

Chapter 3

The Educationalization of the Modern World: Progress, Passion, and the Protestant Promise of Education

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3.1 Introduction

In the foreword to his very last *World Development Report* by the World Bank Group in 2007, World Bank Group President Paul Wolfowitz (2006) reminds readers that the Bank's overarching mission is to fight poverty throughout the world. A core task in this fight is to invest in young people, more precisely in their education. Never before, Wolfowitz asserts, has the time been better to invest in young people, because never before in history has the number of people worldwide aged 12–24 years been larger, and never before have young people been as healthy and well educated as today. Because of falling fertility, the need for this investment has become even more urgent, since the aging of societies will cause tremendous social, economic, and political challenges in the near future. In order to avoid the fundamental problems of aging societies, it is necessary to raise the share of the population that is working and to boost household savings. After all, Wolfowitz reminds the readers, the young people of today are “tomorrow's workers, entrepreneurs, parents, active citizens, and, indeed, leaders” (Wolfowitz, 2006, p. xi).

At least two discursive patterns in this *Foreword* by Wolfowitz might catch our attention. First, we might note the rhetorical trick that reformers always use by urging that ‘never before’ has such and such been the case and that it is most important ‘especially today’ to think or act in this or another way. The seriousness or even tragedy of the present is presented as an indisputable fact. However, despite the fact that the alleged appraisal of the present can only be read as historical argument, it is not based on any historical investigation at all but instead appeals to general sentiments that people have had forever as they deal with everyday life and strive for certainty. According to John Dewey's (1929) Gifford Lectures, *The Quest for Certainty*, this striving is the fundament on which people construct dualistic world-views, praising religiously the intelligible eternal world and being sceptical toward the contingent empirical world.

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Although this discursive pattern would still deserve much more attention in research – for it has a hidden, shaping influence on most of ethical, political, social, or educational discourse – in this chapter I am more interested in a second discursive pattern that is younger historically than the patterns stemming from the fear of the present, for there are good arguments that the latter is in some sort of way the heir of the former. In any case, this second pattern is certainly not independent of the first. It is characterized by isolating educational questions from the social, economic, or political problems of society in order to champion education as a solution to these perceived social, economic, or political problems. The genesis of this specific mode of thinking can be labeled as the ‘educationalizing’ of social, economic, and political problems. As a dominant mode of looking at solutions for perceived non-educational but social, economic, or political problems, it was developed mostly in the eighteenth century. Upon this background we get an idea of why, when discussing the first discursive pattern, Dewey ends his investigation with the eighteenth century because the latter might well be the successor of the first, transferring the religious energy of the first to the second pattern; what was ‘above’ in the first pattern, heavenly salvation, now lays ‘ahead’ in the future, where these perceived problems are solved on earth by means of education. In any case, since the shift to, or genesis of, this (second) discursive pattern occurred, it has experienced a triumphant advance up until the present, as we see, for example, in Wolfowitz’s *Foreword*. Even though education was given prominent attention by people like Plato, Aristotle, Erasmus, the Jesuits, or others in their conception of the good life, no evidence can be found that before, say, 1750 education was dominantly determined to shore up an uncertain future of the social, political, or economic aspects of society by means of education.¹

The two key words ‘education’ and ‘around 1750’ usually generate a reflex within educational discourse, namely, the reference to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, more precisely to Rousseau’s *Emile*, published in 1762. Whatever history of education we are looking at, Rousseau and *Emile* are seen as the key events within the development of ideas on education, the demarcation line between old and new, between the dark ages of education and the dawn of modernity – an assessment that is shared not only by historians but also by philosophers of education (Tröhler, 2003, 2006a). However, reflexes are sensual and mechanical, and not very intellectual or carefully considered. As an important mode of non-reflexive reactions within discourses they certainly deserve deeper analysis. Of course, there is no doubt that Rousseau’s *Emile* was a frequently heard voice in the eighteenth century, but at the same time we have to recognize that this was only one voice within a big, untuned chorale provoked by fundamental societal transformations that took place at the end of the seventeenth century. Rousseau’s may have been the most conspicuous voice within this music, but it certainly did not imply that educational concepts could solve alleged problems of the present and the future caused by these transformations. Rather than asking how the darker sides of these transformations could be tempered by education in order to secure their advantages, *Emile*’s educational theory tries to ignore the social and economic context and arguably tries to educate a pure and independent human being (Emile ends up as a slave-chief in Algeria, having been cheated on by his

wife, Sophie). On this background, Rousseau's educational concept in *Emile* can be seen as almost anything but modern.

