

Nation-Building, Identity and Citizenship Education

Cross-cultural Perspectives

Globalisation, Comparative Education and Policy Research

12-volume Book Series (Springer)

Series editor: Joseph Zajda (Australian Catholic University, Melbourne Campus)
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Editors

Nation-Building, Identity and Citizenship Education

Cross-cultural Perspectives

 Springer

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ISBN 978-1-4020-9317-3

e-ISBN 978-1-4020-9318-0

Library of Congress Control Number: 2008938814

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To Rea, Dorothy, and Nikolai

Foreword

A major aim of *Nation-Building, Identity and Citizenship Education: Cross-cultural Perspectives* is to present a global overview of selected scholarly research on global and comparative trends in dominant discourses of identity politics, and nation-building in comparative education research. It provides an easily accessible, practical, yet scholarly source of information about the international concern in the field of nation-building, identity and citizenship education. Above all, the book offers the latest findings on discourses surrounding national identity, nation-building, and citizenship education in the global culture. It offers a timely overview of current issues affecting the formation of social identity and citizenship education in the global culture.

More than ever before, there is a need to understand and analyse both the intended and the unintended effects of globalisation and the forces of globalisation on nations, organisations, communities, educational institutions and individuals around the world. This is particularly relevant to the evolving and constantly changing notions of nation-states, national identity, and citizenship education globally. Current global and comparative research demonstrates a rapidly changing world where citizens are experiencing a growing sense of alienation, uncertainty, and loss of moral purpose.

In this stimulating and important book, the authors focus on discourses surrounding three major dimensions affecting the national identity, nation-building, and citizenship education debate in education and society: *ideology*, *democracy*, and *human rights*. These are among the most critical and significant dimensions defining and contextualising the processes surrounding the nation-building and identity. Furthermore, the perception of globalisation as a dynamic and multi-faceted processes clearly necessitates a multiple-perspective approach in the study of education and this book provides that perspective commendably.

The book contributes in a very scholarly way to a more holistic understanding of the nexus between nation-state and national identity globally. The book is both

rigorous and scholarly and is likely to have profound and wide-ranging implications for the future of education policy and reforms globally. I commend the book wholeheartedly to any reader who shares these same ideals.

Professor Greg Craven
Vice-Chancellor
Australian Catholic University

Preface

Nation-Building, Identity and Citizenship Education: Cross-cultural Perspectives, which is the third volume in the 12-volume book series *Globalisation, Comparative Education, and Policy Research*, presents up-to-date scholarly research on global and comparative trends in dominant discourses of identity politics and nation-building in comparative education research. It provides an easily accessible, practical, yet scholarly source of information about the international concern in the field of nation-building, identity, and citizenship education. Above all, the book offers the latest findings to the critical issues in identity formation, citizenship education, and democracy in the global culture. It is a sourcebook of ideas for researchers, practitioners, and policymakers in education, globalization, and citizenship education. It offers a timely overview of current issues affecting the formation of social identity and citizenship education in the global culture. It provides directions in education, and policy research, relevant to transformational educational reforms in the twenty-first century.

The book critically examines the overall interplay between globalisation, democracy, and education. It draws upon recent studies in the areas of globalisation, equity, social justice, and the role of the State (see also Carnoy, 1999; Zajda, Majhanovich & Rust, 2006; Zajda, Biraimah, & Gaudelli, 2008). It explores conceptual frameworks and methodological approaches applicable in the research covering the State, globalisation, nation-building, and identity politics. It demonstrates the neo-liberal ideological imperatives of education and policy reforms, and illustrates the way the relationship between the State and education policy affects current models and trends in education reforms and schooling globally. Various book chapters critique the dominant discourses and debates pertaining to cultural identity, set against the current climate of growing social stratification and unequal access to quality education for all. The book opens discourses related to globalisation and the State, and approaches to constructing national, ethnic, and religious identities in the global culture. It explores the ambivalent and problematic relationship between the State, globalisation, and the construction of cultural identity. Using a number of diverse paradigms, ranging from critical theory to globalisation, the authors, by focusing on globalisation, ideology, and social justice, attempt to critically examine recent trends in multicultural education policies, and their impact

on identity politics. The book draws upon recent studies in the areas of multicultural education, citizenship education, and cultural identity equity against the background of dominant ideologies in education (Zajda, 2005).

The general intention is to make *Nation-Building, Identity, and Citizenship Education: Cross-cultural Perspectives* available to a broad spectrum of users among policymakers, academics, graduate students, education policy researchers, administrators, and practitioners in the education and related professions. The book is unique in that it:

- Examines central discourses surrounding the debate of identity, multiculturalism, and citizenship
- Explores conceptual frameworks and methodological approaches applicable in the research of the State, globalisation, and multicultural education
- Demonstrates ideological imperatives of globalisation, neo-liberal ideology, and the State, affecting the formation of cultural identity
- Provides strategic education policy analysis on recent developments in cultural identity, multiculturalism, and citizenship education research
- Gives suggestions for directions in education and policy changes, relevant to democratic and empowering pedagogy in the twenty-first century

We hope that you will find *Nation-Building, Identity, and Citizenship Education: Cross-cultural Perspectives* useful in your teaching, future research, and discourses concerning schooling, social justice, and policy reforms in the global culture.

Joseph Zajda
*Australian Catholic University
 (Melbourne Campus)*

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Acknowledgements

We wish to thank the following individuals, who have provided invaluable help, advice, and support with this major research project:

Harmen van Paradijs, Publishing Editor, Springer

Bernadette Ohmer, Marianna Pascale, Springer

Dorothy Murphy, Assistant Editor, *Educational Practice and Theory*, James Nicholas Publishers

Rea Zajda, James Nicholas Publishers

We also want to thank numerous reviewers who were prepared to review various drafts of the chapters. These include:

John Anchan, University of Winnipeg

Ari Antikainen, University of Helsinki

Alberto Arenas, University of Arizona

Karen Biraimah, University Of Central Florida

Jill Blackmore, Deakin University

Malcolm Campbell, Bowling Green State University

Paul Carlin, Australian Catholic University (Melbourne Campus)

David Gamage, University of Newcastle

Phillip Clarkson, Australian Catholic University (Melbourne Campus)

Kassie Freeman, Dillard University

Mark Hanson, University of California (Riversdale)

Yaacov Iram, Bar Ilan University

Andreas Kazamias, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Kyu Hwan Lee, Ewha Womans University (South Korea)

Kas Mazurek, University of Lethbridge

Marie-Laure Mimoun-Sorel, Australian Catholic University (Melbourne Campus)

Donatella Palomba, Universita di Roma

Margaret Secombe, University of Adelaide

Ken Smith, Australian Catholic University (Melbourne Campus)

John Whitehouse, the University of Melbourne

Rea Zajda, Managing Editor & Publisher, James Nicholas Publishers

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Nation-Building, Identity and Citizenship Education: Introduction

Joseph Zajda

1 Nation-Building, Identity, and Citizenship Education

In examining a complex interplay between nation-building, social identity, and citizenship education globally we need to draw on comparative and international discourses concerning other cultures (Stromquist & Monkman, 2000; Chabbott & Elliott, 2002; Biraimah, 2005; Saha, 2005; Zajda, Majhanovich, & Rust, 2006; Zajda, Davies, & Majhanovich, 2008). One such attempt was the book *Understanding Others, Education Ourselves* (Chabbott & Elliott, 2002, p. 9), where it is argued that comparative and international discourses surrounding other cultures can often lead us to ‘identify and question beliefs and assumptions that are taken for granted’, by ‘making the familiar strange’ and the ‘strange familiar’, and questioning the ‘universality’ of our beliefs and assumptions. This is a good and pragmatic starting point for our analysis of the nexus between nation-building, identity, and citizenship education. At the core of our discussion is the very notion of national identity and its ongoing social and political transformation in the global culture (Giddens, 1990; Secombe & Zajda, 1999; Saha, 2005; Smolicz, 2006; Zajda, Davies, & Majhanovich, 2008).

1.1 Nation State

Before we proceed any further, we need to clarify the current usage of the concept ‘nation state’. As Smolicz (2006) explains, the state can be viewed as a political and territorial unit, ‘vested with legitimate power and a network of the dependent institutions to manage political, economic and legal structures’ (p. 115). Smolicz lists conferral of citizenship as the ultimate acknowledgement of the individual’s membership of a state.

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Thus, a given nation state exists where there is a 'political apparatus ... ruling over a given territory, whose authority is backed by a legal system' (Giddens, 1990, p. 301). Benedict Anderson (1991, 2006), on the other hand, defines a nation as 'an imagined political community (that is) imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign'. He argues that an imagined community is different from an existing society because members do not see the actual community, but imagine it in their minds. Hence, as Anderson explains, a nation 'is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion' (Anderson, 2006, pp. 6–7).

Anderson falls into the modernist and historicist perspectives on nations, national identity, and nationalism. Like Eric Hobsbawm (1990) and others he argues that nations, national identity, and nationalism are products of modernity. This paradigm is diametrically opposed to the traditionalists or primordialists, who believe that nations have existed since the dawn of human history. Hence, Anderson's imagined communities can be seen as a form of modernist version of social constructionism, echoing postmodern cartography of Roland Paulston (1996), constructs of imagined social cartography. Unlike, Anderson, Anthony Smith (2001) argues that even when nations are the product of modernity, it is possible to find ethnic elements that survive and flourish in modern nations, despite globalisation.

A 'nation', usually defined in terms of culture, ethnicity, and geographic space, has the right to constitute and govern an independent or autonomous political community, based on a shared history, cultural heritage, and the rule of law. Members of a 'nation', as a 'community of culture', are attached by 'emotional bonds' (Kloskowska, 1997, p. 70), and share a common ideology (Szacki, 1984, p. 11). According to Smolicz (2006), there are at least three models that are used to distinguish among the basic criteria for membership of a nation:

1. The ancestry-based model (*ius sanguinis*) relies on descent as one of the basic criteria of belonging to a nation.
2. The territorially based model (*ius soli*) uses culture and language as a necessary requirement for membership.
3. Migration-derived model represents a modification of the latter type and requires a commitment to a set of shared cultural/core values. It allows a degree of cultural pluralism for a 'range of cultural characteristics of diverse groups' that constitute pluralist democracies today (Smolicz, 2006, p. 116).

However, Smolicz (2006) also adds that the rise of globalisation and global interculturalism, and what Smith called a 'family of cultures', indicates that it may well be 'increasingly difficult for an individual to remain a citizen of just one state and a member of just one nation' (Smolicz, 2006, p. 129; Smith, 1991, p. 172). Given that most states today are increasingly becoming ethnically, linguistically, and culturally heterogeneous, in some ways attributed to forces of globalisation and economic migration, we could consider a 'multinational nation' and a 'family

of cultures’, as Smith (1991), Smolicz (1999, 2006), and others do in their works, as dynamic constructs, which challenge a geopolitically and ideologically defined nation.

1.2 National Identity

In this chapter we draw on works by Benedict Anderson (2006), Jerzy Smolicz (1999, 2006), and Anthony Smith (1991) in defining ‘national identity’. Like most social theorists, Smolicz (1999) sees national identity as being defined by ancestral, territorial, political, and cultural dimensions (p. 12), and he also refers to a sense of ‘belonging-ness’ to the country, or identification with place (p. 15). Smith (2001) refers to ‘the continuous reproduction and reinterpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of nations, and the identifications of individuals with that pattern and heritage and with its cultural elements’ (Smith, 2001, p.18). ‘National identity’ has always been one of the ontological and teleological goals of promoting nationalism, and a defining dimension of the nation-building process. National identity has certain core characteristics, which are emphasised at varying degrees from one nation to the next. As Smith (1991) explains, the six main attributes of ethnic community, as a foundation of national identity, are:

1. A collective proper name
2. A myth of common ancestry
3. Shared historical memories
4. One or more differentiating elements of common culture
5. An association with a specific ‘homeland’
6. A sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population (Smith, 1991, p. 21)

1.3 Elements of National Identity

‘National’ identity refers to politico-economic and technological community. In a philosophical, legal, and social theory sense, nation denotes ‘a community of people obeying the same laws and institutions within a given territory’ (Smith, 1991, p. 9). Hence, the defining elements of ‘national’ identity include:

- (a) Territory, the homeland, or ‘historic land’
- (b) A community, or a patria, a community of laws and institutions with a single political will
- (c) Citizenship and associated sense of legal equality among the members
- (d) Common values, mass culture, civic ideology, and traditions (including common historical memories, myths, symbols, and traditions (Smith, 1991, pp. 9–11)

In short, the above elements denote a Western model of an ‘ethnic’ perception of the nation and national identity. Meselidis (2008) argues that modern Greek identity is not ‘purely a recent ideological construction or fiction of governments’, since national independence in 1821, in ‘order to create and maintain the nation’, but is based on historical sentiment, myths, memories, values, and traditions in Greek *ethnies* pre-dating the modern nation. Meselidis draws on Smith’s definition of national identity in terms of ethnicity (Smith, 1998, pp. 170–198). There are strong cultural bonds and continuities between modern Greek national identities and the pre-modern (pre-1500 CE) cultural and historical Greek ethnic communities. This does not mean, however, that national identities do not change over the *longue durée*, as, indeed, Smith’s working definition implies (Meselidis, 2008). There is strong evidence in school textbooks (see Zajda, 2008) to suggest that there is a continuous process of redefinition, revision, reinterpretation, and rewriting of historical narratives, in order to reimagine national identity and nationalism.

1.4 The Role of Historiography in Nation-Building

Social identity is drawn from a variety of sources. In particular, historiography greatly influences a society’s sense of identity. Indeed as Welsh (2004) puts it, explaining Australia’s evolution as a nation state, history texts are a way in which a nation or state can, ‘explain to the rest of the world how this remarkable society has evolved into a nation’ (p. xxxviii). Nation-building architects make extensive use of history to promote those historical narratives that embody the politically correct teleology of the state (Anderson, 1991; Smith, 2001). It has been suggested that the historiographies of the new states in Eastern Europe, with parallels in the Russian Federation, China, and elsewhere, engaging in nation-building process, continue to be essentially ‘monolithic and intolerant to alternative views as those of their communist predecessors, merely exchanging a communist ideological colouring for a national one’ (Janmaat & Vickers, 2007, p. 270). Janmaat argues that the new post-Soviet government in the Ukraine was only too ready to use history education to promote a new sense of a nationhood, which would maximise Ukrainian distinctiveness, and its cultural significance in the former Soviet Union (Zajda, 2008).

Continuing global public and political debates about the role of historical explanation and the development of historical consciousness in schools when dealing with popular understandings of a nation’s growth has given history a significant role in repositioning competing and ideologically driven discourses of historical narratives and processes (Nicholls, 2006; Janmaat, 2007; Kaplan, 2007; Zajda, 2007a). Taylor and Young (2003), referring to the role of historical explanation and the development of historical consciousness with respect to a nation’s growth, argue that the main issues are national identity and balanced representations of the past. In Russia for instance, as in other countries undergoing a similar process of nation-building, the three most significant issues defining the repositioning of the politically correct historical narratives are preferred images of the past, reminiscent of Anderson’s (1991) ‘imagined community’—patriotism and national identity.

Current debates around the main issues in historiography and the role of historical narratives in the nation-building process echo similar controversies in the UK in the 1980s (Phillips, 1998), in the USA during the 1990s (Nash, Crabtree, & Dunn, 2000), as well as recent debates in Japan, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Greece, the Ukraine, Korea, China, and the Russian Federation. In the USA, for example, on 18 January 1995, the ‘History Wars’ erupted on the floors of the United States Congress. In a debate on national history standards, Senator Slade Gordon (Republican, Washington) asked the question ‘George Washington or Bart Simpson—which figure represented a ‘more important part of our Nation’s history for our children to study?’. He attempted to define the national character of history teaching for future generations (Stearns, Seixas, & Wineburg, 2000, p. 1). School history texts, as instruments of ideological transformation and nation-building, are currently closely monitored by the state, in countries like Japan, China, the Russian Federation, and Greece, to name a few. In other countries, these processes are still present but in less formal and more ad hoc ways. In the Russian Federation, for example, it represents an ideologically driven nation-building process, and social and political transformation of society, which was overseen by the Putin government until 2007, and which continues today.

2 Identity Politics and Dominant Ideology

In addition to examining the processes affecting identity politics and nation-building, we need to consider the role of dominant ideology, or hegemony, defining such processes. In particular, we need to remind ourselves that globalisation is not an apolitical phenomenon, and nation-building and citizenship education are hegemonic manifestations of reinvented nationalism and patriotism. By accepting globalisation and its economic and technocratic imperatives, we are likely to sink into the ocean of conformity and impotent cynicism. Schmidt (2000) warns us against accepting the status quo, for the ‘the individual is obliterated not by confronting the system, but by conforming to it’ (p. 252). Nation-building processes, currently taking place in many countries, including the USA, Japan, China, and the Russian Federation, are reinvented narratives of traditional values and militant patriotism of the past. Samuel Johnson (1775) stated that ‘[p]atriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel.’ Boswell tells us that Samuel Johnson made this famous pronouncement in 1775. James Boswell, a biographer of Samuel Johnson, assures us that Johnson was not indicting patriotism in general, only superficial patriotism (<http://www.samueljohnson.com/refuge.html>). As Bahruth (2005) observes, ‘countless scoundrels would have us wrap ourselves in the flag, while the liberties it pretends to represent are shrinking under the pressure of the rhetorical patriotic act’ (Bahruth, 2005, p. xi). Current debates in numerous countries around the world on citizenship education, nationalism, and values education reflect a neo-liberal ideology of uncritical conformity, order, and obedience.

2.1 Historical Thinking as Cultural Capital

In discussing a complex interplay between nation-building, social identity, and citizenship we need to refer to historical thinking as cultural capital (Zajda & Whitehouse, 2008). The concepts of cultural and social capital play a significant and critical part in historical thinking. Bourdieu (1986) defined cultural capital in terms of the knowledge and skills advantages necessary for social mobility. Saha (2005) argues that cultural and social capital are ‘two important concepts in understanding many economic and social processes in all societies’ (Saha, 2005, p. 753). Bourdieu (1986) identified four types of capital which are particularly relevant to teaching history: economic, cultural, social, and symbolic. In teaching historical understanding and thinking, cultural and social capitals enable us to understand the ‘forces of globalisation’ and ‘ideological transformations’ affecting nations and individuals (Zajda, 2005, p. 1). In general, globalisation refers to cultural, economic, and educational integration, where the world is ‘becoming more homogeneous with respect to a wide range of economic and social processes’ (Saha, 2005, p. 752).

In historical thinking, the notions of power, cultural and social capital, together with an analysis of an unequal distribution of socially valued commodities globally, are necessary for understanding various forces affecting the dynamics of historical evolution of societies. Such an analysis, grounded in historical thinking and semblance, where we imagine what it was like for them, and the ‘Other’, we can have a far deeper and meaningful understanding of nation-building, social identity, and citizenship in the twenty-first century. It is here, in a Jeffersonian sense, that education holds the potential for an ‘enlightened citizenry’ (Bahruth, 2005, p. xi). Discourses surrounding other cultures, nation-building, and identity politics can often lead us to identify and question beliefs and assumptions that are taken for granted, by making the familiar strange and the strange familiar, and questioning the ‘universality’ of our beliefs and assumptions. It is not sufficient to depict cultural differences in intercultural research, and there is now a need to rediscover to what degree such culturally differences can be ‘generalised’ across cultures. In particular, the issues to be addressed in future research should include: What kinds of roles do our perceptions concerning cultures, identity, and the nation state play in intercultural dialogue and conflict analysis? And what is the relationship between globalisation, social change, and emerging cultural values?

3 Nation-Building, Identity, and Citizenship Education: Cross-cultural Perspectives

In his chapter, ‘Globalisation, Nation-Building, and Cultural Identity: The Role of Intercultural Dialogue’, Joseph Zajda (Australian Catholic University) argues that globalisation discourses have affected the nature of intercultural dialogue and the debate surrounding nation-building processes, social identity, and citizenship

education. Recent global events depicting violence, conflicts, and war demonstrate the need to reassert the relevance of intercultural dialogue in an increasingly interdependent world. Intercultural dialogue needs to focus more on emerging significant issues in cross-cultural understanding globally, affecting identity politics, liberty, and democracy. Michiyo Kiwako Okuma-Nyström (Institute of International Education, Stockholm University), in 'Globalisation, Identities, and Diversified School Education', argues that identities are increasingly constructed and reconstructed both locally and globally simultaneously, and that school, as a major agency of socialisation, contributes to identity formation processes. It is suggested that new social identities, such as global consumer, are constantly constructed, shaped, and transformed under the impact of the mass media and forces of globalisation.

Patricia K. Kubow (Bowling Green University), in 'Democracy, Identity, and Citizenship Education in South Africa: Defining a Nation in a Post-colonial and Global Era', offers a critique of President Thabo Mbeki's call for South Africans to define themselves in terms of who they are. This is a new approach of the country's nation-building efforts. Here, social identity reconstruction is to be accomplished, in part, through a reassertion of African indigenous knowledge systems that draw on the histories, traditions, and values of cultural populations disadvantaged during apartheid. Kubow believes that both the postcolonial and global contexts pose challenges to South Africa's self-definition as a nation state. A serious threat to South Africa's nation-building and the construction of social identity is globalisation itself. With its Western-driven and hegemonic dimensions, economic and cultural forces of globalisation tend to dislodge local culture and decontextualise pluralist democracy. In this particular context, citizenship education, according to Kubow, is likely to play a significant role in helping people to think more critically about their past, present, and future as part of the nation-building project.

Detlef Oesterreich (Max-Planck Institute for Human Development) discusses the Civic Education Project of the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) conducted in Eastern Europe. According to him, civic education has three major goals: political knowledge and understanding, democratic attitudes, and a readiness for democratic political action. The survey as such offered the first opportunity to directly compare civic education between young people in the East and in the West.

Suzanne Majhanovich (University of Western Ontario) discusses different ways in a globalised world that linguistic minorities within nation states advocate for linguistic policies favourable to their language, in an attempt to protect their sense of ethnic identity. The chapter reviews the ways in which governing bodies have tried to come to terms with the English–French reality of Canada. It analyses, within the framework of multicultural education, social justice, and equity, various policy initiatives to acknowledge and preserve where feasible indigenous languages, and demonstrates various ways in which speakers of other languages are accommodated.

Similarly, Jerzy Smolicz and Margaret Secombe (University of Adelaide) examine the inherent tensions and dichotomies between globalisation, the nation state, citizenship, identity, and multiculturalism. They argue that the building of

multi-ethnic nation states, based on the ideology of multiculturalism, can offer tolerance and peace within a common supranational identity in the global world. They also believe that a supranational identity that respects cultural and linguistic diversity within a global culture may counteract interracial and religious conflicts, and forces responsible for the continuing fundamentally inspired ethnic fragmentation and disharmony and offer a new model for global solidarity, based on authentic and empowering global interculturalism. Grace Feuerverger (OISE/University of Toronto), in her case study, examines perceptions of Jewish-Canadian high school students in Montréal and Toronto towards the learning of Hebrew, their ancestral language and the language that is now symbolic of secular, and not only religious, Jewish diasporic identity in the post-Holocaust, postmodern world. She comments on the interrelationships between Hebrew language learning and definitions of Jewish identity, and concludes that the learning of Hebrew has significant social-psychological implications for Jewish students in Canada.

Kaori Okano (La Trobe University) examines multicultural education policies in Japan. She argues that while Japan has always been a multi-ethnic entity, it propagated an assimilationist ideology by promoting its policy of monolingualism and mono-culturalism. One consequence of globalisation in education has been the authorities' reluctant recognition of the multi-ethnic student population, with the arrival of many immigrants since the early 1990s. Okano's research demonstrates that the central government's responses to immigrants in education have been active and well resourced. However, the policies towards new immigrants have focused on language and cultural adaptation, and the affirmation of cultural pluralism. Okano explores how these approaches to multicultural education have interacted with, and contributed to, the development of local-level multicultural education policies and the interaction of globalising forces and local activism.

Daniel Kirk (University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates & University of Georgia), and Diane Napier (University of Georgia) explore the impact of forces of globalisation and intercultural dimensions on the process of social transformation in the higher education sector in the United Arab Emirates. Elisabeth Regnault (Louis Pasteur University, France) discusses various successful models of intercultural education in Europe which affect cultural identity. Halla B. Holmarsdottir (Institute for Educational Research, University of Oslo) presents an analysis of the Language in Education Policy in South Africa and the subsequent implementation of additive and functional multilingualism. Stephen Carney (Copenhagen University) and Ulla Ambrosius Madsen (Roskilde University) discuss schooling and the formation of identities in modern Nepal.

4 Conclusion

In evaluating current research on nation-building, social identity, and citizenship education globally, it needs to be concluded that the modern construct of the nation state is under constant pressure from the forces of globalisation. It is a paradox that

cultural globalisation is unleashing forces that tend to standardise lifestyles through commodities, information technology, and the mass media. Yet, at the same time, globalisation creates opportunities for cultural resistance by ‘powerfully entrenched local cultures’ (Smolicz, 2006, p. 118), where both the ‘old’ (traditional) and/or indigenous historical minorities and the ‘new’ migrant communities are growing as a result of economic globalisation and job mobility. One could argue that the state’s very autonomy and its regulatory role have been eroded by forces of globalisation and decentralisation and privatisation in particular (Zajda, 2004, 2006). However, globalisation, with its seemingly ubiquitous dimension of cosmopolitanism, while impacting nation states, national identities, and nationalism, does not necessarily transcend or supersede them (Smith, 1991, p. 175). In a post-structuralist and postmodern sense, individuals have a potential to develop and maintain multiple identities in the global culture.

In selecting these chapters for inclusion in this volume (see also the previous volumes in the *Globalisation, Comparative Education, and Policy Research* 12-volume Book Series, Springer, 2008, <http://www.springeronline.com/sgw/cda/frontpage>), we have deliberately included scholarly research which is representative of diverse people, regions, and institutions. Our contributors engaged in an informed critical discourse about the nature of the relationship between nation-building, social identity, and citizenship education globally. While we, and the authors, clearly have views about this relationship, we invite the reader into a discourse analysing their views and those of whom they live and work with. Our task was not to present a hegemonic monolithic sense about *what is*, but to extend, inform, and critique assumptions about the nation-building processes, contested discourses of social identity and citizenship education, and their possible implications for a global social stratification and social justice for nation states in the future (Biraimah, 2005; Zajda, 2005; Clayton, 2006; Zajda, Davies, & Majhanovich, 2008; Zajda, Biraimah, & Gaudelli, 2008).

Finally, the rise of global interculturalism, intercultural dialogue, and multicultural citizenship represents an evolving cultural integration and diversity, where an individual can belong to more than one cultural community, as well as to more than one state. Intercultural dialogue is one of the most effective means of overcoming politico-ethnocentric barriers, in order to include the Other. As Smolicz (2006) and Zajda (2007b) explain, global interculturalism can facilitate intercultural dialogue and cultural interaction—both *within* the nations concerned, in order to promote an ‘ethos of multiculturalism’, and *between* them, in the sense of intercultural dialogue (Smolicz, 2006, p. 130).

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Part I
**Main Trends and Issues in Identity
and Citizenship Education**

Chapter 1

Globalisation, Nation-Building, and Cultural Identity: The Role of Intercultural Dialogue*

Joseph Zajda

1.1 Globalisation, Education, and Intercultural Dialogue

Recent global events depicting violence, conflicts, and war demonstrate the need for a more visible paradigm of intercultural dialogue in comparative education research [1]. Such a paradigm needs to focus more on emerging significant issues in intercultural and cross-cultural understanding globally, affecting identity politics, liberty, and democracy. Informed and balanced intercultural dialogue can help us to define, explain, and critique what is achievable, especially within the current imperatives of globalisation, the politics of change, and education reforms (Bourdieu & Passeron 1990). The chapter explores the problematic relationship surrounding globalisation, intercultural dialogue, and the State against the background of comparative education research and a clash of civilizations (Appadurai, 1990, Robertson, 1992, Huntington, 1996, Arnove & Torres, 1999, Carnoy 1999, Stiglitz, 2002, Zajda, 2005, 2007). The chapter is an attempt to answer the following question: How can we contribute to the creation of a more peaceful, equitable, and just society for everyone?

1.1.1 *Epistemological Issues*

One of the first problems in researching the nexus between pedagogy and intercultural dialogue deals with the use of terminology, the meanings attached to it, and the resultant interpretations and behaviour patterns. Like many other intercultural researchers, Béatrice Rafoni (2003) explains that intercultural research has many definitions in multidisciplinary approaches, and a very 'rich variety in works, approaches and definitions'. In France, Rafone argues, the term intercultural is 'not a

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* This chapter is a revised version of the paper presented at the Conference 'Access, Inclusion and Success: Muslim Students at Australian Universities', 2–4 September 2007, University of Western Sydney, Crown Plaza Hotel, Parramatta, NSW.

set notion, neither in the terminology nor in the items'. The ambiguities surrounding terminology and approaches in cross-cultural and intercultural dialogue have been addressed by Stephan Dahl (2000, 2004) in his overview of the main concepts and theories in intercultural communication in the works of Hall, Hofstede, Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, Schwartz, and others. He argues that the term 'culture', within the domain of intercultural communication, is often used 'loosely' in everyday language. As such it affects one's identity, and national boundary, and despite all efforts, including Schwartz's (2002) research on distinct value types, generated from his cross-cultural research in 63 countries, and Hofstede's influential finding, Dahl observes that 'there is no commonly acknowledged "correct" concept of culture' (Dahl, 2004).

Some scholars, like Maureen Guirdham (2004) and Jerzy Smolicz (2005), believe that authentic and dialogical intercultural communication skills hold the key to resolving global political, social, and religious conflicts. Smolicz argues that effective intercultural communication, cross-cultural values education, and intercultural transformation can influence people's perceptions and their views of the world, and may be reflected in increased metacognitive, reflective, and critical thinking domains, affecting their thinking, values, and action (Smolicz, 2005). Similarly, Rosita Albert (2006) observes that in order to address interethnic conflict, intercultural research should focus more on interethnic relations, prejudice reduction, and conflict resolution. Majhanovich (2006), on the other hand, with reference to intercultural dialogue, focuses on the impact of neo-liberal economy and globalisation on education and immigrant/minority students. The imperatives of globalisation impact on most nations around the world. Globalising pedagogies focus, among other things, especially in the USA, Canada, the UK, France, Germany, Japan, and Australia, on critical literacy, and the 'knowledge and skills necessary to compete in a global economy' (Chabbot & Elliott, 2002, p. 8).

1.1.2 Ontological Issues

The other problem, surrounding the nature of debate in education and intercultural dialogue, is understanding the intercultural implications of 'Learning to Be', one of the pillars of education for the twenty-first century. The Delors Report (1996) stated that 'Individual development is a dialectical process which starts with knowing oneself and then opens out to relationships with others. In this sense, intercultural pedagogy becomes an "inner journey"' (Delors Report, 1996, p. 95). At the epistemological level, 'Learning to Be', as applied to intercultural dialogue, has cross-cultural implications (Zajda, 2004, p. 84). It can be argued that, in a dialectical and existentialist sense, 'Learning to Be' is *between, across, and beyond* cultures. In the context of such a transdisciplinary action research, 'Learning to Be' offers an authentic and worthwhile trans-cultural dimension, which enables the individuals to develop an authentic and empowering vision on the meaning of life, peace, and tolerance.

One of the pioneers of intercultural dialogue and research was Sarah E. Roberts (1946), who was writing on the issues of intercultural research in the USA. Since then the body of intercultural research has blossomed into a multicultural, cultural diversity and human rights 'tree':

As nations strive to harmonise their cultural diversity with a stable and resilient nation-state that adheres to the principles of universal human rights, the use of the 'Tree Model' indicates that some rights are indeed indispensable in a democratic state. These include civic, political and cultural rights, as indicated by the 'trunk' in the 'tree diagram'. The cultural rights, however need not conform to a single pattern, with the 'crown' of the tree assuming different configurations, depending on the cultural traditions of the groups that make the nation and their members' current aspirations. (Smolicz, 2005)

1.1.3 Cultural Differences

Gillian Khoo (1994) pointed out that it was not sufficient to know cultural differences in intercultural research, and there was a need to discover to what degree such cultural differences could be 'generalised' across cultures. In particular, the issues to be addressed in future research include: 'What kinds of roles do perceptions, expectations, and self-fulfilling prophecies about particular out-groups play in intercultural conflict style', and the relationship between gender socialisation and cultural values:

As intercultural researchers, it is simply not enough for us to know how and why people differ culturally. We also need to know to what extent such differences can be generalized across situations, and especially to interactions with culturally different individuals. The need for a more global understanding of people, organizations, attitudes, norms, group processes, values, and ways of operating can be enhanced by examining how people interact and transact both among themselves as well as with culturally different individuals. (Khoo, 1994)

Globalisation has affected the nature of the debate in intercultural dialogue. It has resulted in structural and qualitative changes in education and policy, including an increasing focus on the 'lifelong learning for all', and a 'cradle-to-grave' metaphor of learning, and the 'knowledge economy' and the global culture:

The impact of globalisation on education policy and reforms is a strategically significant issue for us all. ... The evolving and constantly changing notions of national identity, language, border politics and citizenship which are relevant to education policy need to be critiqued by appeal to context-specific factors such as local-regional-national areas, which sit uncomfortably at times with the international imperatives of globalisation ... where citizens and consumers are experiencing a growing sense of uncertainty, and loss of flexibility. (Sheehan, 2005, p. xi)

Similarly, Stanley Fischer (2001), in his speech 'The Challenge of Globalization in Africa', stressed that 'globalisation' is a multifaceted concept, containing many important 'economic and social, political and environmental, cultural and religious' dimensions, which affect everyone in some way. As Henry Teune (2002, p. 8) explains 'globalization has changed the world enough to demand serious re-thinking about comparative social research in our era of globalization'.

The nexus between globalisation, cultural identity, and intercultural dialogue is developed further by Jensen (2000). He advocates that the globalisation process has made the notion of ‘cultural identity’ one of the most important constructs in intercultural research. Hence, according to him, the real challenge for intercultural research today is to provide ‘analytical tools for the practitioners—tools which are developed in relation to the complexity in multiethnic societies’. He also rejects Hall’s definition of the *primary* cultural identity, because it has a distinct weakness in relation to intercultural communication, which he describes as follows:

It assumes that national identity always will be the primary identity. This means that we have not dissociated ourselves from the intercultural research’s underlying reducing way of seeing national culture as the most important explanation in a communication situation. (Jensen, 1998, pp. 16–19)

Recently, in the discourses of modern identity politics, liberty, democracy, and migration it has been suggested that modern liberal societies, having evolved ‘beyond identities defined by religion and nation’, manifest a ‘weak collective identities’ and that they suffer from a crisis of identity:

Postmodern elites, especially in Europe, feel that they have evolved beyond identities defined by religion and nation. But if our societies cannot assert positive liberal values, they may be challenged by migrants who are more sure of who they are. (Francis Fukuyama, 2007)

1.2 Globalisation, Education, and the Other

1.2.1 Evolving Muslim Societies as the Other

Globalisation and the competitive market forces have generated a massive growth in the knowledge industries that are having profound effects on society and educational institutions. From the macro-social perspective it can be argued that in the domains of language, policy, education, and national identity, nation states—including Muslim societies—are likely to lose their power and capacity to affect their future directions, as the struggle for knowledge domination, production, and dissemination becomes a new form of cultural domination, and a knowledge- and technology-driven social stratification.

This is particularly relevant to societies undergoing cultural transformation, including Muslim societies currently experiencing a profound identity and cultural crisis brought on by forces of globalisation and competing ideologies. On the one hand, globalisation, with its high-tech commodities, science, and knowledge, has brought material benefits to some nations. On the other, globalisation, cultural homogeneity, and global trade have the power to erode much that Muslims value in their traditional system of beliefs and culture. It seems to represent a clash between tradition and modernity; between Western-driven technodeterminism, technology, and science, and traditional Islamic spiritual values. Is it possible to overcome this clash

of civilisation as well as a cultural dilemma, and reconcile Western post-industrial advances in knowledge and technology with evolving Muslim societies?

Western-driven global culture cannot be rejected since the benefits of advanced knowledge, science, and technology are 'too important to repudiate'. Similarly, Saijid and Ashraf (1979) argued that by rejecting advances in science and technology, Muslim societies would not be able to eradicate inequality, illiteracy, poverty, and disease—by faith alone:

Much as the Muslim, anchored in faith, disapproves of the spiritual nihilism of the West, he himself, because of his neglect of science and technology, has created around his society a suffocating atmosphere as oppressive as the spiritual sterility of the West. (Saijid & Ashraf, 1979, p. 39)

Muslim societies can reconcile Western-driven globalisation of knowledge, technology, and culture, as they have a rich historical heritage of scholarship. As reminds us, Islam was very much an educational enterprise. Furthermore, it is a tenet of Islam that scholarship and learning is in itself a moral and ethically superior activity, as evidenced by the Koran, Hadith, and other sources. The examples include:

The ink of the scholar is even more precious than the blood of martyrs.

Seek knowledge; even if it is in China.

1.2.2 Evolving National Identity

The evolving and constantly changing notions of national identity, language, border politics, and citizenship, which are relevant to education policy, need to be critiqued within the local–regional–national arena, which is also contested by globalisation. Current education policy research reflects a rapidly changing world, where citizens and consumers are experiencing a growing sense of uncertainty and alienation. Jarvis (2002) comments on the need to 'rediscover' one's social identity in active citizenship:

[W]e can see that citizenship is a problematic concept in a rapidly globalising world ... the democratic processes are being overturned and there is an increasing need to rediscover active citizenship in which men and women can work together for the common good, especially for those who are excluded as a result of the mechanisms of the global culture. (Jarvis, 2002, p. 295)

The above reflects both growing alienation and a Durkheimian sense of anomie in the world "invaded" by forces of globalisation, cultural imperialism, and global hegemonies that dictate the new economic, political, and social regimes of truth. These newly constructed imperatives in educational policy could well operate as global master narratives, playing a hegemonic role within the framework of economic, political, and cultural hybrids of globalisation.

1.2.3 *Multidimensional Aspect of Globalisation*

While there is some general consensus on globalisation as a multifaceted ideological construct defining a convergence of cultural, economic, and political dimensions (“global village” now communicates global culture), there are significant differences in discourses of globalisation, partly due to differences of theoretical, ideological, and disciplinary perspectives.

Multidimensional typology of globalisation reflects, in one sense, a more diverse interpretation of culture – the synthesis of technology, ideology, and organisation, specifically border crossings of people, global finance and trade, IT convergence, as well as cross-cultural and communication convergence. In another sense, globalisation as a post-structuralist paradigm invites many competing and contesting interpretations. These comprise not only ideological interpretations but also discipline-based discourses, which include the notions of the homogenisation and hybridisation of cultures, the growth of social networks that transcend national boundaries, supranational organisations, the decline of the nation state, and the new mode of communication and IT that changes one’s notion of time and space (Zajda, 2005, pp. xix–xxvii).

Post-structuralist discourses are particularly relevant to the role of *Intercultural Dialogue* theme, and a seemingly teleological search for some answers in creating the good life for all. By opening up the much-needed dialogue on national identity and citizenship, it may be possible to re-evaluate cultural relativism and ethnocentrism, democracy, and totalitarianism/fundamentalism, thus offering new insights into the ongoing dialectics. Current politico-economic and social shifts around the globe, and in the light of Europe’s new diversity, increasingly challenge existing notions of identity and citizenship, and compel us to rethink the questions ‘Who are we?’ and ‘Why do we act the way we act?’

Immigration forces upon us in a particularly acute way discussion of the question ‘Who are we?’ posed by Samuel Huntington, Jerzy Smolicz, and others. In his provocative article, Huntington (1993) predicted a cultural clash of civilization when he wrote:

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. (Huntington, 1993)

Huntington’s hypothesis of the clash of cultures, while provocative, is flawed due to his definition of culture and his conceptual model. He argues that the clash is primarily cultural rather than ideological or economic, which is a contradiction. Culture, by definition, includes three core dimensions of society as ideology, organisation (economic systems), and technology. Thus, the culture wars have to be inherently hegemonic and politico-economic. Huntington’s modelling appears to be linear, as it does not appear to reflect the complexity of multidimensional typology of globalisation.

If post-industrial and postmodern societies are to move towards a more serious discussion of identity crisis in a global culture, they will need to uncover those positive virtues that define what it means to be a member of the wider society. If they do not, they may be overwhelmed by people who are more sure about who they are (Fukuyama, 2007).

The emergence of cultural synthesis has provided the idea of *Leitkultur*—the notion that German citizenship entails certain obligations to observe standards of tolerance and equal respect. The term *Leitkultur*, which means a ‘guiding’ or ‘reference culture’, can be employed in intercultural dialogue for living together. Europe has created national identities defined by citizenship, rather than ethnicity and religion. France has used its power to homogenise French society. The role of the state in identity politics debate, particularly in the climate of current conflict and terrorism, continues to gain momentum. Britain, seeking to raise the visibility of national citizenship, has been forced to borrow from both French and American cultural traditions.

1.3 Methodological Issues in Education and Intercultural Dialogue

There are at least three further conceptual and methodological issues that are relevant to current discourses of education and intercultural dialogue. Firstly, there exists an assumption that the term ‘intercultural’ has a monocultural and linear definition. However, the term ‘intercultural’ is a multilayered ideal construct, with semantic ambiguities, and refers to a contested and contentious concept concerning levels of perceptions and cross-cultural interpretations of intercultural dialogue. Secondly, it is taken for granted that intercultural dialogue is indeed possible and can lead to significant socio-political changes in the global culture. Thirdly, there exists an ambivalent link between social inequality and intercultural dialogue. The greater the social inequality, the less one finds peace, tolerance, and understanding among cultures (Zajda, 2005). The unequal distribution of economic, social, and political capital is likely to make it difficult for pedagogues to address differences and oppressions in schools and society globally (Zajda, 2006a). Some critics argue (Weiler & Maher, 2002) that cultural transformation is difficult to achieve in a global society where social inequality debate is dormant:

Examples of transformative pedagogy, the need to respect and encourage the voices of students, curriculum which critiques popular culture and analyzes social inequality are invaluable to prospective teachers. Moreover, progressive programs educating prospective teachers need to include both models of progressive pedagogy and curriculum and courses exploring the historical and contemporary politics of education, to give prospective teachers tools of analysis and action. On the other hand, calls for liberatory teaching can appear to ring hollow notes in underfunded and inequitable public schools, where knowledge and teaching practices are increasingly standardized and monitored through high stakes testing.

