the relationship and change the nature of trust. Exchange partners who do not perceive the interactions as consistently mutual might never evolve beyond KBT. Those that do evolve to *identity-based trust* (IBT).

IBT occurs at the full relationship-development stage, where relationship quality is at its highest level. Here, trust is based on the members’ shared desires and intentions. Accordingly, IBT reflects each of the party’s ability to understand and appreciate the other’s wants and needs based on a strong affective connection. Furthermore, at this stage of the relationship, members engage in pro-relationship acts, such as accommodating the other and making sacrifices for the other (Lewicki et al. 2006). The stronger the level of IBT, the more dependent the partners become on the exchange relationship.

Ballinger and Rockman’s Anchoring Model of Social Exchange

Ballinger and Rockmann (2010) recently proposed a new theory of social exchange that articulates the relationship-development process in greater detail. These scholars argue that relationships can change over time, going through different phases. Individuals experience *phase shifts* when they encounter certain key exchanges. A key exchange is either one transaction or a related series that are highly emotional and instrumentally relevant. These key exchanges serve as *anchoring events*. Based on theories of memory and emotion, Ballinger and Rockman argue that once an anchoring event is set in motion, current and future exchanges and their associated outcomes are evaluated based on that particular event. Unlike other theories of social exchange, which posit gradual changes in relationships (cf. Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005), Ballinger and Rockman propose that anchoring events produce dramatic alternations in relationship quality. These new relationships tend to be durable, maintaining themselves until another anchoring event produces a subsequent phase shift.

Ballinger and Rockmann (2010) have presented a thorough model of social exchange. As was the case for Lawler and Yoon (1993, 1996, 1997), Lewicki and colleagues (Lewicki and Bunker 1995, 1996; Lewicki et al. 2006), and Molm (1994, 2003), Ballinger and Rockman provide details as to how transactions are conducted within various relational settings. Though we will deal with the relationship context later in this chapter, it is worth mentioning some key ideas here. Ballinger and Rockman were concerned with how relationships move from reciprocal exchanges to other forms of transactions. Based on a positive anchoring event, the relationship between two parties can rapidly shift from *quid pro quo* to one that is more trusting and flexible. Interesting, Ballinger and Rockman further maintain that a negative anchoring event can also change a relationship in a way that makes it more contentious and angry (cf. Mitchell and Ambrose 2007). In either case, one anchoring event changes the rules by which exchanges are governed. Within work relations, reciprocity is presumed until it is importantly breached, and

then nonreciprocity norms are presumed and guide future exchanges.

How Exchanges Build Closer Relationships (and How They Do Not): The Role of Environmental Moderators

Future research needs to consider the various features of the environmental context within which an exchange can occur. These include the *constraints* surrounding the exchanges, the *motives* of those in the exchange, the *resources available* to those in the exchange, and the *time* by which the exchanges occur. According to Gouldner (1960), not all exchanges are equal. As such, they do not impact relationship formation in identical ways. In the space below, we review these four issues in detail, emphasizing how they impact the formation of social exchange relationships.

Constraints

Gouldner (1960) argued that relational constraints can hinder the nature of reciprocity, as they generally lessen the amount of trust each exchange partner holds in the other. Moving beyond such constraints may provide greater symbolic meaning. As an example, Gouldner drew from the work of Malinowski (1932) with tribal groups that engaged in gift exchanges. In such tribes, it was customary for tribesman to offer a “gift” (or resource) to another tribe to initiate interactions among the two partners. If tribes had previous hostile interactions, such interactions served as “constraints” on the relationship. For tribes working under such constraints, giving up a resource to the other would suggest goodwill and, thus, would be more meaningful. Within other contexts, goodwill efforts can be equally as meaningful. For example, one effective way to deescalated conflict is “tit for tat” (e.g., Wright 1994). When using tit for tat, one party makes a voluntary concession of a nontrivial amount. The other party is thereby urged to reciprocate. If he or she does so, then the original party makes a second contribution, once again awaiting a reciprocal benefit. In so doing, trust can be built and conflict diminished. Hence, reciprocity can help us overcome the constraints imposed by relational distrust.

Motives

Motives also influence exchange relations and are arguably one of the biggest failings of social exchange relations (Price 2006). Sahlins (1972) suggests three types of motives are typical in exchange arrangements: self-interest, mutual concern, and a generalized concern for the other. Self-interested motives emphasize one’s own gains, mutual motives emphasize the balance of gains and costs to each party involved, and generalized motives tend to emphasize gains for the other versus the self. Indeed, Gouldner (1960) discussed the importance of motives and, specifically, as they relate to exploitation. Within mutual arrangements, there is supposed to be an understanding that the interests of the parties involved are mutual – that each party will reciprocate equivalent commodities. If individuals are self-interested, exploitation is likely. Both Gouldner and Sahlins suggested that self-interested individuals are likely to promote “negative” reciprocity arrangements, wherein the self-interested partner is opportunistic and seeks to take advantage of the other, resulting in an imbalanced exchange relationship. Moreover, self-interested behaviors promote retaliation, in which the exploited exchange partner seeks to restore the perceived imbalance and get back at the other for trying to take advantage of the situation.

Thus, exchange commodities from self-interested individuals are perceived to be of speculative value. The other person in the exchange essentially does not trust that the self-interested individual plans to reciprocate appropriately and/or that by accepting the exchange commodity from the self-interested individual, they somehow owe the other in some fashion at some point in the future. We use, for example, a promotion within the context of a work arrangement. Generally speaking, an employee might find the promotion of high value, depending on the supervisor’s motives for providing it. If the promotion was given because the employee’s contributions demonstrated success and value to the organization, the employee might feel the promotion is valuable and deserved (or equivalent). If the promotion is based on what the employee believes is based on their demonstrated potential, there too the employee might find the promotion

particularly valuable. However, if the employee thought the supervisor provided the promotion as a way of passing off more work, setting up the employee to fail or, worse, as an exchange for political favor, the employee might not see the promotion as highly valuable. Ultimately, exchange partners who do not believe the other is acting mutually and in a self-interested fashion will be cautious in future exchanges. As a result, the quality of the relationship will suffer.

Research in the organizational sciences provides evidence for these arguments. In particular, Dirks and Skarlicki (2009) argued that trustworthiness characteristics of the exchange partner – specifically, integrity and benevolence – can offer information about the other’s motives. Integrity is defined as one’s adherence to moral and ethical standards; benevolence involves the degree to which the exchange partner considers the other’s interests and welfare (Mayer et al. 1995). Dirks and Skarlicki argue that both integrity and benevolence of an exchange partner can provide baseline information about the likelihood of being taken advantage of. Results from their experimental studies show that even though individuals were capable of performing at a particular level, if they believed the exchange partner (a coworker) held low integrity, their reciprocated performance levels were significantly lower than if the individual was perceived to be of high integrity. Furthermore, individuals were more willing to provide the exchange partner with beneficial resources if the focal partner was considered of high versus low integrity. While these findings are not a direct test of perceived motives, they do provide suggestive evidence that perceived motives influence exchange dynamics and potentially how exchanges are valued among the parties.

Availability of Resources

Another quality that influences an exchange commodity’s value is the availability of resources of each exchange partner. The importance of which is embedded in the spirit of the gift (Mauss 1967; Sahlin 1972). Not all exchange partners have the same resources. Therefore, meaning or worth of a commodity is also drawn from the resources

available to the parties. Anthropology evidence suggests that in tribal relations, if a receiving tribe had fewer resources than the other, the initiating tribe would not expect the exchange commodity to be concretely the same. Whatever the other tribe could reciprocate with would imply good faith, and the tribesmen would begin to “protect” the other’s interests in the event that other, more hostile tribes entered into their areas. These ideas can be realized within a work exchange. For example, today’s waning economy has pressed many organizations financially, and many employees are aware of this. If a supervisor provides an employee with a raise in light of this knowledge, the employee might find the raise (even if small) particularly valuable. Furthermore, other acts of recognition may further heighten the value.

Time

Lastly, the time by which the exchange of resources occurs also provides exchange partners an indication of how valuable each other perceives the relationship. Blau (1964) suggested social exchanges are based on an indefinite time frame. While the time frame may not be stipulated, there is an expectation that exchange commodities will be reciprocated at some point in the near future. Yet, there is an interesting interplay in terms of the immediacy of the return. Mauss (1925) observed that exchange commodities that are returned immediately invoke feelings of distrust among the other exchange partner. Conversely, delaying returns over an extended period of time can build social friction. Both immediate and extensive delays in reciprocation suggest the commodity is not very valuable to building a quality exchange relationship. Essentially, what is needed to demonstrate a valued exchange is an equivalent time delay from both parties. There is some empirical evidence of this pattern. In particular, Uhl-Bien and Maslyn (2003) found that subordinates who perceived exchanges were of high immediacy characterized their social exchange relationship with their supervisor (via leader-member exchange perceptions) as not as high quality as those exchanges on a more balanced time frame.

The Relationship-Formation Approach: Summary and Future Research Needs

Our review highlights the creation of high-quality exchange relationships from their lower quality antecedents. Some models within this perspective focus on the specific form of the relationship: whether it is economic, tangible, or negotiated or whether it is social, reciprocal, or intangible (e.g., Blau 1964; Molm 1994). Other models attempt to discern how economic or negotiated forms of exchange can evolve into committed and mutual reciprocal exchanges (e.g., Lawler and Yoon 1993; Lewicki et al. 2006; Ballinger and Rockmann 2010). In either case, these models treat the relationship as an outcome that emerges as a result of previous interactions between individuals.

While these models of social exchange have proven quite influential, especially within the organizational sciences, they are limited in two respects. First, as we shall see in our next section, various scholars have found that relationships do more than *form* as a result of the exchange. Individuals may also conduct transactions in *attributes* of the exchange. One might loosely think of this as a sort a relational “currency,” whereby we return the treatment that we receive from others. For example, Berscheid and Walster (1975) argue that we reciprocate the liking that people feel for us. Second, we have yet to consider how people treat one another *once the relationship is in place*. Advantageous exchanges may produce closer working relationships, as Lawler (2001) and Ballinger and Rockmann (2010) argue, but once the relationship has been formed, then the formed relationship will impact subsequent transactions. The theories reviewed above have all discussed this issue at length, and we will return to these ideas later in this chapter.

The Relational-Attribute Paradigm: Models that Emphasize Attributes of the Exchange Relationship

In the preceding conceptual paradigm, resource exchanges – when taken over time – can produce

high-quality interpersonal relationships. The relationship, therefore, is a consequence of the exchanges. A different approach is taken by our next paradigmatic family of theories, which we term the relational-attribute paradigm. In these frameworks, attributes of the relationship serve as *one of the resources that are exchanged*. In other words, the relationship is not the (only) product of serial exchanges. Rather, the relationship can actually *be exchanged* along with other resources.

Sternberg on Romantic Love

As an example of this approach, let us consider Sternberg’s (1985) triangular theory of love, which draws from the social exchange perspective. Sternberg argues that love includes three things – intimacy (feelings of closeness and connection much like liking), passion (a “hot” desire for union with another person), and commitment (a short-term and long-term decision to give one’s love to another). Based on social exchange theory, Sternberg (1985, pp. 159–160) argues that intimacy and commitment, though not necessarily passion, can be exchanged between individuals.

There is evidence for these ideas. For example, Berscheid and Walster (1975; see especially their Chap. 5) discuss evidence for the “reciprocity-of-liking” rule. Essentially, when we discover that another person likes us, we tend to like them in return. Hence, we exchange liking for liking. The reciprocity-of-liking effect seems to be especially strong when our self-esteem has been damaged (Deutsch and Solomon 1959; Walster 1965). These ideas are important because they suggest that attributes of a relationship, such as liking or intimacy, can be exchanged among parties.

Foa and Foa’s Resource Theory

Perhaps the most comprehensive model to discuss the exchange of relational attributes is Foa and Foa’s (1974, 1980) resource theory. This framework attempts to build an understanding of the types of resources transacted within exchange relations. They identified specific “resources” that are considered contributions to exchange relations. Foa and Foa argued that resources can involve “any commodity – material

or symbolic” – which is transmitted through interpersonal behavior (1974, p. 36). Based on this reasoning, they developed a typology that categorizes and identifies the structure underlying which resources can be exchanged between two actors (Foa and Foa 1974, 1980). Accordingly, these resources could be classified into Cartesian space to depict the relationship and dynamics between the resource classes. Resources are categorized along two dimensions: particularism and concreteness. The particularism dimension refers to whether a resource is valued by its source (i.e., particular) or by individuals more generally (i.e., universal), whereas the concreteness dimension refers to whether a resource is tangible (i.e., concrete) or intangible (i.e., symbolic). Based on these dimensions, the typology further dissects resources into six descriptive *classes*:

1. *Love*: an expression of affectionate regard, warmth, or comfort
2. *Status*: evaluative judgment conveying either high or low prestige, regard, or esteem
3. *Information*: any advice, opinion, or instructions
4. *Money*: any coin or token that has some standard of exchange value
5. *Goods*: any product or objects

6. *Services*: activities on the body or belonging to the individual

Figure 6.1 provides a configuration of the typology and the six classes of resources. Accordingly, services and goods are considered overtly tangible and are concrete. Since status and information are conveyed verbally and hold meaning to particular individuals, they are considered to be particular and symbolic resources. Status and services are similar in terms of particularism but differ in concreteness; services are far more concrete than status is. Status and information are similar in symbolism but differ in particularism. That is, status is given relevance based on the individual who receives it, whereas information is far more universal in terms of its worth. Money and love are equally general on concreteness but contrast in particularism. Money is universalistic, since it has the same value regardless of who provides it. Love is more symbolic, since it cannot be priced in a market exchange and ascribes meaning from the individuals receiving it.

In addition to the basic resources and classes described in resource theory, Foa and Foa (1974) richly describe in detail the dynamics and forces




Fig. 6.1 Configuration of the six resource classes (Note: Original typology depicted in Foa, U. G. (1971). Interpersonal and economic resources. *Science*, 171, 345–351)

operating within social structures. Characterizing the nature of resources in this framework is a significant contribution to the interpretation of social exchange. Like the periodic table in chemistry, the typology establishes basic elements and boundaries of social exchange and the nature of their differences. From this understanding, we can begin to theorize about how resources behave in different combinations and social contexts. Foa and Foa (1974, 1980) contend interpersonal behavior can be considered synonymous with the resources exchanged among the parties. Similarly, they contend that all six classes of resources tend to obey different exchange patterns. In particular, abstract and particularistic goods, such as love and respect, are exchanged differently than concrete and universalistic goods, such as money. More concrete and universalistic resources tend to be negotiated in advance and are specific and defined, whereas symbolic and particularistic resources are generally not negotiable and evolve over a longer term. For example, love is not *quid pro quo*; it can be given without the expectation for exact repayment. In fact, the same resource may obey different rules due to situational dynamics. In short, different *types* of benefits are exchanged in different *ways*.

Classical Approaches Based on “Gift” Exchanges

A slightly different approach to this issue was taken in famous classical accounts of social exchange, presented by anthropological theorists such as Malinowski (1922, 1932), Mauss (1925), and Lévi-Strauss (1949, 1957). These authors did not explicitly distinguish among families of resources, as articulated by Foa and Foa (1974, 1980). Rather, they presented all exchange resources as concrete objects, such as when specific gifts are exchanged. In other words, they separated the specific exchange commodity from the meaning that it might convey.

Resources, in the classic social exchange formulation, often possessed a strongly symbolic value. The item itself was concrete, but the message it offered need not be. Malinowski’s (1922) original work highlighted the Kula exchange, in which parties of two distant tribes

would meet to perform a ceremony (i.e., a “gift” exchange). Two items were exchanged: one tribe offered a necklace and the other returned an armlet. While both objects were material, they held no practical value, nor did they quell a specific need of either tribe member. In short, the objects offered no objective “utility” (as suggested in economic exchanges of the traditional view). Instead, the tribes exchanged the objects in ceremony, communicating the symbolic sense of commitment for a long-term exchange arrangement. Thus, Malinowski’s work attempted to dispel the notion that exchange parties are solely motivated by economic self-interest. Even more importantly, he asserted that tangible commodities can communicate something more than they are objectively worth.

A more contemporary example of this same phenomenon can be seen with the gift of an engagement ring. To be sure, the ring is an economically valuable material object, but it can also symbolize love between two people. Two otherwise identical rings might have different value if one is freely given from someone you love and the other is won in a lottery. Similarly, Lévi-Strauss (1969) contends social exchanges are culturally defined, wherein commodities exchanged are based on symbolic value (p. 138). These acts are important, and the symbolism derived from them seems to impact the provider as well as the recipient. In three studies, Lambert et al. (2010) found when people expressed gratitude for good deeds, they felt that they had a stronger relationship with the other party.

Notice that the relational attribute is not exchanged directly but can be carried or signaled through material objects. Even money does not always send a universalistic and concrete message. For example, in an experimental study, Rosenfield et al. (1980) paid undergraduate subjects to work on a task. When research participants were led to think of the payment as a reward for high performance, they showed greater intrinsic motivation. When they were led to think of the payment as a “bribe,” their intrinsic motivation was diminished. The same amount of the same stimulus (money) produced different results depending upon how it was conceptualized.

Unlike the work of Foa and Foa (1974, 1980) and Sternberg (1985), the key distinction for these classical theorists is not among the different types of resources. Rather, it is among the messages that they send. Consequently, individuals are not actually exchanging, say, love, but are mutually defining a loving relationship in which they both participate. More to the point, a symbolic resource can either affirm an existing relationship (e.g., the gift of anniversary flowers to a loved one) or can signal the opportunity to participate in a relationship (e.g., an invitation from a supervisor to present one's viewpoints on an important issue). In this way, the exchange of concrete resources with symbolic and (hopefully) understood meanings can draw people into particular relational modes.

These anthropological frameworks are important; they help us to solve a reoccurring conceptual question – what is exchanged among social exchange relations? It is easy to comprehend how people might exchange something concrete and monetizable, such as money or goods. However, it is more challenging to understand how something intangible, such as intimacy or liking, can be passed from person to person. One solution, of course, is that one could simply articulate one's feelings or have another person communicate them for you. This is usually done in tests of reciprocity-of-liking model mentioned above (Berscheid and Walster 1975). But in other settings, this idea might be more difficult. Besides, the approach does not fully capture the notion of “exchange,” as usually understood. Malinowski (1922, 1932), Mauss (1925), and Lévi-Strauss (1949, 1957) offer another solution. These classical theorists would argue that we need not *directly* exchange, say, status or love. Rather, we can *indirectly* communicate our feelings and intentions by transacting concrete goods that proffer a culturally understood message. These considerations would allow people to exchange relational qualities though both direct communication and through symbolic messages carried by gifts.

The above review redefines resources as commodities with symbolic messages. Something specific is always transacted, even if it is

little more than a smile. However, the same resource can carry different meanings, depending upon the context. In other words, an item may convey distinct symbolic messages based upon the setting in which it is proffered. For example, in a close social exchange relationship, a smile from a supervisor may be reassuring. However, in a quid pro quo exchange relationship, the meaning of this same smile could be ambiguous. It could even be perceived as cynical and contemptuous. While this is a helpful observation, it has a number of implications. A social exchange theory is incomplete unless it can adequately describe the contextual factors that create the symbolic meanings given to objects of exchange.

Socioemotional Resources

A number of social exchange researchers have proposed a two-part taxonomy of benefits that is simpler than Foa and Foa's (1974, 1980) resource theory, while also emphasizing the idea of symbolic messages communicated by resources. These scholars, who are often interested in justice perceptions, tend to separate *economic resources* from *socioemotional resources* (e.g., Chen 1995; Cropanzano and Schminke 2001; Folger and Cropanzano 2001; Martin and Harder 1994). Cropanzano and Ambrose (2001, p. 120) explain this distinction as follows:

Economic, sometimes called “instrumental,” benefits are those that have to do with material well-being, comfort, and standard of living. They tend to be easily monetizable and relatively concrete. Socioemotional benefits are those that refer to one's standing in and identification with a group. Socioemotional benefits are often called “symbolic” because they provide an indication of one's status and value within the context of some social group.

Notice that the notion of socioemotional benefits tends to get very close to what is meant here by relational attributes. Profits and office are economic rewards, whereas friendliness and voluntary helpfulness are socioemotional (Martin and Harder 1994). Martin and Harder further note that socioemotional resources tend to be divided equally, while economic resources tend to be divided based on equity.

There are exceptions, though. At times, even socioemotional resources may be allocated based on relative contribution, rather than providing everyone with an equivalent amount. For example, Chen (1995) found that Chinese managers, as opposed to Americans, were more prone to divide socioemotional goods equitably. Another relevant study was conducted by Bowling et al. (2005). These scholars were studying social support, a type of socioemotional resource, and found that employees who generously provided support to their peers were also more likely to receive support when they required it. Conversely, those who were stingy with their support received less from others. Thus, there is evidence that – at least on some occasions – the rule of reciprocity holds for socioemotional benefits.

The Relational-Attribute Approach: Summary and Future Research Needs

The research review in this section treats the relationship as *something to be exchanged* rather than as, or at least in addition to, *the result of an exchange*. This is an important conceptual distinction, which has some interesting theoretical implications. We will here discuss three issues in need of additional empirical exploration – the structure of relationships and integration with the relationship-formation models.

Scholars who take a relational-attribute approach tend to propose multidimensional structure models, with different relational elements exchanged in different ways. Perhaps the most notable idea is that if relationships are to be exchanged, it would help to break them into dissociable parts. For example, we saw earlier that Sternberg (1985) offered a three-component conceptualization of romantic love. Two parts – commitment and especially intimacy – are amenable to exchange, while a third part – passion – is less so. Foa (1971) and Foa and Foa (1974, 1980) proposed six classes of resources, at least two of which (status and love) were relational in nature. Viewing interpersonal relationships as composed of multiple parts is a conceptual idea that we hope will receive additional research attention.

Another issue in need of inquiry involves the integration between the relational-attribute para-

digm and the relationship-formation paradigm. Combining these two approaches to social exchange may provide researchers to a plausible account of how people can transact intangible goods, such as status and love. Besides simply stating one's feelings (e.g., saying "I love you"), the classical anthropological theorists have provided a useful mechanism. It is important to appreciate that objects have symbolic meanings that are understood in a particular cultural setting. These meanings communicate intimacy, status, love, and so forth, between persons.

Finally, it is important for relational-attribute theorists to take seriously the importance of repeated exchanges over time. Foa and Foa (1974, 1980) make a good start in this regard. Based on previous work, we suggest that individuals often begin by exchanging more tangible and concrete resources; they will later include less tangible and more symbolic goods in their transactions (cf. Rousseau 1995). Of course, this is a hypothesis in need of investigation.

The Relationship-Context Paradigm: Models that Feature the Social Context of the Exchange Relationship

The third category of relational exchange models focuses on the social context of the relationship. This research suggests that exchanges take place *within* different types of relationships. This relationship-context view separates the resources exchanged from the relationship itself. Some contemporary social exchange theorists take this approach. They distinguish between the relationship encompassing the parties and the goods that are exchanged within that relationship (e.g., Clark and Mills 1993; Clark and Pataki 1995). Stating the matter very generally (and loosely), when individuals are in high-quality relationships, they become more generous toward and more forgiving of the other person. This is even so when confronted with a seemingly disadvantageous distribution. For example, in one field study, Fulk et al. (1985) examined employees' attitudes to performance feedback. When they trusted their supervisor, they were more accepting of

unfavorable information. Likewise, Mansour-Cole and Scott (1998) explored reactions to downsizing. Workers who had a high-quality leader-member exchange relationship with their supervisor reported less negative reactions than did those with a poor-quality leader-member exchange relationship. In a final empirical example, Mikula et al. (1998) investigated how couples respond to seemingly unfair treatment from their partners. These scholars found that those individuals in close relationships tended to be more tolerant of ill-treatment than did those in more distant relationships.¹

These studies suggest that the character of the relationship moderates how individuals respond to interpersonal transactions. This possibility is not inconsistent with the paradigms we have already discussed. Indeed, the opposite is true. The theorists we have cited who are interested in relationship formation also assume that once a strong relationship is in place, it will change the way that goods are transacted (e.g., Blau 1964; Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996, 1997). In a like fashion, relational-attribute theorists, such as Foa and Foa (1974, 1980), have also considered the relationship context. Nevertheless, these are conceptually distinct ideas, even though they have often been integrated into the same specific theories. For the sake of emphasis and clarity, it is worth considering the relationship context separately from the other two paradigms we have already discussed. Toward this end, we will review three perspectives that fall into this category: Hollander's (1958) ideas on idiosyncrasy credits, Clark and Mills (1979, 1993) research on communal and exchange relationships, and Fiske's (1991, 1992) model of relational modes.

¹We caution that we are simplifying these findings for conciseness. The results were quite rich and interesting. Notably, Mikula et al. (1998) were interested in actor/recipient differences in judgments of fairness. In general, people who performed the questionable acts (the actors) were more generous in their judgments than were the people harmed by the actions (the recipients). However, these differences were reduced for couples in higher quality relationships.

Hollander and Idiosyncrasy Response Credits

Hollander (1958) recognized the importance of interpersonal relationships in social exchange during the 1950s. He suggested exchanges between leaders and followers are transactional, and their transactions should be considered in terms of the evolving relationship that builds among the parties. Hollander further asserted that pure economic reasoning does not consider "idiosyncrasy credits" that develop among the partners, which constitute each partner's earned status with the other. During the course of leader-follower work relationships, it is possible for one of the exchange partners to return a nonbeneficial contribution back to the other; if the partners built a stock of idiosyncrasy credits of loyalty and commitment, quid pro quo reactions (or returning with nonbeneficial contributions to the exchange relationship) would be lessened. Stated differently, social exchange partners who develop loyalty and commitment toward the other essentially give each other the benefit of the doubt when exchanges are not seemingly mutual and beneficial. Indeed, Hollander's (1960, 1961) empirical work supports these ideas.

Clark and Mills on Communal and Exchange Relationships

Clark and Mills (1993; see also, Clark 1984, 1986; Mills and Clark 1982) argued that human relationships could be divided into two types, each of which was governed by a different set of normative rules. *Exchange relationships* often occur among people who do not know one another well or among people doing business together (even when these involve long-term associates). Exchange transactions tend to be relatively short term and involve specific benefits for services rendered. *Communal relationships* tend to be more open ended. When compared to those in exchange relationships, those governed by communal norms tend to pay somewhat less attention to their own inputs and more attention to the needs of the other party (Clark et al. 1989, 1986). Immediate and direct repayment is less likely to be demanded (Clark and Mills 1979). Within communal relationships, one accepts a degree of

responsibility for the well-being of the other person. The extent to which one feels this way has been labeled *communal strength* (Lambert et al. 2010; Mills et al. 2004). Relationships high in communal strength are more likely to exist among family members and close friends, while they are less likely to exist among strangers and acquaintances (Clark and Pataki 1995).

Clark and Mills (1993) argue that their model is more concerned with *how* benefits are exchanged and less concerned with *what* benefits are exchanged. Clark and Mills (1979) observe explicitly that “The rules concerning the giving and receiving of benefits are what distinguish communal and exchange relationships, rather than the specific benefits that are given and received” (p. 13). This suggests that the same concrete benefit can be differentially transacted depending upon where a relationship is governed by exchange or communal norms.

In one experiment, Clark and Mills (1979, Study 1) compared undergraduate men who desired an exchange relationship with an undergraduate woman to those who desired a communal relationship with the woman. When these subjects were helpful and desired an exchange relationship, they liked the female participant *more* when she repaid him for his assistance. When these subjects were helpful and desired a communal relationship, they liked the female participant *less* when she repaid him. An economic benefit provided for service rendered actually *harmed* the prospects for a communal friendship. Consistent with the work of Hollander (1958), people exchange goods in distinct ways, depending upon the type of relationships they have formed.

Fiske’s Four Relational Modes

Clark and Mills (1979, 1993) proposed only two types of relationships – communal and exchange. Some scholars have proposed additional relational forms (e.g., Meeker 1971). These sundry models were comprehensively reviewed by Fiske (1991, 1992), who then proposed an integrative framework. Other than the “null” case of no relationship, Fiske (1991) suggested four relational modes may occur in exchange: *communal sharing*, *authority ranking*, *market pricing*, and *equality*

matching. These four relational types simplify our social lives. Once we decide which of the four relational models we wish to share with another person, then subsequent exchanges can be interpreted based on the relational mode that is transacted.

Communal Sharing

When a relationship is defined in terms of *communal sharing*, then people give and take freely what they need from a source of pooled resources. What is exchanged is not based upon what each party contributes. Instead, group belonging and identity are emphasized. There is no scorekeeping in terms of who contributes and who receives commodities. The value of commodities in communal exchange is, therefore, based on intimacy (love; cf. Foa and Foa 1974) and the motivation to maintain one’s identity with the overall group.

Authority Ranking

When a relationship is defined in terms of *authority ranking*, people with status and power are provided with the greatest benefits. The principles of exchange in authority ranking modes are based on social custom and tradition of nobility. Superiors demand what they wish from inferiors. In exchange for proffering superiors with what they need, inferiors are guaranteed that superiors will provide a level of protection to them and inferiors may use commodities left over from superiors.

Market Pricing

When exchange relations are based on *market pricing*, the value of the commodity is determined as a function of the market price or its utility. The value of the commodity is based on its proportion to some market standard. Exchanges in the market pricing mode are determined based on what people will pay or the governing principles of supply and demand. In this way, market pricing relations can be seen as very similar to economic exchange relations stipulated by Blau (1964). Individual self-interest is a primary motive, and, as such, commodities can be bargained and negotiated in an attempt to gain as many commodities as possible at minimum cost.

Equality Matching

Lastly, in the *equality matching* mode, all parties are viewed as equally deserving.² Contributions from one exchange partner are reciprocated with an equal commodity. Thus, much like Blau's (1964) social exchange relationship principles, offering a commodity to one exchange partner builds an obligation in the other to return a commodity and balance the exchange. This assumption embedded in these exchanges suggests commodities exchanged must be "equivalent." The value of the commodity exchanged is culturally determined based on what is equal or equivalent. Indeed, Gouldner (1960) discussed the subtleties of equivalence. He described the issue in terms of heteromorphic versus homeomorphic reciprocity. Heteromorphic exchanges involve things that may be concretely different but equal in value (i.e., *tit for tat*). Homeomorphic exchanges involve things that are concretely alike or identical in form (i.e., *tat for tat*). Most social exchanges models within the contemporary organizational sciences literature seem to describe relations in terms of equality matching and focus on heteromorphic or more symbolic exchanges. Yet, the trouble of determining what constitutes an equivalent or heteromorphic exchange still requires attention. If all exchanges are concrete, what determines the symbolic value of a heteromorphic exchange?

Fiske (1991) suggests that the value of equality matching commodities is dependent on cultural norms and expectations. We believe Gouldner (1960) and Sahlins (1972) offer guidance. Both theorists draw heavily from the work of Malinowski (1922) and Mauss (1925) to understand the nature of exchange resources within the context of social life. As we saw previously, when discussing the classic anthropological theorists, giving something to another always *means* something. The meaning of a particular exchange commodity is based on the nuances of cultures

and the structure of exchange partners and their relationship, and specifically the nature of constraints, motives, the availability of resources, and time by which exchanges are made (which we reviewed above).

Concluding Thoughts

According to Fiske (1991, 1992), commodities are exchanged differently, depending upon the sort of relationship that people hold, would like to have, or should have with another person. After making that selection, exchange partners provide symbolic messages as a signal to the other party. Communal sharing involves love. That is, the interests of an overall community (or group) are the basis of exchange. Authority ranking involves status. Market pricing involves more concrete, less symbolic resources like money, goods, and services. Finally, equality matching can involve the reciprocal exchange of concrete resources (i.e., money, goods, and services) in terms of what is an "equal" exchange.

Offering symbolic resources can also signal a desire to change a mode. For example, one may send flowers to suggest a more communal relationship. Or one may receive the proverbial corner office as a sign of authority and rank (or "status," in Foa and Foa's (1974, 1980) terms). Once a symbolic message has signaled a relational mode, the receiving individual can choose to accept or deny the relationship offer. If accepted, the exchange relationship begins and follows patterns based on the mode chosen.

The Relationship-Context Approach: Summary and Future Research Needs

The relationship-context approach to social exchange emphasizes the role of interpersonal feelings in altering the normative rules of resource transactions. This is a powerful way of looking at exchanges. As other theorists have also emphasized, successful interactions can build strong relationships (Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996, 1997), but once these new relationships are in place, people began to treat each differently (Clark 1984, 1986; Clark and Mills 1979, 1993). Future inquiry should keep this distinction carefully in mind. In the relational-formation research, the relationship

²A factor analytic study by Haslam and Fiske (1999) found evidence for all four relational modes. However, it was noteworthy that equality matching was highly correlated with communal sharing. It may be that these two modalities are less easily distinguished than are the others.

is a *dependent variable* that results from transactions. In relationship-context research, the relationship is a *moderator* that changes the impact of the transaction on other criterion variables. Scholars should carefully distinguish the two.

It is also important to consider the implications that the relationship-context paradigm has for relational-attribute models. It is possible that different types of resources are likely to be differentially exchanged, depending upon the nature of the relationship (Foa and Foa 1974, 1980). Intriguingly, this suggests that attributes of the relationship are correlated with, but distinguishable from, the relationship itself. Therefore, the type of resource may not always match with the relationship in question (e.g., providing one status in a communal relationship).

Cropanzano et al. (2001) discuss this possibility directly. Drawing from the research reviewed above, they distinguish two types of benefits – economic and socioemotional. Based on Blau (1964), they also separate economic exchange relationships from social exchange relationships. Crossing the type of benefit with the type of relationship in which it is exchanged produces a set of three categories: simple, strong, and strained.

- *Simple*: Under these common conditions, a socioemotional benefit is exchanged in a social exchange relationship or else an economic benefit is exchanged in an economic exchange relationship. Here the benefit and the relationship match.
- *Strong*: In a strong relationship, an economic benefit is transacted within a social exchange relationship. Such circumstances occur, for example, when people who trust one another do business together.
- *Strained*: When a relationship is strained, individuals who have an economic exchange relationship transact socioemotional benefits. Such a setting is unusual, since it involves intangible resources transferred among parties who may not be interpersonally close. However, such an exchange could signal a desire to develop a social exchange relationship sometime in the future.

While this taxonomy is in need of additional development and testing, it illustrates the

importance of separating the type of resource from the type of relationship. Investigating these different combinations would be a worthwhile area for future study.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have provided a conceptual review regarding the role of interpersonal relationships in social exchange models. As we have seen, there are at least three perspectives. First, the relationship-formation paradigm emphasizes that beneficial exchanges could lead to the formation of close relationships. Second, relational-attribute paradigm emphasizes qualities of the relationship that might become resources for exchange. Third, the relationship-context paradigm emphasizes that interpersonal closeness can moderate the manner in which goods are exchanged as well as how people respond to these transactions. Throughout we have emphasized that these are three distinct but certainly not contradictory points of view about social exchange. Based on previous conceptual and empirical work, we have discussed how these different paradigms can reinforce one another by being combined into specific theoretical positions (e.g., Blau 1964; Foa and Foa 1974, 1980; Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996, 1997; Molm 1994, 2003). From this perspective, we can begin to understand how and why some relationships evolve into committed and trusting commitments in which relational attributes, as well as concrete benefits, are exchanged, and why others simply emphasize economic, tangible, and negotiated interactions. An integrative relational perspective allows for a better understanding on why social exchange relations develop from economic exchanges, why economic exchanges may never develop, and why some tarnished social exchange relations can be reinvigorated. In particular, it is important to consider dissecting and valuing resources within the “context” of the relationship. Doing so will proffer embedding meaning in exchange transactions and ultimately influence the nature of the exchange relationship.

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Attribution of Friendship: The Influence of the Nature and Comparability of Resources Given and Received

Kjell Törnblom and Eva M. Fredholm

Introduction

Work by Clark and Mills (1979; Clark 1981; Mills and Clark 1982; Clark *in press*) has given emphasis to a distinction between *communal* and *exchange* relationships. The former type refers to relationships in which members are concerned with each other's welfare (e.g., friends, lovers, family members). Thus, the intention behind giving a particular benefit is to please the recipient or to fulfill his or her needs. Expectations for returns are inappropriate to the spirit of the relationship, and the acceptance of benefits does not incur specific debts or obligations on the part of the recipient. It should be noted that communal relationships do not include "dependent" relationships

in which "...one person receives benefits from another but does not give benefits to the other" (Clark and Mills 1979, p. 12). Because the needs of any two parties to a communal relationship are likely to differ, the nature of the benefits given and received will typically *not* be exactly comparable. Giving benefits comparable to received ones may appear to be a response to prior benefits, likely to be interpreted as a preference for a different type of relationship, and should therefore be avoided. On the other hand, in exchange relationships (such as between businessmen and customers, employers and employees, doctors and patients, etc.), the receipt of benefits does create debts and obligations to return a benefit of comparable value. Instrumental rather than consummatory motives constitute the basis of such relationships. Similar attempts to describe two major kinds of relationships in terms of their solidary characteristics have a long tradition in classical as well as in modern sociological thought (e.g., Tönnies 1887/1957; Durkheim 1893/1968; Sumner 1906; Cooley 1909; Maclver 1936; Sorokin 1947; Davis 1948; Parsons and Shils 1951; Lerner 1975).

Clark and Mills seem to assume that norms specifying whether or not benefits given and received should be comparable underlie (at least in part) the distinction between communal and exchange relationships. Further, behaviors that are or are not consistent with these norms are assumed to constitute cues which are recognized by outside observers (Clark 1981; Mills and Clark 1982). On the basis of these cues, observers would

This chapter is reprinted with kind permission (No. 005348) from American Sociological Association: Törnblom, K. & Fredholm, E. M. (1984). Attribution of friendship: The nature and comparability of resources given and received. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 47, 50–61.

This research was facilitated by a grant (no. F 327/81) from the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences to the senior author. The valuable comments by Uriel Foa, Donald Granberg, Dan Jonsson, and three anonymous reviewers are gratefully acknowledged.

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make inferences concerning the type of relationship which they believe exists between the people in question:

If one person gives a benefit to another and soon afterward, the second person gives the first a comparable benefit, an observer is likely to infer that the second benefit is a repayment for the first and that the two people have an exchange relationship. In contrast, if the two people give and receive noncomparable benefits, the observer is likely to assume that the benefits were given to fulfill needs or to please the recipient and that the two people have a communal relationship (Mills and Clark 1982, p. 139).

Although the notion of “comparability” of benefits has not been defined in the works of Clark and Mills, their discussions strongly indicate that they *intended* it to refer to comparability (or similarity) *in kind*. However, comparability may have at least two additional meanings. First, as comparability *of absolute value*, as when two or more resources of the same kind, or of different kinds, are worth about the same as assessed in terms of an objective standard, such as dollars or any other currency. Second, as comparability *of relative value*, as when resources of the same or of different kind(s) are worth about the same to two or more persons. (The same amount of, say, praise may not necessarily be worth the same to a low-status and to a high-status person). Thus, it is entirely possible for two resources to be comparable in kind but noncomparable in absolute and/or relative value. In this chapter, we prefer to define and operationalize the term *comparability* as similarity in all three of the above-mentioned respects, while *noncomparability* refers to resources of different kinds but of about equal absolute and relative value.

In our opinion, a distinction between communal and exchange relationships on the basis of comparability *of absolute value* rather than comparability *in kind* appears more meaningful. Granted that certain resources, as such, may be more congenial and, in a way, more appropriate to partners of a communal relationship (as we shall see), it is nevertheless true that the transfer of resources among participants is not restricted to those resources alone. It is rather their symbolic meaning which is of primary significance. This is usually not the case with regard to exchange relationships, in which, in addition, noncomparability in kind seems more common and typical. Whether or not the resources

individuals present to each other are comparable or noncomparable in *kind*, their *absolute* (and, perhaps, *relative*) *value* is of greater importance in exchange than in communal relationships.

There are certain indications, throughout their writings, that Clark and Mills make an unfortunate confusion between comparability in *kind* and comparability of *value*. For example, Clark (1981, p. 376) states that it is important for members of exchange relationships to “...keep track of *how much* they receive in return...” (emphasis added); in another paper (1983, p. 5), she states that “...members of exchange relationships may tend to give and receive comparable benefits” (see also, e.g., Clark and Mills 1979, p. 12; Mills and Clark 1982, pp. 123, 138). When discussing communal relationships, however, the authors seem to refer only to comparability in kind. This confusion is also evident in Clark’s (1981, p. 376) statements about predictions regarding comparability/non-comparability on the basis of equity theory.

Clark (1981) designed two similar questionnaire studies to test the hypothesis that noncomparability (in kind) between benefits given and received is considered a sign of friendship (i.e., a communal relationship). Two benefits, a “ride home” and a “lunch treat,” were used in the first study. In the “comparable-benefit conditions” the same kind of benefit was given and received, while in the “noncomparable-benefit conditions,” one kind was given and another received. The benefits utilized for the second study were two pens, two pads of paper, a small jar of coffee, and candy. Apart from the different types of benefit used, the two studies differed in two other ways. First, the written descriptions of the situations in which benefits were changing hands between two persons (and to which subjects responded by assigning friendship ratings on a five-point scale, ranging from “not friends” to “close friends”) involved different settings: an office in study 1 and a dormitory in study 2. Second, the giving and receiving took place along different “modes”: giving-giving (i.e., P gives a benefit to O; O then gives a benefit to P) in the first study and requesting-giving (P asks O for a benefit; O gives it to P; P then gives a benefit to O) in the second.

The results showed that subjects assigned higher friendship scores to situations described in

noncomparable-benefit conditions as compared to comparable-benefit conditions. (A third study, in which recipients reciprocated with comparable benefits, indicated that subjects were more likely to interpret that act as a repayment.) It should be noted, however, that *both* the comparable and noncomparable conditions elicited positive friendship ratings by the subjects. The mean scores for the comparable and the noncomparable conditions in study 1 were 2.0 and 2.6, respectively, and 2.3 and 2.6 in study 2 (on a scale from 0 to 4). Thus, the magnitude of perceived friendship between the two persons in the two conditions differed by a mere half of a scale unit.

Further qualifications, in addition to those already mentioned, appear necessary with regard to Clark's umbrella proposition and conclusion that noncomparability (but not comparability) between benefits given and received serves as an indicator of friendship (i.e., a communal relationship). *First*, if benefits are classified according to Foa's (1971) resource typology, Clark failed to test her hypothesis because she employed comparable rather than noncomparable benefits. This may explain the positive friendship ratings in both conditions and the small differences between them. *Second*, resource theory (Foa and Foa 1974) has generated propositions some of which are contradictory to Clark's (1981) hypothesis. Indeed, it is not difficult to think of occasions when comparability, rather than noncomparability, between benefits given and received would be a sign of friendship. As an illustration, the above quotation from Mills and Clark (1982) could be construed in a way opposite to what was intended by the authors: It is unlikely that one *would not* infer a communal relationship if a woman immediately returns a kiss just received from a man (i.e., comparable benefits). It is equally unlikely that observers *would* infer a communal relationship if a person stepping out of a car gives the driver money (i.e., noncomparable benefits). Noncomparability is, indeed, the rule rather than an exception in one of the most common types of exchange relationship, that between employers and employees. What is given and received is usually noncomparable in terms of both quality and quantity (kind and value). It seems important, then, to acknowledge the

possible impact of additional factors, such as differences in power, status, sex, age, etc., among the participants in a given relationship.

The models under consideration (i.e., those by Clark and Mills and by Foa and Foa) seem to have predictive value in that comparability *as well as* noncomparability appear likely to act as signs of *both* communal and exchange relationships. This chapter juxtaposes the two models to analyze the conditions under which comparability and noncomparability may each be a stronger sign of friendship than the other. Hypotheses are derived and examined empirically.

We now turn to a consideration of those aspects of resource theory which are relevant in this context.

Particularism, Resource Profile, and Comparability: Propositions

Foa and Foa's resource theory (Foa 1971; Foa and Foa 1974, 1976) is organized around a classification of resources into the six categories of love, status, information, money, goods, and services.¹ These were arranged in a circumplex model on the basis of two dimensions: concreteness-symbolism and particularism-universalism.² Data from studies on the structure of this model

¹"Love" is an expression of affectionate regard, warmth, or comfort. "Status" indicates an evaluative judgment that conveys prestige, regard, or esteem. "Information" includes advice, opinions, instructions, or enlightenment but excludes those behaviors that could be classed as love or status. "Money" is any coin, currency, or token that has some standard unit of exchange value. "Goods" are tangible products, objects, or materials. "Services" involve activities that affect the body or belongings of a person and that often constitute labor for another (Foa and Foa 1976, p. 101).

²"The notion of particularism...indicates the extent to which the value of a given resource is influenced by the particular persons involved in exchanging it and by their relationship." "...concreteness...suggests the form or type of expression characteristic of the various resources." "Love, the most particularistic resource is at one extreme of this coordinate (particularism-universalism). Money, the least particularistic resource, is situated at the other extreme." "Services and status are less particularistic than love, but more particularistic than goods and information, which are more universalistic" (Foa and Foa 1976, p. 102).

(see Foa and Foa 1974, for a review) have supported the proposition that identical resources (i.e., comparable in kind) and, although to a lesser extent, neighboring ones (e.g., love and status, services and goods, information and status) are seen as more appropriately and efficiently given and returned for one another than distant and, especially, opposite resources (i.e., maximally noncomparable: love and money, status and goods, or information and services).

A study by Turner et al. (1971), for example, was designed to explore what resources subjects preferred in return for the one provided by them. The data were collected using an instrument called the Social Interaction Inventory, which deals with “exchange” among friends or acquaintances. In general, the highest preferences were assigned to resources identical (i.e., comparable) to the one previously given and the lowest to opposite ones (i.e., noncomparable resources).

Fitting the benefits used by Clark (1981) into the corresponding classes of the Foas’ resource model reveals that Clark’s resources belong to identical classes rather than to different ones. In her first study, “ride” and “lunch” were used, both of which are services: “Goods for consumption, like food, are difficult to differentiate from services because they are presented as service and are used only once” (Foa and Foa 1976, p. 104). The benefits in Clark’s second study were all goods. Thus, the concept of “noncomparability,” in Clark’s usage, merely referred to different resources from *the same* resource class *rather than* to resources *from different classes*. A more powerful and appropriate test of Clark’s hypothesis would have to involve resources from opposite classes. From this point of view, Clark unintentionally obtained empirical support for a contradictory hypothesis derivable from resource theory, namely, that comparability (rather than noncomparability) of resources given and received is a sign of friendship!

The study by Turner et al. (1971) showed, for any resource subjects gave, that they most preferred to receive love (while money was least preferred). This would, of course, be less likely for relationships different from friendship (communal): Paying for a washing machine with affec-

tion would seldom be satisfactory to the average store owner. In addition, results suggested that the preference for an identical resource was strongest for love, while it decreased with decreasing particularism of the resource—that is, the extent to which the value of a given resource is influenced by the particular persons involved in exchanging it and by their relationship (Foa and Foa 1976, p. 80). As money is the most universalistic (least particularistic) resource and the opposite (maximally dissimilar) to love, then the preference for receiving a resource comparable to the one given would be the lowest for money. Thus, it seems reasonable to suggest that comparability of particularistic resources given and received (i.e., love, status, and services) should be a stronger sign of friendship than is comparability of universalistic resources (i.e., money, goods, and information):

Hypothesis 1: When two persons, P and O, give each other resources from the *same particularistic class* of resources, outside observers will attribute a *higher* degree of friendship *than* when P and O give each other resources from the *same universalistic class* of resources.

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{I.e., (Love – Love)} \\ \text{(Status – Status)} \\ \text{(Service – Service)} \end{array} \right\} > \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{(Information – Information)} \\ \text{(Goods – Goods)} \\ \text{(Money – Money)} \end{array} \right.$$

It is important to bear in mind that a person’s preference for a given resource depends not only upon the resource previously provided and whether or not the resources are comparable. Perhaps more important is whether or not the *nature*, of the resources given or received, is conducive to the development or maintenance of the relationship within which the giving and receiving takes place. Not all resources (and combinations among them) are acceptable and appropriate in all settings. “A categorization of resources must...be married to a categorization of relationships” (Hinde 1981, p. 18). At least to some extent, different institutional contexts may be described by their characteristic *resource profiles*, that is, the nature of resources typically given and received. In communal relationships, such as friendship, the most appropriate resources are the particularistic ones—love, status,

services, and perhaps information (see Carson 1979, p. 252; van Kreveld and van Beemen 1978, p. 392). If "...self and other are less differentiated for love [a particularistic resource] than for money..." (Foa and Foa 1976, p. 106), and if "...particularism implies that the uniqueness of the exchange partner as an individual is important..." (Foa and Foa 1976, p. 110), it would be reasonable to expect friends to give each other particularistic resources. This is not to say that giving and receiving other resources would be rare in friendship. However, the presentation of nonparticularistic resources to a friend usually constitutes a symbolic expression of love (and perhaps status), that is, more than one resource is conveyed simultaneously.

It seems reasonable to suggest, then, that observers would tend to attribute friendship not only on the basis of the comparability of resources given and received but also, and perhaps more importantly so, on the basis of their recognition of the resource profile most typical for friendship relations, that is, on the basis of the *particularistic nature* of the resources involved. (In this context it would not be farfetched to suspect that subjects might have inferred friendship, in Clark's first study, on the basis of the particularistic resources involved, i.e., services, which are typical for this type of relationship.)

We previously indicated that it seems less appropriate (according to Foa and Foa's resource theory) to give and receive resources from different, and especially opposite, resource classes than from the same. Thus, for example, the receipt of \$10 after rendering a friend a favor would be somewhat out of line as compared to the receipt of another favor. In other words, *comparability of resources would be preferred to non-comparability*. However, for most people in communal relationships, this would only hold true *when the comparable resources are particularistic in nature*. A situation in which both persons receive particularistic resources from each other will usually contribute more to the intrinsic character of a communal relationship than when a particularistic resource is given only to one of the two persons. Thus:

Hypothesis 2: When two persons, P and O, give each other resources from the *same particularistic class* of resources, outside observ-

ers will attribute a *higher* degree of friendship *than* when P and O give each other resources from opposite or *maximally different resource classes*.

I.e., (Love – Love) > [(Love – Money) and (Money – Love)],
 (Status – Status) > [(Status – Goods) and (Goods – Status)],
 and (Service – Service) > [(Service – Information) and (Information – Service)].

On the other hand, a situation in which only one person receives a particularistic resource is not entirely without affective sentiments, as it would be if neither one of the participants gave or received such a resource. Thus, *when the comparable resources are universalistic in nature, noncomparability of resources would be preferred to comparability*, at least by one of the participants. (The provision is that the universalistic resources are not given as expressions of affection.) Our main point is that outside observers would, in this case, be most likely to infer the highest degree of friendship to the situation of non-comparable resources, regardless of what feelings the participants may experience. In other words:

Hypothesis 3: When two persons, P and O, give each other resources from the *same universalistic class* of resources, outside observers will attribute a *lower* degree of friendship *than* when P and O give each other resources from opposite or maximally different resource classes.

I.e., [(Money – Love) and (Love – Money)] > (Money – Money),
 [(Goods – Status) and (Status – Goods)] > (Goods – Goods),
 and [(Information – Service) and (Service – Information)] > (Information – Information).

One would also expect, when maximally distant (i.e., opposite or noncomparable)

resources are given and received, that a situation in which a particularistic resource is given and a universalistic one is received is indicative of a *lower* degree of friendship than when the order between resources is the reverse. As previously indicated, the range of resources with which it can be exchanged appears more narrow for a particularistic than for a universalistic resource: "...the more particularistic a resource is, the higher the probability that it will be exchanged for the same resource, while nonparticularistic resources will tend to be exchanged for different ones" (Foa and Foa 1976, p. 109). An observer would, then, most likely attribute a lesser degree of friendship between two persons when one of them expresses affection for the other, who, in turn, gives money to the first, as compared to when one of them gives money to the other, who, in turn, expresses affection for the first person. More generally, then, we propose that outside observers will attribute a higher degree of friendship among people who give universalistic and receive particularistic resources than when the opposite order occurs (A provision would be that the act of giving a universalistic resource first is *not* interpreted as a *prepayment*. This would most likely be indicative of *less* friendship). Thus:

Hypothesis 4: When two persons, P and O, give each other resources from opposite or *maximally different resource classes*, outside observers will attribute a *higher* degree of friendship when P gives O a *universalistic* and O then gives P a *particularistic* resource *than* when P gives O a *particularistic* and O then gives P a *universalistic* resource.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{I.e., } & (\text{Goods-Status}) > (\text{Status-Goods}) \\ & (\text{Money-Love}) > (\text{Love-Money}) \\ & (\text{Information-Service}) > (\text{Service-} \\ & \quad \text{Information}). \end{aligned}$$

Taken together, hypotheses 1–4 thus assume that *comparability* of particularistic resources is a *stronger* sign of friendship *than noncomparability* when a universalistic resource is given and a particularistic one received, which is a *stronger*

sign of friendship *than noncomparability* when a particularistic resource is given and a universalistic one received, which, in turn, is a *stronger* sign of friendship *than comparability* of universalistic resources:

$$\begin{aligned} & (\text{Love-Love}) > (\text{Money-Love}) > \\ & \quad (\text{Love-Money}) > (\text{Money-Money}), \\ & (\text{Status-Status}) > (\text{Goods-Status}) > \\ & \quad (\text{Status-Goods}) > (\text{Goods-Goods}), \text{ and} \\ & (\text{Service-Service}) > (\text{Information-Service}) > \\ & \quad (\text{Service-Information}) > \\ & \quad (\text{Information-Information}). \end{aligned}$$

Finally, if resource type, per se, may characterize (and to outside observers be indicative of) a given type of relationship, and if the giving and receiving of particularistic resources are typically emphasized in friendship (communal) relations, then there should be a positive relationship between the degree of particularism of the resources given and received and the degree of friendship between the participants as attributed by outside observers. According to Foa's (1971) circular ordering of the six resource classes, we would predict the highest friendship scores when love is given and received. Situations involving service and status would elicit higher ratings than those involving goods and information, while the transaction of money should be least indicative of friendship (see also Carson 1979). Therefore:

Hypothesis 5: When two persons, P and O, give each other *love*, outside observers will attribute a *higher* degree of friendship between them *than* when P and O give each other *status* or when they do each other a *service*, and *more so than* when P and O give each other *information* or *goods*, and *still more so than* when they give each other *money*.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{I.e., } & (\text{Love-Love}) > \\ & [(\text{Status-Status}) = (\text{Service-Service})] > \\ & [(\text{Information-Information}) = (\text{Goods-Goods})] \\ & > (\text{Money-Money}). \end{aligned}$$

Method

Subjects

Fifty-three Swedish female students at a nursing school (age=20.8) participated voluntarily in a study during regular class sessions. All subjects responded to the same questionnaire, and no one left before the purpose of the study had been explained to them.

Questionnaire

On each of the six pages of the questionnaire, descriptions of three situations were presented. These vignettes involved two male persons, identified by their full names. The only additional information given about their identities was that they lived in the same neighborhood. The three situations described on a given page of the questionnaire involved the same persons. However, different persons appeared on each of the other five pages.

The first of the three vignettes on each page described the two persons giving each other resources of the *same* resource class. In the other two vignettes one resource was the *same* as in the first situation, while the other was of the *opposite* resource class. The order between the resources given and received in the second vignette was the opposite of that in the third one. The resources given and received, as described on the respective pages, were the following: *page 1*, status-status, status-goods, and goods-status; *page 2*, money-money, money-love, and love-money; *page 3*, goods-goods, goods-status, and status-goods; *page 4*, information-information, information-service, and service-information; *page 5*, love-love, love-money, and money-love; and *page 6*, service-service, service-information, and information-service. The order among the situations on each page varied. The concrete resource items exemplifying each resource class were as follows: *status*, expression of admiration for the person's knowledge and energy and expression of admiration for the person's skills; *money*, 50 Swedish crowns and a bond; *goods*, a car

tire and a sack of grass seed; *information*, instructions on how to change a gear wire in a car and instructions on how to cure a parasite-afflicted apple tree; *love*, conveying appreciation of being together, keeping a bedridden person company; and *service*, changing a gear wire and mowing a lawn.

In order to eliminate as many factors as possible that might confound the effect of resource comparability/noncomparability, the vignettes were constructed with the following criteria: (a) They should reflect familiar real-life situations. (b) Full names of the participants were given, as the use of first names only might imply a certain degree of friendship. (c) The setting was as neutral as possible (a college dormitory, e.g., might indicate to observers a high probability of friendship relations due to the spatial proximity of the occupants' rooms). (d) They contained no cues implying that a resource was necessarily given in response to the recipient's needs; responsiveness, in itself, might constitute a cue implying that a communal relationship prevails. (e) There were no status differences between the two participants. (f) The wording of the vignettes was as "neutral" as possible to avoid implications that a certain kind of relationship existed between the participants. (g) No information was available with regard to how the resources involved were acquired or evaluated by the giver (as giving away something one does not want or received for free carries different connotations than giving away a favorite possession for which one has worked hard to acquire). (h) Possible effects of the order in which the resources are given and received were indicated. (i) The manner, or mode, of giving and receiving was kept constant ("giving-giving" was used in this study).

Page 2 (involving money and love) may serve as an example illustrating the design of the questionnaire:

JOHAN OLSSON AND PER PERSSON LIVE IN THE SAME NEIGHBORHOOD

- (a) One day, Johan gives one of his bonds to Per. Some time thereafter, Per gives a 50-crown bill to Johan.
- (b) One Sunday, when Johan and Per go for a walk together, Johan tells Per that he appreciates being together with him. Some time thereafter, Per gives a 50-crown bill to Johan.

Table 7.1 Mean friendship ratings of situations in which comparable and noncomparable resources are given and received

Resource given by O		Love	Status	Service	Money	Goods	Info.
Resources given by P	Love	3.81 _a			2.77 1.94		
	Status		2.17 _b			3.23 2.53	
	Service			3.62 ^a			3.15 2.87
	Money	2.19 1.89			2.91 _c		
	Goods		2.75 2.74			3.23 _c	
	Info.			3.21 2.81			3.09 _c

Notes

Means with a *subscript* in common are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$ based on related sample *t*-test, $df = 52$). Each pair of noncomparable resources occurs twice in questionnaire $p < 0.0001$ for all means

(c) One day, Johan gives a 50-crown bill to Per. Some time thereafter, when Johan and Per go for a walk together, Per tells Johan that he appreciates being together with him.

The subjects were instructed to read through all three episodes on any given page, and to pay careful attention to the differences among them, before answering the accompanying question and proceeding to the next page. The question required them to rate the degree of friendship they believed existed between the two persons in each of the three situations:

If you did not know anything else about these two persons than what you have just read about them, how good friends would you guess that they are?

The friendship ratings were done along a five-point scale (identical to the one used by Clark 1981), ranging from a neutral point (0) "They are not friends" to (4) "They are close friends."

$p < 0.0007$), and resource type 17.6% ($R^2 = 0.1763$; $F(5, 312) = 13.55$; $p < 0.0001$).³

Consistent with resource theory and Clark's (1981) study, our data also seem to suggest that comparability of resources given and received may be a sign of friendship. The relevant means (most of them in excess of 3) are shown in Table 7.1 on the diagonal running from the upper left to the lower right corner. Although all means differ significantly ($p < 0.0001$) from zero (i.e., no friendship), this may, however, merely reflect response biases causing subjects not to give scores of zero. The highest friendship scores were assigned to the two episodes in which both persons expressed love ($M = 3.81$) and performed services for each other ($M = 3.62$).

The remaining means given in Table 7.1 stand for noncomparability, which included two conditions: (1) a particularistic resource is given and a

Results

Analyses of variance reveal that comparability explained 10.5% of the observed variation among friendship ratings ($R^2 = 0.1051$; $F(1, 104) = 12.21$;

³Our design did not permit a test for the interaction effects between comparability/noncomparability and resource type, as conditions of noncomparability involved two different resources. Thus, we have two designs, one with six categories (resource classes) and one with two (comparability/noncomparability), rather than one 6 × 2 design.

Table 7.2 Differences between mean friendship ratings of noncomparability when preceded by comparability of particularistic versus comparability of universalistic resources

Comparability of particularistic versus		Comparability of universalistic resources				
		Love-love versus money-money	Service-service versus info.-info.	Status-status versus goods-goods		
Non-comparability	Love-money	-0.83 ^a	Service-info.	-0.28	Status-goods	0.70
		-4.56 ^{b,*}		-1.48		4.02 ^{**}
	Money-love	-0.30	Info.-service	-0.40	Goods-status	0
		-1.38		-1.91 ^{***}		0

* $p < 0.0001$ ** $p < .0002$ *** $p < 0.06$ ^aDifference between means^bt-value

universalistic one received (P_1-U_1) and (2) a universalistic resource is given and a particularistic one received (U_1-P_1). However, P_1 and U_1 are paired, not twice, but four times: twice on a questionnaire page where resources of a particularistic class were paired (P_1-P_2) and twice on another page where resources from its opposite universalistic class were paired (U_1-U_2). Thus, each order between any two noncomparable (or opposite) resources given and received appeared twice. Like the means for comparability, those for noncomparability also seem to suggest friendship attributions, although to lower degrees in most cases.

The above-mentioned features of our design also allowed us to examine whether preceding evaluations of a particularistic (P_1-P_2) and of a universalistic (U_1-U_2) resource pairing, respectively, affected differentially (if at all) the friendship ratings of subsequent situations in which noncomparable resources were given and received (in either order). In four of six cases, subjects assigned higher friendship scores to the two situations of opposite resource pairing (i.e., noncomparability) when they had first rated a situation of universalistic resource pairing (comparability) than when they had first rated a situation of particularistic resource pairing (comparability). The situation involving the giving of status and the reception of goods (noncomparability) received a higher rating when preceded by a situation in which status was given and received (particularistic comparability) than when preceded by a sit-

uation in which goods were given and received (universalistic comparability). There was no difference for the situation in which the order between status and goods was reversed. A difference-between-means test showed, however, that significance was attained in only two of the six cases (see Table 7.2).

We predicted, in hypothesis 1, that observers would attribute a higher degree of friendship between P and O when they give each other comparable particularistic resources than when they give each other comparable universalistic ones. As indicated by the subscripts for the means in the diagonal of Table 7.1, all differences were significant ($p < 0.05$), six out of nine in the predicted direction. Apparently, status is an exception to the other two particularistic resources (love and service). Our results indicate that comparability of status will elicit a significantly lower degree of friendship attribution by observers than will comparability of universalistic resources (money, goods, information).

The results of the analyses pertaining to the next two hypotheses are given in Table 7.3. The upper half of the table shows the data relevant to hypothesis 2 and the lower to hypothesis 3. The former hypothesis, stating that subjects would attribute a higher degree of friendship between P and O in a situation with comparability of particularistic resources than in a situation in which resources are noncomparable, received full support for comparability of love and service, respectively. In the case of status, comparability was a

Table 7.3 Differences between mean friendship ratings of comparability versus noncomparability of resources given and received

		Resource given by P – resource given by O: (noncomparability)						
		Status-Goods	Goods-status	Money-love	Love-money	Info-service	Service-info	
Resources given by P:	Status-status	-1.06 ^a	-0.60	-0.57				
Resources given by O:	Love-love	-5.0 ^{b,*}	-2.09 ^{***}	-2.11 ^{***}	1.92	1.62	1.87	
	Love-love		9.65 [*]	6.94 [*]	9.61 [*]	5.74 [*]		
	Service-service					0.81	0.42	
	Service-service					3.57 ^{**}	2.63 ^{***}	
	Goods-goods	0	0.70	0.50	0.50		0.75	
	Goods-goods	0	2.98 ^{**}	1.89 [†]	1.87 [‡]		3.45 ^{**}	
	Money-money						2.75 ^{**}	
	Money-money		1.02	0.72	0.96	0.13		
	Money-money		4.27 [*]	2.42 ^{***}	4.07 [*]	0.55		
	Info.-info.					0.28	-0.11	
	Info.-info.					1.48	-0.83	
	Info.-info.						1.16	
	Info.-info.						-0.27	

* $p < 0.0001$ ** $p < 0.0008$ *** $p < 0.04$ † $p < 0.06$ ‡ $p < 0.07$ ^aDifference between means^bt-value

weaker sign of friendship than noncomparability (in three of four cases). The prediction made in hypothesis 3 was not supported at all. The data mainly indicate a contrary tendency, particularly for comparability of money, and, to a lesser extent, goods. Apparently, giving and receiving comparable universalistic resources, rather than noncomparable ones, constitutes the strongest sign of friendship. This does not seem to be true, however, for the universalistic resource of information, in which case comparability and noncomparability are equally strong signs of friendship.

Hypothesis 4 predicted that subjects would attribute a higher degree of friendship for noncomparability when a universalistic resource was given first and a particularistic 1 s than for noncomparability when the order between the resources was reversed. Although the numerical values of the differences between the relevant means were consistent with this conjecture in four out of six cases, statistical significance was obtained in only two of those cases: (status-goods)>(goods-status), ($t=2.16$; $p<0.04$), and (love-money)>(money-love), ($t=2.82$; $p<0.007$). A more detailed examination of the properties of each resource class, and the implications of various ways of pairing them, seems necessary in order to explain why our predictions were only partially supported. As previously indicated, the notion of “prepayment” may have to be considered.

We may recall that the results from the test of hypothesis 1 showed that subjects assigned higher friendship scores to situations in which P and O gave each other comparable particularistic resources than when they gave each other comparable universalistic ones (with the exception of the situation in which status was involved). We also proposed that resource particularism and degree of attributed friendship are likely to covary positively. Accordingly, a partial rank ordering of the situations in which P and O gave each other comparable resources was proposed in hypothesis 5. Table 7.1 shows that the directional trend conforms to the predictions, except again for the situation involving status. The latter situation ended up with the lowest friendship scores. The differences between situations involving comparability of love and service, respectively, and

goods and money, respectively, were not significant. Thus, it appears that the order predicted by hypothesis 5 has to be somewhat modified as follows: [(love-love)=(service-service)]>[(goods-goods)=(info.-info.)=(money-money)]>(status-status). The means for each situation were 3.8, 3.6, 3.2, 3.1, 2.9, and 2.2. Thus, some types of comparability are, indeed, stronger signs of friendship than others.

Discussion

The results from this study indicate that the nature of resources, as well as the comparability of resources given and received, is likely to affect the attributions of outside observers concerning the *degree* of friendship between two (or more) individuals. Whether or not our subjects viewed the relationship between the persons described in our vignettes as friendship within a communal or within an exchange relationship was not the subject of our study. We would like to point out, however, that friendship is, of course, not an exclusive property of a communal relationship (as Clark 1981, seems to assume); exchange partners may also be friends (although the depth as well as the scope of friendship are probably greater in communal relationships).

Provided that we correctly interpreted Clark's (1981) theoretical arguments to mean that an outside observer's assignment of friendship scores is indicative of his/her recognition of a communal relationship, and that therefore attribution of a lack of friendship indicates an exchange relationship, the results of her study did *not* confirm these conjectures (as both comparability and noncomparability elicited positive friendship ratings in her study, as well as in the present one). Thus, at least for outside observers, comparability/noncomparability of resources given and received does *not* seem to constitute a factor of sufficient significance for the distinction between communal and exchange relationships in terms of presence versus absence of friendship.

The hypotheses stated in this chapter specified when comparability and when noncomparability (and different instances of these)

would constitute a stronger sign of friendship than the other. More specifically, we predicted *when* one type of comparability will be a stronger sign of friendship than another type of comparability (hypothesis 1), *when* comparability will be a stronger sign of friendship than non-comparability (hypothesis 2), *when* non-comparability will be a stronger sign than comparability (hypothesis 3), *when* one type of non-comparability will be a stronger sign of friendship than another type of non-comparability (hypothesis 4), and *which* resources offered by participants in a relationship will be stronger signs of friendships than others (hypothesis 5).

Hypothesis 1 stated that comparability of particularistic resources would be a stronger sign of friendship than comparability of universalistic resources. Support was obtained except in the case of status. Status is responsible for less than full confirmation of two additional hypotheses (2 and 5). Apparently, status may not be perceived as a particularistic resource to the same degree, or of the same kind, as love and service. In fact, status received the lowest friendship scores of all resources in the comparability conditions. Other studies where predictions for status were made on the basis of its particularism have also obtained unexpected results (e.g., Kayser et al. 1982; Schwinger and Nährer 1982; Törnblom and Foa 1983). Thus, the peculiar pattern of reactions to status may be more than a coincidence.

Perhaps status conveys a more impersonal flavor than the other particularistic resources.

We also suggested that sometimes comparability, and at other times non-comparability, of resources would constitute the strongest sign of friendship. As we had expected (see hypothesis 2), comparability of particularistic resources was a stronger sign of friendship than non-comparability (except in the case when non-comparability was represented by status and goods and was compared to status in the comparability condition). However, and contrary to the predictions made in hypothesis 3, non-comparability was *not* a stronger sign of friendship than comparability of universalistic resources. Thus, the only time non-comparability was a stronger sign of

friendship than comparability was in the case of comparability with regard to status. There was no difference in the case of comparability of information. For the remaining four resources, comparability resulted in higher friendship scores than non-comparability. Again, these findings were at odds with Clark's (1981) proposition. A full comparison with Clark's data is not possible, however, as resources from the same class were used to represent the non-comparability conditions.

Unfortunately, other reasons as well prevent a comparison of our own findings with those generated by Clark's (1981) two studies of similar design. In addition to the absence of information about the sex (and age) of her subjects, a mode ("requesting-giving") different from ours ("giving-giving") was used in her second study. Another study showed that degree of attributed friendship varied with mode of giving and receiving. Four modes were compared, and "giving-giving" resulted in higher friendship scores than "requesting-giving" (and higher than "giving-requesting" and "requesting-requesting").

The results of our study show that comparability as well as non-comparability of resources given and received are factors on the basis of which conclusions about the existence and degree of friendship between individuals are made. Curiously, these results do *not* agree with Clark's (1981) theoretical arguments, but they *are* consistent with her findings (with respect to services and goods). It is not possible, on the basis of our data, to determine whether non-comparability, per se, or whether the mere presence of a particularistic resource (or both) were responsible for the subjects' attribution of friendship. To answer this question, one would have to include a condition of non-comparability between universalistic resources, that is, a condition in which the resources given and received are of two different universalistic classes. This remark also concerns hypothesis 4, which suggested (similar to what was predicted by hypothesis 1 and confirmed for comparability) that one type of non-comparability would result in higher friendship ratings than another type. In this context, it is appropriate to note that Clark (1981) found no differences when

the order between the resources was reversed. This may have been due to her use of resources from the same class (as previously mentioned). In the present study, however, the directional trend was largely consistent with predictions in hypothesis 4 (although significance was obtained in only two of the six cases). Again, a more complete picture would have resulted had noncomparability of universalistic (as well as particularistic) resources also been included.

Inasmuch as the present study has shown that variations in the comparability as well as in the nature of resources that two persons give to each other will elicit variations in the degree of friendship that outside observers attribute to the two persons, we know very little about the significance of those two factors in a real-life situation. It is quite possible that their importance is negligible in comparison to a number of other more revealing cues. In the context of the present study, in which a bare minimum of information about the two participants and their behaviors was provided, the two factors barely explained a third of the variation in observer attribution. Even such a restricted context as the present one may contain factors which might be equally, if not more, powerful indicators of friendship than comparability and nature of transacted resources. The very fact that our subjects assigned positive friendship scores in response to all vignettes would seem to warrant further analysis and investigation.

Two additional factors appear particularly conspicuous. One is the *setting* in which the giving and receiving took place. Even though a "neighborhood" may be a more neutral setting than those used by Clark (1981) (i.e., a floor in a college dorm and a place of work), subjects' ratings might still have been colored by norms appropriate to that setting, for example, politeness, consideration, and solidarity. The second factor is the very *act of mutual giving* (regardless of *what* was given) that both persons described in the vignettes exhibited. It seems entirely reasonable to assume that observers would be very unlikely to infer a lack of friendship (and, especially, the presence of animosity or "enemyship") when witnessing two persons voluntarily presenting gifts to each other.

Further research into the phenomenology of subjects' attributions is necessary as well, especially with regard to the tacit awareness of subjects and how they perceive the friendship in terms of its stage along a temporal dimension. As far as *tacit awareness* is concerned, we have more or less assumed that observers react to the episodes described by the vignettes as a gestalt, that is, not taking the point of view of only one of the two persons involved but rather judging the situation as a whole. By *stage* of friendship, we simply mean the history of the relationship, whether the two persons are perceived to be new or old friends (to be distinguished from the *degree* of their friendship). As Hinde (1981, pp. 12, 17) has pointed out, "...what is important may change with the stage of the relationship..." and "...the same words will change in value with the stage in the relationship." Thus, what may be appropriate and conducive to a deepening of friendship for old friends might be inappropriate and counterproductive in the context of a new friendship. As expected, studies by Törnblom et al. (1987) did show that subjects differentially evaluated the effects of various modes of giving and receiving, and of comparability/noncomparability between resources given and received, on the solidification of friendship between new and old friends. Thus, the results of the present study would have been more unequivocal knowing the subjects' perceptions of the temporal dimensions ascribed to the relationship subject to evaluation.

Finally, it would be desirable to compare the attributions made by male and female observers to actors in dyads (or larger groups) of identical, opposite, as well as mixed gender. In the present study, female subjects evaluated the degree of friendship between two male actors. It would not be farfetched to expect differences between male and female observers when rating the degree of friendship in groups of different sex compositions.

In sum, and contrary to Clark's (1981) hypothesis, we have on the whole shown that *comparability* of resources given and received was a stronger sign of friendship than was noncomparability. We have also shown that the *nature of resources* involved was a stronger sign of friendship

than their comparability/noncomparability. This, again, appears contradictory to Clark and Mills's conjectures, at least as far as outside observers are concerned: "The rules concerning the giving and receiving of benefits (specifying the appropriateness of comparable and noncomparable benefits) are what distinguish communal and exchange relationships, *rather than the specific benefits* which are given and received" (Mills and Clark 1982, p. 123, emphasis added; see also Clark and Mills 1979, p. 13). A more direct test of their propositions might utilize a design in which communal and exchange relationships are described, and subjects would indicate (under various conditions of differences in participants' statuses, stages of their relationship, resource types, etc.) how appropriate they think comparability and noncomparability are (in terms of kind and absolute as well as relative value). However, it is doubtful whether such a simple test (involving the extraction of a simple feature from the complexities of multifaceted relationships) would be particularly meaningful.

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Understanding Status as a Social Resource

8

Kevin R. Binning and Yuen J. Huo

Within the framework of social resource theory (Foa 1971; Foa and Foa 1974; Foa et al. 1993), *status* is a symbolic, particularistic resource. That is, compared to currency or concrete goods, status is relatively intangible, as its possession is typically reflected symbolically (e.g., personal possessions, conversational norms, skin color) by the values a society assigns. Status is also particularistic: Whereas universalistic resources such as money hold the same objective value regardless of their source, receiving status from some people (e.g., a respected group member) carries different meanings than when it comes from others (e.g., a disrespected group member) (Huo and Tyler 2001; Tyler et al. 1998). These properties of status serve to make it a highly multifaceted, complex social resource. Status is both difficult to quantify and may be manifested in many forms, and yet such information is conveyed in specific, socially constructed ways.

Using the framework provided by social resource theory, this chapter aims to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of status as a social resource. To do so, we attempt to “zoom


in” on status by examining it as a resource that, just like the six primary resources within social resource theory, varies along (1) symbolic versus concrete and (2) universalistic versus particularistic continuums. When viewed through this lens, status can be broken down into four subtypes (see Fig. 8.1) that shed light on how people within a given social context “use” status in their experience and what it means to allocate or withhold status from others. Status resources can be understood as ranging from symbolic, nonverbal behaviors (e.g., politeness, respect) to concrete, observable social markers (e.g., insignia on a uniform). At the same time, some forms of status can, at least in theory, be distributed universally (e.g., basic human dignity), whereas other forms of status are delivered with careful attention to who is receiving it (e.g., the treatment afforded to the president of a nation or to a prisoner on death row). When viewed together, these two continuums impart a coherent and testable theoretical framework for understanding status.

After describing each quadrant in the taxonomy in more detail, we turn our attention to what we term “status transactions” – that is, when one form of status is exchanged for another – and, based on the insights developed from the taxonomy, we offer some novel predictions about how people are likely to react to violations in status transactions. We do so by presenting an empirical example of the utility of using social resource theory to gain a deeper understanding of status as an exchangeable social resource. Finally, we discuss

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Fig. 8.1 An examination of status along dimensions within social resource theory



how conceptualizing status in this new fashion sheds light on social resource theory and its utility for understanding how the exchange of status as a resource affects social relations.

Part I. A Closer Look at Four Types of Status

Quadrant I: Universalistic, Symbolic Status

Universalistic, symbolic forms of status can be delivered by anyone with equal effect, are relatively intangible, and are difficult to quantify. This notion of status is evident in strains of Western social philosophy arguing that egalitarian norms should guide how respect and dignity are distributed in a society (Kant 1797/1996; Rawls 1971; Sen 2009). The moral grounding of this form of status can be derived from a thought experiment that considers what norms and behaviors people would agree to if, at the outset, they did not know where their position in life would be (in terms of natural abilities, inherited wealth, etc.). Behind this *veil of ignorance* as described by Rawls (1971), it would be impossible and impractical to

distribute all resources equally, but certain resources, such as respect and dignity, would be mutually beneficial, practicable, and preferred by all. This reasoning is evident in formal documents meant to preserve and protect basic dignities to all people regardless of their origin or circumstances, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva conventions, and in political systems more generally (see Kymlicka 1991).

Of course, simply because ideals of universal dignity and respect are adopted in the abstract does not guarantee that they are enacted in practice. Experimental tests simulating the Rawlsian original position indicate that actual preferences deviate from normative ideals (Frohlich et al. 1987). Many societal institutions have historically proclaimed to treat all people equally while, in practice, systematically treating segments of its population unequally (see Fredrickson 1999). Nevertheless, perhaps the most basic and fundamental form of status is to acknowledge a person's standing as human and their entitlement to dignity and respect (see Lalljee et al. 2007). In this sense, the question of basic dignity and respect ("Is this person to be treated like a human or not?") is not a quantitative resource but a qualitative one. As such, the basic dignities prescribed for humanity

also describe the implications of particular practices: Treatment that fails to acknowledge people's basic standing as humans, such as a violation of civil rights, is qualitatively different than treatment that simply fails to acknowledge a relative rank or position (e.g., failing to address a judge as "Your honor"). To be denied basic human rights and dignities is to be denied standing as a human being. In contrast, degrees of rank imply status differences within a human community.

Conceptualizing status in this stripped down, universalistic form provides grounding for status as a social resource in the sections that follow. In fact, when asked, most people subscribe to this universalistic ideal of status and endorse the notion that all people are entitled to respect and dignity (see Kluegel and Smith 1986). Because of this fact, the perceived denial or withholding of this form of status, more so than other forms of status, can elicit civil unrest and anger (see Sears and McConahay 1973).

Quadrant II: Symbolic, Particularistic Status

Everyday social discourse is characterized by systematic variations in politeness and other respectful gestures (Brown and Levinson 1987). That is, although proclamations of equality are endorsed in an idealistic sense, this is generally not possible on more micro levels. Whereas one schoolteacher might receive the attention and respect of their students, another teacher with an equivalent title, training, and experience might not. A teacher may, in turn, treat their individual students with differing levels of admiration and respect. In this way, and in contrast to the universal conception of respect in the preceding section, status is particularistic. Its distribution depends not on simple humanity but on *whom* individuals are (e.g., police officer, favorite student, coworker) and by the psychological functions (e.g., maintaining valued relationships) that treating people in particular ways serves for the individual.

Although people are not always consciously aware of the inequalities in the treatment they distribute and receive, when they do become aware

of these inequalities and there is no clear or morally justifiable rationale for them, they frequently see such disparities unfair. That is, absent a legitimate basis for the differential treatment, people's explicit evaluation of the treatment they receive often reflects the conception of status seen in **Quadrant I (universalistic, symbolic status)**. They evaluate this particularistic resource as if it should be universalistic. To understand this point, it is helpful to consider when unequal distributions of status *are* deemed acceptable or fair. For instance, Americans generally are not offended if a president or CEO receives more deferential (favorable) treatment than they do, presumably because such treatment can be attributed to legitimate hierarchical norms and customs. Similarly, people are generally not offended when a child gets treated more leniently than an adult (see Deutsch 1975). However, people are often taken aback when similar others receive better or worse treatment than they do. For instance, if a White customer receives more attentive restaurant service than an otherwise similar Black customer does, such treatment is seen as unfair because "race" and ethnicity are not justifiable grounds for differential treatment.

Unlike concrete resources such as money and job promotions, people generally do not perceive objective limits on symbolic interpersonal treatment. When deciding between which of two workers to promote, a manager who distributes the promotion – a more concrete form of status – no longer has a promotion to give. In this case, the inequality in status allocation is externally constrained because the promotion is as a zero-sum resource. Respectful treatment (a more symbolic form of status), by contrast, is also something that people may decide to distribute or withhold, but its delivery is not necessarily or logically limited by organizational structure (e.g., Sennett 2003). From an observer's perspective, to be fair a waitress can be more attentive to the Black customer, less attentive to the White customer, or both. When treatment is unequal, and people cannot ascribe the unequal outcomes to legitimate structural considerations ("Somebody had to get it") and/or explicit qualifications for the status ("I lack the requisite experience or

qualifications”), they are likely to infer that the behavior was simply a choice of the individual (see Ross 1977). Furthermore, when people perceive negative outcomes are intentionally chosen rather than situationally constrained, they are more likely to experience anger about the outcomes (see Schwarz et al. 2007).

For these reasons, failure to deliver symbolic, particularistic status can have serious consequences for group and psychological functioning. The group value model (Lind and Tyler 1988) and the relational model of authority (Tyler and Lind 1992) suggest that when other group members behave in a rude, disrespectful, or biased fashion, it communicates a devaluing of the individual by the group. In turn, perceiving that the group does not value the self can reduce identification with the group and lower the individual’s self-esteem (Smith et al. 2003), psychological well-being, and engagement with the group (Huo et al. 2010a, b).

Indeed, epidemiological studies suggest that the distribution of respectful treatment in organizations may have very general and far-reaching health implications. In one survey consisting of over 30,000 Finnish public sector employees, perceptions of unfair and disrespectful treatment by work supervisors were correlated with increased length of sickness-related absenteeism (Elovainio et al. 2005). A survey of German factory workers found that experiences of unfair and disrespectful treatment were associated with more reported sick days and higher frequency of feeling sick at work (Schmitt and Dörfel 1999). And a field experiment on nurses who received an involuntary salary reduction found that nurses with supervisors who were not trained to be respectful and fair suffered more sleep problems such as insomnia (Greenberg 2006). Such psychosomatic evidence provides backing for the notion that denial of symbolic status is an affront to individuals’ physical and mental health.

In summary, even though it does not always occur in practice, it is theoretically possible to distribute symbolic status in a relatively egalitarian fashion. Although status is often delivered in a particularistic fashion, people tend to

care a great deal when they are denied symbolic status without a legitimate justification. They may construe such treatment as a choice on behalf of the distributor to deny their entitlement to basic human dignity. People interpret unfair and disrespectful treatment as signifying exclusion from the broader social context, and this information informs how they feel about their group and about their self (Smith et al. 2003, Tyler, DeGoey, et al. 1996; Tyler, Smith, et al. 1996).

Quadrant III: Concrete, Particularistic Status

Most if not all human organizations possess status hierarchies (e.g., Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Tannenbaum et al. 1977). In contrast to more symbolic forms of status, status of this form is often considered a zero-sum resource. If one person or group has high status ranking, it typically necessitates that another has lower status ranking. Unlike symbolic status, which is theoretically unlimited (i.e., nonzero sum) and without structural constraints, concrete status inequality is sometimes necessitated by the situation. Hierarchies often function to coordinate the efforts of many people engaged in a variety of tasks and can be seen as a necessary means to regulate the behavior of group members during the distribution of scarce resources (Fiske 1992).

The manner in which most societies distribute concrete status – that is, status that exists as a rank or relative position in the hierarchy – is often explicitly unequal and undemocratic. There can be only one number one draft pick, one valedictorian, and one president. Of course, there is no uniform code of distribution that exists across circumstances, as the manner in which concrete status is distributed depends on the nature of the group. Some status hierarchies are tall (with many levels) and others are relatively flat; some have a clear command structure and clearly defined ranks, while others have ambiguous lines of authority and no clear chain of command (Fiske 1992; Tannenbaum et al.

1977). Steiner (2001) suggests that in highly individualistic, masculine, and work-oriented cultures, equity considerations (the belief that people's outcomes should be proportional to their inputs) tend to predominate expectations on who will receive promotions and higher status. In other settings, such as more communal or family-oriented relationships, norms of equality and need are given more importance (see Deutsch 1975; Mannix et al. 1995; Törnblom and Foa 1983).

In line with this reasoning, empirical research by Huo (2002) provides support for the idea that individuals abide by different social norms when asked to distribute symbolic and concrete status resources. Participants in two studies were asked to make allocation decisions, and among the goods they could distribute or withhold were high quality of treatment (e.g., dignity and respect) and positive concrete status (i.e., wealth). Across the two studies, the key finding was that participants were much more likely to withhold concrete status (resources) from their peers than they were to withhold symbolic status (dignified, respectful treatment). This was true even when, in Study 2, the targets of the allocation decisions were members of a marginalized social group (i.e., racists). Participants seemed to adhere to beliefs that all people deserved to be treated in a respectful, dignified manner, but not everyone deserved equal access to concrete status.

Similarly, studies examining Americans' views about social equality show that there is far greater support for policies designed to ensure equal distribution of symbolic status (i.e., equality of opportunity) than for policies that directly intervene to redistribute concrete status (cited in Lane 1988). Social justice research has suggested that the norms guiding the distribution of social goods are such that inequality of process (e.g., fair, respectful treatment) is typically seen as less tolerable than inequality of concrete outcomes (e.g., income) (Brockner and Wiesenfeld 1996; Okun 1975). Taken together, these lines of research depict a high level of societal consensus that concrete status and rankings need not be distributed as evenly as symbolic status.

Interestingly, although people are generally accepting of unequal distributions of concrete status, social-epidemiological science has linked status, defined in terms of rank or positional standing in a community, to broad patterns of social health and longevity. Marmot (2004) reports that after controlling for several obvious predictors of health and longevity, such as income and lifestyle, positional status independently predicted health outcomes. The lower one's social position in their community, the higher their risk of heart, lung, and kidney diseases, HIV-related disease, tuberculosis, suicide, diseases of the digestive tract, and other forms of sudden, accidental death (Marmot 2004). One study found that actors and actresses who had won Academy Awards lived nearly 4 years longer than their nominated peers who had not won (Redelmeier and Singh 2001).

Although the precise mechanisms through which such effects occur are not well understood, a variety of research has ruled out obvious factors such as different lifestyle habits that may be associated with lower status (e.g., smoking, physical fitness). One viable hypothesis is that these effects occur because lower status is associated with less control over one's life and fewer opportunities for full social participation (Marmot 2004). In a study of the effects of draft status on the careers of National Basketball Association (NBA) players, for example, evidence was found that relative draft status (e.g., being 2nd overall pick in the draft vs. 7th overall pick), net of objective performance indicators such as scoring, rebounds, and assists, *independently* predicted who received the most minutes of play and how long players stayed in the league (Staw and Hoang 1995). Likewise, winners of Academy Awards may have had more resources at their disposal, more opportunity, and more admirers. Perhaps the acclaim, praise, and relative scrutiny paid to high concrete status individuals facilitate neuroendocrine states that help stave off illness (see Creswell et al. 2005). What is clear is that one's position in social hierarchies can have significant consequences for well-being and longevity.

Quadrant IV: Concrete, Universalistic Status

Finally, concrete, universalistic forms of status are readily observable and do not attach significant meaning to who allocates them. Although it may be indicative of higher symbolic status to buy a luxury vehicle from a reputed dealer than from a used sales lot, the status contained in the vehicle, all else being equal, is indicative of the type of status described in this section (whereas the status derived from the dealer is more symbolic and particularistic). More broadly, this category consists of status markers. These include objects such as rings and designer clothing and physical characteristics such as “race” and ethnicity. In a given society, the same people, all else being equal, might hold higher status if they are well-dressed than if they are dressed in rags, if they are considered “White” than if they are not, if they are tall than if they are short, and so on. To a certain extent, it does not matter where these features come from; within a specific culture, what is important is the features themselves.

Whereas a title or rank only means something insofar as there is a sponsoring organization that recognizes it, concrete universalistic status generally has broader, more globally recognized significance. For example, all else being equal, two bars on a sleeve for a naval lieutenant carry the same meaning regardless of who physically delivers or possesses these bars. Yet outside the military, where people might be unfamiliar with the meanings assigned to bars on the uniform, the insignia do not convey meaningful information. Concrete status that transcends particular contexts, including very general, but observable categories like ethnic group membership, gold, and wealth, are closer to being universalistic. However, even these forms of status, while being more general and far reaching than a simple organizational rank, are not universalistic per se. The United States’ system of racial classification (e.g., in which a person who is half black and half white is considered “Black”), for instance,

is not used universally or even throughout North America (see Sidanius et al. 2001). Thus, in terms of concrete status or ranking, the distinction between the particular and universalistic is better thought of as quantitative difference, based on a continuum, rather than a qualitative difference.

As discussed under [Quadrant III](#), status hierarchies are a seemingly inevitable feature of human organization. But hierarchies take on special meaning when they are based on more universalistic status and can therefore cut across life domains. In describing a theory of social dominance, Sidanius and Pratto (1999) illustrate some of the potentially insidious aspects of creating social hierarchies on the basis of possession of concrete, universalistic status. The authors’ approach begins with an observation that, without known exception, societies around the world are arranged such that one or more dominant groups (e.g., Whites, men) enjoy a disproportionate share of positive social value (e.g., wealth, power) at the expense of one or more subordinate groups (e.g., Blacks, women). When these dimensions of social differentiation are based on concrete physical or observable features, they take on a universalistic flavor that transcends social contexts in the course of everyday experience. Through a review of literatures on housing and retail markets, the labor market, the health and education systems, and the criminal justice system, the authors present evidence that individual members of low status groups, particularly low status ethnic and religious groups, face routine and systematic forms of discrimination at the hands of high status group members that, when considered together across contexts, serve to maintain and reinforce existing status differences among groups.

The ideologies that support, reinforce, and legitimize the differential distribution of this form of status take on unique characteristics not seen in the ideologies that support more particularistic status distributions. For instance, particularistic forms of status are often predicated on the ideology of meritocracy, where one’s organizational rank is determined by one’s relevant skills, talents, and abilities. The

most skilled, hardest working people are promoted, and we can infer, at least to some extent, that these promotions are predicated on requisite qualifications. But when it comes to very general, near universalistic forms of concrete status, inferences can begin to work in the opposite way. Unlike a rank in a business firm, people do not generally obtain White skin, height, or inherited wealth through hard work or talent, although these things nonetheless influence people's current and future social outcomes. Instead of people working hard to get where they are, the likelihood increases that they will observe where they are and infer they must have worked hard to get there (and are therefore entitled to what they have; see Major 1994; O'Brien and Major 2009; Ridgeway 2001). Scholars argue that beliefs such as these serve fundamental system-justifying functions that help maintain the continuity of societal status hierarchies (Jost and Banaji 1994; Sidanius and Pratto 1999).

Coming full circle, it is possible to see the proximity of concrete, universalistic status to the more symbolic features of status seen in [Quadrant I](#) (symbolic, universalistic status). That is, it seems that holding high concrete, universalistic status can be easily conflated with higher standing as a "human." A poignant example of this conflation was seen in American slavery, where an individual's concrete status as an African automatically identified them as somehow less than human and excluded from the purview of proclamations that all are "created equal." Less extreme, though highly consequential forms of this valuing system remain visible across contemporary human social systems.

Part II. Exchanges Between Quadrants: Understanding Status Transactions

While the preceding sections sought to clarify and conceptualize the different types of status, one of the central purposes of viewing status in this schematic fashion suggested by social resource theory is to generate testable hypotheses about

the consequences of exchanging different types of status. We argue, just as resource theory does, that the present conceptualization of status is useful because it suggests which types of resources are most likely to be exchanged with others. We further argue that each adjacent resource can be and is exchanged with its neighboring resource. Resources that are diagonal from one another, by contrast, are not directly exchanged but are exchanged via status resources in one or both of the adjacent quadrants.

Although the most common connotation of *exchange* is when one party exchanges with another party concrete services, goods, or money, when the resources are more symbolic, the physical exchange of resources is not the correct analogy. Status exchanges regularly occur without anything concrete changing hands. A person wearing a fancy, expensive suit ([Quadrant IV](#)) might receive a high level of polite and respectful treatment ([Quadrant II](#)) because they are assumed to have higher social rank or stature ([Quadrant III](#)). However, this person does not physically hand over the suit for such treatment. Similarly, although a person with a high rank or powerful title in an organization ([Quadrant III](#)) is more likely to be treated with deference and respect ([Quadrant II](#)) they do not physically hand over their rank to receive this treatment. As such, status exchanges are often behavioral responses that follow from a *presentation* or *display* of status (e.g., Foa 1971).

With this conception of status exchange in mind, it is possible to consider all adjacent quadrants as potential exchange partners. [Figure 8.1](#) illustrates the potential exchanges via four different pathways. We treat people politely simply because they are people (Pathway A). We treat higher status people, like doctors and bosses, with more respect than lower status people, like nurses and janitors (Pathway B). We convey higher societal rank or standing to individuals possessing certain status markers (Pathway C). And we implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) assume that people displaying certain status markers qualify as

more human and those without them are considered subhuman (Pathway D). These are just a subset of the status transactions that are possible within the model. The exchanges can also flow in the other direction, as when people aim to attain high concrete status by seeking favor on a symbolic level (see Anderson and Kilduff 2009). Diagonal exchanges are also possible, but we suggest that diagonal status resources are less likely to be exchanged directly with one another and, instead, can be understood to “pass through” one or both adjacent forms of status. For example, people with high organizational ranking (QIII) might command recognition of their humanity (QI) by being afforded a relatively high level of respect (QII) and because they possess more universalistic, concrete status (QIV). In this way, the link between diagonal resources is mediated through adjacent status resources.

Moreover, because each type of status is capable of being exchanged with any other, the schematic model helps elucidate why people care about status. People care about symbolic, particularistic treatment because it both communicates recognition of one’s humanity and conveys information about concrete standing in the group. People care about concrete, particularistic status because it ensures a certain quality of treatment and, more generally, a certain quality of life that transcends social contexts. For each type of status, the adjacent forms of status tell us something about why each type of status is important. That is, they tell us what each type of status “buys them” in terms of their ability to obtain neighboring status resources.

Exchanging Symbolic and Concrete Status: An Empirical Illustration

In this section, we focus on one portion of the model in more detail. Namely, we focus on the exchange of symbolic, particularistic status with more concrete, particularistic status (as discussed above under Quadrants II and III, respectively). In doing so, we focus not only on the outcomes of these exchanges but on the

expectations for these resources that individuals carry around. We argue that one way to understand the norms that are operating in a society is to examine people’s expectations for resources across a variety of circumstances. The asymmetries between these resources implied by the present model – with symbolic status being potentially limitless and nonzero sum and with concrete status being limited and zero sum – have important implications for the exchange of these two resources and the consequences of this exchange for the well-being of individuals and their social groups.

One potentially informative insight from the model is that different types of status, because of their unique characteristics, are associated with different norms and expectations about how they should be distributed. These norms and expectations, in turn, elicit differential psychological responses depending on whether they are met in social exchanges. Although people are often able to report their expectations, expectations need not be conscious or explicit in one’s mind, but can also exist and affect perceptions at an implicit level, beneath the conscious threshold (Miller and Turnbull 1986). Following the logic we outlined, we suggest that individuals’ expectations for symbolic versus concrete status are rooted in distinct sociocultural norms and should therefore produce differential but predictable effects on people’s experiences. Specifically, because concrete status is relatively constrained by external factors (e.g., a boss can only deliver one promotion in some circumstances), people’s expectations for this type of status should be relatively responsive to changes in social circumstances. For example, a person might expect a promotion at work when they perform well but not when they perform poorly, whereas across these two contexts, individuals will maintain relatively high expectations for symbolic status (e.g., respectful treatment).

To establish support for these ideas, we conducted a series of experiments in which we measured participants’ expectations for fair, respectful treatment and for favorable concrete status (e.g., receiving a raise or high mark in class) across a variety of hypothetical scenarios




Fig. 8.2 Expectations for symbolic and concrete status as a function of job performance

that evoked different exchange rules (details reported in Binning and Huo 2006). Our aim was to manipulate the contextual information in the scenario and assess how the means of the two sets of expectations for different status resources changed across different contexts. Although we limited our investigation to educational and employment contexts, we believe that our predictions can be generalized to a wider range of social contexts. Our specific hypotheses were as follows:

1. When measured on the same scale, expectations for symbolic status resources would be higher than would be expectations for concrete status resources.
2. As a corollary, expectations for symbolic status resources would be less variable (reaching ceiling) than would be expectations for concrete status resources.

In one experiment with 34 working adults, participants were asked to imagine that they had performed their job well (in a competent manner). In a second scenario, participants were asked to imagine that they had performed their job poorly (in an incompetent manner). The results, depicted in Fig. 8.2, revealed that participants expected to receive fair treatment (operationalization of symbolic status as it communicates information about one's standing in the eyes of others) and a raise in income (operationalization of concrete

status) when they had performed well. However, in the scenario where they performed poorly, individuals still expected to receive fair treatment, but they no longer expected to receive a raise (Binning and Huo 2006).

In a second experiment, we sought to replicate the above effects and extend them to contexts in which the quality of relationship with the person distributing the resources was manipulated. In particular, because the first experiment dealt solely with situations in which the target either performed their job either well or poorly, in the second experiment, we sought to examine whether similar effects would also emerge if participants had either a warm relationship versus a cold relationship with the person distributing resources (the distributor). To this end, we asked 19 college students to imagine four situations, all of which pertained to an end-of-the-year meeting with their faculty research advisor with whom they had worked as a research assistant for course credit. Mirroring the first experiment, in one scenario, participants were asked to imagine they had performed their research duties well and, in another scenario, poorly. In addition, participants were also asked to imagine that they either had a cordial, friendly relationship with the advisor or a negative, cold relationship with the advisor. The findings are depicted in Fig. 8.3.

Most importantly, the results showed that while a poor relationship with the advisor diminished expectations for both receiving a good grade (concrete status) and for fair treatment (symbolic status), the effect was not equal across these two forms of status. When the target was described as having a negative relationship with their advisor, this diminished their expectation for receiving concrete status more than did their expectations for symbolic status. These findings are consistent with the idea that even when people do things that damage their interpersonal relationships, they may still expect to receive symbolic status while believing that the damage to the relationship would negatively affect their prospects for concrete status. As such, an asymmetry between symbolic and concrete status is evident in that concrete status is more sensitive to variations in social context than is symbolic status.




Fig. 8.3 Symbolic and concrete status expectations as functions of advisor's performance evaluations and student-advisor relationship (Study 2)

Social Consequences of Violating Resource Expectations

Based on evidence that expectations for symbolic status (e.g., fair treatment) are stronger and less variable than those for concrete status (raise at work or academic grade) in particularistic exchanges, it follows that the withholding of symbolic status should be especially attention-grabbing and more likely to evoke strong reactions relative to the withholding of concrete status. Compared with expected events (e.g., receiving fair, respectful treatment), unexpected events (e.g., receiving unfair, disrespectful treatment) tend to elicit higher degrees of arousal (Markovsky 1988), deeper cognitive processing (provided the appropriate cognitive resources are available; see Macrae et al. 1999), and hence are easier to recall. In fact, research has demonstrated that people tend to recall instances of unjust interpersonal treatment more frequently than instances of economic or material injustice (Lupfer et al. 2000; Messick et al. 1985; Messick and Cook 1983; Mikula et al. 1990). Thus, as a corollary to the hypothesis that symbolic status expectations should be relatively high and relatively stable across contexts, violating these expectations should have particularly profound consequences, both for the individuals in the immediate situation and their social organizations. To frame this latter idea in statistical

terms, when entered in the same equation to predict reactions such as overall satisfaction with the decision, evaluations of the decision-maker, and the organization in general, *the effect size for meeting versus violating symbolic status expectations should be greater than the effect size for meeting versus violating expectations for concrete status.*

We tested the above hypotheses with data from a large field study (details reported in Binning and Huo 2006). An ethnically diverse sample of 454 college students provided their specific expectations and reactions in a retrospective report of an actual encounter with a university campus decision-maker (e.g., faculty, administrators, campus law enforcement). To assess violations of expectations, participants reported on four-point scales what they were expecting in terms of symbolic status (e.g., to be treated fairly, respectfully) and what they were expecting in terms of concrete status (e.g., to receive a concrete outcome that benefitted them such as a successful grade appeal). They were then asked what they had actually received (e.g., treated fairly, an outcome that benefitted them). Based on simple difference scores, participants were classified in terms of whether their treatment fell short of expectations, met expectations, or exceeded expectations. A similar classification was created for whether their concrete outcomes fell short of, met, or exceeded expectations. Thus, in total, there were nine possible combinations of treatment and concrete expectancy violations.

To assess the relative influence of these two types of violation in shaping reactions to the particular experience, as well as to test for potential interactions between treatment and outcome expectancy violations, we conducted two 3 (treatment expectations: violated vs. met vs. exceeded) × 3 (outcome expectations: violated vs. met vs. exceeded) ANOVAS, one on participants' evaluations of the resource distributor and one on participants' overall levels of satisfaction. These analyses largely supported our predictions. First, for both dependent

variables, the size of the main effects for symbolic status violations was significantly larger than the comparable effect sizes for concrete status violations. This is consistent with the idea that violated treatment expectations were more meaningful to participants than violated outcome expectations.

However, both ANOVAS also revealed the presence of two-way interactions, which are depicted in Fig. 8.4. The two-way interactions suggested several noteworthy effects. First, it appeared that when treatment expectations were




Fig. 8.4 Authority evaluation and overall satisfaction as a function of violated symbolic and concrete status expectations

met, it mattered very little whether outcome expectations were violated, met, or exceeded. That is, if participants were treated how they expected to be treated, it did not matter what they actually received. They tended to be satisfied and evaluated the decision-maker favorably. Although meeting treatment expectations was always important, it was especially important when outcomes fell short of expectations. This is consistent with previous research that suggests how one is treated is particularly meaningful when outcomes are negative (cf. Brockner and Wiesenfeld 1996). On the whole, then, the field data supported the idea that symbolic status violations, relative to concrete status violations, were especially critical in shaping reactions to experiences.

It may be that people expect an acknowledgment of their symbolic status within their valued groups and organizations, regardless of other factors (e.g., performance, nature of interpersonal relationships). If so, then what may be most critical for group and individual functioning are the messages conveyed by unfair, disrespectful treatment rather than the messages conveyed by fair, respectful treatment. This line of reasoning is, of course, consistent with the research on the pervasive positive-negative asymmetries in human experiences (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Prislin et al. 2000), which suggest that reactions to negative experiences (e.g., losing money) are generally more powerful than reactions to correspondingly positive experiences (e.g., winning money). Being treated poorly may hurt more than being treated well feels good.

Practical Implications

The practical implications of the present findings follow closely from the theoretical implications. From the perspective of decision-makers who are responsible for distributing valued resources among constituents unequally, the present argument makes clear the importance of always delivering symbolic status (e.g., respect, fairness) to those who are affected by the decisions. Results from the field study indicated that as long as peoples' expectations for symbolic treatment

were met, they were satisfied with their outcomes and had favorable evaluations of decision-maker. In fact, this was true even for individuals who received worse-than-expected concrete status.

From the perspective of those who are affected by authority's decisions, the preceding argument highlights how favorable treatment can be used to distract or ameliorate people's reactions to unexpectedly poor decision-making outcomes. Put simply, fair treatment may enable certain groups and individuals to benefit some people at the cost of others without evoking unrest or dissatisfaction from those who are hurt by the decisions (see Jackman 1994). It could be, in other words, that individuals are treated unfairly in a concrete sense (e.g., getting systematically lower concrete outcomes than they deserve) but treated fairly in a symbolic, interpersonal sense (e.g., through apparently fair and neutral decision-making). Of course, whether high-quality treatment is viewed as a bona fide display of concern for the individual or a manipulative technique to get people to accept negative outcomes is often "in the eye of the beholder" and likely to depend on factors such as trust (versus distrust) in authority (Tyler and Huo 2002), in the ingroup, and in people in general (see Binning 2007). Because of the unique, egalitarian potential surrounding the distribution of symbolic status, people are likely to have particularly strong, negative reactions in response to violations of symbolic status expectations relative to violations of expectations for concrete status.

Part III: Implications for Social Resource Theory

In this final section, we discuss the implications of the present conceptualization for Foa and Foa's social resource theory. Resource theory begins with a distinction between economic (goods, services, money) and noneconomic resources (love, status, and information) and attempts to make sense of how these different goods are exchanged with one another. Status is just one of the six primary resources, and as such, the present approach raises questions about how this more

nuanced understanding of status fits within resource theory. We briefly consider one area of resource theory where the present model seems particularly relevant.

