

Chapter 2

It's the End of the World as We Know It: The Advance of Climate Change from a Criminological Perspective

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Introduction

The future effects of climate change depend heavily on the steps we take to mitigate and adapt to it. We now have a reasonably good idea of how to avert the worst effects (see below), but so far have largely failed to act on this knowledge. Psychologists, economists, political scientists, and sociologists have devoted significant attention to the factors that have inhibited meaningful action, factors such as low environmental concern, the tendency to respond to immediate rather than delayed threats, and the efforts of the fossil fuel industry and its allies to create doubt about climate change. Underlying much of this literature is the assumption that action on climate change will increase once the very harmful effects of such change become apparent.

The chapter draws on the major crime theories to make a rather different argument—that the advance of climate change will *reduce* rather than increase the likelihood of meaningful action. I first briefly discuss the effects of climate change, the inadequate response to such change, and reasons for this inadequate response. I then discuss certain of the consequences of climate change from a criminological perspective, consequences such as increased strain, reduced control, and greater social conflict. These consequences are said to reduce the ability and willingness of individuals and groups to take meaningful action on climate change. I conclude by describing an alternative, more hopeful narrative.

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Background: Climate Change and the Failure to Respond

Climate Change and Its Effects

Our climate is changing, due largely to the burning of fossil fuels and, to a lesser extent, deforestation. The global mean temperature is increasing; ocean levels are rising; rain is increasing in some areas and decreasing in others; and extreme weather events are becoming more common—including hurricanes/cyclones, heavy downpours, heat waves, and droughts. Unless we take dramatic action in the very near future, climate change will likely proceed to the point where its effects are catastrophic. There will be massive food and freshwater shortages. Hundreds of millions will lose their homes and livelihoods to flooding, extreme weather events, and habitat change (e.g., grasslands turning into desert). There will be large-scale migrations, with many moving to megacities in developing nations. Social conflict will increase, particularly as groups compete over scarce resources. And billions will have their health threatened due to increased malnutrition, air and water pollution, extreme weather events, and the spread of diseases such as malaria and dengue fever. These effects will be greater among those in developing nations, the poor, females, the very young, and the very old—groups who are more vulnerable and/or less able to adapt to climate change (see also Chap. 9). But all will suffer (e.g., Buhaug et al. 2008; Cullen 2010; Global Humanitarian Forum 2009; Henson 2011; Kolmannskog 2008; Lancet and University College London Institute for Global Health Commission 2009; Oxfam 2009).

The Failure to Take Meaningful Action

Even though we are confronted with perhaps the greatest threat to humanity in our history, there has been little serious effort to mitigate and adapt to climate change. This is particularly true of the United States, which has emitted more greenhouse gases than any other nation, and it is the true at the international level (see Cullen 2010; Henson 2011; Lynch et al. 2010; McCright and Dunlap 2010; McKibben 2010). There is a general consensus that the global mean temperature should not increase by more than 2°C if we are to avert the effects of climate change just described. The greenhouse gases *now* in the atmosphere will result in an increase of about 1.5°C. And the rate of growth in carbon emissions is increasing. At present, we are headed toward an increase of 4–5°C by the end of this century, perhaps sooner (Henson 2011; McKibben 2010).

Efforts to deal with climate change must include a dramatic reduction in the use of fossil fuels, achieved by increasing the cost of carbon emissions, heavy investment in alternative energy sources, increased energy efficiency, alternative methods of farming, population control, and changes in lifestyle (e.g., less automobile use, smaller homes, reduced meat consumption). Efforts must also include initiatives to

remove and store carbon from the atmosphere, such as reforestation and the production of biochar (a charcoal that stores carbon, as well as enriching the soil). They must include programs to adapt to climate change, such as efforts to protect coastal areas from flooding and implement sustainable methods of farming. And they must include efforts by developed nations, who bear major responsibility for climate change, to help developing nations adapt and develop their economies in a sustainable manner (for overviews, see Global Humanitarian Forum 2009; Gore 2009; Henson 2011; Hertsgaard 2011). Most notably, a dramatic increase in funding is necessary to help developing nations create or move to renewable energy sources, improve energy efficiency, foster sustainable agricultural practices, support population-control programs, and adapt to such threats as flooding, food and freshwater shortages, climate-related health problems, and forced migration.