The creation of a more equitable, tolerant, and peaceful society for everyone on this planet is a dream for all empowering and egalitarian pedagogues. But it will remain

a mere hollow rhetoric, or magic words, unless we debate more vigorously social inequality in the global culture (Zajda, Majhanovich, and Rust, 2006). We need to critique the existing status quo of stratified societies and cultures:

As numerous educational researchers have documented, existing schools are profoundly unequal, stratified by race and class, and increasingly driven by the standardized testing of students and teachers and the deskilling of teachers through the introduction of packaged curricula geared to standardized tests. (Weiler and Maher, 2002)

Finally, there is a need to reassert the relevance of intercultural dialogue in an increasingly interdependent world. Informed and balanced intercultural dialogue can help us to define, explain, and critique what is achievable, especially within the current imperatives of globalisation. By focusing on globalisation, nation-building, and cultural identity I wish to answer one of the most pressing global questions: Are social, economic, and cultural divisions between the nations, between school sectors, between schools, and between students growing or declining? To answer this question we need to re-examine and reassess current evidence concerning the nexus between intercultural dialogue, cultural transferability and human rights, and democracy models (Zajda, 2004; Zajda, Davies, & Majhanovich, 2008; Zajda, Biraimah, & Gaudelli, 2008). We need to examine such topics as education for all, language issues in cross-cultural research and education, and issues of race and ethnicity in the regional and global cultures. We also need to focus more on the unresolved tensions between religion, politics, and values education, and the implications for equity, access, and democracy.

We need to critique the overall interplay between intercultural dialogue, education, and the state. This can be accomplished by drawing upon recent major and significant studies in the areas of education, intercultural dialogue, and transformational and global pedagogies. By referring to Bourdieu's call for critical policy analysts to engage in a 'critical sociology' of their own contexts of practice, and poststructuralist and postmodernist pedagogy, we need to understand how central discourses surrounding the debate of intercultural dialogue and education are formed in the contexts of dominant ideology, power, and culturally and historically derived perceptions and practices defining the processes of nation-building and cultural identity in the global culture.

1.4 Conclusion

By focusing on the competing discourses surrounding global political, social, and religious conflicts we need to evaluate critically both the reasons and outcomes of dominant ideologies, education reforms, and policy change, with respect to intercultural dialogue in the global culture. A new understanding and a more effective use of intercultural dialogue could be seen as a means for delivering an authentic and empowering paradigm of peace, tolerance, and harmony in the world. It is likely to offer a more informed and compelling critique of the place of the Other in the Western-driven models of intercultural dialogue surrounding identity politics, liberty, and democracy.

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Chapter 2

Globalization, Identities, and Diversified School Education

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2.1 Globalization, Localization, and Identities

2.1.1 Introduction

Heterogenization, particularization, and localization are phenomena that have been observed in the course of globalization. In these processes, the issue of identity seems to have become more complex than ever before. Certain identities that have been silenced or invisible are becoming more visible, and are sometimes seeking for reconstruction. On the other hand, new identities such as global consumer, cosmopolitan, and new middle class are constantly constructed based on rather shallow commonalities among people. Education has been contributing to construct, reconstruct, maintain, and sometimes destroy identities. This chapter first overviews different types of identities, and consequently presents three examples of how school education has been contributing identity reconstruction, preservation, and construction.

2.1.2 Identities: Ascribed, Acquired, and Named

In general terms, an identity is a social category with which an individual is identified. Certain identities may be ascribed, cannot be chosen, or there is little room for choice, while other identities may be acquired or can even be chosen. In the premodern traditional society, a person was born into “primary ties” (Fromm, 1978) that existed before the emergence of “the individual” resulting from the process of individuation. In such a society, persons are born into the prescribed norms and values (Tönnies, 1955), and thus their identities are ascribed. Furthermore, persons in such a society may not be conscious of some of their identities because they are embedded in the taken-for-granted knowledge of the lifeworld (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Schutz & Luckmann, 1973). Some of the unconscious identities

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are taken as identities only when there is the consciousness of otherness. For example, the Maori in New Zealand became conscious of their identity as Maori in confrontation with, and differentiation from, the Europeans (Olssen, 2002).

In the modern society, some identities are chosen and constructed. Such identities, in order to distinguish from the identities in the premodern society, may be considered as the naming of self, of others, and by others (Brenner, 1993a). When a person is conscious of his or her own naming, whether of oneself or by others, then he or she may attempt to adjust the self to be suitable for the naming. For example, if a teacher is conscious that students see him as a good teacher (naming by the students), he or she will likely make efforts in the way that students continuously regard him as a good teacher. If a Muslim immigrant living in Europe wants to present himself or herself as a Muslim (naming of self), then he or she may behave in a way that emphasizes the naming as Muslim.

The modern state has been the dominating base for the construction of the national identity, which in return has contributed to the nation-building. However, recent history has witnessed that (1) some identities constructed by the modern nation-state have fallen apart due to the collapse of the nation-states (e.g., the case of former Yugoslavia); (2) there have been gradual changes that previously invisible local identities have become more visible; and (3) some particular identities (actually “names”) are globalized (e.g., global elites who move on the globe). In other words, identities are constantly constructed at the local level within a nation-state, on the one hand, and at the level beyond the national border (i.e. international and global levels), on the other.

Following Berger and Luckmann (1966) and Habermas (1987), culture here is defined as “stock of knowledge” that is the accumulation of experiences and interpretations by one’s predecessors. Some identities are cultural in the sense that they have deep cultural roots. With regard to cultural identity, Hampton (1995) cites High Pine who stated: “It is not important to preserve our tradition, it is important to allow our tradition to preserve us” (p. 22). Other identities are acultural and ahistorical. By acultural it is meant here that a “name” is newly constructed with no historical root.

2.1.3 Politicization of Culture and Identities

There are observations that the role of the modern nation-state as the base of the national identity has been undermined. State has “an institutionalized structure of domination” (Hyden, 1992, p. 7) over a territory or territories. Nation, on the other hand, is “a cultural entity often defined in terms of ethnicity” (Holton, 1998, p. 85). Although the definition of nation-state as being confined to the notion of one nation-one state is obviously erroneous, complex plurality of nations within a state tended to be silenced under the national identity maintained by the nation-state. In the last few decades, the way of perceiving boundaries maintained by the nation-state became obsolete (Wallerstein, 1991; Waters, 1995), and the role

of the nation-state has been changed. As the sovereignty of the nation-state was eroded, so was the dominance of the nation-state as the base of an identity. With the changed role of the nation-state, part of its power has been transferred both upwards and downwards (Hall, 1991; Law, 2004). The consequence is that identities are linked with the local and the global simultaneously.

This changed role of the nation-state has implications on revitalization, continuation, and construction of identities of various groups of people (Holton, 1998). Some “names,” such as being cosmopolitan, are acquired and chosen instead of being ascribed. Such “named” identities are sometimes simply based on tastes and preferences, and are easily globalized. However, unlike those identities built around shared cultural memories, they are memory-less and superficial (Smith, 1995). Other identities, such as those based on traditional culture, emphasize their localness or particularity. Despite the homogenization of culture, homogeneity is not guaranteed. In fact, homogenization produces a new kind of heterogeneity (Morrow & Torres, 1995). For example, in the globalization processes, many groups of people increasingly feel marginalized, and struggle against the marginalization “by asserting cultural values that may themselves be global” (Carnoy & Rhoten, 2002, p. 6). They may be traditional religious fundamentalists, postmodern environmentalists, or feminists. Cultural globalization can be understood in the light of “provoking reactions that seek to rediscover particularity, localism and difference which generate a sense of the limits of the culturally unifying, ordering and integrating projects associated with Western modernity” (Featherstone, 1995, p. 114). Thus, heterogenization within the nation-state also became increasingly visible.

Identity is tightly interwoven with notions of human rights, democracy, and culture, which have increasingly been viewed from both global and local perspectives. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, is universal in its scope, but also allows people to claim their particular local identities. The globalized identities and localized identities, thus, do not always take the opposite directions. On the contrary, one identity may be both local and global simultaneously. One remarkable case is the emergence of the notion of “indigenism” (Niezen, 2003) that is a product of global networks of Indigenous peoples.

Although claiming an identity as a member of a specific Indigenous group is local, “indigenism” is a global identity. In this sense, indigenism differs from ethnonationalism that is always local. Niezen (2003) states that “Indigenous organizations defending local attachments to land and simple subsistence technologies make use of electronic media and technologies of communication and transportation to establish and maintain international connections” (p. 10). There is a concept of “Fourth World” that unites Indigenous peoples in various states (Dyck, 1985). This phenomenon can be perceived as “universalized particularity” (Robertson, 1995), and is produced in the global system by a particular historical moment (Friedman, 1995).

Zaretsky (1997) argues that issues of identity cannot be well understood either by Marxist theory of class or Freudian psychoanalysis. The emergence of politics of identity brought to the perception that “in modern society identity is created, not

given, and that culture is the sphere of identity creation” (Zaretsky, 1997, p. 257). Politicization of culture has important effects on identity. In the process of politicization, culture, tradition, and religion are dealt with politically. Some examples of this process are (1) Indigenous peoples’ claim to their distinctive identities as Indigenous, cultural practices, and self-government (United Nations, 1997), and (2) recent movements of religious fundamentalism. In the former case, Indigenous people’s ascribed identities are not only ascribed, but are now actively chosen by those people. Since the 1960s, collective identities that were previously hidden or suppressed have become visible (Kenny, 2004). One example is the case of Indigenous peoples in the United States. They reclaim stigmatized identity as “Indians” (the term which resulted from the historical mistake made by Columbus), and revalue the devalued identity (Zaretsky, 1997).

With regard to the religious fundamentalism, today’s religious movements are not necessarily based on ancient doctrines or traditional sets of beliefs, but often on religio-political values that are still in the process of being invented (Ayubi, 1999; Tibi, 1997). Although various religious groups or movements have always expressed concerns not only for particular social and political issues (Haynes, 1999), the character of organized religion today is becoming more explicitly political (Randall, 1999). Culture is increasingly politicized in all countries of immigration as well (Castles & Miller, 1998). Politicized culture may be re-territorialized and particularized as exemplified by Indigenous people’s claim to their traditional territories. Politicized culture may also be universalized, as Islam spreads on the globe (Lawrence, 1998).

2.1.4 Individualization and Identities in the Late Modernity

In the current late modernity, individualism is institutionalized. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2001) define the institutionalized individualism as the situation in which the individual must lead his or her own independent life outside the old bonds, such as family and religion. In the premodern society, it is often the society that defines the moral education based on the norms and values in the society (Durkheim, 1961). However, in the modern societies, morality has increasingly become an individual matter (see Habermas, 1987). In the traditional society, the individual was born into the prescribed norms and values (Fromm, 1978; Tönnies, 1955), while in the late modernity, the individual has greater opportunities to become an author of his or her own biography, and there is “globalization of biography” (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2001). In the risk society where there are various social insecurities (Beck, 1992), the individualization is accompanied by the risk biography. In other words, the individual must be responsible for what he or she chooses, and cannot shift the responsibility to old social bonds.

Identity is a sort of means to help people to maintain the conceptions of uniqueness of who they are, define themselves for themselves, and express their uniqueness

to others. Cultural identities are a construction, not fixed or essential, and there are new identities constructed (Hall, 1996). Individuals have multiple layers of identities, and political and cultural identities are both multiple and situational (see Law, 2004). The concept of identity involves both uniqueness and belongingness. Miegel (1993) states:

In order to understand how individuals construct their identity, it is important to comprehend how they reason and act in order to solve the never-ending conflicts between their different roles; and their roles and their self-images. (p. 10)

Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2001) state that due to the individualization that undermined social collectivity, the concept of class, which is a social collectivity, was a few decades ago regarded as almost dead. However, they observe that this concept has been celebrating renaissance in the new global context, and that the theory of death of the class will be less valid in the future. In other words, the new inequalities that grow globally are a collective experience that is equivalent to the experience of class. However, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (*ibid.*) further argue that even though the experience of inequality is collective, individualization does not create collective ties within a class. In some countries like Sweden and Japan where class differences have been much less visible than other countries, such as the USA and the UK, there are reports of increasing inequalities within the country. Table 2.1 (see the Appendix) is a heuristic attempt that summarizes different types of the identities and some of the examples of each type. In Table 2.1, ethnic/tribal identity and religious identity appear in the first and second rows. Those identities found in the first column are “given,” and people are often not conscious about the identities. The consciousness may emerge when people encounter “others.” On the other hand, those identities in the second column are “chosen” in the process of politicization of cultures and religions. The example of “Indians” (should be read as Indigenous peoples) given above falls into this category. In the third and fourth columns, there are “old class identity” and “new class identity” respectively. In the old class stratification, a class of an individual was more or less given and there was little room for choice. Compared to the old class identity, “new” middle class has been constructed by individuals who obtained proper education. The fifth column shows the “named” identities based on tastes and preferences, which are ahistorical and acultural.

2.2 Education and Revitalization of Cultural Identity

School education has contributed to the process of the formation of the modern state (Whitty, 1997). School subjects such as history, and symbols such as national flag and national anthem utilized in the school, have contributed to the formation of national identity. The identity construction by the nation-state sometimes took place at the expense of identities of minorities and ethnic groups within the

nation-state. In such cases, school education has sometimes been utilized as means of colonization, and has caused devastation of cultures and loss of cultural identities. One example is the cases of Indigenous peoples in Canada who attend residential schools where those students' native language and cultural practices were strictly forbidden (Haig-Brown, 1988; Wotherspon, 1991). The residential school education that extended for three generations destroyed Indigenous cultures, caused extinction of some Indigenous languages, and resulted in loss of self-esteem among the Indigenous population.

There are often conflicts between the cultural values of the students and the value prevailing in the school. There are also gaps between educational goals of the students and their parents, on the one hand, and educational goals of the school, on the other. One example of the value in the school may be "to foster critical thinking" that is often observed in educational policy statements. However, some students who enter such an educational environment may have a cultural value that highly discourages "critical thinking". Deloria Jr. and Wildcat (2001), criticizing the US educational system, state that the institutions are built based on Western worldviews, but that it is necessary to explore Indigenous education systems.

After having experienced loss of cultures and identities, Indigenous peoples in Canada today demand education that revitalizes their cultures and identities (Agbo, 2002). Their movement toward the control of education is often linked to their demands for recognition as the First People, their claims on their traditional territories, and their demands for "self-government." In other words, the demands on control of education by the Indigenous peoples in Canada emerged in the process of cultural politicization.

In Canada, colonization policies have worked toward assimilation of Indigenous peoples partly through school education (Barman et al., 1986; Tobias, 1983). In this context, the Canadian government's policy can be divided into two phases. The first phase, from 1867 to 1945, was dominated by a paternalistic ideology, with which the Indigenous peoples were educated in separation from the mainstream society (Frideres, 1987). The second phase started after World War II, when colonialism and segregation based on race were protested in many parts of the world. Thus, the federal government's goal for assimilation of Indigenous peoples changed from separate education to immediate integration through multiethnic education in 1949. Many Indigenous children were sent to provincial schools to be educated with non-Indigenous students for subsequent speedy integration into the dominant society (Barman et al., 1986). The second phase involved a more democratic ideology. However, it simply refers to the open-door policy by which Indigenous peoples could attend the off-reserve schools (Frideres, 1988). "Liberalism is full of strange paradoxes and reveals different faces depending on one's angle of vision" (Parekh, 1995, p. 81).

Indigenous students in provincial schools had to face daily and direct discrimination from teachers and other students. In addition, the competition for achievement in provincial schools was unfamiliar to the Indigenous students. In the process of socialization, children with different sociocultural backgrounds acquire

different “codes” (Bernstein, 1975) or “*habitus*” (Bourdieu, 1977) from their home and/or community, which may or may not work advantageously when those children enter schools. Some of the educational reproduction theorists perceive the school as the main agency transmitting dominant culture that is institutionally screened and validated (Apple, 1990; DiMaggio, 1991). “Native children, not used to the intense competition that exists among White, middle-class students, may become psychologically uncomfortable and begin to lose academic ground” (Frideres 1988, p. 179). Not surprisingly, there was a high dropout rate among Indigenous students.

In the 1960s, the American civil rights movement crossed the border and spread into Canada. This movement stimulated the movement of self-determination of Indigenous peoples (Barman et al., 1986). In 1972, the National Indian Brotherhood (NIB) issued a paper entitled “Indian Control of Indian Education,” and asserted that Indigenous peoples must reclaim their right to “parental responsibility” and “local control,” and that only Indigenous peoples could develop Indigenous education based on Indigenous peoples’ values adapted to the modern world (National Indian Brotherhood, 1972, p. 3). The federal government quickly accepted the principles of the NIB and signed an agreement with the NIB to adopt the policy of Indigenous control of Indigenous education (Barman et al., 1986; Wotherspoon & Satzewich, 1993).

Although the definition of “control” was left unclear (Comeau & Santin, 1990), the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) transferred control of programs to Indigenous communities by delegating the administration of programs to the band councils (a band council is an administrative unit). However, the DIA continued to control administrative decisions, and allotted the money to the bands to administer the programs. Numerous Indigenous bands have operated schools on reserves since 1972 without a clear definition of “control.” Wotherspoon and Satzewich (1993) state that in the decade between 1975/76 and 1985/86, the number of schools operated by Indigenous bands increased from 53 to 229.

The Assembly of First Nations (AFN) was established in 1981, and issued the *Indian Education Paper* in 1982. AFN surveyed all band leaders to analyze the mistakes in the existing policy and to suggest ways to rectify them. In 1988, the Assembly reported what the NIB had asserted 16 years earlier: The new AFN paper required the federal government to give up its administrative functions and to be a funding agency. It also asserted the necessity of flexibility to allow individual bands to develop programs which could meet Indigenous peoples’ goals (Comeau & Santin, 1990). Indigenous leaders demanded that traditional Indigenous teaching methods be considered. In recent years, Indigenous groups have gradually obtained more control of their education. Many Indigenous bands hire teachers, and also participate in designing and building schools and in establishing the curricula. They strive to restore their culture and reestablish children’s identity. They attempt to realize this partly by controlling the education of their children. For example, today, numerous Indigenous groups are desperately trying to develop language teaching materials and collect old stories before the last generation of fluent Indigenous language speakers passes away.

2.3 Education and Muslim Identity

Education may adopt different pedagogic models, depending on the goal: competence model and performance model. With the competence model, education develops competence of the learner, whether it is cultural competence, social competence, or other types of competence. This pedagogic model is “therapeutic” while the performance pedagogic model is “economic” (Bernstein, 1996). If the parents wish that their children acquire cultural competence through education, but the school in which the children are enrolled moves the children away from the cultural values, there is a conflict. It is often the case that the Western school system creates competitive and individualistic culture, which creates conflicts when introduced to societies based on collectivity (Eriksen, 1997; Wilson, 1997).

In contrast to some of the holistic learning systems, school education brings about division of tasks between the school and the home, and serves to fragment and stratify society, and devalues indigenous cultural forms (Serpell, 1993). For some groups of people, schools are institutions where the moral universe of the students is threatened (Apple & Christian-Smith, 1991). In this case, there may be an opposing response to the schooling through, for example, withdrawal from the school or simply not choosing the school (see Apple, 1993). Muslim parents in rural Gambia perceive the Western-style education as having negative effects on the socialization of children into traditional local norms and values (Central Statistics Department, 1995).

Muslims in many parts of the world have been exposed to modernity through colonialism. Modernity brought not only improved economic and material conditions, but also individualism, rationalism, and secularism that are opposed to, or threaten, traditional Islamic values (Daun & Arjmand, 2002; Sanneh, 1997; Talbani, 1996). This is also the experience of the people in the Gambia where about 85% of the population is Muslims. Western-style education was introduced into the Gambia by Christian missionaries during the nineteenth century, which met with strong resistance because Muslims regarded these schools as a tool for the conversion of their children to Christianity (Clarke, 1986). In 1977, The Gambia introduced elements of Koranic education at all levels in the Western-style schools, but parents in rural areas prefer to enroll their children in Islamic educational arrangements (Central Statistics Department, 1995).

The Arabic-Islamic school (*madrassa*) is a modernized form of the Islamic educational institution that has played important roles in the Muslim communities across sub-Saharan African countries. The following are some of the characteristics of the *madrassa*: (1) there are formal grades, as in the Western-style school; (2) there is a set timetable; and (3) there is a formal curriculum, including Islamic subjects as well as secular subjects such as mathematics, science, and foreign languages. The *madrassa* has become increasingly popular, and has provided an important alternative type of schooling to the Western-style school in the Gambia.

It has been usual for villagers to develop their traditional village Koranic school into a village *madrassa*, which is then administered by a local committee. External links have often been established between the *madrassa* and Arab countries (1) through teachers who have been educated in Islamic postsecondary institutions in those countries, or (2) through Islamic organizations that support the *madrassa* in various ways. In the last few decades, Muslim civil society has emerged in a more modern form of civil society, which may be exemplified by reference to the increasing number of Muslim interest groups and the growing number of modernized Muslim schools (Brenner, 1993b). Many Muslim interest organizations place strong emphasis on the development of schools and social services (Eisenstadt, 2000), and Muslim countries, especially oil-rich countries, provide financial support for the establishment of such modernized Muslim schools in developing countries.

The number of Islamic organizations that support the *madrassa* in the Gambia has increased during the past 20 years. The form of this support from Islamic organizations may vary from a one-off donation to continuous and regular financial contributions. In addition, support may be in the form of textbooks for teachers, contributions toward the construction of classrooms (money or materials), arranging the supply of teachers, or financing of teacher salaries (Central Statistics Department, 1995).

In one survey conducted in the Gambia, it was found that an overwhelming 96% of those parents who enroll their children in a *madrassa* expect religious and moral instruction to be provided there. That expectation is the strongest reason for their enrolling their children in a *madrassa*. "In their view, formal Western education serves a worldly function which is inadequate to secure ones' place in the hereafter" (Central Statistics Department, 1995, p. 49). Non-Islamic or secular subjects taught in the *madrassa* do not generally hold such a strong sway over the interest of parents, although this does not necessarily mean that there is no interest at all in such subjects (*ibid.*).

In studies conducted in two Gambian villages (see Okuma-Nyström, 2003), villagers were asked in interviews of their views on the Western-style school and the *madrassa*. Among those who expressed some negative views on the Western-style school, several villagers mentioned some kind of value conflict between the traditions of the village and the modern norms introduced through education in the Western-style school, for example: "Western school tends to move the person away from the own tradition and custom"; "It would make some disobey to the religious teachings"; and "There is no unity but only individualism."

Despite those negative perceptions of the Western-style school, many parents nevertheless enroll their children in the Western-style school. The main reason for such a choice is the better possible employment opportunities on completion of the Western-style secondary school. Knowing the reality that the Western-style secondary school charges high tuition fees, enrolling children in that type of school on the part of parents is an investment. In other words, from parents' point of view, what children actually learn in the Western-style school is not the most serious

concern, but the outcome of their investment, which is employed persons who would economically support the parents.

When children, having completed the Western-style secondary school, are unable to find employment but nonetheless do not return to the village, they are labeled as snobs by the villagers (even by their own parents), which constitutes naming by others. On the other hand, in both villages, children who have completed the Western-style secondary school would name themselves “knowledgeable persons,” which constitutes the naming of self. Here, those who have been educated in the Western-style secondary school tend to wish to distance themselves from the others in the village, and such knowledgeable people are “supposed to spatially and symbolically leave the illiterates behind. If they return to farm, that would be a failure” (Hagberg, 2002, p. 3).

With regard to the views on the *madrassa*, the majority of the interviewees point to religious factors as being good things. Daun (1992) describes how education in Islam is a twofold process: “(1) the acquisition of external knowledge that improves faith and (2) the internal realization of intrinsic meaning” (p. 43). Interviewees state that through education in the *madrassa*, children are able to learn the Holy Koran well, which will be of benefit in the next life, that they will know how to worship properly, and that they will become more religious. Several interviewees point out that, as Muslims, it is their obligation to make good Muslims out of their children. An imam in one of the villages states: “One of the *hadith* says that if you have three children and refuse to give one away to learn the Koran, then you are not considered as His [Allah] follower.” By enrolling children in the *madrassa*, both parents and their children will be blessed by God.

While interviewees consider that those who have completed the Western-style school have developed an identity that distances them from village life, those who have completed the *madrassa* are regarded as people who keep to local traditions. Several interviewees point out that in the case that those who have completed the *madrassa* not being able to obtain employment outside the village, they would remain in the village. They would also be good Muslims. Thus the risk of unemployment in the case of those children who have completed the *madrassa* is assessed very differently by their parents, because enrollment in the *madrassa* is not really regarded as an investment for their future on their part. For example, the interviewees state: “They may not be far away from home, and assist the world at home. If they can’t get a job, they would assist me. I have no feeling of waste of money”; and “Even if he [a child] doesn’t have a job [with the *madrassa* education] he will be a good Muslim, and know how to worship. There is no disadvantage of the *madrassa*.”

The main goal associated with the *madrassa*, as perceived by the interviewees, is shaped by values derived from Islam that is a powerful agenda-setting agent (Villalón, 1995). The identity associated with children enrolled in the *madrassa* is identity of being a good Muslim. The *madrassa* is perceived by the parents as an institution that produces people who retain and reproduce the traditions of the village. But even more important is that these children will be the next generation of Muslims, and contribute to the parents receiving God’s blessing.

2.4 Reproduction of the New Middle Class Identity

In the globalization processes, many social aspects have been depoliticized and replaced by economic principles. The state takes less responsibility for welfare, and increasingly protects the market. Traditionally, the view of the state is one of the factors that distinguish the old conservatives and neoliberals. The former stress the importance of a strong state, while the latter assert that the state control must be kept at minimum. In neoliberalism, the individual freedom is associated with competitive markets, and with decision-making based on the market principle. The market principle implanted in education puts schools into the market where they are to be chosen by parents and students, just like any other commodities in the market waiting to be chosen. Education is now less regarded as a public good (Apple, 2000; Stromquist & Monkman, 2000; Zajda, 2005), more as private consumption, and thus has become depoliticized (Apple, 2000; Brown et al., 1997; Giddens, 2000). Supporting ideologies behind these changes are user democracy and meritocracy, and one important premise of the neoliberal freedom of choice is that autonomous individuals are able to make rational choice.

However, there are observations of increasing gap between the rhetoric of meritocracy and individual freedom of choice, on the one hand, and its contradictory realities on the other. Meritocracy that should give everybody equal opportunity to education tends, in reality, to result in an equal opportunity to be unequal. Democracy is changed from a political concept to an economic concept, and is now linked with consumption practices (Apple, 2000; Brown et al., 1997). In the globalizing marketization of many social aspects, even the civil society is marketized where people increasingly solve social problems with money rather than with social action. Educational reforms that are taking place in many countries create a situation in which parents must be good “shoppers” of education, and must be competitive (Schneider, 2001; Whitty, 1997). Lidström (2002) cites Brown who stated that there is a change toward an education system “whereby the education a child receives must conform to the wealth and wishes of parents rather than the abilities and efforts of pupils” (p. 68). Thus, the ideology of parentocracy took over the ideology of meritocracy. At the same time, the responsibility for the choice of school is now on the individuals, which might lead to “risk biography” (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2001). On the one hand, this phenomenon can be seen as convergence; on the other hand, it involves divergence that is emerging from below the state, which is at the local/individual level. The globalism on the one hand and the localism on the other constrain actions taken by the government (Ichikawa, 2002).

The demand that has emerged from below the state level in this context is that from the individuals who have gained increasing freedom with regard to educational choice. In the educational marketplace, “the purchasing power of individuals becomes a legitimate means of acquiring a high-quality education” (Robertson et al., 2002, p. 492). Apple (2000) argues that this is a retranslation of “needs discourses” into a market talk and privately driven policies. Although the expansion of parental choice was meant to benefit the disadvantaged students in some countries,

the emphasis on parental choice and self-governing schools in many cases led to the situation in which the disadvantaged became further disadvantaged. This is especially the case in countries where freedom of school choice was newly introduced (Ladd, 2003; Whitty, 1997).

In terms of the ability to be a competitive purchaser of education on the part of parents, social capital (Bourdieu, 1990) plays a crucial role. Schneider (2001) argues that parents with higher education often rely on their social capital when they choose a school for their children, and that they do not need to search school information widely through, for example, information in the media. There is little doubt that parents' financial, social, cultural, and political capitals (Bourdieu, 1984, 1998) have strong effects on school choice. Here, the concept of "social space" (Bourdieu, 1998) may better catch the picture of parental purchasing power of education. "Social space" is a space that the individual occupies based on the volume of economic, social, cultural, and academic capitals that he or she has acquired (Bourdieu, 1998). Traditionally, those parents who have been competitive purchasers of education are those who have large volumes of cultural, social, academic, and financial capitals (the case of traditional upper class). At least, reasonable volumes of cultural, social, and academic capitals, but not a large financial capital (cases of some intellectuals), allowed those parents to choose prestigious public schools (Saha, 2005).

In the course of parental school choice, there is empirical evidence that some schools attract highly motivated students, while some schools lose students, and may eventually be closed down (Apple, 2000). As a result, there may be a situation in which characteristics of a school are defined by students' family backgrounds. In Sweden, for example, after the introduction of school choice at the 9-year compulsory education level, schools have tended to become increasingly homogeneous in terms of ethnicity and the family background (Daun, 2003; Swedish National Agency for Education, 2003). Both public schools and private (independent) schools in Sweden receive public subsidies and free of charge, except for few private schools that charge high school fees without receiving the subsidies. This situation is very different from that of some countries where private schools charge high school fees, and only wealthy families can afford to send their children to private schools. Yet, private schools with high academic performance in urban areas in Sweden are often chosen by those parents who have higher levels of education, while private schools run by immigrants are usually not chosen by such parents (Daun et al., 2004).

In Japan, private schools as alternative to public schools have a long history, and have attracted many students from privileged family backgrounds since the early twentieth century. As the Japanese society became school-career-oriented, the target of educational strategies on the part of the parents moved down from the higher education level to the primary level (Kobari, 2000). Under the educational policies toward more "relaxed" schools that have been implemented in the last few years, the amounts of school hours and contents of subjects were reduced. Many parents regard this change as having negative effects on their children's preparation for the future higher education. Private schools are, however, allowed to keep the number

of hours or contents of subjects. In the recent years, “kôritsu-banare (public school avoidance)” has been accelerated even at the compulsory education level especially among parents who can afford private schools for their children.

Brown et al. (1997) argue that it is the individualistic “new” middle class that demands increasing access to higher education, which used to be dominated by the “old” middle class, for their children. They also state that the class conflict today is not between the middle class and working class, but within the middle class. The “new” middle class is a group of people who were promoted to this social category by attaining a proper education, generally higher education (Hudson & Lidström, 2002). It is this class that has a strong interest in upwards social mobility (Apple, 2000). The new middle class, from the perspective of the “social space,” may occupy spaces of (1) relatively large economic and academic capitals, but not necessarily a large volume of cultural capital; and (2) relatively large volume of economic capital, but rather small volumes of both academic and cultural capitals. Bourdieu (1990) expresses case (1) as powerful people in the society who may occupy high positions in large firms and companies. As stated above, “proper” school education was an instrument for some people to come to belong to the “new” middle class. For them, proper school choice for their children is the key to reproduce the identity of the middle class (see also Zajda, Biraimah, & Gaudelli, 2008).

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter argues that identities today are constructed and reconstructed both locally and globally simultaneously, and that school education contributes in various ways to maintain, construct, reconstruct, and sometimes to destroying some identities. Figure 2.1 demonstrates some identities and their relation to education. The first example, the case of Indigenous peoples in Canada, falls into the second column in Fig. 2.1 (see the Appendix). Here, their identities as being Indigenous in Canada are actively chosen in the course of cultural politicization. The control of school education by the Indigenous peoples is seen as the key to reconstruct their cultural identities that were once oppressed by the colonial education system in Canada. The second example deals with school choice and Muslim identity in the case of the Muslim parents in two rural Gambian villages. This case also falls into the second column. In those cases, the Muslim parents perceive the modernized Islamic school, the *madrassa*, as the institution that contributes to the preservation of Islam and Muslim identities. The last example shows that school education in some countries contributes to the reproduction of the emerging “new” middle class (column four in Fig. 2.1). This phenomenon is connected with individualization, and individualistic “new” middle class, which appeared partly as a result of certain educational attainment, has become powerful chooser of education. By choosing and purchasing “proper” education for their children, the new middle class maintains that class identity. Here, the school education is partly used as an instrument to maintain the newly acquired identity.

Appendix

Table 2.1 Types of identities and some examples of these

Type of identities	Some examples	Ties	Scope	
Ascribed identity	1 No or little free choice	Ethnic/tribal identity; religious identity; prescribed social roles	Pre-modern primary social ties; no “individual”	Local
	2 Actively chosen; naming	Ethnic/tribal identity; religious identity; gender identity	Politicized cultural and religious ties	Local national global
Acquired identity	3 Little free choice	Old class identity; nationality	Socially constructed collective ties	Local national
	4 Chosen; Naming	New class identity; national identity when residing outside the national boundary	Socially constructed loose ties; collectivity is weak	National global
Naming by tastes	5 Chosen	Consumer identity; global cosmopolitan	Very loose ties of individuals	National global




Fig. 2.1 Some identities and their relation to education

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Chapter 3

Democracy, Identity, and Citizenship Education in South Africa: Defining a Nation in a Postcolonial and Global Era

Patricia K. Kubow

3.1 Introduction

Since lived experiences within social systems are interpreted through cultural lenses, comparative research that seeks the meanings that people in different parts of the world give to the term *democracy* is of particular importance. This need is even more urgent as globalization, guided by Western values and assumptions, is mistaken for national priorities elsewhere. The language and processes of globalization often mask the ideological and hegemonic agenda of a country's elites as well as the intentions of actors across the complex network of nations. Since knowledge is expressed through language, dominant discourses of identity politics and nation-building are an exercise in power and help to fashion citizens' understandings of reality. Thus, democracy, which derives from the Greek word *demos kratia* ("people rule" or "popular rule"), is a concept for cross-cultural study in a non-Western, postcolonial context. The focus in this chapter is on citizen identity and nation-building efforts in South Africa and the role of indigenous (local) knowledge and global discourse in shaping constructions of democracy and citizenship education.

In general, democracy describes the particular kind of political arrangement of a society. In its pure or ideal form, democracy is a mechanism that enables a balance of self and group expression and that seeks to develop relationships based on respect and reciprocity between the nation and its citizens (see also Perry, 2005). Education for democratic citizenship seeks to develop specific knowledge, skills, and values in students that, in effect, help to develop students' identities. *Identity* can be understood as "the frame within which [people] can determine where they stand on questions of what is good, or worthwhile, or admirable, or of value" (Taylor, 1989, p. 27). A study of South Africa's democratic transition, however, reveals that democracy's conceptualization is embedded in a host of sociocultural, economic, and political conditions that have shaped citizen identity and nation-building in particular ways. These conditions are implicated by a colonialist past whereby indigenous knowledge systems—the values,

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beliefs, and practices that indigenous peoples bring to daily life—were negated or devalued by colonialists in favor of Western values and methods (Constantino, 1978; Macedo, 1999). To understand President Thabo Mbeki's call for a contemporary African Renaissance and revival of indigenous knowledge systems in South Africa, one must first consider the historical legacy and ideological effects of Dutch and English colonization in the country that constrained an inclusive vision of citizenship.

3.2 Reasserting African Values—Contending with a Colonial Legacy

An important aspect of identity formation within a society is the way in which particular individuals or groups confirm or deny the identities of others through the kinds of relationships they forge (Lotter, 1998). Conditions of security are necessary to allow the development of complex identities; when people are threatened, discriminated against, or persecuted by dominant others, people often mobilize around cultural identities in protest of that discrimination (Lotter, 1998). South Africa's earliest inhabitants were the San or Bushmen who eventually moved northward from the Cape Peninsula, whereas the Khoikhoi who migrated from the north to the Cape Peninsula about 2,000 years ago were the first group encountered by the Europeans who sailed to Table Bay in the fifteenth century. By 1648, the Europeans had instituted a well-established system of slave labor and brought to the Cape indigenous groups from Angola, Guinea, Madagascar, and Mozambique (Armour, 2005). Europeans, and consequently the indigenous populations they persecuted, came to understand their identities from within a "master and slave" and "oppressor and oppressed" context. Despite continued resistance to white oppression (e.g., violent resistance led by Zulu chief Bambatha in KwaZulu-Natal in the late 1800s to early 1990s, nonviolent resistance in Johannesburg led by Mahatma Gandhi in 1906, and the establishment of the South African Native National Congress in Bloemfontein—which later became the African National Congress [ANC]—by Zulu organizer Pixley kaIsaka Seme in 1912), the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 led by Prime Minister Louis Botha resulted in increased classification and segregation of people according to skin color.

In 1948, *apartheid* (literally "apart-hood"), which accorded or denied citizenship and its privileges and benefits on the basis of race, was codified into law by the white National Party government. Apartheid laws restricted the physical mobility of people in relation to living space, public transport, public facilities, beaches, schools, and political representation. During the 1960s, the National Party implemented a system of separate development, moving blacks to "Bantu lands" and instituting an unequal and restricted type of formal education for indigenous peoples. The apartheid policies, along with the formal school curriculum, served ideological functions: the dominant group constructed "the Other" by granting the

advantages of citizenship to whites only, thereby relegating Indians, coloreds, and blacks to the political, economic, and social margins of society. Thus, the social construction of “the Other” by white South Africans was used to determine the roles and functions of people within the nation state (van Niekerk, van Der Walddt, & Jonker, 2001). In this way, the knowledge and views of subjugated groups were pushed to the periphery by the very definitions of citizenship and policies erected by the colonizers.

Due to white South African interest in maintaining a system that accorded privileges at the expense of the subjugated, the fall of the apartheid state could only be brought about by people willing to risk imprisonment and death for governmental resistance. Mobilization and economic boycotts initiated and carried out by common people and the involvement of prominent political activists, known as freedom fighters, prompted international attention and eventually global pressure that, when combined with internal forces, helped to dismantle apartheid (see Fig. 3.1).

As a way to acknowledge individual persons and to create a national moral commitment to inclusivity and human dignity, the Defiance Campaign in 1952, led




Fig. 3.1 Voices of four prominent freedom fighters

“We, the people of South Africa, declare, for all our country and the world to hear, that this land of beauty and rugged places will grant equality to its rainbow of races. We pledge that all will enjoy the same rights; that all shall be equal before the law and its might; that the doors of learning and culture shall stand wide for the sharing of knowledge and rekindling of pride. We pledge to our children, our aged, those in poor health that all will share in our country’s great wealth. There will be no hunger and all will have homes. There’ll be friendship and warmth so none stand alone. We’ll have freedom of worship and freedom of expression with welfare and safety and no need of repression. There’ll be work for all and wages well paid with a strong new economy and vibrant trade. No laws and cruel passes will keep cultures apart, for our people will unite, in peace, with one heart.”

Fig. 3.2 South Africa’s freedom charter

by ANC organizer Z. K. Matthews, sought the views of people from all races to fashion a charter. The Freedom Charter, written in 1955, was approved in Kliptown, Soweto, in the presence of thousands of South Africans. A year later the apartheid government deemed the Charter an act of treachery and arrested more than 150 people, including Nelson Mandela. The Charter, however, served as the basis for South Africa’s Constitution adopted on 8 May 1996 and demonstrates the efforts of a multicultural nation to begin to define itself from a paradigm of reciprocity. The Freedom Charter, rendered into verse by Patricia Schonstein Pinnock, appears in Fig. 3.2.

The first democratic election held in April 1994 marked the official end of the apartheid era, a transition from authoritarian rule to democratic governance, and a reshaping of citizenship in South Africa. In his opening address to the first Democratic Parliament, then President Mandela (1994) issued the following challenge:

We must, constrained by and yet regardless of the accumulated effect of our historical burdens, seize the time to define for ourselves what we want to make of our shared destiny.

A key feature of a democratic society is that all of the nation’s people have the power to name themselves (Brettschneider, 2002). Because identity is socially constructed, democratic identities are dependent on the participation of common people, as well as policymakers, to articulate a social direction that will sustain a democratic way of life. National identity, similar to personal identity, is defined through “dialogue with, sometimes struggle against, the identities which significant others want to recognize in us” (Taylor, 1992, p. 5). Since concepts represent the particular assumptions, notions, and rules about knowledge in a given society (McGovern, 1999), the concepts people choose have the power to depict democratic cultures in certain ways. Definitions of citizenship describe how people view their place in the world and their perceptions of how the world ought to be. Nation-building and identity politics, then, are central to the citizenship project. Citizen identity is the unique combination of talents, abilities, and specialized skills, as well as one’s values about cultural, moral, and political issues (Lotter, 1998). There is

an important question to be addressed regarding the kind of democratic order that may develop in South Africa, given its pluralistic population, racial tensions, and economic and political divisions (Herman, 1996). Initial efforts at nation-building have been aimed at redressing past inequalities and attending to the needs of the historically disadvantaged. In effect, the ANC has looked to the historically disadvantaged in an attempt to form more inclusive definitions of citizenship that may, over time, fundamentally transform the country.

To guide the shaping of South Africa's democratic culture and its identity to the African continent and the world, President Mbeki contends that South Africans must draw upon their own traditional heritages and African values to construct a unique national identity that can help guide South Africa towards its desired social vision. Mbeki's public speeches have taken on a greater sense of urgency for citizens at more local levels to engage in the ongoing efforts of democratization, identity formation, and nation-building:

We have a duty to define ourselves. We speak about the need for the African Renaissance in part so that we, ourselves, and not another, determine who we are, what we stand for, what our vision and hopes are, how we do things, what programmes we adopt to make our lives worth living, who we relate to and how. (Mbeki, 2002)

While we must indeed celebrate the high levels of optimism that inspire our people, who are convinced that our country has entered its Age of Hope, we must also focus on and pay particular attention to the implications of those high levels of optimism with regard to what we must do together to achieve the objective of a better life for all our people. (Mbeki, 2006)

African indigenous knowledge systems, based on African history, cultural heritage, and customs, have developed in response to particular social and physical realities (Chavunduka, 1995; O'Donoghue & van Rensburg, 2002). The Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS) movement is premised on the notion that indigenous knowledge cannot be extracted from the local settings in which the knowledge was produced and where it receives its meaning (Semali & Kincheloe, 1999). Mbeki's goal is for South Africa's democracy and identity to be shaped by African philosophies and perspectives and to not be limited by Western constructions. This is challenging in a postcolonial and global environment in which the North has created predatory relationships in its interaction with the South—relationships not premised on cooperation, reciprocity, or communality.

