Valerie Møller
Denis Huschka
Alex C. Michalos
*Editors*

SOCIAL INDICATORS RESEARCH SERIES 33

# Barometers of Quality of Life Around the Globe

*How Are We Doing?*

Springer

# Barometers of Quality of Life Around the Globe

# Social Indicators Research Series

Volume 33



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# Barometers of Quality of Life Around the Globe

## How Are We Doing?

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# Preface

The idea for this book came from a special plenary session convened during the meeting of the International Society for Quality-of-Life Studies (ISQOLS) held at Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa, 17–20 July 2006. ISQOLS conferences have always brought together social indicators researchers from around the world. However, the economically advantaged members of the Society based in developed countries tend to outnumber others. We hoped this conference might attract a different audience. The 7$^{th}$ ISQOLS conference was to be held for the first time in Africa and we expected a larger proportion of developing country participants and colleagues from Africa. The conference, we thought, offered a unique opportunity to showcase the various social indicators systems operating in different regions of the world.

In Africa social indicators systems are rarely considered a hot topic although the continent is short of reliable statistical information for social development and good governance. By organising a special plenary session on social barometers and social reporting systems around the world, we wanted to demonstrate to our African audience (and to the next generation of quality-of-life scholars) that social indicators studies are exciting and that researchers in this field are passionate about the importance of monitoring quality of life. With this in mind, we invited colleagues from different parts of the world to present the particular social barometer they rely on to assess quality of life in their region. In the conference programme the panel session went under the heading: "How Are We Doing? Quality of Life Surveys around the Globe".

The programme introduced the session as follows:

> Researchers have come to rely on select regional surveys that assess quality-of-life trends in their part of the world. Some of these instruments have been developed specifically as barometers of quality of life or social welfare and typically they measure well-being, living standards and satisfaction with domains in life. Other regional surveys include key indicators of well-being that serve a monitoring purpose. Many of these regional surveys use internationally comparative measures.

> Importantly, regional surveys reflect local culture and development needs. It is often the local nuances that make a difference in capturing the essence of quality of life under very different living conditions and in tune with popular expectations of the good life.

The brief we gave to our panellists was to

> … draw a sketch of the survey or surveys that serve as quality-of-life barometers in your part of the world. Please share with conference participants the most fascinating trends you have observed in the survey results in the new millennium.

We invited Alex Michalos to chair the session. He did a marvellous job. Somehow he managed to get our experts to take us on a state-of-the-art tour of social surveys in Europe, the Arctic, Africa, Latin America, the Philippines, and Australia in a record 90 min. In fact, Alex was himself so impressed by this indicator tour de force that he suggested we develop the power-point presentations into a proper book for Springer's Social Indicators Series. What is more, he volunteered to write the introduction and co-edit the volume with us. And these decisions were also taken during the 90-minute session that finished on time before the coffee break on the morning of the second day of the conference.

Word of the session must have travelled because we received further offers post-conference of reports on the newer Asian barometer that we had overlooked. We are delighted to include these unsolicited contributions in this book to round off the global picture.

By bringing together in one volume introductions to social barometers applied in a total of over 100 countries, we hope to give a better overview of the many similarities but also the distinct differences in survey efforts to measure quality of life worldwide.

Grahamstown — Valerie Møller
Berlin — Denis Huschka

# Acknowledgements

Our sincere thanks go to Alex Michalos for his initial enthusiasm and then for his willingness to see the project through to publication. We could not have wished for a better co-editor! Our colleague Nova de Villiers in the Institute of Social and Economic Research assisted with her thoughtful language-editing. Esther Otten from Springer has been both helpful and patient with us. We are indebted to our peer reviewers: Laura Camfield, Timothy Hinks, Filomena Maggino, Chong-Min Park, Ruut Veenhoven, and Joachim Vogel provided useful feedback on six chapters in the volume. Some of our authors not only produced their own papers for this volume but also agreed to comment on the papers prepared by fellow contributors. This peer review arrangement seemed most appropriate as all our authors are leading international experts in the field. Lastly, we thank all our contributors for sharing their knowledge and enthusiasm to ensure that the social indicator movement continues to thrive in the new millennium. The quality of life of all of us on the planet may depend on it.

# Contents

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# Introduction: An Overview of the Larger View

**Alex C. Michalos**

As I write this introduction, members of the International Society for Quality of Life Studies are engaged in preparing a fairly large two-volume *Handbook of Social Indicators and Quality of Life Research* under the general editorship of Ken Land. The second volume in that collection will include regional, country and perhaps city-level investigations. Given the relatively huge current interest in social indicators/quality of life research around the world at all levels of political organization, there is much more information available than anyone could put into a single volume or small set of volumes. Nevertheless, members of ISQOLS feel an obligation to try to gather up the disparate pieces from across the globe and to present interested readers with some kind of running jump into the current literature. As Valerie and Denis explained in their Preface, this volume is part of our fulfillment of that obligation. On their journey through the papers in this collection, readers will discover that there is a great deal to be learned about our field of study and a great deal of satisfaction to be obtained from that learning. I am grateful to Valerie and Denis for inviting me to contribute to this interesting and important volume.

Our focus on social barometers picks up a metaphor often used in the field. In their contribution to this volume, Mangahas and Guerrero remarked that they called their social monitoring system in 1981 the Social Weather Stations Project "on the idea that surveys can serve like observation posts to monitor social conditions, much as meteorological stations monitor weather conditions". In Noll's contribution, one reads about the development of the Eurobarometer since its first survey in 1974, perhaps the first usage of the metaphor. (Some readers may recall that the first issue of *Social Indicators Research* appeared in May 1974.)

In over 30 years of publication of *Social Indicators Research*, many authors have illustrated a great variety of ways to represent the multidimensional space of diverse concepts of quality of life with some kind of unidimensional scale. Such reductions are designed to simplify complicated collections of statistical time series and are practically bound to oversimplification. Nevertheless, as Saltelli (2007) and others have explained, for purposes of communication in the popular press, simplicity is very important, even simplicity at the risk of oversimplification (Michalos et al., 2007).

ISQOLS formed a Committee for Societal QOL Indexes in 2000, under the chairmanship of Michael Hagerty, with the aim of evaluating 22 well-known indexes against a set of 14 generally accepted adequacy criteria. The report of the committee was published in Hagerty et al. (2001). Of the 22 indexes examined in that report, only two are discussed in this volume, namely, the Eurobarometer and the UNDP's Human Development Index. So, that report provides a good supplement to the papers in this volume.

A more substantial supplement was published by Sirgy et al. (2006) with the somewhat grand title of "The quality-of-life (QOL) research movement: past, present and future". While the authors of this overview intended to provide a world-wide perspective, close examination of its contents reveals an Anglo-Saxon-North American bias. The bias can be adjusted to some extent with the help of reviews by Noll (2002), Berger-Schmitt and Jankowitsch (1999), several papers in Glatzer, Von Below and Stoffregen (2004), and the present volume. More importantly, perhaps, given the relatively lengthy but biased report contained in Sirgy et al. the absence of a review in the present volume of North American developments may be excused. Interested readers may consult the papers and books cited above and below to round out their picture of what has been happening around the globe.

Noll's contribution to this volume is properly subtitled "Rich sources for quality of life research" because the diverse cultures, regions and great number of research centres and research instruments available in Europe have combined to produce a magnificent mine of social indicators research. In the concluding section of his paper, granting that there are problems with "cross-country comparability", Noll celebrates the diversity of approaches used in the European surveys as providing "an experimental setting, enhancing the research potential by providing additional opportunities to study the implications of using the one or the other measurement approach".

Beginning after the Eurobarometer that included nine nations, the first European Values Study (EVS) survey occurred in 1981 covering ten Western European countries. In 1990 more European countries, Canada and the USA were added, and by 1999–2000 there were 33 countries. While the EVS is run relatively infrequently, the Eurobarometer surveys occur in the spring and fall of every year, giving a database covering over 30 years. The European Community Household Panel Study (ECHP) was a longitudinal annual survey running for eight years, 1994–2001. The European Social Survey began in 2002/2003, and the European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) in 2003. One of the most attractive features of the European Social Survey, in Noll's view (which I share), is that it is based on a eudaimonic rather than a hedonic concept of wellbeing. While hedonists emphasize "positive feelings" following the historic tradition of Protagoras, eudaimonists emphasize "being well and doing well" in Aristotle's phrase or "positive doings and functionings" in Amartya Sen's phrase. The several barometers of conditions and changes in European countries reveal "a remarkable agreement among Europeans across all the EU-member states that the state of health, income and family life are the most important determinants of a 'good life'". In fact, these core components may be traced as far back as the Greek poet Hesiod in the late seventh century BCE (Michalos, 2009).

Concluding his contribution, Noll wrote that "if one expects that quality of life research faces a bright future in Europe it is not only due to the richness of data, but also due to the fact that enhancing quality of life in all member states is among the major policy goals of the European Union". Good supplements to this paper may be found in Hagerty et al. (2002) and Vogel (2003).

Mangahas and Guerrero trace the origins of the Philippine Social Weather Stations to a social indicators project of 1973 whose aim was to measure progress toward the "achievement of the important goals of Philippine society as a whole". Anticipating the goals of the Brundtland Commission by over a decade, the Philippine project focused its attention on "(a) the fairness of sharing among people of today and (b) the adequacy of provision for people of the future". Unlike the European reports that were routinely published as planned, the first "Social Weather Report" was suppressed early in 1983 because it revealed "mostly unfavorable opinions on inflation, crime, corruption and the burden of taxation". Shortly thereafter, the project was terminated, but in 1985 a new NGO was born, calling itself the Social Weather Stations (SWS) and sponsored by the Bishops-Businessmen's Conference for Human Development. As of August 30, 2007, the SWS Survey Data Bank of Philippine surveys "includes 321 datasets . . . containing 37,789 items . . . based on 330,146 interviews". In a wonderfully moving passage, Mangahas and Guerrero wrote that

> The SWS mission statement is phrased in a definite order: data should be generated, firstly, to stimulate the eye; secondly, to influence the heart; and finally to guide the mind . . . Interestingly enough, most criticisms of the Social Weather Reports come from government officials, whose seeming function is to do the opposite: to send non-signals to the general public, and to put sensitive topics away from public debate as much as possible . . . Generating and publicizing alternative statistics is an activity that helps to put its subject matter higher on the agenda of public and private policy makers . . . If SWS polling becomes controversial, we accept it as part of the trade.

We are fortunate that these authors remind us that social indicators research is not only an interesting academic exercise but a politically sensitive and necessary exercise with profound implications for improving democratic discussions and debates, and finally, the real quality of life of people.

The contribution by Shin in this volume is a fine follow-up to the comprehensive collection published in *Social Indicators Research*, i.e., *The Quality of Life in Korea: Comparative and Dynamic Perspective*, by Shin et al. (2003). Theoretically called a Special Issue, it filled two full volumes (62 & 63) of the journal. The Korea Barometer Surveys described by Shin here began in 1988 "with the installation of the democratic Sixth Republic". With ten national surveys running from October 1988 to July 2004, the Korea Barometer provides an extraordinary record of changes in the quality of life of a country in transition "from a low-income country into an economic powerhouse ... from a repressive military dictatorship into a maturing democracy ... from a nation of mostly rural people into one of urbanites ... .[and] from a nation with a predominately traditional Confucian culture into a multi-cultural nation ...". Summarizing his findings, Shin remarked that "Koreans neither interpret nor value democracy in the same way as Westerners do", and that, unfortunately, "democratization, globalization, industrialization, urbanization, and many other changes that have taken place in Korea during the past two decades have not contributed to the building of a nation of greater well-being. Instead, those changes have transformed the country into a nation of lesser well-being".

Graham's contribution to the volume compared results from the 2001 Latinobarometro with pooled data from the U.S. General Social Survey from 1973 to 1998 and the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey of 2000. She provided a fine illustration of how attitudinal surveys from diverse parts of the globe could reveal new insights and provoke new research questions and problems for policy makers. In the last sentence of the first paragraph of her conclusion she captured several of the unresolved problems for both policy makers and researchers who are interested in attitudinal surveys, and urged caution all around. In particular, she mentioned problems related to "the happy peasant, adaptations and set points, hyperbolic discounting, and the absence of clarity on a definition of happiness". In the earlier parts of the same paragraph, she used the terms "happiness", "quality of life", "well being" and "welfare" as names of dependent variables of interest in this kind of research. More precision in our usage of all these terms will be required if we are to make and measure progress in this field. Among her most interesting findings from the Latin American data, she discovered that

> the non-linear relationship between income and happiness holds for countries that are at very low levels of GDP per capita, like Honduras and Guatemala. Earlier literature on the developed economies posited that non-linearities set in well after basic needs were met, at roughly $10,000 per capita. The Latin America results suggest that the level is much lower . . . [and as others have found] Average country income levels had no significant effects on happiness in any of the countries we studied, even the very poor ones, while relative income differences dominated.

The Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic (SLiCA) reported by Kruse and Poppel and their colleagues represents another collaborative initiative involving eight countries and many more indigenous people and communities. Quite modestly the authors remark that "What may be distinct about SLiCA is its intent that a multi-disciplinary group of social scientists and indigenous people work together to redefine and measure living conditions in a region spanning 30 degrees of latitude around the globe". It took them about three years and eleven workshops to craft their questionnaire, which included "950 variables per respondent" and "7,200 observations", and it took about six years (2001–2006) to collect data. Respondents were divided into approximately 76% Inuit from Canada, Greenland and Alaska, and 24% Chukchi, Evan, Chuvan and Yukagir from Chukotka in Russia. As reported in other regions of the world concerning other people, in this collection and elsewhere, "Inuit adults who receive a poverty level personal income (60 percent or less of the median income in their indigenous settlement region) are less likely to be very satisfied with their life as a whole than adults who receive higher personal incomes (32 versus 43 percent). But at higher levels of personal income, the level of income is not always associated with a higher likelihood of being very satisfied with life as a whole". Results from the SLiCA will be essential building blocks for an "Arctic Social Indicators system".

The contribution of Cummins et al. briefly describes the construction and application of the Australian Unity Wellbeing Index (AUWI), which is composed of a Personal Wellbeing Index (PWI) and a National Wellbeing Index (NWI). The PWI is based on an average of respondents' reported levels of personal satisfaction with 7 domains of their own lives (e.g., health, personal relationships) and the NWI is based on an average of respondents' reported levels of personal satisfaction with 6 domains of national life (e.g., the economy, the environment). The PWI and NWI are not aggregated. The first application of the AUWI occurred in a national survey in April 2001 and the current report covers results of 17 such surveys. The AUWI is grounded in Cummins' Theory of Subjective Wellbeing Homeostasis and supporting evidence for the theory is reported in this contribution as well as in several other publications by Cummins and his colleagues. One of the most interesting findings here concerns the rise in the PWI following the *bad news* of the disaster at the Twin Towers in New York in Sept 2001 and the *good news* of the performance of the Australian Olympic team in Athens in August 2004. For these curious results, the authors offer the following possible explanation.

> While both threat and enhancement events appear to have caused wellbeing to rise, the reason for each rise should be different. From a sociobiological perspective, a rise in population satisfaction through social bonding would be an adaptive response to threat. The rise in wellbeing due to nationally enhancing events, however, has no such adaptive links and is more simply explained in the personal pride of association with a winning team.

At a minimum, the existence of such interesting and somewhat anomalous results remind us that social indicators researchers must be prepared to draw upon more than one theory to account for the variety of responses obtained following diverse kinds of events.

In his contribution to this volume, Mattes described the Afrobarometer as "a systematic, cross-national survey of public attitudes in sub-Saharan Africa". The main scale used in the survey is called the Lived Poverty Index (LPI) and it is constructed by averaging five possible responses to five items formatted in the same way, i.e., "Over the past year, how often, if ever have you or your family gone without ...?" (e.g., enough food to eat, enough clean water for home use). The possible responses are "never" (= 0), "just once or twice" (= 1), "several times" (= 2), "many times" (= 3) and "always" (= 4). Results of three rounds of national surveys are discussed, including 12 countries in 1999–2001, 16 countries in 2002–2003 and 18 countries in 2005–2006 (with 25,359 responses in the third round). One of the most interesting findings related to the LPI is that "while lived poverty has weak if not perverse linkages with GDP growth, it has moderately strong and predictable linkages with democratization ... the more a country expanded political liberties and political rights between 2003 and 2005, the lower its level of lived poverty in 2005 ($r = -.625^{**}$)". Møller (1997) would be a good supplement to this paper.

In the last paper of the collection, Inoguchi and Fujii describe the AsiaBarometer as "a regional opinion survey project regularly conducted in a broader East Asia encompassing East, Southeast, South and Central Asia with a focus on daily lives of ordinary people". The project included national surveys in 10 countries of Asia in 2003, 13 countries in East and Southeast Asia in 2004, 14 countries in South and Central Asia in 2005, 7 countries in East Asia in 2006 and 6 countries in Southeast Asia in 2007. Two of the countries surveyed in 2005 (Turkmenistan and Bhutan) had never had any opinion surveys before. The first wave of surveys were funded by "donations from some dozen business firms", and quite generally the AsiaBarometer has been marketed as an instrument for creating regional free trade. "To facilitate and accelerate the generation of such a regional space," the authors wrote, "one must become truly regional, continuously monitoring regional market and non-market forces. Such monitoring exercises must include the monitoring of hearts and minds of people on the street. Not only economic and financial but also social, psychological and political forces unfolding in each country must be grasped systematically on a regional scale". Sensitivity to local cultures, issues, aspirations and languages are emphasized at every step of the development of the surveys, from questionnaire construction to analysis and dissemination of results. As reported by others in this collection, Inoguchi and Fujii remark that "Economic development brings about the improvement of income level, but it does not enhance social stability and sense of security". Good supplements to this paper may be found in Bowles and Woods (2000), Tang (2000), Shin et al. (2003), and Shek et al. (2005).

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# European Survey Data: Rich Sources for Quality of Life Research

**Heinz-Herbert Noll**

**Abstract** The availability and accessibility of information on quality of life issues has much improved in recent years due to a considerable number of supranational European survey programmes. While some of these survey programmes go back as far as the 1970s, others have been established more recently. This article aims to provide basic information on the most important European surveys of this sort and to assess their potential as well as their specific advantages and limitations from a quality of life research point of view. As it turns out, the surveys under review provide rich sources for comparative European quality of life research and although these data have been used for numerous empirical studies and publications in recent years, it seems that this potential has still not been fully tapped.

**Keywords** Europe · quality of life · subjective well-being · survey data · comparative research

The booming interest in research on quality of life and its subjective perceptions and assessments that observers noticed in Europe recently is to a considerable degree due to the much improved availability and accessibility of respective survey data. While the Eurobarometer as well as the European Values Study had been established during the 1970s and early 1980s, the scientific community faced major improvements in the supply of survey data on quality of life issues after the mid-1990s when a series of new European Survey-Programmes was launched.

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V. Møller et al. (eds.), *Barometers of Quality of Life Around the Globe*,

- The European Community Household Panel as a longitudinal data base providing information on various aspects of Quality of Life, including Subjective Well-Being (SWB).
- The European Social Survey including questions on quality of life and SWB in its standard part, but also in its changing modules.
- The European Quality of Life Survey launched by the European Foundation for the improvement of Living and Working Conditions.

Compared to other regions of the world, European quality of life researchers thus find themselves in a very favourable situation by having access to a variety of rich data sources allowing for comparative empirical studies on various aspects of the quality of life of European citizens. The following article aims to provide some basic information about each of the surveys mentioned and to assess their potential and their specific advantages and limitations from a quality of life research point of view.[1] The review will treat some of the surveys in more and some in less detail, however. Although there are also national surveys offering valuable data for quality of life research in several European countries[2], this article is limited to supranational surveys covering larger numbers of European societies and allowing for comparative cross-national or cross-cultural research.

## European Values Study

The European Values Study (EVS) is a survey research programme initiated by a group of academics in the late 1970s, which at present is conducted under the auspices of the EVS-Foundation. Major aims pursued by the EVS are to explore the values Europeans are sharing and to monitor their change over time, to study the significance of Christian values in European life and culture and to analyse the moral and social values underlying European social and political institutions. The strong focus of the EVS on social values and attitudes, perceptions and personal evaluations of the individual and societal environment makes this survey programme an interesting and valuable data source for quality of life research as well.[3]

The first EVS survey took place in 1981 covering 10 Western European societies, but since the project also attracted interest outside Europe the same questionnaire has been used in a number of other countries, resulting in a data set that covered 26 nations altogether. A second wave of the EVS was launched in 1990 in the majority of European countries, including Switzerland, Austria and countries in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in the US and Canada.[4] In 1999/2000 the third round of EVS surveys was launched and fieldwork was conducted in almost all European countries, except Norway, Switzerland and some of the former Yugoslavian nations. It now covered 33 countries, including Turkey and Russia. A further EVS wave is scheduled for 2008.

The EVS focuses clearly on subjective issues and indicators. Objective quality of life components are rarely covered, except those which are part of the socio-economic background variables. From a quality of life perspective, some of the most interesting issues addressed by the EVS are, among others, life satisfaction, job satisfaction and attitudes towards work, happiness, loneliness, trust in people and institutions, perceived health, religiousness, attitudes towards marriage and the family.

The most comfortable way of getting access to the EVS data is through the EVS-website where EVS data are available for downloading as a file that integrates the data from both value surveys, the EVS and WVS. The EVS-website also allows one to run online-analyses of the data. The EVS has been used already for a considerable number of publications on quality of life issues (e.g. Bray and Gunnell 2006; Fahey and Smyth 2004; Gundelach and Kreiner 2004) and continues to be a most interesting data source for this sort of research for several reasons.

Due to the large number of European countries covered, the European map of subjective well-being can perhaps best be drawn by using the database of the European Value Study. The average life satisfaction scores (scale 1–10) from the EVS 1999/2000 reveal remarkable differences in the distribution of subjective well-being across Europe. Basically the former EU-15 countries are filling the upper ranks, followed by the Eastern European new member states of the European Union and some other non-member countries in the east of Europe (Fig. 1).




**Fig. 1** Life satisfaction in Europe 1999/2000
Database: European Values Study; scale: 1 (extremely dissatisfied) to 10 (extremely satisfied).

Within the EU-15 countries, southern Europeans – including the French – usually turn out to be less satisfied with their lives than people in the north and west of Europe. If we look at the enlarged Union, this north–south gradient has been supplemented if not replaced by a west–east gradient. There are some interesting exceptions. These include Malta which does not fit into the southern cluster, and Slovakia and the Czech Republic which – in terms of the average level of subjective well-being – do much better than most of the other new member states in Eastern Europe.

Since the EVS does not only include numerous countries, but also countries at rather different levels of living, it has frequently been used to study the association between material and subjective well-being.[5] As can be seen from Fig. 2, there seems to be a clear positive correlation between life satisfaction and GDP per head as a measure of living standards at the national level from a cross-sectional perspective. Life satisfaction on average turns out to be the higher, the higher the level of GDP per capita. The stronger correlation at the lower end of the income scale has been explained by a number of scholars as a result of the law of diminishing returns of income.

One should keep in mind, however, that wealthy nations differ from poorer nations not only in terms of GDP, but in many other aspects of their living conditions and institutional characteristics, e.g. the health care and educational systems, transportation facilities, welfare state provisions and not least ‘governance’. In other words, the association between GDP per head and subjective well-being may – at least in part – be due to the indirect effect of other benefits received by people living in wealthier nations rather than to the direct effects of income and material wealth.




**Fig. 2** Life satisfaction by GDP per capita (PPP)
Database: Life Satisfaction: European Values Study; GDP per Capita: OECD.

Another comparative advantage of the EVS as a data source for quality of life research is its strong focus on values with a special emphasis on religion, which opens a variety of opportunities not only to study associations between value orientations and subjective well-being within nations, but also to explore the impact of cultural differences across societies as a possible explanation of international gradients in subjective well-being. Although 'culture' has frequently been used as a 'black box' to account for unexplained variance in cross-country studies of SWB, there are surprisingly few attempts as yet to illuminate this box and to identify the cultural elements and mechanisms accounting for intercultural gradients in SWB.

## Eurobarometer

The Eurobarometer is a survey carried out on behalf of the European Commission;[6] it thus covers each of the member states of the Union, including eventual candidate countries. The first standard Eurobarometer Survey was launched by the Commission of the European Community in 1974,[7] designed to provide a regular monitoring of attitudes, opinions, perceptions and evaluations of the citizens of the by then nine member nations: France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, and Luxembourg. Standard Eurobarometer surveys are carried out in the spring and fall of each year. The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CCEB) surveys have been conducted since 2001 to collect information from the countries applying to become members of the European Union in a way that allows direct comparison with the standard Eurobarometer surveys.

For most of the countries covered the samples of Eurobarometer surveys include ca. 1000 respondents. Besides general social and political attitudes and public opinion concerning the policies of the European Commission and European integration, the perceived quality of life is among the major issues focused on by the Eurobarometer surveys. The inclusion of questions on life satisfaction,[8] happiness,[9] domain satisfactions – e.g. satisfaction with democracy – and other issues of the subjective perception and evaluation of individual quality of life from the beginning of the Eurobarometer was not least due to Ronald Inglehart's involvement in the design of this survey programme. In addition to the so-called Standard Eurobarometers, this survey programme also includes Special Eurobarometers addressing varying special themes such as – for example – quality of life in general (1999), the quality of work life (2001), poverty and social exclusion (1993, 2001). Of particular interest for quality of life researchers is (not least) the most recent Special Eurobarometer on ‘European Social Reality’ (2006), which ‘covers opinions and feelings about a vast array of the dimensions of social, economical, political and everyday life of the European citizens offering a great deal of information about life in the European Union at the end of 2006’ (European Commission 2007b:3). This special survey includes some of the standard well-being indicators, but also addresses issues not that frequently touched on as for example ‘the family as support network’, ‘facilities for children in the local area’, ‘leisure time activities and voluntary work’, ‘future expectations and concerns’ and the ‘perception of poverty and social exclusion’.

Access to the Eurobarometer survey data is provided through the Consortium for Political and Social Research and the German Central Data Archive in Cologne. Up to now, the Eurobarometer data have been used for numerous research projects and publications on quality of life issues (e.g. Inglehart and Rabier 1986; Christoph and Noll 2003; Gallie 2003; Noll and Weick 2003; Delhey 2004).

From my personal point of view, there are three characteristics, which make the Eurobarometer data particularly attractive for quality of life research:

(1) The combination of long-term monitoring and international comparison: The Eurobarometer is one of the few if not the only data source allowing




**Fig. 3** Life satisfaction – selected EU-countries 1973–2003 (% very/fairly satisfied) Database: Eurobarometer.

for the analysis of longer-term changes in quality of life components, in particular subjective well-being, from a comparative point of view. Figure 3 displays time series data for some of the countries over a period of 30 years beginning in 1973

As the time series of life satisfaction over the three decades reveal, there is not much change of SWB across time in the majority of European countries selected and even the rank order seems to be rather stable in most of the cases. However, the graph also demonstrates, that life satisfaction is not generally time-invariant, since there are significant temporal changes in some cases, particularly as far as southern European societies are concerned.

A closer look at selected countries provides further evidence for the assumption, that temporal stability and change in SWB might vary considerably across countries. If we look at the cases of France and Ireland (Fig. 4), we find almost perfect examples of the kind of association once introduced by Richard Easterlin and sometimes referred to as the ‘Easterlin Paradox’: Although both societies enjoyed a strong growth of GDP per head and thus a considerable improvement in average living standards from 1973 to 2003, there is no respective increase of SWB at all, just some cyclical variation in the case of France and a literally flat line in the case of Ireland. In consequence, by studying these two countries, one would conclude that ‘rising incomes doesn’t make us any happier’ as Easterlin (1974) has put it once. But does this generally mean that there is no chance for poorer countries to catch up and to raise their level of well-being by economic growth?




**Fig. 4** Growth of material wealth and changes in life satisfaction
Database: Eurobarometer Surveys; OECD, own calculations.

Although the absence of an association between economic growth and SWB has been found for many countries, it still remains to be verified that this finding establishes a general pattern or even law to be observed in all countries in each of their stages of development. This is at least the message that we might learn from the examples of Greece and Portugal (Fig. 4). In both cases it seems as if economic growth and an increase in SWB were going hand in hand in a specific period and up to a certain level of economic development, before the latter stops growing any further. But this is just a preliminary observation as yet and it is obvious that we still need more empirical evidence and theoretical insights concerning this fundamental question on the relation between economic growth and SWB.

(2) Biannual survey cycle: it is also an interesting characteristic of the Eurobarometer programme that surveys are carried out twice a year, one in spring-time and one in fall. One of the advantages of such a programme is the – compared to other cross-sectional surveys – much improved potential to study and control the impact, which certain events may have on respondents' SWB.

Table 1 displays the results on life satisfaction for spring and fall 2001 and thus provides at least some empirical evidence as to whether the terrible events of September 11 might have had an impact on peoples subjective well-being in European nations.

Comparing the life satisfaction figures before and after September 11, there is not much reason to believe that there was a significant decline in SWB due to this event for the EU-15 in general, but we find some evidence for a slight decrease in SWB between the spring and fall surveys in some countries, such as Ireland and Belgium.

(3) Rich variety of questions addressing diverse dimensions and components of quality of life: A third advantage of the Eurobarometer is the rich variety of questions used to address diverse quality of life issues. Moreover, some of the questions used in the Eurobarometer surveys are rather innovative and go beyond the conventional pool of questions usually found in national as well as international quality of life surveys. Just to give a few examples:

Satisfaction with own society: Unfortunately only once so far – in 2001 – the Eurobarometer carried a question on how satisfied respondents are with their own society, accounting for the fact that quality of life is not only a matter of individual happiness and life circumstances, but also a matter of societal conditions, the quality and performance of institutions, the quality of governance and the like. Figure 5 compares the satisfaction with one's life and society in the former EU-15 member states and reveals interesting differences between the two.

**Table 1** Life satisfaction: Eurobarometer spring/fall 2001

| | % very satisfied | | % rather satisfied | | % not satisfied | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | April – May | October – November | April – May | October – November | April – May | October – November |
| Denmark | 62 | 64 | 35 | 32 | 3 | 4 |
| Netherlands | 48 | 47 | 47 | 47 | 5 | 6 |
| Sweden | 41 | 41 | 54 | 55 | 5 | 4 |
| Ireland | 37 | 31 | 53 | 59 | 10 | 7 |
| Luxembourg | 34 | 37 | 58 | 56 | 7 | 6 |
| United Kingdom | 30 | 31 | 57 | 58 | 13 | 11 |
| Belgium | 26 | 18 | 59 | 66 | 14 | 15 |
| Austria | 24 | 27 | 61 | 59 | 13 | 12 |
| Finland | 23 | 22 | 64 | 67 | 12 | 11 |
| EU 15 | 21 | 21 | 62 | 62 | 16 | 16 |
| Spain | 18 | 21 | 67 | 63 | 14 | 15 |
| Italy | 16 | 15 | 63 | 66 | 20 | 19 |
| Germany | 16 | 18 | 67 | 65 | 17 | 17 |
| France | 15 | 14 | 65 | 64 | 19 | 20 |
| Greece | 9 | 9 | 48 | 51 | 43 | 40 |
| Portugal | 7 | 7 | 62 | 58 | 31 | 35 |

Source: The data have been taken from Eurobarometer Reports 55 and 56. See http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/standard_en.htm.