Understanding the Relationship Between Status and Love

In social resource theory, status is defined as “an expression of evaluative judgment which conveys high or low prestige, regard, or esteem,” whereas love is defined as “an expression of affectionate regard, warmth, or comfort.” Initial studies in the development of resource theory illustrated that love and status are exchanged with one another more often than each is exchanged with other resources (see Foa 1971). In response to an expression of warmth (e.g., a smile), a target is more likely to reciprocate with an expression of regard than with a monetary payment or the performance of some service, which helps explain the proximal positions afforded to status and love within resource theory.

As the brief definitions above illustrate, both status and love involve social regard and evaluations. Moreover, both resources are symbolic. However, a variety of researches in social psychology appear to affirm the distinction between these two dimensions. According to Fiske and her colleagues (e.g., Fiske et al. 2007), warmth (similar to love) and competence (similar to status) are among the most fundamental of evaluations people make of others. Illustrating the independence of the two dimensions, people who are judged to be high in warmth can also be judged to be relatively low in competence (e.g., a class clown) and those high in competence can also be judged as low in warmth (e.g., an overachieving bookworm). In recent work by Huo et al. (2010a), perceptions that one is well-liked by others were found to be related to but empirically distinguishable from perceptions of one’s status as a worthy group member, and each dimension predicted different social outcomes.

Given the distinctness of these two dimensions, part of the utility of the present model depends on

its ability to present novel predictions about their exchange. When love is exchanged for status, which of the four types of status is being exchanged? When a person “gives” love to another, they may do so in the hopes of receiving concrete status, such as marriage (particularistic) and wealth (universalistic), and/or they may do it with hope of receiving acknowledgement (particularistic) and appreciation as a person (universalistic). When viewed in this light, it seems unlikely that only one of the dimensions is in play at any given time. As such, the question is not *which* of elements of status are exchanged but rather to what extent each element is emphasized by the context and by the individual. A person is pejoratively referred to as a “gold digger” when they are willing to give love to another solely in hopes of bettering their concrete position in life. But the act of giving love for concrete status does not always have this negative slant. For instance, people in more companionate love relationships may take solace and assurance in having someone there when they need them (see Hatfield 1988). By contrast, prototypical star-crossed lovers give love to others without any expectation of concrete status or benefit to material standing. Presumably, they do so with only the hope of being acknowledged and valued by the other person, regardless of the other’s concrete standing or ability to improve a material position. This analysis highlights the possible development in resource theory, to be explored in future research, that particular types of love (e.g., companionate or passionate love) are systematically exchanged with particular forms of status (e.g., concrete or symbolic, respectively).

Conclusion

Social resource theory was developed according to how people naturalistically divided and organized different social resources. We applied core insights of social resource theory to an in-depth consideration of one particular resource, status. Future research might fruitfully apply the approach taken here to each of the five other major resources. Such efforts would not only help fill out the resource theory framework with more granular understanding of each resource, they may

also generate novel insights about how people assign value and discover meaning in their lives.

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What is a moral resource, and how might it occupy a psychological space of some sort? For example, what is the moral “high ground,” metaphorically speaking? Does it allow someone to “look down” on you? Can it become the basis for someone to say that you are not a person of “upstanding” character, that you have “fallen short” vis-à-vis certain standards of conduct? The use of spatial metaphors in expressions such as these suggests that there is some psychological sense in which up is good and bad is down—in other words, that morality relates to the metaphor of physical representation on a vertical dimension.

Humans apparently also have a tendency to associate power and status with verticality. Indeed, to refer to someone as a “high-status” person reflects the same type of metaphorical language just noted. It seems not unreasonable to suggest, therefore, that notions such as power, status, and authority might go hand in hand with notions related to morality. I take just such a position in this chapter. In turn, I relate that way of viewing things with a perspective on resource categories that integrates Fiske’s (1991) model of social relations with the work

of Foa and Foa on their Resource Theory (e.g., Foa 1971).¹

Perhaps an analogy to the concept of a noun will help to illustrate the approach I am taking. A noun can be a person, place, thing, or idea. In that sense, nouns can be categorized with respect to their *content*; they differ as to content in ways that are recognizable and meaningful. They also share a common property, however, as nouns *per se*. For example, nouns are the kinds of words that can be used as subject or objects within sentences. In that sense, they can *function* in the same way even while differing in specific content.

My discussion of resources in general and of moral resources, in particular, parallels the use of nouns as a unified concept (function) rather than as a set of differentiated categories (content). In essence, I treat categories of resources in terms of their shared function as resources (Foa and Foa) and I treat categories of norms (i.e., “rules” about resources and relationships) in terms of their shared function as norms (Fiske). I build my discussion around the theme that the Foa notion of status represents what I call a first-order resource, whereas moral norms have a kind of status that constitutes a second-order layer of

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¹I do not cite specific articles by Uriel and Edna Foa unless I am quoting specific passages or closely paraphrasing them, in part because I find it awkward to refer to “the Foas.” Instead I refer to “the Foa framework” as inclusive of the work of both authors. I also use Resource Theory as another term to refer to their various works, rather than constantly citing numerous specific references.

abstraction as a meta-resource. In particular, I examine the meaning of the latter as the reflection of a special kind of hierarchy—one in which moral norms trump a person’s status in the social hierarchy.

My development of this theme tracks not only the Foa perspective on resources (especially status) but also that of Fiske (1991). The Foa perspective can be conceptualized as referring to categories of *resources* explicitly. Fiske’s perspective refers to categories of *social relations* explicitly, but these can also be related to resources. Specifically, Fiske’s framework pertains to norms for four different “models” (mental schemata) applicable to social relationships, and he discusses how each has a separate norm for the way in which resources are handled. Note that the Foa perspective also treats different kinds of resources as pertaining to different kinds of norms.

Instead of focusing on specific differences among norms according to their category of resources or type of relationship, I address a single category of meta-norms as it applies to the violation of any specific norm at the lower, first-order level of the Foa perspective or that of Fiske. My approach is the flip side of the Foa approach. The Foa framework conceptualizes different categories of resources as they relate to one another in an overall psychological space. My approach is instead to unify by focusing on a single quality that all types of resources (or relationships) share in common, namely, their capacity to elicit moralized forms of social sanctioning when the norms regarding those resources or relations are violated.

The Status of Moral Resources: Not Exchanged

Foa (1971) offered an exchange context as one way of thinking about resources in general. For that reason, it is useful to consider the nature of *status* resources within an exchange context related more generally to all categories of resources. First, consider the most general context: “[B]ecause people depend on one another

for the material and psychological resources necessary to their well-being, they associate to exchange these resources through interpersonal behavior” (Foa 1971, p. 345). Although interpersonal interactions often involve exchanges, however, some such interactions can differ markedly from the prototypical form of exchange seen in monetary transactions:

Attempts to bridge the dichotomy between economic and noneconomic resources came mainly from sociologists and psychologists...who sought to interpret every interpersonal behavior as an exchange, characterized by profit and loss. Extension of the economic model to noneconomic resources, however, produced difficulties for the social exchange theory. The fact, for instance, that resources like information and love can be given to others without reducing the amount possessed by the giver has been considered contradictory to the very notion of exchange...since this effect does not occur in transactions of money and goods. (Foa 1971, p. 345)

Resource Theory addressed this problem by first (a) posing it in the form of a question, namely, “If...different resources follow distinct rules of exchange, how can they be reconciled”; then (b) suggesting that the answer was “to develop a theory that will reveal order in this framework”—that is, to show how different categories of resources (and associated differences in rules of exchange) could be accommodated “within the same conceptual framework” (Foa 1971, p. 346). The result of this approach was a framework that indicated how different categories of resources could be characterized in terms of their *specific* types of relations with one another—a “classification system” that would make it “possible to predict which resources share more similar rules and to anticipate conditions under which certain resources will be valued and exchanged and what exchanges will take place” (Foa 1971, p. 346).

Note, therefore, that Resource Theory resolved the matter of differences between economic and noneconomic exchanges in three ways. First, the Foa framework provides a classification system for conceptualizing different kinds of resources in a manner that indicates how they can be related to one another. Second, it capitalizes on the insight that although they are *different* kinds of resources, they are all still *resources*. Third, as

resources, they also share the common property of being exchangeable both within and across categories.

There is, however, one potentially problematic aspect to characterizing different kinds of resources under the common umbrella of “a theory of resource *exchange*” (Foa 1971, p. 346). The term *exchange* tends to connote a two-way transaction—giving something (some resource, to some extent) but also receiving something (resource; extent) in return. On the one hand, that certainly can happen and perhaps most characteristically does happen with regard to resources. On the other hand, one-way “transactions” (when one person *transfers* a resource to another person) also can occur and sometimes do. Giving a birthday present is one example. The potential for the absence of reciprocation is especially noteworthy in unrequited love as another very poignant example.

Status as a resource category might be conceptualized in terms of exchanges versus transfers. For example, one way to consider status is by distinguishing between *achieved* and *ascribed* status. An achieved status is granted as part of a two-stage process and can thus be viewed as constituting a type of exchange: First, a person does something of note (e.g., swims in a race and finishes ahead of everyone else) and then that person receives some type of reward (e.g., an Olympic gold medal). That stage-like process does not apply, however, in pure cases of ascribed status. For example, consider a caste system such as the one historically prevalent in India. A yet-to-be-born child in such a system has already been assigned (ascribed) a certain kind of standing in society.

My analysis of morality as a resource treats moral norms as having an ascribed status. When a given moral norm is widely accepted, it has thereby been granted a degree of authority on a predetermined, non-exchange basis. Unlike the forms of status that exist at a first-order level of abstraction such as in the case of prestigious positions (achieved or ascribed), however, the status of moral norms does not seem to be so conveniently conceptualized either as something to be exchanged or as something to be transferred.

Legal statutes are analogous in that regard. Traffic laws do not constitute a resource in the common sense of something that can be exchanged or transferred. Rather, they have a higher-order status in a different sense, namely, the status of a rule that is legitimately enforceable and can be applied coercively (e.g., by fines or imprisonment). They “reign” over people in the same metaphorical sense as high-status rulers (e.g., medieval kings and queens). Laws and moral norms, that is, represent resources that have an impersonal status rather than a personal (to be exchanged or transferred) one.

The status of moral norms can nonetheless be categorized with reference to the Foa system. Specifically, we can analyze moral norms (as a generic resource *category*) in terms of the dimensions of *concreteness* and *particularism*. On the concreteness dimension, moral norms are highly symbolic (i.e., low in concreteness); they are abstract principles. Similarly, “status and information ... are typically conveyed by verbal or paralinguistic behaviors and are thus more symbolic [than services or goods]” (Foa 1971, p. 346).

On the particularism dimension, the second-order status of moral norms differs from first-order status as a resource. Moral norms are *low* on particularism because in principle, anyone within the moral community is eligible to sanction someone else negatively for the transgression of a given moral law. Note that in this case, a specific, first-order exchange can still take place in terms of a specific form of punishment resource, such as when love or first-order status is withdrawn (e.g., criticizing, shunning) “in return for” a moral infraction. This is in fact what we might call *negative reciprocity*, such as when applying the equity principle of having the punishment fit the crime. Nonetheless, the moral norm itself—as a second-order form of status—is not exchanged or transferred. In some sense, it is thus like the kind of resource that “can be given ... without reducing the amount possessed by the giver” (Foa 1971, p. 345).

The discussion thus far indicates that the second-order status of moral norms has some unusual features. In some respects, it is like first-order

status; in other respects, it is not. Clarifying some of those similarities and differences is the next order of business.

Social Hierarchy: The Birthplace of Moral Norms?

To begin an analysis of morality as second-order status, consider how status can be characterized as a first-order resource, namely, as a privileged position in a social hierarchy. Rank orderings of status are in existence across social species, especially primates. Contests for status are in fact so ubiquitous among social animals that expressions such as “top dog” and “alpha male” are common.

Knauff (1991) has noted, however, that the exact nature of rank-ordered social hierarchies has varied along the evolutionary time-span that predates early modern humans and then extends into the time when chiefdoms and kingdoms first arose. Essentially, this trend can be seen as U shaped, with the two tips of the U representing eras when status differentiation has played a stronger role, whereas the trough of the U represents an era of less differentiation and less influence coming from one’s place in the hierarchy. Our primate ancestors lived a hierarchical social existence in which subordinates had to yield to dominants. Similarly, the eventual development of agriculture and the domestication of animals allowed for accumulations of material resources—hence, the potential for wealth, power, and the means to exercise domination.

Humans were nomadic hunter-gatherers between those two eras. There is a widespread consensus among anthropologists (reviewed in Boehm 1999) that this in-between period saw a much less pronounced degree of hierarchical differentiation. The evidence from modern-day hunter-gatherers similarly shows that their nomadic bands display markedly egalitarian tendencies. In Boehm’s (1999) terms, this *egalitarian ethos* reflects a *reverse-dominance hierarchy*. Put another way, “the moral community might have developed originally as a collective means of eliminating the political, social, and

economic problems that go with alpha domination” (Boehm 2000; see also Boehm 1982, 1993, 1999).

Here is a brief statement of the principal theme: “A signal and fundamental accomplishment of early moral communities was to define domination behaviors as morally deviant, and then to back this up with sanctioning by the entire group....There were, of course, definite differences of prestige, rank, and status...; but tendencies of individuals to carry such differences too far were held in check” (Boehm 2000, p. 93). The following synopsis appears elsewhere:

[T]he earliest type of deviance to be sanctioned by groups in the human line may well have been bullying behavior...exerting too much power. No other behavior of the Common Ancestor is suggestive of any of the more important and widespread moral proscriptions that we see in bands today, whereas every band—in fact, every human society of any type—has its limits when the abuse of power is at issue (Boehm 2000, p. 150; cf. Boehm 1999).

Similarly, “My hypothesis is that when morally judgmental coalitions first swung into action as communicative moral communities that shared values and tracked deviant behavior, their initial aim was to suppress alpha domination” (Boehm 2000, p. 156). Boehm thus claimed that when morality first became a source of influence on human behavior, it was as a mechanism for *reducing* (or at least restricting the influence of) hierarchical differentiations of status, thereby keeping high status from becoming a source of power that could be used for the domination of others.

As connoted by the expression *reverse-dominance hierarchy*, there is a metaphorical sense in which an “orthodox” (despotic) status differentiation was stood on its head (i.e., reversed): The weak acquired a means whereby they could, if need be, dominate the strong. Collectively, in other words, the rank-and-file members of a band were able to suppress power-grabbing and excessive self-aggrandizement by those who had some basis for higher prestige within the group. The potential for collective action in turn depended on the shared values that Boehm noted as having characterized moral communities. The next section picks up on this theme that when moral norms exist as shared

values, they become a powerful counterforce precisely because they have a “status” that is “higher” than any one person’s level of prestige as a first-order resource.

Fritz Heider and the “Ought Force”

Fritz Heider (1958) devoted an entire chapter of *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations* to “Ought and Value,” which dealt extensively with the role of moral norms in human society. Although he distinguished between the moral sense of *ought* and its broader possible applications (e.g., “I ought to carry an umbrella because it might rain”), the passages I will quote are especially apropos to the former. That is true, for example, with regard to moral oughts as a second-order status with low particularism: “In the case of [a moral] ought,...it is not a particular somebody that is felt to want or command people to do *x*, but some suprapersonal objective order” (Heider 1958, p. 219). Note also in that passage the idea of an “order” characterized as having a *suprapersonal* quality, such that its status is “above” that of the status possessed by any given person.

Another important feature of Heider’s analysis relates to the notion of the *objective* quality of moral norms (oughts). “Oughts are impersonal,” he wrote, and have “the validity of objective existence”—that is, moral principles “refer to standards...independent of the individual’s wishes” (1958, p. 219). He noted that what a person ought to do “has a significance beyond personal concerns” (p. 220), which means that moral norms seem objective in the sense that they exhibit an intersubjectively validated reality. Put another way, this “requirement of a suprapersonal objective order” is one “whose validity therefore transcends the point of view of any one person” (p. 222). Thus, moral norms are consensually shared values because “ought has interpersonal validity...it is...universal and should look alike to everybody,” and “attributing ought to an objective order requires that people in general should concur in its directives” (p. 222).

I relate these points of Heider’s directly to the kind of analysis that Boehm (1999, 2000) has provided. Moral norms can stand a traditional, orthodox hierarchy on its head because of the suprapersonal quality of their demands. They trump ordinary, first-order status, just as “no one is above the law.” They become, therefore, a special kind of resource—one whereby the weak can coalesce to keep the stronger in check.

Moral Status and Fiske’s Relational Models

In his analysis of social life as exhibiting the use of “relational models” (mental schemata for guiding interactions), Fiske (1991) distinguished four types. *Communal sharing* (CS) is a model of interaction that emphasizes a common identity among the members of a group—one that tends to spawn such activities as the sharing of resources according to need. *Authority ranking* (AR) characterizes social relations when a rank-ordered differentiation is in place. *Equality matching* (EM) refers to situations in which strong norms of reciprocity apply. *Market pricing* (MP) relations exist when resources can be evaluated in commensurable ways (e.g., the value of goods and services can be associated with amounts of money).

Fiske also highlighted the moral aspects of social norms in his analysis of relational models: “The most important distinctive feature of this class of structures is that they are jural, or normative models....Specific rules and practices are held to be obligatory and legitimate because they are derived from these fundamental models” (1991, p. 170). The models “have intrinsic imperative force” in that “it is reprehensible not to concern oneself with the performance of others in these social relationships: there is an obligation to monitor, intervene, and sanction where appropriate” (1991, p. 170). Fiske further claimed that “people value these forms of social relations ideologically and are committed to them as moral standards they impose on themselves and others” (p. 178).

Fiske's conception of the relational models made their moral aspect a defining characteristic: "Most moral precepts...are in some degree derivative from the fundamental underlying models. To the extent that people take such rules and values as axiomatically governing their own behavior, and as requirements which they must necessarily impose and enforce on others, the basic models are directive ideals" (1991, p. 180). Note that this reference to "ideals" fits with the second-order conception of moral norms as status—namely, in regard to their being abstract and symbolic in nature.

I propose (see also Folger and Butz 2004) that *all* moral violations (relational-model transgressions) implicitly invoke the authority ranking (AR) structure as an elementary form of human relations. In other words, moral norms occupy a "rank" that commands obedience in a sense similar to what occurs when people are loyal to a leader or someone in a position of authority. This is the sense in which moral norms act as second-order status resources.

I assume that morality as AR (second-order status) can affect emotional and behavioral tendencies without a person's literally thinking of a hierarchy of social relations (i.e., the relative status of various individuals) at the time. Put another way, certain concepts and contexts implicitly connote aspects of hierarchy even if (a) no mention of hierarchy per se occurs and (b) the specific idea of a formal social hierarchy never comes to mind.

Indeed, morality is a subject matter that refers to hierarchy by its very nature. That status-ranking feature is quintessential to morality even though some ethicists refer to "moral goods" (e.g., Haidt et al. 2003), which might be taken as implying a market pricing (MP) model that relates to allocations and exchanges. It is true that people often, at least in Western culture, will make judgments about the fairness of an exchange by using MP logic (e.g., the outcome/input ratios specified by equity theory; Adams 1965). I distinguish, however, between (a) the relational-model source of a moral judgment that a transgression has occurred, such as the violation of an MP norm, and (b) the feelings and behavioral tendencies spawned by

awareness of such an event. The former can involve any of the four models, but the latter of necessity will always involve an AR mindset in which moral norms have an authoritative status.

As mentioned above, the norms associated with any given relational model have an "intrinsic imperative force." The force metaphor suggests how the status of moral dictates relates to the psycho-logic of the situation (feeling the impulse to abide by the moral code as a force "holding me back" from wrongdoing). Moral dictates have constraint as a basic function. In a positive sense, they serve as guides to correct behavior ("thou shalt")—but perhaps even more importantly, in a negative sense, they *limit* acceptable behavior and thus place bounds around the permissible ("thou shalt not"). The tone of authority could not sound more loudly than when described along such lines of the logic of the term *moral* and the psycho-logic of response to it. Hence, any given model itself, whether CS, AR, EM, or MP, *acts authoritatively* as a superior force one is not supposed to "rise above"—the ultimate rank of dominance in the hierarchy.

The authority force of a given relational model (or rather, of a moral norm derived from one of them) has perhaps not been linked so explicitly to AR before simply because of reasons why other aspects of transgression have greater salience. AR stays in the background, implicitly taken for granted because of other language and modes of thought that influence the relative salience of various elements involved in a wrongdoing incident. The same would tend to be true for transgressions of exchange norms regarding the resource categories in the Foa framework.

Note that descriptions of wrongdoing often use terms such as *transgressor*, thereby tending to invoke language about a victim. Also, the victim's harm might acquire special salience in numerous ways (e.g., similarity to the observer, personal relationship with the observer, or just the observer's capacity for empathy). The "deed" done by wrongdoers, however, actually has two victims rather than one: a person or persons harmed (in the sense that morality involves social relations and due regard for other persons) and the structural integrity of the moral system itself.

Similarly, an exchange of resources that are mismatched according to the Foa framework “harms” the norms regarding how the resource categories should relate to one another.

On the one hand, of course, the moral structure itself does not literally suffer harm: It exists as an abstraction and an ideal. On the other hand, the “breaking the rules” connotations do imply a sense in which something once treated as if impenetrable (or supposed to receive that treatment) now shows itself as porous. Someone has escaped its boundaries, so “breaking” means “breaking through.” Consider the metaphor of cell bars in a jail: When a jail “breakout” occurs, nothing in the jail might exist thereafter in a literally “broken” state (e.g., the bars remain intact, but a prisoner escaped nonetheless).

I argue that natural selection has favored an evolution of moral emotions (cf. Folger and Butz 2004; Folger and Cropanzano [in press](#); Folger and Skarlicki 2008). People experience strongly aroused feelings when they perceive events in moral terms. It may not involve too much exaggeration to suggest that humans treat morals anthropomorphically with respect to authoritative force: The moral injunction *is* “the final authority” (supreme ruler) on the matter. By this psycho-logic, then, “breaking” the “rules” gains the anthropomorphic status of regicide.

Here is the gist of my argument: Violating *any* moral mandate has an inherent structure analyzable in AR terms as a violation of rank privilege, thereby doing something that exceeds the authority of one’s rank. Again, by definition, the moral dictate *is* the ultimate authority, so breaking a moral rule is analogous to killing a ruler. Using the language of regicide may sound overly anthropomorphic, but I use that figure of speech because Fiske emphasizes regicide as the quintessential or worst wrong in the AR category.

Back to Boehm

An impressive array of evidence suggests that people have an inherent tendency to “proscribe the enactment of behavior that is politically overbearing” (1999, p. 43). The roots of the position

can also be stated as follows: “Five million years ago, an ancestral ape was in a position to engage in protomoral behaviours as it dealt with its dislike of alpha bullying” (Boehm 2000, p. 98). But Boehm does not claim that humans hate authority; in fact, he believes that human nature contains within it material whose expression can yield tyranny or democracy, despotism or egalitarianism—and by the same token, a more-or-less shared acceptance of either as legitimate under a given set of circumstances. No matter how strong the ordinary degree of acceptance for a hierarchically ranked authority as a governance structure, however, there can come a time when those lower down find those above to have exceeded their authority. Boehm focuses considerable attention on that key phenomenon as one that tends to draw a *collective* response such as an uprising.

I, too, believe that human moral emotions such as judgmental antipathy and the condemnatory feelings about wrongdoers have emerged out of human history into an evolved set of dispositions. As Fiske (2002) has noted, emotions can act as proxies for more calculative thought. Apparently, natural selection did not favor having a cognitive committee to deliberate and to conduct a debate about the rightness or wrongness of some actions. Rather, a moral emotion evolved as a proxy that can take the place of such ruminations, thereby yielding a more-or-less instantaneous response. Think, for example, about the time when a boss or colleague stole someone else’s idea and tried to take credit for it. The emotional reactions to such events show a commonality that stretches across (a) the Boehm reverse-dominance thesis, (b) outrage about injustice, and (c) the psychology of AR as a relational model.

Nonetheless, my position does not coincide entirely with either Boehm’s or Fiske’s. My idea of an AR-related response tendency in conjunction with violations of any and all relational models, for example, does not seem to fit perfectly with some of Fiske’s discussions concerning quite distinctive reactions depending on the particular model as a source for the violated norm. Similarly, I have no commitment to all of the assumptions that Boehm makes in deriving his arguments for a human capacity in which subordinates rise up

collectively for the sake of administering punitive sanctions against upstartism run amok.

Note, for example, that I referred to a boss *or a colleague* who steals an idea and tries to get all the credit for it or at least the lion's share (cf. AR as priority of access to resources, like the "I get to eat all I want first" disposition seen in the alpha-ranked among lions or other social species with dominance hierarchies). I do not, therefore, distinguish between (a) the lower-ranked person who acts out-of-rank in a social-climbing fashion and (b) the top-ranked person corrupted by power to the extent of becoming abusive. Conceptually, the form or process of both kinds of actions falls into the same type of AR mental category as a function of their anti-normative or immoral quality.

Two points should be made here. First, although crucial tests might well remain elusive as regards the specifics of evolutionary mechanisms responsible for current human proclivities, I think that my speculations stand on more solid ground than most because the essence of my argument points to two parallel sources: (a) On the one hand, I follow Panksepp (1998) in suspecting that the capacity for moral outrage stems from the nature of angry impulses selected for responding to predators. (b) On the other hand, I also tie my analysis to the AR relational model that Fiske argues must have had evolutionary roots as well.

Second, I echo Boehm (1999, 2000) in noting that human nature contains conflicting types of motivation: People have both "the innate tendency to dominate" and "the innate tendency to resent being dominated" (1999, p. 251). A wide range of sociopolitical forms can emerge as a result: "Some of our societies may be seen as 'cultures of rebellion' insofar as the limits of authority or domination are circumscribed....Other societies amount to true 'cultures of dominance,' insofar as people not only accept but identify with a strong political authority that rules them" (1999, p. 252).

I agree; after all, no evolved trait distinguishes humans more than the degree of plasticity and flexibility used to govern (though not always

successfully) impulses from other evolved traits. Despite Boehm's remarks about societies in which people accept and identify with authority, I lean more toward what he has written in other passages that also corresponds with Fiske's description of AR. Although Fiske wrote of cultures whose acceptance of authority far outstrips the norm in Western cultures, he also (as is true of Boehm) noted that even extremes of allegiance have their limit. In my discussion of AR, I have likewise emphasized that humans seem to accept the legitimacy of authority only up to a point.

Perhaps Fiske has put it best in the following words about the precedence and deference of rank among the Moose of Burkina Faso in West Africa: "Moose leaders have tremendous authority, authority that is, in principle, virtually unlimited within its traditional sphere of prerogatives" (Fiske 1991, p. 310). The catch lies in the qualifiers *in principle* and *within its traditional sphere*. In fact, a similarly hedged description fits modern workplace organizations just as readily as it does the political organization of those tribal peoples. Both phrases imply limits. Power and authority, no matter how nearly infinite, stop somewhere. Among humans, *hoi polloi* know that fact instinctively. When those in power forget and yield to the impulses of extreme self-aggrandizement, they often arouse punitive urges that can put them "back in their place"—that is, punishment designed to reduce status as a first-order resource.

Proto-morality as a Social Resource

To extend the analysis of moral authority as a special kind of meta-status resource, we need look no further than Knauff's (1991) view of a U-shaped trajectory of hierarchical tendencies across evolutionary time scales. The fairly strict hierarchies of the great apes (e.g., chimpanzees) anchor one end of that curve. Yet even under those conditions, there seems to have been some "seeds of revolution" being sown in the sense of a preadaptation to the reverse-dominance hierarchies identified by Boehm (1999).

The evidence is somewhat anecdotal but nonetheless intriguing. Consider, for example, the following passage:

[A] possible rule established “from below” is the one against the use of canines against females (male chimpanzees have long, sharp canine teeth; females do not). Attacks by male chimpanzees on females are quite common...and mostly involve hitting and trampling. This behavior, although rough and probably painful to the victim, does not result in physical damage. When males do bite, they almost exclusively use their incisors, again causing little damage...[But] the few times that males did use their dangerous canines in a fight against a female, the victim’s tone of voice immediately changed to a higher pitch. The entire colony would respond to this change with a chorus of barks, sometimes followed by a coalition of females chasing off the aggressor. The particular bark used in this context, the “waa bark,” sounds truly indignant. (de Waal 1991, pp. 340–341)

This incident involved chimpanzees at the Arnhem facility in the Netherlands, but a related report comes from a carefully controlled study conducted in the wild (East Africa). Here, almost half of the observed retaliations of females on males “involved formation of coalitions between adult females” (versus a lone victim trying to retaliate), and “the females threatened the male by approaching with waa-bark[s]” (Newton-Fisher 2006, p. 1593).

Instances of female coalitions taking on higher-ranking males are not restricted to the situation in which another female is subject to abuse from a male. Male-against-male confrontations that are excessive (anti-normative) can also be subject to collective female policing. On an occasion, when the alpha male was about to inflict serious damage on an adolescent male, for example, the following transpired:

Before he could accomplish his aim [viz., initiated by the alpha, Jimoh], several females close to the scene began to “woaow” bark [an alternate spelling of *waa*]. This indignant sound is used in protest against aggressors and intruders. At first the callers looked around to see how the rest of the group was reacting; but when others joined in...the intensity of their calls quickly increased until literally everyone’s voice was part of a deafening chorus.... Once the protest had swelled to a chorus, Jimoh broke off his attack with a nervous grin on his face: he got the message. Had he failed to respond, there would

no doubt have been concerted female action to end the disturbance. (de Waal 1996, pp. 91–92)

Such reactions seem to imply “moral order upheld by the community” (de Waal 1996, p. 92) despite the possibility of alternative explanations:

Whereas some of us are inclined to explain the group’s reaction to Jimoh in moral terms, such as ‘He just went too far,’ other observers might prefer a more neutral account along the lines of ‘Chimpanzees sometimes bark in response to aggression.’ There is one problem with the latter view, however: one never hears woaow barks when a mother punishes her own offspring, or when an adult male controls a tiff among juvenile—even if he uses force in the process. Not every fight triggers these calls. It is a reaction to a very particular kind of disturbance, one that seriously endangers relationships or lives. Thinking in terms of rules and violations may help us come to grips with its relevant features. (de Waal 1996, p. 92)

Or to put it another way, we might think in terms of moral norms that outrank even those group members who otherwise are positioned at the top of the social hierarchy.

Nor should we assume that the collective enforcement of proto-moral norms is restricted to a single primate species. The primate most commonly referred to as a chimpanzee, *Pan troglodytes* (the ones involved in the examples above), is distinct in social organization from its relative, *Pan paniscus*, also known as the bonobo. There is actually a relative lack of aggression from males toward female bonobos, but that “may be the result of the coalitions...that female bonobos form with one another to deter and retaliate against aggressive males” (Newton-Fisher 2006, p. 1590—citing Hohmann and Fruth 2003; Parish 1996; White 1992).

Interestingly, the enforcement of social norms in a proto-moral fashion can extend to behaviors that are not inherently part of the group-living social conditions of chimpanzees in the wild. Even routines that are arbitrarily introduced by humans, as takes place with chimpanzees in confinement, can acquire the property of a “suprapersonal objective order” (Heider 1958, p. 219) that we commonly associate with moral norms. The following incident is illustrative.

One balmy evening, when the keeper called the chimpanzees inside, two adolescent females refused to enter the building. The rule at Arnhem Zoo being that *none* of the apes will receive food until *all* of them have moved from the island into their sleeping quarters, the chimpanzees actively assist with the rule's enforcement: latecomers meet with a great deal of hostility from the hungry colony....[Hence, when they eventually came inside,] they were given a separate bedroom so as to prevent reprisals. This protected them only temporarily, however. The next morning, out on the island, the entire colony vented its frustration about the delayed meal by a mass pursuit ending in a physical beating of the culprits. (de Waal 1996, p. 89).

The reverse can also occur: Primates sometimes enforce their own social norms by punishing human violators. Bekoff (2001), for example, reported an incident in which baboons in Saudi Arabia waited for several days on the side of a road to take revenge on a specific driver who had killed a member of their troop. Despite the passing of numerous cars, the baboons lay in waiting and ambushed the driver after one of the baboons screamed as though to identify the driver. The angry baboons threw stones at the car and broke its windshield.

Conclusion

The lesson to be learned here is that the resource-based, ordinary social ordering of status—as successive ranks along such dimensions as prestige—can yield priority to a special type of “second-order” or “meta-” resource, namely, the moral order as an overarching constraint on social conduct. Beginning with our primate ancestors, even the “alpha” or highest-status individual in a social group could be subject to collective dominance exerted by lower-status members when violations of approved conduct occurred. To put it another way, a unique type of resource grew out of group-based conditions of living. Unlike the types of resources categorized by the Foa framework, this meta-resource is neither exchanged with other categories nor transferred from one member of a group to another. It is never “used up” in any sense of needing to be replenished, as other resources might be. It is shared by all

members alike, even if they are not otherwise governed by the forms of social relations that Fiske (1991) calls communal sharing or equality matching; in other words, it applies just as well when the first-order norms follow the dictates of authority ranking or market pricing.

As I indicated at the outset, my discussion has focused on a single quality that all types of resources or relationships possess—the capacity to elicit moralized forms of social sanctioning when the norms regarding those resources or relations are violated. Put another way, this supra-resource encompasses all the mechanisms of social control that groups might need to sustain their viability. Internalized moral norms even reduce the need for external sanctions, as when people blush or feel guilty although alone. This resource, like the proverbial gift, “keeps on giving”: Moral emotions arise unbidden just like other unbidden emotions can, such as when we experience sudden awe when unexpectedly coming upon a breathtaking vista.

There is much yet to be learned about how moral norms and emotions operate as a higher-order resource possessing a quality of “status.” In what ways is it like the first-order status of the Foa framework, and how is it different? In what ways does it coincide with authority ranking social relations, and how does it deviate? I have emphasized the uniqueness of moral constraints. It remains to flesh out with greater specificity the interrelationships of morality with the Foa and Fiske frameworks—a project that, if I am right, will be well worth the effort it must eventually entail.

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The Structural Bases of Resource Distribution

10

Jonathan H. Turner

Foa's (1971) original presentation of resource theory applied primarily to interpersonal processes, conceptualizing resources as "...any commodity—material or symbolic—which is transmitted through interpersonal behavior" (Foa and Foa 1974). Although resources can be "any commodity," Foa and Foa posit six "resource classes"—money, information, goods, services, status, and love—that they appear to believe are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Resources also vary along two dimensions: particularism and concreteness. The more particularistic is a resource, the more likely will it be exchanged for a similar resource in interpersonal relations; in contrast, the more universalistic a resource, the more likely will it be exchanged for a different resource. For example, love is particularistic in that it applies to specific individuals and, hence, is given by one individual in an exchange relationship with the expectation that the other will reciprocate by giving love back. Unlike love, money is more universalistic because it tends to mean the same thing to all persons and can be used in many different types of relationships, with the result that it can be exchanged for the other five types of resources conceptualized by Foa and Foa (1974)—an idea that Simmel emphasized in his *Philosophy of Money* (1990/1907).

For the other dimension along which resources vary—concreteness—Foa and Foa see the resources of goods and services as the most concrete, information and status as the least concrete, and love and money as somewhere in-between on a scale of concreteness. I think that this distinction along a scale of concreteness is less convincing than the one about particularism-universalism, but even the particularism-universalism distinction seems overly drawn. For example, love is an emotion and, like all positive emotions, can allow individuals to secure other positive emotions as well as more "material" resources like money (as when someone is a "gold digger"); status when denoting honor or prestige is a valued resource that allows individuals to secure many other valued resources, or status when denoting positions in a social structure enables individuals to secure other valued resources like authority or to enjoy valuable resources like compliance by others to authority—resources that embody some of what Foa and Foa mean by "status." Even more universalistic resources like money are often limited by particularism, thus reducing the universalism of money. For instance, money is not supposed to be used to "buy" love or, for that matter, any personal relationships, although it sometimes is. Thus, Foa and Foa's conceptualization is useful, if only to get theorists thinking more generally. Yet, their theory imposes dimensions that do not, in my view, quite capture the nature of resources and their dynamic properties in human social relations and patterns of social organization.

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Resources not only affect how people behave but, from a sociological perspective, they are the essence of social interactions that are used to build social structures and culture. Moreover, by using more sociology in conceptualizing resources, the list of resources can be extended beyond six “classes,” and the issue of particularism can be recast as variable degrees of resource circulation across social structures and the interpersonal relations in these structures. However, I am abandoning any effort to say which resources are more or less concrete because, as I will argue, the most key resources in human systems are highly “generalized” and can be used in many different kinds of situations, although some will circulate more widely than others.

Bringing Social Structure into the Conceptualization of Resources

As Foa and Foa (1974) emphasize, resources are often transmitted by interpersonal processes, and thus, it is appropriate to couch a theory at this level of social organization. Yet, what occurs at the interpersonal level is almost always *embedded* in sociocultural formations that reveal their own operative dynamics (Turner 2000a, 2007a, 2010a, b, 2011), and it is this fact that gives us some purchase on reconceptualizing resources. Virtually all episodes of face-to-face interaction are embedded within *corporate units* that, in turn, are nested in specific *institutional domains*. Corporate units evidence a division of labor in pursuit of goals (no matter how vague), and in the history of human societies, there have been just three basic types of such units: groups, organizations, and communities. These corporate units, especially groups and organizations, are lodged inside of institutional domains, such as economy, polity, religion, kinships, law, sport, medicine, education, science, and the like, that reveal varying degrees of autonomy from each other (Abrutyn 2009) and that constrain the goals, culture, and structure of corporate units (Turner 2010a). Episodes of face-to-face interaction are also embedded within *categoric units* which are created by markers denoting differences among individuals and

which are used to evaluate persons and to develop expectations for their likely behaviors. The only universal categoric units are gender and age, but with societal differentiation, other types of categoric units such as ethnicity, religious affiliation, and social class emerge and have large effects on evaluations of, and expectations for, individuals by virtue of how they are categorized. As I will emphasize, membership in categoric units also determines the type and amount of resources that persons can claim. Like corporate units, categoric units are nested inside more macro-level structures, most particularly a societal-level system of stratification. Looking at these meso-level units—that is, corporate and categoric units—from the bottom up, corporate units are the building blocks of institutional domains with each domain consisting of sets of interrelated corporate units engaged in activities typical of an autonomous institutional domain. Similarly, categoric units are ultimately the building blocks of stratification systems because, depending upon persons’ categoric-unit membership, they will typically receive more or less resources in face-to-face interactions that, over time, create distinct classes of individuals in terms of their relative shares of resources. Corporate and categoric units are interrelated in many ways, but the nodes that I will emphasize are these: Corporate units are the structures that distribute resources to individuals located at different points inside each corporate unit, whereas categoric-unit membership often determines the degree of access that individuals have to resource-giving positions in corporate units. Figure 10.1 outlines my conceptualization of the basic levels of social organization and the generic types of structures at each level. It is the meso and macro levels of social organization that I will examine in this chapter because these levels of social structure and their respective cultures determine resource transmission at the interpersonal (micro) level of social organization.

Thus, the flow of resources in interpersonal processes is very much constrained by the location of individuals in corporate units (within institutional domains) and categoric units (within the societal-level stratification system). As I emphasize in the figure, corporate units distribute




Fig. 10.1 A simple conceptual scheme

resources unequally and, over time, cause the emergence of society-wide patterns of stratification. As stratification emerges and leads to the formation of social classes (one type of categoric unit) and as membership in social classes is correlated with other categoric-unit memberships, such as gender and ethnicity, the level of inequality and stratification in a society increases. It is this set of complex dynamics that I conceptualize in the pages to follow, offering some simple principles about resource flows.

My conceptualization of resources is both narrower and broader than Foa and Foa's (1974) somewhat eclectic mix of "resource classes." I implicitly argue in Fig. 10.1 that resources distributed by different types of corporate units within institutional domains are the most important. By virtue of people's abilities to become incumbent in the divisions of labor of corporate

units in diverse institutional domains, they can receive varying shares of resources. If a person cannot even gain access to corporate units in a domain, such as education, health-care providers, employers, or even family, they cannot receive the resources of these domains. Or, if they can gain access, but cannot move up the hierarchical division of labor of a unit, they cannot receive as many resources as those who have been upwardly mobile. This simple fact of life in highly differentiated societies not only generates a stratification system, but it also has implications for the resources that people can bring to bear in micro-level interpersonal processes. Most importantly, when individuals receive similar shares and configurations of resources by virtue of their access to similar types of corporate units and locations in their divisions of labor, they begin to constitute a social class within the stratification

systems, and membership in a social class—as one kind of corporate unit—has very large effects on their ability to gain access to other kinds of highly generalized reinforcers such as prestige, honor, positive emotional energy, which in turn, represent yet one more type of valued resource in a society. And again, the amount of prestige and positive emotional energy that persons can bring to interpersonal relationships at the micro level of social organization has large effects on the resources that they can realize in these relationships. Psychology and social psychology in both its sociological and psychological manifestations does not adequately conceptualize the resources that are unequally distributed in human societies and that lead to the formation of classes of persons possessing particular configurations of shares and types of resources. Indeed, the “social” side of social psychology is not sufficiently emphasized, even among sociologists who should know better. Within sociology, where stratification has always been a central topic, the discipline is blinded by ghosts of Karl Marx and Max Weber who had very limited views on the resources that make up stratification systems. The result is that sociology overemphasizes just three types of resources: (1) money and the material wealth that it can buy, (2) power and authority to tell other actors what to do, and (3) prestige or honor that can be claimed and that often forces others to engage in deference behaviors. These resources are, to some extent, convertible into each other: Money can buy some forms of power and vice versa; prestige can be used to claim authority and even gain access to money. Moreover, in the case of prestige, other resources such as knowledge, education, skill, and social networks can be used to gain prestige, and so, even in the limited conception of resources so typical in the sociology of stratification, there is an implicit recognition that there more resources in play in human societies. More recent efforts to conceptualize “capital” have, to a limited extent, expanded the definition of resources. For example, Bourdieu (1984) has a four-part distinction among “social,” “economic,” “cultural,” “symbolic” capital as the resources that explain classes and class factions in stratification systems. While these overlap somewhat with Foa

and Foa’s six classes—for example, money and economic capital overlap—they also expose the limitations of Foa and Foa’s conceptualization of just six classes. True, these are very general classes, but they clearly make evident that social networks, cultural symbols and legitimating ideologies, and aspects of culture (language, arts, aesthetics, education, credentials, and many other dimensions of cultural capital) are used as resources. Perhaps some of these overlap with Foa and Foa’s notion of resources, such as information and status, but it is still clear that Foa and Foa articulate the limiting case to a much more general class of resources—at least resources as conceptualized by sociologists.

My conception comes closest to Bourdieu’s, but I still think that even this conceptualization is too limiting. Yet, how do we expand the definition of “capital” or resources without seeing “anything and everything” as a resource? Foa and Foa (1974) do so with their six classes arrayed along the dimensions of concreteness and particularism, but again, this typology is limiting. My alternative is to reconceptualize resource flows in human societies and interpersonal relations by resurrecting from the conceptual graveyard an old idea that has been under-theorized in sociology: the notion of *generalized symbolic media of exchange* (Luhmann 1982; Parsons 1963a, b; Simmel 1990/1907; Turner 2011). In Foa and Foa’s (1974) classes of resources, *money* and *love* come closest to two of the generalized symbolic media that I believe are critical to understanding resource transmission and distribution resources in a society, although I do not dispute the view that information, status, services, and goods can indeed be resources. Still, the media relevant for understanding stratification are generalized symbolic media that are used by actors in corporate units within institutional domains. What, then, are generalized symbolic media?

Let me begin with a formal definition. Generalized symbolic media are media that are exchanged in social relations, that mark value as resources, that are used as symbols for discourse and theme-building, and that are the evaluative symbols used to build ideologies within institutional domains. Thus, symbolic media have very

unique properties as resources because they are not only markers of value but they are also used to build up cultural systems. Now, let me define and explain each term in this label of generalized symbolic media. First, media are *generalized* because they can be used by anyone in a wide variety of transactions; generalized media are thus resources that many people can possess and, when possessed, can be used to secure other resources or to meet desired goals. Second, media are *symbolic* in the sense that they are markers of value, and in so doing, they become valued resources in their own right. For example, paper money has no intrinsic value but because it symbolizes material wealth and can be used to buy objects of value; similarly, talk of “love” is a symbol for particular sets of positive emotions and can be used to secure other positive emotions which, in turn, can be exchanged for additional types of resources. (Foa and Foa conceptualize love as a resource, and to the extent that love is an emotion, they imply that emotions are resources; still, love is just one emotion of many, but it is a unique emotion because it is also a generalized symbolic medium by which talk and transactions occur within the institutional domain of kinship). Third, *media* are symbols that can be used to construct meanings (especially about value), to facilitate discourse among individuals and collective actors, and to form cultural ideologies about what is right, wrong, good, bad, appropriate, or inappropriate in social settings, and, most significantly, to facilitate transactions among persons or corporate units (thus, generalized symbolic media are the symbols used to build up “symbolic capital,” in Bourdieu’s terms). For example, money is the medium by which much economic exchange occurs because it can establish equivalences of value, but it is more than this because it is the medium by which discourse occurs (e.g., television talk about investments in capitalist economies) as well as the medium from which cultural ideologies are constructed (say, the ideology of capitalism emphasizing that making money is good and worthy). And, ideologies can be used to legitimate the possessing of a valued resource like money and to stigmatize those who do not possess money.

Thus, generalized symbolic media are also unique resources because they are not only the medium by which exchanges of resources occur; they are also *the valued resources exchanged* among actors in corporate units of a society’s institutional domains. On the basis of individuals’ shares of these *symbolic media as valued resources*, individuals are able to garner two additional, highly generalized resources that are valuable by all persons: (1) prestige and (2) positive emotional energy. Prestige overlaps with Foa and Foa’s notion of “status” and revolves around the ability to claim deference and honor by virtue of other resources that an individual possesses, whereas positive emotions are intrinsically rewarding and provide individuals with the energy and confidence to secure other types of resources (Collins 1975, 1990; Kemper and Collins 1990; Turner 2007a, 2010b, 2011). Indeed, at the micro, interpersonal level, positive emotions are one of the most valuable resources that individuals can possess because they allow access to so many other resources—for instance, from prestige and moneymaking through influence and authority to knowledge, learning, love, or virtually any of the resources conceptualized by Foa and Foa.

In my view, then, the generalized symbolic media distributed by corporate units within various institutional domains are also valued resources; in turn, the more of these resources that individuals possess, the more claims to status, honor, and prestige they can make, and the more likely are they to experience and exhibit positive emotional energy which is intrinsically valuable to humans but which also allows persons to secure many other resources as well. Moreover, as I will argue, because generalized symbolic media are more than a valued resource but the media by which discourse and ideologies defining worth and value are constructed, possession of large amounts of any given medium automatically allows individuals to define themselves as worthy, thereby arousing positive emotions that, as noted above, are intrinsically valuable and are used to secure additional resources. Indeed, there can be nothing more valuable than being defined as morally worthy by powerful ideologies. When individuals

can secure many types of generalized symbolic media, they can evaluate their worth by the distinctive ideology of each institutional domain, or as typically happens, the ideologies become consolidated into what I term below a *meta-ideology* (consolidating the separate domain-specific ideologies into a more general set of moral codes) that legitimates or stigmatizes, respectively, upper and lower classes in stratification systems.

By viewing the key resources as generalized symbolic media as circulating within and between corporate units of institutional domains and as legitimating the unequal distribution of resources, a more sociological conception of resources is produced. Moreover, generalized symbolic media as resources can allow people to claim other resources, especially generalized resources like status or prestige and positive emotions. This conceptualization takes resource theory to a more macro level and emphasizes the “societal structure” part of Foa and Foa’s famous title of their book, *Societal Structures of the Mind* (1974). Thus, the exchange of resources at the micro level of social organization revolves around (1) the giving and receiving of generalized symbolic media of one or more institutional domain(s) and (2) the use of these resources to secure generalized resources like status (prestige) and positive emotions. And, the more of these two basic classes of resources that individuals receive and accumulate, the higher will be their location in the class system of a society and the more they can evaluate themselves as morally worthy by ideologies and meta-ideologies. And, the more of all other resources they can claim, the more likely are they able to claim prestige and to experience positive emotions which, in turn, can be mobilized to secure additional resources.

My approach will, therefore, address the following dynamic processes: (1) the unequal distribution of symbolic media *as resources* in corporate units within differentiated institutional domains as well as the distribution of prestige and positive emotions, (2) the degree to which this inequality leads to stratification in a society, and (3) the conditions increasing or decreasing stratification and, hence, the pattern of resource distribution. My theory is decidedly more macro

than Foa’s (1971) original approach, but much like other efforts to make resource theory more sociological (e.g., Törnblom and Vermunt 2007), it is necessary to introduce meso- and macro-level sociocultural formations into theories of resource transmission. And for me, this emphasis on how exchanges of resources are constrained by embedding of interpersonal behaviors within corporate and categoric units that are, respectively, embedded within institutional domains and stratifications systems allows me to expand the definition of resources and introduce key sociological variables into resource theories. By considering how resources are distributed to individuals from exchanges with others in corporate units, I can provide some clues to how more micro-level theories like Foa’s and Foa’s theory can inform macro and meso analyses within sociology. I have rapidly outlined my approach without necessary detail, and so, before moving on, let me backtrack and be more precise in defining the terms in Fig. 10.1.

Reconceptualizing Resources and Stratification Dynamics in Human Societies

The Power of Generalized Symbolic Media

In Table 10.1, I briefly summarize the generalized symbolic media for the most prominent institutional domains in complex societies. There is obviously considerable conceptual and empirical work to be done with these definitions, but those offered in Table 10.1 reflect my sense of the media involved. The reason for stressing symbolic media is that they operate at many different levels and, as a consequence, have a much greater effect on human interpersonal exchanges and on societal-level stratification than is commonly recognized by micro-level theories.

Let me repeat in more detail the key ways and levels in which generalized symbolic media operate. One is discourse because, when people talk within the economy, they talk about *money*. When politicians talk, it is about *power* in one way or

Table 10.1 Generalized symbolic media of institutional domains

Kinship	<i>Love/loyalty</i> , or the use of intense positive affective states to forge and mark commitments to others and groups of others
Economy	<i>Money</i> , or the denotation of exchange value for objects, actions, and services by the metrics inhering in money
Polity	<i>Power</i> , or the capacity to control the actions of other actors
Law	<i>Influence</i> , or the capacity to adjudicate social relations and render judgments about justice, fairness, and appropriateness of actions
Religion	<i>Sacredness/piety</i> , or the commitment to beliefs about forces and entities inhabiting a nonobservable supernatural realm and the propensity to explain events and conditions by references to these sacred forces and beings
Education	<i>Learning</i> , or the commitment to acquiring and passing on knowledge
Science	<i>Knowledge</i> , or the invocation of standards for gaining verified knowledge about all dimensions of the social, biotic, and physicochemical universes
Medicine	<i>Health</i> , or the concern about and commitment to sustaining the normal functioning of the human body
Sports	<i>Competitiveness</i> , or socially constructed situations where winners and losers among players are determined and evaluated
Arts	<i>Aesthetics</i> , or the commitment to make and evaluate objects and performances by standards of beauty and pleasure that they give observers

another. When family members talk, it is about *love* and *loyalty* to family members. When people talk about religion, it is about *sacredness/piety*. When individuals think, and talk about medicine, they use the medium of *health* to structure discourse. Education has teachers, parents, and students talking about *learning*. Science is discourse over generating *new knowledge*. Talk within the institution of sport is about *competition* and winning or losing. Law is talk about *influence* to adjudicate social relations. Of course, much discourse is written down, thus becoming a more enduring form of discourse using the symbolic medium of an institutional domain. Thus, within each institutional domain, there evolves a medium of discourse.

A second level at which symbolic media operate is in what Niklas Luhmann (1982) has termed “thematization” or the production of themes to guide subsequent talk and behavior within an institutional domain. For example, a daily dose of the business channels on American television is not just incessant chatter about money; it is also the articulation of themes about capitalism—for example, “making money is good.” Reading the *Wall Street Journal* is essentially a set of themes about how to make capitalism work—albeit in a highly ideological manner.

A third level at which symbolic media operate is ideological. As they facilitate talk and discourse that, in turn, are codified into evaluative themes, symbolic media are cause the evolution of institutional ideologies, which are emotionally charged and value-laden beliefs about what *should* and *ought* to transpire within an institutional domain. The ideology of capitalism, for example, indicates that it is good, right, and appropriate to make money and accumulate wealth, that those who do not do so are somehow deficient and less worthy, and that forces that impede moneymaking and wealth-accumulation are “bad.”

And the final level is, as emphasized earlier, the use of symbolic media *as resources* in exchanges. Each symbolic medium listed in Table 10.1 is also a valued resource in its own right. Money, power and authority, health, influence, love, loyalty, competitiveness, knowledge, learning, and the like are all valued by individuals and, in turn, give extra validation of, and value to, ideologies. Within sociology, money and power tend to get most of the attention as valued resources, and indeed, these resources along with prestige are generally seen as forming the stratification system in a society. In my view, however, this view is far too narrow: *All* of the

symbolic media are distributed unequally to members of categoric units at different places in corporate units within institutional domains. Just as money and power are unequally distributed, so are other symbolic media distributed unequally by schools, churches, teams, health organizations, law firms, courts, laboratories, and other types of corporate units in autonomous institutional domains.

When focus is on only inequalities in money, power, and prestige as valued resources, the conceptualization of stratification and its dynamics becomes distorted—as it has in so much theorizing in sociology. For example, Marx proclaimed religion to be “an opiate” for the masses, but he failed to recognize that *sacredness/piety* is highly valued resource in human societies (just like opium for the addict) and that this alternative medium can compensate for not having power and money—at least to some degree. People are not so much blinded (by false consciousness) as compensated for their lack of money by sacredness/piety. The same is true for other media, such as *love/loyalty* from family, *competitiveness* from sports, *learning* from education, *knowledge* from both science and education, *health* from medicine, and *influence* from rights provided by law. If these nonmonetary and nonpower symbolic media are more equally distributed when compared to money and power, a very different picture of the stratification system emerges. The system suddenly reveals less overall inequality. These other media are valued in their own right and are highly reinforcing the behaviors and transactions at the micro level of social organization, thereby allowing individuals to secure shares of these valued resources.

Moreover, many of these other media bring prestige—as is the case with media such as *learning*, *knowledge*, *competitiveness*, and *sacredness/piety*—independently of any money or power associated with them. Thus, prestige is much more equally distributed when nonmonetary and nonpower generalized symbolic media as resources are counted as resources. Moreover, even if possession of these media does not allow for high levels of honor and prestige, shares of media may still allow for a sense of dignity and

self-worth—also very valued resources. Even more significantly, possession of these other symbolic media generates not only prestige and dignity but also positive emotional energy (e.g., happiness, satisfaction, contentment, confidence). Honor, dignity, self-worth, and happiness are highly valued resources, and when individuals can garner these in micro interpersonal transactions, they are less likely to experience negative emotions that become the seedbed for not only personal pathologies but also organized conflict by the lower classes within the stratification system. These other media are indeed opiates, and this is where Marx went wrong because they do not blind people to the reality of their material conditions, but they make them happier with these conditions. Marx did not recognize that industrializing societies generate differentiated and relatively autonomous institutional domains that are more than mere “superstructures” to ownership of the means of production; instead, as Marx and even contemporary Marxists fail to perceive, institutional domains all have their own unique symbolic medium that is, at one and the same time, the basis for discourse, thematization, ideological formation, and resource exchange. This simultaneity of uses and effects of symbolic media gives these media great power to direct interpersonal behaviors at the micro level, while generating stratification at the macro level of human social organization.

Although generalized symbolic media evolved to direct discourse and transactions within institutional domains, they are nonetheless *generalized* and, therefore, can circulate across institutional domains. Some media circulate more than others, with money as a generalized marker of value in all markets and power as authority allocated by polity to corporate units in all domains circulating readily and rapidly in most domains of differentiated societies. For critical theorists like Habermas (1976), this circulation involves an invasion of the “life world,” but when looked at less critically, the circulation of media like money and authority to other domains increases people’s options and provides yet another resource to be gained within noneconomic and nonpolitical institutional domains.

And what is true for money and power is also true for other generalized symbolic media; they too circulate and dramatically increase the potential for individuals to receive highly valued resources in any given domain. Indeed, as Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser (1956) recognized a long time ago, diverse media are often involved in exchanges and transactions among both individual and corporate actors within all institutional domains. For example, money in the economy is exchanged for loyalty from family, learning from education, or knowledge from science, but the same exchange can occur in virtually all domains: Money for these other media is a transaction that is repeated when teachers collect salaries in return for their loyalty and learning in the educational domain, when clergy are paid for their sacredness/piety in the religious domain, and when athletes are (over) paid for their competitiveness in the sport domain. Similarly, authority (franchised to corporate units by polity) is often exchanged for money, competitiveness, learning, knowledge, and other symbolic media.

The point here is that generalized symbolic media are resources that are exchanged in transactions in diverse domains. They are given up and received in transactions embedded in corporate and categoric units, and over time, a pattern of unequal distribution of these media as valued resources emerges and is legitimated by the ideologies built up from discourse and thematization using these same symbolic media. At the same time, as symbolic media are used in exchanges, some of these media begin to circulate outside of the domain in which they originally evolved over the long course of societal evolution (see Turner 2010a for a description and analysis of these long-term evolutionary processes). The resulting generalized symbolic media are resources that are exchanged and distributed unequally, and, at the same time, these resources carry their own legitimating ideologies on their backs (because of their symbolic nature)—thereby giving generalized symbolic media dramatically more power to structure interpersonal relations and social systems than other types of resources.

Typically, some symbolic media within dominant institutional domains like economy, polity,

or religion disproportionately structure what I termed earlier as *meta-ideologies* (Turner 2011) that legitimize the overall stratification system. As noted earlier, the meta-ideology is a composite of all ideologies built from discourse, theme-making, and exchange in all institutional domains, but the composite is weighted toward the ideologies of dominant domains. In American society, for example, the meta-ideology is biased, in order of dominance, by the ideologies of capitalism, political democracy, learning, competitiveness, love/loyalty, and sacredness/piety, although the mix will vary among diverse subpopulations. For example, sacredness/piety would be given more weight by evangelical Christians or Muslims in the United States, but sacredness/piety would still be subordinate to the ideologies of at least capitalism.

Exchange and Distribution of Symbolic Media by Corporate Units

All corporate units within an institutional domain distribute to incumbents at least the generalized symbolic medium of that domain. For example, families distribute *love/loyalty*, churches *sacredness/piety*, businesses *money*, polity *power*, sport *competitiveness*, medicine *health*, schools *learning*, and so on for all domains. Since many of these corporate units are bureaucratized, they will also distribute authority or power to certain incumbents at various points in the divisions of labor. And moreover, since many incumbents in these corporate units are paid, money is also distributed. Even families distribute authority and money to their incumbents, and so, more than one generalized symbolic medium is typically in play in most corporate units in diverse institutional domains. Indeed, the symbolic medium of a domain is often exchanged for the symbolic medium of another domain, as is the case when teachers receive *money* (economic domain) for the capacity to generate *learning* in students, when family members receive *money* and perhaps *authority* in exchange for their *loyalty* to the workplace (and occasionally their “love,” as is the case when someone “loves their job”), when

athletes receive *money* for *competitiveness*, when church leaders receive (moral) *authority* and *money* in exchange for *sacredness/piety*, and perhaps *learning* as well. Thus, while the micro face-to-face exchanges within corporate units can include all of the resources outlined by Foa and Foa (1974), as well as many more, they always involve the symbolic medium of the institutional domain in which a corporate unit is embedded and usually additional symbolic media from other institutional domains. The structure and culture of the corporate unit thus determine *which* resources in *what* proportions are in play as individuals play out roles in the division of labor of a corporate unit.

Two conditions affect the distribution of generalized symbolic media as resources. One is the *level of hierarchy* in the division of labor in corporate units, and the more hierarchical is the division of labor, the more authority, money, and other symbolic media will be distributed unequally. Furthermore, the higher in a hierarchy are individuals, the more likely will they also be able to garner prestige and positive emotional energy. For example, if a family is structured hierarchically, love is distributed unequally, as are other resources like money, prestige, and positive emotions; the same is true with a business, with its managers receiving more generalized symbolic media than line workers. Religious organizations and denominations are usually hierarchical, with high-ranking clergy receiving more generalized symbolic media (money, power, sacredness/piety), more generalized resources like prestige and positive emotional energy, and perhaps other media such as the love/loyalty of their flock of worshipers.

The second basic condition influencing the distribution of generalized symbolic media is *discrimination on the basis of categoric-unit memberships*. When members of certain categoric units are allowed or denied (by discrimination) access to higher or lower positions in the hierarchical structure of a corporate unit, generalized symbolic media will be distributed unequally. Thus, women are often denied top management positions, as are members of minorities or members of different social classes. As the “diffuse

status characteristics” literature documents (Berger et al. 1972; Berger and Fisek 1974), members with certain diffuse characteristics—for example, males, whites—are considered more “worthy” than those with other characteristics—for example, females, blacks—with the result that they are given more favorable treatment than those revealing less-valued diffuse status characteristics. Indeed, the latter are often victims of discrimination by virtue of their membership in devalued categoric units, with the result that they receive less of the generalized symbolic media distributed within a corporate unit within an institutional domain and less of generalized resources like prestige and positive emotional energy.

Thus, as individuals give their time and energy, as well as symbolic media like loyalty, competitiveness, knowledge, or learning from other institutional domains, they will receive varying shares of the generalized symbolic media distributed within the divisions of labor of corporate units, plus other valued resources like prestige and positive emotional energy. Those in the lower end of the division of labor will receive less of all of these resources, and if they are also members of devalued categoric units, they will also suffer the receipt of negative resources like stigma and negative emotional energy. The outcome of these dynamics as they operate over time is the evolution of a stratification system.

The Parameters Marking Categoric-Unit Membership: Consolidation and Intersection

As Peter Blau (1977, 1994) argued in his macrostructural theory of human societies, the *parameters* marking members of categoric units can *consolidate* with each other—that is, membership in one categoric unit is correlated with membership in other categoric units. Parameters can also *intersect* with each other—that is, membership in one categoric unit does not correlate with membership in another unit. More important for my purposes here is the *degree of penetration* of either consolidated or intersecting parameters marking categoric-unit members into the divisions

of labor of corporate units. When consolidation penetrates all types and levels of corporate units in diverse institutional domains, the result is that the unequal distribution of resources will be associated with clusters of categoric units. For example, if gender differences between males and females penetrate corporate units such as schools or workplaces and favor males over females, men will garner more resources of all kinds than women. Similarly, if ethnic differences penetrate and consolidate with locations in the hierarchical divisions of labor of corporate units, or with access to some corporate units (like those providing education and jobs in the first place), members of devalued ethnic subpopulations will receive less of all resources than those of more valued ethnic groups. Consolidation of parameters marking categoric-unit memberships with divisions of labor in corporate units thus leads to the consolidation of members of devalued categoric units with lower class positions, whereas members of more valued categoric units will be overrepresented in higher social classes. In turn, as class boundaries become parameters for yet one more categoric unit (i.e., social class), the unequal distribution of resources becomes further institutionalized.

The converse of these dynamics is where parameters do not consolidate but, instead, intersect and penetrate down to all types of corporate units in different institutional domains. The result is, as I emphasize below, a more equal distribution of members of categoric units across resource-giving divisions of labor of corporate units—thereby reducing the level of inequality and, in fact, stratification as a whole.

The Structure of Stratification and Distribution of Resources

All stratification systems are composed of four basic elements (Turner 1984): (1) the unequal distribution of resources; (2) the formation of relatively homogeneous subpopulations or classes holding particular amounts and configurations of resources and, by virtue of their relative shares, having converging world views, behavioral

patterns, and lifestyles; (3) the rank-ordering of classes in terms of standards of “worth” typically reflecting their respective shares of resources; and (4) the rate of mobility (or immobility) of individuals and families across class lines. These four elements are all variables in that they vary by degree. A highly stratified society reveals high levels of inequalities in the distribution of resources and high levels of consolidation among categoric units receiving varying shares of resources, homogeneous classes with clear cultural and structural markers, linear rank-orderings of classes on a scale of worth, and low rates of interclass mobility. Moreover, because of the consolidation of parameters marking categoric-unit membership with class, prestige and positive/negative emotional energy will also be unequally distributed, with upper classes having prestige and experiencing positive emotional energy and with lower classes having little prestige, if not stigma, and experiencing high levels of negative emotional energy (Barbalet 1998; Collins 1990; Honneth 1995).

Conversely, a society with low levels of stratification reveals less inequality in the distribution of resources, or at least some resources such as nonmonetary generalized symbolic media. As a result, classes will reveal lower levels of homogeneity, and, indeed, higher levels of intersection of class position with categoric-unit memberships will erode homogeneity even more. With less homogeneity within classes and high levels of intersection among parameters, linear rank-orderings will be difficult to discern, except for the very top and bottom of the system. And finally, high rates of interclass mobility among members of categoric units will be evident as individuals and families use resources to cross less restrictive class boundaries. A further consequence is that generalized reinforcers like dignity, if not prestige, and positive emotional energy will be more equally distributed—thereby reducing further the degree of stratification in a society (Turner 2010a, b). Indeed, unlike money, the distribution of positive emotions and dignity is less of a zero-sum game because increased dignity and positive emotional energy to not cause the loss of these resources in others—in fact, often just the opposite. The result is that there is generally

more equality in their distribution in the stratification system and in the interpersonal relations constrained by this system.

Thus, the transmission and distribution of resources among members of a population is related to *the degree of stratification*. Not only are generalized symbolic media as resources determinative of the system of stratification, so are more generalized reinforcers, especially prestige and positive emotional energy, also determinative of the system. Indeed, in my view, the degree of stratification generated by inequalities in the distribution of symbolic media determines the distribution of prestige and positive emotions. Moreover, possessing symbolic media as resources increases individuals' emotional well-being and gives them the confidence to secure even more valued resources in the divisions of labor in corporate units (Kemper and Collins 1990). Hence, the resources that matter to people are generalized symbolic media, prestige, and positive emotions, a conclusion somewhat at variance with Foa and Foa's (1974) emphasis on a delimited set classes of resources (i.e., money, goods, information, status, love, services), although there is considerable overlap of my conceptualization with theirs.

Inequality, and the stratification that inequality generates, almost always produces tensions and increase the likelihood of conflict, but a broader conception of the resources distributed by corporate units within institutional domains can explain why conflict is, perhaps, less frequent and violent than might be expected when the focus is primarily on inequalities of money, power, and prestige (which have a zero-sum quality if gain by some a loss to others). If money, power, and prestige are the only resources emphasized, then conflict should occur more often than it does, but if *all* generalized symbolic media are examined, the level of overall inequality in many societies declines. Moreover, individuals and families experience positive emotional energy from the receipt of *love/loyalty* from families, *influence* from a legal system responsive to diverse needs, *learning* from opportunities provided by schools, *health* from *medical systems*, *sacredness/piety* from *religion*, *competitiveness*

from sport, *knowledge* from science, *authority* in many diverse corporate units franchised by polity, *aesthetics* from art, and at least some *money* from economy in diverse domains where individuals are employed. As individuals receive this broader package of valued resources, they can at times garner prestige, and, far more often than Marxists recognize, they can experience positive emotional energy from the valued resources that they can receive. For example, when *love/loyalty*, *competitiveness*, *learning*, and *knowledge* are exchanged for each other, they generate positive emotions, and when they are exchanged for other resources like *money* and *power*, they generate even higher levels of positive emotions and, often, prestige as well. The result is a decline in the potential for tension and conflict in societies and the sense of imbalance and "injustice" that often fuels conflict.

Justice is, however, a complex dynamic related to expectations for resources, and so, if individuals do not receive resources that they expected, their anger will not be easily mitigated by meeting expectations for receipt of other resources. Yet, individuals' expectation will, over time, adjust to the kinds and amounts of resources that they can and cannot receive, but if they have failed to receive expected rewards that they particularly value and continue to value highly, and if their anger is sufficiently great over their sense of deprivation, individuals may not be as satisfied with the resources that they have garnered, thereby producing tensions at all levels of social organization. And if sufficient numbers of people feel anger at perceived injustices, they will often organize as a corporate unit (e.g., a social movement organization or terrorist cell) to pursue institutional change and, hence, changes in the distribution of valued resources. The dynamics outlined by Foa and Foa (1974: 220–222) on discrepancies between actual and expected resources (in their terms, "appropriate" resources) will often motivate people to achieve psychological balance, a dynamic effectively theorized by Törnblom and Vermunt (2007). Balance can be achieved in a number of ways: repression of the anger, readjustment of expectations, or action against those perceived to have caused the injustice. The last

strategy is the most difficult and costly, and so it should not be surprising that people often repress or readjust expectations in order to achieve a sense of personal and interpersonal balance.

One structural condition reducing potential conflict comes from intersection of parameters marking categoric-unit memberships. If categoric units intersect rather than consolidate with class locations and with positions in the divisions of labor of corporate units, the tension and conflict potential inherent in the consolidation of parameters is reduced, especially if rates of mobility across classes are comparatively high. In turn, face-to-face interactions and transmission of resources are more likely to involve a sense of profit and justice in resources received, especially for generalized symbolic media received, positive emotional arousal experienced, and respect (if not prestige) garnered from others. And if members of diverse categoric units are equally likely to receive these resources from interpersonal transactions in corporate units distributing resources, then the conflict potential at the societal level is dramatically reduced because tensions at the interpersonal level are low. Indeed, since people from different categoric units are more likely to have their expectations met (and at times exceeded), imbalance is reduced (if not eliminated), with the result that conflict-generating anger is reduced.

Most sociological approaches to stratification fail to recognize these forces because they have a narrow view of stratification as revolving around only money, power, and prestige (which operate in their distribution as zero-sum games) and because they implicitly hold to Marx's vision that all other symbolic media are the obfuscating forces behind false consciousness, if not actual opiates to true class consciousness. In fact, however, people are much smarter than some hard-line Marxists seem to realize; they are very aware that they may lack in power or money. Yet, people also recognize at cognitive and emotional levels that other symbolic media are very valuable and, as a result, experience positive emotional arousal for the opportunities to receive these resources. Moreover, even if their shares of resources do not allow them to command deference and prestige,

they do allow them to maintain dignity—a highly valued resource that also increases persons' level of positive emotions. And given that the symbolic media that they receive are also the legitimating ideologies of value and worth; their sense of dignity is that much greater. As these ideologies are consolidated into meta-ideologies, even meta-ideologies dominated by media from economy and polity, there are other ideologies from many institutional domains still present in these meta-ideologies, and as a result, individuals can still maintain the reality (not just the fiction) of measuring up to the some standards of worth contained in the meta-ideology.

Macro to Meso to Micro Connections in the Distribution of Resources

As I have emphasized, virtually all episodes of face-to-face interaction are embedded in corporate and categoric units. In corporate units, individuals occupy positions in the status order and play roles that follow the cultural script of the particular locations in the structure of a corporate unit. In categoric units, individuals are defined by their membership in these units, and from these definitions, individuals evaluate each other and develop expectations for how members of a category should act. It is relatively easy to visualize interactions as embedded within a corporate unit revealing a division of labor, but it takes a "mind shift" to appreciate that interactions are also embedded in categoric units such as ethnicity, class, age, gender, religious affiliations, and other markers of difference. Still, a moment's reflection indicates that these categories carry as much normative and evaluative information for how individuals are to behave as do roles in the division of labor of a corporate unit.

Because of this nesting inside of corporate and categoric units, the resources in play are highly constrained in these basic types of units, along several fronts. Let me begin with corporate units. First, corporate units are usually lodged within an institutional domain, and hence, the generalized symbolic medium of this domain provides the means of discourse, ideological formation

(and normative systems derived from ideologies), and valued resources to be used in transactions. Second, depending upon the domain, symbolic media like authority, money, learning, knowledge, or competitiveness from other domains may also be available, thus adding to the mix of resources employed in transactions. Third, the structure and culture of the corporate unit and each individual's place in this structure determine which resources at what levels can be used and acquired. Fourth, depending upon the resources available to individuals at a given location in a corporate unit, more generalized resources like prestige and positive emotional arousal, or their converse (stigma and negative emotional arousal), will also be in play in transactions among individuals.

Turning to categoric units, membership determines, first of all, whether or not individuals even have access to the corporate units in an institutional domain. For example, if individuals in certain categoric units are devalued and discriminated against, they may not be able to gain access to corporate units in economy, polity, education, medicine, or any corporate unit where discrimination operates. In these cases, individuals will have trouble gaining access to the generalized symbolic medium of these domains as well as other valued resources such as prestige and positive emotional energy. Second, discrimination against members of devalued categoric units may also determine the location within the division of labor of corporate units, typically in its lower positions within the hierarchy of positions, thus again limiting individuals' access to valued resources. Third, encounters between individuals in valued and less-valued categoric units will be asymmetrical, with deference and demeanor rituals reinforcing definitions of their respective worth and rights to access to resources (Collins 1975).

Thus, an interpersonal theory of resource transmission must take into account the effects of nesting encounters in corporate and categoric units. The resources available to individuals for exchange and transmission are highly constrained by the culture and structure of both corporate and categoric units. And, if access to corporate units in the first place is denied by discrimination against certain categories of persons, then the

resources of the domain in which a corporate unit is embedded will not be available for transmission. If access to corporate units is allowed, but incumbency in the hierarchy of positions is closed to certain categories of persons, the amount of resource shares available to those in lower-level positions will be low, while the resources to those in upper-level positions in the hierarchy can receive will be high. The more that access to corporate units in institutional domains is allowed and more positions in corporate-unit hierarchies (in organizations) or in neighborhoods (in communities) are consolidated with categoric-unit memberships, the more unequal will be the distribution of resources. Hence, the more likely are interactions between members of differentially valued categoric units to involve deference and demeanor rituals reinforcing inequalities in resources. Those with resources can demand honor and deference and thereby experience prestige and positive emotional energy, whereas those with few resources will have to give deference, sacrifice elements of their dignity, repress negative emotions, and thus experience convoluted configuration of negative emotional energy (Turner 2007a).

The converse of these processes reduces resource inequalities when individuals from different categoric units interact. If membership in corporate units within institutional domains and to positions within these corporate units are unconsolidated with membership in categoric units—that is, there is intersection and penetration of categoric units into all levels and types of corporate units—then the salience of categoric-unit membership will decline, and especially so if interactions are iterated over time (Turner 2007a). As a result, inequalities between individuals will follow from their location in the divisions of labor of corporate units or, in the case of community corporate units, from their location in geographical space (neighborhoods). Thus, intersection and penetration of parameters marking categoric-unit memberships with locations in corporate units will increase the number of resources in play and, as a result, increase the likelihood that individuals will receive sufficient shares of resources to experience positive emotional energy. Only those at the

bottom of corporate-unit hierarchies and in poor neighborhoods will be denied access to the full range of available resources and, as a consequence, suffer double jeopardy from stigma and negative emotional arousal. If, however, the proportion of a population in lower social classes and poor neighborhoods is high, then stigma and negative emotional arousal can often lead to organization corporate units designed to pursue conflict. Even if members of lower social classes are not able to be successful in creating social movement and conflict organizations, they will still act out their anger and frustration in interactions with those in higher social classes—thereby placing strains on the flow of interaction and restricting the transmission of resources.

The Stratification of Emotions in Societies

One of the most valuable resources in any face-to-face encounter among individuals is the flow of positive emotional energy (Barbalet 1998; Collins 1990). The level of stratification, and especially when classes and other categoric memberships are consolidated, will allow individuals in higher classes to receive symbolic media as resources, to garner prestige, and, most importantly, to experience positive emotions. When individuals are energized by positive emotions, they generally have the confidence to secure additional resources in corporate units and in interpersonal relations within these units.

Conversely, those in lower classes will receive small shares of only some resources, with the result that they cannot claim prestige and, indeed, must often endure stigma that, in turn, forces them to experience negative emotions in encounters—emotions such as frustration, fear, anger, shame, humiliation, and even guilt (for not having lived up to the evaluative codes in institutional ideologies). Because shame attacks core self (Scheff 1988; Turner 2002, 2007a), it is often repressed, and when repressed, it leads to diffuse anger that will influence all interactions or to alienation that will also strain interpersonal relations (Turner 2007a).

Because negative emotional arousal is the lifeblood of conflict, the stratification of emotions along a positive and negative continuum has large effects not only on interactions between individuals who are high and low in the stratification system but also on the volatility of a society. If emotions are highly stratified, with those at the top receiving consistently positive emotional experiences and with those at the bottom receiving negative emotions that attack self-worth, then both interpersonal and larger-scale conflicts are likely. Such is particularly likely to be the case where the lower class population is large relative to those classes experiencing positive emotions. Moreover, if positive emotions can be aroused in conflict against those in a system perceived to have forced the lower classes to suffer indignities and negative emotions, then the volatility of conflict will increase. Indeed, an emotion like vengeance is anger and happiness mixed together (Turner 2000a, 2002, 2007b), giving people a sense of well-being for attacking their perceived “enemies.” By focusing on “the enemy,” individuals exchange positive emotions as they mobilize for conflict and, at the same time, provide each other with dignity in the pursuit of their “noble” cause against “evil.”

This potentially volatile situation can be mitigated, however, by a number of key forces. One force is the existence of a large set of middle classes between those at the top and bottom of the stratification system. The members of these middle classes are able to receive shares of all symbolic media and, as a consequence, can claim dignity if not prestige for themselves and experience positive emotional arousal. The existence of such classes, particularly ones with weak boundaries where interclass mobility is possible, often forces those in the lower classes to internalize their lack of success and inability to live up to the ideologies of institutional domains and the more general meta-ideology legitimating the stratification system. Another force mitigating violence is the intersection of parameters marking class and other categoric units such that membership of categoric units is uncorrelated with social class. Yet another mitigating factor is intersection and penetration of parameters with divisions

of labor and (residential) locations in all types of corporate units, thereby increasing rates of interaction among diverse members of a population who transmit not only generalized media as resources but also positive emotional energy (Blau 1977, 1994).

Thus, when these mitigating conditions exist in a society, they cause the transmission and circulation of valued resources—generalized symbolic media, prestige, dignity, self-worth, and positive emotions, as well as those resources listed by Foa and Foa (1974)—to a large number of individuals, thus increasing the reservoir of positive emotional energy across the stratification system, except perhaps those at the very bottom of the system who must deal with their shame and humiliation. If this class is small, they may not have the resources to organize collectively, with the result that their repressed and transmitted shame will come out in a variety of potential emotional states, such as alienation and retreat from institutional domains, diffuse anger often directed at fellow class members, and, occasionally, vengeance against those perceived to be responsible for their plight, but, again, vengeance is often confined to cycles of violence and counterviolence against those in their own class and neighborhoods within communities (see Turner 2007a, b, for a theory of extreme violence; see also Scheff 1994).

Conclusion

I cannot develop the full implications of my arguments here in this short chapter, but the general point is clear: Interpersonal behavior is embedded in meso-level units (corporate and categoric units) that, respectively, are nested in institutional domains and stratification systems, which in turn are lodged inside of societies and, potentially, intersocietal systems. What transpires during the course of interaction is use of generalized symbolic media as the terms of discourse, as the moral codes for ideologies, and as the actual resources exchanged. From these embedded interactions in corporate units, individuals receive shares of various resources that eventually cause

some degree of stratification in a society. Categoric-unit memberships are part of these stratifying dynamics because they often determine access to corporate units in the first place and to positions in the divisions of labor in these units. And, if memberships in categoric units like ethnicity and gender are consolidated with class positions, new categoric-unit dimensions are superimposed upon the class system. Once a stratification system is in place, it systematically biases the flow of resources to favored classes and categories of persons—thereby allowing some individuals to continue to receive larger shares of all resources than others. In turn, interactions between persons placed high and low in the stratification systems will involve deference and demeanor rituals that allow higher-ranking individuals to receive more valued resources than lower-ranking persons. Thus, the flow and transmission of resources—whether those that I have examined or those specified in Foa and Foa's (1974) "classes" of resources—is very much affected by meso- and macro-level dynamics of stratification systems.

In way of summary, let me outline some tentative hypotheses about resource transmission from a more macro-level perspective:

1. The likelihood that a symbolic medium will evolve and be used as the medium for discourse, thematization, ideological formation, and resource exchange is a positive function of the degree of autonomy of an institutional domain from other domains.
2. The number of generalized media in circulation across institutional domains and in play within corporate units in these domains and, hence, in episodes of interpersonal contact among individuals is a positive function of the number of institutional domains and the degree of autonomy of these domains, while being an inverse function of the degree of society-wide stratification.
3. The degree of inequality in the distribution of generalized symbolic media as resources and in the distribution of prestige/stigma and positive/negative emotional energy within any given institutional domain is a positive and additive function of:

- (a) The degree of society-wide stratification
 - (b) The degree of consolidation of parameters marking categoric-unit memberships
 - (c) The degree of consolidation of membership in categoric units with positions and locations in corporate units within a domain
 - (d) The degree of hierarchy in the divisions of labor of corporate units of a domain
 - (e) The rate and intensity of discrimination against members of categoric units within corporate units of a domain
4. The level of inequality in the exchange of valued resources in episodes of interpersonal contact is a positive function of the conditions listed under (3) above, whereas the level of symmetry, reciprocity, and equality in the exchange of valued resources in episodes of interpersonal contact is an inverse function of the conditions listed under (3) above.

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Part III

Theoretical Integrations

Towards Integrating Distributive Justice, Procedural Justice, and Social Resource Theories

11

Kjell Törnblom and Riël Vermunt

Introduction

In this chapter, we attempt to expand distributive and procedural justice theories using insights from resource theory. The three theories are first briefly examined with regard to how they conceive of (a) discrepancies between “is” and “ought,” that is, actual and ideal states of existence; (b) psychological reactions to discrepancy; and (c) behavioral responses to discrepancy. Some limitations of each theory are made explicit regarding predictions about reactions to discrepancy. Suggestions are then offered as to how insights from resource theory may be used to reduce those limitations, thereby increasing the predictive power of the two justice theories. This enables new propositions to be derived and tested (Discussions about how distributive and procedural justice theories may “fertilize” resource theory as well as one another are beyond the scope of this chapter).

Turner (2007) argues for integrative theory in the sense that theories be combined to generate more powerful explanations. This is the strategy we have tried to employ in this chapter. What is the rationale behind our choice of theories for the present attempt at integration? *First*, several attempts have been done at integrating distributive and procedural justice theories (e.g., Brockner and Weisenfeld 1996; Cropanzano and Ambrose 2001; Folger 1977, 1987; Gilliland 1994; Greenberg 1987; Jasso & Wegener 1997, pp. 403–404; Törnblom & Vermunt 1999; Younts 1997). This is not surprising since an overall assessment of the fairness of a situation requires information about outcomes (distributive justice) as well as the processes by which the outcomes were produced (procedural justice). Provided this information is available, we need to know how these two aspects of justice judgments combine to enable an assessment of how just a situation is in its totality. *Second*, as any given allocation situation involves different kinds of resources (e.g., money, respect, information, goods), we need information not only about the impact of their valences (in addition to the resulting outcome valence of the allocation event) on justice judgments (see Törnblom 1988, 1992 for reviews; Törnblom and Ahlin 1998); we also need to know whether and how the qualitative nature of the resource may affect justice conceptions and behaviors. Thus, the stage is set for unifying distributive justice theory and resource theory. There is some evidence that the *nature* of the resource may affect distributive justice

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judgments and the choice of a distribution principle (e.g., Sabbagh et al. 1994; Törnblom & Foa 1983; Törnblom et al. 1985). However, we know very little, if anything, about the impact of resource nature on procedural justice judgments and the choice of a procedural principle. Foa's (1971) social resource theory is the most elaborated framework, extensively tested (see Foa and Foa 1974, and Foa et al. 1993, for overviews of research), consolidated (e.g., Foa et al. 1993), integrated into mainstream social psychology (these criteria are adapted from Reichers and Schneider 1990), and relevant to our purposes. This theoretical framework is a very useful extension of social exchange theory, and its relevance to several theoretical issues within the justice area is striking. Thus, it did not seem far-fetched to suggest that Foa's resource theory might contribute to the elaboration of theories of distributive and procedural justice (and vice versa, as well). *Third*, the "total fairness model" (Törnblom and Vermunt 1999), representing an attempt at integrating distributive and procedural justice, includes a consideration of the *valence* of the allocation outcome (termed *outcome valence*, defined as the perceived positive or negative result of transacting or allocating a particular positively or negatively valent resource). Outcome valence should be distinguished from *resource valence*. A resource is positively valent if, and only if, in the eyes of the observer, more is preferred to less; it is negatively valent if less is preferred to more (see Jasso 1998). A positively valent outcome may be accomplished via a positively as well as a negatively valent resource; this is equally true for a negative outcome. Please note that the designation "distributive justice" has long been understood to encompass the distribution of both goods and bads (i.e., positively valent resources – assets, benefits – and negatively valent resources – liabilities, burdens). Further, we use the term "distributive justice" to encompass "retributive justice" as well. In its focus on punishment, retribution can be conceived either as a special case of bads (negative resource valence) or as an example of negative outcome valence. Since distributive justice covers both positively and negatively valent phenomena (regardless of whether valence is used to characterize the resource or the

outcome), the stage was set for unification of goods and bads, on one hand, and of distributive justice and resource theory, on the other hand. Pioneering contributors to the former were Törnblom (Törnblom 1988; Törnblom & Jonsson 1985; Törnblom & Vermunt 1988a, b) and Jasso (1990, 1998), with many others following suit.

Next, we briefly describe the three theories of interest for our present integrative purposes, that is, distributive, procedural, and resource theories. Hopefully, our approach will approximate Turner's vision (2007) that "... by taking one additional idea and seeing what it does to justice formulations ..., a considerable amount of theoretical integration would ensue."

Overview of Selected Aspects of Three Theories

Each one of the three theories shares focus on certain theoretical issues with one of the two other theories, other issues are focused by all three, while still others are unique to each. We may represent this situation as three overlapping circles as shown in Fig. 11.1. There are two sets of three sectors: The three largest sectors (DJ, PJ, and RT) represent those features that are unique to each theory, while the three smaller sectors (DJ + PJ, DJ + RT, and PJ + RT) represent the




Fig. 11.1 The three theories depicted as sets

features that are shared between two of the theories. Subsequently, the remaining middle sector represents those issues focused by all three theories.

We will identify three issues commonly shared by the three theories. These issues concern the statements that the theories make about discrepancy or mismatch between actual and ideal conditions, psychological reactions to discrepancy, and behavioral reactions to discrepancy.

Perceived Discrepancy Between “Is” and “Ought”. All three theories posit an ideal (“ought”) goal state toward which people are assumed to strive. An ideal goal state is achieved when a person’s actual situation matches the ideal. If the two do not match, the person will perceive the situation as discrepant, resulting in psychological/emotional and behavioral responses.

Psychological Responses to Perceived Discrepancy. Discrepancies between is and ought are by each theory assumed to be experienced as unpleasant by the sentient person and need to be eliminated. The Lewinian notion of tension is part and parcel of all three theories, although it is seldom *explicitly* postulated that a linear relationship obtains between experienced aversion and associated psychological tension and subsequent motivation to restore or accomplish a match between is and ought (equity theory excepted). The exact nature of these assumed relationships is generally left unspecified.

Behavioral Responses to Perceived Discrepancy. Finally, all three theories view behavior to be antecedently motivated by the wish to resolve the aversive condition that the discrepancy between is and ought is assumed to constitute.

However, they have focused on somewhat different resulting behavioral (and psychological) responses to discrepancy. We will now examine these in some more detail.

Distributive Justice Theories

Homans (1961) maintained that distributive justice obtains when partners in an exchange relationship receive rewards that are proportional to their

investments. Adams (1965) preferred the term “equity” which he conceived in terms of P’s perceived ratio of outcomes to inputs for himself as compared to that of O’s. Equity exists when the ratio of P’s outcomes and inputs is perceived to be equal to O’s. Investments/inputs may be acquired (e.g., education, effort, training) or ascribed (e.g., age, sex, ethnicity). Rewards/outcomes may include pay, seniority benefits, status symbols, tangible goods, and affection.

The Nature of “Is” Versus “Ought” Discrepancy. Equity theory (e.g., Adams 1963, 1965; Walster et al. 1973, 1976, 1978) focuses on the actual versus just (or ought vs. ideal) match between *amounts* of inputs and outcomes. When P perceives that his ratio of outcomes to inputs is smaller or larger than O’s, discrepancy in the form of inequity obtains. In addition to defining equity/justice in quantitative terms, “multiprinciple” or “contingency” models of distributive justice make room for qualitative assessments of justice, that is, they focus on the match between the nature of the actually *applied distribution rule* and the *rule which is considered just* and should have been applied. These models recognize that several principles – notably equity, equality, and need – may represent justice (e.g., Meeker 1971; Lerner 1975, 1977; Mikula and Schwinger 1978; Lerner and Whitehead 1980; Deutsch 1975, 1985; Greenberg and Cohen (1982); Leventhal 1976; Leventhal and Michaels 1969; Lansberg 1981, 1984; Kayser and Schwinger 1982). Thus, evaluations of a situation are made in terms of how *just* (or equitable, in the language of equity theory) it is perceived to be. In sum, discrepancy is viewed as inequity or distributive injustice and is conceptualized as a perceived mismatch between inputs and outcomes or as a mismatch between the expected and applied distribution principles, respectively.

The Nature of Psychological Reaction to Discrepancy. Based on assumptions within cognitive consistency theories (Heider 1946, 1958; Festinger 1957; see also Lewin 1935, 1936), the perception and subsequent feelings of inequity create tension resulting in dissatisfaction, anger, guilt, etc. (Homans 1958, 1961, 1974; Adams 1965). The magnitude of tension is assumed to be

proportional to the magnitude of inequity as experienced by the victim and is assumed to result in proportional strength of motivation to eliminate or reduce the inequity. Whether tension resulting from violations of other rules than equity may be qualitatively and/or quantitatively different from inequity tension is, to our knowledge, unknown to this date and theoretically ignored. In sum, discrepancy perceived as inequity/distributive injustice leads to experienced psychological tension which, in turn, generates negative feelings like anger and guilt as well as motivation to accomplish psychological balance by restoring justice.

The Nature of Behavioral Responses to Discrepancy. Adams (1965) proposed that six different response alternatives may be available to inequitably treated victims: One's (1) inputs and/or (2) outcomes can be altered, (3) they can be cognitively distorted, (4) one may leave the situation, (5) act on other, or even (6) change one's object of comparison. Adams also proposed, on an abstract level, six general conditions under which each response alternative is likely to be chosen: the person will (a) maximize positively valent outcomes as well as their valence, (b) minimize increasing inputs that are effortful and costly to change, (c) resist changes in inputs and outcomes that are central to the person's self-concept and self-esteem, (d) more likely change cognitions about others' inputs and outcomes than his/her own, (e) leave the field when inequity is severe and other ways of reducing inequity are unavailable, and (f) resist changing comparison person once she/he has become an anchor (Adams 1965, pp. 295–296). Typically, "multiprinciple" approaches to justice assume that individuals who are exposed to distributive injustices not only experience aversive feelings (injustice, dissatisfaction, deprivation, moral indignation, anger, guilt, and the like) but also that they tend to act (cognitively or behaviorally) in consistency with those feelings in order to restore justice.

Limitations in Predictive Precision Regarding Responses to Discrepancy. As previously mentioned, an underlying assumption of equity theory is that there is an approximate correspondence between the magnitude of perceived injustice, the

intensity of psychological/emotional reactions to injustice, and subsequent behavioral responses (e.g., attempts at restoring justice) elicited by those feelings. However, neither equity theory nor multiprinciple theories provide any clues as to whether or not (or under what conditions) violations of other justice principles than equity result in qualitatively and/or quantitatively different justice-restoring behaviors. This is surprising, if we keep in mind that Adams (1963 or 1965) attended to this problem early on in the context of launching his equity theory. Even though justice was initially conceived in terms of the equity principle alone, there seems to be no obvious reason why the problem should be ignored today, particularly as distributive justice theory has been expanded and elaborated to include other principles in addition to equity. Of course, the prediction of responses to injustice as a function of violation of different principles makes the problem quite a bit more complex.

Several theorists (e.g., Wicklund and Brehm 1976; Opsahl and Dunnette 1966; Mowday 1996; Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995) have pointed out that equity theory needs increased accuracy in its predictions of responses to inequity. To be empirically more useful, the conditions under which Adams' proposed that each one of his six response alternatives is likely to be chosen should be matched not only with magnitudes of inequity (thresholds). The conditions should also be given substance and matched with the "content" of inequity, for example, the type of "outcome resource" (reward) by means of which the person was inequitably treated (and within which institutional context, as well as within which type of social relationship injustice occurs). In this chapter, we will provide a few examples of new propositions that may be generated by expanding equity theory (as well as procedural justice theory) to include ideas from resource theory.

Procedural Justice Theories

Thibaut and Walker (1975) compared the perceived justice of a trial procedure in which a judge chairs the trial and a jury arrives at the verdict

(the adversary system) with one in which the chairing judge determines the verdict (the inquisitorial system). The adversary system was considered most fair, as the defendant was believed to have more decision as well as process control than in the inquisitorial system. Leventhal (1980) developed six criteria to evaluate the fairness of a procedure (consistency, bias suppression, accuracy, correctability, ethicality, representativeness). Further developments of procedural justice focused on (a) criteria for the assessment of interactional justice (Bies and Moag 1986) emphasizing interpersonal sensitivity and (b) three criteria for judging the fairness of authorities: respect, neutrality, and trust (Tyler and Lind 1992). Folger (1987) made the comparison process more explicit by introducing the concept of referent cognitions, that is, thoughts of what might have happened, compare these thoughts with what actually happened.

The Nature of “Is” Versus “Ought” Discrepancy. Comparisons concern the match between the actually applied procedural rule and the rule considered just (e.g., Lerner and Whitehead 1980). Injustice is defined as a perceived discrepancy between the two (Folger 1987; Vermunt et al. 1996), and the larger the discrepancy, the more unfair the situation. Thus, discrepancy is viewed as procedural injustice and conceptualized as a perceived mismatch between the expected or just and applied procedural principles.

The Nature of Psychological Reaction to Discrepancy. A discrepancy between the just and the applied procedural principle is assumed to be experienced as injustice. An unjust procedure may trigger several cognitive, emotional, and attitudinal reactions such as anger, resentment, relative deprivation, distress, and frustration.

Similar to the process characterizing distributive injustice, discrepancy is here perceived as procedural injustice which leads to experienced psychological tension, and tension generates negative feelings like anger and distress as well as motivation to accomplish psychological balance by restoring procedural justice.

The Nature of Behavioral Responses to Discrepancy. Research has provided convincing evidence that procedural injustice may cause a

wide array of behavioral reactions, including theft, arson, absence from work, destruction of equipment, violence, disloyalty, and gossip, to mention a few.

Limitations in Predictive Precision Regarding Responses to Discrepancy. Procedural justice theory is so far unable to predict what kind of responses (justice-restoring behaviors) will follow as a result of the violation on a particular procedural rule. Violations of procedural principles are assumed to result in feelings of injustice, and these may result in reactions by victims, perpetrators, and third parties that can be described in both quantitative and qualitative terms. The prediction of quantitative responses (i.e., intensity of reactions to injustice) might possibly be less problematic (cf. equity theory) than qualitative predictions (i.e., the nature of reactions). With regard to the qualitative consequences of injustice, procedural justice theories need to be developed so as to allow a matching between a given rule violation and the most likely type of response to injustice. Certainly, a complicating factor for predictions along these lines is the *availability* of appropriate behavioral alternatives at a particular occasion (cf. Cloward and Ohlin’s 1964 extension of Merton’s typology of deviance).

Foa’s Resource Theory of Social Exchange

Exchange theories may be broadly described as frameworks to explain the initiation, maintenance, and termination of social relationships. They are models and/or theories which allow interpersonal behavior to be analyzed in terms of giving, taking, and receiving. Within the context of resource theory, which is an elaboration of traditional social exchange theory, *interpersonal behavior* is conceived as “a channel for resource transmission,” and *resource* is defined as “... any commodity – material or symbolic – which is transmitted through interpersonal behavior” (Foa and Foa 1974, p. 36).

The major contributions of resource theory are based on its focus on the *nature* of the objects or resources of exchange. These are categorized into




Fig. 11.2 Position of the six resource classes plotted on the two coordinates of particularism and concreteness

six presumably exhaustive and mutually exclusive resource classes which are then plotted along the two coordinates of particularism (ranging from particularistic to universalistic) and concreteness (ranging from concrete to abstract), thereby forming a two-dimensional circumplex model (see Fig. 11.2). The values of particularistic resources (i.e., love, status, and services¹) are influenced by the identity of the provider and the relationship between provider and recipient, while the values of universalistic resources (i.e., information, goods, and money²) are not (money, for instance, is worth the same whomever you get it from). The concreteness dimension concerns the type of behavior that is characteristic for the exchange of a particular resource: providing goods and doing someone a favor are concrete behaviors, conveying status and information are symbolic/abstract behaviors, while love and money may be provided both symbolically (e.g., verbal expressions of affec-

tion and as stock or other tokens, respectively) and concretely (e.g., sexual acts and hard currency, respectively). Resource *classes* are defined as "... categories of the *meaning* assigned to actions and not a classification of actions" (Foa and Foa 1974, p. 82). Thus, a number of different actions may convey the same resource (e.g., the acts of smiling, kissing, hugging, verbal statements, all of which convey love and affection).

The structural model constructed on the basis of the nature of the six resource classes allows the generation of a number of new rules of social exchange. Of particular interest in the present context are the following rules which (as shown in section "Elaborations of Justice Theories via Insights from Resource Theory") allow new predictions about reactions to both distributive and procedural injustice:

"... the more particularistic a resource is, the higher the probability that it will be exchanged for the same resource, while nonparticularistic resources will tend to be exchanged for different ones," "... the more particularistic a resource is, the narrower is the range of resources with which it can be exchanged" (Foa and Foa 1976), and "... the more distal the resource of reciprocation/retaliation the larger the amount necessary for establishing equity" (Foa and Foa 1974, p. 265).

The Nature of "Is" Versus "Ought" Discrepancy. Discrepancy is conceived in terms of the actual versus *appropriate* match between the qualitative nature of the provided and the received (positively or negatively valent) social resources. The greater the distance between the provided and received resources, as conceptualized in terms of their placement within the circular ordering of resource classes along the two coordinates of particularism and concreteness, the greater the discrepancy between the actual and the appropriate exchange of resources. In sum, discrepancy is conceptualized as a perceived mismatch or inappropriateness between the types of provided and received resources.

The Nature of Psychological Reaction to Discrepancy. The greater the discrepancy between the actual and the appropriate exchange of resources, the greater the assumed resulting psychological tension. Foa and Foa (1974, p. 221) conclude that a person is "frustrated" when she/he

¹Love is an expression of affectionate regard, warmth, or comfort. *Status* indicates an evaluative judgment that conveys prestige, regard, or esteem. *Services* involve activities that affect the body or belongings of a person and that often constitute labor for another.

²Information includes advice, opinions, instruction, or enlightenment but excludes those behaviors that could be classed as love or status. *Money* is any coin, currency, or token that has some standard unit of exchange value. *Goods* are tangible products, objects, or materials.

is deprived of an expected resource. Thus, discrepancy generates psychological tension; the person deprived of some resource (when expected and actual resources are discrepant) will be frustrated and motivated to accomplish psychological balance.

The Nature of Behavioral Responses to Discrepancy. When people are deprived of expected resources, they become frustrated. Frustration may result in attempts at retaliation, which is the major way in which people deal with being denied an expected positive resource or receiving an unexpected negative resource. According to relevant research, the victim prefers retaliation by taking away from the source of deprivation a resource similar to the one that the victim had been deprived of or by reciprocating a negative resource similar to the one received. The more dissimilar the resources, the more residual frustration and hostility subsequent to retaliation, which in turn might remain over time, add to other frustrations, and result in future flare-ups of hostility. Foa and Foa (1974) suggested that people may retaliate in three different ways to reduce or eliminate frustration. In *direct retaliation* (the most effective revenge), the victim retaliates directly against the source of frustration; retaliation against a third party is called *displacement* (an ineffective way of reducing frustration), and in vicarious retaliation (which appears to increase rather than decrease frustration), someone else than the victim retaliates against the source of frustration.

Limitations in Predictive Precision Regarding Responses to Discrepancy. Maybe the most problematic aspect of resource theory revolves around encounters in which it is difficult to determine the meaning an actor or recipient assigns to his/her behavior. As resource classes are defined as categories of meaning assigned to actions, and as different actions may convey the same meaning/resource, it is sometimes less than a straightforward matter to exactly determine to which resource class a particular behavior fits. Similarly, it is also possible "... that the same behavior may be assigned to different resource classes depending on the nature of previous interactions and/or the social institution in which the exchange takes

place" (Foa et al. 1993, p. 6). Thus, the precise prediction concerning which particular behavior that will be activated to represent a particular resource in retaliation may sometimes be problematic.

Elaborations of Justice Theories via Insights from Resource Theory

Procedural Justice and Resource Theories

We have previously pointed to the limitations in the predictive powers of procedural justice theories with regard to the match between a given rule violation and a likely type of response to injustice. How might resource theory contribute to an improvement of this situation? One possible way to arrive at a prediction concerning the likely type of response to a given type of procedural or interactional³ injustice might be to examine whether or not (a) the nature of the violated procedural rule and (b) the response to its violation, both are, in some sense, isomorphic (similar in form) with some third "entity." This would perhaps facilitate a reasonably accurate judgment as to the (degree of) congruence⁴ or match between a particular procedural rule violation and a likely subsequent response to the resulting injustice. That third entity we have in mind is social resource (class). Thus, the following steps may hopefully move us in the right direction and lay the foundation for further advances (even though the procedure suggested here may only take us to the point where it is possible to do no more than crudely hint at

³There is disagreement among justice theorists about whether or not procedural and interactional justice should be regarded as separate notions.

⁴Please note that we use the term *isomorphism* to refer to the similarity of form with regard to (a) procedural rule versus resource type/class and (b) type of response to injustice versus resource type/class. We use *congruence* to refer to the fit or correspondence between (a) type of injustice (i.e., type of violated procedural – or distributive – rule) and (b) type of response to injustice; thus, the congruence between (a) and (b) is determined on the basis of their respective isomorphism with resource type/class.

which types of responses to injustice are more unlikely to be chosen than others):

1. *Establish isomorphism between (violated) procedural rules and resource types/classes.* First, let us examine if and how the notion of isomorphism between procedural/interactional justice rules and resource classes would make sense. The most striking observation is the apparent similarity between interactional justice rules and the *status* and, perhaps, *love* resource classes. Interactional rules make stipulations pertaining to the quality of interpersonal treatment during the enactment of procedures and refer to both *what* is said and *how* it is said. They prescribe interpersonally sensitive behaviors and express concerns that behavior should be based on criteria such as respect, truthfulness, propriety of questions, explanation for (especially negative) decisions, and two-way communication (see Bies and Moag 1986; and Gilliland 1993). These behaviors are most likely to be interpreted as expressions or signs of one's regard and (but probably to a lesser extent) affection for the object person. Thus, interactional justice rules appear isomorphic with the *status* and *love* resource classes. Still, other procedural rules can be understood as instances of *status* as well: process control or voice, decision control, ethicality, consistency across persons, and representativeness (see Thibaut and Walker 1975; Leventhal 1980; and Barrett-Howard 1986). Thus, a number of procedures appear isomorphic with *particularistic* resources that convey sentiments (e.g., affection, admiration, helpfulness – or their opposites).

A small group of procedural rules may be interpreted as ways of conveying more “person-detached” or *universalistic* resources. These rules are isomorphic with *information* (advice, opinion, instruction, or enlightenment): bias suppression, accuracy, correctability, and predictability of information. It seems more difficult to identify procedures that are isomorphic with the *goods* and *money* *universalistic* resource classes. If procedures are understood as behaviors (by which outcomes are created), and given that *particularistic* resources (*love*, *status*, and *services*) can be conceptualized as behaviors, it is easy to see that isomorphism between the two may be established

in a meaningful and rather unproblematic way. However, *universalistic* resources like *money* and *goods* (*information* seems to be, at least partly, an exception) cannot as easily be conceptualized as behaviors, per se, which is why isomorphism appears to be a vacuous notion in this case. Surely, *goods* and *money* are provided via behaviors, but those resources cannot be viewed as behaviors in themselves (like in the case of *particularistic* resources).

As a cautionary note, we must in addition be aware that the determination of isomorphism is not always a straightforward matter for the reason that the meaning of both resources and procedural rules (as well as reactions to injustice) may vary with the context within which they appear. Also, it seems possible that some procedural rules may be isomorphic with more than one resource class (or partially isomorphic with one and partially with another).