Reasons for Inaction

Researchers have devoted significant effort to explaining why most individuals and groups have failed to take meaningful action to mitigate and adapt to climate change. It is impossible to fully review this literature here, but a few general themes emerge (for summaries and selected studies, see Diekmann and Preisendorfer 2003; Dietz et al. 2007; Frantz and Mayer 2009; Franzen and Meyer 2010; Gockeritz et al. 2010; Henson 2011; Iwata 2004; Kurz 2002; Lindenberg and Steg 2007; Lynch et al. 2010; McCright and Dunlap 2010; Parks and Roberts 2008; Patchen 2010; Takacs-Santa 2007; York et al. 2003).

In order for action to occur, climate change must first be *defined as a relatively serious problem*. But this is frequently not the case, for a variety of reasons. Among other things, climate change is a problem of a special sort—it is a “slow crisis.” (Chap. 1) Its worst consequences will not appear for many years (e.g., a substantial rise in sea level), but people and groups are inclined to respond to immediate rather than delayed threats. Further, there has been a concerted effort on the part of the fossil fuel industry and others to create doubt about climate change and its negative effects. This effort is reflected in corporate advertising and the support provided to organizations and scientists who question climate change. And the mass media often unwittingly support this effort, in the interest of presenting “balanced coverage” of issues (Henson 2011; Lynch et al. 2010; McCright and Dunlap 2010; Takacs-Santa 2007; Chap. 4).

Second, individuals and groups must feel that they have the *ability to take meaningful action*. But many believe that they are unable to do so, given the structural constraints they face, their lack of resources, and/or the enormity of the problem. Many people, for example, have no choice but to drive to work given the design of cities and lack of public transit. Many developing nations lack the financial resources to adapt to climate change (e.g., build levees to protect against rising sea levels, develop industries less vulnerable to climate change).

Third, individuals and groups must feel that they have *an obligation to act*. This obligation is rooted in their normative beliefs (e.g., belief that others engage in environmentally responsible behavior and expect that they do the same), moral beliefs (e.g., belief that environmentally responsible behavior is good), emotions (anger and sadness about environmental problems), and sense of responsibility for the problem. But many do not feel this obligation. The people around them do not engage in environmentally responsible behavior or expect it of others. They do not accord much value to the environment. Instead, they prioritize economic development, viewing the environment as a resource to be exploited for their benefit. Related to this, they are not upset by environmental problems. And/or they do not believe that it is their responsibility to act. For example, they believe that others created the problem and it is their responsibility to act. Or they believe that climate change will be addressed by technological advances (e.g., Hayward 2010; Patchen 2010; Takacs-Santa 2007). Beyond that, some engage in token behaviors, such as occasional recycling, that make them feel that they have fulfilled their obligation to act.

Finally, individuals and groups must believe that it is in their interests to act, with the *perceived benefits of action outweighing the costs*. But many believe that the costs of action are too high (e.g., Diekmann and Preisendorfer 2003; Lindenberg and Steg 2007; Lynch et al. 2010; Patchen 2010). Many individuals, for example, believe that it takes too much time and effort to walk or use public transit. Many corporations believe that action would jeopardize their profits or even survival. Many in the United States believe that action would threaten their economic prosperity, while many in the developing world believe that it would threaten their plans for economic development. A good case can be made that such views are mistaken, particularly when long-term interests are considered, but such views nevertheless contribute to inaction.

Given the above, some argue that there will not be a meaningful response to climate change until the negative consequences of such change become more apparent. At that point, climate change will become an immediate problem for much of the world; its seriousness difficult to deny. Many will feel an obligation to act, given that climate change will become an *obvious* threat to humanity—as well as to economic prosperity and development. And many will feel that it is in their interests to act, given that the costs of climate change will have become quite high. Unfortunately, it will then be too late to avert many of the effects described above. Climate change and its effects cannot be quickly reversed. The greenhouse gases we emit stay in the atmosphere for decades or longer, and after a certain temperature threshold is crossed we may set in motion processes that rapidly increase the rate of climate change. For example, a further rise in temperatures may result in the massive release of methane—a very potent greenhouse gas—from the arctic tundra and ocean floors. This in turn would result in a dramatic increase in climate change, even if the burning of fossil fuels were dramatically reduced (see McKibben 2010, pp. 20–22). Nevertheless, there is some feeling that meaningful action will come

with the advance of climate change. These ideas are expressed by Giddens (2009, p. 2), among others:

Since the dangers posed by global warming aren't tangible, immediate, or visible in the course of day-to-day life, however awesome they appear, many will sit on their hands and do nothing of a concrete nature about them. Yet waiting until they become visible and acute before being stirred to serious action will, by definition, be too late.