**Fig. 5** Satisfaction with life and society – 2001 (EU-15)
Database: Eurobarometer 2001 (56.1).

For all the 15 countries, satisfaction with the society they live in is lower than their personal life satisfaction,[10] but obviously there is also much more variation across countries concerning people's satisfaction with the society they live in than satisfaction with their own life. Thus the gap between the two elements of SWB turns out to be considerable in most of the countries. While the percentage of those satisfied with their own life falls below 80% only in two countries, satisfaction with society falls below 50% in seven out of the 15 countries and reaches a minimum in Italy with only 25%.

Worth mentioning is also a question asking respondents directly for the factors contributing most to their quality of life. The results reveal that there obviously is a remarkable agreement among Europeans across all the EU-member states that the state of health, income and family life are the most important determinants of a 'good life' (Delhey 2004: 39). This finding confirms precisely the results reported already by Cantril (1965) in his famous cross-national study on 'The Pattern of Human Concerns' and demonstrates impressively the universality of the basic notions of a 'good life'. The proof that 'most people base their judgments of well-being on essentially the same considerations' does not only make sure that comparisons of happiness among groups of individuals are meaningful (Easterlin 2004, 27), but is moreover an essential precondition of cross-national and cross-cultural survey research on quality of life issues.

A question that only recently has made its way into the Eurobarometer is asking respondents to compare quality of life in Europe with that of the U.S., Japan, China and India. The results reveal that a majority of the Europeans believe that European societies provide a better quality of life than other




**Fig. 6** Quality of life in Europe and elsewhere
Source: Eurobarometer Report 64: 173 (http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_en.pdf)

regions of the world (Fig. 6). Interestingly enough, respondents in the new member states of the European Union, who on average do not yet enjoy the same level of living and quality of live as people in the 'old' member states, are far less convinced that quality of life in Europe is better than in Japan and the United States.

## European Community Household Panel Study (ECHP)[11]

The European Community Household Panel Study (ECHP) is a longitudinal annual survey of a representative sample of households and individuals, which was carried out by Eurostat, the statistical institute of the European Union. The ECHP ran for eight years – 1994–2001 – in the by then 12 member states of the European Union.[12] Austria and Finland joined the ECHP in 1995 and 1996 respectively. In the first wave the ECHP had a sample size of some 60,500 households and approximately 130,000 individuals aged 16 years and over. The size of national samples varies within a range of ca. 3,000–6,000 households.

The ECHP covered a wide range of quality of life topics related to objective living conditions as well as subjective well-being. Although there is a special thematic focus on income and employment, the ECHP also provides detailed information on education, housing, health, family relations and other quality of life domains. The ECHP does not include a life satisfaction variable, but carries a range of questions concerning domain satisfactions.

The ECHP microdata are accessible for research purposes, but data use is not free of charge and requires an 'ECHP research contract' concluded between the institution/organisation concerned and Eurostat. The ECHP has been used so far for numerous research projects and publications in various fields and disciplines including quality of life issues (e.g. Christoph and Noll 2003; Clark 2006; Diaz-Serrano 2006; Seghieri et al. 2006) and among the latter many studies on job satisfaction (e.g. Diaz-Serrano and Viera 2006; Kaiser 2005; Kristensen and Westergard-Nielsen 2004).

The particular advantages of the ECHP, making it a unique source for cross-national comparative quality of life research are the – compared to other quality of life surveys – large sample size and its longitudinal character, which provides particular opportunities for advanced designs of analysis. Due to the rich information on the employment situation and living standards of households and individuals, the ECHP moreover offers exceptional possibilities for detailed analysis of the associations between objective living conditions and subjective evaluations in terms of satisfaction and other indicators of subjective well-being. An example of the latter is an analysis by Christoph and Noll (2003) demonstrating that a considerable part of the total variation in individual satisfaction with housing and people's financial situation across countries is actually due to differences in objective housing and income conditions. The authors conclude that the ‘analysis revealed that satisfaction levels are to a large extent due to the objective living conditions of the individual citizens in the respective country, since satisfaction differences diminish substantially after controlling for corresponding variables’ (Christoph and Noll 2003:542).

## European Quality of Life Survey

The *European Quality of Life Survey* (EQLS) is a recently established representative survey launched by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.[13] The EQLS is one of the few surveys specifically designed for quality of life measurement. It was carried out for the first time in 2003 and covers the by then 25 member states of the European Union as well as the former and current accession countries Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. The focus is on employment, economic resources, family and households, community life and social participation, health and health care, education and training, and thus aims to provide detailed information on a whole range of quality of life issues.[14] Although the survey does not only use subjective indicators, most of the information concerns perceived quality of life. Besides subjective feelings, perceptions and evaluations, the survey also addresses behavioural issues, like participation and involvement in or time spent for certain activities. A second wave of the EQLS was fielded in 2007 but is not yet available for secondary analysis. The comparatively small sample size of around 1000 respondents per country – and even less in some of the small countries – forms one of the limitations of this survey for research purposes.

Although the data from the first round of the European Quality of Life Survey are meanwhile accessible for the scientific community through the British Data Archive,[15] the EQLS has so far almost exclusively been used for research commissioned by the European Foundation. Most of the working papers and reports from research based on this survey are available on the Foundation’s website.

## European Social Survey

The European Social Survey (ESS) is an academically-driven social survey designed to monitor and chart attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of European populations.[16] The project is a collaborative effort involving several European research institutes and universities and is directed by a central coordinating team. The survey was carried out for the first time in 2002/2003, followed by a second wave in 2004/2005 and a third round in 2006/2007; additional waves are planned for the future. The ESS covers more than 20 countries, but there is some variation in participating nations across the different rounds. The fieldwork has been funded through the European Commission's fifth and sixth Framework Programmes, the European Science Foundation and national funding bodies in each country.

The ESS pursues the ambitious aims to:

- Provide reliable information on attitudes towards political, economical and societal developments in Europe
- Enable comparative research (cross-sectional and longitudinal)
- Enable multi-level analyses
- Provide data of the highest quality
- Provide access to data for everybody without costs

Beyond these aims, the ESS is rather ambitious in terms of its methodological rigour and has defined demanding standards in terms of sample quality, non-response, equivalence of scales and question formats etc. As far as its content is concerned, the ESS is made up of various modules, some of them permanent and some of them rotating. Themes which are regularly covered by the ESS and which are of particular interest from a quality of life perspective are among others, trust in institutions, well-being, health and security, values, social capital and social exclusion. Rotating modules directly related to quality of life are 'family, work and well-being' (round 2) and 'personal and social well-being' (round 3).[17]

The 'personal and social well-being' module is particularly innovative as its proposers claim, in that it supplements the 'hedonic' notion of well-being, which has dominated theoretical and empirical studies to date, with the 'eudaimonic' notion.[18] While the hedonic approach emphasises positive feelings, the eudaimonic approach emphasises – referring to Aristotelic philosophy and Amartya Sen's conceptualisation of welfare and human development - positive doings and functionings. The module thus includes questions deduced from both approaches: happiness and satisfaction types of questions from the 'hedonic'; questions addressing self-determination, interest and meaning, aspirations and motivation from the 'eudaimonic' approach. Moreover the module addresses not only dimensions of personal, but also social well-being and pays attention to people's aspirations, norms, values and expectations in order to enhance the understanding of processes of comparison in explaining levels, differences and changes in well-being.

The ESS certainly has defined new standards as far as the timeliness and convenience of getting access to the data is concerned. First versions of the microdata files are usually available at about six to nine months after the completion of field work. Access to the data is provided through the internet via the Norwegian Data Archive.[19] Potential users may either use the 'on-line browsing and analysis' facilities or may directly download the complete dataset(s).

Comparative advantages of the ESS as a source for quality of life research are the concept driven measurement approaches, the amount of methodological efforts invested to ensure representativity, equivalence and comparability and thus the resulting quality of the data. Although the ESS is a rather 'young' survey and data are thus available and accessible only for a few years, they have already been used for various quality of life research questions.[20] However, it is realistic to expect that the availability of this dataset, which is supposed to become richer with each new round, will fuel European quality of life research even more in years to come.

To give a few examples, Fig. 7 presents the average life satisfaction scores for the total population and senior citizens in selected countries covered by the ESS. The chart demonstrates that life satisfaction of the elderly turns out to be lower than that of the average population in some countries, but not generally; in others it even exceeds the general population average.

Another component of subjective well-being addressed by the ESS is how people feel about living on their current household income. As Fig. 8 reveals,




**Fig. 7** Life satisfaction 2004/2005 – total population and the elderly (mean on a scale from 0 to 10)
Database: European Social Survey.




**Fig. 8** Percentage of people who feel they can 'Live Comfortably' on their current income 2004/2005
Database: European Social Survey.

the percentage of people who feel they can live comfortably on their income varies considerably across the 21 countries covered, not only for the elderly, but also for the total population, ranging from 64% in Denmark to only 5% in Poland.

The large variation across countries reflects of course to a large extent the enormous differences in income levels and standards of living within Europe. According to this indicator the elderly obviously are best off in the Nordic countries (except Finland) and Luxembourg and clearly worst off in most of the Southern and Eastern European countries. Interestingly, also, the relation between the elderly and the population average in the notion of living comfortably varies considerably across countries: Although in most of the countries the elderly feel that they live worse than the average population, there are also countries (e.g. Luxembourg, Norway, U.K.) where the percentage of the elderly who feel that they live comfortably on their income exceeds that of the average population.

A well known quality of life indicator used in many national und international surveys which is also part of the ESS standard programme, is the rating of how safe or unsafe people feel 'if they are walking around in their residential area at night'. Figure 9 displays the perceived fear of crime as the percentage of persons feeling *unsafe* or *very unsafe*.




**Fig. 9** Fear of crime across European nations 2004/2005 – total population and the elderly
Database: European Social Survey.

Again there is a substantial variation across the European populations: Whereas people feel rather safe in countries like Slovenia, Finland, Norway and Denmark, people feel rather scared in the U.K., Slovakia, and Estonia. Generally, in terms of feelings of unsafety the ranking of countries is almost identical from the point of view of the elderly and the total population. However, in countries such as Germany and Luxembourg, the elderly seem to be particularly scared compared to the average population, while they are less so in other countries, such as Ireland, Greece and Spain.

## European Quality of Life Surveys Compared – Concluding Remarks

By comparing the various surveys looked at, it is obvious that they have been developing over the years more or less ‘naturally’ and not been designed by a ‘central planning agency’. As a result one finds some overlaps concerning the themes addressed - not only as far as quality of life issues are concerned – as well as methodological singularities and particularities. An example for the latter are identical indicators included in several surveys – e.g. life satisfaction – but at the same time variation in question wordings as well as answering scales used. This and other variations in measurement procedures, sampling etc. turn out to restrict the cross-survey comparability of the data to some extent. On the other hand one may regard methodological variation across surveys more favourably as an experimental setting, even enhancing the research potential by providing additional opportunities to study the implications of using the one or the other measurement approach.

A standard question to measure general subjective well-being in terms of life satisfaction is the one that is used by the European Social Survey: 'All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?' The answering scale runs from '0' (extremely dissatisfied) to '10' (extremely satisfied). The European Values Study uses a similar, but slightly different question: 'All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days' and presents respondents an answering scale running from '1' (dissatisfied) to '10' (satisfied). In Eurobarometer Surveys respondents are being asked: 'On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?'.

Given these variations in question formats and scales, the results are – although not identical – at least quite similar in terms of the country patterns found. Comparing the ESS, EVS and Eurobarometer ranking for a selection of European nations and taking the methodological particularities into account, there is obviously some variation in the rank order, but differences are overall rather modest (Table 2).

As it turns out from our review, each of the surveys reveals particular strengths and limitations:

- One of the advantages of the European Values Study is the large number of countries covered, which goes well beyond the current member and candidate states of the European Union. The enormous differentials in terms of economic, cultural and institutional differences between these countries make the EVS an attractive data source for quality of life studies. Although EVS surveys cover altogether a rather long time period, the periodicity of the survey – it is carried out only every 5–10 years – may be regarded as a limitation, particularly when it comes to monitor short-term changes in quality of life across time.
- Advantages of the Eurobarometer surveys may be seen primarily in the long period of more than three decades covered, the bi-annual survey frequency, the complete coverage of EU member states and candidate countries, and not least the variety of quality of life issues addressed over the years. Limitations of the Eurobarometer are the small samples size – which applies, however, also to some of the other surveys – and the limitations concerning methodological standards and rigour.
- The major strength of the European Community Household Panel Study as a source for quality of life research is its longitudinal character. Moreover it has the by far largest sample size among the surveys under review and provides certainly the best information on a wide range of objective living conditions. Major limitations arise from the comparatively

**Table 2** ESS (2002), EVS (2000) and Eurobarometer (2002) compared: life satisfaction rank order

| ESS | EVS | Rank order difference to ESS | Eurobarometer | Rank order difference to ESS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Denmark | Denmark | 0 | Denmark | 0 |
| Finland | Ireland | 6 | Netherlands | 3 |
| Luxembourg | Austria | 3 | Sweden | 1 |
| Sweden | Finland | −2 | Luxembourg | −1 |
| Netherlands | Netherlands | 0 | Ireland | 3 |
| Austria | Luxembourg | −3 | Finland | −4 |
| Belgium | Sweden | −3 | U.K. | 3 |
| Ireland | Germany | 3 | Spain | 1 |
| Spain | United Kingdom | 1 | Austria | −3 |
| United Kingdom | Belgium | −3 | Belgium | −3 |
| Germany | Slovenia | 2 | Slovenia | 2 |
| Italy | Italy | 0 | Germany | −1 |
| Slovenia | Spain | −4 | Italy | −1 |
| Czech Republic | Czech Republic | 0 | France | 1 |
| France | Portugal | 2 | Czech Republic | −1 |
| Greece | France | −1 | Portugal | 1 |
| Portugal | Greece | −1 | Poland | 1 |
| Poland | Poland | 0 | Greece | −2 |
| Hungary | Hungary | 0 | Hungary | 0 |

small number of countries covered as well as from the fact that it has been discontinued after its last wave in 2001. Another important limitation is the restricted comparability due to replacements of the original sample by national household panels in some countries (U.K., Germany, Luxembourg).

– The European Quality of Life Survey is a survey specialised on quality of life issues and thus of particular interest for this kind of research. Similar to the Eurobarometer it covers all the EU member states and candidate countries. Limitations are the comparatively small sample size, limited methodological standards applied and the fact, that currently only a first wave of the survey exists.
– The European Social Survey is most ambitious in terms of methodological rigour and a concept-driven measurement approach. These features – together with the fact that quality of life issues are explicitly among the social issues addressed – make the ESS a most attractive source for quality of life research. Weaknesses may be seen in the limited sample size as well as in the somewhat varying inclusion of countries.

Taking all things together, there is no doubt that the surveys reviewed provide rich sources for comparative quality of life research in Europe. This has been proved already by numerous pieces of research making use of the available data sets. However, if one expects that quality of life research faces a bright future in Europe it is not only due to the richness of data, but also due to the fact that enhancing quality of life in all the member states is among the major policy goals of the European Union. The recent Special Eurobarometer Survey on 'European Social Reality' (see above) for example has been launched by the Commission among other purposes to better understand why 'many Europeans question whether the net effect of globalisation, liberalism and the drive for better competitiveness adds to their well-being' and with a view 'to build a consensus on the common social challenges facing Europeans' (European-Commission 2007a). Thus, in years to come there seems to be a good chance that quality of life research will play an increasingly important role not only in the academic field, but also as a means in European policy making.

## Notes

1. Two other surveys, which are also providing valuable information for quality of life research, will be excluded from this review: (1) the Euromodule-Survey which was carried out only once in 1998 (Delhey et al. 2002) and (2) the International Social Survey Programme –ISSP (http://www.issp.org/index.shtml), which currently covers more than 20 European nations, but is not limited to Europe.
2. See e.g. the German Welfare Survey (http://www.gesis.org/en/social_monitoring/social_indicators/data/ws/ws_intro.htm), the Swedish Living Conditions Surveys (Vogel 2001), or some of the national Household Panel Panel studies, e.g. the British BHPS, the German SOEP or the Swiss SHP.
3. Details about the history, organisation, and programme of the EVS can be found at the EVS-website: http://www.europeanvalues.nl/.
4. Ronald Inglehart played a major role in coordinating the EVS surveys carried out in non-European nations and became later the principal investigator and chairman of the World Values Survey Association, which separately from the EVS organised World Value Surveys (WVS) in 1995, 2000 and 2005.
5. Due to the fact that the EVS covers eastern European countries in its 1990 as well as 1999/2000 surveys makes it also an attractive source for the study of quality of life changes in the course of the transformation processes of the former socialist societies (see e.g. Sanfey, Teksoz 2005).
6. For detailed information see http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm.
7. Some pilot surveys had already been carried out in previous years.
8. The question " 'On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?' " has been asked regularly since 1973.
9. The question " 'Taking all things together, how would you say things are these days – would you say you're very happy, fairly happy or not too happy these days' " was introduced in 1975 and repeated in numerous subsequent Eurobarometer surveys.

10. This result may at least to some extent be considered as a manifestation of the more general observation that individuals tend to assess their own personal life circumstances less critically than societal conditions, which they can neither control nor are directly responsible for.
11. For more information on the ECHP see: http://epunet.essex.ac.uk/echp.php and http://qb.soc.surrey.ac.uk/surveys/echp/echpintro.htm.
12. After its termination the ECHP was replaced by the " 'European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions' " (EU-SILC). Contrary to the ECHP, the EU-SILC provides neither fully input harmonised nor panel data in a strict sense, although it has a longitudinal component. Rather it is based on an EU-wide harmonised data collection programme implemented through official national surveys. Unfortunately also the collection of data on subjective well-being has been discontinued within EU-SILC.
13. For more information on the European Foundation and the EQLS see http://www.-eurofound.eu.int/.
14. For a detailed analysis of subjective well-being based on this survey see Böhnke (2005).
15. See http://www.data-archive.ac.uk.
16. For detailed information on the ESS see http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/.
17. The proposals for rotating modules are available at the European Social Survey website. The data from round 3 have been made available subsequentlysince fall 2007.
18. This distinction between 'hedonic' and 'eudaimonic' approaches corresponds largely to another distinction found in the literature between 'utilitarian' as opposed to 'capabilities or human development' approaches (Noll 2004: 159f).
19. Access to the archive is provided from the ESS-website.
20. See e.g. Berger-Schmitt (2004), Kafetsios (2006) and Lima, Novo (2006).

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# Two Decades of Social Weather Reporting in the Philippines[1]

**Mahar Mangahas and Linda Luz B. Guerrero**

**Abstract** For over two decades, Social Weather Stations (www.sws.org.ph), a non-stock, non-profit private scientific institute, has been generating a steady stream of survey-based national statistics on the quality of life (QOL, which is intended to include the quality of governance),[2] and public opinion in the Philippines. Its historical background[3] is the development of QOL-measurement principles (1974–75), the demonstration of the use of social surveys to construct new QOL indicators (1981–84), and the successful combination of independent, open opinion polling with QOL-measurement (1984–85). Since 1985, SWS has been serving as an independent source of pertinent, accurate, timely and credible data on Philippine economic, social and political conditions, produced mainly by a quarterly omnibus called the Social Weather Survey. The SWS surveys include innovative measures of hunger and poverty, traditional measures of gaining/losing, optimism/pessimism, victimization by crime, satisfaction in governance and in democracy, life-satisfaction and happiness, and readings of public opinion on contemporary issues, including elections. The data are regularly released to the general public through the mass media, and thus serve to place many social issues on the political agenda.

## 1974–1975: The Social Indicators Project

In 1973, one year into Ferdinand Marcos's authoritarian regime, the Development Academy of the Philippines (DAP) was established, mainly to train government bureaucrats, but also to do research on development topics. One

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V. Møller et al. (eds.), *Barometers of Quality of Life Around the Globe*,

of these topics was Social Indicators. The DAP Social Indicators Project, like those in other countries, was motivated by realization of the limitations of orthodox economic indicators for depicting meaningful development.

With an ad hoc team of university-based researchers, the Project aimed to set principles for measuring national welfare, described thus:

> The term "welfare" is used here in a very broad sense. It is interchangeable with "well-being," "happiness," "quality of life," "state of development," and any other term which is meant to refer to the degree of achievement of the important goals of Philippine society as a whole. Mindful of these goals, and given the nation's limited research manpower and statistical resources, to what extent can the degree of achievement be quantified and made amenable to statistical monitoring over time?[4]

The Project began by recognizing that *welfare has many dimensions*. It identified basic social concerns: health and nutrition; learning; income and consumption; employment; non-human productive resources; housing, utilities, and the environment; public safety and justice; political values; and social mobility[5].

The Project realized that each concern should be measured not only in the aggregate, but also with consideration for (a) the fairness of sharing among people of today and (b) the adequacy of provision for people of the future. The multiple concerns, and the aspects of *equitable sharing* and *provision for the future* under each topic, constitute the many dimensions of welfare.

The Project recommended certain indicators for these dimensions. In addition to those already generated by the Philippine statistical system, it proposed new ones – disability due to illness; human capital created by schooling; net beneficial product; families below a food threshold; an index of housing adequacy; an air pollution index; an index of perceived public safety; indices of political mobility and efficacy; and indices of occupational mobility and perceived social mobility. Finally, the Project did a pilot social survey of 1,000 households in one province to examine the feasibility of gathering primary data to construct the recommended new indicators (Mangahas, 1977).

## 1981–1984: The Social Weather Stations Project

In 1981, the DAP established a regular research department for the first time, and put on its agenda a project to produce new, survey-based social indicators. It was named the Social Weather Stations Project, on the idea that surveys can serve like observation posts to monitor social conditions, much as meteorological stations monitor weather conditions. This Project produced a number of survey reports for internal consumption of the government, which, the researchers thought, were well-received, at least at some levels. However, its monograph, *Measuring the Quality of Life: A 1982 Social Weather Report* (Mangahas, Miranda and Paqueo, 1983) was suddenly suppressed, without explanation, only two weeks before scheduled public release in early 1983.

In Fig. 1 are some results of the suppressed Metro Manila survey, which asked people to compare the current (1981) state of the nation with the state prior to September 1972. The survey had found mostly favorable opinions on church-state relations, political stability, credibility of leadership, integrity of elections, and reduction of alien economic influence and subversive activity. But it also found mostly unfavorable opinions on inflation, crime, corruption and the burden of taxation. The discovery that the government could not tolerate even partially unfavorable research findings was a great blow to the research department's morale; within a few years it was completely disbanded.




**Fig. 1** Suppressed 1981 Metro Manila survey which asked for a comparison of the current state of the nation with that prior to declaration of Martial Law in September 1972

## 1984–1985: The BBC Socio-political Opinion Surveys

In 1984 and 1985, the Bishops-Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, a civic organization of Catholic bishops and businessmen, as well as some labor leaders and academics[6], conducted two nationwide sociopolitical surveys, with technical support from social scientists who had also been with the DAP Social Weather Stations Project. The 1985 BBC political poll and a sponsored national study of public attitudes towards the legal profession were done together on a survey omnibus. Among the key findings of the two surveys were that majorities of two-thirds disapproved of the presidential powers to legislate by decree and to detain persons by executive fiat, regardless of the courts.[7]

Although the BBC surveys also had some QOL items, public interest focused almost entirely on the findings on public opinion on matters of politics and governance. This demonstrated the value of blending QOL monitoring with opinion polling in young democracies (Møller, 1997; Guerrero and Mangahas, 2004). The BBC's ability to present these findings in public during the Marcos regime, before both domestic and foreign media, was undoubtedly due to the immense political influence of Jaime Cardinal Sin.

## 1985–Present: Social Weather Stations

In 1985, Social Weather Stations – taking its name from the DAP Project, in which four of its seven co-founders were involved – was formally registered, for the general purpose of serving as an independent source of pertinent, accurate, timely and credible data on Philippine economic, social and political conditions. The SWS mission is to measure, by means of statistical surveys, critical components of Philippine development, and also to bring these measurements to public attention.

The first SWS project, over 1986–1987, was a series of four national political surveys jointly with the Ateneo de Manila University, a prestigious private Catholic institution[8]. These surveys, and all succeeding ones by SWS, used the same methodology as the BBC surveys and thus extended the time-series.

The four SWS-Ateneo surveys were originally intended to lead up to the then-scheduled local elections of 1986 and presidential election of 1987. However, in late 1985 Marcos suddenly decided to set a "snap" presidential election for February 1986 – even claiming that the BBC survey pointed to him winning it, which was false. The snap election's result was highly controversial, with the official count putting Marcos over Corazon Aquino, but the parallel count of the National Movement for Free Elections, the official citizen's arm, putting Aquino over Marcos. After two weeks, the issue was settled by People Power, that drove Marcos into exile.[9] The re-opening of democratic space in 1986 in the Philippines led to an early flowering of opinion polling in the Philippines relative to its Southeast Asian neighbors.

Since 1986, the SWS surveys have proceeded at an increasing pace – 13 surveys in the rest of the 1980s, 159 surveys in the 1990s, and 126 surveys over 2000–06. All the SWS datasets are statistically representative of the populations studied; almost half of them have been done at the national level.[10]

**Scope of the Social Weather Reports**. Aside from its regular, periodic releases to media, SWS presents a public annual review of key findings of its surveys in the past twelve months. To illustrate, in January 2006 SWS reported that economic well-being was in a bad state, and that the rosy GNP figures should be ignored. These were based on surveys of hunger, poverty, and past trends and expected future trends in quality of life (Figs. 2–5).[11]

The January 2006 review showed an upward trend in victimization by common crimes, based on direct survey questions about victimization (Fig. 6). It revealed that public satisfaction with executive governance was at a historical low (Fig. 7). Most Filipinos have long been dissatisfied with the national administration's performance in fighting inflation, corruption, and crime (Fig. 8). Satisfaction with its performance in foreign relations has been typically positive, but satisfaction with how much it helps the poor is rather volatile and was negative at the end of 2005 (Fig. 9). Satisfaction with how democracy works has been on the low side, but preference for democracy over authoritarianism has been strong nevertheless (Fig. 10). Notwithstanding all the bad news in 2006, public morale and equanimity were in good




**Fig. 2** Hunger went from a record low in mid 2003 to a record high in late 2005 (Note: Don't know and refused responses are not shown. Moderate hunger for December 2005 includes 0.5% unstated whether moderate or severe)




**Fig. 3** Self-rated poverty is volatile; the recent trend is up

order, going by the periodic survey items on life-satisfaction and happiness (Figs. 11–12).

Aside from its core or regular time-series indicators, the quarterly Social Weather Surveys obtain public opinion on contemporary issues. The survey review of January 2006 pointed out that enthusiasm about the United States




**Fig. 4** Quality of life losers have exceeded 40% for the past 7 years




**Fig. 5** Quality of life pessimists were a record 34% in March 2005

was below its traditionally high level. It saw that the private sector's new Coalition Against Corruption, organized in 2004, as likely to be sustainable, due to strong support in the annual SWS survey of businessmen. On the political side, SWS reported that the 2004 election cheating scandal was still




**Fig. 6** Household victimization by common crimes has been rising since 2001 (reference period: past 6 months)




**Fig. 7** Governance: satisfaction with a president has never been so low, for so long

an important issue, and that the prospects for public ratification of amendments of the Constitution were very poor, especially for any amendment, such as switching from the Presidential to the Parliamentary system, that would allow for extension of the President's term in office.

**The enlightenment model**. The SWS approach involves a deliberate switch from the *technocratic model* to the *enlightenment model*, as in many other parts of the world (Land, 1996). The technocratic model saw the




**Fig. 8** Most are dissatisfied with national administration performance on fighting inflation, corruption, and crime




**Fig. 9** Satisfaction with the national administration is positive on foreign relations; it has become negative on how much it helps the poor

production of relevant data as the main problem delaying the discovery of solutions to social problems. *The enlightenment model, on the other hand, sees the first task as putting social issues on the political agenda by supplying data for public debate through the mass media*. This, according to Vogel (1997, p. 104) is actually "the original purpose of social indicators: to send signals to governments, business, other organizations and the general




**Fig. 10** Satisfaction with how democracy works is low, but preference for democracy is still strong




**Fig. 11** Two-thirds are very/fairly satisfied with life

public." Hence the SWS mission statement is phrased in a definite order: data should be generated, firstly, to stimulate the eye; secondly, to influence the heart; and finally to guide the mind. The SWS media releases are now being issued to the general public on a near-weekly basis through the mass media, and are heavily cited not only by journalists but also by many social and political analysts from academe, government, the business sector, civil society organizations, and other institutions. The very high success rate of




**Fig. 12** Three-fourths feel very/fairly happy

SWS in predicting elections has undoubtedly been an important factor in establishing the credibility of its surveys.

Interestingly enough, most criticisms of the Social Weather Reports come from government officials, whose seeming function is to do the opposite: to send non-signals to the general public, and to put sensitive topics away from public debate as much as possible. Many officials argue that SWS survey-based measures are "merely perceptions" and hence different from reality. Official statistical agencies often insist that national sample sizes must be in the tens of thousands, which are affordable only once every few years, rather than the gold standard of one thousand respondents, practiced in the international barometers.[12]

SWS believes that the path towards effective social indicators is as much institutional as it is technical. It has demonstrated that the non-governmental research sector has a strong capability for monitoring national well-being. It recommends that private research institutes be pro-active in the generation of social statistics for public use (Guerrero and Mangahas, 1989). These institutions should aim to develop statistical indicators that are *meaningful, communicable, credible, frequent*, and *sustainable*.

*Meaningfulness*. Critical concerns, such as poverty and hunger, should be included regularly on the agenda. The rise in families suffering from involuntary hunger, from 2003 up to the present, demonstrates, more than ever, how misleading is per capita GNP as an indicator of economic well-being. In a democratic society, political well-being and the quality of governance are very important aspects of the QOL.

*Communicability*. In order to promote public debate, social indicators should be easy to understand by the general public, and not only by social scientists. Short statements posted to media are much more effective than traditional scientific papers. Scientists should be prepared to communicate over radio and television, which are much more effective media than print.

*Credibility*. Being able to predict how citizens will vote is the globally-accepted litmus test for quality survey research. SWS does surveys in every national election, and is quite successful in predicting the results (Mangahas, 1998; Guerrero and Mangahas, 2004). It established its institutional credentials, even when still a relatively young institution, by obtaining membership in prestigious cross-country survey networks such as the International Social Survey Program, the World Values Survey, the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, and Asian Barometer. Its key persons became active members in the World Association for Public Opinion Research and the International Society for Quality of Life Studies.