In an effort to counter Western values and influences, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981) asserts that it is the duty of the citizen to not only preserve African cultural and social values, but to also strengthen those values in one's relations with other citizens (Cilliers & Sturman, 2002). An aim of the African Renaissance in South Africa is the reassertion of basic values central to Southern Bantu populations, which include moral, religious, and social views of generosity, cooperation, solidarity, goodwill, and reciprocity (Hammond-Tooke, 1974). This social vision, fundamental in African cosmology, was disrupted and suppressed by Western constructions of citizenship that, in effect, divided the public and private spheres of the self into separate domains. The spiritual and emotional aspects of citizens' lives were relegated to the local and private realm of the

home while reason and intellect were ascribed to the public realm of the city. In African thought, no such public–private split is a part of African thought because emotion–intellect and passion–reason are integrally linked to the person as citizen. The Zulu proverb, *umuntu umuntu ngabantu* (a person is a person through people) helps to illustrate this integration—that citizenship is understood within the context of community, and the individual is not separate from it. One *is* because (as the result of) other people. Similarly, the Zulu term, *ukulungisa*, which means that one’s personal relationship with the world is in harmony with one’s environment, depicts the kind of social order and balance advocated in African cosmology. The democratic citizen, therefore, is both participatory creator and actor whose personhood is known through larger entities (e.g., community, spirit, and environment) that are a part of, and that extend beyond, the person:

A central reason many fight for the self-determination and dignity of their peoples is because their peoples—their histories, cultures, and ways of knowing—are deemed worth fighting for. (Brettschneider, 2002, pp. 16–17)

Definitions of citizenship, therefore, are culturally laden. An analogy is useful here to distinguish some of the different assumptions and values underlying indigenous African communities and Western nations. In African contexts, the learning of music is the result of lengthy exposure and immersion in indigenous communities. The totality of the musical experience does not come by being told where to find the notes or by playing scales independent of the group, as typically found in Western societies (Tracey, 1994). While musicians in the West generally warm up independently of other orchestra members, African musical groups find the notion of playing without others “unthinkable” because “warming up is already part of the performance” (Tracey, 1994, p. 6). The energy created sustains the performance. Applied to democracy, the giving and receiving of power between society’s members creates the complementarity necessary for sustaining democracy in South Africa, which involves balancing the tensions inherent between unity and diversity, freedom and responsibility, and inclusion and individuality (Tracey, 1994). The knowledge and values generated in indigenous communities, therefore, afford possibilities for rethinking development and education (McGovern, 1999).

3.3 Reforming or Transforming?: Considering the Purposes of Citizenship Education

Educational restructuring, similar to social restructuring, is shaped by a host of economic, political, cultural, and transnational factors. The terminology used to identify a country’s educational change process, however, reveals both the kind and degree of change envisioned for the country and distinguishes the role that citizenship education must play in developing democratic identity in learners. By definition, educational reform is as “a process of modification without fundamental change” (Fourie, 1999, pp. 276–277), whereas educational

transformation is a process in which the formal education system and other social institutions are “fundamentally altered” (p. 277). In South Africa, educational transformation has been chosen as the principal mechanism by which democratic social transformation is to be fostered and sustained. The democratic elections of 1994 resulted in the abolishment of laws that segregated people on the basis of race, ethnicity, and gender. To establish democratic structures, the South African government has sought to dismantle established structures premised on these factors (Figaji, 1997). Motivated by increased public scrutiny and its own desire to maintain social order, the government’s task is to demonstrate that its own policies and procedures, as well as the nation’s social institutions such as formal schooling, reflect concern for persons previously disadvantaged under apartheid (Figaji, 1997).

Aligned with principles of the Constitution, the four social aims of South Africa’s National Curriculum—social justice, human rights, a healthy environment, and inclusivity—constitute the citizenship education framework for guiding educational efforts in fostering national identity and developing students’ human and social capital. The first aim, social justice, refers to a person’s responsibility to care for others and to make sound decisions for his or her own life. As stated in the Western Cape Education Department Participants’ Manual (2004), “social justice serves to remind all humanity (government and civil society) that the needs of all individuals and societies should be met, within the constraints imposed by the biosphere, and that all should have equal opportunity for improving their living conditions” (p. 6). The second aim, human rights (political, economic, social, and cultural), asserts one’s right to life, to bodily integrity, and to the means for development, including food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and social services. A healthy environment, the third aim of schooling which parallels the Bill of Rights in South Africa’s Constitution, states a citizen’s right to a safe and clean environment, the right to protect the environment, and “the right to information, to access to justice, and to participate in environmental decision-making” (WCED, 2004, p. 7). Finally, inclusivity addresses the concern for the inclusion of people diversified by culture and nationality, geography, gender, disabilities and abilities, and their rights to participation, education, and social integration in South Africa.

Human capital formation and citizenship education constitute two overall purposes of formal education: Schooling is a form of national development and investment in human capital (i.e., students), while schools are simultaneously called upon to be a vehicle for democratization and the expansion of equal opportunity for more and more people. Increasingly, the demands for workplace skills have received priority over concerns for democratic teaching and learning.

The nation’s focus on economic development and social justice is often viewed in dichotomous terms, as occupying opposite ends of a political spectrum and one that poses challenges for both educators and policymakers. It is unlikely, however, that equality for the majority of South African citizens can be realized without economic development or that economic development can be realized without a striving toward the social ideal of equality (Walters, 1999). “For the majority to benefit, an approach to economic and social development must recognize

the interrelatedness of society and the economy where human values not human capital predominate” (p. 579).

Transforming societies into democratic, equitable communities, however, requires an equally transformative educational philosophy and pedagogy—one directed at fashioning citizenship identity by helping learners recover indigenous histories. The inculcation of colonial views and values could not have succeeded without indigenous populations being denied the truth and the opportunity to write their own histories (Constantino, 1978, cited in Macedo, 1999). Thus, the Department of Education, as part of the Race and Values Directorate, has promoted the South African History Project (2002), which is committed to developing youth who have an appreciation of South Africa’s past, who understand their country’s diversity, and who view diversity as contributing to their nation’s continuing development. The project serves as one example of the value accorded to historical learning, cultural identity, and collective memory. The project is seen as a way to forge a national identity that is more coherent and representative of the entire population. As South Africa attempts “to remake itself in time” (Ndebele et al., 2000, p. 6), the study of history helps to foster civic responsibility and critical thinking, to aid identity construction, to give attention to formerly subjugated voices, to desegregate society, and to emphasize the central role that memory plays in national development. Identity formation, then, is indispensable to help the nation move in a desirable direction for its future.

Democratic thought and practice cannot be “divorced from the concrete struggles that citizens face” (Brettschneider, 2002, p. 7). To redress the apartheid legacy as part of present nation-building efforts, it is acknowledged that all South Africans must come to terms with their “inherited historical consciousness, to examine it and, not least, to deconstruct it and observe its possible limits” (Ndebele et al., 2000, p. 7). An important purpose of formal schooling is to equip learners with the abilities and skills to think deeply about issues of citizenship and to deconstruct the fixed notions of “race” and “ethnicity” fashioned during the apartheid era. Wrestling with the historical conditions that have shaped personal and social identity in South Africa is necessary to move the nation forward:

Attending to the complex legacy of memory can ... help to foster shared understanding of one of the deepest imaginative functions of history, which is to show that through the historical medium of *time*, in the movement of continuity, change and conflict, or action and reaction, no one can avoid confronting the costs and pain which history brings to the surface. (Ndebele et al., 2000, p. 7)

Thus, the task of constructing a new national identity can only come about through the hard work of citizens as they strive to accommodate diverse viewpoints and choose a course of action that will best balance diverse interests and safeguard the common good. Toward that end, formal education must provide students with the conceptual tools for critical and creative thought. The social aims of schooling (social justice, human rights, a healthy environment, and inclusivity), however, are implicated by globalizing processes and agendas.

3.4 Globalization and Its Implications for Citizenship Education

Citizenship is a “‘site of struggle’ where global and local interests try to influence its meaning within specific contexts” (Walters, 1999, p. 583). In the past and at present, the particular construction of citizenship and social vision promoted on the world stage is largely a Western one. Globalization—defined as “the systematic reduction of protective barriers to the flow of goods and money by international trade rules” (Legum, 2002, p. 72)—has also served to divide nations and individuals (see also Zajda, 2005; Zajda, Davies, & Majhanovich, 2008). According to the UNDP Human Development Report in 1990, the wealthiest 20% of the world’s population were 60 times richer than the poorest 20% (Brock-Utne, 1996). It is predicted that between country differences in relation to “capacity to generate and utilize knowledge will create a new ‘global apartheid’ ” (Brock-Utne, 1996, p. 336). Indeed, a global apartheid is already apparent when one considers the chasm in scientific and technological development between the North and South. In only a 10-year period, the number of technicians and scientists in the North has increased by 60% over that of the South (Barre & Papon, 1993, cited in Brock-Utne, 1996). Currently, Japan, the European Union, the USA and the former Soviet Union hold 88% of the world’s resources in the area of research, while sub-Saharan Africa has less than 1% of the world’s scientists and only about 0.2% of the global expenditure for research and development activities (Barre & Papon, 1993, cited in Brock-Utne, 1996).

In South Africa, a number of social divides (e.g., rural–urban, female–male, illiteracy–literacy) serve to widen the income disparities between citizens (Tsele, 2002). Economic status is especially divided along racial lines, with blacks constituting 95% of South Africa’s poor compared to 1% of Indians or whites (Walters, 1999). The fact that nearly all the top positions in commerce and industry are held by white South Africans, and that whites have a 54% participation rate in higher education, signal to the rest of the population that tertiary education is necessary to improve their standard of living (Figaji, 1997). Thus, “the test of equality is not in the constitutional clauses that make up provisions of the Bill of Rights, but rather in their actual realization for ordinary citizens” (Walters, 1999, p. 81).

A central challenge facing South Africa is how to fashion a national identity while simultaneously equipping a population with technical and scientific skills to meet the demands of the global marketplace. Globalization is increasingly remaking countries into information societies where knowledge, information, and practices are commodities traded among nations. The discourse about globalization, and education’s role in preparing citizens for a global world, is implicated by complex relationships that continue to privilege the “social and cultural positions of the neo-colonizers” (Macedo, 1999, p. xv). According to Nassimbeni and de Jager (2000), globalization “has critical implications for the higher education sector whose primary tasks are the production and the reproduction of knowledge” and the preparation of students for the world of work (p. 193). The consequence

for citizenship education is that the fields that might restore African heritage and fashion African identity, such as the humanities and arts, have been targeted for cutbacks (Brock-Utne, 1996).

The 1996 Green Paper on Higher Education Transformation from the Department of Education has asserted that a democratic culture could be forged through educational curriculum and instruction designed to encourage students' critical thinking and to promote cultural tolerance and a commitment to human rights for all people (Higgs, 1999). However, as South Africa strives to redress historical disparities between black and white institutions, countries of the North are actively pursuing worldwide educational markets (Walters, 1999). The danger in the latter is that school curriculum in the South is becoming increasingly "dislodged" from local culture and "decontextualized" in the process (p. 584). In South African primary and secondary schools, the inclusion of indigenous cultures and histories in the National Curriculum competes with the more conservative literacy and numeracy emphases (i.e., reading and writing in English and math).

The vestiges of Bantu education from the apartheid era, namely high student/teacher ratios, under-qualified teachers, and limited school resources, have left generations of students struggling to obtain the kinds of benefits that democratic citizenship should afford (Wills, 2008). "Despite the many achievements of the government over the past ... years, there have been some worrying tendencies towards democratic centralism and towards valuing the interests of the ruling party above those of the country and its institutions" (Spicer, 2002, p. 77). Knowledge production must involve the local community and must attend to the pressing issues of a local, regional, and national kind (Brock-Utne, 1996; Strydom & Fourie, 1999). Formal education's myriad purposes are that of knowledge producer, value and cultural transmitter, and local and global capacity builder (Brock-Utne, 1996). The degree to which formal schooling can accomplish these purposes is dependent on a combination of factors, including student access, finance, curricular relevance, modernization, autonomy, accountability, and quality (Figaji, 1997).

3.5 Conclusion

Identity politics in South Africa are embedded in a host of local, national, and international forces. Cooperation–conflict, dependence–independence, and communality–individuality constitute the tumultuous terrain on which a definition of citizenship and a social vision are to be fashioned. As part of its nation-building project, New South Africa has sought to construct a democratic identity through the reassertion of an African worldview and indigenous knowledge systems that draw on the histories, traditions, heritages, and values of cultural populations previously devalued during apartheid. However, the postcolonial and global context poses challenges to democracy, placing increasing demands on the government and formal education to equip citizens with the skills and abilities to secure employment and to improve their quality of life. Globalization's hegemonic agenda in the image of the West

continues to dislodge local culture and decontextualize democracy in South Africa, making it all the more difficult to construct a national identity based on social justice and inclusive of diversity (Soudien, 2005; Zajda, Biraimah, & Gaudelli, 2008). Citizenship education, therefore, has an important, albeit challenging, role to play in helping students to think critically about their nation's past, present, and future (see also Zajda, 2005). President Mbeki's call for South Africans to define themselves will require schooling curriculum and practices that will help people "connect critically the micro with the macro and, in the search for a vision of the world which will be both utopic and viable, point to an horizon of a cooperative globalization, built by individuals and societies that have become active and conscious subjects, personally and collectively, of their own development" (Arruda, 1996, p. 30). This task of transformation through education will require exposure to, and use of, democratic forms of pedagogy to engage citizens in the construction of healthy and just environments and relationships premised on mutual reciprocity and human rights.

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Chapter 4

Civic Education in Eastern Europe: Results from the IEA Civic Education Project

Detlef Oesterreich

4.1 Approach of the Study (Study Design)

Since mid-2004 the European Union (EU) has ten new members. Eight of them are former socialistic countries, and except Slovenia they all were under the sphere of influence of the former Soviet Union. The changes which took place in these countries during the last 10 years affected not only the political and economic system, but also the educational system—especially teaching at schools has undertaken fundamental changes. The changes and reforms were accomplished within the existing civil societies. Many established structures of the former systems still remain, and the majority of teachers has not been replaced after the change of the systems. This raises the question whether the young generation in the former socialistic countries nowadays is really socialized towards a democratic orientation.

This study aims to analyse the situation of civic education students at the age of 14 in East Europe. For this purpose we use the data of the Civic Education Project of the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) from 1999, which give a broad view at different aspects of civic education. Civic education has three major goals: political knowledge and understanding, democratic attitudes, and a readiness for democratic political action. These aspects result from the requirements of a living democracy.

The teaching of civic education and political understanding has to orientate itself at the criteria of a professional and qualified teaching. These include a conveying of the basic knowledge of a certain subject and the generation of cognitive competencies, which enable an understanding of more complex structures. These criteria apply to such different subjects as mathematics, languages, history, and civic education.

But professional and qualified teaching in civic education does not automatically generate democratic attitudes or a democratic engagement. Somebody who is well informed about politics and democratic institutions is not necessarily a good democrat. The learning of democratic action and the establishing of a basic democratic

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orientation are bound to a learning environment which enables the acquiring of basic rules of democratic cooperation. Young people have to experience that other people with other interests have their own rights, they should learn to handle conflicts and find compromises, and they should learn to work together with others for shared interests.

4.2 The IEA Civic Education Project

The Civic Education Project compares the civic education of young people in 28 countries. In all participating countries a representative sample of students at the age of 14 was interviewed. The study was carried out in 1999. It was developed and organized by the International Society for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). The realization of the study was financed nationally, and the costs for coordination were financed with money from foundations and research organizations. A central aim of the study was to evaluate the civic education of students at the end of their school attendance. Because in some countries the compulsory school attendance lasts only until the age of 14, it was decided to evaluate students at the grade with the highest share of 14-year-olds at the time of the evaluation (spring 1999). In most participating countries this is the eighth grade, and in some the ninth grade.

Participants of the empirical study were Western democracies (besides European countries, the US and Australia) and former socialistic Eastern European countries. Also two South American countries (Chile and Columbia) and Hong Kong participated. In all these countries' representative samples were drawn. There is a total of about 94,000 interviewees.

The questionnaire was developed by researchers of the participating countries in collaboration with an international headquarters under the leadership of Judith Torney-Purta.

The main questions of the survey are:

- What knowledge do young people have about democracy?
- How is their attitude towards democracy?
- How tolerant are their attitudes?
- How strong is their engagement to act politically?
- How deep is their trust in the political structures of their countries?
- What kind of experiences do young people make in their schools?

Eleven former socialistic countries participated in the investigation. To reduce the amount of data for presenting the results we aggregated the countries to specific groups. That makes sense from a political and historical view, and with reference to the results as well. The answers of young people from countries like Poland or the Czech Republic are more similar compared with the answers of young people from the Baltic countries or from Russia. The following groups were distinguished and are presented in the following tables:

- The new European member countries from Central Europe (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia)
- The Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania)
- The candidates for EU membership (Romania and Bulgaria)
- The Russian Federation
- The rich Western industrial countries (Australia, Denmark, England, Finland, French Belgium, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US)

Results of the IEA project have been published in numerous books and articles. The central references for this article are Torney-Purta et al. (2001) and Oesterreich (2002).

4.3 Results of the Study

4.3.1 Civic Knowledge

A responsible political acting is based on an insight into the principles and regulations of democracy. Young people must learn to understand political processes by knowing the basics of democratic functioning. The international team constructed a knowledge test including 38 items with varying difficulty. The items are on fundamental characteristics of a democracy and the democratically constituted states like democratic principles, rights and duties of citizens, problems of the transit from a non-democratic to a democratic government, economic issues and their political significance, the role of the mass media, the importance of maintaining human rights, and the importance of international organizations. Besides pure knowledge items (25 items), questions concerning political insight (13 items) were asked. The latter questions shall prove the competent application of political information.

All items are constructed as multiple-choice questions. Each question is followed by four proposed answers from which the correct one has to be chosen. In the following we present three examples of pure knowledge questions and one ability question. The correct answer is printed in italics:

1. In democratic countries what is the function of having more than one political party?

- (a) *To represent different opinions in the national legislature (e.g. Parliament, Congress)*
- (b) To limit political corruption
- (c) To prevent political demonstrations
- (d) To encourage economic competition

2. Which of the following is most likely to happen if a large publisher buys many of the smaller newspapers in a country?

- (a) Government censorship is more likely
- (b) *There will be less diversity of opinions presented*

- (c) The price of the country's newspapers will be lowered
- (d) The amount of advertising in the newspapers will be reduced

3. In a democratic country having many organizations for people to join is important because this provides

- (a) A group to defend members who are arrested
- (b) Many sources of taxes for the government
- (c) *Opportunities to express different points of view*
- (d) A way for the government to tell people about new laws

The next item requires interpretative skills. A fictional political leaflet is presented followed by a question.

4. This is an election leaflet which has probably been issued by

We citizens have had enough!
 A vote for the Silver party means a vote for higher taxes.
 It means an end to economic growth and a waste of our nation's resources.
 Vote instead for economic growth and free enterprise.
 Vote for more money left in everyone's wallet!
 Let's not waste another 4 years!
VOTE FOR THE GOLD PARTY!

- (a) The Silver Party
- (b) *A party or group in opposition to the Silver Party*
- (c) A group which tries to be sure elections are fair
- (d) The Silver and the Gold Party together

In the following table we show how many young people in different countries have given the correct answers to the 38 items of the knowledge test (Table 4.1). An average of 62.9% of the 94,000 students gave the correct answers; the pure knowledge items were answered correctly by 64.7%, and the ability items by 59.5%.

Table 4.1 Civic knowledge

	Civic knowledge	Knowledge items	Skill items
Western industrial countries	65.2	65.3	65.1
US	69.1	66.3	74.3
Central European former socialist countries	68.4	71.1	63.3
Poland	73.7	77.2	66.9
Baltic countries	56.6	58.9	52.1
East European candidates	57.4	61.4	49.8
Russia	62.6	66.7	54.8
International average	62.9	64.7	59.5

The highest and lowest percentages in each column are printed **bold**.

As the differing percentages show, the ability items are more difficult on the average than the knowledge items. Young people in the East European countries do not differ much from the international average. But there are considerable differences between the several former socialistic countries. So within the new EU members, the Baltic countries have a lower civic knowledge than the Central European countries (56.6% vs. 68.4%).

It is remarkable that the Polish students with a percentage of 73.7% of correct answers have the best civic knowledge of all countries participating in the study. In Poland, but also in the Central European countries – Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia – an orientation towards Western values and ideas has taken place earlier than in the other former socialistic countries. This might explain the above-average knowledge about democracy of 14-year-olds from these countries. But it might also be the wish of these countries to become full members of the EU to engage themselves in a thorough instruction of the fundamental principles of democracy. Young people from former socialist countries clearly have a better knowledge about democracy than the ability to make correct conclusions from their knowledge. In the Central European countries an average of 71.1% solves the knowledge questions, but only 63.3% of the skill questions (a difference of 7.8%). In the Western industrial nations there is no difference in correct answers between both types of questions (65.3% vs. 65.1%).

The difference is especially high between the knowledge and the skill questions among young people from Russia who are quite average in the total knowledge test, but are below average in the skill questions. There are 66.7% correct answers in the knowledge questions (similar to the US with 66.3% correct answers), but only 54.8% in the ability questions (a difference of 11.9%). Compared to the US the difference is 19.5%. What specific knowledge do East European young students have? Which of the 38 items are solved correctly above average and which below average?

The young people from former socialist Central European countries clearly better solved questions on formal democratic rights and questions concerning the parliamentary system, like the right to vote, the functions of elections, the parliament, the parties, and the freedom of the press. They were below average with questions to more everyday democratic rights like the discrimination by sex or the ability to distinguish a fact from an opinion (e.g. ‘In many countries rich people pay more taxes than poor people’). This difference between knowledge about parliamentarianism and knowledge about everyday democratic rights does exist among all students from Eastern Europe, even in the new EU countries in Central Europe where civic knowledge in general is above average.

4.3.2 Democratic Attitudes

Another central part of the civic education questionnaire contains items on democratic attitudes. In the following sections only two topics will be discussed: attitudes towards human rights in general and attitudes towards women’s political rights.

4.3.2.1 Attitudes Towards Human Rights

There is no discussion among young people in all countries: human rights are a highly respectable good. But the answers differ when national laws interfere with human rights. Among the questions about the duties of the individual in the society we included the following two topics:

- An adult who is a good citizen takes part in activities promoting human rights.
- An adult who is a good citizen would be willing to ignore a law that violated human rights.

As shown in Table 4.2, the approval of promoting human rights is quite high among all 14-year-olds. Especially German adolescents agree to 90.8% to a promotion of human rights. But clearly other results show up when there is a conflict between human rights and national laws. Table 4.2 shows that the readiness of young Germans to disregard a national law which violates a human right is lower than the readiness of young people in other countries. This shows a legalistic position, which is found also in other rich industrialized countries as for instance Switzerland or the US.

In the former socialistic countries the readiness to disregard national laws in favour of human rights is clearly higher. So among young Russians about 4% more agree to the statement, 'A good citizen would be willing to ignore a law that violated human rights' than to the statement 'A good citizen takes part in activities promoting human rights'. These results show a democratic attitude among young people in Eastern Europe. It might have developed in the generation of their parents who were protesting against the socialistic regimes of these countries. Their resistance was based on human rights which were experienced as being in contrast to national laws.

Table 4.2 Attitudes towards human rights

	An adult who is a good citizen takes part in activities promoting human rights	An adult who is a good citizen would be willing to ignore a law that violated human rights
Rich industrialized countries	82.1	63.7
Germany	90.8	53.1
Switzerland	87.3	53.1
US	83.9	61.5
Central European former socialist countries	84.7	68.2
Baltic countries	83.2	78.1
East European candidates	85.9	73.8
Russia	79.7	83.5
International average	84.4	67.5

The highest and lowest percentages in each column are printed **bold**.

4.3.2.2 Support for Women's Political Rights

Tolerance is a central feature of a democratic attitude: tolerance for minorities, immigrants, homosexuals, and the support for women's political rights. In the following we will present results concerning the attitudes towards women's political rights. Women have to face discrimination because of their gender. Even though most countries have laws which support equal treatment of men and women and punish a discrimination of women, there is no country which has achieved a complete equality of men and women.

We raised six issues about women's political rights, three of them stated negatively and therefore reversed in scoring:

- Women should have the same rights as men in every way.
- Women should run for public office and take part in the government just as men do.
- Women should stay out of politics (negative).
- When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women (negative).
- Men and women should get equal pay when they are in the same jobs.
- Men are better qualified to be political leaders than women (negative).

Young people from all countries of the study agree positively to the items about the rights of women (an average of 85.1%). Nevertheless there is some variation between the Western industrial countries and the former socialistic countries (see Table 4.3). In the East the image of women is much more conservative than in the West, and students in the East European candidate countries Romania and Bulgaria are less positive towards women's rights. Only 72.9% support women's rights, while these are 89.3% in the Western industrial nations.

German adolescents agree to the support of women's rights to the same percentage (89.3%) as young people in the other Western industrial nations. Remarkable is the specific high engagement of young people from East Germany (90.3%). This position does not differentiate between the East German and the

Table 4.3 Support for women's political rights

	Support for women's political rights
Rich industrialized countries	89.3
Germany	89.3
West Germany	88.9
East Germany	90.3
US	88.6
Central European former socialist countries	84.4
Baltic countries	81.4
East European candidates	72.9
Russia	77.5
International average	85.1

The highest and lowest percentages in each column are printed **bold**.

West German adolescents, but it differentiates between the East Germans and the students from other former socialistic countries. In socialist countries the equality of men and women—highly propagated in these regimes—was more part of the official ideology than of everyday-life reality. Former German Democratic Republic (GDR) was clearly an exception. This might be due to the comparatively strong economy of the former GDR. It is well known that the political standing of women correlates strongly with the economic strength of a country.

4.3.3 Democratic Engagement and Political Activities

Besides the teaching of the principles of democracy and an education towards democratic attitudes, the third focus of political education is an education to democratic and political engagement. It is not enough to be familiar with the functioning of democracy and to have a democratic attitude; there is also a need to act in a democratic way.

Most of the 14-year-olds yet cannot act politically. To vote or to stand as candidate for a political office requires in almost every country an age of 18. For that reason, we asked the young people what they thought they would do as adults. We covered 12 questions about the engagement for political activities. They were reduced by means of a factor analysis to five different scales:

1. Fulfilment of democratic duties
 - Vote in national elections.
 - Get info about candidates before voting.
2. Active conventional engagement
 - Join a political party.
 - Write letters to a newspaper about social or political concerns.
 - Be a candidate for a local or city office.
3. Social engagement
 - Volunteer time to help poor or elderly people.
 - Collect money for a social cause.
4. Peaceful protesting
 - Collect signatures for a petition.
 - Participate in a non-violent protest march.
5. Illegal protesting
 - Spray-paint protest slogans on walls.
 - Block traffic as a form of protest.
 - Occupy public buildings as a form of protest.

We already pointed out that answers to these questions are to be understood as intentions. But this limitation applies to all interviewees, so that differing answers can actually be interpreted as differences in the readiness to act politically. A majority of young people show a readiness for democratic engagement. Particularly high is the engagement to vote and to get informed about the candidates before voting (see Table 4.4). Especially the students from the new EU member countries from Central Europe have a very high readiness for such political activities (83.0%). In the Baltic countries, in the EU candidate countries Romania and Bulgaria, and in Russia the readiness for this type of activity is significantly lower.

Besides a high engagement for voting, the engagement for an active conventional political activity like ‘join a party’ or ‘stand as candidate for public office’ is quite low. In all participating countries there is only a small minority of maximally a quarter who expects to engage themselves in an active political manner. In the Eastern European countries this readiness on the average is somewhat greater than in the Western industrial nations. Equally low is the readiness for illegal protesting (between 10% and 16%). But in some countries, which we are not analysing in this comparison, this kind of engagement is much higher (Greece 36.8%).

Concerning social engagement (collecting money for a social cause or volunteering time to help poor and elderly people) there are differences between the young people from the Eastern countries and those from the Western countries. In the EU candidates and especially in Russia the readiness for social engagement is greater than in the Western industrial nations. For example, 67.7% of the young Russians show such readiness and only 53.2% of the young people from the West. But the highest social engagement exists in the comparatively poor developed countries in South America and in the less rich countries of southern Europe. In Colombia 82.4% would engage in social activities, and in Greece 77.9%. In general, the social readiness to help is higher in poor countries than in rich ones.

Table 4.4 Readiness to act politically

	Fulfilment of democratic duties	Active conventionnel engagement	Social engagement	Peaceful protesting	Illegal protesting
Rich industrialized countries	76.5	14.5	53.2	41.4	13.7
Central European former socialist countries	83.0	15.7	53.4	36.8	10.6
Baltic countries	71.4	21.1	57.5	36.0	13.5
East European candidates	72.1	25.9	68.9	39.1	15.9
Russia	65.4	23.1	67.7	39.6	14.5
Greece	84.6	22.6	77.9	61.8	36.8
Columbia	86.0	43.3	82.4	70.5	19.2
International average	78.4	20.7	63.4	45.7	15.4

The highest and lowest percentages in each column are printed **bold**.

The readiness for peaceful protesting (collecting signatures, participating in non-violent protest marches) is lower for students in Eastern European countries than for students from Western nations. But again a comparison with the poorer countries of the south reveals greater differences. While peaceful protesting is about 40% in both Western and Eastern countries, the young people from Colombia would engage themselves to 70.5% and the young Greeks to 61.8% in such form of protest.

4.3.4 Classroom Climate

What experiences do young people make at school, and what are the consequences for their political socialization? Civic education is not only taught in subjects like Social Sciences, History, and Geography, but also mediated through the interaction of teachers and students in all subjects. The everyday life in school is therefore a central place for acquiring democratic competencies. Teaching democracy at school means to encourage young people to state their opinions and discuss it with others. The creating of an open climate for discussion is a more successful learning method than traditional ones like learning dates and facts by heart or a teacher-orientated instruction (Torney, Oppenheim, & Farnen, 1975; Hahn, 1998).

We asked our students about their experiences with an open classroom climate (see Table 4.5).

In comparison to the Western industrial nations, young people from the former socialistic countries report a clearly more conservative, less discussion-orientated instruction. In Western countries 57.8% of young people have the experience that it is necessary to learn facts by heart to achieve good grades, but in the former socialistic countries this is experienced by over 70%, in Russia even 83.6%. Not that big are the differences concerning teacher-orientated

Table 4.5 Classroom climate (approval in percentages)

	Students are encouraged to make up their own minds about issues	To get good grades it is best to memorize dates and definitions	Teachers lecture and the students take notes
Rich industrialized countries	80.7	57.8	62.8
Central European former socialist countries	69.8	71.3	64.3
Baltic countries	73.5	73.5	64.0
East European candidates	65.8	77.2	80.9
Russia	68.7	83.6	76.0
International average	76.4	65.3	68.0

The highest and lowest percentages in each column are printed **bold**.

instruction: 62.8% of the Western students report the experience that during their lessons the teacher is giving a lecture and the students are taking notes. In the Baltic countries these are 64% and in the Central European former socialist countries 64.3%, but in Russia 76% and in the EU candidate countries 80.9%. Parallel to these results are the findings that in the Western industrial countries the encouragement of developing own opinions is stronger than in the east of Europe. In the West, 80.7% have made such experiences at school, and in the new EU member countries 69.8%.

The high share of teacher-orientated instruction and the significance of learning dates and facts by heart in the former socialistic countries may explain why these countries have more correct answers in the knowledge questions than in the ability questions (see Section 3.1). Also the high positive attitudes towards democracy could be explained with an intensive learning of the principles of democracy. But such an instruction does not automatically educate to more tolerance, which is demonstrated by the fact that support for women's rights is much lower in the Eastern European countries than in the West.

4.4 Analysis

At the time of the cold war there were no comparative studies about young people in the East and in the West. The first international comparison about civic education of the IEA in 1970 was limited to ten Western democracies (Torney, Oppenheim, & Farnen, 1975). Therefore the IEA study from 1999 was the first opportunity to directly compare civic education between young people in the East and in the West. Undoubtedly, in 1999 the young people in the East in their political attitudes and behaviour were not the same as 10 years before. A democratization had taken place in all Eastern European countries; eight of them joined the EU in summer 2004, and two more would follow in 2007. The IEA study gives the chance to observe this process of democratization at the level of civic knowledge, democratic attitudes, and democratic activities.

The results are clear: 14-year-olds from Eastern Europe do not differ much from young people in the West concerning their knowledge about democracy, or in their political attitudes or political activities. They have a great knowledge about the constitutional democratic state, and their readiness to act politically is not less than within young people in the West.

But there also exist deficits. In the knowledge test young people from the East are significantly better in the pure knowledge questions than in the ability questions, which require political reasoning. Another deficit is, compared to Western students, their lower readiness to support women's rights. Clear differences exist within the group of former socialistic countries. The young people from the new EU member countries in Central Europe, such as Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Hungary, are the most similar to the young people from the West. There is no difference in their comprehension of democracy. Greater differences to the West

exist in the three Baltic countries Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; the EU candidate countries Romania and Bulgaria; and also in Russia.

Our interviewees in the former socialistic countries report still quite a traditional teaching, with the focus on teacher-orientated instruction and on learning dates and facts by heart. The open discussion of different opinions in the classroom stays behind the experiences Western students make. Chances to practice and internalize democracy through an open classroom climate at school are not fully taken.

It remains an open question as to what these findings imply for the learning conditions, the learning habits, and the chances for learning of young people. Traditions of the different countries play a great role and even more so the interplay of parental and scholastic socialization. School cannot educate totally differently as parents do at home. A traditional instruction with a high teacher orientation and a focus on learning facts is seen as less qualifying. But such an instruction might correspond more with the expectations from society and from parents towards their children, who learn efficiently in such a context and might not be able to deal with more open teaching methods which they are not used to. These questions cannot be answered satisfactorily with only quantitative investigations. There is a need for explorations at the places of interest; at school (interviews with students, teachers, and principals); and overall observations of what is going on in school.

Reasons for the differences in civic education might be found also in the daily organization of the schools, especially the climate in the schools, but also in the political culture of a nation. However, the educational systems of the East European countries do not differ much in their school structure from the ones in the Western democracies. In Eastern Europe as in the West, the comprehensive school is the most common type of school with a predominant all-day schooling. After reforms which took place in the last years in the former socialistic countries, more differentiating types of school were established. But, overall, the differences are too small to explain the results of our study.

This leads the focus of interest to differences in the political culture of the participating countries. But they are difficult to determine scientifically. One cannot assume that the East European countries have developed in the short time since the overcoming of socialism an intensive tradition of a democratic political culture. It might be a helpful observation that the young people from the Central European former socialistic countries which joined the EU in 2004 have a higher level of civic education (civic knowledge, tolerance, and conventional political engagement) than the young people from the other former socialistic countries. These Central European countries are more Western-orientated countries, which wanted to join the EU as soon as possible and which have a long tradition of a democratic resistance against the regimes of their countries. Since the 1950s in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia groups of resistance existed in the name of the human rights which tried to overcome the socialistic regimes. In Romania and Bulgaria such resistance existed in less intensity, and in the Baltic countries the liberation from the Soviet occupation was more important than the resistance against the regime.

4.5 Conclusion

If one considers democracy as a goal, then the Central European former socialist countries took this challenge first. In countries where democracy is not part of everyday life, the endeavour for it is of a special importance. Western countries have developed an indifference towards democracy, where often only the negative aspects are seen. In Eastern Europe democracy to a greater extent is still a hope and promise.

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Chapter 5

National Identity, Multiculturalism, and Language Policies

Suzanne Majhanovich

5.1 Issues of Languages and Linguistic Rights

Thomas Ricento (2006) noted individuals speaking one language only do not appreciate the complexity of other languages and the way they influence one's perception of cultural pluralism:

Language is something most of us take for granted most of the time; it is usually when we discover that our language (or language variety) is different from, and perhaps less valued than, the language of others, or that our options are somehow limited either because we don't speak/understand a language or language variety ... that we begin to pay attention to language. (p. 21)

Taking language for granted is, of course, easiest for those who speak a language of power and influence such as English, or for those living in relative isolation. However, in a globalized world, isolation is decreasing. Issues of language are incredibly sensitive given their connection to personal and national/ethnic identity. Recently researchers in the area (Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson, 1994; Zajda, 2005 a,b; May, 2006; Ozdowski, S. 2006; Smolicz, Nical, & Secombe, 2007; Makropoulos, 2007) have argued passionately for language rights. For example, May (2006) has observed that the Linguistic Human Rights (LHR) paradigm argues that minority languages and their speakers should be accorded at least some of the protections and institutional support that majority languages already enjoy (p. 265).

One need only consider the situation in the former Soviet Union where the newly independent states (former Soviet republics) have since 1991 promoted their local languages at the expense of Russian, with the possible exception of Belarus (see also Smolicz & Secombe, 2008). The independent nations of the former Yugoslavia provide another example: Serbo-Croatian is no longer an acceptable designation for what is now, depending on the state, referred to as Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian. In a multilingual nation-state, when ethnic populations demand linguistic rights, the consequences for the nation as a whole can be very serious indeed. For the purposes of this chapter I will use the example of Canada and trace its attempts through

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various policies to balance demands of its two major linguistic groups, English and French speakers. While policies related to rights accorded to citizens who speak the two official languages have throughout Canada's history been a major concern, more recently, there have been attempts to recognize the legitimate claims of speakers of indigenous languages. Another matter involves accommodation for the many immigrants whose first language is neither English nor French.

The chapter will first review the ways in which governing bodies have tried to come to terms with the English–French reality of Canada. Then it will address initiatives to acknowledge and preserve, where feasible, indigenous languages, and finally will briefly discuss ways in which speakers of other languages are accommodated.

5.2 Language Rights in Canada

French and English language rights have been acknowledged in Canada from its founding as a nation in 1867 (and indeed, since the Constitution Act or Canada Act of 1791). As Magnet (1998) remarks: “Canada’s Constitution was born in the attempt to unite two powerful language communities—two nations—in a single state” (p. 188). English and French were not designated official languages in the 1867 Constitution Act (formerly known as the British North America Act), but it did allow for bilingualism in Parliament and in the Quebec legislature, as well as in federal and Quebec courts; statutes and delegated legislation were also to be recorded in both languages (Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages, 1985, p. 1175). As the demographer Roderic Beaujot (1998) has argued, the situation remained fairly stable until the 1960s when, because of a drastically falling birth rate in Quebec, those claiming French as a first language began to decline to less than 30% of the population of Canada as a whole. At that time as well, immigration to Canada rose and the vast majority of immigrants, even those choosing to reside in Quebec, chose English as their preferred language. At that point francophones felt that their language and culture were threatened by the huge mass of anglophones that surrounded them both in the rest of Canada and to the south in the USA (see also Macropoulos, 2007).

5.2.1 Bill 63

In 1969 the Union Nationale Party in Quebec brought in the “Loi pour promouvoir la langue française au Québec” (Bill 63). The bill promoted teaching French in English-medium schools and made provisions for French classes for immigrants, but actually it allowed parents to choose the language of instruction for their children—and many immigrants, particularly recent Italian immigrants wished to send their children to English-medium schools. Quebec francophones could see that such a law would hasten integration and assimilation of immigrants into the anglophone population; with the falling birthrate of francophones in the province,

they anticipated the eventual demise of French as an operative language. The language issue contributed to the defeat of the Union Nationale party in 1970 (Bélanger, 2000).

5.2.2 Bill 22

The next Quebec government under the Liberals brought in Bill 22 (*La loi sur la langue officielle*) which declared French the official language of Quebec and set up a regulatory body to implement the bill. Under Bill 22, public institutions were required to address public administration in French; French became the official language of contracts; corporations had to give themselves a French name, and to advertise primarily in French in Quebec; businesses also had to obtain a certificate of francization to demonstrate their ability to work in French and address employees in French. Although parents still could exercise choice in the language of instruction for their children in schools, the children had to demonstrate knowledge of English on a test before being admitted to an English-medium school. Finally, an English language section of education was guaranteed (Bélanger, 2000; Hudon, 1985a, p. 216). This bill satisfied neither francophones who felt it did not go far enough to protect French, nor anglophones who believed the bill went too far. Ironically the anglophones mounted a protest against the bill and deserted the Liberal Party with the result that in the next provincial election in 1976, their defection from the Liberals helped ensure the election of the Parti Québécois, a party dedicated to separation of Quebec from Canada.

5.2.3 Bill 101

Under the Parti Québécois, the language laws ensuring the primacy of French in Quebec were solidified. Bill 101, “*La Charte de la langue française*” was passed in 1977. It declared French the official language in Quebec (as had Bill 22 previously), but extended requirements for the use of the French language to every aspect of life in the province: government, judicial system, education, advertising, business, contracts, and required all advertising as well as all commercial signs to be in French; all businesses had to have a French name and employees had to be addressed in French. Dealings with corporations and other governments in Canada were to be carried out in French. English-medium education was restricted to children whose parents had been educated in English in Quebec or to those temporarily stationed in the province (Bélanger, 2000; Hudon, 1985b, p. 217). Needless to say, anglophones and some allophones took this law as a personal attack and many moved out of the province; several businesses and corporations also transferred their head offices to English-speaking provinces. Francophones on the other hand, welcomed the law as providing a buttress against the growing influence of the English

language and American culture in North America—and worldwide. Although Quebec anglophones found Bill 101 to be repressive and draconian, it must be noted that they still enjoyed far more privileges with regard to their language in Quebec than francophones in other provinces of Canada could claim for French.

5.3 Federal Language Initiatives

While Quebec's growing unease at the increasing dominance of English was being addressed through successive language laws in the 1960s and 1970s, the Federal Government was aware that it had to act as well or face the possibility of the dissolution of the country if Quebec separated. As early as 1963, it established the "Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism" to recommend ways of ensuring wider recognition of the basic cultural dualism of Canada (Laing, 1985, p. 216). This enormous study was carried out over 8 years, co-chaired by an anglophone and a francophone commissioner and all work was carried out in both languages. In 1965 there was a preliminary report soon followed by six other volumes. Predictably Québécois were suspicious of the work of the Commission believing it to be an attempt to cover up the real political issues; many anglophones, especially from the West believed it was a plot to force everyone to learn French. However, the study did reveal that the francophones were justified in feeling marginalized—that they did not have the opportunities even in Quebec enjoyed by anglophone Quebecers, nor were they adequately served or represented in the federal government agencies. As a result of one of the Commission's recommendations, the "Official Languages Act" was enacted in 1969, declaring French and English to be official languages, such that "all federal institutions [would be required to] provide their services in English or French at the customer's choice" (Yalden, 1985, p. 1560).

5.4 *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982*

When Canada's constitution was patriated from England in 1982, it was revised to include as its first section (Part 1), *The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. Sections 16 through 23 are concerned with language issues, and outline the responsibilities of the Federal Government to operate in the two languages as well as affirm the rights of parents who have received education in one of the official languages to have their children educated in that language as well. New Brunswick declared itself bilingual at that time, and so the rights and privileges as to the use of the two languages in the government and in government offices in that province were also mentioned. It was hoped that Ontario would also declare itself bilingual because it did have a sizable francophone population. Largely because Quebec had declared its official language as French, Ontario did not opt to become a bilingual province but it did as a result of the Charter extend services

in French to its francophone population set up a francization office to help reclaim the French that had been lost in previous more repressive regimes, and ultimately in the 1990s set up French school boards parallel to the English boards to promote French among the francophone population.

The particular clause on minority-language educational rights was designed to counteract parts of Quebec's Bill 101 which originally only permitted English-medium education to children whose parents had received English education in Quebec. Subsequently Bill 101 was modified to permit English-medium education to children of parents educated in English outside of Quebec as well. Section 23 also addressed problems francophones outside of Quebec had faced when seeking education for their children in French. There had been some very repressive legislation in Ontario and Manitoba clearly designed to assimilate the francophone population into the English majority. After the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* came into effect, provinces outside of Quebec had to accommodate their francophone citizens and provide schools and in some cases health services for them in French where numbers warranted.