2. *Establish isomorphism between types of responses to injustice (justice-restoring behaviors) and resource types/classes.* Procedural and interactional injustices may generate a wide variety of responses from victims. Among those that appear to be isomorphic with negative *status* are disobedience to authority, decision rejection, disloyalty, and lowered self-esteem. Separation, withdrawal of friendship, wrath, and divorce may be viewed as isomorphic with the negative valence of *love* and sick leave with *disservice*. Deception and lying are examples of behaviors which are isomorphic with *disinformation*. A number of additional reactions to procedural injustice seem to be simultaneously similar in form to more than one resource, for example, gossip – *status/love*, violence – *love/service*. Still, other behaviors may be isomorphic with a *particular* resource in one situation and with another in a different situation, depending on the content of the behavior in question: for instance, sabotage may be similar in form to *service*, *goods*, or *information*, depending on the content of the sabotage. Likewise, theft could be construed as embezzlement of *goods*, *info*, or *money*.

3. *Assess congruence between the violated procedural rule and the response to injustice via*




Fig. 11.3 Congruence between procedural rule violation and response to injustice via resource type/class

their respective resource class isomorphism. Once isomorphism has been determined between (a) procedural rule and resource class and between (b) reaction to injustice (i.e., to the violation of a procedural rule) and resource class, the match or congruence between the violated procedural rule and type of reaction to injustice may be assessed on the basis of their respective isomorphism with a resource class. Thus, *denial of voice* (i.e., a violated status isomorphic procedural rule) should be more likely to result in *disobedience* (a status isomorphic reaction to injustice) than in theft (i.e., goods, info, or money isomorphic response). Figure 11.3 provides examples of congruences between violated rules and behavioral reactions to violations (i.e., procedural injustices).

We proposed that some procedural rules may be isomorphic with more than one resource class (or partially isomorphic with one and partially with another). If so, the range of reactions to the violation of such a rule is likely to be wider as compared to a rule that is isomorphic with only one resource class. In such cases, congruence between a procedural rule and reactions to the violation of this rule (i.e., procedural injustice) may be assessed on the basis of more than one resource class.

New Sample Propositions: How Resource Theory May Inform and Elaborate Procedural Justice Theories

Resource theory proposes that reciprocity for the receipt of a *particularistic* resource will more likely be accomplished via resources from an

identical or similar resource class. Reciprocity will be increasingly unlikely via dissimilar resources, the more distal they are to the received particularistic resource (in terms of their circumplex ordering along the two dimensions of particularism and concreteness). This has been found to be even more likely for retaliation than for reciprocation; people tend to retaliate in kind (Foa 1971). Further, as mentioned in section “[Overview of Selected Aspects of Three Theories](#),” in comparison with particularistic resources, nonparticularistic (i.e., universalistic) resources tend to be exchanged with a wider range of resources. However, this seems to be true only for positive exchange; in *negative* exchange, the ranges for particularistic and universalistic resources seem to be equally narrow. Applying these rules from resource theory to procedural justice theory via a translation of procedural rule and justice-restoring behavior into their resource isomorphic counterparts generates the following proposition:

Proposition 1 Given a situation of procedural injustice, restoration of justice will be attempted via congruent behaviors (i.e., those that are isomorphic with the resource with which the violated procedural rule is isomorphic).

Based on Foa’s (1971) categorization of resources and his circumplex model, a number of additional propositions and corollaries may be stated. The following are some examples:

Proposition 2 Given a situation of procedural injustice resulting from the violation of a procedural rule which is isomorphic with resources belonging to a given particularistic

resource class *P1*, restoration of justice is (a) more likely to be attempted via congruent behaviors (i.e., those that are isomorphic with resources belonging to the *P1* class), (b) less likely via behaviors that are isomorphic with other particularistic resource classes *P2* and *P3*, and (c) least likely via behaviors that are isomorphic with resources belonging to universalistic resource classes *U1*, *U2*, or *U3*.

Given the previous establishment of isomorphism between procedural rules and resources, somewhat more specific “hypotheses” may now be stated. Also, by utilizing the notion of congruence to denote match between procedural rule and justice-restoring behavior on the basis of their identical resource isomorphism, these propositions may be expressed in a simpler form than Proposition 2. For example (as in Corollary 2.1 below), given that the violated procedural rule is “process control” (“voice”) and that this rule is isomorphic with the particularistic resource “status” (denying someone to express himself/herself is equivalent to exclusion which, in turn, signals lack of respect and prestige), attempts to restore justice will more likely be made via status isomorphic behaviors, such as impoliteness, disobedience, slander, and insult, rather than via behaviors that are isomorphic with other particularistic resources (e.g., sick leave or divorce, assumed to represent service and love, respectively) or with universalistic resources (e.g., theft – which is conceived as isomorphic with money and/or goods rather than with status). Thus, the following are two examples of more specific propositions, both of which present a situation of procedural injustice due to the violation of the status isomorphic voice rule. Corollary 2.1 concerns a situation in which P has access to two justice-restoring behavioral alternatives, impoliteness, and robbery (i.e., status isomorphic and money isomorphic behaviors, respectively), whereas Corollary 2.2 is based on accessibility to justice-restoring behavioral alternatives other than ones which are isomorphic with the violated rule:

Corollary 2.1 Given (a) a situation of procedural injustice resulting from the violation of the status isomorphic “process control” (“voice”) principle and (b) access to two behavioral alternatives –

impoliteness and robbery, restoration of justice will more likely be attempted via congruent behavior; that is, impoliteness (which is status isomorphic) rather than robbery.

If status isomorphic behaviors are inaccessible to the person, behaviors isomorphic with resources belonging to other particularistic resource classes (e.g., withdrawal of friendship or sick leave which is isomorphic with the resource classes love and service, respectively) will be preferred over behaviors that are isomorphic with universalistic resources (e.g., lying or sabotage/destruction of property, behaviors which are isomorphic with resources belonging to the information and goods resource classes, respectively). Thus:

Corollary 2.2 Given a situation of (a) procedural injustice resulting from the violation of the status isomorphic “process control” (“voice”) principle and (b) lack of access to justice-restoring status isomorphic behavioral alternatives, restoration of justice is more likely to be attempted via expressions of dislike (which is isomorphic with love) rather than via destruction of property (which is isomorphic with money and/or goods).

A second set with a proposition and two corollaries – now focusing on the violation of procedural rules that are isomorphic with universalistic resources (i.e., information, money, and goods) rather than particularistic resources (i.e., status, love, and services) – can be stated in the same manner as above:

Proposition 3 Given a situation of procedural injustice resulting from the violation of a procedural rule which is isomorphic with resources belonging to a given universalistic resource class *U1*, restoration of justice is (a) more likely to be attempted via congruent behaviors (i.e., those that are isomorphic with resources belonging to *U1* class), (b) less likely via behaviors that are isomorphic with other universalistic resource classes *U2* and *U3*, and (c) least likely via behaviors that are isomorphic with resources belonging to particularistic resource classes *P1*, *P2*, or *P3*.

Corollary 3.1 Given (a) a situation of procedural injustice resulting from the violation of the

information isomorphic “correctability” principle and (b) access to two behavioral alternatives – disobedience and lying, restoration of justice will more likely be attempted via congruent behavior; that is, lying (which is information isomorphic) rather than disobedience.

Corollary 3.2 *Given a situation of (a) procedural injustice resulting from the violation of the information isomorphic “correctability” principle and (b) lack of access to justice-restoring information isomorphic behavioral alternatives, restoration of justice is more likely to be attempted via destruction of property or robbery (which is isomorphic with goods and money) rather than via disobedience or sick leave (which is isomorphic with status and services).*

Although Foa and Foa (1974) saw the relevance of resource theory to Adams’ equity theory (as well as to other areas of inquiry), they never developed that line of thinking further. Nevertheless, they did suggest that “... when two different resources are exchanged, the appropriateness of the exchange determines the amount necessary for establishing equity” (Foa and Foa 1974, p. 265). Thus, to accomplish justice, a larger amount is presumably required of an inappropriate (i.e., distal) than of an appropriate resource. Accordingly, conceptualizing the congruence between the violated procedural rule and the behavioral reaction to the injustice in terms of their respective resource isomorphism yields the following two propositions:

Proposition 4 *The less congruent the nature of justice-restoring behavior is with the nature of the violated procedural rule, the more intense justice-restoring attempts will be.*

For example, the derogation of a perpetrator (a status isomorphic response) will be more intense when responding to the violation of the correctability procedural rule (which is information isomorphic) as compared to the violation of the voice rule (which is status isomorphic).

Proposition 5 *The less congruent the nature of justice-restoring behavior is with the nature of the violated procedural rule, the greater will*

be the required outcome value of the justice-restoring behavior to actually restore justice.

Thus, for example, a larger amount of theft (of goods or money) is predicted when a status isomorphic rule is violated than when the violated rule is information isomorphic. Indirect support for Propositions 3 and 4 (as well as for Propositions 10 and 11) was provided by Donnenwerth and Foa (1974). They found that the more distal the available resource of retaliation was from the resource in which a loss was incurred, the more intense the retaliation (and the greater the amount of residual hostility). The reason for stating that this study only provided indirect supports is that the match concerned magnitude of retaliation and resource loss rather than procedural injustice (i.e., the violation of a resource isomorphic procedural justice rule); justice was not even measured (the title of the article to the contrary).

Research also suggests that even when a large amount of a resource dissimilar to the resource of deprivation is acquired, there will be a residue of dissatisfaction, frustration, or hostility to cope with. No amount of money could, for example, restore a broken heart or a life taken. Thus:

Proposition 6 *The less congruent the nature of justice-restoring behavior is with the nature of the violated procedural rule, the greater will be the residue of experienced injustice.*

Additional propositions and corollaries regarding reactions to procedural injustice can easily be added to the list. Let us close this section with three propositions that seem to have interesting implications for the relationship between procedural rules and the type of allocated resource:

Proposition 7 *Distributing positively valent particularistic resources (e.g., love or status) by means of unjust interactional procedures (e.g., disrespect) reduces the value of, or more likely, renders worthless, the provided resource.*

Proposition 8 *Distributing negatively valent particularistic resources (e.g., hate, and disrespect) by means of unjust interactional procedures (e.g., disrespect) renders the provided resource even more negative.*

Not surprisingly, a positively valent particularistic resource (e.g., respect) cannot be distributed via an unjust status isomorphic procedure (e.g., acting disrespectfully), while a negatively valent particularistic resource (disrespect) can – and will in the process become more negative. Attempting to provide “respect” via disrespectful behavior/procedure transforms the resource into its opposite! However, the absolute value of *universalistic* resources (e.g., goods and money) is not affected by the fairness of the procedure (just like their values are not affected by the identity of the provider or the relationship between provider and recipient). For example, \$200 is worth the same, whether it is provided respectfully or disrespectfully. Thus:

Proposition 9 The absolute value of positive as well as negative universalistic resources is not affected by the (in)justice of the procedure by which they are provided.

In sum, some unjust procedures may affect the value of positive and negative *particularistic* resources, but procedures – just and unjust alike – have no impact on the absolute value of *universalistic* resources. Apparently, the value of a particularistic resource may be affected not only by the identity of the provider or the relationship between provider and recipient but also by the procedure via which the resource is transacted. These insights may have important implications for the interaction between distributive and procedural justice (e.g., the fair process effect).

Distributive Justice and Resource Theories

New Sample Propositions: How Resource Theory May Inform and Elaborate Distributive Justice Theories

We mentioned earlier the need for equity theory to widen its scope to account for qualitative aspects, that is, when inequity results from the presentation of an inappropriate or removal of (or withholding) an appropriate resource. If a person’s input consists of deference or positive

affect, for instance, are those resources considered meritorious when money is allocated? Adams (1965) proposed that two criteria will determine whether or not a particular resource serves as a legitimate input for the receipt of a share of what is allocated on the basis of merit. The existence of the input has to be *recognized* and *relevant* by at least one party to the exchange. Kayser and Lamm (1980) suggested that inputs are relevant if they are perceived as causally important for the production of outcomes, variable, and under the contributor’s control. Thus, although these researchers saw the need to consider qualitative aspects of equity, they only suggested via the recognition and relevance criteria when *quantitative* equity calculations are and are not meaningful. Later, by connecting the notion of relevance to resource theory, Törnblom and Foa (1983) proposed that relevance may be determined by the relationship (or exchangeability) between the “input resource” and the “outcome resource.” As previously mentioned, perceived relationships among resources are within the context of resource theory conceived on the basis of their spatial locations as plotted along the particularism and concreteness coordinates. For example, in most contexts, money is not a relevant outcome resource in return for love (the most distal resource to money), or vice versa. Applying insights from resource theory paves the way for further progress in predicting the nature of behavioral reactions to various types of inequity.

Propositions about reactions to procedural injustice were constructed on the basis of congruence between the violated procedural rule and the reactions to the violation (i.e., procedural injustice) via their respective resource isomorphism. Reactions to *distributive* injustice (inequity), however, have to be derived in a different manner. Discrepancy is here conceived as a low degree, or total lack, of exchangeability (relevance) between the “input resource” and the received “outcome resource.” The nature of reaction to the receipt of an inappropriate “outcome resource” (i.e., resource of reciprocation) is predicted to be of the kind which is isomorphic with the “input resource” (i.e., O’s inappropriate reciprocation to P’s input has to be compensated by O via an

appropriate resource – i.e., an “input resource” matching “outcome resource”). Suppose that P had a \$25 dinner at a restaurant and instead of paying his bill with money, he asked the waiter to tell the cook that he had enjoyed the food very much. We would certainly expect the waiter to demand \$25 (i.e., an “input resource” matching “outcome resource”) rather than verbally insulting P about P’s malfunctioning brain (i.e., disregard, an “input resource” mismatching “outcome resource”).

We previously noted Foa’s contention that a person is “frustrated” when she/he is deprived of an *expected* resource. The nature and meaning of the notion of frustration is partly contingent on the *modality* of the expectation, that is, whether it is *descriptive* (an anticipation or aspiration), *affective* (a preference or want), or *normative* (entitlement). Feelings of relative deprivation are often assumed to result from unfulfilled preferences and desires, while disconfirmed *normative expectations* include a moral aspect which, in the case of a non-provided resource, arouses feelings of violated entitlements. It seems reasonable to assume that deprivation of a normatively expected resource may result in feelings which are more accurately conceived as feelings of injustice (which does not exclude the possibility that the person may also feel frustrated – assuming that there is a difference between the two emotional experiences). Thus, if provided and received resources that are discrepant according to currently applicable norms do generate feelings of injustice as a result of violated entitlements, new predictions about qualitative reactions to injustice are made possible.

Some of the following propositions about reactions to distributive injustice will be similar to those made in the previous section about reactions to procedural injustice. We have, however, omitted the interspersed explanatory text to avoid repetitiveness and save space. Please note that several additional propositions may easily be derived regarding reactions (by victims, perpetrators, and observers) to procedural as well as distributive injustice.

Proposition 10 *Receiving an inappropriate type of “outcome resource” for a given “input resource” (i.e., resource discrepancy – e.g., sex in return for goods) is likely to result in perceived injustice.*

Proposition 11 *The more distal/inappropriate the “outcome resource” is to the “input resource” (i.e., the greater the discrepancy), the greater the magnitude of perceived injustice.*

Proposition 12 *Given a situation of distributive injustice in the form of inequity, restoration of justice will be attempted via behaviors that are isomorphic with the “input resource” that was mismatched by an inappropriate “outcome resource.”*

If I received money in return for love, and if this made me feel unjustly treated, I would withdraw my love as it was not reciprocated, thereby restoring justice – none invested, none returned. I would less likely try to restore justice by taking the money-provider’s bicycle. On the other hand, if I received love in return for my stock investment rather than an increase in the value of my investment, I would demand my money back rather than telling the provider of love how much I hate him.

Based on Propositions 9–12 and our statements in the preceding section, we suggest that:

Proposition 13 *Given a situation of distributive injustice in the form of inequity resulting from a discrepancy between a particularistic “input resource” P1 and a dissimilar “outcome resource,” restoration of justice is (a) more likely to be attempted via behaviors that are isomorphic with the “input resource” P1 rather than via behaviors that are isomorphic with particularistic resource classes P2 or P3, and (b) even more so than via behaviors that are isomorphic with resources belonging to universalistic resource classes U1, U2, or U3.*

Corollary 13.1 *Given (a) a situation of inequity resulting from discrepancy between an “input resource” of status and the “outcome resource” of money and (b) access to two behavioral alternatives – impoliteness and robbery – restoration of justice will more likely be attempted via impoliteness than via robbery.*

Corollary 13.2 *Given a situation of (a) inequity resulting from the discrepancy between an “input resource” of status and the “outcome resource” of money and (b) lack of access to justice-restoring behavioral alternatives which are isomorphic*

with status, restoration of justice is more likely to be attempted via withdrawal of friendship or sick leave (which are isomorphic with love and service) rather than via lying or destruction of property (which are isomorphic with information and goods).

Proposition 14 *Given a situation of distributive injustice in the form of inequity resulting from a discrepancy between a universalistic “input resource” U1 and a dissimilar “outcome resource,” restoration of justice is (a) more likely to be attempted via behaviors that are isomorphic with the “input resource” U1, (b) less likely via behaviors that are isomorphic with other universalistic resource classes U2 or U3, and (c) and least likely via behaviors that are isomorphic with resources belonging to particularistic resource classes P1, P2, or P3.*

Corollary 14.1 *Given (a) a situation of inequity resulting from discrepancy between an “input resource” of money and the “outcome resource” of love and (b) access to two behavioral alternatives – embezzlement and insult – restoration of justice will more likely be attempted via embezzlement than via insult.*

Corollary 14.2 *Given a situation of (a) inequity resulting from discrepancy between an “input resource” of money and the “outcome resource” of love and (b) lack of access to justice-restoring behavioral alternatives which are isomorphic with money, restoration of justice is more likely to be attempted via destruction of property (which is isomorphic with goods) rather than via impoliteness (which is isomorphic with status).*

Proposition 15 *The less isomorphic (the more distal) the nature of justice-restoring behavior (e.g., theft of office equipment – which is isomorphic with goods) is with the “outcome resource” in terms of which injustice occurred (e.g., status), the more intense the justice-restoring attempt will be.*

Proposition 16 *The less isomorphic the nature of justice-restoring behavior is with the “outcome resource” in terms of which injustice occurred, the greater will be the required outcome value of the justice-restoring behavior to actually restore justice.*

Proposition 17 *The less isomorphic the nature of justice-restoring behavior is with the “outcome resource” in terms of which injustice occurred, the greater will be the residue of experienced injustice.*

Proposition 18 *Cognitive distortion of an inequitable situation is more likely the less isomorphic the available resource is with the preferred/appropriate resource for equity restoration.*

A loss of status will hardly be fully restored by the receipt of goods, for example. Thus, if provision of goods were the only available means of compensating the victim (i.e., restoring injustice), then the perpetrator would likely be more prone to cognitive distortion, than if status were an available resource of compensation. If P has verbally insulted O, P may achieve compensation by showing O respect. Also, the less likely restoration is via a resource from the same resource class, the more costly the restoration will be, as a larger amount of an inappropriate resource is required, and the more likely cognitive distortion will occur (see Walster et al. 1978, for a detailed discussion).

Corollary 18.1 *P, a victim of inequity, who was insulted by O in return for revealing his love for O, will be more likely to cognitively distort the inequity if his only means of restoring equity is to deprive O of goods, than if his only means is to express dislike or hatred for O.*

Like Turner (2007) notes with regard to his own propositional derivation, the list of propositions offered here toward the goal of expanding procedural and distributive justice theories is certainly not exhaustive. It should further be noted that the propositions exemplified here only focus on situations in which the victim of injustice/inequity is exposed to disadvantageous rather than advantageous injustice. Thus, not only may the list of propositions and corollaries pertaining to disadvantageous injustice be considerably expanded, a complementary set of propositions may be generated for situations of advantageous injustice. The presently offered limited list of theoretical statements will hopefully serve as an initial vehicle toward further work on theoretical integration between resource and justice theories.

Discussion and Conclusions

The work reported in this chapter continues a systematic attempt at theoretical integration in the study of justice, a line of work that now has three steps. The first step involved contributions toward the integration of distributive justice and retributive justice, bringing both under a single umbrella called distributive justice. At the second step, we proposed the total fairness model which aims at integrating distributive justice and procedural justice in the allocation of positive and negative resources. And we have now, at the third step, proposed an integration of distributive justice, procedural justice, and social resource theory.

In this chapter, we briefly described for our purposes relevant parts of procedural justice, equity/distributive justice, and resource theories. We also pointed at convergencies and divergencies among the three theories. Divergencies occur regarding what they state about the nature of discrepancies, as well as psychological and behavioral reactions to discrepancy. Some limitations of distributive and procedural theories were discussed, limitations which appear to be reduced by incorporating insights from resource theory. Distributive justice theories provide no clues to help us determine whether or not violations of the various justice principles (other than equity) would result in qualitatively and/or quantitatively different justice-restoring behaviors. Equity theory needs to be able to specify the likely (cognitive, affective, and behavioral) type of reaction to inequity, given information about the particular kind of resource in terms of which the person is inequitable treated. Finally, procedural justice theories are unable to predict the likely type of response to the violation of a particular procedural rule.

A full integration of the three types of theories would most certainly generate a large number of additional predictions. We have here chosen to formulate a limited sample of propositions and corollaries that can be derived when resource theory is combined with procedural justice and equity theory, respectively. Several testable hypotheses can now be generated on the basis of the suggested theoretical statements. Future developments may include a fertilization of resource theory from distributive and

procedural justice theories as well as an integration of all three theories.

A series of research studies can be designed to systematically test hypotheses derived from the suggested as well as additional propositions and corollaries. The initial stages would include empirical validation studies to generate (a) a list of procedural rules, (b) a list of behavioral reactions to injustice/frustration, and (c) to assess isomorphism between rules and resources and between behavioral reactions and resources. Assessing the congruence of procedural rules and behavioral reactions to injustice based on their isomorphism with resource class would hopefully move us toward a preference order among behavioral reactions to specific types of injustice. However, preference assessment is only possible if there is a choice between behavioral reactions that are isomorphic with *different* resource classes. If the choice is limited to reactions that are isomorphic with resources belonging to the *same* resource class, preference assessments based on resource theory assumptions cannot be established without further developments of resource theory. We assume, however, that in those cases, preferences can meanwhile be at least approximately assessed in other ways, for example, by the perceived effectiveness of the behavioral reaction to restore justice. If, for instance, one has the choice between theft and destroying equipment (both alternatives presumably being isomorphic with the resource class of goods), the victim of injustice may prefer theft to destroying equipment, as this would result in a win for the victim and a loss for the source of injustice, while the former alternative would only incur loss to the source of injustice without producing any material benefits for the victim, all things being equal.

Considering these limitations, integrating procedural justice and resource theories as well as distributive justice and resource theories appears to yield increased predictive precision regarding reactions to injustice (i.e., reactions that result from violations of the equity rule and violations of procedural rules). In addition, resource theory hints at a seemingly possible way of classifying procedural rules. Finally, some conceptual overlaps between the theories have become apparent. Theory integration that may be accomplished along these lines is not only theoretically important but may also be pragmatically useful.

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Resource Types and Fairness Perceptions in Social Dilemmas

12

Barry Markovsky and Nick Berigan

Social dilemmas confront individuals with choices about resources that they control or to which they have access. They are *social* in the sense that choices occur in the context of a collectivity or group and so impact others to at least some degree. They are *dilemmas* due to the fact that individuals generally make their choices under the conditions that their own interests and the group's are not in perfect alignment, and the results of their choices are contingent on the choices made by other members. So, for example, by cooperating with the group, you may be helping others, but you also may be sacrificing some resources that you would have received had you not been so cooperative.

Across more than a half century, a number of scholarly disciplines have seen a great deal of sustained research on social dilemmas. There are at least two fundamental reasons for the allure of this work to social theorists and researchers: tractability and ubiquity. Social dilemmas are tractable in the sense that there are relatively few kinds, and these may be fully described and distinguished using a small number of concepts. They are ubiquitous in the sense that, although extremely simple in the abstract, a large number and wide variety of instances have been identified in the natural world. This is a testament to the

unifying power of basic theory and research: While applied research is oriented toward understanding specific cases (and appropriately so), basic theory directs attention to underlying structure, dynamics, and social forces that may not be intuitively evident or readily observable in particular cases, but are at play across all empirical manifestations.

Although different labels have been applied, the choices that confront actors in social dilemmas are always enacted with respect to behavioral *inputs* and resource *outcomes*. On the input side, each individual must decide, sometimes once and sometimes at each of a series of opportunities, whether or not to act cooperatively with others, or how much to invest in the group, or how much of a common resource to use, or whether to levy sanctions on others. On the outcome side, consequences for each participant and for the whole group may include monetary losses or gains, emotional satisfaction, or maintenance of a public good, to name just three possibilities. In the starkest game-theoretic interpretation, participants are purely self-interested and strategic, acting under the presumption that all others are the same way. A great deal of research has focused on departures from these ideals, however, and various contextual factors have been shown to affect inputs and outcomes. For example, whether or not communication occurs among participants, the magnitudes of incentives involved and inferences made from others' past behaviors have all been shown to modify processes in predictable ways (Komorita and Parks 1996).

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Our focus in this chapter is on the nature and effects of fairness perceptions and different types of resources in social dilemmas. Most recognizable under the rubrics of *equity* and *distributive justice*, theories of fairness in their many incarnations have a long history in the social sciences and have expanded into a variety of research lines. Equity theory employed the terms *inputs* and *outcomes* in simple mathematical models designed to account for interpersonal comparisons of these quantities and their impact on feelings of fairness (Walster et al. 1978). In the pure game-theoretic sense, there is no place for fairness issues in social dilemmas so long as all participants subscribe to the rules. However, we will argue that (1) social dilemma settings fall within the scope of distributive justice theory, (2) input and outcome patterns activate justice concerns, and (3) these concerns will result in predictable alterations of subsequent inputs with predictable consequences for the group. The scope of these arguments will be further expanded by taking into account the kinds of resources involved. In this way, our theory will be able to explain the effects of different types of resources on the input side, and/or outcomes involving different types of resources for different members, and/or outcome resources that differ from input resources. Resource theory provides us some direction for establishing a model of resource effects on social dilemmas via fairness processes.

Surprisingly, there has never been a program of theory-driven investigations of the role of fairness evaluations in social dilemmas. Below, we will explicate our approach and use our theory to derive predictions for a line of social dilemma experiments.

Public Goods

There are three major kinds of social dilemmas, characterized by different choice contingencies: prisoner's dilemmas, social traps, and public goods. Most readers are probably familiar with the two-person prisoner's dilemma. In this setting, incentives are structured such that, faced with the choice of cooperation or defection, the

latter appears optimal to both individuals, but is detrimental if both opt for it. Social traps include the familiar "tragedy of the commons" in which all members of a population may extract a self-replenishing good, but if some individuals overuse the resource, then it is destroyed for all. In public goods dilemmas, the choice is whether or how much to contribute to the maintenance of a resource that is available to all, as opposed to extracting some amount of a self-replenishing good. In a sense, the choice is between being a "good citizen" and free-riding on the generosity of others.

Fairness Considerations

Although fairness concerns may arise in any kind of social dilemma, our initial foray concentrates on fairness perceptions in public goods settings. Given sufficiently high levels of cooperation across members, the potential exists in a public goods setting for all to benefit at levels higher than would have been possible by disparate individuals. The greater the number of contributors and magnitudes of contributions, the greater the benefits to all – *even to those who contributed nothing*. Depending on who contributes and in what amounts, some may receive benefits or incur losses that seem undeserved. This is a situation ripe for fairness judgments.

The ubiquity of public goods creates some profound implications for the effects of fairness evaluations – in applied research, organizations, social interventions, public policy, and even in society as a whole. Public goods are usually regarded as positive and progressive features of the social system that supplies them. Everyday examples include fire departments and public libraries. Especially in nascent public goods systems, perceptions of fairness on the part of members and prospective members may be critical to the system's maintenance. Given the uncertainties associated with decisions about whether or not to contribute, feelings of unfairness regarding prior outcomes and inferences about future outcomes are likely to be critical in decisions about whether to contribute and, if so, how much.

One of the reasons that this is such an interesting problem is that even simple public goods settings offer a variety of social comparisons that may impact fairness evaluations and contribution decisions.

Properties of Public Goods Dilemmas

Olson (1965) recognized that personal interests are at odds with collective interests in public goods situations. In the simplest case, individuals have two behavioral options: (1) *cooperate* by acting in the group's interest or (2) *defect* by acting self-interestedly. If there are just two participants, then either one of them, both of them, or neither may cooperate at a given opportunity. These results are termed, respectively, "unilateral defection," "universal cooperation," and "universal defection." Dawes (1980) specified criteria for an especially ubiquitous type of dilemma in which the relative payoffs for these three kinds of results are ordered highest to lowest as above. Each participant thus has an incentive to defect while reaping the rewards of others' contributions. If all defect, however, then the group benefit fails to materialize.

The relationship between group members' contributions and the rewards they receive is described by a *production function* (Heckathorn 1996; Marwell et al. 1988; Oliver et al. 1985). In the public goods settings, resources that result from the group members' contributions increase monotonically with each additional unit contributed. This means that collective outcomes may exceed the sum of individual contributions, that is, a kind of "interest" can accrue as an added benefit to the members. Another requisite property of these settings is that group resources are *non-excludable* in that all group members have equal access to them and benefit equally from them when used. Finally, rewards are also *non-rival* in public goods settings, that is, no group member loses rewards due to another member receiving them (Cornes and Sandler 1996).

Public goods dilemmas also are distinguishable by the initial distribution of resources across members and the divisibility of those resources

(Komorita and Parks 1996). Members initial endowments may be *symmetric*, meaning that all members begin with equal amounts, or *asymmetric*, with unequal amounts across members. Also, resource holdings may be *discrete* or *continuous*. With discrete endowments, members can choose only between contributing all or none of their resources to the group. In contrast, if endowments are *continuous*, then members choose how much of their initial endowment to contribute. Our research will focus on the combination found most often in natural settings: asymmetric, continuous holdings.

Prior research on asymmetric social dilemmas is limited. Computer simulations by Oliver, Marwell, and associates (Oliver et al. 1985; Marwell et al. 1988) demonstrated how unequal initial endowments may facilitate cooperation. That is, resource heterogeneity heightens the chances that there will be a critical mass of members who are willing to contribute to the group when most still regard it as too costly or risky. Heckathorn's (1992, 1993) simulations further showed that such inequality only facilitates cooperation when the incentive to free-ride is high and should reduce cooperation when the incentive to free-ride is weak. Experimental research has found that total contributions are greater in continuous symmetric public goods settings than in continuous asymmetric settings (Aquino et al. 1992; Marwell and Ames 1979; Rapoport et al. 1989). Marwell and Ames (1979) argued that people with higher initial endowments contribute more to the group because they consider it "fair" for them to contribute more. They did not test this claim, however.

Public Goods in the Real World

Public broadcasting systems and charities are familiar examples of real-life public goods dilemmas, as are recycling programs (e.g., Diekmann and Preisendörfer 1998). The latter offer citizens the benefits of a cleaner environment by reducing landfill and preserving natural resources. However, individual households must expend the effort to sort their recyclables in a manner dictated

by their communities. Although this may not be a major investment of time and effort relative to the act of simply throwing all recyclables into the garbage, it also necessitates a change in attitudes and is usually resisted by segments of given populations.

Tax policies also reflect public goods considerations where individuals are endowed with unequal resources. In the USA, tax revenues support a range of services that are made available to all citizens. Examples include fire and police departments, public schools, maintenance of public parks and roads, and military defense. In principle, every American household is equally entitled to these benefits, even while individual and corporate taxation varies widely by income and other factors. There are also tax incentives that encourage various kinds of action on the part of citizens and corporations and disincentives to discourage other kinds of actions. Members of congress generally legislate in ways that reflect their constituents' beliefs about fair taxation and incentive structures. For instance, left-leaning groups often advocate that tax breaks are unfair if they fail to benefit the lower and middle classes. In contrast, right-leaning groups point out that a larger portion of the tax dollars that the government collects comes from a wealthy minority of Americans. Despite their wealth, it is not so preposterous that wealthier individuals would seek larger rewards and tax breaks for their greater contributions.

As noted above, much research on public goods identifies factors that affect choices to free-ride. (For reviews, see Kollock 1998; Komorita and Parks 1996; Macy and Flache 1995; Piliavin and Charng 1990.) Our research focus also falls within this realm in the sense that we expect fairness considerations to impact contributions and outcomes. However, it differs from all of the other factors previously studied in that, depending on the values to which they are compared, the perceived fairness of inputs or outcomes can vary independent of their absolute amounts. Before we establish a theoretical connection between public goods and fairness judgments, we first explore the ways that different resources impact public goods situations.

Social Resources and Public Goods

Foa and Foa (1976) asserted that all of social interaction entails exchanges of resources, and they have provided a more or less comprehensive typology of resource types. Details on Foa and Foa's *resource theory* are available elsewhere in this volume. For our purposes, the various resource types they identify, such as *love*, *information*, and *money*, each has different implications for an actor's gains and losses when he or she contributes to the group. Thus, according to Foa and Foa, a person is likely to (1) *gain* when giving love, (2) *neither gain nor lose* when giving information, and (3) *lose* when giving money.

It is interesting to note that Willer's (1984) *elementary theory* (ET) defines types of dyadic exchange in terms of costs and benefits associated with giving and receiving *sanctions*. These are actions that are may be (1) transmitted from one actor to another, (2) costly or beneficial to the giver, and (3) costly or beneficial to the recipient. Although throughout his writing Willer uses the term *resource* quite interchangeably with *sanction*, unlike Foa and Foa, he goes no further insofar as specifying sanction/resource types beyond their valence. He does, however, identify two general types of exchange relations based on the costs and benefits associated with sanctioning: In *social exchange*, the actor gains when giving positive sanctions to the other, and in *economic exchange*, the actor loses when giving positive sanctions to the other. If we were to include *informational* exchange, in which an actor neither gains nor loses when giving to the other, we complete a typology parallel to the three resource theory categories defined above.

To generalize a bit further, allowing the "other" to include collective actors permits us to apply these concepts to resource dilemmas where the "actor" is a focal person from whose perspective we analyze the situation, and "rest of the group," or just "group" for short, indicates all other parties in the situation (Rapoport 1970; Willer and Skvoretz 1997). Normally in a social resource dilemma, every group member is oriented toward the same resources. This premise eliminates any

concerns about the commensurability of resources (Heckathorn 1983; Willer 1999). The nature of the actor-group exchange thus depends by definition on whether the actor experiences a cost, benefit, or neither when contributing some of that resource to the group.

If m is the value of the resource to the group upon its receipt and k is the value to an actor of giving the resource, then the three resource types cited above can be characterized; thus,

$m \geq k > 0$	for love
$m \geq k = 0$	for information
$m > 0 > k$	for money

Although we are not theoretically constrained to do so, to keep our illustrations simple, we will assume that the resource can only be contributed on an all-or-none basis. Although it is not necessarily true for all resources, here we also assume that if the resource’s value to the group is m , then it is also worth at most m to the actor if he or she keeps it. The production function is designated $f(m)$. For example, a $3 \times$ production function would be represented as $f(m) = 3m$, signifying that contributions to the group are multiplied by three prior to redistribution.

To illustrate some of the payoff contingencies, assume that the focal group member and every other group member contribute m to the group cause. Then, each member of the group receives a payoff of $k + f(m)$. Alternatively, if the focal group member is the only one who contributes (“unilateral cooperation”) and there are n group members, then the other group members will each receive $f(m)/n$ plus their original m , and the focal actor ends up with $k + f(m)/n$. If the focal actor is the only actor to not contribute to the group (“unilateral defection”), then the focal actor keeps m plus an additional payoff of $f(m) \left(\frac{n-1}{n} \right)$ from the group, while the other group members will receive a payoff of $k + f(m) \left(\frac{n-1}{n} \right)$. Finally, if no one contributes, then each actor is left with their initial endowment of m . Table 12.1 shows the payoffs for these potential outcomes in standard game-theoretic matrix notation.

Table 12.1 Profits from resource exchanges

		All others contribute?	
		Yes	No
Actor contributes?	Yes	$k + f(m)$	$m + f(m)/n$
	No	$k + f(m)$	$k + f(m)/n$
		$k + f(m) \left(\frac{n-1}{n} \right)$	m
		$m + f(m) \left(\frac{n-1}{n} \right)$	m

Notes
 n = group size
 m = a contribution’s increment to the group fund
 $f(m)$ = value of m after production function applied
 k = value to the actor of making a contribution

The foregoing assumptions can be used to derive implications about what actors will do when confronted with opportunities to contribute or to not contribute to a public good. The resource to be exchanged carries with it certain properties (expressed earlier as inequalities) that, in combination with $f(m)$ and n , will determine the incentives for a given setting.

To illustrate the implications of the three resource types on exchange relations, we first consider an extremely simple public good setting in which $n = 2$ group members (“actor” and “other”) may exchange love under the production function $f(m) = 2m$. Suppose that a member can give $m = 2$ love units and receives $k = 1$ love units for doing so. When actor and other both contribute love to the “group,” both receive $k + f(m) = 1 + (2 \times 2) = 5$ units. If actor contributes unilaterally, he receives $1 + (2 \times 2)/2 = 3$ units, and other receives 3 units of love plus the 1 unit she did not contribute. Conversely, if actor unilaterally withholds contributing love, he receives 4 units from the group while other receives 3 units. Finally, if both members choose not to contribute, each is left with the initial endowment of 2. These conditions produce a payoff structure known as the *privileged game*, characterized by the absence of any incentive to *not* contribute to the group unless one seeks to lower the other’s payoff at one’s own expense (Heckathorn 1996).

Table 12.2 Three kinds of resource exchange $n=2; f(m)=2m$

	Resource					
	Love $m=2; k=1$		Information $m=2; k=0$		Money $m=2; k=-1$	
Who contributes?	Actor's profit	Other's profit	Actor's profit	Other's profit	Actor's profit	Other's profit
Actor and other	5	5	4	4	3	3
Actor only	3	4	2	4	1	4
Other only	4	3	4	2	4	1
Neither	2	2	2	2	2	2

Table 12.2 shows the payoffs for this scenario under the two “Love” columns.

Next, consider a public goods scenario involving information exchange. If one neither gains nor loses when giving information to the group, but the group does benefit, we can represent this as $m=2$ and $k=0$. In our two-person group example, actor and other each ends up with 4 units of information when both contribute. Actor’s payoff is 2 and other’s is 4 when actor contributes unilaterally and conversely. Finally, if neither contributes, both end up with 2 units. The payoffs are summarized in Table 12.2 under the “Information” columns. These particular conditions give rise to a condition of *mutual fate control* (Thibaut and Kelley 1986). That is, each member in isolation is indifferent as to whether or not to contribute information to the group; however, each member’s choice fully determines the other’s payoff.

Finally, consider a public goods scenario involving the exchange of money. Once again, we let $m=2$, but this time giving the money to the group comes at a cost, $k=-1$. Here, if both members contribute, each nets 3 units of money (4 from the group minus 1 from contributing to the group). Each member can receive a higher payoff (4 units) by unilaterally withholding his or her contribution. However, if both withhold, then neither profits as much. In other words, the only way *everyone* gains is if everyone acts *against* their self-interest and contributes. Table 12.2 shows the payoffs for this scenario under the “Money” columns. This scenario is recognized as the classic *prisoner’s dilemma*. It is theoretically interesting for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that each group member acting on self-interest leads to deficient outcomes for all (Rapoport and Guyer 1966).

In sum, the resource the actors exchange affects the incentive structure guiding decisions about whether to contribute to the group. These decisions then jointly dictate each actor’s payoff from the collective effort. Finally, actors use these payoffs as a basis for making justice evaluations as discussed next.

Fairness

The terms “fairness,” “equity,” and “distributive justice” often are used interchangeably in social psychological literatures, and few theories define any of them explicitly. “Fairness” is most often used in a loose, generic way, whereas the terms “equity” and “justice” are associated with theories that may be more or less explicit. Equity theories mainly have emerged from psychology. They attempt to identify conditions under which the inputs and outcomes of two people in a social exchange are perceived to be fair by the parties involved. As exemplified in the seminal work of Adams (1965) and Walster et al. (1978), equity theories usually have as their centerpiece an equation specifying a relationship between the outcomes and inputs of persons *A* and *B* that must hold in order for fairness to be perceived. Usually, this is a variant of the formula $R_A/I_A = R_O/I_O$, where *R* indicates a quantity of outcomes or *rewards*, *I* is an input or *investment*, and subscripts indicate the actor and other with which each quantity is associated.

Distributive justice theories have tended to emerge from sociology (Berger et al. 1972; Jasso 1980; Markovsky 1985) and focus more on the sources of fairness standards and on departures from states of fairness. For example, Berger et al.

(1972) introduced the concept of *referential structure* – a generalized set of associations between social statuses and rewards that may be activated in local settings and that serves as a standard for justice evaluations in those settings. Jasso (1980) used the model $J = \ln(R/C)$ which predicates the experience of injustice on the ratio of an actual reward to a preconceived just reward, C . More recently, there have been attempts to integrate several strands of justice research, including distributive justice, equity, and others, under new umbrellas such as *organizational justice* (Greenberg and Colquitt 2005; Greenberg and Cropanzano 2001). As the label implies, organizations have become important sites for testing and applying justice theories in the contemporary literature. At least in the equity and distributive justice realm, however, the above theories are still cited and used in these integrations and also in applications to empirical settings outside of organizational spheres.

Markovsky's multilevel justice theory ("MJT"; Markovsky 1985; Markovsky et al. 2008) has several features that make it especially useful in public goods applications. First, the functional form of the MJT has been verified empirically. Second, it is the only justice theory that offers explicit scope conditions and definitions for all of its key terms. This greatly facilitates testing and application by establishing criteria for (1) when an empirical setting is appropriate for analysis by the theory and (2) whether necessary situational elements such as rewards, investments, referents, and modes of response are amenable to the theory's propositions. Third, MJT was built upon the strengths of its predecessors in the distributive justice area – particularly Jasso's (1980) theory and Berger et al. (1972) status value theory – while also incorporating equity theory's focus on identifying conditions for "local fairness." Fourth, MJT was explicitly designed to cross levels of analysis. For instance, individuals' judgments may be predicated on information associated either with individuals or with collectivities. Fifth, key factors are abstractly defined, opening the theory to integrations with propositions and theories from other substantive areas (Markovsky et al. 2008). For example, justice evaluations are

amplified by a "justice indifference" factor, defined in terms of the evaluator's interest in the fairness of a given social comparison. Justice indifference may be affected by a variety of exogenous factors such as the evaluator's ties with the subject of the evaluation or his or her feelings of empathy or identification. Finally, the theory has at its core an empirically validated algebraic model that permits the derivation of precise hypotheses.

The justice evaluation model is expressed as
$$JE_{i^*} = \log_{JI} \left[\frac{R_i / I_i}{R^* / I^*} \right]$$
. It accounts for comparisons between rewards (R) and investments (I) associated with a focal person or group (i) and a referent person, group, or standard ($*$). The referent may be general beliefs or norms, prior experiences, or an actual other in the immediate setting. Ji is *justice indifference*, or the inverse of the observer's interest in the existence of justice for the given comparison. The logarithmic form, borrowed from Jasso (1980), captures properties of the marginal behavior of justice evaluations, that is, the diminishing impact of over-rewards and the accelerating impact of under-rewards on the experience of injustice. Logarithms are not defined for negative values, and so only positively valenced outcomes may be used as outcomes in this theory. Finally, the theory assumes a direct effect of justice evaluations on "justice-restoring attempts," that is, behaviors enacted for the purpose of restoring justice if an injustice has been perceived.

Fairness in Public Goods Settings

As mentioned earlier, there is little if any systematic research examining fairness judgments in social dilemma settings. This is despite occasional mentions and discussions of the potential benefits of doing so, and research on related aspects such as the choice of distribution rules (Schroeder et al. 2003, 2008; De Cremer and Van Dijk 2002; Marwell and Ames 1979; see Kazemi 2006:24–26 for a review). Our approach differs from previous work in two ways. First, we focus on what we believe to be the most salient features

of resource contributions and outcomes, as opposed to other properties of the situation (Aquino et al. 1992; Clark 1998; Van Dijk and Wilke 1995). Second, our theory considers the magnitude of group members' injustice responses and behaviors, rather than their beliefs regarding what they ought to have received (Wit et al. 1992; Van Dijk and Grodzka 1992; Van Dijk and Wilke 1993, 1994, 1995).

MJT has three scope conditions that determine whether or not it applies in a given social setting: "(1) actors and or groups possess or exhibit levels of investments and receive amounts of reward; (2) there exists a legitimate referential relationship (i.e., some normative or existential mapping) between investments and rewards... and (3) a legitimate method for attempting to restore justice exists" (Markovsky 1985:826). The application to public goods settings is straightforward (Berigan and Markovsky 2008): Investments, I , correspond to contributions to the group or inputs. Rewards, R , are the returns from those investments or outcomes – the group's allocations to its members. The subject of the justice evaluation, i , may be oneself or another in the situation or a collectivity such as a subset of group members. The referent, $*$, may be another individual or group, or an abstract standard.

Justice indifference is defined explicitly but very abstractly in the theory. Essentially, the evaluator's degree of interest or disinterest in the justice evaluation is assumed, respectively, to amplify or to dampen the impact of *incongruences*, that is, departures from a state of distributive justice. The theory leaves open what specific factors may have such an effect. Markovsky (1985) manipulated identification with the group in order to alter the level of justice indifference. In the high identification condition, subjects were reminded that group outcomes impact their individual outcomes and were informed that they would meet as a group at the conclusion of the study. Emphasizing group outcomes and meetings fostered increased group identification and heightened responses to collective injustices relative to individual injustices. Younts and Mueller (2001) also found clear effects of justice indifference in their survey data. Their measure was a

direct question regarding the perceived importance of being fairly paid at a job given the work that the respondent actually performed.

There are three factors that we believe are likely to impact public goods settings through justice indifference: (1) the salience of certain properties of the resource allocations, (2) whether resources are invested and received by individuals or by subgroups, and (3) the interplay of group identification and social value orientation. To illustrate the operation of different kinds of resources and allocation patterns in social dilemmas, we will next explicate the operation of these factors and derive a variety of predictions for empirical testing.

Testable Implications

In this section, we provide directions for empirically testing some of the foregoing theoretical ideas and their consequences. We believe that initial research should be extremely basic in the sense that its focus should be squarely on theoretical assumptions and derivations rather than on realistic applications. If the theory fails under the simplified conditions of the laboratory, there is no point in applying it under more complex natural conditions where it is far more difficult to isolate the theory's shortcomings and effect repairs.

The first experiment uses the public goods setting as a test bed for observing justice evaluations and their effects on contribution decisions. A key problem for justice evaluations in such settings concerns a possible ambiguity in deciding what contribution levels are fair in the absence of any explicit rules. The second experiment illustrates how, all else being equal, shifting the type of good toward which the group is oriented leads to certain predictable shifts in justice evaluations.

Before we discuss these hypothetical experiments, a methodological note: Recall that m is the value of a resource given to the group and k is the value to the giver of having contributed that resource to the group. Then to reiterate, $m \geq k > 0$ for love, $m \geq k = 0$ for information, and $m > 0 > k$ for money. To conduct rigorous tests of the implications of different resource types for fairness

judgments or for some other purpose, it is essential to first validate these assumed ordinal relationships between the values of giving and getting the resource in the empirical setting within which exchanges will take place. Even better would be a standard procedure for quantifying the values of resources at the ratio level of measurement. For present purposes, we will not address these measurement issues but instead focus on more general derivations and tests.

Test #1: Actual Versus Proportional Contributions

The first line of testable implications applies the justice model to a public goods setting in which actors begin with different levels of initial endowments. Most research in public goods settings focus on situations with equal initial endowments (as in the illustrations above), a condition not generally found in natural groups. Virtually all public goods experiments render initial endowments a nonfactor by equating them across group members. While this further increases artificiality, it also eliminates a host of potential complications and allows a brighter light to be shed on other issues. Perhaps foremost among those complications is the group members' potential concern with fairness – a process sure to be activated when all start with the same personal resources, receive identical shares of the group resource, but observe some members deciding to contribute more to the group and others deciding to contribute less.

Experimentally manipulating initial endowments creates variability in the bases for justice evaluations. However, a newly formed laboratory group lacks rules or referential structures to inform them of exactly what sort of reward is to be expected for a given level of contribution. In an experimental setting, it would not be very interesting simply to tell our subjects what is fair and what is not and then to see these instructions reflected in their responses. Instead, we are more interested to learn, in the absence of such overt rules, how responsive subjects are to situational cues. Specifically, we consider whether subjects

will evaluate justice based on comparing (1) the absolute amounts that members contribute versus (2) the amounts they contribute relative to their endowments. A given contribution to the group could be perceived as much higher if it represents the totality of a member's holdings, compared to the case where it is only a small fraction. The problem is that most social settings lack any cues – much less specific rules – for regarding contributions one way or the other, leaving members to use idiosyncratic comparison bases for their evaluations.

Setting

Consider an experimental setting that induces implicit referential rules, either a “proportional cue” which leads members to consider contributions to the group relative to endowments or an “absolute cue” that highlights the face values of contributions. The MJT can then be used to generate predictions for two principal dependent variables: justice evaluations and justice-restoring attempts. Conditional upon (1) the referential cue, (2) members' initial endowments, and (3) actual contributions and allocations from the group resource, the theory allows us to derive fine-grained predictions for the expressed injustice experiences of group members and for changes in the magnitudes of subsequent contributions as a response to perceived injustices. Although not necessarily the state of the art, psychophysical scaling (Stevens 1975; Lodge 1981) is relatively easy to use and ideal for this type of measurement.

Assume that there are three subjects participating in a group via a local network: a focal subject, S, and two computer-simulated members E and Q. Subjects are informed that their initial endowment or “personal fund” was randomly assigned. E, S, and Q begin with, respectively, 8, 16, and 32 points. Instructions then manipulate the salience of one or the other referential rule. In the *absolute cue* conditions, the instructions include the statement:

Just as in real communities, the more people give to the group, the more everyone benefits. If people put in a lot of resources, then everyone benefits a lot.

In the *proportional cue* conditions, the instructions instead contain this statement:

Just as in real communities, the more that people are able to contribute relative to what they can give, the more everyone benefits. If people give most of their resources, then everyone benefits more.

After either the proportional or absolute cue is made salient, subjects are informed that (1) they will have three opportunities to contribute to the group, and (2) following each opportunity, the total of the three members' contributions to the group will be doubled and allocated in equal shares to each member. The subject then enters his or her decision and shortly thereafter receives feedback on others' contributions and on the total points each member has after shares of the group fund are distributed. This is followed by the injustice experience measures, and finally the contribution decision for the next round.

Design

A 2x2x2 design permits the efficient testing of three crucial factors: E's contribution (2 vs. 7), Q's contribution (8 vs. 28), and salience cue (absolute vs. proportional). Members E and Q's contributions to the group fund are simulated such that each contributes about 25% or 87.5% of their initial endowment. Table 12.3 displays a summary of all eight conditions, with the subject's actual contribution indicated by *x*.

Tests

Applying MJT to the experimental setting yields nine predicted justice evaluations in each round of

exchanges. Recall the justice evaluation model given earlier, $JE_{i*} = \log_{JI} \left[\frac{R_i / I_i}{R^* / I^*} \right]$. In this model, *i* is the person on whose behalf justice is being evaluated and * is information from the other person or from the reference standard used as a basis for comparison. Six comparisons of the form *i*:* are made available to S by the information given in our setting. These are S:E, S:Q, E:S, E:Q, Q:E, and Q:S. Given that our setting offers virtually no basis for socially identifying with the others, we expect *J*I (justice indifference) to be much lower when S makes an evaluation on his or her own behalf than when it is made on behalf of another. We thus hypothesize that injustice experiences, whether due to over- or under-reward, will be greater for S:E and S:Q comparisons than for any of the other four. Additionally, the subject can make overall evaluations for self, E and Q. Again, we predict higher absolute values of injustice experience for self than those made on behalf of E or Q.

Regardless of salience manipulations, subjects still may focus on absolute contributions, proportional contributions, both, or some other criterion. However, heightening the salience of one particular referential standard is tantamount to decreasing the subject's indifference toward it. That is, salience focuses attention on the reference standard and in the absence of alternative cues should heighten indifference to other potential standards. Making absolute contributions salient, for example, will (1) heighten indifference to proportional contributions, (2) reduce indifference to absolute contributions, and (3) heighten injustice experiences for any incongruences involving absolute comparisons.

We generate our hypotheses using the justice evaluation equation. For the sake of illustration, we have set justice indifference to 10 and S's contribution at 10. Here, we will illustrate how the predictions are calculated for Condition 1. Respectively, E, S, and Q contribute 7, 10, and 28 points to the group for a total of 45. The return to each member is then $(45 \times 2) / 3 = 30$. In making their contributions, E, S, and Q each withheld, respectively, 1, 6, and 4 points. So adding the 30

Table 12.3 Contributions by condition

Condition	Salience cue	Member (endowment)		
		E (8)	S (16)	Q (32)
1	Absolute	7	<i>x</i>	28
2		7	<i>x</i>	8
3		2	<i>x</i>	28
4		2	<i>x</i>	8
5	Proportional	7	<i>x</i>	28
6		7	<i>x</i>	8
7		2	<i>x</i>	28
8		2	<i>x</i>	8

points from the group fund yields $R_E = 31$, $R_S = 36$, and $R_Q = 34$. The respective group investments from Table 12.3 were $I_E = 7$, $I_S = 10$, and $I_Q = 28$. (For Condition 5 with the proportional investment condition, we would have used $I_E = 7/8$, $I_S = 10/16$, and $I_Q = 28/32$.) With justice indifference set at 10, we can use the common log in the justice evaluation model. Substituting terms for the S:E comparison gives us $JE_{SE} = \log\left[\frac{36/10}{31/7}\right] = -.09$

and for the S:Q comparison, $JE_{SQ} = \log\left[\frac{36/10}{34/28}\right] = .47$, suggesting that the subject will feel under-rewarded compared to E, over-rewarded compared to Q, and summing across experiences, will feel over-rewarded in the situation.

Table 12.4 summarizes all of the predicted injustice experiences for S in cases where S contributes 10. Not shown are parallel calculations made for S’s experiences on behalf of E and Q. These tend to have lower absolute values (due to the higher *J*) and are not our primary focus in this study. The predictions shown in Table 12.4 suggest that S experiences negative injustice (unfair under-reward) when observing E’s outcomes in any of the absolute salience conditions. That is because E received the same outcome as S, but contributed considerably less. Only in cases where Q contributed considerably more than S – Conditions 1 and 3 – does the comparison result in a positive injustice experience under absolute salience conditions. Note that despite the pattern of investments in Conditions 5–8 being identical to those in 1–4, changing the salience condition results in a different pattern of

predicted injustice experiences. This means that the setting should provide a strong test for this application of the theory.

The theory predicts the same response pattern for justice-restoring attempts – changes in contributions to the group following injustice experiences. That is, the JE model generates hypothesized reductions in contributions following perceived overall negative injustices and increments in contributions following perceived overall positive injustices.

Test #2: Different Resources

Earlier, we identified three types of resources. Due to their potentially unique patterns of impact on payoffs in public goods settings, each should also manifest unique impacts on justice evaluations. This proposed study would offer a direct test of the hypothesized differential impacts and combined impacts of different resources on fairness judgments. We again operationalize our exchange system as a public goods setting, but this time integrating features that permit the simultaneous operation of three different resources. Below, we omit some details of the experiment in order to devote more attention to key factors.

Setting and Design

Three subjects will serve as the group members in each experimental session, with each session consisting of a series of approximately 15 exchange opportunities. Subjects participate via networked computers. The group’s *raison d’être* will be to simultaneously maximize individual payoffs *and* a collective fund that will be donated anonymously to a charity. *Money* is the resource to be used for these purposes. At the same time, however, two additional resources will be integrated into the setting. Subjects will have opportunities to provide a resource to the group in the form of *friendship units*, defined in such a way that, from a resource exchange perspective, it operates the same as *love*. That is, benefit accrues to both the group *and* the actor who contributes it. Finally, each subject will be given a unique

Table 12.4 S’s injustice experience (assumes S contributes 10)

Condition	Salience cue	S:E	S:Q
1	Absolute	-.09	+.47
2		-.05	-.35
3		-.70	+.47
4		-.70	-.38
5	Proportional	+.21	+.17
6		+.25	-.68
7		-.40	+.17
8		-.40	-.68

information set, elements of which, if given to the other group members, will assist those others in achieving higher personal payoffs, but not the giver. The information is simply in the form of a two-trial sequence of monetary values that, if given to the group, will increase k for the other two members in the second of the two trials. As in the first study, subjects will respond to a set of injustice experience questions administered by the computer after each round of giving and receiving.

The success of this study hinges on the reliability and validity of measures for subjects' m and k values for each resource, that is, the values that the group and each subject associates with each resource when it is given or when it is kept. Each subject must be familiarized with each resource prior to the start of the exchange process so that their subjective valuations can be assessed. Several available methods could be used for the assessment, but psychophysical scaling will be the most expedient given that (1) it is well suited to our particular measurement needs, (2) it can be administered relatively quickly and efficiently, and (3) we are also using it to measure justice evaluations. The magnitude estimation procedures associated with this method permit the derivation of ratio-scaled response modes for subjectively evaluated phenomena, that is, a power function relating the magnitude of an objective stimulus such as "dollar amounts" to a subjective magnitude such as "value." A very robust *power law* (Stevens 1975) relates these values via the equation $f(D)=aD^p$, where the exponent captures the marginal subjective impact associated with the given stimulus (e.g., $p=.90$ could represent the diminishing marginal utility of dollars) and the proportionality constant depends on the measurement units that are used in the assessment. In our study, pretests may reveal that each resource has a fairly narrow range of estimated a and p values across subjects, allowing a single value to be used for each parameter in subsequent statistical analyses. This is frequently the case in studies using this method. Alternatively, it may be necessary to assume heterogeneity across subjects and treat a and p values as unique data points for each subject.

Built into the methodology of psychophysics are cross-validation procedures. Not only are these methods ideal for our purposes but they also provide a way to validate Foa and Foa's (1974:126) concept of the motivational state of the individual. They assume that individuals possess optimal ranges for each resource, spanning from a lower limit of indifference to an upper limit of satiation. Within these ranges, particular amounts of a given resource presumably may substitute for particular amounts of a different resource. The proposed method determines subjective values associated with various amounts of each of the three resources, either expressed in neutral units or expressed in terms of quantities of each of the other two resources. For instance, a subject may be instructed to indicate how much given quantities of friendship are worth in terms of amounts of information or amounts of money. Six such combinations are possible in this case, and, when analyzed together, they should provide a comprehensive picture of the value system activated in the experimental setting. Again, there is a good chance pretesting will reveal that these cross-valuations are generally consistent across the subject pool, making it unnecessary to assess every individual subject.

Tests

An important question in this research is whether the subjective valuations subjects initially provide for money, information, and friendship will remain stable throughout the exchange process and fairness evaluations. If so, then we can derive very precise hypotheses for justice evaluations in this relatively complex setting. Subjects will receive data on all of the transfers of money, friendship, and information transpiring in their group, and these serve as the basis for a variety of possible justice evaluations. Thus, it will be possible to test the MJT under a very novel set of circumstances. Results will provide valuable information on whether distributive justice concerns generalize across resources and whether subjects regard different kinds of resources as substitutable along some underlying value dimension.

Conclusions

Social dilemmas serve as models for untangling the complexities of cooperation in human groups. The multilevel justice theory helps us to understand the social origins and consequences of fairness perceptions. By combining the two research programs, we have constructed a theory of human responses to the dilemmas that arise in settings where cooperation may be problematic. Such models can generate further predictions, including actors' likelihoods of making future contributions or their likely use of sanctions. Resource theory furthers the model by defining the nature of the dilemma according to the resource in which each actor exchanges or contributes. We showed how resources impact the payoff structures associated with exchange of the resource, which ultimately influence justice evaluations through their effects on cooperation.

We first translated resource exchange into game theory via Foa and Foa's (1976) arguments about the implications of giving the resource. Based on their criteria, we considered three resources distinguished according to whether individuals gain by giving to others (e.g., love), neither gain nor lose by giving to others (e.g., information), or lose by giving to others (e.g., money). We then showed how the exchange of each resource can lead to different dilemmas such as the privileged game, mutual fate control, and the prisoner's dilemma.

Second, we showed how the inputs and outcomes associated with the dilemmas of resource exchange easily translate into the terms of multilevel justice theory (Markovsky 1985). By combining the two, we generated testable predictions concerning individual's justice evaluations in social dilemmas. MJT further allows us to generate predictions concerning matters such as changes in contribution behavior, the use of sanctioning, and partner selection. Theorists may then generate testable hypotheses based on the predicted injustice experience calculated from the model.

Finally, we described two possible studies that integrate social dilemmas with the justice and resource theory literatures. In the first study,

we proposed a method to test the influence of salient features of contributions – actual versus proportional – on justice evaluations. This proposed study looks at social dilemmas where subjects have asymmetric initial endowments of resources and is thus akin to real-life issues such as income tax policy. The second study proposes to test how different resources impact justice evaluations. By creating a public goods setting in which three different resources each plays a different role, it is possible for the first time to determine whether different kinds of contributions and outcomes are substitutable insofar as justice evaluations and subsequent decisions about whether or not to cooperate.

We call for a more systematized, theory-driven research program concerning justice in social dilemmas. Research on social dilemmas is powerful because of the ubiquity of such situations in our daily lives and in society. Integrating justice considerations into social dilemmas research provides us with an understanding of the basic mechanisms of cooperation (Schroeder et al. 2003, 2008). Resource theory helps to further generalize our knowledge by extending this understanding to an even broader range of common settings involving virtually any kind of socially valued resources.

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Goods, Bads, and the Foa Resources: Analyzing Their Operation in the New Unified Theory of Sociobehavioral Forces

13

Guillermina Jasso

Introduction

The purpose of a theory is to explain a lot by a little. We know there is progress when more and more is explained by less and less. The goals for which we strive are a combination of extremes – a minimum of postulates and a maximum of predictions. The theory on the hill, the gold standard, so to speak, is the hypothetico-deductive form invented by Newton (Toulmin 1978:378–379), whose postulates are “genuine guesses about the structure of the world” (Popper 1963:245), whose predictions display the “marvellous deductive unfolding” of the theory (Popper 1963:221), and whose fruitfulness is evident in the “derivations far afield from its original domain,” which “permit an increasingly broad and diversified basis for testing the theory” (Danto 1967:299–300).

As a theory grows, and as theories unify, the emergent new theory begins to display the telling stigmata, in the words of Samuel Smiles (1875), “A place for everything, and everything in its place.” This process may be jagged. Not everything comes in at once. For some elements, it may take years to come to understand their

deep connections to everything else in the theory. Nonetheless, this theoretical effort is important and may yield a variety of theoretical pleasures.

In this chapter, I look at the Foa resources – the six classes of resources identified by Foa (1971) and his associates (e.g., Foa et al. 1993) – and ask how they operate in the new unified theory of sociobehavioral forces recently proposed by Jasso (2008a) – which unifies theories of justice and comparison, status, power, identity, and, partially, happiness. As will be seen, I find the Foa resources in both the postulates and predictions of the new unified theory (NUT). Thus, they have a home in the NUT. As the NUT develops, it will be possible to trace the effects on the predictions of the NUT of the resource properties analyzed by Foa and his associates, potentially generating new and rich chains of predictions for diverse domains of individual and social phenomena.

The Foa Resources

In briefest outline, Foa (1971) identified six classes of resources. His aim was to enlarge the set of resources considered in economics and thus enable a larger, deeper theory more faithful to human behavior. Importantly, he noted that the six resources vary along two dimensions: “concreteness versus symbolism and particularism

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versus universalism” (Foa 1971:346). The six classes of resources are (Foa 1971:346):

1. Love – “an expression of affectionate regard, warmth, or comfort”
2. Status – “an expression of evaluative judgment which conveys high or low prestige, regard, or esteem”
3. Information – “includes advice, opinions, instruction, or enlightenment, but excludes those behaviors which could be classed as love or status”
4. Money – “any coin, currency, or token which has some standard unit of exchange value”
5. Goods – “tangible products, objects, or materials”
6. Services – “involve activities on the body or belongings of a person which often constitute labor for another”

Importantly, the Foa resources represent things which are important to people because they are “necessary to their well-being” (Foa 1971:345) – because, that is, they increase happiness.

Of course, we can immediately extend the class of Foa resources to things that decrease happiness. For example, money covers not only income and wealth but also taxes, liabilities, and fines. Similarly, information includes not only information that increases well-being but also information that reduces well-being (as is common in stories of war and espionage and in literature and opera – think of the information that Iago passes on to Othello). Services can be extended to anti-services, such as insult and injury to persons or their belongings. Love, too, has its dual. As for status, consider the oft-told story of the Wake Island meeting of 15 October 1950 at which General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the United Nations Command in the Korean War, failed to salute President Harry S. Truman – it would not be long before President Truman relieved General MacArthur of command on 11 April 1951.

The New Unified Theory of Sociobehavioral Forces

In briefest outline, the goal of the recently proposed new unified theory (NUT) is to integrate theories describing five sociobehavioral pro-

cesses – comparison (including justice and self-esteem), status, power, identity, and happiness (Jasso 2008a). The integration (partial, in the case of happiness) is made possible by the remarkable similarity of the internal core of the theories.

Substantively, the key idea can be traced to Plato and Aristotle, in Aristotle’s ([384-322 B.C.] 1952, *Politics*, Book 7, Chap. 8) words: “Different men seek after happiness in different ways and by different means, and so make for themselves different modes of life and forms of government.” The new theory formalizes the “different ways and ... different means” of seeking happiness by the operation of three sociobehavioral forces, in which the primordial sociobehavioral outcomes which give each force its name (status, power, comparison) are generated by distinctive mechanisms from personal quantitative characteristics (such as beauty and wealth) within groups formed by categories of personal qualitative characteristics (such as nativity, race, and gender). For example, status is generated from beauty within a classroom. Each bundle of elements, say, status-wealth-city, simultaneously generates an identity and a magnitude of happiness. Different combinations of elements – for example, power-wealth-club, status-horsemanship-army – generate distinctive identities and magnitudes of happiness.

The core of each sociobehavioral force (and hence of each of the component theories as well as of the unified theory) includes three elements, one from each of three sets:

- *Personal quantitative characteristics*
- *Personal qualitative characteristics*
- *Primordial sociobehavioral outcomes*

Personal quantitative characteristics are personal characteristics of which there can be more or less. These are of two kinds: (1) *cardinal*, such as wealth, land, and head of cattle and (2) *ordinal*, such as beauty and athletic skill. Cardinal characteristics are measured in their own units (such as dollars or acres). Ordinal characteristics are measured as relative ranks within a group or population.

Quantitative characteristics of which more is preferred to less are called *goods*; if less is preferred to more, they are called *bads*. To illustrate, for most people, wealth is a good and time in prison is a bad. In the language of philosophy, goods are what people want. They want goods

not only for their own sake but also for the sake of happiness (Aristotle [384–322 B.C.] 1952, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 1, Chap. 7). In the language of theology, goods are the things humans pray for, while bads (whose classic account is found in the Book of Job) are the things humans pray to be spared from.

Personal qualitative characteristics are unorderable, categorical personal characteristics. They may be dichotomous, like gender, or polytomous, like race, ethnicity, or religious affiliation.¹

The primordial sociobehavioral outcomes (PSOs) are generated from quantitative characteristics within the groups formed by categories of qualitative characteristics; this is the fundamental template for a sociobehavioral force. The global process, including all three elements, is called by the name of the PSO and characterized as a behavioral engine, a driver, a mechanism, or a motivational process. For example, the sociobehavioral force “status” subsumes the status PSO, the distinctive mechanism associated with the PSO, the quantitative characteristics from which the status PSO is generated, and the qualitative characteristics within whose categories the status PSO is generated. Importantly, each force has a long reach and yields implications for far-flung phenomena and associations.

The classical tradition in sociology, made explicit by Homans (1974:231), posits the operation of three basic sociobehavioral forces – status, power, and justice and the other comparison processes. In the classical tradition, all three sociobehavioral outcomes may be generated by the same quantitative characteristics – for example, wealth may generate power, it may generate status, and it may generate self-esteem and the sense of justice. This leads to the problem of how to distinguish between the three basic forces.

The new unified theory, building on the classical tradition, invokes the magical second derivative to add the new principle that each force has a distinctive rate of change. Previous work on status dating to Goode (1978) and Sørensen (1979) proposed that status increases at an increasing rate with the

quantitative characteristic, and previous work on comparison processes dating to Jasso (1978, 1990) proposed that justice and the comparison processes increase at a decreasing rate with the quantitative characteristic. Thus, Jasso (2008a) suggested that if power is indeed a basic force and not merely a synonym for status or justice, then it must increase at a constant rate. Accordingly, the theory posits that as the personal characteristic increases, status increases at an increasing rate, the comparison processes increase at a decreasing rate, and power increases at a constant rate (Jasso 2008a).

Thus, what makes each outcome special and unique is its rate of change with respect to the quantitative characteristic. As noted above, each combination of elements – for example, justice-wealth-city or status-beauty-classroom – generates a distinctive identity and a distinctive magnitude of happiness.

The comparison and power forces notice both ordinal and cardinal quantitative characteristics. Thus, when a person reflects on her knowledge of Greek or his relative rank in the wealth distribution, the quantitative characteristic has a rectangular (or continuous uniform) distribution, but when a person reflects on her amount of wealth or his amount of land, the quantitative characteristic must be approximated or modeled via a specific distribution (such as the Pareto or lognormal).

In contrast, the status force notices only relative ranks. Thus, the underlying distribution of the quantitative characteristic is always rectangular.

A long literature discusses the specific form of the functions which generate comparison and status from the quantitative characteristics. Strong cases can be made for the functional forms associated with comparison,

$$Z = \ln\left(\frac{A}{C}\right), \quad (13.1)$$

where Z denotes the comparison outcome (such as self-esteem or the justice evaluation J discussed above), A denotes the actual amount or relative rank of the good, and C denotes the expected, desired, or just amount/rank of the good, and with status,

$$S = \ln\left(\frac{1}{1-r}\right), \quad (13.2)$$

¹The idea that there are two kinds of personal characteristics, quantitative and qualitative, and that they differ in their social operation was pioneered by Blau (1974).

where S denotes status and r denotes the relative rank on the good.

For simplicity, we will often refer to the comparison force as the justice force, but it should always be understood that this is shorthand for “justice and all the other members of the class of comparison processes.”

Every person has a large repertory of combinations of sociobehavioral force, quantitative characteristic, and qualitative characteristic. And at each turn of the sociobehavioral wheel, so to speak, a new identity and a new magnitude of happiness are generated. Thus, each person can be characterized by a distinctive sociobehavioral profile, consisting of all the sociobehavioral outcome scores during an interval of time. Equivalently, as in research on identity, each person may be considered a collection of identities.

Meanwhile, a collectivity can be characterized by the instantaneous identities of all its members. Accordingly, there is potentially a rich diversity across collectivities, as known already to Plato and Aristotle.

Thus, in the spirit of the classical tradition, the individual’s configuration of identities gives rise to personality, and the society’s configuration of its members’ identities gives rise to culture.

In simple, a priori modeling, it is assumed that all persons are governed by the same force and reacting to the same characteristic. Accordingly, if the good is ordinal, the distribution of identities will be rectangular in the power case, positive exponential in the comparison case, and negative exponential in the status case. If the good is cardinal, the distribution of identities will still be negative exponential in the status case – because status notices only relative ranks – but will assume a wide diversity of shapes in the comparison and power cases.

Because the justice and power sociobehavioral forces distinguish between ordinal and cardinal goods, there are five kinds of identities and five kinds of societies – justice-materialistic, justice-nonmaterialistic, status, power-materialistic, and power-nonmaterialistic. This echoes Plato’s ([c. 428-348/7 B.C.] 1952, *Republic*, Book VIII) idea that there are five distinct dispositions of persons and corresponding to each a distinctive type of government.

There are yet further complexities and elaborations. For example, a person may value more than one good at the same time, and the goods may be independent or positively or negatively associated. Such combinations can lead to new distributions of the outcome, such as the distribution called “unnamed” by Jasso (2001b) and extended to the mirror-exponential family introduced and analyzed by Jasso and Kotz (2007).

Sometimes, the group or population has a subgroup structure generated by a qualitative characteristic, such as race or sex. In such case, each individual has access not only to the identity generated by his or her magnitude or relative rank in the quantitative characteristic – now called the personal identity – but also to a new identity called the subgroup identity and defined as the average of the personal identities within the subgroup (Jasso 2008a).

The new unified theory generates an abundance of testable predictions, some intuitive, others counterintuitive, and including novel predictions. Some of these predictions are generated by each of the three component theories – justice, status, power. Other predictions pertain to the effects of the active force and could not have been generated from within any of the component theories. The predictions are generated by four techniques which have come to be called the micromodel, macromodel, mesomodel, and matrixmodel. The names signal the initial setup of each model. However, all four techniques yield predictions for all levels of analysis. The predictions discussed in this and the following sections are drawn from Jasso (1980, 2001a, b, 2008a, b).

Some predictions that have been generated from comparison theory include:

1. A thief’s gain from theft is greater when stealing from a fellow group member than from an outsider, and this premium is greater in poor groups than in rich groups.
2. Parents of two or more non-twin children will spend more of their toy budget at an annual gift-giving occasion than at the children’s birthdays.
3. Blind persons are less at risk of eating disorders than are sighted persons.

4. Veterans of wars fought on home soil have lower risk of posttraumatic stress syndrome than veterans of wars fought away from home.
5. Conflict between subgroups is an increasing function of economic inequality, but the effect of the subgroups' relative sizes depends on the form of the valued good's distribution.
6. Vocations to the religious life are an increasing function of economic inequality.
7. In societies and eras where mothers predecease fathers, mothers are mourned more than fathers, but where fathers predecease mothers, fathers are mourned more than mothers.

Some predictions are the same across all three basic sociobehavioral forces. An example of such a prediction is as follows: In a society with two subgroups that are nonoverlapping on the valued good, such that, for example, the richest person in the bottom subgroup is poorer than the poorest person in the top subgroup, the lower-ranking from each subgroup maximize their identity (and happiness) by attaching and orienting themselves to the subgroup, but the higher-ranking from each subgroup maximize their well-being by being individualists. Thus, across all societies, it is a mistake for subgroups to entrust matters of importance to "the best and the brightest" – because, in a crisis, these will put their interests ahead of the subgroup's.

An early assumption of comparison theory and one that can be extended immediately to status and power suggests that love and marital cohesiveness increase, the smaller the difference between the two spouses' scores on the sociobehavioral forces –i.e., their identity and happiness (Jasso 1988). Conversely, social distance and the potential for conflict increase with the discrepancy between individuals' scores (personal identity) or subgroups' average scores (the subgroup identity).

Other predictions differ across the three basic sociobehavioral forces. An early example is the prediction that in a society dominated by comparison, each person is closer to the neighbor above than to the neighbor below, while in a status society, each person is closer to the neighbor below than to the neighbor above, and in a power society, each person is equally close to the

neighbors above and below – a consequence of the distinctive rates of change.

In some applications, some predictions are the same for all three forces while others differ. For example, in the application above with the two nonoverlapping subgroups, the prediction discussed holds for all three forces. Other predictions, however, depend on the sociobehavioral force. Whether the individualists are in the majority depends on both the sociobehavioral force and the valued good, as do the proportions from each subgroup among the individualists and the subgroup-oriented (Jasso 2008a).

If the subgroups are races and the subgroup-oriented prefer to live in segregated neighborhoods while the individualists prefer to live in a mixed neighborhood, results include the following, for the special case where status is the active sociobehavioral force (Jasso 2010):

1. The proportion who prefer to live in the mixed neighborhood is always less than half.
2. The proportion integrationist in the black subgroup is always larger than the proportion integrationist in the white subgroup.
3. In the whole population, the proportion integrationist exceeds the proportion segregationist when the proportion black is between approximately 36% and 76%.
4. The integrationist group (or mixed neighborhood) has a fifty-fifty composition from the two racial subgroups when the proportion of the population in the black subgroup is about 44%.

The results differ when comparison or power is the active force, and the results further differ according to whether the valued good is cardinal or ordinal and, if cardinal, its distributional form. For example, when comparison is the active sociobehavioral force and the valued good is either ordinal or has a power-function distribution, the proportion of the population who prefer to live in a mixed neighborhood will always exceed half. Further, continuing with the case of comparison, if the valued good is distributed log-normally, the proportion who prefer to live in a mixed neighborhood will exceed half only if the proportion black exceeds half.

Another recent three-force model pertains to the case where a ruler is overthrown, analyzing

the determinants of whether the deposed ruler is killed or enslaved (Jasso 2008b). The model pertains to societies which value ordinal goods like bravery, yielding predictions for three of the five types of societies – justice-nonmaterialistic, status, and power-nonmaterialistic – and covering the magnitude of members’ gains from killing or enslaving the deposed ruler. Results indicate that in a justice-nonmaterialistic world, the gains from removing the deposed ruler are equal if and only if the deposed ruler is killed, while in a power-nonmaterialistic world, the gains from removing the deposed ruler are equal if and only if the deposed ruler is enslaved. Accordingly, the theory predicts that if justice is the active sociobehavioral force, there is only a single path to equal gains – killing the deposed ruler. Thus, we speculate that the deposed ruler is killed only in a justice-nonmaterialistic regime and with the otherwise noble purpose of achieving equality.

Foa Resources in the New Unified Theory of Sociobehavioral Forces

The most important thing to note is that both resource theory and the new unified theory have a common purpose – to understand happiness. As noted above, Foa (1971) conceptualized the resources as necessary for well-being, and Jasso (1980, 2008a) conceptualized justice theory and later the new unified theory as formalizing the process that generates happiness. Thus, both efforts grow out of the same spirit, and hence, a priori, we can expect similarities and overlaps.

Having summarized the Foa resources in the section on “[The Foa Resources](#)” and the new unified theory in the section on “[The New Unified Theory of Sociobehavioral Forces](#)”, we turn now to explicitly locate the Foa resources within the new unified theory. We follow the same order in which Foa (1971:341) presented the resource classes.

1. Love. Love plays a prominent part in the marriage predictions and, more subtly, in the predictions for parental patterns of giving gifts to their children. The prediction that parents of two or more non-twin children will spend more of their toy budget at an annual gift-giving occasion (such as Christmas or New Year’s or

the Feast of the Three Kings) than at the children’s birthdays is based on two premises: (1) parents love their children and want them to be happy, and (2) children become unhappy if only one of them receives a gift.

2. Status. Status is one of the three basic sociobehavioral forces.
3. Information. Information permeates the new unified theory and its predictions. First, individuals have information about their own and others’ characteristics albeit sometimes in limited or incomplete form; this information is critical for status, comparison, and power processes. Second, in comparison theory, information about group parameters such as the average wealth is sometimes used to form the comparison standard. Third, information about subgroup parameters such as the subgroup average wealth is used to contrast own and subgroup identities in all three basic forces. Fourth, information plays a part in many of the predictions; examples include interruptions in conversation and the prediction that a just society has a mixed government – benefits are distributed by the many and burdens by the few.
4. Money. Some of the personal quantitative characteristics which generate the sociobehavioral outcomes are based on money and measured in units of money.
5. Goods. Foa-type goods correspond to cardinal characteristics which are transferable, as in the theft and gift predictions.
6. Services. Foa-type services and anti-services appear in many of the predictions. These include the theft and gift predictions, the deposed ruler predictions, and love predictions. They also appear in predictions for appointing the head of an organization and for destruction of property due to war or natural disaster.

Concluding Note

Resource theory, pioneered by Uriel Foa in the early 1970s and developed with associates, provides a systematic framework for analyzing the resources individuals use and exchange and from which they derive meaning and well-being.

Meanwhile, virtually all theoretical and empirical work in the social sciences incorporates one or another of the Foa resources – for example, money, love, and status. One of these approaches, the new unified theory of sociobehavioral forces, building on large literatures in the study of justice and status, posits that personal quantitative characteristics (such as wealth, skill, and other goods and bads) generate the primordial sociobehavioral outcomes (such as status, power, and the sense of justice) within groups formed by personal qualitative characteristics (such as citizenship and gender). Moreover, examination of the theory indicates that further outcomes such as love and social cohesion arise from the individuals' sociobehavioral outcomes (status, justice, etc.) and that, indeed, the Foa resources are at work in all corners of the new unified theory. This chapter began the effort to analyze the precise ways that goods, bads, and the Foa resources operate in the NUT and to make the overlap transparent. This work thus suggests that resource theory and the new unified theory might benefit from explicit theoretical integration.

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The Complementary Natures of Resource Theory and Interpersonal Evaluation Theory

14

Robert Gifford and Michael Cave

Fifty years ago, exchange theories came to prominence in social psychology through the work of Thibaut and Kelley (1959) and Homans (1958). Social interaction, particularly satisfying social interaction, was seen as a consequence of exchanging rewards, in particular rewards that exceeded costs, leading to a “profit” outcome that meets or exceeds a person’s expectations or “comparison level.” Later, Foa and Foa (1974) also postulated that social life can be characterized by the exchange of resources but specified the types of commodities that are exchanged. These are, by now, the familiar six: love, status, information, money, goods, and services.

One important value of this advance, to set out the specific types of resources exchanged in social life, was to set the stage for more focused theories; if the periodic table of the chemical elements may be invoked as a model, the Foa and Foa set of postulated resources helped to specify and organize the resources people exchange. This has important heuristic value as the science of social interaction progresses.

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The main purpose of this chapter is to suggest a further kind of organization in the same spirit. We propose that *who the other person is* should be considered. Just as Foa and Foa (1974) realized the value of categorizing the types of resources exchanged, rather than thinking of resources as an amorphous mass of possibilities, we suggest that progress will be made if a similar effort is made to categorize the types of individuals who exchange the resources. In brief, this chapter proposes and examines how resource theory (RT; Foa et al. 1993a; Foa and Foa 1974) and interpersonal evaluation theory (IET; Gifford 2000, 2010) may complement each other.

Needs as the Foundation

The study of human needs has a long history in psychology (e.g., Maslow 1954; Murray et al. 1938). Needs were notably acknowledged as part of interpersonal life by Murray and his colleagues (1938) in their early need-press theory, which proposed a list of 20 needs that people try to fulfill. The idea of needs and the motivation to satisfy them was later presented by Maslow (1954), who proposed that individuals have a hierarchy of needs that they strive to fulfill. Needs have recently been investigated with increased interest (e.g., Baumeister and Leary 1995; Deci and Ryan 2000; Fiske 2003; Pittman and Zeigler 2007; Pyszczynski et al. 2003). Not all needs are social, of course, but

for needs that are social in nature, clearly it is other persons who help us to fulfill those needs.

Both RT and IET consider needs as the foundation for their theories' social dynamics. Foa and Foa (1974) introduced RT, which proposes that personal interactions are motivated by a drive to fulfill certain resource-based needs. They propose that social interactions are much like the barter-and-trade systems found in the early periods of human civilization. A need is created by a deficiency in a particular resource. A person is said to seek to fill that deficiency, or need, by interacting with others who have an abundance of the resource in which they are deficient (Foa and Foa 1974). A resource is defined as "anything transacted in an interpersonal situation" and is further refined as "any item, concrete or symbolic, which can become the object of exchange among people" (Foa et al. 1993b, p. 2).

Following the development of a measure of perceived needs for the six resources (Foa and Bosman 1979), RT theorists began to explore the differential perceived needs of groups (Foa and Krieger 1985). In contrast, IET ultimately draws its inspiration from the work of Murray et al. (1938). The RT tradition focuses on the need for the six classes of resources, whereas IET focuses on the need for types of persons who are seen as potential suppliers of key social needs. The needs in RT theory are straightforward in terms of their proposed origin; those in IET theory have taken a less simple path, which requires some explication.

Who Are These Others?

Other people are crucial for need fulfillment, yet they often are treated generically or discussed as mere examples in the literature on needs and goals, often because the focus is on the particular needs under consideration. For example, "Winch's (1958) theory of need complementarity proposes two forms of interpersonal attraction based upon the need structures of individuals in a dyad. In one, persons *A* and *B* are complementary in need structure because *A* is high and *B* is low in the same need" (Secord and Backman 1964, p. 252).

Our central assertion is that interacting individuals deserve more specific attention, primarily because they are not all the same or interchangeable; they should not to be dismissed as "*A*" and "*B*." Oddly, after decades of social psychology research, interacting individuals have hardly become any less anonymous. We believe that without an elaboration and differentiation of the types of persons sought, as individuals attempt to fulfill their needs, a complete account of social interaction is lacking.

Put another way, if the fulfillment of many or even most needs requires interacting with other people, *who are these others?* As Murray and his colleagues (1938) wrote over 70 years ago: "What should interest us particularly is the nature of the [social] objects ..." (p. 107). However, since their injunction, no systematic research or theory has focused on the taxonomic structure of social goal objects. The "other" usually is ignored in terms of being a particular sort of person or assumed to be "anyone" who might satisfy a need or a goal. Of course, one obvious reason for this lack of systematic attention to the nature of "others" is their very numerosity and diversity. As Murray et al. (1938) also aptly observed, "It can have no scientific meaning to say that an *S* likes Bill Snooks, or enjoys the works of Fred Fudge ..." (p. 107). Despite their awareness of the problem, even Murray and his colleagues did not develop a taxonomy of social objects beyond proposing two simple distinctions among them: the other's *status* (e.g., higher status, more dominant, or competent versus lower status, less dominant, and competent) and *ideology* (e.g., program of action, strategy, or philosophy). However, this failure to pursue a more complete taxonomy does not mean that social objects should not be considered, even to Murray et al.: "... the object, as such, can have no scientific status until it is analysed and formulated as a compound of psychologically relevant attributes" (1938, p. 107–8).

Yet few have systematically tackled the problem of how to deal with the myriad of potential goal objects (one notable exception is Törnblom and Nilsson 1993). Rather, modern theories such as self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan 2000), terror management theory (Pyszczynski et al. 2003), and core social motive theory (Fiske 2003) are largely devoted to another worthy task,

that of reducing the long, somewhat unworkable lists of *needs* posited by early researchers (e.g., Murray et al. 1938) into more manageable, parsimonious, and heuristic taxonomies.

Toward a Compendium of, and Structure, for Need-Fulfilling Person Types

Therefore, one necessary step toward scientific progress is to discover a way to structure, classify, or organize the myriad of “others” in a parsimonious way. Our overall goal has been to further this objective. The two specific purposes of this effort are (a) to create a reasonably comprehensive list of goal objects, which we define as person types, and (b) to seek a reasonably simple structure for them. A fundamental premise of this investigation is that a more complete understanding of social motivation and, indeed, of all social cognition and interaction, requires knowing more about *which* sort of other person is sought for *which* sorts of needs and goals (cf. Brewer 1988).

Individuals often, or even constantly, assess and reassess one another. Until now, person perception research has focused on trait-like attributes of other persons (e.g., energetic, assured, or cold; Asch 1946); characteristics that might serve as bases for judgments of others’ suitability for interdependent relations (e.g., trustworthiness or cooperativeness; Cottrell et al. 2006); or prototypes, exemplars, categories, or social stereotypes (Andersen and Klatzky 1987; Anderson and Sedikides 1991; Brewer 1988; Cantor and Mischel 1979; Fiske et al. 1999). However, these approaches have not set out to discover a compendium of person types nor to reduce such a compendium to an economical taxonomy. In one partial exception to this, research participants were asked which goals their participants had in terms of five types of significant other: mother, friend, romantic partner, classmate, and roommate (Fitzsimons and Bargh 2003). One suspects that these five person types were selected ad hoc, to roughly represent “significant others,” rather than with any taxonomic goal.

In general, science cannot advance without some organization of complex constructs or items;

chemistry’s periodic table may be the prime example, but the interpersonal circle (e.g., Wiggins 1979) and Big Five personality framework (e.g., Costa and McCrae 1996) are instances of construct organization that have importantly aided the understanding of personality and reinvigorated research in that area.

A Functional Approach

We propose a functionalist solution to this problem, and this is where IET returns to the theoretical vicinity of RT. IET suggests that people view others as potential need fulfillers, that is, when individuals have a need, they seek a person who has, or is believed to have, particular *resources* to fulfill that need.¹ For example, one might predict that a person with a strong need for competence (Deci and Ryan 2000) is likely to seek a teacher, mentor, or coach to help fulfill that need. Those with a need for power might be expected to seek individuals they can lead, those who find fulfillment in being a follower presumably will seek someone to lead or inspire them, and those who need a challenge presumably will seek opponents.²

The Roots of Interpersonal Evaluation Theory

Although many distinguished thinkers have deeply considered interpersonal perception and processes (e.g., Anderson 1962; Anderson and Sedikides 1991; Asch 1946; Brunswik 1956, pp. 26–40, Cantor and Mischel 1979; Homans 1958; Kenny 1994; Laing et al. 1966; Maslow

¹IET also proposes that persons also evaluate themselves, as to how they might or might not satisfy the needs of others, in a parallel manner, although this theme will be developed in future papers.

²To regard the other as an enemy, opponent, or challenger may not appear to “satisfy a need,” although it certainly seems to for some people: many individuals seek opponents in sports or business as a way of challenging themselves or others. Others even seem to seek (and find) enemies (cf. Adams 2005; Dodge 2006; Van Vugt et al. 2007).

and Mintz 1956; McArthur and Baron 1983; Murray et al. 1938; Wiggins 1979, 1980), the interpersonal circle system of Leary (1957) seems particularly relevant to this investigation's goals because of its fundamental premise that psychological constructs often form a particular structure.

For example, Leary (1957) work has inspired the discovery of circumplexial structures for dispositions (e.g., Kiesler 1983; Wiggins 1979), emotions (Russell 1980), nonverbal behaviors (Gifford 1994), and clinical constructs (Benjamin 2005). In most of these structures, the primary axes may be described in terms of agency and communion (Bakan 1966), that is, power, control, and mastery (and their antitheses) along one dimension, and love, warmth, and nurturance (and their antitheses) along the other.³ Some social psychological theories also propose central constructs that resemble these main axes. For example, the primary social cognition judgments are said to be about competence and warmth (Fiske et al. 2007).

One important benefit of circumplex-based models is that their structures suggest specific implications about the relations between and among their constituent constructs, something that mere lists do not. Thus, the present research seeks to discover whether a circumplexial structure might exist for person types.

The Hypothesized Structure of Person Types

Therefore, we selected the circumplex as a general working hypothesis for this potential structure. Given the role-like nature of the person types, to translate agency into power-oriented person types, and communion into love-oriented person types seemed a reasonable starting point (see Fig. 14.1). Thus, the agency or power axis might be expected to be represented by person types ranging from boss to employee, and the

communion or love axis might be expected to be represented by person types ranging from friend to enemy. The off-axis person types might be expected to be combinations of these primary axes. The teacher (upper right) is a somewhat powerful person who is liked. The ally (lower right) is a weaker but appreciated person. The student (lower left) is a weaker person who requires effort and thus, while not an enemy, is loved less. The challenger (upper left) is a somewhat powerful person who, while not hated like an enemy, is not loved either. The center of the circumplex might well be inhabited by the "nobody," an other whom one does not know well at all, and therefore is not assessed as having any particular typological character (see Fig. 14.1).⁴

A Problem and a Proposed Solution

Resource theory proposes that six classes of resources are exchanged: love, status, information, money, goods, and services. It proposes a general basis for human social interaction, but says little about the different *types of people* with whom one exchanges resources in everyday social interactions. Of course, resource theory has not ignored that exchanges occur between particular (as opposed to random) persons. For example, resources are said to derive their value from the "identity" of the provider (source) of the resource (Foa 1971), and exchanges have been examined in terms of the particularist-to-universalist nature of the source in relation to the particularist-to-universalist nature of the resource and how these match or not (e.g., Törnblom and Nilsson 1993). So far, however, resource theory has not considered the nature of the source or provider outside that person's particularism-universalism.

³Interestingly, Wiggins' (1979) approach to personality as a circumplex drew upon the Foas' ideas.

⁴The eight major person types are, around the circumplex from the top: Boss, Teacher, Friend, Ally, Employee, Student, Enemy, and Challenger. The person types are based on the two major dimensions that underlie other circumplexes, which are usually described as power and love (Leary 1957), dominance and warmth (Wiggins 1979), or agency and communion (Horowitz 2004).




Fig. 14.1 The interpersonal evaluation theory circumplex. IET proposes that others begin, in our experience of them, as unknowns (nobody) and evolve with experience into a

person type defined by seeming to have more or less power and be loved more or less. With further experience, the other's person type may change from that type to another

Interpersonal evaluation theory (IET; Gifford 2000, 2010) proposes a taxonomy of person types that would distill the very large and therefore scientifically unmanageable number of others that individuals encounter in their social world into a manageably parsimonious set of person types. These types are based on prototypical roles and are defined from the actor's perspective (i.e., how they are experienced). They may, but do not necessarily, correspond to the formal roles in the actor's life. For example, one may experience one's spouse as a boss without the spouse actually being one's employer. IET proposes that individuals search for others in their social environment who might satisfy their needs. However, its limitation has been that it has not directly considered which kind of *resources* individuals prefer to exchange.

Thus, in sum, RT focuses on resources without considering differences in need satisfaction seeking, and IET focuses on the latter without considering the former. This study examines the potential connections between the two theories by investi-

gating which of the six resources, as defined by RT, people prefer to exchange with four key IET person types: boss, friend, employee, and enemy.⁵ These four person types are defined as follows: friend, someone with whom you could talk for hours; boss, someone who has supervised you (either on the job or in another life activity); employee, someone whom you have supervised (either on the job or in another life activity); and enemy, someone with whom you have fought or struggled.

The general hypothesis is that preferences for receiving resources in return for offering different resources to different person types vary with both the resource and the person type. Because

⁵These four were chosen to be representative of the eight IET person types because the length of the questionnaire, already 288 items, would have doubled if all 8 person types were examined. The four chosen represent the 4 "cardinal" points of the circumplex; the other 4 are intermediate to these four, and thus need not be examined in a first study.

this hypothesis has not been tested before, more specific hypotheses about precisely how these differences would play out are not proposed. However, noting that RT arranges the six resource classes into two facets, particularism-universalism (ranging from love, services, and status to information, money, and goods), and concreteness-abstractness (ranging from service and goods to status and information), the possibility that these two facets might be related to expressed preferences will be actively explored.

Method

Participants

Two hundred twelve undergraduate psychology students (170 females, 39 males, and 3 who did not respond to the gender question) initially participated. All volunteered after seeing a notice for the study posted on the research participation system available online to introductory psychology students at a medium-sized Canadian university. Their ages ranged from 18 to 49, but most were 19–22, and their average age was 21.

Materials and Procedure

The questionnaire was adapted from one Foa and Foa (1974) used to investigate resource theory. The language was modernized in a few places so that the participants would be better able to easily understand what was being presented to them. Foa and Foa's questionnaire was lengthened so as to include the four IET person types.

When participants visited the website, an introductory page displayed a brief welcome statement, broadly described the study, and presented a consent form. Next, the questionnaire was presented. It consisted of four subsections, one for each of the four person types under investigation (boss, friend, employee, and enemy).⁶ Within

each person subsection, six situations were presented in which one of the six resource types (love, money, status, services, goods, or information) was hypothetically offered by the participant to one of the four person types. For example, one interaction scenario read:

You provide certain information to your Boss, someone who has supervised you (on the job or in another life activity). Rate the desirability of the following options for how you would like the Boss to respond to you, on a scale in which 1 is the least desirable and 7 is the most desirable, in your own opinion).

Six options were offered, representing the RT resources, for example (only the text in italics was presented to the participants; the non-italicized words identify the resource for this paper's purpose):

Your Boss expresses respect for you (status); You are made to feel that your Boss enjoys your company (love); Your Boss tells you something that you didn't know beforehand (information); Your Boss gives you money in return (money); Your Boss gives you an object that you like (goods); Your Boss does a favor for you (services).

In total, each participant responded to 144 items (i.e., for each of the four person types, six resources were offered to the other person).⁷ In each of these 24 situations, the participant's preferences for each of the six resources were requested. The order of choices for preferred resources was randomized from situation to situation, in order to reduce monotony that could arise from responding to many similar situations and to lessen response biases, but the text was not changed.

The questionnaire also contained five randomly placed items which explicitly instructed the participant to select one particular response. This was done to check whether participants were reading each question carefully. Incorrect answers to these items were used as an indicator that a participant was not responding conscientiously. Finally, the

⁶Although it may seem odd to suggest that persons have a need for enemies, many people do have them, and in fact some people do report needing or even valuing enemies (Adams 2005).

⁷Participants also answered a parallel set of questions about a negative interaction, that is, when the other person removed or deprived the participant of a resource, but because of the length and complexity of the results, that part of the study will be reported elsewhere.

participants were asked for basic demographic information: age, gender, and occupation (provided their main occupation was not student).

Results

Among the 212 participants, 45 answered one or more of the five check questions incorrectly. Although some of these participants may have made an isolated error and provided generally valid data, we removed the data from all 45 of those participants to be careful, which left data provided by 167 participants for the following analyses:

The results for all 144 choices made by each participant may be examined in various ways, depending on the question one wishes to answer. Because this was an exploratory study, we present the results in several ways, but the primary emphasis is on the question of how the six resources are related to the four person types, in order to explore the complementary nature of the two theories.

In the service of completeness and clarity, the means and standard deviations for each of the 144 choices are presented in Table 14.1. This allows the reader to consider the participants' preference means for every combination of resource and person type.

Table 14.1 Preferences for receiving a resource after offering a resource to another person by person type and resource ($n = 167$)

Resource received	Resource given											
	Services		Love		Money		Goods		Status		Information	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Boss												
Status	6.46	0.96	5.96	1.34	5.84	1.78	5.47	1.62	6.37	1.06	6.02	1.34
Love	5.43	1.31	5.87	1.40	4.43	1.84	4.46	1.74	5.48	1.47	4.25	1.78
Information	4.47	1.46	4.22	1.52	3.12	1.64	3.40	1.56	4.13	1.73	4.50	1.78
Money	5.40	1.54	2.14	1.60	5.10	1.84	3.95	1.93	2.42	1.62	3.04	1.80
Goods	4.08	1.79	3.14	1.73	3.58	1.78	4.61	1.77	2.82	1.57	3.00	1.66
Service	4.84	1.48	3.35	1.82	5.13	1.46	4.95	1.49	3.48	1.57	4.30	1.63
Friend												
Status	6.46	0.98	6.03	1.08	5.88	1.44	5.61	1.58	6.42	1.12	6.16	1.17
Love	6.43	1.04	6.56	0.93	4.92	1.88	5.34	1.86	6.10	1.25	5.37	1.76
Information	4.78	1.68	4.06	1.82	3.13	1.73	3.47	1.75	4.03	1.91	4.72	1.93
Money	2.04	1.50	1.37	0.98	4.17	2.10	2.64	1.79	1.64	1.22	1.78	1.41
Goods	3.27	1.83	2.84	1.85	3.37	1.79	4.65	1.84	2.48	1.54	2.53	1.61
Service	5.22	1.50	2.81	1.74	5.19	1.52	4.90	1.59	3.29	1.74	4.02	1.71
Employee												
Status	6.56	0.86	6.05	1.33	5.69	1.54	5.61	1.60	6.29	1.16	5.90	1.36
Love	5.47	1.40	5.93	1.47	4.38	1.85	4.57	1.81	5.34	1.52	4.57	1.83
Information	3.75	1.70	3.52	1.84	2.79	1.65	3.19	1.57	3.67	1.80	4.36	1.87
Money	2.31	1.81	1.53	1.26	4.81	2.10	3.05	1.99	1.80	1.37	2.05	1.44
Goods	2.43	1.67	2.36	1.58	3.09	1.91	4.22	1.89	2.43	1.46	2.60	1.53
Service	4.50	1.94	2.79	1.77	4.65	1.73	4.77	1.61	3.42	1.79	4.31	1.71
Enemy												
Status	5.95	1.66	5.67	1.66	5.32	1.85	5.19	1.91	6.10	1.41	5.43	1.75
Love	3.50	1.95	4.99	2.01	3.57	2.02	3.58	1.92	4.16	2.01	3.32	1.80
Information	3.66	1.98	3.69	1.95	3.16	1.88	3.19	1.84	3.57	1.90	4.34	2.07
Money	3.78	2.25	1.74	1.44	5.67	1.80	4.20	2.33	2.26	1.73	2.78	1.90
Goods	3.34	2.10	2.68	1.89	3.72	2.00	4.70	1.95	2.69	1.64	3.01	1.71
Service	4.95	1.88	2.99	1.90	4.92	1.87	4.71	1.71	3.49	1.88	4.63	1.83

Main Effects: Which Resources Are Most Preferred and from Which Person Types?

To examine the main and interaction effects, within-subjects two-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine how received resource preference varied by person type, resource, and the interaction of the two. The main purpose of the study was to investigate whether preference varies for different combinations of resources and person types, and so the interactions in these ANOVAs most closely test this general hypothesis. However, preferences also may significantly vary by resource and by person type separately as main effects. The main effects are reported first and the interactions after.

First, across *all* person types to which resources were offered and *all* resource types offered, which resource was most strongly preferred to be received in return by the participants? The grand means, on the 1-to-7 scale, were services 4.55, money 4.39, goods 4.20, information 4.02, status 3.87, and love 3.85.

Second, which *resource* did participants most prefer to receive across all four person types to whom they offered that particular resource? For each of the six resources offered, status was most strongly preferred as a resource to be received, and love usually was second or third. Usually, but not uniformly, the remaining preferences were, in order, for services, information, goods, and money. Among the pairwise comparisons for resources, all were significantly different from one another ($p < .004$), except that between money and goods ($p > .05$). See Table 14.1 for details.

Third, from which *person types* did participants most prefer to receive resources? The nearly universal answer (i.e., for almost every resource offered) was boss, friend, employee, and enemy, in that order. Among the pairwise comparisons for the person types, all were significantly different ($p < .001$) from each other, except for receiving services from an employee and from an enemy ($p > .05$). See Table 14.1 for details.

Interactions: Resource Exchange Preferences Depend on Both Resource and Person Type

The main effects just described have their own interest, but our hypothesis was that the desirability of exchanging resources depends on *both* the person type with whom the exchange is made *and* the resource in question. Thus, in statistical terms, we predicted significant interactions. At the overall level, the ANOVA revealed that participant preferences significantly differed for resources offered to them in return, $F(5, 157) = 134.99, p < .001$; for the other's person type, $F(3, 159) = 55.19, p < .001$; and—as hypothesized—for the resource \times person type interaction, $F(15, 147) = 45.96, p < .001$. At the within-subject level, all three effects were also significant (all $ps < .001$); this was also true of all six resource-specific interactions to be described next.

The interaction effects are reflected, at the descriptive level, in the matrix of 24 means (six resources to be received in return for offering services to each of the four person types). What do we see at this descriptive level? The largest difference in preferences for any *resource* received in return for offering any of the resources was, not surprisingly, between receiving love from a friend ($m = 6.41$) and receiving love from an enemy ($m = 3.48$). The largest difference in preferences received from any *person type* was between receiving status from a friend ($m = 6.47$) and money from a friend ($m = 2.04$). Of all 24 preferences in the matrix, the smallest preference was the latter (money from a friend) and the strongest preference was for receiving status from an employee ($m = 6.47$).

Preferences by Resource Offered

Services

In the case of services offered to the other person, the multivariate tests showed that participant preferences significantly differed for resources offered to them in return, $F(5, 157) = 134.99, p < .001$;

the other's person type, $F(3, 159) = 55.19, p < .001$); and the resource x person type interaction, $F(15, 147) = 45.96, p < .001$). The hypothesis is supported by the latter significant interaction. In the matrix of 24 means (six resources to be received in return for offering services to each of the four other person types), the largest difference in preferences for a resource received in return for offering a service was between receiving love from a friend ($m = 6.41$) and love from an enemy ($m = 3.48$). (For details of other differences about services, see Table 14.1. The same will be true for the following five resources. Details are available from the authors.)

Money

In the case of money offered to the other person, the multivariate tests showed that participant preferences significantly differed for resources offered to them in return, $F(5, 154) = 99.18, p < .001$); the other's person type, $F(3, 156) = 6.78, p < .001$); and the resource x person type interaction, $F(15, 144) = 12.13, p < .001$). Again, the hypothesis is supported by the latter significant interaction. In the matrix of 24 means, the largest difference in preferences received in return for offering money was between receiving money from a friend ($m = 4.15$) and receiving money from an enemy ($m = 5.70$) (!).

Goods

In the case of goods offered to the other person, the multivariate tests showed that participant preferences significantly differed for resources offered in return, $F(5, 152) = 76.61, p < .001$); the other's person type, $F(3, 154) = 46.01, p < .001$); and the resource x person type interaction, $F(15, 142) = 19.64, p < .001$). Once again, the hypothesis is supported. In the matrix of 24 means, the largest difference for a resource to be received in return for offering goods was between receiving goods from a friend ($m = 4.67$) and goods from an enemy ($m = 2.66$).

Information

In the case of information offered to others, the multivariate tests showed that participant preferences significantly differed for resources offered to the participant in return, $F(5, 151) = 161.11, p < .001$); the other's person type, $F(3, 153) = 6.78, p = .002$); and the resource x person type interaction, $F(15, 141) = 17.84, p < .001$). Again, the hypothesis is supported by the latter significant interaction. In the matrix of 24 means, the largest difference for a resource to be received in return for offering information was between receiving love from a friend ($m = 5.30$) and love from an enemy ($m = 3.28$).