*Frequency*. SWS believes that QOL indicators should aim to match the periodicity of the main competition, the orthodox economic growth indicators based on the National Income Accounts (NIA). In 1986–91 the Social Weather Surveys were semestral; since 1992 they have been quarterly, or as frequent as the Philippine NIA.

*Sustainability*. The SWS business model has made the Social Weather Reports financially sustainable (Mangahas and Guerrero, 2002). An enterprising non-profit can attain sustainability by exploiting the cost-effectivity of the omnibus approach in surveying and by actively engaging in survey research contract work, especially where quality-of-life indicators play a role. Using subjective indicators, wherever possible, also helps to lower costs, since they do not require extensive questionnaires.

**Alternative statistics for democratic discourse**. SWS says (Mangahas, 2006): "Generating and publicizing *alternative statistics* is an activity that helps to put its subject matter higher on the agenda of public and private policymakers. SWS data on regular topics like hunger, poverty and governance and on special topics such as corruption, the legal profession, domestic violence, and disadvantaged groups are consciously meant as *Statistics for Advocacy*, and not for mere academic study.

"Democratic Discourse, in the modern world, has particular need for scientific opinion polling during times of crisis ... If SWS polling becomes controversial, we accept it as part of the trade. We are not creating controversies, but simply letting the light of day shine on them, in keeping with the final verse of the SWS Hymn:

Yan ang aming hangarin
Demokrasya'y pagtibayin.
Instrumento ng masa
Sa kanilang karaingan
SWS ay tinatag
Layon nitong magampanan
Na ang baya'y magising sa katotohan

which means

It is our goal
To strengthen democracy.
A means for the masses
To air their needs,
SWS was set up
To perform its task
Of awakening the nation to the truth.

## Notes

1. Revised from a presentation made at the 7th Conference of the International Society for Quality of Life Studies, July 17–20, 2006, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa.

2. Mangahas (2006): "A reasonably complete survey on QOL includes *Governance* among its topics, since bad governance definitely makes people feel bad. *It is quite normal for chronically bad aspects of QOL to have priority in social science research, just as illness has normal priority over wellness in medical research.* SWS deliberately tracks *poverty* and *hunger* rather than purchasing power and nutrition, since it regards deprivation as more urgent to measure than wealth and obesity."
3. Mangahas (1994), "Institutional background of the SWS surveys," pp. vii–xvii.
4. Mangahas (1976), p. 1.
5. Given that the country was under martial law, it was particularly important to the researchers to be able to include *political values* as an important concern (Jurado, 1976).
6. Aside from the bishops, the other BBC members need not be Catholic.
7. The BBC report (1985) laid its cards on the table: "While it aims to be objective in describing the pulse of society, an openly-disseminated survey does not play a neutral part in the social process. An open survey plays an active part in enhancing the democratic quality of the social process. This is the intention of the BBC surveys of 1984 and 1985."
8. See Ateneo and SWS (1986); the four surveys were supported by the Ford Foundation. After the joint project, the Ateneo opinion polls continued up to 1992, and the SWS polls up to the present.
9. In the first SWS-Ateneo survey, in May 1986, two-thirds of the respondents said they had voted for Aquino in the snap election. Nonetheless, to a question on the basis for legitimacy of Aquino's presidency, the most popular answer was People Power, rather than that they considered her the actual winner of the election.
10. The SWS Survey Data Bank of Philippine surveys, as of August 30, 2007, includes 321 datasets (of which 143 are national in scope), containing 37,789 question items excluding backgrounders, based on 330,146 interviews.
11. The SWS techniques for measuring Self-Rated Poverty and Hunger on a quarterly basis are global innovations (Mangahas, 1995 and 2004). The tracking of past and expected trends in QOL are based on SWS renditions of the familiar survey questions, used in many countries, which ask respondents to compare their conditions twelve months ago, and twelve months in the future, to present conditions.
12. The standard Social Weather Surveys use face-to-face interviews of 1,200 voting-age adults divided into random samples of 300 each in the four broad geographical areas of Metro Manila, the Balance of Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao (sampling error margins of ±3% for national percentages and ±6% for area percentages). Within each area, provinces, cities/towns, and barangays (villages) are selected with probabilities proportional to size, to arrive at 240 primary sample spots. In each spot, five households are selected by interval sampling. Then one respondent per household is randomly selected from among qualified adults within the household by means of a probability selection table. This methodology meets the standard of international barometers (Guerrero, 2004).

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# Monitoring Democratic Politics, a Market Economy, and Citizen Well-Being: The South Korea Barometer

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**Abstract** South Korea is regarded as the most influential and vigorous new democracy in East Asia. The country has not only transferred power peacefully to an opposition party but has also fully transformed its age-old crony capitalism into a competitive and transparent market economy. Yet the question remains: How much progress has Korea really made in democratizing its authoritarian institutions and its underlying cultural values that for nearly three decades supported the military dictatorships that ruled the country? To what extent has the country succeeded in restructuring its crony capitalism? How have these political and economic changes affected the quality of life that ordinary Koreans experience in the private and public spheres of their lives? This study addresses these questions by analyzing the Korea Democracy Barometer surveys conducted over the period of 1997–2004. The results of this analysis reveal that Korea has become a market democracy but its people do not experience any significant improvements in the quality of their lives.

**Keywords** Korea · the quality of life · democratization · economic reform · democracy barometer

The current wave of democratization began in Southern Europe 30 years ago and has spread to Latin America, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and Africa (Huntington, 1991; McFaul, 2002; Shin, 1994). With the proliferation of new democracies especially over the past decade, an increasing number of individual scholars and research institutes have expanded their efforts to study democratic regime change from the perspective of the mass citizenry

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in the midst of that change (Camp, 2001; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Montero, 1993; Norris, 1999; Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Rose et al., 1998). The Korea Barometer (KORBAR hereafter) represents one of these research endeavors seeking to monitor and compare the dynamics of democratization and its consequences for citizen well-being. The KORBAR is one of the oldest and most innovative democracy barometer projects, although it is not considered one of the best known.

Among the best-known projects are the New Democracies Barometer, the Latinobarometer, the Afrobarometer, and the East Asia Barometer. All of these projects began in the early 1990s or later. In 1991, Professor Richard Rose of the Center for the Study of Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow, Scotland commenced the New Democracies Barometer surveys and the New Russia and Baltic Barometer surveys in order to compare the mass experience of democratization in post-Communist countries (Rose, 1998; 2000). Since 1995, Dr. Mata Lagos of Market Opinion Research International in Santiago, Chile has been conducting the Latinobarometro surveys on an annual basis to trace and compare the levels and sources of popular support for democracy and democratic reforms in 15 Latin American countries and Spain (Lagos, 1997; 2001). In 1999, Professors Michael Bratton of Michigan State University in the United States and Robert Mattes of the University of Cape Town in South Africa launched the Afrobarometer to map mass attitudes toward democracy, markets, and civil society in a dozen African countries (Bratton and Mattes, 2001a, b). Most recently in 2001, a team of Asian and American social scientists under the direction of Professor Yun-han Chu of Taiwanese National University embarked on the East Asia Barometer project to monitor and compare value changes and democratic reforms in the region.

The KORBAR completed its first survey in 1988 when the New Democracies Barometer and other regional barometer projects were yet to be initiated in Europe and elsewhere. This was also the year when nearly three decades of military dictatorship formally ended and the new era of democratic political life dawned in South Korea (Korea hereafter) with the installation of the democratic Sixth Republic. Since 1998, the KORBAR has been continually monitoring a triple transition – political democratization, cultural democratization, and economic liberalization – and its consequences for the quality of life. The KORBAR is, therefore, a research program of greater breadth and depth than a multitude of sample surveys that individual scholars and various institutions have conducted in order to find out how Koreans are adapting to democratic change.

Furthermore, since 1996, the KORBAR program has joined forces with other democracy barometer programs to develop questionnaires and share databases that permit inter-regional and inter-continental comparisons of mass responses to democratization (Chu et al., 2001; Mattes and Shin, 2005; Rose and Shin, 2001; Shin and Rose, 1999; Shin and Shyu, 1997). Through a multi-layered strategic alliance with special research teams especially in Africa, Asia and Europe, this ongoing survey research program seeks to provide meaningful and unique opportunities to effect the widespread study of contemporary Korea on a global scale. The purpose of this article is to introduce the KORBAR program to the scholarly community and policy circles by highlighting the key findings of its recent surveys on democratization, marketization, and citizen well-being.

## Parallel Surveys of the Korean Mass Public

Beginning in October 1988, the KORBAR conducted 10 parallel surveys of the Korean mass public in order to determine the breadth, depth, direction, durability, and stability of mass support for and involvement in democratic politics. The Institute of Social Sciences (ISS) at Seoul National University conducted the first three surveys during the Roh Tae Woo (1988–1993) and Kim Young Sam (1993–1998) governments. The first two occurred in October 1988 (N = 2,007) and November 1991 (N = 1,185) when former General Roh Tae Woo was the first president of the democratic Sixth Republic, and the third took place in November 1993 (N = 1,198), the first year of the second democratic government of President Kim Young Sam. The Gallup conducted the next three surveys during the Kim Young Sam government. The first occurred in November 1994 (N = 1,500), the second in January 1996 (N = 1,000), and the third in May 1997 (N = 1,117). The Gallup also conducted three surveys during the Kim Dae Jung government in October 1998 (N = 1,010), in November 1999 (N = 1,007), in March 2001 (N = 1,005), and one survey under the current Roh Moo Hyun in July 2004 (N = 1,037).

In conducting KORBAR surveys, the aforementioned polls selected their samples to reflect the population of the Republic of Korea aged 20 and over. The advance report of the Population and Housing Census of the National Statistical Office was used first to stratify the population by region (*Do*) and the eight large cities on the basis of their proportionate share of the national population. The island of Cheju-Do, with 1.2 percent of the total population, was excluded mainly because the size of its population is too small to influence survey findings. Second, each region or large city was stratified by administrative subdivisions (*Dong, Eup, Myun*) on the basis of its proportion of the population. At the third stage, the primary sampling units (*ban or village*) were randomly selected, with six to eight households in a *ban* and 12–15 in a *village*. At the household level, the interviewer was instructed to select for interview the person whose birthday came next. Respondents to the 10 surveys were all interviewed, face-to-face, at their residences. The average interview lasted between 30 and 60 min. In all the surveys conducted by Gallup, 10% of those interviews were verified on a random basis.

## Korea as a Country in Democratic Transition

Korea is widely known as one of the success stories of the current wave of global democratization that began in Southern Europe more than three decades ago. Since its transition from decades of military rule in the wake of the 1987 "founding elections", Korea has chosen all four different governments through democratic elections. Moreover, free and competitive elections have been regularly held at all the different levels of government, as is the case in established democracies of North America and Western Europe. In Korea today, there is general agreement that electoral politics has become the only possible political game in town (Diamond and Kim, 2000; Shin, 2001).

In the presidential election held on December 18, 1997, Korea established itself as a mature electoral democracy by elevating an opposition party to political power and becoming the first new democracy in Asia to transfer power peacefully. In the latest presidential election held on December 19, 2002, the Korean people reconfirmed their commitment to electoral democracy by electing for the first time a relatively young and progressive candidate to lead their nation – a nation where decades of conservative authoritarian rule promoted economic development.

To date, the country has successfully carried out a large number of electoral and other reforms to transform the institutions and procedures of military-authoritarian rule into those of a representative democracy (Kihl, 2005; Shin, 1999). Unlike many of its counterparts in Latin America and elsewhere, Korea has fully restored civilian rule by extricating the military from power. The democratic institutional reforms have also expanded civil liberties and political rights by downsizing and overhauling the various security agencies, which used to meddle in every important decision of both government and private organizations and controlled the behavior of private citizens. For more than 10 years, Korea has received an average rating of 2.0 on Freedom House's scale of political rights and civil liberties, placing it within the ranks of the world's liberal democracies.

Currently, Korea is undergoing a political transformation from limited democratic rule to a fully consolidated liberal democracy (Choi, 2005; Im, 2004). In Asia, it is the first new democracy to have transferred power peacefully to an opposition party and to have transformed fully its age-old crony capitalism into a competitive and transparent market economy. In the world of new democracies undergoing the dual transformation of political and economic systems, Korea is also the first new market democracy to recover fully from the dire financial crisis that erupted in Asia eight years ago. One of the world's third-wave democracies, Korea has already used the internet in a more active and crucial role in presidential elections than have more advanced democratic countries, including those in Western Europe and North America (Choo, 2002). As a result, Korea is widely regarded as one of the most vigorous and analytically interesting third-wave democracies.

## Institutional Democratization

Ruled by the military for nearly three decades, Korea was long known as a prototypical development state. One of the most significant research topics for the KORBAR, therefore, concerns the transformation of the military dictatorship into a well-functioning liberal democracy. How democratic is the political system under which the Korean people currently live? How much progress has recently been made in transforming authoritarian political institutions into those of representative democracy? What direction and trajectory characterize the process of democratizing the institutions and procedures of the authoritarian past? These questions are explored with a set of three items selected from the five KORBAR surveys conducted to study the period of 1997–2004.

## The Extent of Democratization

The KORBAR surveys asked respondents to rate political systems on a 10-point scale to indicate the extent to which the systems operate as a dictatorship or a democracy. This scale allows them to respond according to their own understanding of democracy and dictatorship. A score of 1 on this scale indicates "complete dictatorship" while a score of 10 indicates "complete democracy". Numeric ratings of the past, present, and future political systems on this scale provide valuable information about the experienced and expected dynamics of institutional democratization.

In the latest 2004 KORBAR survey, for example, we asked respondents to place their past, present, and future political systems on this 10-point scale. We also asked them to rate the political system in the North on the same scale (Appendix Q49). For these systems, Fig. 1 and Table 1 provide the percentages




**Fig. 1** Perceptions of the past and present regimes on a 10-point dictatorship-democracy scale **(a)** past political system **(b)** current political system **(c)** future political system **(d)** North Korean political system (Source: 2004 Korea Barometer survey)

**Table 1** The democratic and authoritarian perceptions of regimes in South and North Korea

| | Mean on a 10 point-scale | Democratic ratings (A) | Authoritarian ratings (B) | Difference (A–B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **South Korea** | | | | |
| Past regime | 4.0 | 22.7% | 77.3% | −54.6 |
| Current regime | 6.3 | 72.0 | 28.0 | −44.0 |
| Future regime | 7.5 | 91.9 | 9.1 | +86.0 |
| **North Korea** | | | | |
| Current regime | 2.2 | 2.0 | 98.0 | +96.0 |

Source: 2004 Korea Barometer survey.

of respondents who chose each of the 10 positions or steps on the ladder scale. It also reports the average ratings on this scale for the past and present political systems. As the data in this figure reveal, a large majority (77%) rated the past regime as undemocratic by placing it at 5 or below. In sharp contrast, a substantial majority (72%) and an overwhelming majority (91%) rated, respectively, the current and future regime as democratic by placing it at 6 or above. These figures, when compared, make it clear that the political system of South Korea has democratized considerably over the past 16 years in the eyes of its citizens and is expected to democratize further in the future.

Like the percentage ratings, the average ratings on this 10-point scale also indicate the extent to which citizens perceive the past and current regimes as either democratic or authoritarian. The average rating of the past regime was 4.0; for the present regime, the average increased to 6.3. In five years, it was expected to increase further to 7.5. This upward shift in the mean ratings from the past to the present confirms considerable progress in institutional democratization in the wake of the democratic regime change in 1998. Similar upward shift over the next five years indicates considerable optimism about the future of institutional democratization. The mean rating of 6.3 for the present system on a 10-point scale, however, suggests that in the eyes of its citizens, Korean democracy is quite limited even after more than a decade of democratic rule. Yet this rating is three times more democratic than North Korea's rating of 2.2, which indicates a nearly complete dictatorship.

## The Quality of Democratic Performance

How well does the current political system perform as a system of representative democracy? To explore this question, the 2004 KORBAR survey asked respondents how satisfied or dissatisfied they were with the way democracy was working in their country (Appendix Q40). On a 10-point scale, where 1 means complete dissatisfaction and 10 means complete satisfaction, respondents were asked to express the degree of their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the current practice of democratic politics. Figure 2 reports the mean rating on this scale and percentages of those placed at each of its 10 scale points.

Figure 2 shows that more than three-fifths (63%) expressed satisfaction with the present regime with a rating of 6 or above on the scale. The percentage of satisfied respondents is 9% points lower than the percentage of Koreans who perceived the current regime as a democracy. Among those who perceive the current regime as a democracy, the satisfied constitute about two-thirds (67%). The mean score of 5.9 on this 10-point scale is




**Fig. 2** Evaluations of the performance of the present political system on a 10-point dissatisfaction-satisfaction scale (Source: 2004 Korea Barometer survey)

slightly higher than its midpoint (5.5) and reinforces this qualified response. These findings testify to the fact that Korean democracy is far from a well-functioning democracy in the eyes of its citizens.

For a comprehensive and balanced account of democratization taking place within the political system, we jointly consider positive and negative assessments of its substantive performance – responsiveness to the people – with democratic and authoritarian perceptions of its institutional character. These perceptions of the current regime and assessments of its performance are classified into four distinct patterns of democratization. The first pattern features the lack of progress in either the institutional or the substantive domain of democracy. The second and third patterns represent partial progress with the advancement of only one of these two domains. The fourth pattern represents democratic progress on a full scale as evidenced in both domains. These patterns make it possible to unravel the dynamics of democratization and its distinctive characteristics.

About one-seventh of respondents (16%) fall into the first pattern by judging the existing political system as neither democratic nor functioning to their satisfaction. A smaller minority (11%) judged it as undemocratic but functioning to their satisfaction. One-fifth (20%) judged it as democratic but failing to function to their satisfaction. A plurality (48%) was fully positive about the character as well as performance of their current political system.

Thus, to more than one-half of the Korean population, the Korean political system today does not represent a well-functioning democracy (Shin, 2001).

Why is it that a majority of the Korean people refuses to endorse their regime as a *well-functioning democracy?* To explore this question, we selected another pair of questions from the 2004 KORBAR survey questions, both of which were derived from the two general principles of democratic governance: government by the people and government for the people (Appendix Q13 and Q29). The questions were: "Do you think the Roh Moo Hyun government has been governed, by and large, by the will of ordinary people or ruled by a powerful few?" and "Do you think the Roh Moo Hyun government has worked for a majority of the people or some particular classes or political forces?" Relatively small minorities of less than one-third gave democratic responses to each of these questions (23% to the first question and 33% to the second one). When responses to both questions are considered together, less than one-quarter (24%) perceives that the current regime fulfills both principles of democratic governance. More than two times as many (56%), on the other hand, say that the current regime works for neither the will of the people nor for their welfare. The regime's failure to practise these two principles of democratic governance signals that the current regime malfunctions as a democracy.

## Trends

What direction and trajectory characterize the institutional and substantive dynamics of Korean democratization to date? To address this question, we calculated for each year of the 1997–2004 period the average ratings of the present political system on the aforementioned two 10-point scales, which tap, respectively, the extent to which the system is perceived as a democracy or dictatorship and to which its performance is appraised as satisfying or dissatisfying. For each of those surveys, we also calculated percentages of those who viewed the current system as a well-functioning democracy (higher than 5 on 10-point scales).

The data reported in Table 2 reveal little or no significant downward or upward change in the perceptions of the current system as a democracy and the positive assessments of its performance. In 1997, on average, respondents rated the character of the current political system as 6.2, but by 1999, this rating dropped to 6.0. By 2004, it rose slightly to 6.3. In terms of percentages also, little has changed to the democratic perception of the current system. In 1997, 69 percent perceived it as a democracy. In 2004, seven years later, 71% did the same. From these ratings, it is apparent that Koreans have seen little progress in the expansion of their limited democracy.

**Table 2** Trends in democratic perceptions of the current political system

| Survey year | Mean on 10-point scale | | Functioning democracy (%) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Character | Satisfaction | Dem. sys. | Satisfaction | Both |
| 1997 | 6.2 | 4.9 | 69.1 | 35.1 | 31.5 |
| 1998 | 6.1 | 5.3 | 64.6 | 43.2 | 37.0 |
| 1999 | 6.0 | 5.3 | 67.9 | 41.5 | 35.5 |
| 2001 | 6.2 | 5.3 | 67.9 | 46.8 | 38.0 |
| 2004 | 6.3 | 5.9 | 70.6 | 59.6 | 47.6 |

Notes: Dem. sys. refers to democratic regime functioning democracy includes those who scored 6 or higher on two 10-point scales.
Source: Korea Barometer surveys.

In improving the quality of its performance, however, Korea appears to have achieved significant progress in the citizenry's view. The average rating of democratic satisfaction rose by 1 full point on a 10-point scale from 4.9 in 1997 to 5.9 in 2004. During the same period, those expressing satisfaction with the democratic performance of the existing regime rose more sharply by 25 percentage points from 35 percent in 1997 to 60 percent in 2004. As a result of this upward change in the perceived quality of democratic performance, the Koreans appraising the current regime as a well-functioning democracy rose substantially from 32 percent in 1997 to 48 percent in 2004. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that more than half the Koreans have yet to report such a democratic system.

## Cultural Democratization

Another main component of the KORBAR program deals with political values and beliefs. To what degree do the Korean people desire to live in a democracy? How strongly are they committed to the various practices of democratic politics? To what extent are they dissociated from the age-old practices of authoritarian rule? To explore these questions regarding the cultural dimension of democratization, the KORBAR surveys have differentiated democratic support into two broad categories: normative and empirical. Normative support consists of favorable orientations to democracy as a political ideal; empirical support involves the acceptance of democracy as a viable political system. This split notion of democratic support is based on the theoretical premise that there is a wide gulf between people's aspiration for democracy-in-principle and their commitment to democracy-in-practice (Mueller, 1999; Norris, 1999; Rose et al., 1998; Shin, 1999).

## Affinity for Democracy

All democracies, both new and old, depend on their citizens' continuing and widespread support. Popular support is not only crucial for their legitimacy but also vital to their effective performances (Dahl, 1992; Dalton, 1999; Linz and Stepan, 1996; McDonough et al., 1998). In new democracies, consolidation depends more on citizen support for democracy than any other essential component of political culture (Montero, 1993; Fuchs, 1999; Shin and Wells, 2005). As Diamond (1999) and Gibson (1996) point out, the beliefs, values, and attitudes of ordinary citizens structure, as well as limit, the pace and possibilities of democratic change.

To what extent do the Korean people embrace democracy as both a set of political ideals and political practices? Are they merely in favor of democracy as an embodiment of political ideals? To what extent do their abstract and concrete attitudes toward democracy cohere? To estimate the coherence or structure of favorable democratic attitudes, we used three separate questions from the KORBAR surveys. The first question asked respondents to express on a 10-point scale the extent to which they desire to live under the principles of democracy (Appendix Q49d). The second question asked them to indicate on a 10-point scale the extent to which they think democracy is suitable for their country as a political system (Appendix Q25c). The third question asked them whether democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government or whether a dictatorship would be preferable in certain situations (Appendix Q43).

In Table 3, we compare the percentages of respondents who offered positive responses to each, none, and all of the three questions to determine whether the Korean people tend to see democracy merely as a preferred ideal or both a normative and empirical phenomenon. Nine of every ten Koreans (92%) remain at least somewhat favorably attached to the abstract idea of democracy. More than seven-tenths (73%) are in agreement that democracy

**Table 3** Support for democracy: its depth and trends

| Categories of support | Year | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2001 | 2004 |
| Desire | 94.8% | 89.4% | 92.3% | 90.9% | 91.9% |
| Suitability | 64.0 | 63.0 | 62.9 | 74.3 | 72.6 |
| Preference | 68.9 | 53.7 | 55.1 | 44.6 | 58.3 |
| *No support* | *4.3* | *6.1* | *5.1* | *5.2* | *3.9* |
| Full support | 46.7 | 35.6 | 37.2 | 34.5 | 45.9 |
| (N) | (1123) | (1010) | (1007) | (1005) | (1037) |

Source: Korea Barometer surveys.

is appropriate for their country. Yet when asked whether democracy is always the most preferable method of governance, a much smaller majority (58%) remains supportive. When favorable responses to all three questions are considered together, less than half the Korean population (46%) is fully supportive of democracy, both normatively and empirically. For many Korean people, it is evident that democracy as a set of political ideals means one thing and democracy as a set of political practices means something else.

## Trajectories

In order for new democracies to consolidate and become full democracies, their citizens have to orient themselves increasingly toward both the ideals and practices of democratic politics. Specifically, the direction and trajectories of popular support for these democracies affect their survival and effective functioning as much as the total amount of such support does (Mishler and Rose, 1996, p. 565). Over time, four different trajectories are conceivable for democratic support. First, the trajectory of support becomes steadily positive or upward when its aggregate level increases on a continuing basis. Second, continuing decreases in its aggregate level make the trajectory steadily negative or downward. Third, a combination of upward and downward changes in the support level makes the trajectory erratic or fluctuating. Finally, the trajectory may be flat with little or no significant change of level in either an upward or downward direction.

What sort of trajectory best characterizes Koreans' support for the ideals and practices of democratic politics during the past seven years? The data in Table 3 show that the number of people favoring democratic ideals fluctuates somewhat, revealing downward and upward changes during that period of time. With the deepening of the economic crisis in 1998, this indicator went down by five percentage points. With the economy recovering from the crisis in 1999, the level of normative support went up somewhat and then settled just above the 90 percent level.

Empirical support, on the other hand, has fallen more sharply during the same period, 1997–2004. The sense of democratic legitimacy, for example, has declined substantially from 69 percent in 1997 to 54 in 1998, 55 in 1999, and 45 percent in 2001, and then rose to 58 percent 2004. Before the outbreak of the economic crisis, more than two-thirds of the Korean people subscribed to the view that democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government. By 2001, less than one-half expressed this view of democratic legitimacy, while more than a half (55%) of all Koreans held that democracy is not always the best for their country. In 2004, this percentage rose sharply by 13 percentage points to 58. The full support for democracy in

Korea has also weakened sharply and steadily from 47 percent in 1997 to 35 percent in 2001 and has started to rise up since then. As in the pre-economic crisis period, only a minority (46%) of Korean voters remains supportive of democracy both normatively and empirically.

In summary, 9 in 10 Koreans are fully supportive of democracy as an ideal political system, but less than one-half are equally supportive of democracy as a real system of governance. Even among those who are fully supportive of democracy-in-principle, a minority (49%) fully supports democracy-in-action even after more than one and a half decades of democratic experiment. To a large majority of ordinary Koreans, democracy is appealing only when experienced as an abstract ideal or a distant goal, not as a working system of governance.

## Opposition to Authoritarian Rule

Citizens of new democracies like the Korean people lived all or most of their lives under a civilian or military dictatorship. Due to decades of socialization to authoritarian life, these citizens cannot be expected to dissociate themselves from authoritarian cultural values and political practices quickly and fully. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that their acceptance of democracy as the preferred political system would bring about the end of their association with authoritarianism as a normative and empirical phenomenon. Thus, popular opposition to non-democratic regimes is another important measure of support for democracy-in-action (Bratton et al., 2005; Rose et al., 1998; Shin, 2001, 2007).

From the KORBAR surveys, we selected a pair of questions to tap orientations toward or against the practices of the authoritarian past (Appendix Q34). Specifically, respondents were asked whether or not they were in favor of having the military govern the country again. They were also asked about their views on getting rid of parliament and elections and having a strong leader decide everything. Table 4 reports the percentages rejecting military rule and civilian dictatorship. It also reports the percentages of those who

**Table 4** Opposition to authoritarian rule

| Year | Military rule | Civilian dictatorship | Both |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1997 | 84.2% | 79.5% | 70.2% |
| 1998 | 85.5 | 74.3 | 68.0 |
| 1999 | 87.7 | 81.4 | 74.6 |
| 2001 | 78.7 | 76.4 | 74.6 |
| 2004 | 79.1 | 76.8 | 66.2 |

Source: Korea Barometer surveys.

refused both of these authoritarian alternatives, thus dissociating themselves fully from authoritarian solutions to policy problems.

When asked about military rule, nearly 8 of 10 Koreans (79%) in 2004 disapproved of replacing the current democratic regime with an authoritarian one controlled by the military. With respect to civilian dictatorship, a slightly smaller majority (77%) disapproved. Simultaneous consideration of these responses reveals that a large majority (66%) rejected both of these authoritarian institutions. Obviously, a large majority of the Korean population has successfully disengaged itself from the powerful institutions of the military and civilian authoritarian regimes. Yet, not every Korean is willing to reject the political institutions of the authoritarian past. A substantial minority of Koreans (34%) thinks that an authoritarian government of a military or civilian nature would sometimes be preferable. Meanwhile, the percentages fully detached from authoritarian politics changed little between 1997 and 2004 and hover around the 70 percent level.

## Patterns

To ascertain the distinct patterns of cultural democratization among the Korean people, we must know whether they have fully embraced democracy as the best political system and whether they have fully rejected the virtues of authoritarian rule. Dichotomous responses to these two questions allow for four distinct patterns: (1) failing to embrace democracy and reject authoritarianism; (2) failing to embrace democracy with rejecting authoritarianism; (3) embracing democracy without rejecting authoritarianism; and (4) embracing democracy and rejecting authoritarianism simultaneously. While the first pattern features a lack of progress in either the pro-democratic or antiauthoritarian domain of cultural democratization, the second and third patterns represent partial progress through the advancement of one of the two domains. The fourth pattern, on the other hand, represents full progress in developing a democratic political culture.

Table 5 shows that about one-quarter (24%) falls into the first pattern of no progress by refusing to embrace democracy or to reject authoritarianism on a full scale. A larger minority (30%) falls into the second pattern of partial progress by rejecting authoritarianism fully without embracing democracy fully. The smallest minority (10%) falls into the third pattern of partial progress by embracing democracy fully without rejecting authoritarianism fully. The largest minority (36%) falls into the fourth pattern of full progress by fully embracing democracy and rejecting authoritarianism simultaneously. Among the Korean people, the partially democratized

**Table 5** Patterns of cultural democratization

| Embrace democracy | Reject authoritarianism | Year | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2001 | 2004 |
| No | No | 20.1% | 20.6% | 19.4% | 27.8% | 24.1% |
| No | Yes | 33.0 | 37.9 | 44.5 | 37.7 | 30.0 |
| Yes | No | 9.8 | 5.4 | 6.1 | 6.5 | 9.6 |
| Yes | Yes | 37.2 | 30.2 | 30.1 | 28.1 | 36.3 |

Source: Korea Barometer surveys.

or barely democratized are nearly twice as many as the fully democratized (36% vs. 64%). This may be the reason why the Korean nation as a whole remains highly divided and quarrelsome over the ultimate end of democratic rule and the appropriate means of democratic governing (Choi, 2005).