The importance of language to the Canadian Confederation is evident in the fact that its *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* devotes 8 out of 34 sections or about one quarter of the document to the elaboration of rights and privileges accorded to speakers of the official languages, and government responsibilities to support the two languages. On the other hand, Canada's multicultural heritage is affirmed in one brief statement, Section 27: "This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canada." Aboriginal rights are also mentioned in one section (25) only, and pertain mainly to recognition of treaties and land claim settlements.

Quebec has never signed on to the patriated Constitution, and in fact on two occasions, in 1990 and 1995, the Parti Québécois government has held a referendum seeking approval of Quebecers to secede from Canada or to enter into an arrangement of Sovereignty Association, a kind of common union in which Quebec and the rest of Canada would be equal partners. The 1995 referendum came close to giving the party the majority results it needed to enter into negotiations for Sovereignty Association or outright separation with 49% for and 51% against, because of inordinately high feelings at the time and a very ambiguous referendum question. Fortunately with the failures of the referenda the confederation stood, and Quebec remains subject to the Canadian constitution and charter as one of ten provinces, albeit a unilingual French province. Attempts by the Federal Government to persuade Quebec to sign on to the Constitution through the Meech Lake Accord (1990) and later the Charlottetown Accord (1992) have failed. Meech Lake failed because although all Premiers in the country accepted the Accord, it had to be ratified in every provincial and territorial legislation, and neither Newfoundland nor Manitoba would ratify it; it was the lack of consideration for aboriginal rights in it that led Elijah Harper, a Native parliamentarian in Manitoba, to speak passionately against the Accord and signaled its doom. In the Canada-wide referendum to ratify the Charlottetown Accord, the provinces of Nova Scotia, Quebec, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia, along with the Yukon Territory rejected the accord and so it failed as well.

The current Conservative government recently proposed a bill that passed almost unanimously in the Federal Parliament that Quebec be recognized as a “nation” within the confederated state of Canada. Will this be enough to defuse the tensions between the two linguistic groups? Time will tell. One can be cautiously optimistic that forces of globalization have for the time being seemed to dissipate the will of a majority of Quebecers to separate from Canada. Apparently English classes for francophone Quebecers are currently extremely popular, and students are required to take English classes from Grade 1 through to the end of secondary school. In Ontario, on the other hand, French is required only from Grades 4 through 9.

Perhaps in a globalized world, nation-states have lost their relevance. Perhaps it is just that without officially setting up sovereignty association, the Federal Government has quietly undertaken more decentralization than ever by divesting certain powers to Quebec such as the right to send its own delegates to meet with the “Francophone” nations of the world, to be represented in organizations like UNESCO, to exert influence over immigration to the province, favoring those from French-speaking countries, and finally achieving the largely symbolic recognition as a nation with the confederation of Canada. Bélanger (2000) reflects on the largely positive changes brought about in Quebec since Bill 101 was passed in 1977 and notes:

[T]he preeminence of French is now unchallenged in the province. The objective of preserving and developing the French culture is one universally shared among the people of Quebec. ... The rate of bilingualism among Anglophones and allophones, indeed among francophones as well, has soared since the 1970s and made it possible for all to participate fully in the public affairs of the province.

He also remarks that now that Quebecers feel more secure about their language and culture, there is less resistance to learning English. He concludes his article on a positive note: “In the process of these changes being made, civility, for a time disturbed, has returned in the province; greater understanding and fraternity now prevail.”

In English Canada as well the linguistic tensions seem to have abated. But in response to the passage of Bills 22 and 101 in Quebec, and the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (1982), some groups expressed their resentment and frustration at what they deemed to be high-handedness of the Parti Québécois and appeasement of francophones by the Federal Government. A group called the “Alliance for the Preservation of English in Canada” (APEC) was very active in Ontario in the 1970s and 1980s, stirring up ill will against French-speaking Canadians, suggesting that the real agenda of the Federal Government was to make Canada unilingually French-speaking. (See *Bilingual Today, French Tomorrow*, 1976.) Some 27 municipal councils in Ontario in the late 1980s went so far as to declare their cities unilingual English—or against expenditures to support French services, even though bilingual services were not under the jurisdiction of municipalities but rather of the federal and provincial governments (Cartwright, 1998). The misguided, misinformed, and frankly bigoted activities of APEC probably contributed to sovereignty demands in Quebec and to the 1995 Quebec referendum. Fortunately APEC wields little or no influence today;

virtually nothing has been reported in the media about their activities since the late 1990s (Wikipedia, 2007).

In fact, after 4 decades of official bilingualism there is widespread acceptance among Canadians. A recent Centre de Recherche sur l'Opinion Publique (CROP) poll showed that 81% of those surveyed support the idea that Canada is a bilingual country, and 91% believed that the Prime Minister should be able to speak both languages (CBC News report, February 4, 2007).

5.5 Linguistic Rights for First Nations in Canada

Successive Canadian governments have been preoccupied with English and French language rights and have attempted with varying degrees of success to keep harmony between the two so-called founding nations. As a result, linguistic rights of Canada's original inhabitants have received little attention until fairly recently. In fact, there is considerable evidence that until the 1970s, government policies starting with the Indian Act of 1876 were dedicated to the eradication of the cultural (and by extension linguistic), spiritual, and economic foundations of First Nations societies (Hill, 2004). A major cause of native language loss is connected to Canada's infamous residential schools where generations of native children, forcibly removed from their families, and taken far from home, were educated in the ways of the dominant culture and severely punished if they dared to speak their native language (even if that was the only language they could speak). Most residential schools closed only by the mid-1970s; the last one closed in Saskatchewan in 1996 (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 2004).

It is estimated that there are about 50–60 distinct aboriginal languages in Canada belonging to 11 language families (*The Canadian Encyclopedia Historica*, 2007). However, currently it is thought that only three languages—Cree, Inuktitut, and Ojibwe—have the critical mass of speakers necessary to sustain the language (Government of Canada, Department of Canadian Heritage, 2003). Efforts in Nova Scotia to promote facilities for Mi'kmaq have resulted in a recent growth of Mi'kmaq speakers but it is not at all certain the Mi'kmaq with only about 7,000 speakers will survive (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 2005). For the purposes of this chapter, I will refer to policies affecting linguistic rights of Aboriginal people in Ontario and in Canada's Northern Territories, particularly in Nunavut.

5.6 Ontario Policies Relating to Native Languages

In the late 1990s when Ontario's curriculum was restructured, guidelines were developed for Native Studies (1999) and Native Languages (1999) for Grades 9 and 10 (Ministry of Education and Training, 1999a,b). It was decided that where numbers warranted, a native language course could be substituted for the

required French as a second language course. Ontario permits languages courses in seven native languages: Cayuga, Cree, Delaware, Mohawk, Ojibwe, Oji-Cree, and Oneida (Guidelines, p. 4). Because of the lack of resources, trained native language teachers, and numbers of students to take a native-language program, there are very few classes. Many students opt for the Native Studies program instead where appreciation of the language and culture is taught. As it is, the Native Languages Guideline recognizes three levels, the first of which is essentially an introductory Native Second Language course with expectations that students will attain only a novice level of proficiency and be able to use basic vocabulary and phrases. Level 2 is geared to those who have completed at least 4 years of native language study in elementary school or who have completed Native Languages, Level 1. Level 3 is for those (few) who can demonstrate proficiency in the language or who have completed Level 2 successfully. It should be noted that given Ontario's rigid requirements for completion of a secondary school diploma—30 credits of which 18 are compulsory and only one required credit for a language other than English, it is highly unlikely that even in areas of the province where there are sufficient numbers of native-language students to provide a class, that they would be able to acquire much more than one credit in their language—hardly sufficient to support proficiency. Indeed, in a recent paper by Karen Hill (2004) describing First Nations languages Education in Ontario, she reports only 544 students in total in secondary native-language programs: 27 in Cree, 411 in Ojibwe, 85 in Mohawk, and 31 in Oneida (p. 10, based on Ministry of Education 2002/03 school enrollment figures). Elementary-school enrollment in native languages was somewhat healthier with a total of 3,422 students enrolled in native language courses in Ontario public schools in 2002/03. There are probably a few more students enrolled in native-language immersion elementary schools in private band schools but overall, the numbers are worrisome.

Preparation for native-language teachers is offered in a small program at Lakehead University, and through distance continuing education programs, but it is clear that native languages in Ontario are in a rather precarious state. It is really up to individual communities to rescue and preserve their languages, culture, and distinct native identity. At least the policies are no longer actively working to eliminate native languages and assimilate the people.

5.6.1 *Inuktitut*

Because of the isolation and sparse population of Canada's north, the native languages spoken there, mainly Inuktitut and Dene, have suffered less attrition. Still policies were needed to support and protect the languages. Mark Fettes, an expert in aboriginal languages, carried out an interesting comparative case study (Fettes 1998) to examine how aboriginal languages in the north have fared under Canada's Official Languages Act (1988), which as mentioned earlier, is concerned mainly with English and French linguistic rights. Regarding policies to support native

languages, he notes that the Territories provide a vivid example of multicultural education at work:

In the whole of Canada, the Territories provide the only examples of a sustained attempt by public government to develop a coherent and supportive Aboriginal Language Policy. (p. 125)

He compares the approaches taken by the governments of the Yukon and the Northwest Territories (NWT). The NWT legislature passed an Official Languages Act modeled on the federal Official Languages Act (1988), but the NWT's legislation includes as official languages the aboriginal languages spoken in the territory. The Act was supposed to enhance the status of aboriginal languages although it seemed mainly to confirm that all government documents be published in English and French and available in other official local languages if requested and if numbers warrant. Still, the legislation seems to overlook considerations of culture or problems of declining oral-language communities (p. 127). As far as education is concerned, it is clear that English is the dominant compulsory language. Native languages may be taught either as a second language or a language of instruction up to the end of Grade 2 (3 years of instruction). In the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, minority French or English populations are guaranteed publicly funded K–12 first-language instruction, but this right was not included for aboriginal populations in the NWT even though their languages were declared “official” languages, and aboriginal groups often were the majority population of some communities. Fettes argues that in the NWT not enough attention was paid to communities to express their concerns about preserving their culture and language. In subsequent revisions of the language legislation the right to decide whether or not to provide instruction in an aboriginal language was decentralized to District Education Authorities. However, as is often the case in such moves, the necessary financial resources were not provided.

The Yukon followed a different path. It did not impose the Federal official language policy, did not declare any languages official, but did agree to provide services in English, French, and aboriginal languages. It passed its Languages Act in 1988 and provided funding for aboriginal languages. The Yukon government has preferred *laissez-faire*, a decentralized approach in which local aboriginal communities decide for themselves whether to include the local language in the curriculum. Linguistic rights had a low priority in the Yukon Government, but it has set up a Director of Aboriginal Languages Services to work with local communities. This program has proven to be very successful and has given the aboriginal communities a sense of ownership with responsibility for sustaining and promoting their language and culture through community-based initiatives. Fettes finds that the Yukon model is preferable to the NWT one mainly because the NWT approach was a top-down one that excluded serious consultation with the aboriginal groups. Because the Yukon model is both decentralized and cost-effective, relying on the communities themselves to determine their needs to offset language shift and put into effect, in a small-scale, grassroots approach, their own programs. This is, in fact, the approach that the Indian Brotherhood has recommended for

all native groups across Canada. Still, Fettes cautions that government financial cuts could undermine the progress made no matter how cost-effective the program has been.

Since Fettes' study on linguistic policies in Canada's north, the territory of Nunavut has been created (out of eastern Arctic lands of the Northwest Territories) as of April 1999. This territory is home to the largest concentration of Inuktitut speakers. Right from its foundation, Nunavut has declared English, French, Inuktitut, and Inuinnaqtun (a dialect of Inuktitut) as official languages (Office of the Languages Commissioner of Nunavut, n.d.). All government services are provided in Inuktitut, and government workers are expected to be able to communicate in the language. There is a broadcasting service in Inuktitut. Education is available in English and Inuktitut throughout the elementary and secondary systems, and there is even a higher education facility, Nunavut Arctic College, that offers programs in Inuktitut. Under these circumstances, it is probable that the Inuktitut language will survive and perhaps even prosper. As for other aboriginal languages in Canada, it will be up to the communities, supported by federal and provincial funding to maintain or resuscitate their languages.

5.7 Heritage Languages in Canada

In this section, policies in Canada to support heritage languages of immigrant minorities are discussed. Section 27 of the *Charter* acknowledges the multicultural heritage of Canadians, but this is always understood in the context of a bilingual framework. Still, some provincial education policies have been enacted to allow for classes in other languages if numbers warrant and if parents request the program. In the province of Ontario the heritage/international languages regulations allow boards to offer 2.5 hours per week in languages other than English or French on the request of 15 parents. The classes are normally held outside of regular school hours, often on Saturdays. There are few resources for these programs and not all boards require qualified teachers—merely native speakers. The Toronto area offers classes in at least 65 languages, but the heritage-language program is not terribly successful in most cases. If students acquire an appreciation of their heritage language and learn a few basic words and phrases, the program is considered to have fulfilled its expectations. With some established language communities such as Italian, German, Portuguese, and Polish—and more recently Russian and Mandarin in the Toronto area, students often get credits at the secondary level for their language. More recent immigrants usually are unable to sustain the classes beyond the elementary level and there are few teachers of these lesser-taught languages who hold Ontario teaching certification. Some have suggested that the Ontario heritage-language program is really designed to speed up assimilation to English since many children resent being sent to language school on Saturdays and quickly reject their heritage language. Furthermore, the lack of a sequenced curriculum, limited resources, unqualified

teachers, and the small amount of time devoted to language study (2.5 hours per week) all work against the possibility of retaining or developing proficiency in the language.

A more promising arrangement has been developed in the province of Alberta which offers bilingual 50–50 programs in Arabic, Mandarin, German, Hebrew, Spanish, and Ukrainian, in addition to French immersion programs (Duffy, 2004; Marcopoulos, 2007). Students can attend bilingual schools from kindergarten through Grade 12 in Mandarin, German, and Ukrainian. It has been shown that students in the German, Hebrew, Mandarin, and Ukrainian bilingual schools do better on the Alberta Learning Achievement Tests in Grade 6 (Duffy, 2004), thus supporting research that learning more than one language contributes to academic success (Alberta German Bilingual Program Web site).

5.8 Conclusion

As the above discussion demonstrates, Canada is a country of immense diversity including its aboriginal groups, descendants of the French and English colonists, as well as succeeding waves of immigrant groups from all over the world. As this chapter has outlined, throughout its history, Canada has been mainly concerned with the English–French fact of the country and linguistic policies, particularly in the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* have attempted to establish a stable relationship between the English- and French-speaking groups. After 40 years of official bilingualism, the country seems finally to be comfortable and accepting of this arrangement. However, the efforts expended to foster English–French relations have been at the expense of other legitimate linguistic claims, especially those of Canada's First Nations and other Aboriginal peoples. It is only since the 1980s and 1990s that the importance of aboriginal languages has been recognized and supported through legislation. It remains to be seen whether it is too late to save native languages. The most hopeful scenario is in Canada's north, especially in Nunavut where the aboriginal people outnumber the Canadian descendants of Europeans, and where the isolation from the rest of the country will work in favor of the preservation of their language and culture. As for the language and culture of immigrant groups, less of a case can be made for official protection (May, 2006; Bratt-Paulston & Heidemann, 2006). Respect for other cultures and tolerance of their languages must be encouraged in a multicultural nation in the spirit of pluralist democracy, human rights, and social justice (see Zajda, Majhanovich, & Rust, 2006; Zajda, Davies, & Majhanovich, 2008). In our globalized world, knowledge of languages other than English can be a real asset, the power and hegemony of English notwithstanding. Thus, in Canada it is encouraging to see efforts to encourage Aboriginal languages and support for the bilingual schools in Alberta. Recognition and support for the cultures and languages of the peoples that make up the Canadian mosaic is a positive way to embrace differences and engage in constructive nation-building.

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Chapter 6

Globalisation, Identity, and Cultural Dynamics in a Multiethnic State: Multiculturalism in Australia

Jerzy Smolicz and Margaret Secombe

6.1 Concepts of State and Nation

The cultural aspects of globalisation are often overshadowed by its economic impact, although both impinge upon the pattern of interaction among national and ethnic cultures within the state (see Smolicz & Secombe, 2005; Zajda, 2005, 2007, Zajda et al. 2008). In this chapter, Australia is taken as an example of a multi-ethnic state which is in the process of building a nation based upon a multicultural, rather than monocultural framework. The Australian case study is discussed as a possible model for other multi-ethnic countries in their search for a solution to the pluralist dilemma of how to achieve a resilient and stable nation state which does not negate the persistence of cultural pluralism along ethnic lines. Such a search has universal significance, since it calls for stability based upon the interdependence of peoples and cultures, and ultimately of whole regions and civilisations. The key lies in a global interculturalism that transcends national/ethnic affiliations by overcoming borders that have a cultural meaning, as well as those of solely political and administrative significance.

Before examining the process of cultural and economic change within a nation state under the impact of globalisation, it is first necessary to clarify the concept of nation state itself by examining the distinction between its two constituent parts (Znanięcki, 1952, 1998; Smith, 1986; Connor, 1994). The **state** can be viewed as a political and territorial unit, vested with legitimate power and a network of the dependent structures to manage political, economic, and legal affairs. Conferral of citizenship is the ultimate acknowledgment of the individual's membership of a state. The **nation**, on the other hand, is conceptualised as a 'community of culture', to which members are attached by 'emotional bonds' (Kłoskowska, 1996, p. 70, 2000). Ossowski, for his part, views the nation as a 'society of national ideology' (Szacki, 1984, p. 11) which can be regarded as linked to certain cultural values perceived by members as reflective of their shared past and influencing their present and future development. This sense of solidarity may be based upon a wide range of phenomena, such as descent/ancestry and/or a distinct set of cultural, particularly linguistic, characteristics, which may also include what Ooman (1997) regards as a 'moral attachment to one's land'.

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Despite changes taking place within the European Union and elsewhere (Brubaker, 1992; Davies, 1996; Zajda, 2007), it is possible to distinguish between the grounds on which individuals may become accepted as members of a nation. The *ancestry-based model* (as exemplified, until recent modification, by Germany) relies upon descent (*ius sanguinis*) as one of the basic criteria of belonging to a nation, in contrast to the *culture-based model* (as exemplified by France) which takes the state's territory (*ius soli*) as the qualifying entry-point, but singles out culture, and language in particular, as a *sine qua non* of membership. Australia's current *migration-derived model* represents a modification of the latter type and requires from its members a commitment to a set of shared cultural values, but excluding descent/ancestry and religion as criteria of belonging. In its still rather fluid form, Australia's notion of nation permits a degree of pluralism for a range of cultural values that are characteristic of the diverse groups that make up Australia today.

6.1.1 *Different Types of Nation States*

Each of the above nation models leads to a different formulation of a nation state, with the ancestry-based model of a nation, viewed as a closed concept, determining the limit of the German nation state and its citizenship. In contrast, the citizenship of the French state, acquired on the basis of residential criteria, can be seen as providing a more open concept, with membership of the nation state based upon cultural, rather than ancestral criteria. In fact, France has for long followed the culturalist approach which assumed that acceptance of cultural/ancestral 'others' into the membership of the state would lead them, virtually automatically, to comply with the cultural and linguistic determinants of the French nation. The present Australian concept of a nation state is based like the French on *ius soli* principle, but is more inclusive than the French, in that it is less prescriptive culturally, so that the acquisition of citizenship (and hence of statehood) may open the way for newcomers and their descendants to enter into a nation, without the need to abandon all their original cultural core values. In this way, new members are able to retain their ethnic identity provided that it fits within the overarching framework of shared Australian values (Fraser, 1981; Smolicz, 1995, 1998; Smolicz & Secombe, 2005). The implementation of the Australian model creates ideal conditions for the possible future emergence of what has been labelled as a 'multicultural nation' (Smolicz, 1997), albeit with the acknowledgement of the British foundation of the framework (see also Smolicz & Secombe, 2005).

6.1.2 *Mono-ethnic Nation States: Some Doubtful Cases*

While all these three models represent a particular type of the nation state, the coupling of the two concepts is frequently confusing, inaccurate, or simply not applicable. Some countries, for a variety of reasons, openly refrain from seeking

to parade as monistic nation states (e.g. Switzerland, the Russian Federation, India, or the painfully reconstituted Bosnia). The more usual approach, however, is for dominant nations to insist upon nationally homogeneous nation-state status, in spite of opposition from some of their fellow citizens, as in the case of the 'Hungarian ethnics' who hold Romanian or Slovak citizenship, but who consider themselves to be part of the Hungarian, rather than Romanian or Slovak nations, despite their place of domicile in the Romanian or Slovak states. There are numerous other examples of attempts at compulsory incorporation of ethnic minorities, or subordinated nations, into 'nation states', as demanded by the majority/dominant nation that assumes sole ownership of the state, while possibly accepting cultural minorities either on the basis of their ultimate assimilation or limited (often second-class) citizenship.

The fact that there are no more than about a dozen of UN members with an almost perfect 1:1 nation state fit (e.g. Japan and Iceland) places the whole notion of nation state into question (Connor, 1993). The French 'open' model, with its culturally assimilation assumptions, has also been increasingly questioned by the historic regional minorities of Bretons, Basques, even Occitans, and, more militantly, by Corsicans, not to speak of the culturally resilient new citizens of Islamic North African origin, who resist the dissolution of those fundamental aspects of their culture which have been termed as 'core values' (Smolicz, Secombe & Hudson, 2001; Smolicz & Secombe, 2005).

6.1.3 Nation State Under Pressure of Globalisation

The nation state is currently under multiple pressures of economic, cultural, and political globalisation. There is indeed a paradox in globalisation unleashing forces that appear to herald the convergence of cultures through the homogenising effects of the mass media and information technology explosion, while at the same time contributing to conditions that create opportunities for cultural resistance to such trends by firmly entrenched local cultures. These cultures, for long assumed as docile and/or dormant, are proving their extraordinary resilience by voicing an array of demands upon the nation state for both cultural and political autonomy. Such local cultural demands and pressures originate from two sources, one from the 'old' historical/regional minorities (or 'submerged' nation states) and the other from the 'new' migrant communities, whose numbers have been swollen through the channels opened by the forces of economic globalisation.

In fact, the extent to which the nation state has been transformed by a global economic system and a variety of other transnational processes is still insufficiently appreciated. As Sassen (2000) argues, in a great number of countries, the state's regulatory role and its very autonomy have been weakened through the privatisation of public sector activities and economic deregulation. This results in the virtual privatisation of a variety of governance functions, affecting even such hallowed state prerogatives as control over immigration policy and its implementation. As a result of the internationalisation of trade and investments, multinational corporations and

market forces in general are exercising a commanding influence over migration across borders, particularly in the case of highly specialised professional workers from a variety of ethnic backgrounds. Such processes enmesh the state in a network of relationships which are structurally augmented by the operation of supranational organisations, such as the EU, ASEAN, NAFTA, and APEC, as well as by a great variety of bilateral or multilateral agreements at interstate level.

While a number of state's functions are diluted in this way, its control of immigration represents one issue which is particularly sensitive in demonstrating the fracturing of the nation state's traditional authority, and even its very sovereignty. In particular, economically induced international migrations are creating communities which cross the borders of nation states, often resulting in multiple citizenships. As Gobbo (1997, p. 13) points out 'more and more countries are moving to tolerate, if not recognise dual citizenship – [a situation that is] ... basically inconsistent with a traditional notion of citizenship'. There is little doubt that such overlapping citizenship erodes the power of nation states at both ends of the migration chain.

The massive migration flows across the globe have been swollen by the rising number of political refugees. The dimensions of the latter problem exert a powerful impact even upon a country such as Australia that was formerly proud of its ability to control immigration inflow, with immigrants carefully classified as 'skilled', 'family reunion', 'refugees', and 'humanitarian need' cases. Australia has no official category for asylum-seekers who arrive without official papers by boat, by air, or inside cargo containers. This 'illegal' migration flow is no longer a minor problem. In 2000, over 4,000 asylum-seekers were washed up on Australian shores (a dramatic increase from the 157 people who came in 1997/98; Hugo, 2001, p. 188). With a further 5,000 arriving over the first 8 months of 2001, the Australian immigration authorities have been virtually powerless in their efforts to stem the tide of mostly Middle Eastern people converging upon Australia via South-East Asia. Since many originate from Afghanistan, with which Australia has no diplomatic relations, it is virtually impossible to repatriate them, even when their refugee status has been denied. The state is then placed in a dilemma of balancing humanitarian concerns against the discharge of its function as regulatory authority in upholding the sovereignty of the state. As the Australian Prime Minister, John Howard (2001a, p. 11), has put it: '[T]here is a concern inside the Government ... that we are fast reaching a stage where we are losing ... our absolute rights to decide who comes to this country.' Subsequently, he asserted that it was 'in the national interest that we have the power to prevent, beyond any argument, people infringing the sovereignty of this country' (Howard, 2001b, p. 1). Although proud of its currently non-discriminatory migration policy and its acceptance of the rising proportion of non-European immigrants of Asian origin (including a jump in 'Asian ethnic strength' from 0.3% in 1947 to 6.4% in 1999, with an additional 2.5% from 'western' Asia or the Middle East (Hugo, 2001, p. 181)), Australia is loathe to relinquish its regulatory powers and is fearful for the future of its generally harmonious multicultural consensus.

The dilution of the authority of the nation state over immigration intakes not only undermines the control which it has formally exercised over its own demographic composition, but it also weakens the power which the dominant nation has traditionally exercised over the non-dominant groups. In the process of economic, trade, and immigration flux, the minorities, whether of migrant or autochthonous nature, acquire opportunities to make cultural, political, as well as economic demands and to construct their own linkages with supranational organisations, as exemplified in the case of Europe by Catalonia's increasing direct relationship with Brussels and the appeals of Russian minorities in the Baltic States to the European Union and OECD for the granting of equal political status with indigenous groups. In Australia, multicultural policies in relation to immigrant minority groups have been paralleled by growing self-awareness and demands for 'Reconciliation' by the country's indigenous peoples, with calls for a 'treaty' and a form of autonomy, as well as 'land rights' and an equitable share of national wealth (Jupp, 2001).

6.2 Australian Multiculturalism

In response to its pluralist composition and its non-discriminate immigration policy, Australia has been evolving a multicultural model of nation state which, despite its still rather embryonic form and uncertain future development, has the advantage of being based on the acceptance of a shared framework of values for all Australians. This includes political equality for all citizens and respect for ethnic/local differences through the principles of cultural democracy. Such, at least, is the multicultural ideal which is still in the process of gestation as the country moves away from a French-type concept of an Anglo-Celtic-based nation, dominated by Anglo-Australian cultural and linguistic elements, to a multicultural society which has the potential to crystallise as a multicultural nation state (Smolicz, Nical, & Secombe, 2007).

The Australian search for a 'multicultural nation' can be regarded as a response to the dilemma of reconciling love for one's original homeland and its culture, on the one hand, and adapting to Australian society, on the other. In the years after the establishment in 1901 of the Australian Federation as an independent state within the British Empire (later Commonwealth), it was assumed that the Australian nation was but a branch of the British national family, on the lines of the regional distinctions found among people from Yorkshire as opposed to those from Cornwall or the Midlands. The Irish Catholics formed an unofficial minority (never openly referred to as ethnic), and their fusion into Anglo-Celtic national entity occurred gradually, until its virtual completion after the Second World War. The arrival of millions of people from Continental Europe (after 1949) and subsequently an influx from Asia (post-1972), as well as final acceptance of Aboriginal people as citizens (1967) and as rightful inhabitants of the country with recognised land rights (1996), presented a dilemma for the articulation of the concept of a nation and its extension to people

of non-Anglo-Celtic background (Jupp, 2001; Bourke, Bourke, & Edwards, 1994; Ozdowski, 2005).

The multicultural ideal opened a way whereby retention of one's ethnic identity, and aspects of cultural heritage associated with it, could be permitted, and even formally encouraged, provided minority ethnics (occasionally labelled as 'people of non-English speaking background' (NESB)) subscribed to a series of shared overarching values. Most of these were derived from the Anglo-Celtic cultural tradition and subsequently moulded into their present Anglo-Australian form. Hence, as Jain (2000, p. 71–72) comments, Australian multiculturalism has eschewed pure cultural relativism, although there are already signs of further modifications of the overarching framework under the impact of an increasing number of new cultural inputs (Jupp, 2001; Smolicz, 1998).

Successful completion of this process requires the acceptance of a culturally pluralist solution by the Anglo-Celtic-dominant majority – with some values shared, and others preserved and adapted by constituent ethnocultural groups, within the new nation. The degree of acceptance of minority ethnics as 'real Australians' (i.e. as members of the nation in its most basic ideological/emotional sense) has not yet been fully accomplished, with special commissions formed to look after minority interests, implying their continued cultural and linguistic difference and consequent social distance.

6.3 Patterns of Cultural Interaction: Research in South Australia

Our research in Australia indicates that while minority individuals are exposed within the multicultural setting to both majority and minority values, and they often incorporate both into their personal systems, individuals from the dominant majority are much less likely to do so. Furthermore, the education system so far has been slow to actively promote cultural interaction for the majority, except at a superficial level or as rhetoric (Smolicz, Hudson, & Secombe, 1998; Smolicz & Secombe, 2005).

The Adelaide research has been based on the analysis of memoirs written by tertiary students of both Anglo-Australian majority and minority ethnic origins. They have revealed that students who received their school education during the 1960s and 1970s differed in relation to their experiences and attitudes to cultural pluralism, depending on their background. The investigation of Anglo-Australian university graduates' attitudes towards cultural interaction and their experiences of it revealed that only just over a third had actually been involved in cultural interaction. A number of these commented on the importance of their first experience of participation in another culture and the way this subsequently affected their attitudes towards the cultural pluralism to be found within Australian society (Secombe & Zajda, 1999; Smolicz & Secombe, 2000).

In her investigation carried out in Poland, Kloskowska (1996, 2000) had developed a concept of cultural valence, which presupposed not only proficiency and

participation in a given culture, but also a positive attitude to the culture concerned, including a perception of co-ownership and a sense of belonging to it. She distinguished between individuals with valence in a single culture (univalent) and those with valence in two or more cultures (bivalent/polyvalent). All Anglo-Australian respondents in the Adelaide study were found to be univalent individuals, with none showing bivalent, polyvalent, or ambivalent characteristics (Smolicz, Hudson, & Secombe, 1998; Secombe & Zajda, 1999). Such data confirm that these majority background students had not crossed cultural borders in any meaningful way, but remained essentially within the confines of the dominant group, which was the only culture they had been introduced to in their home and school contexts. However, the Anglo-Australian group could be subdivided into two groups, namely those who did and those who did not reveal any transformation in their monistic attitudes towards cultural diversity. The respondents who had modified their attitudes could be regarded as in the initial stages of border-crossing that could be achieved in a multicultural nation. Although their personal cultural values were derived from only one (Anglo) cultural source, their support for cultural diversity was evident in the positive attitudes they expressed towards ethnic minority groups, not just their own.

In contrast to the majority-group students were those from non-English-speaking minority ethnic backgrounds. Three ideal types of valency could be identified among the group of respondents. All of them were at least bivalent, showing both the retention of their minority ethnic culture and their success in crossing the border to participate in the culture of the Australian majority. Some were polyvalent, and a few could be classified as ambivalent, because of their sense of conflict between the two cultures of their experience. The study therefore provides evidence of the positive results enabling young people from minority ethnic backgrounds to cross the border into mainstream Anglo-Australian society via its overarching values, and even at time influence those shared values, without having to retreat either away from their home cultures or exclusively towards them into some kind of 'ethnic ghetto'. The findings also point to the incomplete aspect of the 'multicultural experiment' in Australia, namely, the scarcity of bivalent or polyvalent individuals among the Anglo-Australian respondents, although the positive attitudes to be found among many of them indicate a more hopeful trend for the future. Their identification points to a way for Australia to escape the ever-present dilemma of multi-ethnic societies – namely, how to combine cultural diversity with a resilient and stable nation state that seeks to uphold universal human rights.

The Adelaide studies emphasise the important role of the school in achieving the multicultural ideal among students of majority Anglo background through the development of intercultural education and culturally inclusive curricula which could encourage them to interact across ethnic boundaries. If the crossing of cultural borders in Australia is to become the experience of majority and minority Australians alike, students need to be introduced to the experience of other cultures in the school situation, as an integral part of the regular curriculum. Optimism in the country's achievement in the teaching of languages other than

English (Clyne, 1991; Clyne & Kipp, 1996; Smolicz, 1991) is reflected in the Report of the Centenary of Federation Advisory Committee (1984) which states:

Australia's education and training system has responded to the changing ethnic composition of our population. A system of language training was put into place to provide migrants with access. Community languages were integrated into school curricula and became an important national resource. In 1987 the Federal Government adopted a National Policy on Languages, becoming the first English speaking country to have such a policy and the first in the world to have a multilingual languages policy.

This perhaps over-optimistic assessment of the Australian educational status quo reflects the idealism of the National Policy on Languages (Lo Bianco, 1987) which adopted a dual focus on languages learning, namely the need for speakers of a minority (or 'community') languages to acquire literacy in their first language, alongside English; and for English background speakers to be given the opportunity to acquire a second language, whatever it might be – geographical, community, trade, or one which would combine all those characteristics (see also Secombe & Zajda, 1999).

6.4 New Challenges to Australian Multiculturalism: The Asian Presence

While the Australian multicultural 'experiment' is still unfinished, it holds sufficient promise to commend it to the rest of the pluralist world, in spite of some disquieting shadows over the horizon, such as the formation in 1997 of the 'One Nation' party, with the goal of returning to a single Anglo-Saxon concept of the nation and a rejection of the Aboriginal, Asian, and other 'multicultural accretions'. Such extremist fringe reactions are not unexpected in a society which has undergone such rapid ideological, cultural, and economic change over the past 3 decades.

The extent to which the cultural and racial perceptions of Australians have changed has not perhaps been fully appreciated. It is significant that the arrival of non-British European settlers after the Second World War was originally made possible only on the understanding of their assimilation and as a protection against Asians. While multiculturalism became the official policy, the term multiracialism has never been officially used. The arrival of the first significant group of Asian migrants and the abolition of the White Australia Policy were remarkable events made possible at that time by a feeling of obligation to the Vietnamese refugees. Hence, their willy-nilly acceptance by those who strongly supported the American stance in Vietnam. The general trend of the 1970s was one of liberating movements and of the opening up of society, whether in the area of environment, sexuality, or migration. At all times, it was, however, assumed that the Asian proportion of the population would remain small. In fact, changing migration patterns between 1981 and 1996 have already exerted a significant impact on languages spoken in the Australian homes, with a dramatic increase in the proportion of people who claimed to speak Chinese in their homes (148%),

Filipino (181%), and Arabic (53%), as compared with the decrease in the proportion of such European language speakers as Italian (−9%), Greek (−6%), German (−11%), and Maltese (−23%).

The recent Australian record in the settlement of immigrants from Asia has generally been good but accompanied by the assumption of cultural integration to Australian ways. Except for sporadic outbursts, augmented by international events this is unlikely to deteriorate. What is clear is that Australia as a country while not ‘racist’ towards its ‘existing’ Asian residents, is not yet ready for a very substantial increase in the proportion of its Asian-background fellow citizens, as demonstrated by the disquiet over the ‘illegal’ arrival of ‘boat people’ from Middle East.

The process of balancing the factors of culture, race, and territory in the future development of Australia have been sharply thrown into focus – initially by the former leaders’ push in these areas towards pluralism and culture-sharing, in contrast to the diffidence on the part of current leadership on most of these issues. Nevertheless, the ideal that an Australian can be of any religion or race, and that he or she can follow any pattern of culture, provided it resides within the dynamic shared framework, has been reaffirmed by the Parliament in order to ensure that Australia never returns to the concept of an ethnically monistic British-derived nation state. Following the recent catastrophic events in New York and Washington DC, the Australian Prime Minister, John Howard (2001c), asked

all Australians to extend to their fellow countrymen or women, whether they are of Islamic faith; Christian faith, the Jewish faith, or no faith at all, tolerance and decency and inclusion. We are a harmonious society, I want to keep it that way.

What is remarkable is the extent to which Australians’ image of their country as a culturally pluralistic nation state has already stabilised. This is illustrated by a statement of the former Governor General of Australia, Sir William Deane (1997, p. 3): ‘Australia’s multiculturalism sustains the nation. It both protects and promotes respect and tolerance for the backgrounds of all Australians – for people who came from Britain as much as those whose origins were in other parts of the world.’ The Governor General also expressed his belief in multiculturalism as one of the fundamental underpinnings of the nation: any attempt to undermine it was to ‘defy or deny the very basis of our Australian nation’.

6.5 Culturally Plural Nation State as an Alternative to Assimilation and Fragmentation

The relative success of the Australian multicultural experiment so far has demonstrated the possibility of establishing a stable and cohesive, yet inclusive society within a state that is unique in covering a whole continent. In an ethnically pluralistic setting, it presents a model of nation state development which, if successful, could provide an alternative to assimilationist models (where one nation dominates all others) or to the fragmentation alternative, whereby each national entity seeks

a separate and independent statehood. Both alternatives presuppose a usually vain and fruitless search for a monocultural, mono-national, and monolingual nation state – a most doubtful and culturally limiting ideal, which in practice is hardly every possible to achieve and which the current globalist momentum makes both economically impractical and politically irrational.

It would be inappropriate to imply that the Australian multicultural-nation model could be viewed as the answer to the pluralist dilemmas facing so many countries of the world, since each of them is moulded historically, demographically, and economically in a different way and carries the load of its own particular traditions. For example, Spain, previously so centralist and oppressive of national variants, is currently deemed to be near a settlement of its internal pluralist dilemmas. There still lurk, however, dangers that could threaten to undo a solution, which in some way matches the Australian version of sharing, while allowing cultural diversity, albeit at a territorial level (Generalitat de Catalunya, 1997). In particular, the process of finding a constitutional balance between the cultural rights of the regions and the sovereignty of the state is still being challenged by the Basque country which remains dissatisfied with its current status (Conversi, 1997).

To achieve stability, the culturally pluralistic nation state needs to ensure that regionally based cultural ethnic groups or nations feel secure within it. They must become convinced that the dominance, discrimination, and even persecution of the past are not an option which dominant groups would now wish to repeat, even in the most distant future. Unfortunately, current conflicts can be regarded as the penalty which the present pays for past misdeeds, such as former attempts to obliterate cultural variation in the construction of a homogeneous nation state. This is well illustrated by former denial of linguistic rights in such far-flung parts of the world as Ireland and Brittany, as well as in some parts of Asia (Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson, 1994). Quebec's efforts to leave Canada, despite the reasonably satisfactory current economic and cultural situation, shows how past wrongs still weigh too deeply upon emotions for the past to be forgotten, and for the francophone Québécois to feel secure and assured of cultural survival in a multinational single state partnership with the anglophone majority (Beaupre, 1986; Bourhis, 1984).

It is clear that a nation state in the form in which it was originally conceived in Western Europe – mono-national and equipped with all the culturally centralising powers of intact sovereignty – is a thing of the past. Global economic trends are already eroding it of much of its cultural and political omnipotence, as well as extinguishing some of its former charisma through a process perceived as the decoupling of the institutional encasement of nation state within its territory (Sassen, 2000). The paradox is that the process of the decharismatisation of nation state (Eisenstadt, 2000) is proceeding under the simultaneous impact of the denationalising of the economy and the renationalising of politics. The effect of such developments upon national/ethnic configurations has been a very complex one; on the one hand, it appears to have moderated the nationalism among traditional 'post-industrial' nation states, with their members losing some of their former patriotic/nationalist zeal (Dogan, 1997). This does not necessarily equate with

their eagerness to respond positively to the aspirations of the 'submerged' nations, or ethnic groups within their midst, although recent developments in the United Kingdom demonstrate positive trends to a Spanish-type accommodation in relation to Scotland and Wales (if not yet Northern Ireland).

Conflicts arising from the long-term subjugation of national/ethnic groups in Central and Eastern Europe and from the European colonisation in Asia and Africa are deemed by Dogan (1993, 1997) to have led to an 'asynchronic' situation, whereby a decrease of nationalist sentiments in the West is contrasted with its rise in the *non*-Western world (Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe). The rise of nation states and the associated doctrine equality and civic responsibility are assumed by this author to have reached a state of maturity in the West, enabling it to achieve growing detachment from the former nationalist ideologies.

Such a vision on the maturation of the Western model of nation state in Europe, together with the implied need to have the process replicated elsewhere in the world is contradicted by those Asian scholars who have expressed strong criticism of its former operation and continued influence upon their countries (Ooman, 1997; Tombiah, 1996). The model of nation state developed in the West, for all its claimed egalitarian and unifying virtues, has left a trail of subjugation, and cultural destruction in its wake. According to Tombiah (1996, p. 126): '[T]he Western model of the secular nation-state [stands condemned for its] aggressive nationalism and its imperialistic expansion and penetration into what has become its colonialist dependencies.' His contention is that what was intended as a liberal democratic structure and concept in the West, assumed 'the fierce shape of authoritarian rule abroad ... [through] the inferiorization, if not erosion, of the cultures of the colonised'.

The nation state pattern adopted by the colonialist powers in Asia and Africa has exerted a powerful influence upon the ideas of independent countries in their decision to build their own 'nation states' out of multi-ethnic populations that have often been arbitrarily carved out of ex-colonial countries. In the latter case, the European ideal of a nation state has led to the search for a single language and culture, and created uncertainties about the future role of other cultural forms that do not fit the chosen dominant pattern, as demonstrated, for example, by the situation prevailing in countries such as Nigeria, the Sudan, Indonesia, or Sri Lanka (Smolicz, Nical, & Secombe, 2000).

The current stresses placed upon the formerly so much admired nation state notion leads to a review of the utility and benefit of the concept and the possible need for its modification and adaptation. Such trends can be observed even in those parts of Western Europe that managed to escape enforced homogenisation of the past. These formerly 'submerged' nations are at long last claiming their cultural rights and searching within unified Europe for an escape route from cultural suffocation within the confines of the mono-national nation state. Through the incipient de-nationalisation of national territory, the forces of globalism have created conditions for the renaissance of local cultures and ethnic identity (see also, Zajda, 2005, 2007; Smolicz & Secombe, 2008).

6.6 Conclusion

The solution to pluralist dilemmas is not to be found in the fragmentation of multi-ethnic states into ever-smaller and less viable small nation states, but in politically and culturally stable, cohesive societies that recognise and accept their pluralist make-up – either through the construction of multicultural nation states on the Australian or Indian models or on the European-type solution of the gradual incorporation of nations within a common supranational entity that respects cultural and linguistic diversity within a wider regional community and within each of its component parts.