The Response to Climate Change: A Criminological Perspective

I next question this view, arguing that the advance of climate change will *reduce* the likelihood of meaningful action to mitigate and adapt to it. I draw on the leading crime theories in making this argument, particularly strain, social support, social control, social learning/rational choice, and critical theories (see Agnew 2009; Cullen and Agnew 2011). These theories suggest that the consequences of climate will be such that they create more pressing problems for individuals, reduce the ability to take meaningful action, undermine the obligation to act, and increase the costs of such action. It is not my intention to be a doomsayer in making these arguments, but rather to point to certain unanticipated consequences of climate change in the hope that we might better respond to them.

Climate Change as a Relatively Serious Problem

Many people now view climate change as a serious problem; even in the United States—where there has been a major campaign to raise doubts about it. In a 2010 Gallup poll, for example, 53% of the people surveyed in the United States agreed that “global warming” was a “very” or “somewhat” serious threat (42% of the people in the 111 countries surveyed said the same). When people are asked to list the *most important* issues facing the United States, however, the environment—including climate change—is typically listed by less than five percent of respondents in open-ended questions. Similar results are obtained in Europe. And the environment is ranked at or near of the bottom when respondents are presented with lists of problems to rank (Hayward 2010; also see Dietz et al. 2007). As a result, climate change is one of many problems competing for resources, with other problems taking priority.

Drawing on strain theory (Agnew 2006), I argue that the advance of climate change will *not* increase the *relative* priority attached to it. This may seem like an odd argument; research suggests that concern about environmental problems is partly a function of vulnerability to, experiences with, and media reports on such problems (Brody et al. 2008; Takacs-Santa 2007). All of these will increase given the massive problems that climate change will bring. Strain theory, however, suggests that while these problems will increase the *absolute* level of concern

about climate change, they will not increase the *relative* priority attached to it. To understand the basis for this argument, it is first necessary to describe the problems or strains that will result from climate change. These strains include the following:

- Extreme weather events, including hurricanes, heat waves, droughts, and floods, as well as associated phenomena such as forest fires and blackouts (Henson 2011; Oxfam 2009).
- Massive food, freshwater, and fuel shortages, especially in the developing world. Billions of people, for example, will face extreme freshwater scarcity (Global Humanitarian Forum 2009; Oxfam 2009).
- The loss of or threats to livelihood, particularly on the part of farmers, herders, fishers, and those involved in snow- and water-related tourism (60% percent of the population in developing nations). Partly as a result of such threats, poverty and inequality will increase (the poor will suffer proportionately more than the rich from climate change, thus increasing levels of inequality) (Global Humanitarian Forum 2009; Oxfam 2009).
- The loss of homes and property due to extreme weather events and rising sea levels (Global Humanitarian Forum 2009; Oxfam 2009). For example, sea level is predicted to rise by at least 1 m this century, and perhaps many meters beyond that. Thirteen of the world's 20 largest cities are on the coast, and so are directly threatened by this rise, as well as by the higher storm surges associated with more severe storms.
- Illness and injury due to the spread of disease, food and freshwater shortages, increased air and water pollution, and extreme weather events; as well as the death and injury of close others. The Global Humanitarian Forum (2009) estimates that 300,000 people *now* die each year as a result of Climate Change, and a Lancet Commission report states that "climate change is the biggest global health threat of the twenty-first century," with the lives and well-being of billions of people at risk (Lancet and University College London Institute for Global Health Commission 2009; also see Oxfam 2009).
- Forced migration, both within and across borders, with many moving to the slum areas of megacities in developing nations. Residence in these slums involves exposure to additional strains. Among other things, work and resources are scarce; living conditions are often crowded, noisy, and chaotic; those in the receiving population are sometimes hostile; and criminal victimization is frequently high. Estimates vary a good deal, but many claim that hundreds of millions of people will be forced to move this century due to such things as rising sea levels, desertification, extreme weather events, and social conflict (Kolmannskog 2008; Oxfam 2009; Tacoli 2009).
- Exposure to violent social conflicts and crime, fueled in part by competition over scarce resources and the above strains (Agnew 2011; Buhaug et al. 2008; Kolmannskog 2008; Raleigh et al. 2008; Oxfam 2009; Smith and Vivekananda 2007). In particular, climate change may increase conflict between states (e.g., interstate conflicts over freshwater sources), between groups within states (e.g., conflicts over food, the distribution of disaster relief), and between individuals (interpersonal violence

and theft). Agnew (2011) argues that climate change will become one of the major, if not the major, forces driving crime as the century progresses.