For five survey years, Table 5 reports the percentages of those completely or fully democratized who not only favor democracy as a set of political ideals and practices but who also oppose the authoritarian rule of a civilian or military nature. In 1997, 37 percent of Koreans were completely committed to democratic politics by embracing democracy while rejecting authoritarian rule to the fullest extent. In the aftermath of the economic crisis, this figure suffered a general decline to 28 percent in 2001. Over the next three years, it climbed back to the pre-economic crisis level of 36 percent. Since the outbreak of the economic crisis in 1997, little progress has been made in democratizing the political values and beliefs of the Korean citizenry. At first glance, then, Korea seems to have seen no progress in its democratization since 1997. However, before the economic crisis, the 36 percent that reported full commitment did so without having experienced a true test of their commitment. The 36 percent that report full commitment now do so after surviving a crisis. Thus, democracy proponents may have reason to hope that respondents falling into the present 36 percent have a stronger commitment to democracy than did respondents from the 36 percent in 1997.

## The Solidity of Democratic Support

How solid or unwavering is the commitment of the Korean people to democracy? When citizens begin to attribute policy failures to democratic institutions and procedures, the democratic regimes cannot long remain a preferable alternative to non-democratic ones. New democracies, like the one in Korea, can survive and thrive only when citizens remain intrinsically supportive of democratic rule even if and when their economy, their government, and their regime fail to satisfactorily resolve the problems facing their society (Duch, 1999; Huntington, 1991). These democracies become durable when their citizens are willing to defend democratic institutions and reject authoritarian solutions even in the face of growing economic and other policy failures of the democratically elected government (Dalton, 1999; Gibson, 1996). Such willingness to withstand economic and political crises by the method of democratic governance can be, therefore, considered an indicator of the behavioral quality of democratic citizenship (Shin et al., 2005).

Table 6 provides the percentages of the Korean people who remain fully supportive of democracy and fully disengaged from authoritarianism among those who are dissatisfied with the performances of the national economy, the government, and the democratic regime (Appendix Q40, Q1 and Q14). The same table also provides the percentages of authentic or complete democrats among those who are dissatisfied with the

**Table 6** Percentages expressing support for democracy and opposition to authoritarian rule among dissatisfied citizens

| Targets of dissatisfaction | Year | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2001 | 2004 |
| a. Full support for democracy | | | | | |
| Economy | 46.3% | 34.7% | 28.6% | 29.7% | 45.0% |
| Government | 44.3 | 26.5 | 24.4 | 30.9 | 39.3 |
| Democracy | 41.1 | 24.8 | 26.9 | 26.2 | 26.6 |
| *All of the above* | *41.2* | *21.3* | *15.6* | *23.2* | *22.7* |
| b. Full antipathy for authoritarianism | | | | | |
| Economy | 71.5% | 66.9% | 75.5% | 68.7% | 72.0% |
| Government | 71.2 | 65.3 | 75.9 | 68.5 | 70.6 |
| Democracy | 70.5 | 64.8 | 76.8 | 68.2 | 66.1 |
| *All of the above* | *71.6* | *61.5* | *69.2* | *66.9* | *65.6* |
| c. Authentic and full support for democracy | | | | | |
| Economy | 37.3% | 28.6% | 23.2% | 24.7% | 24.1% |
| Government | 35.6 | 21.9 | 21.0 | 25.7 | 25.1 |
| Democracy | 33.1 | 20.3 | 22.6 | 22.7 | 23.6 |
| *All of the above* | *34.0* | *15.6* | *11.6* | *20.4* | *19.1* |

Notes: Figures are percentages of partially and fully dissatisfied citizens (a)who support democracy not only in principle but also in practice, (b)who reject both rule by a strongman and return to army rule, (c)who are completely committed to democracy.
Source: Korea Barometer surveys.

economic and political conditions of their country. We define authentic democrats as those who not only fully support democracy but also fully reject authoritarianism.

In Table 6, we see that a large majority refused to support democracy fully when the economy, the government, and the democratic regime were not functioning to their satisfaction (see the Appendix for the survey items tapping these qualities). In all five surveys reported in the table, minorities ranging from 24 to 46 percent expressed full support for democracy when they were not satisfied with the performance of the economy, the government, or the democratic regime. When they were critical of both the economy and the polity, much smaller minorities were fully supportive of democracy. In the last four of the five surveys conducted since 1997, moreover, less than one-quarter of the critical citizens has been willing to continue its full support for democracy when deeply troubled by both economic failures and government and regime blunders. More notable is the finding that such intrinsic supporters of democracy have decreased by 25 percentage points from 41 to 16 percent in the aftermath of the 1997 economic crisis.

In rejecting authoritarian rule fully, the Korean people tend to remain steadfast even when they are dissatisfied with the way their economy, the government, and the regime perform. More than two-thirds of these critical citizens remain fully detached from the alleged virtues of military or civilian dictatorship (see Table 6). The percentage of such fully committed authoritarian opponents was highest (72%) in 1997 and lowest (62%) in 1998. The figure for 2004 is 66 percent, a figure 6 percentage points lower than what it was before the outbreak of the economic crisis. This indicates significant decreases rather than increases in unconditional opposition to authoritarian politics.

In Table 6, authentic democratic orientations – fully pro-democratic and fully antiauthoritarian – are considered together in order to determine how many disaffected Koreans are willing to defend democracy unconditionally. The table shows that in all four of the latest surveys conducted over the 1998–2004 period, unconditional democratic defenders constituted one-fifth or less of the disaffected population in Korea. In 2004, more than four out of five fully disaffected Koreans (81%) were not likely to defend democratic politics when the economy soured and when democratic institutions and elected officials malfunctioned. This finding suggests that democratic support among the Korean people is, by and large, neither unqualified nor unconditional (Shin et al., 2003).

## Congruence Between Cultural and Institutional Democratization

Overall progress in a country's democratization involves more than the democratization of the political regime and of its cultural values on their own. The country's institutions and its cultural values must make democratic advances alongside each other for the country to achieve congruence between institutional and cultural democratization (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Fuchs et al., 1995; Shin, 2007). This dimension of Korea's democratic progress is estimated in terms of the percentage of respondents who not only desired but also affirmed the democratization of their political system.

Figure 3 shows a combination of downward and upward changes in the level of congruence between citizens' desire to live in a democracy and institutions' fulfillment of their democratic desires. In May 1997, five months before the outbreak of the economic crisis, two-thirds (67%) found their regime congruent with their democratic desire. In October 1998 when Korea was experiencing the worst economic crisis since the war with the North in 1950, two-fifths (61%) found congruence between their democratic affinity and regime character. With the rapid recovery from the crisis, the proportion of these Koreans began to rise. In July 2004, two-thirds (67%) found their political system commensurate with their democratic desire. Nonetheless, when this latest rating is compared with the pre-crisis rating, it is evident that the level of overall progress in Korea's democratization has changed little in recent years.




**Fig. 3** Changing levels of congruence between cultural and institutional democratization (Source: Korea Barometer surveys)

## The Liberalization of Crony Capitalism

The Korean economy has long been dominated by the big business conglomerates known as the Chaebols. In 1997, this system of crony capitalism and mass corruption produced the worst economic crisis since the Korean War 50 years ago. To restructure this immoral and inefficient system of political economy, the Kim Dae Jung government adopted the neo-liberal economic paradigm and introduced a variety of reform policies after he was inaugurated as the third president of the democratic Sixth Republic in February 1998. In order to sever the collusive ties between government and the Chaebols, he emphasized the need to liberalize the marketplace and deepen democratic rule simultaneously (Kim, 1999). Until now, no one has examined the basic principles and implementation of neo-liberal policies from the perspective of ordinary citizens. This section does so by highlighting the reactions of the Korean mass public to those principles underlying President Kim Dae Jung's parallel development model and its implementation.

## Support for the Notion of Parallel Development

Did the Korean people agree with President Kim when he claimed that these two systems needed fundamental change? Table 7 reports data directly relevant to these questions from the 1999 KORBAR survey. Specifically, the table reports perceptions about the need to reform either or both the economic and political systems. More than nine in 10 (95%) Koreans agreed about the need for fundamental change in the economic system (Appendix Q17). Among this overwhelming majority, more than a half (53%) expressed strong support for economic reform, strongly agreeing that their country was in need of such change. Strong opponents of the economic reform, by sharp contrast, constitute a negligible minority of one percent. Together these

**Table 7** The felt need to transform the current political and economic systems

| Opinion | Economic system in need of fundamental changes | Political system in need of further |
|---|---|---|
| Strongly agree | 53% | 40% |
| Somewhat agree | 42 | 49 |
| Somewhat disagree | 4 | 10 |
| Strongly disagree | 1 | 1 |
| (N) | (1,006) | (979) |

Source: 1999 Korea Barometer Survey.

percentages clearly indicate that the Korean people were overwhelmingly in support of reforming their crony capitalist system.

Regarding the political system, a large majority of Koreans supported an expansion and deepening of their current system of limited democracy (Appendix Q47). Nearly nine out of 10 Koreans (89%) agreed on the need for further democratization at least to some degree. Only one in 10 Koreans (11%) disagreed about a need to further reform the current system of democratic governance. While two out of five (40%) Koreans expressed strong agreement, only a tiny minority of one percent strongly disagreed about the need for such reform. Obviously, the intensity of the perceived need to reform the political system was not as great as that to reform the economic system. Nonetheless, a vast majority of the Korean population believed that their democratic system was in trouble and needed reform.

Did most Korean people believe that both the economic and political systems were malfunctioning so much that they needed fundamental reform? Table 8 directly explores this question by jointly considering perceptions about the need to reform the economic and political systems. Instead, Koreans wanted such reforms for the politico-economic system as a whole. A large majority (85%) believed that both systems needed reform. These results indicate, unequivocally, that the desires for institutional reform were not confined to an individual component of the politico-economic system. Rather, Koreans wanted such reforms for the politico-economic system as a whole.

Does their preference to reform both the economic and political systems mean that Koreans endorsed President Kim Dae Jung's notion of parallel development as a guiding principle for Korean national development? To address this question, the 1999 KORBAR survey included an additional item

**Table 8** Patterns of felt needs to restructure the existing political and economic systems

| Opinion pattern | | Distribution of respondents (%) |
|---|---|---|
| Economic system | Political system | |
| No | No | 1% |
| No | Yes | 4 |
| Yes | No | 10 |
| Yes | Yes | 85 |
| (N) | | (978) |

Note: "Yes" means affirming the need to change; "No" means rejecting the need to change.
Source: 1999 Korea Barometer Survey.

comparing the relative priority of economic and political reforms at the level of policy (Appendix Q48). Specifically, respondents were asked: "Between the two national goals of democratization and economic development, which goal do you think is more important?"

Just over one-third (36%) rated democratization and economic development of equal priority as a national development goal. A significantly larger proportion (50%) put economic development ahead of democratization. One in seven (14%) Koreans, on the other hand, chose democratization over economic development. The figures indicate that nearly two-thirds of the Korean people (64%) did not endorse, *in principle*, the policy of parallel development, which underlay the Kim Dae Jung government's reform program formulated in the aftermath of the economic crisis. Instead, they favored a policy that promotes sequential development, either putting economic development ahead of democratization or democratization ahead of economic development.

Prioritizing economic development and democratization equally constitutes one necessary component of support for the President Kim Dae Jung model of parallel development. To fully support his parallel development model *in principle*, ordinary citizens should not only recognize the need for reforming both the economic and political systems, but they must also assign the reform of each system equal weight. When these two components of support – salience and need – are taken into account together, those expressing either nonsupport or just partial support for this model became larger than when its salience was considered. While less than one-third (30%) were full supporters of his parallel development model, a large majority (70%) expressed either nonsupport or just partial support for his model. Less than one-third (30%) were full supporters of the parallel development model *in principle*. Given this understanding of public opinion, popular support for this parallel development model was quite meager. We need to inquire next how strongly they were committed to the various specific reforms required to build a free market economy and a consolidated democracy at the same time.

## Support for Neo-liberal Economic Reforms

The neo-liberal notion of political economy holds that both the private and public sectors of the national economy have to be reformed simultaneously in order to restructure Korea's crony capitalism into market capitalism (Kim, 1999: chap. 3; Sachs et al., 1996; Strange, 1996; Williamson, 1993). The chaebol, family-owned conglomerates that have tended to maintain cozy relationships with the government, have long dominated the private sector of the Korean economy. To what extent did the Korean people support restructuring these institutions of crony capitalism? To explore this question, the 1999 KORBAR survey first asked how strongly they approved or disapproved of breaking up the chaebols in order to restructure the economic system (for the wording of this and other questions on economic restructuring, see Appendix Q18). Slightly less than one-third (30%) *strongly* approved of this measure of reforming corporate structure, while slightly more than one-third (36%) approved of it *somewhat*. The Korean people as a whole did support restructuring the chaebols.

Did the Korean people also support restructuring the government, which is the chaebols' counterpart in Korean crony capitalism? How did they feel about the government's control over the chaebols, banks, and other corporations? Did they want their government to reduce its control over these businesses and financial institutions, which is what President Kim Dae Jung's model of parallel development proposed? The 1999 KORBAR survey reveals that three-quarters (76%) of the respondents were not in favor of reducing governmental control over those institutions. About one-quarter (24%) expressed direct support for the practice of governmental deregulation required for building a free market economy. More notably, a substantial majority (57%) favored expanding rather than reducing governmental control over private businesses. It is highly ironic that the Korean people tended to demand more, not less, active involvement from the government for the restructuring of the age-old crony capitalist system.

In addition to the question about the preferred role of government regarding economic institutions, the 1999 KORBAR survey asked two more questions concerning the need to reduce the degree of governmental involvement in the economy, which the IMF and many lending agencies had demanded (Appendix Q18c and Q18e). When asked about reducing the size of the government by privatizing state corporations, as many as seven-tenths (71%) of the respondents approved of this reform measure. When asked about making the government smaller by reducing its budget, a smaller majority of nearly two-thirds (63%) approved of this measure, which would also reduce the size of the government. Nearly nine out of every 10 Koreans (86%) approved at least one of these two reform measures. Both would reduce the size of the government.

Figure 4 reports the general levels of support for economic reforms among the Korean people on a 5-point scale. This scale was constructed by summing affirmative responses to the four aforementioned reform measures that would restructure the private and public sectors of the Korean economic system. A score of 0 on this scale indicates no support for the restructuring of crony capitalism into a free market economy. A score of 4 reflects

**Fig. 4** Levels of overall support for economic reforms (Source: 1999 Korea Barometer Survey)




full and unqualified support for economic restructuring. The mean support score on this scale was between two and three of the four proposed measures. While less than one-sixth (16%) supported none or only one of those measures, nearly three-fifths (56%) supported three or all four of them. Aside from the measure aimed to reduce governmental control over major business and financial corporations, nearly half the Korean population (46%) fully supported the liberalization of the marketplace known as marketization.

Among the Korean population, there was a general agreement that the monopolistic system of Chaebols needed to be restructured so that their operations would be made more transparent and accountable to shareholders and the general public. There was also general agreement that the government should shrink through budget reductions and divestiture of state enterprises. Nonetheless, ordinary Koreans did not want their government to relinquish its control over the Chaebols that needed to be restructured. What they really wanted in economic reform was a smaller government but one that would continue to play an active role. They wanted their government to do what the authoritarian governments of the past had done: bring about the successful transformation of a poverty-stricken country into an economic powerhouse.

## Assessments of Economic Reforms

How did average citizens react to the economic reforms the Kim Dae Jung government implemented to sort out the financial crisis and other economic problems facing the country? The 1999 KORBAR survey first asked: "How much effort do you think the Kim Dae Jung government has made to restructure banks, Chaebols, and other economic institutions?" (Appendix Q21a). A large majority (78%) replied in the affirmative by saying "some" or "a lot."

Yet those who said “some” effort outnumbered those who said “a lot” by a margin of over 3–1. Only a relatively small minority (18%) expressed very positive assessments of the government’s reform effort. Their number is, moreover, much smaller than the number who expressed negative feelings. All in all, the Korean people tended to feel that the government did not do enough to fix the foundation of crony capitalism, which they saw in need of fundamental change.

To determine their actual level of satisfaction with economic reforms, the KORBAR asked the Korean people the extent of their satisfaction with the Kim Dae Jung government’s effort to reform the economic system (Appendix Q21b). Only one-third (33%) expressed satisfaction, while nearly as many (31%) expressed dissatisfaction with it. A plurality (36%) of those surveyed in 1999 remained indifferent, neither satisfied nor dissatisfied. As discussed above, a significant majority believed that the government should give the top priority to economic reform. Even so, two-thirds (67%) of the Korean people remained less than satisfied with that effort. In the eyes of the Korean mass public, the Kim Dae Jung government implemented the economic component of its parallel development program with insufficient effort and unsatisfactory effectiveness.

## Citizen Perceptions of Life Quality

On all fronts, Korea today is a country different from what it was 20 years ago (Shin et al., 2003b). As the 11th largest economy in the world, Korea has been transformed from a low-income country into an economic powerhouse. Politically, it has been transformed from a repressive military dictatorship into a maturing democracy. Socially, it has been transformed from a nation of mostly rural people into one of urbanites. Culturally, Korea has also been transformed from a nation with a predominantly traditional Confucian culture into a multi-cultural nation with one of the fastest growing Christian populations in the world. How have these changes affected the quality of life that ordinary Koreans experience in the private and public spheres of their lives? To address this question, the 2001 KORBAR survey replicated two sets of questions asked in a national sample survey conducted by the Institute of Social Sciences at Seoul National University (SNU hereinafter) in 1981.

As done in the 1981 SNU survey, respondents to the 2001 KORBAR survey were asked to evaluate their own personal lives and their country’s on an 11-point ladder scale at three different points in time: the present, five years ago, and five years hence (Appendix Q58 and Q59). On this ladder scale, the bottom step with a score of 0 referred to the worst possible situation each respondent could imagine for one's own life or that of the country, while a score of 10 referred to the best possible situation he or she could imagine. Table 9 reports the complete distribution of respondents to the two surveys across 11 scale points. It also reports the mean rating on the scale and percentages expressing positive and negative feelings about their private and public life as a citizen within a nation.

The percentage and mean ratings in Table 9 are compared across the two surveys conducted in 1981 and 2001 in order to determine whether Koreans were feeling better-off or worse-off than two decades ago. In the *private sphere*, in which the Korean people experience life on an individual basis, little has changed over the period in either the negative or positive direction. Its mean score (4.3) remains almost the same as it was before (4.4). Across the survey years, no significant differences are found between the ratings of positive changes or between those of negative changes. These findings indicate that the quality of *private life* among a majority of the Korean people has changed little during the past two decades.

In the *public sphere* of life in which ordinary Koreans are involved as members of the national community, however, notable changes have taken place. In 1981, life in Korea was rated far more positively than negatively. While about a quarter (27%) expressed varying degrees of ill-being, nearly

**Table 9** Changes in the perceived quality of public and private life, 1981–2001

| Scale points | Public life | | Private life | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1981 | 2001 | 1981 | 2001 |
| 0 (worst) | 0.0% | 1.4% | 2.3% | 2.4% |
| 1 | 0.6 | 2.6 | 4.3 | 4.1 |
| 2 | 1.4 | 7.7 | 9.1 | 6.5 |
| 3 | 9.0 | 19.8 | 15.0 | 17.5 |
| 4 | 16.2 | 23.3 | 20.8 | 19.7 |
| 5 | 28.3 | 24.0 | 27.9 | 25.3 |
| 6 | 18.1 | 13.6 | 11.9 | 14.5 |
| 7 | 14.2 | 4.9 | 5.6 | 6.3 |
| 8 | 8.1 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 3.0 |
| 9 | 1.9 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.4 |
| 10 (best) | 2.1 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.4 |
| Negative (0–4) | 27.2 | 54.8 | 51.5 | 50.2 |
| Positive (6–10) | 44.4 | 21.3 | 20.5 | 24.6 |
| *(mean)* | *(5.5)* | *(4.3)* | *(4.3)* | *(4.4)* |

Source: 1981 Social Development survey and 2001 Korea Barometer survey.

half (44%) expressed ones of well-being. Those experiencing well-being outnumbered those experiencing ill-being by a substantial margin of 17 percentage points. Currently, in sharp contrast, the former are outnumbered by the latter by a larger margin of 34 percentage points (21% vs. 55%). In the eyes of the Korean people, life in Korea has significantly changed for the worse during the past two decades. For a majority, the country has become an unattractive place to live.

Twenty years ago a little over a quarter (27%) felt negative about the country as a place to live. Today more than half (54%) the Korean population feels that way. Compared to over two-fifths (44%) in 1981, only one-fifth (21%) feel positive about it. To put it differently, the proportion rating Korea as a bad place to live has increased by 23 percentage points while the proportion rating it as a good place has decreased by 28 percentage points. Why is it that the quality of public life in Korea has declined so much during the last two decades particularly when the country has been transformed into an economic powerhouse and a democratic state? This is the most puzzling question concerning the dynamics of life quality perceptions among the Korean people. It appears that their hopes were raised in the wake of those changes but shattered quickly, making the Koreans feel worse-off than before.

Because of significant declines in the quality of *public life* during the past two decades, the proportion experiencing ill-being in the public as well as private spheres of Korean life has risen sharply. Compared to 17 percent in 1981, 35 percent currently feel negative about their life experiences in both spheres. Those *fully negative* about the quality of Korean life have doubled over the last 20 years. Those *fully positive* about Korean life, on the other hand, have changed little. As they did 20 years ago, only a small minority of one-tenth (11%) express varying degrees of well-being in both private and public life. When these findings are considered together, it becomes evident that democratization, globalization, industrialization, urbanization, and many other changes that have taken place in Korea during the past two decades have not contributed to the building of a nation of greater well-being. Instead, those changes have transformed the country into a nation of lesser well-being.

## Concluding Remarks

What distinguishes the KORBAR surveys from the surveys undertaken by the news media and academic institutions in Korea to date? With very few exceptions, other surveys are one-time surveys offering nothing more than snapshots of the continuously changing process of Korea politics; they cannot tell us how Koreans have shifted in their opinions and behavior during the course of democratization (Auh, 1997; Dong-A Ilbo, 2003; Joong-Ang Ilbo, 2003). In addition, the same surveys are often based on a teleological assumption that Koreans are becoming citizens of established democracies in the West. The KORBAR surveys, on the other hand, constitute the one indisputable reality that Koreans neither interpret nor value democracy in the same way as Westerners do.

Equally notable is that the KORBAR surveys generate trend data about how individual Koreans change their opinion and behavior over time and whether the performance of their representative institutions improves or deteriorates during the course of democratization. These surveys, which have been assembled over a period of 15 years, offer the only databases that are currently available to analyze the direction and trajectories of both cultural and institutional democratization in Korea. In short, the KORBAR surveys can be considered a much more discriminating tool for uncovering and unraveling how Koreans are adapting to democratic change than a variety of other sample surveys that individual scholars and various institutions have recently undertaken.

In light of the parallel survey data presented above, it can be concluded that those KORBAR surveys are contributing toward significant advances in the study of democratizing and globalizing Korea. The surveys are grounded in the conception that democratization is a multi-dimensional, multi-directional, and multi-level phenomenon (Shin, 2001). Theoretically, they are predicated on the premise that acceptance of democratic political order does not necessarily bring about rejection of authoritarian political practices. They are also predicated on the premise that the democratization of political institutions and the liberalization of the marketplace do not necessarily enhance the quality of citizens' lives. The KORBAR surveys, therefore, offer rich and unique databases capable of providing a comprehensive and balanced account of those changes and their consequences for the quality of life ordinary Koreans experience and cherish for themselves and their own country.

Methodologically, the KORBAR surveys are built on the convention that the dynamics of political and economic changes in a single country cannot be understood properly in isolation (Chu et al., 2001). Only when we compare those dynamics across other new and old democracies can we meaningfully explore their problems and prospects in that country (Chu et al., 2001; Mattes and Shin, 2005; Rose and Shin, 2001; Shin and Shyu, 1997; Shin and Wells, 2005). These KORBAR surveys, when analyzed in comparison with similar surveys conducted in other new democracies, can also provide new insights and perspectives for a meaningful study of political life that reflects the sentiment Aristotle expressed 2,500 years ago: “The end of state is not mere life, rather, a good quality of life” (Barker, 1962).

## Appendix: A Sample of Survey Questions

### *Perceptions of the Current and Past Political Systems*

Q49. **[SHOW CARD]** Here is a scale ranging from a low of 1 to a high of 10. On this scale, 1 means complete dictatorship and 10 means complete democracy. The closer to 1 the score is, the more dictatorial our country is; the closer to 10 the score is, the more democratic our country is.

a. On this scale, where would you place our country under the Chun Doo Whan government? Please choose a number on this card.
b. Where would you place our country under the Kim Dae Jung government?
c. Where would you think our country stand now?
d. Where would you like our country to be right now?
e. Where do you think our country will stand five years from now?
f. Where on this scale does North Korea stand now?

### *The Quality of Democracy*

Q40. **[SHOW CARD]** Here is a scale ranging from a low of 1 to a high of 10. On this scale, 1 means complete dissatisfaction and 10 means complete satisfaction. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in our country? Please choose a number on this scale ranging from a low of 1 (complete dissatisfaction) to a high of 10 (complete satisfaction).
Q13. Do you think the Roh Moo Hyun government is run by the will of the people or by small poltitical forces?

1. the will of the people
2. small political forces
8. Don’t know

Q29. Do you think the Roh Moo Hyun government works for a majority of the people? Or does it work for some particular class or political forces?

1. A majority of the people
2. Some particular class or political forces
8. Don’t know

### *Attachment to Democracy*

Q25c. **[SHOW CARD]** Here is a scale measuring the extent to which people think democracy is suitable for our country. On this scale, 1 means complete unsuitability while 10 means complete suitability. During the present Kim Dae Jung government, to what extent is democracy suitable for our country?
Q43. With which of the following do you agree most?

1. Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government.
2. Under certain situations, a dictatorship is preferable.
3. For people like me it doesn't matter if we have a democratic or non-democratic government.

Q47. How much do you agree or disagree with the statement that our political system should be made a lot more democratic than what it is now–strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree?
Q48. Between the two National goals of democratization and economic development, which goal do you think is more important?

### *Detachment from Authoritarian Rule*

Q34. Our present system of government is not the only one that this country has had, and some people say we would be better off if the country was governed differently. How much do you agree or disagree with their views in favor of each of the following:

a. The army should govern the country – agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly?
b. Better to get rid of Parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide Everything – agree strongly, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree?

### *Assessments of the National Economy and Government*

Q1 How would you rate the overall economic condition of our country today?

1. Very good.
2. Good
3. Neither good nor bad
4. Bad

5. Very bad
8. Don't know

Q14 **[SHOW CARD]** Here is a scale measuring the extent to which people are satisfied with the government. Please choose a number on this scale where 1 means complete dissatisfaction and 10 means complete satisfaction.

1. On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way the
2. Roh Moo Hyun government handles problems facing our society?

## *Support for Economic Restructuring*

Q17. How do you feel about the opinion that our economic system needs fundamental changes – do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree?
Q18. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of the following measures to restructure our economic system?

a. Breakup chaebols
b. Lay off unnecessary workers in the private sector
c. Lay off unnecessary workers in the public sector
d. Privatize state corporations
e. Make the government smaller by reducing its budget

Q19. How do you feel about the government's control over chaebols, banks, and state corporations?

1. Make them a lot more subject to government control
2. Somewhat more subject to government control
3. Leave them as they are now
4. Somewhat less subject to government control
5. A lot less subject to government control

Q21a. Since the outbreak of the economic crisis two years ago, how much effort do you think the Kim Dae Jung government has made to restructure banks, chaebols, and other economic institutions – a lot, some, a little, or none?
Q21b. Are you satisfied with the Kim Dae Jung government's effort to reform our economic system? Or are you dissatisfied?

1. Very satisfied
2. Somewhat satisfied

3. Neither satisifed nor dissatisifed
4. Somewhat dissatisfied
5. Very dissatisfied

### *Global Assessments of Life Quality*

Q58. **[SHOW CARD]** Here is a picture of a ladder. Imagine that the top of the ladder represents the best possible place to live and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible place to live.

a. Where do you think our country stands on the ladder at the present time?
b. Where do you think our country stood three years ago when Kim Dae Jung was our president?
c. Where do you think our country stood five years ago when Kim Young Sam was our president?
d. Where do you think our country will stand five years from now?

Q59. **[SHOW CARD]** Looking at the ladder again, suppose the top represents the best possible life for you; and the bottom, the worst possible life for you.

a. On which step of the ladder do you feel you personally stand at the present time?
b. On which step do you think you stood three years ago when Kim Dae Jung was our president?
c. On which step do you think you stood five years ago when Kim Young Sam was our president?
d. Where do you think you will stand five years from now?

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# Measuring Quality of Life in Latin America: Some Insights from Happiness Economics and the Latinobarometro

**Carol Graham**

**Abstract** This paper addresses the challenges and contributions that come from taking a broader quality-of-life based approach rather than a simpler income-based approach to assessing welfare. It uses the tools provided by the economics of happiness and relies on large-scale surveys as well as more in-depth field research in Latin America. It shows how a quality-of-life approach can help us understand the welfare effects of a number of factors ranging from health, education, and employment status to institutional arrangements such as inequality and opportunity. It also sounds a note of caution about directly inferring policy implications from the results due to – among other factors – norms and expectations based on differences in the way individuals answer surveys (the "happy peasant" versus "frustrated achiever" problem) and due to lack of clarity in the definition of happiness. The latter allows for research comparisons across individuals and cultures, but presents challenges when making policy choices based on the concept.

**Keywords** Quality of life · subjective well being · happiness · economics · inequality · Latin America

Economists have increasingly been questioning the extent to which traditional, income and consumption based measures of utility and welfare fully capture important elements of individual welfare. At the same time behavioral economists have been using experiments and other tools to explore how individuals depart from standard notions of rationality and welfare maximization. An outgrowth of these developments has been the new interest in

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happiness surveys as a tool for measuring welfare and well being. Happiness economics combines the techniques typically used by psychologists with the standard econometric tools more common to economists. The most important departure of happiness economics is that it relies on surveys in which individuals report their happiness levels as a measure of welfare rather than relying on the standard revealed preferences approach, which is based on measuring what people purchase or consume.

Economists have traditionally shied away from survey data, which, like much other data, is rift with bias and measurement error problems. Yet increased usage of such data in recent years has resulted in improved econometric techniques for accounting for the errors. In addition, the results of large N studies demonstrate remarkable consistency in the determinants of well being or happiness across hundreds of thousands of individuals across countries and over time. There are, no doubt, cross cultural differences in the definition of happiness. It is key to the robustness of the studies that no attempt is made to define the term happiness in the surveys. Each respondent does so on his or her own.

The lack of an externally imposed definition of happiness allows for the usage of the surveys as a research tool across diverse populations and cultures. Yet it presents challenges when applied to policy. The weight that is assigned to happiness as a policy objective will vary depending on how it is defined – which will vary across cultures and countries, as well as the weight that is given other policies, given budget and resource constraints. Addressing those challenges will be critical to the successful application of happiness surveys to policy questions. This paper will discuss the specific problems associated with doing so. Notwithstanding these challenges, the approach has the potential to significantly enhance our understanding of human well being.