While a single or integral national identification is underpinned by a feeling of togetherness among members of one particular nation or ethnic group, global interculturalism rests on the prospect of forming bonds based on cultural experiences that cross existing political and administrative borders and embrace other groups and peoples. In this sense intra-group solidarity, founded upon the principle of exclusion of ‘aliens’, must be counterbalanced by inter-group solidarity developed on the basis of the inclusion of ‘cultural others’. One of the most effective means of overcoming barriers is the fostering of cultural interaction, and intercultural dialogue – both within the countries concerned, in order to encourage an ethos of multiculturalism, and between them, in the sense of global interculturalism (Zajda, 2007).

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Part II
Cultural Identity: Case Studies

Chapter 7

The Dialectic of Globalisation, Identity, and Local Activism: Multicultural Education Policies in Japan

Kaori H. Okano

7.1 Multicultural Education in Japan

'Multicultural education policies in Japan' sounds contradictory in itself. Japan not only projects itself as an ethnically and linguistically homogeneous nation but most citizens share that view. In 1986 Prime Minister Nakasone declared that ethnic homogeneity, when compared with multi-ethnic US, has benefited Japanese society in terms of economic progress and social stability, causing outrage in the US (Schweisberg, 1986; *New York Times*, 1986). The modern Japanese state was underpinned by ethnic nationalism in the mid nineteenth century, but the empire it built in the next several decades was a multi-ethnic entity, incorporating peoples in the expanded territories. The post-war 'democratic' Japan was, however, conceived as mono-ethnic polity, depriving former colonial subjects of Japanese nationality. Throughout the modern Japan's trajectory, the dominance of 'ethnic Japanese' has continued.

The system of education has disseminated 'modern' knowledge, and nurtured a sense of what it is to be 'Japanese'. In this process it has taken various measures to assimilate other ethnic groups under its umbrella. This seems to have been successful, despite local activism which has pursued social justice for ethnic minorities. Long-existing distinctive ethnic groups (i.e. indigenous peoples Ainu and Okinawans, and long-time residents of Korean and Chinese descent) have become, to casual observers, 'invisible', since many individuals have 'assimilated' to mainstream Japanese society through schooling. However, they still remain ethnic minorities, seen as 'different' from the mainstream and marginalised in the society.

It was against this backdrop that globalising forces started affecting Japanese schools in the late 1980s. On the one hand, the perceived need for Japan to make contributions to global and regional politics and to maintain a competitive edge in the global economy drove the central government's adoption of the 'internationalisation of education'. Critics argued that this 'internationalisation' policy was economically oriented, Japan-centric, and nationalistic (e.g. Lincicome, 1993).

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On the other hand, large numbers of immigrant and guest workers from the Third World countries forced schools to develop strategies for managing linguistic and cultural diversity. This phenomenon, referred as to 'internal internationalisation' and 'coexistence of plural cultures', attracted public attention via the media, which presented it as a 'discovery' of ethnic diversity in schools, quite oblivious of the long-existing and distinctive domestic ethnic groups.

Examining policies to address ethnic diversity in Japanese government schools, this chapter aims to illuminate the contrast between central government and local government initiatives, and the different approaches towards the long-existing minority Koreans and new immigrants. It then explores how distinctive approaches to the two groups have interacted and contributed to the development of local-level multicultural education policies since the 1990s. My particular focus is the 'local policies for the education of foreign nationals or Koreans in Japan' that have been issued by 47 local governments.¹

The chapter suggests that the central government's policies to address the special needs of long-existing minority Korean residents has been minimal; in contrast to its policies towards recent immigrants in education, which have been relatively swift and well resourced. Despite the central government position, local governments with large numbers of Korean residents formulated policies for the education of Koreans beginning in the early 1970s. I argue that these local policies are 'multicultural education policies' in that they contain 'multicultural education' goals advocated internationally, despite their official title 'policies for the education of foreigners in Japan (mainly Korean)'; but that they are distinct due to their main focus on human rights and social justice, rather than celebration of cultural diversity. I suggest that this focus derives from an initial Korean reluctance to play the politics of 'difference', and from the impact of the human rights education movement for ex-outcasts (Dôwa education). On the other hand, the policies towards new immigrants focus on language and cultural adaptation to the mainstream society and cultural maintenance. A convergence of these two distinct approaches is observable in a more recent development of local policies targeted at Koreans, which have become inclusive of immigrant needs. These local policies, however, continue to use the terms 'foreign nationals' or 'Koreans' to denote these groups. This is problematic, in that these terms exclude Japanese citizens with non-Japanese ethnicity. Local governments and activism, which have displayed relative autonomy from the central government in formulating their own policies for the education of Koreans, may pave a way in moving towards a multi-ethnic understanding of Japanese citizenship in schools.

The chapter's significance is threefold. First, it uncovers 'multicultural education' goals in the local policies hitherto unstudied. Second, it reveals the nature of the interaction between the respective responses to 'visible' immigrant students and to

¹ There may be other local governments, which have issued such policies. In addition to those included in Tei's volume (Tei et al. 1996), I examined three policies that I found on the Internet (Midokoro city 1995; Mie prefecture 2003; and Hyogo prefecture 2002).

'invisible' long-existing ethnic minorities, rather than seeing the former as unilaterally impacting on the supposedly ethnically homogeneous Japanese schools. In so doing, it illuminates the interaction of globalising forces and local activism. Third, it also underscores the importance of the less-publicised grass-roots activism which sustained school-level activities for the education of 'invisible' ethnic minorities, and the considerable independence displayed by local governments.

The study draws on several surveys on ethnic Koreans and foreign nationals in Japan, central and local government policy documents, and my own fieldwork observation. I begin with a brief description of 'invisible' long-existing ethnic minorities, in particular, ethnic Koreans, and of new immigrants who have arrived since the late 1980s. My discussion then turns to policies regarding the education of these minorities in Japanese government schools, first at the central level, and then at local and school levels, as well as local activism.

7.2 Ethnic-Nationalism, Multi-ethnic Empire, and Mono-ethnic Post-war 'Democracy'

The modern Japanese state embraced ethnic nationalism from its founding in the mid nineteenth century, and built a multi-ethnic empire which incorporated indigenous peoples in its expanded territories (e.g. Okinawa, Hokkaido, Taiwan, Korea, north-east China, and some Pacific Islands). After losing these territories at the end of the Second World War, 'democratic' Japan reinvented itself as a mono-ethnic entity, ignoring the distinct ethnicities of Okinawans and Ainu on the one hand, and making other ex-colonial subjects 'foreign nationals' on the other. These groups have become 'invisible' to much of mainstream Japan due to central government policies which have long embraced the ideology of a 'monolingual and monoracial state' (Maher, 1997).

There are two types of long-existing ethnic minority groups. One is the indigenous peoples of Hokkaidô (the Ainu) and Okinawa, which were internally colonised in the late nineteenth century. The other comprises descendants of ethnic Koreans and Taiwanese who were brought to Japan during its colonial occupation of these territories. All these groups were not only given schooling based on the dominant alien culture and its language; but schooling also forced them to abandon their language and culture, as is the case with colonised peoples elsewhere (Corson, 1997, pp. 77–78). The schooling process accelerated this 'assimilation' (partly because minority students could learn to 'pass' as dominant Japanese), and has led them to internalise the dominant Japanese view that they were 'inferior' (Okano & Tsuchiya, 1999, pp. 110–140).

The Ainu are an indigenous people of Hokkaidô, the northern island of Japan, who had long maintained own language and subsistent living styles in harmony with the forest environment. By the eighteenth century, a local feudal lord and the then central feudal government ruled the Ainu. Subsequently, the modern Japanese government sought development of the land in the late nineteenth century by expropriating both

Ainu land and labour and by sending migrants from the mainland (Oguma, 1997; Siddle, 1997). Young Ainu received assimilationist education in state schools and gradually lost the language. In 1999 there were 23,767 self-claimed Ainu in Hokaidô (Hokkaidô-cho, 1999, p. 2). It is estimated that there were further 7,200 Ainu who did not claim ancestry (*Tokachi Journal*, 1997).

Okinawans are an indigenous people of the Ryûkyû Islands located between the southern tip of the Japanese archipelago and Taiwan. They had long maintained their own language and culture, and a kingdom which had enjoyed an independent relationship with China and other Asian societies. After a gradual incorporation into a local feudal domain, the kingdom was officially annexed by Japan in the late nineteenth century. Imperial Japan considered the kingdom to be a geographically strategic acquisition for later expansion towards Asia. Local people received the state's assimilationist schooling which prohibited the use of the local language, internalised the imperial ideology imparted; and played active roles in the colonisation of Taiwan as 'Japanese' subjects (Oguma, 1997). Okinawa remained under the rule of the US Army which created extensive military bases on the islands, even after Japan regained sovereignty in 1952. In 1972 Okinawa was returned to Japan to become a prefecture, but extensive American bases still remain to the present. This history causes Okinawans to perceive themselves as victims in relation to other Japanese, and to maintain ambivalent identities (Oguma, 1997). Okinawa prefecture's population is currently 1.3 million (Okinawa-prefecture, 2004), but the number of the many Okinawans who reside outside the prefecture is difficult to estimate.

The Ainu and Okinawans are not conspicuous in Japanese society, partly because of their Japanese citizenship which entitles them access to the range of government services. It is also because they possess physical features similar to dominant Japanese; have learned the Japanese language, cultural mores, and lifestyles of dominant Japanese; and have limited functional knowledge of their ethnic language. The often-used official category 'foreigner' does not apply to them, a point distinguishing them from ethnic Koreans. The Koreans are the largest ethnic minority group in contemporary Japan. Korean nationals numbered 632,405 in 2001 (Japan, Statistics Bureau, 2002, p. 53). When naturalised ethnic Koreans, their descendants, and Japanese nationals with a Korean parent are included, the number is said to approximate 1.2 million (Zenkoku Zainichi Chôsenjin Kyôiku Kenkyûkai Kyôto, 1993, p. 7). Amongst this 1.2 million ethnic Koreans, considerable diversity exists.

First is the difference between 'newcomers' and 'old-timers'. The 'newcomers' were born and mostly educated in South Korea, and came to Japan for economic reasons. The 'old-timers' are the descendants of Koreans who have resided in Japan since the time of Japan's colonisation of the Korean Peninsula (1910–1945) and who hold special permanent resident status (*tokubetsu eijûsha*). In 1996 there were approximately 550,000 old-timers (Fukuoka, 2000, p. 21). They have popularly been referred to as '*zainichi kankoku chôsenjin*' (*zainichi*, in short).

Among the long-term resident Koreans, further divisions exist between Japanese citizens and non-citizens. The number of ex-Koreans who were naturalised in

the period 1952–1996 is estimated to be over 200,000 (Jyung, 2000, p. 63). The younger generations are more willing to take up Japanese citizenship (Youn, 1992, pp. 135–136). Marriages between Japanese and Koreans have increased over time and now accounts over 80% of marriages involving Koreans (Fukuoka, 2000, p. 35). Children of mixed Japanese–Korean marriages born since 1985 are automatically granted Japanese nationality. Before 1985 only the children of Japanese fathers were granted Japanese nationality. When this change took effect, children of such mixed marriages who were under the age of 20 were able to gain Japanese nationality upon their parents' application. This change has, and will in the future, increase the number of Japanese nationals with a Korean background. Differences are also observed in terms of generation and affiliation with North and South Korean organizations.

The existence of the 'old-timer' Koreans in contemporary Japan is a direct result of Japan's colonisation of the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945. As with other peoples newly integrated into the Japanese Empire, Koreans in both Korea and Japan were Japanese nationals. The original Koreans fled to Japanese cities in pursuit of employment after being dispossessed of their farming lands by the Japanese colonial authorities, or from 1937, were shipped to Japan as forced labour to fill an acute shortage of workers in the war economy (Lee & De Vos, 1981). The Korean population in Japan at the end of the war was almost 2.3 million, about three quarters of whom returned to Korea within a year of the end of the war (Tanaka, 1991, p. 57). For those who stayed on longer in Japan, repatriation became more difficult with the division of Korea in 1948 and the outbreak of the Korean War. After a period of ambiguous citizenship status, when Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952, Koreans living in Japan suddenly and unilaterally became 'foreign' nationals.

Koreans have maintained their 'ethnicity' (whatever it means to individuals), although the majority of second- and third-generation Koreans do not have functional Korean language skills (Lim, 1993, p. 64). Nor do many of them use their Korean names in daily life (e.g. Osaka-fu Kyôiku Iinkai, 2000, p. 5), but many Koreans continue to practise 'the Korean way of life' (Fukuoka & Kim, 1997, pp. 37–39). The increasing proportion of Japanese nationals with a Korean ethnic background (we may call them 'Korean Japanese') within the general Korean population calls for a more inclusive definition of *zainichi* Koreans (Jyung, 2000; Kim, 1999). Indeed, many parents distinguish between Korean ethnicity and Korean nationality, and are more concerned that their children maintain their ethnicity, ahead of Korean nationality (Nakajima & Hong, 1990, p. 46).

7.3 New Immigrants and Guest Workers Since the Mid-1980s

Since the mid-1980s a large number of foreign guest workers and illegal workers have arrived in Japan, along with 'Japanese' orphans from former Japanese territories of China. Distinct from 'involuntary minorities' (e.g. Koreans and indigenous

peoples), the immigrants are 'voluntary minorities' (Ogbu & Simon, 1998) who chose to come to Japan from the Third World countries in pursuit of economic benefits unattainable in their homelands, and attracted by the strong Japanese currency and the Japanese labour shortage. They have worked at construction sites, on factory floors, and, in the case of women, in the entertainment industries. The number of registered 'foreigners' increased from 0.8 million in 1985 to 1.1 million in 1990, and 1.68 million in 2000. In 2000, approximately 1.68 million registered 'foreigners' resided in Japan, 1.3% of the total Japanese population (120 million). The origins of these registered 'foreigners' were mainly Asia and South America. Forty percent of registered 'foreigners' are permanent residents, mainly Koreans. The percentage of permanent residents among registered 'foreigners' has decreased over the last decade because of the arrival of newcomers, and because of the increasing number of ethnic Koreans with Japanese citizenship resulting from the 1985 revision to the Nationality Act mentioned earlier. Amongst non-permanent residents, 60% were from Asia and 29% were from South America (Japan, Hômu-shô Nyûkokukanrikyoku, 2001).

For the first time Japanese schools faced a considerable number of children who did not have Japanese-language proficiency and were distinctively different from their Japanese counterparts. From the outset, various school-level episodes of 'problems' were reported in the media, such as a newspaper article entitled 'Children of foreign guest workers: Increased troubles at school' (*Nihon Keizai Shinbun*, 27 January 1992, p. 30). There have always been foreign children in Japan, but expatriate parents (only skilled expatriates had been allowed to work in Japan) traditionally sent their children to American-style international schools.

There are four groups of 'newcomer' children. The first is second- and third-generation descendants of the Japanese who emigrated to South America in the first half of this century. They have been granted the privilege to work in Japan, regardless of the level and kind of employment skills held, by the 1989 revised Immigration Act. As a result, the number of Brazilians and Peruvians working in Japan increased fivefold in the period 1987–1991, to constitute the majority of legal foreign workers. The second is grandchildren of Japanese orphans who recently returned from China. These orphans were left behind in China (Japan's former colonial territories) by their Japanese parents who fled back to Japan at the end of the war, and were brought up by Chinese as 'Chinese'. In the 1980s some of them decided to return to Japan with their children and grandchildren in order to start a new life (Kawamura, 1993, pp. 34–41). Their children (second-generation returnees) have little knowledge of Japanese language and cultural mores. The third group is illegal foreign workers. Many foreign workers of non-Japanese descent work illegally—about 250,000 according to the Immigration Bureau's estimation in 2000 (Japan, Naikakufu Daijinkanbôseifu Kôhôshitsu, 2003). The fourth group of newcomers is approximately 8,000 Indo-Chinese refugees who have settled in Japan. Some have taken up Japanese citizenship, but over half of the refugees who arrived in Japan have subsequently left for the US, Canada, and Australia (Sekine, 1990, p. 10).

In 2003, approximately 19,000 students required Japanese as a Second Language (JSL) in 3,200 primary schools, 1,700 middle schools, and 300 high schools (Japan, Monbukagakaku-sho, 2004a, p. 1). These schools concentrated in several prefectures, and 36% of these children spoke Portuguese, 25% Chinese, and 14% Spanish (Japan, Monbukagakaku-sho, 2004a, pp. 7–9). The number of these students increased 2.3 times between 1991 and 2003. This required urgent measures. Individual teachers' concerns and initiatives were initially taken up by their schools and/or union, who then requested that administration authorities consider specific measures to cater for the needs of newcomer children. Local education boards sent out more teachers to needy schools, set up classes for 'cultural adaptation', and provided instructors fluent in the children's mother tongue (Enokii, 1993, p. 25). At the school level, Portuguese classes for Brazilians of Japanese descent have been organised. In 2003, 25 Latin American (Brazilian and Peruvian) ethnic schools (private institutions) operated in nine prefectures (Japan, Monbushô).

7.4 Policies for the Education of 'Foreign Nationals' Central Government Policies

While Koreans in Japan had been required to attend Japanese schools as imperial subjects during the colonial period, as soon as they were 'liberated' they organised schools to teach the Korean language and culture throughout Japan, in order to prepare for repatriation to Korea. These individual efforts later received support and guidance from the League of Koreans in Japan, which was established in October 1945 to protect Korean interests. At the end of 1946, 525 Korean schools operated throughout Japan (Mitchell, 1967, p. 113). Initially, the Ministry of Education allowed prefectural governments to register Korean schools.

In 1948, however, the Ministry ordered that school-age Korean children receive compulsory education specified by the 1947 School Education Law; and that Korean ethnic schools comply with the 1947 School Education Law if they wished to continue offering full-time schooling (*Monbushô Gakkô Kyôiku-kyokuchô tsu-tatsu*, 'Chôsenjin stsuritu gakkô no toriatsukai ni tsuite', 24/1/1948). It further ordered the closure of Korean schools which did not comply (*Chosengakkô heisaei* 24/3/1948). These orders severely restricted Korean children from receiving Korean ethnic education, which prompted protests, conflict, and negotiations amongst interested parties (including the League); but in the end, fearing communism, the Japanese authorities dissolved the League, which had by then publicly supported the Pyongyang regime. The closure of Korean schools forced Korean children to attend Japanese government schools. Extensive protests against the forced closure of the ethnic-Korean schools resulted in an agreement between the Osaka prefectural governor and an ethnic-Korean organization in 1948. This agreement allowed government schools with Korean students representing 30% or more of the school population to employ full-time or fractionally appointed teachers funded by the prefecture to teach ethnic classes as well as other subjects.

The majority of ethnic-Korean children attend local Japanese schools. Since the late 1970s, over 80% of school-age Koreans have been enrolled in Japanese schools (Son, 2000, p. 90; Sugitani, 1993, p. 43). In most Japanese school grounds Korean students are not discernible even to average Japanese people, although many urban schools would have some Korean students (Okano, 1997; Rohlen, 1984). The remaining students attend ethnic-Korean schools. Ethnic schools re-emerged when the Association of North Koreans in Japan (*Chongryun*) created their own schools and had them approved as 'miscellaneous schools' in 1955 (Ryang, 1997). In 1993 these schools numbered 81 primary schools, 57 middle schools, 12 high schools, and 1 university (Fukuoka, 2000, p. 25). As 'miscellaneous schools' they were not required to follow the central government regulations for registered schools and maintained autonomy to conduct bilingual teaching in Korean language. In contrast, South Korean schools (only a few exist) conduct lessons in Japanese, only teaching Korean for several hours a week.

The subsequent central government policy (*Chôsenjin no gimukyôdiku shôgakkô eno shûgaku ni tsuite*, 11/2/1953) stated that Korean permanent residents were to be treated in the same way as Japanese students; schools were to accept them with the provision that the Korean students follow Japanese laws; and that they pay school fees (which did not apply to Japanese nationals). Free compulsory schooling for Koreans came in 1965. After an agreement between Japan and South Korea, the Ministry of Education issued a circular to prefectural education boards that Korean residents must receive the same financial assistance as Japanese students (i.e. school fees for compulsory education and subsidised textbooks); and that government schools shall not provide any special treatment based on their ethnicity (28/12/1965). While most Japanese schools have not actively taken the presence of Koreans into consideration and treated them *in the same way* as Japanese children, many teachers, in particular at schools with a large number of Korean students, soon questioned this simple equality principle and have long supported such activities as ethnic lessons and Korean cultural study clubs, as I shall discuss later.

The Ministry remained silent on the education of Koreans in Japanese schools for the next 25 years until 1991, when it sent out another circular to local education boards. In it, for the first time, the Ministry formally acknowledged that ethnic classes for Koreans existed at government schools under local government discretion and approved their continuation, stating that 'ethnic classes during extra-curricular hours are exempt from the no special treatment clause in the 1965 circular'. It also suggested that local governments send the parents of Korean children of school-starting age an information letter regarding local school entry, in the same way as to Japanese counterpart. The circular also stipulated that this approach be followed for other foreign nationals.

In comparison with the Koreans' experiences, the central government's response to the special needs of new immigrant and guest workers' children in Japanese schools was relatively swift and concrete. The Ministry of Education's first response in 1991 was to start conducting surveys on 'foreign students who require JSL'. This survey was subsequently conducted every 2 years until 1999, when it became an annual undertaking. Besides the regular surveys, to date the central government has

instituted ‘measures to respond to the special needs of foreign students and returnee students from China’ (*Kikoku Gaikokujin Jidōseito Kyōiku ni kansuru Shisaku*) (Monbukagaku-sho, 2004b). For example, it started funding JSL teachers in 1992; and in 1993 began conducting in-service professional development courses in JSL to teachers and members of local education boards with responsibility for these students (*Gaikokujin jidō seitonado nihongo shidōkōshūkai*). In 1999 the Ministry started a specialised counsellor dispatching programme (*Gaikokujin jidō seito sōdanin haken jigyō*), funding educational counsellors with proficiency in the students’ mother tongue in designated local areas (e.g. 71 areas in 2004).

The Ministry established the Committee for Research in the Education of Returnee and Foreign Students (*Kikoku Gaikokujin Jidō Seito Kyōiku Kenkyū Kyōgikai*) in 2001, where local practitioners and education board members discuss and research practice and policies. (It resembled a committee formed by Osaka city as far back as 1972 to support ethnic Koreans, as discussed later.) In the same year the Ministry started the ‘Internationalisation of Education Promotion District Program’ (*Kikoku Gaikokujin Jidō Seito to tomoni susumeru kyōiku no Kokusaika Suishin Chiki jigyō*). Selected schools in designated districts (to date, 56) study and implement measures to promote education for international understanding through interaction between returnee/foreign students and local students. Individual education board reports on this project reveal details of undertakings at schools with substantial numbers of newcomer children. Building on the five series of JSL teaching materials that it had published since 1989 (including a multimedia set), the Ministry launched an extensive curriculum development of JSL in 2003. In addition, published guidelines and manuals on ‘cultural adaptation’ were created for teachers involved with returnee and foreign students (Monbukagaku-sho, 2004b).

Whilst these responses were slow in coming, the central government has taken relatively overt measures to meet the special needs of newcomers. The most important consequence is that the central government now openly acknowledges the existence of these newcomers (returnees and foreigners) in Japanese schools, and their ‘special needs’ (i.e. language and cultural adaptation). Newcomer groups were so different from the Japanese that neither teachers nor students could fail to notice, or ignore, their distinctiveness.

7.5 Local Activism and Local Government Policies

Despite the Ministry’s policy of ‘treating all in the same way’, Korean parents and organizations and professional groups of sympathetic teachers initiated local activism, which led to local government policies for education of Koreans in Japanese government schools. As of 2004, about 50 local governments have announced ‘policies for the education of foreign nationals (mainly Koreans)’ (*zainichi gaikokujin kyōiku hōshin or shishin*). How and why did these policies come to be formulated by local governments despite the Ministry’s policy of ‘treating all in the same way’? Later I examine the local policies issued by 47 local governments in

four respects: backgrounds leading to the formulation of the policies, the naming of the target groups ('Koreans' or 'foreign nationals' or both), the effectiveness of the policies, and major shared elements. This will reveal the relative autonomy that local government and education boards have possessed and exercised, the nature of the local activism that involved ethnic organizations and teachers' professional bodies, and the understanding of 'diversity' and human rights at the local and school levels.

While after-school ethnic education existed in Japanese mainstream schools, those involved did not actively seek public recognition of 'difference' until the 1970s. For example, Korean ethnic classes were conducted at government schools in Osaka prefecture under the 1948 agreement; and by the late 1960s, concerned parents and teachers in schools with large numbers of Korean students in neighbouring prefectures had begun to run similar classes. Local and school level policy and practice in relation to education for Korean residents underwent profound changes in the 1970s. These came from two directions. On the one hand, a series of civil movements and court cases regarding education in the 1960s caused lively discussion about students' rights to education, and teachers' rights to oppose what was considered to be central government intervention. On the other hand, the powerful activism of a minority organisation, the Buraku Liberation League and the subsequent installation of Dôwa education programmes (Hawkins, 1983) forced schools to re-examine their hitherto taken for granted assumptions and educational practice in relation to, first, *buraku* students and later Korean students. Subsequently, Dôwa education covered the human rights of students generally, including those with disabilities and newcomers. This movement brought about acceptance of the principle of 'no discrimination' that was actively taught in schools through Dôwa education by schools, students, and society in general.

Concerned teachers initiated inter-school bodies in order to support ethnic education of 'foreign nationals' (most of whom were Koreans) around the time when Dôwa education was gaining legitimacy in the policy discourse. The first of these bodies, the Osaka City Committee for Research in the Education of Foreign Nationals (*Osaka shi gaikokujin kyôiku kenkyû kyôgikai*, *Osaka Shigaikyô*, in short), was formed in 1972 by interested teachers as the city education board's research body (*kenkyû itaku kikan*) (Sugitani, 1993, p. 44). All government primary and middle schools in Osaka city participate in this body, which over the years has created a series of supplementary texts, 'Salam', for teaching Japanese students about Korea. These texts have been used at 80% of the schools in Osaka city (Sugitani, 1993, p. 46). Similar bodies were created by other local governments in the 1990s.

In 1970 the Osaka city education board was the first to create its own policy for the education of foreign children in government schools (with special reference being made to Koreans) ('*Zainichi Gaikokujin Kyôiku Hôshin Shishin*') in response to demand from teachers, and later with assistance from the Osaka City Committee for Research in the Education of Foreign Nationals. The policy has been revised several times since then to respond to changing needs. It focuses on human rights, maintenance of Korean ethnic identity, and promotion of Japanese understanding of Koreans; and has encouraged individual schools to develop policies

regarding foreign national students. Twelve local governments followed with similar policies in the 1980s, 33 in the 1990s, and 2 since 2000. Many of these areas have ethnic-Korean population.

The naming of these policies reveals the essential assumption that prevails about Japanese citizenship, that is mono-ethnicity. Citizenship in this case is not conceived independent of one's ethnicity. There are four types of naming for these policies: (1) 'foreign nationals in Japan (mainly Korean nationals)' (27 cases); (2) 'foreign nationals in Japan (13 cases); (3) 'Korean nationals in Japan' (6 cases); and (4) 'Korean nationals (foreign nationals) in Japan' (1 case). All policies start with reference to Korean residents in Japan in their main texts. The earlier policies tended to refer only to 'Koreans'; in the 1980s we started seeing 'foreign nationals (mainly Koreans)', a shift from the Korean only reference to 'foreigners'. I suspect that this resulted from a compromise to appease all parties involved. The policies were initiated by local and professional activism for the education of Korean residents; and the number of Korean residents remains the majority amongst foreign residents. Local governments would have been obliged to acknowledge the Koreans' desire that their special place be recognised in relation to new immigrants in the policies, since the Koreans' existence and marginalisation resulted directly from the state's colonial policies.

The effectiveness of these 'policies for education of foreign residents in Japan' is difficult to measure, and is dependent on how individual schools implement them. Parents can always report concerns about their children to teachers and school authorities, but the institutionalisation of policies by education boards was expected to assist the process. With such policies in place, teachers feel that their activities for the education of Koreans (e.g. participation in various workshops and professional organizations) more 'legitimate' as professional development.

There are seven elements that are commonly observed in most of these 47 policies. The first four elements concern the education of all students (both 'foreign' and Japanese), the next two specifically give consideration to 'foreign' students in Japanese schools, and the last addresses the professional development of teachers implementing the first six elements.

All the policies start with the premise that the task of educating Koreans and other foreign nationals in Japanese government schools necessarily involves the whole school environment, not just those minority students. This requires the dissemination of accurate knowledge about Korean residents in contemporary Japan: how Japan's past colonial policies resulted in the present existence of Korean residents, and how they have long suffered from marginalisation by the dominant society. In explaining Korean marginalisation in Japan, schools are urged to reflect on the pre-war social Darwinist idea that Asian people and civilisations are inferior to their Western counterparts, and that the Japanese are somehow superior to other Asians. According to these policies, this idea still has some currency in Japan, not only in relation to Koreans, but also to other 'newcomer' foreigners, many of whom come from the Third World. The third element is respect for cultural and language differences. Fourth, all policies advocate the need to cultivate greater awareness of human rights amongst all students. Here the Japanese Constitution, the United

Nation Human Rights Declaration, and Dôwa education principles of the 1970s are variously mentioned.

Schools are expected to address the special needs of Korean and foreign students by nurturing ethnic pride through creating opportunities for them to learn ethnic languages and family histories. In relation to Korean residents, most policies urge schools to encourage Koreans to adopt 'real (Korean) names' (instead of 'Japanese names'), and to create the kind of school environment and subculture which would enable Korean students to feel comfortable in doing this. In addition, schools are required to recognise the disadvantages that Korean and foreign students face at school, in obtaining employment, and in the wider society; and to devise teaching and learning in both academic and social fields, as well as guidance for life-after-school that reflect this recognition. In this context, some policies refer to one of the Dôwa education slogans, 'guidance for life-after-school is the ultimate culmination of what schools can do for these children's future—safely placing them in the adult world'. Schools with considerable numbers of Korean students implement such policies to ensure that all minority students obtain permanent full-time jobs (Okano, 1997). Local education boards often conduct surveys of post-high school destinations for Korean residents.

The education of other foreign nationals (new immigrants) features in seven of the local government policies, but remains supplementary. New immigrants are described as needing specific Japanese as a second language instruction. For example, Mie prefecture's policy for the education of foreign nationals in government schools (2003) has a separate section on new immigrants and identifies three specific needs that schools need to address: JSL, adaptation to the Japanese school environment, and maintenance of the mother tongue. The Mie prefectural education board has developed JSL materials, and employs JSL teachers and Portuguese-speaking counsellors. Osaka municipal government's policy (1994 version) states that the principles for education of Korean residents are applicable to new immigrants in its preamble, and urges schools not to repeat the 'mistake' made with Korean students of treating them in the same way as their Japanese peers. A later document (2003) more effectively lists distinctive needs of immigrants.

Above, I have identified, as shared elements of these local policies, provision of accurate knowledge of the causes for marginalisation of Koreans, acknowledgement of the prevailing Japanese view of Asians in general, respect for cultural differences, the sacred nature of human rights regardless of difference, promotion of ethnic language and culture maintenance, teaching and guidance to address the specific needs of 'foreign nationals', and professional development of teachers to implement these elements. These elements are widely observed in so called multicultural education goals elsewhere as outlined by Banks (2004, p. 5).

Seen as 'multicultural education' policies, these local policies display two distinctive features. One is their focus on human rights, and the other is the use of the term 'foreigners'. All these policies were presented in the framework of human rights education. Respect for, and acceptance of, other ethnic cultures are briefly mentioned; but remain marginal to human rights. In this regard, these policies differ from multicultural education policies initially developed in Australia in the 1970s,

whose focus was on the celebration of the cultural differences of immigrants and their benefit to the whole community (Welch, 1996, pp. 105–110). Indigenous peoples were not included in the national multicultural education policy because, according to Hill and Allan (2004, p. 980), indigenous leaders wanted to emphasise their peoples' special place in Australian society. This exclusion of the most disadvantaged might have contributed to the focus on cultural difference, rather than human rights.

The dominant focus on human rights in these policies, I suspect, derives from two reasons. Firstly, many Korean residents have long chosen not to assert and display their ethnicity markers in order to 'pass' as Japanese, rather than seeking recognition of 'difference'. This was because many initially saw their stay in Japan as transitory (before eventually returning to their homeland), and formed their ethnic identity in terms of their allegiance to their homeland (North or South Korea). The Japanese government also saw Koreans as transient residents, and differentiated Koreans from Japanese citizens. Given the physiological similarities and the continued marginalisation in employment and social relations, they judged this strategy to be more effective for avoiding discrimination. Subsequently the majority of Korean residents in Japan do not have a functional knowledge of the Korean language and have acquired 'Japanese' mannerisms and lifestyles, but we cannot interpret this as willing assimilation.

Secondly, activism for the education of Koreans was influenced by the long-lasting activism for the education of *buraku* people in the 1970s. Most of the Japanese teachers active for *buraku* education became sympathetic to the cause of education for Koreans in Japanese schools. Activism for *buraku* people began in the late nineteenth century when they realised the Meiji abolition of the class system did not liberate them from marginalisation. The first organization was formed in 1922. Post-war activism for *buraku* people (the Buraku Liberation League was formed in 1955) sought to remove marginalisation and social stigmatisation by asserting their 'Japaneseness' and focused on human rights, in order to counter continuing allegations of their racial, ethnic, and language distinctiveness.

The active Dôwa education movements influenced activism for education of Koreans in three ways: through voluntary creation of ethnic classes at the individual school level, via the process of local policy formulation, and through local policy implementation mechanisms. It was in the context of Dowa education that the second wave of Korean ethnic classes were started in 1972 by concerned Japanese teachers as well as volunteer Korean parents and Korean community members at schools with a large number of *buraku* children in Osaka. The first wave of ethnic classes in Japanese government schools resulted from the 1948 agreement between the Osaka prefectural governor and an ethnic-Korean organization after the central government order to close ethnic schools. The third wave of ethnic classes started in 1992 when the Osaka city government began funding 'club instructors', in response to the 1991 Ministry of Education circular mentioned earlier (Usui, 1998, p. 98). The ethnic classes that thus emerged at Dôwa education active schools were more successful in involving the whole school than those established during the other waves mentioned above. This was because these schools, having already committed

to Dôwa education, were more able to integrate ethnic education programs into teaching across the curriculum (Usui, 1998, pp. 104–107). Secondly, when formulating policies for education of Korean and foreign nationals, participants looked to Dôwa education policies for reference. Some local policies specifically state that education of foreign nationals is based on the local governments' existing framework of 'human rights education policies'.

Besides the local policy formulation, implementation of these policies was undertaken through institutional mechanisms which had already been established for Dôwa education at local government and individual school levels. For example, teachers generally obtain guidance in relation to minority students from their schools' committee to promote Dôwa education (*Dôwa kyôiku suishin inkai*). Every high school in the city where I conducted my fieldwork has such a committee. Each committee implements the school's policy on human rights and minorities, which includes students from buraku, Korean, and solo-parent families, tries to raise awareness of human rights issues amongst students, and encourages minority students to apply for various scholarships available specifically for them. Often the teacher in charge of the Korean cultural study club is a member of the committee. The level of activities that occur within a school is influenced by the membership of the committee and the headmaster—that is to say, the levels of commitment of the teachers in charge make a significant difference. In Saki city, the head of each school's committee is a member of the city-wide organisation, the Saki Municipal High School Dôwa Education Study Society. This organisation is active in disseminating the latest information on national- and local-level policies affecting minority students and scholarships through regular publications to schools, and in opposing or supporting changes in policies and lobbying local governments and other institutions.

The other distinctive feature of these local policies is the continuing official use of the terms 'foreigners in Japan' or 'Korean residents in Japan' to denote ethnic minorities. Officially these terms refer to residents without Japanese citizenship. The Ministry also uses these terms. While most Japanese would associate the term 'foreigner' with someone born outside Japan and residing temporarily in Japan, until 1990 the majority of 'foreigners' residing in Japan comprised permanent resident ethnic Koreans born in Japan, with Japanese as their first language. Therefore, there was an assumption that schools with relatively large numbers of 'foreigners' had many ethnic Koreans enrolled. Conversely, schools without 'foreigners' do not necessarily have ethnically homogeneous student populations because there are large numbers of Korean–Japanese, ethnic Koreans who have taken up Japanese citizenship, and children of Japanese–Korean marriages in such schools.

The use of these terms is problematic when considering 'multicultural education'. These terms exclude 'ex-foreigners' who have taken up Japanese citizenship and children of Koreans and/or foreigners who are granted Japanese citizenship at birth. Once a 'foreigner' takes up Japanese citizenship, he or she simply disappears into the 'Japanese citizen' category at that point. His or her ethnic background ceases to exist in the official discourse. However, an increasing number of ethnic Koreans now possess Japanese citizenship, through 'naturalisation' or as

a result of 'mixed marriage', resulting from the 1985 revision to the Nationality Act. While officially they ceased to be 'Korean', ethnic identity and a sense of marginalisation continue to exist. The term 'foreign nationals' also excludes indigenous peoples (Okinawans & Ainu) who are 'Japanese citizens'. There are no official documents detailing the 'ethnic' composition of the Japanese population nationwide. This contrasts with, for example, a country like Australia which collects such information in each national census where respondents are asked to indicate his or her 'ethnic' background. The use of these terms in the policies does not acknowledge the diverse ethnic ancestry of Japanese citizens. My further reading of the policies, however, suggests that a few local governments do recognise multi-ethnic citizenship in the student population, and advise that the same policies be applied to Japanese nationals with non-Japanese ethnicity. At the classroom level, based on daily interaction with Korean students, young Japanese students' understanding of citizenship has begun to be more inclusive and to defy the official definition (Okano, 2004, p. 17).

7.6 Discussion

I argued that the central government's policies to address the special needs of new immigrants have been relatively well articulated and resourced, in comparison to its minimalist approach towards long-existing minority Koreans. At the local level, however, governments with large numbers of Korean residents formulated policies for the education of Koreans beginning in the early 1970s, in response to the demands of local activism (which comprised both ethnic groups and professional groups of teachers). An examination of the policies issued by about 50 local governments suggests that these policies are based on 'multicultural education' principles in that they contain 'multicultural education' goals advocated internationally, despite their official title 'policies for the education of foreigners in Japan (mainly Koreans)'; but that they are distinct due to their main focus on human rights and social justice rather than celebration of cultural diversity. I suggested that this focus derives from an initial Korean reluctance to play the politics of 'difference' and from the impact of the human rights education movement for ex-outcasts (*Dôwa* education). In contrast to the human rights focus in policies towards Koreans, those towards new immigrants emphasise language and cultural adaptation to the mainstream society and cultural maintenance.

In a more recent development of local education policies targeted at Koreans, these two distinct approaches towards Koreans and new immigrants began to converge. The policies originally instituted for Koreans started to address the needs of new immigrant children, some of which were shared by Koreans. This development gives the potential for the two groups to jointly challenge the assumption of the mainstream schooling that the student population is ethnically homogeneous. The continued use of the terms 'foreign nationals' or 'Koreans' remain problematic in that these terms exclude Japanese citizens with non-Japanese ethnicity. However,

local governments and activism, which have displayed considerable autonomy from the central government in formulating their own policies for the education of Koreans are likely to play an important role in promoting a multi-ethnic understanding of Japanese citizenship in Japanese schools. The use of the terms simply reflects the dominant notion of mono-ethnic Japanese citizenship.

7.7 Conclusion

I have examined the development of policies to address ethnic diversity in Japanese government schools in the last 3 decades, and shown that these policies differ significantly at the central and local levels; and that approaches diverge considerably in relation to long-existing minority Koreans and to new immigrants. One of globalising forces that has affected Japanese schools is an influx of immigrants to local classrooms. This is, however, not a case of new immigrants unilaterally impacting on supposedly ethnically homogeneous Japanese classrooms. Central and local government responses to immigrants were observed and questioned by the Koreans and their activist groups, who in turn developed policies which furthered their cause while including the interests of the new immigrants. Such interaction between, and negotiation over, the respective responses to ‘visible’ immigrant students and to ‘invisible’ long-existing ethnic minorities illuminates how globalising forces and local activism, in interaction, affect changes to the educational practice.

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Chapter 8

Jewish-Canadian Identity and Hebrew Language Learning: Belonging (or Not Belonging) in Montreal and Toronto Diaspora: A Comparative Analysis

Grace Feuerverger

8.1 The Hebrew Language and Ethnic Identity

Since the establishment of the modern State of Israel in 1948, the Hebrew language has been transformed within the cultural, political, and historical fabric of global Jewish consciousness into a communicative language and a salient symbol of Jewish ethnic identity (e.g., see Fellman, 1973, 1985; Fishman, 1977, 1991; Herman, 1970; Katz, 1985; Kutscher, 1982; Shaffir & Weinfeld, 1981). Identities are shaped by location as well as dislocation. Throughout history, the Jewish case is a very clear one of rootedness in the land of Israel, in the religious teachings of Judaism, and in the use of the Hebrew language. Indeed, to invest in Jewish ethnicity is to invest in a specific cluster of identifications: to region, Israel as the national homeland; to kinship, a location within a social, moral, and ancestral community; to Judaism, as a secular culture and/or as a religion; and to language, Hebrew as the sacred and ancestral/resurrected tongue (Feuerverger, 1989, 2001, 2006).

Being Jewish, however, also represents a painful journey from the center into the margins, that is, it is an experience of mass expulsions and death, a nomadic wandering throughout the centuries in order to find a sense of home, and of legitimacy in the world. This “strangerhood” or “otherness” in the *Diaspora*¹ is a disturbing way to live and yet most of humanity, whether Jewish or not, has felt this “foreignness,” either as immigrants or sojourners in a new land, or as displaced persons of war. The theme of diaspora is universal. The wound is deep and the rift unhealable but we must accept the reality that this dislocation and migration of cultural groups are the signatures of our postmodern era. Therefore, now more than ever before, it is crucial to learn how to accommodate the “stranger” and his or her language and culture in our societies (see Shabatay, 1991). In order to “make friends” with “the other” in our contemporary cities, “we must confront ‘the other’ in the deepest part of our souls, in the psychological no-man’s

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¹Diaspora: the dispersion of a people out of their homeland; being in exile.

land where the ‘foreigner’ lurks—he is the hidden face of our identity, the space that wrecks our abode, the time in which understanding and affinity founder” (Kristeva, 1991, p. 1). Knowing the existence of the “foreigner” is a central aspect of second-language learning, which I believe can be defined as a sensitivity and a conscious understanding of the myriad languages and cultures in our world and of their role for humanity. As we enter the twenty-first century, we must be secure enough within ourselves to acknowledge the “foreigner” who speaks a different language and has a different culture and different values and traditions and who competes for the same physical space.