But as we know, the education of the pure and independent human being was not Rousseau's favored solution to education. In the very first pages of *Emile*, when complaining about the present, Rousseau mentions his favored educational concept 'public instruction'. Rousseau felt that this concept was incompatible with modernity: "Public instruction no longer exists and can no longer exist, because where there is no longer fatherland, there can no longer be citizens. These two words, *fatherland* and *citizen*, should be effaced from modern languages" (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 40). Surprisingly, it has rarely been noted that Rousseau himself uses these two words unabashedly. He first uses them in the third book of *Emile*, and he praises the concept of public instruction in *Lettre to d'Alembert* (Rousseau, 1758), where he defends the educational practices in his hometown of Geneva. A similar defense appears in *Considerations about the Government in Poland* (Rousseau, 1782). He defends the concept of *citizen* education as compared to the education of a *bourgeois*, the latter being the dominant concept in the new transformed eighteenth century. For Rousseau, this is a terrible sign of decay. In *Emile*, Rousseau writes: "He will be a Frenchman, an Englishman, a bourgeois. He will be nothing" (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 40).

The *bourgeois*, the concept Rousseau is challenging, is primarily an ideological attribution, a *parole*, if you wish, that refers to a specific ideological *langue*, namely, the *langue* of republicanism. Within this *langue* of republicanism, the counterpart of the *bourgeois* is not the pure and independent human being but rather the *citoyen*, the virtuous citizen. In *Emile*, Rousseau hides this distinction to a certain degree. This is unfortunate, particularly when we consider the bizarre reception of the novel. However, he makes the distinction clear in *A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality Among Mankind* (Rousseau, 1755). On this background we understand why Rousseau says in *Emile* that he wants to efface the "two words, *fatherland* and *citizen*," because the transformation of the big European societies – save those of Switzerland and of Poland – has made them obsolete. The ideal of the republic appeared to be unreachable under the conditions of modernity in the European monarchies that resulted from the previously mentioned fundamental transformations.

But what was at the core of this transformation of the societies in the eighteenth century that in the eyes of Rousseau obviously seemed to be incompatible with the ideals of republicanism? It is a process that we can call somewhat sweepingly the 'capitalization of society' that became possible after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the death of Richard Cromwell in 1658. Capitalism builds essentially on trade, and trade requires peace.² This process, described by numerous inspiring studies, caused, on the one hand, a transformation of the social structure of the societies, and on the other a deep ideological conflict, for since antiquity, views on commerce have always been conflicting. A large part of the discussions of the eighteenth century dealt with this conflict; it shaped the 'gigantic *querelle*' between the ideal of the modern entrepreneur on the one hand and the ideal of the virtuous Roman citizen on the other (Pocock, 1980, p. 301). It is within this *querelle* that

Rousseau published most of his writings, looking to the future with an idealized past in his head and heart, and it is in the very same *querelle* that a less provocative solution was presented. This solution was also educational, but dedicated to harmonizing the modern economy and republican ideals, the future and the past. It is in this context that the second discursive pattern that we find in Wolfowitz's *Foreword*, identifying improved education for the salvation of the social future, arose in the middle of the eighteenth century.

It is no coincidence that this educational solution arose in a Protestant context, more precisely in a Reformed Protestant context, that is, in Swiss Protestantism, of which Rousseau – as a citizen of Geneva – was a part of, of course. I will demonstrate this development showing four stages. First, I will reconstruct the conflict between commerce and republicanism that took place around 1700 (1.), in order to reconstruct the preferred methods for moving beyond this conflict. Two such methods were adopted in Great Britain, namely, the ‘botanizing’ of women and the adjustment of the political vocabulary (2.). In the third step I show how this conflict between the rise of commerce and the renaissance of republicanism expressed itself around 1750 (3.), in order to explain how the educationalization of the modern world became the favored solution in Swiss Protestantism (4.). At the end I will outline how this educationalization has become a global idea that dominates educational thinking.

3.2 The Ideological Conflict Between the Rise of Commerce and the Renaissance of Republicanism Around 1700

Rousseau and many others criticized current social and political developments based on economic transformations; this conflict can be seen as a reaction to the ‘capitalization of society.’ A particularly prominent expression of this process is the founding of the Bank of England in 1694, an event that illustrates the ‘triumph’ of the economy, so to speak. When William of Orange took the throne in 1688 (William III), years of political unrest had depleted public finances. The Scottish trader and financier William Patterson (1658–1719) proposed the establishment of a creditor association of wealthy private citizens to lend money to the nation, a total of 1.2 million pounds at an interest rate of 8%. With the founding of the Bank of England a successful and enduring system of public underwriting emerged that from this time onward allowed individual persons and companies to invest in the state. This meant that owners of capital assets were in a position to transform “the relations between government and citizens, and by implication between all citizens and all subjects, into relations between debtors and creditors” (Pocock, 1979, p. 149). The competition between politics and capital was thus decided; politics became the object of private interests. Consequently, politics became largely indifferent to issues pertaining to morality.