- Strains affecting higher-class individuals, corporations, and developed nations. While the poor will suffer more, wealthier individuals and groups will experience many of the above strains, such as extreme weather events. Also, they will pay more for things such as energy, consumer goods, and insurance. Their lives will be more closely regulated, as efforts to limit carbon emissions increase. And the poor will often make demands on and threaten them, since they are largely responsible for climate change and possess valued resources.

These strains pose an immediate and direct threat to individuals and groups, and so will be ranked highest in priority. In particular, individuals and groups will focus on ways to reduce and escape from these strains, as well as seek revenge against those blamed for them. One might argue that these strains are caused by climate change and so the major focus will be on ways to alleviate and adapt to such change. But when presented with strains of the above type, the immediate focus is on the strains themselves and not on the background factors that cause them. A hungry person, for example, searches for food rather than more sustainable methods of farming. We see evidence for this today, particularly in the United States. When the economic crisis struck in 2008, there was a substantial shift in public opinion, with people becoming much more likely to state that economic growth should take priority over environmental protection (53% felt this way in 2010, versus 23% in 2000) (Hayward 2010). More generally, data suggest that poorer nations and the poorer people within nations have lower levels of environmental concern (Franzen and Meyer 2010).

In addition, climate change is a problem of a special sort. Just as the negative effects of climate change take years to emerge, efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change take years to have an effect. Efforts at mitigation will take decades or longer, partly because of the extended lifecycle of most greenhouse gases. And most efforts at adaptation will take much time to implement, assuming that the resources for implementation are available. Individuals and groups experiencing the above strains, however, will be in the market for immediate solutions. Further, they will be less selective about the nature of such solutions than would ordinarily be the case. Their desperate state promotes a focus on immediate self-interest, with less concern for the long-term consequences of their behavior and its effect on others. Consequently, they will sometimes cope by committing criminal or harmful acts, including acts that contribute to further climate change. For example, they may steal food, raid forests for fuel, burn low-grade coal, and attack migrant groups. The likelihood of such criminal or harmful coping is further exacerbated by other of the effects of climate change, described below.

The Ability to Take Meaningful Action

Climate change will also undermine the ability of individuals and groups to take meaningful action to mitigate and adapt to it. First, climate change will reduce

the resources necessary for such action. As climate change proceeds, the strains described above will become more widespread, frequent, and severe. Further, they will often co-occur; for example, certain areas will experience much increased temperatures, coastal flooding, extreme weather events, *and* drought. As a consequence, levels of poverty will increase, with large numbers of people losing their livelihoods and property. Likewise, large numbers of people will have their physical and mental health impaired, with extreme weather events and other of the above strains increasing depression, lethargy, and stress disorders (Page and Howard 2010). Many will lose their social supports as well. Family members, friends, and neighbors will be killed and injured, experience health problems, lose their resources, and/or move away. Private insurance will become too costly or unavailable. And many will migrate to the slums of megacities, where social support is low. Likewise, communities and states will exhaust their resources as they struggle to cope with the negative effects of climate change. Such effects include food, freshwater, and fuel shortages; widespread death, injury, and illness; the destruction of critical infrastructure by extreme weather events; the displacement of large numbers of people due to flooding, drought, and extreme weather events; and social conflict. As a consequence, individuals and groups will lack the resources—including material, physical, psychological, and social resources—to take meaningful action. This will be especially true for poor individuals and developing nations.