Status

In the case of status offered to the other person, the multivariate tests showed that participant preferences significantly differed for resources to be received in return, $F(5, 145) = 200.86, p < .001$); the other's person type, $F(3, 147) = 11.49, p < .001$); and the resource x person type interaction, $F(15, 135) = 12.49, p < .001$). Again, the hypothesis is supported by the latter significant interaction. In the matrix of 24 means, the largest difference for a resource to be received in return for offering status to the other was between receiving love from a friend ($m = 6.07$) and receiving love from an enemy ($m = 4.18$).

Love

In the case of love offered to another person, the multivariate tests showed that participant preferences significantly differed for resources offered to them in return, $F(5, 155) = 271.60, p < .001$); the other's person type, $F(3, 157) = 17.21, p < .001$); and the resource x person type interaction, $F(15, 145) = 12.07, p < .001$. As for all the other five resources offered, the hypothesis is supported. In the matrix of 24 means, the largest difference for a resource to be received for offering love was between receiving love from a friend ($m = 6.57$) and love from an enemy ($m = 4.96$).

Discussion

We began by hypothesizing that the other person should be considered in the resource theory of interpersonal exchanges. Based on several varieties of circumplex theory that all suggest two cardinal dimensions—agency and communion—we constructed a typology of persons who might supply eight important social needs derived theoretically from the two dimensions. Four of these, representing the theory's cardinal points, were examined here. The results are strongly affirmative. They show that, across a series of scenarios in which participants hypothetically offered another person each of the six RT resources, preferences vary not only with the resource and with the type of person with whom one is exchanging resources but also with the combination of the two.

Resource theory—like virtually all social psychology theories—has lacked a parsimonious taxonomy of actors. Interpersonal evaluation theory has lacked specification of the types of resources that people exchange. This study explored the utility of specifying both resource type and person type when explicating social interactions and found that doing so has value. In short, we suggest that the union of resource theory and interpersonal evaluation theory has important benefits for both theories and for social psychology in general.

Which Resources Do People Prefer to Receive, Regardless of Which They Offer to Whom?

Although our major point is that both resource type and person type are important, it remains true that some resources are more desirable than others, as a main effect. Both RT and IET propose that individuals seek others for fulfillment of their needs, and that needs are fulfilled by receiving various kinds of resources. One may then reasonably ask which resources are most preferred to be received, across *all resource types offered to all person types*.

Considered this way, the answer is services, money, and goods, followed by information, status,

and love. In terms of the facets that produce RT's resource circumplex (Foa and Foa 1974), this suggests that the more concrete-universalistic resources are preferred over the more abstract-particularistic resources. As always, this may be a function in part of the sample studied, in our case, Canadian university students, but might it be true more broadly? Among Swedish adults, when collapsed across source type (Fig. 14.1), status, love, and information were rated as more important than service and money (Törnblom and Nilsson 1993).⁸ Thus, the two studies report almost directly opposite conclusions. Whether this difference (change) with culture, economics, or age is legitimate, or was caused by some difference in methods, remains to be resolved.

A small difference, perhaps inconsequential, is that in the present study, participants were asked how much they *desired* each resource, whereas in the Törnblom and Nilsson study participants were asked how *important* each resource was. Probably a more noteworthy methodological difference between the two studies is that in the present study, the results were obtained by asking the respondents to report how much they desired to receive each resource *after offering each one of the six resource types* to the other, whereas in the Törnblom and Nilsson study, the respondents were not asked about which resources they had first offered to the other person or whether they had (mentally) offered any at all. Perhaps the reason for the strikingly different results in the two studies lies hidden, in the sense that the resources that the Swedish participants imagined or did not consider as they reported the importance of each resource are unknown.

Which Resources Do People Prefer to Receive, Depending on Which They Offer?

Alternatively, we may consider the answer in terms of *each resource offered* (while still collapsing across all four person types, as before).

⁸Data for goods were not displayed in Fig. 14.1.

From this angle—for *each* of the six resources offered—status was most strongly preferred as a resource to be received, and love usually was second or third. The remaining preferences usually were for services, information, goods, and money, in that order. In terms of RT's facets, and again ignoring person type, people seem to prefer to receive the more abstract-particularistic resources (status and love) over the more concrete-universalistic ones (goods and money). This accords better with the Swedish outcome.

How can the apparent contradiction between this study's first conclusion (that services, money, and goods are more important) and the second (that status and love are more important) be resolved? The answer may be deduced from Table 14.1. No matter which resource is offered to the other person, status is the single most-preferred resource to receive in return for offering resources to others. However, *cumulatively* across the preferences for receiving all six resources in return, preferences are stronger for resources other than status. Looked at this way, (cumulative) preferences for resources are strongest when service is offered to the other. In one example from Table 14.1, consider the preferences for receiving status and money when services versus status are offered to the boss. To receive status in return is most preferred in both cases, as usual (the means are 6.46 and 6.37), but to receive money from the boss in return for offering the boss *service* (mean 5.40) is much preferable than receiving money from the boss for offering the boss *status* (mean 2.42).

From Whom Do People Prefer to Receive Resources, Regardless of Which Resource They Offer?

Third, we may look at the results from the IET point of view: from which person type do people prefer to receive resources? For all resources offered to others, participants most preferred to receive resources from a boss. Perhaps they expected that boss could return the greatest amount of any given resource; amounts of resources were not specified, in the scenarios, but

perhaps participants inferred that more might be given by a boss, who presumably controls a larger amount of resources than do other person types. Receiving resources from friends was preferred next. One might surmise that this next-strongest preference stems from the inference or expectation that the relationship would be strengthened by these exchanges; that further exchanges are likely to occur, and that in the longer term, one might benefit more from future exchanges. Employees may have less to offer (cf. boss), and enemies may give the least or may give tainted or even dangerous resources; furthermore, future exchanges are less likely than with friend.

Resource Type and Person Type Matter: Which Matter Most?

The hypothesized interactions demonstrate that although some resources are more preferred in general and people prefer to receive resources from some person types more than others, combinations of the two are also significantly important. This is our main point. But which combinations are the least and most preferable? The answer is that people least prefer to receive money in return when they give love to a friend ($m=1.37$), employee ($m=1.53$), or enemy ($m=1.74$); they are a bit more eager to receive money from a boss ($m=2.14$). What do people want most, from whom? Status is huge when offering services to an employee ($m=6.56$), a friend ($m=6.46$), or a boss ($m=6.46$); status almost hits the ceiling (seven was the maximum rating). However, receiving status is also important when offering status to those same three person types status ($ms=6.29$, 6.42, and 6.37, respectively). However, happily it would seem, receiving love from a friend after offering love is also at the very top ($m=6.56$).

Limitations and Future Research

Overall, our general hypothesis and broad theoretical postulation were clearly supported. One next step is to learn how these results generalize

or not to other categories of people, including younger and older age groups, people in various economic situations, and in other cultures and contexts. We would not be surprised to find that the specific preferences change, given for example that students' lives are materially different from, say, middle-aged people, but we fully expect that the broad findings (that preferences vary with other's person type and with combinations of person type and resource) will be found.

The results are also limited to four of the eight person types in interpersonal evaluation theory. These results and analyses already can be difficult to follow without close attention; to double them would exacerbate the situation. However, the four person types studies are the "cardinal" (north, south, east, and west) points on the IET circumplex, and we see no reason why the intermediate person types (teacher between boss and friend, aide between friend and employee, student between employee and enemy, and challenger between enemy and boss) should not have the same broad outcomes.

Finally, the results are limited to positive exchanges. Sometimes, others remove resources, and that has consequences for resource exchanges, including retaliation to various degrees (e.g., Donnenwerth and Foa 1974). However, the role of person types has not yet been examined in this regard. Some evidence suggests that the seemingly universal choice for retaliation when someone removes (any class of) resource is to withdraw love (Foa et al. 1972). Again, however, one might ask whether the same result would obtain across the range of person types.

Future research should also investigate the degree of experience between the participant and the person types. For example, is there a difference in preferred resources that a person would want to receive from a boss if he or she were on the first day of work as opposed to after working for the same boss for 5 years?

Other questions concern which resource and how *much* of a resource a person would be willing to give up or receive in each of the scenarios examined in this study. For example, *how much* of *which* resources are people willing to give up

in order to fulfill their love needs? Many novels and historical events attest to the suggestion that some people are willing to give up startling amounts of their resources, but scientific investigations of these amounts are lacking. This and many other important questions remain as the complexities of resource exchanges with various person types are explored.

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J. Scott Lewis and Jeffrey A. Houser

Resource Theory: The Evolutionary Adaptation of Social Exchange

At its core, Darwin's (1859) theory of evolution claims environmental forces lead to the selection of traits that best ensure the survival of an organism/species. Sociologists have long ignored the Darwinian potential for sociological theory while at the same time mimicking the mechanics of evolution as a means for social change. For example, Marx's (1905) dialecticalism posits that as the inequities of social class (an environmental force) increase, class conflict will erupt (akin to competition over resources between biological subgroups); out of which, a new social order will emerge. As such, the emergent social order (or social organism) will better fit an environment in which egalitarian ideals supplant those of capitalism. In evolutionary terms, Marx's social revolution represents a cladogenic change in which the sudden branching of the organism's lineage

occurs as the result of an eruption of long dormant stressors.

Likewise, Parsons (1951, 1966) incorporates the mechanics of evolution, as well as its terminology, into a functionalist theory of social action. In Parsons' four factor theory, also known as the AGIL system, one requisite for a functional social order is adaptability. Adaptation in the face of changing physical and social environments allows a population or society its greatest chance of survival. Changes at the macrolevel, however, must coincide with simultaneous changes at the microlevel. We argue Foa and Foa's (1974) resource categorization represents one such social psychological adaptation and can be explained from an evolutionary perspective.

Thinking in terms of populations, rather than individuals, is primary in Darwinian evolution (Mayr 1988). The genetic diversity of the population, not the individual, or any one individual's genetic makeup provides the measure of the population's fitness. Just as sociological theories strive to bridge the micro–macro gap, microevolutionary processes (e.g., changes in allele frequencies—the basic unit of a chromosome) must be commensurate with macroevolutionary changes at or above the level of species (Dobzhansky 1937).

Parsons' theory of social action places adaptation at the cornerstone of social evolution. As new values emerge, social structures must be initiated and integrated with existing institutions to ensure system-wide maintenance. Institutions founded

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on antiquated values, which have subsequently been replaced, trend toward extinction. Latent pattern maintenance, or the passing along of successful traits, provides a fiduciary framework for social relations while at the same time eliminating pathological forms of interaction. As society evolves, individuals “learn” new ways of thinking, feeling, and interacting. The emergent categories of thought parallel the emergence of social structures. The social mind evolves as a reaction to and a precursor of structural transformations (Fiske 2000). Alan Page Fiske calls the simultaneous transformation of social structure and social mind the “complimentarity” process of evolution. Darwin (1872) too recognized that the process of evolution by natural selection applied not only to anatomic structures but also to the “mind” of an animal and to its perceptions and feelings. From a social psychological standpoint, new categories of thought emerge as the structure of social world of the individual changes. And so, we reach the premise of this chapter—our purpose is to show how resource categorization, the social psychological capacity of “mind” as envisioned by Foa and Foa (1974, 1993), rests on the complementarity of a biological, psychological, and cultural evolution.

Fiske’s Complimentarity Theory

Fiske (2000) introduces complimentarity theory as a description of “the natural selection of universal psychological mechanisms [in which] human social coordination is the product of structured psychological proclivities linked to corresponding cultural paradigms” (p. 76). Psychological proclivities refer to the microlevel stratagem people invent and transcribe to coordinate behavior. Knowing how and what others think creates an evolutionary advantage in the pursuit of cooperative goals. Psychological proclivities represent the evolutionary adaptation of “fitness-enhancing coordination devices” (p. 77). Those individuals or groups who learn to incorporate the adaptation “most reliably and rapidly and are most adept at using it” (p. 77) will accrue, via natural selection, an evolutionary advantage.

Cultural paradigms represent the much slower evolution of macrolevel social environments and institutions. However, institutional change presents “strong selection” (Fiske 2000, p. 77) forces which contextualize and facilitate changes at the microlevel. The theory’s underlying assumption is that the evolution of one without the other is insufficient to explain or “permit complex social coordination” (p. 76). Akin to W. I. Thomas’s (1923) “definition of the situation,” Fiske envisions human action embedded in a structured environment in which actors share an understanding of how to fit in, how to interact, and how to react one with the other. Where Fiske distinguishes his theory from more mainstream symbolic interactionism is the extent to which the psychological framework and cultural structures coevolve in a mutually inclusive fashion.

From Parsons to Fiske

Parsons recognized and actively sought opportunities to integrate evolutionary biology with his sociological theorizing (Parsons 1977).¹ Renée Fox (2005) positions Parsons’ evolutionary framework

¹Lidz (2005) argues that Parsons’ social evolution and Darwinian evolution are incommensurate. He sees Parsons’ social evolution as tracing the changes within a society as it moves through a series of stages, which do not culminate in the emergence of a new society. This is unlike Darwinian evolution in that changes in one species lead to the occurrence of another—the process of speciation. Lidz summarizes his argument against an evolutionary sociology as follows:

I have come to the view that true evolutionary theories apply only to systems based on processes of genetic variation and natural selection, hence strictly to biological systems. Change in sociocultural systems, including their growth in complexity in the course of human existence, seems to require explanation framed in terms of categories of the action frame of reference, even though they are undoubtedly conditioned, in Parsons’ sense of the cybernetic hierarchy of controlling and conditioning factors (Parsons 1961a, 1966), by biological processes subject to natural selection and thus evolution. (p. 310)

Lidz’s objections aside, our intent is to use the connection between Darwinian natural selection and Parsons’ theory of social action as a springboard for understanding the evolutionary roots of the resource categories outlaid in Foa and Foa’s (1993) resource theory.

around four vectors of change: differentiation, inclusion, value generalization, and adaptive upgrading (Parsons 1961, 1966; 1971). As society becomes increasingly modern, it experiences “emancipation from ascription” (Parsons 1964, p. 312). This may be seen as an increase in autonomy in terms of opportunities for exchange. But, as Tiryakian (2005), p. 273, quoting Durkheim notes, the alteration and emancipation comes with a cost:

Given that the needs of the organism and the needs of society, of the collective, have different requirements, there is a basic tension in our existence in the world. Society’s sustenance—what we might here consider analogous to “pattern maintenance”—does not come free, but at the cost of “perpetual and costly sacrifices” (Durkheim 1919, 1960, p. 338). To live in society, to be a social actor, is to some degree to depart from our individual biological nature and thus to be in a state of more or less painful tension. Unlike the dream of the Romantics, there is no returning to a simpler, tension-free state of nature; the more history advances, Durkheim concludes, the more important the role of the social in our individual selves will become. Consequently, it is very unlikely that an age will come when human existence will lead an easier life, freer of tension: “To the contrary, all evidence compels us to expect our effort in the struggle between the two beings within us to increase with the growth of civilization.” (1914/1960, p. 339)

Fiske is perhaps more recognized in the development of a theory of “relational models of sociality” (1992, p. 689) as a way of solving the “painful tension” of organic solidarity. Fiske’s (1991) four elementary forms of social relations describe fundamental ways in which human sociality occurs. The four models are not mutually exclusive, and can be combined in differing degrees and combinations to add ever complex levels to human social interaction. Fiske hypothesizes that the four elementary forms comprise the building blocks of more complex human social systems and that these blocks are irreducible as fundamental components of interaction. It should be noted that the four elementary forms of social interaction are categorical in nature, rather than hierarchical.

Fiske begins with the assumption that people have both a subjective desire and an objective proclivity to associate with other people and

interact in each of the four basic modes. Additionally, there exist both personal goals for the interaction, as well as group goals—that is, goals for the interaction itself that supervene the individuals’ reasons for engaging in the interaction. Furthermore, each type of interaction format is contextual and perspectival. The interaction format is contextual in the sense that the form used is dependent upon the individual and group goals for the interaction and perspectival in the sense that the success of the interaction is relative to the desired goals versus the acquired goals, and the goals of each actor are relative to the other actors in the format group.

Figure 15.1 below outlines the connections between Parsons’ macroevolutionary framework and the elementary forms of sociality posited by Fiske.

Inclusion, especially with respect to out-group members, likewise enhances the heterogeneity of the in-group, and as such, increases its adaptability. Biologically, introduction of outsiders expands the gene pool and allows for hybridization, which in and of itself creates the potential for improved fit. Institutionally, Parsons views the emergence of an enfranchised democracy as the structural arena best suited to maximize inclusionary values and norms (1937 [1961]). The establishment and maintenance of a sense of belonging represents a significant hurdle for the heterogenization of social roles. Social mobility, immigration, and increased specificity tear away at traditional levels of social cohesion. Mechanical solidarity gives way to an organic-based cohesion (Durkheim 1893[1997]); without strong pressures to foster inclusion social order is in jeopardy. An enfranchised democracy facilitates one facet of inclusion. Feeling a part of the larger order, that your vote counts, generates feelings of patriotism. The love of one’s society, country, and way of life cuts across social differentiation binding together disparate and disjointed social strata.

Communal sharing, a relic of mechanical solidarity, can be expanded into an organic social system provided group members can find common ground upon which to stand. Communal sharing systems are fundamental interactions wherein




Fig. 15.1 A biosocial model of resource theory

actors attend primarily to group membership and common identity so that the boundaries of individual selves are indistinct from the boundary of the group. The high solidarity implicit in this type of interaction works to the exclusion of outsiders, so that internal benefits may be maximized for the good of the group, in contrast to the good of any one actor. Resources are distributed equally among the members, since the distinction of individuals is virtually lost within the group.

Differentiation decreases the uniformity of social roles allowing for greater heterogeneity across the population. Heterogeneity enhances fitness in the face of changing environmental forces. The same holds true, biologically speaking. Chromosome anomalies present opportunities of heterogeneity within the gene pool. Populations with a single allele pattern (an unrealistic possibility even in single cell organism) are closed off in an evolutionary sense. Allele differentiation, no matter how subtle, provides the strata upon which selection mechanics operate.

Conversely, when social roles are homogeneous, societies lack entrepreneurial innovation (Rogers 2003). Extreme homogeneity may preclude the ability to respond to and assimilate environmental changes, especially given the unpredictability of the direction and magnitude of the change. Organisms, be they biological or sociological, perpetually lag behind in terms of their fit with the environment (Veblen 1915). Tolerance to difference within the in-group facilitates freedom to explore the boundaries of social roles and responsibilities. In the face of changing environmental, ecological, or social forces, entrepreneurial members of the social group may possess the requisite talents, skills, and traits to negotiate the emergent social order. In Parsons' view, the social structure best suited to facilitate and legitimate differentiation is found in a bureaucratic division of labor (1961). Bureaucracies amplify competition and foster innovation among as a means of hierarchical advancement. Advancement within the ranks of the hierarchy is predicated upon the ability to

distinguish ones' self in the eyes of one's superiors. Those who learn the "rules of the game" advance more quickly just as Darwin would predict.

Authority ranking is a transitive and asymmetrical relationship. Implicit in this form of social interaction is the assumption of inequality, an ordered linear hierarchy in which higher ranking individuals control more of the resources, and command greater power in the distribution of the available resources than those individuals of lower status. Individuals of lower status show deference and loyalty to the higher status members, and in turn are entitled to receive protection and aid from the extant power structure.

Judiciary institutions such as the courts are charged with instilling and enforcing the value generalization initiated by communal sharing. The establishment of laws itself follows an evolutionary trajectory. Laws represent the routinization of social expectations while at the same time allowing for potential shifts in social practices. Standards of fairness, justice, and equity become codified practices in daily commerce. "Equal under the law" reinforces elements of inclusion while at the same time allowing for assessment based upon rank, status, and contribution.

Equality matching forms of social interactions is equality-based systems in which peers are distinct but coequal individuals. In contrast to the communal sharing style of interaction, divisions in equality matching formats are not necessarily dependent upon receipt of exactly the same resources but are rather dependent upon receipt of resources of similar value. Similarly, infractions within the group are dealt with *lex talionis*.

Parsons (1971) identified adaptive upgrading as a master trend in the evolution of modern societies. Adaptive upgrading refers to the ability of societies to increase their ability to adjust to their environments and function efficiently within the framework of those new environmental conditions (Sanderson 2001). In contrast to traditional biological models which see adaptation as occurring at the level of the individual or the gene, what adapts for Parsons is "a sociocultural system as a whole (or some subsystem of it)" (Sanderson 2007, p. 177). Sociocultural systems respond to

environmental dynamism by evolving to meet the changing needs of society. For Parsons, social equilibrium is allostatic, rather than homeostatic. That is, the equilibrium point changes as environmental circumstances change, rather than maintain a single point of optimization. This movement is directional, always from the simpler to the more complex.

This puts Parsons squarely in the camp of group selection—a generally distasteful prospect for evolutionary biologists, if not for social scientists as well. Indeed, for this and other reasons, Parsons' notion of adaptive upgrading has been the subject of considerable criticism. However, one need not be entirely dismissive of Parsons' notion of adaptive upgrading (Sanderson 2007). Indeed, Fiske's understanding of the four elementary forms of social relations bridges the gap between Parsonian group selection and upgrading at the individual level. As Fiske demonstrates, adaptive upgrading is problematic only if the needs of the individual and the needs of the group are in fundamental conflict with one another. Rarely is this the case. Rather, the needs of the individual and the needs of the group are often congruent (Hazlitt 1964). Such a notion is most easily recognized in market pricing.

Market pricing is a relationship mediated by values determined by a market system. In this form of social interaction, the self is most distinct, and rational self action is the preeminent determinant of values. Value is denominated in this system by individual utility, against which the product in question is evaluated relative to other products. This is a typification of subject-object evaluation, rather than subject-subject, wherein the value of the individual is considered as paramount.

The value of each domain of social interaction has evident utility both on ontogenetic and phylogenetic planes. Ontogenetically, each form of social relation implies that any individual has probability of receiving more than they began with and that the probability of receiving the benefit of the interaction is greater than the probability of receiving the same thing without the interaction. Additionally, there exist latent functions of these interactions, such as implicit protective

measures afforded to each valued actor in the interaction, since lack of protection negatively affects the other actors by detracting from the maximization of probability of their own interactive success. Flexibility and fluidity in anticipating the relational model in play for any given exchange enhance an actor's probability of success. However, as noted by Fiske (1991) and Foa (1993), understanding the form of the relation simply provides the context within which specific resources can be exchanged. Completing our argument for an evolutionary social psychology of exchange necessitates an analysis of the evolutionary roots of each of the six resources outlined in Foa's resource theory.

Foa's Resource Exchange Theory: A Biosocial Approach

As the cornerstone of his theory, Foa (1993, p. 13) noted that "human needs are seldom satisfied in solitude; because people depend on one another for the material and psychological resources necessary to their well-being, they associate to exchange these resources through interpersonal behavior." Indeed, among humans (as well as many other social species), exchange of fundamental resources is universal precisely because it is necessary for survival and reproduction. As Dimond (1970, p. 12) notes, "the study of motivation points to the importance of social rewards. Animals behave in a directed fashion to obtain these." Because humans evolved as a social species, no individual's needs or interests can be realized without some form of cooperation with other group members (Goldsmith 1991). The satisfaction of these evolutionary imperatives drives the normative structure of groups in its various manifestations. Goldsmith (p. 60) notes:

Much of what is referred to as human nature is understandable as a consequence of the evolution of a long-lived, slowly developing, *resource requiring*, mildly polygynous social primate that also happens to be highly intelligent. (emphasis added)

Human beings are a product of their evolutionary heritage and have evolved within the boundaries of a dynamic environment. The pressure

that environmental change places on individuals within that environment forms the driving force of selection within and between species. However, humans also possess advanced culture. While at root, culture is a biological phenomenon—that is, a product itself of our evolutionary heritage (Alcock 2001)—it has nonetheless transformed behavior in ways that move beyond the limitations of evolutionary change. Specifically, culture operates on a timescale that is significantly faster than the operation of natural selection. *Inter alia*, culture accelerates the pace of environmental change. The acceleration of environmental dynamism is a consequence of the exchange processes that drive satisfaction of individual needs. However, at the same time, these processes create structures, heuristic in their nature, that imbue the exchange acts with norms and accompanying sanctions that further specify the nature of future exchange acts (Fiske 1991). These processes delimit the direction, but not the speed, of subsequent interactions. In fact, the construction of culture must be accelerative (Oppenheimer 2003; Spencer 1862). Culture is also self-justifying (Oppenheimer 2003). The existence of culture specifies the need for culture. Alcock (2001) suggests that culture may have altered the human environment so as to remove the link between achieving proximate goals and satisfying evolutionary imperatives. Expanding on this view, we believe that culture has significantly altered the nature of this relationship by redefining the fundamental causal relationship between the two mechanisms of behavioral adaptation. In fact, we argue that the relationship changes such that cultural processes often usurp control from, or direct, evolutionary mechanisms in a manner akin to Baldwinian selection.

Named after philosopher and psychologist James Mark Baldwin (1896), the Baldwin effect purports that epigenetic factors can act as a strong mechanism of evolutionary change. Phenotypic changes can occur through mechanisms other than alterations in the genetic code. This would include cultural influences whereby the biological underpinnings of phenotypic behavior are gradually replaced by the internalization of culture. Rather than changing the underlying genetic code, epigenetic effects act to alter the expression of the genes while simultaneously retaining the behaviors associated with that

expression. Norms that are powerfully enforced remove the natural selection pressure, and thus the underlying expression of the gene is suppressed without corresponding suppression of the phenotypic behavior. In other words, “behavioral flexibility and learning could amplify and bias the course of natural selection” (Oppenheimer 2003, p. 19). Just as evolution can direct and constrain behavior, so some behaviors when they become so integral to survival can direct or constrain evolution by acting as a mechanism of change.

Evolutionary mechanisms such as natural selection, sexual selection, and others are not mutually exclusive mechanisms with Baldwinian selection, however. When they appear together, they often act in a mutually reinforcing manner. They both may operate as evolutionary forces at the same period of time, though for very different reasons and under varying selection pressures.

There are numerous precedents for Baldwinian selection in the human species (Oppenheimer 2003). Rose (1998) notes that there is consensus on two important targets for selection on the human species. The first, technical intelligence refers to the capacities to innovate using external environmental apparatuses. The second, social intelligence refers to capacities to use interactions with conspecifics to improve reproductive fitness. In both cases, the influence of Baldwinian selection can be seen. In the first case, the benefits accrued through the use of tools become transmitted culturally with the use of the tools—the tool as artifact and the consequences of the artifact, in fact, become inseparable (Rose 1998). In such cases, which appear quite common throughout human history, the genetic elements that gave rise to culture can easily become controlled by culture. In the second case, social intelligence becomes exapted² when the benefits of interaction become ritualized. In these cases, ritualized

interactions become memes³—units of cultural selection. Cultural transmission, which occurs faster than genetic transmission, becomes the primary means of expression and change.

Richerson, Boyd, and Henrich (2003, p. 366) argue persuasively that culture is not “a strictly proximate phenomenon, akin to individual learning.” Rather, culture coevolved with genes. In many areas, culture “is plausibly a leading rather than lagging partner in this process” (p. 367). We must, they insist, understand human behavior both on the timescale of evolutionary change that shaped the social instincts as well as on the considerably shorter timescale of human cultural evolution. “During this period, much genetic change occurred as a result of humans living in groups with social institutions *heavily influenced by culture* [emphasis original]” (p. 367). Similarly, Carbonell and Vaquero (1998) note that there exists anthropological evidence that there is an “association between the changes in material culture and in human biology, which suggests a possible relationship between the two processes,” and that “cultural innovations would have a cause-effect relationship with the biological transformations” (p. 373). Crawford and Marsh (1989) have shown how gene expression is affected by alterations of dietary patterns influenced by environmental and cultural circumstances and how resulting phenotypic expressions can influence further cultural change. Similar arguments have been made by Calvin (2003) and Brothers (1997).

The essential argument, then, is that the resource categories articulated by Foa have their roots in our evolutionary past, yet have been elaborated upon by cultural change. As noted in Foa, Törnblom, and Foa (1993), the patterns of interrelations among resources appear to be cross-culturally valid. This is indicative of the fact that the categorizations exemplify satisfaction of evolutionary imperatives upon which have been layered varying degrees of cultural elaboration. We argue that the more culture has

²Exaptation refers to a genetic adaptation that takes a purpose other than that for which it originally adapted. For example, prevailing theory suggests that feathers evolved as a means of body temperature regulation in a varying climate. Only later did feathers facilitate flight—a purpose that is almost certainly not what feathers evolved for (see Gould, S. J., & Vrba, E. S. (1982). Exaptation: A missing term in the science of form. *Paleobiology*, 8(1), 4–15.)

³The term “meme” was coined by biologist Richard Dawkins to refer to the cultural equivalent of genes. Memes are the smallest unit of independently existing culture. They are also the basic units of cultural change.

interposed layering atop these evolutionarily prescribed needs, the less particularistic the categories will be. The decline in particularism emerges from the increasingly complex web of cultural manifestations on exchange behavior. Yet, we argue that these cultural elaborations fulfill an important role in facilitating adaptation to increasingly accelerated environmental changes. In this section, we seek to show how each exchange category can be seen as a greater or lesser cultural elaboration of evolutionarily determined needs at the individual level.

Love

Perhaps the most direct example of cultural elaboration of innate biological mechanisms lies in attachment behavior. “Both love and social attachments function to facilitate reproduction, provide a sense of safety, and reduce anxiety or stress” (Carter 1998, p. 779). Both causes and consequences of attachment, several hormones have been identified that facilitate different aspects of social bonding. In males, testosterone increases competition and aggression between rival conspecifics. This has the social effect of creating relatively specified and stable social hierarchies, which reduce social conflict over time (Lancaster 1975). Balancing these competitive tendencies is vasopressin, a peptide hormone that has been associated both with pair bonding (Allman 2000; Winslow et al. 1993) and father-infant bonding through stimulation of the reward centers of the brain during contact (Palmer 2009). Vasopressin reinforces the protective defense mechanisms of testosterone while simultaneously reducing the accompanying aggressive tendencies. The result is a more balanced and less erratic familial participation repertoire.

Prolactin is released in mothers in response to the infant’s suckling behavior and helps stimulate continued milk production as well as initiating and maintaining other maternal behaviors (Hrdy 1999). Over time, prolactin has been shown to actually reorganize the female brain to favor maternal behaviors that facilitate long-term attachment to the infant (Palmer 2009). In males,

prolactin increases marginally as the birth of the child becomes imminent. However, prolactin production spikes in the male after consistent cohabitation and interaction with the infant (Palmer 2009). A period of time between the third and seventh week of life is essential for the development of attachment to conspecifics (Dimond 1975). In males, the effect of prolactin is similar to the role of vasopressin.

Oxytocin is perhaps the most widely studied and best known of the bonding hormones. This hormone is released in response to social contact—particularly skin-to-skin contact—but also facilitates additional social contact (Carter 1998). Oxytocin receptors increase dramatically during pregnancy (Palmer 2009), making the mother more receptive to oxytocin. The hormone has been shown to increase mother-infant bonding in a variety of ways, including making both mother and child receptive to the unique smell of the other. Mothers also become more calm, caring, and accepting. Like prolactin, oxytocin permanently changes the organization of the brain to reflect these effects (Palmer 2009). Yet, another effect of oxytocin in the mother is to increase preference for whatever male is around (Palmer 2009).

Similarly, infants respond to oxytocin. Regular body contact of the infant by the parent stimulates the production and retention of oxytocin in the infant. A number of studies have shown a relationship between the level of oxytocin in the infant and later social developmental outcomes. Specifically, lower levels of oxytocin have been related to later antisocial behavior, mental illness, poor stress management, aggression, and difficulty forming attachments with others (Palmer 2009). That these effects are causal as well as consequential can be deduced from the fact that hormone levels not only increase after birth but increase prepartum as well.

There are, of course, other hormones that function in various ways to facilitate social bonding, such as opioids and norepinephrine. In such cases, the hormones generally function as stimulants to the brain’s reward processing systems. Social contact is a reward. It makes the person feel good. It is, indeed, as Foa and Foa (1974) note, the cornerstone of exchange. Love is the

first and most basic form of exchange, as seen by the reciprocal nature of hormonal effects. This most basic emotion is deeply rooted in both biology and culture.

The adaptive significance of these hormones is readily apparent. In most animals, recognition of kin appears initially through chemosensory cues (Reeve 1998). The facilitation of attachment behaviors improves the likelihood of survival of infants through the most vulnerable age. This fact is even more evident when it is known that oxytocin and vasopressin fulfill these functions primarily in iteroparous species, while these hormones are not typically present in species practicing semelparity.⁴ Schneirla and Rosenblatt (1965), p. 253 note that “in neonate mammals, behavior is typified by reciprocal stimulative relationships between parent and young.” They go on to argue that these “processes of reciprocal stimulation are basic to all levels of social integration” (p. 267).

Cultural elaborations of attachment are replete, and too numerous to list in detail here. Thus, we shall concentrate on those most relevant to resource theory. First, it should be noted that according to Foa, love is the most particularistic of exchange categories. This is entirely consistent with the effects of attachment hormones, which function to bond specific caretakers to the infant. The initial needs of the infant for warmth, softness, food, and care are ensured by the evolutionary roots outlined herein and are differentiated only after the attachment of the infant to its parents is secure (Foa and Foa 1974).

Perhaps the most obvious cultural elaboration of the biology of love and attachment is the notion of family. In all cultures, family is a convenience of attachment and love. It is highly particularistic because although the boundaries may vary cross-

culturally, the inclusion or exclusion of members is highly specified within the particular culture. The family functions socially not only as a mechanism to exchange love but other resources as well. Foa and Foa (1974) note that from the administration of warmth, softness, food, and care comes the differentiation of services from love. Harlow’s classic experiments in which infant monkeys were placed with a choice artificial surrogates made either of soft cloth (but with no food) or wire (but with available food) demonstrate this effect. Infants developed attachment (love) to the soft cloth surrogate regardless of its ability to provide food (a service). Infants bonded with the soft surrogate transferred temporarily to the wire surrogate to feed.

One might also note that the differing roles of father and mother in the family aid in this distinction. Love and services become detached as the roles are learned and reinforced.

Services

Trivers (1971) notes that diversity of talents is a necessary characteristic of groups. This allows for the efficient exchange of necessary resources. If every member of the group had the same talents, the group would perish quickly due to an inability to adapt to changing environmental variables. Thus, the exchange of services is essential for the maintenance of groups over time. Diversity of talents is obviously a consequence of genetic variability. Differences in genetic inheritance and expression are key components in variability of abilities over a wide range of behaviors.

The evolutionary foundation of exchange of services emerges from early attachment behavior. Foa (1974, p. 36) notes that “the differentiation between love and services becomes possible after the child has acquired some psychomotoric skills, sufficient for serving himself.” The child wishes to integrate into the larger social world, which involves developing an understanding of exchange, and the social norms that accompany those exchange acts. Development of the understanding of the normative rules of exchange is essential to survival in the modern world as much

⁴Iteroparity refers to a reproductive strategy in which the organism has fewer offspring spaced at relatively large reproductive intervals over a long life. This strategy generally requires substantial parental investment over time and probably involved in a long-term stable environment. In contrast, semelparity refers to producing a large number of offspring in one episode of fecundity but with little or no postpartum parental investment. Such strategies are common in the lower animal kingdom and evolved in response to rapidly changing environments.

as it was in our evolutionary past, but for different reasons.

Much of this early development occurs through play behavior. While most studies of play behavior focus only on humans, it is widely known that social mammals, and some birds, also engage in play. Groos (1898, 1901) demonstrated that play behavior is a means by which animals—including man—hone basic inborn skills in preparation for adulthood. Much of this practice revolves around social play rooted in exchange. Turn taking, a fundamental aspect of successful exchange, is learned through this process. Notions of reciprocity, trust, and *quid pro quo* are also developed through basic social play behaviors. That these behaviors are seen universally in the play of social mammals as well as universally in the play of humans is testament not only to their genetic origins but also to the cultural endurance.

Among iteroparous species, the death of even one parent often meant that the offspring could not be cared for, and would ultimately perish. In our evolutionary past, in an environment in which the life span was very short, development of relationships beyond the parent was essential if the individual wanted to survive to reproductive age.

This separation is both consequential to and the cause of an expanding social world, in which nonfamilial conspecifics gradually take on value first as alloparents, then as exchange actors. As the child develops talents and a unique behavioral repertoire, the exchange of services becomes more prevalent and important as an exchange category.

In the modern world, though the challenges are different, the principles imbued by our evolutionary heritage remain essentially the same. That the progress of an understanding of social norms through exchange is essential for proper cognitive, emotional, and social development is well documented in the literature on developmental psychology.

Goods

Along a similar line of reasoning, the exchange of goods also has its roots in evolution. Considerable

literature has been devoted to food-sharing behaviors both in humans and other animals. Although research on primates has dominated the literature, reciprocal food-sharing behavior has also been documented in other animals as well. “Elaborate systems of begging and feeding have evolved repeatedly in the birds and mammals” (Wilson 1975). African wild dogs returning from a successful hunt have been shown to regurgitate food to conspecifics that have remained behind (Kühme 1965). Similarly, vampire bats have been shown to regurgitate blood to conspecifics that were not successful feeders (Wilkinson 1984). Many primates engage in food-sharing behavior, including capuchin monkeys, baboons, and both species of chimpanzee (DeWaal 1996). Food-sharing behavior reaches its peak among social insects (Wilson 1975). In every case, there exists an expectation of reciprocity, an understanding of an expectation of exchange that while delayed, is certain to materialize in the future. Indeed, so strong are the drives that lead to food sharing and so strong the expectation of reciprocity that many evolutionary psychologists and biologists believe that the cooperative social exchange has its origins in food-sharing behavior.

Further evidence of the evolutionary origins of goods exchange can be adduced from the fact that the earliest human societies were gatherer/hunters. Gatherer/hunter societies are highly egalitarian, with a strong tradition of resource exchange that is based on expectations of exchange reciprocity. (Bliege Bird and Bird 2005; Blurton Jones 1987; Gurven et al. 2000; Hawkes 1992; Waguespack 2002). Given the scarcity of resources relative to niche populations, the evolution of food-sharing behavior is not surprising. Exchange of goods through norms of reciprocity maximizes the probability of individuals within the group. Consistent with this line of reasoning and with the evolutionary origins of exchange of services, DeWaal (1996), p. 144 notes that “sharing is most prevalent in species that feed on high-energy foods of which the collection, processing, or capture depends on special skills or rare opportunities.” That is, goods that are most likely to be shared are those that are most difficult to procure. Individuals who have specific talents toward

acquisition of those resources will likely develop higher status than individuals who are less successful at procuring desired resources (Hawkes 1993). Indeed, as DeWaal (1996, p. 150) notes, “sharing is a selective process.”

Status

Status hierarchies are an elaboration of dominance hierarchies found in nearly every social species (Houser and Lovaglia 2002; Lancaster 1975). Indeed, with only minor changes, correlates to the six diffuse status characteristics⁵ may be found in the animal kingdom. All six of these correlates relate to dominance hierarchies in the same way that diffuse status characteristics relate to status. The origin of diffuse status characteristics is traced to evolutionary pressure. Brothers (1997) notes that human brains are social by nature and that “the primate brain evolved a specialized system for producing mutually regulated behavior in these complex social environments” (p. 28). Therefore, as Sidanius and Pratto (1999), p. 51 note, “it seems reasonable to assume that hominoid social systems are predisposed to organize themselves within some range of group-based inequality.”

The formation of dominance hierarchies is functional for reproductive success at the individual and group level for at least two reasons. First, stable dominance hierarchies tend to reduce conflict within groups (DeWaal 1996; Dubos 1980; Lancaster 1975). Lancaster states that:

Dominance hierarchies clearly have an important adaptive value. They allow individuals in a society to predict the outcome of an interaction when two animals compete for a scarce item in the environment....Ultimately, hierarchies are based on the ability of one animal to physically dominate the other in a fight, but this ability is based on a very complex set of factors such as the strength, age,

health, motivational level, and social alliances of each animal....It is clearly not adaptive for individuals living together and having many daily contacts to have to fight every time an issue arises. It is far better for both the dominant and the subordinate to avoid the fight if the outcome of that fight is truly predictable. (p. 14)

In the long run, therefore, dominance hierarchies promote group tranquility and stability.

The second evolutionary consequences of dominance hierarchies is reproductive skew, in which individuals of higher social status reproduce more successfully than conspecifics lower in the hierarchy. For example, Dunbar (1980), wrote of gelada baboons that p. 253 “the number of offspring that a female has is shown to be a function of her dominance rank.” In humans, evidence also exists of this same effect (Hrdy 1999). Hopcroft (2004) found that high-income males report greater frequency of sex than all other groups and have more biological children than other groups. This is not to say that dominance hierarchies benefit only those at the top of the hierarchies. In fact, as Lancaster’s (1975) quote implies, an understanding of one’s place in the dominance hierarchy can improve evolutionary fitness for all members of the group. “Ultimately,” she writes, “individuals who are unable to appreciate the major features of a dominance hierarchy will lose out in the selection process. This selection exists at all levels of the hierarchy and does not simply benefit the individuals at the top at the expense of those at the bottom” (1975, p. 15).

It is likely that at least some of the characteristics of dominance hierarchies have their evolutionary origins in sexual selection. Sexual selection is a well-established mechanism of evolution which is based on preferences for specific traits in one sex by members of the other sex (Darwin 1871). It is important in the evolution of specific morphological traits such as symmetry, which has been shown to be relevant to reproductive fitness (Hrdy 1999). Specifically, morphological characteristics that are selected for by the opposite sex as being relevant will result in individuals with the chosen characteristic leaving more offspring than conspecifics that do not possess that characteristics or that possess the characteristic in a less-desired fashion.

⁵The six diffuse status characteristics, as discussed by Berger, Cohen, Zelditch (1972), are sex, race, age, physical attractiveness, occupational prestige, and educational attainment. The reader is referred to these sources for further elaboration of these concepts.

Status as an exchange category is based upon cultural elaborations of the more evolutionarily primitive dominance hierarchies. The advantages of having high status in exchanges lead to the development of a mutually reinforcing framework of exchange. This is consistent with the expectations of resource theory, in which individuals who exchange status would prefer to receive status in kind. One example of this can be seen among political elites who often engage in mutually self-supporting acts to enhance the status of the other.

High status is also associated with differential accumulation of other resources (Ridgeway 2006). This can be used to create power differences within the exchange network. Power differences can be used to develop further resource differentiations. Thus, status acts both as a tool to gain access to other valued resources as well as being an intrinsically valued resource.

Cultural elaborations of status take on many forms and contain many interrelated layers which are too numerous to elaborate on herein. However, the generalities of these elaborations can be seen in expectation states theory, which links task expectations to the status of the individual. Specifically, higher status is associated with higher expected competency in task situations. In other words, we expect more from people of higher status. Additionally, cultural elaborations tend to move the acquisition and maintenance of status from ascribed ones to achieved ones. Evolutionary corollaries of status are by and large ascribed characteristics, while the cultural elaborations tend toward achievement. What for animals is an ability to learn and gain knowledge is formalized in human culture as educational attainment. From the largely ascribed is built the largely achieved.

Information

Information is often associated with reproductive fitness. The successful individual is the individual that can acquire and utilize information most effectively. This is true for animals as well as humans. Individuals that know more tend to be more successful (Trivers 1985). There is a high

correlation between information and status, particularly because one may be exchanged for the other. Like status, “information is often valued because it provides access to other resources rather than for its intrinsic value” (Foa 1993, p. 6). Information, though important as an end in itself, is valued also as a means to an end.

Goodall (1971) offers an excellent example of the role that information plays in constructing a dominance hierarchy among chimpanzees. Among males, chimpanzee social status is often characterized by a show of aggression, in which competing males demonstrate their status through visual and audio displays. Goodall relates the story of a chimpanzee of low status that discovered two empty gasoline tins discarded by Goodall’s research center. After some experimentation, the chimpanzee discovered that banging the tins together and dragging along the forest floor made for an intimidating presence. It was not long before this clever chimpanzee used the tins in a confrontation with the alpha male and took the dominant position. As a direct result of his experimentation and knowledge related to both the use of objects, as well as the criteria of confrontation, this chimpanzee increased his status in the group considerably.

Cultural elaborations of the evolutionary necessity for information have been formalized in some cultures as education. Culture itself represents a form of information accumulation and utilization that is formalized. However, some cultures have further elaborated information acquisition to include compulsory formal schooling at an institutional level. As noted above, the fact that the ability to gain knowledge is a key component in the construction of dominance hierarchies illustrates the evolutionary importance of this exchange category. The extensive formalization of this exchange category is further evidence of its importance as a means of achieving individual well-being.

Money

As previously noted, greater cultural elaboration of evolutionarily driven aspects of well-being is associated with lower particularism. There is,

perhaps, no greater cultural elaboration than the advent of money. Although humans are the only animal that uses money, many animals do have measures of wealth and income.

Distribution of resources within an environment is rarely even within and between groups. Female selection of mates overwhelmingly favors males with high access to resources (Darwin 1871). In some bird species, males are required to bring the females trinkets as tokens of affection (Darwin 1871). Objects of specific colors fall in a hierarchy of preference based roughly on the scarcity of that color in the environment. Males who are able to procure preferred items demonstrate their ability to gain and maintain a resource advantage over competing males (Trivers 1985). Furthermore, in numerous species, males are required to present the females with demonstrations of their ability to procure adequate resources prior to mating. One example of this is the dance fly. In this species, males bring either an edible or nonedible gift to a potential mate. Such behaviors evolved presumably because relative male parental investment is almost always lower than female investment (Trivers 1985). An ability and willingness to invest resources in mating and childrearing, especially over the long term, is illustrative of reproductive strength. The use of money largely universalizes this evolutionary process.

The cultural process that led to the use of money is reasonably historically well documented. It provided a method of standardization of resource value—whereas the quality and therefore value of goods may vary, the value of money is relatively stable. Additionally, the accumulation of money as a measure of wealth is far less cumbersome than the accumulation of cattle or other measures of wealth. Yet, money still functions as both a reliable and valid measure of the evolutionary fitness of an individual. Individuals with more money have more resources to devote to high quality of life of offspring, and would therefore make more attractive mates. When all other indicators of fitness fail, money offers a standardized measure of an individual's ability to operate effectively in exchange situations. Its high concreteness and low particularism function

both as valid and reliable indicators of both evolutionary and culture fitness.

Synthesis

Thus, each of the six resources exchange categories identified by Foa has its roots in the satisfaction of evolutionary imperatives. Cultural elaborations have changed the way in which we identify and utilize some of the resources, but the underlying structural and rational foundations remain fundamentally intact. Much of the differentiation identified by Foa involves not only the development of the individual through the life course but also the influence of cultural elaborations of the desire to satisfy evolutionary imperatives. In many cases, as we have suggested, cultural mechanisms become the dominant drivers of these satisfactions. In fact, we propose that cultural elaborations hybridize behavioral responses to the desire to satisfy.

Culture and evolution are not mutually exclusive mechanisms. They have operated together since the evolution of the human species. Yet, while evolution is a slow and amoral process, culture is accelerative and iterative. Culture operates to satisfy the same desires and needs that evolved along with the human species, and we believe that an understanding of the evolutionary nature of those needs—and how culture has addressed those needs—is fundamental to a thoughtful and complete understanding of humans in the modern world.

As culture accelerates the pace of change, the ability to satisfy desires in exchange situations becomes increasingly difficult to accomplish biologically. The specific desires remain fundamentally fixed by evolution, though evolution has become increasingly incapable of dealing with the nuances of cultural elaboration. Evolutionary change is slow to operate, often requiring tens or hundreds of generations. Conversely, memetic change is increasingly rapid. Cultural elaborations allow individuals to efficiently and rapidly navigate an increasingly fast-paced world, satisfying fundamental biological needs through ever changing channels of exchange in six fundamental

categories identified by Foa. Like a compass spinning on its axis, culture points continuously in the right direction to satisfy our needs in an increasingly accelerated and complex social environment.

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Part IV

Organizational, Institutional, Societal, and Inter-cultural Issues

The Emergence of Social Meaning: A Theory of Action Construal

16

John Adamopoulos

The search for the meaning that underlies and is communicated by social behavior has been the focus of many research programs in social, cross-cultural, and personality psychology over the past half century (e.g., Adamopoulos 1984, 1988; Benjamin 1974; Leary 1957; Lonner 1980; Osgood 1970; Plutchik and Conte 1997; Triandis 1972, 1977, 1978, 1994, 1995; Wiggins 1979). Theoretical approaches to the study of social meaning have run the gamut from assuming that it is implicit in the very structure of overt interpersonal acts—thus *not* requiring extensive reliance on psychological states for understanding it (e.g., Mead 1934/1962)—to searching for its *psychological* structure (e.g., Lonner 1980; Triandis 1972), to making the *explanation* of such structure the explicit focus of experimental investigations (e.g., Adamopoulos and Stogiannidou 1996). Of course, Foa and Foa (1974, 1980) understood the dimensions of this problem quite well and dedicated many years to providing very useful insights on how to approach it by emphasizing that interpersonal interaction is best conceptualized as a *resource-exchange process*.

In the theoretical paradigm of Foa and Foa (1974), psychological meaning is found through the structural analysis of the exchange process (cf., Foa et al. 1993). This assumption has generally

been supported by empirical evidence, though there have been on occasion inconsistent results. For example, while it appears that the six major resource classes Foa and Foa (1974) proposed (i.e., love, status, information, money, goods, and services) can summarize the variety of social behaviors that human beings produce in their daily lives, it may well be that the two psychological dimensions thought to underlie these resource classes—concreteness-abstractness and particularism-universalism—do not capture completely the functional relationships between the resources and the behaviors that correspond to them (e.g., Brinberg and Castell 1982).

This is precisely the starting point of the theoretical approach outlined in this chapter. In other words, accepting the assumption that all social behavior involves the exchange of resources, I will attempt to reconcile the major kinds of social meanings that have been identified in various research traditions with the cognitive dimensions of interpersonal resources proposed by Foa and Foa (1974). I will argue that these dimensions, if embedded in a broader framework, can be useful in explaining the emergence of social meaning across cultures and even over long periods of time. The first part of this chapter will review briefly social meanings identified in a few research programs. These meanings will then be organized in theoretical frameworks that are, to some extent, based on the work of Foa and Foa. In the final part, the possibility of using these frameworks to explain the construal of social behavior will be explored.

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Varieties of Social Meaning

Over the past few decades, a number of distinct research programs on the nature of social meaning have resulted in some remarkable convergences. It appears that, regardless of culture being studied, methodological preference, or theoretical commitment, certain ideas seem to be involved in most interpersonal interactions and communication. In retrospect, the ideas themselves are not particularly surprising—we all communicate them to others and recognized them with ease in other people's behavior. Rather, it is remarkable that a relatively small number of ideas or social meanings form the core of a large amount of theorizing in psychology, though they often appear as distinct terms, idiosyncratic to particular research traditions. A few of these traditions are summarized below.

The Universal Structure of Interpersonal Behavior

One of the most sustained efforts in describing the basic meaning of social behavior has been that of Triandis and his colleagues (e.g., Adamopoulos 1988; Triandis 1972, 1978, 1994). Over a period spanning more than 30 years, Triandis and colleagues identified a number of perceptual dimensions that seem to reflect the manner in which people understand social interaction. The basic approach employed in many of these studies involved the rating by research participants of the likelihood of the occurrence of a large number of social behaviors in various situational contexts—what Triandis (1972) called the “behavioral differential”—and the subsequent structural analysis of the behavior intercorrelation matrices.

After investigations using this technique in cultures as diverse as the USA, Japan, India, and Greece, among others, Triandis (1978) concluded that there are at least three major dimensions of interpersonal behavior that appear to be true psychological universals: (1) *association-dissociation*, (2) *superordination-subordination*,

and (3) *intimacy-formality*. The first dimension refers to behaviors that are affiliative in nature or involve moving away from someone, the second dimension involves the concepts of dominance and submissiveness, and the third dimension involves interpersonal closeness or distance.

It is worth noting that very similar dimensions—especially the first two—have been identified independently by other research programs in social psychology (e.g., Wish et al. 1976) or in personality psychology (e.g., Wiggins 1979), but much of this research lacked the cross-cultural component of the work by Triandis (1972, 1994) and thus could not lead to conclusions about the universality of the interpersonal structure.

The Structure of Interpersonal Verbs

Following his pioneering work on the measurement of affective meaning (Osgood et al. 1957), Osgood (1970) undertook an original, if somewhat subjective, analysis of the structure of interpersonal verbs (intentions) in the English language. The basic rationale of the investigation was that some sort of psychological system must exist that can explain the meaning embedded in verbs of action. After experimenting with decoding systematically various semantic features of such verbs, Osgood identified four major *interpersonal* dimensions, as well as several others that added to the semantic “refinement” of the verb codes: (1) *associative-dissociative*, (2) *supraordinate-subordinate*, (3) *initiating-reacting*, and (4) *ego-oriented-alter-oriented*. He further speculated that these may be universal, though such a statement is, naturally, subject to empirical verification.

The first two of these dimensions seem to be identical to constructs identified by Triandis (1994). Osgood (1970, p. 240) defined the associative-dissociative features as involving an intent by an actor to “generate and/or maintain positive affective...or...negative affective relations” with another person. The supraordinate and subordinate features were defined as involving the expression of superior and inferior status, respectively.

The remaining two features seem to have more to do with the form of the interpersonal interaction rather than its psychological meaning, but may nevertheless be very useful in the explanation of behavior, as we will see later on.

Elementary Forms of Sociality

Fiske (1991, 1992) has presented a typology of the most basic models of sociality based mostly on anthropological observations but also some psychological evidence (e.g., Fiske 1993). Fiske's argument is that all human relationships can be classified as involving one of four types of exchange: (1) *Communal sharing* involves the free give-and-take of pooled resources in a community of people who share an identity. (2) *Authority ranking* involves a clear hierarchy in a community, with higher-status persons receiving more resources than their subordinates. (3) *Equality matching* is found in communities of distinct individuals who, however, are expected to contribute equally and have equal rights to resources. (4) *Market pricing* involves exchanges that are based on proportionality relative to some commonly accepted standard or "utility" metric.

This interesting typology of relational models, which very clearly assume that the basic characteristic of all human interaction is the exchange of resources, bears many conceptual similarities to the work reviewed previously. Even though the four sociality models occasionally have been treated as irreducible, in fact they all involve at least two interpersonal features: (1) They all implicitly or explicitly emphasize status—with communal sharing and equality matching promoting relative status equality and authority ranking and market pricing reflecting resource inequality. (2) They all involve affiliation to a greater or lesser extent. For example, communal sharing, according to Fiske (1991, p. 14), "is a relationship based on duties and sentiments generating kindness and generosity among people conceived to be of the same kind, especially kin." On the other hand, in market pricing, people "... may bargain in an adversarial and explicitly self-interested manner..." (Fiske 1991, p. 16).

Basic Human Values

Schwartz's (1992; Schwartz et al. 1999) cross-cultural investigation of human values has received a great deal of attention in recent years. While the purported intent of the theory—to provide an alternative explanation of human behavior to standard utilitarian/attitudinal (e.g., Malpass 1977) or even culturally based (e.g., Triandis 1995) approaches—appears distinctly different from the other theoretical approaches reviewed so far, its main constructs bear a great deal of resemblance to the social meanings described in an earlier section. Schwartz (1992) proposed that there are ten major universal types of human values that motivate behavior: *power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security*. These values form roughly a circumplex that is defined by the more abstract dimensions of *self-transcendence* versus *self-enhancement* and *conservation* versus *openness to change*.

Schwartz et al. (1999) have provided explicit definitions of these value types along with descriptions ("portraits") of the kinds of things individuals who hold particular values are likely to think, feel, and do in a broad sense. The concepts of association (affiliation), superordination, and subordination appear fairly explicitly in the majority of these value definitions and portraits. For example, superordination is the main attribute of the values *power, achievement, and self-direction*; subordination defines *tradition and conformity*; and association is used to define *universalism and benevolence*. The obvious conclusion is that there are a handful of meanings that are absolutely essential to all social explanation and thus inevitably become components—explicit or implicit—of practically all attempts to account for interpersonal behavior.

The Diachronic Structure of Interpersonal Behavior

Inspired by the work of Triandis (1978, 1994) regarding the possibility that certain social meanings are psychological universals, I have made the

argument that in order to claim universality with confidence, we must attempt to show that constructs are not simply found across cultures but across historical time as well—that is, that they are *diachronic* universals (Adamopoulos 1988, 1991, 2009; Adamopoulos and Bontempo 1986). To explore this possibility, literary documents depicting human interaction in different cultures and at different historical times were used as data sources. For example, interactions in the Homeric epics—the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*—and in old French (*Song of Roland*) and English (*Beowulf*) epic poetry, among other literary works, were coded across specific social contexts. Structural analyses led to the general conclusion that some social meanings (e.g., association and superordination) may have emerged relatively early in recorded human history, but others (e.g., intimacy) may have appeared at a later, more recent time (cf., Adamopoulos 1982a, 1991, 2009). Specifically, constructs like association or superordination emerge relatively clearly as independent dimensions even in the Homeric epics (ca. eighth century B.C.E.). On the other hand, while intimate *behaviors* appear very clearly in these epics, the notion of intimacy as a general meaning does not emerge as an independent construct, but, rather, appears in conjunction with—folded into—other psychological meanings (e.g., superordination or association). For example, the kind of love and closeness (intimacy) that Odysseus experienced appears to be inseparable from his superordinate position as the head of his household and court (e.g., Adamopoulos and Lonner 1994).

This line of research, while still under development, leads to a fundamental set of questions: Wherefore these meanings? Where do they come from? How can we account *at the same time* for their cross-cultural commonality and the possibility of their emergence over time? Emergence is an idea that is receiving increased attention in a number of areas in psychology (e.g., Adamopoulos 2008), but its complexity presents a significant challenge to the construction of theoretical conceptualizations (e.g., Holland 1998). A process of emergence will be outlined in the second part of this chapter.

Varieties of Explanation of the Origins of Social Meaning

Attempts to explain the wherefore of social meanings like association or dominance are not at all well developed. Traditionally, such attempts were at the margins of most psychological theorizing, and it is only in recent years that questions of origins and emergence have become a central concern to a number of theorists. The efforts that have been made to date fall into two broad categories: (1) theorizing that evokes biological and genetic mechanisms and, ultimately, evolutionary processes; and (2) theorizing that describes sociocultural transmission mechanisms because they are considered by many social and cultural psychologists as far more efficient devices for the production of effective human activity in a variety of social contexts (cf., Berry et al. 1992).

Evolutionary Explanations

I will address the first category only briefly because it is clearly not the focus of this chapter. Analyses from this perspective are rather diverse and hard to summarize. One approach to such explanation involves recent research by personality psychologists (e.g., McCrae 2000) who argue that the basic dimensions of personality—which very clearly include ideas like affiliation and dominance—are heritable not only at a very general level of broad dispositions but also at a much more specific trait level (e.g., Jang et al. 1998). This by no means negates the role of culture or even its (partial) causal influence on personality, but it certainly relegates cross-cultural work to a lower level of theoretical significance, with its primary purpose being the establishment of the (already assumed) universal validity of basic personality dimensions, rather than the explication of the *emergence* of its structure.

Similar arguments can be made about a number of evolutionary approaches to personality (e.g., MacDonald 1998), which propose the significance of species-wide human adaptations to shared environmental features as explanations

of the universal structure of personality systems like the five-factor model (e.g., McCrae and Costa 1997). The general argument seems to be that since humans evolved to live in groups, negotiating status and group membership, with all the costs and benefits that this entails, were extremely adaptive. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that these basic social meanings reflect such adaptations. A similar and quite sophisticated argument has been formulated in social psychology to explain the importance of coordinated activity in the evolution of cooperative (and presumably associative) behavior (e.g., Caporael 2007).

Sociocultural Explanations

One of the earliest theorists to wonder about the emergence (the “wherefore”) of semantic structures was Osgood (1969). Osgood’s pioneering cross-cultural work with the semantic differential established that three affective dimensions of meaning—*evaluation*, *potency*, and *activity*—were psychological universals (Osgood et al. 1957, 1975). It was inevitable that Osgood would eventually confront the problem of the origins of these semantic features, and he did so in a rather original fashion. Osgood (1969) speculated that early humans had to address three very important questions that concerned their daily survival: On facing a potential threat (e.g., a saber-toothed tiger), our ancestors would have to decide (presumably quite fast) if the threat were friendly or unfriendly (*evaluation*), stronger or weaker (*potency*), and faster or slower (*activity*)—so they could outrun it. The survival value of these decisions could have led to the development of cultural transmission mechanisms (socialization and educational practices) that became deeply embedded in the manner in which people across the world perceived and understood their environment.

We could argue in a very similar manner that the basic social meanings described earlier had significant implications for the survival of human beings. Affiliating with others and forming problem-solving groups, accepting a knowledgeable leader’s commands at times of great danger, or attempting to dominate the social environment by

controlling resources can all be understood as patterns of action that can improve an individual’s chances of survival. The major question here is: Is it necessary to formulate biological mechanisms for the transmission of these ideas across generations, or can we describe other processes that can account for the emergence of these social meanings across cultures and historical periods? What would such processes look like? The remainder of this chapter will address this issue in some detail and develop the foundation for a system that may eventually lead to our being able to understand the structure of all social interaction.

The Emergence of Social Meaning

The Explanation of Interpersonal Structure

I have discussed elsewhere (Adamopoulos 1984, 1988, 1991) a model that describes a process for the emergence of some basic social meanings—including association-dissociation, superordination-subordination, and intimacy-formality. This model is based on one fundamental assumption that it shares with the work of Foa and Foa (1974): All interpersonal behavior is understood as involving the exchange of resources because through this exchange, human beings are able to secure what they need for survival and indeed for thriving.

This assumption is by no means unique to the present model or to the resource theory of Foa and Foa (1974). The utilitarianism implicit in it has a long history in psychological theorizing. In fact, it reaches all the way back to Aristotle’s (ca. 384–322 B.C.E.) major social-psychological treatise—the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In this book, Aristotle (1987) fairly explicitly described the purpose (“end” or “aim”) of all action as the “practicable” or “realizable” good. But, he continued in his argument, the final good is self-sufficiency (“*autarkeia*”), which does not mean solitude or isolation, but, rather, a desirable life with family and friends—a life free of wants. Clearly, the assumption that social behavior aims at securing resources has a very solid foundation in the history of ideas!

As described earlier in this chapter, Foa and Foa (1974, 1980) assumed that the resource-exchange process involves six major resource classes arranged as a circumplex defined by the dimensions of *abstractness-concreteness* and *universalism-particularism*. The first of these dimensions involves the contrast between material and symbolic resources (e.g., goods vs. information), and the second refers to the significance that the specific identities of the individuals participating in exchange have for the satisfactory completion of the interaction. Presumably, a customer does not really care about the identity of the bank teller who gives him/her his money, but an individual cares a great deal about the identity of the person with whom he/she chooses to fall in love.

These ideas seem to be fundamental to the conceptualization of social behavior. Indeed, we can think of a minimal social interaction as a situation in which an actor gives or denies a resource to another individual. As we elaborate the situation, we can take into consideration the relationship between the actor and the recipient of the action: Is it a specific (particularistic) relationship as that between, for example, a mother and her child, or is it a general one as that between two strangers who pass each other on the street? Elaborating even further, we can consider the nature of the resource being exchanged: Is it a material one, as in offering food to a hungry person, or is it a symbolic one, as in acknowledging a person's social status or superior knowledge?

This brief analysis suggests that any social interaction is *constrained* by a number of factors, such as the mode of the exchange (*giving* vs. *denying* a resource), the relationship between the participants (*specific* or *particularistic* vs. *general* or *universalistic*), and the type of resource being exchanged (*material* or *concrete* vs. *symbolic* or *abstract*). We can further speculate that these three types of constraints appeared in early human history in a certain order, with the mode being the most basic. The relationship between the individuals involved in the interaction was probably something that appeared fairly early as well, since the ability to distinguish between friend and stranger or between one's own child

and any child could be critical to the successful completion of one's *intended* action. The ability to make such distinctions can be thought of as corresponding to the ability of children to distinguish self from other and to expand from egocentrism to an understanding of multiple perspectives. Finally, we can speculate that recognizing the nature of the interaction—reflecting an ability to distinguish between physical object and symbol—may have appeared more recently in human history since thinking in symbolic terms is an activity that probably developed as human beings invented culture.

Taken together, these constraints form the inputs of the model that appears in Fig. 16.1. The basic implication of the model is that complex social meanings emerge as these constraints—which can be thought of as elemental meanings—are combined and become integrated over a period of time. Thus, *association* emerges as individuals learn to differentiate between giving and denying resources, but this feature becomes more intense as people differentiate between giving resources to “specific” as opposed to “general” others. In other words, behaviors that involve giving resources to specific others are considered more *associative* than behaviors that involve giving to general others. Similarly, behaviors that involve denying resources to specific others are more *dissociative* than behaviors denying resources to general others.

In an analogous fashion, *superordination* becomes differentiated from *subordination* as denying symbolic resources (e.g., status) to specific others becomes distinct from giving resources to such individuals. *Bargaining* and *trading* emerge as meanings when primarily material (concrete) resources are exchanged (or exchanges are denied) in the marketplace and in other social situations. *Intimacy* presents a somewhat more complicated picture: It is defined by particularistic interactions or exchanges that are frequently, though not exclusively, physical (material). For instance, many behaviors that typically represent intimacy as a behavioral dimension (e.g., *kissing* and *petting*) emphasize the physical aspects of an interpersonal relationship, but behaviors like *declaring one's deep affection*




Fig. 16.1 The emergence of the meaning of interpersonal behavior (Adapted from Adamopoulos 1991, 2009)

for someone reflect a more symbolic side of the construct. However, all exchanges communicating intimacy involve either the giving or the denying of resources. Thus, for example, behaviors like “hitting” or “scolding” someone—clearly indicating the denial of a resource—are also often considered intimate because they involve interpersonal closeness (a “specific” other) (e.g., Adamopoulos 1982b; Triandis 1977). This complexity associated with *intimacy* as a social meaning is in line with the finding, reported earlier, that it may have emerged later than the other social meanings as an independent idea. Presumably, more complex meanings develop over longer time periods.

Finally, it is important to note that all predictions are to a large extent based on a formal property of the model. Specifically, the order in which the various constraints are believed to have appeared over time (in human history) and have become integrated is critical to, and strictly determines, the types of social meanings that emerge as well as the relationships among these meanings. The emergent structure leads to hypotheses about particular empirical relationships between social meanings (interpersonal dimensions) because it is expected that the closer any two meanings are in the model, the more psychologically related

they are. For example, the association-dissociation dimension is expected to be more highly correlated with intimacy-formality than with superordination-subordination because in the model, intimacy is closer to higher levels of association (or dissociation) than is superordination (or subordination). Similarly, superordination-subordination and intimacy-formality are expected to be somewhat correlated, rather than completely orthogonal, dimensions. In general, predictions of the model are in line with empirical relationships among meaning dimensions identified in a number of investigations (e.g., Adamopoulos 1984, 2009; Adamopoulos and Bontempo 1986; Triandis 1977, 1978, 1994).

The Emergence of Cultural Patterns of Social Behavior

The past 25 years have witnessed a virtual explosion of cross-cultural studies in psychology and related disciplines. The theoretical benefits from this growth have been numerous, but perhaps none are greater than the construction of frameworks to provide psychological explanations of cultural differences (e.g., Adamopoulos and Lonner 2001). Among the most important ideas

in this endeavor has been the development of “cultural syndromes,” or shared patterns “of beliefs, attitudes, self-definitions, norms, roles, and values organized around a theme” (Triandis 2001, p. 43). One syndrome that has drawn particular attention and has been utilized extensively in cultural explanation incorporates the constructs of *individualism and collectivism* (e.g., Hofstede 1980, 2001; Triandis 1995, 2001). According to Triandis (2001), the primary attributes of the two constructs are

the definition of the self as independent (in individualism) or interdependent (in collectivism), the primacy of personal or ingroup goals, the primary emphasis on attitudes or norms as the determinants of social behavior, and the importance of exchange or communal relationships. (p. 36)

Triandis (1995) offered a further refinement of these constructs by differentiating between vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism. Briefly, vertical individualism involves an emphasis on individual uniqueness and personal success and distinction. Horizontal individualism involves individual uniqueness with a sense of equality across people. Vertical collectivism emphasizes the subjugation of the individual to the needs of the group or of higher-status persons. Finally, horizontal collectivism implies status equality with no distinctions or a sense of uniqueness among group members.

Individualism-collectivism theory and other culturally based theories like Schwartz’s value theory (Schwartz 1992) or Fiske’s (1992) typology of the models of sociality, both reviewed earlier, in a sense have been competing for the explanation of similar phenomena—all related to interpersonal relations. The model of interpersonal structure presented in Fig. 16.1, modified accordingly, can offer a broader framework that incorporates most of these competing theories because it belongs to a family of models that aim to explain the emergence of social meaning. Specifically, as I have argued elsewhere (Adamopoulos 1999), it is important to introduce another component in this case—that of the orientation of the relationship, or, alternatively, the beneficiary of the interpersonal interaction (*self* vs. *other*). For convenience, I have dropped the

exchange mode since this model deals with broad behavior patterns rather than specific interactions. The resulting modification appears in Fig. 16.2.

The basic idea conveyed by this model is that cultural patterns differ with respect to whether they tend to emphasize benefiting others as opposed to benefiting the self in typical relationships. If the emphasis is on benefiting the self, then the general cultural pattern will tend toward individualism; if on benefiting the other, then it will tend toward collectivism. The model distinguishes among a number of different broad behavior patterns, most of which are self explanatory (see Fig. 16.2). For example, if most actions in a particular cultural context are oriented toward securing resources for the individual with little emphasis on particular relationships, then the overall cultural pattern will be oriented toward individual survival (what might even be called ego-sustaining individualism or “protoindividualism”). The same pattern oriented toward benefiting any other will reflect the prosocial and even philanthropic patterns of certain cultures (altruistic collectivism).

Cultural patterns that emphasize the exchange of symbolic resources and aim to benefit the self will tend to achieve to some extent the glorification of the individual—hence the label “egocentric” to characterize this type of individualism. On the other hand, if the pattern involves primarily symbolic (i.e., status) exchanges with specific others, the pattern reflects an ego-protective function. In material exchanges, the emphasis is on wealth accumulation—hence the term “acquisitive” individualism.

On the collectivist side, interactions focusing on concrete exchanges (e.g., services, love) with specific others lead to a cultural pattern reflecting an emphasis on relations (relational collectivism). Symbolic exchanges, on the other hand, reflect a concern with status and social hierarchy (referential collectivism). Finally, a pattern involving an “other-orientation” that is based on a concern with upholding highly regarded cultural values reflects ideational collectivism. The term here is deliberately borrowed from the cultural theory of Sorokin (1962) and is meant to refer to the nonmaterial, values-based type of




Fig. 16.2 The emergence of some cultural patterns and syndromes (Adapted from Adamopoulos 1999)

culture he labeled “ideational.” Figure 16.2 also presents a tentative, and I hope fairly self-evident, proposal about how several other theories that have been reviewed so far can be subsumed under, and understood within, the context of the model developed in this section based on a resource-exchange process.

Toward a Theory of the Construal of Action

The theoretical models presented so far have as their primary purpose to account for fundamental, even universal, social meanings that form the basis of all human interactions. As we have seen, these models can also be used to account for a variety of theories that have been developed in social, personality, and cross-cultural psychology in recent years to explain a variety of highly related phenomena—from the structure

of personality to the values that may guide human social relationships. Whatever success this family of models enjoys is, above all, a confirmation of the usefulness of the resource-exchange approach to the study of human interaction.

An emerging additional benefit of the approach implicit in these models is that it can be useful in the development of tools for the analysis of *specific* behavioral events, actions, or interaction episodes. Put in a different way, this approach can be used to develop a “grammar” of action in interpersonal settings, or a set of tools to understand how different components of the social environment can be put together to form socially meaningful behavior. I will present below some preliminary thoughts about such a process, with the understanding that this is still mostly at the level of theoretical speculation and somewhat removed from the rigors of empirical testing.

Components and Rules of Action Construal

The structural orientation of resource theory in general and of the models reviewed in this chapter in particular invite a rule-theoretic approach to the construal of action (Fig. 16.3). By rule-theoretic, I mean that any interpersonal action can be conceptualized as a configuration consisting of a number of components of varying complexity bound together by certain rules. Two sets of rules are proposed here: (a) rules about the elements of the *primitive* (i.e., the most basic) components of action (*componential rules*) and (b) rules about the manner in which all components are combined to formulate meaningful action (*syntactical rules*).

As I described in a previous section, a fundamental assumption behind this work is that (interpersonal) action is subject to a certain number of *constraints* that characterize all human exchanges. Specifically, in any interaction, a resource *must* be given or denied (*mode*), it *must* be material or symbolic (*type*), and so on. These constraints, which form the primitive components of the proposed system, appear in the third row (from the top) of Fig. 16.3.

We can start by creating a series of rules that extend some of the basic characteristics of the interpersonal models presented in Figs. 16.1 and 16.2:

A. Componential Rules

1. *Mode* consists of *giving* a resource *or denying* a resource.
2. The *beneficiary* can be the *self* or the *other*.

3. The resource *type* can be either *material* or *symbolic*.
4. The *interpersonal relationship* can be either *target specific* or *target general*.

B. Syntactical Rules

1. Any *action* consists of a *direction* and a *resource*.
2. *Direction* includes a *mode* component and a *beneficiary*.
3. *Resource* includes a *resource type* and an *interpersonal relationship*.

These two sets of “rules” of an “action grammar” are by no means arbitrary, merely descriptive, or without specific functions. I have already discussed in detail in previous sections the conceptual dependencies in the first set of rules: Each primitive component includes elements that constitute a constraint. The second set of rules also seems to reflect certain conceptual dependencies between pairs of components. For example, rule B3 reflects the whole circplex that formed the core of social resource theory, and the relationship between the two constraints has been supported empirically (Foa and Foa 1974; Foa et al. 1993). By combining the *mode* (give/deny) with the *beneficiary* (self/other), rule B2 creates a meaningful conceptual unit (*direction*) that, in some ways, defines the context of the action. In other words, this configuration includes a generic act (i.e., an act without much specific content) and a generic social connection (i.e., a relationship that merely points to the broad orientation of the exchange toward the actor or the target of the action). These two components together create a sense of the milieu or context within which a




Fig. 16.3 Components of the process of construing interpersonal behavior

specific exchange may take place (e.g., a situation that involves something being given to benefit the target of the action, or a situation in which something is given for the benefit of the self, and so on). A somewhat similar configuration that involved behaviors occurring within social role relationships was found to account for a substantial portion of the variance in at least one analysis of individual perceptions of interpersonal behavior (Adamopoulos 1982b). This implies a possibility that such a configuration may be psychologically meaningful in the organization of social interaction and, therefore, is included as a basic syntactical rule in the proposed action construal system.

The clear implication here is that each syntactical rule presents a unified cognitive configuration that should have important psychological properties. For example, it can be predicted that the conceptual units are perceived—and, therefore, recalled—together and that they play an important role in the explanation of action by perceivers and actors alike. Empirical tests of these predictions are, of course, essential in establishing the validity of the proposed approach.

Examples of the Construal of Action

Figure 16.4 provides two simple examples of the analytic usefulness of the action construal model. We can see how with a change in only one component of rule A2 we generate actions with extremely different psychological implications. Case A involves the *giving of target-specific* (particularistic) and *material* resources (e.g., services) in order to *benefit the self*. An action such as “seeking sexual gratification from someone close”—an individual with whom one has a close, personal relationship—is a plausible action for this structure. Note that by changing the beneficiary from *self* to *other*, the particular episode would become “giving sexual gratification to someone close.” Naturally, many other behaviors have a similar structure, as described in case B. Thus, this theory of action construal may ultimately allow the parsing of interaction episodes

into conceptual units that capture important underlying social meanings.

It should be fairly clear that the action construal system proposed here can function both in a top-down and in a bottom-up fashion. For the former, the proposed componential and syntactical rules can be used to *generate* behaviors occurring in social contexts, as outlined in Fig. 16.4 and described in the preceding paragraph. A social exchange can easily be formed in this manner by simply selecting four component elements (e.g., giving or denying a resource, interacting in a situation in which the actor-other relationship is particularly important, and so on). From this perspective, even this early version of the theory of action construal—only involving four basic components—is capable of generating a remarkably rich repertoire of social behaviors whose particular meanings are precisely defined by the system. The basic orientation in this case is reminiscent of a process of *encoding*—creating specific contexts and situations of interpersonal interaction in order to communicate various social meanings.

The second, bottom-up process of construal is more similar to a process of *decoding*—deriving a social meaning by parsing a specific interaction to its constituent components (mode of exchange, type of resource, etc.). Such a process, to the extent that it is successful, can lead to the psychological comparison of seemingly disparate social interactions, which, nevertheless, may communicate very similar meanings. Consider, for example, the interactions that take place in the context of an athletic training camp and those that are involved during a meal in a large dining hall. Most social interactions, of course, may have multiple meanings. In this case, it is possible that the latter may involve a friendlier, more cooperative series of exchanges, whereas the former may be perceived as more competitive (e.g., Forgas 1981). At a deeper level, however, there is a structural similarity between these two situations that, the theory of action construal predicts, would lead to a fairly similar understanding of both: The two social situations involve the giving of primarily material resources to benefit the self in interactions with others who are not




Fig. 16.4 Two examples of action construal

necessarily connected to the actors in close or particularistic relationships. In general, then, the decoding process can lead to predictions

about psychological similarities or differences between social exchanges that are not always immediately obvious.

A Brief Empirical Exploration and Demonstration of Action Construal

A first test of the decoding process afforded by the theory of action construal—based on the structural similarities among different social interaction situations—will be attempted here as a way of illustrating the potential of the proposed theoretical development. The fundamental idea underlying this approach is that, if the theory actually reflects the emergence of social meaning, then the parsing of social exchanges using the rules outlined earlier ought to generate the psychological meanings of these exchanges. In other words, the application of the theory's rules to the parsing of social situations ought to yield results similar to those obtained from independent structural analyses of the meaning of these situations.

In this case, I made an effort to show the empirical reach of the theory by parsing a set of social interactions that were used in a different research tradition. Forgas (1976, 1977, 1981) explored the perceptions of a number of interaction episodes by a variety of groups, such as athletic team members, college students, and members of an academic department at a British university. He used a methodological approach that relied on the multidimensional scaling of similarity judgments of a variety of "social episodes" by members of these groups in order to derive the dimensions of the meaning of the episodes. In most of his studies, some of the derived social meaning dimensions involved concepts like friendliness, intimacy, competence and knowledge how to act in a situation, evaluation, and sociability.

Forgas (1976) obtained similarity indexes of 25 social episodes from a number of middle-class housewives at Oxford, who participated in a sorting task. Multidimensional scaling of the indexes yielded two dimensions of social meaning: (a) perceived knowledge of how to behave in the situation and (b) perceived intimacy and involvement. Semantic differential-type scales fitted to the multidimensional space supported this interpretation. The proposed action construal theory can offer an explanation of the basis of the obtained dimensions of social meaning. If the

basic assumption of the theory is correct, then the structural similarities among the social episodes should explain, to a large extent but not necessarily completely, these dimensions.¹

I decoded quickly and intuitively the 25 social episodes examined in Forgas' (1976) group of housewives.² The episodes and the intuitive code "strips" I assigned to them appear in Table 16.1. In each case, I tried to think of the most salient aspect of the episode for me today—which, of course, is conceivably quite different from the salient characteristics of the episodes for 20–30-year-old British housewives in the 1970s. In other words, I tried to maximize the psychological distance between the decoding process and the original structural analyses. In addition, I did not take at all into consideration the possibility that most of the episodes had multiple meanings. This possibility could be explored with the sorting method used in the original study but was not investigated in the present case. Each social episode, then, was decoded into a *single* configuration or code strip that included one element from each of the following components: mode, beneficiary, resource type, and interpersonal relationship. Following this procedure, an index of similarity was computed for every possible pair of social episodes by counting the number of common coding elements in their respective code strips.³

¹It is important to note that any episode or social exchange can have multiple meanings, which makes interpretation a complicated process. Normally, in order to explain the meaning of any single social episode exhaustively, several different parsings using the proposed rules of action construal may be necessary.

²I decoded the 25 episodes into the elements of the four components of the theory of social construal very quickly, without any prior knowledge of their location in the multidimensional space derived in Forgas' (1976) analysis and without second-guessing myself at any point about the correct identification of the elements involved. In all cases in this analysis, I focused only on the first, perhaps most salient, "image" for each episode that came to mind. Thus, incorrect or incomplete decoding of the episodes stemming from this fast-moving process added to the "noise" in the study.

³All episodes in this case involved *giving* a resource. Consequently, the number of common elements in any comparison between pairs of code strips varied from 1 to 4.

Table 16.1 Intuitive coding of action components of 25 social episodes (Forgas 1976)

Social episode	Action construal code <Mode, Beneficiary, Type, Relationship>
1. Having a short chat with house delivery man	<1,0,0,0>
2. Playing with your children	<1,0,1,1>
3. Your husband rings up from work to discuss something	<1,0,0,1>
4. Having a short chat with the shop assistant while shopping	<1,0,0,0>
5. Having dinner with your family	<1,0,0,1>
6. Shopping on Saturday morning with your husband at the supermarket	<1,0,1,1>
7. Attending a wedding ceremony	<1,0,0,1>
8. Having a drink with some friends in the pub	<1,1,1,1>
9. Washing up dishes after dinner with family help	<1,0,1,1>
10. Chatting over morning coffee with some friends	<1,1,1,1>
11. Reading and talking in bed before going to sleep	<1,1,0,1>
12. Chatting with an acquaintance who unexpectedly gave you a lift	<1,0,0,0>
13. Watching TV with your family after dinner	<1,1,1,1>
14. Having a short chat with an acquaintance whom you met on the street	<1,0,0,0>
15. Going to the pictures with some friends	<1,1,1,1>
16. Discussing the events of the day with your husband in the evening	<1,0,0,1>
17. Talking to other customers while queuing in a shop	<1,0,0,0>
18. Talking to a neighbor who called to borrow some household equipment	<1,0,0,1>
19. Having guests for dinner	<1,0,1,0>
20. Visiting a friend in hospital	<1,0,0,1>
21. Chatting with others while waiting for your washing in the coin laundry	<1,0,0,0>
22. Talking to a neighbor through the backyard fence	<1,0,0,0>
23. Playing chess	<1,1,0,0>
24. Going to the bank	<1,1,1,0>
25. Visiting your doctor	<1,1,1,1>

Note

Mode: give = 1/deny = 0; Beneficiary: self = 1/other = 0;

Type: material = 1/symbolic = 0; Relationship: target specific = 1/target general = 0

Dissimilarities for all pairs of episodes were computed from the number of elements (out of 4) that any two episodes had in common. The dissimilarity matrix was subjected to a multidimensional scaling analysis (MDS) in order to derive a set of meanings, based on the structural characteristics of the episodes, which could then be compared to the meanings obtained from the original sorting task. One- to four-dimensional solutions were computed. Based on the obtained stress values and other measures of fit, it was decided to retain the three-dimensional solution as the best-fitting configuration. The first dimension appeared to involve the contrast of formality versus intimacy (e.g., being polite in public exchanges with other persons who are strangers

or distant acquaintances versus interacting with others who are close). The second dimension could be interpreted as concerning interactions oriented toward and benefitting well-known, specific others versus interactions that involve a generalized other. Finally, the third dimension concerned situations in which actions are taken for personal benefit versus situations in which services are offered to specific others.

In order to explore the basic tenet of the theory of action construal that social meaning emerges from the underlying structure of action, the coordinates of the 25 social episodes on each of the two dimensions derived from the original sorting task (i.e., Forgas 1976) were predicted from their coordinates on the three dimensions derived from

Table 16.2 Prediction of perceptual dimensions of social episodes (Forgas 1976) from action construal component dimensions

Social episodes	
Dimension 1 ^a	Standardized regression weights
Action construal dimension 1 ^b	-0.42*
Action construal dimension 2 ^c	0.13
Action construal dimension 3 ^d	0.16
Dimension 2 ^e	
Action construal dimension 1 ^b	0.53**
Action construal dimension 2 ^c	-0.33*
Action construal dimension 3 ^d	0.09

*Note** $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$ ^aOccasional, involved, and complex episodes without clear knowledge of how to behave versus regular and simple episodes in which it is easy to know how to behave^bFormality versus intimacy (e.g., being polite to and chatting with others in general versus interacting with others who are close)^cExchanges oriented toward and benefitting well-known, specific others versus a general other^dBehavior for self-benefit versus offering services to specific other^eNon-intimate and uninvolved episodes versus intimate and involved

the code strip comparisons using multiple regression analysis.⁴ The results of this analysis appear in Table 16.2. As can be seen, both original meaning dimensions can be reliably predicted either from the first or from a combination of the first and second dimensions obtained from the analysis of the action construal codes. In particular, the first dimension reported in the original study (not knowing how to behave in situations, one finds oneself only occasionally) was negatively correlated with the formal-informal dimension obtained from the scaling of the code strips. The second dimension in the original investigation (noninvolvement and non-intimacy) was positively correlated with the formality dimension of the code strip analysis and negatively correlated

with the second dimension obtained in this analysis (exchanges with well-known, specific others).⁵

The results suggest the possibility that the original interpretation by Forgas (1976) of the dimensions obtained from the use of the sorting task may not be complete. Specifically, based on the semantic differential scales fitted onto the multidimensional episode space, Forgas concluded that dimension 1 reflected complex and rather involved social situations in which there may not be clear rules for appropriate behavior versus situations that occur with relative regularity and in which people know how to behave. The dimension is correlated negatively with the first dimension derived from the analysis of the action construal codes (formality vs. intimacy). This implies that it may be the specificity of the relationship with the person with whom one is interacting, as well as the fact that the relevant situations are oriented toward benefitting or offering a resource to the self, that account, at least to some extent, for the meaning of this dimension and particularly for the judgment that some social episodes are “complex.” Complexity in this case probably reflects the fact that these episodes are considered personal and, therefore, provide a wide range of possible interactions for the participants. Indeed, it would be difficult to explain otherwise why chatting with friends over coffee in the morning might be more strongly associated with not knowing how to behave than going to the bank, as was found in the original investigation.

In a similar vein, the negative correlation of the second dimension from the original analysis (non-intimate and uninvolved vs. intimate and involved) with the second dimension of the construal codes analysis, as well as its high positive correlation with the first dimension of the latter analysis (formality vs. intimacy), suggests that this cluster of situations is strongly associated with the specificity of the relationship between episode participants, which is how the models

⁴Forgas (1976) did not provide the actual dimensional coordinates of the 25 episodes, but, rather, a detailed graphic representation of the structure. I estimated the episode coordinates from this configuration.

⁵The polarities of the two dimensions and the order in which they are discussed here are arbitrary and only reflect the manner in which the primary axes of the configuration described in Forgas (1976) were transferred and coded for the present analysis.

presented earlier in this chapter defined intimacy theoretically.

These findings provide strong initial support for the basic claim of the theory of action construal that meaning emerges as elements of basic action components combine in structural configurations that reflect the underlying social exchange process.

Concluding Comments

It is possible to envision the development of a fairly detailed cultural theory based on the perspective outlined in this section. However, it is clear that before such a theory can be completed, it will be essential to engage systematically in the empirical testing of the preliminary components of the action construal system in order to establish the psychological validity of the proposed configurations of elements. In addition, it will be necessary to examine in much greater detail the cultural sensitivity of this model and, in particular, the extent to which the availability of different kinds of resources has a causal influence on the development of specific interpersonal actions at the individual level. Such an analysis is essential for all types of resource theories that wish to claim cultural universality.

A related set of questions pertain to the theoretical adequacy of the type of system advocated here. This means that a strict set of criteria must be developed to ensure that the system generates meaningful actions under different circumstances. Even more important, all theories that aim to explain how action is generated must ultimately be able to demonstrate that they do not generate meaningless behavior as well. This is a very strict but necessary criterion in testing any theory. In the present case, it probably means that additional constraints on interpersonal behavior—which can be thought of as filters that eliminate nonsensical actions—will have to be introduced into later versions of the proposed theoretical system.

Finally, the theory of action construal must ultimately relate social meanings not only to culturally invariant structures (e.g., giving or denying a resource) but also to culture-specific content

such as the *kinds* of resources available within particular cultural contexts. For example, a society substantially lacking in material resources may tend to develop meanings, behavior patterns, and, ultimately, even social institutions that are more closely associated with exchanges of symbolic resources. Alternatively, such a society may choose to exaggerate the importance of the exchange of material resources and come to celebrate the social significance of wealth and property ownership. These are ultimately empirical questions, but the theory of action construal raises the conceptual issues that underlie such questions. To date, connections among societal resources, cultural practices, the constraints that impinge on interpersonal relationships, and the production of individual social behavior have not been investigated systematically.

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Some Hypotheses on Cross-Cultural Differences in the Impact of Resource Type on the Preferred Principle of Distributive Justice

17

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Justice principles are highly important social norms that guide human interaction. The subjective violation of these norms has substantial psychological and social consequences. Social justice research has revealed that perceiving oneself as the victim of injustice leads to anger, outrage, and attempts at retaliation (Barclay et al. 2005; Gollwitzer and Denzler 2009; Mikula and Wenzel 2000). On the other hand, perceiving oneself as violating a justice principle triggers feelings of guilt and shame, self-sanctions, and reparative actions (Montada 2003; Tangney et al. 2007). These and many other studies have shown that the adherence to justice principles is decisive for the maintenance of peaceful social relations. The social sciences face the task of identifying culturally shared justice principles and investigating their psychological and social functioning. This task is of high social importance because disagreement among persons or groups regarding the validity of justice principles in a specific situation may trigger, perpetuate, and even accelerate

the escalation of “hot” conflicts (Mikula and Wenzel 2000; Montada 2007). Particularly in cross-cultural contexts—such as multinational businesses, international research collaborations, or political negotiations among nations—knowledge about diverging justice perceptions in different cultures seems indispensable for avoiding social conflicts that could easily become very costly (Conner 2003; Hofstede 2001).

Despite widely criticized shortcomings and desiderata (Leung 1997), cross-cultural research on distributive justice has made important contributions to this endeavor, on theoretical (Bolino and Turnley 2008; Fadil et al. 2005) as well as on empirical grounds (Fischer and Smith 2003; Sabbagh et al. 2010). However, most empirical research thus far has held a limited perspective on cultural differences in justice perceptions: Most research has focused on allocations of monetary rewards among coworkers or teammates in relation to their achievements at work (Fischer and Smith 2003). Recently proposed theoretical frameworks have aimed to broaden this view by incorporating different kinds of resources that can be distributed and different kinds of information about the recipients that may be integrated into fairness judgments (Bolino and Turnley 2008; Fadil et al. 2005). In our understanding, this step takes us in the right direction, but does not offer a sufficiently systematic account of the kinds of resources that are potentially relevant for fairness perceptions. This is exactly what resource theory (Foa 1971; Foa and Foa 1974; Foa et al.

Author Note We thank Ina Hief for her literature search and Jane Thompson for important comments on this chapter.

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1993) has to offer. For this reason, we suggest a triangulation of distributive justice theories, cross-cultural research, and resource theory.

First, we will briefly present two approaches to distributive justice: equity theory and the so-called multi-principle approach, and we will discuss how they are complemented by resource theory. Second, we consider cultural characteristics that are relevant for justice perceptions in order to explore how they may affect preferences for distributive justice principles regarding the different kinds of resources identified by resource theory. On the basis of the derived hypotheses, we review previous empirical research and point out which predictions remain to be tested, as well as potential confounds that have to be avoided. Finally, we discuss the benefits of the proposed triangulation from each of the three perspectives involved.

Distributive Justice and Resource Theory

Concerning the fairness of the distribution of resources (benefits or burdens), equity theory (Adams 1963, 1965; Homans 1961; Walster et al. 1973) has made a prominent contribution to the literature on justice perceptions and has substantially stimulated research in this area. In a nutshell, according to equity theory, persons compare their outcomes relative to their investments (inputs) with the outcomes of referent others relative to the respective inputs of the others. Perceived discrepancies should be regarded as unfair and should motivate actions to restore equity.

Despite its seminal character, equity theory has been subject to criticism, particularly because it does not sufficiently specify how different kinds of investments and outcomes can be compared with each other and which reactions can be expected from perceived inequities (Bolino and Turnley 2008; Törnblom and Vermunt 2007). As a remedy for this shortcoming, Törnblom and Vermunt (2007) suggested an integration of equity theory with resource theory. Since both theories are social exchange theories, they both focus on perceived discrepancies between inputs and outcomes. Unlike equity theory, however, resource

theory offers a systematic account of the types of resources that can be exchanged (i.e., love, status, information, money, goods, services) as well as rules for their exchange. Specifically, resource theory predicts that inequity will be perceived if investment and outcome resources are not subjectively appropriately exchangeable (Törnblom and Vermunt 2007). Similarly, equity theory states that both investments and outcomes need to be recognized as such, and most importantly, regarded as relevant by at least one of the exchange partners in order to affect his or her perception of equity or inequity (Adams 1965). Resource theory, in turn, specifies that a discrepancy in the relevance of investments and outcomes will most probably be perceived if resources are highly dissimilar in terms of particularism and concreteness (Foa 1971). Concreteness refers to the degree that exchange of resources involves overtly tangible activities or products (e.g., the provision of services or goods) or, by contrast, rather symbolic verbal or paralinguistic behaviors (e.g., the exchange of information or status). Particularism refers to the significance of the person who provides the resource. Specifically, love is more particularistic than status and services, and these in turn are more particularistic than information, goods, and money. According to resource theory, more particularistic resources, such as love, can be equitably exchanged only for the same resource, whereas universalistic resources, such as money, can be exchanged for a broader range of resources (Foa and Foa 1974).

Regarding reactions to perceived inequity, resource theory suggests that retaliation should be “isomorphic” with the resource that was invested in the first place (Törnblom and Vermunt 2007): An investment not appropriately repaid should be withdrawn, and retaliation should be aimed at the withdrawal of the invested resource or a similar type of resource. For example, if one partner provides information but feels uninformed in return, he or she can be expected to reduce his or her openness and, in extreme cases, even to lie to restore equity.

While equity and resource theory clearly complement each other, further approaches to distributive justice seem to be less easily integrated

within this social exchange framework. In particular, the multi-principle approach (Deutsch 1975, 1985) states that in some contexts, indeed, it is considered fair to distinguish among the recipients of a resource according to their relative inputs (equity principle). However, in other contexts, it has been shown that differential treatment is not perceived as fair but rather that equal allocations are preferred (equality principle). Applying a third prominent distributive principle, need-based allocations that are intended to reduce existing differences rather than to further distinguish between recipients may be considered fair (need principle).

Importantly, the nature of the resource in question has repeatedly been shown to moderate which of these principles is perceived as appropriate and just (Sabbagh et al. 1994; Schmitt and Montada 1982; Törnblom and Foa 1983; Törnblom et al. 1985). But findings have been partially inconsistent between nations (Törnblom and Foa 1983). Thus, a further prominent determinant of preferences for distributive justice principles may moderate how resources are perceived and treated in distributions: the social context a distribution takes place in, or more specifically, the dominating social or cultural goal (Deutsch 1975, 1985; Törnblom et al. 1985). As Törnblom et al. (1985) state: “It is not unreasonable, then, to propose that (both in situations of exchange and distribution) a distribution rule which is appropriate to a given resource is inappropriate to another. Moreover, the degree of appropriateness may vary for different cultures” (p. 53).

Triangulation of Distributive Justice and Resource Theory Within a Cross-Cultural Perspective

What are cultural goals or characteristics that shape perceptions of resources and preferences for their allocation? Research on distributive justice from a cross-cultural perspective has drawn mostly upon Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) framework of four basic dimensions on which cultures differ: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism/collectivism, and masculinity/femininity.

(Other cultural frameworks entail partially similar concepts, e.g., Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 1961; Schwartz 1999; Triandis 1995.) Put very briefly, power distance refers to the extent that inequality in power is accepted within a culture; uncertainty avoidance captures the degree to which members of a culture generally see uncertainty as threatening and try to avoid it; individualism/collectivism primarily addresses whether people perceive themselves as distinct from others or as defined within relationships with others and whether people place their personal goals above or below communal goals; and masculinity/femininity refers to whether important values in a society consist of money, success, and tangible objects versus caring for others and quality of life (Hofstede 1980, 2001; Triandis 1995).

Between cultures, resources may be regarded as differentially relevant, and their instrumentality may differ significantly. Considering the definitions of cultural characteristics (Hofstede 1980, 2001), we suggest that these characteristics partly imply a high estimation of the importance of specific types of resources. Power distance seems to entail the culturally attributed importance of status differences (Hofstede 1980). In cultures high in power distance, rank differences are not only favored by the leaders, but they are also endorsed by the followers. Generally, in these cultures, it is seen as important that some people have the right and means to realize their own wills, whereas others have to follow orders (Hofstede and Bond 1988). Importantly, it is the social status or rank that somebody holds that determines whether this person is seen as entitled to more possessions of resources of all kinds than other persons. Thus, compared to a culture low in power distance, in a culture high in power distance, status should be an important resource that can be employed to legitimately claim other kinds of resources (e.g., money, services, or love).

Uncertainty avoidance can be linked with a high need for information (Foa and Foa 1974). In cultures high in uncertainty avoidance, people on average feel more uncomfortable in unstructured situations and try to avoid them compared to people in less uncertainty avoidant cultures. “‘Unstructured situations’ are defined as novel, unknown, surprising,

or different from usual” (Hofstede and Bond 1988, p. 11). Thus, information that can reduce uncertainty should be a highly valued resource.

Masculinity explicitly refers to the valuation of achievement, money, and goods as important resources. By contrast, femininity entails the valuation of modesty and caring (Hofstede and Bond 1988) and, thus, seems to indicate the importance of love and services within a culture.

Unlike power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity/femininity, individualism/collectivism is not as clearly linked to the importance assigned to a particular resource type. It is rather related to the units among which differentiation is perceived as adequate, presumably regardless of the type of resource. While individualistic cultures conceive of the individual as differentiated from other individuals, in collectivistic cultures, identity is construed at the level of the group (Hofstede 1980, 2001). Hence, differentiation should take place between groups rather than within.

From an exchange theoretical point of view, monitoring the appropriateness of investments and outcomes becomes more and more crucial the more valuable a resource is (cf. Törnblom et al. 1985). Hence, we propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1.1: The more important a resource is perceived within a culture, the more its investment will be recognized as relevant input that is expected to be equitably “repaid.”

Hypothesis 1.2: By contrast, resources that are not culturally valued as much will not be viewed as relevant input in exchange or allocation situations.

Hypothesis 2.1: Equity will be the preferred justice principle in the allocation of culturally valued resources.

Hypothesis 2.2: For less culturally valued resources, an undifferentiated (i.e., egalitarian) allocation or even an allocation aimed at reducing differences (i.e., need-oriented) will be more easily accepted than for highly valued resources.

These hypotheses have important consequences for the interpretation of results from cross-cultural research in distributive justice. Many research studies, thus far, have suggested that people in individualistic cultures favor equity as the distributive principle, whereas in collectivistic cultures,

people prefer equal allocations within their own group but favor equity with out-group members (for reviews, see Erez 1997; James 1993; Leung 1997). However, Fischer and Smith (2003) criticized that most of these studies failed to directly assess the focal cultural dimension as well as other potentially confounded dimensions, and conclusions remain post hoc in nature. The results of their meta-analysis show that masculinity (vs. femininity) and power distance—and not individualism/collectivism—were systematically linked to preferences for equity over equality (Fischer and Smith 2003). Important with regard to our hypotheses is the fact that all of the studies that these conclusions were based on exclusively focused on the allocation of economic rewards (money or goods) or status increases (promotions). Thus, it is unknown whether these results will generalize to other kinds of resources (e.g., respect, friendship, gratitude, or information).

In light of our hypotheses, we predict that this is not the case. Regarding the allocation of status, we predict that power distance should be the cultural dimension that determines whether equity is preferred as a justice principle over equality and need. For the allocation of information, we predict that uncertainty avoidance is the relevant cultural determinant of preferences for equity. For the allocation of socioemotional resources, we suggest that low masculinity (high femininity) will be predictive of a preference for equity (cf. Hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2).

At first sight, this last prediction may appear to contradict findings in social justice research that show that, in intimate and caring relationships, equality and need are generally preferred over equity (e.g., Deutsch 1975, 1985; Schmitt and Montada 1982; Törnblom and Foa 1983). Nevertheless, we believe that our prediction does not in principle contradict these results but rather complements them by differentiating resource types on both the input and outcome sides. We agree with prior justice theory and research that in rather feminine cultures—similar to intimate and caring relationships—allocations of money and goods should be preferred if they are based on the principles of equality or need, rather than on the equity principle. As Deutsch (1975, 1985)

hypothesized, preferences for allocation principles reflect the predominant goal in these cultures or contexts: Whereas equal distributions of money or goods promote harmonious relationships, need-based distributions are conducive to the welfare of the recipients, and achievement-based distributions maximize task performance and profit. Importantly, however, these social or cultural functions of distributive rules may vary if different types of resources are considered. Specifically, if resources such as friendship, loyalty, or respect are particularly valued, treating them as relevant input and “repaying” them equitably may foster harmonious social relationships. Accordingly, we expect that, in more feminine cultures, equitable allocations of love and services should be perceived as fair compared to more masculine cultures (cf. Hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2). Moreover, in more feminine cultures, resource allocations should be perceived as particularly just if they differentiate between recipients’ investments of love, loyalty, or respect. Investments of money or goods should be regarded as rather irrelevant in these cultures compared to more masculine cultures (cf. Hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2).

Most cross-cultural studies that the meta-analysis of Fischer and Smith (2003) or other reviews drew upon were limited regarding both outcome resources (allocation of money, goods, or status) and investment resources (task achievement) that they considered. There is far less cross-cultural research that has investigated other kinds of resources on the input or the outcome side. Some studies have compared countries regarding preferences for principles when interpersonal rewards (praise, friendship) were allocated (e.g., Bond et al. 1982; Kim et al. 1990; Otto et al. 2011). There are also a few studies in which participants from different countries were asked about their justice preferences regarding allocations of all six different types of resources identified by resource theory (Törnblom and Foa 1983; Törnblom et al. 1985).

Regarding the input side, some studies not only considered task achievement to be an investment, but they also considered investment aimed at maintaining the cohesion of the group (social-emotional support, friendship, e.g., Bond

et al. 1982; Gómez et al. 2000; Kim et al. 1990; Lin et al. 1991; Nauta 1983; Tower et al. 1997). Again, other studies looked at the impact of seniority (i.e., status) as an attribute that could determine an equitable outcome (e.g., Hundley and Kim 1997; Kashima et al. 1988; Rusbult et al. 1995). To our knowledge, however, no single study has systematically addressed the impact of resource types with regard to both inputs and outcomes in a cross-cultural setting.

Despite the limited cross-cultural evidence available regarding distributive justice for the different types of resources, we would like to point out a few findings that may be interpreted as the first hints of the validity of our hypotheses.

Power Distance: Status

For example, Hundley and Kim (1997) found that Korean students based their fairness judgments of pay allocations across employees significantly more strongly on a recipient’s status (e.g., seniority, education) than did students from the USA. Similarly, Kashima et al. (1988) revealed that Japanese students considered age (a potential sign of status) more than Australian students did in fairness judgments of pay allocations. Seniority was also shown to influence allocation decisions and promotion recommendations regarding male employees more strongly among Taiwanese subjects in comparison to US-American subjects (Rusbult et al. 1995). All of these findings are consistent with differences in power distance revealed in cross-cultural comparisons among the investigated countries (Hofstede 2001; http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php). Thus, these findings are consistent with the idea that status is considered to be a relevant investment in cultures with high power distance. Accordingly, the cited results may be counted as the first support for our hypotheses that resources that are considered to be important within a culture count as relevant input in exchange or allocation situations (Hypothesis 1.1), whereas these resources are seen as less relevant in cultures that do not value this specific resource type as much (Hypothesis 1.2).

Femininity: Love

Consistent with our assumption that in rather feminine cultures, socioemotional investments (love) may be regarded to be of high importance and, hence, equitably “repaid” in allocations either of the same or other kinds of resources, Nauta (1983) found that subjects from the Netherlands based their (pay) allocation decisions more strongly on the group-maintenance contributions of recipients than did subjects from Hong Kong (James 1993). Russian subjects considered friendship when allocating rewards, whereas British subjects exclusively considered work-oriented input (Tower et al. 1997). The respective nations have been shown to differ with regard to masculinity/femininity in accordance with the findings (Hofstede 2001). Thus, again, the cited findings are consistent with the notion that a culturally valued resource is considered to be a relevant investment in allocation situations (Hypothesis 1.1), but a resource that is not particularly valued within a culture is not perceived as relevant input (Hypothesis 1.2).

Uncertainty Avoidance: Information

With regard to the perception of information as a relevant investment, we did not find any empirical studies that addressed the proposed link with uncertainty avoidance.