Edward Said (1990) claims that the loneliness of exile is “compelling to think about but terrible to experience” (p. 159). “Exiles are cut off from their roots, their land, their past. ... [They feel] an urgent need to reconstitute their broken lives, usually by choosing to see themselves as part of a triumphant ideology or a restored people” (p. 163). The resurrection of Hebrew as a communicative language (see Fellman, 1973) may be looked upon as an act of Jewish redemption, an act of hope. As Chambers (1994) explains:

In language we inhabit, construct and extend realities. ... Language is what permits our being to be, to occur, to be explored, carried out and carried on. ... It is where what we refer to as our historical, cultural and personal identities are not simply formed, but, more significantly, performed. Language calls out for a voice, a body. Such a summons propels us beyond the limited refrain of instrumental speech and writing into song, dance and dream. (Chambers, 1994, pp. 133–132)

In the case of the Jewish people, the dream is to reshape historical space through the modern revival of the Jewish nation and thus to reenvision the place of the Jews in the secular world. Hebrew has become the linguistic container for this dream. Within this context, my research inquiry provides an investigation of Hebrew language learning by my participants as a “metaphorical” journey through cultural, historical, and personal borders (see Derrida, 1979; Giroux, 1991). Language therefore is not solely a means of communication; it is also a way of constructing our cultural selves and creating a sense of belonging in the world within the context of the historical narratives of our particular group (Chambers, 1994; Fishman, 1991; Garcia, 1994; Lambert, 1982; Spolsky, 1989; 2000; Feuerverger, 1998; Adams & Tulasiewicz, 1993; Zajda, 2004; Macropoulos, 2007; Smolicz et al. 2007; Smolicz & Secombe, 2008; Tulasiewicz & Zajda, 1998; Zajda, Davies, & Majhanovich, 2008).

The purpose of this study is to explore the subjective perceptions of Jewish-Canadian high school students in Montreal and Toronto toward the learning of Hebrew; their ancestral language and the language that is now symbolic of secular (and not only religious) Jewish diasporic identity in the post-Holocaust, postmodern world. One of the aims of this chapter is to examine the interrelationships between Hebrew language learning and definitions of Jewish identity, and therefore to explore the ways in which the learning of Hebrew has significant social-psychological implications for Jewish students in Canada. In fact, since the establishment of modern Israel, Hebrew has gradually replaced Yiddish in the curricula of most Jewish day schools throughout the Diaspora,

and Canada is no exception.² Hebrew, however, is not generally the home language for Jewish-Canadian children. Thus our study is complicated by the interesting and unusual social-psychological situation in which our participants are located. Hebrew is not their native language, nor will they use it in everyday communication. On the other hand, and this is the crucial difference here as compared to other studies in second-language learning, Hebrew is *not a* foreign language to these Canadian students, as would be Spanish or Swedish or even French. Hebrew is their ancestral language as well as the language of modern Israel, and also the sacred language of their Bible. Hebrew harbors within it powers of religion, history, culture, tradition, and folk values; it is the basis for an active Jewish consciousness.

In 1933, Sapir argued that language is a fundamental expression of collective social identity and a powerful symbol of group solidarity (Sapir, 1933). Thus, learning an ancestral and/or ethnic language, particularly to a high level of proficiency, may promote the group cohesion necessary for ethnic identity maintenance and “ethnic rediscovery,” a concept put forward by Isajiw (1981). My intention here is to explore the ways in which Hebrew language learning can provide Jewish-Canadian students with a sense of identity, place, and possibility. All too often, the voices of the language learners themselves remain silent in sociolinguistic research. In this regard, I agree with Spolsky’s (2000) recent claim that “the study of language motivation then remains an area where the social and psychological aspects of language learning and use are a source of fruitful exploration and deserve regular revisiting.”

8.2 A Qualitative Methodology and Theoretical Considerations

The approach for this inquiry was based on the interactive relationship between me as the researcher and the participants through dialogue, reflection, and conversation. Case study and narrative methodologies were employed to document perceptions of the meaning of learning Hebrew, the ancestral language (see Connelly & Clandinin, 1990; Eisner, 1991; Glesne & Peshkin, 1992; Hornberger, 1990; Huberman & Miles, 1984; Schon, 1991; Yin, 1984). The primary goal was to reflect on the educational and personal experiences of my participants, in order that we

²It should be noted that there is presently a revival of Yiddish in cultural/literary circles, in terms of university courses, Klezmer music events, and courses in elementary and high schools. In fact, I was involved in hosting an event at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education cosponsored by the Goethe Institute in Toronto, which featured the German singer Manfred Lemm from Wuppertal who has devoted his musical repertoire to the works of the Yiddish poet Mordechai Gebirtig who was killed in World War II. However this does not detract from the fact that the power of Hebrew remains uncontested in terms of a communicative presence with a homeland called Israel.

as applied linguists, language researchers, and educators could learn about their social-psychological struggles and thereby make sense of their needs in terms of Hebrew language learning and curriculum development. In this quest for meaning and authenticity in the learning of Hebrew as a symbol of Jewish identity, I concur with John Dewey's (1938) concept of "teaching and learning as a continuous process of reconstruction of experience" (p. 111).

In this research study, I collected data from Jewish-Canadian Grade 9 and 11 students in Montreal and Toronto, the two largest cities in Canada, by means of in-depth interviews and participant-observation in their classrooms over a period of many months in a total of five Jewish high schools of essentially three different religious and cultural orientations (two Orthodox, two Traditional, and one National-Secular).³ Through the narratives offered to me by my participants, I examined how they continually struggled to establish a sense of location in their multiple identities as Jews, as Canadians, as adolescents, as male or female, and to find a voice that is valid both in the Diaspora and in Israel. Within the context of this present study, the motivation for learning Hebrew is a function of how these students personally define their Jewish ethnic group membership, that is:

- 1) Religious, as an expression of religious identity
- 2) Ethnocultural, as a symbol of sense of belonging to the Jewish People, and/or
- 3) Nationalist, as an identification with the modern State of Israel and Israeli-Jewish society

Therefore, motivation in Hebrew language learning is closely related to the differential religious and cultural orientations of the schools that the participants have chosen to frequent. It should be noted that in all the schools discussed in this study, Hebrew is taught in an immersion format; that is, where half of the school day is devoted to teaching subjects (e.g., grammar, literature, history, religion, and social studies) where Hebrew is the medium of instruction. Furthermore in Montreal, the Jewish day schools also have a French immersion component, whereas in Toronto, French immersion is not an option in the Jewish day schools (see also Macropoulos, 2007). These students are only taught French as a subject for 40 minutes per day.

The interviews that I conducted contained questions that were mainly concerned with the learning of Hebrew for "integrative" purposes, based on Gardner's (1979, 1982) interpretation of the integrative motive.⁴ Gardner argues that because language is an integral part of culture, the learning of a second language is dependent on the

³The emphasis in the Orthodox schools is on religion. The Traditional schools focus on the traditions of the Jewish People but with less stress on following the religious laws of Judaism. Finally, the National-Secular high school (which is located only in Montreal) is involved in the nonreligious expression of Jewish identity, that is, through culture and language. There is a small but important component of Yiddish instruction in this school, which is lacking in the other Jewish high schools.

⁴Originally in Gardner and Lambert's (1959) study on linguistic orientation. It is important to note that in this study the "instrumental orientation" is not relevant because in all cases the participants have a personal commitment to the learning of Hebrew due to their Jewish status.

learner's willingness to identify with the target language (TL) culture and to make aspects of that TL culture part of his or her own social/linguistic repertoire. His socio-educational model suggests that second language learning is facilitated by this integrative motive which "reflects a high level of drive on the part of the individual to acquire the language of a valued second language community in order to facilitate communication with that group. Indeed, research evidence shows that all students become more involved in second language learning when the content of what they are learning is relevant to their personal lives (see Abu-Rabia & Feuerverger, 1996; Krashen & Biber, 1988; Spolsky, 1989; Spolsky, 2000; Tulasiewicz & Zajda, 1998; Zajda, 2001; Smolicz & Secombe, 2008). For instance, Spolsky (2000) suggests "Knowing a language is the kind of knowledge that Code (1991) characterized as contextualized, dynamic, and reciprocal, depending on the context in which it is learned and used, changing with mood and need, and varying according to the person with whom it is used." In this qualitative study, the interviewing process opened a space for reflection and speculation about the historical, cultural, and social discourses that dominate the educational terrain of Hebrew language learning for Jewish students in Canada's two largest cities.

As participant-observer, I had the opportunity to listen to the stories of adolescent students who, for the most part, were quite pleased that the issue of learning Hebrew within the context of Jewish identity was being explored empirically in Canada. Not surprisingly, these were students who showed a great deal of interest in discussing the research topic. Indeed, they had chosen to pursue full-time Jewish education and thus have invested heavily in their ethnic language maintenance. In this section, I offer excerpts from the interviews in order to provide a brief discussion of their perceptions of Hebrew language learning within the context of Clément's individual motivation process, the *primary motivational process*, which is directly influenced by conditions in the social milieu. Within the specific context of this study, 'integrativeness' refers to the willingness of Jewish-Canadian students to identify with, and be like, valued members of another community, that community being Israel. Within the domain of relations between Israeli Jews and Diaspora, with its competition for power in the affairs of world Jewry, "fear of assimilation" may mean that the position of the Israeli group will be enhanced at the expense of the Diaspora group (in this case, Canadian Jews), if identification with Israel becomes very strong. Here the interface between language and identity is particularly powerful.

8.3 A Reflective Discussion on Hebrew Language Learning and Definitions of Jewish Identity in Montreal and Toronto

One of the factors that appears to be operating in this competition between contemporary Jewish languages and cultures can be found in the differential ideological rationales of the National-Secular school versus the Traditional schools.

The National-Secular school has its roots in the “proletarian Jewish culture” of the Jewish Bund in Eastern Europe of the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. For the Bundists, Yiddish, and not Hebrew, was to be the vehicle of their cultural expression (see Rosenberg, 1985). This circumstance of two “Jewish” languages, competing for title as the symbol of ethnic group membership, has a long historical tradition. Rabin (1969) argues that this phenomenon can be traced back to the Second Temple period. Most scholars will agree that Hebrew ceased to be a language of daily communication in the second or third century CE (Common Era). It did, however, remain functional as the language of liturgy, of religious instruction, and for literacy purposes. Indeed, Hebrew became one of the salient languages within scientific and cultural spheres in the Middle Ages. Even orally, Hebrew remained the lingua franca for Jews of different lands in social and commercial endeavors. The modern revival of the Hebrew language for communicative purposes is unquestionably a significant sociolinguistic phenomenon in this century.

As far as Yiddish is concerned, it is commonly accepted that it had its beginnings approximately 1,000 years ago in German-speaking areas east of the Rhineland and that it developed as the language of the Jewish folk in Eastern Europe (Fishman, 1991; Katz, 1985; Kutscher, 1982). Since World War II and the Nazi destruction of the Jews of Eastern Europe, Yiddish has died as a communicative language (except among the Ultra-orthodox) and Hebrew has taken over the role as the national language of Jews in the modern State of Israel and of most Jews around the world. Within this sociolinguistic context, the National-Secular school students appear to be driven by two opposing forces, namely the desire to accept Hebrew as the unifying language for modern Jewry (i.e., integration with Israeli–Hebrew culture) versus the fear that such pro-Hebraist identification might result in the loss of Yiddish maintenance in the Diaspora. Their school offers more instructional time in Yiddish than the other Jewish schools in the study (see Feuerverger, 1989).

My interviews with these students revealed a somewhat sad resignation about the fate of Yiddish as a communicative language. Many admitted that although the usefulness of Yiddish on an everyday basis was very limited, they still believed that Yiddish should remain on the curriculum as a symbolic gesture so that current and future generations of Jewish students would be able to learn and appreciate the rich Yiddish literature of pre-World War II Eastern Europe. They were enheartened by the present revival of Yiddish in academic courses and in social events in North America and in Europe. (Yiddish is even beginning to make some inroads into the Israeli cultural scene.) Some students, on the other hand, expressed the opinion that learning Yiddish was a waste of time and should be replaced by more instructional time in Hebrew. One Grade 9 female student summed it up very eloquently:

I love the sounds of Yiddish, the “*mameloschen*”⁵ when I hear my grandmother speak it to my mother. I wish I could have spoken it when I was growing up. At least I’m learning Yiddish in school and I am really enjoying the literature of Isaac Bashevis Singer, Sholem

⁵Die *mameloschen* means mother tongue, referring to Yiddish. It has a very endearing quality, evoking the warmth of mother, home, and childhood.

Aleichem and all the other fine Yiddish authors. I don't want to see Yiddish disappear. I know some of my classmates think it's a waste of time and we should only be learning Hebrew. But I disagree. Yiddish is too beautiful and even though it won't be spoken in an everyday way, it is important that the effort is being made to maintain it through education and literary and music events. It makes me feel less sad.

This source of psychological conflict was generally not in evidence in the other four schools in this study. To those students, Hebrew enjoys uncontested ancestral and national status. The interview data overwhelmingly indicate that learning Hebrew for communicative purposes was significantly related to identification with Israel and the possibility of spending a substantial amount of time in Israel. The following are some comments that exemplify this motivation. For example, this Grade 11 male student clearly indicates an "integrative" orientation toward Hebrew language learning that shows successful results:

Learning Hebrew gives me a sense of being Jewish. In my school [National-Secular] we learn a lot about modern day Israel and that's so important to me. I'm not really very religious and so if I only learned Hebrew to read the Torah [the Jewish Bible: Old Testament] I wouldn't really make the effort to learn. I mean Hebrew is so different from English, it even has a different alphabet, so you have to really go out of your way to master the language. I'm very curious about Israel and in Grade 12, we will be going on a trip to Israel and live on a kibbutz⁶ for a month. That's what makes me interested in the Hebrew language.

In all the cases where the students identified with the TL group (i.e., Israel and Israeli Jews), their motivation to learn Hebrew was generally high. Often physical contact with Israel was the deciding factor in terms of increased motivation. For example, a Grade 9 female student says:

You know I've been trying to learn Hebrew from kindergarten and it's been a struggle for me. It's not like you use it in your everyday life here in Toronto. But when I went on a visit to Israel with my family last year it suddenly changed. Then Hebrew came alive for me and I understood its value. That had a big influence on me. Now I really look forward to Hebrew classes, especially culture and literature. And I can't wait to go back to Israel. It's such a vibrant culture.

This student is in effect supporting the assertion of Deci and Ryan (1991) that interest and motivation are so closely linked that they must be taken into account in terms of the curriculum planning for a second language course. More specifically, they suggest that "intrinsically motivated behaviours are those the person undertakes out of interest" (p. 241). Indeed, this research work has allowed me to understand more fully the dialectical relationship between identity and motivation in ethnic language learning. As Vygotsky (1962) argues, language creates and concretizes our world. Therefore knowing a language constitutes a great part of understanding the culture in which that language operates (see Geertz, 1983; Kuhn, 1970). Thus for some of the participants in this study, Hebrew holds the "magic key" that opens the door to Israeli culture. Furthermore, Taylor (1992) argues that the crucial feature of human life is dialogical in nature. "We define our identity always in dialogue with,

⁶A kibbutz is a communal, rural way of life where all the residents share their property collectively.

sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us. Even after we outgrow some of these others, our parents, for instance, and they disappear from our lives, the conversation with them continues within us as long as we live” (p. 79; see also Bakhtin, 1981). These reflections are highly relevant, given the formative years in which my participants find themselves. Adolescence is known to be a time for experimentation and, as such, represents an inner struggle between one’s individual needs and those of the family and community. In the learning of Hebrew as an expression of identification with Israel and Israeli Jews, these students are making a statement of individuality within their Jewish-Canadian community. The motivation of subtle rebelliousness is strong. For example, on the one hand, their parents are happy with their children’s Hebrew language proficiency and interest in Israel, on the other hand, there is the fear that their children will choose to eventually live in Israel and not return to Canada. One 17-year-old boy who attends a Traditional school explains:

I’ve always felt a kind of emptiness here [in Toronto]. I don’t know, I never really felt like I fitted in. There’s too much emphasis on material things and I’m looking for a deeper sense of values. Israel to me is a symbol of strength and gives real meaning to life. I want that very much and I don’t have that here. Maybe my parents are a little worried about my wanting to live in Israel but I have to find a place where I really belong.

One female 16-year-old at the National-Secular school in Montreal confessed:

One troublesome aspect of Jewishness is the overprotection of the girls. I’m sure it happens in other groups too. So I don’t have the same freedom as my brother. Israel is an escape for me and my parents can’t object to it because it is what I’ve been learning about all these years. So I am going to work on a Kibbutz for a while. I’m also considering doing my B.A. [undergraduate work] at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. I haven’t been able to find a spiritual connection anywhere here so I have turned to Israel. And I am taking my Hebrew courses very seriously.

Psychologically, it is a difficult tightrope walk, a problem that Jews must wrestle with: Where do they really belong? Where can they make their greatest contributions? In the Diaspora as a minority group, or in Israel as a majority group? For many classical Zionists, Israel represents an end to the wandering of the Jewish people and an “ingathering of the exiles,” and therefore aliyah (immigration to Israel) is indispensable to authentic Jewishness and survival (see Urofsky, 1976). However, the attitude held by most contemporary North American Jews is that they are willing to support the “idea” of aliyah, but do not actually feel that it is imperative to take part in it themselves. They perceive other alternatives to Jewish authenticity—commitment to Jewish causes in the sociopolitical arena, Jewish education (and that would include Hebrew language learning), and/or religious practice.

Whatever be the case, for many of the participants in this study (especially those who are less religiously inclined), the perception certainly is that the destiny of the Jewish people is inextricably bound with that of the State of Israel. For the Orthodox students, however, the perception is that, although the State of Israel is very important, the destiny of the Jewish people transcends the temporal aspects of the modern State reflecting their classical Judaic orientation—that Jewish destiny is determined only by the coming of the Messiah and the subsequent redemption. In terms of Hebrew

language learning, these differential perceptions are expressed in learning Hebrew for communicative purposes in order to identify with Israeli–Jewish society for the secular and Traditional students, versus learning Hebrew in order to read the Torah and Talmud for the religious Orthodox students. I will present here excerpts from interviews that were carried out both with secular and religious students. Firstly, I present comments from some secular students whose Jewishness focuses on a sense of belonging to the Jewish people generally and to Israel in particular:

In my school, the purpose of learning Hebrew is to learn about modern Israel and the public culture of Israel as well as the literature and poetry. What I mean is that Jewishness is also a national identity, not only a religion. Israel is essential; the Jews need a homeland. It's a question of survival. It's a place where there's a lot of emotional attachment for me. That's why learning Hebrew is important to me. (Grade 9 male student)

I love Canada very much but I am also Jewish and very attracted to the way of life in Israel. It seems like a much more close-knit society and people seem to be closer to one another. I am so interested in really learning Hebrew well so that I will be able to be completely accepted in Israel. I know that they treat you differently if you can get along in Hebrew (Grade 11 female student)

Israel is the heart of the Jewish community in the world and therefore learning Hebrew is important for me. It makes me feel like I belong. It strengthens my feeling of being Jewish and creates a sense of solidarity. (Grade 11 male student)

Tradition is most important in Jewishness. A lot of it is cultural for me, for instance the history of the People. It is not so much religious in the sense of keeping kosher or keeping the Shabbat.⁷ (Grade 11 Montreal male student)

It's so easy to lose your Jewishness here [in Toronto] and become assimilated. You have to make a special effort to remain Jewish and I do it by my association with Israeli culture and Hebrew literature. I found a piece of pottery on Masada⁸ and I still have it. It means so much to me. It gives me a sense of pride in my ethnic background and a feeling of identity. (Grade 11 female student)

The following are comments from some Orthodox school students who are religiously oriented:

In my opinion the Jewish religion is the most important aspect of being Jewish. For me learning Hebrew is to be able to read the Scriptures. It is less important to me to be able to communicate with anyone in Hebrew. Some religious people even think that's sacrilegious. (Grade 9 Toronto male student)

Whether Jews are in Israel or anywhere else in the world, what's crucial is to keep the mitzvot (religious laws). That's what will maintain the Jewish people. I'm not saying the State of Israel isn't important, I'm saying that Judaism is at the top of the list for me. (Grade 9 Montreal female student)

Nothing will ever take the place of the Jewish religion for me in terms of spiritual fulfillment. And I don't have to be in Israel to have it. My feeling of belonging is found in religion. (Grade 11 Toronto male student)

⁷This means following the dietary laws of Judaism and maintaining the holiness of the Sabbath day.

⁸*Masada*, in the Judean Hills was the last stronghold of the Jews and the site of the famous Bar-Kochba Revolt, a symbol of heroism against the invading Romans in AD 70.

8.4 Evaluation

In terms of attitudes toward language learning, the findings of this study provided an unexpected response: generally the Toronto Jewish students were somewhat less confident in their Hebrew proficiency and more dissatisfied with the communicative aspects of their Hebrew language programme, and were less positive about language learning as compared to their Montreal peers. This is noteworthy due to the fact that the schools in both cities use the same methodological approaches in the teaching of Hebrew. The difference lies in the fact that the Montreal Jewish schools are involved in French immersion programs whereas the Toronto Jewish schools are not. These findings, although speculative in nature, contribute to empirical evidence that high levels of bilingualism (in the Montreal case, it is French–English) may facilitate the learning of additional languages (in this case Hebrew) and may enhance positive attitudes toward language learning in general. The reasons for these differences require some comment. It turns out that the Jewish day schools in Montreal are highly subsidized by the Quebec government in exchange for government control of French instruction, and hence of the French immersion programs. In Toronto, however, Jewish day school education is entirely privately funded. Also, the greater interest in language learning on the part of the Montreal students may be related to the ever-present French-Canadian concern for ethnolinguistic survival in Quebec. The latter group has always been adrift in the midst of an anglophone sea in North America and therefore issues of language and culture have constantly been at the forefront of Quebec consciousness. This may have encouraged a greater linguistic and cultural awareness on the part of the Jewish group (as well as of other minority groups) in Montreal. Language issues in Toronto, or any other part of Canada, have never posed a similar dilemma because the status of English has never been in jeopardy.

Indeed, how vastly different is this sociolinguistic scene compared to that of Zisenwine's (1997), in his study of teaching the Hebrew language in Jewish schools the United States, that:

[t]he changing climate and reality of Israel as part of the community of nations has not always lived up to the dream, or fantasy, of the American Jewish community. The post-1967 realities as well as the image of the "new Israeli-Jew" have been found disappointing by [American] Jewish educators and their clients. Hence the ethnolinguistic vitality of Hebrew is at present low, and the motivation to learn a language offering negative status as well as inferior culture and values is no longer worth of the effort. (p. 59)

The purpose of Zisenwine's paper was to "point out the intimate relationship between Hebrew language and Jewish culture and identity" and he in fact shows great concern in the "de-emphasis of Hebrew language learning [which] leads teachers to present a culture and religion that does not properly reflect the texts, culture and practice which form the basis of Jewish tradition" (p. 1), thus arguing for "an awareness and understanding of the centrality of Hebrew in the training of Jewish teachers." Here is one clear example of the great difference in attitudes between Canada and the United States in at least one minority language context. There is simply no altercation in Jewish-Canadian communities around the fact "that knowing the Hebrew language is in fact a critical element in the training

of Jewish teachers for Jewish schools” (p. 56). Interestingly, Jewish-Canadians (as well as other ethnic-Canadians in general) do not have to be reminded that “the use of a specific language is a means of declaring one’s identity. Perhaps we are witnessing a vivid exemplar of the profound difference between the Canadian “multicultural mosaic” ethos versus the American “melting pot” one.

To complicate this social, political, historical, and linguistic matter even further, the findings in this study indicate that, for the most part, the Jewish students in Montreal displayed a greater sense of confidence in their dual (Jewish–Canadian) identities than did their Toronto counterparts. This may seem puzzling until one compares the social fabric of the two cities. Only in the last 2 or 3 decades has Toronto become the multicultural, cosmopolitan city that it is today. In the past, what was deemed acceptable there was an Anglo-Saxon society where pockets of minority groups had little choice but to try to assimilate as quickly as possible. Indeed, the elitist social structure of the “Anglostocracy” still exists, and it is into this Anglo-Saxon majority culture that Jews in Toronto have been obliged to integrate. Although Jews in Toronto have been very successful in the economic and political sectors, they have been carefully excluded from the highest positions in the dominant corporations, the prominent social institutions, and the elitist private clubs.

Interestingly, Jews in Montreal have been exposed to a very different social history. They have always been more community (secularly) oriented than their Toronto counterparts who are more congregation (synagogue) oriented. For more than a century, Jews have been an established group in Montreal. They were, of course, in the minority but their host culture (i.e., the French Canadians) also found themselves in a minority position on an overwhelmingly anglophone continent. The Anglo-Saxons had traditionally dominated economic affairs in Montreal,⁹ even though the Anglos held only minority group status demographically, socially, and politically. Thus in a real sense the *uniqueness* of Montreal was its historic lack of a true majority culture. Consequently, Jewish—as well as other ethnic groups—did not perceive their minority status so completely within the traditional “dominant versus subordinate group” framework. The Jews in Montreal established an understanding of society which was distinct from that of the traditional minority group concept, and thereby may have gained a greater collective cultural confidence. The challenge now is how to lessen the anxiety that minority (non-francophone) groups feel in the wake of the possibility of Quebec separation from the rest of Canada.

8.5 Conclusion

One of the aims of this inquiry was to provide a vehicle for expanding the pedagogical discourse on Hebrew language learning as a salient feature of Jewish identity in Canada. Through the interview process, the participants in this study

⁹This is the reason why immigrants to Montreal in the past had no choice but to learn English in order to find a job.

were given the opportunity to cross personal and cultural borders as a way of clarifying their own journey toward a vision of their definitions of Jewishness. It is a way, as Roger Simon (1992) explains, “of getting students beyond the world they already know in order to challenge and provoke their existing views of the way things are and the way they should be” (p. 17). Just as the students’ schooling experiences influenced their Hebrew language learning and attitudes toward the State of Israel, so did their personal experiences.

These sociolinguistic/cultural observations have major implications for educational practice. For instance, when teachers know more about the lives that their students lead, they can better understand the motivations, perceptions, and values within the language classroom. It is essential that language educators balance their understanding of students as products of their ethnocultural contexts along with their knowledge of them as individuals with specific personal needs. This discussion on Hebrew language learning and Jewish identity was intended to open a window onto the larger objective of developing appropriate pedagogies with the intention of reframing the understanding of language, as a social phenomenon, which is intertwined with second language learners’ identity needs. As a researcher I became convinced that it was necessary to collect the narratives of these Jewish-Canadian students in order to convey a sense of the dilemmas and challenges facing them. Clandinin and Connelly (1995) assert that narrative refers to the process of making meaning of experience by telling stories of personal and social relevance.

The purpose of this chapter was to locate the Hebrew language learning enterprise within the complex social, cultural, and psychological landscape inhabited by the participants in this study. Their encounter with Hebrew symbolizes a passionate journey toward Jewish group maintenance. For some it signifies a cultural and/or religious quest for survival; for others it is a bridge to a more valued target community and way of life; for others still it is a romantic escape; and for all it is a symbol of deep attachment to their ancestors and to their history. Finally, what emerged clearly from the interviews was an overwhelming need for these Jewish-Canadian adolescent students to claim a cultural, social, and historical place in the world, and to come to terms with being the “other,” the quintessential “stranger” in the eternal geography of humankind.

Acknowledgments The author wishes to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) for its support of this research study.

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Chapter 9

The Transformation of Higher Education in the United Arab Emirates: Issues, Implications, and Intercultural Dimensions*

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This chapter focuses on the case of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and that country's endeavors to modernize and expand its higher education subsector. The expansion of higher education in the UAE reflects influences and forces that are impacting on education in general, and higher education in particular, worldwide, as well as regional influences and development strategies in the Middle East, more specifically the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) of states that share many features of history and legacy as well as development priorities. As issues for consideration in the UAE case, the global and regional contexts are provided, followed by a brief examination of the development history of the UAE and its education sector. Research on higher education programs, particularly teacher education programs, in the UAE sheds light on the features of contemporary development, and on the range of issues and intercultural dimensions involved in transforming UAE higher education to serve the nation's needs, as well as to bring the UAE into the global arena. The chapter concludes with considerations of the decisions made by/in the UAE with regard to the optimum forms of higher education and teacher education, as well as the implications therein. The UAE is a significant case in point, given its peculiar circumstances as a resource-rich state and given the decisions taken with regard to opting for imported programs and personnel while seeking to meet internal needs that juxtapose traditional Islamic society with capitalistic ventures, Western consumerism, and participation in the ever-growing global economy and education system.

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*This chapter is a revised version of a paper presented at the XIII World Congress of Comparative Education Societies Higher Education Thematic Group, September 3–7, 2007, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina.

9.1 Global Trends in Higher Education Transformation: The Global Context for Considering the UAE Case

Recent decades have seen unprecedented changes in institutions of higher education worldwide (see Samoff, 2003; Steiner-Khamsi, 2004; Talhami, 2004; Zajda, 2005, 2007a; Shaw, 2006 Kirk 2007). In developed, wealthy countries, and in developing countries alike, higher education has undergone significant transformation and expansion. The general features of this transformation include the following: There is markedly increased participation, both in university programs (i.e., in higher education) as well as in other forms of tertiary education and further education programs worldwide. There has been a shift in focus from the traditional notion of higher education occurring in elite institutions, and therefore of being exclusionist and exclusive, to programs forming part of an overall mass education system. This process has been referred to as “massification” linked to “democratization” of education systems that cater to a wider spectrum of society. Also, fueling the expansion of higher education and further education/training is renewed recognition of the value of education, training, and skills development for meeting labor force needs of national and global economies. Vocational and technical training, previously decried as inferior to so-called academic higher education, have enjoyed a revival in status, given their relevance for economic development in countries worldwide (Wilson, 2006; Samoff, 2003; Steiner-Khamsi, 2004; Talhami, 2004; Zajda, 2007b; Shaw, 2006; Kirk 2007).

With developments in information technology and communications, the notion of “knowledge production” and the desirability of creating a “knowledge society” have also become prevalent, not only in postindustrial states but also in developing countries whose participation in the global arena demands being able to compete as “knowledge societies.” Increasingly, there are tensions between privatization and state involvement in higher education and training, and market forces are playing new and varied roles in the manner in which institutions are funded and how they function. Higher education transformation has far-reaching impacts on, and changes in, the nature of students, faculty, the curriculum, and outcomes (both desirable or unintended). There are multiple impacts on societies themselves, in terms of socioeconomic status, language, and participation of women, human capital, and national development (Zajda, Biraimah, & Gaudelli, 2008; Zajda, Davies, & Majhanovich, 2008).

9.1.1 Additional Elements and Dimensions: Global Context

Education and training, at all levels but perhaps particularly higher education, are increasingly closely linked to wider economic development and to national or post-colonial development depending on the country in question. For developing countries and postcolonial states, global trends and influences in educational transformation

generate an array of pressures as well as choices. Trends in school-level education are mirrored in higher education, and in teacher education the two are closely related. For instance, postcolonial development and reform/modernization needs might go hand in hand, and the role of higher education in national development can be most significant in the case of a country seeking to undergo rapid modernization to catch up with the rest of the developed world. Secondly, with globalization, a global system of education has emerged in which education within countries is increasingly influenced by national and international standards, testing, accountability, and evaluation systems, and by numbers-driven, outcomes-based systems. A family of priority subjects (mathematics, science, technology, English) dominates, creating pressure on all countries to keep up with other countries in these key content areas. Competition and the preoccupation with supranational comparisons of achievement and quality (such as in the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) Civic Education studies) creates pressures on all countries to conform and compete, which in turn creates inordinate pressures on developing countries to do likewise, lest they be left behind (Zajda, 2005). These global trends and influences have ramifications for the importance of teacher education in any country and they have secondary impacts on schools.

In the increasingly competitive global educational arena, the decisions and choices made by developing countries are of particular importance with regard to the case of the UAE as a relatively young postcolonial state seeking to modernize, develop, and compete. Many developing countries have opted for importation of educational reform ideas, packages, or systems from the West, in many cases from the former mother country such as Britain or France, and in other cases from a perceived world leader in democratized, “modern” education such as the USA. The export of educational reform and development ideas has been a topic of considerable scholarly debate in terms of the benefits of lending and borrowing, but also in terms of the concerns that programs and systems imported, and then transplanted onto a different context create a swarm of problems. Similarly, the exportation of expertise and educational systems from countries of the North to countries of the South (or the core–periphery transfer) generates concerns about sustained domination and neocolonialism. In contrast, some developing countries have chosen a different path, choosing South–South collaborations in which a lesser-developed country like Cuba has collaborated with and supported education and capacity building in other postcolonial and lesser-developed states such as Jamaica, Namibia, and South Africa.

9.1.2 Contradictions, Dilemmas, and Choices, as in the Case of the UAE

While all countries are plagued by contradictions and dilemmas in terms of their educational reform priorities, in developing countries these dilemmas and the choices made can be particularly painful as well as particularly interesting. In the case of

the UAE, one can discern several of the contradictions, dilemmas, and choices made in selecting the optimum path for modernization and development of the education system, particularly the higher education system (that then has impacts on schools and communities). Among the universal dilemmas facing countries reforming their educational systems, the following are of particular interest regarding the case of the UAE: expansion (quantity) versus quality; regional/national goals versus local internal needs; resolving questions of equity and equality, inequity and inequality; developing an indigenous, homegrown system versus importing systems, programs, and qualified personnel from elsewhere (particularly from superpowers and former mother countries); reconciling neocolonialism and independence; and managing continuity versus change such as in preserving elements of traditional society while embracing modernization.

In the case of the UAE, these dilemmas can be seen in the reform and development agenda in which the decision was to affect a compromise, to opt for the creation of a hybrid education system with both traditional elements and modern imported features. Although the UAE shares many development dilemmas with other developing countries, as a country that is resource-rich, awash in oil revenues, the UAE demands additional consideration in terms of how it chooses to spend healthy revenues while seeking to meet its goals on several levels. The UAE has to be considered in the Middle East regional context too, as a member state of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). An overview of the regional context follows.

9.2 The Middle East: Regional Context

Higher education development in the region was driven by Egypt, Jordan, and Kuwait—countries in which infrastructure was comparatively more developed. University education was linked to, and provided for, in response to human resource development (HRD) needs. In Egypt and Jordan, non-oil-rich countries, the focus was heavily on capacity building and development of human resources, and higher education included cultural, moral, and religious aims in programs. In contrast, the oil-rich nations of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE sought to develop higher education to reduce their reliance on expatriate personnel, and to foster cultural transmission and modernization. As has occurred in most countries, the development of higher education in this region occurred in response to national development goals as well as to the rapid expansion of primary and secondary education provision. Another ingredient was that of postcolonial development, in which these modern states were influenced by their respective colonial legacies and ties to Britain and France in particular. “Modern” Western-style education only came into being in the postcolonial era, from the 1950s onward, and as secular education in contrast to the “mutawwa” or religious schools. Educational development in the region is heavily impacted by the “ideological battle ... of balancing traditional values and the contemporary scene” (Mina, 2006, p. 223; Griffin, 2006, p. 22; Hatch, 2006; Kindar, 2006). Development of higher education was gradual, and then it accelerated

in recent decades. Acute shortages of indigenously educated skilled workers plague each of the countries, while individual country differences are also noted, for instance in the large population and high unemployment rate of Egypt compared to much smaller population of Jordan and the UAE. In the UAE, because of the shortage of skilled and qualified nationals and the availability of revenues to pay for importing workers, there is heavy dependence on expatriate or foreign workers in all sectors, so too in education. Teacher education poses a significant challenge for each of these states since it is relatively underdeveloped. The need to develop an indigenous, qualified teaching force is an important goal in the UAE and several other member states.

9.2.1 The Gulf Cooperation Council

The GCC (Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, and Kuwait) was formed in 1981 to foster closer collaboration and ties between its member states, and within them the historically linked tribal/family groups that had been artificially separated by the creation of colonial states. The member countries have a shared cultural, religious, and historical legacy (Arab identity and culture, Islam, colonial legacy) as well as common economic and political interests. Among them, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar are oil-resource-rich, which makes them somewhat different to most developing countries in that they have significant revenues for capacity building and development. Among the aims of the GCC are the improvement of educational provision and access at all levels in the member states, through regional collaboration; promotion of Gulf Arab educational opportunities; and in general the promotion of national and regional development, modernization, and global competitiveness.

9.3 United Arab Emirates—Educational History and Development

The UAE is a relatively new nation-state that was formed in 1971 by the joining together of seven emirates into one federal system of government. The UAE is located on the southern shore of the Arabian Gulf, sandwiched between Oman and Saudi Arabia, its two larger neighbors. Prior to this federation being formed, educational provisions consisted of religious or Quranic schools (*mutawwa*) until the establishment of a modern school in Sharjah in 1953, with assistance from Kuwait. Since this development, the UAE has made considerable strides in several areas, mainly petrochemical exports, tourism, and financial services, and the UAE has become a center of religious tolerance and Western-style capitalism. However, one area that needs further development and improvement is the educational provision that exists within the country, despite education being a stated priority of the Supreme Council, the ruling body of the federation. It is understood that an essential

tool in the development of a country is a viable and effective education system. This need has been recognized by the government of the country and has led to the importation of educational systems and personnel with an aim to build a university system that is modern and that can be competitive with other systems around the world. The two main providers of expertise, structure, and curricula have been the USA and the UK.

The educational system based itself firmly on the British model through the early years following the formation of the UAE. From this point a system of primary and secondary education was slowly developed with access to schooling slowly opening up to the general population. Until this process began, the ruling elite would send the males of the family overseas (usually the USA and Britain) to obtain a secondary- and university-level education. Students in the UAE were usually urbanites from the middle and upper classes, as the rural areas of the country were not well served by schools. In 1971 the UAE spent \$1,641 per pupil on schooling, yet the children of poor and agrarian families did not benefit from this, as schools were not within reach. Higher education was also slow to develop. Much of this had to do with the fact that the ruling family sent their sons abroad for university so there seemed, at first, no real need to provide higher education to the population. Also, the country was poor until the discovery of oil and this prevented the creation of a state education system. The country relied, and still relies, heavily on imported labor. In 2004, expatriates outnumbered indigenous Emiratis by nearly 3 to 1. The wealth of the country allowed the government to import the expertise and workforce it needed to develop its oil and tourism business.

The use of Western systems in the UAE has much to do with the ambitions of the country and the HRD that is needed for these aims to be met. The greater global awareness and the international context in which it must now survive has forced the UAE, and the academic institutions that are there, to look beyond their own national needs and cultural confines and to place themselves within a larger global framework. The UAE has traditionally relied on expatriate workers to carry out both professional and manual labor work in the country. This workforce has usually been imported, and has been possible through the wealth of the country and the favorable taxation and economic structures that are in place. As the realization that oil wealth is finite and that expatriates are transitional and do little to develop the long-term sustainability of a country, the UAE government set in place an educational system that would help meet the needs of the country through creating an educated and trained workforce. Although the need for expatriate workers will not stop in for the foreseeable future due to the fact that the Emirati population is too small to fill the needs of the workforce and there are aspects of the economy that Emiratis will not work in, the aim for universal schooling and mass access to higher education may go some way to allow the local population to play a larger role in the development of the economy and the country.

The UAE has seen dramatic and rapid growth in the numbers of students enrolling in the secondary-level schools (Fig. 9.1). This rise in school numbers is a result of increased spending on education as well as the recognition that literacy rates in




Fig. 9.1 UAE secondary school graduates

the country were not comparable to worldwide averages. This rise led to an increase in the need for university and higher education places, a need that could not be met with the only university in the country, the United Arab Emirates University (UAEU), prior to the opening of alternative institutions. This growth in student numbers allowed the development of higher education to gain official approval, as institutions, both private and public, began to appear in the country.

9.3.1 Rapid Growth in UAE Educational Provision

In 1978 the UAE government approved the formation of the UAEU with a mission to “meet the educational and cultural needs of the UAE society by providing programs and service of the highest quality” (UAEU Web site). The UAE University, located in Al Ain, sets out to replicate older, more established institutions such as those found in Egypt and Kuwait, but with the needs of the national population firmly in mind. Following cultural norms, it became a segregated campus, with male and female students studying separately, often in identical buildings, and sharing a faculty. As the need for university places grew, the federal government, the Supreme Council, began to explore the formation of other national institutions. This development ran parallel with several rulers of emirates becoming interested in having higher education institutions under their control in individual emirates. This led to the system that is in place today, with federal institutions (e.g., UAE University and Higher Colleges of Technology); emirate-funded institutions (e.g., American University of Sharjah and Ajman University of Science and Technology); and private, foreign institutions opening campus operations under the patronage of federal or emirate government (e.g., British University in Dubai, George Mason University (Ras al Khaimah), and Sorbonne University [Abu Dhabi]). The federal government also created a Ministry of Higher Education, which oversees and accredits all the institutions, both private and public.

9.3.2 Teacher Education at the UAE University, Al Ain: An Example

Teacher Education at UAEU follows a fairly traditional model, with undergraduates completing a 4-year program which includes methods, theory, and practical elements. All the preservice teachers are female, a characteristic of the local culture, and in 2006 there were just under 2,000 students enrolled in the College of Education. The faculty are drawn mainly from Arab states other than the UAE, and in the 2006 school year there were 63 faculty members working within the college. The fact that the majority of the faculty are nonnationals is an issue that arises when talking with preservice teachers and administrators, and it is a factor in the perceived efficacy of the programs. The aim of the college is to produce teachers who will be able to contribute to the nation and assist with the development goals through education. The aim to “Emiratize” the teaching force within the country is also readily stated by national teachers, faculty, and students, yet the likelihood of this happening in the foreseeable future is open to debate. The college faculty employs very traditional teaching methods, with the majority of classes observed for this study following a teacher-centered approach with the vast majority of class time being spent by the teacher lecturing from the front. This may stem, in part, from the mandated use of English as the language of instructions, which often causes communication issues between Arabic-speaking faculty and students, especially when abstract ideas are being discussed.

Qualitative research, to which reference is made in this presentation, focuses on the teacher education programs and the issues and challenges facing institutions in the UAE aims to document and describe these dilemmas in the UAE expansion and development of Higher Education, particularly teacher education. While this research is in the early stages, insights from participants are already providing important verification of these issues and dilemmas in the UAE, and they demonstrate that the views, aspirations, and fears of preservice teachers in this new and growing system are in some ways unique to the context, but they are also reflective of universal issues in teacher education in any country. As an illustration of this, two brief examples are offered here.

9.3.3 A Voice from Within: The Views of UAE Preservice Teachers

My main fear is classroom discipline. ... I feel that there is little too much [sic] classroom in the university. ... I want to go to school and teach and be around students and learn in real setting. (Student teacher, UAE National)

9.3.4 *Another Voice from Al Ain*

The university it is very good ... there are many good professors here from different places. ... Sometimes it is difficult to do all my work in English but I know this must be done if we [the UAE] are to be good in the world. ... I hope someday that I will like being and be a good teacher, inshallah. (Student teacher, UAE National)

9.4 Evaluation

The case of the UAE reflects many global forces and universal issues in Higher Education development; regional developments and pressures; and internal tensions, dilemmas, and contradictions. The case is also an illustration of hybridity, or dichotomous educational development characterized by imported Western-style teacher education programs versus local traditional education and Islamic society, raising the questions of a possible match/mismatch between higher education reform and societal development; match/mismatch between new teacher education programs (Western imports, expatriate-staffed) and local schools/micro-level needs. A key issue of interest is the choice made by the UAE, to import higher education programs and teacher education systems/programs from the USA and the UK (which might be conceptualized as North–South transfer), rather than develop in indigenous, internal system directly matching internal needs. On the question of South–South Collaboration, one might consider that the regional cooperation of the GCC member countries is a form of South–South Collaboration in which unification, modernization and development, and independence from colonial powers might be achieved alongside participation in the global arena.