Second, climate change will reduce the ability of groups to exercise social control, also critical if meaningful action is to occur. An effective response to climate change requires action that is not in the immediate interests of individuals and groups. In particular, it requires prohibiting individuals and groups from engaging in certain self-interested acts that contribute to climate change (e.g., excessive driving, building coal-fired power plants). And it requires mandating them to engage in acts that do not serve their immediate interests (e.g., taking public transit, installing emissions controls). That is, it requires that they invest their resources in mitigation and adaptation projects that will not provide benefits for years or even decades. Further, it requires that developed nations provide massive aid to developing nations, to help them adapt to climate change and build sustainable economies. Accomplishing these things requires the exercise of social control, since individuals and groups are often reluctant to act against their immediate self-interests—especially in the face of the threats just described.

Effective social control involves setting clear rules, monitoring behavior, and consistently sanctioning rule violations in a meaningful way. It involves socializing individuals and groups so that they accept the need for such rules. And it involves providing individuals and groups with a stake in conformity, so they have some incentive to abide by the rules (see Agnew 2009). Climate change, however, will reduce the ability of communities, nations, and international organizations to exercise such control. These groups will have to devote more of their resources to coping with the negative effects of climate change just described, and so will have fewer resources to devote to their criminal justice systems and other organizations designed to exercise social control. Extreme weather events and associated phenomena, such as blackouts and forest fires, will reduce the ability to exercise social

control by disrupting routine activities. Likewise, the growth of megacities will undermine efforts at control, since it is more difficult to exercise control in very poor areas characterized by high turnover (Agnew 2009). But most importantly, these groups will have trouble meeting the basic needs of people, such as the needs for food and water, shelter, security, and work. As a consequence, people will be less likely to accept the rules promoted by these groups—both because they have a lower stake in conformity and are more likely to question the legitimacy of these groups.

Finally, the advance of climate change will increase both intra- and inter-state conflict, making it difficult to forge the cooperative agreements necessary for a meaningful response to climate change. The advance of climate change will intensify existing conflicts. This includes conflict between those who benefit from activities linked to climate change and those who do not. The primary beneficiaries are those associated with the fossil fuel industry and, more generally, the economic/political elites of most nations. These elites are dependent on market economies fueled by high levels of consumption, with this consumption being a major cause of climate change (Worldwatch Institute 2010; York et al. 2003). The advance of climate change will increase challenges to these groups, as their harmful actions become more apparent. These groups, in turn, will use their enormous power to resist such challenges. Indeed, these groups are already heavily involved in a fight to undermine meaningful action on climate change and—as suggested above—have been quite successful in this fight (Frantz and Mayer 2009; Henson 2011; Lynch et al. 2010; McCright and Dunlap 2010; York et al. 2003).

The advance of climate change will also exacerbate existing conflicts between developed and developing nations (Parks and Roberts 2008). Those in developing nations did not cause climate change, but they will suffer greatly from its effects. For example, they are far more likely to experience death, injury, and homelessness from climate-related disasters (see Global Humanitarian Forum 2009; Parks and Roberts 2008; Oxfam 2009). Consequently, developing nations will become more insistent in their demand that developed nations make large cuts in carbon emissions and provide them with aid, both to help them adapt to climate change and build sustainable economies. Developed nations, however, will be reluctant to drastically cut their emissions and provide massive aid to distant others—especially when they feel threatened by the above strains. This conflict between developed and developing nations is perhaps the major reason for the current failure to reach meaningful international agreements on climate change (Parks and Roberts 2008).

Climate change will also create new conflicts. Most such conflicts will likely center around competition over scarce resources, such as freshwater and fuel. Migration will also increase conflict, particularly when large numbers of people move into areas with scarce resources. Also, conflict will emerge as communities, states, and international organizations lose their ability to exercise effective social control. The exercise of such control prevents much conflict, since groups are encouraged to restrain themselves from acting on their immediate interests and governmental bodies mediate those disputes which do arise. In sum, the advance of

climate change will undermine the ability to take meaningful action, as resources become scarce, social control weakens, and conflict increases.

The Obligation to Act

As climate change advances, the great harm that it causes will certainly foster an obligation to act. Increasing numbers of people will call for action, such action will appear increasingly desirable, and the negative emotions aroused by climate change will increase. But at the same time, this advance will provide a variety of excuses and justifications for inaction—undermining this general obligation to act. Most of these excuses and justifications were suggested above. Individuals and groups will claim that they must focus on more pressing issues, particularly those involving basic needs for food, shelter, and security, that they lack the resources to act, and/or that it is not their responsibility to act.