Besides empirical evidence that potentially supported our hypotheses, there were also patterns of results that were not as directly consistent with them. For example, in the allocation of status (grades), Hong Kong students have been shown to base their decisions on prior input of task-directed effort as well as on socioemotional input (love) (Bond et al. 1982). However, they gave less consideration to these two types of input than students from the USA (Bond et al. 1982), even though people in the USA have been found to score lower on power distance than people from Hong Kong (Hofstede 2001). Similar patterns were found among students from the USA, Korea, and Japan (Kim et al. 1990). These findings

seem to contradict our prediction that power distance is related to a preference for equity for allocating status (cf. Hypothesis 2.1).

Evidence is mixed with regard to the allocation of love. A few studies have shown no differences in the endorsement of equity for the allocation of friendship among nations that scored equally high on masculinity in Hofstede’s (2001) cross-cultural comparisons (e.g., the USA and Hong Kong; Bond et al. 1982). However, subjects from substantially less masculine countries have been shown to strongly endorse the equality and the need principles for allocations of love instead of the equity principle compared with more masculine nationalities (e.g., Sweden and the USA, Törnblom et al. 1985; Korea and the USA, Kim et al. 1990).

Thus, whereas our first set of hypotheses (i.e., Hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2; culturally important resources are subjectively relevant input and are “repaid” equitably) has received some support in prior cross-cultural comparisons, our second set of hypotheses (i.e., Hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2; equity is preferred as the distributive principle for the allocation of culturally important resources in comparison to the allocation of less important resources where equality or need are preferred instead) may be called into question in light of previous studies. However, consistent with prior criticisms of cross-cultural research (e.g., Fischer and Smith 2003), it has to be stressed that the cited findings at best can be seen as the first hints for or against the validity of our hypotheses. First, the nations that were compared with regard to preferences for distributive principles differ not only on the focal dimension but on several dimensions simultaneously. For example, differences in power distance or in masculinity may coincide with significant differences in individualism that are potentially linked to generally more egalitarian attitudes within the in-group. Second, the fact that national samples have been found to differ on specific dimensions in cross-cultural research does not necessarily imply that newly drawn samples from the same nations will display the same mean score differences (Hofstede 1980). Both remarks lead to the conclusion that a valid test of our hypotheses requires the assessment of

cultural characteristics together with the systematic probing of preferences for distributive principles for different types of resources both as investments and as outcomes.

Conclusions

A comprehensive empirical test of our hypotheses has yet to be undertaken. Such a test is likely to yield results relevant for all three perspectives involved in the suggested triangulation: distributive justice theory, cross-cultural research, and resource theory. The integration of resource theory with distributive justice theories provides a correct understanding of the equity principle. In justice research, this principle is easily mistaken for achievement-based allocations only. However, equity can be established with different types of resources on both the input and the outcome sides (cf. Törnblom and Vermunt 2007). For example, respect or loyalty could be “repaid” by means of attention or information allocation.

Moreover, the proposed triangulation shows that resource theory and the multi-principle approach are not incompatible but rather complement each other in a fruitful way, acknowledging that subjectively fair allocations do not necessarily entail a differentiation among recipients. Instead, the interaction of resource type and socially shared goals is taken to determine preferences for equity, equality, or need as prominent distributive principles (Törnblom et al. 1985). Cultural characteristics, such as those proposed in Hofstede’s framework (1980, 2001), should determine how resources are perceived and evaluated in the context of allocations and, thus, whether they are employed to differentiate among recipients or not.

The systematic consideration of different types of resources that are exchanged, invested, or allocated may allow a reinterpretation of seemingly unrelated findings in cross-cultural justice research (cf. Bolino and Turnley 2008; Fadil et al. 2005). Importantly, resource theory provides a framework for the operationalization of the kinds of investments or characteristics by which recipients may differ. As resource theory stresses, it is not trivial whether praise (status), friendship

(love), and help (service) are collapsed into one category of investments or not (cf. Bond et al. 1982; Gómez et al. 2000; Kim et al. 1990).

Prior theoretical explorations of how culture shapes resource allocations had no systematic account of resource types. Recent theoretical developments were aimed at acknowledging cultural differences in the perception of different kinds of inputs and outcomes (Bolino and Turnley 2008; Fadil et al. 2005). Nevertheless, in our understanding, they were lacking a parsimonious set of propositions comprehensively linking cultural characteristics, preferences for justice principles, and resource types. Cultural characteristics identified by Hofstede (1980, 2001) are theoretically related to the cultural evaluation of specific types of resources as structured by resource theory. Derived from an exchange theoretical perspective, we proposed basic assumptions of how the cultural evaluation of a particular resource type may affect (a) preferences for its consideration as relevant input and (b) preferences for its allocation. As Adams (1965) stated, in the process of socialization, the individual adopts culturally shared expectations regarding relevant inputs and outcomes that can be equitably exchanged. Taken together, we believe that integrating cross-cultural justice research with resource theory takes theoretical developments one step further toward a coherent and comprehensive account of cultural differences in distributive justice perceptions.

Finally, empirically testing our hypotheses in cross-cultural justice research may also yield important findings regarding the exchange rules postulated within the framework of resource theory (Foa 1971; Foa and Foa 1974; Foa et al. 1993). For example, whereas the structure of resource types has been found to be invariant across cultures (Foa and Foa 1974; Foa et al. 1987), it seems possible that the instrumentality of resources varies systematically between cultures. As we proposed, culturally valued resources may count as relevant input in exchange for different kinds of resources, whereas less valued resources may not be considered to be relevant input or may be exchanged for similar resources only, rather than dissimilar ones. Thus, in a culture characterized by low masculinity (high femininity), for instance,

a highly particularistic resource—love—may be exchanged for more universalistic resources, a pattern of exchange uncommon in more masculine cultures (cf. Foa 1971). Of course, this idea remains speculative, but it stresses the importance of systematic cross-cultural research for further developments in resource theory.

In summary, the integration of distributive justice theory, cross-cultural perspective, and resource theory allows for the development of a parsimonious understanding of cultural differences in preferred allocations of different types of resources. The empirical inspection of our hypotheses remains for future research and promises important and stimulating results for each theoretical perspective involved: distributive justice theory, cross-cultural research, and resource theory.

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Cultural Differences in Resource Exchange at the Workplace: A Sino-US Comparison

18

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The main purpose of social exchange theory in general (Blau 1964), and resource theory (RT) in particular, is to help understand social relationships (Foa, Converse et al. 1993, p. 2). On the other hand, organizational researchers are concerned with understanding how resources are exchanged in the workplace. The goal of this chapter is to inform RT by adding a cross-cultural perspective on workplace resource exchanges with a focus on building relationships. In this light, pertinent research questions include the following: Does the breadth of social resources in exchange vary across different societies and cultures? Does the use of given social resources vary across different societies and cultures? What accounts for such cross-cultural similarities or differences?

We contend that the nature of existent social relationships and social orientations (their fundamental conceptions of self in relation to others) greatly influence which and how resources are exchanged between partners as well as the perception of their physical manifestations. In this chapter, we first introduce RT and reflect on some conceptual challenges presented by view-

ing it through a cross-cultural perspective. Next, we discuss how social relationships and people's social orientations at the societal level affect the characteristics of resource exchange. Third, we examine how resources are exchanged differently in the USA and China at three levels of relationships (peer, supervisor-subordinate, and employer-employee). Finally, we discuss research implications, offer a model of cross-cultural resource exchange, and provide direction for future cross-cultural research in RT.

Cross-Cultural Perspective on Resource Theory

RT conceptualizes social resources as anything which can be exchanged in interpersonal situations (E. Foa and Foa 1980, p. 78). Six types of social resources are identified: love, status, information, money, goods, and services. Under this framework, love is an expression of affection, warmth, or comfort. Status is an expression of evaluative judgment conveying prestige, regard, or esteem. Information is advice, opinion, instruction, or enlightenment (excluding expressions of love and status). Money is any coin, currency, or token possessing a standard unit of financial value. Goods are inanimate objects, while services are activities directed to the body or the belongings of another person (often described as labor).

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RT maps these six resources on the two underlying attributes of concreteness and particularism (Foa 1971). First, a resource high on concreteness is said to have a physical representation and a means of exchange that are high on tangibility, while a resource low on concreteness is said to have a physical representation and a means of exchange that are low on tangibility (e.g., verbal or paralinguistic behavior). Note that the attribute of concreteness refers to the tangibility of the physical representation of a resource as well as the tangibility of the means through which it is exchanged. More specifically, goods and services are described as high in physical tangibility for both representation and means of exchange, whereas status and information are described as low in tangibility for both physical representation and means of exchange. Thus, as described in RT, services and goods are the most concrete, while status and information are the least concrete.

However, there may be social resources which do not have such a one-to-one relationship between its physical representation and means of exchange. For example, love, being socio-emotional in nature, is low on tangibility in terms of its physical representation but can range greatly in terms of the degree to which it is exchanged through tangible or intangible means. For example, expressing affection may involve providing food and personal care, which is highly tangible or may involve verbal expression, which is much more intangible. Nonetheless, there seems to be some conceptual inconsistency with regard to the concreteness of money. Strictly based on the definition of concreteness, money is highly tangible, in means of exchange (i.e., in the exchange of a specific amount of payment) as well as physical representation. That is, in the sense that money can express love, pay for a service, or demonstrate status, money is able to be both tangible (in physical representation) and intangible (in means of exchange). However, such a broad interpretation of tangibility goes beyond the definition of concreteness in RT and is a sign that conceptual clarification may be in order.

From a cross-cultural perspective, the concreteness attribute of RT is problematic with regard to love and status. The extent to which love and status are understood as low in "concreteness" and used

as such may depend on culture. One cultural concept that is particularly pertinent is the extent to which meaning is communicated through context, or the extent to which meaning is directly articulated versus indirectly implied. That is, in low-context cultures, meaning is coded primarily in verbal expression, whereas in high-context cultures, meaning is coded to a larger extent in nonverbal expression (Hall 1976), including body language, contextual setups, and substantive behaviors. These differences may influence how resources are categorized, perceived, and exchanged.

To begin, people from low-context cultures such as the Germans, Scandinavians, and Americans (Copeland and Griggs 1986) may rely on symbolic acts (e.g., linguistic and paralinguistic) to a greater extent to express status and love, whereas people from high-context cultures such as the Japanese, Chinese, and Arabs (Copeland and Griggs 1986) may rely on what are called substantive acts (e.g., providing services or goods). Symbolic acts from members of low-context cultures may be viewed as a failure to provide the social resources needed by exchange partners from high-context cultures, while substantive acts from members of high-context cultures may be viewed as a failure to provide the social resources needed by exchange partners from low-context cultures. Further, there are cultural preferences for different symbolic acts. Exchange partners from a low-context culture may use more direct explicit expressions of love or status, whereas exchange partners from a high-context culture may use more suggestive expressions of these resources. Finally, cultures even differ greatly in the body language used to express social affection or status. For example, customary greetings in terms of physical touch (e.g., hugging and kissing), firmness (e.g., handshake), as well as the duration and intensity of eye contact vary across cultures.

The second way resources are classified in RT is on their degree of particularism. Particularism relates to the "significance of the person who provides the resource" (Foa and Foa 1980, p. 79). A resource is high in particularism to the extent that the provider bears high relational significance to the recipient. With regard to particularism, the

six resources ranked in descending order are love, status and services, information, and goods as well as money. Love is described as the most particularistic because its value depends greatly on who is providing it, while money is described as the least particularistic as its standard value remains the same, regardless of who provides it. Notice particularism does not differentiate resources in terms of an inherent characteristic but in terms of the relationship between exchange partners. Resource theorists readily acknowledge the subjectivity of this underlying attribute (e.g., Foa and Foa 1974, p. 82; Foa, Tornblom et al. 1993, p. 3), in that both the expression and value of a particularistic resource can only be gauged within a specific relational context. However, as Berg and Clark (1986) discuss, particularism may also be indicated to the extent that the provider tailors the resource to the need of the recipient. Interestingly, in a study of US college students, Brinberg and Castell (1982) found that when behaviors were used to signify social resources, money and love were perceived as similar in terms of particularism. More specifically, a “hug” and “care” (expressions of love) were seen as similar to “earn money for” and “spend money on” (among friends, acquaintances, and strangers). Thus, we contend that a resource may be considered particularistic (regardless of how concrete its expression might be) to the extent it is provided by someone who is relationally close to the recipient and/or to the extent it satisfies a particular need of the recipient. That is, even though money is very concrete and bears some standard of universal value, if the recipient is in dire need of money, money may be perceived as particularistic. The argument presented by Brinberg and Castell (1982, p. 267) to explain their finding parallels ours on need, namely, that the limited availability of money leads to a need among college students and a sense of affect when money was exchanged.

If relationships influence the very definition of a resource by individuals within a culture, one could imagine the challenge of defining resource characteristics in a cross-cultural or intercultural context. We will devote a complete section to how patterns of social relationships across different

societies influence the perception, characterization, and use of social resources. At this point, it is sufficient to state that we prefer to separate relationship characteristics of exchange partners from characteristics inherent to a resource. The conceptual distinction between relationship characteristics and resource characteristics would allow researchers to theorize how relationship characteristics influence perceptions and uses of resources. This is especially important since particularism is a well-established concept regarding personal relationships within the cultural literature (Parsons and Shils 1951; Trompenaars 1994).

One way of defining resources on the basis of their inherent characteristics is to differentiate resources in terms of their capacity to satisfy task requirements as opposed to relational needs. Research on social exchange theory often differentiates economic and social relationships (Blau 1964), with the former using relationships to accomplish specific tasks and the latter using relationships to express socio-emotional sentiments and enhance psychological well-being. In a cross-cultural study, Chen (1995) measured the degree to which Americans and Chinese perceive organizational rewards (social resources) in terms of a material/financial and socio-emotional dimensions. It was found that both Chinese and Americans perceive salary and bonuses as predominantly material/financial while managerial friendliness and a displayed photo in a company news letter as predominantly socio-emotional. However, the Chinese interpreted the use of a company car, a paid vacation, and attending a party with a company president as significantly more socio-emotional than American subjects. Thus, this study provides direct evidence for cross-cultural similarities and differences in the perception of the same physical representation of social resources used in organizations.

Further, regarding the use of a given social resource, Chen (1995) found that Chinese subjects preferred differential rules in the allocation of both financial and socio-emotional resources for accomplishing organizational goal priorities of economic development. On the other hand, Americans preferred differential rules in the allocation of financial resources but equalitarian rules

in the allocation of socio-emotional resources because Americans hold both economic and humanistic goal priorities for their organizations. "In a follow-up study, about 10 years later, He and colleagues (2004) found general support" for the differential allocation tendencies among Chinese, but the preference for differential allocation was stronger with material/financial rewards than with socio-emotional rewards.

There are some other studies regarding cross-cultural allocation preferences which shed light on this matter. With regard to the allocation of money, Marin (1981) found that Columbians preferred an allocator using equity versus equality more than Americans; Aral and Sunar (1977) found that subjects from Turkey preferred equity to a greater extent than subjects from the USA, while Leung and Iwawaki (1988) found no difference in allocation behavior regarding money among Americans, Japanese, and Koreans. Although such equity preference may vary in strength across different societies, these studies show that money, the least socio-emotional social resource, is generally preferred to be allocated according to member contribution.

Further, by summarizing the results of several studies using the six resource types described in RT, Törnblom and Foa (1983) found that Swedish subjects rated the equality rule as the most desirable and equity (contribution) as the least desirable allocation rule for all resources. On the other hand, Americans preferred the equality rule for love, goods, and services, the equity (contribution) rule for money, the need rule for information, while they similarly preferred the equity (contribution) and need rule for status. There were also three German samples included in the summary. All three German samples perceived the equity (contribution) rule for the allocation of status as the most just, and two of the three samples perceived the equality rule as the least just. Further, all three German samples perceived need as the most just and equity (contribution) as the least just for love, information, goods, and services. Two of the three German samples perceived equality as the most just and equity (contribution) as the least just in allocating money.

The above studies suggest that culture may influence resource allocation in a number of ways. First, culture may dispose its members toward a general tendency of equity versus equality, as in the equalitarian tendency among Swedes. Second, culture interacts with resource characteristics to influence allocation preferences. For example, Americans prefer equity for the allocation of financial resources but equality for the allocation of socio-emotional resources. Third, there can be idiosyncratic cultural preference for the allocation of a specific resource, possibility due to some idiosyncratic meaning in the culture. For instance, to Germans, status departs from socio-emotional and symbolic resources such as love and information as well as the financial/material resources such as goods and money. It is also worth noting that situational differences in resource allocation, as presented to subjects in different research projects, may account for at least some of the influences attributed to culture. For example, is money allocated as a form of reward for good performance or as means to assist the survival of the needy? These situational differences should be controlled when comparing preferences across cultures.

Finally, the cross-cultural support for the proposed ranking of the resources in terms of particularism is less than clear. For example, although Foa and colleagues (1987) have found that the pattern of relationships among resources seems to be similar in samples from five countries, the sample from the Philippines (the nation which could be considered the most "Eastern"), was severely limited (based on 16 young women). Further, other researchers have noted a substantial limitation with using the dimensions of particularism and concreteness (Törnblom et al. 1993, p. 216). Nonetheless, we will put aside these concerns and continue this chapter by recognizing the utility in the "objectivity" that RT attempts to provide and use it to facilitate a comparison of social exchange across the USA and China on three levels of relationships. However, we first describe the influence of different social relationships and then consider the impact of different social orientations on resource exchange at the workplace.

Cultural Differences of Social Relationships in the Workplace and Resource Exchange

In this section, we discuss cultural differences in workplace relationships and their impact on social exchange by applying Fiske's (1992, 1993) four cultural templates of relationships (market pricing, communal sharing, equality matching, and authority ranking). The first two templates of relationships include market pricing and communal sharing. In market pricing relationships, exchange partners assume each other to be rational cost-benefit calculators when determining their behaviors at work. In this type of relationship, universally recognized incentives are used to sway the cost-benefit analysis of an exchange partner (agent) to act favorably (toward the principal) on a "transaction-by-transaction" basis (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Generally speaking, US business culture is characterized as this type of relationship (e.g., Williamson 1985). On the other hand, communal sharing relationships are based on the assumption that the group interest transcends that of its individual members (Fiske 1993) and that assets (objects or talents) of each group member are considered to be "in common" and represent a means of building a shared identity (Fiske 1992). The Japanese workplace is often characterized in this fashion (Hsu 1975, p. 215).

In market pricing relationships, money is normally used as the common base of comparison as different types of resources are converted into money, allowing for a single metric to summarize alternatives and facilitate the optimization of calculative short-term behavior. This conversion to money leads to a much higher propensity to use money in market pricing relationships than in other types of relationships. Further, the emphasis on a common base of comparison across resources tends to narrow the breadth of exchanged resources to money and those resources which can be easily converted to money (e.g., homogenous goods and services).

On the other hand, resource exchange in communal sharing relationships tend to include a broader breadth of resources, as in-group members

exhibit considerable effort to directly satisfy the various needs of other in-group members. That is, the "need" of in-group members may take on various forms, leading to a much broader assortment of exchanged resources in communal sharing relationships as compared to market pricing relationships. Simply put, even if money (or a close substitute) is exchanged in a communal sharing relationship, it may be interpreted as socio-emotional or a means of helping an in-group member satisfy personal needs. Since nonmonetary resources tend to take longer to cognitively process than monetary resources (Foa and Foa 1974, p. 166), a longer perceived length of exchange is anticipated in communal sharing relationships than in market pricing relationships.

The two templates which remain include equality matching and authority ranking. First, an equality matching relationship consists of a "one-for-one" or "like-for-like" additive/subtractive association (Fiske 1993) in resource exchange. Though this type of exchange can technically occur with any type of resource, by definition, the breadth of exchange is narrow, as the exchange is "like-for-like." In this tit-for-tat exchange, the successive receipt or provision of a specific resource has a summative impact on what one owes or is owed in terms of a specific resource. Essentially separate "accounts" are kept, tabulating which exchange partner owes or is owed which resource. The ability to tabulate one's personal "payables" and "receivables" in terms of each resource clarifies the obligations among exchange partners, making them easily discharged and leading to a rather short perspective of exchange (Fiske 1992). Blau elaborates this type of relationship by describing a one-for-one (e.g., service-for-service) reciprocation as a means of creating a mutual interdependence and equating power between exchange partners (1964, p. 29), building the relationship.

On the other hand, in authority ranking relationships, an ordering of partners by rank creates a hierarchy which defines their exchange (Fiske 1992). In authority ranking relationships, those of higher rank accrue certain privileges over those with lesser rank while offering those of lesser

Table 18.1 Social relationships and exchange characteristics

Exchange characteristics	Social relationships			
	Market pricing	Equality matching	Communal sharing	Authority ranking
<i>Resource emphasis</i>	Financial or material	Like-for-like	Socio-emotional	<i>Intangible</i> : lesser to higher <i>Tangible</i> : higher to lesser
<i>Length of perspective taken</i>	Short term	Short term	Long term	Long term
<i>Breadth and diversity of resources</i>	Narrow	Narrow	Broad	Broad

rank security and protection (Fiske 1992). Within this hierarchical “mutual dependence” (Redding 1990, p. 117), intangible resources (e.g., tribute) tend to flow from lesser to higher rank, while tangible resources (e.g., protection and sustenance) tend to flow from higher to lesser rank (Fiske 1992). Thus, a broad breadth of resources is exchanged within authority ranking relationships. Further, due to the dissimilar nature of the resources, partners in authority ranking relationships tend to take a long-term perspective with the view that inequities will even out over time. In order to sustain an authority ranking relationship, the exchange between partners must have what Blau calls a “positive balance.” More specifically, those of lower rank must perceive that the resources received from the relationship are adequate to compensate for the resources provided (Blau 1964, p. 30). Thus, to build the relationship, each partner must continue to receive a net benefit.

Though these four templates for relationships can be used to analyze “micro” context-specific behavior, we contend that the use of the templates may cluster on the cultural level. More specifically, due to the association between market pricing and equality matching relationships, Piaget (1956) has been described as muddling their distinction (Fiske 1992). Further, Hofstede’s power distance and collectivism cultural dimensions were highly correlated (Hofstede 1980), giving evidence that communal sharing and authority ranking relationships can coexist. In fact, Fiske shows that communal sharing and authority ranking relationships do coexist with few incidents of conflict between them (Fiske 1991, p. 312). Simply put, by constructing relationships with

predominantly market pricing and equality matching characteristics, exchanges will involve a narrow breath of resources and focus on the exchange of universal resources among “equal” partners with a short-term perception of exchange. On the other hand, in cultures with relationships comprising of communal sharing and authority ranking characteristics, social resource exchange will involve a broad breadth of resources and focus on the exchange of tangible and intangible resources among unequal partners with a long-term perception of exchange. A summary of this discussion can be seen in Table 18.1.

Cultural Differences of Social Orientations in the Workplace and Resource Exchange

Differences in social orientations regarding the conceptions of self also have implications for social resource exchange. That is, an independent and interdependent self are two forms of self-concept which have been identified in the literature (Markus and Kitayama 1991). First, an independent self, as normally found in Western nations, views the self as unique and autonomous, while behavior is seen as determined from within (e.g., one’s desires and motivations of the self). On the other hand, as found in many Asian nations, an interdependent self is cast as malleable in accordance with social relationships, whereby internal preferences and attitudes tend to be regulated and behavior is governed by the understanding of the relevant relational other (e.g., significant others’ desires and motivations).

First, RT suggests that exchange partners are motivated to seek social resource homeostasis of the self, or levels of each social resource within an optimal range. That is, when a person possesses an amount of a resource outside an optimal range (either a shortfall or surplus), a partner with compatible preferences is said to be sought out, so a mutually agreeable exchange can occur. The motivation of exchange is to attain an optimal amount of each social resource for each partner (Foa and Foa 1974, pp. 127–132 and 174–175). This proposition applies to people with an independent self-construal better than those with interdependent self-construal. Since an independent self is more oriented toward satisfying their own personal needs (Markus and Kitayama 1991), a social interaction is a means of expressing and satisfying what is important to the individualized self. Thus, an exchange partner is seen as a replaceable means to satisfy a specific need of the individualized self. As such, those with an individualized self are likely to seek partners who can optimally facilitate the fulfillment of a self-preference, resulting in a lower frequency of exchange between a given set of exchange partners, a narrower breadth, and lower diversity of resources in exchange.

In contrast to the independent self, an interdependent self leads to highly embedded in-group relationships. To the extent that people with an interdependent self view workplace coworkers as in-group members, they will tend to devote resources to personal relationship building and take a long-term perspective to exchange. This devotion and long-term perspective, in turn, will lead to a greater frequency of exchange between partners as well as a broader scope and a greater diversity of exchanged resources for building and maintaining these highly embedded relationships. It is worth noting that being other-oriented in social interactions does not imply that interdependent people are always altruistic in their motivation. It simply means that those with an interdependent self perceive that the attainment of personal preferences can only be meaningfully achieved through facilitating the satisfaction of other in-group member preferences (Markus and Kitayama 1991). More specifically, via a reciprocity favorable to

in-group others, in-group members maintain a long-term mutually beneficial relationship. Thus, in totality, the needs and preferences of both in-group others and the self are satisfied. This discussion is similar to what Berg and colleagues have identified in the Western literature as satisfying the need of relational others (1993), as they have shown that being responsive to the needs of others may lead to the development of a close relationship (Berg 1987).

Next, cross-cultural research has found that the independent self tends to be more task focused, whereas the interdependent self tends to be more relationship focused (Triandis 1995), leading to implications for resource exchange. More specifically, since one's attention is directed toward getting the task accomplished, an independent self often neglects the relational needs of others. As a result, resource exchange may be more restricted to those concrete, financial, and material resources to the neglect of symbolic and socio-emotional resources. Further, a focus on "getting the job done" does little to bond exchange partners, further limiting future opportunities for resource exchange.

Given the above discussion, we propose that exchange partners with an independent self and interdependent self will engage in differing degrees of what Blau (1964) identifies as economic and social exchange. To begin, economic exchange includes financial resources with specific expectations of a predetermined length, while social exchange includes socio-emotional resources with unspecified expectations of an indeterminate length. We argue that since (in-group) partners with an interdependent self are sensitive to the various needs of in-group members (Markus and Kitayama 1991, p. 231), they should primarily adopt social exchange and use economic exchange for instrumental purposes. On the other hand, exchange between partners with an independent self should resemble economic exchange to a great extent as a lack of connection between partners should limit social exchange and direct attention to (mutually beneficial) instrumental purposes.

In sum, exchanges between partners with an independent self tend to have a relatively low frequency, consist of partners with a short-term

Table 18.2 Social orientations and exchange characteristics

Resource exchange	Independent self	Interdependent self (in-group)
<i>Frequency of exchange</i>	Low	High
<i>Length of perspective taken</i>	Short term	Long term
<i>Breadth and diversity of resources</i>	Narrow	Broad

perspective of exchange, and are comprised of a narrow breadth of resources. On the other hand, exchanges between (in-group) partners with an interdependent self are likely to be of a relatively high frequency, consist of partners who take a long-term perspective to exchange, and are comprised of a broad breadth of resources. A summary of this discussion regarding social orientation can be found in Table 18.2.

A Sino-US Comparison of Resource Exchanges at the Workplace

Based on the work of social exchange (Blau 1964) and reciprocity (Gouldner 1960), organizational researchers have highlighted three related yet distinct levels of social resource exchange in a workplace. First, the peer level pertains to social resource exchange in which exchange parties are of similar social standing in the organization. Employees who work side-by-side on a daily basis would be typical examples. Second, the supervisor-subordinate level pertains to the social resource exchange when one exchange party is of greater formal social standing than the other. Leader-member and foreman-worker dyads would be typical examples. An unequal span of control and differentiation in formal decision-making powers normally corresponds to the supervisor-subordinate level in a business context.

Finally, the employer-employee level pertains to the exchange between an employee and the employing organization in general (Wang et al. 2003). More specifically, employees have been found to personify their employing organization by aggregating their experiences with the members in their organization who control resource allocation (Eisenberger et al. 1986). Though some of these experiences are related to an employee's current supervisor, exchanges with direct supervisors

from the past, nondirect supervisors as well as even higher-level supervisors are all included in how employees construe the exchange with their employing organization. Past research has empirically differentiated the supervisor-subordinate level from the other levels of exchange (Settoon et al. 1996; Wayne et al. 1997). We next turn to describing typical exchanges in these three levels of relationships in the USA and China; Table 18.3 provides a summary of this discussion.

Resource Exchange in Peer Relationships

Social resource exchange among peers in the USA is stereotypically described as an impersonal market. That is, distinct partners offer their resources in exchange for other resources of similar market value. Generally speaking, free choice and personal goals characterize this type of social exchange between peers (Bellah et al. 1985). Further, peer relationships are described to last as long as a mutually beneficial exchange can continue, regardless of any broader social connection or lack thereof (Tocqueville 1969). This mutually beneficial exchange is normally related to how one can benefit via exchange regarding the overt instrumental value of the tangible and universal resources being exchanged.

The work of Parsons and Shils (1952) further suggests that this market orientation to social interaction allows peers the flexibility of benefiting in an instrumental way from an ever-changing context but limits the number of exchanges between any given set of exchange partners. It is suggested that as time changes, so too does an actor's personal instrumental resource needs and the ability of a specific peer to satisfy those needs. Thus, an actor's limited attention and effort are continuously redirected to different

Table 18.3 Exchange characteristics in the USA and China

	Characteristics of exchange	
	USA	China (in-group)
<i>Peer</i>	Market like	Family like
	Exchange equivalent market value	One-upmanship (offer more than receive)
	Meaning of resource is overt	Meaning depends on partner need
	Focus on tangible and universal resources	Broad breadth and diversity of resources
	Low frequency	High frequency
<i>Supervisor-subordinate</i>	Confined to work context	Both work and nonwork contexts
	Among distinct partners	Among “connected” partners
	Assumes personal self-interest	Assumes hierarchical roles
	Mutual benefit in short term	Mutual benefit in long term
	Narrow breadth of exchange	Broad breadth of exchange
<i>Employer-employee</i>	Business/professional organization	Total organization
	Driven by profit and productivity	Driven by social/political and business objectives
	Short term	Long term
	Exchange prespecified	Exchange broad and holistic
	Monetary incentives (most common)	Personalistic (residence, daycare, etc.)
	Predetermined outcomes (from labor)	Labor + loyalty/devotion
	Predefined individualized charge	Responsible for general charge

peers who can best attain one’s current instrumental resource needs. In support of this discussion, Morris and colleagues (2008) found that the instrumental ties among US peers were of a shorter duration than found in Hong Kong Chinese.

Thus, building relationships among US peers involves exchanging social resources of similar market value, perceiving resources in an overt manner, and fulfilling the instrumental needs of an exchange partner, whereby the frequency of exchange between a given set of exchange partner is limited by economic efficiency.

As opposed to the impersonal, market-oriented peer exchange found in the USA, essential to the Chinese peer exchange is the notion of “renqing,” literally translated as “human sentiment”; it refers to “the bond of reciprocity and mutual aid between two people” (Yang 1994, p. 68). Hwang (1987, p. 954) points out that assisting an in-group peer in times of need (or performing a “renqing”) is very common. That is, fulfilling a resource need of a peer is recognized as a method to build and strengthen close relationships in

China. This need fulfillment leads to a broad range of resources in exchange, unlike their US counterparts who focus on tangible and universal resources. Some researchers describe personal instrumentality for tangible resources as the “pre-eminent characteristic” (Gold 1985, pp. 659, 662) of peer exchange in China. For example, “walk guanxi,” as in “walking through the back door” to attain various tangible resources (Hwang 1987, p. 967; King 1991, p. 70) is commonly discussed. However, a primary focus on instrumentality may typify exchanges with out-group members, whereas instrumental exchanges in a close peer relationship in China are overlaid with affective sentiment and a sense of social obligation.

In contrast to the more flexible US peer relationships, Chinese peer relationships are often built on a “guanxi base,” a common institution or community, spanning time but possessing a clear social or physical boundary (Chen and Chen 2004). These guanxi bases are associated with a shared social identity (Jacobs 1979, 1982), at times strong enough to emulate the bonds between family members (Hwang 1987). Typical examples

of *guanxi* bases include birthplace, educational institution, and workplace (Yang 1997). This connectivity via a *guanxi* base is so prominent in China that some suggest even instrumental exchange cannot be achieved if no such connection is established between peers (Hui and Graen 1997). In comparison with US workplace peer exchange, the Chinese extend peer interactions from work to after-hours social events, home visits, sending gifts for special occasions, disclosing intimate aspects of the self as well as support in work and nonwork contexts (Law et al. 2000). Thus, it is clear how the frequency of exchange between Chinese peers is much greater than that between American peers.

One effective way to build close peer relationships in China is through what has become known as “one-upmanship” in exchange, which contrasts with comparable exchanges among American peers. This type of “one-upmanship” among Chinese peers is colloquially summarized as “receive a droplet of generosity; repay like a gushing spring” (*di shui zhi en dang yi yong quan xiang bao*) (Chen and Chen 2004, p. 317; Hwang 1987, p. 954) so as to create stronger feelings of indebtedness for repayment via future exchanges (Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars 1997, p. 179). This feeling of indebtedness is so pervasive among Chinese close peers that well-known proactive tactics have developed to prevent close relationships from being formed or to mitigate its resulting social obligations (Hwang 1987, p. 968).

However, economic development is influencing the way resources are exchanged in China. That is, when consumer goods were of short supply, the exchange among peers tended to be a barter of personal services for concrete resources. For example, an invitation for a home-cooked meal would suffice for the personal use of a corporate vehicle (Yang 1994, p. 163). However, resource exchange among Chinese peers has begun to shift from a barter of goods and services to an exchange of resources with greater universal value (Yang 1994). However, such universalistic resources (e.g., money) can still be exchanged in a personal fashion when offered to satisfy the financial need of the recipient, an occurrence of increasing frequency in the ever-more market-oriented Chinese

society. Even so, when money is perceived as “payment” in exchange for highly personal favors, it may signal a “closing” of the relationship. Thus, though modernization in China may be increasing the use of financial resources, the need of the recipient likely determines the socio-emotional meaning of the exchanged resources.

In sum, Chinese peers tend to build relationships by a type of “one-upmanship,” supplying what is needed by a close peer, potentially exchanging a broad breadth of resources with a relatively high frequency of exchange. This discussion is summarized in Table 18.3.

Resource Exchanges in Supervisor-Subordinate Relationships

In a review of the Western-based leader-member exchange (LMX) literature, Graen and Uhl-Bien conclude that the “development of LMX is based on the characteristics of the working relationship ... [and refers to] individuals’ assessments of each other in terms of their professional capabilities and behaviors” (1995, p. 237). Further, Gabarro’s analysis of several interviews of US supervisors and subordinates concludes that “effectiveness” and “task accomplishment” are the primary gauges of successful US supervisor-subordinate relationships (1978, p. 291 and 292). This focus on “working/professional capabilities” and “effectiveness/task accomplishment” in the USA bounds the supervisor-subordinate relationship to the work context.

As such, Western literature describes the individual accountability of supervisors as motivating them to engage subordinates in accomplishing an organizational charge. First, most of the social exchanges between supervisors and subordinates in the USA are described as having a transactional component (Bass 1985), whereby subordinates are incentivized by contingent rewards (usually money) to follow supervisor instructions. The use of contingent incentives assumes that subordinates are distinct individuals who may act according to personal self-interest. Thus, a rather short-term exchange of directed effort from the subordinate for contingent rewards from

the supervisor is created, benefiting both partners. Nonetheless, USA supervisors focus attention on those subordinates who have the required competence, a solid reputation, and high motivation (Liden and Graen 1980), all signs of instrumental capability.

However, the exchange of social and personal resources in the US leader-member relationship is generally restricted. For instance, though the exchange of socio-emotional resources in a US supervisor-subordinate dyad is described as associated with trust, respect, and obligation (Graen and Uhl-Bien 1995), a weak version of such resources (e.g., general warmth and friendliness) tends to be provided by the supervisor to all organizational members in a rather egalitarian manner (Martin and Harder 1994). That is, even when socio-emotional resources are exchanged within an American supervisor-subordinate dyad, the affective component is severely limited (Gabarro 1978, p. 292).

Contrasting their US counterparts, Chinese supervisor-subordinate exchange takes place in both work and nonwork contexts. For instance, Law and colleagues (2000) propose that after-work home visits and other social functions including marriages, births, birthdays, and promotions are all included as such contexts. Further, there have also been reports of Chinese supervisors assisting with a subordinate's marital dispute, the burial of a subordinate's relative, and visiting the family members of a delinquent subordinate (Wall 1990).

That is, rather than understanding exchange between distinct partners acting from personal self-interest, the Chinese supervisor-subordinate exchange tends to stress a connection among partners who are "filling" hierarchical roles. More specifically, though it is true that the Chinese Confucius self is described as having autonomy in establishing "achieved" relationships (King 1991), once formal "hierarchically differentiated" (Fei 1992) roles are established (as in a supervisor-subordinate dyad), certain hierarchically determined role requirements tend to emerge (Yang 1959). In fact, all five cardinal relationships in China, known as "lun" (ruler-subject, father-son, husband-wife, older brother-younger brother, and

older friend-younger friend), tend to be hierarchical, in which each partner is expected to satisfy role-based requirements.

Applying these hierarchical traditions to the workplace, supervisor-subordinate social resource exchange tends to be integrated with the social structure of the hierarchical dyadic relationship (Farh et al. 1997). More simply, the role one possesses in a hierarchical dyad tends to dictate how one should act (Redding and Wong 1986), influencing which and with whom one exchanges social resources. In China, the junior provides the senior with respect and obedience, while the senior owes the junior protection and consideration (Hofstede and Bond 1988), leading to a broader exchange as compared to their US counterparts. As Hui and Graen (1997) point out, the supervisor-subordinate connection is not required to involve personal "liking" but, if mandated by role requirements, affective resources may flow nonetheless. Given the nonequivalent exchange of resources, to allow the accrual of mutual benefit, a long-term perspective of supervisor-subordinate exchange is normally taken.

Thus, the Chinese supervisor-subordinate relationship tends to merge work and nonwork interaction, is guided by hierarchical roles of connected partners, includes a broad breadth of resources, and involves a long-term reciprocal approach to exchange (Chen and Farh 2009).

Resource Exchange in Employer-Employee Relationship

Facilitating the productivity of each individual worker is seen as of the utmost importance to US employers (Milkovich and Newman 2002). As such, US employers generally incent each employee to accomplish a specific predefined organizational charge with what have become known as "extrinsic" rewards (Herzberg 1966), or rewards offered to employees for satisfactory job performance. Though organizations need to increase their understanding of intrinsic rewards (e.g., Osterloh and Frey 2000), their use in US organizations generally serves the instrumental purpose of enhancing performance. Thus, this

system implicitly assumes such incentives can corral each distinct employee in contributing to the organizational purpose, as the short-term interests of each individual may be divergent from those of the organization as a whole.

Though there are a broad variety of possible rewards accessible to US employers with varying organizational benefits (Chen et al. 1999), US employers normally incent employees via monetary performance-based rewards (e.g., Gerhart and Milkovich 1993). In fact, several researchers have documented the positive impact of using financial resources as incentives in attaining predefined outcomes from US employees (Etzioni 1967; Steve Werner 2005). Given this precise individual charge, it would normally not be seen as the responsibility of US employees to contribute to the organization beyond their predefined job requirements (Osigweh et al. 1993). In general, these exchange characteristics are similar to those described as transactional contracting (Rousseau 1990).

In sum, employer-employee relationships in the USA tend to be governed by economic exchanges with resources more or less prespecified in legal and contractual agreements. Thus, since their quantifiable and convertible nature facilitates equitable assessment, employer-employee resource exchange in the USA tends to stay in the boundary of an economic relationship, involving primarily concrete and financial resources.

On the other hand, though there is ongoing modification in employer-employee exchange in China, it is quite different than US employer-employee exchange. More specifically, under Mao's socialist system, lifetime employment (the "iron-rice bowl") was the standard. The exchange between employee and employer was constructed to foster a social and ideological identity with the Chinese Communist Party, as a typical employer was seen as a constituent of the State. More specifically, state-owned business organizations were to first and foremost serve a social-political agenda (Zhu and Dowling 2002). Work organizations in Mao's era were similar to a "total organization" or "total institution," whereby the workplace was given not only a mandate of economic production but also a mandate with a broader social and ideological implication (Goffman 1962). As a

consequence, 80 % of state employees had lifetime employment (Zhu and Dowling 2002), a rather long-term perspective from any viewpoint.

Generally speaking, employees were expected to provide employers with not only tangible resources of labor and skill but also intangible resources of loyalty and devotion. That is, though "labor" may normally be considered as a concrete resource in the West, it may have a much greater symbolic component in China, representing loyalty and a type of connection to the employer-community. In exchange, employers provided employees with the concrete but personalistic resources needed for sustenance. Typically Chinese work organizations, especially large ones, provided employees with a base wage plus a broad assortment of benefits, such as residential quarters, daycare, schools, hospitals, and meals (Gold 1985, p. 664; Zhu and Dowling 1994). Notice, this exchange is much more holistic than the comparable US employer-employee exchange. That is, the employer-employee exchange in China can be considered similar to what is known as relational contracting (Rousseau 1990).

However, as the post-Mao era in China took hold, this type of employer-employee relationship was targeted for reform by the central government. For example, the use of employment contracts specifying the responsibilities of both the employer and employee was gradually phased-in (Branine 1997; Howard 1991), while contract length was eventually capped at 5 years (Maurer-Fazio 1995). Further, legislation was also introduced which clarified that employment was provided by a specific organization rather than the state (Dang 1991). Nonetheless, efforts to further refine the employer-employee relationship have been somewhat restrained. For instance, the central government of China has limited the ability of many employers to terminate redundant and underemployed workers (Yue 1997), and there is evidence which suggests formal contracts may have had a limited influence on the relationship between Chinese employers and employees, as contracts may be renewed automatically (Howard 1991).

Despite these reform efforts, though Chinese employers are using employee contracts to detail

the employer-employee exchange to an ever-increasing extent (Goodall and Warner 1997), employees still tend to consider their job charge as a general charge (e.g., to an organization or work unit). Further, performing tasks outside a contract, assisting colleagues, and consenting to job transfers (when requested by the employer) are all common in current-day Chinese employer-employee relationships (Tsui et al. 1997). Thus, what may be classified by Westerner employees as extra-role organizational citizenship behavior may be seen as part of typical responsibilities among Chinese workers (Farh et al. 2004). This general charge unquestionably contrasts with the individualized charge generally found in the US employer-employee exchange.

Though there are some formal efforts in China to change the employer-employee exchange, this level of exchange remains relatively ideological, long term, and broad, as compared to similar exchanges between American employers and American employees. Thus, to better an employer-employee relationship in China, it would be beneficial if both the employer and employee considered the general welfare of the other, in a rather holistic manner. Once again, a summary of the discussion comparing and contrasting the three levels of organizational-related relationships in the USA and China can be seen in Table 18.3.

Directions for Future Research and Conclusion

Through this chapter, we have shown that different social relationships as well as social orientations in the USA and China are associated with different approaches to social exchange in three levels of relationships commonly found in organizations. First, the characteristics of social exchange differ across these cultures. For instance, US social resource exchange at the workplace has been typified as precisely defined, rather short term and among discrete partners of similar rank. On the other hand, Chinese social resource exchange at the workplace has been typified as broad based, rather long term and among connected partners of a differential rank.

Further, the interpretation of specific manifestations of resources also tends to differ across these cultures. For example, it is argued that in the USA, labor is generally interpreted as concrete, while in China labor may take on a more symbolic role. Next, concrete and universalistic resources tend to be used in the USA to build relationships, while more symbolic and particularistic resources tend to be common for this purpose in China. That is, though the norms governing social resource exchange may differ across cultures, as predicted by Gouldner (1960), reciprocity in exchange seems to play an important role in relationship building in both the USA and China.

Given the discussed differences in social exchange in both of these cultures, various fruitful avenues of research can be highlighted. Broadly speaking, cross-cultural research on RT can focus on (1) social resource characteristics and (2) the exchange characteristics which effectively build relationships.

Social Resource Characteristics

First, cross-cultural research is greatly needed to validate a typology of social resources. Simply put, are the six resources identified in RT the most parsimonious and inclusive of all resource types, especially those of importance in an organizational context? For example, does information include knowledge or should information be subsumed under knowledge in modern organizations where the creation, sharing, and development of knowledge are increasingly important? Another important resource in the workplace which does not seem to have a place in RT is social capital, one's social network ties. Referral and access to a social network is a critical resource exchanged at the workplace and contributes to the effectiveness of an organization and its members.

Apart from refining or expanding the existent major types of resources, cross-cultural research can conceptually and empirically explore the underlying attributes of resources. We commented on the attribute of concreteness and pointed out that the current conception in RT confounds the concreteness of a resource with

the concreteness of an exchange behavior. Future research could specifically investigate the two types of concreteness as independent and cross them to further classify resources. For example, goods tend to be tangible in form and method of exchange, whereas status tends to be intangible in form and method of exchange. That is, tangibility in form can be studied on its own or in combination with exchange concreteness to form a classifying framework.

Next, we also raised questions about the conceptual soundness of particularism. In our view, particularism, as defined in RT, confounds inherent characteristics of resources with relational characteristics of the interacting partners. Here, we argue against defining resource characteristics in terms of relational characteristics and propose separating particularism either as a characteristic of relationship quality or as a cultural value, as proposed by Parsons (1952). Once particularism is relationally defined, it may serve as an antecedent or moderator of the perception and exchange of social resources in a cross-cultural context.

To conduct this line of investigation, researchers need to establish the comparability of resources. In other words, researchers need to assure the equivalence in perception of the physical manifestations of social resources across cultures. To do so, we recommend that instead of, or in addition to, concreteness and particularism, materiality/financial and socio-emotionality may be a fruitful line of investigation (e.g., Martin and Harder 1994). For instance, to study how material/financial and socio-emotional resources are allocated among organizational members in different cultures, these concepts should be first assessed to make sure that the distinction is valid for participants from different cultures (Chen 1995).

Effectiveness of Exchange Characteristics

Apart from cultural comparisons regarding social resource characterization, there is great opportunity with regard to cultural comparisons as to how resources are exchanged. Even with the above-mentioned notion of equivalence in mind,

currently, only general statements can be made regarding the relationship between resource characteristics and exchange characteristics (e.g., the more socio-emotional the resource, the longer the perspective taken by exchange partners). However, once resource characteristics become more conceptually focused and empirically justified in a greater number of cultures, especially those generally omitted in the literature (e.g., Eastern cultures), the influence of resource characteristics on exchange characteristics can be better articulated.

Second, cross-cultural comparisons can be conducted on a range of exchange characteristics. For example, we highlighted the differences of symbolic and substantive acts and how their unexpected use may contribute to intercultural unease. Further, we have discussed differences in the frequency of exchange, the breadth and diversity of resources in exchange, as well as the length of perspective taken by exchange partners. As indicated in the discussion comparing three levels of relationships in the USA and China, characteristics commonly found in workplace exchange as well as the implications of specific exchange characteristics for relationship building may vary by culture.

To this end, Fig. 18.1 outlines a general model indicating possible main effects and moderating effect of culture on resource characteristics and exchange characteristics. For example, the extent to which certain types of social resources (e.g., socio-emotional) are used in workplace exchange as well as the way they are expressed (e.g., symbolic/substantive) depends on culture. Further, the moderating effect of culture can be examined in various ways with different degrees of rigor. For example, a common approach is to use nationality or other social categories (e.g., ethnicity and gender) as a proxy of culture. Further, as we imply in our earlier discussion, culture can also be unpacked either in terms of values (e.g., high/low context, individualism-collectivism, power distance, and universalism/particularism) or social relationships (e.g., closeness and instrumental/expressive) or both, as values and relationships are intricately related.

Finally, resource exchange is most dynamic in an intercultural social context in which a member




Fig. 18.1 Cross-cultural comparative model of exchange

of one culture interacts with a member of another culture (Adler and Graham 1989). In such cultural interactions, taken-for-granted resource categories and exchange characteristics that arise from given social systems and cultural beliefs are likely to be questioned, resisted, or accommodated by members from different cultures. What if a person from the West attempts to provide a socio-emotional resource via a symbolic act when a person from the East is expecting a substantive act or vice versa? Further, what if a person with an independent self-construal expects a partner to consider self needs but this partner considers the needs of others (or vice versa)? How would intercultural perception, trust, and cooperation be influenced? Finally, over time, do members learn to adapt their perception and behavior to members from other cultures? How will such adaptation be received by exchange partners?

Through this chapter, we have adopted a cross-cultural perspective in investigating RT. In addition to proposing a cross-cultural perspective on the definition and classification of social resources, we highlight the influences of how general social

relationships and social orientations can influence exchange characteristics in different cultures. Further, we illustrate the differences and similarities between social exchange on peer, supervisor-subordinate, and employer-employee levels in the USA and China. Since cross-cultural work relating RT to bridging the East–west divide is in a nascent state, we propose a preliminary cross-cultural model to encourage other researchers to pursue such work.

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The Positive, Sustaining, and Protective Power of Resources: Insights from Conservation of Resources Theory

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Conservation of resources (COR) theory is a motivational theory of stress that highlights the power of resources in predicting the experience of stress and resilience, through the often complex interface of gains and losses. Though the principles of COR theory have largely been used to explain major stress and the impact of traumatic events (Benight et al. 1999; Freedy, Saladin et al. 1994; Freedy, Shaw et al. 1992; Hobfoll et al. 2006; Ironson et al. 1997; Kaiser et al. 1996; Norris et al. 1999), more recent work has been focused on applying the theory to the field of positive psychology, including resilience (Bakker et al. 2007; Bonanno et al. 2007; Halbesleben and Bowler 2007; Ito and Brotheridge 2003; Jawahar et al. 2007; Sun and Pan 2008; Zellars et al. 2006). In this chapter, we will pay particular attention to the ways in which resources sustain and protect us,

including the impact of resource gain cycles, and focus on the ways in which COR theory informs processes of resilience. First, we will examine the principles and corollaries of COR theory, with a particular focus on cycles of resource gain.

We believe this work both follows and extends the work of Foa (1971) in several ways. Foa opened a key conceptual gate, illustrating that psychosocial and cognitive resources behaved in much the same way as money, goods, labor, and information, which were seen traditionally as the resources economists considered. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) extended this understanding of the “economy” of noneconomic resources further to outline key cognitive principles that followed from resource exchange and delineated the particular relationship between loss and gain. COR theory, in turn, illustrated and expanded an understanding of the psychological economy of resources by outlining its likely evolutionary origins, the emotional basis of resource loss and resource gain, and the implications for human motivation and more specifically to stress reactivity. We outline some of our more recent advances in this regard next.

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Primary Principles and Corollaries of Conservation of Resources Theory

COR theory begins with the primary tenet that individuals strive to obtain, retain, foster, and protect those things which they centrally value.

In contrast to other dominant theories of stress that emphasize appraisal (i.e., Lazarus and Folkman 1984), COR theory states that resources that are centrally valued to human beings are largely universal and include factors such as social connection, family, health, well-being, peace, and self-preservation. People around the world and across cultural groups will seek to create contexts within which these valued resources can be protected, sustained, and built. Social systems are generally structured to do the same. Thus, little or no appraisal is required to determine whether these resources are likely to be valued. Further, though psychology tends to emphasize individual differences, these differences are actually quite minimal when predicting how people will behave in response to threatened or real resource loss. Extending from this primary tenet are several principles that are fundamental to COR theory (Hobfoll 1988, 1989, 1998, 2001; Hobfoll and Lilly 1993), each of which has been examined and supported across dozens of studies. In contrast to many of our previous discussions of COR theory, we will pay particular attention to the positive growth cycles associated with resource gain. Of course, as will be made clear in the context of the principles below, the power of gains is always relative to loss, and thus discussion of resource loss is critical for a thorough understanding of this model.

Principle 1: The Primacy of Resource Loss

The first principle of COR theory states that resource loss is disproportionately more salient than resource gain. Resources include object resources (those tangible resources necessary for survival or culturally highly valued, e.g., car, house), condition resources (those that directly or indirectly support survival, e.g., employment, marriage), personal resources (traits or skills central to survival or resilience, e.g., key skills and personal traits such as self-efficacy and self-esteem), and energy resources (those which can be used in exchange for other resources, e.g., credit, knowledge, money). It is obvious to see

how the presence of these resources could be protective in the face of a range of major and traumatic stressors and simultaneously how loss of such resources could be devastating. Yet, COR theory predicts, and results of many dozens of studies support, that the impact of gains and losses are not functionally equivalent in an equal and opposite way (see Hobfoll 1988, 1989, 1998, 2001). Losses have a significantly more deleterious impact on the individual, community, and society than the gain of equivalent resources would offer benefit. This disproportionate impact of loss versus gain occurs in several ways, including both speed and degree of impact, as loss spirals tend to occur more quickly and intensely, as we will discuss later. An initial view of resilience in COR theory emerges here. Some conceptualizations of resilience focus on factors such as an absence of psychopathology after experiencing traumatic stress, which implies that resilience is associated with a lack of loss of resources in the face of adversity. However, a more thorough conceptualization of resilience in COR theory would suggest that it is not just lack of loss but the ability to counteract loss or otherwise avert a resource loss spiral through mobilization of resources that is associated with resiliency, as introduced in the following principle.

Principle 2: Resource Investment

The second principle of COR theory is that people must invest resources in order to protect against resource loss, recover from losses, and gain resources. A related corollary of this principle (Corollary 1) is that those with fewer resources are more vulnerable to resource loss and less capable of resource gain. Conversely, (Corollary 2) those with greater resources are less vulnerable to resource loss and more capable of orchestrating resource gain.

Of primary importance, and related to the theme of the sustaining nature of resources, is that resource investment requires that people must either have resources at their disposal or be able to build a pool of resources for use in investing toward resource growth and minimizing loss. This notion led to the concept of *resource caravans*

within COR theory (Hobfoll 1988, 1998). From a developmental perspective, resource caravans likely begin at an early age, when individuals are (or alternatively are not) born into circumstances that are resource rich. Their environments offer additional shared resources, and in such environments, the individual learns to foster, maintain, and grow resources. Important variables such as stability, nurturing, love, and safety (within the family and community) contribute to the resource caravan and, if present, require little investment of resources to be sustained. In situations where these resources are not present, however, significant investment of other resources is required to counter against further loss. For example, poor families may have few options but to live in unsafe environments with low-quality schools, and parents or others who are financially supporting the family with little education may need to work several jobs (at minimum wage) in order to afford to sustain that lifestyle. It will, of course, be extraordinarily difficult, perhaps impossible, for them or their children to build the resources necessary to escape from such an environment. The family as a whole, and particularly the children, will be vulnerable to the influence of the unsafe community, as Rutter (2000) has demonstrated in a long line of research on the ecological influence of systems on children's development.

Resource Loss and Gain Spirals

The first two principles of COR theory, suggesting the primacy of resource loss and the necessity of resource investment, also lead to two additional critical corollaries on the processes through which losses and gains generally occur (Hobfoll 1988, 1998).

Corollary 2 of COR theory states that those who lack resources are not only more vulnerable to resource loss, but that initial loss begets future loss.

Corollary 3 mirrors Corollary 2, in that those who possess resources are more capable of gain and that initial resource gain begets further gain. However, because loss is more potent than gain, loss cycles will be more impactful and more accelerated than gain cycles.

Historically, much of the large body of research on stress in general and traumatic stress specifically has tended to look at stressors as single events, though this has evolved over time to include the impact of multiple and recurrent stressors. COR theory suggests that this newer recognition of the impact of multiple events is critical: resource loss cycles tend to occur because stress is a result of resource loss, and in response, additional resources must be invested to offset further resource loss and thus further stress (which is, of course, not always possible if resources have already been depleted). Such loss cycles leave one vulnerable to the impact of continued loss, which could result in continued stress and even in the experience of future trauma. These resource loss cycles are significant not only in relation to the sheer quantity of resources that can be used up but also in regard to the speed with which resource reservoirs are often dismantled (Ennis et al. 2000; Norris and Kaniasty 1996). Our research has demonstrated that these resource loss cycles extend across the life cycle over many decades, likely because stress and resource loss reduce key resources that are related to resilience and limit the individual's ability to build new resource reservoirs (Schumm et al. 2005). In this study, women who were abused during childhood were more likely than women who were not to suffer more life stress and to react more negatively to those stressors (Schumm et al. 2005). Further, women who experienced "only" either childhood physical or sexual abuse or adult sexual assault were six times more likely to have probable posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as adults than women who had experienced neither, whereas women who experienced both child abuse and adult sexual assault were 17 times more likely to have probable PTSD (Schumm et al. 2006). These results support the COR theory prediction that loss cycles occur in a complex, multiplicative way, rather than simply in an additive fashion.

Building a reservoir of resources is critical to limiting the impact of losses, preventing future loss cycles, and enhancing resilience in the face of future loss. Yet, it is critical to recognize that gains are often very difficult to initiate and gain

cycles are particularly unlikely in the face of loss. Initiating a gain cycle requires significant resource investment from the individual, family, community, and larger social ecosystem. Children with strong early resources, either bestowed upon them by strong, loving, healthy families in resource-rich environments or developed through the child's own skills, are fortunately placed into a trajectory of a safe *caravan passageway* within which they, and their resource pool, will continue to be sustained and grow (Hobfoll 2011). This concept has been introduced recently to describe this process within which their resource caravans are likely to continue on a path of resource gain, as reviewed below.

Caravan Passageways

Caravan passageways are the environmental conditions that support, foster, enrich, and protect the resources of individuals, families, and organizations, or that detract, undermine, obstruct, or impoverish people's resource reservoirs (Hobfoll 2011). Thus, this idea of caravan passageways recognizes that the ability of individuals and families to build and maintain their resource reservoirs (or, alternatively, fail to do so) is largely a function of circumstances outside their control. That those who are impoverished are more likely to live in dangerous neighborhoods riddled with drugs and crime, or less likely to attend high-quality schools, is not a "choice" that is made but is a function of their environments dictated by the availability of resources. However, the same is true for those in the middle class and for the wealthiest in society: environmental conditions foster caravan passageways that sustain those current resource caravans and make it quite difficult for the individual to "escape" the boundaries of that social status (and reservoir of resources). Those in the middle class are likely to have access to average to good early childcare and education, obtain average to reasonably good (and stable) employment, and have access to competent health care. For the wealthy, often through a process of inheritance, rich resources are available that extend beyond simply the financial into variables such as access to elite educational institutions, social networking

and connections that aid in excellent employment opportunities, and relative choice of living environments that promote safety and links to others in their community who have access to similar resources. Each of these pathways is most powerfully influenced by individual and community-level resources that are present or absent based largely on the context of the environment, not on individual-level variables.

Yet, families have an impact on the nature of the caravan passageways in other ways, including through the potency of social support. Our work has demonstrated that the benefits of social support are robust after factors such as SES and race are controlled for (Schumm et al. 2006) and even when significant personal resources (such as self-efficacy) have been depleted (Palmieri et al. 2008). In children, strong perceived social support—both within the family and from teachers and peers—is related to a range of positive outcomes including social-emotional competence, adaptive behavior, and academic achievement, thus providing some support to this notion that the positive individual and family resources placed on a strong caravan passageway likely facilitate good social connection and skill development (Elias and Haynes 2008; Warren et al. 2009).

Principle 3: The Paradox of the Power of Gain in the Face of Loss

Although resource loss is more potent than resource gain, the salience of gain increases under situations of resource loss (Wells et al. 1999). The key element of this principle is that, as people experience resource loss, the significance of gain—which is otherwise minimal—increases substantially. Further, gain spirals accelerate in speed in the face of loss, and the magnitude of their effect increases substantially, as gain's impact generally increases in the face of loss. Thus, even resource gain that, under other circumstances, might be viewed as minimal could become a critical component of resilience in the context of loss, as small gains may elicit hopefulness, positive expectancy, and serve to reinforce efforts, no matter how small, toward

continued growth. This notion leads to a broader conceptualization of the positive potential impact of gains, and in the next section, we will review a range of positive psychological variables through the lens of COR theory.

Understanding “Positive” Variables in the Context of COR Theory

Hope and Optimism

The literature on hope and optimism as positive psychological variables is rich and extensive. Conceptualizations of hope have primarily centered on this construct as individually oriented, focused on future change or goals, with a cognitive element in which one’s process of thinking is connected to a sense of agency and awareness of the path toward achieving a goal (Farran and Popovich 1990; Snyder et al. 1991). Although conceptualizations of optimism are very similar definitionally, one key difference exists in that optimism is largely considered to be characterological, or a component of one’s personality, as opposed to goal-oriented and transient as with hope (e.g., Carver et al. 2010).

Importantly, there has been a recent recognition in the literature of the role that resources play in shaping and facilitating hope and optimism (Carver et al. 2010). As we have argued earlier (Hobfoll et al. 2003), the psychological construct of hope may have little to do with “hope” under many circumstances but may actually reflect the presence or absence of necessary resources and one’s ability to mobilize these resources for use. If an individual has plentiful resources, and a history of achieving goals and building resources, being “hopeful” may have nothing to do with “hope” at all but is really a function of their resource reservoir. On the other hand, an individual with fewer resources who is not hopeful about their future may not be “pessimistic” by nature but rather making an accurate or realistic appraisal of their current available resources and ability to foster change using those resources.

Though few studies in general examine these variables through the COR theory lens, some

recent empirical studies support this idea that hope and optimism are related to and shaped by resources. In a study of adolescent youth in Tanzania, adolescents living in a stable living environment reported higher rates of hope than did those in unstable contexts (Nalkur 2009). Adolescents whose parents have higher educational levels are generally more optimistic and use more engagement coping than children of parents with less education (Finkelstein et al. 2007). Thus, emerging evidence suggests that resources are, in fact, an important component of these positive psychological variables, and this is a potentially quite fruitful area for future study.

Resilience

Understanding the relationship between resources and resiliency requires first a clear delineation of the construct of resilience. Some have conceptualized resilience as the ability to withstand the impact of major stressors or, said another way, the lack of psychopathology or health problems in the aftermath of a major or traumatic stressor (e.g., Bonanno 2005). This definition has limitations, and a potentially more useful one should define as “resilient” those who not only live through loss and cope, but those who are able to remain active, engaged, and committed to life even, perhaps especially, if they also experience distressing emotions and/or health problems as a result of the stressor (Hobfoll 2011). Butler, Morland, and Leskin (2007) identified the central role of resources in their conceptualization of resilience:

Resilience may be seen as an issue of resources: the quality and quantity of psychological and interpersonal assets that can be drawn upon and brought to bear in traversing life’s most difficult experiences. Such resources may be circumstantial or dispositional, learned through successes or life’s knocks, or provided by supports we have in place or that come to our aid in times of need. However, resources may be limited by experience or situation, and they may be drained, inaccessible, or overwhelmed by traumatic events. (p. 412)

Several studies suggest that the interconnected coping resource caravans across the life span affect individuals’ resiliency, or lack thereof,

following traumatic events. A large-scale study by King, King, Foy, Keane, and Fairbank (1999) examined the impact of childhood, war zone, and postwar resiliency factors in determining postwar adjustment among US military veterans. Results showed that higher coping resources at each developmental time period were associated with less psychological maladjustment following the war. In addition, resources at prior time periods (e.g., childhood) were found to predict the amount of resources at subsequent time periods (e.g., postwar). Hence, a solid coping resource reservoir early in life increased the chances of individuals being able to maintain strong coping resources later in their life. This lifelong foundation of coping resources allowed for individuals to be more resilient in the face of traumatic stress.

These findings are consistent with the work of Banyard, Williams, Saunders, and Fitzgerald (2008) in showing that resource reservoirs from early life stages carry on to affect resource levels later in life, thereby determining resiliency capacity. In a sample of women seeking services at a family violence program, Banyard and colleagues (2008) found that the relationship between women's childhood risk factors and traumatic experiences with their adulthood psychological functioning was completely accounted for by their adulthood resource levels. Those with less childhood risk factors and trauma were shown to exhibit higher adulthood coping resources (e.g., social support) which, in turn, predicted better psychological outcomes. Once again, these findings highlight the COR theory prediction that resiliency is determined by coping resource caravans that are built over the lifetime, in combination with a healthy caravan passageway.

In addition to empirical evidence supporting the role of individuals' coping resources, studies also support community-wide resources as being important in determining collective resiliency. Bonanno, Galea, Bucciarelli, and Vlahov (2007) found that following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, New York residents who maintained high degrees of coping resource capacity were more likely to be classified as psychologically resilient (i.e., absence of psychiatric

symptoms). Similar results were also found in a longitudinal of Israeli Jews and Arabs within the context of ongoing terrorism threat (Hobfoll et al. 2009). Specifically, those who exhibit higher coping resources were able to demonstrate more resilience in the face of recurrent threats.

Studies show that the mobilization of social support following traumatic events to be a key resource to determining resiliency. A series of longitudinal studies by Norris and colleagues (Kaniasty and Norris 1993; Norris and Kaniasty 1996; Norris et al. 2005) have demonstrated that social support mobilization following a natural disaster predicts later adjustment. According to this model, initial social support mobilization can help individuals, families, and communities to mobilize together, thereby providing opportunities for pooling their collective resources. Not only does the pooling of collective resources increase the potential for resiliency by allowing there to be "strength in numbers," but the findings from these studies suggest that initial social support mobilization helps to offset later deterioration in this resource domain. These findings are consistent with COR theory principles in showing that the ability to maintain and gain resources is critical to offset potential resource loss. Those that are capable of maintaining and adding to resources will be more resilient since they are better able to sustain the onset of resource loss that occurs following traumatic situations.

Posttraumatic Growth

With the recent increased focus on the promotion of positive psychology, there has been a shift toward understanding the mechanisms of posttraumatic growth (PTG). Following COR theory, Hobfoll and colleagues (2006, 2008, 2009) began examining this concept within the context of groups experiencing ongoing war and terrorism. In this research, PTG was conceptualized as the ability to find benefits with regard to psychosocial resource gains following stressful and traumatic situations. This conceptualization was similar to that of Tedeschi (2004, p. 1) who defines PTG as "positive psychological change

experienced as a result of the struggle with highly challenging life circumstances.”

To operationalize PTG, individuals were asked if they experienced gains in several domains as a result of the intifada [terrorist uprising]. Namely, they reported the degree to which they had experienced gains in intimacy with one or more family members, intimacy with at least one friend that their life has purpose, and confidence. This newly developed scale was meant to capture growth in the domains of self-perception, interpersonal relationships, and philosophy of life, which is described by Tedeschi and Calhoun (1995). This short scale was shown to exhibit adequate psychometric properties among Israeli samples (Hobfoll et al. 2006) and correlated at 0.85 with the full version of Tedeschi and Calhoun’s Posttraumatic Growth Inventory (Hall and Hobfoll 2008).

The initial study of PTG examined the impact of the Al-Aqsa Intifada among individuals in Israel (Hobfoll et al. 2006). Participants were comprised of a nationally representative sample of Israeli Jewish ($n=720$) and Arab ($n=185$) citizens. In addition to assessing PTG, structured telephone interviews were conducted to assess posttraumatic stress symptoms (PTS) and constructs related to ethnocentrism, support for political violence, and authoritarianism. It was hypothesized that if the proposed construct of PTG was consistent with the humanistic foundation described by Frankl (1959), then PTG should be related to less ethnocentrism, less support for political violence, and less authoritarianism.

Findings from Hobfoll and colleagues (2006) showed the expected relationships involving resource loss but also provided somewhat unexpected findings regarding PTG. As hypothesized, higher exposure to terrorism was associated with both higher psychosocial resource loss and higher PTG. These findings are expected, given that resource loss and PTG can occur simultaneously. However, the study also found that higher PTG was related to *higher* ethnocentrism, *higher* support for political violence, and *higher* authoritarianism. Due to the cross-sectional nature of this study, though, clear causal inferences could not be drawn, and it is possible that higher PTG may have been a response to higher PTS.

A separate study was also conducted by Hobfoll and colleagues (2008) to investigate whether the experience of PTG following terrorism would increase individuals’ resiliency by lowering their risk against probable PTSD. As with the initial study, a large sample of Israeli Jews (1,070) and Arabs (392) were enrolled and assessed via telephone interview. Findings showed rates of probable PTSD among Jewish citizens to be 6.6%, whereas rates of probable PTSD among Arab citizens were 18.0%. Within the Jewish sample, demonstrating resiliency (i.e., lack of probable PTSD) was associated with lower income, secular or high religious orientation (versus traditional religiosity), less economic loss, less psychosocial loss, higher social support, and *less* PTG. Within the Arab sample, resiliency was associated with higher education and less psychosocial resource loss. Other pathways in the Arab sample mirrored those from the Jewish sample, although they did not reach statistical significance. Hence, the findings from this follow-up study replicated those from Hobfoll et al. (2006) in showing that PTG was not a resiliency variable but rather was a vulnerability factor. As with the first study, however, this study was cross-sectional, thereby limiting the conclusions that could be drawn regarding these relationships.

To improve the inferences that could be drawn regarding the directionality of the relationships between PTG and demonstrating of resiliency, Hobfoll and colleagues (2009) conducted a prospective study in Israel. The sample involved 709 Israeli citizens, sampled at two time points in 2004–2005. The first time point occurred during a period of heightened terrorism activity, and the second time period occurred during a period of less terrorism activity. A sizable number (22%) demonstrated a resistance trajectory (no more than one symptom of depression and no more than one symptom of PTSD at either time point), while an additional 12.5% demonstrated a resiliency trajectory. These trajectories were predicted by being Jewish (versus Arab), having higher income, having higher education, and having greater social support. However, replicating the previous studies, PTG was associated with *less* likelihood of being in the resistant or resilient categories.

Together, these findings suggest that there are multiple resiliency factors, although the purely cognitive reappraisal conceptualization of PTG is not among those that can be considered as a resiliency resource. Such findings point to a need to operationalize PTG not in terms of pure cognitive restructuring but rather to look at behavioral action as a component of PTG. Namely, the theories described by Frankl (1959) and Deci and Ryan (2000) would suggest that PTG may have positive benefits when it is conceptualized as a process involving not only cognitive change but also behavioral action as well. Hence, it is not sufficient to simply reappraise how lemonade can be made of lemons. Rather, individuals must find ways to put forth the behaviors that result in the lemonade actually being made.

Conclusion

The centrality of a broad range of resources in the development and maintenance of a range of positive psychological variables is evident. COR theory provides a useful framework for researchers and clinicians to conceptualize and evaluate these positive variables. Importantly, we believe that future research should focus on evaluating these variables in the critical context of individual, family, and community-based resources to add to our understanding of the role of resources.

COR theory emphasizes the major, mostly objective, environmental challenges that people face and the things that they do to actuate an accumulation and sustaining of resources, very much in line with Foa's (1971) original formulations. This still stands in stark contrast to the much, if not most, of the stress literature that follows the more existential, appraised perception of stress, and the related emphasis of individual differences. It is our view that this stems largely from the fact that stress, challenge, and resources are measured through questions rather than direct observation and that the lens is that of the clinical or cognitive social psychologist, whose theories and work are individualistic. We view the individual as important but believe that the environment, social world, and socioeconomic factors

are key. When we ask people their perceptions, that is largely what they will give us, because people are good, if imperfect cataloguers of events. We have similarly argued that if we filmed people, that life film is the best predictor of stress. If we solely ask their appraisals, then we will conclude that appraisals are key.

It is fascinating that some people, given a modicum of support, will continue to remain vigorous, absorbed, and committed to the tasks that face them, even while they are challenged with chronic, traumatic conditions. What interests us in more cognitive formulations, such as Fredrickson's (1998) broaden-and-build theory, is not that positive emotions lead to positive ends. Rather, COR theory would ask to what extent can people who face trauma and generally lack resources still remain creative, engaged, and hopeful? It may be that the answer here is that positive emotions will be common among those with the most resources or who have experienced the least resource loss. But it is at least possible that a glimmer of hope and positive emotion may have a germinal effect on creativity, a search for building on that positive emotion, and a reaching out to others.

Foa (1971) gave us a launching point, and several proposed rules of how resources operate and are engaged in interpersonal, social economies. Hobfoll in his earlier work focused on resource loss. In the next phases of our work, we hope to move to the gain aspects of the resource frontier and reveal more about the ecology of people's resiliency, flexibility, and ability to withstand stress and trauma.

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Initiating Customer Loyalty to a Retailer: A Resource Theory Perspective

20

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Introduction

The study of loyalty has been traced to Copeland's (1923) notion of consumer insistence, yet it remains a fuzzy under analyzed concept (Oliver 1999; Henry 2000). Traditionally, loyalty research has investigated the outcomes that business might realize from gaining customer loyalty, with little effort devoted to understanding the ways in which consumers develop and maintain loyalty (Pritchard et al. 1992). However, more recent research is beginning to examine the development and maintenance of customer loyalty from a relationship perspective (c.f., Dick and Basu 1994; Dwyer et al. 1987). These studies suggest that continued loyalty to a retailer can be favorably influenced by repeat customer-salesperson interactions that involve such factors as trust, commitment, friendship, functionality, and special treatment (Beatty et al. 1996; Garbarino and Johnson 1999; Gwinner et al. 1998; Price and Arnould 1999; Reynolds and Arnold 2000). Yet, while businesses desire customer loyalty, they

often fail to invest resources in their customers, and when faced with these one-sided relationships, customers tend to withdraw their loyalty from the retailer (Schultz 2005).

In this study, Resource Theory (RT) (Foa and Foa 1974, 1980) provides a basis from which to examine that retailers can initiate relationships with their shoppers through their resource investments. More specifically, an exploratory study was conducted to examine two related, yet distinct research issues. First, we examine the extent to which intentions of first-time shoppers to repatronize a retailer are influenced by retailer investments involving the six different resource categories characterized by Foa and Foa (1974, 1980). Second, we investigate whether first-time shoppers place equal importance on the resources when deciding to revisit the retailer to make a product purchase. To increase the generalizability of the research findings, the study was conducted using two retail settings. One retail setting is a brick-and-mortar retail context involving a person-to-person interaction, and the other is an Internet retail (i.e., e-tail) context involving a person-to-entity (nonperson) interaction.

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Conceptual Framework

Retail success depends, in large part, on the retailer's ability to establish meaningful customer relationships that result in customer loyalty (Crosby et al. 1990; De Wulf et al. 2001; Dorsch et al. 1998). Whereas the loyalty domain continues to

evolve, it is currently conceptualized as consisting of a behavioral component and a psychological component (Dick and Basu 1994). Yet, most loyalty research traditionally examines it from a behavioral perspective. Recognizing the importance of the psychological component for loyalty development, Oliver (1999) expands on Jacoby and Chestnut's (1978) exploration into the psychological meaning of loyalty by examining it within the traditional attitude structure and suggesting that loyalty may occur at each attitudinal phase beginning with cognitive loyalty, continuing to affective loyalty, conative loyalty, and finally behavioral loyalty (e.g., repeat purchase behavior). In the current study, our interest is in understanding how retailers can influence the formation of conative loyalty, which relates to the formation of customer intentions to purchase a particular brand or from a particular retailer. Buying intentions, in turn, signal a customer's motivation to purchase and represent a customer's commitment to the intention to rebuy a brand (Oliver 1999) or to revisit a retailer.

Marketing relationships (e.g., customer-retailer relationship) have been characterized as a special type of interpersonal behavior that tends to be composed of both market-based and social components (Berry and Parasuraman 1991; Carruthers and Babb 2000; Foa and Foa 1980; Price and Arnould 1999) that have been described in terms of resource investments that are valued by the resource recipient (e.g., Day 2000; Dorsch et al. 2001; Foa and Foa 1980; Hunt and Morgan 1995; and Weitz and Bradford 1999). From this perspective, a relationship is formed when one resource provider retains ownership to the invested resources, which establishes an economic and/or social claim on the resource recipient (Dorsch and Carlson 1996). An economic claim is established when tangible resources are invested in another; these tangible investments are protectable through government legislation, such as contract law (Macneil 1978). In contrast, a social claim is established when social resources are invested in another; these social investments are governed by the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner 1959, 1960) and norm of indebtedness (Greenberg 1980). For example, businesses that make resource investments in

their customers tend to create psychological bonds that impress the customer (Hart and Johnson 1999) and result in an increased likelihood that the customer remains in a relationship with the business (Smith and Barclay 1997). Furthermore, De Wulf et al.'s (2001) multinational empirical study found that retail customer behavioral loyalty was favorably influenced when retailers made an information investment (e.g., a retailer's use of direct mail to keep customers informed about its sales and offerings), status investment (e.g., a retailer gives preferential treatment to their regular customers), love/affection investments (e.g., a retailer communicates with its regular customers in a warm and personal manner), and goods/money investment (e.g., a retailer rewards its regular customers with tangible benefits, including price discounts). These findings provide support for examining loyalty from a resource investment perspective that is grounded on Foa and Foa's (1974, 1980) Resource Theory.

RT proposes that transacted resources may be grouped into six distinct categories and compared along two dimensions. The six distinct resource categories are Love, Status, Information, Services, Goods, and Money. Love refers to an expression of affection regard, warmth, comfort, or caring for another. Status is an evaluative judgment that expresses importance, prestige, or stature. Information refers to one's understanding, knowledge, enlightenment, beliefs, opinions, instructions, or advice. Services are the exertion of labor when performing activities on the body or an individual's belongings. Money is any unit of currency that has a standardized value. Goods are tangible materials or objects (Foa and Foa 1974).

The two organizing dimensions used for assigning value to a resource are the concreteness-symbolism dimension and the particularism-universalism dimension. The concreteness-symbolism dimension captures the meaning of the resource. Concrete resources are more tangible, their value is derived from a more literal (factual) meaning, and transactions involving them are more easily tractable. Resource categories that tend to be more concrete are Money, Goods, and Information. In contrast, symbolic resources tend to be less tangible, their value is derived from a more figurative (abstract)

meaning, and their tractability tends to be more difficult. Resource categories that are considered to be increasingly more symbolic are Services, Status, and Love. The particularism-universalism dimension determines the extent to which the value of a resource is influenced by the exchange participants. The value of particularistic resources is most strongly influenced by the exchange partners, as these resources do not have a standardized value in an exchange market. Correspondingly, parties who participate in the transaction of particularistic resources must be clearly identified. Resource categories that are considered to be more particularistic are Love, Status, and Services, such as people-processing services (Lovelock 1983). Universalistic resources, in contrast, tend to possess a standardized value, which is not influenced by the exchange participants. Therefore, the parties involved in the transaction of universalistic resources may remain anonymous. Resource categories that tend to be more universalistic are Information, Goods, and Money. Since the value of particularistic resources depends on the specific exchange parties, they are not expected to be as easily transacted as universalistic resources. Besides serving as an organizing function, the two dimensions provide insights into the degree of exchangeability among the six resource categories. For example, neighboring resources (resource categories that are contingent to each other) are conceptualized to be more similar to each other and correspondingly more easily exchanged with each other. Alternatively, resource categories that are positioned further apart are less similar and therefore less easily exchanged with each other. Empirical support was found for the proposed functional relationships among the six resource categories (Brinberg and Wood 1983; Foa and Foa 1980).

Whereas the extant literature demonstrates that retailer investment in existing customers can positively influence customer intentions to remain in the relationship, little is known about whether retailer investments can initiate customer relationships. Similarly, empirical research into the creation of online customer relationships is scant and disjointed. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that online customer loyalty may exist. For example, Reibstein (2002) found that shopper behavioral loyalty to an e-tailer may be influenced by factors such as specific

product offerings and customer service support. Other evidence suggests that e-tailer shopper affective loyalty may be influenced by factors such as designing e-tail websites that are easy to navigate, contain sufficient and useful product information, provide prompt replies to customer inquiries, and demonstrate a caring for their customers by attending to all customer interface activities that enhance shopper's e-tail experience, including prompt resolution of any breakdown in service that might occur (Srinivasan et al. 2002). These findings suggest that shopper loyalty to an e-tailer, whether behavioral or affective, may be influenced by the investments that e-tailers make in their customers.

Our study extends the literature in two ways. First, in contrast to previous studies, our study is based on an established theoretical framework. More specifically, RT (Foa and Foa 1974, 1980) provides the basis from which to examine how retailers can initiate customer relationships by making resource investments in their first-time shoppers. Second, the generalizability of the research findings is extended by examining further the extent to which six categories of retailer-invested resources are equally effective in retail settings that vary in their interpersonal interactions with customers (i.e., person-to-person versus entity-to-person). One examined retail setting is a traditional brick-and-mortar setting where shoppers visit a retail store and interact with a salesperson (i.e., a person-to-person retail encounter). The other examined retail setting is an e-tail context in which shoppers use the Internet to visit a virtual retail store where there is no explicit salesperson with whom the shopper interacts (i.e., a person-to-entity retail encounter).

Research Design

Subjects

Subjects for our exploratory study were undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory marketing course at a major university located in the southeastern United States. All subjects volunteered for the study and received extra credit for their participation. Furthermore, the resulting sample is appropriate for testing theory (see

Calder et al. 1981). To enable a systematic investigation into the two retail contexts, the sample of subjects was randomly assigned to one of two groups, with each group randomly assigned to one of two retail contexts. All 51 subjects who were assigned to Group A completed the full-profile conjoint measurement process for a brick-and-mortar retailer, and all 51 subjects who were assigned to Group B completed the full-profile conjoint procedure for an Internet retailer (i.e., an e-tailer). The demographic profiles for the two subsamples were comparable in terms of age (i.e., $M_{\text{brick-and-mortar retailer}} = 20.2$ years, $sd = 2.24$ and $M_{\text{online e-tailer}} = 20.0$ years, $sd = 1.09$), race (i.e., 92.2% of each sample was Caucasian), and student classification (the percent of sophomores assigned to the online e-tail setting and the brick-and-mortar retail setting was 76.5% and 70.6%, respectively). The subsamples differed slightly by gender, with females making up approximately 41.2% of the brick-and-mortar setting and 52.9% of the online e-tail sample.

Experimental Design

The full-profile conjoint format employed in this study is a decompositional approach that utilized an orthogonal 2^6 fractional factorial experimental design to examine the main effects of six manipulated resource categories. Each research category consisted of two levels (i.e., the resource was invested (present) or not invested (absent)). According to Addelman's (1962) Basic Plan 5, 25 profiles were required for each retail context to test each main-effects model. Each profile described a retail encounter in which retailer investment (presence) or noninvestment (absence) of each of six resource categories was manipulated. Appendix A contains the six resource category manipulations created for each retail setting. The appropriateness of each manipulation was assessed by four undergraduate student judges who were unfamiliar with the study. The judges were given the definitions of each resource and asked to make independent assignments of the manipulations to the six resource categories. For each retail context, all four judges were consistent in their assessments

and assigned each manipulation to its intended resource category, providing support for the appropriateness of the manipulations.

To create realistic retail encounters for undergraduate students that are applicable to both retail settings, each retail scenario depicted a clothes-shopping situation in which the shopper is a first-time visitor to an unnamed retailer. While visiting the retailer, the shopper examines the clothing but does not make a purchase. All 25 retail encounter profiles for each retail setting were created to be as identical as possible, including their length (e.g., each scenario contained approximately 390 words). For example, the profiles for each retail context were similar in terms of the product offerings and prices to other stores where the subjects normally shopped. In addition, in the brick-and-mortar retail context, the store locations were equally convenient to the subject. The only difference among the profiled retailer encounters is the presence/absence of retailer-invested resources. During the data collection process, subjects were asked to rate the realism of the set of profiles on a five-point Likert-type scales ranging from 1 ("Very Realistic") to 6 ("Very Unrealistic"). Subjects rated the retail encounter profiles for each retail context as realistic (i.e., $M_{\text{brick-and-mortar retailer}} = 2.30$, $SD = 0.79$ and $M_{\text{online e-tailer}} = 2.10$, $SD = 0.69$). Appendix B contains an example of a brick-and-mortar retail-shopping scenario and an online e-tail-shopping scenario used in the study.

Data Collection

An interviewer-based approach was used to collect the data. Specifically, subjects were asked to attend one of three one-hour interview sessions that were arranged in back-to-back intervals. The average size per session was 35 subjects, and the average time for completing the questionnaire was 30 min. Prior to each interview session, the questionnaires for the two retail contexts were created, pooled, and randomly ordered. With the exception of the retail context, the questionnaire for each group was identical. Each questionnaire consisted of a cover page describing the general purpose of the

study (i.e., “learning how the experiences of first-time shoppers may influence their decisions to revisit a particular retailer”), a conjoint measurement process consisting of 25 profiles, with each profile appearing on a separate page, and a set of questions requesting demographic data.

During each interview session, the interviewer followed the same script. First, the interviewer distributed folders containing the questionnaire and instructed the subjects not to open the folder. Next, the interviewer informed the subjects of the study purpose, instructed them to open the folder, and invited them to follow along as she read the directions for completing the questionnaire. After acknowledging that they understood the instructions, the subjects were asked to complete the conjoint portion of the study. Specifically, subjects were asked to examine 25 retail encounter profiles and to identify the one retail profile that would result in a decision to revisit the retailer and assign this “best” retail profile a score of 25, where 25 means “Definitely will return to the store to make a purchase.” Next, subjects were asked to identify the retail profile that would result in a decision not to revisit the retailer and assign this “worst” retail encounter profile a score of 1, where 1 means “Definitely will not return to the store to make a purchase.” Subjects then ranked each of the remaining retail encounter profiles between the best and worst profiles.

Method of Analysis

To analyze the data, we followed an approach outlined by Green and Krieger (1991) for segmenting markets with conjoint data. First, full-profile conjoint analysis was performed on each subject to estimate the contribution of each retailer-invested resource to the subject’s (i.e., shopper’s) intention to return to the retailer to make a product purchase. Second, the subjects’ (shoppers’) part-worth estimates were cluster analyzed to discover whether segments of shoppers existed who differed in the importance that they placed on the investment/noninvestment of the six retailer resources when deciding to return to the retailer to purchase a product.

Full-Profile Conjoint Analysis. Full-profile conjoint analysis is a decompositional approach that begins with an overall (global) rating and extracts the individual attribute ratings (i.e., the part-worth estimates) using regression analysis (Green and Srinivasan 1990). The dependent variable (global rating) in our study was the subject’s (shopper’s) likelihood of revisiting the retailer to make a product purchase, and the independent variables (individual attributes) were the six resource categories. The computed partial regression coefficients (i.e., the part-worth estimates) represent the incremental change in a shopper’s likelihood of returning to a retailer to make a purchase decision that is attributable to the presence/absence of a retailer resource investment and are computed for each subject using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with effects coding (Pedhazur 1982). Effects coding is similar to standard dummy coding for conjoint measurement (Jain et al. 1979), except that the part-worth estimates are equal to the partial regression coefficients (Teas 1985) rather than transformations of the partial regression coefficients (Jain et al. 1979).

Besides determining the incremental contribution associated with the investment/noninvestment of each resource (i.e., the part-worth estimates), it is also possible to estimate the importance of each resource, relative to the set of examined resources. The importance rating for each profiled attribute (e.g., resource investment) is measured as the percent of total explained variation in the dependent variable that is accounted for by an attribute. In our study, the importance a shopper places on a resource when assessing the likelihood of returning to the retailer to make a purchase is measured as the percent of variability within the intention rating measure that is accounted for by the investment/noninvestment of a particular invested resource. More specifically, the total explained variability in the intention rating measure that is explained by the set of invested resource categories is estimated by summing together the computed differences between the largest and smallest part-worth estimates for each profiled attribute (i.e., resource). Next, the importance rating for each resource was computed by dividing the total explained variability into each

resource's part-worth difference. The set of resources can then be arranged from most important (i.e., the resource that accounts for the greatest percent of explained variability) to least important (i.e., the resource that accounts for the smallest percent of explained variability).

Cluster Analysis. To determine whether each retail setting contained distinct segments, subjects were organized by retail context, and cluster analysis was performed on the subject (shopper) part-worth estimates for each retail setting. Each cluster analysis used the same approach. First, each subject's part-worth estimates were transformed into Euclidean distances and submitted to the Ward's method of hierarchical clustering to determine the number of clusters within each examined retailer setting. Hierarchical cluster analysis is traditionally employed in exploratory studies, such as this one, and the Ward's algorithm appears to outperform other commonly employed hierarchical clustering procedures (Punj and Stewart 1983). The optimal number of clusters obtained in each solution was determined using as a guideline the point at which a sudden and large increase in the clustering (agglomeration) coefficient occurs (cf., Hair et al. 1995). Once the number of clusters for each retail setting was determined, K-means cluster analysis was used to assign subjects to their unique cluster (i.e., loyalty segment).

Interpretation of the individual clusters (segments) was conducted by averaging the subject part-worth estimates for each of the six resources and computing each resource's importance rating within each cluster. Next, differences among the clusters were examined using multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) and univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA). Each statistically significant ANOVA was followed up with a Student-Newman-Keuls multiple range test to determine the particular segments that differed from each other.

Research Findings

Brick-and-Mortar Retail Setting

The cluster analysis revealed the existence of three brick-and-mortar shopper segments, and the MANOVA findings indicated that shopper

segments could be distinguished in terms of the retailer resource investment effects on shopper intentions to revisit the retailer ($\Lambda = .137$, $F(12, 86) = 12.060$, $p < .000$). Subsequently, the ANOVA results (see Table 20.1) revealed that the three shopper segments differed on three retailer resource investments (i.e., Love, Status, and Information), and the proportions of variance explained (i.e., ω^2 s) for the three resource categories ranged from .122 to .643. According to Malhotra (1996), the effect of an independent variable (e.g., the shopper segment) on the dependent variable (e.g., a resource category) in an ANOVA is large when ω^2 is .15 or greater and medium when ω^2 is around .06. Correspondingly, the brick-and-mortar segments exhibited large effect sizes for two resources (i.e., Love and Status) and a medium-to-large effect on the other resource (Information). In addition, a comparison of the three ω^2 s revealed that effect sizes for Love and Status were approximately four times greater than the effect size for Information. This finding indicates that the more social (i.e., particularistic and symbolic resources) retailer resource investments accounted for the greatest amount of differentiation among the three brick-and-mortar shopper segments.

Love. While the three shopper segments indicated that shopper intentions to revisit a brick-and-mortar retailer was favorably influenced when the retailer was helpful and caring, the degree of influence differed across all three shopper segments ($F(2,48) = 43.293$, $p = 0.000$, $\omega^2 = .386$). A retailer's Love investment had the strongest favorable (positive) effect on Segment B shoppers, a strong favorable effect on Segment C shoppers, and a weak favorable effect on Segment A shoppers (Student-Newman-Keuls multiple range test, $p < .05$). These findings suggest that by demonstrating that they care for their shoppers (i.e., invest Love), brick-and-mortar retailers can favorably influence shopper intention to revisit them to make a product purchase, regardless of segment.

Status. Shopper intentions to revisit a retailer were mixed when shoppers were treated with respect and received a retail salesperson's full attention ($F(2,48) = 35.210$, $p = 0.000$, $\omega^2 = .595$). In particular, while Status had favorable (positive)

Table 20.1 ANOVA results for the brick-and-mortar retail setting

Social resource	F	df	p value	ω^2	Segment average part-worth estimates and importance ratings					
					Segment A		Segment B		Segment C	
					Part-worth	Importance (%)	Part-worth	Importance (%)	Part-worth	Importance (%)
Love	43.293	2,48	0.000	.643	0.28	4.2	4.23	48.9	1.56	19.8
Status	35.210	2,48	0.000	.595	-1.17	17.7	1.30	15.0	3.98	50.4
Information	3.322	2,48	0.045	.122	1.17	17.7	-0.41	4.7	0.30	3.8
Services	1.627	2,48	0.207	.063	2.15	32.5	1.41	16.3	1.05	13.3
Goods	1.378	2,48	0.262	.054	-0.97	14.7	0.26	3.0	0.22	2.8
Money	0.334	2,48	0.717	.014	0.87	13.2	1.04	12.0	0.78	9.9
Segment size					4		27		20	
(%)					(7.8)		(52.9)		(39.2)	

effect on Segment B and C shopper intentions to revisit the retailer, Segment A shoppers reported an unfavorable (negative) effect (Student-Newman-Keuls multiple range test, $p < .05$). These findings suggest that while some retail shoppers are influenced by the respect and full attention they receive from retail salespeople, other retail shoppers prefer to shop in anonymity and do not necessarily desire a salesperson's full attention. Given the mixed effects associated with a Status investment, a prudent approach would be for retailers to invest Status in those shoppers seeking an interaction with the retailer's salespeople.

Information. Shopper intentions to revisit a retailer were differentially influenced by retailer efforts to learn about the shopper in order to match the retailer's product offerings to shopper needs and lifestyles ($F(2,48)=3.322$, $p=0.045$, $\omega^2=.122$). More specifically, differences in Information's influence on shopper intentions were observed between Segments A and B only, with Segment A shoppers reporting a more favorable effect of Information on their intentions to revisit the retailer, relative to Segment B (Student-Newman-Keuls multiple range test, $p < .05$). In addition, since no significant differences were observed between Segment C's weak favorable rating and the other two segments, it may be concluded that Segment B shoppers appear to be relatively uninfluenced by the salesperson's efforts to learn about them. This finding suggests that retail salespeople who invest in learning about the needs and lifestyles of their potential customer may be better able to positively influence shopper intentions to revisit the retailer to make a purchase.

Services, Goods, and Money. Shopper intentions to revisit a brick-and-mortar retailer were not differentially influenced by a retailer's investment of Services ($F(2,48)=1.627$, $p=0.207$, $\omega^2=.063$), Goods ($F(4,46)=2.057$, $p=0.102$, $\omega^2=.152$), or Money ($F(2,48)=0.334$, $p=0.717$, $\omega^2=.014$). Regardless of segment, brick-and-mortar shopper intentions to revisit a retailer were favorably influenced by retailers who offered their customers a complete set of free services (Services) and provided their qualified customers

with a line of credit (Money). Finally, it appears that shopper intentions to revisit a retailer were not meaningfully influenced by retailers who allowed qualified customers to borrow the retailer's product offerings to better evaluate them (Goods). These findings suggest that brick-and-mortar retailers may be able to positively influence shopper intentions to revisit through their customer service and financing practices.

Brick-and-Mortar Shopper Segment Compositions

Segment A (Service-Oriented Shoppers). The service-oriented shopper segment considered the set of retailer services to be most important influence on their intentions to revisit a retailer (see Table 20.2). More specifically, while its effect did not differ significantly across the brick-and-mortar segments, the importance that service-oriented shoppers placed Services (32.5%) was approximately two times greater than the value that they placed on other more moderately important resources such as Status (17.7%), Information (17.7%), Goods (14.7%), and Money (13.2%). The least important resource to the service-oriented shopper segment was Love (4.2%). These findings suggest that brick-and-mortar retailers may be able to favorably influence a service-oriented shopper's intentions to revisit them by emphasizing that they offer their customers a complete set of free services (Services). In addition, since the set of moderately important resources accounted for approximately 64% of the variability in the intentions ratings, it appears that retailers could intensify service-oriented shopper intentions to revisit them by training customer contact personnel (e.g., salespeople) to learn about the shopper in order to match the retailer's products with the shopper's lifestyle and product needs (Information) and by providing qualified customers with a line of credit (Money). Furthermore, retailers who are caring and helpful (Love) when interacting with shoppers may have a weak favorable influence on service-oriented shopper intentions to revisit the retailer. Interestingly, our findings indicate that service-oriented shoppers were less likely to

Table 20.2 ANOVA results for the online retail setting

Social resource	F	df	p value	ω^2	Segment average part-worth estimates and importance ratings											
					Segment A		Segment B		Segment C		Segment D		Segment E			
					Part-worth	Importance (%)	Part-worth	Importance (%)	Part-worth	Importance (%)	Part-worth	Importance (%)	Part-worth	Importance (%)		
Love	7.244	4,46	0.000	.386	2.78	23.8	3.99	40.0	0.77	13.6	1.39	12.9	1.87	28.5		
Status	19.874	4,46	0.000	.633	3.74	32.1	1.09	10.9	-3.59	63.5	-0.78	7.2	-0.32	4.9		
Information	5.255	4,46	0.001	.314	1.27	10.9	0.24	2.4	0.12	2.1	-0.02	0.2	-1.04	15.8		
Services	2.057	4,46	0.102	.152	0.31	2.7	1.08	10.8	-0.50	8.8	0.85	7.9	0.85	12.9		
Goods	24.314	4,46	0.000	.679	-2.21	19.0	1.57	15.7	-0.44	7.8	4.46	41.3	0.21	3.2		
Money	5.602	4,46	0.001	.328	1.34	11.5	2.01	20.1	-0.23	4.1	3.29	30.5	2.28	34.7		
Segment size (%)					6	(11.7)	22	(43.1)	4	(7.8)	7	(13.7)	12	(23.5)		

revisit a brick-and-mortar retailer when the salesperson gave full attention to the shoppers as a way of providing them with status. This finding suggests that brick-and-mortar retailers might be able to favorably influence service-oriented shopper revisit intentions by training its salespeople to give a shopper his/her full attention only when the shopper requests it through actions or words. Finally, since service-oriented shoppers do not appear to be favorably influenced by being able to borrow a retailer's products to better evaluate them (Goods), it appears that retailers should not expect an immediate favorable customer reaction to this practice.

Segment B (Affection-Oriented Shoppers). The affection-oriented shopper segment considered the caring actions of a retailer to be the most important resource influence on their intentions to revisit a retailer (see Table 20.2). In particular, the importance of Love (48.9%) to affection-oriented shoppers was more than three times greater than the value they placed on the other moderately important resources (i.e., Services, Status, and Money). The least important resources to the affection-oriented shopper were Information (4.7%) and Goods (3.0%). These findings suggest that brick-and-mortar retailers may be able to effectively influence affection-oriented shopper intentions to revisit them by training customer contact personnel to genuinely care and help (Love) shoppers. Furthermore, since the set of moderately important resources accounted for approximately 43% of the variability in the intentions ratings, it appears that retailers could intensify affection-oriented shopper intentions to revisit them by informing shoppers of the services they offer to their customers (Services), by requiring the retail sales people to give the store shopper their full attention (Status), and by informing shoppers that the retailer provides a line of credit to qualified customers (Money). Interestingly, retailer salespeople who attempted to learn about shoppers in order to better match the retailer's products to the shopper (Information) had a weak negative effect on affection-oriented shopper intentions to revisit the retailer. Correspondingly, since affection-oriented shoppers appear to be more interested in a salesperson who listens to them and cares about them, retailers might be able to

favorably influence service-oriented shopper revisit intentions by encouraging its salespeople to avoid learning about the shopper's needs until the shopper initiates the discussion. Similarly, affection-oriented shoppers do not appear to be favorably influenced by being able to borrow a retailer's products to better evaluate them (Goods), which suggests that retailers should not expect an immediate favorable customer reaction to this practice.

Segment C (Respect-Oriented Shoppers). The respect-oriented shopper segment considered the respect and full attention given to them by the retailer to be the most important influence on their intentions to revisit a retailer (see Table 20.2). The importance that respect-oriented shoppers placed on Status (50.4%) was about two-and-one-half times greater than Love (19.5%) and four or more times greater than the value placed on the other more moderately important resources (i.e., Services and Money). The least important resources to the respect-oriented shopper were Information (3.8%) and Goods (2.8%). These findings suggest that retailers may be able to favorably influence respect-oriented shopper intentions to revisit them by emphasizing that their customer contact personnel (e.g., salespeople) are respectful and give shoppers their full attention. Moreover, since the set of moderately important resources accounted for approximately 43% of the variability in the intention ratings, it appears that retailers could intensify respect-oriented shopper intentions to revisit them by being caring and helpful (Love), by informing shoppers of the services that the retailer offers its customers (Services), and by informing shoppers that the retailer provides a line of credit to their qualified customers (Money). Finally, since respect-oriented shoppers appear to be indifferent to a retailer's efforts to learn about them (Information) and to allow them to borrow its products (Goods), it appears that retailers should not expect an immediate favorable customer reaction to these practices.

Online e-Tail Setting

The cluster analysis revealed the existence of five e-tail shopper segments, and the MANOVA findings indicated that e-shopper segments could

be distinguished in terms of the e-tailer resource investment effects on shopper intentions to revisit the e-tailer ($\Lambda=0.02$, $F(24, 144)=12.521$, $p<0.000$). Furthermore, the ANOVA results (see Table 20.2) revealed that five of the resource categories (i.e., Love, Status, Information, Goods, and Money) explained the differences among the five e-shopper segments, with the proportions of variance explained (i.e., ω^2 s) ranging from .314 to .679. These findings indicate that the e-shopper segments had a large effect (see Malhotra 1996) on explaining the variability of the five resource categories. In addition, a comparison of the five ω^2 s revealed that the effect sizes for Goods and Status were approximately twice those for Love, Money, and Information. This finding indicates that a combination of social (i.e., particularistic and symbolic resources) and economic (i.e., universalistic and tangible resources) e-tail resource investments accounted for the greatest amount of differentiation among the five e-tail shopper segments.

Love. While all e-shopper segments indicated that shopper intentions to revisit an e-tailer were favorably influenced by e-tailer efforts to provide helpful and caring customer support, the degree of influence differed across the e-shopper segments ($F(4,46)=7.244$, $p=0.000$, $\omega^2=.386$). An e-tailer's Love investment had the strongest positive influence on shopper intentions for Segment B (Student-Newman-Keuls multiple range test, $p<.05$) and the least influence for Segment C (Student-Newman-Keuls multiple range test, $p<.10$), relative to the other segments. These findings suggest that e-tailers can favorably influence shopper intentions to revisit them by developing helpful websites and caring customer service, regardless of shopper segment.

Status. Shopper intentions to revisit an e-tailer were mixed when e-shoppers were invited to register with the e-tailer to receive preferred customer treatment ($F(4,46)=19.874$, $p=0.000$, $\omega^2=.633$). More specifically, while Status had a favorable effect on the revisit intentions of some e-shopper segments (i.e., Segments A and B), other e-shopper segments (i.e., Segments C, D, and E) reported that it had an unfavorable effect (Student-Newman-Keuls multiple range test, $p<.05$). These findings indicate that while some

e-shoppers are willing to be identified in order to receive preferred customer treatment, other e-shoppers prefer to shop in anonymity. Given its mixed effects, a prudent approach for e-tailers who want to award Status to their shoppers would be to explain what the e-tailer means by preferred customer treatment and then query the e-shopper about his/her interest in receiving preferred customer treatment before inviting them to register with the e-tailer.

Information. Shopper intentions to revisit an e-tail were differentially influenced by e-tailer efforts to learn about them ($F(4,46)=5.255$, $p=0.001$, $\omega^2=.314$). More specifically, differences in Information's influence on shopper intentions were found between e-shopper Segments A and E only, with Segment A e-shoppers reporting that Information had slightly more favorable effect on their intentions to revisit an e-tailer (Student-Newman-Keuls multiple range test, $p<.05$). Moreover, since no significant differences were observed between Segment E and remaining e-shopper segments (i.e., Segments B, C, and D), it may be concluded that Segment E shoppers appear to be relatively uninfluenced by an e-tailer's efforts to learn about them. These findings suggest that if e-tailers design their websites to invite shoppers to share their preferences so as to match them with the e-tailer offerings, the overall effect on shopper intentions to revisit the e-tailer, at best, is likely to be somewhat favorable.

Services. Shopper intentions to revisit an e-tailer to make a product purchase were not differentially influenced by an e-tailer's investment of Services ($F(4,46)=2.057$, $p=0.102$, $\omega^2=.152$). Regardless of segment, e-tailers that provide their customers with a set of free services appear to have a weak favorable effect on shopper intentions to revisit the e-tailer to make a product purchase.

Goods. Shopper intentions to revisit an e-tailer were mixed when e-tailers informed shoppers that qualified customers could borrow the e-tailer's products to better evaluate them ($F(4,46)=24.314$, $p=0.000$, $\omega^2=.679$). More specifically, while Goods had a favorable effect on some e-shopper segments (i.e., Segments B and D), other e-shopper segments (i.e., Segments

A, C, and E) reported a weak unfavorable effect (Student-Newman-Keuls multiple range test, $p < .05$). Overall, these findings suggest that by instituting a practice of allowing qualified customers to borrow its products to better evaluate them, e-tailers may be able to have a somewhat favorable influence on shopper intentions to revisit them.

Money. Shopper intentions to revisit an e-tailer were differentially influenced when e-tailers offered qualified customers a line of credit ($F(4,46) = 5.602, p = 0.001, \omega^2 = .328$). In general, four segments (i.e., Segments A, B, D, and E) reported that an e-tail investment of Money had a favorable effect on their intentions to revisit the e-tailer, whereas the remaining Segment (i.e., Segment C) seemed to be relatively uninfluenced (Student-Newman-Keuls multiple range test, $p < .05$). Correspondingly, it appears that e-tailers may effectively influence shopper intentions to revisit them by informing shoppers that they provide a line of credit to qualified customers.