## The Economics of Happiness: A Novel Approach to Measuring Welfare[1]

While psychologists have long used surveys of reported well-being to study happiness, economists only recently ventured into this arena. Early economists and philosophers, ranging from Aristotle to Bentham, Mill, and Smith, incorporated the pursuit of happiness in their work. Yet, as economics grew more rigorous and quantitative, more parsimonious definitions of welfare took hold. Utility was taken to depend only on income as mediated by individual choices or preferences within a rational individual's monetary budget constraint.

Even within a more orthodox framework, focusing purely on income can miss key elements of welfare. People have different preferences for material and non-material goods. They may choose a lower-paying but more personally rewarding job, for example. Happiness economics relies on more expansive notions of utility and welfare, including interdependent utility functions, procedural utility, and the interaction between rational and non-rational influences in determining economic behaviour. Richard Easterlin was the first modern economist to revisit the concept of happiness, beginning in the early 1970s. More generalized interest took hold in the late 1990s.[2]

The economics of happiness does not purport to replace income-based measures of welfare but instead to complement them with broader measures of well-being. These measures are based on the results of large-scale surveys, across countries and over time, of hundreds of thousands of individuals who are asked to assess their own welfare. The surveys provide information about the importance of a range of factors which affect well-being, including income but also others such as health, marital and employment status, and civic trust.

The approach, which relies on expressed preferences rather than on revealed choices, is particularly well suited to answering questions in areas where a revealed preferences approach provides limited information. Indeed, it often uncovers discrepancies between expressed and revealed preferences. Revealed preferences cannot fully gauge the welfare effects of particular policies or institutional arrangements which individuals are powerless to change. Examples of these include the welfare effects of inequality, environmental degradation, and macroeconomic policies such as inflation and unemployment. Sen's capabilities-based approach to poverty, for example, highlights the lack of capacity of the poor to make choices or to take certain actions. In many of his writings, Sen (1995) criticizes economists' excessive focus on choice as a sole indicator of human behaviour. Another area where a choice approach is limited and happiness surveys can shed light is the welfare effects of addictive behaviours such as smoking and drug abuse, or of public health problems such as obesity, where differences in social norms and in future expectations and related variance in discount rates may be at play.[3]

Happiness surveys are based on questions in which the individual is asked, "Generally speaking, how happy are you with your life" or "How satisfied are you with your life", with possible answers on a four-to-seven point scale. Psychologists have a preference for life satisfaction questions. Yet answers to happiness and life satisfaction questions correlate quite closely. The correlation coefficient between the two – based on research on British data for 1975–92, which includes both questions, and Latin

American data for 2000–1, in which alternative phrasing was used in different years – ranges between 0.56 and 0.50 (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Graham and Pettinato, 2002).

This approach presents several methodological challenges.[4] To minimize order bias, happiness questions must be placed at the beginning of surveys. As with all economic measurements, the answer of any specific individual may be biased by idiosyncratic, unobserved events. Bias in answers to happiness surveys can also result from unobserved personality traits and correlated measurement errors (which can be corrected via individual fixed effects if and when panel data are available). Other concerns about correlated unobserved variables are common to all economic disciplines.

Despite the potential pitfalls, cross-sections of large samples across countries and over time find remarkably consistent patterns in the variables that correlate with happiness. Many errors are uncorrelated with the observed variables, and do not systematically bias the results. Psychologists, meanwhile, find validation in the way that people answer these surveys based in physiological measures of happiness, such as the frontal movements in the brain and in the number of "genuine" – Duchenne – smiles (Diener and Seligman, 2004).

Micro-econometric happiness equations have the standard form: $W_{it} = \alpha + \beta x_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$, where $W$ is the reported well-being of individual $i$ at time $t$, and $X$ is a vector of known variables including socio-demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Unobserved characteristics and measurement errors are captured in the error term. Because the answers to happiness surveys are ordinal rather than cardinal, they are best analysed via ordered logit or probit equations. These regressions typically yield lower $R^2$ than economists are used to, reflecting the extent to which emotions and other components of true well-being are driving the results, as opposed to the variables that we are able to measure, such as income, education, and marital and employment status. In order to answer many of these questions, researchers need more and better quality well-being data, particularly panel data, which allows for the correction of unobserved personality traits and correlated measurement errors, as well as for better determining the direction of causality (for example, from contextual variables like income or health to happiness versus the other way around).

The availability of panel data in some instances, as well as advances in econometric techniques, are increasingly allowing for sounder analysis (Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004). The coefficients produced from ordered probit or logistic regressions are remarkably similar to those from OLS regressions based on the same equations. While it is impossible to measure the precise effects of independent variables on true well-being, happiness researchers have used the OLS coefficients as a basis for assigning relative weights to them. They can estimate how much income a typical individual in the United States or Britain would need to produce the same change in stated happiness that comes from the well-being loss resulting from, for example, divorce ($100,000) or job loss ($60,000) (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004).

## The Easterlin Paradox

In his original study, Easterlin revealed a paradox that sparked interest in the topic but is as yet unresolved. While most happiness studies find that *within* countries wealthier people are, on average, happier than poor ones, studies across countries and over time find very little, if any, relationship between increases in per capita income and average happiness levels. On average, wealthier countries (as a group) are happier than poor ones (as a group); happiness seems to rise with income up to a point, but not beyond it. Yet even among the less happy, poorer countries, there is not a clear relationship between average income and average happiness levels, suggesting that many other factors – including cultural traits – are at play (Fig. 1).

Within countries, income matters to happiness (Oswald, 1997; Diener et al., 2003, among others). Deprivation and abject poverty in particular are very bad for happiness. Yet after basic needs are met other factors such as rising aspirations, relative income differences, and the security of gains become increasingly important, in addition to income. Long before the




Source: Graham and Pettinato, 2002.

**Fig. 1** Happiness and income per capita, 1990s economics of happiness was established, Duesenberry (1949) noted the impact of changing aspirations on income satisfaction and its potential effects on consumption and savings rates. Any number of happiness studies have since confirmed the effects of rising aspirations, and have also noted their potential role in driving excessive consumption and other perverse economic behaviours (Frank, 1999).

Thus, a common interpretation of the Easterlin paradox is that humans are on a "hedonic treadmill": aspirations increase along with income and, after basic needs are met, relative rather than absolute levels of income matter to well-being. Another interpretation of the paradox is the psychologists' "set point" theory of happiness, in which every individual is presumed to have a happiness level that he or she goes back to over time, even after major events such as winning the lottery or getting divorced (Easterlin, 2003; Headey and Wearing, 1992). The implication of this theory for policy is that nothing much can be done to increase happiness.

Individuals are remarkably adaptable, no doubt, and in the end can get used to most things, and in particular to income gains. The behavioural economics literature, for example, shows that individuals value losses more than gains (Kahneman et al., 1999, among others). Easterlin argues that individuals adapt more in the pecuniary arena than in the non-pecuniary arena, while life changing events, such as bereavement, have lasting effects on happiness. Yet, because most policy is based on pecuniary measures of well-being, it overemphasizes the importance of income gains to well-being and underestimates that of other factors, such as health, family, and stable employment.

There is no consensus about which interpretation is most accurate. Yet numerous studies which demonstrate that happiness levels can change significantly in response to a variety of factors suggest that the research can yield insights into human well-being which provide important, if complementary, information for policymakers. Even under the rubric of set point theory, happiness levels can fall significantly in the aftermath of events like illness or unemployment. More recent studies by psychologists, suggest that there are some events that individuals never adapt back from (Diener et al., 2006). Even under the rubric of set point theory, meanwhile, accepting that levels *eventually* adapt upwards to a longer-term equilibrium, mitigating or preventing the unhappiness and disruption that individuals experience for months, or even years, certainly seems a worthwhile objective for policy.

## Selected Applications of Happiness Economics

Happiness research has been applied to a range of issues, all of which could be relevant to quality of life in Latin America. These include the relationship between income and happiness, inequality and poverty, the effects of macro-policies on individual welfare, and the effects of public policies aimed at controlling addictive substances.

Some studies have attempted to separate the effects of income from those of other endogenous factors, such as satisfaction in the workplace. Studies of unexpected lottery gains find that these isolated gains have positive effects on happiness, although it is not clear that they are of a lasting nature (Gardner and Oswald, 2001). A recent study based on the German socio-economic panel (GSEOP) finds that individuals adapt to income gains very quickly but, in contrast, status changes have more lasting effects on well being (DiTella et al., 2004). Other studies have explored the reverse direction of causality, and find that people with higher happiness levels tend to perform better in the labour market and to earn more income in the future (Diener et al., 2003; Graham et al., 2004; Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998; Ferrer and Frijters, 2004).

A related question, and one which is still debated in economics, is how income inequality affects individual welfare. Interestingly, the results differ between developed and developing economies. Most studies of the United States and Europe find that inequality has modest or insignificant effects on happiness. The mixed results may reflect the fact that inequality can be a signal of future opportunity and mobility as much as it can be a sign of injustice (Alesina et al., 2004). In contrast, our own recent research on Latin America finds that inequality is negative for the well-being of the poor and positive for the rich. In a region where inequality is much higher and where public institutions and labour markets are notoriously inefficient, inequality signals persistent disadvantage or advantage rather than opportunity and mobility (Graham and Felton, 2005).

Happiness surveys also facilitate the measurement of the effects of broader, non-income components of inequality, such as race, gender, and status, all of which seem to be highly significant (Graham and Felton, 2005). These results find support in work in the health arena, which finds that relative social standing has significant effects on health outcomes (Marmot, 2004).

Happiness research can deepen our understanding of poverty, which is, no doubt, a critical factor eroding quality of life in Latin America. The set point theory suggests that a destitute peasant can be very happy. While this contradicts a standard finding in the literature – namely, that poor people are less happy than wealthier people within countries – it is suggestive of the role that low expectations play in explaining persistent poverty in some cases. Work on social mobility by Birdsall and Graham (1999), meanwhile, suggests that high and persistent levels of inequality – which they distinguish from the kind of inequality that rewards productivity and innovation – can exacerbate the low expectations/poverty trap.

What is perceived to be poverty in one context may not be in another. People who are high up the income ladder can identify themselves as poor, while many of those who are below the objective poverty line do not, because of different expectations (Rojas, 2004). In addition, the well-being of those who have escaped poverty is often undermined by insecurity and the risk of falling back into poverty. Income data does not reveal this vulnerability, yet happiness data shows that it has strong negative effects on their welfare. Indeed, their reported well-being is often lower than that of the poor (Graham and Pettinato, 2002).

Happiness surveys can be used to examine the effects of different macro-policy arrangements on well-being. Most studies find that inflation and unemployment have negative effects on happiness. The effects of unemployment are stronger than those of inflation, and hold above and beyond those of forgone income (Di Tella et al., 2001). The standard "misery index", which assigns equal weight to inflation and unemployment, may be underestimating the effects of the latter on well-being (Frey and Stutzer, 2002b). Political arrangements also matter. Much of the literature finds that both trust and freedom have positive effects on happiness (Inglehart et al., 2008) Layard, 2005). Research based on variance in voting rights across cantons in Switzerland finds that there are positive effects from *participating* in direct democracy (Frey and Stutzer, 2002b). Our research in Latin America finds a strong positive correlation between happiness and preference for democracy (Graham and Sukhtankar, 2004).

Happiness surveys can also be utilized to gauge the welfare effects of various public policies. How does a tax on addictive substances, such as tobacco and alcohol, for example, affect well-being? A recent study on cigarette taxes suggests that the negative financial effects may be outweighed by positive self-control effects (Gruber and Mullainathan, 2002).

Given the wide range of potential applications for these surveys, they can and should provide important insights into quality of life in the region, as well as serve as a tool for its measurement. At the same time, for a number of reasons, discussed below, caution is necessary when directly applying the research findings to policy. Prior to discussing happiness studies as an input to quality of life measures, however, it is necessary to see how the correlates of happiness in Latin America compare to other places where it has been studied.

## Happiness: How Does Latin America Compare?

Our 2002 study of happiness in Latin America was the first study of happiness in such a large sample of developing countries and certainly the first for the region. We have confirmed the general direction of those findings in a number of studies since then (Graham and Pettinato, 2002; Graham and Sukhtankar, 2004; Graham and Felton, 2005). In the 2002 study, we compared the determinants of happiness in Latin America with those of the USA. For the USA, we used the pooled data for 1973–1998 from the GSS. We also compared the correlates of happiness in Latin America with those in another large sample of respondents in a very different context, Russia. For Russia we relied on the most recent available survey (2000) from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). For Latin America, we relied on the 2001 Latinobarometro. The Latinobarometro survey consists of approximately 1000 interviews in 17 countries in Latin America, providing 17,000 observations for statistical analysis. The samples are conducted annually by a prestigious research firm in each country, and are nationally representative except for Brazil and Paraguay. The survey is produced by the NGO Latinobarometro, a non-profit organization based in Santiago de Chile and directed by Marta Lagos (www.latinobarometro.org). The first survey was carried out in 1995 and covered 8 countries. Funding began with an grant from the European Community and is now from multiple sources. Access to the data is by purchase, with a 4 year lag in public release. This paper includes data collected in 2007, the latest available year. Graham is an advisor to the poll and therefore has access to the data each year. We used 2001 data as it is the one year for which we have variables for both self reported health status and for being a minority, which makes it comparable to the USA and Russia surveys (See Tables 1, 2 and 3). In our other studies, based on a pooled sample for several years of Latinobarometro rather than on cross sections for particular years, we get essentially the same results.

We find a remarkable degree of similarity: there are similar age, income, education, marriage, employment, and health effects.[5] In all contexts, unemployed people are less happy than others. Self employed people are happier in the USA and in Russia on average, while in Latin America, they were less happy. While in the USA, self employment is a choice, in Latin America the self employed are often in the informal sector by default. Another difference is that women are happier than men in the USA, while in Russia men are happier than women (due to disparities in status?) and in Latin America there is no gender difference. Blacks are less happy than other races in the United States, and similarly, those that identify as minorities in Latin America are less happy. In contrast, minorities are happier than ethnic Russians, which may be explained by the increased freedom that minorities have established, particularly outside Russia proper, since the break up of the Soviet Union.[6]

Even these subtle differences in the correlates of well being suggest that the analysis of reported well being highlights public policy challenges, such as inadequate employment opportunities and unequal gender rights. While these issues often enter the public debate as a result of pressure from special

**Table 1** Happiness in Latin America, 2001

| Dependent variable: happiness | | |
|---|---|---|
| Independent variables | Coef. | z |
| Age | −0.025 | −4.21 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 4.72 |
| Male | −0.002 | −0.07 |
| Married | 0.056 | 1.63 |
| Log wealth index | 0.395 | 10.56 |
| Years of education | −0.003 | −0.64 |
| Minority | −0.083 | −2.49 |
| Student | 0.066 | 1.01 |
| Retired | −0.005 | −0.06 |
| Homemaker | −0.053 | −1.04 |
| Unemployed | −0.485 | −7.54 |
| Self employed | −0.098 | −2.33 |
| Health (self-reported) | 0.468 | 24.58 |
| *Pseudo $R^2$* | *0.062* | |
| *Number of obs.* | *15209* | |

* Ordered logit estimation; country dummies included but not shown.
Source: Latinobarometro, 2001. Author's calculations.

**Table 2** Happiness in Russia, 2000

| Dependent variable: happiness | | |
|---|---|---|
| Independent variables | Coef. | z |
| Age | −0.085 | −11.27 |
| Age squared | 0.001 | 9.97 |
| Male | 0.040 | 0.90 |
| Married | 0.192 | 4.19 |
| Log equivalent income | 0.399 | 17.18 |
| Education Level | 0.018 | 1.37 |
| Minority | 0.254 | 4.16 |
| Student | 0.481 | 3.03 |
| Retired | −0.244 | −3.25 |
| Housewife | 0.363 | 2.21 |
| Unemployed | −0.437 | −4.03 |
| Self employed | 0.270 | 1.82 |
| Health index | 0.387 | 4.09 |
| *Pseudo $R^2$* | *0.032* | |
| *Number of obs.* | *7666* | |

* Ordered logit estimation.
Source: Graham, Eggers, Sukhtankar (forthcoming).

**Table 3** Happiness in the US, 1972–1998

| Dependent variable: happiness | | |
|---|---|---|
| Independent variables | Coef. | z |
| Age | −0.025 | −5.20 |
| Age squared | 0.038 | 7.53 |
| Male | −0.199 | −6.80 |
| Married | 0.775 | 25.32 |
| Log income | 0.163 | 9.48 |
| Education | 0.007 | 1.49 |
| Black | −0.400 | −10.02 |
| Other race | 0.049 | 0.59 |
| Student | 0.291 | 3.63 |
| Retired | 0.219 | 3.93 |
| Housekeeper | 0.065 | 1.66 |
| Unemployed | −0.684 | −8.72 |
| Self employed | 0.098 | 2.29 |
| Health | 0.623 | 35.91 |
| *Pseudo* $R^2$ | *0.075* | |
| *Number of obs.* | *24128* | |

* Ordered logit estimation; year dummies included but not shown.
Source: GSS data, Author's calculations.

interests such as unions or NGO's, it is novel to find strong backing for them in individual assessments of welfare.

We also find that in both Latin America and Russia happier people are more likely to support market policies, to be satisfied with how democracy was working, and to prefer democracy to any other system of government. Happier people, on average, have higher prospects for their own and their children's future mobility; are more likely to believe that the distribution of income in their country is fair; place themselves higher on a notional economic ladder; and have lower fear of unemployment.[7]

The above studies are based on cross sections from the Latinobarometro. For one country in Latin America, Peru, we have data on both reported and objective well being for the same respondents over a ten year period. This allows us to get a picture of the over time effects of income on happiness, as well as to begin to separate out what is driven by contextual factors versus what is driven by individual specific personality traits. We also have similar data for Russia.

In Peru, we re-interviewed a sub-sample (500) of respondents in a large, nationally representative panel for 1991–2000, and asked a number of questions about their perceptions of their past progress and for their future prospects. We repeated this perceptions survey three years in a row. The




Source: Graham and Pettinato, 2002.

*Similar findings when using observations are limited to only those with above median wealth

**Fig. 2** Long term percevied mobility vs. 1991–00 income mobility

most significant and surprising finding was that almost half of the respondents with the most upward mobility reported that their economic situation was negative or very negative compared to ten years prior (See Fig. 2). We conducted a similar analysis based on comparable data for Russia, and found an even higher percentage of frustrated respondents – or "frustrated achievers" as we now call them (Fig. 3).

These frustrated achievers (FA's) were at or about average income (and therefore not the poorest in the sample). They were slightly older on average than non-frustrated respondents with upward mobility, and there were no significant gender or education differences.[8] The FA's scored lower on a whole host of perceptions questions, such as their perceived prospects of upward mobility, and their position on a notional economic ladder. They also had a higher fear of being unemployed in the future. In addition, the Russian FA's were more likely to want to restrict the incomes of the rich, and were less satisfied with the market process and with democracy (we did not have the same questions in the original survey for Peru).[9]

In Peru the likelihood of having upward mobility and being frustrated (a frustrated achiever) is negatively related to initial income levels.[10] In other words, the frustrated achievers started from lower income levels, on average, even though they are not the very poorest in the sample at the time that




Source: Graham and Pettinato.

**Fig. 3** Perceived past mobility vs. 1995–99 income mobility

they answered our survey. This is not surprising, as thus even large percentage increases in their incomes will seem insufficient to reach the levels of wealthier groups. The FA's were also more likely to be urban, and therefore more informed about the lifestyles of others, including those of the very wealthy.

Relative income differences could certainly be a plausible explanation for these frustrations. Both Peru and Russia have high degrees of inequality. The FA's were more likely to score lower on the notional economic ladder in both surveys, as well as to compare their situation negatively to others in their community and their country in Peru (this latter question was not in the Russia survey).

A lack of adequate social insurance and insecurity could be another explanation. As noted above, the FA's had a higher fear of unemployment than non-frustrated achievers. Thus even though the FA's are doing well by objective income measures, they perceive that there is no guarantee of stability or maintaining their earnings level. This is not surprising, given that both surveys were conducted in very volatile economic contexts, and the objective mobility data reveal a remarkable degree of vulnerability.[11]

Most of the FAs were at mean levels of education. In Latin America, with the opening of trade and capital markets in the 1990's, those with higher levels of education are gaining high marginal returns compared to the rest of society, while those with secondary education are seeing decreasing marginal returns compared to those with primary education (Behrman et al., 2001). Prior to this opening, people with secondary education were able to lead relatively stable, “middle class” lives. Yet by the end of the 1990’s, the income gaps between the middle and the poor had narrowed and the public sector jobs which many of this cohort held were far fewer and less desirable.[12] The unemployed, for example, are disproportionately represented among those with completed or almost completed secondary education (Graham and Felton, 2005).

Lastly, it is quite plausible that some of the frustrations that we find are driven by individual character traits. There is probably some percent of every sample that will always be negative or unhappy, regardless of objective conditions. Yet we do not have the over-time data that is necessary to test this proposition. Some intersect of contextual variables and character traits is likely driving the frustrations of our achievers.

## Inequality and Opportunity

Clearly the frustrated achievers findings are highlighting the role of insecurity and inequality in undermining well being in the region. The effect of inequality on individual welfare remains a debated question in economics. In a separate study, Andrew Felton and I looked at the effects of inequality on happiness in Latin America, and found that this is one important area where the region looks very different from the OECD countries (Graham and Felton, 2005). In Europe and the USA, inequality does not seem to have significant effects on happiness, one way or the other. In those contexts, and particularly the USA, it seems to signal mobility and opportunity as much as it suggests injustice. In stark contrast, we find that it has significant effects on well being in Latin America, making those in the highest quintiles 5% happier than the average and those in the poorest quintile 3% less happy. Indeed, the effects of relative income differences in the region – measured as each respondent’s distance from the mean wealth level for his or her country – held regardless of average country level incomes, which had no effect (See Table 4).

In a simple illustration we show how a respondent in the poorest quintile in Honduras, whose distance from the country mean is half that of a respondent in the poorest quintile in Chile, is happier than the respondent in Chile because of smaller relative differences. Yet the poor Honduran is twice as poor in objective terms (See Fig. 4).[13]

We conducted the same analysis using different reference norms, and compared respondents in large, medium, and small sized cities. Our results were similar, except that in the small cities average income levels still had

**Table 4** Average vs. relative wealth

| Ordered logit estimation of a 1–4 scale of happiness | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Average wealth calculated by: | | | | | |
| | Country | Country | Country city size | Country city size | Country city size | Country city size |
| Individual wealth | 0.106557 | | 0.111905 | | 0.094951 | |
| | 5.52** | | 11.78** | | 12.60** | |
| Average wealth | −0.044854 | 0.0617034 | 0.053104 | 0.0588004 | −0.063055 | .0318961 |
| | −0.70 | 0.81 | −1.5 | 1.65* | −1.48 | 0.73 |
| Relative wealth | | 0.106557 | | 0.111905 | | 0.094951 |
| | | 5.52** | | 11.78** | | 12.60** |
| Country dummies* | N | N | N | N | Y | Y |
| Citysml dummies | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Cluster by: | Country | Country | Country city size | Country city size | Country city size | Country city size |
| Individual wealth | 0.104796 | | 0.111883 | | 0.094975 | |
| | 5.43** | | 12.2** | | 12.60** | |
| Average wealth | −0.044854 | 0.060438 | 0.051717 | 0.060166 | −0.069826 | 0.025149 |
| | −0.60 | 0.78 | −1.37 | 1.45 | −2.69** | 0.94 |
| Relative wealth | | 0.104796 | | 0.111883 | | 0.094975 |
| | | 5.43** | | 12.2** | | 12.60** |
| Country dummies* | N | N | N | N | Y | Y |
| Citysml dummies | N | N | N | N | N | N |
| Cluster by: | Country | Country | Country city size | Country city size | Country city size | Country city size |

Demographic variables in all regressions: age, age squared, years education, married, male, health, unemp, selfemp, retired, and student.
* When calculating average wealth at the country level, country dummies cannot be included in the regression due to multicollinearity. When we run split sample regressions, by city size, average wealth is positive and significant for small cities.
* t-statistics underneath coefficients.




Happiness Gap = wealth gap * coefficient ÷ 4

Calculated Happiness Gap

| | Poor | Rich |
|---|---|---|
| Chile wealth gap | –2.489 | 2.521 |
| Honduras wealth gap | –2.142 | 3.261 |
| Chile-Honduras difference | 0.347 | 0.740 |
| difference * coefficient / 4 = Honduran happiness differential | **0.43%** | **0.93%** |

| | Mean Happiness (1-5 scale) | | | Mean Wealth (1-11 scale) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wealth quintile | Chile | Honduras | Overall | Chile | Honduras | Overall |
| 1 | 2.54 | 3.11 | 2.73 | 5.26 | 2.64 | 3.12 |
| 2 | 2.74 | 3.15 | 2.85 | 7.00 | 4.00 | 5.00 |
| 3 | 2.77 | 3.17 | 2.91 | 8.00 | 5.00 | 6.00 |
| 4 | 2.94 | 3.13 | 2.97 | 9.00 | 6.00 | 7.46 |
| 5 | 3.08 | 3.30 | 3.08 | 10.27 | 8.04 | 9.63 |
| Total | 2.79 | 3.17 | 2.88 | 7.76 | 4.78 | 5.81 |

Regionwide results: rich are 3.83 points higher than mean; poor are 2.68 points lower than mean.
These gaps * .05/4 = 5% > happiness for the rich and 3% < happiness for the poor.

**Fig. 4** Happiness gap in honduras and chile

a significant positive effect, in addition to relative income levels, suggesting that at lower levels of income, concerns for relative income are still mediated by absolute levels, a finding which is consistent with the broader literature (and the Easterlin paradox).

We also looked at the effects of perceptions of inequality, as measured by respondents' response on the economic ladder question and perceived prospects of upward mobility. Two questions in particular allow us to separate feelings of status from other economic concerns or utility of wealth. One of these is a catch-all question asking "In general, how would you describe your present economic situation and that of your family?" This variable is consistently one of the most significant to well-being, usually more so than any other except health. The other is the economic ladder question (ELQ), included in many other well-being surveys besides the Latinobarómetro, which asks respondents to place themselves on a 10-step ladder where the poorest are on step one and the richest on step ten. This question is also an important predictor of happiness, even when other questions about wealth are included. It is purely a relative ranking of wealth. When combined with the personal economy question, it allows us to decompose the utility of wealth into status and other effects (See Table 5a/b).

We looked at how these scores varied according to where people live (city sizes). Wealth levels are, on average, higher in large cities than in small ones. In contrast, we found that respondents' subjective personal economic rankings were LOWER in big cities and higher in small towns (Table 5a/b). In our view, this perceptions gap is in keeping with other findings in the happiness literature. It is suggestive of Luttmer's recent work on USA earnings areas and our own findings on average country level wealth. In both cases, respondents of similar income or wealth levels are less happy when their peers or compatriots have higher levels of wealth. James Duesenberry's classic work on savings also resonates. He finds that, holding income levels constant, respondents that live in neighborhoods with higher average levels of wealth are less satisfied with their incomes than those that live in less wealthy neighborhoods. ELQ, on the other hand, rises with city size (as does wealth), and even after controlling for socio-demographic data, ELQ rankings tend to be higher in big cities. Once again, this appears to be a reference-group effect: people in small cities are more likely to know how others around them live than are those in medium or large ones. And for the most part they are fairly on par with their neighbors, as there is less variance in wealth levels in smaller cities. People in big cities, meanwhile, are probably aware that objective economic conditions in the countryside and smaller towns are worse than they are in the major cities.

A related inequality perceptions variable was the time respondents thought it would take to reach their desired standard of living. The question was phrased as: "how long do you think it will take you to reach your desired standard of living?" with possible answers ranging from "I already have it" to several different year categories (1–2 years; 5–10 years, and so on) to "never". Respondents who live in small towns are more likely to report "never", while there was no significant difference in the responses of those that live in big cities from those in medium ones. It is likely that those in small towns, particularly rural ones, are well aware that the greatest opportunities for both education and employment are in larger urban areas rather than in their small towns. Meanwhile, those respondents with completed

**Table 5a** Components of the ELQ and Relative ELQ

| ELQ | Coefficient | z-Score | Relative ELQ | Coefficient | z-Score | Relative ELQ | Coefficient | z-Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age | −0.026 | −5.98** | Age | −0.026 | −6.14** | age | −0.026 | −6.040** |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 4.56** | Age squared | 0.000 | 4.59** | age2 | 0.000 | 4.580** |
| Education | 0.059 | 11.05** | Education | 0.056 | 10.74** | yedu | 0.057 | 10.830** |
| Wealth | 0.188 | 21.71** | Wealth | 0.184 | 22.21** | wealth | 0.186 | 22.000** |
| Married | 0.034 | 1.52 | Married | 0.030 | 1.32 | married | 0.031 | 1.390* |
| Male | −0.107 | −4.29** | Male | −0.106 | −4.26** | male | −0.106 | −4.280** |
| Health | 0.228 | 9.59** | Health | 0.226 | 9.57** | health | 0.227 | 9.580** |
| Unemployed | −0.103 | −2.59** | Unemployed | −0.105 | −2.6** | unemp | −0.105 | −2.600** |
| Self-employed | −0.023 | −0.85 | Self-employed | −0.016 | −0.6 | selfemp | −0.019 | −0.680 |
| Retired | 0.098 | 1.44 | Retired | 0.091 | 1.34 | retired | 0.093 | 1.380 |
| Student | 0.098 | 1.69 | Student | 0.091 | 1.58 | student | 0.093 | 1.620 |
| Small town | 0.047 | 0.69 | Small town | 0.214 | 4.47** | smalltown | 0.157 | 4.080** |
| Big city | 0.080 | 2.12** | Big city | −0.291 | −8.74** | bigcity | −0.164 | −5.490** |
| | | | | | | avgELQ | −0.341 | −6.750** |

OLS regression of a 1–10 scale of the economic ladder question.
Controls include standard demographic variables and country dummies, clustered by country/city size.
Average ELQ is computed at the country/city size level.

**Table 5b** Average and Relative ELQ and Happiness

| Happy | Coefficient | z-Score |
|---|---|---|
| Average ELQ | 0.1297 | 1.76 |
| Relative ELQ | 0.1245 | 6.65** |
| Average personal economy | 1.006 | 4.12** |
| Relative personal economy | 0.623 | 14.9** |

OLS regression of a 1–5 scale of happiness.
Controls include standard demographic variables and country dummies, clustered by country/city size.
Average ELQ is computed at the country/city size level.
Average personal economic satisfaction is computed at the country/city size level.

secondary school were the most likely to answer "never" or the next lowest score. Again, trends in returns to education are likely playing a role.

To help explain our findings, we examined a variable which asked respondents to choose what affected them most among the many reasons for which there was unequal treatment of people in their countries. Possible answers ranged from skin color to poverty to age. Respondents in small towns were more likely to say that poverty and lack of education were the primary reasons, while those in big cities were more likely to report corruption or the need to pay bribes.