Further, group conflict will lead some groups to denigrate others. It is common for conflicting groups to blame one another for the problems they are experiencing and, in some cases, to dehumanize each other (Bandura 1990). This denigration will also undermine the obligation to take meaningful action, since it reduces the moral concern for those in other groups. The result, instead, will be more limited actions that benefit one's in-group and often hurt those in outgroups. The wealthy, for example, may take steps to protect themselves from the worst effects of climate change—even though doing so hurts those in other groups. For example, the wealthy may use their resources to build protected communities and secure needed resources, while others remain exposed to the worst effects of climate change. Related to this, we might also expect efforts to deny the suffering experienced by these others (see Cohen 2001).

The Interest to Act (Costs and Benefits of Acting)

Even if individuals and groups feel an obligation to act, they may not do so if the perceived costs of action outweigh the benefits. As noted above, the effects of climate change will promote a focus on immediate interests. This reduces the likelihood of a favorable cost–benefit ratio for acting on climate change, since the upfront costs of mitigation and adaptation efforts are often high, but the benefits are delayed. Further, the upfront costs will become increasingly high as climate change proceeds, while the ability to pay such costs will decline. And, as noted above, the increase in costs will be particularly high for those associated with the fossil fuel industry and for the economic/political elites in many countries—making these especially powerful groups quite reluctant to act. At the same time, the immediate costs associated with criminal or harmful responses to climate change will decline as social control breaks down.

Conclusion

The above arguments are quite bleak, suggesting that the advance of climate change will reduce rather than increase the likelihood of meaningful efforts to mitigate and adapt to it. This will occur because climate change increases strain, reduces social support and control, increases social conflict, fosters justifications and excuses for inaction, and increases the cost of meaningful action. The end result will be a Hobbesian world, with people and groups struggling to survive in a harsh environment, and the state unable to provide adequate support or exercise effective social control. At the same time, it is critical to note that there is an alternative, more hopeful narrative.

Research indicates that people are not simply motivated by self-interest; they have a prosocial side as well. Among other things, they care about others, desire to cooperate with them, and will come to their aid in times of need—even if it involves some (limited) cost (e.g., Penner et al. 2005; Sautter et al. 2011). These prosocial tendencies apply more to members of one's ingroup than to outgroups; but people have become increasingly likely over time to view diverse others as part of their ingroup (Singer 1981). Further, these prosocial tendencies are sometimes displayed even during times of hardship. For example, disaster researchers have found that individuals tend to help one another in the period immediately following disasters (Tierney 2007). Perhaps reflecting these facts, there is now much environmental concern throughout the world, even among the poor and those in developing nations (Dunlap and York 2008). So there is some reason to believe that people may be able to overcome their immediate interests and divisions, and take meaningful action on climate change. Beyond that, meaningful action might also be fostered by technological advances, particularly advances that dramatically reduce the upfront costs of responding to climate change (Gore 2009).

It is at this point an open question which narrative will dominate our response to climate change. This is a topic researchers should investigate, through both case studies and quantitative research. In particular, researchers might examine how the effects described above—such as food and freshwater shortages, the loss of home and livelihood due to natural disaster, and migration in the context of scarce resources—influence the ability and motivation to take meaningful action on climate change. Such research will be limited by the fact that it cannot fully duplicate the severe effects of future climate change. Nevertheless, it can provide useful information. I suspect that evidence will be found for both narratives, with climate change stimulating both self-interested and prosocial behaviors.

The central point of this paper, however, is that it is critical to be aware of the possibility that climate change may at least sometimes have the negative effects described above. And if research finds evidence for these effects, steps can be taken to reduce or counteract them. Social and behavioral scientists have discussed ways in which we might foster environmental concern, increase the perceived and actual ability to engage in environmentally responsible behavior, create an obligation to engage in such behavior, and reduce the likelihood that people will base their actions

solely on immediate self-interest (e.g., Kurz 2002; Lindenberg and Steg 2007; McCright and Dunlap 2010; Patchen 2010; Parks and Roberts 2008). And, as suggested in this chapter, criminologists have much to contribute to this discussion. In particular, we might increase the likelihood of a meaningful response to climate change by addressing certain of the criminogenic effects of such change, particularly increased strain, reduced social support and control, the development of beliefs conducive to harmful behavior, and increased social conflict (for suggestions in these areas, see Agnew 2009; Barlow and Decker 2010; Simpson and Weisburd 2010).

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