Online e-Shopper Segment Compositions

Segment A (Respect-Oriented e-Shoppers). The respect-oriented e-shopper segment considered an invitation to receive preferred customer treatment by registering with the e-tailer to be the most important influence on their intentions to revisit an e-tailer (see Table 20.2). More specifically, respect-oriented e-shoppers placed the greatest importance on Status (32.1%), followed by Love (23.8%), and Goods (19.0%). Together, these three e-tail resource investments accounted for approximately 75% of the total variability in the respect-oriented e-shopper intentions to revisit an e-tailer. Moreover, Status was about three times more important to the respect-oriented e-shopper than the remaining more moderately important resources (i.e., Money and Information). Finally, while its effect did not differ significantly across the e-shopper segments, respect-oriented e-shoppers placed the least importance on Service (2.7%) when deciding to revisit an e-tailer. These findings suggest that e-tailers may be able to

effectively influence respect-oriented e-shopper intentions to revisit them by inviting shoppers to register with the e-tailer to receive preferred customer treatment (Status) and by creating websites that offer shoppers caring and helpful customer support (Love). Furthermore, since respect-oriented e-shoppers do not appear to be favorably influenced by being able to borrow an e-tailer's products to better evaluate them (Goods), it appears that e-tailers should not expect an immediate favorable customer reaction to this practice. Additionally, since the set of moderately important resources accounted for approximately 22% of the variability in the intention ratings, it appears that e-tailers may be able to strengthen respect-oriented shopper intentions to revisit them by informing shoppers that the e-tailer provides qualified customers with a line of credit (Money) and by designing e-tail websites to match shopper preferences with the e-tail offering (Information).

Segment B (Affection-Oriented e-Shoppers). The affection-oriented e-shopper segment considered helpful e-tail websites and caring customer service to be the most important influence on their intentions to revisit an e-tailer (see Table 20.2). More specifically, affection-oriented e-shoppers rated Love (40.0%) as being at least two times more important to them when compared to other important e-tailer investments such as the provision of a line of credit to qualified customers (Money) or enabling qualified customers to borrow its products to better evaluate them (Goods). Together, these three e-tail resource investments accounted for approximately 76% of the variability in the intention ratings of affection-oriented e-shoppers. Moreover, Love was about four times more important in influencing affection-oriented e-shopper intentions to revisit an e-tailer, relative to the more moderately important resources (e.g., Services and Status). The least important resource to the affection-oriented e-shopper was Information (2.4%). These findings suggest that e-tailers may be able to effectively influence the intentions of affection-oriented e-shoppers by creating helpful websites that provide caring customer service (Love), by offering qualified customers with a line of credit (Money), and by allowing qualified customers to

borrow the e-tailer's goods (Goods). In addition, since the set of moderately important resources accounted for approximately 22% of the variability in the intention ratings, e-tailers may also be able to strengthen affection-oriented e-shopper intentions to revisit them by informing shoppers that the e-tailer provides its customers with after-sale Services (Services) and by inviting e-shoppers to register with the e-tailer to receive preferred customer treatment (Status).

Segment C (Anonymity-Oriented e-Shoppers). The anonymous e-shopper segment considered an invitation to receive preferred customer treatment by registering with the e-tailer to have the strongest negative effect on their intentions to revisit an e-tailer (see Table 20.2). More specifically, anonymity-oriented e-shoppers rated Status (63.5%) as being between four and eight times more important in influencing their intentions when compared to the more moderately important resource investments (i.e., Love, Services, and Goods). Finally, Information and Money investments do not appear to have much influence on anonymity-oriented e-shopper intentions to revisit the e-tailer. Since anonymity-oriented e-shoppers were most negatively influenced by e-tailer invitations to receive preferential treatment by register with the e-tailer (Status), a prudent approach for e-tailers who want to award Status to their shoppers would be to explain what the e-tailer means by preferred customer treatment and then query the e-shopper about his/her interest in receiving preferred customer treatment before inviting them to register with the e-tailer. Additionally, since the moderately important resources account for about 30% of the variability in the anonymity-oriented e-shopper intention ratings, e-tailers may be able to strengthen anonymity-oriented shopper intentions to revisit them by creating websites that offer shoppers caring and helpful customer support (Love), by informing shoppers that the e-tailer provides its customers with after-sales services (Services), and by allowing qualified customers to borrow the e-tailer's goods (Goods).

Segment D (Economical-Oriented e-Shoppers). The economical-oriented e-shopper segment considered e-tailer practices of allowing

qualified customers to borrow its products to better evaluate them (Goods) and to establish a line of credit (Money) as the most important e-tail resource investments when deciding to revisit the e-tailer (see Table 20.2). Together, Goods (41.3%) and Money (30.5%) accounted for approximately 72% of the total variability in the intention ratings of economical-oriented e-shoppers. In addition, each of these resource investments was between two and four times more important than the more moderately important resource investments (i.e., Love, Services, and Status). Finally, an e-tailer's Information (0.2%) investment was essentially unimportant to the convenience-oriented e-shopper. These findings suggest that e-tailers may be able to effectively influence economical-oriented shopper intentions to revisit them by informing shoppers that as qualified customers they would be able to borrow the e-tailer's goods to better evaluate them (Goods) and to establish a line of credit (Money). In addition, since the set of moderately important resources accounted for approximately 31% of the variability in the intention ratings, e-tailers may also be able to strengthen economical-oriented e-shopper intentions to revisit them by creating websites that are helpful and provide caring customer support (Love) and informing them that the e-tailer provides its customers with after-sales services (Services).

Segment E (Convenience-Oriented e-Shoppers). The convenience-oriented e-shopper segment considered an e-tail practice of extending a line of credit to qualified customers (Money) and helpful e-tail websites that include caring customer service (Love) to be the most important influences on their intentions to revisit an e-tailer (see Table 20.2). Together, Money (34.7%) and Love (28.5%) accounted for more than 63% of the total of the variability in the intention ratings of the convenience-oriented e-shopper. In addition, the importance of Money and Love was about one and one-half times more important than the moderately important resources (Information and Services) and at least five times more important than the least important resources (Status and Goods). These findings indicate that e-tailers may be able to effectively influence

convenience-oriented e-shopper intentions to revisit them by informing e-shoppers that they provide a line of credit to their qualified customers (Money) and creating websites that are helpful and provide caring customer service (Love). In addition, since the set of moderately important resource investments accounted for about 29% of the variability in the intention ratings, e-tailers may also be able to strengthen convenience-oriented shopper intentions to revisit them by informing e-shoppers that they provide after-sale services (Services). Furthermore, convenience-oriented e-shoppers were negatively influenced by e-tailer efforts to provide them with information/recommendations. It appears that convenience-oriented e-shoppers know what they are shopping for and are less likely to respond favorably to an e-tailer's website that invites shoppers to share their preference so that the e-tailer can better match its offerings to these preferences. Correspondingly, e-tailers that attempt to make an Information investment in their shoppers by encouraging convenience-oriented shoppers to share their preferences should not expect an immediate or favorable customer reaction to this practice.

Discussion

While many retailers attempt to achieve customer loyalty, scant research exists to help retailers understand how they might initiate meaningful customer relationships. As a first step in filling this gap, a study was conducted to examine the extent to which retailers might effectively influence first-time shopper intentions to revisit them to make a product purchase. Based on Resource Theory (Foa and Foa 1974, 1980), we conducted a study using two retail settings to determine the theory's applicability for understanding how retailers can initiate customer loyalty in both a person-to-person retail environment (i.e., a brick-and-mortar setting) and a person-to-entity retail environment (i.e., an online e-tail setting). The research findings demonstrate that first-time shopper intentions to revisit a retailer may be influenced by the nature of the retailer resource investments used to initiate a relationship with

the customer, regardless of retail context. The findings also provide evidence that first-time shoppers place differing amount of importance on the social (i.e., more particularistic and symbolic) resources and economic (i.e., more universalistic and concrete) resources when deciding to revisit a retailer. Furthermore, these findings are consistent with the related studies employing different methodologies (cf., Beatty et al. 1996; De Wulf et al. 2001; Gwinner et al. 1998; Reibstein 2002; Reynolds and Arnold 2000; Srinivasan et al. 2002). Correspondingly, our results demonstrate that retail shoppers, regardless of retail context, may be segmented in terms of the importance that they place on retailer-invested resources. Furthermore, as described below, two shopper segments (i.e., affection-oriented and respect-oriented) appear in both brick-and-mortar (i.e., person-to-person) and e-tail (person-to-entity) settings. Additionally, it appears that creating customer loyalty in an online setting may be more difficult than in a brick-and-mortar setting. The findings are discussed in greater detail below.

A cross-segment and cross-context comparison reveals that shopper intentions to revisit a retailer were favorably influenced by a retailer's Love investment, regardless of segment and context. More specifically, even though the shopper segments varied in the importance that they placed on a retailer's investment of Love, all of the segments indicated that their intentions to revisit a retailer were favorably influenced when retailers were caring and helpful. In a brick-and-mortar (i.e., person-to-person) setting, retailers can invest Love in their customers by training their customer contact personnel (e.g., salespeople) to use words and action that clearly demonstrate that they care about their customers and want them to make the best product purchase, even if it means purchasing the product at a different retailer. In an online (i.e., a person-to-entity) setting, e-tailers can invest Love in their customers by designing their websites that are user friendly (e.g., contain useful and helpful product information) and helpful customer support. Similarly, first-time shoppers in all seven shopper segments reported that their intentions to

revisit a retailer tended to be favorably influenced by retailer Service investments and Money investments. Correspondingly, to initiate customer relationships, retailers may be able to favorably influence first-time shopper intentions to revisit them by providing (qualified) customers with a full complement of services and a line of credit, regardless of retail context.

The magnitude and direction of influence for the other retail-invested resources is not as clear cut. For example, some shopper segments reported that retailer Status investments favorably influenced first-time shopper intentions to revisit the retailer to make a product purchase, whereas other segments reported that they were negatively influenced (i.e., these shoppers indicated that retailer Status investments resulted in intentions to not revisit the retailer). More specifically, respect-oriented shoppers in both brick-and-mortar and e-tail settings reported that they were most favorably influenced by retailer Status investments, whereas anonymous e-shoppers indicated that they were most unfavorably influenced. The mixed findings may be attributable to how shoppers interpret a retailer actions and words for communicating Status to their customers. For example, in a brick-and-mortar (person-to-person) retail setting, Status may be effectively communicated to shoppers using verbal and non-verbal cues when customer contact personnel behave respectfully toward a shopper. However, it should also be recognized that awarding status to a customer by giving him/her a retailer's full attention may not be well received by the shopper. For instance, some shoppers (e.g., service-oriented shoppers) do not want salesperson's full attention and consider such actions as intrusive. These shoppers may simply prefer to remain anonymous and left alone until they have need of a salesperson to answer a question or to complete a sales transaction. Similar findings existed in the e-tail (person-to-entity) setting. Whereas some e-shoppers were favorably influenced by an e-tailer's invitation to receive preferred customer treatment by registering with the e-tailer (e.g., respect-oriented e-shoppers and affection-oriented e-shoppers), other e-shoppers prefer to remain anonymous and indistinguishable from other shoppers (e.g., anonymity-oriented e-shoppers, economical-oriented e-shoppers, and conve-

nience-oriented e-shoppers). Explicit attempts to identify e-shoppers by asking them to register with the e-tailer may be interpreted with skepticism by some e-shoppers. These e-shoppers may interpret preferential treatment to mean that they would receive unwanted e-mails from the e-tailer. One way to avoid receiving unwanted (junk) e-mails is to remain anonymous when visiting the e-tail website. In this instance, avoiding unwanted contact from the e-tailer seems to be preferable to receiving preferential treatment from the e-tail. Future research should examine this issue in greater detail.

Retailers who invest Information and Goods in their shoppers may also experience mixed results, regardless of retail context. The contradictory findings related to retailer Information investments may be explained, in part, by the product knowledge possessed by the shopper and shopper comfort in making product purchases. Brick-and-mortar shoppers oftentimes visit with retail salespeople to learn more about the product offerings and their benefits. During these interactions, the salesperson is able to tailor his/her responses to the shopper. Similarly, in person-to-entity retail contexts, such as e-tailing, retailers have the capability of matching product offerings with customers preferences and past purchases (e.g., product suggestions offered e-tailers such as Amazon.Com and Apple's iTunes). In contrast, there are other instances in which shoppers have a clear idea of the brands that they intend to purchase. In these instances, shoppers may not be interested in learning about alternative offerings or product accessories that fit their lifestyles. Instead, these customers may be more interested in product information related to a specific brand (e.g., price, delivery, and so on). Correspondingly, future research is needed to examine the circumstances when retailer should invest knowledge in their customers by learning about them.

The conflicting findings related to retailer investment of Goods in the shopper may be attributable, in part, by shopper unfamiliarity with type of investment or to shopper acceptance of an additional burden of returning a borrowed product to a retailer. Shopper unfamiliarity with borrowing a retailer's products in order to better

evaluate them may be product/retailer specific. For example, some electronics retailers/e-tailers (Barnes and Nobel and Apple iTunes) allow their music CDs or movie DVDs to be sampled (borrowed) by providing shoppers with the opportunity to listen to snippets of songs or watching movie trailers at the retail site. In addition, for more tangible product offerings, such as clothing, e-tailers often allow their customers to return products for a refund or store credit when the products do not satisfy the customers. Such situations may be interpreted by e-shoppers as a way of sampling the product, which might partially account for the favorable influence of the two e-tail segments. In a brick-and-mortar setting, retailers, such as small local furniture retailers, may allow qualified shoppers to borrow a fabric cushion or pillow in order to enable shoppers to better visualize how well the furniture might match the shopper's current décor. However, such practices tend to be atypical and oftentimes the shopper must initiate a request to borrow the pillow or cushion from the furniture store. Correspondingly, shopper borrowing of a retail product is not necessarily a common or well-understood shopping practice, especially in a brick-and-mortar setting. Additional research would help to determine on how retailers may better benefit by making a Goods investment in their qualified customers.

Overall, the study findings suggest that retailer resource investments in their customers should not be entered into lightly. Rather, retailers are recommended to learn about their target markets and to tailor the resource investment programs to match those desired by the target market. For example, some findings suggest that some retailer resource investments (e.g., Love) tend to favorably influence first-time shopper intention to revisit a retailer to make a product purchase, regardless of retail context. In contrast, other resources may be considered a double-edge sword (e.g., Status), and their investment needs to be more carefully executed in order to successfully influence shopper purchase intentions. In addition, a comparison of the shopper segments across the retail contexts reveals that the effects

of the retailer resource investments on shopper revisit intentions are more varied for the e-tail (person-to-entity) retail setting. This finding suggests that the development of loyalty in an online retail context may be more complex and difficult, relative to a brick-and-mortar setting.

While our findings are consistent with the emerging conceptualization regarding the structure of loyalty, there are study limitations that restrict the generalizability of our findings. First, while care was taken to design the retail scenarios to represent retail-shopping contexts that are familiar to students (i.e., students considered the scenarios to be realistic), future research is needed to examine the extent to which our findings can be reproduced in other nonstudent populations. Second, while the study subjects considered the research scenarios to be realistic, the generalizability of the study is limited to the particular manifestations of the examined resource investments. Future research should examine the extent to which other expressions of forms of the resource investments produce similar results.

Regardless of the study limitations, the research findings have relevant implications for retailers. First, our findings demonstrate the applicability of Resource Theory (Foa and Foa 1974, 1980) for understanding the development of buyer-seller relationships in a retail setting. The research findings also draw attention to the importance of the more social (i.e., particularistic and symbolic) resources when initiating customer relationships. As a result, retailers interested in developing relationships with their customers are recommended to consider factors (resources) that extend beyond the economic realm. Second, our findings suggest that a retailer's target market is likely to be comprised of distinct shopper segments whose likelihood of becoming loyal to the retailer depends on the combination of retailer-invested resources. This finding reinforces the need for retailers to develop an intimate understanding of their target markets and to develop customer loyalty programs that are tailored to include the social (particularistic and symbolic) and economic (universal and concrete) resources desired by specific shopper segments.

Appendix A

Resource Manipulations

Brick-and-mortar retail setting

Social resource	Resource provided	Resource not provided
Love	While showing you different clothing options, the salesperson, through words and actions, demonstrates that he/she truly cares about you and wants to help you make the best clothing choice, even if you purchase the clothing elsewhere	After locating and asking the salesperson for help, the salesperson shows you the most popular clothing options. In addition, the salesperson, through words and action, demonstrates that he/she is just worried about closing the sale, not really caring about you or wanting to help you make the best clothing choice
Status	A salesperson of your same sex, who is not working with a customer, notices that you entered the store. The salesperson stops his/her activity and approaches you. In a respectful tone, the salesperson greets you and introduces himself/herself to you. In addition, the salesperson makes eye contact with you, and his/her body language shows that he/she is giving you his/her full attention	A salesperson of your same sex, who is not working with a customer, notices that you entered the store. Even though the salesperson does not stop his/her activity he/she does greet you but does not introduce him/herself. While acknowledging you, the salesperson does not make eye contact with you and his/her body language does not show that he/she is giving you his/her full attention
Information	Once the salesperson is informed of your interest in casual wear, the salesperson begins a conversation with you. During the conversation, the salesperson asks you questions, trying to learn about you and your clothing preferences. The salesperson uses this information to find clothing that fits your needs and lifestyle	Once the salesperson is informed of your interest in casual wear, the salesperson directs you to the appropriate clothing aisle and states that he/she will be available to help you when you need it
Service	When asked about store services, the salesperson explains that his/her store is a full-service store and that they offer customers a complete set of free services, including free alterations, advance notice of sales, free gift wrapping, and store catalogs among other things	When asked about store services, the salesperson explains that his/her store is not a full-service store and that they do not offer customers free services, such as free alterations, advance notice of sales, free gift wrapping, and store catalogs
Goods	After learning that you are not ready to make a decision and intend to visit other stores, the salesperson offers to let you borrow the clothing so that you can compare it with clothing found in the other stores. To borrow the clothing, you will be required to leave a credit card number as a security deposit to protect against product damage or non-return of the clothing to the retailer. If the clothing is returned undamaged to the retailer, the credit card will not be charged	After learning that you are not ready to make a decision and intend to visit other stores, the salesperson states that the clothing is popular and may not be in stock when you return to the store. The salesperson then suggests that you purchase the clothing today. Then if you decide against the clothing after a few days, it may be returned for a refund or in-store credit
Money	In addition to describing the clothing and its features, the salesperson explains that the store offers a line of credit to their qualified customers, which enables them (the customers) to borrow the store's money to make in-store purchases	In addition to describing the clothing and its features, the salesperson explains that store has a cash-and-carry policy in that purchases must be in cash, check, debit card, or a major credit card. The retailer, itself, does not extend a line of credit to its customers; this means that the retailer does not allow any of its customers to borrow the store's money to make in-store purchases

(continued)

Appendix A (continued)

Online e-tail setting

Social resource	Resource provided	Resource not provided
Love	After opening the casual wear webpage, you notice that the product description is very descriptive and helpful and the price is listed next to each product. In addition, the webpage has menus for customer support including phone numbers, e-mail addresses, and online customer service to help the shopper with their orders. The webpage also has links to other online retailers that offer similar clothing to help shoppers compare clothing online. The bottom of the webpage contains a panel which reads, "How are we doing? Are we meeting your needs? Let us know!" and provides both a phone number and e-mail address to contact the customer service department	After opening the casual wear webpage, you notice that the product description is very brief and the price is listed next to each product. However, there is no other support, such as phone numbers, e-mail addresses, or online customer service to help the shopper with their orders
Status	As the website for the online retailer opens, the top panel of the webpage lists the name and logo of the online retailer and the phrase, "Welcome to our online store. You, our customer, are important to us. Please register with us so to receive our preferred customer treatment"	As the website for the online retailer opens, the top panel of the webpage lists only the name and logo of the online retailer
Information	A side panel of the online retailer's webpage prompts you for information about you and your clothing preferences. After entering your information using the webpage's pull-down menus and selecting the submit button, another of the online retailer's webpages opens, which consists of clothing that matches your indicated needs and lifestyle	A side panel on the retailer's webpage contains a set of pull-down menus that direct the shopper to the many products available online
Service	The website advertises the online retailer as a full-service store that offers customers a complete set of free services, including free alterations, advance notice of sales, free gift wrapping, and store catalogs among other things	The website does not advertise the online retailer as a full-service retailer, meaning that customers are not offered free services including free alterations, advance notice of sales, free gift wrapping, or online store catalogs among other things
Goods	Realizing that online shoppers are not always ready to make a product purchase on a first visit to a webpage, the online retailer offers to let qualified customers borrow the clothing so that they can compare it with clothing found at other stores. To borrow the clothing, you will be required to provide a mailing address and leave a credit card number as a security deposit to protect against product damage or non-return of the clothing to the retailer. If the clothing is returned undamaged to the retailer, the credit card will not be charged	The online retailer's webpage emphasizes that its clothing is popular and may not be in stock when you return to the webpage. The webpage then suggests that shoppers purchase the clothing today. If shoppers decide against the clothing after a few days, it may be returned for a refund or online credit
Money	When purchasing clothing from the online retailer, the webpage explains that in addition to accepting major credit cards, the retailer offers a line of credit to their qualified customers, which enables them (the customers) to borrow the online retailer's money to make online purchases at the retailer's website	When purchasing clothing from the online retailer, the webpage explains that the retailer accepts only major credit cards. The retailer, itself, does not extend a line of credit to its customers; this means that the retailer does not allow any of its customers to borrow the store's money to make in-store purchases

Appendix B

Examples of a Brick-and-Mortar and Online Retail-Shopping Scenario for Conjoint Study

Brick-and-Mortar Retail Store A

While shopping for casual wear, you visit this retail clothing store for the first time. You do not plan on purchasing anything today but are just looking at various options. As you enter the store, you experience the following events:

- A salesperson of your same sex, who is not working with a customer, notices that you entered the store. Even though the salesperson does not stop his/her activity he/she does greet you but does not introduce him/herself. While acknowledging you, the salesperson does not make eye contact with you, and his/her body language does not show that he/she is giving you his/her full attention.
- Once the salesperson is informed of your interest in casual wear, the salesperson directs you to the appropriate clothing aisle and states that he/she will be available to help you when you need it.
- After locating and asking the salesperson for help, the salesperson shows you the most popular clothing options. In addition, the salesperson, through words and action, demonstrates that he/she is just worried about closing the sale, not really caring about you or wanting to help you make the best clothing choice.
- In addition to describing the clothing and its features, the salesperson explains that store has a cash-and-carry policy in that purchases must be in cash, check, debit card, or a major credit card. The retailer, itself, does not extend a line of credit to its customers; this means that the retailer does not allow any of its customers to borrow the store's money to make in-store purchases.
- When asked about store services, the salesperson explains that his/her store is not a full-service store and that they do not offer customers free services, such as free alterations, advance notice of sales, free gift wrapping, and store catalogs.
- After learning that you are not ready to make a decision and intend to visit other stores, the salesperson states that the clothing is popular and may not be in stock when you return to the store. The salesperson then suggests that you purchase the clothing today and explains the retailer's return policy, which is typical for clothing retailers. Specifically, the salesperson states that if you are dissatisfied with the clothing, it must be returned within thirty (30) days of purchase in its original, unused condition and be accompanied with a proof of purchase (e.g., an original sales receipt). After meeting the return policy conditions, the customer may choose to receive a full refund of the original purchase price (including sales tax) or a merchandise credit.

After shopping at the other clothing retailers, you realized that the stores did not differ in their clothing styles or clothing prices and the store locations are equally convenient to you.

How likely is it that you will return to this retailer to make a clothing purchase?

(Clearly Print Your Rating)

(1 = Definitely Would Not Return to 25 = Definitely Would Return)

Online Retailer A

While shopping for casual wear online, you visit this retailer's website for the first time. You do not plan on purchasing anything today but are just looking at various options. After you enter the online retailer's webpage, the following occur:

- As the website for the online retailer opens, the top panel of the webpage lists only the name and logo of the online retailer.
- A side panel on the retailer's webpage contains a set of pull-down menus that direct the shopper to the many products available online.
- After opening the casual wear webpage, you notice that the product description is very brief and the price is listed next to each product. However, there is no other support, such as phone numbers, e-mail addresses, or online customer service, to help the shopper with their orders.
- The website does not advertise the online retailer as a full-service retailer, meaning that customers are not offered free services including free alterations, advance notice of sales, free gift wrapping, or online store catalogs among other things.
- When purchasing clothing from the online retailer, the webpage explains that the retailer accepts only major credit cards. The retailer, itself, does not extend a line of credit to its customers; this means that the retailer does not allow any of its customers to borrow the store's money to make in-store purchases.
- The online retailer's webpage emphasizes that its clothing is popular and may not be in stock when you return to the webpage. The webpage then suggests that shoppers purchase the clothing today. If shoppers are not satisfied with their purchase, the online retailer's return policy, which is typical for clothing retailers, states that the clothing must be returned within thirty (30) days of purchase in its original, unused condition and be accompanied with a proof of purchase (e.g., an original sales receipt or a proof of purchase label that is included on the packing slip). After meeting the return policy conditions, the customer may choose to receive a full refund of the original purchase price (including sales tax) or a merchandise credit. Shipping charges for returned clothing are paid by the customer.

After shopping at the other clothing retailers, you realized that the online retailers did not differ in their clothing styles or clothing prices.

How likely is it that you will return to this retailer to make a clothing purchase?

(Clearly Print Your Rating)

(1 = Definitely Would Not Return to 25 = Definitely Would Return)

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Resources and Transactions in the Organization's Underworld: Exchange Content and Consequences

21

Dan S. Chiaburu, Zinta S. Byrne, and Janet Weidert

The organizational centaur is the embodiment of both actions on behalf of organizations and on behalf of the natural person; it is part organization, part human.

(Ahrne 1994, p. 28)

For some employees, organizations are functional entities. Such organizations are comprised of groups of individuals, bounded by workspaces, schedules, organizational goals, hierarchical structures, and routines for sense making and interaction (Katz and Kahn 1978). For others, organizations are more about layers of informal structures not apparent to everyone, ambiguous goals, and possibilities beyond formal work tasks. This latter position is described in classical studies where work activities deviate from established goals (Selznick 1980), employees fail to comply with changes resulting in the disruption of work habits (Gouldner 1954), and employees engage

in information-sharing practices not sanctioned by management (Blau 1960, 1987). In extreme cases, employees “game the system” by enhancing productivity indicators through means bordering on illegitimacy, manipulating information, and using organizational resources for their own benefit (e.g., Shulman 2006; Winiacki 2007). The metaphor of organizational centaurs, employees representing both the organization and themselves, captures the duality of employment well (Ahrne 1994).

Provided this fundamental duality in one's position toward the organization, some sets of employee practices can be thought of as gray areas, twilight zones, or unclaimed domains, described as the underlife of a social establishment, “what an underworld is to a city” (Goffman 1961, p. 199). One can think of most major cities where two parallel but intertwined worlds coexist: one above ground and one underground, where the context of each determines the norms to which residents adhere. To describe the practices used in these parallel organizational worlds, we rely on Goffman's concept of *secondary adjustments*. These adjustments are “any habitual arrangement by which a member of an organization employs unauthorized means, or obtains unauthorized ends, or both, thus getting around the organization's assumptions about what he should *do* and *get* and hence what he should *be*” (Goffman 1961, p. 189, italics added). In other words, secondary adjustments are the practices (including the politics or the

Note. This chapter is an extension of Chiaburu, D. S. (2009). Exploring the organization's underworld: a typology of transactions and their consequences. *68th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management*, August 8–13, Chicago, IL. The authors would like to thank Sophia Marinova for her helpful comments on a previous draft.

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social nuances of the organization's power structure) by which employees get things done for themselves or the organization by *not* using the formal system of policies, structures, or established interactions.

We emphasize in this chapter the tripartite differentiation of secondary adjustments: doing (employee behaviors), getting (and symmetrically giving; employee exchanges with the organization and with those in proximity such as managers, colleagues, clients), and being (employees' identifications, roles, and selves required, used, and re-created at work; Goffman 1961). These three components (i.e., doing, getting, being) become important later on, when we explore how the Foa classes of resources can be connected to secondary adjustments. Additionally, for clarity, secondary adjustments need to be presented in contrast to *primary adjustments*. Even though the current organizational behavior literature has started to recognize a nuanced view of organizational identification (in its ambivalent, neutral, and disidentification forms; Kreiner and Ashforth 2004), it is helpful to contrast primary and secondary adjustments. Under a primary adjustment, individuals are described as being literally enamored with their roles through both cognitive and affective mechanisms and subsequently enacting their roles in corresponding behaviors. Primary adjustments result in a high level of "self-identification emerging from this enactment" (Goffman 1961, pp. 88–89). Thus, primary adjustments can be seen when the employee "co-operatively contributes required activity to an organization and under required conditions" (pp. 188–189), essentially a conforming behavior. Conversely, secondary adjustments can be considered deviant or counter-normative in a conventional sense (e.g., Merton 1949).

Similar to Goffman's (1961) residents of total institutions, employees may appear to actively embrace the official reality, routines, and activities of the organization, while privately abhorring them and even using them for their own benefit. Goffman suggests that "whenever we look at a social establishment, we find [t]hat participants decline in some way to accept the official view of what they should be putting into and getting out

of the organization and, behind this, of what sort of self and world they are to accept for themselves" (p. 305). Hence, secondary adjustments can cover a wide spectrum, from physical to psychological actions. In extreme situations, for example, humans engage in secondary adjustments to survive concentration camps; "One of the most persistent forms of 'secondary adjustment,' in both the camps and the ghettos, was smuggling" (Des Pres 1980, p. 101). It is not implausible, however, to encounter secondary adjustments in work organizations.

Adjustments may be necessary to maintain one's psychological makeup or well-being. For example, creating a critical space for thought, engaging in resistance, and struggling to create an image of self, independent of the one sanctioned by the organization, may speed one's recovery from drug addiction (McCorkel 1998). Employees may engage in secondary adjustments too, as described in a handful of studies authored by sociologists (e.g., Hodson 1995, 2001), industrial relations researchers (e.g., Winiecki 2007), and organizational scholars (Ingram 1986; Noon and Blyton 2007). Even though more empirical work is needed to provide details about secondary adjustments in work settings, it is safe to provisionally assume, together with Goffman (1961), that "whenever worlds are laid on, underlives develop" (p. 305) and to engage in further explorations in this direction.

If underworlds and related transactions exist in work organizations, the first broad question is: How does one map what happens in the organizational underlife? Can the transactions and exchanges happening in these places be classified according to well-established categories or perspectives (i.e., social resource theory)? Previous research used social resource theory to conceptualize exchanges between employees and their organization (or its representatives; e.g., Berg and Wiebe 1993; McLean Parks et al. 1999; Törnblom and Vermut 2007; Villanueva et al. 2006). We extend this line of work by investigating whether the categories proposed by Foa and Foa (1974) apply (either directly or indirectly) to transactions that are less explicit, such as those describing secondary adjustments. Specifically,

is it possible to classify resources exchanged in the organizations' underworld using the six categories (goods, services, love, money, status, and information) proposed by social resource theory?

Second, after matching the six categories with underworld transactions, we focus on the rules of exchange. According to social resource theory, resources get *exchanged*. If consistency with social resource theory is maintained for underworld transactions, exchanges with the same or proximal resources may be more frequent than ones involving distal resources (e.g., Berg and Wiebe 1993). Consequently, we examine if transactions involving secondary adjustments are in fact exchanged (as in an economic transaction) or whether they are subject to other transaction rules (e.g., appropriation). Finally, we explore possible consequences of secondary adjustments. Specifically, we examine the extent to which those who engage in secondary adjustments are more satisfied with their jobs and committed to their organization and if the type of resource obtained is associated with these attitudes. Overall, our objective in this chapter is to penetrate the "crawl-space of the organization" (Ingram 1982), start systematizing the structure of this parallel organizational world, and attempt to propose a set of preliminary dimensions capturing actions undertaken by employees to discover or (re)claim various work aspects (e.g., spaces, moments, routines, and interactions) that escape regulation by functional organizational arrangements.

Social Resource Theory

Using social resource theory to explore secondary adjustments has the potential for new theoretical developments in an under-researched area. One can think of social resource theory as an extension of economic exchange theories, but one that explains how individuals engage in social rather than economic exchanges and provides rules for exchange that pertain to varying resource classes (Foa and Foa 1974). According to the theory, there are six resource classes: love, status, information, money, goods, and services. These classes possess two different attributes: concreteness

versus symbolism and particularism versus universalism. Concreteness versus symbolism refers to the tangibility of a resource, whereas particularism versus universalism pertains to how an individual evaluates a resource based on who is involved in the exchange. Foa and Foa (1980) contend that information and status are the least concrete, whereas goods and services are the most concrete, whereas love and money fall in the middle). Conversely, love is the most particularistic resource (its value is determined by the identity of the provider and/or the recipient's relationship to the provider); in contrast, money is the least particularistic (the value of money is the same regardless of provider). In general, similarity on attributes typically indicates a likelihood of being exchanged for one another (e.g., money for material goods).

Social resource theory (Foa and Foa 1976) has been used to explain a variety of phenomena including power, frustration, and Machiavellianism. Theoretical explanations based on resource exchanges can be extrapolated to employees. For example, employees high in Machiavellianism may be willing to trade any resource at their disposal in an effort to gain the desired resource, despite the social taboo that might be associated with the exchange. Namely, using knowledge of a superior's weakness to get an exchange for a raise would be an example of using information resources to gain money. In addition, if transactions take place in the organizations' underworld, exploitation by improper and unauthorized exchanges of resources may be particularly salient. We believe that the numerous transactions employees can engage in create an opportunity (i.e., a space, using Goffman's 1961, terms) for individuals to engage in secondary adjustments: acquiring or exchanging resources in ways that are not known or regulated by the organization.

Secondary Adjustments: Existing Literature and Opportunities for Research

Even though Goffman's (1961) pioneering work on secondary adjustments in total institutions (institutions where people live, dress, and behave

according to regulations, e.g., asylums, prisons) generated significant interest, research extending the concept outside the restrictive space of these institutions remains limited, though not entirely absent. For example, Ingram (1982), Zurcher (1965), and Renshaw (2006) provided rich examples of secondary adjustments in churches, aboard a ship, and in recreational activities such as swing dance. Despite these advances, more research is needed to derive theoretical principles of secondary adjustments outside of institutions. As an exception, Ingram (1982) posited a principle whereby “if underlife is to be diminished, the formal or official organization must become more complex” (p. 149). Propositions such as Ingram’s, however, have yet to be empirically tested. Unfortunately, advancements in this direction are precluded not only by the absence of empirical data but also by the absence of attempts to classify or systematize secondary adjustments. Hence, the application of social resource theory to secondary adjustments in organizations may provide an initial starting point for developing these coherent dimensions.

Organizational researchers have dealt with the tension between what is required at work, what employees provide, and how workers attempt to engage in secondary adjustments. In his study at “the smile factory” (Disneyland), Van Maanen (1991) offers examples of workplace actions that can be construed as secondary adjustments, though they are not labeled as such. For example, Disneyland workers’ brief moments of respite (e.g., a submarine captain furtively enjoying a cigarette inside the coning tower, where his upper body is in the vessel hidden from the crowd) can be considered a secondary adjustment, together with similar actions and strategies learned on the job to deal with annoying customers.

In a study of call center agents, Winiecki (2007) observed that agents with very high productivity ratings would increase one productivity indicator (the “% available” ratio, or the extent to which they are available to take calls from customers) by using means incongruent with the purposes for which the indicator was designed. Agents would, for instance, take a call but leave the customer waiting while they completed their

data processing for the prior call. This parallel tasking was done to manage supervisor impressions (“She thinks I’m the best one here!” and to “keep [the supervisor] off my back,” p. 368). In general, to survive at work, employees go to great lengths to anticipate job requirements and use spaces, moments, resources, and identities that somehow escape organizational regulation and regimentation (e.g., Noon and Blyton 2007).

We also note several limitations in existing analyses of secondary adjustments within an organizational behavior context. First, secondary adjustments – which are by definition directed at obtaining unauthorized ends and relying on unauthorized means – are oftentimes conflated with other concepts, including misbehavior or counterproductive behavior, (lack of) power, resistance, or a tension between the self and the system (Ackroyd and Thompson 1999; Ashforth and Mael 1998; Collinson and Ackroyd 2005). Thus, in the rare instances when they have been studied, secondary adjustments have been embedded in a theoretical network that restricts their understanding. For example, most studies ignore the fact that employees can take *proactive approaches* (rather than purely reactive ones) to create their parallel worlds. These agentic stances are not captured when the behavior is placed in the context of organizational constraint – resistance dynamics. Second and more importantly, there are no prior attempts to detail how secondary adjustments can be classified, especially in organizational contexts. Hence, the exchanges taking place in this domain and the organization of these (trans)actions into a meaningful pattern are yet to be captured.

To summarize, the main objectives of this chapter are to (a) provide a preliminary conceptual map for secondary adjustments (defined as employing unauthorized means, obtaining unauthorized ends, or both), using social resource theory as a basis. Because social resources have been used to characterize exchanges in a variety of settings including work (e.g., McLean Parks et al. 1999), they represent a logical starting point. In addition, (b) we attempt to determine the rules of exchange governing transactions in the underworld. Finally, (c) we explore the

consequences of engaging in transactions in these alternative worlds for the individuals involved in them and examine whether they lead to increased employee satisfaction and commitment.

Study Method

Reviews of the employee–organization relationship literature have previously noted the need for a greater variety of methods, including “qualitative approaches such as interviews and the use of critical incidents” (Coyle-Shapiro and Shore 2007, p. 175), especially when new phenomena are introduced. Secondary adjustments have a complex texture, in that they can include cognition-, identity-, and behavior-based aspects. In consideration of their complexity, we used semi-structured interviews to capture critical incidents describing resources exchanged at work, how these resources are obtained, and the extent to which they are consequential for work-related attitudes.

Participants

Respondents were 33 employed individuals, working in a variety of jobs, organizations, and industries. To account for the possible influence of structural work factors, they were asked to provide information on demographics (e.g., age, gender, and education), occupation, position, organization, and industry. Participants were well dispersed between the ages of 20 and 60, with approximately 40% between 20 and 28, 42% between 43 and 56, and the remaining 18% between 57 and 60. The sample consisted of 11 females and 22 males. About 9.1% of the sample reported completing high school, 30.2% completed some college, 30.3% completed 4 years of college, 3% obtained a masters degree, 9.1% held a doctorate degree, and 12.1% noted having a professional degree. We obtained information from employees situated both in blue-collar (e.g., cashier, waiter/waitress, electrical engineer) and white-collar (e.g., shift manager, lawyer, management) occupations. All major divisions of the Standard Industrial Classification code (except agriculture and mining) were represented.

Instrument and Procedure

The interviews were designed based on the critical incident technique (e.g., Flanagan 1954), with the explicit objective to elicit critical incidents corresponding to our domain of interest. Specifically, employees were asked to describe, in as much detail as possible, situations where either they or their colleagues thought of their organization and its resources in ways that were unconventional and whether they took any action based on their observations. To clarify what examples we were looking for, we specified that we were looking for behavioral examples whereby a member of their organization would use unauthorized means, obtain unauthorized ends, or both, thus circumventing the organization's assumptions about what he or she should *do* and *get*, as well as who he or she should *be* (e.g., role, a tripartite description consistent with Goffman's (1961) description of secondary adjustments). After the respondents provided incidents in which they were personally involved, they were asked to rate (on a scale of 1 = *not at all* to 7 = *to a great extent*) the extent to which the transaction they just described increased their job satisfaction and organizational commitment.

The coding process of critical incidents was iterative and relied on both a preexisting coding scheme (based on the social resource theory categories) and open coding (for incidents that could not be classified in the six a priori categories, or for transactions that did not follow the similar or proximal category exchange rule); the open coding allowed for the emergence of new categories. Specifically, interview segments were coded based on the six types of resources proposed by Foa and Foa (1974). When respondents' examples did not fit into the preexisting typology, they were coded separately and aggregated using a second-order coding (e.g., Van Maanen 1979). After classifying the resources, we also coded (on a scale from 1 to 7) the extent to which the resource obtained by the respondents was scarce or unavailable (as opposed to widely available) to others in the organization. We speculated that resource scarcity will be positively correlated with respondents' job satisfaction and commitment. Specifically, obtaining valuable resources is

positively correlated with positive affect (Thoresen et al. 2003) thus having the potential to increase both respondents' satisfaction with their job and their commitment to the organization providing these otherwise difficult to obtain resources. For the quantitative analyses, we computed the means and standard deviations across the six resource categories and calculated the percentages of critical incident interviews categorized in each of the six categories. In addition, we calculated the correlations between resource scarcity and job satisfaction and organizational commitment, respectively.

Study Results

Types of Resources

As presented in Table 21.1, all the categories of resources proposed by Foa and Foa (1974) were present for transactions using unauthorized means, resulting in unauthorized ends, and circumventing the organizations' assumptions about one's behavior and identity (Goffman 1961). Exploring transactions in the organizations' underworld using the social resource classification dimensions revealed that employees' primary exchanges were information (36.37%), love (19.32%), and status (18.18%). These are resources with low levels of *concreteness* and variable (low [information], to medium [status], to high [love]) levels of particularism. Resources with a high level of concreteness, such as goods (14.77%), services (9.09%), and money (2.27%) were less transacted.

In addition to classifying the resources, we explored the extent to which their utilization was positively related to respondents' job satisfaction and commitment to the organization. Our findings indicated that the level of job satisfaction and organizational commitment varied little between resources. With the exception of love (mean rating of 3.33), respondents rated their job satisfaction associated with the resource categories between 5.0 and 6.08 (out of 7.0). Similarly, ratings on organizational commitment associated with each resource category, except love (mean rating of 2.33), ranged from 3.38 to 5.08 (out of 7.0). Hence, respondents' job attitudes did not

seem to change much by their utilization of a resource.

Rules of Exchange

Because of the nature of our investigation, aimed at obtaining broad information about transactions in the organization underworld, we had insufficient data to unambiguously determine the extent to which these transactions involved a quid pro quo component and symmetry in the type of resource exchange. For example, some of the critical incidents pertained to behaviors exhibited by others, and as a result, we were unable to inquire about the rules governing the transactions in these particular situations. However, based on the respondents' descriptions of their own behaviors and on their discussions of behaviors they observed, we are able to make some inferences regarding transaction rules.

Some examples of asymmetries in transaction rules are presented below. Our analysis reveals several patterns. First, respondents (or the employees they observed) do not engage in exchanges using the same or a proximal resource. For example, in the example below, the transaction seems to involve an exchange of services for status (or even some type of unspecified potential benefit to be obtained in the future).

Quite often, I see servers and hostesses giving special treatment to certain individuals who seem to be either successful or rich. I believe they offer their attention and services to these people in hopes of developing a bond with that individual that may lead to another, more glamorous job. I have yet to see this actually work for a coworker, but the special treatment always leads to higher customer satisfaction. (CI 1)

In another example, status (acquired by a recent promotion) seems to lead to obtaining goods, another type of exchange not following the proximity rule.

After most of my shifts, the owner will usually allow me to choose anything off of the menu to eat free. I discovered this opportunity for food by asking the owner shortly after my first promotion. When I attempted to pay him, he refused to accept it. Ever since then, he has offered me food regularly and allows me to save the money I would normally spend more on food than on other things that are important. Other employees have noticed this, but because

Table 21.1 Categories of resources and percentage of critical incidents

Dimension	Example	Percentage
<i>Money</i>	“I’ve used money in my Department’s marketing account to sponsor a sports tent for my son’s high school cross country team. The tent had the school’s name on front, and company name on sides. I knew about the opportunity by being in charge of the marketing fund assigned to my department. Others in my department would not be as knowledgeable about this.” (CI 5)	2.27
<i>Information</i>	“I am a voice major, so I sing a lot at work especially for birthdays. I have actually got a singing gig from singing in the back of the kitchen. I was asked to sing in a co-worker’s wedding. Unfortunately, I was not able to go to [US vacation city] for the wedding. I also talk to my guests whenever it is appropriate. They sometimes ask me what I do for a living. Of course I then recommend them going to see me in a concert of some sorts. My benefits are getting more singing gigs and getting my name out there in my hometown.” (CI 81)	36.37
<i>Status</i>	“During the same Grand Prix Michael Schumacher one of the greatest ever drivers and sportspeople of this generation was giving a final press interview as he was retiring from competitive racing. One of the other bartenders who was a huge Formula 1 fan used the organizations’ security pass to gain access to the press conference. The security thought he was there to prepare drinks or serve food – however he was just there to get a glimpse of the great man.” (CI 87)	18.18
<i>Love</i>	“People who work closely together naturally form relationships, but I know of a guy who started working here not too long ago simply for the reason that he thought one of the current employees – a girl – was attractive. Once he was offered a job, he tried really hard to be placed in the same sector as she was in so that he could talk to her and try to ask her out. It didn’t end up working out, but it was definitely an attempt at using the workplace for his own benefit.” (CI 60)	19.32
<i>Services</i>	“All of the employee’s travel is booked through a specific website. It is a well known fact that many of the company’s employees not only book their business travel through this website, but use their access to this website to book their personal travel plans.” (CI 108)	9.09
<i>Goods</i>	“He has let me borrow many things from jack hammers to flat bed trucks to do things at my home. This saved me a lot of money because I didn’t have to purchase or rent these things. Because I am upfront with him he allows me to pretty much do what I want and allows me to use whatever I need but only because I respect him and ask permission to use items that he has paid for.” (CI 37)	14.77

of my position, I am the only one who receives such treatment. (CI 3)

It is useful to note that the initial attempt to align the transaction with a proximity rule did not work in this case (“When I attempted to pay him, he refused to accept it,” a money for goods proximal transaction); the transaction was changed into status for goods. In the situation above, transactions do take place, even though the resources that were exchanged have blurred boundaries, and there were no precise rules for the exchange. Our second observation, then, is that in many situations described by our respondents, transaction rules are notably absent. Respondents, or those whom they observed, simply appropriate resources for themselves or provide resources

to others without any visible utilization of a transaction rule. In fact, most of the transactions we outlined in Table 21.1 are not based on explicit exchange rules. We return to this point when we describe motives and exchange patterns in the last part of this section.

Influences on Satisfaction and Commitment

Further, we examined the extent to which resource scarcity (of resources obtained via secondary adjustments) is correlated with job satisfaction and organizational commitment. The correlation between resource scarcity and job satisfaction was $-.08$ (*ns*) and $.03$ (*ns*) between resource scarcity and organizational commitment. Hence, the

scarcity of the resource obtained did not relate to the employees' job satisfaction or commitment to the organization, as we speculated it would. Because the result is based on a small sample of respondents, it should be interpreted with caution. If confirmed in other studies, it is possible that job attitudes are not related to resources obtained via secondary adjustments. Future extensions of this work should consider measuring different aspects of satisfaction, including how satisfied the employee is with obtaining the specific resource, a more proximal job attitude to the resource than job satisfaction.

Transactions: Motives and Exchange Patterns

In the following, we focus on instances when the critical incidents provided by the study participants did not fit well into the how resources are supposed to be exchanged according to social resource theory, especially the quid pro quo form of the same or proximal resource exchange (e.g., Brinberg and Castell 1982; Brinberg and Wood 1983). For these incidents, we describe four sets of actions undertaken to acquire or provide a resource, coupled with (if available) motives underlying the action. As evident in the discussion below, these four strategies can be used to acquire any of the six resources identified by social resource theory; however, some appear more direct and possibly more effective than others depending on the specifics of the situation. As a result of the qualitative data analysis, we classified these motives and exchange patterns into four categories: (a) ulterior motives, (b) blurring the line, (c) using identities and stories, and (d) tapping into lateral resources. These are described below.

Ulterior Motives

One of my former colleagues took a particular position within the company with the sole intention of gaining increased exposure to the representative of one of the organization's clients. He used this exposure to get in close with this representative and eventually left the organization to take a position in the client's company. (CI 107)

Similar to Goffman's (1961) psychiatric hospital residents who became institutionalized to escape economic hardship rather than for health

reasons, employees join organizations for motives that are not apparent at first. For the organization, among the most serious consequences of secondary adjustments may be those that involve employees who join only to get trained, get access to customers, or acquire some benefit important to them that the organization can supply as part of the employment process. Such situations consume a tremendous amount of organizational resources, yet are not controllable. It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine who joins an organization with a long-term employment plan in mind versus who is there just to sharpen skills, get some contacts, and move on to another job. Even though this exchange can be framed as an information-based transaction (from the organization to the employee), the strategy used to transact the resource cannot be readily situated along the existing resource theory model (Foa and Foa 1976). In this regard, the ulterior motives serve to explain how secondary adjustments play a role in acquiring resources.

The level of particularism and concreteness of resources obtained via ulterior motives can vary according to the desires of the individual and are not apparent to the organization. In addition, it is unspecified what the individual perceives he or she is providing in the exchange. Recall that social resource theory stipulates that people want to exchange resources that are the most proximal to the resource they give (so one would expect an individual to want love, goods, or services if they perceive they are offering services). If individuals perceive that they are solely providing a service to the organization, any gain in information, status, or money is, therefore, inconsistent with social resource theory.

Critical incidents, provided by our respondents, of secondary adjustments falling into this strategy of exchange include:

I work here because the company offers tuition assistance for people in college, studying something related to the job. I'm studying meteorology, and they tried to tell me that didn't have anything to do with retail. But I wrote letters to everyone I could think of in that dept. letting them know that customer traffic is greatly dependent upon the weather (chuckle). Eventually they relented. (CI 73)

In case CI 73 above, the employee succeeds to stretch the tuition assistance policy to the limit,

being reimbursed for a degree that was not related to the primary area of retail. The nature of the situation (e.g., secondary adjustment) appears transparent to all parties involved, as the respondent is using a resource widely available to all employees. Again, the resource is not readily classifiable, as it can be simultaneously thought as a money, service, or information. More importantly, employees using this secondary adjustment voluntarily join the organization to obtain resources for their own benefit. The ulterior motive of obtaining a resource (i.e., training, tuition reimbursement) seems to be the *main reason* for joining the organization. In case CI 107 above, social resource theory does not adequately explain how the employee provides a warm body to the organization, yet is primarily interested and receives information and status concerning a client. In both cases, though social resource theory does not exclude the possibility that an employee would strategically provide a desired resource to obtain one, it focuses on explicit exchanges. The ambiguities just presented may be solved by introducing the concept of exchange motives, capturing what the parties believe to exchange and for what reasons/motives. While the organization believes that the central part of the transaction is work (services, goods) for money, some employees are primarily there to obtain contacts (information) or a degree (information/status).

Blurring the Line

Typically, it is believed that individuals join organizations for a career, job, or for prospects to another future job. In rare situations, the motivation for joining an organization is not work-related. In the following example, employees acquire or attempt to get access to resources that are not claimed by others:

People who work closely together naturally form relationships, but I know of a guy who started working here not too long ago simply for the reason that he thought one of the current employees – a girl – was attractive. Once he was offered a job, he tried really hard to be placed in the same sector as she was in so that he could talk to her and try to ask her out. It didn't end up working out, but it was definitely an attempt at using the workplace for his own benefit. (CI 60)

It may be possible to classify this resource under the category of "love" in social resource theory (see Table 21.1). However, doing so does not capture the complexity of the exchange, especially when considering that the employee joined the organization *for the sole purpose* of engaging in a non-work-related relationship. The employee has entered the exchange relationship with the organization for a specific outcome (i.e., love), but what is given in return is unclear (aside from labor). The point here is that the exchange is not mutual; one party is looking to take advantage of the other by seeking a desired resource, without any intention of giving back in a meaningful way. Though social resource theory was not written to explain motives for entering into an exchange relationship, it does explain the acquisition of a particular resource. The application of the theory can be extended by including the motive for entering an exchange in order to obtain a specific resource that falls within social resource theory.

In this next situation, the employee is already in the organization, has a flexible job, and takes advantage of the free time and resources available but not claimed by others:

When I worked at [company name], each craft used to have its own tool crib. Because of union regulations each crib was manned by a union worker whose sole job was to watch the tools and take care of the equipment. He made the same money as all the other workers in the union. For example, the steel workers who climbed up the sides of cooling towers to weld steel made the same money as the guy who ran the tool crib. This one guy decided he was going to set up a restaurant of sorts. He sold chips and soda to the other workers and even used to heat up hotdogs in the welding rod ovens. He already had a cushy job and figured out a way to make additional cash on top of that. (CI 68)

It is unclear to what extent the situation above is transparent for the parties involved and to what extent this situation is accepted. Again, the exchange of resources that are not proximal (service for money) is of secondary importance in this example. Having someone who takes care of the food may be regarded as positive by some of the employees who need to focus their efforts on the job, rather than on finding lunch. In other instances such as the one below, realizing the

differences in task difficulty, employees may creatively opt for simpler and more rewarding tasks, essentially by being less than transparent with those higher in the chain of command and exploiting the difficulties to coordinate perfectly:

I bypassed the chain of command or blurred information many times. The company was giving this 1½ time off for every weekend worked and we would spend this time when needed. The task [*during weekends*] was much simpler than the ones I was hired for, so the supervisors would limit the number of hours I could put in on weekends. So I would go once to the team leader, next time to the manager, then to the director, to obtain approval to work on weekends. (CI 119)

In the following example, the entire organization is rented for a purpose not originally designed:

Our store is closed on Sundays. One time, I allowed a film company to come in on a Sunday and film a sales training video. They needed a retail location with certain merchandise and a sales office. It was a perfect fit for them. I was hesitant when the film company approached me. But since the store was closed on Sundays anyway and I was the manager, I made the decision and didn't inform the owner. I actually benefited from this event as my family and myself were hired as extras in the video! We made some money and the store was only out the electricity that the company used that day. To this day, I don't believe that any other employees even realize this actually happened! (CI 87)

As opposed to the ulterior motives examples, where employees join the organization, extract a resource, and then leave, this action set of secondary adjustments presents situations where employees intend to maintain their membership in the organization (and the related set of benefits). In such cases, employees seem to discover and extract resources not apparent at first, mainly because of their position in the flow of resources and information in the organization. More importantly, the resource is appropriated or utilized in the absence of any explicit exchange process. Such examples have the potential to contribute to a more refined mode of thinking about resources, exchanges, and the rules involving their transaction, by introducing the concept of unclaimed resources. Additional questions include how are unclaimed resources obtained, and what underlies their transaction? Even though it is plausible to posit both giving/receiving and taking dynamics

in this process, most of the critical incidents (as well as the illustrations presented above) seem to suggest that employees simply claim these resources (i.e., taking) without much consideration for what they provide in exchange.

Using Identities and Stories

Employees may use their professional identity to gain access to another organization's resources or to influence specific individuals to gain resources. They can do so not only through ingratiation (Jones and Pittman 1982) but also by using their identification and personal stories to persuade others (or enter into a social exchange) in an attempt to gain resources and achieve their personal goals (such as a getting a larger tip in the example below).

I remember one time saying how I just had to purchase a parking permit that cost \$620 and that is one reason I work so much over the summer to make money to pay for school. I ended up getting a nicer tip after they heard I'm trying to get money to pay for school. I mean of course it was also because I'm a great server because I do a lot of little things to make your dinner more enjoyable. Obviously the benefit is I tend to get better tips when I talk about working for school. Other employees are aware of this. Some are single parents, in school, or made some wrong decisions in their life, so they do tend to give their sob story to make a little more money. I don't feel I overdo it when I talk to my guests though because everyone seems so interested with my college life especially when I say I go to [*the local university*]. (CI 77)

Our proposition here is that the identity or story opens the door for an exchange. Specifically, the exchange is not certain and its terms not well mapped. In the above example, the employee provided insight into why he or she was working as a server with the goal of receiving money in exchange for the sad story. The employee sought empathy in the form of money and provided a story of low prestige (status, not proximal to money) and insight (information, proximal to money) to obtain a material benefit (money) for the counterpart in this transaction.

Tapping into Lateral Resources

One new set of actions emerged as we moved from resources accessed during the employee–

organization relationship to exchanges with other members in the organization (e.g., clients, coworkers; Chiaburu and Harrison 2008). Considerable opportunity for unregulated transactions and exchanges exists in these domains, which are either loosely regimented (i.e., it is impossible to stipulate all lateral transactions between coworkers) or largely uncontrollable (employees can engage in various unspecified interactions with clients, given the lack of control over these interactions). For example, employees may ask their colleagues to participate in fundraisers or in activities that they support outside work:

I have placed brochures for fundraisers that my children may have been doing at various times in our lunchroom. Many others in our office do the same thing. No one feels obligated, but if they want to participate, they do. Benefits for me - I don't have to work hard to sell stuff. (CI 58)

In other situations, employees know that their skills are interchangeable and sometimes negotiate to change assignments or locations.

During the Formula 1 Grand Prix the catering company I work for sets up corporate tents to host all the sponsors or organizations that wish to wine and dine their clients or potential clients. The corporate sections are set up above the pits and each organization reserves a dining area, which can seat between 300 to 1,200 people depending on the size of the company. Being the bartender is a great opportunity to meet people and generally in such a work oriented environment people try and escape the 'work talk' and come speak to the bartender for an informal relaxed conversation. This particular year I was assigned to the ABC tent (*Australia's oldest and most successful airline company*) which is a good assignment; however, I was in the process of applying for a job in the financial sector. So I swapped tents with one of my friends who got assigned the XYZ (*Australian and New Zealand bank*) tent. This enabled me to use the organization as a resource as in essence although I was working as a bartender I was interviewing and networking with XYZ. (CI 87)

Unlike the transactions outlined in the previous three categories, lateral (employee-to-employee) transactions are likely to take place according to well-known social exchange norms (Blau 1964), such as reciprocity (Gouldner 1960) and equity (Homans 1958, 1961):

I have used the organization to help raise funds for charitable causes that I support. It is in some ways a captive audience and one where mutual *reciprocation* frequently is practiced. Once you ask someone to donate to your cause you are now basically obligated to support their cause when approached. (CI 48, italics added)

On one hand, employees may be very selective in their choice of lateral relationships and exchanges. On the other hand, their keen interest in the outcome may drive them toward generic transactions and make them less discriminate in their choice of lateral relationships. In addition, there are no limits to the types of lateral exchanges that can be made in an organization; employees may trade resources regardless of their attributes. Alternatively, as in the Formula 1 Grand Prix example above, the exchange might be for the same resource (job for job). Tapping into lateral relationships (with peers or coworkers) may involve various (proximal and distal) resources. However, transaction rules seem to be more specific: parties seem to keep in mind the need for "mutual reciprocity," as presented above. This is in contrast with some of the other transactions presented previously, where employees simply appropriated resources.

Discussion

Organizations consist of normal, programmed, and well-adjusted members, engaging in what Goffman (1961) would consider primary adjustments. However, organizations also have employees who distance themselves in some way from the organization and attempt to create opportunities to use resources in ways other than those established. On the one hand, "when an individual co-operatively contributes required activity to an organization and under required condition, [h]e is transformed into a co-operator; he becomes a 'normal', programmed; or built in member" (Goffman, pp.188–189). On the other hand, despite organizational efforts to normalize transactions and identities, organizations also consist of various gray areas where resources seem to remain unclaimed and employees discover and utilize them as they see fit.

Our focus on secondary adjustments, or practices that “do not directly challenge [the rules of the institution] but allow [individuals] to obtain hidden satisfactions or to obtain permitted ones by forbidden means” (Goffman 1961, p. 54, brackets added for clarity), provides for a preliminary mapping of situations where secondary adjustments are possible. One can interpret our findings, based on existing critical incidents, to suggest that resources exchanged within the confines of secondary adjustments can be classified within the six categories of resources specified by Foa and Foa’s (1974) social resource theory. In most situations, categories obtained from the critical incidents were isomorphic with the predetermined categories. When mapping the critical incidents from the interviews (illustrative examples provided in Table 21.1), we found the six classes within the Foa and Foa model useful for a preliminary classification. When examining how resources were exchanged, we discovered, however, that some further clarifications are necessary for the specifications of rules or assumptions about what is transacted and how.

Concerning resources, as indicated in Table 21.1, individuals in the organization underworld seem to transact mostly abstract resources, including information (36.37% of critical incidents), status (18.18%), and love (19.32%). Concrete resources (i.e., goods, services) are used to a slightly lesser extent than more abstract resources (i.e., status and information) when employees engage in secondary adjustments. The dataset did neither allow for differentiating types of resources transacted by specific exchange partners (e.g., other employees in the organization, the organization itself) nor for determining precisely the exchange methods (some resources may be transacted, some can be simply appropriated). Such differentiations remain of interest and may be explored in future research.

One of the main tenets of social resource theory is that people prefer to enter into exchanges that result in the trading of proximal resources, especially for particularistic resources. An implication of our findings is that when people engage in secondary adjustments, the proximity of resources does not seem to represent a major consideration.

This finding is consistent with Coyle-Shapiro and Conway (2004), who argue that the span of exchangeable resources is so wide that proximity offers little information when choosing one resource over another. Additionally, we found that employees use strategies for resource exchange not described by a quid pro quo (proximal) resource transaction. Although not specified in the original theory, these strategies are important in explaining how resources are obtained and traded within organizations and may, as such, complement existing exchange frameworks.

Specifically, we uncovered the presence of ulterior motives, blurring the line, using identities and stories, and tapping into lateral resources. These transaction motives and patterns, which extend beyond conventional resource exchanges, provide the opportunity to theorize what goes on in the organization’s underworld and can lead to directional, testable hypotheses. For example, how does time influence the use of resources in secondary adjustments? Is it possible that employees exchange resources with dissimilar attributes as time goes by? It may also be productive to examine what resources tend to be exchanged in lateral and vertical trades and explore the factors (e.g., organizational structure, complexity, supervisor competency) influencing the type and frequency of resource exchanges.

Secondary adjustments can be classified according to their underlying resource, which may be material (e.g., taking a truck to help someone move) or identity based (e.g., using one’s identity as a waiter to attend a social event). However, when taking place in the organizations’ underworld, transactions between employees and their organizations could not be readily classified as exchanges. In many instances, employees perceived the resources almost as one would see natural resources: within the reach of those with abilities to discover them and tools to apprehend them. Reciprocation or equity principles did not seem to be central in these situations, an issue already noted by some reviewers of the employee–organization literature (e.g., Coyle-Shapiro and Shore 2007). Conversely, exchange frameworks and reciprocation seemed to be more important in lateral transactions (e.g., CI 87 and 48, above).

Our findings are consistent with statements in social resource theory specifying the relationship between giving and taking in some domains (e.g., love), where there is a “certain degree of ambivalence” whereby “giving love does not exclude the concurrent presence of some hostility, or the taking away of love” (Foa and Foa 1980, p. 85). Our results suggest the existence of unclaimed resources and unclear rules of transactions, which go beyond the ambivalence noted by Foa and Foa (1980), possibly into ambiguities related to what is transacted and how. As a result, we believe researchers should explore whether, and to what extent, specifying resource exchanges based on apparently universal norms (e.g., equity, reciprocity) exhausts the entire domain of organizational exchanges. It may also be useful to determine what is considered a valuable resource by each party, together with an explicit determination of the motives driving one to enter an exchange relationship. Although consistent with the core of social resource theory, whereby resource classes are defined as “categories of the *meaning* assigned to actions and not a classification of actions” (Foa and Foa 1974, p. 82), distinctions related to meaning across parties are not routinely captured by researchers and remain, as a result, unexplored.

Beyond the immediate focus on social resource theory and its application to underworld transactions represented by secondary adjustments, our results also suggest that current frameworks used to capture the employee–organization relationship, such as social exchange (Blau 1964; Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005), may have limited explanatory power. For example, the three cornerstones of social exchange, “relationship, reciprocity, and exchange” (Coyle-Shapiro and Shore 2007, p. 166) were of marginal importance in our respondents’ descriptions. In a large number of cases, reciprocity was absent and employees appropriated resources without providing something in exchange. Similarly, rules of transaction were either unclear or unspecified. Overall, these findings point toward the need for an increased attention toward (a) the employee construed as a natural person (i.e., who can act in various degrees on behalf of him or herself and of the organization; Ahrne 1994) and (b) his or her

social interactions in the organization (defined broadly, as both primary and secondary adjustments), including a consideration of motives.

Study Limitations and Future Research

The investigation reported in this chapter is based on a limited number of critical incidents, and as a result, the set of actions and strategies to obtain resources identified within social resource theory presented here are provisional. More interviews with employees working in different industries, occupations, and organizations may enrich the number of exchanges uncovered. In addition, we built our analytic strategy around the basic definition of secondary adjustments, focusing on doing, getting (and giving), and being. These categories could be expanded further: for example, getting can be analyzed in its different aspects of receiving, taking, or acquiring. Enlarging the number of critical incidents in future research may allow for a finer-grained conceptualization and analysis. One additional limitation is that we did not limit our respondents’ descriptions of secondary adjustments and as a result, exchanges were conceptualized in a broad manner (e.g., with the organization, with individuals inside the organization, with customers). As a result, we obtained rich descriptive material that allowed us to investigate and present some broad findings. However, the data did not permit us to zoom in and explore in-depth particular transactions, such as employee–organization, among employees (coworker-to-coworker), or leader–subordinate, making it difficult at times to identify exact resources exchanged.

Future research can investigate the role of individual and structural factors in employees’ engagement in secondary adjustments. Such an investigation can be conducted by interviewing a large number of individuals, nested in the same industry, occupation, and organization and determining patterns of between-individual actions. The absence of such patterns may reveal that secondary adjustments are a result of individual differences rather than structural factors

(Stangl 1993). Higher general mental ability, openness to experience, proactive personality, and risk-taking may be some of the factors leading to behavioral secondary adjustments. For example, general mental ability has the potential to predict an individual's ability to recognize and manipulate opportunities (spaces) for secondary adjustment behaviors within the organization. Openness to experience, proactive personality, and risk-taking propensities are all aspects of one's psychological makeup that could influence the likelihood that an individual engages in those observed opportunities.

Finally, one limitation of Goffman's (1961) positioning of secondary adjustments is the examination in the context of total institutions (i.e., mental hospitals), where structural coercion is strong and therefore adjustments are intense and even spectacular. Although various types of adjustments have been posited in other settings (e.g., factory, church; Ingram 1986), empirical examinations of these types of behavioral patterns, crossed with the strength of the constraint imposed by the institution, are insufficient. In addition, as recognized by Goffman, "the initial question to be asked of a secondary adjustment is not what this practice brings to the practitioner but rather the character of the *social relationship* that its acquisition and maintenance require. That constitutes a structural as opposed to a consummatory or social psychological point of view" (1961, p. 201). The caveat is further echoed by Ingram (1982); it therefore remains unclear whether secondary adjustment behaviors originate within the self ("psychological reductionism," p. 150) or the structural properties of the organization.

Therefore, further elaborations on the processes may investigate both the traits and motives of the practitioner (why does one engage in such a practice?) and the structural dynamics underlying such behaviors (what organizational settings, job design factors, or other structural determinants may be more likely to covary with the presence of specific adjustments?). Respondents also need to be asked explicitly about how they conceptualize their relationship with the organization: communal versus exchange, social versus economic based (Haslam and Fiske 1992; Shore et al. 2006),

or what types of resources they prefer in exchanges with the organization (Stangl 1993). Overreliance on the social exchange explanatory framework in employee–organization transactions is based on the underlying assumption that employees engage in equality-matching relationships (Fiske 1992) with their organization, thus striving for reciprocity and equity. This is not always the case. As demonstrated in other domains (e.g., marketing, McGraw and Tetlock 2005), norms governing exchanges can be activated (e.g., communal sharing, authority ranking, market pricing). As seen within our study, individuals may use various strategies of resource exchange to acquire the six resources identified by social resource theory, and these transactions cannot be easily captured by social exchange concepts.

Conclusion

To summarize, we attempt to compensate for what scholars called "the curious absence of Goffman [f]rom most organization theories" (Clegg et al. 2006, p. 143; see also Manning 2008) combined with a need to study more how secondary adjustments can be integrated with social exchanges (Nugent and Abolafia 2006, p. 647) and in particular with a framework based on social resource theory (Shore et al. 2004). Functional and natural aspects of organization are inseparable, and this chapter attempts to clarify aspects of the latter, in the form of secondary adjustments seen through the lens of social resource theory. Future investigations are necessary to examine whether transactions vary in content as a function of the exchange partner (e.g., the organization itself, other employees in the organization) and to specify the rules of transaction (equity based, reciprocity based, etc.).

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Part V

Justice Conceptions and Processes in Resource Exchange

Limitations on Structural Principles of Distributive Justice: The Case of Discrete Idiosyncratic Goods

22

Richard F. Galvin and Charles Lockhart

Our aim is to draw a set of distinctions among types of goods which have significant implications for theories of distributive justice.¹ We begin by providing a general account of two sets of properties—fungibility and nonfungibility, divisibility, and indivisibility—and arguing that goods can be distinguished according to these criteria. Further, we contend that these distinctions entail complications for structural principles of distributive justice (i.e., principles such as maximin that distribute payoffs to positions). As an example, we consider James Fishkin’s discussion of structural principles, arguing that (1) Fishkin’s view that value, structure, and assignment are independent holds only to the degree that the goods considered are fungible and divisible; (2) structural principles face difficulties beyond those which Fishkin identifies and addresses with his principle of nontyranny, since structural principles cannot accommodate highly nonfungible, indivisible goods; and (3) these difficulties can be managed

through the application of a value-sensitivity proviso. We then show that two important goods, medical care and advanced education, are highly nonfungible and indivisible and thus support the distinctions drawn earlier. Finally, we specify the nature of complementary contributions as well as coordination problems between structural principles and the value-sensitivity proviso in their application to distributive justice issues.

I—Preliminary Distinctions

At its core, distributive justice concerns how justly to allocate goods to persons or, alternatively, the issue of “who gets what.”² Throughout this chapter, we shall employ the following terminology: *goods* are items, offices, etc., whose distribution is of *value* to some person or persons. A measure of something’s *value* to a person is how it affects his *well-being*.³ Typically, discussions of distributive justice involving structural principles

Part of this chapter is reprinted with kind permission from Southern Political Science Association and Cambridge University Press: Galvin, R.F. & Lockhart, C. (1990). Discrete idiosyncratic goods and structural principles of distributive justice. *The Journal of Politics*, 52, 1182–1204.

¹ This is an updated and revised version of analysis originally presented in two earlier papers (Galvin and Lockhart 1990; Lockhart and Galvin 1991). We thank this volume’s editors for helpful suggestions and criticisms.

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² See, for example, the discussion of distributive justice in Aristotle (1947, Book V, Chaps. 2 and 3 [1130b–32b]).

³ Our use of *goods* corresponds roughly to Ronald Dworkin’s use of *resources*, and our use of *value* corresponds roughly to his use of *welfare* in his two articles on equality (Dworkin 1981). Additionally, this use of *well-being* enables us to maintain relative neutrality among the most prominent value-theory choices of Western civilization including the Christian notion focusing on the state of the soul, the Aristotelian concern with fulfillment of natural functions, and the classical utilitarian focus on pleasure.

presuppose that goods to be distributed possess the following two features⁴:

First, an item's status as a "good" is assumed to be independent of any distinctive features of individual recipients. Consider the case of currency. At least in theory, the "value" of currency is indifferent to features of its possessor, so that my \$5.00 is just as valuable as anyone else's \$5.00. What makes currency a "good" is that people can and do exchange it for a wide variety of things which are valuable to them. Except in peculiar cases such as rare coins or bills, or when love of money becomes an end in itself (issues not typically addressed by theories of distributive justice), the value of currency derives from its ability to be exchanged for other goods, and its purchasing power does not vary according to its possessor.⁵ Theories of distributive justice pre-

We should point out that the focus of (especially contemporary) accounts of distributive justice does not include all things that affect a person's well-being, which might include, for example, the love and respect of one's family and close friends, but instead focus on issues related to the basic structure of society. See Rawls (1977).

Although not central to our present concerns, we might also speak of "burdens" or "liabilities," that is, items that *diminish* a person's level of well-being. For instance, one important concern of economic theory is how to handle so-called negative externalities, that is, effects of market transactions that negatively affect parties other than those involved in the transaction—negative third-party effects.

Our understanding of resources is consistent with Foa's, which we understand as follows: resources are the means for attaining goals and meeting demands. These contribute to the quality of one's life and include those that are both tangible and intangible, human and material, as well as levels of particularism and concreteness (see Foa 1993).

⁴We provide a brief account of structural principles at the beginning of Section II.

⁵This is not so, of course, in an international perspective, and entrepreneurs engage in arbitrage of various national currencies. But this is not a perspective of relevance for most members of most societies most of the time. Additionally, consider the matter of varying levels of information among consumers. A consumer with better information about alternative products can, in all likelihood, purchase more quality with an equivalent amount of currency.

In a sense, what we refer to as "fungible resources" is similar to what Foa refers to as "universalistic" resources in being at least presumed to provide a benefit to any recipient. But especially given that contemporary discussions of distributive justice focus on goods associated with the basic structure of society, we would be reluctant to make any claims beyond that level of similarity.

suppose that an unrequited transfer of currency from Smith to Jones will result in Jones being better off and Smith being worse off. By taking \$5.00 from Smith and giving it to Jones, we have in no way undermined the purchasing power of the \$5.00, even if due to variations in marginal utility, it is of *more value* to Smith than Jones. We shall refer to the characteristic of an item having value regardless of who possesses it as *fungibility*.⁶

Second, goods are assumed to be *highly* or even infinitely *divisible*.⁷ Consider again the case of currency. If one sets out to distribute \$100 among 10 persons by employing a principle of strict equality, but subsequently discovers that there were actually 12 persons to consider, one could alter the shares from \$10.00 to \$8.33 and probably find some way of dealing with the remaining four pennies. This *high divisibility* allows such goods to be distributed according to principles allowing modest gradations among recipient positions. Structural principles can thus accommodate varying quantities of a good, as well as varying numbers of positions, by altering allotments incrementally.

Some goods, however, appear to be neither especially fungible nor highly divisible. For example, medical care appears to lack fungibility. Identifying medical care as a good entails something—although not necessarily everything—about its potential recipients. Consider the case in which the elderly Jones suffers from degenerative hip disease, whereas the young Smith has no hip problems. Here, reconstructive surgery would be a good for Jones but not for Smith. Whereas considerations of declining marginal utility might entail that the impoverished Jones might derive more value from \$5.00 than the wealthy Smith, the hip surgery case seems different in kind from distributing currency: reconstructive hip surgery is a good only for those who need it. This differ-

⁶ In a sense, this is the obverse of the dictionary meaning of this term, whereby goods are fungible from a person's perspective if they are interchangeable. In our sense, goods are fungible to the degree that they contribute to the well-being of a broad range of people, that is, the people, as potential recipients, are interchanged to see for how extensive a proportion of a population an item is a good.

⁷ See Blalock (1991) for an admittedly brief discussion of divisibility (pp. 29–30).




Fig. 22.1 Dimensions of goods

ence in kind marks a distinction in the type of good involved. Unlike currency, at least certain types of medical care are goods only when distributed to certain individuals. We shall call this characteristic *nonfungibility*. Nonfungibility is thus distinct from and more basic than preference ordering. If an entity is nonfungible with respect to Smith, it is not merely far down Smith’s preference ordering. It is not a good for Smith.

Moreover, certain types of medical care are not infinitely divisible; they are distributed in discrete increments, for example, reconstructive hip surgery and antibiotic injections. If we have the resources to perform ten hip reconstructions, we can serve ten people. If 12 people need this surgery, some criterion must be implemented for choosing ten of them for operations.⁸ It would do no good—as it typically would in the case of currency—to distribute the ten operations over 12 people by giving each 5/6 of an operation. This relative lack of divisibility requires that one makes sharp distinctions among potential beneficiaries, since marginal adjustments are not possible. Candidates either

receive the good in question or they do not. In claiming that “marginal adjustment is not possible” and “individuals either receive the good or do not,” we do not suggest that one cannot receive more than one good of this sort, or even a higher quality good of the same sort. Rather, we argue that the item in question admits of a “threshold effect,” that is, an allotment less than which is of no value to the recipient, since the allotment does not increase the recipient’s well-being.⁹ We shall refer to this characteristic as *indivisibility*.¹⁰

While the preceding distinctions serve as handy introductions, goods might be characterized more accurately in terms of two dimensions: degrees of fungibility and divisibility.

The goods portrayed in Fig. 22.1 differ in the range of people for whom they provide some benefit—their relative fungibility—and the degree to which their status as goods is independent of

⁸ Our use of hip reconstructions as an example draws on British experience in this regard (see Aaron and Schwartz 1984).

⁹ In the case of vaccinations and antibiotic injections, a minimum quantity must be administered for the patient to derive its anticipated benefits (see our discussion in Section III below).

¹⁰ Rescher (1969, pp. 93–95) introduces the idea of indivisible goods but does not discuss the implications developed here.

the quantities in which they are provided, their relative divisibility.

High degrees of fungibility and divisibility intersect in the northeast corner. Abstractions such as utility and well-being as well as the actual good currency have these characteristics. Currency's high divisibility gives it the characteristic of continuousness in the manner of decimal numbers. And its high fungibility gives it nearly universal value. We will call goods with these features *continuous universal goods* (CUGs).

Toward the northwest corner are goods that are highly divisible but relatively nonfungible. They are goods for only a few. Elementary special education can serve as an example. It is composed of numerous increments and thus highly divisible, but the practices used with respect to retarded youngsters or children with disabilities would not represent goods for more average children. The pace and specific procedures would be apt to bore them, turning them off to education.

In the southeast region of Fig. 22.1 is a good, air, that is highly fungible but indivisible. Everyone needs air. And while as an item air is clearly divisible, as a life-sustaining good air is required in certain amounts or threshold levels per unit of time. A similar argument could be made with respect to potable water.

For many goods—those located in the central region of Fig. 22.1—range of benefit and degree of divisibility questions vary with context. Consider the fungibility of the goods that compose our diets. Peanuts are a source of a number of important nutrients. While some find peanuts tasty and others mildly unpleasant, they represent a (nutritional) good for most. Still, for others with particular food allergies, peanuts are an especially deadly item whose ingestion is literally life-threatening. A similar situation exists with respect to divisibility. While nutritionists have developed a variety of basic standards for both aggregate consumption and specific nutrients, the occupants of a drifting lifeboat will rejoice at, and survive for a while on, half a loaf of bread, even though it falls short of such standards.

But goods in the southwest corner of Fig. 22.1 are characterized by ranges of benefit and degrees of divisibility that are rigid. These items are not

goods for most people most of the time—they are relatively nonfungible. And for them to contribute to the well-being of those for whom they represent goods, they must be allocated in quantities that surpass relatively inflexible thresholds—the mark of indivisibility. The indivisibility of a hip reconstruction gives it the characteristic of discreteness, analogous to integer numbers. And the hip reconstruction's narrow range of fungibility, limited to those with particular hip problems, gives it highly idiosyncratic value among persons. We will call goods with these features *discrete idiosyncratic goods* (DIGs).

So while most actual goods are nonfungible and indivisible to some degree, our main concern is not an analysis of goods per se. We shall instead focus on two sets of goods, CUGs and DIGs, since these goods have important implications for theories of distributive justice. The first set (CUGs) contains goods which are both highly fungible and divisible. Goods of this sort increase the well-being of any person to whom they are distributed and do so at any level of allocation (although the level of allocation can affect the level of increase in well-being). The second set (DIGs) contains goods which are highly nonfungible and indivisible. Goods of this sort increase the well-being of only those recipients who possess relevant complementary characteristics (particular hip defects in the case of a hip reconstruction) and do so only at levels of allocation above a specific threshold.¹¹

The remainder of this chapter will concern implications of CUGs and DIGs for a number of principles of distributive justice. We shall argue that (a) some accounts of distributive justice, namely, those employing “structural principles,” presuppose that all goods are CUGs, but (b) some important goods are DIGs, and since (c) structural principles of distributive justice cannot accommodate DIGs, we conclude that (d) structural principles alone are inadequate, requiring supplementation in the form of some provision for accommodating these latter goods. Finally, we

¹¹ Our distinction should be seen as complementary to that associated with resource theory (see Foa et al. 1993).

shall discuss briefly some difficulties associated with accommodating DIGs.

II—Implications for Principles of Distributive Justice

In this section, we shall argue that structural principles of distributive justice such as strict equality, classical aggregative utilitarianism, or Rawlsian maximin¹² cannot accommodate DIGs. These principles provide a grand or macrovision of distributive justice and so “bracket out” through abstraction a variety of complications that characterize actual life. In so doing, they fail to address the complications posed by DIGs that we introduced in the previous section, and as a consequence, a discontinuity develops between the “payoffs” of structural theories, which denote the value of those goods distributed according to that principle to the person who occupies a position as specified by the structural principle and some of the goods that are distributed to actual persons. We begin by examining James Fishkin’s interesting argument for the inadequacy of structural principles. Fishkin (1979, pp. 82–90) argues that since (1) value, structure, and assignment are independent issues, and (2) structural principles take no account of the issue of assignment or which payoffs go to which individuals, (3) structural principles require supplementation in the form of a principle of nontyranny which addresses the issue of assignment.¹³ While we shall agree with Fishkin that structural principles are inadequate, we shall argue that (1) although value, structure, and assignment appear independent when the goods considered are CUGs, they are not independent in the case of DIGs, (2) structural principles tacitly assume all goods to be CUGs, and

cannot accommodate DIGs precisely because value, structure, and assignment are *not* independent in the case of DIGs; hence, (3) structural principles require supplementation beyond Fishkin’s principle of nontyranny in order to accommodate DIGs. Let us now turn to Fishkin’s argument.

Fishkin contends that structural principles must be supplemented by a “principle of nontyranny,” in the absence of which structural principles would legitimize significant injustices. According to structural principles, questions of distributive justice reduce to relationships between “payoffs” (distributive shares) and *positions* rather than *persons* (Fishkin 1983, p. 12). Fishkin argues that according to such principles, distributive justice involves three distinct issues. First is the issue of value or what is to be distributed—money, medical care, education, etc. Second is that of structure—*by* which principle, rule, or set of rules are the value or good in question to be distributed among positions. Third is the question of assignment—which individuals occupy which positions in societal distributions. Fishkin argues that (a) for structural principles, these are independent questions; questions of value are independent of questions of structure, and each of these is independent of assignment; and (b) structural principles can legitimize tyranny, since they are insensitive to the issue of assignment.

Consider first the independence of value, structure, and assignment. In some contexts, the choice of principle appears independent of the determination of value. For example, hedonism is compatible with endorsement of either classical aggregative utilitarianism or a Rawlsian maximin structural principle. Further, since the structural nature of these principles entails that they are “impersonal” (in that they assign payoffs to positions in societal distributions rather than to individuals specified in some way other than via occupying a certain slot in a distribution), questions of principle appear independent of questions of assignment.

Fishkin (1979, p. 13) holds that structural principles may legitimize tyranny—severe deprivations of rights. Even a structural principle such as maximin, which generally upgrades the least

¹² Our use of the term “Rawlsian maximin” is not intended to imply that Rawls (1971) advocates a purely structural theory of distributive justice since his lexically ordered principles include not only maximin but the “priority of equal liberty” and “fair equality of opportunity” principles as well. Still maximin, even as endorsed by Rawls, is itself clearly a structural principle.

¹³ Fishkin’s principle of nontyranny stipulates that societies ought to remedy severe deprivations of rights that are avoidable.

envious positions, would permit injustices if some people (e.g., a racial minority) persistently monopolize these lower positions over time. And since it is “impersonal,” in having “no way of accounting for effects on persons that are independent of effects on positions” (Fishkin 1983, p. 19), maximin can contain no provision which would identify such an injustice. Fishkin concludes that structural principles require supplementation in the form of “criteria for assignment to positions—criteria for how persons may, or may not, justifiably be moved around from one position to another” (Fishkin 1983, p. 19). We believe that Fishkin is correct in pointing out this “insensitivity” on the part of structural principles, and any adequate account of distributive justice must address this issue, as does his principle of nontyranny.

Perhaps most insightful and illuminating about Fishkin’s argument is that it illustrates precisely why structural principles are insensitive to the issue of assignment. As Fishkin points out, structural principles match “payoffs” to “positions” in this manner:

Position	Payoff
X^1	Y^1
X^2	Y^2
.	.
.	.
.	.
X^{n-1}	Y^{n-1}
X^n	Y^n

If payoffs are listed in decreasing order of distributive share, then under the structural principle of maximin, Y^n would denote a higher distributive share than any other Y^n in any other possible distributive schema. What Fishkin has, in effect, argued is that such pairings of payoffs and positions address the “to whom” issue of distributive justice at too high a level of abstraction—distributive shares are ultimately allocated to *persons*, not positions. And questions of justice can arise if the *people* who occupy the lowest positions are always the same or similar in some important (e.g., morally arbitrary) respect.

Following the “distributive justice involves allocations of goods to people” theme, we shall apply an analysis to payoffs similar to Fishkin’s

analysis of positions. We begin by examining relations among value, structure, and assignment, in light of the distinction between CUGs and DIGs.

The preceding analysis of Fishkin’s argument about the independence of value, structure, and assignment relies on the conventional and tacit assumption that what gets distributed is both fungible and divisible, that is, that the goods in question are CUGs. And if all goods had these characteristics, value, structure, and assignment would be distinct. If, on the other hand, not all goods are CUGs, then the situation is more complicated. In the case of DIGs, value *does* imply something (although not everything) about both structure and assignment. First, the low fungibility of DIGs conjoins value and assignment, since nonfungible entities (such as hip reconstruction) must be distributed to persons for whom they have value (those who *need* hip reconstruction), in order for the item to contribute to well-being. Second, the high indivisibility of DIGs conjoins value and structure, since structural principles which allot distributive shares in the manner of “pieces of a pie” will be sensitive to crucial thresholds of indivisible goods only through coincidence if at all. Thus, in the case of DIGs, value, structure, and assignment are *not* independent issues, since value implies something about structure and assignment. We may then conclude that while value, structure, and assignment may appear independent when value is considered in the abstract, they are *not* independent in the case of DIGs, where value implies something about both structure and assignment. And the interdependence of these three matters carries implications for the adequacy of structural theories.

We should recall that (1) structural principles are concerned with payoffs and positions, (2) positions must “be identified anonymously,” (3) structural principles can “say nothing about how particular persons match up to positions,” and (4) structural principles are insensitive as to how “persons are moved from one position to another” (Fishkin 1979, p. 9). Since structural principles identify positions anonymously and do not address the issue of how payoffs (in terms of goods) are matched with individual persons, these principles cannot accommodate items

which contribute to well-being only when distributed to certain individuals, that is, highly nonfungible goods. Similarly, structural principles are concerned exclusively with pairing individuals with distributive shares. But such principles treat distributive shares as percentages of an infinitely divisible aggregate. Structural principles such as strict equality, aggregative utilitarianism, and maximin do just this. Each tacitly assumes that distributive shares can be treated on the model of “fractions of a whole” or “pieces of a pie,” where the issue is what *percentage* of the aggregate constitutes each share. In the case of highly indivisible goods, such assumptions are false.

If distributive justice concerned only CUGs, then structural principles, supplemented with a principle of nontyranny, would yield *prima facie* defensible, albeit conflicting, accounts of distributive justice. And while many goods are nonfungible or indivisible to some degree, they admit broad ranges of benefit and have thresholds of divisibility which cause only minor difficulties. But in Sect. III, we shall argue that there are important goods, DIGs, which are highly nonfungible and for which thresholds of divisibility are seriously problematic. Structural principles that allocate distributive shares in the manner of “pieces of a pie” to anonymously specified positions cannot accommodate these degrees of nonfungibility and indivisibility and require supplementation in order to “bridge the gap” between payoffs, which structural principles assume to be fungible and divisible, and DIGs, which are nonfungible and indivisible. DIGs pose serious problems for which structural principles can make no provision and which require an additional principle, which we shall call the value-sensitivity proviso.

According to our value-sensitivity proviso, DIGs should be allocated according to criteria that (1) assure that the item is a good for those to whom it is distributed and (2) assure distribution in quantities sufficient to provide benefit. In achieving these tasks, the value-sensitivity proviso generates value-sensitive criteria that are specific to classes of DIGs and accomplishes two operations that structural principles alone cannot incorporate.

First, it requires that for a DIG such as a hip reconstruction to be a good, it must be assigned to a person who has a complementary feature—a bad hip—such that assigning a hip reconstruction to *this* person would increase *this* person’s well-being. In this case, the appropriate criterion guiding us to this match is physiological need. Second, our value-sensitivity proviso stipulates that the DIG in question be allocated in sufficient quantity so as to contribute to the person’s well-being—a complete hip reconstruction. So (1) structural principles that do not address the distinction between CUGs and DIGs have failed to address important concerns of distributive justice, and (2) just distribution of DIGs requires addressing the concerns of the value-sensitivity proviso.¹⁴

The role of the value-sensitivity proviso is similar to the role of Fishkin’s principle of nontyranny in the following respect. Structural principles, in considering anonymous “positions” rather than persons, address the “to whom” issue of distributive justice at a level of abstraction that ignores important concerns about how actual persons are “assigned” to these positions. This insensitivity to assignment is remedied by requisitely

¹⁴ We do not claim to have provided a comprehensive account of the nature and role of the value-sensitivity proviso. That would appear to be as challenging as providing a rigorous analysis of Fishkin’s principle of nontyranny, which itself does not say much about which distributions it will identify as unjust, and minimally requires elaboration of what counts as a “severe deprivation.” A similarly thorough account of the value-sensitivity proviso would include an exhaustive list of the types of nonfungibility and threshold factors found in DIGs, if not an exhaustive list of DIGs themselves, which in turn presupposes some theory of value. In this chapter, we have tried to remain neutral on questions of value theory, and as a result, our discussion falls short of a thoroughgoing account. We do, however, identify those issues which the value-sensitivity proviso must address. And in Section III below, we argue that two important goods (medical care and advanced education) are DIGs, thus providing an illustration of what is involved in addressing nonfungibility and threshold factors for at least these goods. There is, then, some justice in characterizing both Fishkin’s principle of nontyranny and the value-sensitivity proviso not as principles of distributive justice, but rather as guidelines for generating principles that respectively (1) identify unjust distributions arising from severe deprivations and (2) provide for the distribution of DIGs in response to nonfungibility and threshold factors.

“personal” principle such as Fishkin’s, which considers how payoffs are allocated to persons. Similarly, structural principles address the “what” issue of distributive justice at a level of abstraction that treats “payoffs” as CUGs or as similarly fungible and divisible abstractions and consequently ignore important concerns raised by the distribution of nonfungible and indivisible goods to actual persons. Our value-sensitivity proviso is intended to address the sensitivity to complementing characteristics of both the good and the recipient required by highly nonfungible goods as well as the sensitivity to thresholds required by highly indivisible goods.

In Section IV, we shall return to consider how larger issues in distributive justice are affected by the need for the value-sensitivity proviso. But thus far the argument depends on the claim, established only intuitively at this point, that some goods are indivisible and nonfungible. We shall now argue that two important goods are in fact DIGs.

III—A Case for Two DIGs

The claim that “ x is a good” typically entails that possession of, access to, or awarding of x by or to some individuals will have some *value* for those individuals. In short, if x is a benefit to be distributed, a person is assumed to be better off having x than lacking it. As Rae et al. (1981, p. 85) put it, distributive shares “are always to be understood as things having a causal or determinative relationship to value, and value is always to be understood from the viewpoint of persons.” And according to Rae et al. (1981, p. 91), “value” is to be understood in terms of a person’s “well-being”; for x to be a good for Jones, distribution of x to Jones should increase Jones’ level of well-being (and, to be thorough, burdens or liabilities would diminish a person’s well-being).

While a comprehensive theory of value is beyond the scope of this chapter, in this section, we shall argue that if medical care and advanced education are goods, they are DIGs. Moreover, the argument will suggest that medical care and advanced education

are important goods, since they are strongly tied to well-being. Consequently, structural principles face the difficulty of being unable to accommodate at least two important goods.

a)—Medical Care

Medical care should bear a causal or determinative relationship to the well-being of those for whom it is a good, so that distribution of appropriate medical care to Jones should be (at least) likely to increase Jones’ level of well-being. We shall argue that medical care is a DIG. This will require showing that medical care is both highly nonfungible and indivisible. Since indivisibility can be demonstrated more directly than nonfungibility, we shall consider indivisibility first.

In most instances of medical care, the recipient receives either some substance or substances (penicillin), some service (appendectomy), or a combination thereof. Since medical care involves substances and services, if one can show that the substances and services involved are indivisible, the case for the indivisibility of medical care has been made. Consider services. Is marginal adjustment possible for a procedure or service such as an appendectomy? In a sense, appendectomies are like refrigerators—they do not retain their physical homogeneity through repeated rounds of physical division. If one were to attempt to “divide” or provide a “fractional increment” of a refrigerator, the result would not be smaller refrigerators (or “refrigerator shares”) but parts of refrigerators or (at best) refrigerator parts. In the case of medical procedures, the result is much the same—anything less than one appendectomy (whatever that might be) is not an appendectomy at all—it is part of an appendectomy.¹⁵ And whatever might count as “1/2” (or any fractional increment) of an appendectomy

¹⁵Of course we do not wish to imply that there is no *qualitative* distinction to be drawn. There are clearly grounds for saying that some procedures are of *more value* than other procedures undertaken with similar objectives. But a fractional increment of *any* procedure would be *part* of that procedure, and hence of no value.

would be of no value to the recipient—it would be of zero value or (most probably) of negative value. But then such procedures are highly indivisible.

On the other hand, substances such as penicillin can be divided, perhaps nearly infinitely, and retain their physical homogeneity throughout repeated divisions. Quantity x of penicillin could be divided into n shares, the result being n shares of quantity x/n of penicillin. What we get are smaller quantities of the same good. Substances which retain their physical homogeneity in this manner are not as obviously indivisible as are appendectomies. But this distinction is less pronounced in light of what we might call value homogeneity.¹⁶ Even though penicillin itself can be divided nearly infinitely, there is a “threshold effect”—a share (quantity or dosage) less than which would provide no benefit to the recipient. While a small quantity of penicillin might still be penicillin, it is likely to be of no value to a recipient, whereas a prescribed dosage might fight an unhealthy condition. While the amount of a substance required to provide some benefit will vary from substance to substance and from individual to individual (and might be controversial even for one substance and one individual), a substance must be allotted in increments at or above a certain level in order to increase the well-being of its recipient.¹⁷ But then even for a substance which is divisible, its status as a good requires distributive shares which do not fall below a “threshold level.” We may then conclude that medical care, whether in the form of substances, procedures, or combinations thereof, is highly indivisible.

Is medical care highly nonfungible? For some procedures, the case is obvious—hysterectomies and prenatal care are of no value to males, and

prostate surgery is of no value to females. Still, cases of this sort comprise a small subset of medical care. Bernard Williams has argued for a more ambitious claim, which would entail that a large percentage of medical care is nonfungible. He writes, “Leaving aside preventive medicine, the proper ground of distribution of medical care is ill health: this is a necessary truth” (Williams 1962, p. 121). If Williams is correct, medical care is highly nonfungible since it should be distributed only to those who need it. In the case of hip reconstructions, Williams’ claim seems correct—the procedure is a good only if distributed to those with hip problems which the procedure might alleviate.

There are, however, reasons for questioning Williams’ claim as it stands. Williams appears to presuppose that medical care falls neatly into two categories: preventive and “non-preventive” care. But medical care appears to be a more motley phenomenon than Williams suggests. What are we to make of procedures such as cosmetic rhinoplasty and facelifts? Much cosmetic surgery (but not reconstructions after mastectomies, repairs of cleft palates, etc.) falls into a category which might be called “purely elective” or “recreational” medicine, where the recipient has no need in terms of illness.¹⁸ Williams’ criterion cannot be applied straightforwardly to medical care of this sort. While “therapeutic care” (the attempt to remedy some malady) is surely the paradigm case of “non-preventive” medicine, palliation is another category of medical care which is neither preventive nor therapeutic. Palliation is roughly the attempt to reduce suffering when it is too late for prevention and therapy is useless. Although candidates for palliative care do suffer from ill health, it is not clear that drug addicts and even recreational drug users could not claim that being provided with narcotics and other palliative agents would reduce their suffering as well. This

¹⁶ Gregg Franzwa deserves credit for this term.

¹⁷ Of course, allotments *above* a certain level might cause harm to a recipient, as in administering too much Sodium Pentothal to a patient undergoing general anesthesia, and trace amounts of a pollutant such as carbon monoxide might produce no negative effect, but large amounts are fatal.

¹⁸ We concede that for some “recreational” procedures, a need which is *not* related to illness could be argued. Models and actors could claim a need for plastic surgery based on employment opportunities.

causes problems for Williams in the following way. If in the case of palliative care it is argued that ill health creates a need in terms of suffering, it is not clear that ill health is the only condition which could create a need in terms of reduction of suffering which could be alleviated by palliative agents such as narcotics.¹⁹

Let us then confine discussion to therapeutic care, where Williams' position is most plausible.²⁰ An appendectomy would then be of value only to those who need it. How might one argue against this type of claim? We shall consider three lines of argument.

1. Perhaps an appendectomy is not a good for an individual who has appendicitis if he does not want to undergo the procedure. Likewise, a blood transfusion might not be a good for a Jehovah's Witness who (medically) needs one. A related point is made by Rae et al. (1981, p. 100) who warn that "need-based" criteria run the risk of "highly coercive paternalism." But therapeutic care would still be nonfungible if

¹⁹ The category of preventive care is also more complex than Williams appears to allow. If it can be assumed that administering tests, vaccinations, and other such "preventive measures" improves one's prospects for health and longevity, then such items would increase their recipient's well-being. The "probability factor" is not a problem—all medical care is arguably only probabilistically related to well-being. One could contend that, *ceteris paribus*, otherwise healthy individuals need such items (in terms of preventing ill health) to by and large the same degree. But then Williams' claim entails an egalitarian criterion for distributing preventive care, based on equal need.

²⁰ Even if limited to therapeutic care, it is not clear that it is a *necessary* truth that need is the proper criterion of distribution. For one thing, it is a purely contingent matter that therapeutic care of any particular sort is causally related to well-being. Perhaps it is necessary for something's being an instance of therapeutic care that it increases the well-being of its recipients. Even so, suppose that all therapeutic care could be effectively self-administered and did not require skills possessed by few and materials which are frequently scarce, expensive, and not readily available to nonprofessionals. It would no longer be clear that need is the proper criterion for distribution. Williams' claim would be more plausible if couched in terms of a "natural necessity" on the model of H. L. A. Hart's treatment of the "minimum content of natural law" (Hart 1961, pp. 189–94). This would avoid complications associated with necessary truths by restricting the claim to those situations in which humans and the world they live in retain the salient characteristics which they actually have.

need were to function as a necessary but not sufficient condition for distribution. One could supplement the bare "need" criterion with a "voluntariness defeasibility condition" which stipulates that mentally competent individuals with a need for therapeutic care, but who expresses a sincere, informed, and uncoerced desire not to receive treatment, should not be forced to receive it, since treatment would not be a good for them. Therapeutic care would still be nonfungible since it would not be a good for those who do not need it, although it might not be a good for some who do need it (those who satisfy the defeasibility condition). This would circumvent the difficulties suggested by Rae et al.

2. Nozick has criticized Williams' position in the form of a *reductio*. Nozick (1974, p. 233) asks, "why doesn't it follow that the only proper criterion for distribution of barbering services is a barbering need?" If Nozick is correct, one could produce a seemingly endless number of such needs. For any "service," postulate a "need" and claim that the need is the proper criterion for distributing the service. If this is all that can be said for Williams' claim, perhaps it does not merit serious consideration.

The crucial difference, of course, between barbering and medical services is that given the salient features of humans and their societies, there is no causal or determinative relationship between barbering services and human well-being, whereas there is this connection in the case of medical services. Of course, neither of these relations is *necessary*. As Michael Walzer (1983, p. 88) argues: "one can conceive of a society in which haircuts took on such central social significance that communal provision would be morally required."

The problem with Walzer's example is that the value of medical care is not simply a function of its "social significance."²¹ The relationship between medical care and well-being is clearly "causal or determinative." Walzer's argument would be more formidable if it contained a hypothetical in which

²¹For a critique of Walzer's "conventionalism" see Fishkin 1984.

barbering services *were* “causally or determinatively” related to well-being. But suppose that (a) such counterfactuals can be constructed, and (b) one admits that “barbering need” would be the proper criterion for distributing barbering services in these counterfactuals. It is nonetheless the case that *in the actual world*, medical services *are* causally related to well-being while barbering services *are not*. So even if one could counterfactually alter how medical and barbering services affect well-being, a “need” criterion for medical services can be grounded in the causal relations which *actually* obtain. Since there is no such relation in the case of barbering services, Nozick’s counterexample can be dismissed.

Further, it is the nature of this causal relation that makes medical care—especially therapeutic care—such an important good. In many cases, a patient’s receiving therapeutic care of a specific sort can be (literally) a life-or-death issue. Where lack of therapy can mean death, the seriousness of the matter is obvious: Individuals who die can receive no further goods of any sort. And even in non-life-threatening situations, failure to receive therapeutic care can cause suffering and morbidity. For reasons of this sort, medical care is (and should be) considered an important good. And the failure of Nozick’s “system of natural liberty” approach (1974, pp. 234–35) to address how such goods can be obtained by those with clear needs for them marks it as a means of circumventing rather than dealing with distributive justice questions. Specifically, medical skills are not acquired for self-administration; practitioners nearly always dispense medical care to persons other than themselves. Moreover, medical skills are acquired in a social context—medical education is highly subsidized and relies on a socially mediated base of knowledge accumulated by previous generations of medical professionals and others. Still further, medical care itself typically involves the cooperation of a number of medical professionals, as well as equipment and substances produced by persons other than the immediate provider of care (McCullough 1983; Outka 1983). For these reasons, the claims of practitioners of medical care to dispense their services as they please are distinct from and less persuasive than

similar claims that might be made by bakers and barbers.

3. Perhaps one final argument against the “need” criterion for therapeutic care could be produced based on a “radically subjectivist” account of well-being. Thomas Scanlon distinguishes two types of criteria of well-being. According to “subjective criteria,” the well-being of a person “is to be estimated by evaluating those material circumstances or that benefit or sacrifice solely from the point of view of that person’s tastes and interests” (Scanlon 1975, p. 656). On the other hand, “objective criteria” provide “a basis for appraisal of a person’s well-being which is independent of that person’s tastes and interests” (Scanlon 1975, p. 658).²² If one adopts a subjective criterion of well-being, then something’s value is a function of a person’s tastes and interests. But then if a person has an interest in receiving an appendectomy, it would have value for that person irrespective of the condition of his appendix. According to subjective criteria, need would not determine whether even therapeutic care is a good, since need is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for something’s being of value to an individual.

We shall not consider the merits of subjective and objective criteria of well-being, since the issue at hand does not require it. We should recall that the “need” criterion for therapeutic care was introduced in order to argue that therapeutic care is highly nonfungible. But if one adopts a subjective criterion of well-being, then *all* goods, including therapeutic care, become *nonfungible*, since whether *anything* is a good is a function of individual tastes and interests. If this is so, then if *x* is a good for Jones, Jones must have an interest in *x*. If *x* is distributed to Smith rather than Jones, *x* will be a good for Smith only if it increases Smith’s well-being. This, of course, depends entirely upon Smith’s interests, and there is no guarantee (or even likelihood) that Smith will have such an interest. Subjective criteria provide

²²We should note that Scanlon himself does not opt for subjective criteria.

a paradigm case of a theory of value according to which an item has value only if distributed to certain individuals. One cannot appeal to subjective criteria in arguing for the fungibility of anything: nothing is fungible according to subjective criteria.²³

It appears, then, that at least, therapeutic medical care is both highly indivisible and nonfungible and hence a DIG. Similar arguments can most likely be provided for other categories of medical care as well. But at least, this is clear: Since therapeutic care is a DIG, structural principles cannot accommodate at least one type of good and a very important one at that.

b)–Advanced Education

Due to considerations of length, our argument in the case of advanced education will be less thorough. We will argue, however briefly, that specific programs of advanced education are both highly indivisible and nonfungible.

For advanced education to be a good for Smith, it must bear a causal or determinative relationship to Smith's well-being. But this relationship is not as clear-cut as in the case of therapeutic medicine. Advanced education is an *opportunity* of sorts, for example, a place in the entering class of Harvard Law School, and as such, the preponderance of benefits is not derived from being awarded the opportunity itself (save for the status, a sense of accomplishment, etc.). The majority of benefits derived from advanced education are reaped upon successful completion of the education program. This is usually signified by the awarding of an advanced degree, which in turn allows access to certain privileged positions, that is, one is "credentialed." Also, the benefits derived from advanced education are not limited to the recipient alone. For many types of advanced education, the well-being of "society at large" or

some segment thereof is also (at least claimed to be) increased.

From the perspective of the recipient, the awarding of advanced educational opportunities provides access to benefits attached to privileged positions—money, status, etc. For many types of advanced education, it could be argued that the recipient's well-being is increased directly as a result of succeeding in advanced education. Such claims typically rely on arguments to the effect that *ceteris paribus*, people are better off if their talents and capacities are developed, and advanced education can be viewed as a vehicle for developing an individual's talents and capacities. As for the well-being of nonrecipients, it could be argued that society (or some segment thereof) benefits from providing advanced education to some individuals, insofar as they provide the means for addressing various societal needs (e.g., for medical care). Even advanced education of academicians might support a modest claim of this sort.

We shall now argue that specific programs of advanced education are both highly indivisible and nonfungible. They increase well-being only if distributed (a) in non-infinitely divisible increments and (b) to those who have the appropriate interest and ability.