These developments, which capitalized people’s relations to the state and each other, were associated with the Whig Party majority in the English Parliament.

Language, ideology, and political party were bound together. The Tories, the political opposition, consequently formulated their arguments in a decidedly anti-capitalist *langue*, which led to a renaissance of the *langue* of republicanism. This revival of the republican ideal made it possible for representatives of the ‘commercial society’ to be accused of ‘corruption’ and for the ideal of the patriotic citizen to be raised against them (Pocock, 1979, p. 148). The accusation of corruption was based on the reasoning that people whose lives are so utterly shaped by trade and commerce could make no contribution to the common good. The ‘commercial men’ were specialists dedicated to the production and trade of specific goods, who paid other specialists, that is, politicians and soldiers (mercenaries), to lead the country politically and militarily. From the view of republican ideology, ‘commercial men’ lacked rationality and efficiency, for they were subject to their passions: “For these the appropriate term in the republican lexicon was corruption” (Pocock, 1975, p. 464). Against this, the patriotic ideal was the fully moral person able and willing to fulfill public duties. This ideal is based not on owners of money and goods but on owners of land. This person is, in the term of Rousseau, a true *citoyen*, whereas the commercial man is a *bourgeois*, a ‘nothing.’

Thus, the main argument against these developments was psychological. It built on the assumption that, as a rule, commerce, or trade, are coterminous with passion, passion being seen as the opposite of reason and politics, and the explanation for the corruption of the soul. Passionate people with social and/or political power were – in the eyes of critics – the exact opposite of the political ideal they shared, which was the autarkic citizen filled with the overarching and only legitimate passion, love for the fatherland. This ideal citizen is oriented toward the common good. He is quite unlike the entrepreneur that is always worried about stock markets or the destiny of trading ships holding expensive goods. Such an individual is only consumed with passionate concern for his own fortune. Obviously, the ideological conflict between reason and passion was not only a political one but also a clearly gender-biased one, for the ideal of the republican citizen had an unmistakable masculine connotation. In the dominant languages of the seventeenth century, economy and passion were feminine attributes, being connected with desires, fantasies, and hysteria. Both Luxuria as the Greek Goddess of indulgence and Fortuna as the moody Roman Goddess of fate were connected (in the discourse of the time) with the results of capitalist economy. They provided a challenge to the male-godlike *logos* and thus were set in opposition to the masculine *virtú* of the (male) citizen. Feminine attributes on the social or political level connoted either apocalypse, or, at the very least war. Consequently, the only solutions that seemed possible would have to emerge within an anti-commercial ideological setting, that is, in an agrarian economy. This attitude was not only held in England but was a feature of the discussions over republicanism taking place across Europe. Such an attitude even influenced Thomas Jefferson: “I repeat it again, cultivators of the earth are the most virtuous and independent citizens (. . .) But the actual habits of our countrymen attach them to commerce. They will exercise it for themselves. Wars then must sometimes be our lot; . . .” (Jefferson, 1785/87/1984, p. 301).

The notion is that landowners are far less concerned with income than people who invest their money in the stock markets and thus become nervous and passionate regarding their own interests. By contrast, land owners are in a political position to put themselves fully in the service of the common good: “The landed man, successor to the master of the classical *oikos*, was permitted the leisure and autonomy to consider what was to others’ good as well as his own; but the individual engaged in exchange could discern only particular values – that of commodity which was his, that of the commodity for which he exchanged it” (Pocock, 1975, p. 464).

3.3 Botanizing Women and Adjusting the Vocabulary: The British Example

The ideological tension between the real material process of the ‘capitalization of society’ and the growing discursive critique of the consequences of this development brought about a need to modify the dominant political language: money had to be made more ‘socially acceptable’. As Pocock notes (1980), the problem behind this need was that although the commercial society came to reign, it never succeeded in developing a concept of a person that was as attractive as the image of the patriot whose central passion was the common good. In relation to this background, from 1700 on, ‘patriot’ and ‘investor’ stood in dialectical ideological opposition to one another: “The social thought of the eighteenth century has begun to look like a single gigantic *querelle* between the individual as Roman patriot, self-defined in his sphere of civic action, and the individual in the society of private investors and professional rulers, progressive in the march of history, yet hesitant between action, philosophy, and passion” (Pocock, 1980, p. 349).

In other words, the dominant mode of economy did not have a dominant language at its side but rather a critical one. This obvious tension caused the need to change the traditional political *langue* and its vocabulary. It had to give way to a language in which money, capital, and capitalism could not be stigmatized any more – and where passions no longer played any crucial role. Two different strategies can be distinguished: One was to domesticate the female nature, so that economy in the eighteenth century could become a masculine affair, and the other was to replace the notion of passion with the notion of interest, so that the emotions of trading men were ideologically more acceptable.