These findings suggest that both sets of respondents perceive that there is inequality and injustice. Yet the responses suggest that those in small towns feel that they do not have access to opportunity due to their own poverty and education (explaining a higher tendency to the "never" responses on the above question), while those in big cities are more likely to believe that opportunities and access are monopolized by those with greater means or connections.

Those in small towns are more concerned about their own poverty compared to the rest of society, while those in large cities are more concerned with their access to opportunities compared with more "connected" folks. In both instances, the concerns cited run in the opposite direction of an interpretation in which inequality signals opportunity and mobility, which is more typical for the USA and for Europe.

## Unemployment

One of the most important variables affecting well being or happiness is employment status – a relationship which is in turn mediated by income and earnings. An obvious question is how the region compares. Previous happiness research has found that unemployment is one of the most traumatic events that can happen to people. One of the reasons for this is of course the loss of income; however, there is also a cultural stigma to unemployment that impacts happiness. The typical unemployed person in our study is a male who has attended some high school (on average 10 years of education). The unemployed percentage of the population increases with city size. This may be an artifact of the data, however, because people in rural areas are more likely to be outside the formal labor force altogether and unemployment is a less relevant concept for them.

The strength of these effects—e.g. the "costs" of unemployment—tend to vary across countries and regions. We build from the work of others. Di Tella et al., (2001) find that respondents in the United States and Europe are made more unhappy by higher unemployment rates than they are by inflation. In other words, the typical respondent—including employed respondents—would accept higher levels of inflation if it would eliminate the insecurity associated with higher unemployment rates.

Several studies have shown that increased unemployment in general lessens the impact on unemployed individuals. Clark and Oswald (1994) find that the unemployed in Britain are less unhappy in districts where the unemployment rate is higher. The costs to happiness that comes from the decreased probability of finding a job seems to be lower than the gains to happiness that come from being less stigmatized and accompanied by more unemployed counter-parts. Similarly, Stutzer and Lalive (2004) find that unemployed respondents are less happy in cantons that have voted to reduce unemployment benefits in Switzerland (controlling for benefit levels), as the stigma from unemployment is higher. Eggers et al. (2005) find that both employed and unemployed respondents are happier in regions with higher unemployment rates in Russia.

We, too, find positive effects of general unemployment on happiness in Latin America, both using an unemployment rate calculated from our own data and the latest statistics available from the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). These are country-wide unemployment rates (formal, open unemployment rates) and have statistically significant positive effects on happiness. As in the above studies, higher overall unemployment may reduce the stigma effect on individuals. The results must be tempered, though, by the limited information that open unemployment rates can provide in a region with high levels of informal employment (exceeding 50% in a few countries).

Inequality in countries also has an effect on happiness among the unemployed. Using our pooled data set from 1997 to 2004, we ran a standard happiness regression, including a control variable for being unemployed, and then adding interaction terms for being unemployed in a high or low

**Table 6a** Cost of Unemployment

| | Coefficient | z-Score |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployed | −0.342 | −6.05** |
| Unemployed | −0.174 | −6.57** |
| Unemployed | −1.375 | −5.07** |
| Unemployed*gini coefficient | 0.020 | 3.93** |
| Unemployed (incomplete primary) | −0.485 | −3.83** |
| Unemployed (completed primary) | −0.205 | −1.63 |
| Unemployed (incomplete secondary) | −0.511 | −4.46** |
| Unemployed (completed secondary) | −0.562 | −5.17** |
| Unemployed (incomplete tertiary) | 0.027 | 0.13 |
| Unemployed (completed tertiary) | −0.246 | −1.39 |

Ordered logit regression of a 1–5 scale of happiness for 2004 data set.
Controls include standard demographic variables and country dummies.
OLS estimation of a 1–5 scale of happiness for 2004 data set.
Ordered logit regression of a 1–5 scale of happiness for pooled 1997–2004 data set.
Controls include standard demographic variables, country dummies and year dummies.
Ordered logit regression of a 1–5 scale of happiness.
Costs of unemployment by education level. Base case is illiterate.

Gini country. We find that the costs to happiness of being unemployed are lower in higher Gini countries (Table 6a). In other words, unemployed respondents in countries with higher inequality are actually happier than those in countries with low inequality. Countries with high inequality are also, on balance, poorer than other countries, so the unemployed may have less far to fall.

Another reason may be the higher levels of informal employment in the poorer and more unequal countries in the region, thereby resulting in less stigma for the unemployed. Or it may be due to some other country level unobservable that we are not accounting for. And while the costs of being unemployed are *lower* in higher Gini countries, fear of unemployment (among the employed) is *higher*, in keeping with our intuition about greater levels of informality and associated insecurity. Thus in higher inequality countries, the lower stigma for the unemployed is accompanied by greater insecurity for the employed.

Job instability has particularly affected those with a high-school level of education (the majority), and if we look at the happiness impact of unemployment among different educational groups, it turns out that, in addition to having the highest rate of unemployment, those with a high school education are also made most unhappy by unemployment. In fact, unemployment has a statistically insignificant effect on happiness on the ends of the education spectrum (Table 6b). College-educated people are also less likely to fear unemployment than those with less education. And unemployment is a less rel-

**Table 6b** Fear of Unemployment

| | Coefficient | z-Score |
|---|---|---|
| Small town | −0.256 | −4.34** |
| Big city | 0.081 | 1.87 |
| Gini coefficient | 0.017 | 4.45** |

Ordered logit regression of a 1–5 scale of fear of unemployment.
Controls include standard demographic variables (except dummy variables for jobs that are not in the workforce) and country dummies.
Controls include standard demographic variables (except dummy variables for jobs that are not in the workforce).

evant concept for the illiterate, who are most likely to be outside the formal labor market to begin with, and those with higher education are more likely to be able to find another job than those with secondary school education.

We also looked at the costs to unemployment by city size. As in the case of our Gini coefficients, we find that the costs of unemployment are lower in big cities than they are in small towns, suggesting that there is a lower stigma effect in big cities (where labor markets are also more competitive). Yet again as in the case of inequality (as measured by the Gini), fear of unemployment is higher in the big cities, presumably because labor markets are more integrated into the international economy and volatility is more of a factor, while relying on farming as a safety net is not an option the way it is in smaller towns (Table 6b).

Our findings are suggestive of how the costs of being unemployed can vary across countries and according to different measures of inequality. Inequality seems to be correlated with a lower "stigma" for the unemployed, but with a higher fear of unemployment for the employed.

## *Policy Implications*

Layard (2005) makes a bold statement about the potential of happiness research to improve people's lives directly via changes in public policy. He highlights the extent to which people's happiness is affected by status – resulting in a rat race approach to work and to income gains, which in the end reduces well-being. He also notes the strong positive role of security in the workplace and in the home, and of the quality of social relationships and trust. He identifies direct implications for fiscal and labour market policy – in the form of taxation on excessive income gains and via re-evaluating the merits of performance-based pay.

While many economists would not agree with Layard's specific recommendations, there is nascent consensus that happiness surveys can serve as an important complementary tool for public policy. Scholars such as Diener and Seligman (2004) and Kahneman et al. (2004) advocate the creation of national well-being accounts to complement national income accounts.

Despite the potential contributions that happiness research can make to policy, a sound note of caution is necessary in directly applying the findings, both because of the potential biases in survey data and because of the difficulties associated with analysing this kind of data in the absence of controls for unobservable personality traits. In addition, happiness surveys at times yield anomalous results which provide novel insights into human psychology – such as adaptation and coping during economic crises – but do not translate into viable policy recommendations.

One example is the finding (discussed above) that unemployed respondents are happier (or less unhappy) in contexts with higher unemployment rates. The positive effect that reduced stigma has on the well-being of the unemployed seems to outweigh the negative effects of a lower probability of future employment (Clark and Oswald, 1994; Stutzer and Lalive, 2004; Eggers et al., 2005). One interpretation of these results for policy – raising unemployment rates – would obviously be a mistake. At the same time, the research suggests a new focus on the effects of stigma on the welfare of the unemployed.

Both the promises and pitfalls of applying happiness research to policy apply to Latin America. Certainly, there is great promise in understanding a variety of phonemena, many of them poverty related, that revealed preferences cannot tell us much about. As noted above, two sets of questions along these lines that come to the fore. The first of these is the welfare effects of macro and institutional arrangements that individuals are powerless to change, such as macroeconomic volatility, inequality, or weak governance structures. The poor in a region where access to political as well as economic opportunities are unequally shared are obviously least able to express their preferences (as they are the least able to either circumvent the system or vote with their feet and emigrate or put their assets abroad). Yet they may suffer the negative welfare effects from inequality, as the above findings suggest.

The other set of questions are those in which behaviors are not the result of preferences, but of norms, addiction, or self control problems. Any number of public health related questions, such as obesity, cigarette smoking, and other phenomenon, can and have been addressed by happiness surveys, and could be usefully analyzed in the region, as it suffers from many of these. Equally important, though, are those behaviors that are driven by low expectations. If the poor have low expectations for their own and their children's future – and if that is exacerbated by high and persistent levels of inequality as in Latin America – their behavior on any number of fronts, ranging from investing in their children's education to saving to public health attitudes – could be compromised. If those behaviors are merely analyzed as a result of revealed preferences, then the policy implications will be very different than if they are analyzed in the context of the well being costs associated with those behaviors.[14]

A second area of much promise for applying well being surveys to policy is in the exploration and understanding of the importance of non-income variables, such as health, education, employment status, gender rights, environment, and any number of other variables to well being and quality of life. Standard approaches, which rely on income-based measures of well being, tend to underweight the importance of these variables. Happiness surveys not only highlight their importance but also allow us to attach relative weights to them.

Along those lines, the recent move to develop national well being indicators in both the USA and the UK is based on the assumption that happiness surveys can help us better gauge the relative weights of these variables, as well as track how those relative weights change over time across large N samples. The idea behind National Well Being Indicators is that, in the same way and as a complement to the way GNP tracks income trends over time, well being in these areas could be tracked and assessed. It is an approach that holds much promise for helping to measure QOL in Latin America.

While there are certainly many promises for applying the results of happiness surveys to policy, there are also many caveats. Three in particular stand out in the context of Latin America.

The first is the extent to which individuals adapt to many situations, both upward and downwards.[15] This has clear implications for a region with very volatile growth. A number of studies suggest that people's expectations rise with rapid income growth and/or income gains and then drop with recessions and/or income losses. This will obviously affect trends in well being indicators as economies change throughout the region.

A related issue, which was alluded to above, is the so-called happy peasant problem which was alluded to above. In this instance, there are many cases where very poor and uninformed respondents, who happen to have a high set point (cheery nature), report they are very happy, even though they live in destitute poverty. The implications of this information for policy are very unclear. Should policy raise the peasant's awareness of how bad his or her situation is in order to raise expectations, although risking making them miserable? Should policy leave the peasant ignorant? How policy factors in set point/character differences is another difficult normative question. Should policy listen to the naturally unhappy respondents who have a tendency to complain more than to others? How much is expectations and how much is character, for example? Another issue is cardinal versus ordinal measures. Happiness surveys are ordinal in nature and do not attach cardinal weights to the answers. Thus no distinction is made between the answers very happy and happy or happy and unhappy. Yet if these measures are really used to guide policy, does it become necessary to attach such weights? Does unhappiness matter more than happiness, for example? How does one choose between a policy that raises a happy person to very happy versus one that raises an unhappy person to just happy status? Many of these choices require normative judgments.

Perhaps a more fundamental question is whether happiness should be a policy objective. Are happy people successful or complacent, for example? There is some evidence that happier people, on average, perform better in the labor market and are healthier (Graham et al., 2004). In other words, being happy seems to have positive causal effects on behavior. And certainly very unhappy or depressed people have all sorts of related negative externalities. But the evidence also suggests that there is a top limit to this. Psychologists find that those that answer happiness questions near the top end of a 10 point scale are indeed more successful, but the effects are stronger around the 7–9 range rather than at the very top of the scale (Diener et al., 1999, 2006). And there are certainly examples of very successful and creative people who are miserable for most of their lives. On average, though, it seems that happiness is correlated with better outcomes than is unhappiness or misery, and that eliminating the latter seems a worthwhile objective for policy.

The definition of happiness is fundamental to resolving these questions. Attempting such a definition is clearly beyond the scope of such a paper – and of the author's expertise. Philosophers have provided a range of definitions over centuries. A more recent attempt to define happiness, by Kenny and Kenny (2006), seems particularly well suited to policy. Kenny and Kenny define happiness as having three separate components: contentment, welfare, and dignity. Happiness defined simply as contentment seems an inappropriate objective for public policy. Yet when it is defined as a combination of these three factors, it seems more relevant, particularly for a region where the major policy challenge is not extreme poverty but relative poverty, vulnerability, and inequality of income and opportunity.

Imposing a definition of happiness does not answer the question of how much weight policymakers should put on happiness as an objective versus others such as growth, policy reforms, and fiscal stability. There are intertemporal considerations as well. Reforms can and do make people unhappy in the short term, but in the long run are likely to guarantee them more prosperity and possibly greater happiness. There is a significant body of evidence, from both the behavioral economics and the happiness literatures, that individuals are loss averse and value losses disproportionately to gains. And the happiness literature shows that individuals adapt very quickly to income gains but much less quickly to losses, and more to changes in income than to changes in status.

There is also significant evidence of hyperbolic discounting: individuals will trade off much larger future benefits for much shorter short term ones; it is not a coincidence that most developed economies have forced savings schemes. Our own work, meanwhile, which is in the initial stages, suggests that high levels of inequality or low levels of social mobility, and related low expectations, can result in higher discount rates (and therefore more hyperbolic discounting) for those in the lower income ranks. This discounting can apply to areas such as public health as well as in the income realms, and may help explain why phenomenon such as obesity are concentrated among lower income cohorts, at least in the developed economies (Graham and Felton, 2005; Felton and Graham, 2005).

Certainly, understanding these behaviors is important information for policymakers. But can we use short-term happiness questions and measures as a gauge for policy? The information may be more useful for explaining lack of public support for optimal policies than it is as a guide to policy choice. Structural policy reforms, for example, can result in major changes in income and status and related unhappiness for particular cohorts, at least in the short term, while producing gains in the aggregate in the long term.

Latin America is a region that has for years suffered from the threat and the reality of populist politics and policies, which have primarily manifested themselves in fiscal profligacy for short term political gain at the expense of longer term investments in the structural changes in the macroeconomic and social policy realms that could generate sustainable growth and poverty reduction.[16] With the widespread turn to the market and acceptance of democratic institutions throughout most of the region in the 1990's, voting behavior seems to have matured and begun to resemble patterns in developed countries in some countries. There have been several rounds of leadership change in – including with significant shifts on the ideological spectrum – without fundamental changes in economic policy in countries ranging from Chile and Brazil to Peru and El Salvador. There have also been cases of countries undergoing significant economic crisis and still retaining democratic institutions and some continuity in economic management, as in Argentina. In the majority of countries, patterns are typical of retrospective voting, where voters judge past governments by their economic performance, and/or the patterns are influenced by some degree of party or ideological loyalty. Voters are, for the most part, also making the important distinction that characterizes mature democracy: that between support for systems of government and economic arrangements as opposed to specific governments in power (Stokes, 1996; Weyland, 2002; Lora and Olivera, 2005; Graham and Sukhtankar, 2004).

At the same time, there are also significant pockets of political instability and increasing support for populist politicians and policies, such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, where popular backlash against market reforms has also resulted in an erosion of democratic institutions. In these countries, the future of constitutional democracy as well as of pro-market policies is at risk. And in the rest of the region, meanwhile, support for many reforms, such as privatization, is remarkably shallow, and governments face significant challenges in mustering the political support that is necessary to deepen reforms and make the structural and institutional changes that are necessary to establish the sustained and higher levels of growth that are necessary to poverty reduction. Inequality, meanwhile, remains a challenge that defies established policy prescriptions and likely undermines support for reform. How can surveys of happiness be relevant in such a context?

Indeed, taken at face value, happiness surveys could, at least in theory, lend support to populist politicians. If the results of a national happiness survey show that the majority of citizens prefer inflation to unemployment (as happiness surveys in most contexts, including Latin America suggest), those results could fuel irresponsible fiscal policies in countries that are very vulnerable to hyper-inflation (which indeed makes people very unhappy). The kinds of structural reforms that are necessary for long-term growth, meanwhile, are unlikely to be supported by a population that has a high tendency for hyperbolic discounting. How many voters will report that they are happier than before in the throws of a controversial privatization or tax reform, the benefits of which are not immediately clear, for example? How can happiness surveys be useful in such a context?

Surely there are risks. Yet our previous work also shows that economic crisis makes people very unhappy, and that happier people are more supportive of democracy and market reforms (Graham and Sukhtankar, 2004). While the direction of causality is not clear (happier people may be more supportive of whatever policy context they live in), it does suggest that happiness is not inherently linked to support for irresponsible or anti-reform politics.[17] And the same literature that finds that crisis reduces happiness in Latin America also finds that crisis is linked to decreased support for how markets and democracy are working but *increased* support for markets and democracies as systems.

Perhaps the most useful role for happiness surveys in the context of Latin American economic policy, where there is reform fatigue, risk and loss aversion due to past experience with macroeconomic volatility and other crises, and a large proportion of the population that is, at least in theory, vulnerable to hyperbolic discounting, is in helping us understand and better navigate the political outcomes that can result. Is it really irrational if one is poor and unemployed in Ecuador, for example, to support an anti-system politician in the hope of change and a possible short-term improvement? And understanding what makes people most unhappy with the policy context, via well being surveys, might also help reformists avert the kind of policy mistakes that lead to populist or "hyperbolic" politics.

## What Happiness Surveys can Contribute to Quality of Life Measures

Any attempt to develop better quality of life measures for the region must focus on income and non-income measures. Happiness surveys tell us about many of these measures – and how they compare to each other in relative terms in determining well being. While it is not accepted practice to compare coefficients on equations based on categorical variables, as is the case with the ordered logits that are typically used for happiness studies, the results of OLS regressions on the same data and with the same specifications typically yield very similar results. The latter can be used as a basis for attaching relative weights to the coefficients on independent variables, such as income and health. They can also highlight areas where we need to know more to better understand quality of life in the region.

### *Happiness and Income*

Perhaps the most studied and least well understood relationship is that between happiness and income. Virtually all studies find that there is some relationship, but it varies across contexts and is mediated by a range of variables. Our study of happiness in Latin America shows that there is, as in the OECD countries, a strong and consistent relationship between income and happiness within countries, but it is non-linear. Nor is it the most important determinant of happiness, with other variables such as health and unemployment having stronger effects[18] (See Table 1).

And, again as in the case of the OECD countries, there is no cross country relationship between income and happiness (Fig. 1). What is most surprising about the Latin America findings, meanwhile, is that the non-linear relationship between income and happiness holds for countries that are at very low levels of GDP per capita, like Honduras and Guatemala. Earlier literature on the developed economies posited that non-linearities set in well after basic needs were met, at roughly $10,000 per capita. The Latin America results suggest that the level is much lower.

Similarly, the strong results that we get on the effects of relative income differences on happiness support this proposition. Average country income levels had no significant effects on happiness in any of the countries that we studied, even the very poor ones, while relative income differences dominated. Average income levels only mattered in a positive way for the small, poor towns. At other levels of aggregation, such as medium and large cities, average income levels actually had a negative effect on happiness, as in the case of Luttmar's work on PUMAS in the United States.

In addition to inequality, our work also highlights an important role for volatility in undermining whatever positive effects income gains may have for happiness. Income gains, even relatively large ones, in the context of high levels of volatility, do not have the expected positive effects on happiness, at least not over time, as the results from our frustrated achievers suggest.

## *Happiness and Education*

Education has a remarkably small effect on happiness among Latin American respondents. When income is included in the equation, education is typically insignificant, in contrast to OECD countries, where for the most part it has a modestly significant and positive effect in addition to income (Tables 1 and 3). In all of these contexts, income and education are highly correlated. As our findings on unemployment above suggest, there are certain non-linearities in the Latin American context, with those respondents who have either completed or near completed secondary school most vulnerable to unemployment, while those with completed higher and technical education earn the highest rewards, in both relative and absolute terms. Those non-linearities, no doubt, mediate the education and happiness relationship.

This is one instance where happiness surveys can highlight discrepancies between the predicted effects of variables which are typically associated with higher levels of quality of life, such as more years of education, and actual outcomes. While the surveys do not provide a clear policy solution, they provide an important first step towards understanding the problem.

## *Happiness and Health*

Health is one of the most important determinants of well being. And, as some studies show, higher levels of well being are also often associated with better health outcomes. Latin America is no exception. Of all of the variables in our happiness equations, health status – as gauged by an index of a number of pointed questions on self reported health – has the strongest coefficient (Table 1). This is consistent with studies in other contexts – developed and developing.

An area where we know much less is how the health-happiness relationship works among the poor. The poor are notorious for under-reporting health problems, not least because they rarely stay home from work when they are ill. Targeted happiness and health studies among lower income cohorts might help understand the variables mediating the relationship at lower levels of income, as well as factors which could encourage the poor (and their governments) to make better investments in their health.

## *Happiness and Employment Status*

Another key determinant of happiness, everywhere that it has been studied, is employment status. The experience of unemployment is one of the most deleterious events as far as happiness is concerned, and is one experience that most individuals do not adapt back from, as discussed above. Latin America is no exception. The (negative) coefficient on unemployment is actually higher than that of either health or wealth, although the t-stat on the other two variables is actually higher (most likely because of the smaller numbers of unemployed respondents as opposed to those that report their wealth or income) (Table 1).

This result is hardly surprising in a region where there is, for the most part, no unemployment insurance or other safety net for the unemployed. In other contexts, while the unemployed are still unhappier than others, they are less unhappy where there are more unemployed around them and/or where there is more support for unemployment benefits, as there is less stigma and less insecurity surrounding unemployment. Our findings on less negative effects of unemployment in higher inequality countries, where unemployment or at least informal employment levels are typically higher, supports the less stigma channel. Yet our higher levels of fear of unemployment (which has very negative effects on happiness) among employed respondents in the same countries supports the higher insecurity channel. A third area where employment status findings are different in Latin America is in the case of self employment. The self employed in the USA and Europe, for example, are typically happier, on average, than others. Yet in Latin America they are less happy than the average (See Tables 1, 2 and 3). Here again is an instance where happiness surveys can yield insights into quality of life. In the former context the self employed are usually self employed by choice. In Latin America, in contrast, the majority of self-employed are working in the informal sector due to lack of available jobs in the formal sector and consequently have a lower quality of life.

## *Other Key Variables and Happiness*

There are a number of areas where happiness surveys could yield valuable insights into quality of life in the region, but where more work remains to be done. One is in the area of social safety nets and other forms of social insurance. Our work on frustrated achievers and fear of unemployment suggest that insecurity and volatility are major causes of unhappiness in the region. But are respondents with access to better social welfare systems and other safety nets happier? This is an open question for research and could help provide insights into the kinds of social arrangements that best mediate this insecurity.

Another area is inequality. We have some sense that inequality and perceived differences in rank, status, and access to opportunities have negative effects on happiness (at least for the poor) in the region. Do other kinds of inequality, such as racial and gender inequality, have similar effects? Which kinds of inequality are most important? Again, happiness surveys could help us better understand the role of these variables and their relative roles in determining quality of life in the region. A third area is job quality. Our self employment results are certainly suggestive, but again this is an area where modest research efforts, building from existing findings, could yield very useful insights.

Finally, happiness surveys could help us track the effects of different policy arrangements, such as inflation versus unemployment and local versus central level governments/democracy, on quality of life. Frey and Stutzer, cited above, show that participating in direct democracy has positive effects on happiness, above and beyond the benefits of living in a direct democracy. John Helliwell finds that citizens that live in contexts where social capital is greater are also happier (Helliwell and Putnam 2005). Better understanding of these factors in Latin America could contribute to better measurement of quality of life more generally. Public health arrangements – such as access to health insurance, particularly in a context where many people lack it – may also matter to happiness. Analysis of such variables via happiness surveys would give us one way to weight their relative importance to quality of life.

## Conclusions

Happiness studies can provide critical insights into QOL in Latin America, in areas ranging from income, poverty and inequality, public health, and political arrangements. The happiness studies can provide a method for gaining insights into many other questions, such as the effects of the environment or commuting time or modality on quality of life in the region. National well being indicators, used cautiously, meanwhile, can be a good tool for tracking welfare, quality of life, and other well being measures across countries and over time, and attaching relative weights to different variables. In the same way that GNP allows us to track economic growth within and across countries, national well being measures provide a complementary tool for assessing welfare trends. Yet for all of the reasons cited above, including the happy peasant problem, adaptations and set points, hyperbolic discounting, and the absence of clarity on a definition of happiness, among others, caution is necessary before directly applying the results of happiness surveys to policy.

Happiness economics opens a field of research questions which still need to be addressed, both more generally and as applied to quality of life in Latin America. These include the implications of well-being findings for national indicators and economic growth patterns; the effects of happiness on behavior such as work effort, consumption, and investment; and the effects on political behavior. In the case of the latter, surveys of unhappiness or frustration may be useful for gauging the potential for social unrest in various contexts.

In order to answer many of these questions, researchers need more and better quality well-being data, particularly panel data, which allows for the correction of unobserved personality traits and correlated measurement errors, as well as for better determining the direction of causality (for example, from contextual variables like income or health to happiness versus the other way around). These are major challenges in most happiness studies. Hopefully, the combination of better data and increased sophistication in econometric techniques will allow economists to better address these questions in the future, and increase the potential of such surveys to become a critical component of defining and measuring quality of life in Latin America.

## Notes

1. This section of the paper draws on Carol Graham, "The Economics of Happiness" in Steven Durlauf and Steven Blume, eds., *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*, 2nd Edition, forthcoming.
2. See, among others, Easterlin, 1974, 2003; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Clark and Oswald, 1994; Frey and Stutzer, 2002a; Graham and Pettinato, 2002; Layard, 2005.
3. For an application of this line of thinking to the obesity problem, see Felton and Graham (2005) and Graham (2008).
4. For a fuller description of these, see Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Frey and Stutzer (2002b).
5. The coefficient on marriage for Latin America is positive but short of significant for the 2001 sample. For other years for which we have data, the coefficient on marriage is positive and significant.
6. Indeed, there is even anecdotal evidence that native Russians are discriminated against in some of those countries.
7. The ELQ question asked respondents to place themselves on a 9 step ladder representing their society, where the poor are on step 1 and the rich are on step 9. Support for market policies was measured by an index based on several scaled questions about the private sector, foreign investment, free trade, and privatization. For detail, see Graham and Pettinato (2002).
8. For a complete picture of the statistically significant differences between frustrated and non-frustrated upwardly mobile respondents, see Graham and Pettinato (2002), Chapter 4.
9. In an initial and at this point cursory analysis of the 2003 Peru survey data, Graham and Margaret MacLeod (Mimeo, The Brookings Institution, 2003) find that the frustrated achievers are less likely to favor democracy, but there is no link with market policies. Yet the results are also not fully comparable as a much lower number of respondents had upward mobility during this latter period and thus there was a far lower percentage of frustrated achievers.
10. Finding is based on a logit regression on the probability of being a frustrated achiever. Results are reported in Carol Graham, "Some Insights on Development from the Economics of Happiness", *World Bank Research Observer*, Fall 2005.
11. A higher percentage of respondents went from "rags to riches" – or from the bottom to the top quintile in a ten year period in Peru (5%) than in a similar period in the United States (1%), for example. Yet a surprising 11% of respondents in the middle of the distribution (quintile 4 in Peru) fell back all the way to the bottom quintile during the same period, which is analogous to falling from the middle class into extreme poverty.
12. We discuss this in detail, and introduce a measure of "middle income stress" (MIS) in Nancy Birdsall, Carol Graham, and Stefano Pettinato, "Stuck in the Tunnel: Has Globalization Muddled the Middle Class?" Center on Social and Economic Dynamics Working Paper #13, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., August 2001.
13. The happiness gap in this figure is divided by four, which is the scale on the happiness question.
14. On obesity see Felton and Graham (2005); Graham and Ladkawalla (2006); Graham (2008); and cigarette taxes see Gruber and Mullanaithan (2002).
15. Javier Herrera, for example, using panel data for Peru and Madagascar, finds that people's expectations adapt upwards during periods of high growth and downwards during recessions, and that this adaptation is reflected in their assessments of their life

satisfaction. People are less likely to be satisfied with the status quo when expectations are adapting upwards. Graham and Pettinato (2002) have similar findings for Peru; more recent work on China by Whyte and Hun (mimeo, Harvard University, 2006) confirms the direction of these findings.

16. See, for example, Dornbusch and Edwards, 1991.
17. See Graham and Pettinato (2002); Graham et al. (2004); and Eggers et al. (2005); and Weyland (2002).
18. We do not have a reported income variable in the Latinobarometro survey, as accurate reporting of incomes in contexts where a large percent of the population is in the informal sector is rift with error problems. Instead we rely on a wealth index, which we construct based on the ownership of a range of assets, ranging from indoor plumbing to computers and second homes.

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# Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic (SLiCA)

**Jack Kruse, Birger Poppel, Larissa Abryutina, Gerard Duhaime, Stephanie Martin, Mariekathrine Poppel, Margaret Kruse, Ed Ward, Patricia Cochran and Virgene Hanna**

**Abstract** Major findings of the Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic (SLiCA) are: (1) A combination of traditional activities and cash employment is the prevailing lifestyle of Arctic indigenous peoples; (2) family ties, social support of each other, and traditional activities have a lot to do with why indigenous people choose to remain in Arctic communities; (3) well-being is closely related to job opportunities, locally available fish and game, and a sense of local control. Well-being and depression (and related problems like suicide) are flip sides of the same coin. Improving well-being may reduce social problems; and, (4) health conditions vary widely in the Arctic: three-in-four Greenlandic Inuit self-rate their health as at least very good compared with one-in-two Canadian and Alaska Inuit and one-in-five Chukotka indigenous people. Findings are based on 7,200 interviews in a probability sample of Iñupiat settlement regions of Alaska, the four Inuit settlement regions of Canada, all of Greenland, and the Anadyrskij, Anadyr, Shmidtovs, Beringovskij, Chukotskij, Iujl'tinskij, Bilibinskij, Chaunskij, Providenskij, Uel'Kal' districts of Chukotka. Indigenous people and researchers from Greenland, Russia, Canada, the United States, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland collaborated on all phases of the study.