The following questions and issues are emerging in the course of the study reported here and these questions are possible avenues for further research and exploration in the future. We are beginning to explore some of these ideas and questions and we hope to be in a position to present additional insights and answers in the future as the research continues.

Q: What will be the long-term result of the choices that are being made now with respect to Higher Education development in the UAE?

- Implications for schools, communities, and teachers: How will national development transform teaching practices and the experiences of school that students have (see Baker & Wiseman, 2005; Brook Napier, 2005; Gal, 2005)?
- Implications for national development: How will human resource issues be improved or hampered by the increase in university graduates?

- “EDU-COLONIALISM”: Is the rapid and ongoing importation of foreign systems and faculty in the UAE, and the Gulf as a whole, going to negate the need or opportunity for an indigenous system? Will it be possible to indigenize the workforce in a reasonable span of time (see Christina et al., 2003; Clarke & Otaky, 2006; Findlow, 2005; Kirk, 2006)?
- To what degree will GCC cooperation and development be successful in attaining the stated goals (for comparisons in other countries, see Hickling-Hudson, 2004a, b)?

Q: *How will the new programs for preparing teachers best meet the needs of the pupils they teach?* (This is a universal issue in teacher education worldwide; see Gal, 2005.)

Q: *What forms of knowledge will become prevalent, and will they be relevant to the needs of the society and local communities?* (This is a universal educational reform question, as noted by Brook Napier, 2005, for countries worldwide and particularly in developing countries striving for rapid development; see also Haider, 1999.)

Q: *What implementation issues will surface?* In the research underway, a host of questions is surfacing, echoing the issues noted by Abdulla (2000), Bahgat (1999), Halloran (1999), and others (see selected references below). These questions include the following:

- Is it too early to tell whether the decisions made by the UAE will indeed produce a sound higher education system? What changes have taken place up to now?
- Is there a need for long-term study to watch for sustainability?
- To what degree will the “hybrid” system be successful (infusing old and new, intercultural dimensions)?
- How will language issues emerge? What will be the relationship between Arabic versus English usage?
- What about equity, equality, and gender issues?
- Might programs imported from abroad be scrapped in favor of another import?
- What will be the implications (of any and all of these) for UAE society?
- Will the goal of “Emiratization” be attained? Will full indigenization be achieved (see Leach, 1994)?
- Will the plans and programs underway at present and in the near future result in desirable development for the UAE, or new form of Edu-Colonialism?

9.5 Conclusion

There is a need for long-term study of the UAE systems to ascertain the nature of implementation issues, to determine ingredients of success and/or failure, and to document intended and unintended outcomes. It will be fruitful to consider whether

or not the UAE attains its stated goals with regard to education in general, to higher education and teacher education in particular, and with regard to education as a part of broader national and regional development.

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- www.aus.edu American University of Sharjah

Chapter 10

Cultural Identity and Good Practices in Intercultural Education in Europe

Elisabeth Regnault

10.1 Intercultural Pedagogy

If education is the act or process of educating or being educated, and also the field of study that is concerned with the pedagogy of teaching and learning (*Dictionary of the English Language*, 2003), then intercultural education includes pedagogy, curricula, and the communication between the migrants and the natives in school and in society. The integration of children in school is linked to the integration of parents in society. The intercultural education means therefore that managing diversity is not a problem in schools only, but concerns the whole of society, particularly with regard to policies implemented in social, family, and migration fields. In European societies, non-European migrants are integrated in two ways: through a universalist philosophy or a differentialist philosophy. The first means equity between migrants and natives based upon similarity and the second means equity based upon differences. Those traditions can be observed also in school practices.

Nevertheless, these two traditions produce unexpected effects. The universalist philosophy does not recognize discrimination, and through the differentialist philosophy there is no communication between migrants, and between migrants and natives. The European Union (EU) proposes therefore “good practices” in intercultural education to avoid these unexpected effects. A comparative study concerning eight European countries will try to confirm this hypothesis (Italy, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). The results of the research focus on three major points:

- A single model of integration does not exist because each good practice is related to the proper tradition of integration of each country.
- The status of the children’s mother tongue in school is an indicator of integration because the place of this language in school reflects its place in the host society.
- The intercultural education is not limited to pedagogy and curricula but integrates the communication in school and society to purchase the objectives of social justice and inclusion. The success of an intercultural pedagogy depends on the status of the migrants’ culture in the host society.

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10.2 The Council of Europe Definition: “Intercultural Education: Managing Diversity, Strengthening Democracy”

How can education systems prepare young people and teachers, in Europe, for life in an increasingly multicultural society while respecting democratic values and promoting social cohesion? This question was the focus of a conference bringing together Council of Europe Education Ministers in Athens from 10 to 12 November 2003.¹

The Council of Europe gives a major contribution in maintaining and developing the unity and diversity of our European societies. Observing the diversity of the European societies in terms of ethnicity, culture, languages, religions, and education systems is relevant for the Council. It is also important, for this institution, to be aware of the disturbing persistence in the societies of “xenophobia” and racist practices, violence, and intolerance that sometimes affect educational establishments. The Council wants to encourage member states to acknowledge that managing diversity is not a problem in schools alone, but concerns the whole of society, particularly with regard to policies implemented in social, family, and migration fields. In this regard, two dimensions appear:

- Integration as inclusion and participation
- “Learning to live together”

Integration does not only mean assimilation because this term is related to equity in participation and exchanges of cultural values (Zadja, 2008). It means also the transformation and the maintenance of the culture of migrants and natives in the host society. The host society generally asks the migrants to transform their culture. The “pluralist integration” (Clanet, 1990) means also the transformation of the natives’ culture. Therefore the cultures in contact can mix and a new culture can be formed. The new challenges for the teacher training are:

- Democratic governance in schools, particularly through partnership, youth participation, and cooperation with communities, parents, and civil society
- Work methodologies that are suitable to integrate the principles of nondiscrimination, pluralism, and equity
- Cooperative learning in order to take into account the intercultural aspects in all teaching activities
- Professional competences for the teaching profession, taking account of skills existing within a team linked to the roles of learning facilitator, mediator, counselor, partner, and human resources manager

In schools, the intercultural education can concern not only migrant children but all the children. This pedagogy takes into account the heterogeneity of the children in the field of learning, languages, and cultures (Abdallah-Pretceille, 1996).

¹www.coe.int

10.3 The UNESCO Definition: “Policies for Inclusion and Participation for Social Cohesion, the Vitality of Civil Society and Peace”

This conception of the intercultural education can be found in the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Universal Declaration on the Cultural Diversity.² In the first article, cultural diversity is considered as a source of exchange, innovation, and creativity for humankind, as biodiversity is for nature. In the second article, the UNESCO develops the idea that, in our increasingly diverse societies, it is essential to ensure harmonious interaction among people and groups with plural, varied, and dynamic cultural identities, as well as their will to live together. Policies for inclusion and participation of all citizens are guarantees of social cohesion, the vitality of civil society, and peace. Thus defined, cultural pluralism gives policy expression to the reality of cultural diversity.

10.4 The Status of Mother Tongue in Intercultural Education

For the Council of Europe, each child speaking two languages at home is considered a bilingual person. Hamers and Blanc (1983) have developed a framework concerning the valorization of the mother tongue. There are two different types of bilingualism:

- The “additif bilinguisme” means good skills also in the mother tongue and in the national language because the two languages are valorized in the society.
- The “soustractif bilinguisme” means bad skills also in the mother tongue and in the national language because the mother tongue is not valorized in the society as the national language.

10.5 Universalism and Differentialism

In European societies, non-European immigrants are integrated in two ways:

- The universalist philosophy means equity between migrants and natives based upon similarity. The migrants can obtain the nationality of the host society and can get civil rights (*Jus Soli*; Todd, 1994). France belongs to this tradition.

In school, the reasons for scholastic failure are highlighted by the socioeconomic dimension. For example, France has put into place “Priority Educational Area” in disadvantaged suburban areas. The new incoming migrant children learn French

²www.unesco.int/education/fr

first. Mother tongue teaching falls under cooperation with the embassies, and the professors come from the countries of the migrants in order to teach the children who have French citizenship and who were born in France. Therefore, mother tongue teaching concerns only children speaking this language.

- The differentialist philosophy means equity between migrants and natives based upon differences. The migrants cannot obtain the nationality of the host society but can get civil rights (*Jus Sanguinis*; Todd, 1994). The United Kingdom belongs to this tradition.

In school, the reasons for scholastic failure are highlighted by the cultural dimension. For example, the United Kingdom considers that the scholastic failure is linked to a cultural or parental deficit, and to contradictory attitudes between the parents and the school (Van Zanten, 1996). The new incoming migrant children learn English and their mother tongue. The mother tongue teaching is integrated in school. Separated schools can exist when the state cannot provide mother tongue, cultural, or religious contents. According to Lapeyronie (1992), reality is more complex. Each European society can develop the two traditions. For example, in Germany, each “länder” has its own tradition.

10.5.1 The Unexpected Effects of Universalism

The problem of universalism is the difficulty to recognize discrimination because the universalist society does not want to be divided into different communities. France has put into place two “affirmative actions”: the parity man/woman in politics (1990) and the Priority Educational Area (1981). The American framework has inspired those laws, but France does not want to change its republican principles of equality, indivisibility of French people without distinction linked to origin, race, and religion (Boeton, 2003). The affirmative action is not ethnic but linked to the area. But ethnic discrimination in the field of housing and employment exists in France, and means that the republican principles have difficulties in being applied and that the affirmative action becomes therefore ethnic (Weil, 2004). The report of “la Cour des comptes”³ (November 23, 2004), concerning the integration of the migrants in France, focuses on one main fact: In 30 years, political decision-makers could not adapt to the changing immigration profile passing from a temporary to a definitive installation.

10.5.2 The Unexpected Effects of Differentials

Through the differentialist philosophy, there is no communication between migrants, and between migrants and natives. In the United Kingdom, the law of

³<http://.lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/044000576/000.pdf>

1988 increased the rights of parents to choose the school and to glance at the school curricula. The cultural communities can create separate schools if they are not satisfied with school curricula and the results of their children. These schools can be financed by the Local Education Authority (LEA). These separate schools prevent the contact between the communities and can generate ethnic discrimination, although this separation can be approved of by the communities because the children can develop a strong ethnic identity in order to face the multicultural society perceived discriminatory. But the common school has problems to fill the classes. In order to overcome this difficulty, the common school proposes a mixed solution: the school curricula contains not only the basic teaching but also lessons about religion, arts, the mother tongue, and the school guidance (Pagé, 1993).

10.6 The European Union Has Identified “Good Practices” in Intercultural Education Which Mix the Two Philosophies

10.6.1 Recommendations for the Migrants and Their Children

- In universalist society, obtaining civil rights not linked to the nationality for the parents and taking into account the migrants’ cultures and mother tongue in school.
- In differentialist society, obtaining the nationality for the parents and teaching in a multicultural class without separating migrant children from the others.

10.6.2 “Good Practices” in Intercultural Education in Eight Countries from the EU (Office of the Official Publications of the European Communities, 2002)

A single model of integration does not exist. Each country can transfer the practices of another country because the aim of the comparative education is to improve its own practices by finding what is similar and different by the others (Groux, 1997).

Teaching the migrants’ cultures and mother tongue to multicultural classrooms: universalist tradition (France, Luxembourg)

France valorizes the mother tongue by giving it a status of foreign language offered to all the children. This country has developed a universalist tradition by a political unification of the country, where the school is regarded as a cultural instrument of the regional and linguistic unification. Intercultural education is included in the education of citizenship because it must concern all the children. Intercultural

education is an aspect of the human rights. Languages such as Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese were taught as mother tongue from 1960–1980. These languages became foreign languages for all. Portuguese, for example, has recently become a foreign language taught in primary schools in Alsace. In secondary schools in Alsace, Arabic and Turkish have the status of foreign languages. But in primary schools, these languages are taught to Arab and Turkish children. It is not standard Arabic which is taught but the Moroccan and the Algerian languages. These courses fall under cooperation with the embassies and the professors come from the countries of the migrants in order to teach to the children who have French nationality and who were born in France. The French government would like to change this status so that these languages can become foreign languages offered to all. But this change of status can lead parents to choose these languages only if the representation of these populations improves in the French society (Dupuis, 2004).

Luxembourg offers mother tongue teaching in school and an immersion in Luxembourg language in the “prescolarization” for the migrant children. The school is compulsory from 4 years of age. This compulsory “prescolarization” makes it possible for non-German-speaking children to enter primary school where the courses are given in German. Luxembourg is in the middle of two linguistic and cultural entities, one German speaking (Germany) and the other French speaking (Belgium and France). Consequently, the languages of the neighbors became official. German and French are taught at school. German is the language of teaching in primary school and in the vocational lower secondary level. French gradually becomes the language of teaching in the general higher secondary level. This system is very well adapted to the needs of the natives because the Luxembourg language is close to German. But it is very difficult for non-German-speaking children, like the Portuguese or Italian children, to succeed. The orientation deciding at 11 years, the Portuguese and Italian children can be directed, in the best case, toward the vocational schools because they have difficulties to learn German. If not, they are orientated toward the complementary primary schools and toward early professional training.

In 1990, the Social Democrats wanted to adapt the school to the migrant children and not the opposite. The government put forward four measures:

- The non-German-speaking children can learn German as a foreign language in French.
- Mother tongues are taught in schools.
- Immersion in the Luxembourg language is compulsory in “prescolarization”.
- Intercultural education training for the teachers.

The current Liberal Party did not retain the first measure because they did not want to separate the children in the schools. Three other measures were applied.

An intercultural education which proposes to separate the children on the basis of their mother tongue by introducing bilingualism with the mother tongue considered as the first language and the national language as a second language. Differentialist tradition (followed in some “Länders” in Germany, Italy, Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Sweden)

In **Germany** different possibilities exist.

- Teaching the mother tongue when this language is already taught as a foreign language in school (English and French).
- Teaching the mother tongue depending on the will of the children (Turkish, Serbo-Croatian, Italian, Greek, Spanish, Portuguese, and Moroccan). These languages are not considered real foreign languages because they are not taken into account in the qualification for the “Abitur.”
- Teaching the mother tongue takes into account the qualification of the “Abitur” (Russian, Polish, Roman, and the “Aussiedler”⁴ languages).
- Bilingual teaching from 6 to 18 years of old Greek or Turkish as first language and German as a second language.
- In order to teach in public schools, teachers must be German. But, in the “Land” of North Rhine-Westphalia, non-German people teach their mother tongue. These teachers live in Germany and are bicultural.

Italy proposes a bilingual course with the mother tongue as the first language and Italian as the second language. This country has a universalist tradition implemented by a political unification of the country. Since 1970, there has been a policy of decentralization, and collaboration between the various academies and the local authorities. The regional and, consequently, cultural differences are developed. Linguistic integration of the migrant children consists of an alternative between the class and the language laboratory in order to reduce the linguistic (Italian) deficit.

In Turin, bilingual lessons are actually taught, which makes it possible for bilingual pupils to learn the second language—which is Italian—and the mother tongue in the form of linguistic plays, and this has interested the monolingual children. The mother tongue is regarded as the first language and Italian as the second language. Italy passed from a universalist tradition to a differentialist and integrative tradition. The cultural differences must be thought of as a positive resource (Collot et al. 1993).

The Netherlands proposes a bilingual course between the mother tongue as the first language and Dutch as the second language. The intercultural policy consists in developing mutual comprehension between group domination and minority and fighting discrimination by stimulating intercultural contacts among the pupils, the parents, the teachers, and the migrants’ organizations. Currently, Dutch can be taught as a second language.

In Rotterdam, bilingualism concerns the children from 4 to 6 years. A teacher of first language (Turkish or Arabic) handles the words or the situations one week before the Dutch teacher, i.e., the second professor wants to use in his Dutch lesson as a second language.

The United Kingdom proposes a bilingual course with the mother tongue as the first language and English as the second language. Mother-tongue teaching is

⁴The “Aussiedler” are regarded as German when they can prove that their ancestors emigrated there are 700, 400, or 200 years of certain parts of the territory which was not Germany but rather Hesse, Pfalz (Rathzel, 1995).

generally the responsibility of the ethnic communities. But public school wants also to bring together all the children in a multicultural space and to avoid separate schools which reinforce the stereotypes. "Pluriculturalism" in the United Kingdom gives an equal status to all the cultures, and antiracism tries to cure the social handicap while screening the school curricula in order to eliminate the prejudices (Joly, 1992). In all the schools of Essex, multicultural education is regarded as a dimension which concerns the whole program. It is present in the teaching of all the subjects, from mathematics to history, impregnating the ethics of the teaching body, its behavior, and the methods of research, teaching, and training that it uses. In Essex, a certain number of projects comprise a shutter of equal opportunity and multicultural education:

- To erase the obstacles to the training for the bilingual pupils, and in particular the barriers to the English reading, by setting up bilingualism with the mother tongue as first language and English as second language
- To train the teachers by seeking the equity of the chances through an evaluation of school and its management of the equity of the sexes and races

It is an intercultural education focused on the critique of discrimination in institutions and society (Pagé, 1993).

Sweden proposes a bilingual course with the mother tongue as the first language and Swedish as the second language. Twenty-five percent of the total Swedish population has a different mother tongue from Swedish. The political objective concerning these children is to develop active bilingualism, which means the right for the children to choose the language their prefer. This active bilingualism is facilitated by the following measures:

- Each child has the right to follow courses in his or her mother tongue. A teacher and at least five children are required. This teaching will be organized if the child and his or her parents wish it.
- For the child who speaks another language than Swedish at home, part of the courses can be organized in another language than Swedish (Finnish, Arabic, Turkish, Greek, etc.).
- When the child arrives as refugee, he or she is directed toward a preparatory class where the majority of the subjects are taught in Swedish. He can receive courses in the mother tongue for this period.
- Each child who has an insufficient knowledge of Swedish must follow courses in Swedish as second language and, therefore, cannot follow courses in a foreign language. In this case, the decision is taken by the institution, and not by the parents and the children.
- Second language teachers are trained at a university within the framework of a training called "Swedish in a multicultural society."

In the primary school that I visited in Uppsala "Bäcklösaskolan" during the European Region Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students (ERASMUS) staff mobility, a bilingual course with Arabic as first language and Swedish as second language had been set up in order to help Arab children who were proficient in Arabic to learn good Swedish.

In **Finland**, compared to the majority of the inhabitants, national minority groups as Sames (Lapons) and Roms do not profit from the equal opportunity as regards education because the current legislation provides that the language of teaching is either Finnish or Swedish. As part of Finland's differentialist tradition, intercultural education offers the children two possibilities: choosing their mother tongue teaching or the national language teaching. The reform introduced the following two objectives:

- Harmonization of the provisions related to the language of teaching and the mother tongue used in the schools.
- Adoption of a law confirming the legal status of the Same, the Romani, and the language of signs. This reform wants to satisfy the needs of groups that are not able to express themselves in Swedish or Finnish.

The idea is that the language plays a capital role in the formation of the identity. In the three Sames municipalities of northern Finland, Same is used for teaching samophone pupils. If a child is ready to receive lessons in Finnish as well as in Same, the parents must choose the language of teaching. As for the language of signs, it can only be used alone, or as support for another language in teaching of deaf pupils. The new Education Law provides that the organization that is responsible for the teaching must work out separate local programs for teaching in Finnish, Swedish, in Same, in Romani, and in sign language.

10.7 Conclusion

Intercultural education objectives are the equity of status, and social justice to avoid the feelings of exclusion or frustration. The more the parents are integrated in society, the more the children can be successful in schools. Some children can feel frustrated because they consider that their parents are excluded from society. Two attitudes can appear—either successful children wanting to get better jobs than their parents and to give a good image of the migrants, or unsuccessful children becoming aggressive and violent and defending an ethnic identity. In France, for example, Arab children who are successful in school and in society feel French. But the Arab children who fail feel that they are Arabs even if they have a French nationality. In contrast, the more the children are successful in the schools, the more the parents feel integrated in society. In France and in other European countries, parents want their children to go to general and not vocational schools because they want a better future for them. When the children are successful and have integrated the values of the host society, it has an influence on the integration of the migrants. We can draw the following observations from this discussion:

- Intercultural education is linked to the traditions of each country.
- The challenge is to find the right balance between universalism and differentialism to avoid the unexpected effects of the two traditions. The example of France and the United Kingdom has been presented.

- These “good practices” aim to take into account not only the needs of the minority groups, but also the need for the construction of a host society which shares common values, a common ethical space in order to “live together” in a multicultural society;
- Intercultural education is not limited to pedagogy and curricula. It also concerns the whole society in order to fight the stereotypes and discrimination;
- Teacher training in intercultural education is very important;

It is also important to link the status of the parents and their children. In France and Germany, the governments separate the policies concerning the two groups. For example, in France, nationality, since 1994, can be obtained at 13 years and before this period, as of the birth. So in the same family, teenagers are generally French and children less than 11 years old are not French. It would be interesting to know how the feeling of integration is in the same family. In Germany, nationality can be acquired between 16 and 21 years of age. If the German nationality is chosen, the person must leave his or her nationality of origin. A good number of Turkish migrants do not want to become German in order to keep their Turkish nationality. The Social Democrat government in 2000 proposed to give nationality to the children at their birth. It would be thus *Jus soli* for the children and *Jus sanguinis* for the parents. In this case, the status could be different in the same family. The comparison of the integration policies in universalist and differentialist countries is important because, for example, in this comparison between France and Germany, France seems to become differentialist and Germany universalist.

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Chapter 11

Cultural Identity and Implementing a New Language-in-Education Policy in South African Schools

Halla B. Holmarsdottir

11.1 Globalization and Language Policies in Africa

In this chapter I present an analysis of the Language-in-Education Policy (LiEP) in South Africa and its implementation, which is seen as necessary in order to better understand the effectiveness of the language policy in promoting additive and functional multilingualism, and sociolinguistic and cultural integration, which are major policy objectives. Through an ethnographic classroom study I was able to gain valuable insight into the everyday realities and problems faced by both teachers and learners and, more importantly, the coping strategies used by teachers that are focused on in this chapter, as it is important to understand these teachers' actions as they attempt to implement the language policy.

The process of globalization¹ has had certain effects on the education sector. The competitive, global market ruled by a market discipline has led to a decrease in government spending and that includes the education sector (Zajda, 2005, 2008). Weakening governments with less funding for education, in some instances, lead to privatization of education. "Good" and expensive schools² are being built for children whose parents are able to pay. Education is not seen as a universal welfare right but rather as a commodity to be traded in the global market. By partly a willed and partly an enforced political choice our political leaders have removed legal and administrative tools which previously protected local educational systems.

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¹In this study globalization is acknowledged as having three dimensions: the economic, the political, and the cultural (Armove, 2003; see also Zajda, 2005; Zajda et al. 2008). My focus in this discussion is on the latter as language is seen as part of the cultural dimension.

²It may be noted that private schools are often seen as providing quality education as opposed to public schools (Apple, 1996). However, in a recent study on private secondary education in China, Cheng and DeLany (1999) found that parents and students in China do not necessarily equate private schools with high quality as access to these schools is provided on the basis of ability to pay as opposed to public secondary schools characterized by intense student competition to gain entry. Thus for Chinese parents these private schools do not necessarily offer higher-quality education, but they do provide an opportunity for education if parents are able to pay the price.

Certain languages, certain skills, and certain ways of thinking get added value as commodities in the global marketplace. The spread of English as the language of instruction in some of the so-called anglophone countries of Africa is just one example of such a commodity.

The language policy in education is a key example of the educational dilemmas facing many African countries in the new millennium. Despite the research on the language situation in education throughout Africa, which highlights the usefulness of African languages (the mother tongue of students or regional languages) as medium of instruction, the use of these languages as medium of instruction in education, in general, remains a contentious issue (Akinnaso, 1993; Benson, 2004; Obanya, 1980, 1998; Williams, 1998; Zajda, 2004; Brock-Utne, 2006). Additionally, Obanya (1998) argues that several programs of mother tongue education, including those publicized as highly successful, have not gone beyond the experimental phase with other even more compellingly publicized programs being terminated soon after there was a regime change (e.g., the six national languages developed for education in Sekou Toure's Guinea). Moreover, some researchers have even argued that the "educational policy and practice in linguistically diverse contexts may be based on semi-articulated assumptions about the nature of human learning, and second language learning in particular" (Cummins, 2000, p. 2). Therefore, I argue that there is a need for studies which, in addition to analyzing language policies, focus on the implementation of language policies in the African context.

Throughout Africa and other parts of our global village many multilingual nations are faced with linguistic policy decisions of a national or official language(s) for use in government and administrative sectors. Such policy decisions, which often give status to "international" or former colonial languages in these areas, may also influence and promote the use of these languages in the educational sector³ as well. Another recurring issue for educational policy in many of these countries has been "the extent and the nature of support that second language learners require to succeed academically. Students must learn the language of instruction at the same time as they are expected to learn academic content *through* the language of instruction" (Cummins, 2000, p. 57).

Since the first democratic elections in South Africa, educational legislation has been passed to implement a new school system, introducing the 11 official languages (including nine African languages (Ndebele, Xhosa, Zulu, Sepedi, Sotho, Tswana, Swati, Venda, and Tsonga); a European (English); and a European-based (Afrikaans) language) and a new policy for schools on medium of instruction. In South Africa, despite a very progressive language in education policy (July 1997) which enables learners or their guardians to choose the language of instruction (DoE, 1997), schools catering to learners who are speakers of African languages

³This is, however, not always the case. Kiswahili is, for instance, the language used for administration, in ministerial documents, in Parliament, and in the lower courts in Tanzania while English is the language of instruction at secondary and tertiary levels.

still, as a general rule, use English as their medium of instruction from the fourth grade. Research conducted in the country has described the results of using English as a medium of instruction in the primary phase as disastrous (Desai, 1999, 2001; Heugh, 1995; Holmarsdottir, 2005; NEPI, 1992). It is important to note here that, however, according to the current LiEP there is nothing preventing South African schools in using an African language as the language of instruction all through the primary school level as well as in secondary school and higher education.

11.2 Collecting the Data

Despite the abundant literature available on the language-in-education issue, in South Africa the majority of the data is theoretical or policy-based as opposed to ethnographic classroom studies. Few researchers spend time at the grassroots level, asking the participants for their own views and observing the dynamics of the classroom, particularly in economically oppressed areas. Given that the LiEP goals include promoting the use of students' mother tongue in education in an additive bilingual/multilingual way, in connection with the wishes and attitudes of parents, teachers, and students, this qualitative and ethnographic investigation had as its aim to examine the views of those very participants along with observing the implementation of the policy at the classroom level. The aim was to look at the relationship between policy and practice while adopting a bottom-up approach in reporting the perspectives of those most directly involved.

For the purposes described above a qualitative research approach was chosen, with the emphasis on capturing or representing in considerable depth what was "going on" in the implementation of the LiEP. Qualitative research is viewed as holistic and allows for environmental factors believed to affect the implementation of the LiEP to be incorporated into the study. Furthermore, it has been argued that this approach offers the researcher an "understanding of the complex interrelationships of causes and consequences that affect human behavior" (Brock-Utne, 1996, p. 609).

It was believed that in order to describe classroom situations and in order to gain insight into how language policy is implemented at the grassroots level, an extended period of observation was required. Thus the activities in the classroom became the object of the research observation. In addition, "fieldwork is the central activity of qualitative enquiry" (Patton, 1990, p. 46). In the field the scholar is able to have direct contact with the people under study in their natural surroundings. This allows the researcher the ability to get close to the situations and the people being studied in order that the realities may be understood, something which many quantitative studies fail to do.

The fieldwork for this study was carried out from the beginning of September 2001 until the end of March 2002 with an additional 1-year period of data collection

during the writing-up phase. In total there were three different schools⁴ participating in the project. These schools were located in three different “townships”⁵ in Cape Town, South Africa.

11.3 A Historical Look at Language-in-Education Policies

For nearly 50 years the majority of South Africans suffered from language policies aimed at social and political control under apartheid. As a result, schools were used as a mechanism to restrict speakers of African languages from access to power with language policies in education as a major component in the apartheid plan (under British rule the policies served a similar purpose although not necessarily following the same ideology). The ultimate goal of these policies was separate and unequal development. The result was social and economic development of the dominant minority alongside the social and economic under development of the oppressed majority. Great socioeconomic divisions between different racial groups characterized the society inherited by the new government. If the African National Congress’ (ANC’s) vision of non-racialism, development, and equity was to be realized upon its rise to power, in 1994, both the society and economy required transformation.

Historically the language issue in South African education has mainly centered around the position of English and Afrikaans and when the African languages were considered it was not for reasons that benefited the majority black population, but rather for reasons designed to serve the needs of the whites. Decisions concerning language in education have been taken *for* the African language speakers and not *by* them (Hartshorne, 1992).

In the 1950s language planning in education was organized centrally and stood directly under government control. Language planning was top-down and differentiation between the various racial groups was introduced to enhance their separate development while simultaneously securing the hegemony of the whites. The Eiselen Report “paved the way for the abolition of missionary education” (Malherbe, 1977, p. 545) and replaced it with an apartheid education specifically known as Bantu Education. Under the Bantu Education Act (1953) the government assumed control of public education for blacks under which education for this racial group was expanded and simultaneously firmly controlled; blacks now had to submit to an inferior system of education, preparing them for inferior status in South African society. The arrogance of the whites in controlling the lives of blacks

⁴Originally there were three schools involved in the project. However, due to teacher illness in one of the original schools, observations became impossible and as a result this school was eventually suspended from the study. However, research results also include, to some extent, information gathered in this school.

⁵The “townships” were Khayelitsha, Crossroads, and New Crossroads.

and their children is clearly stated in the Eiselen Report⁶ as much of the evidence given by blacks collected by the Commission was disregarded:

We realize that in this connection we will have to face great difficulties and that public opinion, especially among the Bantu, is to a large extent still unenlightened, and that it would consequently possibly be hostile to any drastic change in the use of the medium of instruction. (Eiselen Report, 1951 cited in Hartshorne, 1992, p. 196)

Hartshorne (1992, p. 196) comments on this quote stating:

What is appalling about ... this statement ... is the unquestioning assumption of white superiority in all matters—that even on issues touching the everyday lives of blacks and their children, whites would presume “to know better,” to know “what was good for” others, when in fact they were vastly ignorant of the needs and aspirations of those for whom they were prescribing.

Thus it may be argued that the discourse presented in the Eiselen Report was important as it both created and expressed the underlined apartheid ideology—the unquestioning hegemony of the whites over the lives of the blacks, and how at the time the only view that mattered was that of the whites. The Bantu Education Act in 1953 brought all schools for the black population under the control of the Department of Native Affairs and as a result phased out the independent missionary schools that had existed. Furthermore, Bantu Education imposed a uniform curriculum that stressed a separate “Bantu culture” with the intent to prepare students for little more than manual labor (Wills, 2008). This ideology was very clear in the words of Dr. Verwoerd in his speech pertaining to the Bantu Education Act delivered to Parliament in 1953:

The curriculum, therefore, envisages a system of education which, starting with the circumstances of the community, aims at meeting the requirements of the community and which will be given in the mother tongue of the pupils.

The economic structure of our country, of course, results in the Natives in large numbers having to earn their living in the service of Europeans. For that reason it is essential that Bantu students should receive instruction in both official languages. (Verwoerd, 1954, p. 77)⁷

Furthermore, in his speech Dr. Verwoerd mentions specific curriculum requirements that included more specifically religious instruction and handicraft. Under the Bantu Education Act the foundations were also laid for the development of the mother tongue in addition to an increased emphasis on Afrikaans as noted in the excerpt above. The Bantu Education policy reinforced the use of the mother tongue in the junior primary school in addition to enforcing the teaching of both English and Afrikaans (the two official languages at the time) as subjects in the first year of

⁶The Eiselen Report is often the most cited evidence in support of the hegemonic design of Bantu Education. It was a report of the Commission on Native Education which was published in 1950. W. W. M. Eiselen was the convener of the commission, and thus his name is used in reference to the report.

⁷The source of this information is taken from a collection of speeches by Dr. Verwoerd from 1948 to 1966 that are compiled in an edited book by Professor Pelzer from the University of Pretoria and published in 1966. Although the speech was made by Dr. Verwoerd in 1953 the speech was not made public until June 7, 1954.

schooling. Under this policy, then, mother tongue education was compulsory for African language speakers in the early grades with a sudden transition in later grades to English and/or Afrikaans as the medium of instruction (Wills, 2008).

In analyzing the LiEP that have been in effect up to the time of the 1994 elections, I argue that for the speakers of African languages a number of different approaches have been applicable with different programs being utilized.

1. **The pre-1910 period** can best be described as a phase of *laissez-faire approach* to the language issue vis-à-vis the speakers of African languages. During this period the state was mainly concerned with education in general and language, specifically, with reference to the English- and Dutch-speaking settlers.
2. **The period 1910–1948** was characterized by a struggle between the two white groups over the distribution of power and as a result the hegemony of the two official languages of the period, namely English and Afrikaans. Concerning the speakers of African languages it was found that since English had, for the most part, already been established in the mission schools (initially the only schools for African language speakers) then English would continue to dominate. Therefore, in this period a *transitional approach* namely an early-exit model was in effect, which is often seen as a subtractive form of bilingual education.
3. **During the apartheid period of 1948–1976** the policy in force was also a *transitional approach* for the speakers of African languages, but the model may also be defined first as a segregation model, given that this was the ideology behind the apartheid thinking. Simultaneously, it may also be described as a late-exit model in which the “linguistic minority children with a low-status mother tongue ... [were] initially instructed through the medium of their mother tongue for a few years and where their mother tongue ... [was] taught as though it has no intrinsic value, only an instrumental value” (Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000, p. 593) before making the transition to another language, namely English, although in theory it was to be both English and Afrikaans (of course this was an abrupt transition).
4. **The declining years of apartheid 1977–1994** is still defined by a *transitional approach*; however, the model now in use is that which was also utilized in the pre-apartheid years. Thus an early-exit model becomes the de facto approach and although the events in Soweto were instrumental in influencing this change in the policy it would not become official until 1979. Here the policy, passed in 1979, then reduces the number of years that the mother tongue is used as a medium of instruction from 8 to 4 years with a choice thereafter of either English or Afrikaans, with most schools selecting English as the medium. Thus a subtractive language-learning situation results as opposed to an additive one.

According to Hartshorne (1995), “In the period of negotiations (1990–3) prior to the installation of a democratic government in South Africa, the language debate took on a new vigor and a new relevance” (Hartshorne, 1995, p. 314). In this investigation it is believed that this period has had considerable influence on the outcome of both the Constitution and the LiEP and as a result it is important to briefly review the different positions during this period.

11.3.1 *Language Policy in the New South Africa*

Early in the 1990s the ANC began to review their position on language policy. The initial work on this began with a Language Workshop in Harare, held on March 21–24, 1990. Hartshorne (1992, p. 209) argues that, “given the past history of South Africa ... and the divisiveness of previous language policies as applied under apartheid, it is very clear that ANC language policy ... will have to lean towards unity rather than to diversity.” He notes that in the Harare Language Workshop there were indications of this trend which I believe favored English as a means of achieving this goal, as one delegate noted:

In building a unified South Africa, a new government may have to select a national language. In a multi-lingual context such as South Africa, a linking or common language is essential. ... Choosing any particular African language, on the other hand, carries a high source of potential conflict, since it will elevate one cultural group above others. (Benjamin, 1990 cited in Hartshorne, 1992, p. 209)⁸

The assumption here is that African languages present an ethnic conflict and there is an unstated acceptance of English as being a “neutral” language. Furthermore Hartshorne argues that in the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) report on the Harare Workshop there appeared to be no discussion paper from an African language speaker. He then asks if this is again “a signal that decisions are going to be taken *for* the ordinary parent” (Hartshorne, 1992, p. 217). However, there were alternative views expressed which focused on the neglect of African languages, maintaining that “indigenous languages should be developed and actively promoted for the purposes of medium of instruction” founded on the belief that “no person should be prevented from gaining access to economic, social and political life because of the language she/he spoke” (Desai, 1990, p. 27), but this contribution was only included in a report after the conclusion of the workshop.

In reviewing the ANC’s position on language issues before 1990, I examined a number of draft documents that highlight that within the ANC there was a strong bias towards English (ANC, 1992a, b), which has been equally noted by other researchers (there are a number of researchers that are critical of the ANC’s bias towards English and space limitations do not allow me the opportunity to discuss them all in detail). It is interesting to note that English has always served as the ANC’s working language from its conception in 1912 to the present. Even in the ANC school in Tanzania (the ANC ran a school in Tanzania during the years that they were banned in South Africa), English was the medium of instruction from preschool through to the secondary level and even adult literacy classes were concerned with literacy in English (Hartshorne, 1992). The question that needs to be considered is that given this strong and clear bias toward English in the earlier

⁸It is not clear from Hartshorne’s referencing whether this statement, made by Jean Benjamin, is taken directly from the conference itself (if he was present and wrote it down) or if it is found in one of the conference reports. In the list of references in his book there is no listing of this reference directly. Thus I refer to Hartshorne in citing this information.

ANC documents, is this bias still present in the ANC's thinking? Although the specific mention of English was subsequently dropped from the LiEP one may wonder how much earlier documents influence the actual ideology and practice of the ANC-led government.

Through the interaction between the National Party (NP) and the African National Congress (ANC) then it is possible to see the competing agendas that were at work. The ANC's ideology was that English should serve as the lingua franca, and that this was in part influenced by their own internal language policy and the beliefs of many of the senior members as a result of their experiences in English-speaking countries during their exile. In an interview I conducted with Neville Alexander he also draws attention to the role played by the Afrikaners concerning the language issue with reference to the Constitution:

We have a Constitution that today in its essence promotes multilingualism and equality of language rights and so on ... mainly because of the position which the Afrikaner political leadership took up during the negotiation settlement. ... In getting multilingualism into the Constitution and the equality of languages into the Constitution had to do with the fact that Afrikaners wanted Afrikaans to maintain its equality with English. And the black middle-class leadership could not accede to Afrikaans if it did not also accede to the African languages, that is the fundamental point. But that does not mean that they were convinced that it was possible. (Interview: Alexander, February 25, 2002)

The implicit message here is that the identity of the Afrikaner people embodied in their language ultimately became a powerful symbol of a minority group willing to demand their language rights simultaneously demanded the language rights for all language groups as a way of combating the hegemony of English. The Afrikaner claim for self-determination is in fact a demand for the recognition of the Afrikaner group as one minority group amongst many others. Norval argues that the

disempowerment of the Afrikaner led them from a position of being a Government in control of what they considered to be their own land, to a position of a minority subjected to a majority which is clearly willing to enforce its majority position, without any reference to a legitimate form of group rights that would ease the apprehension of the minority group (Norval, 1998, p. 98).

In essence the Afrikaans lobby "shifted from the segregationist position to a language as a right, in order to protect its inevitable minority situation in the future and a tentative commitment to language as a resource" (Alexander & Heugh, 1999, p. 12). The result was that the NP promoted equal status for all⁹ of South Africa's languages seeing *language as a right* and *multilingualism as a resource* in their effort to maintain the status of Afrikaans (Ruiz, 1988). A final version of the Language in Education Policy (LiEP) was then developed as a result of the draft document along with discussions and consultations among the informed individuals and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Before turning my attention to the classroom realities, it is noted that nowhere in the document (the LiEP) is it stipulated that a transition from the mother tongue

⁹The term "all" used here does not suggest that all languages found in South Africa were to be included as ultimately the Constitution gave official status to only 11 languages.

to English as the language of learning and teaching must take place at all. It is, however, assumed by many (teachers, principals, parents, and students) that this transition must take place. Previously this switch occurred in Grade 5 and now it occurs even earlier in Grade 4. The result is that the status quo is maintained and the de facto 1979 language policy remains intact. In 1979 the switch from mother tongue to English became law “empowering the use of English from Std 3” (Grade 5) (Hartshorne, 1992, p. 204). However, the 1979 law is no longer subject to the pre-1994 laws, but it remains the current practice. It is this practice to which I now turn my attention.

11.4 The Practice of the LiEP

According to Bamgbose (1992), language is fundamental to the teaching/learning process:

Language is without doubt the most important factor in the learning process for the transfer of knowledge and skills is mediated through the spoken or written word. The paradox is that educational programs and schemes are often designed to pay more attention to the structures and curricula than to language policy. (Bamgbose, 1992 taken from ADEA, 1996, p. 1)

The realities of this statement are apparent in classrooms throughout Africa. In this section I would like to present some of the realities found within the classroom context in South Africa where I conducted my research.

Brock-Utne (2003) argues that the situation in most classrooms in Africa is that students do *not* understand what the teacher is saying. Furthermore, she argues that this is particularly true “if the teacher follows the official policy she/he is supposed to follow, namely to teach through a foreign language *only*, a language children do not use outside of school, have little exposure to and are not familiar with” (Brock-Utne, 2003, p. 1). Additionally, most teachers also do *not* use this language outside the classroom setting and as a result their own exposure to the language is also limited.

In South Africa many teachers are faced with this same dilemma. Do they follow the “official” policy¹⁰ and teach *only* through the foreign language or do they employ coping strategies in order to deal with the mismatch between the home and community language on the one hand and the school language on the other. In my investigation I attempted to find out how teachers cope with teaching through a foreign language, which neither they nor their pupils use outside the classroom.

¹⁰The policy of the schools in my study declared that at the Grade 4 level the transition from Xhosa (one of the nine official African languages) to English as the Language of Learning and Teaching (LOLT) should take place. It was determined that these policies were of an informal type, that is, none of the schools involved in this investigation had drafted official policies according to the recommendations set forth in the LiEP. As a result, the de facto 1979 apartheid policy remains in force in these schools. Meanwhile, despite the official government policy claiming support for the African languages there appears to be a lack of political will to truly support these languages and their development.

Through the analysis of the data it became evident that teachers made use of a number of coping strategies in order to deal with this mismatch and to facilitate learning. In particular the learning strategy referred to as code alternation, involving the use of code-switching and code-mixing, was the most widely used teaching strategy among the teachers involved in the study. Here I will limit my examples to code-switching only as constraints of length do not permit a detailed discussion of the other strategies.

In looking at mainstream teachers who have limited English-proficient (LEP) students or English language learners (ELL) in their classrooms in the US, Carrasquillo and Rodriguez (2002) argue that these teachers must integrate *English language development* with *content-knowledge acquisition* if instruction is going to contribute effectively to these students' linguistic, cognitive, and academic development. This is the same situation that the teachers in my investigation find themselves in. However, in the study by Carrasquillo and Rodriguez the teachers are native speakers of English as opposed to my investigation where English is a foreign language for both the teachers and the learners. These researchers identified three instructional features t in dealing with LEP/ELL students, which are believed to be effective:

- Specification of the task outcomes and identification of the specific activities students must do to accomplish those tasks
- Use of active teaching behaviors that are found to be related to increased student performance on academic tests of achievement in reading and mathematics
- Mediation of instruction for LEP/ELL students (i.e., by using the students' native language and English for instruction, alternating between the two languages whenever necessary to ensure clarity of instruction)

It is this last point that is of relevance here, and with this in mind I will now focus my discussion on this specific issue in relation to my own research.