At the core of the first strategy, we find botanical texts that were unequivocally addressed to the female sex (George, 2006). The language of these botanical texts, focused on “reproduction and sexuality, experience and science, classification and order, introspective solitude and public debate” (p. 3), and served to define the intellectual, moral, and social status of women (p. 3). The pioneer of this discourse (based on a new system of hierarchy of orders and classes in botany) was the Swedish scientist Carl Linnaeus or Carl von Linné (1707–1778). Linnaeus was interpreted by and used by authors who derived social implications from his ideas and encouraged women to engage in botany “as an antidote to feminine faults”

(p. 6). Following Linnaeus' logic of order, some of the treatises written by these authors focused on botany as a specific curricular subject for young women, "who were imagined to lack discipline" (p. 6), so that they would "engage with order and regularity" (p. 6). The most famous of these authors was – again – Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who wrote *Lettres elementaires sur la botanique*³ in 1771–1773. The *Lettres* were translated into German in 1781 (*J.J. Rousseau's Botanik für Frauenzimmer in Briefen an die Frau von XXXXL****) and in 1785 an English translation by Thomas Martyn, Professor of Botany in Cambridge, was published (*Letters on the Elements of Botany Addressed to a Lady*) (p. 6). In the letters Rousseau makes it clear that a young woman should be engaged with nature in general and, in particular, with plants, because this will "suppress the taste of vicious pleasures, preempt the break-out of passions and give the soul useful food by fulfilling it with the most dignified objects of her examinations" (Rousseau, 1781, p. 2 [freely translated from the German translation here]). In addition to this botanical/pedagogical domestication of the female passions, a set of reading lists containing books for women emerged. The books on these lists (*woman's libraries*) would then allow women to participate in the male world of reason (at least to a certain degree).

In regard to the second strategy, Felix Raab's (1964) is worthy of mention. Raab demonstrated how the concept of 'interest' changed over the last decade of the seventeenth century and gradually became the substitute for 'passion.' In the sixteenth and for most of the seventeenth century, the concept of 'interest' had political connotations; it encompassed a notion of the prince's acquired knowledge, which served to maintain or expand his power. However, shortly before 1700 the emphasis changed and took on a primarily economic resonance (Raab, 1964, p. 237). Albert O. Hirschman (1977), in his famous study, *The Passions and the Interests*, showed that this transformation did not come about by chance, but occurred in order to depict the feared consequences of commercialization, which were seen in the raging passions. In the classical dual between reason and passion, 'interest' could take an intermediate position, because it was understood to be free of the destruction that characterized the passions but also free of the ineffectiveness of reason (Hirschman, 1977, p. 42). Upon this background it is not surprising that 'interest' became dominant in British and to a lesser degree in the French philosophy of the eighteenth century as a crucial notion within social theory (Locke, Hutcheson, Hume, Smith, Bentham, Hélivétius, Holbach, Condorcet).

3.4 The Conflict Between the Rise of Commerce and the Renaissance of Republicanism Around 1750

The very same ideological conflict that occurred in England around 1700 re-emerged around 1750 in Switzerland – at about the same time that the notion of 'interest' had successfully supplanted the notion of 'passion' and the question of luxury had moved from a moral category to a morally neutral economic issue (Berry, 1994). However, the contextual conditions in Switzerland were not the same as they had

been in England, which is why eventually another solution to the conflict was found. The accepted solution in England and France for tempering the passions, which was only applied to women, was seen (by the Swiss) to be relevant to men also. However, botany was not, in this case, seen as a mediating device. The differences between the contextual conditions in Great Britain and Switzerland were not grave but crucial enough to lead to another solution. Like the Scots, the Swiss were (dominantly) Reformed Protestants, but they were fundamentally embedded in a republican tradition. This did not apply to the Scots. And compared to England, in Switzerland both the republican tradition and Reformed Protestantism were much more broadly established and were not simply limited to dissenters and outsiders. This was partly due to the fact that many of the exponents of Protestant republicanism had left England for the New World by 1700 (Woods, 1969; Pocock, 1975).

In other words, when the ideological *querelle* that dominated the discussions in the eighteenth century ‘entered’ Switzerland, it met two preconditions that put this *querelle* into a distinct mode. This twist allowed the educational idea to become the rescuer with regard to the fundamental societal problems that were ideologically connected with economic developments. This idea became the pivotal means to allow for and secure progress without giving up on political ideals. So we have two preconditions: First, the *querelle* between commerce and free republic had to be viewed as a crisis in the *langue* of traditional republicanism; second, the understanding of the human soul in Reformed Protestantism (more precisely the Protestant unification of Calvinism and Zwinglianism of 1710, called *Formula Consensus*) was able to suggest a way out of the crisis.⁴ At the center stood Zurich, and later also Basel; both were Protestant commercial republics.