**Keywords** Living conditions · arctic · inuit · SLICA · indigenous peoples

## Motivation for the Study

The initiative for the Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic (SLiCA) came from the Greenland Home Rule Government. In 1994, Statistics

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Greenland (SG) conducted a survey of living conditions in Greenland, partly based on what has been described as the Scandinavian model (Erikson and Uusitalo, 1987). Analysis of the data caused researchers in Greenland to re-examine their theoretical assumptions. They decided that the dimensions and indicators of living conditions had to be context-specific so that the concept of well-being reflects the life of the respondents and their priorities (Andersen and Poppel, 2002). Thus it was crucial to the research effort that representatives of the respondents, the indigenous peoples, were included as partners in the process. The preliminary discussions with representatives of the respondents indicated that the role of household production in Arctic regions, the strong ties of Arctic people to the environment, and the continuing role of extended informal social relationships were among the dimensions that had to be included in a future living conditions survey. They decided that a multidisciplinary team was needed to assess living conditions—and that it was more important to examine differences in living conditions among peoples with similar cultures and environmental circumstances than to compare living conditions of northern indigenous peoples and southern majority cultures.

By 1997, Birger Poppel (the then chief statistician, SG) and Thomas Andersen (international project coordinator, SG) had consulted with researchers, research institutions, indigenous organizations, and governments in Canada, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia, and the United States about the idea of an international comparative study of living conditions in the Arctic. In 1998 the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) passed Resolution 29 (Section I) in support of the study: "Rapid social change characterizes all indigenous peoples of the Arctic. There is a need to document and compare the present state of living conditions and development among the indigenous peoples of the Arctic." In October 2000, the Arctic Council (a ministerial level international body) formally named the project as a part of its Sustainable Development initiative.

## Study Design

SLiCA's conceptual design is described in detail elsewhere (Andersen et al 2002; Andersen and Poppel, 2002). Briefly, our approach is based on previous studies on living conditions, social indicator development and quality of life (Bauer, 1966; Sheldon and Moore, 1968; US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1969; Campbell et al., 1972; Campbell et al., 1976; Andrews et al., 1976; and Allardt, 1975). For a recent review of the state of the art of this field, see Sirgy et al (2006). Although previous research has shown that commonly applied economic indices such as income and unemployment explain most, but not all, of the variation in a broader array of quantitative statistics (Diener and Suh, 1997:192), these indicators do not offer strong explanations of Arctic peoples' choice to continue living in their communities. As a first step in resolving this inconsistency, the SLiCA definition of living conditions, focusing on resources, is broadened to embrace the full scope of economic production in the North; that is, including the role of household production in Arctic regions and the mixed cash-local harvest economy (Usher et al 2003), Dahl (2000), Wenzel (2000). SLiCA's approach was further expanded to incorporate other dimensions of living conditions that have been previously identified as important in the Arctic. These include: family relationships and spirituality (McNabb, 1991); social adjustment and social support (Larsen, 1996); and ethnic identity (Sprott, 1994). Finally, Diener and Suh's review on the relationship between economic indices, living condition measures, and subjective well-being concludes that these measures do not always agree: including both objective and subjective measures provides an opportunity for greater understanding of living conditions (1997:213). Therefore SLiCA's measurement of living conditions includes both subjective and objective measures.

Questionnaire development took place between 1998 and 2001 in eleven workshops and field pretests in each country. This work involved indigenous people and researchers from eight countries and five social science disciplines. Indigenous steering committees approved the final questionnaire design. The entire process of questionnaire development is documented on the project website[1].

## Sample Summary

The SLiCA target population is defined in three elements: (1) indigenous individuals aged 16 (or 15[2]) and over; (2) residing in households; (3) in a traditional settlement region. Although the original intent of SLiCA was to include Arctic Saami settlement regions in Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the Kola Peninsula of Russia, funding difficulties precluded completion of fieldwork in these regions. For the present, settlement regions are defined as shown in Fig. 1 and as follows: Alaska (North Slope, Northwest Arctic, Bering Straits census areas); Canada (Inuvialiut, Nunavik, Nunavut, Labrador Inuit land claims regions); Greenland (all regions); and Chukotka, Russia (Anadyrskij, Anadyr, Shmidtovs, Beringovskij, Chukotskij, Iujl'tinskij, Bilibinskij, Chaunskij, Providenskij, Uel'Kal' districts). The indigenous peoples represented by the data include Inuit in Alaska,




**Fig. 1** Sample regions

Canada, Greenland and Chukchi, Inuit, Evan, Chuvan, and Yukagir in Chukotka. Probability sampling procedures were used in each country to ensure that each adult had a known probability of selection. Results are weighted to properly reflect these probabilities. Again for reasons of funding, SLiCA's target population did not include Yupik traditional settlement regions in Alaska nor the indigenous groups occupying the vast territory between Russia's Kola Peninsula and Chukotka. For ease of reference we refer to SLiCA results as pertaining to Arctic Inuit people; please keep in mind that technically the results do not include all Arctic Inuit people and do include Chukotka indigenous peoples other than Inuit.

Response rates exceeded 80 percent in all regions (see Table 1). We did observe a bias in favor of female respondents that we addressed as a final sampling weight.

Results for Arctic indigenous settlement regions as a whole are subject to a maximum estimated sampling error of plus or minus one percentage point. Regional comparisons have sampling errors of one to four percentage points. Breakdowns for subpopulations and more refined geography are subject to larger sampling errors.

Interviews were conducted face-to-face. Statistics Canada was responsible for field work and data processing in Canada. The average interview length was 60 min in Canada (using a shorter questionnaire) and 90 min elsewhere. Interview data for Alaska, Greenland, and Chukotka were separately coded and processed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences

**Table 1** Sample Summary

| Indigenous settlement region | Indigenous adults | Sample size | Response rate (%) | Maximum estimated sampling error (plus or minus %s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Northern Alaska | 11,000 | 700 | 84 | 4 |
| Chukotka | 14,000 | 600 | 85 | 4 |
| Canada | 22,000 | 4,700 | 83 | 1 |
| Greenland | 36,000 | 1,250 | 83 | 3 |
| Indigenous Settlement Regions | 83,000 | 7,250 | 83 | 1 |

(SPSS). Due to the involvement of Statistics Canada, Canadian data is subject to the Canadian Privacy Act. Application of the provisions of this act requires the research team to merge the Canadian data with that of the other three regions within secure analysis laboratories in Canada.

The 90 min interviews produced 950 variables per respondent. Thus one observation record in the raw data file consists of 950 variables and there are 7,200 observations. A combination of scheduling differences and length of interview resulted in a more limited Canadian data set. The 950 variables in the international data set were used to produce 398 analytic variables. The Canadian data set includes 129 of these 398 analytic variables. We therefore report some results without Canadian comparisons.

An important analytic feature of the data file is that it is possible to test hypotheses about relationships among variables. We may hypothesize that income is related to education, for example. We can use the observed level of covariation between income and education to test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between education and income. While an observed covariation does not prove that higher education leads to increased income, it lends support to the hypothesis. Since all the variables in a single observation are linked, it is possible to test multivariate hypotheses as well.

## Overview of the Population

Seventy-six percent of the population represented by SLiCA is Inuit, including all indigenous peoples represented in Canada, Greenland, and Alaska. Chukchi residing in Chukotka constitute 18 percent of the population represented by SLiCA while Evan, Chuvan, and Yukagir together represent the remaining six percent of the SLiCA population. Throughout this paper we refer to the combined indigenous population represented by SLiCA as Inuit adults.

One-in-two households have a school age child in the household while one-in-three households have a person 60 or over living there. Almost three-in-four households (73 percent) have four or fewer members. Only13 percent of households overall have six or more members, although more than a third of Alaska Iñupiat settlement region households (37 percent) have at least six members.

## International Analysis Themes

SLiCA's indigenous partners developed five analysis themes. The idea behind all the themes is that many people making decisions that affect living conditions in the Arctic have misperceptions about life in the Arctic. SLiCA partners asked analysis questions directed toward the goal of increasing understanding about ways of life in Arctic communities. The analysis themes are:

- The importance of a mixed cash- and harvest/herding- based economy to living in the Arctic.
- The importance of social relationships and the standard of living to settlement patterns
- Relationships between social problems and other dimensions of living conditions
- The influence of educators and missionaries
- The influence of policies on living conditions

### *The Importance of a Mixed Economy to Living in the Arctic*

Four decades ago, as wage work rapidly became more common in the north, scientists and policy makers assumed that indigenous people would take advantage of opportunities to participate in the cash economy, abandoning harvest and traditional food processing activities (Graburn 1969; Applebaum 1984; Usher and Wenzel 1987). In 1987 Wolfe and Walker advanced the concept of a mixed economy to describe an economy based on both wage employment and hunting, fishing, and gathering (Wolfe and Walker 1987). In a paper describing the conceptual development of measures of a mixed economy, Usher and his colleagues note that there is a substantial literature documenting the prevalence of mixed economies in the north, but that the literature consists largely of case studies involving no more than a few communities (Usher et al 2003:197). SLiCA provides an opportunity to examine the prevalence of the concept of a mixed economy on a broad geographic scale.

The structure of the mixed economy differs by country. In Alaska, most products of hunting, fishing, and gathering do not enter the market economy. Rather, subsistence products are directly consumed by the harvesting household, given away, or exchanged. Cash plays an important role in the Alaska mixed economy however. Money buys snow machines, gas, and ammunition. The time spent in wage work may conflict with time that otherwise would be spent harvesting subsistence resources. In Greenland, in contrast, licensed professional hunters account for a large portion of the harvest of traditional foods. Households purchase these products in local open-air markets or processed in supermarkets. Greenlandic households are, with some restrictions, also allowed to hunt and fish for the consumption of their own household. Despite differences in the structure of the mixed economy, there are measures of the extent to which the components of a mixed economy are present in the Arctic.

We measure the cash generating component primarily with measures of employment and income. We measure the subsistence component primarily with measures of harvesting, herding, gathering, and processing activities, and with measures of the amount of traditional foods harvested and consumed. With these measures we can examine the extent to which households and individuals participate in the mixed economy.

Starting at the individual level, Table 2 shows the percentage of indigenous adults participating in 25 different hunting, herding, gathering, processing, or indigenous art activities in a twelve month period. The mean number of activities per adult (excluding Canada) is 7.3. The differences between countries are significant but not large. Hunting, herding, gathering, processing, or indigenous art activities constitute part of the lives of the vast majority of Arctic Inuit people.

At least six out of ten Inuit adults have worked in the reference week (the week prior to the interview). Table 3 also shows that 81 percent of Inuit adults worked for pay at least part of the year. Most Arctic Inuit participate in the wage economy.

To get an idea of the extent to which individuals participate in the mixed economy, we can compare the mean number of hunting, herding, gathering, processing, or indigenous art activities by wage work status (see Table 4). With the exception of Chukotka, indigenous adults who worked for pay in the last year participated in as many subsistence activities as those adults who did not work, but who are able to do so.

**Table 2** Participation in Subsistence Activities by Country

| | Canada | Greenland | Chukotka | Northern Alaska | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fish in last 12 months | 69% | 69% | 88% | 77% | 74% |
| Pick berries in last 12 months | * | 71% | 73% | 70% | 71% |
| Preserve meat or fish in last 12 months | * | 55% | 86% | 74% | 67% |
| Prepare or pack for hunting, fishing, camping trip | 73% | 44% | 84% | 71% | 63% |
| Make and repair equipment or do household repairs | 48% | 73% | 64% | 51% | 62% |
| Maintain a household camp | * | 40% | 92% | 46% | 56% |
| Gather greens, roots or other plants in last 12 months | * | * | 45% | 53% | 48% |
| Hunt seal or ugruk in last 12 months | * | * | | 42% | 43% |
| Hunt waterfowl in last 12 months | 59% | 40% | 26% | 44% | 43% |
| Hunt caribou, moose or sheep in last 12 months | * | 35% | 21% | 53% | 34% |
| Hunt sea mammals | * | 43% | 6% | | 31% |
| Help whaling crews by cooking, giving money or supplies, cutting meat in last 12 months | * | * | 29% | 33% | 30% |
| Gather eggs in last 12 months | * | 19% | 31% | 40% | 26% |
| Make sleds or boats in last 12 months | * | 17% | 43% | 23% | 25% |
| Skinned and butchered a caribou in last 12 months | * | * | 44% | 53% | 25% |
| Manufacturer Native crafts for own use | * | 20% | 26% | 37% | 24% |
| Sew skins, make parkas and kamiks in last 12 months | * | 17% | 37% | 24% | 24% |
| Member of whaling crew or herded reindeer in last 12 months | * | * | 14% | 30% | 21% |
| Hunt walrus in last 12 months | * | * | | 21% | 21% |

**Table 2** (continued)

| | Canada | Greenland | Chukotka | Northern Alaska | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Make native handicrafts in last 12 months | * | 12% | 15% | 36% | 17% |
| Sold meat fish or berries | * | 10% | 23% | 7% | 13% |
| Manufacturer Native crafts for sale | 18% | 7% | 12% | 23% | 13% |
| Trap in last 12 months | 11% | 4% | 15% | 11% | 9% |
| Growing crops | * | 7% | 6% | * | 7% |
| Estimated Total | 22,090 | 35,240 | 17,527 | 10,547 | 85,404 |
| Mean number of seven subsistence activities in common with Canada: | 2.7 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.0 |
| Mean number of 25 subsistence activities: | * | 6.5 | 7.9 | 8.9 | 7.3 |
| ANOVA p = 0.000 | | | | | |

*Data not available.

**Table 3** Summary of work status by country

| | Canada | Greenland | Chukotka | Northern Alaska | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Worked last week | 58% | 67% | 66% | 50% | 63% |
| Worked full time in last year but not in last week | 20% | 6% | 15% | 10% | 12% |
| Worked part time in last year but not in last week | 10% | 7% | 7% | 15% | 8% |
| Did not work last year - probably unemployed | 6% | 6% | 6% | 8% | 6% |
| Not in labor force due to health, family responsibilities, or in school | 0% | 4% | 3% | 3% | 3% |
| 65 or older | 6% | 9% | 3% | 14% | 8% |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Estimated total | 18,100 | 37,391 | 19,042 | 10,787 | 85,320 |
| Chi Square p = 0.000 | | | | | |

**Table 4** Mean number of subsistence activities by wage work status

| | Canada | Greenland | Chukotka | Northern Alaska | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Worked last week | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.8 | 3.1 |
| Worked full time in last year but not in last week | 2.9 | 3.2 | 3.7 | 3.5 | 3.3 |
| Worked part time in last year but not in last week | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 3.5 | 2.9 |
| Did not work last year – probably unemployed | 2.7 | 2.4 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 2.7 |
| Not in labor force due to health or family responsibilities | * | 2.1 | 1.8 | 2.8 | 2.2 |
| 65 or older | 2.5 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 1.0 |
| Estimated Total | 22,100 | 37,392 | 16,255 | 10,786 | 86,533 |
| ANOVA p = 0.000 | | | | | |

*Data not available.

A similar lack of relationship between wage work and subsistence activities can be seen by comparing total personal income[3] with the number of subsistence activities (see Fig. 2).

Looking at the perceived share of meat and fish consumed by the household that is traditional food there is again no evidence of a relationship between subsistence and income (see Fig. 3, p = 0.02).




**Fig. 2** Mean number of subsistence activities by total personal income adjusted for purchasing power




**Fig. 3** Percentage adults perceiving that more than half of meat and fish consumed by household is traditional food by household income, adjusted for purchasing power

One nuance in understanding the role of the mixed economy is differences in stated preferences by gender and nationality. Unfortunately, results are not available for Canada. Table 5 shows that there are significant differences (note that the question on preferred lifestyle was asked differently in Greenland, as it included a category: self-employment; though asked, none

**Table 5** Lifestyle preference by gender and country

| | Male (%) | Female (%) | Total (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Greenland | | | |
| Working on a wage job | 49 | 66 | 56 |
| Harvesting, herding or processing own food | 36 | 22 | 30 |
| Self-employment | 16 | 12 | 14 |
| | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Chukotka | | | |
| Working on a wage job | 33 | 45 | 39 |
| Harvesting, herding or processing own food | 39 | 26 | 32 |
| Both | 28 | 29 | 29 |
| | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Northern Alaska | | | |
| Working on a wage job | 13 | 18 | 15 |
| Harvesting, herding or processing own food | 7 | 9 | 8 |
| Both | 80 | 73 | 77 |
| | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| ChiSq p = 0.000 | | | |

of the Greenlandic Inuit preferred a combination of lifestyles). Women in Greenland and Chukotka are more likely than men to prefer working on a wage job over harvesting, herding or processing their own food. Men and women in Greenland are more likely than their counterparts in Chukotka or Alaska to prefer wage work. In Alaska, gender differences almost disappear in the preferences for lifestyle. And for some reason, almost 8 in 10 Alaska Natives see a combination of working on a wage job and harvesting, herding or processing their own food as the most attractive lifestyle. We think this may be because the structure of Alaska's mixed economy makes it easier and more rewarding to do both. The North Slope Borough's policy of granting subsistence leave is one example. More subtle but perhaps as important is the respect given to hunters who also have full time jobs.

### *The Importance of Social Relationships and the Standard of Living to Settlement Patterns*

Settlement patterns vary across the Arctic. Table 6 shows that in Greenland, most indigenous people (age 15 and above) live in cities (places with populations over 10,000) or towns (places with populations between 1,000 and 7,000). In Chukotka and northern Alaska, most live in villages with populations less than 1,000. In Canada, most indigenous people live in towns. How does living in a village compare to living in cities and towns?

Table 7 compares villages to towns and cities. Table 7 shows that in all countries: people who live in villages perform more subsistence activities and are more likely to be fluent in their native language. In towns and cities, people have higher levels of formal education, and more likely to be employed, and report slightly higher levels of social support. People in communities of all sizes report strong family ties.

**Table 6** Arctic settlement patterns

| | Canada (%) | Greenland*(%) | Chukotka (%) | Northern Alaska (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Villages/settlements | 19 | 21 | 58 | 68 |
| Towns | 81 | 53 | 26 | 32 |
| City/Capital | | 26 | 16 | |
| | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

*Greenland normally distinguishes between settlements and towns. Using this definition, the distribution between settlements and towns (excluding Nuuk) in Greenland would be 18% and 56% respectively.

**Table 7** Summary comparisons of Villages, Towns, and Cities

| | Canada | | Greenland | | Chukotka | | Northern Alaska | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Village/ Settlements | Towns & Cities | Village/ Settlements | Towns & Cities | Village/ Settlements | Towns & Cities | Village/ Settlements | Towns & Cities |
| Number of children in household | 1.6 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 2 | 1.6 |
| Mean-index of native language (max = 20) | 17.2 | 15.6 | 18.4 | 17.7 | 13.7 | 12.5 | 11.2 | 10 |
| Mean - 5 subsistence activities | 2.8 | 2.3 | 3.1 | 2.7 | 3.3 | 2.7 | 3.5 | 2.9 |
| % adults with a vocational or college education | 14% | 50% | 19% | 54% | 39% | 50% | 19% | 34% |
| % of adults with job past 12 months | 46% | 58% | 58% | 77% | 71% | 76% | 70% | 79% |
| Mean-index strength of family ties (max = 3) | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2 | 2 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| Mean-index availability of social supports (max = 28) | 21.8 | 23.1 | 21 | 22.5 | 18.7 | 17.5 | 20.8 | 22.5 |

**Table 8** Considered moving in last five years by place size & country

| | Towns & Cities (%) | Villages, settlements (%) | Total (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Canada | 31 | 28 | 29 |
| Greenland | 35 | 38 | 36 |
| Chukotka | 28 | 30 | 29 |
| Northern Alaska | 49 | 38 | 42 |

Before we started the project people were asking, 'Why do people continue to remain in communities with poor housing conditions and a low material standard of living'? Our data show that most people (68 percent) are satisfied or very satisfied with the quality of life in their community, and when we asked people if over the past five years they had considered moving away from their community, about two thirds replied that they had not considered moving. Most people want to stay in their communities, but there are differences among countries. Inuit people in northern Canada are the least likely to want to move away (29 percent). In Greenland 36 percent have considered moving, Chukotka, 29 percent, and in northern Alaska 42 percent. Table 8 shows that Alaska Inuit who live in cities and towns are more likely to want to move than people who live in villages; in other countries there is very little difference.

Our data show that material living conditions are important for settlement patterns. They also show that family ties and social support are important for understanding why people live where they do. We asked people why they moved to their community and why they remain in their community. People who want to move out of villages say they want to move for a job, or children's education[4]. People wanting to move out of towns report that they want to move because of the high cost of living (perhaps indicating they want to move to a big city), or to be near family (possibly indicating they want to move to a village). More than any other reason, people say they stay in their communities because of family. This is especially true in villages. In regional centers, people also cite jobs as a reason for staying.

## *Relationships Between Social Problems and Other Dimensions of Living Conditions*

Our Native partners recognize that social problems like suicide are more pronounced in the north. They also feel that public discussion of these problems is often negative. They encouraged the research team to look at social

**Table 9** Percentage of adults perceiving of social problems for indigenous people in their community

| | Canada | Greenland | Chukotka | Alaska | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unemployment | 87% | 84% | 100% | 83% | 88% |
| Alcohol abuse | 78% | 79% | 100% | 84% | 84% |
| Suicide | 70% | 67% | 97% | 60% | 74% |
| Drug abuse | 79% | 68% | 72% | 71% | 72% |
| Family violence | 69% | 63% | 91% | 50% | 69% |
| Sexual abuse | 60% | 58% | 87% | 34% | 62% |
| Estimated Total | 16,870 | 37,026 | 20,456 | 10,393 | 84,745 |

problems in the context of other living conditions. We started by verifying what indigenous peoples see as social problems facing their community. With one exception, half or more of indigenous adults in the sampled regions of Alaska, Canada, Chukotka and all of Greenland see unemployment, alcohol abuse, drug abuse suicide, family violence, and sexual abuse as social problems (see Table 9).

Social problems are usually publicly recognized aggregates of individual problems.

The individual problems SLiCA measures include: thoughts of suicide, depression, victimization, and alcohol and drug abuse. Here we focus on the relationship of suicide and depression to other living conditions. As Table 10 shows, eight percent of indigenous adults considered suicide in the last year, with little variation by country. Using a five item scale predicting likelihood of being seriously depressed (Berwick et al 1991), 13 percent of Inuit adults are likely depressed. There is a large variation by country, with 29 percent of Chukotka indigenous adults likely depressed compared with six percent of Canadian Inuit adults.

It is important to keep in mind that our measure of depression is not a clinical diagnosis and, while the questions making up the scale were asked during a self-administered portion of the interview and sealed by the respondent in an envelope before given the completed form back to the interviewer,

**Table 10** Percentage of adults experiencing individual problems

| | Canada | Greenland | Chukotka | Alaska | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Most likely depressed | 6% | 13% | 20% | 8% | 12% |
| Considered suicide in last year | * | 8% | 6% | 6% | 7% |
| Estimated Total | 19,550 | 37,401 | 14,790 | 9,309 | 81,050 |

*Data not available.

the setting in which the questions were applied was not a clinical setting. In part to validate the measure of depression, we can test for its relationship to thoughts of suicide. Inuit adults who score as likely being depressed are more than twice as likely as other Inuit adults to have considered suicide in the last year (15 percent versus 6 percent, excluding Canada where the question on thoughts of suicide was not asked).

To place the individual problems of depression and suicide in the context of other living conditions, we first want to test whether depression and satisfaction with life as a whole are related. If so, then examining key relationships with well-being may suggest ways to influence the likelihood of depression, and in turn thoughts of suicide. Forty-three percent of Inuit adults who are satisfied with their life as a whole are least likely depressed compared with ten percent of Inuit adults who are dissatisfied with their life as a whole (see Table 11).

We of course cannot prove that increasing well-being will reduce the likelihood of depression, but the data support this as a working hypothesis. What else is related to the likelihood of depression? We tested hypotheses that social support, alcohol problems in the home, self-rated overall health, and being a victim of assault are related to the likelihood of being depressed. Inuit adults with higher levels of social support (e.g. frequent access to people they can count on for advice) and who do not have alcohol problems in their home are significantly less likely to be depressed. Together, life satisfaction, alcohol problems in the home and health explain four percent of the variation in depression scores, with life satisfaction and health being most important.

We then hypothesized that people who are more active in productive activities are more likely to be satisfied with their lives as a whole. The choice

**Table 11** Likelihood of being depressed by satisfaction with life as a whole*

| | Dissatisfied (%) | Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied (%) | Satisfied (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Most likely depressed | | | |
| (score 1–14) | 11 | 6 | 7 |
| (score 15–19) | 26 | 23 | 20 |
| (score 20–25) | 53 | 40 | 30 |
| Least likely depressed | | | |
| (score 26–30) | 10 | 31 | 43 |
| | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| ChiSq p = 0.000 | | | |

Data based on Alaska and Greenland (scale constructed according to Berwick and Donald 1991) of focusing on productive activities is predicated on the idea that there are ways to help people become more productive. Inuit adults who receive a poverty level personal income (60 percent or less of the median income in their indigenous settlement region) are less likely to be very satisfied with their life as a whole than adults who receive higher personal incomes (32 versus 43 percent)[5]. But at higher levels of personal income, the level of income is not always associated with higher likelihood of being very satisfied with life as a whole. We also found that people who work full time during at least part of the year are more likely to be very satisfied with life as a whole as people who were likely unemployed (35 versus 18 percent). Those who are more active in subsistence are also more likely to be satisfied with life as a whole. Forty-four percent of the most active in subsistence (12–22 activities) are very satisfied with their life as a whole compared with 30 percent of the least active (0–2 activities).

We tested the combined explanatory power of personal income, subsistence activities along with satisfaction with the combination of productive activities. Each variable significantly contributes to the explanation of variation in life satisfaction. We then tested two additional variables: satisfaction with the amount of fish and game available locally, and satisfaction with the number of job opportunities in the community. These each added their own contribution to explaining life satisfaction, tripling the percentage of variation explained from six to 18 percent. Finally, we hypothesized that the sense of local control is important to well-being and subject to policy intervention. Adding an index of influence based on three questions concerning satisfaction with the influence of indigenous people over the management of natural resources and local environmental problems modestly increases our ability to explain life satisfaction.

Our model explaining overall life satisfaction could be considerably more complete by taking into account other factors such as health, education, transportation, and recreation services, and housing. The point to be made here is that productive activities, the presence of production opportunities (i.e. fish and game, jobs), and a sense of local control are associated with satisfaction with life as a whole. How might we foster improvements in these factors and ultimately hope to reduce the incidence of depression and thoughts of suicide?

Not surprisingly, a good way to improve cash production is formal education. Inuit adults with a high school degree earn on average 49 percent more than Inuit who did not complete high school. Inuit completing a college education earn on average 47 percent more than Inuit with a high school education. Perhaps it should not be a surprise either that the same relationship works in subsistence. The number of traditional skills learned as a child

**Table 12** Satisfaction with influence over the management of natural resources like fish, game, petroleum and mining, and over reduction of local environmental problems

| | Greenland | North Slope | Northwest Arctic | Bering Straits | Chukotka | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| very satisfied | 1% | 22% | 12% | 9% | 1% | 3% |
| somewhat satisfied | 27% | 44% | 39% | 26% | 3% | 23% |
| neither satisfied nor dissatisfied | 38% | 21% | 29% | 33% | 13% | 30% |
| somewhat dissatisfied | 20% | 11% | 15% | 22% | 35% | 23% |
| very dissatisfied | 15% | 2% | 5% | 10% | 48% | 22% |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |

(Scale based on three items)

explains 29 percent of the variation in the number of subsistence activities pursued in the last year. Both formal and traditional education contribute to production activities that in turn contribute to overall well-being.

How do we increase the sense of local control? SLiCA results are provocative in this regard. We hypothesized that greater regional autonomy is related to a greater sense of local control. We ordered SLiCA study regions based on our own judgment of relative autonomy, listing Greenland at the top and Chukotka at the bottom. We ordered the three Alaska Iñupiat settlement regions based on access to economic resources from the North Slope first, Northwest Arctic second, and Bering Straits region third. We do not have SLiCA results from Canada on perceived influence. Our hypothesis is supported by the data shown in Table 12 with the striking exception of Greenland. The North Slope of Alaska appears to be a success story; the Iñupiat there were successful in forming a regional government funded through taxation of petroleum facilities. They have effectively used their access to economic resources to influence such bodies as the International Whaling Commission and to manage development. The Greenland results invite discussion but it seems obvious that there was change in the political discourse[6] since the introduction of Home Rule Government in 1979 towards a common vision of an independent Greenland through the expansion of self-governance. This discourse has focused on political domains lacking influence.

## *The Influence of Educators and Missionaries*

During the pretest phase of SLiCA the international team discovered a remarkable similarity in the stories told by Saami in Norway, Iñupiat in

**Table 13** Percent attending at least part of schooling outside community by country

| | Canada | Greenland | Chukotka | Alaska | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Elementary School | 1% | 48% | 35% | 28% | 31% |
| High School | 1% | 13% | 50% | 44% | 22% |
| Estimated Total | 22,320 | 39,117 | 20,714 | 10,898 | 93,049 |
| ChisSq p = 0.000 | | | | | |

Alaska, and Inuit in Canada and Greenland. They talked about having to leave their community to go to school. In fact, going away to school has been quite common (see Table 13).

The stories we heard suggested that going away to school was often stressful. The results regarding elementary school differ by country. About the same percentage of Greenland Inuit found attending elementary away from their community stressful as those who attended elementary school at home (see Table 14). In Chukotka and Alaska, attending elementary school away from home was substantially more likely to be stressful. But even at home the experience could be stressful. One Alaska Iñupiat reported, “There was a conscious effort to punish students who used Iñupiaq language and a conscious effort to separate students from parents. We had a black board in a class of 4th, 5th, and 6th graders. If one child spoke Iñupiaq, the teacher

**Table 14** Adults with stressful experiences in elementary and/or high school

| | | Attended at least part of elementary school away from community | Attended elementary school at home | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Greenland | Elementary school stressful | 25% | 21% | 23% |
| Chukotka | Elementary school stressful | 69% | 28% | 40% |
| Alaska | Elementary school stressful | 39% | 15% | 22% |
| | | Attended at least part of high school away from community | Attended high school at home | Total |
| Chukotka | High school stressful | 39% | 31% | 36% |
| Alaska | High school stressful | 34% | 21% | 28% |

Chi Sq p = 0.000 except Greenland, P = 0.02.

would put on the wall a bull's-eye and all the students would be forced to stare at the center for 30 min to 2 h."

We don't have data from Greenland regarding stress in high school. The differences in Chukotka and Alaska of being away in high school are less than that for elementary school, but still exist. Stress can come at home as well as away from home. One Alaska Iñupiat told us, "You know what formed in high school, the different cliques, the different groups - the cheerleaders, the smart ones, the losers. I had friends who were higher status and friends who were losers. I struggled with this with my son. He hates school. My husband wants him to go elsewhere. I wish I had the opportunity. So we're leaning toward Mt. Edgecombe [a boarding school]. It's stressful and something I have to deal with through my son."

Another aspect of education important to Arctic indigenous peoples is the integration of their culture with the educational system. The level of integration has changed markedly within living memory. It also differs substantially by country. In Greenland, for example, since at least the early 20th century some of the teachers or teachers' aides have been Greenlanders, the Greenlandic language has been taught in schools, and subjects have been taught in Greenlandic (see Table 15). Most Greenland Inuit were taught about Greenlandic culture and history, although less than half of Greenland Inuit think what they were taught was usually accurate.