Before turning my attention to the issue of code-switching it is important to define this concept as it is used in this study. *Code-switching* refers to a switch in language that takes place *between* sentences, also called an *intersentential* change. Thus in the classrooms in this investigation one language is being used as a medium of instruction (English), but the learners' mother tongue is a different language (Xhosa); in this case the teachers may sometimes code-switch to the learners' mother tongue if they consider it necessary. Lin (1996, 2000) argues, for example, that code-switching is a reasonable response by a teacher to the specific kind of teaching and learning situation:

[B]y always starting in the L1, Teacher D always starts from where the student is—from what the student can fully understand and is familiar with. (Lin, 2000, p. 282)

While other researchers have concluded that the code-switching as a teaching strategy is of questionable value, particularly if one of the aims of the teaching is to improve students' competence in English (cf. review by Martin-Jones, 1995). Moreover, Ferguson (2002) describes the practice of code alternation as a pragmatic coping strategy used by teachers in situations where pupils have limited proficiency in the official-language medium. Other researchers have argued that given the fact

that English is the target language in South African schools, and in support of the new principals in Curriculum 2005 (the latest educational reform), code alternation practices are not “only inevitable but also necessary in schools where English is being learned at the same time as it is being used as the *language of learning and teaching* (LOLT)” (Setati, et al. 2002, pp. 76–77).

At the classroom level it became evident that all the teachers observed in my investigation made use of code-switching to some degree. In determining the function of this strategy a general pattern appeared to be evident. This pattern revealed that the use of code-switching served a variety of different functions.

1. **Provide access:** Concepts were clarified in order to make lessons more accessible to learners.
2. **Classroom management:** Task instruction was clarified so that learners will understand what is expected.
3. **Elicit student response:** Used to encourage pupil participation and response.
4. **Interpersonal communication:** Individual learners’ attention was sought, and also to focus on individual assistance.

Although the amount of code-switching used varied among teachers, the overall pattern was the same with the majority of code-switching employed to provide learners access to the curriculum, followed by the use of this strategy to elicit student responses and classroom management. Finally, the use of code-switching as a form of interpersonal communication was the least-used function. In their use of code-switching teachers were often able to engage a wider spectrum of learners, regardless of pupils’ proficiency in the official medium, thus allowing all learners access to the curriculum.

In looking at the practice of code-switching in the classroom, the following example draws attention to the use of both English and Xhosa that were observed at the Grade 4 level for this study. During a mathematics lesson I observed, in November 2001, the following language situation where the teacher (Zandile)¹¹ was explaining to the students the addition of numbers 20 and 19, which she had written on the board. At first Zandile made an attempt to explain the lesson in English, but quickly switched to Xhosa after realizing that the students were not following her. During the explanation of this addition lesson she proceeded as follows:

- T: We are now going to do the addition together and I will explain and you will follow along. We are breaking up the numbers. Do you understand?
- Ss: (Silence, no one responds).
- T: *Siyacalula ngoku, siyawaqhekeza la manani. Sithatha bani phaya* (We are simplifying now, we are breaking these numbers. What do we take from there)?
- S1: Utwo (two).
- T: *Sithathe bani phaya* (And what do we take from there)?
- S1: *Uone* (One).

¹¹Note that the names of the teachers are pseudonyms in order to provide anonymity for those participating in the study.

- T: *Utwo ujika abe ngubani* (Two changes into what number)?
 S2: *Abe ngu-twenty* (Becomes twenty).
 T: Right, *u-one lo ujika abe ngubani* (Right, this one becomes what)?
 S3: *Abe ngu-ten* (Becomes ten).

This example of a typical lesson shows how an entire lesson was carried out in Xhosa except for the initial attempt to use English only, and it illustrates how the lesson remains in Xhosa (something that happens rather often in the classrooms observed). Zandile thus switched languages after receiving no response from the students when she initially used the foreign language (FL)¹² only. As a result, this teacher was *providing access* to the curriculum, which she recognized as unattainable through the use of English only. Furthermore, the remainder of the mathematics lesson continued in Xhosa with only some minor code-mixing taking place, for example, “right,” “okay,” “understand,” and so on, which was followed by Xhosa to strengthen the previous and, to some extent, artificial English word “right.” In addition, the book the teacher was working from was in English, which the teacher depended on heavily. The example of the mathematics lesson described above is not an isolated case and in fact many of the lessons observed during the fieldwork were often conducted mainly through the medium of Xhosa. However, at the end of the day students are expected to use English for all the writing that is done in the subjects, except for the subject Xhosa, as well as for examination purposes. Xhosa also becomes only an oral language as opposed to English which is both oral and written, and thus strengthens the status of English. The result is that when teachers see that their students do not understand because they are using a language that is unfamiliar (even foreign), they make use of the code-switching strategy.

Other forms of code-switching involve the function of *classroom management*, for example, teachers switching from teaching a lesson mainly in English to clarifying task instruction (moving to the next stage of the lesson) in Xhosa. An example of this type of code-switching is highlighted below. First the teacher begins by explaining the lesson briefly in English and then she switches to Xhosa to communicate to the learners what they will be required to do after she has gone through the vocabulary words:

T: *Uza kuwasika la maphepha kancinci, uwa-paste(e) encwadini yakho, wakugqiba uwabhale la magama ... but phambi kokuba senze loo nto leyo kufuneka siwajundile ukuba athini na kuqala, la aza kwenza ipuzzle yethu.* (You are going to cut these papers into small pieces, you paste them on your book, when you finish you write these words ... but before we do that we must read them to get what they mean first, those that are going to make our puzzle).

Here the teacher emphasizes to her pupils the objective of the exercise that will follow and in communicating this information she chooses to use the mother tongue thus ensuring that the learners will understand the point of the exercise.

¹²In many postcolonial societies and Africa, in particular, children often receive most, if not all, of their education in a language that is not their mother tongue or even a regional language. This leads me to question this practice, which for many means being educated in a foreign language. Thus I specifically use the term foreign language to highlight this issue.

Code-switching has also been observed as serving the function of *eliciting the response of learners* when the use of English only to ask questions fails. Here teachers often recognize that the nonresponse of learners requires that the question be reformulated in their mother tongue ensuring almost immediate student response in the new code. My observation notes, from early October, clearly describe how Thembisa uses this function of code-switching during a mathematics lesson:

The teacher is giving the students a mathematics equation to answer. She begins by asking them, in English, “What is $(15 \div 3)$ ” and then she says “15 sweets to give 3 students the same amount.” The students do not respond at all at which time the teacher then repeats the same question in Xhosa and immediately 10 students raise their hands to answer. A little later the teacher asks another mathematical question “What is $(16 \div 2)$ ” and again no response from the students. The teacher switches again to Xhosa to ask the students and again the response is immediate.

Finally, another purpose of code-switching serves the function of *interpersonal communication* between teachers and pupils. Here switching from English to Xhosa served to gain the attention of individual learners and to give individual assistance to learners, which was on the whole never conducted in English. During an English reading lesson the following observation was made.

The teacher reminds the students “*this is an individual exercise and not group work and you need to look at your own paper.*” She then switches to using Xhosa to assist a particular student who is having difficulty with this exercise.

Here there is a switch from the use of English emphasizing at the collective level that the exercise is not group work followed by an explanation of the lesson in Xhosa to an individual student, demonstrating how this code-switching functions for interpersonal communication. Here Xhosa is seen as more appropriate for individual interaction as opposed to English, which would seem artificial given that both the learner and teacher speak Xhosa as a mother tongue and not English. Moreover, if the focus of individual attention is generally to assist students who are having difficulty with the lesson, using English as opposed to Xhosa would not be as effective or perhaps even appropriate. Further, teachers acknowledge that they need to use Xhosa even in Grades 5–7 because if they were to use only English as one teacher admitted to me “students would look at me like I am crazy” (interview: Nosisa, November 28, 1991). Here the teacher is referring to the fact that students even in Grade 7 require Xhosa in order to grasp the concepts being taught. Despite the debates surrounding the effectiveness of code-switching, researchers cannot simply overlook this practice as it appears to be a relevant coping strategy for teachers as they attempt to provide their students access to the curriculum.

11.5 Evaluation

As teachers have considerable autonomy in how they implement a policy, it is essential to include an understanding of the teacher’s perspective or beliefs into the micro-level analysis. Semiformal and open-ended, taped and transcribed interviews

with teachers have provided important information about teachers' attitudes toward, and understanding of, the language policy as well as difficulties in implementing the policy. In the Western Cape at the various universities and Technikons I was also able to confirm Ferguson's (2002) claim that the use of code-alternation strategy is neglected or marginalized in teacher education, and that it lacks legitimacy, that is, it is not recognized as a possible resource for teachers. In my discussions with eight different teacher-trainers I discovered that the code-alternation practice is not dealt with by them in preservice or in-service teacher-training and as such teachers do not make effective use of this strategy. Although teachers themselves acknowledge the use of this strategy, their belief regarding its effectiveness or possible effectiveness are often questioned as some felt as though they are *smuggling the vernacular into the classroom*, while others are unsure as to when and how to use this strategy.

My investigation has confirmed what others have described as the *intentional but dilemma-filled practice* of code-switching as teachers indicate the need for the practice to enable the learners to develop the ability to understand concepts and ideas and to provide them with opportunities to access the curriculum, but since it is not dealt with in teacher education, acknowledgement and approval for its use in the classroom is not given (Brock-Utne & Holmarsdottir, 2003). Rather than being used as a possible resource in learning the additional language more related to additive bilingual education, the use of the code-alternation strategies, at times, appears to be used in an ad hoc and disorganized fashion. Hence, in the classrooms English and Xhosa are used as needed to simply get the information across to the students. Thus more work needs to be done in this area as it appears that in situations such as the ones found in this investigation, code alternation seems to be a crucial communicative resource for managing teaching and learning.

11.6 Conclusion

Although English is the official language to be used, in many schools at least from Grade 4 onward, in order to teach all content subjects effectively, the majority of the teachers are more concerned that pupils should develop a better and more meaningful understanding of the subject matter. As a result, teachers make use of the code-alternation strategy. Hence, acquisition of the foreign language becomes a secondary objective.

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Chapter 12

A Place of One's Own: Schooling and the Formation of Identities in Modern Nepal

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12.1 Introduction

This chapter reports the findings of an ethnographic study of young people living in and around Kathmandu, Nepal, especially in terms of their engagement with modern schooling. By tracing down processes of socialisation and enculturation, the research examines the culturally grounded histories poor children carry with them as migrants to the city, the ways in which they negotiate new roles and subject positions, and the formation of what Levinson and others (1996) call 'schooled identity'. We suggest that many children gain much from formal education but that this is predominately in terms of a range of *unseen and unintended* phenomena that provide resources with which to craft new identities able to negotiate those bequeathed to them by history and circumstance. The extent to which these new identities lead to such things as democratic citizens, loyal subjects or, for example, consumers within modernising capitalist economies will continue to exercise the thoughts and policies of development agencies, national governments, and school professionals, even though for many children such concerns are distant.

12.1.1 Globalisation and Identities

The phenomenon of globalisation is multifaceted and complex, as are its effects. Whilst scholars disagree on its origins, its specific forms, or its ultimate consequences, it is clear that education is being profoundly affected by a range of forces not seen in previous generations. New notions of the state, relations between states and peoples, new ideologies of individualism, and shifting notions of self are all attributed in greater and smaller degree to globalisation (Zajda, Davis and Majhanovich (2008)). Burbules and Torres (2000) attempt to give this phenomenon

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shape by considering three key dimensions of particular import to education. First, the world faces new economic relations and processes. The demise of Fordist work patterns, new trading arrangements, global financial markets, and lending agencies are changing the nature of commerce, the meaning of work, and creating new subjectivities amongst workers. Second, changing political conditions are affecting the autonomy of nation states, giving rise to new types of state via global political structures (e.g. European Union (EU), United Nations (UN), etc.) and challenging established notions of citizenship. Third, globalisation is viewed as facilitating cultural standardisation and the universalisation of values; in essence homogenising identities, lifestyles, and social relations (see also Zajda, 2005).

The precise implications of these trends for education are unclear, although most writers focus upon the ways in which economic and political imperatives are leading to what Carter and O'Neill (1995) describe as the 'new orthodoxy'. A tightened coupling between economy and schooling, a focus upon student outcomes and employment-related competences, increased intervention by the state in matters of curriculum and assessment, reduced financial commitments on the part of government, and increased roles for communities via the policies of choice and free markets can all be seen as technologies aimed at changing what it means to be schooled and, consequently, the role of school in the creation of values and forms of citizenship. For Ball (1998) education is not just modelled on the values of capital but drawn into the commodity form itself. Irrespective of how one views these developments, and there remains considerable disagreement, it is clear that new discourses are arising in response to them. Notions of the 'learning society', the 'knowledge-based economy', and the reconceptualisation of curricula and pedagogy to fit the needs of independent 'lifelong learners' are shaping educational thinking and provision worldwide. Such discourses are as prevalent in the developing world as they are in the West from which they emerged, and can be located centrally in the politics and programmes of multi-lateral and bilateral development agencies as well as in the agendas and programmes of aid-receiving nations.

Whilst the policy and bureaucratic elite in the developing world share the concerns and visions of the West, it is altogether less clear how children make sense of, and operationalise, these discourses. Our research suggests that many children in the developing world—especially that sizable number who can be categorised as living on the edge of extreme poverty and deprivation—understand school quite differently. Whilst school holds the promise that the skills, knowledge, and dispositions gained through formal education make possible individual development that can support the social, national, and economic progress demanded of globalisation, these intended outcomes are often distant concerns for many children. For them, the challenge is to find a basic degree of dignity, the means for continued survival, and a place in which simply to negotiate the rapidly changing contexts in which their lives are played out; concerns often overlooked by many of those engaged in improving and extending the reach of the modern school, as well as those who view globalisation as having profound effects on all peoples.

12.2 Approaching Identity

12.2.1 *Identity and Modernity*

The approach outlined here arises from a general dissatisfaction with prevailing strategies for exploring the relations between globalisation, schooling, and identity. At one extreme, institutional theorists focus upon the ways in which individual identities are contingent upon what Ramirez (2003) calls the 'triumph of the West' in the twentieth century, meaning the 'intensification of the Western emphasis on both universalism and rationalisation' (p. 246). This perspective views education as exogenous to specific nation state legacies and aspirations and, by implication, to significant reinterpretation by participants. The dominant paradigm within the field of the Third World development is grounded implicitly on such assumptions. Here, it is assumed that universal and rational models of schooling can improve not only learning achievement, equality of opportunity, and institutional efficiency, but also the status where current levels of progress are inadequate, and ensure that all members of society recognise and share the desire to rectify this state (e.g. UNESCO, 1990, 2000; World Bank, 1999). Critics of development use a similarly broad brush in rejecting prevailing strategies and programmes (Brock-Utne, 2000; Harber & Davies, 1997; Crew & Harrison, 1998) or, more dramatically, dismissing the entire development 'project' (Shrestha, 1995). Others take a more nuanced approach to understanding the affects of the modern school, highlighting the ways in which elites, teachers, and students signal a symbolic commitment to Western values (Fuller, 1991) or shape them along culturally contingent lines (Halskov Hansen, 1999; Riesman, 1992; Serpell, 1993).

A range of perspectives from within the frame of critical theory, or those taking more general inspiration from Marxist critiques of schooling and the state, focus on the ways in which schools oppress, disenfranchise, and shape students' aspirations along (largely static) class, social, or economic lines (e.g. Apple, 1990, 2001; Bernstein, 1996; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977; Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Carnoy, 1974; Giroux, 1997; Willis, 1977). Some scholars working with the phenomenon of globalisation have located neo-liberalism and its carrying agencies as the main cause of increasingly standardised educational systems, processes, and schooling experiences (e.g. Ball, 1998; Burbules & Torres, 2000; O'Neill, 1995). Others highlight the pervasiveness of discourses of 'salvation' that serve to reform subjectivities via connecting the separate texts of self, society, state, and science (e.g. Popkewitz, 2000).

12.2.2 *Cultural Production*

One exception to these approaches can be found in the recent literature from educational anthropology where attention has been given to the task of finding spaces between reproduction and production approaches to identity (e.g. Anderson-Levitt,

2003; Levinson et al., 1996, Levinson, 2000; Sutton & Levinson, 2001). Work in this tradition sees the meaning created as a consequence of the interplay of everyday life, taken-for-grantedness, and modern schooling as a legitimate end for study, and seeks to retain a distance to the dominant modernisation logic that has shaped much thinking about schooling and identity. Nevertheless such work also tends to downplay the voices of individual actors, and to generalise across what are necessarily and logically quite different histories, inheritances, and possibilities for action.

12.2.3 Capturing Complexity

Thus, whether positioned in the prevailing modernist discourse of development, its critiques and alternatives, theories of social and cultural reproduction, education and the state, anthropologies of schooling, or, indeed, globalisation, the voices of living, reflective actors remain stifled, if not deliberately silenced. More often than not, children find themselves categorised by others in terms of culture, gender, class, ethnicity, poverty, social and political conflict, and a host of other labels generated and colonised by established academic fields. We believe that the genuine interest of many researchers to understand schooled identity is not served well by such categorisation and that, on the contrary, one can only understand the multiple, often incoherent, affects of schooling by grasping the lived realities of the individuals caught up in it. From such a perspective, one becomes sensitised to the unforeseen consequences of schooling, and the detailed, specific strategies of belonging, resisting, progressing, dominating, and surviving that are the richest, most significant outcomes to emerge from it. Once this complexity and diversity is captured, one is in a much stronger position to consider the ways, if at all, that globalisation is impacting upon schooling across the very different geographical, cultural, social, and political regions it purports to touch.

12.3 Schooling in Nepal: Between Policy and Ethnography

12.3.1 Social and Political Context

Nepal, rather than being unique, is a typical example of a country in transition between tradition and modernity, between state-based and global systems of governance, and between economic independence and increasing reliance upon unsustainable donor-driven ‘grants’ and loans. Notwithstanding this volatile landscape, persistent material deprivation remains a defining characteristic, with some 40% of its population of 22 million living under the poverty line (UNDP, 2001). Social and economic inequality drive the deepening Maoist insurgency—or ‘People’s War’—that has claimed 10,000 lives since 1996, although political reform can perhaps be viewed as the ultimate aim of the conflict. Education policy cannot be separated from this context. During the period of the ‘Rana’ dynasty (1846–1951),

Nepal experienced an elite and highly centralised education system with autocratic administrative and pedagogical practices. Early attempts at modernisation, notably during the 'Panchayat' era (1951–1990) led to a form of national schooling, albeit one in which caste and gender discrimination continued to disenfranchise many, and to dominate the remainder via restrictive textbooks and curricula aimed at reinforcing one-party government. The collapse of the Panchayat regime in 1990 led to an explosion of free speech, critique, and expectation. A new constitution defined Nepal as a 'multi-ethnic', 'multi-lingual', 'independent', 'democratic' constitutional monarchy, albeit within the framework of a Hindu conception of the 'state' (Gellner, 2003, p. 13). During the 1990s enormous effort was expended to transform the education system, both to respond to this new political landscape, and to address a centuries-old legacy of social and material inequality. A programme of Basic and Primary Education (BPEP) was initiated which is now entering a third 4-year phase. Whilst participation and literacy rates have risen dramatically from a low base, the government and its donor partners highlight persistent low levels of achievement, 'educational quality', and institutional management as barriers to social and economic progress, and continue to devise multiple strategies to overcome the perceived shortcomings of the system (MOES, 2003).

12.3.2 Competing Educational Discourses

Like the institutions of the state itself, society in Nepal is in transition. Lawton and Cowen (2001) note that prevailing educational discourses tell us much about contemporary social, cultural, and political values. Since ancient times, discussions about education have been framed in terms of the 'relationship of man to heaven and to virtue'. This discourse was supplemented in the nineteenth century by the emergence of nation states and the need to promote the virtue of nationalism to the citizenry. More recently, it appears that education discourses have been related to, if not 'absorbed' into, the language of the market. For Lawton and Cowen (2001) 'that which is economic has become that which is virtuous. Virtue is efficiency and effectiveness.' (pp. 17–18). The relations between the discourses of church/ religion, state and market are worth exploring in the case of Nepal. The 'developmentalist state' (Gellner, 2003) from the Panchayat regime to the current fledgling democracy is, perhaps, the most visible manifestation of society in modern Nepal. Defined by a discourse of economic, social, and national progress, it is manifested in a wide-ranging state bureaucracy comprising institutions, programmes, and visions of inclusion and hope. Here, education is defined in terms of national curricula, language(s) of instruction and pedagogy, and centrally controlled systems of teacher training and educational administration. Educational practices take place against a backdrop of shared symbols centred round the monarchy and state and a pervasive discourse of progress and opportunity that constructs rural, village-based, and agricultural experiences as being inferior to those formed in urban, suburban, and industrial centres (Pigg, 1992).

Two other discourses interconnect with the modern nation state project. A discourse of tradition manifests strongly in the permeation throughout society

of religious ethics and ultimate beliefs, what Weber referred to as *other-worldly* values. In education, this discourse finds form in culturally sanctioned practices in schools (what many children refer to as the ‘temple’) with girls and low-status groups experiencing additional barriers to learning, all within a context where the teacher (seen by many as a ‘guru’) is understood as a mediator of self-evident truths about knowledge, wisdom, and values (via the religious ‘script’ of the text). From this perspective, education serves a powerful role in preserving and legitimising customs, social relations, and approaches to knowledge that connect to long-held and persistent modes of ‘being’ in Hindu societies (Alexander, 2000). Additionally, the discourse of ‘rational calculation and routinized *this-worldly* action’ (Gane, 2004, p. 2), manifested for Lawton and Cowen (2001) as the commodification of education into the logic and language of the market, can be seen in Nepal in a kaleidoscope of neo-liberal technologies aimed at transforming ‘modern’ institutions and processes along the lines of efficiency and competition. Reforms as diverse as community-managed schooling, private schooling and parental choice, and plans for decentralised educational administration can be seen both in terms of attempting further to embed the modern school in the public consciousness, but also as strategies to reorder and shift understanding of the individual and the state itself.

Taking the work of Lawton and Cowen (2001) further, our data gathered in relation to schooling in Nepal suggests that these three discourses *compete* for space and influence. In some cases this is a consequence of explicit policies and intentions; in others it is as a consequence of the generic project of modern schooling finding form in the specific site of Nepal. Schooling becomes a stage upon which multiple, often contradictory, interests, ideologies, policies, and practices are played out. Strategies of caste and gender control and resistance, progressive and domineering teaching strategies and curricula, approaches to parental choice, privatisation, local management, and new models of citizenship, state and subjectivity can be found in each and every educational ‘space’ in Nepal and create profound possibilities for negotiating identity, contesting histories, and realising new ways of being.

12.3.3 *The Case Study*

The ethnographic study reported here explores the lives of a group of children engaged in primary and secondary schooling in and around Kathmandu.¹ For the purposes of this chapter we present insights related to three children, all of whom are approximately 12 years old, drawn from one inner-city primary school located in a deprived and densely populated area of the city. We view these stories not

¹We are deeply indebted to our colleagues Renu Tharpa and Leknath Sharma who conducted much of the preliminary fieldwork and sensitised us to many embedded issues of local importance. Their contributions as ‘knowledgeable local actors’ have made it possible for two Western researchers—albeit with a range of experiences from Nepal—to attempt a type of ethnography shaped both by ‘local’ and ‘foreign’ lenses.

as representative of all schooling experiences in Nepal but ones that nevertheless resonate with a large and growing number of young people in that country. We would argue that such experiences are far from unique in Nepal.

The stories can be seen as standing apart from, but also as being crucially interconnected with, the history of the school that serves to shape an important part of the consciousness of each child. In the same way that the lives of these children are constituted by a range of histories and experiences, so too can the school be seen as reflecting many of the traditions and discourses inherent in contemporary Nepalese society. It is for this reason that we explore the physical and psychic space of the school before turning to the lives of the children who shape and are in turn shaped by it.

Established in 1952, in the aftermath of the Rana regime, Bal Bikash School currently consists of some nine teaching staff, nursery and kindergarten classes, and the first 5 years of formal schooling. Approximately 250 children attend the school with significant numbers receiving small scholarships in order to offset the cost of tuition fees, imposed by the school on financial grounds. Like the children, the teaching staff are drawn from other parts of Kathmandu.² Significantly, however, the majority of the teachers send their own children to private schools in more prosperous sections of the city.

The built environment of the school and its surrounds shape its educational potential. An imposing four-storey structure rebuilt in recent years in the traditional Nepalese style, its teaching rooms are correspondingly dark, cramped, and sparsely furnished, mostly with heavy benches. Notwithstanding this austerity, teachers and children have decorated and personalised teaching spaces with posters, songs, poems, and students' own work. Poor sanitation facilities and incessant noise from the adjacent streets and thoroughfares add to the instructional challenge at Bal Bikash. There are no open areas for play, with children needing to spill out onto a poorly secured rooftop terrace in order to move somewhat more freely, and to experience daylight. As the streets adjoining the school are inhabited by the dhobis, every available external space is taken up with washing lines and the scorn of their overly protective owners. Like schools across the world, the foyer is filled with inspirational and motivational messages, texts, and images that give some insight into the school's mixed philosophy. One notice reads: 'Never hurt a child. Never, never, never, ever. For help, call 719-578-3206, Colorado'. Images of the monarch and national flag compete with pictures of the Hindu gods 'Laxmi' (goddess of wealth) and 'Saraswati' (goddess of knowledge), the influential contemporary Indian mystic Sai Baba, Lord Buddha, and the Virgin Mary. The principal explained this diversity in terms of creating a balance between the role of the school

²Surprisingly, the school serves not the dominant local group of the catchment area, but a wide range of low caste and economically vulnerable migrant and other groups. The dominant social group inhabiting the physical space around the school is an occupational caste group known as the 'Dhobi'. This group are employed as washers of clothing, a traditional activity that they have retained as an integral part of their sense of selves, even though they are economically mobile and are attempting to realise their aspirations by sending their children to private schools beyond the traditional reach of the case study school.

in promoting ‘international’ values about how to raise children, ‘Nepalese’ values about state and nation, and ‘universal’ values related to peace and tolerance.

12.3.4 School in Conflict

During our fieldwork, the school appeared deeply divided by the sorts of conflicts that are commonplace throughout public schools in Nepal. One debate amongst teachers focused upon plans to upgrade the school to a junior secondary institution that would enable physical expansion, an increase in staff and student numbers, and, it was stated by some, as a commensurate rise in personal and institutional status. Another conflict centred round the principal’s leadership style that for some teachers manifested itself as a discomfort with being lead by a poorly educated female teacher. Other disputes concerned the locus of control within the school with disgruntled parents, the community, school management committee members, teachers, and local administrators all claiming to have been disenfranchised. Additionally, new state-driven discourses of skills and individual competence were seen as challenging the school’s long-standing commitment to social inclusion and equality of opportunity. This latter dimension found form in great internal unrest over the policy of charging tuition charges (legitimised by the title ‘examination’ fee). Teachers were split between defending their explicit commitment to serving the poor and rationalising their own strategies for class mobility. One group of teachers, notably older females, felt threatened by the ambitions of younger male teachers to change the philosophy of the school from one of pastoral care for the most needy to one concerned with competing for the best students within and across the catchment area.

Such diverse standpoints, strategies, and practices make attempts at summary or distillation problematic. Further, we recognise the impossibility of presenting a ‘true’ account of the history of the school, or the forces that are shaping it. Our analytic strategy has been to prepare sets of portraits of children engaged in the school, both as a way to understand these actors in their own right, but also as a way to capture and consider the complexity of phenomena at play in such settings. In the next section, we introduce three such portraits—those of Santosh, Phurba, and Phul Bahadur—as a means to highlight the individualised nature of their engagement with schooling, and as a point of departure for considering the relations between schooling and identity in modern Nepal.

12.4 Identity Lived

12.4.1 Santosh

Santosh’s life has been governed by attempts to hide his social origins. His mother comes from the Magar ethnic group, a proud hill tribe from the central regions of Nepal. At the age of 14 she eloped with a man of ‘untouchable’ caste, which led,

necessarily, to her own exclusion from the Magar caste and a new identity at the bottom of Nepal's social order. The five golden earrings she wears in each ear, given to her by her own mother, attest to an earlier life and status to which she desperately clings, providing as they do a sense of social security against her incorporation into the lowest orders of society. As the product of such a union, Santosh must also wear this label, although he tries desperately to conceal it. Santosh and his mother rent a small room under the roof of a high-caste Brahmin family. Notions of ritual purity prohibit untouchables from entering such dwellings, let alone residing in them, and it is only the ambiguity created by the mother's apparent wealth—manifested in the earrings—that enable Santosh's mother to conceal her true identity and thus provide the hope of a future to her children. Santosh is regarded as a good student and dreams of being a doctor in order to help 'all valuable lives survive'. His mother feels released from the 'pain of a life of mistakes' when she sees her son studying, and dreams of him becoming a 'thulo manche' (big man). Notwithstanding these aspirations, Santosh has few means to progress to junior secondary school, and the hope of university education is so distant as to be little more than an abstract concept. School provides a place to exist, a site in which for some hours each day he can 'belong'. School provides a refuge from the harsh judgements of society, and the hope that a new schooled identity might conceal more effectively the stain of his inheritance.

Our analysis suggests that Santosh's life has been determined by the rigidities of caste-based social segregation. Marginalised by the structures that constitute life in Hindu society, and discriminated culturally and socially, Santosh and his mother utilise school to construct an identity—that of a modern, 'educated' citizen—that helps them disguise their origins. Santosh's dream for the future—to help all valuable lives survive—is a response that mirrors his own position in society where he finds himself struggling for social inclusion and belonging. For Santosh and his mother, hiding becomes a strategy to deal with suppression, and as long as this practice provides a place and certain moments of belonging, they can manage to escape exclusion. However, this escape can only ever be temporary, as the historically constructed social hierarchy of Nepal and the mother's break with her caste identity and belonging has thrown Santosh into a life course where the only chance of survival is through deception. It appears that belonging for Santosh will always be contingent upon hiding, and that through hiding he will never be able to fulfil his dream of belonging for he lives in fear that his caste origins will ultimately be unveiled at an enormous expense to his psychic and material well-being.

12.4.2 Phurba

Phurba's life has been marked by loss and injustice. Nevertheless, from this experience comes a will to resist the domination of society and to play an active role in shaping new possibilities for herself and those around her. A Sherpa by ethnicity, Phurba's family moved to India seeking work, but after the death of her father

and three siblings, all victims of jaundice, her mother was forced to migrate to Kathmandu and to the family of her late husband. Having lost her life savings on the journey to Nepal, Phurba's mother suffered the further humiliation of submitting to the authority of her mother-in-law who viewed her as guilty for the death of her son. Oppression and domination shaped her early years and it was only after leaving her father's family that a degree of control and freedom became possible, in large measure as a consequence of Bal Bikash School. Here, Phurba's mother has become chairperson of the school's management committee where she attempts to play an active role in shaping her daughter's education.

Unusually for a female student, Phurba was elected class monitor and brings to the role a remarkable if not unique sense of justice and advocacy, insisting that students show restraint and respect towards each other, and that teachers provide more help to those struggling with their lessons. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Phurba aspires to a career in teaching where she can empower children to improve their chances for life. Whilst her mother views education as a necessity, and advocates equality of opportunity, it is her son who is provided the money required for additional tuition, and Phurba who carries out most of the tasks and chores around the home. Despite her ambitions, Phurba sees her own future as precarious. She worries incessantly about her mother's physical and mental health and their shared economic vulnerability. School provides a release from such concerns and the chance to shape the only world over which she has some measure of control.

Our understanding of Phurba's story is grounded in her role in the classroom where she insists upon fairness and decency in social relations as a starting point for social change outside the school. This stance resonates with the position Phurba fills at home. Here, she performs an important role by fortifying her mother in the management of her small shop and confronting violent and drunk patrons who refuse to pay their bills. The risks that this involves for a 12-year-old girl are considerable. However, the trajectory of her life, from the tragedies of losing loved ones, her mother's financial ruin, gender discrimination, and the contempt of many of those she serves daily, provides for this young woman an impetus to fight for justice and respect. This fight is grounded in the larger historical narrative of gender discrimination in Hindu society, and in her personal history and life course. For Phurba, school seems a highly appropriate stage on which to perform acts of resistance with which to make sense of, and respond to, her particular history, as well as to create new worlds of understanding and hope.

12.4.3 Phul Bahadur

Phul Bahadur is shaped by a belief in the possibility of improvement. Like the other children of our study, Phul comes from a migrant family. His father recognises the value of schooling, not least because his son's literacy and numerical skills are essential to their small family-run restaurant. Although Phul Bahadur appears to benefit greatly from school, his successes are shaped by a family context marked

by caste and gender conservatism. Phul's father finds it necessary to serve lower-caste customers, but he makes it clear that he would not voluntarily socialise with such groups. Similarly he excludes Phul's sisters from schooling because of the perceived 'waste' this entails. Shaped profoundly by his father's heavy drinking and gambling, Phul views schooling as a means to educate young people 'away from alcohol or using drugs' and to 'bring improvement to society'. Phul Bahadur's confidence in the project of schooling cannot however guarantee his own continued participation in it as his father is unsure if there will be sufficient means to enable him to continue at Bal Bikash. Phul dreams of singing or dancing, but says that such a future 'is not possible for me', with a 'more realistic' future lying in 'white-collar work'.

Though socially deprived, Phul Bahadur's living conditions are somewhat better than those of Santosh and Phurba. His father's restaurant is profitable for now, not least because of the skills acquired by Phul at school. Our data suggest that Phul is driven by a desire to improve and he manifests this desire both at school by working hard and at home by propping up his wayward father. Utility is a theme that resonates within both spaces. For Phul, home life is governed by completing tasks, making do, and collecting payments for services. Low-caste people are rejected socially but accepted within the domain of the family restaurant. Daughters and sisters are accepted so long as they do not drain scarce family resources and can provide useful labour. The meaning Phul creates for school is linked inextricably to this outlook; schooling is constructed as a practical resource with which to shape immediate and potential material futures. The tragedy for Phul is that his desire to dance and sing is necessarily suppressed by the realisation that life is a serious project of survival rather than a quest for individual expression. Unfortunately Phul appears trapped by his circumstances as he fears that any improved profitability in the restaurant is likely to lead to further drinking and destructive behaviour by his alcoholic father, thus risking the only security they have.

12.4.4 Reproducing and Contesting Histories

The lives of these three children, treated so briefly here, are unique for the ways in which cultural, social, and economic forces have conspired to attach to their identities a particular historical shape. Nevertheless, their stories are much more than monolithic portraits of despair or hopelessness that one might connect with their material disadvantage. Issues of social exclusion and immobility interlink with visions of hope and resistance, but in ways that are extremely difficult to capture or predict. Rather than overturning previous analyses of young people in Nepal, such stories invite more nuanced understandings of the relationship between schooling and lived identities. Clearly, these young people are navigating between pre-existing structures and their own reflectivity and agency. In many ways they are acting out or reproducing the destinies of their families delivered by history. In other ways, however, they are contesting and moving beyond these histories, constructing meanings

with which to shape unique life projects. To explore theoretically the nature of these processes, it is necessary to consider the ways in which schooling and the formation of identity have been conceptualised by others, to move beyond conventional culturalist or constructivist interpretations, and to locate reflexive and situated lives at the centre of the analysis.

12.5 Identity Theorised

In approaching issues of education and identity, much of the sociology of education has focused upon notions of social and cultural reproduction. One classic approach in the social reproduction tradition views schools as an ideological state apparatus charged with the function of creating citizens of modern capitalism (e.g. Althusser, 1971). Another approach within this tradition sees reproduction as a dynamic process in which subjects themselves are actively involved in creating meaning, albeit within the confines of their class positions and accepted social norms (Willis, 1977). Taking a point of departure in the interplay between privilege and power, theories of cultural reproduction suggest that schools be seen as institutions in which dominant capital forms operate to constitute symbolic violence and social segregation through advanced mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion (e.g. Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977).

These approaches have merit for the ways in which they critique education and schools as public/state institutions engaged in imposing power structures and ways of working that order and produce citizens that contribute to building and sustaining the nation and a certain cultural, social, political, and economic order. Notwithstanding the significant contribution of such ideas, reproduction theories have been subjected to the critique that they treat schools as 'black boxes which, perforce, reproduce(d) the structured requirements of the capitalist economy and state' (Levinson et al., 1996, p. 7). Recent work within educational anthropology has attempted to explore this 'box' in both Western and developing country settings in order that we might better understand the ways in which schooling is perceived and practised subjectively by children, teachers, parents, and politicians (e.g. Anderson-Levitt, 2003; Bledsoe, 2000; Levinson et al., 1996; Levinson, 2000; Rival, 2000; Stambach, 2000).

Centring agency and reflexivity in social analysis is not, however, without problems. A neo-Marxist critique would argue that attempts to (re)install agency in theories of social and cultural processes lead necessarily to a blurring and, ultimately, the legitimisation of fundamental power structures, which in late modernity manifest themselves increasingly as liberal conceptions of the individual. Scholars from the tradition of critical pedagogy view the primary function of education as ensuring 'the production of persons that fit into the existing societal structures', thus serving to deepen processes and forms of oppression (Miedema & Wardekker, 1999, p. 71). This perspective suggests that subjectivities are always already inscribed in history. To claim, therefore, that agency exists independent of social structures implies a belief in autonomy and authenticity; an essentially ahistorical

and transcendental position which disengages education and subjectivity from time and space. In this regard, we find Holland and Lave's (2001) notion of history-in-person–person-in-history useful for our efforts to study the meaning of, and in, schooling as children and parents produce it. Exploring children's everyday lives and schooling, and studying education ethnographically through the narratives told by children and parents, reflect, therefore, two basic standpoints: first, that education is the institutionalised exercise of power as state intervention in the processes of identity formation; and second, that education is a space for negotiating identity and constructing meanings that can reflect and create individuals' visions about their lives.

12.6 The Promise of Schooling

We have attempted to explore these ideas through the ethnographic data of our study. *Hiding* from one's caste origins, *resisting* male dominance, and *improving* one's living conditions emerge as strategies employed by these three children in their struggle to make sense out of everyday lives that appear governed by hardship and suppression. Like the ancient Greek myth of Sisyphus³ these three children face near-certain futures of hardship, oppression, and marginality, irrespective of the extent to which they commit themselves to action. Santosh will never obtain belonging as long as he has to hide, and in a caste-oriented society hiding will remain necessary for his survival. Schooling can be a place of freedom, expression, and belonging but traditional Nepalese society remains harsh in its judgements of purity and pollution. Schools, as sites for traditional values, are no exception. Phurba is managing to establish a limited domain of control over her life by leading her fellow students at school and supporting her mother at home. However, in both arenas one can see the limits of her agency. Schooling provides Phurba with a voice with which to express the hardships of her life but the neo-liberal turn in Nepalese education, especially the illegal introduction of fees and the flight of qualified staff from the public school system, make it most uncertain that she can progress beyond compulsory schooling. Such inequity resonates with her home situation where, in spite of her mother's claims, resources for continuation classes and extra tuition are only provided for her brother, who in any event seems uninterested in improvement. Finally, Phul appears fated to work harder to improve the family's situation, not least because he is succeeding. As the material resources of the family improve, Phul's father's is likely to drink more heavily and jeopardise the family's slender grasp on a measure of self-sufficiency. This threat will only make it more likely that Phul will eventually need to take over the duties of the restaurant, distancing him further from

³Sisyphus, a king of Corinth, was punished in Hades by having to roll a large stone to the top of a hill. Every time he approached the summit, however, the stone would roll to the bottom again, at which point Sisyphus's eternal and futile work would commence again.

the promise of becoming an educated person. This distance is only increased further by the rise of discourses of value and usefulness in education in Nepal.

This interpretation of our portraits may suggest that we see each actor as condemned to futures of futility and hardship, and this is precisely the analysis one might expect if the lenses of social and/or cultural reproduction theory are applied to their lives. Conceiving children's lives as objects in the reproduction of dominant power structures is certainly one analytical strategy. In identifying alienation as the framework for modern lives, Adorno and Horkheimer (1971), classical representatives of the critical theory tradition, have been challenged because their concept of negative dialectic limits the space for change. However, much is missing in this view, with yet another 'black box' generated to obscure important visions, processes, emotions, and meanings. Struggling against suppression and condemned to hiding, fighting, and improving, children are *also* engaged in acts of caring (by and for others), violence, support, love, and alienation.

Rather than legitimising suppression or justifying the abuse of children, this stance acknowledges that children are actively involved in establishing meaningful realities that are grounded in the worlds they inhabit. Whilst our own conditioning as affluent Western intellectuals normalised by modernist discourses of development and progress sensitises us to injustice and hardship, it is important to acknowledge the many facets and affects of schooling. It is clearly the case that these children live difficult, perhaps unendurable, lives. But they are also *creating* lives, and in doing so, notions of individuality, collectivity, nationhood, and citizenship. Schooling is one departure point for these acts of creation, and we greatly reduce our awareness of its function and impact if we obscure or deny this reality.

12.7 Conclusion

Processes of globalisation are facilitating the rapid spread of a certain type of educational thinking, derived from the Western enlightenment experience but repacked as an ideologically driven set of reforms and strategies (see also Zajda, 2005; Zajda, Biraimah, & Gaudelli, 2008). We do not dispute the growing evidence that suggests that national economies, political systems, and modes of communication are being increasingly interlinked, and that this impacts upon education plans and programmes. However, it is far from clear whether the predominately Western vision of schooling is understood and enacted in uniform or, even, predictable ways. Identities are unique and under constant development. For many children these identities are increasingly contingent upon standardised values, ways of being, and aspirations. For many others, however, life is a project of finding meaning and a place to survive. Schooling provides that space as children create culture which, in many cases, is derived from much more basic battles for self-understanding, self-determination, equality, and social justice. The extent to which globalisation drives or even significantly influences this project needs to be subject to more investigation.

Our research suggests that children conceptualise and engage in schooling for a range of reasons, in many cases only tangentially related to state and global discourses of progress. For a significant number, schooled identities emerge from the dynamic interplay of lived worlds and modern schooling practices. Many may 'fail' in the terms set by international funding agencies but these very same 'failures' may look upon school as a source of liberation, security, and hope. Others may condemn it for its violence (symbolic and physical) or for the dissonance it creates with everyday rituals, beliefs, and ways of being. Either way, monolithic, totalising approaches to understanding schooling within the frameworks and assumptions of modernisation, technical rationality, or globalisation fail completely to capture the richness, diversity, inconsistency, and complexity of schooling experiences, and thus the schooled identities that emerge from them.

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