Thus, once again, there was an originating process that we might call the ‘commercialization of society,’ and once again, there was a reaction that led to a renaissance of the republican language. The preconditions were steady population growth and continuous development of ‘industry’ (mainly, spinning and weaving) and trade in Zurich. This development, which had been spared any larger crises, alongside a system of duties and taxes, resulted in the relatively great wealth of Zurich around 1750. In contrast to the monarchies in other countries, which in the eighteenth century staged elaborate lifestyles and had a huge need for finances (this was partly due to the fact that they needed to finance their standing armies), the problem for Zurich was not the procurement of finances but investment. This can be shown by the rate of interest, which had been set at 5% since the Reformation but fell to 3% in the eighteenth century. Seeking better investment vehicles for the accumulated monies, Zurich began to consider exporting capital, for there were plenty of interested parties. To this purpose, in 1754 the government of Zurich established a committee to oversee return on investments. This interest rate committee first invested monies from the various city funds in what were called the ‘Town Hall Bonds’ at 3–3.5%; from 1755 on private monies were also invested. With the goal to bring in higher returns, the monies were invested in loans to foreign powers but also in loans to trading companies and plantations in Middle and South America (Peyer, 1968, p. 140). Soon six private banks came into being that operated according to the same model.

What was decisively new about these allocations of monies was that business was conducted with more or less any interested party, regardless of that party's political allegiances. That meant that the credit system that had been previously bound to personal contacts was superseded by (impersonal) loans. Prior to 1750, the allocation of credit had concentrated mainly on interested parties of the same political or religious persuasion (Peyer, 1968, p. 124). While a few loans had been made to large cities, Zurich had been restrained in the case of France, which favored the Catholic parts of Switzerland (p. 130). In contrast to this credit system, the impersonal system of loans came to be dominant after 1755. The countries that profited most from this were those toward which Zurich, for political reasons, had been very cautious (Fritzsche, 1983):

Mediation by the banks not only made the loan business easier but also impersonal; the impersonal investments, loans and bonds of private societies were politically neutral—they could be sold also prior to the end of the stipulated period. Because of division into shares, risk was spread more broadly. With the credit market becoming independent, the Zurich government was able, via the interest rate committee, to invest in the English, French, Austrian, Saxon, and Danish national debt. (p. 42; freely translated here)

For this reason, the conditions in Zurich around 1750 were not identical to those in England around 1700. However, both experienced comparable commercialization. The Bank of England was established in England because the state needed monies; the interest rate committee was founded in Zurich because Zurich possessed surplus capital. In both cases, a commercial society developed in which political relations were not marked by moral or religious concerns but were instead shaped by the forms of trading. Investments were made not on the basis of political or religious preference but instead in accordance with the impersonal laws of the market. As a consequence of this background Zurich saw a renaissance of the language of republicanism. One of the most important exponents of Zurich republicanism was Johann Jacob Bodmer (1698–1783), professor of history at the Zurich Academy.

3.5 Educationalization of the Modern World: The Swiss Protestant Promise

In the wake of these developments, Zurich's city parliament began discussing new sumptuary laws in 1755. Johann Jakob Bodmer (1755), who was a member of the parliament, comments in a letter to a friend:

It is believed that luxury is a consequence of the industry, of abundance, of commerce, and that these areas would suffer if the law restricted the enjoyment of their fruits. But on the other hand, it is believed that luxury creates a strong break in the spirit of equality and mitigation that is so important in a popular or semi-popular state. But a soul depraved by luxury has many other desires and soon becomes an enemy to the laws that confine it. (Freely translated here)

It is interesting to note that Bodmer's words here are almost identical to the words of Montesquieu in *The Spirit of the Laws* written in 1748 (Montesquieu, 1951,

Book VII/2). We can therefore clearly see that Bodmer ‘speaks’ the republican language using Montesquieu’s words or *paroles*. This language enabled recognition and articulation of a problem, namely, the capitalization of society, interpreted as a cultural crisis. In this way, this language is transnational and to a certain extent trans-denominational; Montesquieu was Catholic and Bodmer a Reformed Protestant. But, precisely *because* of this, it is easy for Bodmer to formulate the problem in educational terms. Bodmer’s (1755) letter continues:

Only a small number of them seriously seek new sumptuary laws. Vanity is the shared characteristic of both the noble and the common. You would not believe how absurd the pomp of clothing, furniture, food, and beverages has become. Who will control those who are assigned to control the people? There is no way to correct corrupted customs in one go. How can fathers that lack sentiments implant sentiments in their children? What kind of an education can a father provide them if he himself needs education? (freely translated here)