That specific programs of advanced education are highly indivisible can be seen as follows. Consider the case of law school. Perhaps the experience of 2 years of a law school curriculum might produce benefits for both the individual and society, in terms of the effects of the specific knowledge and skills acquired by the recipient or simply the "learning experience" itself. Successful completion of an entire program might not then be necessary for *some* benefits to accrue. While various elements of advanced educational curricula might be divisible, what actually gets distributed are *slots* in these programs, slots that lead fairly directly to degrees or credentials. And we claim that these slots are highly indivisible. For example, if the ratio of "law school slots" to "individuals in the applicant pool" (regardless of how the latter is determined) is 1–100, it would be of no benefit to anyone to distribute 0.01 of a place in the class to *each* applicant. Such a distribution would offer little educational development

²³Thus, preference-based utilitarianism may not qualify as a structural principle since "positions" cannot be specified anonymously as all questions of value reduce to individual tastes and preferences.

and no hope for an important credential or, at best, a seriously deflated credential. While it might be argued that a more just arrangement would not allow such a limited number of opportunities, the issue of how to distribute opportunities when there are more applicants than available slots remains. Consequently if there are x slots and y applicants, it would not be acceptable to provide a “distributive share” of “ x/y ” of a slot to each of the y applicants. Marginal adjustment of this sort is not possible, since fractional increments are inappropriate “distributive shares” in the case of advanced education. But then advanced education is highly indivisible.

As for nonfungibility, the well-being of neither the recipient nor “society at large” is increased if the recipient lacks sufficient interest for successfully completing the program and the ability to do so. Advanced education requires an individual to expend at least some effort in order to succeed. While this clearly varies across individuals, at the very least, one must register for classes and take examinations. An individual with absolutely no interest in law, who might refuse even to register for classes and take examinations, and who would rather be rebuilding automobile transmissions (and could do it) would not benefit from law school. Nor would there be any benefit to others—all that would be accomplished is the exclusion of some more interested person, for whom the opportunity might have been of some value. Further, if IQ and LSAT scores are presumed to be reliable indicators of relative aptitude, distributing a place in the entering class at Yale Law School to an individual with an IQ of 80 and LSAT score of 121 would be of no benefit to *anyone*. While a person unqualified for Yale might be awarded a slot at a “lower quality” institution and still benefit, there is a “threshold level” in terms of ability such that a person who falls below that level simply cannot do the required work at *any* law school. But then advanced education is a good only when distributed to those possessing the requisite interest and ability. Indeed, justice might require that these variables be measured in some fair and rational manner. Regardless, specific tracks of advanced education appear to be highly nonfungible.

IV—Theoretical Conclusions

We have argued for the existence of a set of goods, DIGs, which pose significant problems for structural principles of distributive justice. In effect, we have extended the set of considerations, initiated by Fishkin with the principle of nontyranny, that need to be addressed in conjunction with structural principles of distributive justice. Structural principles are insensitive to complications that arise in distributing highly nonfungible and indivisible goods to people. These concerns are addressed by our value-sensitivity proviso which is distinct from structural principles in two ways. First, the value-sensitivity proviso requires that goods be assigned to people rather than distributed to positions in accordance with a particular structure. Further, assignment is value sensitive in that a feature of the good in question—the capacity of an inoculation to provide immunity, for example—complements a feature or features of the assignee, risk of contracting a certain disease. Second, such a principle requires that allocations of goods be sensitive to thresholds in amounts beneath which the entity in question is not a good for the person involved. Hence, the value-sensitivity proviso requires distribution of inoculations in quantities sufficient to provide immunity.

We need now to consider the relations between structural principles of distributive justice and the considerations that first Fishkin and now we have appended to them. Common to both Fishkin’s and our arguments is what might be called a “gap thesis”: In order to provide adequate accounts of distributive justice, structural principles must be conjoined with principles that are nonstructural and bridge the gap between (1) positions and persons (in the manner of Fishkin’s principle of nontyranny) and (2) payoffs and goods (in the manner of our value-sensitivity proviso).

As Fishkin argues, the principle of nontyranny addresses an essential element of distributive justice insofar as it will identify as unjust those distributions which impose avoidable severe deprivations. This concern cannot be accommodated by structural principles alone. From the

theoretical perspective of bridging the “gap” between positions and persons, the principle of nontyranny does not obviously conflict with structural principles per se, only with certain operationalizations of them (Fishkin 1979, pp. 121–23). But when Fishkin turns to a positive device for avoiding tyranny, the compatibility of structural principles and the principle of nontyranny become more limited (Fishkin 1983, Chaps. 2, 3). In *Justice, Equal Opportunity, and Family*, Fishkin argues for a strong sense of equality of opportunity. Realizing this concept requires that native characteristics unrelated to the values in question not be used in assigning people to scarce educational and occupational positions. This in turn requires not only merit-based procedural fairness but also background fairness so that youngsters from very different households have equal opportunities to develop their natural talents. And providing background fairness may conflict, not only with liberty as Fishkin demonstrates, but also with structural principles of distributive justice that do not afford sufficiently equal opportunities for talent development (perhaps anything other than strict equality).

Similar problems characterize relations between structural principles and our value-sensitivity proviso. The need for the value-sensitivity proviso arises due to the failure of structural principles to address complications entailed in distributing highly nonfungible and indivisible goods to people. Structural principles are appropriate for allocating fungible and divisible abstractions and currency to positions, whereas the value-sensitivity proviso addresses the issue of assigning highly nonfungible and indivisible goods to people. In this manner, the value-sensitivity proviso attempts to bridge the “gap” between value and goods.

If, however, our argument shows only that structural principles ultimately need to be brought down from the level of abstract payoffs to the level of actual goods, it may be criticized as simply another token of a generic “it is one thing to deal with an abstract or ideal world and another to deal with the concrete actual world” argument. If so, then perhaps structural principles are no worse off than any other general account of

distributive justice operating at a high level of abstraction. But the issue runs much deeper. What our argument shows is a divergence between the logical properties of the domain of CUGs and the logical properties of the domain of DIGs.²⁴ That is, we have shown a divergence in the properties within the domain of *actual* goods and how these divergent properties entail complications for structural principles. While the logic of structural principles, which is limited to the paring of payoffs and positions, might be adequate within the domain of CUGs, the logic of principles which is appropriate within the domain of DIGs must be distinct from that of structural principles. In considering goods at the level of abstraction associated with value (i.e., assuming divisibility and fungibility), structural principles cannot accommodate any domain, regardless of its level of abstraction, that includes nonfungible indivisible goods. And theories of distributive justice must ultimately confront the domain of actual goods, which includes DIGs. As we have shown, DIGs are represented among extremely important goods such as medical care and advanced education. But many other goods at issue in public

²⁴Here is a brief demonstration of these distinct logical properties.

Where G is a good, P is a potential recipient, and q a quantity, level of allocation, or allotment of G :

G is *fungible* just in case for each P there is some allocation q of G such that allocating q of G to P will increase P 's well-being over being allotted no G at all.

G is *nonfungible* just in case G possesses some characteristic C (not possessed by all goods) and some (but not all) P possess some complementary characteristic C' such that: (i) for any P lacking C' , there is no allocation q of G which will increase P 's well-being over being allocated no G at all, and (ii) for any P possessing C' , there is at least one allocation q of G which will increase P 's well-being over being allocated no G at all.

G is *divisible* just in case if G is of value to P , any allocation q of G will increase P 's well-being over being allocated no G at all.

G is *indivisible* just in case if G is of value to P , there is an allocation q of G such that: (i) allocating q of G to P will increase P 's well-being over being allotted no G at all, and (ii) allocating less than q of G to P will not increase P 's well-being over being allotted no G at all, although (iii) q may vary from person to person and across time for individuals.

policy disputes have similar characteristics—offices, legal services, and transportation—and thus fit our analysis.

Concerns about distributive justice reflect this distinction by admitting two separable questions: (1) What general principles justly accommodate the well-being of humans who are represented as occupying positions in a distribution? (2) How do we distribute actual goods to real people? There are instances in which the properties of what is actually distributed require the use of mechanisms of distribution different from those embodied in reasonable responses to the first question. Hence, if one employs a structural principle to procure a “solution” to the first of these questions, problems raised by the latter question would not be resolved.

These distinct distributive issues represent varying levels of abstraction that serve specific purposes by bracketing out different complicating features of actual conditions. Hence, answering both questions requires employing both structural principles and the value-sensitivity proviso, each addressing distributional questions at a distinct level of abstraction and thus coping with problems on which the other fails to focus. For instance, used in conjunction with a structural principle, our value-sensitivity proviso stipulates—as structural principles do not—that, in order to be goods, DIGs such as hip reconstructions must be distributed to those with particular health impairments in sufficient quantities to achieve specific improvements. While structural principles may not explicitly oppose these objectives, on their own they cannot assure them, and indeed, they will achieve them only through the most remarkable coincidences. Conversely, used in conjunction with the value-sensitivity proviso, structural principles guide the macroform of a distribution of payoffs to positions toward certain criteria considered to embody a grand view of social justice: equal positional shares for strict equality, optimizing the relative share of the minimal positions for maximin, or increasing the total across all shares for utilitarianism. The value-sensitivity proviso, while prohibiting certain assignments of and distribution levels of particular DIGs, does not oppose such grand visions

of social justice across multigood payoffs to numerous positions, but it cannot—on its own—achieve such visions.

Additionally, value issues associated with these distributive concerns introduce further potential for coordination difficulties between structural principles and the value-sensitivity proviso. Characteristically, theories of distributive justice operate under conditions of scarcity such that not all legitimate claims can be satisfied.²⁵ Structural principles address this problem in various ways. For utilitarianism, the proper response is to opt for maximum aggregate satisfaction of claims. For strict equality, in contrast, the concern is to respond to all positional claims in the same or similar degree.²⁶ Maximin is concerned with upgrading the degree to which the claims associated with the least enviable positions are met. In contrast, our value-sensitivity proviso does not address this concern. Its task is to specify the general conditions that must be met for DIGs to contribute to recipients’ well-being and thus to *be* goods. It does not, in other words, rank values or legitimate claims hierarchically.²⁷ This limitation on the value-sensitivity proviso’s appropriate function suggests that even if it were conjoined with structural principles some difficulties would remain unresolved.

First, for practical application, it would be handy to have some means for limiting the claims on societal resources that the value-sensitivity proviso might support in the name of specific value-sensitive criteria associated with particular DIGs (e.g., physiological need for medical care). This requires transforming a nominal criterion (need) into one or more ordinal criteria that allow rank ordering the claims of potential recipients with respect to a specific DIG. Second, there is the issue of how claims with respect to various DIGs

²⁵ See Hume (1975), pp. 494–95.

²⁶ Rae et al. (1981) offer some interesting guidance as to the variety of options such an approach might encompass in practice.

²⁷ The value-sensitivity proviso could be seen as positing a hierarchy of sorts but only in the limited sense of distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate claims with respect to particular (especially scarce) goods.

(or even goods generally) are to be resolved. At what point in our rank-order of claimants for medical care is it appropriate for us to stop and begin using societal resources to meet the claims of those interested in advanced education instead? The value-sensitivity proviso does not tell us. And as we have just shown, structural principles address such a question variously and only indirectly in terms of positional allotments. That is, maximin does not directly address the question of whether medical care needs should be satisfied prior to advanced education interests. Rather, it tells us that we should concern ourselves with upgrading the levels of well-being of the least enviable positions in a distribution. The relative importance of medical care and advanced education in terms of potential recipients' well-being is a value-theoretic issue that neither the value-sensitivity proviso nor structural principles confront directly. Both the proviso and these principles, when used in conjunction with theories of value prominent in Western civilization, certainly accept entities such as medical care and advanced education as goods. In fact, the value-sensitivity proviso is more specific on this point than are structural principles—but neither on its own ranks goods or values. For each, this issue is an exogenous task to be handled by a theory of value.²⁸

While a thorough examination of this issue is surely merited, it would require considerable attention that falls beyond the scope of our current objective, focusing on the problems DIGs pose for structural principles. In adopting a stance of relative neutrality with respect to the range of value theory options prominent in Western political thought,²⁹ we have shown that the problems which DIGs pose for structural principles are independent of any specific value-theoretic presuppositions.

²⁸ This distinction between affirming values and ranking them bears similarities to Rawls' (1971) distinction between "thin" and "thicker" descriptions of the good. Also, a theory such as Maslow's (1970, pp. 35–47), while not strictly speaking a value theory, also offers a basis for ranking values. But from the perspective of the distributional concerns of either structural principles or the value-sensitivity proviso, this too is an exogenous source.

²⁹ See note 3.

V–Practical Applications: Medical Care and Advanced Education

The practical problems for distributing DIGs are distinct from those associated with CUGs and other goods.³⁰ These difficulties are commonly associated with the increased requirements for cooperation from the professionals who actually deliver the services as well as from benefit recipients.³¹ Some important aspects of these difficulties, however, arise inevitably from the characteristics of DIGs. That is, the fundamental differences in the degrees of difficulty associated with practical efforts to distribute justly medical care or post-graduate education, as opposed to currency, stem from problems created by characteristics of DIGs that CUGs do not share. For example, one fundamental difficulty faced by public policy efforts to redistribute medical care or advanced education is posed by the indivisibility of the goods involved. As we have seen, the indivisibility of DIGs requires assignment in specific increments rather than allowing the marginal adjustments that facilitate spreading a CUG across any number of claimants.

This basic difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that those who determine the nature and extent of medical and educational DIGs are normally professionals who act independently from the officials who develop public programs for allocating these goods. Accordingly, two distinct sets of social institutions develop with respect to individual DIGs. One is concerned with using public policy

³⁰ In actual practice, societies are frequently hesitant about applying abstract structural principles of distributive justice. Even when the good to be allocated is, like currency, a CUG, societies may choose to utilize principles that assign goods to persons rather than distributing them to societal positions. See Hochschild (1981). Criteria that assign goods to individuals on the basis of personal characteristics are better able to address concerns such as the consequences for work incentives. Thus, in contrast to a guaranteed annual income policy (a practical application of the structural maximin principle), a criterion such as effort can handle questions of assignment so that currency is distributed to persons who have previously exerted effort in the paid-labor market—and so earned public policy benefits—as is at least loosely the case with social security pensions.

³¹ See Wildavsky (1979), especially pp. 41–61.

to distribute certain DIGs more justly, and the other involves determining the nature and extent of these goods. This is clearly illustrated in the area of medical services in which researchers are regularly creating new treatments, whereas public officials are nonetheless involved in fashioning programs designed to distribute growing arrays of medical services justly. Moreover, in a world of scarce resources, the indivisibility of DIGs entails not only that there are frequently more legitimate claimants than goods, but also that when this is so, recipients and nonrecipients, respectively, will receive sharply different outcomes—all or nothing. Not only may value-sensitive criteria such as need provide insufficient practical guidance for allocating DIGs, they provide no means for rank ordering legitimate prospective claimants.

DIGs then deny policy makers the highly useful tool of marginal adjustment. Absent this device for distinguishing among individuals by incrementally altering levels of allocation, those who attempt to distribute DIGs justly find that available resources frequently will not stretch to cover all legitimate claimants. Faced with this reality, American policymakers have confronted a dilemma between two general and unenviable options. On the one hand, they can manipulate demand by employing devices to rank individual claims for goods along with cutoff points beneath which goods are not awarded. Potential claimants, for example, might be ranked according to capacity to benefit from medical care or capacity to do academic work. Measuring such indices involves significant practical problems, and some attempts to develop ordinal criteria have created glaring horizontal inequities.³² Alternatively, public officials can manipulate supply: public officials often try to exercise more influence over the nature or extent of the goods in question. With respect to medical care, for instance, the state of Oregon developed a system for ranking the cost/benefit ratios of various medical treatments, eliminating Medicare coverage for low-ranking treatments in the hope of thereby stretching the capacity of existing resources to cover more promising medical care needs more

thoroughly.³³ With respect to postgraduate education, public officials could redefine student places as offices, thus legitimating public efforts to increase their supply. Manipulating supply then includes activities that are more ambitious than many Americans have felt comfortable having the state perform. Practical efforts to rectify injustices in the distribution of DIGs thus frequently trap American public officials between manifestly unjust distributions and ambitions that exceed their means.

a)–Medical Care

Until recently, Americans generally thought of medical services as commodities appropriately distributed in the market according to ability and willingness to pay. Substantial change in these views occurred in the 1960s.³⁴ Reformers viewed medical treatments as essential services appropriately distributed through public policy on the principle of need.³⁵ Practical considerations focused their attention on specific groups—the elderly and the extremely poor—who were perceived as having both exceptionally high levels of need for these services and limited capacities to pay for them. As a consequence, American public policy began to help the elderly (Medicare) and the extremely poor (Medicaid) pay for medical services. But these programs left service-delivery questions in the hands of private providers and simply picked up much of the tab for their services.³⁶ And given that the elderly and

³² For a relatively early example, see the experience of a Seattle kidney dialysis center as related in Childress (1970).

³³ See the *New York Times*, May 3, 1990, p. A1 and May 6, 1990, p. 131.

³⁴ See Starr (1982), Derthick (1979, Chaps. 15 and 16), and Chapman and Talmadge (1971).

³⁵ See Marmor (1970).

³⁶ So in actuality, Medicare distributes currency (a CUG) to pay for medical service rather than the services (DIGs) themselves. This is unquestionably a sensible choice politically. However, this “monetization” of medical care, whether accomplished by private employment-related group insurance or public policy (Medicare), does not, as we show shortly, eliminate some distressing effects of DIGs for distributive justice concerns. These effects are inherent consequences of indivisible goods whose nature and extent lie not only beyond the control of public officials but beyond the control of medical researchers and practitioners as well.

the extremely poor hold no monopoly on either high need for medical services or limited ability to pay the costs of contemporary care, some individuals receive public support for extensive medical care expenses, while others with similar medical needs and possibly even greater inability to pay get none.

Medicare's expansion into national health insurance has been blocked primarily by an issue that was relatively unvoiced in the effort to achieve the limited public provision of medical services that Medicare represents: costs. Admittedly, rising costs have been of concern in the case of public income maintenance programs as well. But, as Lawrence Mead relates, other concerns such as work incentives have been crucial to the rejection of guaranteed income proposals.³⁷ If public officials were convinced that it was desirable to distribute transfer payments that assured certain minimum income levels to all households, the costs of viable programs could be borne. The guarantee levels would be relatively low, the increases would involve marginal adjustments, and the determination of both initial levels and subsequent adjustments would lie within the hands of public officials.

Expanding public support for medical services, however, represents a different situation. Lack of cost control is arguably the principal practical constraint. The inability of American public officials to control these costs has multiple sources. First, the goods in question are generally indivisible. Second, determination of the nature, extent, and unit cost of services has, until recently, lain entirely beyond the province of public officials. Instead, medical professionals have generally made these determinations. That physicians and medical researchers determine the domain of medical treatments creates a situation sharply different from that of income maintenance programs. The periodic, incremental adjustments associated with social security pensions place the determination of both initial guar-

antees and rates of incremental increase in the hands of public officials.³⁸ In contrast, the medical services case involves making the public purse liable for the growing and open-ended array of increasingly expensive DIGs that independent medical professionals develop and deliver.

Under these circumstances, control of costs is a fearsome problem. American public officials have to date focused primarily on sharply delimiting demand by restricting the population that can take advantage of public support of these medical services. And public policy limits eligibility for publicly supported medical services, not on the basis of individual characteristics, but on the basis of group affiliation.³⁹ In actuality, neither medical need nor ability to pay for medical services is the distinguishing criterion for public policy assistance with medical expenses. Instead, factors such as age, type of malady (end-state renal failure), and degree of destitution determine eligibility. These factors are clearly not irrelevant to questions of medical need and ability to pay, but they do create sharp horizontal inequities. Few argue that this situation is just, but it is largely a consequence of the practical problems that the character of DIGs poses for distributive justice.

b)–Advanced Education

Public efforts with respect to advanced education reveal problems associated with the supply horn of the dilemma that afflicts practical efforts to distribute DIGs justly. We turn initially to a brief clarification of the status of advanced education as a DIG.

³⁷ See Mead (1986, Chap. 5). Also see Moynihan (1973) and Shapiro (1978, Appendix A), for details with regard to Family Assistance Plan and Program for Better Jobs and Income, respectively.

³⁸ The more recent COLAs, tied to economic indicators at least partially beyond the control of public officials, share some of the problems of medical care services with respect to cost containment although not to the same degree. But this is not a necessary feature of the CUG involved (currency) and could be changed by political action.

³⁹ Fishkin (1983, Chap. 4) offers an interesting discussion of the limits of distributive justice efforts that assign by group membership rather than by individual characteristics.

With respect to nonfungibility, advanced education is appropriately distributed according to interest and ability. Only a relatively small proportion of the population will be interested in earning a Ph.D. in astrophysics from Princeton, and not all of these people have the ability to do the work involved. With respect to indivisibility, specific tracks of advanced education are discrete in that what is socially recognized is the credential entailed in the degree. Even if we were to regard specific tracks of education of this sort as divisible, we should recognize that in practical terms it is a place in a class, not education per se, that is allocated, and these places are not divisible. As was the case with medical care, both the thresholds that lead to educational credentialing and the various types of goods available are determined largely by professional associations.

When social norms with respect to equal educational and labor market opportunities for women and minorities began to change in the 1960s, the federal government was responsive to the pleas of people suffering from what was increasingly viewed as discrimination. But public efforts aimed at assuring greater equality of individual opportunity generated considerable conflict.⁴⁰ In part, this conflict involved the issue of how to define ability fairly. These efforts characteristically used different criteria to evaluate the ability of applicants from distinct backgrounds. Conflict over how to measure aptitude for professional schools was also exacerbated by the character of advanced education as a DIG. Since the nature of the goods did not admit marginal adjustment, the measures used to calculate ability involved extremely high stakes. Applicants distinguished incrementally from one another in terms of ability experienced sharply different consequences—admission and rejection—rather than incrementally different outcomes as CUGs would have allowed.⁴¹

⁴⁰ We have come to recognize many complexities to this concept over the last couple of decades. See particularly Barry (1988) and Jencks (1988).

⁴¹ This was especially troublesome in the case of student places in prestigious schools. These student slots are inherently limited “positional” goods. See Hirsch (1976). The supply of these goods cannot be increased sharply without seriously diluting their value.

The distributive justice consequences of these efforts were mixed. On the one hand, the influence that social position had previously conferred on applicants was reduced as legal pressures increasingly favored indices of ability sensitive to the backgrounds of disadvantaged individuals. There were on the other hand some difficulties. For one, some formally accepted departures from ability as legitimate criteria of selection, such as an institutional goal of achieving greater diversity among its students, sometimes represented backsliding. To the degree that these procedures define personal eligibility through group affiliation, they suffer difficulties similar to those we recounted with respect to medical care. Additionally, through the redefinition of professional school positions, white males were increasingly threatened with the nothing end of all-or-nothing decisions. In contrast to the people left out with respect to public support for medical care expenses, those rejected for advanced education frequently had formidable political resources. Public figures do not relish the sort of heat they applied. Supporting people from the fringes of society by granting them precious benefits wrested from the grasp of the societal mainstream is bound to be difficult for popularly elected officials as well as for others in positions of authority and public scrutiny. The new criteria for assignment represented such a sharp break with traditional practices that they have frequently enjoyed less than thorough, whole-hearted practical realization.

We therefore conclude that the enhanced difficulties associated with distributing DIGs justly are not adequately explained by the conventional argument that distributing medical care or education involves reliance on independent professionals, whereas distributing a CUG like currency does not. It is, of course, accurate that some DIGs must be distributed through professionals who are apt to retain some degree of independence. But the problems with distributing DIGs justly—not just those we discuss here but public offices, legal services, transportation, and others as well—run deeper than professionals having interests and priorities different from those of the officials who develop public programs with

distributive justice aims. Whereas marginal adjustment is always possible with currency, the indivisibility of DIGs and the consequent inadmissibility of marginal adjustment entail that sharp distinctions have to be made among prospective claimants when demand exceeds supply. CUGs entail no similar difficulties: Although sharp distinctions among persons may arise from choosing a particular principle of distribution, for example, market success, these distinctions are not entailed solely by the character of the goods.

American public policy experience with devising rules for making these sharp distinctions has been fraught with problems. On one hand, public officials can strive to limit demand, keeping the number of those eligible for publicly provided DIGs roughly in line with existing supply. Until recently, this has been the course of American policy with respect to public support for medical care expenses. And an important problem from the standpoint of distributive justice is that the means for selecting people as eligible have essentially been group affiliation. People who are not members of favored groups may have equal or even greater physiological need for medical services and inability to pay for them, but public support is not extended to them. On the other hand, public officials can approach this dilemma from the standpoint of supply. This avenue is apt to involve encroaching on what is generally considered to be the realm of independent professionals through determinations of the nature or extent of DIGs. This has been the focus of crucial decisions made with respect to advanced education.

What, if anything, can be done to relieve these practical problems? There is certainly no panacea, but we can project some improvement. First, we need to upgrade our conception of the nature of the problem. Second, with respect to demand, we need to choose more adequate indices for distinguishing among claimants, so that we avoid the sorts of horizontal inequities that currently characterize public support for medical care expenses in the United States. For example, here we would suggest applying a progression of three criteria: physiological/psychological need, ability to benefit, and ability to pay. Third, with respect to supply-oriented efforts, we need to

create better means of facilitating two-way communication and coordination between the public officials who create policies aimed at rectifying injustices in the distribution of particular DIGs and the independent professionals who are engaged in delivering these goods. Progress will generally be modest. But a society dedicated to "justice for all" should do what it can to reduce clear injustices in the distribution of goods as central to citizens' life plans as medical care and advanced education.

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Predicting Reactions to Procedural Injustice via Insights from Resource Theory

23

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Introduction

Justice or fairness is one of the vital motives in the social life of human beings. As such, it has a significant effect on people's thoughts, feelings, and actions. Justice has been, and still is, a central theme in the history of human thought and in the practice of political and social institutions, and it can be traced back to the early writings of Plato (e.g., Cohen and Greenberg 1982). In the social psychological inquiries of justice, several types of justice have been discussed, two of which have received more attention, distributive justice referring to the final shape or result of an allocation and procedural justice referring to the way(s) of accomplishing outcomes, negative as well as positive. In this chapter, we focus on procedural justice and specifically on two criteria or rules of procedure, namely, voice and accuracy. *Voice* refers to whether individuals affected by a certain decision are allowed to participate in the decision-making process (Folger 1977; van den Bos 1999), and *accuracy* refers to the extent that allocative procedure is based on informed opinion

and that this information must have been gathered with a minimum of error (De Cremer 2004; Leventhal 1980). The accuracy rule has, as contrary to voice, been the focus of a limited number of experimental justice studies, where the effect of accuracy was manipulated in relation to distributive justice (van den Bos 2001; van den Bos et al. 1997; Vermunt et al. 1996). Violation of procedural rules is defined as the discrepancy between expected (ought) and applied (is) procedures, which lead individuals to perceive the procedure as unjust. Hence, according to the accuracy rule, procedural fairness is violated when performance evaluations are based on inappropriate information, that is, when information is provided by incompetent observers or when only some part rather than all of the available information is considered. Similarly, with regard to voice, violation of procedure occurs when individuals are deprived of voicing their opinions in the process of decision making.

Although there have been a large number of studies conducted in the procedural justice area, a rationale accounting for the differential effects of injustice in terms of withdrawal or violation of different procedural criteria on behavioral reactions is lacking. Törnblom and Vermunt (2007, and in this volume) argue that procedural justice theories are unable to predict the kind of responses that are likely to result from the violation of particular procedural rules. To predict the nature of response to procedural injustice, they propose drawing on social resource theory (Foa and Foa

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1974) that isomorphism (i.e., similarity in form) between violated procedural rules and social resources is the missing link. That is, restoration of justice will be attempted via behaviors that are isomorphic with the resource with which the violated procedural rule is isomorphic.

Foa and Foa (1974) asserted that consideration of the type of resource involved in social exchange may provide important insights into the exchange process at both the interpersonal and societal levels of analysis. Resource theory of social exchange (RT) conceives interpersonal behavior as “a channel for resource transmission” and defines resource as “any commodity—material or symbolic—which is transmitted through interpersonal behavior” (Foa and Foa 1974, p. 36). The variety of interpersonal exchanges are classified into six classes of love, status, information, money, goods, and service which are plotted along the two dimensions of concreteness (i.e., tangible activity or products) versus abstractness (i.e., verbal or paralinguistic behavior) and particularism versus universalism (implying the significance of the person who provides the resources for the perceived value of the resource) in terms of which they are interrelated in a circular form. Service and goods are concrete resources, whereas status and information are symbolic resources; love and money are exchanged in both concrete and symbolic forms and thus occupy intermediate positions on this dimension. Love is the most particularistic resource as its value derives from the identity of the provider, whereas money is the least particularistic because its value is the same regardless of the provider. The nearer any two classes are on a given dimension, the more similar they are perceived on the corresponding dimension (concreteness and/or particularism). For example, status and services are similar in particularism but differ in concreteness, status and information, on the other hand, are similar in symbolism, but they differ in particularism. According to RT, when people are deprived of expected resources, they become frustrated, and this frustration may result in attempts for retaliation. Foa and Foa (1974) suggested that people may retaliate in three different ways to reduce or eliminate frustration.

In *direct retaliation*, the victim retaliates directly against the source of frustration; retaliation against a third party is called *displacement*, and in *vicarious retaliation*, someone other than the victim retaliates against the source of frustration.

This suggests that the role of emotions in the process of retaliation cannot be ignored. Furthermore, the issue of (un)fairness is at the heart of these processes (Donnenwerth and Foa 1974). Individuals who experience injustice often describe a “hot and burning” experience (Bies and Tripp 2002; Mikula 1986). Several studies have shown that perceptions and experiences of injustice give rise to negative emotions, such as disappointment, anger, sadness, hostility, hatred, and jealousy (e.g., De Cremer 2006; Hegtveld and Kilian 1999; Mikula et al. 1998; Mullen 2007; Weiss et al. 1999; Vermunt et al. 1996). Lazarus (1991) argued that negative emotions occur when individuals experience an event that involves a change or violation of their expectations. Mikula et al. (1998) had 2,921 participants from 37 different nations recall experiences where they felt various emotions. They found that distributive injustice was important for a variety of negative emotions, including sadness, guilt, and especially anger (see also Clayton 1992, and Sprecher 1986). Mikula et al. also showed that anger and guilt are the most likely emotional responses to the perception of injustice, depending on whether the injustice is disadvantageous or advantageous to the perceiver. In the study reported in this chapter, we focused on the links between procedural injustice and emotional reactions as moderated by the type of resource a person is deprived of.

Krehbiel and Cropanzano (2000) examined emotional response in relation to both procedural fairness and outcome favorability. They found that negative emotions such as anger and frustration were highest when their participants found themselves in an unfair process, receiving an unfavorable outcome. Bembenek et al. (2007) claimed that it is difficult to isolate the effect of unfair procedures on emotion because procedural (in)justice is often confounded with distributive (in)justice. In this chapter, we present data from an empirical study examining the effects of

procedural injustice on participants' discrete emotional and behavioral reactions without knowing the outcome following the enactment of a certain procedure (i.e., voice and accuracy).

Barclay et al. (2005) distinguished between inward-focused (e.g., shame and guilt) and outward-focused (e.g., anger and dissatisfaction) negative emotions as outcomes of injustice. Inward-focused negative emotions occur when individuals evaluate themselves negatively and/or when they feel that others are passing negative judgment on them. Outward-focused negative emotions occur when individuals evaluate others and assess their role in causing the injustice. They argued that violation of procedural justice may result in outward-focused negative emotions because outward-focused emotions, such as anger, arise when events are threatening (e.g., unfair procedure) and are associated with blaming the other party for the situation (i.e., what "the other" did).

Törnblom and Vermunt (2007, and in this volume) attempt at integrating theories of distributive and procedural justice with resource theory. The aim of this integration is to advance more precise predictions concerning *behavioral* reactions to distributive and procedural injustice. Weiss et al. (1999) state that although emotional reactions are often discussed in justice theories, the lack of empirical research is a serious omission. The aim of the empirical study reported herein was to extend the Törnblom and Vermunt's integrative framework to include the prediction of *emotional* reactions as well.

To predict the kind of behavioral reaction that results from the perception of procedural injustice, Törnblom and Vermunt introduced the concept of isomorphism linking resources with procedural rules. Isomorphism is at first assessed between the procedural rule and the resource class(es) in terms of which it may be classified and, second, between the types of reactions to injustice and resource class(es). Consequently, the congruence between the particular violated procedural rule and the type of reaction to injustice might be assessed rather conveniently and with greater precision than previously possible. An example may illustrate the above reasoning.

Imagine that the procedural rule of voice (isomorphic with the particularistic resource "status") is violated, in which case the assumption is that restoration of justice most likely will be attempted via status isomorphic behaviors, such as impoliteness, disobedience, or insult. This chapter reports data from an empirical study exploring the effects of violations of voice and accuracy on emotional and behavioral reactions via insights from resource theory.

Deprivation Congruent Reactions to Procedural Injustice: An Empirical Illustration

When people are unfairly treated, they tend to react toward the source of unfairness in some way. However, as previously mentioned, procedural justice theories lack a more comprehensive formulation as to what kind of reaction that may follow from a certain type of unfair treatment. Drawing on RT, we argue here that the assessment of the resource isomorphism between the type of unfair treatment in terms of violated procedural rule and the behavioral reaction ought to provide more precise predictions.

The group-value model (Lind and Tyler 1988) supports the contention that there is a link between procedural fairness criteria (e.g., voice) and status (i.e., a social resource). According to this model, people value membership in social groups and care about their standing within a group. Thus, how other members and in particular authority figures treat them bear identity-relevant information and is critical to the individuals' assessment of their standing within the group. If an authority treats individual members respectfully, people will infer that the authority regards them as having high status within the group, whereas disrespectful treatment lead people to infer that the authority regards them as having low status in the group. Hence, if giving individuals an opportunity to voice their opinion in a decision-making procedure can be interpreted as an expression of authorities' respectful treatment of individual group members, voice or process control would be isomorphic with the status resource

class. Theoretical extensions and developments of the group-value model [i.e., the relational model of authority (Tyler and Lind 1992) and the group engagement model (Tyler and Blader 2003)] provide support for this reasoning as well. In the same vein, isomorphism between the procedural rule of accuracy and the resource class of information could be inferred from the work of Leventhal (1980), in which he stresses that for a procedure (ultimately leading to an allocation of some sort) to be conceived as fair, it has to consider *all correct* information available. The information has to be correct, and it has to be comprehensive covering all aspects and/or accomplishments or whatever criteria that are used to make a final decision.

Isomorphism between types of reactions to injustice and resource classes implies that when the person has been unfairly treated by violating a procedural rule isomorphic with love, for example, he/she is more likely to respond with an act that is isomorphic with love, that is, divorce or withdrawal of friendship. Once isomorphism has been established between procedural rules and resource classes as well as between types of reactions to injustice and resource classes, the match or congruence between the violated procedural rule and type of reaction to injustice may be established based on their respective isomorphism with a resource class. Therefore, receiving inaccurate information (a violated information isomorphic procedural rule) should result in deception (a reaction to injustice isomorphic with information) rather than in divorce (a love isomorphic response). It is worth noting that some procedural rules may be isomorphic with more than one resource class, in which case the range of reactions to the violation of such a rule is likely to be wider and harder to predict in comparison to a rule that is isomorphic with only one resource class. Further, it seems possible that some behaviors may be isomorphic with a particular resource in one situation and simultaneously isomorphic to another resource in a different situation, depending on the content of the behavior.

To sum up, the aim of the present empirical illustration is to examine individuals' reactions to a situation characterized by procedural injustice by drawing on insights from RT. More specifically,

it is expected that if someone experiences injustice due to violation of a procedural rule that is isomorphic with status, he/she is more likely to retaliate with an action that is isomorphic with this particular resource, that is, status. If the unjust action is isomorphic with information, the person who was unfairly treated is most likely to react with an action that is isomorphic with information.

By using a scenario methodology, participants were exposed to descriptions of situations in which they were the target of an unfair treatment which in one scenario involved deprivation of a bonus and in another a promotion on the job. It was assumed that in a situation of procedural injustice resulting from the violation of voice, restoration of justice will more likely be attempted via status isomorphic behaviors and less likely via behaviors that are isomorphic with resources belonging to universalistic resource classes (e.g., money). In a situation of procedural injustice resulting from the violation of accuracy, restoration of justice will more likely be attempted via information isomorphic behaviors and less likely via money isomorphic behaviors or via behaviors that are isomorphic with particularistic resources (i.e., status). Thus,

Hypothesis 1: When people are unjustly deprived of status (i.e., having no voice) and wish justice to be restored, they are more likely to resent the perpetrator than to deceive or steal from him/her.

Hypothesis 2: When people are unjustly deprived of information (i.e., being a victim of inaccuracy) and wish justice to be restored, they are more likely to lie to the perpetrator than to resent or steal from him/her.

As mentioned earlier, although the role of emotions has been researched in the field of social justice (e.g., De Cremer and van den Bos 2007), most procedural justice research have neglected emotions as a response variable (Mikula et al. 1998). Hence, the present study also aims at exploring the effects of violations of the two procedural fairness criteria of voice and accuracy (as "translatable" into the resource classes of status and information, respectively) on the intensity of a variety of negative emotional reactions.

According to the group-value model (Lind and Tyler 1988) and the relational model of

authority (Tyler and Lind 1992), unfair treatment by an authority is likely to threaten one's identity as a valuable member of the group (i.e., loss of status and love). Combining the outward-focused negative emotions (Barclay et al. 2005) and the group-value and relational model of authority perspectives, it is reasonable to assume that unfair treatment by an authority would be perceived by individuals as harming one's identity as a valued group member and most likely result in stronger negative emotional reactions. Thus,

Hypothesis 3: When individuals are deprived of status (i.e., having no voice), they will experience stronger negative emotional reactions than when they are deprived of information (i.e., being a victim of inaccuracy).

Method

Participants and Design

Forty-six females and 34 males were recruited from nursing classes to take part in the study. Participation was voluntary, and responses to the factorial survey items were solicited after regular class meetings. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (type of violated procedural rules: no voice vs. inaccuracy) × 2 (resource of deprivation: position vs. money) between subjects factorial survey design.

Materials and Procedure

Data were collected using a factorial survey methodology. The vignettes were constructed using a scenario adapted from van Prooijen et al. (2002). The vignettes in the four conditions appear below. Violation of the procedural rules of voice and accuracy occurred in two different situations involving deprivation of bonus and promotion, respectively (Fig. 23.1).

After reading the assigned vignette, the dependent variable measures were presented. Participants were asked to state the intensity of nine negative emotions as a reaction to the way they had been treated (i.e., anger, bitterness, disappointment, humiliation, hurt, sadness, unhappiness, displeasure, and insult) on a 7-point rating scale ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = extremely.

A Cronbach's alpha reliability analysis revealed a satisfactory internal consistency estimate of .78. Thus, responses to all nine emotions were averaged to form a negative emotion index. The behavioral reactions were assessed via tapping behaviors that were isomorphic with the resources of status, information, and money as these resources also appeared in the vignettes. These questions were also answered on 7-point rating scales ranging from 1 = not at all likely to 7 = totally likely. Prior to reliability analysis for internal consistency, behavioral reaction items were submitted to a principal components analysis with varimax rotation and resulted in three distinct and theoretically meaningful factors pertaining to each of the resource classes at hand (i.e., status, information, and money isomorphic behavioral reactions). Cronbach's alpha reliability analyses revealed satisfactory internal consistency estimates of $\alpha = .73$ (for status isomorphic behavioral reactions) and $\alpha = .70$ (for information isomorphic behavioral reactions). Responses to *status* ("How likely is it that you would tell your manager that you resent him?" "How likely is it that you would react by belittling your manager when he talks to you?" "How likely is it that you would react by insulting your manager?" "How likely is it that you would react by acting unkindly toward your manager?") and *information* ("How likely is it that you would deceive your manager regarding information he requests from you?" "How likely is it that you would, deliberately, give your manager wrong advice?" "How likely is it that you would give wrong information to your manager leading him to the wrong decision?") isomorphic behavioral reaction items were averaged to form two separate indices. The corresponding Cronbach's alpha for money isomorphic behavioral reaction items was unsatisfactory ($\alpha = .50$). Despite this, *money* isomorphic behavioral reaction items ("How likely is it that you would react by making your manager lose money?" "How likely is it that you would withhold money that should be given to your manager?" "How likely is it that you would steal money from your manager?") were averaged to form a money isomorphic reaction index.

		Resource of deprivation	
		<i>Bonus</i>	<i>Promotion</i>
Violated procedural rule	<i>Voice</i>	For some time now, you have been an employee at Textile Company. Because of a financial windfall, the manager has decided to give every employee a financial bonus. In order to assess the size of the bonus, the manager arranges a meeting to give the employees an opportunity to present their opinion regarding the size of the bonus that they feel they should receive. You found out that you are not invited to this meeting and therefore, cannot present your opinion.	For some time now, you have been an employee at Textile Company. The manager has decided to promote an employee to a higher position. In order to choose the person, the manager arranges a meeting to give the employees an opportunity to present their opinion regarding the higher position that they feel they should receive. You found out that you are not invited to this meeting and therefore, cannot present your opinion.
	<i>Accuracy</i>	For some time now, you have been an employee at Textile Company. Because of a financial windfall, the manager has decided to give every employee a financial bonus. In order to assess the size of your bonus, the manager has made a total evaluation of your work. Your work includes 10 different tasks. You provided performance records for all ten tasks on your areas of responsibility. However, you found out that the manager has taken your performance on only two out of those ten tasks into account.	For some time now, you have been an employee at Textile Company. The manager has decided to promote an employee to a higher position. In order to choose the person, the manager has made a total evaluation of your work. Your work includes 10 different tasks. You provided performance records for all ten tasks on your areas of responsibility. However, you found out that the manager has taken your performance on only two out of those ten tasks into account.

Fig. 23.1 Design of the study

Results

Table 23.1 depicts the means and standard deviations of status, information, and money isomorphic behavioral responses related to violated procedural rule and resource of deprivation. A 2 (type of violated procedural rule) × 2 (resource of deprivation) ANOVAs on the three behavioral response types revealed significant effects which were broken down and studied in the four experimental conditions using paired samples *t*-tests. In line with Hypothesis 1, individuals deprived of status (i.e., receiving no voice), to restore justice, resented the perpetrator more than they expressed

tendencies to steal from or deceiving him/her. This expected pattern of results was revealed in both cases of position and money. That is, in both cases, in a situation of procedural injustice resulting from the violation of voice, restoration of justice was more likely attempted via status isomorphic behavior and less likely via behaviors that were isomorphic with resources belonging to universalistic resource classes, that is, money and information.

Hypothesis 2 focused on the condition where the procedural rule of accuracy was violated. The results provided mixed support for Hypothesis 2. As Table 23.1 shows, the expected pattern of

Table 23.1 Means and standard deviations of status, information, and money isomorphic behavioral reactions related to violated procedural rule and resource of deprivation

Behavioral reactions	Violated procedural rule			
	Voice		Accuracy	
	Deprived resource		Deprived resource	
	Bonus	Promotion	Bonus	Promotion
Status	4.02(1.2)	4.38(1.1)	3.19(1.1)	3.63(1.4)
Information	2.43(1.1)	2.92(1.4)	3.47(1.2)	3.10(1.5)
Money	2.35(0.9)	2.67(1.3)	2.37(0.9)	2.57(1.1)
<i>t</i> - and <i>p</i> -values for pairwise comparisons				
Pair 1	6.79(0.001) ^a	4.01(0.001) ^a	0.92(0.371)	1.32(0.203)
Pair 2	5.38(0.001) ^a	3.99(0.001) ^a	3.27(0.004) ^a	3.01(0.007) ^a
Pair 3	0.346(0.733)	1.03(0.320)	3.78(0.001) ^a	1.50(0.150)

Note. Higher means indicate that the behavioral reaction is more likely. Entries within parentheses in front of the means are standard deviations, and entries within parentheses following absolute *t*-values are approximated *p*-values. Behavioral reactions were compared in three pairs in the four experimental conditions, that is, pair 1 (status vs. information), pair 2 (status vs. money), and pair 3 (information vs. money).

^aIndicates statistical significant differences between means

results was revealed only in the case of money. More specifically, restoration of justice was more likely attempted via information isomorphic behavior than via status and money isomorphic behaviors. However, the differences reached statistical significance only in comparing information and money isomorphic behaviors. In the corresponding comparison between information and status isomorphic behaviors, the pattern was in the expected direction but nonsignificant. In the case of position/promotion, the differences vanished. More interestingly, although statistically nonsignificant, the pattern of means was reversed in comparing information and status isomorphic behaviors in that restoration of justice was more likely attempted via status isomorphic behavior and less likely via information isomorphic behavior.

Hypothesis 3 predicted heightened expression of negative emotion when the procedural rule of voice was violated than when the rule of accuracy was violated. A 2×2 ANOVA on the negative emotion index revealed a significant main effect of violated procedural rule, $F(1, 76) = 15.10$, $p < 0.01$, and provided support for Hypothesis 3. Thus, when the procedural rule of voice was violated, participants experienced a stronger negative emotion ($M = 4.62$, $SD = 1.20$) as compared

to the situation in which the procedural rule of accuracy was violated ($M = 3.76$, $SD = 0.73$). The main effect of violated procedural rule suggests that regardless of the resource of deprivation (i.e., bonus or promotion), the absence of voice looms larger than inaccurate decisions.

Discussion and Concluding Remarks

This research originated in the observation that procedural justice theories have not been explicit with regard to the different types of behavioral responses that may follow from the violation of different procedural rules. Violations are assumed to result in experiences of injustice that, in turn, affect how people behave, both quantitatively (i.e., in terms of intensity) and qualitatively (i.e., the nature of behavioral response). The study reported in this chapter focused on the qualitative aspect and was based on the proposition that restoration of procedural justice will be attempted via behaviors that are isomorphic with the resource with which the violated procedural rule is isomorphic. In line with Hypothesis 1, the results showed that when the procedural rule of voice was violated (i.e., when the resource status was denied), restoration of justice was attempted via

status isomorphic behaviors. Foa et al. (1972) showed that individuals exposed to a loss of a resource caused by another person preferred to retaliate via a proximal resource class rather than distal one, given that they had a choice among resources.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that the violation of accuracy (a procedural rule assumed to be isomorphic with the universalistic resource of information) will lead to information-targeted behavior (i.e., lying or withholding information) rather than resentment-oriented behavior or theft. However, this hypothesis received mixed support. Specifically, in support of Hypothesis 2, when inaccuracy concerned a bonus, restoration of justice was more likely to occur via information isomorphic behavior (i.e., lying) and less likely via status or money isomorphic behavior. However, when inaccuracy concerned promotion, participants reported a preference for status isomorphic behavior to restore justice rather than the predicted information isomorphic behavior. A possible explanation for the latter finding might be that the procedural rule of accuracy is perceived to be isomorphic with more than one resource class. Subsequently, the range of reactions to the violation of accuracy would be wider. An alternative explanation is based on the fact that two resource classes may be identically located on either of the two dimensions (i.e., particularism and concreteness) but simultaneously occupy different positions along the other dimension (even though those positions are proximal to each other). For instance, while the status and information resource classes are located somewhat differently (although proximal to each other) along the particularism-universalism dimension, they occupy an identical location on the abstractness-concreteness dimension. Therefore, similarity on behavioral properties could be expected. Consequently, participants might prefer justice-restoring behaviors that are isomorphic with a resource class similar or identical to the one in terms of which they perceived the loss was incurred.

The effects of procedural injustice on the intensity of nine different negative emotions were also examined. Our data indicate that regardless of the resource of deprivation (i.e., money or position),

the absence of voice had a greater impact on the intensity of emotions as compared to inaccuracy. Interestingly, in accordance with this finding and Hypothesis 3, participants in the no-voice condition judged the procedure as more unfair than did participants in the inaccuracy condition.

An interesting focus of future research is to examine the linkages between injustice and behavioral reactions to injustice via emotions in terms of their resource isomorphism. Also, the presently reported data, corroborating our line of reasoning concerning the differential reactions to denial of voice and inaccuracy, encourages studies on violations of additional procedural justice criteria such as bias suppression, correctness, predictability of information, ethicality, representativeness, and consistency.

In conclusion, resource theory appears to be a promising way of conceptualizing and classifying procedural justice criteria. As procedures may be understood as behaviors or means to accomplish outcomes (Törnblom and Kazemi 2010), and as particularistic resources like status, love, and services can be interpreted or conceived as behaviors, resource isomorphism might be a useful notion facilitating a deeper understanding of the social psychology of behavioral and emotional reactions to procedural injustice.

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Resource Theory and Restoration: What is Restored in Restorative Justice?

24

Ronald L. Cohen

Introduction

In one rarely referenced section of *Societal Structures of the Mind* (1974), Foa and Foa suggest that because of high population densities and the nonrecurrent nature of most social encounters¹:

The relative scarcity of particularistic exchanges in the city deprives society of powerful informal instruments of social control, particularly the giving and taking of status. The law enforcement system is built on the assumption that for most people the threat of status deprivation by other and by self, which are positively related, is a sufficient deterrent against the violation of social norms ... When one does not care about the opinion held by his neighbors about him, sitting in jail becomes merely a temporary loss of freedom and not a permanent loss of face. (p. 171)

And in his initial statement of the theory of reintegrative shaming, John Braithwaite (1989) suggests that increases in the size and density of “communities,” and in residential mobility,

increases “anonymity.” What is required to combat this is “shaming by neighbors and relatives and congregation members” because “most of us will care less about what a judge (whom we meet only once in our lifetime) thinks of us than we will care about the esteem in which we are held by a neighbor we see regularly,” one whose “stony stare” we will have to confront every day (p. 87).

More than simply lamenting urbanization and its ills, both thus emphasize the importance of face-to-face sanctions by those with whom an offender has close relations in confronting norm or legal violations. It is this face-to-face setting, and the nature of the interactions that occur there, in which informal social control is jointly constructed. In this chapter, I will discuss three aspects of this construction that future work in these two traditions should seek to clarify: the nature of the central parties—victim, perpetrator, and “community”; the complexities involved in shifting from a dyadic to a triadic relation; and the discursive dimension of status alignments and realignments.

Face-to-face contact between victim and perpetrator is a central feature of restorative justice, but such contact is meant to occur

under the protective cover of safety provided by the community ... [and] is thought to provide the context in which the legitimate needs of the offender, victim, and community are most likely to be met. (Cohen 2001, p. 212)

Also necessary is that the contact occurs in “public space” accessible to all members of the community and protected from intrusion by the

¹ Throughout, I refer to those who have been most directly harmed by an act as “victims” and those who have produced that harm as either “offenders” or “transgressors.” I employ the generic feminine to refer to victims and the generic masculine to refer to either “offenders” or “transgressors.” I do so only for the sake of clarity; important as they seem to be, I do *not* intend to make or defend any substantive claims by doing so.

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state. Restorative justice focuses on interactions in which one actor has “harmed” another and in which perpetrator and victim meet in the presence of a third party to consider how to address the harm.

The most important links between social resource theory and work on restorative justice involve the complexity of the resources involved in social exchange and the centrality of status threat and realignment processes. Recent research (e.g., Shnabel and Nadler 2008; Wenzel and Okimoto 2010) suggests that social resource theory can also contribute to distinguishing restorative from other types of justice.

Resource Theory and Restorative Justice

Foa and Foa (1974) distinguish their six resource classes in terms of concreteness and particularism. More *particularistic* resources (and relations) are those in which “the value of a given resource is influenced by the particular persons involved in exchanging it and by their relationship.” “Love is the most particularistic resource ... money the least ... Services and status are less particularistic than love but more particularistic than goods and information” (pp. 80–81). The concreteness dimension involves *the type of behavior* characteristic in an exchange of a particular resource: services and goods are the most concrete resources and status and information the least (Törnblom and Vermunt 2007, p. 319).

Resource theory focuses on exchange between two actors, each of whom gives or takes resources from the other. Their five “paradigms of interaction” (1974, p. 179) link an initial action by one actor to a subsequent response by another. When A gives resources to B, B may either (1) give to A (*giving*) or (2) take from A (*ingratitude*). When A takes resources from B, B may (3) take resources from A (*aggression*) or (4) give resources to A (*turn the other cheek*), or (5) A may give resources to B (*restitution*).² The theory is a general one

²Though they distinguish between positive and negative resources, as do some of those who have extended their work (e.g., Törnblom and Vermunt 1999), I focus exclusively on giving and taking positive resources.

meant to address any and all types of resource exchange.

Restorative justice focuses on interpersonal harm, interaction sequences that begin with a “taking.” This harm often involves taking concrete resources such as goods (theft) or services (failing to pay). One of the paradigms of interaction distinguished by Foa and Foa is “restitution,”³ A’s return to or replacement of something he/she has taken from B. The appropriateness of a restitution depends not only on its value (as work on distributive justice suggests), but on the similarity of the classes to which the resources taken and restored belong (Donnenwerth and Foa 1974), demonstrated in work on taboo exchanges (e.g., Tetlock et al. 2000).⁴

The other two responses to taking discussed by Foa and Foa—aggression and turning the other cheek—have begun to be incorporated into work on restorative justice. Work by both Wenzel and Nadler (addressed in more detail below) explores factors affecting victims’ and observers’ preferences for punishing the offender (aggression) as well as for forgiving (e.g., Gromet and Darley 2009; Wenzel et al. 2008). Though not yet incorporated into restorative justice, work on “turning the other cheek” can be seen in game theory investigations of strategies exploring the effects of generosity on cooperation (e.g., Klapwijk and Van Lange 2009; Weber and Murnighan 2008).

The meaning of “taking” in social resource theory is unclear, whether the resources involved are concrete and universalistic (e.g., money and services) or abstract and particularistic (e.g., status and love). Because they are exchanged in a market, the value of money and services seems clear, but the value of more abstract and more particularistic resources (status and love) is much less clear.⁵

³At some points, they employ “restitution” and “restoration” interchangeably.

⁴Foa and Foa say that “restoration is often offered by a third individual rather than by the previous frustrator [offender]” (1974, p. 238), though they do not pursue such third party restoration (restitution) further.

⁵Of course, even economic exchange involves values and meanings beyond those related to the market, as suggested by research emphasizing the importance of a range of social norms (e.g., Nelissen and Zeelenberg 2009).

Because an initial “giving” or “taking” may appear to the recipient or target to be unprompted by any act of the self, it may appear “gratuitous.” This might explain why both initial, “gratuitous,” givings and takings may be impossible to reciprocate (Blau 1964; Simmel 1950). They may seem inexplicable and more likely than subsequent actions to be attributed to characteristics of the initial actor rather than to the situation or to a prior act of the self. Work on interpretations of anger (e.g., Baumeister et al. 1990) and forgiveness (Zechmeister and Romero 2002) suggests that the occupants of victim and perpetrator roles have conflicting interpretations of the exchange. Those in the victim role see taking as having no understandable past (especially as unprovoked by their own previous actions), but having a continuing negative effect, while those in the perpetrator role see themselves as victims of a previously unprovoked taking, and thus see their own taking as appropriate. Thus, perpetrators seem to emphasize the past, while victims might tend to ignore it.

Recent work by Wenzel and his colleagues (2008) suggests another reason an initial taking is seen as requiring something both more and other than “simple reciprocity.” This may be particularly the case when the victim and/or a third party attributes intention, negligence, and blame to the transgressor (p. 379). Even though the victim and/or third party believes that both distributive and procedural injustices have been rectified, what appears to be required is “an undoing of the moral-symbolic meanings of the [unprovoked] offense.” A public declaration that the transgression itself is an injustice makes clear it should not have happened. In addition, when seen as a benevolent gesture, efforts by members of a transgressor’s group to compensate a victim may be seen symbolically as a legitimate act of concern (Okimoto 2008).

Because calculating the value of resources exchanged can be difficult, social exchange can create a “balance of debt” and gratitude. Not only is it difficult or impossible to eliminate this balance because of the ambiguous social value attached to any resource, but the inability to do so, along with the tendency of actors involved in

“takings” to interpret them differently, means that the two parties might find themselves competing for the role of “victim.”⁶

Victim, Perpetrator, and Community

Roles

Foa and Foa (1974) define “role” as “a set of behaviors and norms, pertaining to a specific ‘actor’ in the context of his relationship to a given ‘object’” (p. 93) so that any role must be understood in relation to its “reciprocal” (e.g., father/daughter). Though they mention “third parties” at certain points, noting, for example, that “the presence, actual or potential, of a third individual may modify the relationship between or the behavior of two persons” (p. 108), they focus primarily on the dyad and devote most attention to generational, family, and service roles.

Work on restorative justice identifies three central roles—“offender,” “victim,” and “community”—and examines interactions among them. In addition to the complexities attending the conception of each of these roles, offenders and/or victims may be accompanied by “supporters” (family members, friends),⁷ and restorative practices often require two or more “third-party” facilitators. Thus, there may be important *intra*-group role distinctions (i.e., offender and supporters, victim and supporters, and differentiation among facilitators), in addition to the primary *inter*group role distinctions.

The roles of “victim,” “offender,” and “community” have received much less attention than they require in work on restorative justice. For practices situated in criminal justice institutions, cases are referred only after a “victim” and

⁶See the discussion of Kenney and Clairmont’s (2009) notion of “victim contests” below.

⁷Crucial to Braithwaite’s (1989) argument is that “offenders” are accompanied by those with whom they have close ties, as it is they who will share the shame of the offender; “victim supporters” will share the victim’s harm. Shame is interpreted as a shared experience of offenders and their supporters, and harm as a shared experience of victims and their supporters.

“offender” have been institutionally identified, after which they are referred to a third-party facilitator. Rights and obligations for role occupants are institutionally defined; for example, facilitators must be trained and must follow prescribed procedures; often, an “offender” must have previously admitted responsibility for harming a victim⁸; and both offenders and victims must abide by the prescribed procedures as explained by the facilitator(s).

Facilitators in restorative justice practices are intended to represent the “community” of which victim, offender, and supporters are part, but little work has focused on the meaning of “community” in this context. Though restorative practices are often considered a type “informal justice,” they are usually embedded in a formal, usually governmental, institution. Facilitators may be volunteers or professionals, and there is some research on occupants of this third-party role (e.g., Karp 2004; Cohen 2001). Conceptualizing the role of third-party facilitators, and examining their actual interactions with victims and offenders, has received far too little attention.⁹

Dyads and Triads

Social resource theory focuses primarily on dyadic interaction, while restorative justice emphasizes triads. This difference is important, as dyadic and triadic structures differ in fundamental ways (e.g., Kalish 2008; Lindemann 2005; Peters and Kashima 2007). Christie (1977) suggested that the basic form of dyadic conflict had been (mis)appropriated by the sovereign or state imposing itself as the actor entitled to respond collectively to a violation *on behalf* of the victim and society as a whole. He argued that this *displaced* the victim, in effect creating a different but essentially dyadic conflict. Most

forms of alternative conflict resolution, including restorative justice, can be seen as attempts to *restore* the victim to her or his rightful place in the presence of a third party.

Restorative justice (implicitly) distinguishes two types of *dyadic* social relations: (1) communal—between victims and their supporters, between perpetrators and their supporters, and, if they have a prior relationship, between perpetrator and victim; and (2) exchange—between perpetrator and facilitator, between victim and facilitator,¹⁰ and, if they are strangers to each other, between perpetrator and victim. As explained above, it also focuses on a triadic relation among victims, perpetrators, and third parties. The nature of the triad depends, of course, on the nature of each of the three dyads.¹¹

Wenzel and his colleagues (e.g., Okimoto et al. 2009; Wenzel et al. 2008, 2010) have explored the symbolic meanings of exchange between victims and transgressors and the differences between these meanings in retributive and restorative justice practices. They describe the core of restorative justice as

a dialogical process geared toward making offenders accept accountability for the harm they have caused (as well as its repair), show remorse, and offer an apology, while victims are, at least implicitly, encouraged to overcome their resentment and offer forgiveness. (Wenzel et al. 2008, p. 377)¹²

This is accurate in the sense that the restorative process involves conversation but incomplete as it suggests the conversation takes a dyadic form. Victim and transgressor *do* participate in a decision together on a suitable sanction for the latter and/or a suitable compensation for the

⁸Complications arising from this requirement are explored below.

⁹Weisberg (2003) provides a critique of the way “community” has been conceptualized in restorative justice, and Dignan et al. (2007) offer one of the roles of “restorative facilitator.”

¹⁰This assumes that third parties are strangers to both victim and perpetrator, as is likely to be so for restorative justice facilitators.

¹¹Haldemann (2008) provides the only other discussion employing a similar conceptual scheme, though he does so in constructing a philosophical argument for the centrality of *recognition* in transitional justice, “the process by which societies confront legacies of widespread or systematic human rights abuses as they move from repression or civil war to a more just, democratic, or peaceful order.” (p. 675)

¹²Here and elsewhere (Wenzel and Okimoto 2010) the process is described as “bilateral.”

former, but they do so in the presence, and often with the active participation, of a third-party “facilitator.” Wenzel argues convincingly that the central issue in restorative justice is “a shared understanding of the harm the offense has done and the values it violated” and that justice is restored “when the relevant principles and values that have been violated by the offense are re-established and re-validated through social consensus” (p. 378); however, the social consensus involves three parties, not two.¹³

This is particularly important in view of the importance restorative justice practice attaches to the role of “the community” and the importance this recent research on restorative justice attaches to “identity.” If “the salience and definition of a shared group identity are central to people’s endorsement of a restorative justice notion” (Wenzel et al. 2008, p. 385), then it is important to note that each of the three roles involved—offender, victim, and facilitator—is often occupied by more than one person. Thus, the concept of a “shared group identity” is a very complex one. The victim and her supporters may share both a situational and kin (or kin-like) identity that differs from the identities shared by the offender and his supporters. It is only when the process of conversation about what to do (re) establishes a shared “community” identity between the occupants of these two roles, and among occupants of all three roles, that restorative processes are likely to be successful.¹⁴

¹³To be sure, reference is often made to the third party actor: “Restorative justice censure is a collective effort shared between victim, offender, and community.” “Their [aggressors’] concession that they owe the victims/community an apology amounts to an acknowledgment of rights and an expression of respect for them. As forgiveness can only be granted by victims (perhaps by the wider community on their behalf ... the offenders’ request for forgiveness subjects them to the victims’ (or community’s) will and control” (Wenzel et al. 2008, pp. 380–381). However, explicit attention to the triadic structure of restorative justice and the effect facilitators have on it is often absent.

¹⁴A facilitator might *not* be present, but if so, the situation is no longer one in which institutionalized restorative justice is applied but rather a direct, bilateral one. Even so, the roles of victim and perpetrator might still be occupied by more than one person.

Reciprocity and Moral Emotion

Reciprocity

Work on reciprocity that extends the focus from dyadic to triadic and larger social forms is particularly relevant to both social resource theory and restorative justice. Keysar et al. (2008) demonstrate a fundamental asymmetry in reactions to the *giving* and *taking* of an identical resource; giving is reciprocated equally, but *taking* is reciprocated more selfishly and may be followed by escalation. Though the authors employed money as the resource, they argue that the same asymmetry would apply to resource exchange in other classes identified by the Foas (“from compliments versus insults, to rewards versus punishments, to helping versus hurting”) and that “the harm of taking away something cannot be undone by simply giving something comparable in return” (p. 1285).

Work on “indirect reciprocity” and “strong reciprocity” could extend the applicability of work on resource theory and restorative justice from dyadic to triadic social relations. In *indirect reciprocity*, A gives to or takes from B, and then B gives to or takes from C. The decision to give or take

can be interpreted as a misdirected act of gratitude [or ingratitude]. In one case recipients are thanked [or harmed] for what another did; in the other case they are thanked [or harmed] by someone who did not profit [or was not harmed] by what they did.” (Nowak and Sigmund 2005, p. 1292)

In *strong reciprocity*, the victim of harm reciprocates the harm to the perpetrator, but in addition, “unaffected” third parties punish (harm) the perpetrator, even at their own expense (Fehr and Gintis 2007).

In addition, reciprocity itself has both instrumental and symbolic value. Molm et al. (2007) describe the former as the value to the recipient of the good or service obtained in an exchange and the latter as the degree to which the exchange communicates the partner’s predictability and trustworthiness and her “regard and respect for the actor and the relationship” (p. 199). Important as this distinction is, Molm and her colleagues here conceptualize reciprocity as *giving* benefits to another in return for benefits received, but do not address *taking*. Doing so would suggest the

extent to which *taking* and *responses to taking* convey a lack of predictability, trustworthiness, regard, and respect. Work on restorative and procedural justice focuses on precisely these issues (e.g., Wenzel, et al. 2010).

Cultural Factors

Cultural factors affect reciprocity, and some are particularly important in the triadic resource exchange involved in restorative justice. “Honor cultures” emphasize the importance of “takings”; the status implications of having a resource taken are often more important to an actor in such cultures than the more concrete and universalistic resource of money or goods taken (e.g., Henry 2009; Rodriguez Mosquera et al. 2002). The victim is dishonored unless (in this case) *he* responds to the perpetrator, not only in his own eyes, but in the eyes of those who become aware of his response or inaction.¹⁵ Kam and Bond (2009) suggest that victims assume that others present will make the same attribution, “thereby giving the harmdoing social moment” (p. 213). As a result, the victim is required to respond.

Green et al. (2008) note that third parties relationally close to a victim may be less forgiving of a perpetrator than the victim herself, suggesting a particularly complex dynamic among the three in restorative justice. If victim supporters are more unforgiving of the perpetrator than is the victim, the victim might be led, even more than she might be otherwise, to “side” or form a coalition with the perpetrator. Though they experienced the harm indirectly as a result of their closeness to and empathy for the victim, third-party supporters might be less forgiving because they believe they *cannot* or believe they *should not* offer forgiveness for a harm they did not suffer directly.

The importance of this dynamic is revealed in recent work on anger and shame responses to insult. Some data suggest that insults dishonor their target (much as “takings” do) unless they are confronted; however, *how* they are experienced internally and addressed in interaction

varies across cultures (Rodriguez Mosquero et al. 2008). “Shame” in non-honor cultures is less likely than in honor cultures (1) to be shared socially, and (2) to be associated with “psychological weakness, a flawed self, and lowered self-esteem” likely to lead to withdrawal. In honor cultures, shame is more likely to be shared socially, and a “sense of shame” may even be considered a moral virtue (pp. 1475–1476). Moroccan/Turkish-Dutch and ethnic Dutch participants experienced equal amounts of shame and anger in response to being insulted. However, shame as a result of being devalued by others led to withdrawal among ethnic Dutch participants, while it led to verbal expression of disapproval among Moroccan/Turkish-Dutch participants.

Moral Emotions in Triads

If both victims and offenders experience shame (e.g., Rodogno 2008; Scheff 1997) and if those in individualistic, or non-honor, cultures respond to insult and dishonor by withdrawal (e.g., Rodriguez Mosquero et al. 2008), restorative justice facilitators in those cultures might face unwillingness to participate or a reluctance to speak. However, as restorative practice *requires* offenders to accept responsibility before participation, they may experience more shame than do victims. That they might do so is consistent with research demonstrating that victims and offenders engage in “victim contests” (Kenney and Clairmont 2009; Stillwell et al. 2008), each trying to claim the moral high ground.

A similar, but complementary, dynamic might affect the relation between the perpetrator and his supporters. On the one hand, supporters of the perpetrator might (and restorative justice theory suggests they *will*) experience his shame because of their closeness to and empathy with him. It is not clear whether, as a consequence, they might also take a less forgiving position toward the victim than does the perpetrator himself. Such a less-forgiving position might be the result of greater blaming of the “actual” victim, and a tendency to see the “perpetrator” as a victim, but one with less blame. Offenders’ supporters might also experience negative feelings toward the facilitator(s), though they might fear that expressing

¹⁵ See Molm et al. (2003) and Nowak and Sigmund (2005) for related arguments.

them during the proceedings would subject the offender to greater sanctions.¹⁶

To the extent that victim supporters are less forgiving than the victim toward the perpetrator and to the extent that perpetrator supporters are less forgiving than the perpetrator toward the victim, their presence and participation in a process intended to restore justice or otherwise “resolve” the conflict might actually aggravate it. Each collective party might be *less*, rather than more, disposed to restore justice or resolve the conflict because of the implications the process has for their collective identities. Not only the status resources of individuals but those of collectivities are at stake.

Admissions of responsibility, and apologies, are attempts to restore one’s status and the status of the group to which one belongs. They are also attempts to prevent exclusion from, or to gain readmission to, the larger collective of which both individual and collective actors are part. That most restorative practices require that the offender admit responsibility for the offense might itself serve as an initial symbolic acceptance of guilt. Restorative practices are intended to focus on the harmful act, not the person who committed it, but it is likely they will inevitably involve shame. Restorative practices are intended to initiate *reintegrative shaming* necessary for the offender’s eventual readmission to the community. It is not clear whether these practices are intended to ensure not only that the offender will *experience* shame but that he will display it convincingly to others present. Scheff (1997) argues that “unacknowledged shame” can interfere with reintegration and suggests that facilitators be trained in identifying it for victims, offenders, and their supporters.¹⁷

It is not only individual shame that is at issue but the “collective shame” of the perpetrator and his supporters and that of the victim and her supporters. Perpetrators’ experience of collective

shame comes from two sources: the victim and her supporters and the third party and what it represents—the practices and values of the “community” or collective.¹⁸ Work on collective guilt and shame (Giner-Sorolla et al. 2008; Iyer et al. 2007) identifies some of the complexities likely to be involved.¹⁹

The “needs-based model of reconciliation” (e.g., Shnabel and Nadler 2008) attempts to integrate resource theory and restorative practices where reconciliation is an act of social exchange. Harm creates a need for status (“the need for relative power”) in the victim and a need associated with love (“the need for relatedness” for the perpetrator) (p. 117). Research based on this model provides evidence that an interaction that restores the respective psychological resources for each of the adversaries can facilitate reconciliation.

One recent publication based on this model (Shnabel et al. 2009) considers, but then questions, the possibility of extending the model to the role of third parties. Because the resources that need to be restored are particularistic (affected by the specific people involved and their relationship; Foa and Foa, pp. 80–81), the ability of these parties to convey messages of acceptance and empowerment successfully, and thus, to achieve reconciliation, may be limited (Shnabel et al. 2009, p. 1028). This is an unusual argument, and it illustrates the difficulties in linking social resource theory, focused primarily on a dyad, to the triadic form of restorative justice.

If the only conceivable role for third parties is to provide directly (or to “convey”) the resources of empowerment and acceptance “on behalf” of the party which has them to give, it is likely that provision will fail. The relevant resource, for example, a status-restoring apology, is not one a third party can provide, at least not in the absence of the victim. For a third party to play an effective role in the kind of reconciliation on which the needs-based model is based, that role must include more

¹⁶ Holt (2009) reports findings consistent with this possibility for offenders’ parents. See also Bradt et al. (2007).

¹⁷ Work on the antecedents and consequences of guilt and shame in restorative justice practice continues to draw attention but little agreement (cf., e.g., Rodogno 2008).

¹⁸ The focus here is shame experienced by the offender and his supporters. Shame experienced by the victim and her supporters will be considered below.

¹⁹ These will be explored in greater detail below.

than “conveying messages.” In most instances, the effectiveness of a third party to facilitate and legitimize publicly that the resources have been transferred—that the status realignment has occurred—requires that party’s presence. Apologies are unlikely to be effective if conveyed by someone other than the perpetrator, just as offerings of forgiveness are unlikely to be effective if conveyed by someone other than the victim.

Direct Interaction Among Participants

Two areas of work suggest the mutual benefits an intellectual exchange between social resource theory and restorative justice might produce: the types of resources exchanged among actors in restorative justice settings and qualitative research on participants as they interact in them.

Resources Exchanged in Restorative Justice

The central focus of restorative justice is the harm imposed on a victim and the response to that harm by others. A third party’s presence is essential in restorative justice, both to the *public acknowledgment of harm* and to the *public response to it*.

To be a victim, and more importantly, *to be known as a victim*, as in restorative justice settings, is to occupy a degraded status, a claim supported by voluminous work on “blaming the victim” and victim self-blame. So, too, the relatively recent shift from “victim” to “survivor” to describe those who have been harmed suggests the negative characteristics of that identity (e.g., Dunn 2005; Leisenring 2006). “Survivors” have overcome the effect of having resources taken from them, and perhaps more importantly, the social harm they have undergone. They have restored their status to, perhaps even elevating it above, “what it was before.” Once dishonored, shamed, and lowered in status, they have been “restored” or have “re-stored” themselves.

“Victim” is a morally ambiguous role. It can confer certain advantages in interactions with third parties who might intervene or at least sympathize with agents of social control (e.g., police), and in

some cases with perpetrators. This can be seen in experimental work (e.g., Baumeister et al. 1990) and in at least one ethnographic study where victims and perpetrators engaged in “victim contests” (Kenney and Clairmont 2009; see above and Stillwell et al. 2008).²⁰ But it also has disadvantages.

Those cast (by themselves or others) as “victims” may be ashamed to have to acknowledge publicly the fact that they were harmed. Restorative justice theory (e.g., Braithwaite 1989) distinguishes between the offending act and the offender as a person, suggesting that a focus on the former will produce “guilt,” a focus on the latter, “shame.” I suggest here the importance of a similar distinction concerning the victim; a victim may be someone from whom something valuable has been taken—a person who has been harmed, or as a characterological victim, an easy mark, someone of whom it is easy to take advantage (cf. Christie 2010; Janoff-Bulman 1979; Vohs et al. 2007).

As important as status degradation and recovery in the presence of third parties are for the victim, restorative justice settings are intended to create a space in which the offender experiences a reduction in status by experiencing shame. Offenders who commit more serious crimes than those usually addressed by restorative practices (e.g., rape) may experience increased status as a result of the offense. Subcultural theories of crime make exactly this claim: people commit “offenses” because the norms of the groups to which they belong offer elevated status for doing so. Braithwaite’s work on restorative justice (1989) relies on the same mechanism by trying to mobilize the norms of competing groups—kin, friends, community—to reverse this process.

In a sense, then, restorative justice settings are intended to acknowledge publicly a victim’s degraded status and either to restore the victim to a previous status indistinguishable from non-victims or to elevate the victim to another status, that of “survivor.” Such settings are also intended to acknowledge publicly the offender’s status as someone who has caused harm—both material harm and status degradation—and

²⁰“Blame contagion” (Fast and Tiedens 2010) may also contribute to such contests.

either to restore the offender to a previous status indistinguishable from non-offenders or to elevate the offender to an even higher status than before the offense, someone with “humility.”

The possibility of *public* acknowledgement comes from the presence of third parties. Harm and response exchanges known only to a dyad are not public in this sense and thus much less complicated as interaction sequences. Parents experience both guilt and shame in response to their children’s wrongdoing (Scarnier et al. 2009), and though the two emotions overlap somewhat, they have different antecedents and consequences. Parents’ perceived severity of a child’s transgression and their belief they failed to exercise control over the child’s behavior predict *guilt*, while the publicity of the child’s transgression and the effects it might have on parental self-image, particularly in the eyes of a critical observer, predict *shame*. Both guilt and shame significantly predicted “reparative tendencies,” apologies and relationship repairs thought to underlie guilt, and attempts to repair self-image thought to underlie shame.²¹

These results suggest that perpetrators’ supporters (these were parents in Scarnier et al. 2009) might avoid restorative justice procedures as a way of distancing themselves from the shared shame (and guilt) they might experience. When supporters *do* attend, to the extent they experience shared shame and guilt, they might undertake, and might insist the perpetrator undertake, reparative behaviors such as attempts to repair the relationship with the victim and their tarnished image.

Participants in Restorative Settings

Participants in most restorative settings arrive having already been cast in one of the three major roles: victim (and supporters), offender (and supporters), or facilitator. This does not necessarily

mean they accept that designation. Because of the private and public advantages it can offer, each central party may see himself or herself as the “victim.” The “perpetrator” may be less likely to do so overtly because the central obligation of his role is that he accepts “responsibility” for the harm done to the “victim.”

This requirement seems likely to stem from, and to confirm, a belief among victims and facilitators (as well as restorative justice advocates) that deficits in the offender’s moral reasoning are primarily responsible for his offense.²² Such a strategy might ignore, or be perceived by offenders to ignore, the role of structural constraints they face, constraints that have already excluded them from the community. This, in turn, might convince offenders, and victims, that “accepting responsibility” for their action simply confirms that exclusion, rather than, as restorative theory and practice suggest, reintegrates them into the community.

Qualitative research supports the claim that the most important resources at stake in restorative justice are status, identity, and their likely correlates—(dis)honor, (dis)esteem, and (lack of) prestige. It also provides a clear view of the discursive processes that facilitate and inhibit status realignments. Interviewing participants in a British governmental restorative justice program,²³ Gray (2005) found most offenders confident about staying out of trouble and said that apologizing was important (e.g., “Being able to apologise to the victim is most important. Paying back, that’s nothing, as long as you apologise and you mean it”). Those who performed community reparation were more likely to see it as punishment to deter them from reoffending; their major concern seemed to be unfairness to the victim, who obtained “no explicit benefit”

²¹ “The parents in a Canberra shoplifting case also expressed incredulity that their son could be a thief, but indirectly; most of their comments seemed geared to distance them from the offender (their son), because they saw themselves as hardly the kind of people to be spending time in a police station. Incredulity, hardly being able to believe, is a highly visible sign of self-righteous indignation” (Scheff 1997; see also Presser and Hamilton 2006).

²² Some describe this as a strategy of “responsibilization” (e.g., Gray 2005; Holt 2009).

²³ The underlying aims of the program are responsibilization: “that offenders take responsibility for their offense and make amends to victims and/or to the community”, victim participation: “that victims participate actively in the process and have a voice in constructing the ways offenders make amends”, and reintegration or restoration: “offenders are empowered to reintegrate or to be restored to mainstream family and community life” (p. 942).

(p. 946). Though most victims were satisfied with their participation, many also had doubts about some of the outcomes, uncertain about whether the offender was actually sorry about the negative effects they experienced, and unclear whether they were sufficiently punished (pp. 946–947).

Both offenders and victims expressed satisfaction with the process, but it was unclear whether the outcomes were “restorative.”

[The interventions] challenge young offenders’ attitudes and behaviour through structured, time-limited, restorative activities, such as community reparation, writing letters of apology and victim awareness training, rather than addressing the more nebulous and resistant social-exclusion factors which frequently require the cooperation of other agencies and may be subject to resource constraints. (p. 952)

This suggests the importance of distinguishing between a reintegration that is *local and immediate* and one that is *broader and longer lasting*.

In the 28 restorative sessions they observed, Clairmont and Kenney (2008) found that victims emphasized their status by saying “how serious” the offense was and how things could have been much worse, apparently trying to raise offenders’ shame and put them and their supporters on the defensive (p. 286). Offenders admitted the offense, claimed remorse and guilt, apologized, and also said the incident “ruined their lives,” including a loss of parental respect and trust, even lost jobs. Their supporters reiterated the offenders’ suffering, some also noting *they* had suffered, and that they had already disciplined their child.

Some offenders claimed they were themselves victims of circumstance or peer pressure, or problems in their home and family life, even at times suggesting the victim was the source of the problem. This shaming produced anger and hostility, and because neither could leave, what resulted was a “victim contest.” At times, victims also acted defensively, claiming that simply by attending, offenders had accepted responsibility, that their actions were not “personal,” or that they were acting to defend and protect themselves (Clairmont and Kenney 2008, p. 290).

Presser and Hamilton (2006) examined 14 sessions of a juvenile court operated victim/

offender mediation program. Neither victims nor offenders seemed “coerced” to play their roles. Victims did not necessarily adopt a conciliatory stance nor refrain from expressing their feelings, alternating being expressions of anger and good will. When they forgave offenders, they did so not to follow a script but because doing so seemed to elevate their moral status. Offenders did not always convey remorse, at times seeming to question its appropriateness and whether they “were” offenders, and in some instances, the facilitator permitted and even supported them in doing so.

Interactions between offenders’ supporters and the perpetrator and the victim also demonstrate the centrality of status and identity alignment in this setting. One victim criticized the family supporters of the offender, suggesting their supervision was insufficient, but the supporters deflected the criticism onto the offenders, the only father in attendance doing so in a particularly tough way:

He considers, in the future, “throwin’ his little ass in jail...cause I’m not havin’ it...[and] encourages the victim to make the offenders work more than [she] requires to cover her costs: ‘Charge ‘em a thousand dollars if you want, Millie. (pp. 330–331)

The authors suggest the setting provided an opportunity for victims to reject their status as victims by allowing them to speak up for themselves and in the process even to elevate their status by nurturing and forgiving. At the same time, it provided offenders an opportunity to reclaim their status as good and responsible members of the community.

Tentative Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Work

The primary good that we distribute to one another is membership in some human community. And what we do with regard to membership structures all our other distributive choices: it determines with whom we make those choices, from whom we require obedience and collect taxes, to whom we allocate goods and services. (Walzer 1983, p. 31)

To the extent that “membership” is the primary good people distribute to each other, it is

important to understand how it is conceived and how it is gained and lost. Restorative justice and resource theory address these issues differently, and one important task for future work linking the two literatures is to address them more explicitly and clearly.

Restorative justice practices are premised on a shared agreement about the role definitions and status structure in which they are implemented. In harming someone, an “offender” has degraded his own and his “victim’s” status, as well as the status of the community²⁴ they share with others; members of the community are present to acknowledge this, to make public its disapproval, and to participate in a status restoration achieved through moral discourse. For this to occur, the offender must publicly accept his degradation by admitting responsibility for harming the victim and the community, the victim must acknowledge her degradation by publicly discussing the harm she has experienced, and the community must acknowledge its degradation by admitting its failure to prevent harm to one of its members. For the attempt at resolution to succeed, each must present a case sufficient to convince the other, and the community members present, of the validity of their description and the authenticity of their experience of degradation. Community members legitimize the factual validity and emotional authenticity by joining with each to accept the claim of the other to a restored or even elevated status. In doing so, the status of the community is also restored.

Restorative practices also presuppose that occupants of all three roles share membership in a community, and, as Walzer suggests, this fact affects all their other distributive choices. Resource theory contributes to such a view by

distinguishing among the types of resources those who share membership distribute to each other. However, it is not simply sharing membership but rather sharing a social identity that provides the basis of their willingness to accept positive and negative resources allocated by the community among its members. Offenders, those whose conduct suggests otherwise, will have their membership and claim to a shared identity jeopardized. If threats to the assumption of common identity emerge in the context of a restorative practice, retributive justice may emerge as a salient alternative (cf. Wenzel et al. 2008).

Restorative justice focuses on a triad structured to address a dispute among occupants of three situationally defined roles: victim, offender, and community. Restorative practices focus on those disputes the parties have not resolved, and the presence of community members “publicizes” the dispute and the status implications of those roles. Though the roles, and their corresponding rights and obligations, are institutionally assigned, identities and the status linked to them are reconstructed in interaction as the roles are situationally enacted. Whatever social and individual identity a participant might claim and others might accept at the outset of the interaction, a participant is identified as a “victim,” “offender,” or “facilitator” in the “community.” An important part of what then occurs involves accepting, reinterpreting, or contesting the identity implications of the role one has been assigned.

In addition to the individual identities each person brings to the setting, and the community identity they are assumed to share, other group identities are also at stake. “Victims” and their “supporters,” “offenders” and theirs, and “community members” not only bring and reconstruct individual identities and statuses, but group identities also subject to degradation and reconstruction. Resolution of what began as a dyadic interpersonal dispute has now expanded to encompass several other interpersonal disputes, within, between, and among the three groups present. Some evidence discussed here demonstrates the emergence of intra- as well as

²⁴I use “status” as conceived by social resource theory as “an evaluative judgment that conveys prestige, regard or esteem” (Törnblom and Vermunt 2007, p. 319). This seems consistent with the argument that “transgressions symbolically (if not actually) imply an offender’s usurpation of power and status, and the disempowerment and degradation of victim and community” (Wenzel et al. 2008, p. 380).

intergroup conflict that has implications for shared identities and the eventual resolution of the dispute.

Resource theory can be applied effectively to intergroup as well as interpersonal, and to triadic as well as dyadic, exchange. This will necessitate considering the exchange of collective as well as interpersonal resources and the likely nesting of the latter in the former. Such nesting is also likely to be important in expanding the focus of attention from dyadic to triadic processes. In considering this possible expansion, it will be important to examine closely the attempts made to compare restorative justice practice on the interpersonal and intergroup levels (e.g., Hilker 2009; Stensrud 2009).

A final area for future work to explore is the value of information exchange in the form of narrative. As some of the qualitative discussed here demonstrates victims often want to know why they were victimized, and they also want to tell offenders about the harm they have suffered. Offenders often want to explain the social circumstances surrounding the offense—including their own suffering—and to convey their understanding of the harm they have caused the victim. Facilitators want to understand, and to be seen to understand, the harm done to victims and offenders and to explain the harm the event has visited on the community.

Thus, restorative practices consist essentially of a face-to-face exchange of accounts between victims and offenders in the presence of, and initially directed to, facilitators. The triadic structure is particularly important because triads tend to be unstable, splitting into a dyadic coalition and an excluded other. As such, and because one can see these narratives as mediated through the facilitator, as each party narrates his or her experience to the facilitator, the two form a coalition, in part because the audience (facilitator) co-constructs the narrative (cf. Bavelas et al. 2000). If, as seems likely in this context, the narrative reflects negatively on the excluded other, victim and offender each initially forms a dyadic coalition with the facilitator that excludes the other. To achieve a restorative outcome, the facilitator must then facilitate a triadic coalition through

co-constructing a shared narrative of the event and a (restored) shared identity (cf. Peters and Kashima 2007; see also Auerbach 2009; Kelman 2007).

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The Salience of Outcome and Procedure in Giving and Receiving Universalistic and Particularistic Resources

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Introduction: Outcome or Procedure?

A minimally meaningful description of a resource allocation event will include information about the object of allocation (i.e., the type, amount, and valence of the resource); whether the result of the allocation is positive or negative (i.e., outcome valence¹); whether the event is considered from the perspective of the recipient, the provider, or a third party; and within what kind of social relationship, setting, institutional, and sociocultural context the allocation takes place. These factors have been shown to affect *fairness* evaluations of the outcome and the choice of a *distribution* principle (Törnblom 1992). It seems reasonable to expect that the relative *salience* of

(or focus on) the outcome and the procedures enacted to accomplish the outcome would also be affected by the mentioned variables.

Increasingly, contemporary justice theorists assume that a meaningful overall (total) fairness assessment of a situation or an event requires assessments of both the *distribution*² (the outcome or end result) and the *procedure* (the means) by which the distribution is accomplished. Most contemporary justice theorizing assumes that the two cannot be studied in isolation from each other (e.g., Brockner and Wiesenfeld 1996; see also Törnblom and Vermunt 1999, for more details and a model for integrating these two allocation components). Lind and Tyler (1988), for example, proposed that procedural fairness assessments are at least as important as distributive fairness assessments for overall justice evaluations in legal and organizational settings. Törnblom and Vermunt (1999) postulated that the perceived total fairness of a situation is a function of fairness assessments of both the distribution and the procedure, and when both distribution and procedure are salient, their fairness assessments are likely to be interdependent. Much research efforts have thus been devoted to mapping *perceived justice* of social encounters as a function of both outcome and procedure independently as well as interactively. However,

We would like to thank Robert Folger, Gerold Mikula, and Paul van Lange for collecting the data in USA, Austria, Italy, and the Netherlands, respectively.

¹The valence of the resource and the outcome may not necessarily have the same sign. A student may be assigned extra homework (i.e., negative resource valence) which in turn might lead to better grades (i.e., positive outcome valence).

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²The terms “distribution” and “outcome” will be used interchangeably to refer to the endstate of a resource allocation event.

research dealing with the *salience* of each in making judgments about allocation events is scarce, and the research reported in this chapter examines this latter focus.

Focusing the relative salience³ of the outcome and the procedure in people's evaluations of an allocation event generates some interesting questions: Under what conditions do outcome and procedure play equally important roles in people's experiences? Under what conditions is one experienced as more figural and weighty than the other? Under what means and to what extent might they interact with one another? Researchers have argued that (1) procedural aspects may be more important than the outcome (because they seem to affect overall satisfaction to a greater degree), and that (2) the fairness evaluation of a particular outcome may be affected by the fairness of the procedures that produced it – *the fair process effect* (e.g., Lind et al. 1983; Lind and Tyler 1988). Thus, fair procedures may lessen the disappointment associated with unfair outcomes. Gilliland (1993) predicted that (1) the perceived justice of the procedure will have the greatest impact on overall justice evaluations when distributive justice rules have been violated, and that (2) the perceived justice of the outcome (distribution) will have the greatest impact on overall justice evaluations when procedural justice rules have been violated. Leventhal (1980) proposed that distributive fairness is assumed to be generally more salient than procedural justice and is, thus, more important in determining overall fairness. On the other hand, procedural fairness has greater influence on overall fairness judgments (a) when organizations are being created, and (b) when people are dissatisfied with the distribution of outcomes (in which case procedures are examined more closely to find explanations of the

unsatisfactory outcome and justifications for change). Other consistent findings in the organizational justice literature are that procedural justice perceptions tend to account for more variance in attitudes about institutions and authorities as well as being more strongly related to global attitudes (e.g., organizational commitment) than do distributive justice perceptions (which appear to be more related to specific attitudes such as job and pay satisfaction) (e.g., Ambrose and Arnaud 2005). Törnblom and Kazemi (2010) found that the outcome was more important than the procedure for fairness judgments of an offense (theft as well as physical abuse) regardless of its severity.

The major focus of the study reported here concerns how perceived importance (salience) of the outcome and procedure is moderated by the nature of allocated resource [love (liking and caring) vs. money (monetary gift and financial help)] and by the direction of allocation (giving vs. receiving).

Resource Type

Several studies suggest that the allocated resource affects people's justice conceptions concerning the outcome distribution (e.g., Sabbagh et al. 1994; Törnblom and Foa 1983; Törnblom et al. 1985). Thus, the analysis and understanding of a particular outcome allocation is incomplete and less meaningful without information about the resource changing hands. The most commonly used classification of resource types was provided by Foa (1971) in the context of his resource theory of social exchange (see also Foa and Foa 1974). Within this framework, love, status, and service are particularistic resources; their values derive mainly from the identity of the provider and/or from the relationship between the provider and the recipient – which is not the case for universalistic resources (information, goods, and money). Particularism and universalism are extremes on a single continuum rather than discrete categories. The degree to which a resource is predominantly valued as particularistic or universalistic is affected by the social context in which it is transacted. Resource classes are further differ-

³ Outcomes and procedures may, of course, be evaluated in terms of various other types of criteria than salience, such as preference, acceptability, expediency, appropriateness, importance, impact, desirability, efficacy, satisfaction, and fairness. Various factors determine what values are assigned to each of these different criteria, and it may well be that some factors are appropriate for all criteria, while certain other factors are only meaningful for some of the criteria. In this study, we examine the impact of two factors – resource type and direction of allocation.

entiated along a dimension ranging from concrete to symbolic. This dimension pertains to the type of behavior that is characteristic for the exchange of a particular resource: providing a good and doing someone a favor are concrete behaviors, conveying status and information are symbolic/abstract behaviors, while love and money are located between these two extremes as they may be provided both symbolically (e.g., verbal expressions of affection and as stock or other tokens, respectively) and concretely (e.g., sexual acts and hard currency, respectively).

As resource classes in RT differ on two dimensions and it is the impact of particularism that is the focus of the current study, the resource classes examined were chosen to be similar with regard to their position on the concreteness dimension. Thus, the two resource classes differ the most on the particularism dimension while occupying the same position on the concreteness dimension (i.e., love and money).

As stated in RT, it is the symbolic meaning of the resource (rather than the resource, per se) that is typically focal. Importantly, and relevant to the purpose of this chapter, the way in which a resource is provided may affect its meaning. You cannot present a token of respect (e.g., a gold watch meant to symbolize an organization's appreciation of your loyal services during 25 years) unless the token is presented via respectful behavior (i.e., an appropriate procedure). The procedure by which a universalistic resource is provided can "make or break" the intended result of the interaction. If the provider who wishes to convey love and affection fails to act with sensitivity and warmth (i.e., via an appropriate procedure) when handing over money, for instance, only the money, per se, might be the focal (salient) outcome.

The significance of a particularistic resource (such as affection, warmth, regard, admiration) is likely to be relatively unambiguous with regard to the purpose of its provision. For instance, when you receive a hug, you most likely understand that he/she wants to convey affection for you. However, giving a universalistic resource (e.g., a book, a piece of information, a chocolate bar) is not equally unambiguous. The book gift might be your way of saying that you like the recipient, but you may also present the gift for very different

reasons. If you do not wish to convey liking, you must pay attention to just how you present the book or give the hug. Thus,

Hypothesis 1: The procedure is more focal when universalistic than when particularistic resources are allocated.

Procedure _(universalistic resource allocation) > *Procedure* _(particularistic resource allocation)

What about the outcome then: Is the outcome focal in the same way as the procedure? We find no basis for predicting why outcome would be more focal for either kind of resource allocation. As previously stated, the procedure is more focal for universalistic resource allocations. Intuitively, one would perhaps assume the opposite – verbal praise provided with a disapproving facial expression makes the message obsolete. Thus, the meaning of particularistic resources like love and status are straightforward which is not the case for most universalistic resources. One can interpret the meaning of giving a book as a sign of affection, a source of information, or repayment for a previous service. Therefore, we argue that the procedure by which a universalistic resource is provided serves to reduce the possible ambiguity associated with the provision or receipt of the resource. Following this line of reasoning, it seems reasonable to conclude that the procedure is more salient for the allocation of universalistic than for particularistic resources, and that this difference is larger than the corresponding difference when outcome is considered. Thus,

Hypothesis 2: The difference between the saliency of procedure in the evaluation of a universalistic as compared to a particularistic resource allocation is greater than that for the outcome distribution.

Procedure _(universalistic-particularistic resource allocation) > *Outcome* _(universalistic-particularistic resource allocation)

Allocation Direction

In this chapter, we focus on the direction of allocation and examine two situations: (1) P allocates resources to others ("giving") and (2)

P is the recipient of resources provided by others (“receiving”). Research on the two perspectives of givers (i.e., resource providers) and recipients is highly scattered in the literature. In the ultimatum game, two players interact to decide how to divide a sum of money. The first player (the allocator) proposes how to divide the money between herself and the other player (the recipient), and the recipient can either accept or reject this proposal. If the recipient rejects the offer neither player receives anything. If the recipient accepts, the money is split according to the offer. In a dictator game, the allocator determines how to divide a particular endowment (most often money), and the recipient simply receives the remainder of the endowment left by the allocator. Results from ultimatum and dictator game research indicate in general that allocators are driven by both a fairness motive and self-interest, presumably because they are corecipients of the resource (e.g., van Dijk and Vermunt 2000; Handgraaf et al. 2004).

Furthermore, Flynn and Brockner (2003) found in a study on favor exchange among peer employees that givers’ and receivers’ commitment to their relationship (i.e., their willingness to invest energy in the relationship and being loyal to it) was motivated by different factors. Specifically, favor givers’ commitment to the relationship was more strongly associated with the amount of aid and services they provided, while favor recipients’ commitment was more strongly associated with how the favor was enacted (i.e., helpful behavior that was provided in a demeaning manner was less or not at all appreciated by the receivers). Thus, previous empirical findings (see also Lissak and Sheppard 1983) suggest that allocators and recipients may have somewhat different foci in resource allocation situations. Thus, we predict that:

Hypothesis 3: Resource providers are more focused on the outcome of their allocation than on the procedure by which the outcome is accomplished.

Resource providers (outcome focus > procedure focus)

Hypothesis 4: Resource recipients, in contrast, are less focused on the outcome than on the procedure by which the outcome is accomplished.

Resource recipients (outcome focus < procedure focus)

However, in real life, it is not always true that resource recipients are more concerned with the procedure and resource providers (as well as decision makers) with the outcome. In support of this reasoning, Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan (2007) reported that decision makers are not only influenced by instrumental criteria (i.e., outcome concerns) but also by relational concerns. Specifically, decision makers did not differ from decision recipients in that they placed an equal emphasis on respectful treatment when securing the group’s welfare was taken into account (see also Sivasubramaniam and Heuer 2008).

Another purpose of the present study was to examine how allocation direction interacts with resource type in affecting the perceived importance (salience) of the outcome and the procedure. Interestingly, we expected that taking resource type into account would reverse the patterns predicted by Hypotheses 3 and 4. In the following, we continue our theoretical line of reasoning by focusing on the salience perceptions of outcome and procedure *separately* rather than together like they usually appear in real-life situations. Thus, the aim is not to compare salience perceptions of outcome with salience perceptions of procedure but to discuss the relative salience of each for resource providers versus resource recipients under the conditions of universalistic versus particularistic resource allocations.

When it comes to the salience of *outcome*, we previously posited that resource providers (i.e., givers) focus more on the outcome of the allocation, and this is not assumed to be moderated by the nature of allocated resource. Outcome salience is unaffected by whether the allocation involves a particularistic or a universalistic resource. However, the situation might look differently from the recipient’s perspective. Two arguments, previously stated, support this contention. As the amount of a universalistic resource is more easily assessed than the amount of a particularistic resource, it is argued that an allocated outcome

(of a certain amount) is more focal in universalistic resource allocations. Thus,

Hypothesis 5: Resource recipients are more focused on the outcome in allocations of universalistic as compared to particularistic resources.

Resource recipients (universalistic outcome focus > particularistic outcome focus)

When it comes to the salience of *procedure* for resource providers and resource recipients, a somewhat reverse pattern is expected. Specifically, as previously argued, ensuring the satisfaction of the recipients is focal for resource providers and for the group of recipients, and equality of treatment (cf. the procedural rule of consistency, Leventhal 1980) is highly salient. This leads us to assume that resource providers are more focused on the procedure in the case of universalistic as compared to particularistic resource allocations. Thus,

Hypothesis 6: Resource providers are more focused on the procedure in allocation of universalistic as compared to particularistic resources.

Resource providers (universalistic procedure focus > particularistic procedure focus)

For resource *recipients*, the way providers behave toward them (i.e., the procedure) when allocating a resource is also important and focal. Lind and Tyler (1988) argued that the procedure (or the way of acting toward others) is important because it conveys the recipients' status in the group. Interestingly, and in contrast to the perspective of providers, we argue that the procedure (which is aimed at ensuring the group's welfare and satisfaction) is important to resource recipients *regardless* of the nature of the provided resource. Thus, there seems to be no compelling reason for expecting that there will be a stronger focus on the procedure in the allocation of particularistic as compared to universalistic resources.

Method

Data were collected as part of a large cross-national survey among students from five countries: Austria (N=400), Italy (N=89), the

Netherlands (N=378), Sweden (N=213), and the USA (N=391). The total sample consisted of 32.6% male and 67.4% female respondents. Respondents' age varied from 20 to 70 years with a mode of 21 years. In all countries, respondents were recruited mainly from psychology and sociology classes.

A 2 (allocation direction: giving vs. receiving) × 2 (resource type: particularistic vs. universalistic) × 2 (allocation focus: outcome vs. procedure) mixed design was employed.⁴ The last two were repeated measures factors, and the salience of outcome and procedure for allocation decision served as the dependent variable.

We chose a table-wise presentation of the questionnaire as it made it easier to the respondents to compare their answers within one question (table) and because it was less space consuming. Each table consisted of four rows and five columns resulting in 20 cells. For each table, the upper-left cell, where row 1 and column 1 cross, contained the question to be answered; the cells of row 1 and the four other columns contained the labels of the four types of relationship used, respectively: your partner in a love relationship (A), a good friend (B), your child (C), your coworker (D). The question to be answered was:

"If each person (A–D) listed to the right would show you that *he/she likes you* (the receiving mode) (in the money scenario it reads receive financial help/monetary gift) what would you pay most attention to?"

1. The *amount*, i.e., how much he/she likes you (row 2 of column 1).
2. The *way* in which he/she shows it to you (row 3 of column 1).
3. *Both* the amount and the way, they are equally important (row 4 of column 1).

⁴The study reported herein included two additional variables, that is, social relationship and resource valence, the results from which will be reported elsewhere. For the purpose of this chapter and simplification of the original design we chose to focus on the roles of resource type and allocation direction for the perceived relative salience of outcome and procedure in resource allocation events.

In another similar version of the questionnaire, *receiving* was replaced by *giving*. “If you would show (give) each person (A–D) listed to the right that *you like him/her* (in the money scenario it reads *give financial help/monetary gift*), what would you pay most attention too?”

The instructions to the respondents read as follows: “The following items contain three

response alternatives. Even though you might think of additional alternatives, please restrict your choice to those given here. Make one (and only one) choice that comes closest to your opinion for each person (A–D). Thus, a full answer to each question requires you to make four choices – as the following example illustrates:”

<i>If each person (A–D) listed to the right would give you some instructions you need, what would you pay most attention to?</i>	A	B	C	D
	Your partner in a love relationship	A good friend	Your child	Your coworker
1. The <i>amount</i> of instructions you get	✓			
2. The <i>way</i> in which he/she conveys them to you			✓	
3. <i>Both</i> the amount and the way, they are equally important		✓		✓

Results

Prior to data analyses, the raw scores were transformed in the following way: Respondents indicated how much attention they would pay to the outcome, the procedure, or to both equally in allocating two types of resources (particularistic and universalistic). For each resource type, we separately counted the number of times a respondent paid attention to the (1) outcome, (2) procedure, and (3) both outcome and procedure. The transformation resulted in the creation of three levels of the variable *allocation focus* – with each level concerning the salience of outcome, procedure, and equal salience of outcome and procedure, respectively. Thus, for each level of the variable allocation focus, importance scores varied from 0 (no attention paid) to 2 (full attention).

The Salience of Outcome and Procedure in Allocation Decisions

The effects of allocation focus on importance of outcome and procedure were significant, $F(1, 1468)=811.2, p<0.01$. The Helmert procedure revealed that differences should be larger than

Table 25.1 Focus on outcome and procedure in allocation of particularistic and universalistic resources

Resource type		
<i>Allocation focus</i>	Particularistic	Universalistic
Outcome	0.31	0.37
Procedure	0.68	0.80

0.08 to be significant (Stevens 2002). There was a stronger focus on the procedure ($M=0.74$) than on the outcome ($M=0.34$).

The Effects of Resource Type on the Salience of Outcome and Procedure in Allocation Evaluations

The two-way interaction of resource type by allocation focus was significant, $F(1, 1468)=6.57; p<0.01$. The Helmert procedure revealed that differences should be larger than 0.075 to be significant (Stevens 2002). In Table 25.1, the mean focus ratings on outcome and procedure for particularistic and universalistic resource allocations are depicted.

Table 25.1 shows that allocation of universalistic resources triggered a stronger focus on the procedure ($M=0.80$) than the allocation of particularistic resources ($M=0.68$). Hypothesis 1 was thus confirmed. Furthermore, as expected, the difference

Table 25.2 Focus on outcome and procedure in allocation of particularistic and universalistic resources for resource providers and recipients

	<i>Allocation direction</i>			
	Providing		Receiving	
	<i>Resource type</i>			
	Particularistic	Universalistic	Particularistic	Universalistic
<i>Allocation focus</i>				
Outcome	0.32	0.33	0.30	0.42
Procedure	0.69	0.87	0.68	0.73

between the salience of procedure in the evaluation of a universalistic as compared to a particularistic resource allocation was greater ($0.80 - 0.68 = 0.12$) than the corresponding evaluation concerning the salience of outcome ($0.37 - 0.31 = 0.06$). Hypothesis 2 was thus also supported.

The Effects of Allocation Direction and Resource Type on the Perceived Salience of Outcome and Procedure

The two-way interaction of allocation direction by allocation focus was, as expected, significant, $F(1, 1468) = 19.13$, $p < 0.01$. The Helmert procedure revealed that differences in means should be larger than 0.10 to be statistically significant (Stevens 2002).

Resource providers were less focused on the outcome ($M = 0.37$) than on the procedure ($M = 0.71$), disconfirming Hypothesis 3. In contrast and as expected, resource recipients were more focused on the procedure ($M = 0.78$) than on the outcome ($M = 0.32$), which confirmed Hypothesis 4. As the pattern of means clearly shows, both resource providers and recipients were more focused on the procedure than on the outcome, the differences between procedure and outcome for both providers and recipients were therefore explored. Interestingly, this revealed that the difference between procedure and outcome for resource recipients was larger (i.e., $0.78 - 0.32 = 0.46$) than the corresponding difference between procedure and outcome for resource providers (i.e., $0.71 - 0.37 = 0.34$). A closer scrutiny of these findings also revealed that outcome was perceived as more focal for providers than for recipients, and that the procedure was more focal for recipients than for providers, corroborating our line of reasoning.

The three-way interaction of allocation direction, resource type by allocation focus was significant, $F(1, 1468) = 26.80$, $p < 0.01$. The Helmert procedure revealed that differences in means should be larger than 0.088 to be statistically significant (Stevens 2002). Means are depicted in Table 25.2.

With regard to outcome, allocation direction moderated the effects of resource type on the perceived salience of the outcome. That is, recipients had a stronger focus on the outcome in the allocation of universalistic ($M = 0.42$) as compared to particularistic resources ($M = 0.30$). Hypothesis 5 was thus confirmed. In contrast, data revealed that it did not matter for the providers whether particularistic or universalistic resources were allocated. That is, for providers, outcome was seen as equally important in allocation of universalistic ($M = 0.33$) and particularistic resources ($M = 0.32$).

With regard to procedure, allocation direction also moderated the effects of resource type on the perceived salience of the procedure. Specifically, providers focused more on the procedure in the allocation of universalistic ($M = 0.87$) as compared to particularistic resources ($M = 0.69$). Hypothesis 6 was thus confirmed. For recipients no such effect was found ($M_{\text{universalistic}} = 0.73$ vs. $M_{\text{particularistic}} = 0.68$).

Concluding Comments

In this chapter, the question raised and examined was whether it is the outcome or the way the certain outcome has been accomplished (as well as the relative extent of each) that is focal in a

resource allocation event. The novelty of this research is in its consideration of the nature of the allocated resource from the perspectives of both resource providers and resource recipients.

Procedure was conceived as more focal when universalistic than when particularistic resources were allocated. The amount of a universalistic resource can be more easily determined than the amount of a particularistic resource. The amount of love one gives or receives is rather ambiguous and open to subjective interpretation. Subjective assessments of universalistic resources are far less frequent – a dollar is a dollar. Because the precise amount of a universalistic resource can usually be determined relatively quickly as compared to the amount of a particularistic resource, evaluations of the procedure, if called for, may be taken on early in the overall fairness evaluation process. As this is not the case for a particularistic resource, the assessment of which typically requires more time due to the ambiguity of its subjective nature. This might explain the finding that procedure was deemed as more focal for universalistic than for particularistic resource allocations.

Both resource type (universalistic or particularistic) and allocation direction (i.e., providing or receiving a resource) turned out to be crucial factors accounting for differences in the perceived relative salience of outcome and procedure. Our findings suggest that the impact of the distinction between money and love was not as straightforward as expected based on their position along the particularism dimension in the circular structure proposed by Foa. Specifically, the salience of the outcome was the same for universalistic and particularistic resources. In contrast, procedure was more salient when universalistic resources were allocated than when particularistic resources were allocated.

Two other interesting observations were that recipients of a universalistic resource focused more on the *outcome* than did recipients of a particularistic resource. In contrast, *procedure* was equally salient in allocations of universalistic and particularistic resources. A somewhat opposite pattern emerged for resource providers. Specifically, whereas resource providers attached equal importance to the *outcome* in allocation of

both resource types, they tended to focus more on the *procedure* in the allocation of universalistic than when particularistic resources were allocated.

To conclude, an important point of departure for this chapter was that the perceived justice of a situation is frequently a function of both outcome and procedure, but the salience of each may vary when making justice judgments. The findings suggest that the nature of allocated resource triggers different foci on outcome and procedure and that the perspective from which the judgment was made played an important role.

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Evaluating the Distribution of Various Resources in Educational Settings: The Views of Jewish and Arab Teachers in Israel

Clara Sabbagh and Hila Malka

Perceptions of (actual) just distribution practices of various scarce resources, by and within institutions, have been the object of a wide range of literature in the social sciences (Foa and Foa 1980; Hochschild 1981; Lane 1986; Rawls 1971; Sabbagh et al. 1994; Törnblom et al. 1985; Verba et al. 1987; Walzer 1983). However, despite the important role of justice in formal educational settings, such as schools, comparatively less systematic attention has been paid to the examination of such perceptions and their behavioral consequences among students and particularly teachers (Deutsch 1979; Sabbagh et al. 2006).

Some scholarly attention has been directed at the facet of “order-related” justice perceptions (for this distinction, see Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995; Jasso 1989; Wegener 1998) (hereafter, distribution preferences), referring to students’ and teachers’ evaluations of the relative importance that should be ascribed to different rules (e.g., proficiency, effort, students’ need) when distributing grades, which are especially salient in this setting (Dalbert et al. 2007; Dushnik and Sabar Ben-Yehoshua 2000; Nisan 1985; Tata 1999; Zeidner 1993). These studies have ascertained

that both students and teachers believe that the distribution of grades has to be guided by a set of different meritocratic rules. Moreover, this preference seems to be affected by factors such as the subject matter being taught (Resh 2008; Sabbagh et al. 2009), teaching methods (Thorkildsen 1989), students’ academic level (Nisan 1985), and students’ cultural background (Sabbagh et al. 2004).

Another body of justice research in educational settings has focused on the facet of “outcome-related” justice perceptions (for this distinction, see Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995; Jasso 1989; Wegener 1998) (hereafter, sense of (in)justice) – in other words, students’ perceived gaps between the just and the actual (daily) distribution rules or practices pertaining to grades (Dar and Resh 2001). This type of perception, which seems to be affected by students’ gender (Jasso and Resh 2002) and ethnicity (Dar and Resh 2003; Resh and Dalbert 2007), impacts student motivation and aggressive behavior (Chory-Assad 2002; Chory-Assad and Paulsel 2004; Lentillon et al. 2006).

The above studies conceive students and teachers in terms of a complex form of social exchange, whereby students are the recipients and teachers are the (third-party) allocators of the valuable resources (mainly grades) that are being distributed (Homans 1974). To the best of our knowledge, however, the examination of teachers as recipients of valued resources in schools (e.g., salary and status) has been neglected (for an exception, see Mueller et al. 1999). Such an analysis may draw attention to important moral values

We thank Kjell Törnblom and Ali Kazemi for their helpful comments.

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that are embedded in the school's daily distribution practices and ascertain the extent to which these values are shared or dependent upon educational sector. Moreover, these distribution values and their correspondence to the daily distribution practices of schools may ultimately affect teacher motivation and effectiveness in the classroom.

In light of the above, and following Foa and Foa's (1974) seminal typology of social resources, as well as Randall and Mueller's (1995) application of this typology in the context of organizations, this chapter delves deeper into the institutional fine grain of schools by examining "order-related" and "outcome-related" justice perceptions with respect to different kinds of resources that are being distributed to teachers (as recipients) in this organizational context. Specifically, the present study has three main goals. First, we aim to reveal whether teachers' distribution preferences and sense of (in)justice are resource specific, that is, dependent upon the kind of resource being distributed. Second, we examine whether resource-specific justice perceptions are shared, or vary, across two sectors or national groups of teachers in the Israeli population and educational system: the dominant Jewish and minority Arab groups. The third and most general aim of this study is to implement the structural model of social resources suggested by Foa and Foa (1974) as an integrative tool for investigating resource-specific distribution preferences and sense of (in)justice in a specific setting and as applied to the population of Israeli teachers.

"Order-Related" and "Outcome-Related" Facets of Distributive Justice Perceptions

Justice research has identified three archetypal justice principles and their correspondent, more specific rules, which determine the "order-related" values underlying the distribution of various kinds of resources in a given setting (Deutsch 1985; Lerner 1975; Leventhal 1980): equality (to each according to arithmetic equality or equal opportunities), need (to each according to her needs), and equity (to each according to her effort, contribution, and ability). Drawing on

this distinction, Sabbagh (2005) defined distribution rule preferences as complex evaluations regarding the relative importance that should be assigned to different rules when distributing various social resources (e.g., prestige, power, learning opportunities, and money). To enable a simple portrayal of distribution preferences that characterize a given social setting, such as schools, the author defined a general attribute that classifies distribution rules according to the degree to which the rule in question promotes a differential distribution of a given resource (Sabbagh 2003). Accordingly, equality rules (arithmetic equality or equality of opportunities) are assigned low differentiation because they disregard personal traits or performance and neutralize status differences as bases for granting the resource. In contrast, equity rules are assigned high differentiation because they grant social resources based on personal traits, such as effort, contribution, and ability. They thus lead to asymmetrical relationships in which status differences among recipients are maintained or reinforced and are motivated by self-interest. The need rule falls between equality and equity, as it considers personal traits as bases for granting the resource, yet is not contingent on performance or any other base that increases or maintains status differences among recipients.

This ordering of distribution rules has been empirically corroborated by multidimensional scaling analysis in several studies conducted in Israel and Germany (Sabbagh 2005). Furthermore, a factor analysis of social justice judgment (SJJ) items conducted among Israeli respondents in a prior study (Sabbagh 2003) yielded two distinct and independent groups along that dimension: an equity group (comprising effort, contribution, and ability) and an equality/need group (comprising all equality and need items). Consequently, *preference for differentiation* is defined as the distance between the degrees of importance a person attributes to equity and to equality/need rules.

Assuming that the preference for differentiation has been established, people make "outcome-related" evaluations of justice. That is, they strive to get what they think they deserve (Lerner 1981) by comparing the extent to which the *actual* pattern of distribution fits the *just* reward based on

the perceived “order-related” distribution rules. This type of comparison thus determines people’s sense of (in)justice with respect to a specific distribution’s outcome.

We adopt Guillermina Jasso’s (1980, p. 3) comprehensive model for determining degrees of perceived (in)justice. This model formulates a universal law that defines the sense of (in)justice mathematically and applies it to a variety of resources and social settings:

$$\text{Justice evaluation} = \ln \text{Actual share} / \text{Just share}$$

“Actual share” refers to the reward that is actually received. “Just share” (or just reward) is analogous to the expected distribution values, or entitlements, that are derived from the observer’s comparisons with reference groups. When the “actual share” does not match the “just share,” the result is an experience of injustice. Thus, if the logarithm of the actual share/just share ratio equals zero, perfect justice is perceived (sense of justice). If it has a positive value, overreward (or sense of gratification) is experienced. If it assumes a negative value, underreward (sense of deprivation) is experienced. This law provides a way to assess the sense of (in)justice both at the individual and collective/societal levels. It is worth noting that, when people evaluate perfect justice,

they are more likely to feel satisfied and legitimize the existent social order. Conversely, when they perceive a sense of injustice (deprivation), this may lead to feelings of anger, moral outrage, and, eventually, antisocial behavior, alienation, and protest (Gurr 1971; Moore 1979).

Resource Structure and Its Implications for Examining Resource-Specific Justice Perceptions

We have extracted from Randall and Mueller (1995, p. 179) five types of resources that are being distributed in organizational settings, such as schools: job security, opportunity for altruism, opportunity for friendships, status, and opportunity for self-actualization. We also added to these five types the resource of income (money) which is being distributed in working places. As shown in Table 26.1, the contents of these resources largely correspond to the resource classes in Foa and Foa’s (1974) typology. The similarities and differences among these resource classes can thus be captured by means of Foa and Foa’s circular structure of resources (Fig. 26.1). This structure organizes the contents of the different classes of resources along two dimensions: particularism/universalism and concreteness/symbolism.

Table 26.1 Description of resource classes

Randall and Mueller (1995, p. 179)	Foa and Foa (1974, p. 81)
	<i>Money</i> : “a coin, currency or token which has some standard unit of exchange value”
<i>Job security</i> : “protection and safety in employment associated with one’s work place.” Job security is a sort of good because it directly increases the utility of the consumer	<i>Goods</i> : “tangible products, objects or materials”
<i>Opportunity for altruism</i> : “degree to which job allows for helping others”	<i>Services</i> : “activities on the body or belongings of a person which often constitute labor for another”
<i>Opportunity for friendships</i> : “degree to which job allows personal relationships to develop”	<i>Love</i> : “an expression of affectionate regard, warmth or comfort”
<i>Status</i> : “prestige associated with one’s work”	<i>Status</i> : “an expression of evaluative judgment which conveys high or low prestige, regard or esteem”
<i>Opportunity for self-actualization</i> : “degree to which job allows for personal growth and development.” That is, it allows the development of an enlightened self	<i>Information</i> : “includes advice, opinions, instruction or enlightenment”




Fig. 26.1 Foa and Foa's (1974) schematic representation of the circular structure of social resources (Resources specified by Randall and Mueller 1995)

The degree of a resource's particularism (or, conversely, universalism) is the extent to which its value is person- and context bound and contingent on its conversion to desiderata. That is, a resource's value depends on the persons involved in the distribution and is therefore difficult to convert into other assets. In this conception, love (opportunity to make friends), services (opportunity to help others), and status are largely particularistic resources because their value is context- and person bound. In contrast, money (income), information (opportunity for self-actualization), and goods (security) are relatively less particularistic because they retain the same value regardless of the context and persons involved in the transaction. The dimension of particularism, which was found to be especially relevant in the domain of distributive justice (Sabbagh et al. 1994), is parallel to Jasso's distinction between quantity goods, which are additive and transferable (e.g., money), and quality goods, which are nonadditive and nontransferable (e.g., health).

The second dimension specifies the degree of a resource's concreteness (or, conversely, symbolism). Accordingly, money (income) and goods (security) involve the exchange of a tangible activity or product and hence are concrete resources, whereas love (opportunity to make friends) and information (opportunity for self-actualization)

are more symbolic. In this regard, services and status can be characterized by a moderate degree of concreteness. It is worth noting, however, that this classification can be further refined. For example, love can be expressed both in an abstract mode (telling someone I love you) or concretely (e.g., making love with someone) (for a refinement of Foa's dimensions, see the chapter by Sabbagh and Levy in this volume).

The circular ordering of resources, as suggested by Foa and Foa, implies a "contiguity principle" whereby the resources that are close to each other along a dimension (e.g., love and services are both particularistic resources) would be more similar and highly correlated and hence should appear closer together than resources that are distant along that dimension (e.g., love is highly particularistic, while money is not) (see the chapter by Sabbagh and Levy in this volume and Foa 1971). In our case, this means that, when examining peoples' preference for differentiation across different resources, we can expect preferences pertaining to resources that are close to each other in the circular structure (e.g., love and services) to be more similar than preferences pertaining to distant resources (e.g., love and money). Empirically oriented research, which rests on the assumption that the essential attributes of resources differently correspond to distribution

rules, supports this assumption (Foa and Foa 1974; Lane 1986; Walzer 1983). This research, which has been conducted mainly in Western countries, indicates that preference for differentiation negatively correlates with the resource's degree of particularism. In other words, when particularistic resources, such as love and status, are at stake, people tend to favor equality/need over equity rules. Conversely, when universalistic resources, such as money, are at stake, people tend to favor equity over equality/need rules (Schmitt and Montada 1982; Törnblom and Foa 1983; Törnblom and Jonsson 1985).

Yet, at the same time, preferences for a given distribution rule in regard to a particular resource may have different social meanings in different (cultural) settings (Sabbagh 2003; Törnblom and Jonsson 1985; Walzer 1983). As exemplified below in our comparison of Israeli-Jewish and Israeli-Arab teachers, this may be true not only across but also within countries; different groups, in differing social and economic positions, may not necessarily agree on distribution rules and may not perceive them as equally just (Kluegel and Smith 1986; Robinson and Bell 1978).

The "contiguity principle" also implies that associations between resource-specific preferences for differentiation and any other variables (e.g., age or nationality of respondents in our case) will decrease monotonically as one goes around the circular structure of resource classes in both directions from the least to the most particularistic resource class (for a similar approach in the area of human values, see Schwartz 1992). For instance, if one predicts that preference for economic differentiation will increase with age, it follows that the associations of this variable with preference of differentiation pertaining to goods, services, and love resources will tend to decrease monotonically and then increase monotonically in the other direction from love to status and from status to information (see Schwartz 1992).

In sum, the above conceptualization serves as a conceptual framework for specifying resource-specific evaluations of the just and actual distributions that construe the system of distributive justice in a specific setting – such as schools. Accordingly, on the basis of accumulated knowledge on the sociocultural and historical conditions

of Israeli society and its educational system, we derive hypotheses below regarding the expected resource-specific distribution preferences and resource-specific sense of (in)justice among Israeli-Jewish and Israeli-Arab teachers.

The Israeli Educational System: Socioeconomic and Cultural Aspects

The Israeli educational system is by and large public, financed and regulated by the relatively centralized administration of the Ministry of Education. Education is free, 10 years of which are compulsory. Under the umbrella of one national public system, there are four educational groups: Jewish general (secular), Jewish religious, "independent" (ultra-Orthodox), and Arab. Although Israel was founded as a Jewish state, it included from the very outset a relatively large Arab population (20 % of the entire population), which can be regarded as a marginal minority (Smooha 1978). Against the background of the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, the dominant Israeli-Jewish and the minority Israeli-Arab sectors have occupied an unequal position within the socioeconomic ladder and political community. While all educational laws and regulations apply equally to Jewish and Arab groups, the latter are much more closely controlled by the central education system, on the one hand, and deprived in terms of resource allocation, on the other hand (Al Haj 1995). This condition has implied inequality in both the provision of educational opportunities for Israeli-Arab students and lesser financial investment in school infrastructure and the professional development of Israeli-Arab teachers.

The Dominant Israeli-Jewish Group

The dominant Jewish group has developed a pioneering ethos aimed at establishing a distinctive Jewish national life according to Zionist ideology (Eisenstadt 1967; Roniger and Feige 1992). On the one hand, this ideology was influenced by a set of Western values that underlie liberal democracies. As suggested above, these values, which particularly characterize high-position (self-interested)

dominant groups, imply a preference for political equality and economic differentiation (by equity) (e.g., Hochschild 1981; Lane 1986). On the other hand, the Jewish pioneering ethos has also emphasized traditional Jewish values (e.g., use of the Hebrew language and celebration of Jewish holidays) and an ethno-republican ethos which stresses active contributions by (Jewish) citizens in the attainment of collective goals (Cohen 1989; Kimmerling 1985). Both ideological sources thus have accelerated the creation of a new national culture that embraced Western distribution values while attempting to enhance the Jewish character of the country (Aronoff 1993). Since the late 1960s, Israeli society has been undergoing socio-economic changes that have weakened collectivistic motives of social solidarity and reinforced instead capitalist competition and personal achievement in a wide range of social spheres (Ram 2000; Shafir and Peled 2002).

The competitive market-driven values of achievement (i.e., equity) among the dominant Israeli-Jewish group are reflected in the curriculum and structure of the educational system. There is a strong meritocratic orientation, reflected in growing and virtually universal school participation, especially in its compulsory stage, and a rising rate of matriculation eligibility, though the Israeli-Arab population still lags behind considerably. At the same time, extensive selection measures are prevalent, especially at the junior and senior high levels, in the form of ability grouping and tracking that differentiate curriculum and educational opportunities (Resh and Dar 1996; Swirski 1999; Yogev 1981). Differentiation is justified by a discourse of economic modernization which demands a highly qualified (i.e., achievement-oriented) workforce and its integration into the market economy by means of formal educational credentials (Adler 1989; Yogev and Shapira 1986).

The Minority Israeli-Arab Group

While the Zionist ethos has a uniform national significance, it is interpreted differently by different sectors of society (Smootha 1993). These interpretations may be influenced by the particular

sociocultural meaning that this ethos has for a given sector, such as the Israeli-Arab group.

As part of the state system, the official Arab curriculum is very similar to that of Jewish schools, placing emphasis on general subjects, like mathematics, science, and English, and leading up to matriculation at the end of high school. In addition, their teachers are trained in general (Jewish-controlled) colleges or universities. However, Arabic is the major language (alongside the need to master Hebrew), and emphasis is placed on Arab traditions and history. Thus, along with exposure to a "Western" structure and curriculum, school plays an important role in sustaining traditional Arab values. Specifically, emphasis is given to recognizing collective identity and to solidarity, and there is a demand for individual compliance and conformity to collective and family values. Furthermore, an individual's rank and status are determined mostly by ascriptive (unequal) criteria (gender, age, religion affiliation, and kinship ties) (Abu-Rabia-Quader and Oplatka 2007; Al Haj 1995).

The above considerations lead to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1 ("Order-Related" Justice Perception): When the distribution of universalistic resources is at stake, Israeli-Jewish and Israeli-Arab teachers will similarly favor equity over equality/need (positive preference for differentiation). But when the distribution of particularistic resources is at stake, Israeli-Arab teachers will show a stronger preference for differentiation than their Israeli-Jewish counterparts.

Sense of (In)Justice with Respect to Workplace Resources

As indicated above, we expect the preference for differentiation among Israeli-Jewish and Israeli-Arab teachers to be positively correlated with the degree of a given resource's universalism. But to what extent is their resource-specific sense of (in) justice also likely to vary along the dimension of particularism/universalism?

Over the last decades, the prestige and socio-economic standing of Israeli teachers, regardless

of sector, have significantly eroded (Dovrat 2005; Natan 2006). This erosion process, which has become a major theme in Israeli public agenda, has also led to several general strikes by the Teachers' Federation. The relative low standing of teachers in Israel is determined by a number of factors. Teachers' earnings are lower than the average wage in the labor market, and their job security has been threatened, especially in the Jewish sector, due to a downsizing policy related to a significant cut in the Education Ministry's budget. In addition, teachers have poor working conditions (e.g., large classes, a high student-teacher ratio, and teaching overload), and their social image is negative (e.g., the public perception is that teachers do not invest enough in their children) (Dovrat 2005). This condition is exacerbated when comparing the standing of teachers in Israel to other OECD-developed capitalist democracies (Natan 2006; Oplatka 2009). Finally, as described above, Israeli-Arab teachers face more social inequality and marginalization than their Jewish counterparts. Accordingly, they are likely to experience a stronger sense of (in)justice in regard to the different kinds of resources that are being distributed to them.

The above considerations lead to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2a–2b (“Outcome-Related” Justice Perception): (2a) Given that social standing in developed societies is mainly determined by income, we expect that irrespective of teachers' nationality, the sense of (in)justice will be stronger when universalistic rather than particularistic resources are at stake. (2b) Both Israeli-Jewish and Israeli-Arab teachers will experience a sense of deprivation (underreward) when evaluating the distribution of the different classes of resources at schools, but the sense of deprivation will be stronger among Israeli-Arab teachers.

Method

Sample

The sample included a total of 207 high school teachers (103 Israeli Jews and 104 Israeli Arabs) from ten schools in the northern part of Israel.

Female teachers comprised 85 % of the respondents in the Jewish sector but only 49 % in the Arab sector ($F_{(1,205)} = 33.704; p < .05$). The average age of Jewish and Arab respondents was 38 and 36 years, respectively ($F_{(1,205)} = 4.492; p < .05$). No sectorial differences were obtained for levels of education and subjective perception of social class. The majority of our respondents held a BA degree and reported that they earned an average salary.

Measurement

Nationality: 0 = Israeli Arabs; 1 = Israeli Jews

Preference of Resource-Specific Differentiation

This scale was based on Sabbagh et al. (1994) inventory, adapted to the school setting and to the classes of resources specified by Randall and Mueller (1995), which, as suggested in Table 26.1, correspond to Foa and Foa's (1974) typology. As mentioned earlier, Sabbagh (2003) conceptualized preference for differentiation as the distance between the degrees of importance a person attributes to equity and to equality/need. In order to confirm this definition's validity in the current study, we conducted a confirmatory varimax two-dimensional factor analysis of the distribution preference items (see Appendix A) among the teacher sample. Similar to prior studies, results yielded two distinct and independent groups of items: an equity group (comprising effort, contribution, and ability) and an egalitarian group (comprising all equality and need items). The obtained percent of explained variance by these two factors was 41.84 %. Item loadings on the equity and egalitarian factors are specified in Appendix A.

Consequently, for each of the six classes of resources (income, job security, opportunity for altruism, opportunity for friendships, status, and opportunity for self-actualization), preference for differentiation was computed as the difference mean of importance ratings, which ranged from 1 = not important at all to 5 = very important, pertaining to equity rules and equality/need rules. For instance, preference of economic differentiation was computed as the mean value of items 3 and 4

minus the mean value of items 1 and 3 (see [Appendix A](#)); preference of job security differentiation was computed as the mean value of items 7 and 8 minus the mean value of items 5 and 6 and so on. Accordingly, positive scores in the scale represent a positive preference of resource differentiation (equity is favored over equality/need), negative scores represent a negative preference of differentiation (equality/need is favored over equity), and a score of zero represents neutral preference for differentiation (equity and equality/need are favored similarly). The resource-specific differentiation scale varies from very weak (−4) to very strong (+4) preference of differentiation.

Resource-Specific Sense of (In)Justice

In order to determine more accurately the sense of (in)justice, we applied Guillermina Jasso's (1980, p. 3) definition of justice evaluations (see above formula/description). Accordingly, for each resource class, if the logarithm of the ratio of actual share/just share is zero, perfect justice is experienced; if it has a positive value, a sense of overreward is experienced; if it assumes a negative value, a sense of underreward is experienced. In the context of our study, respondents were asked to evaluate on a 5-point Likert scale the amount of the resource (income, job security, friendship, and so on) they *actually receive* (i.e., the actual share) and the amount of the resource they *ought to receive* (i.e., the just share). These variables ranged from 1 = very little to 5 = very much.

Findings

Resource-Specific Preference for Differentiation by Sector ("Order-Related" Facet of Justice Perceptions)

We tested our hypotheses using MANOVA, with teacher nationality as the group factor and resource class as a factor of repeated measures.

In keeping with Hypothesis 1, the MANOVA reveals a main effect of resource on differentiation preferences ($F_{(5, 202)} = 83.15, p < .000$).

Specifically, positive mean scores are obtained for the differentiation scale (i.e., equity is favored over equality/need) pertaining to universalistic resources: income = 1.37 (se = .10), security = .76 (se = .08), and self-actualization = .33 (se = .06), while negative differentiation mean scores (i.e., equality/need is favored over equity) are yielded for the more particularistic resources: altruism = −.05 (se = .06), friendships = −.12 (se = .08), and status = −.10 (se = .05). Thus, the extent to which differentiation is preferred depends on the class of resource being distributed.

Moreover, in keeping with the above-mentioned "contiguity principle" implied in Foa and Foa's circular structure of resources, trend analyses reveal that the most significant pattern of means can be decomposed into a quadratic trend (or parabola) ($F_{(1, 202)} = 170.95; p = .000$). This quadratic trend, presented in [Fig. 26.2](#) (see also [Table 26.2](#)), graphically represents the structure of resource-specific differentiation scores when they are arrayed on the horizontal axis according to the resources' circular ordering. Specifically, this trend implies that the differentiation scores change monotonically as one goes around the circular structure of resources in both directions. The strongest preference for differentiation is obtained for income (the most universalistic resource), followed by job security (goods), altruism (services), and friendships (love) (the most particularistic resource), with friendships obtaining the weakest differentiation score. In the opposite direction, the weakest differentiation score is obtained for friendships (love) (the most particularistic resource), followed by status and then self-actualization (information) (more universal than these other two resources), with self-actualization obtaining stronger differentiation scores.

The MANOVA also reveals a significant, though moderate, main effect for teacher nationality ($F_{(1, 202)} = 7.40; p < .001$). Specifically, Israeli-Arab respondents favor differentiation across the different classes of resources more strongly than Israeli-Jewish teachers (differentiation scores of .48 and .25, respectively). Finally, supporting




Fig. 26.2 Preference for differentiation by resource class and group

Table 26.2 Adjusted mean values (std. error) of teachers’ preferences for differentiation by resource class and group

	Israeli Jews	Israeli Arabs	F value
Income (money)	1.21 (0.15)	1.52 (0.14)	2.08
Job security (goods)	0.84 (0.11)	0.69 (0.11)	0.96
Opp. for altruism (services)	-0.28 (0.09)	0.18 (0.09)	12.873*
Opp. for friendships (love)	-0.34 (0.12)	0.10 (0.12)	7.20**
Status	-0.21 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)	5.22***
Opp. for self-actualization (information)	0.28 (0.09)	0.38 (0.09)	0.57

*** $p < .000$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

Hypothesis 1, there is also a significant, though moderate, effect pertaining to preference for differentiation for the nationality X resource interaction ($F_{(5, 202)} = 3.06, p < .05$). Inspection of the mean profiles in Table 26.2 (see also Fig. 26.2) reveals (as mentioned above) a quadratic trend of resource-specific differentiation scores for both national groups in our sample. Yet while no significant group differences in differentiation scores are obtained for the universalistic resources (income, security, and self-actualization), Israeli-Arab respondents favor differentiation of particularistic resources more strongly than Israeli Jews: The most significant association was obtained for altruism (services), followed by friendships (love) and status.

Sense of (In)Justice by Sector (“Outcome-Related” Facet of Justice Perceptions)

In support of Hypothesis 2a, MANOVA revealed a main effect of resource on sense of (in)justice ($F_{(5, 199)} = 58.629; p < .000$). Similar to the analysis of resource-specific preference for differentiation presented above, trend analyses revealed that the most significant pattern of means can be decomposed into a quadratic trend (or parabola): $F_{(1, 199)} = 167.540; p < .000$. This quadratic trend graphically represents the structure of resource-specific justice evaluation scores when they are arrayed on the horizontal axis according to resources’ circular ordering (see Fig. 26.3). Specifically, this trend implies that the sense of (in)justice changes monotonically as one goes around the circular structure of resources




Fig. 26.3 Sense of (in)justice by resource class and group

Table 26.3 Adjusted mean values (std. error) of teachers’ sense of (in)justice by resource class and group

	Israeli Jews	Israeli Arabs	F value
Income (money)	-0.57 (0.03)	-0.55 (0.03)	0.60
Job security (goods)	-0.68 (0.4)	-0.38 (0.05)	22.98*
Opp. for altruism (services)	-0.17 (0.03)	-0.25 (0.03)	4.18**
Opp. for friendships (love)	-0.11 (0.03)	-0.22 (0.03)	7.23***
Status	-0.46 (0.04)	-0.39 (0.04)	2.12
Opp. for self-actualization (information)	-0.46 (0.04)	-0.44 (0.04)	0.57

*** $p < .000$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

in both directions. The strongest sense of (in)justice is obtained for income (the most universalistic resource), followed by job security (goods), altruism (services), and friendships (love) (the most particularistic resource), with friendships obtaining the weakest deprivation score. In the opposite direction, status indicates a stronger sense of deprivation than friendship, as does self-actualization (information) (a more universalistic resource).

Furthermore, MANOVA findings support Hypothesis 2b. That is, they reveal a moderate main group effect ($F_{(1, 202)} = 7.40$; $p < .001$) and a

significant group X resource interaction effect ($F_{(5, 199)} = 12.183$; $p < .000$). Specifically, findings in Table 26.3 (see also Fig. 26.3) indicate that negative scores are obtained for all justice evaluations with regard to all kinds of resources. In other words, regardless of nationality or resource, teacher respondents experience underreward; that is, evaluate that schools assign them lower levels of resources than the ones they deserve (Hypothesis 2b). However, the main group effect suggests that the sense of injustice is stronger among Israeli-Arab than among Israeli-Jewish

teachers (Hypothesis 2b). Moreover, these group differences are dependent upon resource class: Table 26.3 indicates that no significant group differences in the sense of deprivation were obtained for income or self-actualization (both universalistic resources) or for status (a particularistic resource). However, Israeli-Jewish respondents experience a stronger sense of deprivation pertaining to job security (universalistic resource) than their Israeli-Arab counterparts. In contrast, Israeli-Arab respondents experience a stronger, though moderate, sense of deprivation with respect to opportunities for altruism and making friends at work, both of which are particularistic resources.

Discussion

This chapter has examined Israeli teachers' perceptions of the (actual) just distribution of different kinds of resources that are distributed to them in school settings. Specifically, the examination has focused on two facets of justice perceptions: distribution rule preferences ("order-related" facet) and the perceived gap between these preferences and daily distribution practices ("outcome-related" facet). In both cases, we argue that these two interrelated, though distinct, types of justice perceptions are dependent upon both the resource that is being distributed and teachers' sectorial affinity (Jewish or Arab).

Drawing on Foa and Foa's (1974) structural theory of resource exchange and on accumulated sociocultural knowledge of the Israeli educational system, we have portrayed resource-specific justice perceptions among Israeli-Jewish and Israeli-Arab teachers in an integrated form. In other words, rather than examining resource-specific justice perceptions separately, we conceptualize them as an interrelated system of perceptions structured along the dimensions of particularism and concreteness.

In keeping with prior research (e.g., Hochschild 1981; Törnblom and Foa 1983; Törnblom et al. 1985; Verba et al. 1987), our results indicate that, despite sectorial (cultural) differences, Israeli teachers in both subsamples similarly rank the

rules which they actually and justly prefer in the distribution of various kinds of resources. Specifically, Israeli teachers across sectors prefer differentiation (favoring equity over equality/need) of universalistic resources (income, job security, and self-actualization) more strongly than they do with regard to particularistic resources (opportunities for making friends, altruism, and status). This description of the educational institutions may best be represented by a "market pricing" model of social relationships, in which emphasis is placed on criteria of achievement, although this setting also includes some elements of "solidarity" (equality) and "authority ranking" (i.e., based on inequality of statuses) (Fiske 1991). However, it is worth noting that this finding may not be generalized to other settings in this society. For instance, a prior study revealed that, when evaluating a just society, young Israeli-Jewish respondents preferred the differentiation of particularist resources (prestige and power) more strongly than they did universalistic resources (learning opportunities and money) (Sabbagh 2003). Accordingly, preference for differentiation seems to be dependent upon social setting.

Our findings also reveal that, regardless of sector, Israeli teachers' sense of (in)justice varies with the degree of a resource's particularism. Specifically, their sense of deprivation is stronger with regard to universalistic resources (income, job security, and self-actualization) than to particularistic resources (altruism, friendship, and status); in the latter case, teachers evaluate the distribution as very close to perfect justice. It is worth noting that the sense of deprivation is particularly stronger for resources whose favored distribution is differential – that is, universalistic resources, such as income, job security, and self-actualization. In contrast, sense of deprivation is significantly weaker for particularistic resources, such as altruism and friendships, whose favored distribution is egalitarian (Shepelak and Alwin 1986; Verba et al. 1987).

This suggests a possible relationship between "order-related" and "outcome-related" facets of justice, although the theoretical and empirical association between these facets requires further

examination (for a first step in this direction, see Jasso 1989). In the current study, we stipulate that, in the case of universalistic resources, teachers both prefer differentiation and experience deprivation more strongly. We interpret this finding as follows: As the context of inequality salient in the wider society is regulated by power relations, people are more preoccupied with making comparisons with significant others (Berger et al. 1983). In contrast, in the case of particularistic resources, teachers both reveal a neutral preference for differentiation and experience a stronger sense of justice: In the context of equality, people are more likely to persuade others rather than impose their opinions. Thus, comparisons with significant others are less frequent and people experience a stronger sense of justice (Kahane 1975).

The similar pattern of justice perception profiles among Israeli-Jewish and Israeli-Arab teachers can be attributed to the centralized structure of the Israeli public educational system. As described above, Arab schools are a subsector of this system, controlled and directed by the dominant Jewish majority. Teacher training and professional development are basically common to candidates of both groups, and the schools' structures and curricula are very similar. Hence, although Jews and Arabs study in separate schools, the pattern of resource distribution (as perceived by teachers) is quite similar. It should be noted that we asked teachers to specifically refer to the school in which they teach. Thus, we assume that when evaluating actual and just resource distributions, they were probably comparing themselves with other (similar) teachers, that is, making referential comparisons (Berger et al. 1983). We have some (unpublished) empirical indication that, when Israeli teachers are asked to evaluate resource distributions in comparison to other sectors, Israeli-Arab teachers experience a stronger sense of (in) justice than their Israeli-Jewish counterparts.

At the same time, our findings also support the view that justice perceptions vary across sectorial/cultural lines. For instance, the largest group injustice gap obtained is for the distribution of job security, whereby Israeli-Jewish teachers in particular experience injustice in this regard. As pointed out earlier, the Israeli teachers, especially

in the Jewish sector, were subject in 2005–2006 to a massive downsizing threat. This policy was part of the recommendations suggested by the Dovrat National Committee, which was meant to enhance teachers' status in the wider society (Dovrat 2005).

Furthermore, Israeli-Arab teachers prefer differentiation of particularistic resources (altruism, friendships, and status) more strongly than their Israeli-Jewish counterparts. This finding corresponds to the view of the Israeli-Arab sector as having a traditional social structure in which group (tribal) interests are prioritized over individual interests, even when it comes to such professional issues as hiring or promoting teachers (Abu-Rabia-Quader and Oplatka 2007). In this conception, emphasis is given to "communal sharing" and "authority ranking" types of social relations (Fiske 1991); that is, there is recognition of collective identity and demand for individual compliance and conformity to these collective and family values. Moreover, an individual's rank and status are determined mostly by ascriptive considerations, such as gender, age, religious affiliation, and kinship ties. Nonetheless, this social setting also combines, as indicated above, elements of the "market pricing" type of social relations which are organized by means of achievement-oriented considerations (i.e., equity rules) (Fiske 1991). Despite adherence to religion and traditional family patterns, the continuous exposure of the Arab sector to the competitive and individualist features of the dominant Jewish setting seems to be affecting patterns and norms of resource distribution, especially in the educational system (e.g., Falah 2000). The Jewish setting and its educational institutions may thus best be portrayed as a competitive and market-driven setting, in which emphasis is placed on criteria of achievement (differentiation), although this setting also includes some elements of "solidarity" (equality) and "authority ranking" (i.e., based on inequality of statuses) (Fiske 1991).

In sum, with the ethnic and national diversity in contemporary Israel, it is important to capture the differing social meanings that various subgroups ascribe to different resources. In this regard, the structural model applied here allows for a parsimonious

monious yet comprehensive analysis of specific sociocultural cases without sacrificing their richness or complexity. This model enables the simultaneous study of several resources within a unified conceptual framework; thereby, it reveals relationships between classes of resources, especially between

the particularistic and the universalistic. Further cross-cultural and cross-sectional research along these lines may provide a clearer understanding of patterns of convergence and divergence in the meanings assigned to social resources and of the corresponding distribution rules.

Appendix A: Inventory of Rule Distribution References According to Resource Class (*Factor analysis loads*)

To what extent should the following considerations be taken into account at schools for distributing the following resources?

Money and income

1. Everyone should get the same income. (*egalitarian .36*)
2. The needy should get more income. (*egalitarian .66*)
3. Diligent people who invest more should get more income. (*equity .73*)
4. People whose work is more important and contributes more should get more income. (*equity .75*)

Security

5. Everyone should get equal job security conditions. (*egalitarian .56*)
6. The needy should get better job security conditions. (*egalitarian .79*)
7. Diligent people who invest more should get better job security conditions. (*equity .59*)
8. People whose work is more important and contribute more should get better job security conditions. (*equity .66*)

Altruism

9. Everyone should have an equal opportunity to help others. (*egalitarian .44*)
10. The needy should receive more help than others. (*egalitarian .39*)
11. Diligent people who invest more should receive more help. (*equity .63*)
12. People whose work is more important and contribute more should receive more help. (*equity .62*)

Friendships

13. Everyone should have the same opportunities to have social relationships. (*egalitarian .56*)
14. Needy people should have more opportunities to have social relationships. (*egalitarian .62*)
15. Honest and diligent people should have more opportunities to have social relationships. (*equity .43*)
16. People whose work is more important and contribute more should have more opportunities to have social relationships. (*equity .45*)

Status

17. Everyone should be assigned equal status. (*egalitarian .53*)
18. Honest and diligent people should be given greater status. (*egalitarian .57*)
19. Talented people who contribute more should be given greater status. (*equity .47*)
20. The needy should be given greater status. (*equity .63*)

Self-actualization

21. Everyone should have the opportunity for self-actualization. (*egalitarian .41*)
 22. The needy should have more opportunities for self-actualization. (*egalitarian .65*)
 23. Honest and diligent people should have more opportunities for self-actualization. (*equity .68*)
 24. People who contribute more should have more opportunities for self-actualization. (*equity .51*)
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Factorial Survey Methods for Studying Goods, Bads, and the Foa Resources

27

Guillermina Jasso

Introduction

The Foa resources, introduced by Foa (1971), lead to a variety of empirical questions, many of which can be addressed using the factorial survey method pioneered by Rossi (1951, 1979). This chapter provides a brief guide for using factorial survey methods to explore the Foa resources.

As set forth by Foa (1971) and elaborated with associates (e.g., Foa et al. 1993), the resource framework identifies six classes of resources which individuals use and exchange and from which they derive happiness. The Foa resources are love, status, information, money, goods, and services. In the Foa framework, the resources vary along two dimensions: (1) concreteness versus symbolism and (2) particularism versus universalism. Definitions and characterizations of the Foa resources appear often in this book, for example, in Jasso (2013).

Jasso (2013) notes that each of the six classes of resources has a kind of anti-resource, which decreases happiness. For example, money spans not only income and revenues but also liabilities, fines, and taxes. Similarly, bads (such as time spent in prison) decrease happiness. Jasso (2013)

also notes that the Foa resources correspond in specified ways to the postulates and predictions of theories of status, power, justice, and identity and to their unification (Jasso 2008). For example, the Foa goods, which include money, together with bads, generate the three primordial sociobehavioral outcomes (PSOs), which include status; and the three PSOs in turn generate love.

Thus, the stage is set for empirical exploration of the six Foa resources and the two Foa dimensions, together with the overlapping active goods and bads, active forces, and predictions of the new unified theory. One approach in the empirical task is to use factorial survey methods to assess individuals' beliefs and judgments about these processes and predictions.

Factorial survey methods can be used to address a variety of questions. Two prominent questions that factorial survey methods address pertain to (1) individuals' positive beliefs about the actual determination of outcomes like happiness, healthiness, earnings, love – called the *what is* question; and (2) individuals' normative judgments about the correct or proper or just determination of the outcomes – called the *what ought to be* question (Jasso 2006). In the first type of question, the individual is viewed as a *lay scientist* and in the second as a *lay judge*. The method enables not only assessment of the individuals' positive beliefs and normative judgments – the *equations inside the head* – but also analysis of the determinants and consequences of those beliefs and judgments. To illustrate, the method

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can be used to ascertain (1) the individual's belief about the *ceteris paribus* effect of age at marriage on marital love; (2) the parental, social, and cultural determinants of beliefs about the *ceteris paribus* effect of age at marriage on marital love; and (3) the effects of the belief on the individual's own age at marriage.

This chapter describes briefly the factorial survey method (in the section on "[Brief Overview of Rossi's Factorial Survey Method](#)") and outlines a series of applications for exploring goods, bads, and the Foa resources (in the section on "[Factorial Survey Applications](#)"). A short note concludes this chapter.

Brief Overview of Rossi's Factorial Survey Method

The overarching goal is to understand individuals' ideas about the way the world works and the way it ought to work. Accordingly, the factorial survey protocol is designed to obtain estimates with the best possible statistical properties of the beliefs/judgments equations and the determinants and consequences equations.

Data Collection in Rossi's Factorial Survey Method

Each respondent is asked to assign the value of a specified outcome variable – a "what is" outcome or a "what ought to be" outcome (such as healthiness, marital happiness, actual wage, just wage, or fairness of an actual wage) – corresponding to a fictitious unit (a person, say, or a family, or a country) which is described in terms of potentially relevant characteristics such as age, gender, study or eating habits, access to medical care or housing, and the like. The descriptions are termed "vignettes." One of Rossi's key insights was that fidelity to a very rich and complex reality can be achieved by generating the population of all logically possible combinations of all levels of potentially relevant characteristics and then drawing random samples to present to respondents. Accordingly, the vignettes are described in terms of many characteristics, each characteristic is

represented by many possible realizations, and the characteristics are fully crossed.

The Rossi design has three important additional features: First, in the population of vignettes, the correlations between vignette characteristics are all zero or close to zero, thus reducing or eliminating problems associated with multicollinearity. Second, the vignettes presented to a respondent are under the control of the investigator (i.e., they are "fixed") so that endogeneity problems in the estimation of positive-belief and normative-judgment equations arise only if respondents do not rate all the vignettes presented to them. Third, a large set of vignettes is presented to each respondent (typically 40–60), improving the precision of the estimates obtained for the respondent-specific equations.

The rating task reflects the outcome variable, which may be a cardinal quantity (e.g., earnings), a probability (e.g., probability of divorce), a set of unordered categories (e.g., college major), or a set of ordered categories (e.g., verbal happiness assessments).

Data Analysis in Rossi's Factorial Survey Method

The analysis protocol begins with inspection of the pattern of ratings, which in some substantive contexts may be quite informative (e.g., the proportion of workers judged underpaid and overpaid), and continues with estimation of the belief/judgment equation. Three main approaches are (1) classical ordinary least squares approach; (2) generalized least squares and seemingly unrelated regressions approach, in which the respondent-specific equations may have different error variances and the errors from the respondent-specific equations may be correlated; and (3) random parameters approach, in which the respondents constitute a random sample and some or all of the parameters of the respondent-specific equations are viewed as drawn from a probability distribution. Under all approaches, an important step involves testing for differences across respondents.

Depending on the substantive context and on characteristics of the data, the next step is to

estimate the determinants equation and the consequences equation. Again depending on the context, the determinants equation may be estimated jointly with the beliefs/judgments equation.

Factorial Survey Applications

Positive-Belief Equations About the Determinants of Goods and Bads: The Actual Reward Function

The Foa resources of money and goods, together with bads, can be analyzed via a simple design in which the vignettes contain a set of characteristics that may be determinants of the outcome good or bad and the respondent is asked to assign the outcome. For example, the fictitious vignette persons may be described in terms of health-relevant characteristics – such as diet, exercise, and smoking – and the outcome provided by the respondent may be a magnitude of healthiness or a value of life expectancy. Similarly, the fictitious vignette persons may be described in terms of earnings-relevant characteristics – such as schooling and experience – and the outcome provided by the respondent may be an amount of earnings.

The equation expressing the determinants of the good or bad is sometimes called the *actual reward function*, especially if the good or bad is socially allocated, such as earnings or prison sentences. This usage arose in social psychology in studies of justice, which distinguish, as will be seen below, between actual rewards and just rewards (Jasso 2007). Formally, the actual reward equation is written:

$$A = \beta_0 + \sum_{k=1} \beta_k X_k + e, \quad (27.1)$$

where A denotes the actual reward, the X s denote the determinants of the actual reward, including rewardee and contextual characteristics, the β s represent the intercept and slope parameters, and e denotes the random error. Importantly, this is an individual-specific equation – one of the “equations inside the head” – and the parameters denote each person’s ideas about determination of the actual reward.

Jasso (2006, pp. 411–414) provides three examples of vignettes developed for actual reward equations – of immigrant visa applicants, adolescents, and chief executive officers – and three examples of rating tasks – for healthiness, scholastic achievement, and perceptions of CEO compensation. To illustrate, combining the vignettes of CEOs with the rating task for perceptions of CEO compensation produces a design for estimating respondent-specific equations of the determinants of actual CEO pay.

Normative-Judgment Equations About the Determinants of Just Goods and Bads: The Just Reward Function and the Just Reward Distribution

A large body of work addresses individuals’ ideas about the just amount of a good or bad and the determinants and consequences of those ideas (Jasso and Wegener 1997). Though much of the literature has focused on earnings and punishments, many other goods and bads may be usefully studied via factorial survey methods. These include grades received in school, library fines, and penalties in sports (such as yard penalties in football).

The *just reward function* parallels the actual reward function in (27.1):

$$C = \pi_0 + \sum_{k=1} \pi_k X_k + \varepsilon, \quad (27.2)$$

where C denotes the just reward, the X s denote the determinants of the just reward, including, as above, rewardee and contextual characteristics, and the π s denote the intercept and slopes. The just reward equation, like the actual reward equation, is an individual-specific “equation inside the head” – thus representing the Hatfield principle that ideas of justice are in the eye of the beholder (Walster et al. 1976, p. 4).

A long tradition in philosophy and social science explores the principles of justice – the considerations or rules that guide ideas of justice and of the just reward. In the allocation of goods and bads, interest has focused on a few key principles – equality, need, and merit (the latter sometimes called desert or contribution). Social

science development has progressed from early exploration (Deutsch 1975) to the distinction between *principles of microjustice* and *principles of macrojustice* (Brickman et al. 1981) and their mathematization (Jasso 1983). Principles of microjustice embody individuals’ ideas about *who should get what and why*, namely, about the worth and weight of rewardee characteristics; principles of macrojustice embody individuals’ ideas about *what the distribution should look like*, namely, about the mean and inequality of the distribution of just rewards.

Thus, the just reward function in (27.2), whose roots can be traced to Berger et al. (1972) – and which therefore is sometimes called the BZAC function – enables estimation of the principles of microjustice (Jasso 1983). Specifically, parameters of the just reward function, or transformations thereof, provide estimates of the principles of microjustice. For example, in a just earnings function, where the dependent variable is expressed as the natural logarithm of earnings, the coefficient of schooling provides an estimate of the just rate of return to schooling, and the exponential of the intercept provides an estimate of the just base salary. The just rate of return to schooling is thought to reflect the merit principle, and the just base salary is thought to reflect the need principle.

Meanwhile, the array of just rewards forms a distribution, called the *just reward distribution*. Parameters of this distribution, such as the mean,

median, and measures of inequality, provide estimates of the principles of macrojustice.

Jasso (1983) established the exact correspondence between the just reward function and the just reward distribution.

It has been known for a long time that the equality principle of justice is represented in both the just reward function and the just reward distribution. Jasso (1994, p. 379) observes that the equality principle can be viewed as a principle of microjustice, in which case it is satisfied when all the slopes in the just reward function in (27.2) are equal to zero, and it can be viewed as a principle of macrojustice, in which case it is exactly satisfied when the just reward distribution has zero inequality. Moreover, the equality principle establishes an exact correspondence between the just reward function and the just reward distribution – the intercept of the just reward function (or a transformation thereof) is equal to the point on the just reward distribution’s support at which all the mass accumulates.

However, it has been less appreciated that the need and merit principles of justice can also be viewed as both principles of microjustice and principles of macrojustice, that is, that they operate in both the just reward function and the just reward distribution. Table 27.1 assembles these links across the principles of microjustice and macrojustice for the need and merit principles, as well as for the equality principle. Above, we noted that the intercept (or a transformation

Table 27.1 Operation of the principles of justice in the just reward function and the just reward distribution

	Just reward function	Just reward distribution
Principles of justice	$C = \pi_0 + \sum_{k=1} \pi_k X_k + \varepsilon,$	$Q_C(\alpha; \mu, I)$
Equality	π_0	I
Need	π	$Q_C(0)$
Merit	π_k	$Q_C(1)$

Notes: In the just reward function, C denotes the just reward, X denotes the reward-relevant characteristics, and π denotes the parameters. The just reward distribution is represented by the quantile function and specified in terms of two parameters, the arithmetic mean μ and the inequality I . The equality principle of justice is visible in the intercept of the just reward function and the inequality in the just reward distribution. The need principle of justice is visible in both the intercept and slope parameters of the just reward function and the lower extreme value of the just reward distribution. The merit principle of justice is visible in the slope parameters of the just reward function and the upper extreme value of the just reward distribution.

thereof) in the just reward function represents need. Table 27.1 shows this but also shows that the need principle may be represented in two additional ways. First, it may be represented by the slopes of the just reward function, as when number of children induce considerations of need. Second, it may be represented by the lower extreme value of the just reward distribution.

Similarly, the merit principle of justice can be viewed as both a principle of microjustice and a principle of macrojustice. As a principle of microjustice, it is represented by the slopes in the just reward function; as a principle of macrojustice, it is represented by the upper extreme value in the just reward distribution.

Two remarks are in order. First, the advantage of this setup is that it enables direct confrontation of competing principles of justice so that their weights (in each observer's head) are made transparent. Second, it is possible for a single characteristic to operate as both a need and a merit consideration. A case in point is number of children. Number of children is often thought to indicate need. However, in some societies and time periods, number of children has operated as a criterion of merit. In Spain, for example, there was a tradition of admitting to the untitled nobility any man who fathered seven sons in legal matrimony ("hidalguía de bragueta").

The link between principles of justice and resource classes was explicitly made by Törnblom and Foa (1983), who speculate that the type of resource class may shape ideas of justice. Thus, the reward-relevant characteristics and the weights in the just reward function in (27.2) may differ systematically across resources of different classes. Factorial survey methods are ideally suited for assessing this conjecture.

Analyzing the just reward distribution requires estimates of the just rewards – the respondent-specific/rewardee-specific rewards. Analyzing the just reward function may or may not require estimates of the just rewards, depending on the estimation approach. Without going too far afield into the just reward literature, we linger to note that there is one direct method and several indirect methods for measuring or estimating the just rewards. The direct method parallels closely the

techniques used in estimating the actual reward (as described in the section on "Positive-Belief Equations About the Determinants of Goods and Bads: The Actual Reward Function" above). The vignettes describe fictitious persons in terms of their reward-relevant characteristics, and the respondent is asked to assign the just reward. For example, the same vignettes used in a study of the actual compensation of CEOs (Jasso 2006, p. 412) may be used in a study of just compensation, the only difference being that the outcome variable is just compensation rather than actual compensation.

The classic direct design is the design developed by Rossi and Berk (1997) to study the just prison sentences for offenders described in terms of their own and the victims' characteristics. More recently, Hagan et al. (2008) used the direct design to study ideas of just prison sentences among a sample of Iraqi judges.

When the vignettes include only a small set of characteristics, such as the worker vignettes in Jasso (2007), which are described only in terms of gender, schooling, and occupation, there is concern that the direct design may invite response biases. An alternate approach is to use an indirect design. The indirect designs capitalize on justice theory and are made possible by it. The two best-known indirect designs are both based on the justice evaluation function (introduced below and also discussed in Jasso 2013) and operate as follows. Suppose that the vignettes presented to respondents include not only the reward-relevant characteristics but also a randomly attached hypothetical actual reward. The respondents can be asked to judge the fairness or unfairness of the hypothetical actual reward. Because justice theory provides the equation that links the actual reward, the just reward, and the justice evaluation, the justice evaluation function can be used to statistically retrieve estimates of the just reward. The two justice-evaluation-based indirect designs were introduced in Jasso (1990) and Jasso and Webster (1999) and are described in Jasso (2007), which also provides sample vignettes and rating tasks for both indirect designs, as well as information on the statistical properties of the obtained estimates.

Jasso and Törnblom circulated a letter to justice researchers in May 2000, outlining an interdisciplinary and international agenda for studying the sense of justice, focusing especially on ideas of justice – the just reward, the just reward function, and the just reward distribution, together with their determinants and consequences. The first substantive question in the research plan pertains to “Multiple Reward Domains,” including resources of different classes. The first methodological question listed is “Direct vs. Indirect Measurement of Just Reward.” The research plan goes on to address such further frontiers as differences and changes in ideas of justice across the lifecourse, across generations, across select pairs of samples, and across countries and cultures.

Equations of the Primordial Sociobehavioral Outcomes

Status is one of the Foa resources and also one of the three primordial sociobehavioral outcomes in the new unified theory. It happens that status was in fact the subject of the first factorial survey fielded by Rossi. The study was designed to explore the determinants of household status. The vignettes included the schooling and occupation of both husbands and wives, and respondents were asked to rate the social standing of the family (Rossi et al. 1974). [Status, prestige, and social standing were treated as synonyms, as were family and household].

The tradition of using factorial survey methods to study status produced several classic works, including Sampson and Rossi (1975) and Bose and Rossi (1983).

The second application of factorial survey methods was to the justice of earnings. Jasso and Rossi (1977) constructed vignettes in which unmarried persons, married persons with no information about the spouse, and married couples were described in terms of gender, schooling, occupation, and a randomly attached hypothetical earnings, and ask respondents to rate the fairness or unfairness of the hypothetical earnings. Reanalysis of the data led to discovery

of the justice evaluation function, in which the justice evaluation varies with the logarithm of the ratio of the actual reward to the just reward (Jasso 1978). The initial analyses had been patterned on the status analyses, namely, regressions of the outcome (the prestige rating or the justice rating) on the vignette characteristics, with the regression based on the pooled sample of all respondents. But the work in Jasso (1978) showed that such an equation included within it the deeper and more general theoretical equation,

$$J = \ln\left(\frac{A}{C}\right), \quad (27.3)$$

where J denotes the justice evaluation, A denotes the actual reward, and C denotes the just reward. This equation in turn opened many doors. It was adopted as the cornerstone and first postulate of a new theory (Jasso 1980), a theory which would not only lead to a wealth of testable predictions but also transform the empirical landscape, for example, by taking seriously the Hatfield principle (in Walster et al. 1976, p. 4) that justice is in the eye of the beholder and that therefore analyses should be carried out within each respondent – a separate equation for each respondent rather than one equation for the entire sample (Jasso 1990). As well, the justice evaluation function would lead seamlessly to the two indirect methods described in the preceding section for estimating the just reward. Its many appealing features led Jasso (1978) to propose it as a candidate for a law of justice evaluation.

Today, in the context of the new unified theory, a prime example of this type of application would be to describe vignettes in terms of several personal characteristics, such as schooling, earnings, athletic skill, attractiveness, and so on, and ask respondents to predict the vignette persons' PSOs, for example, status, self-esteem, power, and the justice evaluation. This would enable assessment of the valued goods, by PSO, for each respondent. As studies accumulated, it would be possible to characterize individuals and groups by their goods' profiles. The evidence might indicate that, indeed, as the press reports, people who live in certain communities of Florida and California

value only one thing, physical attractiveness, while people who live in other places value other things, and people on the tennis tour or golf tour value skill in the corresponding sport.

Equations of Love

Love is one of the Foa resources. It is also an important further outcome of the new unified theory, arising from the difference between two individuals' scores on the PSO (Jasso 1988).

One class of analyses would focus on positive-belief equations about the determinants of marital cohesiveness. The prototype of this analysis is reported in Jasso (2006). A second class of analyses, also focusing on positive-belief equations, would highlight the theoretical love variable and examine the effect on predicted love of vignette partners' discrepancy on the valued goods.

Equations of Predictions in the New Unified Theory

The new unified theory yields many predictions which are amenable to exploration of positive-belief equations. Assessment of positive-belief equations is a useful adjunct to rigorous empirical testing, as there will be cases in which lay scientists intuit reality before practicing scientists in addition to the more usual cases where the opposite occurs.

Some of the predictions for which it may be useful to estimate positive-belief equations include the following:

1. Parents of two or more non-twin children spend more of their toy budget at an annual gift-giving occasion (such as Christmas) rather than at the children's birthdays.
2. Thieves are more likely to steal from fellow group members rather than from outsiders. This effect is stronger in poor groups than in rich groups.
3. Veterans of wars fought on home soil are less likely to suffer posttraumatic stress disorder than veterans of wars fought away from home.

4. The parent who dies first is mourned more.
5. The greater the economic inequality, the greater the vocations to the religious life.
6. Blind persons are less at risk of eating disorders than are sighted persons.
7. In a materialistic society, social distance between subgroups always increases with inequality.
8. In a population with two subgroups, the highest ranking from each subgroup will always put their own interests ahead of the subgroup's.
9. When people care about status, they are closer to their neighbor below than to their neighbor above, but when they care about self-esteem or justice or any of the comparison processes, they are closer to their neighbor above than to their neighbor below.
10. The just society has a mixed government; distribution of benefits is by the many, and distribution of burdens is by the few.

As discussed in Jasso (2013), some of the predictions embody Foa resources, including not only money, goods, and love but also services and information.

Equations of Information Effects

Information is one of the six classes of Foa resources. Information can be studied in a variety of ways using factorial survey methods. One very simple approach is as follows. Consider almost any of the factorial survey studies that have been carried out to date or discussed in this chapter. Preserve the vignettes and the rating task intact. However, vary the instructions so that the vignettes presented to randomly selected subsets of the respondent sample differ in the amount of information provided. For example, in the setup for the justice of earnings designs, mention in one set of instructions that all the workers attended a particular elementary school.

There are many other ways of searching for information effects. Indeed, the very first factorial survey justice study had a set of vignettes describing married persons but withholding information on the second spouse (Jasso and Rossi 1977).

Equations of Particularism-Universalism Effects

The dimension of particularism versus universalism plays an important part in Foa's work. This dimension can also be studied via the simple technique of varying the information in the instructions to the respondent, discussed in the previous section. For example, randomly selected subsets of respondents could receive different instructions. Some instructions might say that all the workers "live in your neighborhood" or "attend your church" or "grew up in your hometown" while others remain in the general form (Jasso 2006, 2007). The distribution of earnings amounts would signal the effects on just earnings of the particularism-universalism dimension.

Concluding Note

Resource theory, pioneered by Uriel Foa in the early 1970s and developed with associates, provides a systematic framework for analyzing the resources individuals use and exchange and from which they derive meaning and well-being. The Foa resources – for example, money, love, and status – play many parts in all social science, as inputs and outcomes, in postulates and predictions, and, in particular, as the stuff of humans' ideas about the way the world works and the way it ought to work. Meanwhile, factorial survey methods enable rigorous analysis of the two corresponding types of "equations inside the head" – the positive-belief equations and the normative-judgment equations – together with the determinants and consequences of those beliefs and judgments.

This chapter provided a brief guide for using factorial survey methods to explore the Foa resources, together with the overlapping theoretical processes and predictions. Some of these applications are already well-known. For example, there is a growing body of research that examines individual-specific ideas about determination of goods and bads like earnings and prison sentences – both actual determination and just determination, formalized as actual reward functions and just reward functions. Other processes and predictions involving the Foa resources await careful empirical scrutiny

via factorial survey methods. Some of the applications discussed in this chapter require only minor modification to existing research protocols – for example, studying the Foa resource dimension of particularism versus universalism requires altering only the instructions given to random subsets of respondents. Thus, factorial survey methods may help accelerate progress in understanding goods, bads, and the Foa resources.

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Part VI

Envoi

Where Do We Stand and Where Do We Need to Go?

28

Elaine Hatfield and Richard L. Rapson

Introduction

Throughout history, scholars have always been interested in the nature of social justice, fairness, and equity. In the eleventh century, for example, St. Anselm of Canterbury (1998) argued that the will possesses two competing inclinations: an affection for what is to a person's own advantage *and* an affection for justice; the first inclination is stronger, but the second matters, too.

Anthropologists such as Lévi-Strauss (1957), Malinowski (1922), and Mauss (1925), were among the first scientists to theorize about the development of societal notions of fairness in social exchanges. In the 1950s, almost all undergraduates read Malinowski's fascinating description of the Trobriand Islanders' Kula Ring, a complex system of reciprocity and exchange. Natives would canoe to nearby islands, gifting those Islanders with powerful and magical gifts – Mwali arm-shells, Bagi necklaces, Amphlett Island pots, and the like. In return, Kula traders coming in the other direction, would gift *them* with an array of other magical trinkets. Sometimes, it took 10 years for Islanders to complete a circle. The aim was, of course, to build a cohesive network of allies and trading partners.

It was not until the mid-twentieth century, however, that social psychological research on social justice, fairness, and equity—following a long trail blazed by towering political philosophers such as Locke, Voltaire, Jefferson, Diderot, J.S. Mill, and a host of others—really burst on the scene.

In the West, the 1960s and 1970s were a time of intellectual and social ferment. There was a great concern with social justice and spirited debate as to what was fair in life, law, marriage, and work. In the United States, it was the time of Martin Luther King's historic 1965 civil rights march from Selma to Montgomery. (On "Bloody Sunday", March 7, 1965, 600 civil rights marchers were attacked by state and local police with clubs, dogs, and tear gas.) It was the time of Jane Fonda's 1972 trip to North Vietnam to protest the war.

On the gender front, in that same year, women lobbied, marched, petitioned, picketed, and committed acts of civil disobedience in the hopes of persuading the 92nd Congress to pass the Equal Rights Amendment, which guaranteed men and women equal rights under law. (It passed the Senate and the House, but in the end the states failed to ratify it.) It was an era when feminists such as Betty Friedan described the *Feminine Mystique*, Gloria Steinem and her colleagues founded *Ms. Magazine*, and Shulamith Firestone penned *The Dialectic of Sex*. All these feminist leaders argued for women's rights in education, law, and the workplace. On the comic side, Bobby Riggs spewed out chauvinist insults in challenging tennis star Billie Jean King to the "Battle of the Sexes". (King won handily.) Valerie

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Solanas contributed her mad ravings to the *SCUM Manifesto*. (*SCUM = The Society for Cutting Up Men*.) (We assumed Ms. Solanas was a witty satirist until she acted upon her beliefs by shooting her pal Andy Warhol.) It is no surprise then, as issues of race, gender, war, and peace ignited passions everywhere, that many social psychologists became interested in devising theories of social justice. Battles over issues of social justice are as old as the human species, but we wish to focus on their more recent manifestations, Homans instead of Yahweh.

Early Social Exchange Theories

The first modern-day scholars to propose models of social justice and social exchange (in the late 1950s and early 1960s) were sociologists George C. Homans (1958) and Peter Blau (1967) and social psychologists John Thibaut and Harold Kelley (1959). They viewed all social life as involving the exchange of goods—such as approval, money, or material goods. All people, they contended, are seeking maximum reward at minimum cost. As a consequence, given market forces, in the long run social exchanges tend to be balanced. The scholars described the factors that influence the creation, maintenance, and breakdown of exchange relationships.

In the early days, four different interlocking theories attempted to provide a complete model

what would cause people to perceive relationships as fair or unfair, and how they would behave when they discovered themselves caught up in patently unfair relationships. These theories were: Equity theory, a general theory (Hatfield [Walster], Walster, & Berscheid, 1978), and three theories that deepened scholars understanding of theories of the social exchange process. These were the models of Foa and Foa (1974), which attempted to categorize the resources (inputs and outcomes) involved in exchanges (Foa & Foa, [1974], that of Deutsch [1975], and that of Lerner [1980]), which pointed out the various types of exchange relationships that may exist, and that of Adams (1965b), which attempted to detail the way people involved in inequitable relationships attempt to set things right. Some of these theorists stressed self-interest in their models, others the desire for procedural and distributive justice.

In Chap. 11, Kjell Törnblom and Riël Vermunt offer a lively account of this era.

Let us now provide a brief review of these theories.

Classic Equity Theory

Elaine Hatfield, G. William Walster, and Ellen Berscheid's (1978) Equity theory is a straightforward theory. It consists of four propositions:




Fig. 28.1 The relationship between perceived equity and contentment/distress

Proposition I. Men and women are “hardwired” to try to maximize pleasure and minimize pain.

Proposition II. Society, however, has a vested interest in persuading people to behave fairly and equitably. Groups will generally reward members who treat others equitably and punish those who treat others inequitably.

Proposition III. Given societal pressures, people are most comfortable when they perceive that they are getting roughly what they deserve from life and love. If people feel over-benefited, they may experience pity, guilt, and shame; if under-benefited, they may experience anger, sadness, resentment, disgust, indignation, or fear (Fig. 28.1).

Proposition IV. People in inequitable relationships will attempt to reduce their distress through a variety of techniques – by restoring psychological equity, actual equity, or leaving the relationship.

We would argue that notions of social justice came to be writ in the mind’s “architecture” because a concern with social justice possessed survival value (see Tooby and Cosmides 1996). A concern with social justice, in all its forms, is alive and well today (in all cultures and all social structures) because fairness in love and work remains a wise and profitable strategy. (For a further discussion of these points, see Hatfield et al. 2008.)

Assessing Equity

Technically, Equity is defined by a complex formula (Traupmann et al. 1981; Walster 1975). Respondents’ perceptions of the equitableness of their relationships are computed by entering their estimates of inputs and outcomes of Persons A and B (I_A , I_B , O_A , and O_B) into the Equity formula¹:

$$\frac{(O_A - I_A)}{(|I_A|)^{KA}} = \frac{(O_B - I_B)}{(|I_B|)^{KB}}$$

¹ The Equity formulas used by previous researchers, from Aristotle to Stacy Adams, only yield meaningful results if A and B’s inputs and outcomes are entirely positive or entirely negative. In mixed cases, the formulas yield extremely peculiar results. This is simply a formula designed to transcend these limitations. See Walster (1975) for a discussion of the problems and the mathematical solutions. The superscript k simply “scales” equity problems (by multiplying all inputs and outcomes by a positive constant) such that the minimum of I_A , I and I_B is greater than or equal to 1.

Respondents are classified as “over-benefited” if their relative gains exceed those of their partners. They are classified as “equitably treated” if their relative gains equal those of their partners, and as “under-benefited” if their relative gains fall short of those of their partners.

In practice, however, a relationship’s fairness and equity can be reliably and validly assessed with the use of a simple measure. Specifically, research participants are asked: “Considering what you put into your dating relationship or marriage, compared to what you get out of it ... and what your partner puts in compared to what (s)he gets out of it, how does your dating relationship or marriage ‘stack up’?” Respondents are given the following response options:

- +3: I am getting a much better deal than my partner.
- +2: I am getting a somewhat better deal.
- +1: I am getting a slightly better deal.
- 0: We are both getting an equally good, or bad, deal.
- 1: My partner is getting a slightly better deal.
- 2: My partner is getting a somewhat better deal.
- 3: My partner is getting a much better deal than I am.

On the basis of their answers, persons can be classified as over-benefited (receiving more than they deserve), equitably treated, or under-benefited (receiving less than they deserve). (For a comprehensive list of the rewards and costs found to be important in dating relationships or marriages, see Hatfield et al. 2008).

The work of a number of other theorists in the 1960s and 1970s fit together like jigsaw pieces in constructing a picture of social justice. These theorists pointed out that different types of relationships invoke different rules, that we can classify the resources relevant to various kinds of relationships, and when inequity is found to exist, predict how men and women will set about to restore social justice.

Morton Deutsch’s Commentary

All people are concerned with social justice. Historically, however, societies have had very

different visions as to what constitutes social justice, fairness, and equity (for an overview of justice conflict conceptualization see Törnblom and Kazemi 2012). Some dominant views were discussed by Hatfield and her colleagues (1978):

- “All men are created equal.” (Equality).
- “The more you invest in a project, the more profit you deserve to reap.” (American capitalism)
- “To each according to his need.” (Communism)
- “Winner takes all.” (Dog-eat-dog capitalism)
- “It’s a man’s world.” (Patriarchy)

In *Equity: Theory and Research*, the authors proposed that these culturally divergent views as to the nature of justice determined which inputs and outcomes would be considered relevant in a given setting. If justice was conceived as equality, for example, participants’ inputs (as human beings) would be, by definition, identical. If a society was a meritocracy, on the other hand, talent and hard work may be deemed the appropriate inputs in determining fairness.

Deutsch (1975) pointed out that in various societies, at various times, justice has been viewed as consisting in the treatment of all people:

1. As equals
2. So that they have equal opportunity to compete without external favoritism or discrimination
3. According to their ability
4. According to their efforts
5. According to their accomplishments
6. According to their needs
7. According to the supply and demand of the market place
8. According to the requirements of the common good
9. According to the principle of reciprocity (p. 21)

He attempted to specify the conditions under which various values would predominate in various types of social exchanges. We will discuss Deutsch’s views at greater length in section “Where Do We Stand Today?”

Uriel and Edna Foa’s Resource Theory

In Equity theory, respondents’ perceptions of the equitableness of their relationships are computed

by comparing their inputs and outcomes with those of their partners. Respondents are classified as “over-benefited” if their relative gains exceed those of their partners. They are classified as “equitably treated” if their relative gains equal those of their partners, and as “under-benefited” if their relative gains fall short of those of their partners.

Generally, a one-item scale (the Global Equity Measure) has been used to calculate how fair various relationships are perceived to be. In calculating the fairness of love relationships, however, a 25-item Multi-Factor Measure of Equity – which asks couples to indicate the fairness of their relationship in 25 diverse areas – is sometimes employed (see Appendix A). Unfortunately, as yet, psychometricians have developed no multi-item scales to allow Equity theorists to calculate the importance of various inputs and outcomes in altruistic relationships, philanthropist/recipient relationships, parent–child relationships, business relationships, or exploiter/victim relationships.

In Foa’s (1971) seminal paper and in Foa and Foa (Chap. 2), the authors attempted to specify the inputs and outcomes that would be most relevant in various kinds of relationships. They contended that the resources of interpersonal exchange fall into six classes: love, status, information, money, goods, and services. According to the authors, all resources can be classified according to their “particularism” and “concreteness.” The dimension *particularism* refers to the extent to which the resource’s value is influenced by the person who delivers it. (Since love’s value depends very much on who is doing the loving, it is classified as *particularistic*. Since money is valuable regardless of its source, it is classed as *universalistic*.) The dimension *concreteness* refers to the resource’s characteristic form of expression. (Since services and goods involve the exchange of tangibles – things you can see, smell, and touch—they are classed as *concrete*. Since status and information are usually conveyed verbally, they are classified as *symbolic*.)

This volume is a testament to the fact that the Foas’ classification system as to which resources are most important in various types of

relationships has made a signal contribution to the understanding of social justice.

J. Stacy Adams' Theory of Social Inequity

In *Equity: Theory and Research*, Hatfield and her colleagues argued:

People in inequitable relationships will attempt to reduce their distress through a variety of techniques—by restoring psychological equity, actual equity, or leaving the relationship (p. 6).

The authors provided a few examples of such equity restoration, but offered no comprehensive theory as to which resources would be used when. Adams, on the other hand, proffered a detailed set of “rules,” designed to predict preferences in equity restoration. Let us review this research.

In the 1960s, Adams and his colleagues (Adams 1965a, b) in a series of elegantly simple papers excited a revolution in business research. He proposed the unthinkable: That capitalistic American workers would be uncomfortable earning too much, as well as too little, and that their desire for equity would influence both the quantity and the quality of their craftsmanship. Adams (1965a), acknowledging that people who were involved in an inequitable relationship could utilize a variety of techniques to set things right, proposed six general “rules” that would allow scholars to predict which potentially inequity-reducing alternative was likely to be chosen in a given setting.

- (a) Person will maximize positively valent outcomes and the valence of outcomes.
- (b) He will minimize increasing inputs that are effortful and costly to change.
- (c) He will resist real and cognitive changes in inputs that are central to his self-concept and to his self-esteem. To the extent that any of Person's outcomes are related to his self-concept and to his self-esteem, this proposition is extended to cover his outcomes.
- (d) He will be more resistant to changing cognitions about his own outcomes and inputs than to changing his cognitions about Other's outcomes and inputs.

- (e) Leaving the field will be resorted to only when the magnitude of inequity experienced is high and other means of reducing it are unavailable.
- (f) Person will be highly resistant to changing the object of his comparisons, Other, once it has stabilized over time and, in effect, has become an anchor (pp. 395–396).

Six theorists, four ways of viewing distributive justice; four interlocking theories. Given these classic models (see also Leventhal 1980), what have scientists learned in the past 40–50 years about the nature of social justice? Where do things stand in the first decade of the twenty-first century?

Where Do We Stand Today?

Kjell Törnblom and Ali Kazemi's *Handbook of Social Resource Theory* provides a comprehensive review of the research questions that have intrigued social justice researchers over the last half century. In this section, we plan to do a sort of “meta analysis” of the four major issues that have intrigued researchers since the 1960s: (a) What is considered fair, in general? (b) What is considered to be fair in general and in various kinds of relationships? (c) Can scholars develop a taxonomy of resources? (d) Can we predict how people caught up in inequitable relationships will go about setting things right? Let us now turn to the current state of knowledge with regard to these questions.

What Is Considered to Be Fair in General?

According to Deutsch (1974), it should come as no surprise that people often disagree about what is fair, since in deciding what they deserve, people may emphasize:

1. The values underlying the rules governing the distribution (*injustice of values*)
2. The rules which are employed to represent the values (*injustice of rules*)
3. The ways that the rules are implemented (*injustice of implementation*)

4. The way decisions are made about any of the foregoing (*injustice of decision-making processes*) (pp. 19–20.)

Deutsch (1975) focused on three values—equity, equality, and need—that are often used as a basis for distributing outcomes. He argued that:

In cooperative relations in which economic productivity is a primary goal, equity ... will be the dominant principle of distributive justice.

In cooperative relations in which the fostering or maintenance of enjoyable social relations is the common goal, equality will be the dominant principle of distributive justice.

In cooperative relations in which the fostering of personal development and personal welfare is the common goal, need will be the dominant principle of distributive justice. (p. 143)

In this *Handbook*, further building on his work, theorists have discussed an array of other cultural and societal values that may shape perceptions as to the appropriateness of various kinds of allocations (see Törnblom and Kazemi, Chap. 3; Törnblom and Vermunt, Chap. 11).

Törnblom and Kazemi (Chap. 3), for example, point out that people often care about how their supervisor acquired the resources he is so lavishly distributing. (Is he a crook? A drug dealer? Are we profiting from others' misery?) People have also been found to care about whether or not their CEO followed fair procedures in allocating salaries and bonuses. (If favoritism is evident, even a "fair" allocation may be suspect.) Recently, such procedural justice has been the focus of much theorizing and research.

What Is Considered to Be Fair in Various Kinds of Relationships?

Equity theory appeared in an era in which traditional views of gender roles, women's liberation, and the rules of love and sex (including innovations such as marriage contracts) were being hotly debated. Thus, it is not surprising that the contention that couples care about "What's in it for me?" and "Am I being treated fairly" sparked criticism. In *The Art of Loving*, for example, Erich Fromm (1956) declared that:

[while flawed] human love relationships [may] follow the same pattern of exchange which governs the commodity and labor market, the truest form of love is unconditional love (love given without any thought of return. (p. 3)

Alas, Fromm assumed that altruism came more naturally to women than to men—a proposition not generally accepted today. A variety of social commentators agreed with the contention that people are generally *not* concerned with reward or fairness in their love relationships (see Clark and Mills 1979; Murstein et al. 1977). An equally great number of advocates argued that Equity considerations *are* important in the most intimate of relationships. They noted that when mothers recite that old refrain: "After all I've done for you," they are expressing indignation that all their sacrifices have not been reciprocated (at least with appreciation). When old men give a young woman a diamond tiara, they may also be hoping for affection and perhaps a little more (see Hatfield et al. 1978, for a review of theorists on both sides of The Great Debate).

In the past decades, scholars have gained a far better understanding of when equity matters in love relationships and when a strict accounting can be put off for another day.

In surveying this research, Hatfield, Rapson, and Aumer-Ryan (2008), concluded that: dating is a "marriage marketplace," in which considerations of reward, fairness, and equity loom large. Once couples have committed themselves to a close, intimate relationship, however, they generally become less concerned about immediate rewards and short-term equity than before; they may also find it more difficult to calculate fairness and equity than previously. Once a relationship begins to deteriorate, however, people may once again begin to worry about "What's in it for me?" and ask "Do I deserve better?" The degree to which couples worry about reward and fairness and equity, then, will vary during the course of a love relationship.

As we have seen in this *Handbook*, people may be involved in a wide variety of relationships – with romantic partners, mates, children, friends, teachers, and students (Vermunt, Kazemi and

Törnblom, Chap. 25; Törnblom and Fredholm, Chap. 7); bosses and workmates (Mitchell, Cropanzano, and Quisenberry, Chap. 6; Adamopoulos, Chap. 16; Chiaburu, Byrne, and Weidert, Chap. 21; Kraemer and Chen, Chap. 18); and strangers and enemies (Gifford and Cave, Chap. 14). They have greatly added to our understanding as to how people caught up in these diverse relationships perceive fairness and attempt to deal with existing inequities.

Fiske (1991), for example, argued that people possess four types of “relational models” (mental schemas for guiding interactions): *Communal Sharing* is a model of interaction that emphasizes a common identity of group members – in such groups, resources would be shared according to need. *Authority Ranking* is a model in which participants are hierarchically ordered. There, power and status determine outcomes. *Equality Matching* refers to situations in which reciprocity is the norm. Finally, *Market Pricing* relations specify that goods and services be traded for what the market will bear. Obviously, in these kinds of relations, different allocations of reward are considered to be fair.

Can Scholars Develop a Taxonomy of Resources?

Potentially, since Equity is in the eye of the beholder, almost anything can “count” as an input or an outcome in a relationship. One man may find enduring the fact that his beloved is a little dim witted, another might value his mate’s sparkling intelligence. Not surprisingly, then, in this *Handbook*, theorists have struggled mightily to develop taxonomies that will reduce the potential inputs and outcomes to a manageable number. In their chapter, Foa and Foa (Chap. 2) were among the first to attempt to specify which resources will be most relevant in various kinds of relationships. They argued that the resources of interpersonal exchange can be sorted into six classes: love, status, information, money, goods, and services. They can be further classified according to their “particularism” and “concreteness.”

This chapter provides an extended commentary on the merits and disadvantages of the Foa’s classification and some suggestions for alternative taxonomies (see Binning and Huo, Chap. 8; Fiske 1991; Folger, Chap. 9; and Turner, Chap. 10).

Can We Predict How People Will Go About Setting Things Right?

Adams (1965b) was a pioneer in attempting to develop a theory designed to predict how men and women caught up in inequitable relationships would choose to restore equity. He proposed that people follow six rules when deciding how to restore equity. Essentially, he argued that people would choose the strategy that best protected their own self-esteem, which was in accord with their vision of the world, and minimized the costs and maximized the benefits of utilizing a given technique.

For example, Adams and Rosenbaum (1962) pointed out that according to Equity theory: (1) Employees who realize they are being overpaid or underpaid should feel distress. (2) Overpaid and underpaid workers can potentially reduce their distress in a variety of ways. Workers, for example, could restore actual equity by altering either the quantity or the quality of their work.

In a now classic study, the authors predicted that employees who are paid on a salary or an hourly basis *versus* a piece-rate basis ought to restore actual equity in very different ways. The overpaid worker who is paid on an hourly basis can restore equity by increasing his/her inputs: he can produce more and higher quality work. An underpaid worker can restore equity by doing the opposite: he/she can produce less and lower quality work. The worker who is paid on a piece-rate basis, however, must follow a very different strategy if he/she is to set things right. An overpaid piece-rate worker can only restore equity by producing less work of a higher quality. An underpaid piece-rate worker can restore equity by doing just the opposite: he/she can produce more work of a lower quality. The authors found strong support for these intriguing hypotheses.

Other modern-day theorists have offered still more comprehensive theories focusing on the ways the community, perpetrators, and victims, can best restore justice to problematic relationships (see Baumert and Schmitt, Chap. 17; Cohen, Chap. 24; and Törnblom and Vermunt, Chap. 11, for excellent reviews of this research).

This *Handbook*, then, has provided a comprehensive guide to the current state of knowledge about social justice.

Yale historian Robin Winks once observed that writing history is “like nailing jelly to the wall.” But, he added, “someone must keep trying.” Trying to describe sweeping historical trends and then to predict future trends is even more difficult. But let us, in a playful and humble spirit, make the effort. Let us examine the scholarly disciplines where the first faint glimmerings of social justice research have appeared and attempt to identify those that look most promising.

Where Should Things Go in the Future? Where Are They Likely to Go?

Multidisciplinary Approach

At the current time, some of the most interesting research into the nature of social justice emanates from scholars of diverse intellectual traditions: crosscultural and historical theorists, who emphasize the stunning *diversity* of societal definitions of social justice, as well as evolutionary theorists, neuroscientists, and primatologists, who focus on *cultural universals*, arguing that a concern for justice arose early in humankind’s evolutionary history, and who speculate about how this ancient “wiring” affects current visions of social justice. Let us review some of these approaches here:

Searching for a “Grand Unified Theory” of Justice

As in any scientific endeavor, one of social psychology’s most intractable problems is the

attempt to develop a “Unified Field Theory” of social justice, one that brings together culture and biology. We all yearn to be a Michael Faraday, an Albert Einstein, or a Carlo Rubbia, who brings order out of chaos. It is surely too early in the evolution of our discipline to hope for that, but we see in this *Handbook* that a number of theorists have made a valiant effort to develop comprehensive theories of justice, with a special emphasis, of course, on social resources and their exchange (see Baumert and Schmitt, Chap. 17; Gifford and Cave, Chap. 14; Markovsky and Berigan, Chap. 12; Mitchell, Cropanzano, and Quisenberry, Chap. 6; Törnblom and Vermunt, Chap. 11; and Turner 2007). Surely, these efforts will continue to flourish.

Cultural Considerations

Cultural theorists are well aware that culture has a profound impact on people’s perceptions as to what is fair and just, which social resources they think “count” and which do not, and the “appropriate” rules for social exchange. Anthropologists like Richard Shweder and his colleagues (1987) and Alan Fiske (2002) surveyed moral concerns around the globe. All people, they concluded, possess an innate sense of fairness. People assume that they should reward benefactors, reciprocate favors, and punish cheaters – and will often go to great lengths to do so. Yet, there are cultural differences in people’s sense of justice, the value of various kinds of social resources, and the “appropriateness” of various types of exchange, too. Culture exerts a profound influence on how fairness is defined, how concerned men and women are that their intimate affairs and work relationships be equitable, what social resources they care about, and how rewarding and equitable love and work relationships are likely to be (Amir and Sharon 1987; Aumer-Ryan et al. 2006; Murphy-Berman and Berman 2002).

Triandis and his colleagues (1990), for example, argued that in individualistic cultures (such as the United States, Britain, Australia, Canada, and the countries of northern and western Europe) people generally focus on personal

goals. In such societies, citizens are concerned with how rewarding (or punishing) their relationships are and how fairly (unfairly) they are treated. Collectivist cultures (such as China, many African and Latin American nations, Greece, southern Italy, and the Pacific Islands), on the other hand, insist that their members subordinate personal goals to those of the group: the family, the clan, or the tribe. It is tradition, duty, and deference to elders that matter. Rosenblatt and Cunningham (1976) claimed that equity is of less importance in collectivist societies: “[regardless of] who has the better life, a man or a woman, they [people in collectivist cultures] might argue ... that the lives of men and women are different and not comparable” (cited in Buunk and Van Yperen 1989, p. 82).

Do cultures differ in how much importance they attach to dating and marital fairness and equity? The evidence is mixed. In a series of studies, Aumer-Ryan and her colleagues (2006) interviewed Japanese-American, West Indian, and multicultural Internet users, seeking answers to three questions. In different cultures, do men and women: (1) differ in the value they ascribe to equity in dating and marital relationships – some considering it to be crucial, others dismissing “fairness” as of trivial importance? (2) differ in whether they consider their own relationships to be equitable or inequitable? and (3) differ in how satisfied (or upset) they are when they discover their own relationships have turned out to be strikingly equitable/inequitable?

The authors found that in all cultures, people considered reward and equity to be the gold standard of a good relationship. Both Westerners and their non-Western counterparts insisted it was “important” to “very important” that a courtship relationship or marriage be equitable.

The authors did find some fascinating cultural differences, however. People around the world may aspire to social justice, but few were lucky enough to achieve that goal. People in the various cultures differed markedly in how fair and equitable they considered their intimate relationships to be. Men and women from the United States claimed to be the most equitably treated. Men and women (especially women) from Jamaica, in

the West Indies, felt the least equitably treated. Jamaican women often complained about men treating women as “second class citizens” and about men’s lack of commitment to relationships. In describing men’s attitudes, one woman quoted a classic Calypso song by Lord Kitchener (1963), which contains the repeated lyric: “You can always find another wife/but you can never get another mother in your life.” Such attitudes, the women claimed, make it very difficult for them to find a relationship that is rewarding, fair, and fulfilling.

In all cultures, men and women reacted much the same way when they felt fairly or badly treated. All were most satisfied when receiving exactly what they felt they deserved from their relationships – no more (perhaps) but (just as in the West) certainly no less.

This *Handbook* makes it clear that social justice scholars have begun to conduct studies in America, Australia, Austria, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Turkey, to name just a few (see Baumert and Schmitt, Chap. 17; Lewis and Hauser, Chap. 15; Törnblom and Vermunt Chap. 11; Kazemi, Gholamzadehmir and Törnblom, Chap. 23; Vermunt, Kazemi, and Törnblom, Chap. 25.) Most of the cross-cultural research was conducted in educational settings (Sabbagh and Malka, Chap. 26) or work settings (Dorsch and Brooks, Chap. 20; Kraemer and Chen, Chap. 18). In the future, however, we can be confident that cultural scholars will increasingly begin to investigate questions of social justice and the social resources that are considered of value, worldwide.

Historical Considerations

Historians have long been interested in the way people throughout the world define social justice (see Davies 2001; Hobsbawm 1988; Kershaw 2001; or Schama 2002.) Their investigations provide a window on the impact that social change has on societal definitions of fairness and the social resources people care about.

History’s subject is time. The study of the past offers perspectives on the present. Put these two

together and the possibility of making more informed guesses about the future becomes possible.

What about the future, then? Currently, futurists and historians predict that globalization and pending cultural, economic, and technological advances may well produce profound social changes in the way people view social justice and the social resources they care about – especially in the areas of love, sex, and marriage (Hatfield and Rapson 2005). Among such anticipated changes are the following:

Cultural

- Increasing acceptance of cosmetic surgery.
- Increasing acceptance of multiple definitions of “family.”
- Improved status of women worldwide.
- Increasing acceptance of interracial relationships.
- Increasing acceptance of homosexuality.
- The norm will be change – probably very rapid change.

Economic/Practical

- Toward gender/economic equality.
- More consensual unions (fewer marriages).
- Both spouses working.
- More long-distance relationships.
- More cyberspace relationships.

Technological

- Love, sex, and relationships on the Web.
- Second Life Avatars.
- Sex dolls: Choosing fantasy mates over real men and women.
- Computer matching.
- Increased availability of pornography and technological sex.
- Cures for AIDS, STIs, and impotence.
- Advances in reproductive technology – including boutique babies, birth control, and abortion.
- People living longer. Much, much longer? “The Singularity.”

What impact might these anticipated transformations have on the way men and women define fairness and the social resources they consider to be most valuable? How contented might we expect people confronting such profound changes to be? (Or will they suffer from “future shock?”

[Toffler 1984]) Will men (who will be losing power) tend to cling to the past while women rush into the future? How will all people attempt to deal with the momentous and unsettling new challenges that may lie ahead? In future, we might expect futurists and social historians to provide new insights into the nature of justice and their perceptions of social resources and those that matter and those that do not.

Evolutionary Models

The Evolution of Darwin’s Evolutionary Theory

Although in the 1970s, when crafting Equity theory, we were hoping to develop a “unified theory” – integrating the insights of Darwinian theory, economic theory, and Hullian and Skinnerian reinforcement theories – in fact (like everyone else) we focused far more on nurture than nature. True, in the 1960s and 1970s, some pioneers like Hamilton (1964), Smith (1974), and Trivers (1972), assumed that altruism, as well as aggression, was embedded in the architecture of the mind. (Theorists talked about the advantages of “group selection,” “kin selection or inclusive fitness,” and “reciprocal altruism” – a version of “blood is thicker than water,” and “If you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours”). Nonetheless, the most influential theorist was Dawkins (1976), who contended in *The Selfish Gene* that, day-to-day, people are programmed for savage competition, ruthless exploitation, and deceit. Admittedly, altruistic acts occur – but alas, such altruism is more apparent than real. Our challenge, then, was to craft a theory that accounted for people’s desire for fairness and justice using primarily social constructionist and reinforcement models. Equity’s propositions I-IV focused on the social forces that prod people to care about social justice and to privilege one type of social resource over another. The evidence for our contentions came, for the most part, from cultural psychology, social psychology, and I/O research.

In the past 25 years or so, social psychologists have begun to explore the evolutionary underpinnings of social justice. (See, e.g., the later work

of Richard Dawkins (2006), on the probable evolution of reciprocal altruism and social exchange.) As Cosmides and Tooby (1992) observe:

It is likely that our ancestors have engaged in social exchange for at least several million years... Social exchange behavior is both universal and highly elaborated across all human cultures—including hunter-gatherer cultures ... as would be expected if it were an ancient and central part of human life. (p. 164)

Currently, interesting work on social justice from evolutionary perspective is being conducted by scholars such as Rob Boyd (Boyd et al. 2003). They provide strong support for the notion that “Proposition II: Groups will reward those who treat others fairly and punish those who do not” – even at considerable cost to themselves.

In this *Handbook*, theorists provide an excellent summary of this new research (see Folger, Chap. 8; Lewis and Hauser, Chap. 15; Markovsky and Berigan, Chap. 12).

Additional evidence as to the biological underpinnings of social justice comes from neuroscientists and primatologists.

fMRI Research

In recent years, neuroscientists have begun to investigate the cognitive factors (and brain processes) that are involved when men and women confront moral dilemmas. These concern such things as the nature of social justice and a question of profound concern for Foa and Foa, (Chap. 2): How a variety of competing moral claims are resolved. For instance, “What’s more important: the claims of friendship or the demands of fairness and equity in a social exchange?” Robertson and her colleagues (2007) presented men and women with several real-life moral dilemmas. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) techniques, they studied people’s brain activity as they pondered such dilemmas. The neuroscientists found that sensitivity to moral issues (in general) was associated with activation of the polar medial prefrontal cortex, dorsal posterior cingulate cortex, and posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS). They speculated that moral sensitivity is probably related to one’s ability to retrieve autobiographical memories and to

take a social perspective. They also assessed whether sensitivity to social concerns (as distinguished from impartial justice) involved different kinds of neural processing. They found that sensitivity to issues of justice (and social exchange) were associated with greater activation of the left intraparietal sulcus, whereas sensitivity to care issues was associated with greater activation of the ventral posterior cingulate cortex, ventromedial, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and thalamus. These results suggest that different parts of the brain may operate when people ponder their duty to loved ones versus their obligation to be fair and just to all. For additional neurobiological speculations as to the neural circuits involved in the perception of and reaction to social inequality, see Borg et al. (2006), Raine and Yang (2006), Reis et al. (2007), Watson and Platt (2006), and Witvliet et al. (2008).

Neuroscience is still in its infancy, of course. Many social scientists have sharply criticized the widespread use of fMRI techniques to study the nature of social justice, claiming that currently the fMRI studies track only superficial changes and lack reliability and validity (Cacioppo et al. 2003; Movshon 2006; Panksepp 2007; Wade, cited in Wargo 2005). Nonetheless, this path-breaking research has the potential (as it grows ever more sophisticated) to answer age-old questions as to the nature of culture, perceptions of social justice, and the ways in which people react when faced with equitable or inequitable treatment.

Animal Models

Today, paleoanthropological evidence supports the view that notions of social justice and equity are extremely ancient. Ravens, for example, have been observed to attack those who violate social norms. Dogs get jealous if their playmates get treats and they do not. Wolves who do not “play fair” are often ostracized – a penalty that may well lead to the wolf’s death (Bekoff 2004; Brosnan 2006).

Primatologists have amassed considerable evidence that primates and other animals do care about fairness. In a study with brown capuchin (*Cebus apella*) monkeys, Brosnan and de Waal

(2003) found that female monkeys who were denied the rewards they deserved became furious. They refused to “play the game” (refused to exchange tokens for a cucumber) and disdained to eat their “prize” – holding out for the grapes they thought they deserved. If severely provoked (the other monkey did nothing and still got the highly prized grapes instead of the cucumber), capuchins grew so angry that they began to scream, beat their breasts, and hurl food at the experimenter. Interestingly, in a later study, the authors found that chimpanzees (*Pan troglodytes*) were most upset by injustice in casual relationships. In *chimps’* close, intimate relationships, injustice caused barely a ripple (Brosnan et al. 2005). We see, then, that different species, in different settings, may respond differently to injustice.

Potentially, this fascinating animal research may provide some insights into three questions that have intrigued equity researchers: (1) When, in primates’ long prehistory, did animals begin to feel “guilty” about receiving “too much,” as well as feeling outraged when they were “ripped off?” (Brosnan et al. 2005; Brosnan 2006); (2) Are animals more (or less) concerned about fairness in despotic, hierarchical societies than in those that are relatively egalitarian? (Brosnan 2006); (3) Are primates and other animals more (or less) concerned about inequities in close kin relationships than in more distant encounters? (Brosnan et al. 2005).

(For additional information, see Folger, Chap. 9 and Lewis and Hauser, Chap. 15.)

Why Do Good People Sometimes Behave Cruelly and Unjustly? The In-Group Versus the Out-Group

In discussing the nature of justice, we talked about what people perceive to be fair, how they calculate fairness and equity, and the techniques they use to set things right. What we have totally neglected to consider is “If people are so concerned with social justice, how is it that they are often so willing to engage in unjust and cruel behavior?” Turn on TV and watch any news broadcast (from the right wing Fox News to BBC News, from Deutsche Welle to Al Jazeera TV,

and, of course, the Web) and you will see horrific war scenes, demonstrating that in trying times, people often seem not to care a whit about justice. People would happily smite their enemies – if only they could. How can it be that sometimes ordinary citizens actually revel in cruelty and brutality?

In one of his early papers, Deutsch (1975) observed that people’s definitions of who is in one’s “moral community” is often severely circumscribed:

...one would not feel it to be unjust if one killed an annoying mosquito or caught a fish to eat for dinner. Similarly, “justice” is not involved in relations with others —such as heathens, “inferior races,” heretics, or “perverts”—who are perceived to be outside one’s actual or potential moral community or who are opposed to it. (p. 23)

There is, in fact, some pioneering neuroscience research documenting that social identity shapes neural responses to intergroup competition and harm. Specifically, scholars have found that seeing members of our own group suffer causes pain; seeing competitors suffer brings a smile to our face – or more precisely to our anterior cingulate cortex and insula (Cikara et al. 2011).

Deutsch (1975) observed that the broader one’s definition of “community,” the more people one will feel compelled to treat with respect and concern. Believers in “the family of man” may have a most generous perspective. Those in tight-knit groups may have a far narrower perspective. (There is some evidence in support of this contention as well. Knafo et al. (2009), for example, found that people in embedded cultures generally focus on the welfare of their own in-group, limiting their concern for outsiders’ well being; those in non-embedded cultures invite more people into their “moral community.” In three field experiments in 21 countries, they found that people in embedded cultures are less likely to help strangers in need than are their peers.)

In subsequent years, we suspect scholars will come to be increasingly interested in – not just the conditions that cause people to be concerned with social justice – but those that allow good people to view injustice with a shrug and to flagrantly violate norms of honor and decency.

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, we have traced the evolution of theories of social justice, focusing particularly on the pioneering work of Foa and Foa (Chap. 2). We began by reviewing early theorists' rather shaky (and narrow) speculations about the nature of social justice, social resources, and the rules for their exchange. We discussed modern-day theory and research, which has added both breadth and depth to our understanding of the attitudes, norms, and rules involved in the exchange of social resources. We ended by observing that social justice research is becoming a multidisciplinary enterprise. This is happening in a variety of ways: with cultural and historical scholars investigating the changes that have occurred (over time) in peoples' attitudes toward various social resources and the "appropriate" rules for their exchange; and with both psychobiologists and evolutionary theorists on the lookout for cultural universals.

Whether we focus on the conditions that motivate people to act with fairness, or to ignore the dictates of conscience, all of us probably harbor the secret desire that our research could help to make the world a better place. If only people around the world cared about not only family, friends, and neighbors, but all of humankind, as well! But how to persuade the world's citizens to care more deeply about social justice? In a famous essay, when discussing the problem of persuading Americans to sacrifice today for a future good, the economic historian Robert Heilbroner (1991) posed an ironic question: "What has Posterity Ever Done for Me?"

Certainly social change is not easy. We are not likely to be able to persuade most Afghanistan Sunnis to care much about their Shia enemies' well-being, Prime Minister David Cameron to worry about the EU, or Newt Gingrich to care overmuch about Mitt Romney's feelings. So it is naive to believe that even several lifetimes of social justice research can have a major impact on the world. But we need not aim so high. Fernand Braudel, an eminent French historian, once observed that he would happily settle for a world with a bit more justice, a bit more equality,

a bit more freedom, less violence, and a good deal less poverty. Those modest achievements would indeed be worthy of celebration.

Braudel's modest goals are not beyond reach (Cameron et al. 2003; Giacalone and Jurkiewicz 2003; Paloutzian and Park 2005). In fact, many social commentators point out that – as surprising as the claim may sound – over time the world has been improving. In his new book, *The Better Angels of Our Nature*, Steven Pinker (2011) provides compelling documentation that over the last 500 years, the world has grown more peaceful and less violent. People have become less racist, sexist, homophobic, and cruel to animals and children. He also contends that this moral progress has accelerated as we approach our own time. In the Bible, for example, God insisted that his true believers smite those who worshipped false gods, in an orgy of genocide. ("Thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth": Deuteronomy 20:16.) Now we have the Geneva Convention. A study of Native-American skeletons from hunter-gatherer societies found that 13 % of citizens had met a violent death. In the seventeenth century, the Thirty Years' War reduced Germany's population by one-third. Statistically, Pinker (2011) and Goldstein (2011) argue, even accounting for the calamities of World Wars I and II, the proportion of the citizenry killed in battle has declined. We think of the Twin Towers crumbling, but when we step back, the richer historical perspective offers better news than the daily cascade of headlines telling a story of violence, unending.

It is to be hoped that the work of scores of social justice thinkers and texts like this *Handbook* will increase the chances of making the world a *bit* better and a *bit* more concerned with social justice.

Appendix A

A Multi-factor Measure of Equity

Introduction: Explanation of Concepts

We're interested in the give-and-take that goes on in a dating relationship or marriage. We'd like to ask you a few questions about the things you put

into your relationship ... and the kinds of things you get out of it. We know that most people don't ordinarily keep careful track of exactly what they're giving and getting from their dating relationships or marriages. They certainly don't pull their relationship apart and think about the various aspects of their relationship, one by one. But in order for us to get some idea of what goes on in dating and marital relationships, we have to ask you and the other people we're interviewing to *spell out* some of the give-and-take that naturally occurs.

Let us look at some of the critical areas in any dating relationship or marriage. Look over this list. [Hand respondent list.] We'd like to ask about you and your partner's Personal Concerns, your Emotional Concerns, your Day-to-Day Concerns, and a little about the things the two of you feel you gain or lose – simply by dating or being married. We'd like you to read each item.

[Each item is read through, aloud if interviewer is used. After reading each item, Respondent is asked]:

Considering what you put into your dating relationship or marriage (in this area), compared to what you get out of it ... and what your partner puts in compared to what he or she gets out of it, how does your dating relationship/marriage "stack up"?

- +3: I am getting a much better deal than my partner.
- +2: I am getting a somewhat better deal.
- +1: I am getting a slightly better deal.
- 0: We are both getting an equally good or bad deal.
- 1: My partner is getting a slightly better deal.
- 2: My partner is getting a somewhat better deal.
- 3: My partner is getting a much better deal than I am.

Areas Involved in the Dating/Marital Give-and-Take Personal Concerns

Social Grace

1. Social Grace: Some people are sociable, friendly, relaxed in social settings. Others are not.

Intellect

2. Intelligence: Some people are intelligent and informed.

Appearance

3. Physical Attractiveness: Some people are physically attractive.
4. Concern for Physical Appearance and Health: Some people take care of their physical appearance and conditioning, through attention to such things as their clothing, cleanliness, exercise, and good eating habits.

Emotional Concerns

Liking and Loving

5. Liking: Some people like their partners and show it. Others do not.
6. Love: Some people feel and express love for their partners.

Understanding and Concern

7. Understanding and Concern: Some people know their partner's personal concerns and emotional needs and respond to them.

Acceptance

8. Accepting and Encouraging Role Flexibility: Some people let their partners try out different roles occasionally, for example, letting their partner be a "baby" sometimes, a "mother," a colleague or a friend, an aggressive as well as a passive lover, and so on.

Appreciation

9. Expressions of Appreciation: Some people openly show appreciation for their partner's contributions to the relationship – they do not take their partner for granted.

Physical Affection:

10. Showing Affection: Some people are openly affectionate – touching, hugging, kissing.

Sex

11. Sexual Pleasure: Some people participate in the sexual aspect of a relationship, working to make it mutually satisfying and fulfilling.
12. Sexual Fidelity: Some people live up to (are "faithful" to) their agreements about extra-marital relations.

Security/Freedom

13. Commitment: Some people commit themselves to their partners and to the future of their relationship together.
14. Respecting Partner's Need to Be a Free and Independent Person: Some people allow their partners to develop as an individual in the way that they choose; for example, they allow their partners freedom to go to school or not; to work at the kind of job or career they like; to pursue outside interests; to do things by themselves or with friends; to simply be alone sometimes.

Plans and Goals for the Future

15. Plans and Goals for the Future: Some people plan for and dream about their future together.

Day-to-Day Concerns*Day-to-Day Maintenance*

16. Day-to-Day Maintenance: Some people contribute time and effort to household responsibilities such as grocery shopping, making dinner, cleaning, and car maintenance. Others do not.

Finances:

17. Finances: Some people contribute income to the couple's "joint account."

Sociability

18. Easy-to-Live-With: Some people are easy to live with on a day-to-day basis; that is, they have a sense of humor, are not too moody, do not get drunk too often, and so on.
19. Companionship: Some people are good companions, who suggest interesting activities for both of them to do together, as well as going along with their partner's ideas about what they might do for fun.
20. Conversation: Some people tell partners about their day's events and what is on their mind...and are also interested in hearing about their partners' concerns and daily activities.
21. Fitting in: Some people are compatible with their partner's friends and relatives; they like

the friends and relatives, and the friends and relatives like them.

Decision Making:

22. Decision Making: Some people take their fair share of the responsibility for making and carrying out of decisions that affect both partners.

Remembering Special Occasions

23. Remembering Special Occasions: Some people are thoughtful about sentimental things, such as remembering birthdays, your anniversary, and other special occasions.

Opportunities Gained and Lost*Opportunities Gained*

24. Chance to Be Dating or Married: Dating and marriage give many people the opportunity to partake of the many life experiences that depend upon dating or being married; for example, the chance to become a parent and even a grandparent, the chance to be included in "married couple" social events, and finally, having someone to count on in old age.

Opportunities Foregone

25. Opportunities Foregone: Dating and marriage necessarily requires people to give up certain opportunities ...in order to be in this relationship. The opportunities could have been other possible mates, a career, travel, etc.

To calculate a *Total Index*, the experimenter sums the respondents' estimates of how Over-benefited, Equitably treated, or Under-benefited they are in each of the 25 areas and divides by 25.

If experimenters wish to weight the items by importance, they can simply go through the 25 items, one by one, and ask:

How important is this area to you?

8: Extremely important

7: Very important

6: Fairly important

5: Slightly important

4: Slightly unimportant

3: Fairly important

2: Very unimportant

1: Extremely unimportant

Then weight item by importance.

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