The problem is, again, the passions. Here is Bodmer (1755), once again applying the language of Montesquieu: “Une ame corrompue par le luxe a bien d’autres desirs que l’amour de la patrie” [A soul corrupted by luxury has other desires than the love of fatherland]. Obviously the problem became ‘educationalized’ by transposing it to the father–son relationship. The question that arose from all this concerned the concept of education that could be utilized to deal with this ‘educationalized’ republican perception of crisis. Some radical approaches – like that of Rousseau and approaches inspired by Rousseau – foresaw the primacy of the agrarian economy and education in the countryside, which was rather unrealistic in the face of Zurich’s commercial economy, despite the fact that Pestalozzi followed precisely this plan and failed in several respects (Tröhler, 2006b). For this reason, the concept that became successful was one that aimed at mediating between commerce and republic. This mediation was thought of as the task of education, which was essentially shaped by the Protestant psychology or the Protestant view of the soul.

One of the influential authors was Johann Kaspar Hirzel (1725–1803),⁵ physician to the city of Zurich, whose work, *Der philosophische Kaufmann* [The Philosophical Merchant], was published in 1775. In this work, Hirzel first seeks to demonstrate, in contrast to the republican accusations, that one’s profession per se does not impair the person. Hirzel emphasizes explicitly that “in the profession of the merchant the moral virtues and correct taste for the good and beautiful can be present as much as in any other profession” (Hirzel, 1775, p. 53). In other words, contrary to the diverse ideological accusations, merchants are not more strongly subject to the passions than people in other walks of life. This comment is equivalent to a morally neutral stance toward the professions. Hirzel, however, does not formulate it in order to rationalize a liberal-capitalist state but rather a republic with the ideal of the virtuous citizen. This is thus Hirzel’s attempt to resolve the *querelle*.

It is characteristic that Hirzel’s *Der philosophische Kaufmann* does not, in fact, describe the practice of a ‘philosophical merchant’ but instead lays out educational maxims for the prospective merchant. The work is thus an educational work, even if this is not apparent in the title. The book culminates in the conclusion that a person aspiring to be a ‘philosophical’ (meaning moral) merchant must be educated in the virtues at an early stage in life. This education should take place alongside actual

training for the professions in bookkeeping, correspondence, and foreign languages. It targets the ‘soul,’ which is to be educated to be virtuous (Hirzel, 1775, p. 84). The means of doing so – and this is where Protestant psychology finds expression – is self-examination. The philosophical merchant-to-be should be taught, from the earliest days of youth onwards, to subject his inner self to permanent self-examination and to justify his motives (p. 119). The soul that emerges from this, tested and justified, is the guarantor of a virtuous commercial republic.

Here we see how the first and second discursive patterns that Wolfowitz (2006) uses in his *Foreword* are linked to each other, and it is only in Protestant psychology that the second pattern can appear as heir to the first. What in the first pattern was the (religiously interpreted) intelligible eternal world is now the individual human soul, which according to Protestant theology, is the single ‘place’ on earth where God and individual can merge together under the circumstance of deep faith and reading of the Holy Bible. The faithful soul, in this view, is ‘above’ the earth, disconnected from social, economic, or political questions – not even to the Holy Church, for in Protestantism there is no Holy Church any longer. By this means the Protestant soul becomes the key to the solution of earthly problems. In other words, it becomes the key to a secure future without having to debate over whether or not commerce corrupts the soul. The corruption of the soul is neither a question of wealth nor professional identity, and this is why Swiss Protestantism could now accept the rise and dominance of commerce and not give up the ideals of Republicanism. The corruption of the soul was now a question of individual inward-looking faith. This Protestant faith was solitary, and no sacred ritual, smells, bells, or costumes could help the man exposed to the world of passion caused by commerce. The crucial issue was that this man would not be strong enough to be faithful. The solution is then evident: Education has to lead the soul to strength and faithfulness by following an inward-looking trajectory. The traditional military *virtù* had become an inner virtue, which would help citizens to secure the freedom of the republic.

Hirzel’s concept was not unique but instead represented the opinion of the elite in Zurich, who wanted to profess their faith in the principle of the republic and of commerce. This is shown by a most explosive case of censorship that occurred in the face of the translation into German of Gabriel Bonnot de Mably’s (1763) *Entretiens de Phocion*. Mably’s work is an anti-capitalist tract of classic republicanism, a plea for an agrarian republic (it was also published as *Phocion’s Conversations: Or, the Relation between Morality and Politics* in London in 1769). The translator of the work into German, Hans Conrad Vögelin, came into conflict with the censor because of the passage in which Phocion, in accordance with agrarian republicanism and the ideal of the *landed man*, espouses the opinion that tradesmen should not be allowed to participate in government. It would take a miracle to “turn them into just, clever, and courageous people,” for which reason it would not be wise to allow them to participate in government (Mably, 1764, p. 109). The censor objected to this passage, as Vögelin recounted in a letter, because it was “directly opposed to” the economic structures and would therefore cause “civil commotion” (Vögelin, cited in Zehnder-Stadlin, 1875, p. 664). For this reason, Vögelin added a note to the German translation, stating that the corruption of tradesmen noted by Phocion did not lie in

the trades per se. There was no reason why a tradesman could not be virtuous: “Why shouldn’t they be industrious and moderate, why shouldn’t they be able to have a desire for fame and religion?” And opposing the opinion that agriculture was a considerably more favorable basis for a republic than the trades, Vögelin wrote further: “What then is especially virtuous about the plow, more so than the hammer?” Vögelin’s conclusion regarding Phocion’s criticism of tradesmen is as follows: “The nobility are good, tradesmen are good, commerce is also good, as long as it can be correctly modified” (Vögelin, cited in Mably, 1764, p. 111).

This modification, the education of the soul to (public) virtue, here becomes an attractive solution to this fundamental conflict between modern economy and classical republicanism. Such adherence to ‘modification’ is shown also in the book *Schreiben eines Vaters an seinen Sohn, der sich der Handelschaft widmet* [*Letter of a Father to His Son Who is Devoted to Trade*] (Iselin, 1781), written by Isaak Iselin (1728–1782), council secretary of Basel. Whereas the book depicts farming the land as an especially noble occupation, following closely in second place, we find the occupation of merchant. However, Iselin warns his son against choosing that occupation simply in order to enjoy privately the “pleasures and delicacies” that “the stupid mortal buys with money, often to his doom.” Iselin therefore goes on to advise his son to apply the “eight principles” that underlie any occupation including the occupation of merchant (p. 392). To ensure that his son submit to these good intentions (p. 420), Iselin, in a supplement at the end of the book, draws up a procedure designed to serve “Preparation in the Morning. Examination in the Evening.” Following this procedure, his son should start the day by recalling his duties to God and humanity. Here, he should apply *reason*. Only insights into good and evil should adorn his soul. He should treat the poor well, fight against depravity, and refrain from pride and malice. He is to treat women ‘respectfully’ and not bother them with ‘criminal passions’; hard work, restraint, gentleness and fairness should be the central virtues. Along with hedonism and flattery, vanity and garrulousness are to be avoided (p. 423). Then, as the day draws to a close, his son should ask himself the following questions: “From what fault have you freed yourself today? What evil have you conquered? To what extent have you improved your soul?” (p. 425).

Educating the young toward self-examination thus appeared as a key to resolution of the conflict between republican politics and the modern economy, as guarantor of an ordered modernity that does not fall prey to the passions but instead will ensure justice and progress. In Switzerland, the notion of ‘interest’ was not able to replace the ‘passions’ – it (‘interest’) hardly appears even in the moderate reform discussion. Even the most moderate exponent of Swiss republicanism, Iselin (1764), in a speech criticizing the radical republicanism of Bodmer’s school, accepted passion as artifact. By distinguishing patriotism from radical patriotism, Iselin’s definition of ‘enlightened patriotism’ is based on rational considerations, and the true patriot is neither proud nor disheartened; he is steadfast. According to Iselin (1764), if the patriot ‘believed’ his efforts to be fruitless, he would resign, but he ‘knows’ the ‘eternal truths of virtue,’ he ‘knows’ that good deeds are immortal. The patriot also knows himself as ‘tool of felicity,’ and he holds strong against the ‘passions’ – “nothing is able to keep him from doing things he knows are truly

good” (p. 147; freely translated here). A free man, a citizen (a man living in a free republic), first has to be free from the passions, for the passions turn every man into a slave (Münch, 1783, p. 25) – slave being the fundamental opposite of the citizen or *citoyen*. This is exactly the point Rousseau made in Book V of *Emile*, where he discusses political issues and ideals of citizenship and fatherland as if he had never (in Book I of *Emile*) announced that these two words should be deleted from the modern vocabulary: “Freedom is found in no form of government; it is in the heart of the free man. He takes it with him everywhere. The vile man takes his servitude everywhere. The latter would be a slave in Geneva, the former a free man in Paris” (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 473).

In the age of commercialism the core element of the free state, of the republic, is not (is no longer) the Machiavellian *virtù*, but the educated, strong inner (Protestant) soul. It guarantees that the motor of progress, economic development, will not corrupt the (free) soul of the citizen, for this soul has been made strong by means of education toward self-examination. The ideal of the virtuous citizen was seen to be able to resist the threats of commerce without rejecting modern economy as part of modern social life. Economic development and political justice are able to harmonize and to succeed by means of education that focuses primarily on the soul and prevents its corruption.

3.6 Outlook: Education, Schooling, and Progress

If I am not mistaken, it was this idea that became attractive in the Western world in the most diverse contexts, and it is still the basis of our thinking on education and schooling today, finding expression in texts like Paul Wolfowitz’s (2006). The history of this idea has not been written yet, although some attempts have been made to do this within what is called neo-institutional sociology by John Meyer and his circle. They argue that the idea originated in the nation states of the nineteenth century (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer & Ramirez, 2000). The history yet to be written would make clear why it is that public attributions to education still have a strongly religious, that is, Protestant character, even today. Such attributions are steeped in the language of earthly redemption.

Writing this history, two problems have to be dealt with. First, it is necessary to reconstruct the way in which this deeply Protestant, future-oriented view of solving social problems became attractive to denominations and religions other than Reformed Protestant and to forms of government that did not embrace republicanism. It is more than obvious that this idea fascinated the public, so that education became one of the central themes in many countries on both sides of the Atlantic in the decades around and after 1800. Cult figures like Pestalozzi knew (by making use of the booming media market) how to go about promising that by means of the ‘right’ educational methods, lasting solutions to the problems of society would be achieved. Second, it is necessary to explain how this clearly private (or family) setting of education toward self-examination was transfused after 1800 into the modern organization of schooling. Except for the fact that the school could discipline young

people and therefore control their behavior, it is not obvious how the curricular structure of the organized mass schools could ‘reach’ the soul in order to strengthen it against the passions. The result was a parallel transnational phenomenon of the developing of mass school systems in the Western world during the long nineteenth century (Tröhler, Popkewitz, & Labaree, in press) with apparently such good results that in the last couple of decades there have been attempts to implement the promises of education in non-Christian nations as well. Upon this background, the World Bank, Wolfowitz, and others are only representatives of this Reformed Protestant promise of earthly salvation that in the long term seems to have been (due to its decisive contribution to the ‘educational turn’ in relation to societal problems of the eighteenth century) more successful than any other ideology of the last 500 years.

Notes

1. One might argue that, for instance, Plato’s conception of education in his *Politeia* is directed toward justice as a core factor of society. This is certainly true, but the difference between Plato’s conception and the one described here is that Plato by no means wants to solve a social problem (injustice, in his case) *progressively*. Compared to Plato’s philosophy the pattern described here asks how can we accept the multiple factors of social development (as, for instance, the economy) and still secure the good life by specific means that foreclose possible dangers arising from this development. Against this background, the Jesuit’s educational reaction toward the Reformation, for instance, is not similar to the pattern discussed here.
2. As we know from landmark studies, such as the study by Jacques Le Goff (*Marchands et banquiers au Moyen Age*, 1956; *La bourse et la vie*, 1986), capitalism, as a specific economic mode, is not the child of the eighteenth century. But it is no coincidence that the advent of the notion of “capitalism” is in the second half of the eighteenth century (in French and English) or even nineteenth century (in German), as it indicates that this mode of economy has become in some way conspicuous and for some people a specific ideological problem. Max Weber (1904/05) dates the crucial progression of the older capitalism to a dominant social phenomenon with the activities of the English dissenters in the second half of the seventeenth century. This corresponds with the analysis found here.
3. These letters were addressed to Madelaine Catherine Delessert (*1747), respectively, to her daughter Marguerite-Madelaine (*1767). They were published in 1781 in the *Collections Complètes des***** Œuvres de J.J. Rousseau*, which was the basis of the German and English translations (George, 2006).
4. The Lutheran conception differed from this, first because Lutheranism was never compatible with Republicanism and thus the *querelle* in Germany was essentially different (and hardly recognizable as a *querelle*), and second because the concept of the soul was different. The concept was then (and is up until today) inseparable from the notion of *Bildung* (Horlacher, 2004; Tröhler, 2003).
5. In 1761, Hirzel became renowned throughout Europe with his work, *Die Wirthschaft eines philosophischen Bauers*. In this work he applauded hard work, thriftiness, common sense, and obedience arguing that these were the fundamental virtues of the ‘wise’ farmer. The work appeared as early as 1762 in French translation, under the title *Le Socrate rustique, ou description de la conduite économique et morale d’un paysan philosophe*, translated by Jean Rodolphe Frey, who was from Basel and was an officer in the French Services. The Frey translation was translated into English by Arthur Young and published in London in 1770 in an anthology under the title *Rural Oeconomy*. These translations appeared in several editions; an American edition was published in 1800. Thomas Jefferson recommended this book in 1820 as a title

that should belong in an agricultural library. (I thank Ellen Russon for this instructive hint, see <http://www.lib.umd.edu/RARE/MarylandCollection/Riversdale/biblios/jefferson.html>.)

An undated, probably earlier edition was published in Italian translation in Florence under the title *L'economia d'un contadino filosofo*.

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