In both Chukotka and Alaska, the presence of indigenous teachers or teacher's aides in elementary or high school classes has increased over the lifetimes of the oldest residents, as has indigenous language instruction and coursework in indigenous culture and history. About a third of Chukotka indigenous people and two-thirds of Alaska Inuit think that what they were taught about indigenous culture and history was usually accurate. Overall, the integration of indigenous culture in the Arctic education system has substantially improved, but there is apparently a long way to go, particularly in meeting Inuit standards for the accuracy of information about their own culture and history.

Another story to be told is about the effects of missionaries in the Arctic. It is a complicated story and mostly must wait for further coding of open-ended responses and analysis. We can begin by stating that virtually all Greenlandic Inuit consider themselves to be Christians, as do eight in ten Alaska Inuit and one-in-two Chukotka indigenous adults. At the same time three-in-four Alaska and Chukotka indigenous adults and one-in-two Greenland Inuit think that indigenous beliefs are part of their life. Put another way, one-in-two Arctic Inuit consider themselves a Christian and think that indigenous beliefs are part of their life.

People bring a lifetime of experience to the question of the effects of organized religion on their community. Some focus on the early negative effects:

**Table 15** Indigenous culture in education by age and Country

| | 15/16–24 | 25–34 | 35–44 | 45–54 | 55 and over | All adults |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Some teachers or teachers aides indigenous in elementary or high school | | | | | | |
| Canada | 83% | 83% | 63% | 27% | 38% | 66% |
| Greenland | 100% | 98% | 98% | 100% | 99% | 99% |
| Chukotka | 98% | 86% | 90% | 54% | 68% | 81% |
| Alaska | 94% | 92% | 72% | 57% | 46% | 72% |
| Taught indigenous language in elementary or high school | | | | | | |
| Canada | 83% | 83% | 63% | 27% | 41% | 67% |
| Greenland | 100% | 99% | 96% | 99% | 99% | 98% |
| Chukotka | 91% | 79% | 70% | 50% | 57% | 69% |
| Alaska | 91% | 95% | 56% | 18% | 6% | 52% |
| Taught some subjects in indigenous language in elementary or high school | | | | | | |
| Canada | 82% | 83% | 62% | 25% | 36% | 66% |
| Greenland | 100% | 96% | 96% | 99% | 99% | 98% |
| Chukotka | 19% | 7% | 3% | 6% | 17% | 8% |
| Alaska | 80% | 79% | 54% | 19% | 19% | 50% |
| Taught about indigenous culture and history in elementary or high school | | | | | | |
| Canada | 83% | 83% | 63% | 29% | 41% | 67% |
| Greenland | 86% | 90% | 92% | 91% | 79% | 88% |
| Chukotka | 60% | 18% | 14% | 17% | 12% | 22% |
| Alaska | 90% | 88% | 63% | 28% | 17% | 57% |
| Information taught about indigenous culture and history usually accurate | | | | | | |
| Canada | 65% | 70% | 67% | 55% | 58% | 66% |
| Greenland | 18% | 32% | 37% | 40% | 52% | 37% |
| Chukotka | 36% | 5% | 29% | 31% | 39% | 27% |
| Alaska | 58% | 77% | 64% | 61% | 80% | 66% |
| Estimated Total | 10,153 | 10,576 | 13,234 | 9,920 | 6,791 | 50,674 |

"It's had a devastating effect. It purposely robbed people of their rights to traditional spiritual practices." Others remember the difficult time during which missionaries arrived: "This village was established with a church. Everybody came here starving. [The Bureau of Indian Affairs] provided Quakers to 'straighten' them out. People came here to get saved." Still others bring a more current focus. Here are two examples of answers to the question of effects of organized religion on the community: (1) "When you go to church - if you're ill you go to a doctor - for your spirit you go to church. For your inner peace and calmness to tackle the world church gives you assurance that you can make it in the world."; and, (2) "Some good and some bad. The good is that it gives people that inner belief. The bad is that the church often dictates what's good for the community, what the community can and can't do."

## *The Influence of Policies on Living Conditions*

SLiCA results gain meaning in the context of decision making. Local villages face decisions about what is taught in their community schools, or how to handle teens troubled by thoughts of suicide. Regional institutions face decisions on how to design employment and housing programs. National institutions face decisions about making major investments in community infrastructure. International bodies like the Arctic Council face decisions about how to promote sustainable development. SLiCA results obviously don't identify the best decisions to make; they can, however, inform decision making. One way in which SLiCA results can inform decision making is by broadening comparisons. Only 8 percent of Canadian Inuit have been diagnosed with high blood pressure, for example, in comparison to 27 percent of Alaska Inuit. Apartment living is common in Greenland and Chukotka (19 percent and 14 percent of homes respectively are multiple family buildings). Yet 59 percent of Greenland Inuit living in multiple family dwellings feel drafts from doors and windows compared with 74 percent of Chukotka indigenous people.

Larissa Abryutina of the Russian Association for Indigenous Peoples of the North initiated an analysis of health indicators relevant to decision makers. She found that Chukotka Indigenous people are more than twice as likely as Arctic Indigenous in Greenland or Alaska to have three or more symptoms of health problems. Chukotka indigenous people are five times less likely to have a doctor or other medical professional in their community. They consume less meat and fish that is traditional food. Diet and health are related. Chukotka Indigenous adults who eat less traditional food are more likely to have three or more diagnosed health conditions as those whose traditional food constitutes more than half the meat and fish they eat.

Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR) – an Arctic Council supported project concludes on gender violence that "There is a need to analyse men's changing roles in society and how this affects social problems such as suicide and violence towards others. Violence against women has been identified as a significant problem in the Arctic and has been attributed in part to male loss of identity and self-worth, societal tension as well as issues of power and control" (AHDR 2004).

As a part of her PhD study Mariekathrine Poppel is including some of the questions related to violence:

- Violence as a problem in local community
- Whether the respondent has been a victim to sexual assault or other assault.
- Assault includes domestic violence as well as violence outside respondents' home (e.g. street, restaurant etc.)

The SLiCA findings (see Table 9) seem to give a clear answer to the question whether violence is a concern in the Arctic as more than two out of three Inuit perceive violence is a problem in the local community – the highest percentage among Inuit in Chukotka and the lowest in Alaska. When all Inuit are considered, 20% more women than men find that violence is a problem.

Violence is often related to alcohol abuse, and it is common to see alcohol as the main reason for violence including domestic violence (see Table 16). Table 16 does not tell us about causal relationships but it shows that persons with alcohol or drug problems in their home more often are victims of assaults (other than sexual assaults) than persons without these problems: roughly twice as often in Greenland and Chukotka and three times as often in Alaska.

Furthermore, and still without claiming causality: to investigate if there might be support for a hypothesis of social heredity when it comes to alcohol related problems, the relationship between having faced alcohol and drug problems at home today and in childhood has been examined. A preliminary finding is that among the people facing alcohol problems in their home today the group that experienced alcohol problems in their home as a child compared to the ones that did not is three times higher in Greenland, nine times higher in Chukotka and 2½ times higher in Alaska.

Another topic to be further researched is whether violence is related to income. The first tests show that distributing the victims of assault among the households by income there seem to be a decreasing percentage of victims with increasing income (only the lowest income group does not fit into this pattern).

**Table 16** Problems with alcohol or drugs in home today and victims of (other than sexual) assaults during last 12 months – Inuit in Greenland and Alaska age 15 and above

| | Victim of another type of assault during past 12 months | Problems with alcohol or drugs in home today | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | No (%) | Yes (%) | Total (%) |
| Greenland | yes | 8 | 14 | 9 |
| | no | 92 | 86 | 91 |
| | | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Chukotka | yes | 10 | 21 | 15 |
| | no | 90 | 79 | 85 |
| | | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Alaska | yes | 3 | 16 | 8 |
| | no | 97 | 84 | 92 |
| | Total | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Larissa Abryutina's and Mariekathrine Poppel's work illustrates the potential relevance of SLiCA results to informed policy decision making. Much more work remains to be done by other researchers. To support this effort, the SLiCA research team is collaborating with the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan and Computer-assisted Survey Methods Program (CSM) at the University of California, Berkeley to develop a means by which the highly dispersed Arctic policy community can access and analyze SLiCA microdata via the web without risking inadvertent disclosure of respondent identity.

## Lessons Learned About the Process of International & Indigenous Collaboration

SLiCA is obviously not the first international, comparative survey of living conditions. Many others, such as the European Values Study[7], the Eurobarometer[8], and the European Social Survey[9] have had to confront the challenges of maintaining a consistent meaning across languages, trading off quality of measurement against response burden, and raising the necessary funds. What may be distinct about SLiCA is its intent that a multidisciplinary group of social scientists and indigenous people work together to redefine and measure living conditions in a region spanning 30 degrees of latitude around the globe. What was the process and how did it work?

Prior to SLiCA the research team was aware that the checkered history of social science research among indigenous peoples of the North had caused indigenous people to question the benefits of research. Indigenous people and the research team also recognized the unequal distribution of power between researchers who came with money and expertise and indigenous people who possess an in-depth traditional and local knowledge of their environment not easily expressed in the world of science. National teams tried to compensate for this imbalance by forming indigenous steering committees. In Alaska, for example, the team invited indigenous representatives from Iñupiat regional organizations to come together and decide if the proposed research could be structured to benefit indigenous peoples. Their affirmative answer was predicated on the research team's commitment to give the indigenous steering committee, the Alaska Native Management Board, the final say on the questionnaire and an opportunity to comment on draft publications resulting from the study.

The researchers initially underestimated the potential contribution of our indigenous partners. They began with the idea that the research team would bring completed work products (e.g. a pretest questionnaire) to the indigenous steering committee for discussion and approval. The research team developed these initial work products in workshops based on the preparatory work of the national/regional steering committees without direct indigenous participation. Soon, however, our indigenous partners challenged the research team to directly involve indigenous representatives in the workshops. This proved to be an outstanding success. Not only did the indigenous representatives add a valuable perspective based on their traditional knowledge and on-the-ground experience; they also were able to step back from the, at times, arcane academic discussions and bring the entire group back to a productive focus.

The direction received by the indigenous steering committees improved the science and focused the study on questions intended to benefit the well-being of indigenous Arctic peoples. When the team explained the collaboration to outsiders, some voiced fears that the indigenous steering committees would hijack the science for other purposes. On the contrary, our indigenous partners were as motivated as the research team to produce high quality results.

How well did the anthropologists, economists, political scientists, sociologists, ethnographers, and geographers work together? Perhaps most telling was a decision taken at the first, joint international meeting held in Slagelse, Denmark. The disciplinary makeup of national teams differed. We could either try, at great expense, to duplicate expertise in each national team, or we could trust that we could work as an international team. Despite the fact that many of us were just becoming acquainted, we decided on the latter approach. This collaboration across disciplines and countries proved to strengthen the study as a whole, causing members to bring their expertise to bear in new environments. Seeing first hand how such things as the organization of labor (e.g. whaling crews, reindeer herders) and sample frames differed between countries helped the team to identify potential problems that could threaten the validity of the study as a whole. In short, transcending national team thinking greatly benefited the study as a whole.

The Statistics Greenland team decided to invite Statistics Canada's Special Surveys Division to prepare a feasibility study for the Canadian component of the study (Statistics Canada 1998). Stat Can methodologists worked with research team members from other countries to build a common understanding of underlying assumptions and associated costs. As a result, national research designs converged to a much more realistic approach than initially envisioned.

Where we failed to transcend national thinking was in the area of funding. The Greenland team was successful in securing support for international team workshops from the Nordic Council of Ministers. This support was absolutely critical. The international team decided that primary funding for each country's contribution to questionnaire development, fieldwork, analysis, and publication would come from national funding sources. We did not pay sufficient attention to differences in national funding priorities, nor did we help each other enough in the development of national proposals. There was no international science plan that could serve as a guide to national review panels.

Differences in funding success by country produced differences in schedule that in turn increased study costs and affected the comparability of results. In Canada, our indigenous partners suggested that SLiCA could be implemented in conjunction with Statistics Canada's Aboriginal People's Survey (APS). Stat Can agreed, and ultimately contributed three million dollars US to the Canadian component of SLiCA in in-kind research support. Stat Can worked with SLiCA researchers and indigenous peoples' representatives to design APS questionnaire components. Unfortunately, the schedule for APS preceded funding of SLiCA in many countries and therefore completion of the SLiCA international core questionnaire. As a result of schedule differences and tradeoffs Stat Can had to make between comparability with SLiCA and other APS objectives, only about a third of the SLiCA international core measures are contained in APS. Recoding of APS data to fit the international data set also proved to be a major task, involving over 6,000 lines of computer code and hundreds of hours of labor. The lesson here is not to avoid piggybacking one survey on another, but rather to take into account all the costs. We cannot reliably predict what different decisions we would have made. Perhaps, though, knowledge of the costs would have expedited the team's decisions on the content of the core questionnaire.

Perhaps the biggest lesson was the length of time it took for questionnaire development: three years. Had all countries had their funding in place at the onset of questionnaire development, we doubtless could have accelerated the questionnaire process. But there was also a good reason for such a protracted questionnaire development effort. At our first meeting our anthropologist team members were extremely skeptical that structured questions could produce valid measures of such concepts as cultural identity or even herding and harvesting production systems. Had the team members sharing a more quantitative bent pushed ahead without extended discussions and pretesting, we probably would have lost a sense of common ownership of the study approach. As it was, the major compromise took the form of an intent to complement the structured interviews with in-depth qualitative studies. Huge difficulties in obtaining funding for the structured interview component displaced this commitment to become a future research priority. Nevertheless, the SLiCA questionnaire evolved to a form that reflected the multi-disciplinary makeup of the team and of direct indigenous involvement.

While far from perfect, the questionnaire reflects the study's intent to measure living conditions in a way relevant to Arctic indigenous peoples.

## SLiCA: Where Next?

In March 2007 the international team conducted an international workshop to discuss SLICA results and to announce a comprehensive release of results (see www.arcticlivingconditions.org). SLICA results are now being used by the international research community and Arctic indigenous representatives to help design an Arctic Social Indicators system under the auspices of the Arctic Council.

## Notes

1. www.arcticlivingconditions.org
2. In Greenland and Canada
3. Personal incomes are adjusted for purchasing power using national PPP figures. In general Arctic regions have lower purchasing power than the nation of which they are a part. The major effect of adjusting for purchasing power is to increase Chukotka Russia incomes by a factor of almost five.
4. The dataset contains responses for Chukotka, northern Alaska and Canada.
5. It should be noted though, and this is to be further investigated, that there might be regional variation in how satisfied people should be to rate themselves "very satisfied". A hypothesis is that the inclination to use the Greenlandic word for "very" might be smaller than using "very" in English.
6. In 2003 a Commission on Self-Governance presented a report re-evaluating Greenland's position within the Danish Realm. Following this report a joint Danish-Greenlandic Commission on Self-Governance was established to propose further development on the jurisdiction of the Greenland Home Rule.
7. See www.gesis.org/eurobarometer
8. www.europeansocialsurvey.org
9. www.europeanvalues.nl

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# Quality of Life Down-Under: The Australian Unity Wellbeing Index

**Robert A. Cummins, David Mellor, Mark A. Stokes and Anna A.L.D. Lau**

**Abstract** This paper describes changes in the wellbeing of Australians as measured through the Australian Unity Wellbeing Index. This project has been in progress for six years, from 2001 to 2007. Each of 17 surveys has collected geographically representative data from 2,000 new respondents on both the Personal Wellbeing Index and the National Wellbeing Index. In addition, over the last nine surveys, people have been asked about their perceived likelihood of a terrorist attack in Australia. The variations in wellbeing over the 17 surveys are interpreted in term of data norms, Homeostatic Theory and possible causal agents. It will be shown that some of the wellbeing measures show no systematic variation over time, while others change quite markedly. However, with a few exceptions, it is usually not clear what might be causing such variation. It is concluded that the results generally conform to the predictions of homeostasis but much work remains to be done in order to understand the kinds of factors that influence such changes in population wellbeing.

## Australian wellbeing – An overview

Australia is a relatively wealthy country, due largely to an abundance of natural resources. GDP per capita is about $39,000 which places it 17th amongst all other countries of the world. As one consequence, its citizens enjoy good medical care and high levels of education. Unemployment is normally about 5%, there is a minimum wage, and a social security safety-net which provides, as a minimum, an income about 1/3 of the average wage. There are relatively high levels of trust between citizens,

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and relatively low levels of corruption. Such factors lead to Australia being ranked third in the United Nations' 2006 Human Development Index (Human Development Report, 2006) and sixth in The Economist worldwide quality-of-life index (2005).

Due to such factors, Australians generally enjoy a high life quality. The Subjective Wellbeing (SWB) of Australians is always in the top cluster of countries within international comparative surveys (e.g. Cummins, 1995, 1998). In this article we will present data from the Australian Unity surveys that have recorded the changing wellbeing of the Australian population over the past six years as measured through the Australian Unity Wellbeing project.

## The Australian Unity Wellbeing Index

Since 2001, the Australian Unity Wellbeing Index has been a barometer of Australians' satisfaction with their lives and life in Australia. Unlike most indicators of life quality, the Index is subjective. That is, the Index measures quality of life as experienced by the average Australian. As such, it is an alternative indicator of population wellbeing to such economic indicators as Gross Domestic Product, population health, literacy, and crime statistics.

The Index comprises two scales. The Personal Wellbeing Index (International Wellbeing Group, 2006) measures Subjective Wellbeing (SWB) through the average level of satisfaction across seven life domains: health, personal relationships, safety, standard of living, achieving in life, community connectedness, and future security. The National Wellbeing Index is the average satisfaction score across six domains of national life: the economy, the environment, social conditions, governance, business, and national security.

The first index survey, of 2,000 adults from all parts of Australia, was conducted in April 2001. A total of 17 such surveys have now been conducted with the most recent survey in April 2007. A new report is constructed from the results of each survey and these can be obtained from the Australian Centre on Quality of Life website at Deakin University (http://www.deakin.edu.au/research/acqol/index.htm).

### *Measuring and Understanding Subjective Wellbeing*

The major measurement instrument used in these surveys is the PWI. This is designed as the first level deconstruction of the single item 'How satisfied are you with your Life as a Whole'. This single question, devised by Andrews and Withey (1976), is the most commonly used measure of SWB and has the desirable characteristic of being both highly personal and abstract, which is the essence of the SWB construct (Cummins et al., 2003c). The deconstruction criterion is that each domain individually contributes unique variance to ‘satisfaction with life as a whole’ in a multiple regression (see the manual for details of this procedure).

Each domain is rated by respondents on a 0–10 end-defined scale (Jones and Thurstone, 1955) anchored by ‘completely dissatisfied’ and ‘completely satisfied’. The scores are then combined across the seven domains to yield an overall Index score, which is adjusted to have a range of 0–100.

On a population basis in Australia, the mean scores derived from the PWI are remarkably stable. As will be shown later in Fig. 1, the total range of these mean scores shows a variation of only 3.0 points. How can such stability be achieved?

We hypothesize that personal wellbeing is not simply free to vary over the theoretical 0–100 range. Rather, it is held fairly constant for each individual in a manner analogous to body temperature. This implies an active management system for personal wellbeing that has the task of maintaining wellbeing, which averages about 75 points on the 0–100 scale. We call this process Subjective Wellbeing Homeostasis (Cummins et al., 2002).

The proper functioning of this homeostatic system is essential for adaptive human functioning. At normal levels of population wellbeing, which for group mean scores lies in the range of 73.4–76.4 points in Australia, or more approximately between 70 and 80 points in Western countries (Cummins, 1995, 1998), people generally feel good about themselves. They are well motivated to conduct their lives, and have a strong sense of optimism (for a review see Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004; Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005). When this homeostatic system fails, however, people lose their normal positive mood state and are at risk of depression. This can come about through such circumstances as exposure to chronic stress, chronic pain, failed personal relationships, etc.

Fortunately, the homeostatic system is remarkably robust. Many people live in difficult personal circumstances which may involve, for example, low income or medical problems, and yet manage to maintain normal levels of wellbeing. This is why the Index is so stable when averaged across the population. But as with any human attribute, some homeostatic systems are more robust than others. Or, put around the other way, some people have fragile systems which are prone to failure.

Homeostatic fragility can be caused by two different influences. The first of these is genetic. Some people have a constitutional weakness in their ability to maintain wellbeing within the normal range. The second influence is chronic exposure to some form of negative source of challenge such as caring for a disabled family member, unemployment or a broken relationship. On the other hand chronic positive influences, such as an intimate personal relationship, can strengthen homeostasis.

We also measure 'National Wellbeing' through the National Wellbeing Index, the construction of which has been described. Because the domains that comprise this Index are less personal, they are under less homeostatic control (Cummins et al., 2003c). As one consequence the measures of national wellbeing are more volatile than those of personal wellbeing, as will be demonstrated.

In summary, personal wellbeing is under active management and most people are able to maintain normal levels of wellbeing even when challenged by negative life experiences. Because of this, when we track the Australian population over time, there is a great deal of consistency in the sample mean scores. However, there are fluctuations in the mean population SWB over time and the degree of these fluctuations varies with the domain being measured. The purpose of the following sections is to show the fluctuations that have occurred in both the Personal and the National Wellbeing Index over the past six years. Firstly though, the survey methodology will be described in more detail.

## The Survey Methodology

Each survey involves a fresh, geographically representative national sample of people aged 18 years or over and fluent in English. They are surveyed by telephone in a 7–10 minute interview and the duration of each data-collection period is some 3–4 weeks. In order to ensure an even gender and age distribution, interviewers ask to speak to the person in the house who had the most recent birthday and is at least 18 years old. On average some 13,000 to 14,000 calls are made, about 7,000 to 8,000 connect with a potential respondent and 2000 agree to complete the survey. This gives an effective response rate of about 25.0%. This rather low rate reflects, in part, the methodological constraint that an even geographic and gender split is maintained at all times throughout the survey. Thus, some willing respondents are eliminated due to their gender being different from the one required at that time. This procedure ensures that if a major event occurs during the period of data collection, its impact can be analysed using representative before and after data.

Initial data screening is completed before data analysis. This involves checking for numbers outside the possible range and also identifying respondents who have consistently scored at the top (10) or the bottom (0) of all PWI domains. These respondents are eliminated prior to further analysis. They either represent a response set or an acquiescent response style typical of people who do not understand the question (Rosen, Floor, & Zisfein, 1974; Sigelman, Schoenrock, Winer, Spanhel, Hromas, Martin, Budd, & Bensberg, 1981; Sudman & Bradburn, 1974). The proportion of respondents eliminated in this way is about 1%. While their inclusion would have little impact in analyses of the whole sample, in break-down samples related to demographic criteria, where the numbers of respondents per cell become much smaller, the impact of such aberrant responses can be considerable if they are included.

Unlike gender, the age composition of the sample is not actively managed but yields a break-down similar to that of the national population as determined by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (see Cummins et al., 2003a).

### *Presentation of Results and Type of Analysis*

In the presentation of results to follow, the statistically significant data trends have been established by analysis of variance. In situations where homogeneity of variance assumptions has been violated, Dunnetts T3 Post-Hoc Test has been used. In the case of t-tests we have used the SPSS option for significance when equality of variance cannot be assumed. Bonferroni corrections to a criterion of $p < .01$ have been employed where necessary.

More detailed analyses are presented in the cited reports, which also contain the tables of means and standard deviations. The raw data are available from our website: http://www.deakin.edu.au/research/acqol/index_wellbeing/index.htm.

All satisfaction values are expressed as the strength of satisfaction on a scale that ranges from 0% to 100%. The conversion formula is presented in the PWI manual.

## The Personal Wellbeing Index 2001–2007

The primary measure of wellbeing in Australia is gained from the PWI and the results are shown in Fig. 1. The temporal spacing of these surveys is shown on the baseline and involves intervals of approximately 3 or 6 months.

The first survey was conducted in April 2001 and most obvious trend in Fig. 1 is the rise in SWB that followed September 11. This rise took the population SWB to a significantly higher level than it had been at the time of the first survey, and this higher level has been generally maintained. In making this determination, a lot of responsibility rests on the first survey being a reliable measure of the pre-September 11 population wellbeing. However, several lines of enquiry have led us to regard this single estimation as being reliable. These are as follows:




**Fig. 1** Personal Wellbeing Index

1. The results have been carefully checked.
2. As will be shown later, not all of the domains that comprise the PWI have changed over the surveys. Thus, the rise has been driven by only some domains. If this rise was caused by some general sampling phenomenon or methods effect, then all of the domains would be expected to rise together.
3. There is no methodological reason to expect the data from Survey 1 to be different from the next two surveys. The data were collected by the same call-centre using the same operating procedures and verbal instructions to the respondents.

One plausible reason for this rise, if it is correctly attributed to September 11, is the sense of threat experienced by the Australian population. Even though very few Australians were directly affected by the event, it represented an attack on a strong ally for Australia, the United States of America. The two countries have a long and stable relationship of defence agreements and trade. For example, the USA-Australia alliance under the ANZUS Treaty (1951) binds both countries to recognize that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either one of them endangers the peace and safety of the other. The Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (2005) ensures a preferential trade agreement between the two countries.

While the details of such agreements are of little concern to the majority of the population, the general view of America as a powerful ally is widely held. Thus the attack on the World Trade Center had far greater impact on the public psyche than an equivalent attack in Russia or China. If it happened to America then, quite conceivably, it could also happen to Australia. Moreover, to reinforce the impact of the event on the public, Australian television played the terrible images of planes hitting the Twin-Towers over and over again. The print media and radio were also full of speculations about motives and future scenarios. So, a new idea took shape, that terrorists attacks on such a scale were not just conceivable but real. People had a new source of fear.

When groups are threatened from the outside they tend to become internally stronger. They engage in behavior conducive to the creation of social-capital. This concept was defined originally by Bourdieu (1986) as "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to — membership in a group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively owned capital" (p. 249). This describes the intuitively-appealing idea that social networks provide their members with access to the group's shared social and material resources. The description of social capital has more recently popularized by Putnam (1993; 2000) and Fukuyama (1995) and has received much research attention. With special relevance to the current results, both Durlauf (2002) and Requena (2003) suggest that social capital building is enhanced by circumstances where cooperative relationships are more likely to facilitate solutions to collective problems than are individual actions. It is, thus, conceivable that such terrorist threats to collective wellbeing would engender bonding social capital (Putnam, 2000). If this is correct, our results should show an increase in satisfaction with the domains that focus on interpersonal relationships. This will be demonstrated when the individual domains are examined in the next section.

However, it is not just threat events that apparently cause the wellbeing of Australians to rise. Figure 1 shows that the highest level of population wellbeing was attained in August 2004 at the time of the Athens Olympics (Survey 12). In some respects this is an artefact caused by the timing of the data collection. Whereas we normally collect data some time after an event, on this occasion the period of data collection spanned the Olympic period and the results are shown below

Australia achieved spectacular success at the Olympic Games. After the USA, China and Russia, its medal tally ranked 4th. National jubilation was further enhanced by pre-games fears that Australian athletes would do less well than they had done at the 2000 Sydney Olympics. For a small nation of 20 million people this success vindicated the national preoccupation with sport.

It is evident from Fig. 2 that the Personal Wellbeing Index rose during the Olympic period, and then started to decrease shortly afterwards.




**Fig. 2** Weekly values for SWB during Survey 12

These patterns are statistically weak ($p = 0.078$ and $p = 0.017$ respectively), but achieve significance using a one-tail test. While slight rises were also evident in the National Wellbeing Index, these were not significant. Thus, the experience of the Olympics was felt more personally than nationally.

While both threat and enhancement events appear to have caused wellbeing to rise, the reason for each rise should be different. From a sociobiological perspective, a rise in population satisfaction through social bonding would be an adaptive response to threat. The rise in wellbeing due to nationally enhancing events, however, has no such adaptive links and is more simply explained in the personal pride of association with a winning team.

If this interpretation is correct then there should be a major difference between these two event types in that the influence of threat event should be longer lasting. It may be adaptive to maintain a sense of threat for a long period after the event, thereby maintaining the alertness to detect a new source of harm and the resources to deal with it. Enhancement events, on the other hand, are likely to be far more transitory. The fact of Olympic success should be soon submerged within the caldron of current life realities and other local or international sports carnivals (e.g. football grand finals in September). This is consistent with the trend in Fig. 2 showing an apparent return of SWB to lower levels soon after the Athens Olympics were over. In contrast, the influence of the threat events has apparently been much longer lasting.

In summary, it appears that both positive and negative national events have been associated with changes in the wellbeing of the Australian population. However, the theoretical construction of the PWI is such that the individual domains may not be expected to rise or fall in unison. While each domain is predominantly driven by core affect (Davern et al., 2007), they are individually flavoured by the cognitive target in question, such as health, safety, etc. Because of this, it might be expected that all of the domains would show a great deal of stability, due to the unchanging nature of core affect, but that each would also show variation reflecting changing attitudes to the cognitive target. This prediction is tested below. It will be shown that, consistent with theory, only some of the domains have shown significant variation over the 17 surveys.

## *Changes in Individual Domains*

Consistent with the idea that external threats and national successes affect SWB through social capital, it would be predicted that the domains most influenced by such events would be those concerned with interpersonal relationships. Two of the seven PWI domains concern connection to other people. One is 'How satisfied are you with feeling part of your community'?, the other is 'How satisfied are you with your relationships?'. The results from these two questions are shown in Fig. 3.

The thickest line shows the PWI, the second-thickest line shows Relationships, and the thinnest line shows Community connection. All lines have been adjusted in the vertical dimension such that they indicate when each one first became significantly higher than the first survey. The linear (Pearson) correlation between each domain and the PWI, using the 17 survey means as data, is also shown.

The range of scores for both domains is very similar (Relationships 3.8 and Community is 4.0 points). While both achieved their highest level at S12 (Olympics) the timing of their lowest point is different, being April 2005 (S13) for relationships and April 2001 (S1) for Community. Thus,




**Fig. 3** Satisfaction with feeling part of your community

while these two domains are significantly correlated with one another ($r = 0.73$, $p < 0.001$), they only share 53% of variance, so there is evidence of independent influence by whatever forces are driving such changes.

It is also evident that the general pattern of both domains is very similar to that of the PWI. However, there are differences. The rise in both domains in the year following September 11 did not reach significance, so these two domains were not completely responsible for this rise in the PWI. It was not until the period of the pre-Iraq war (Survey 6, March 2003) they both rose above the level of Survey 1, seemingly in anticipation of the looming war to which Australian troops were to be committed. Perhaps the anticipation of war drew people closer to their family and friends as well as enhancing bonding with the general community. This higher level was maintained for six months following the overthrow of Hussein (S9), it then dissipated, only to be recharged once again during the Athens Olympics and following the second Bali bombing (S14). Since then both domains have returned to be no different from S1 while the PWI has risen significantly higher. Thus, once again, these two domains are not completely responsible for the significant rise in the PWI in the last survey 17. Overall, however, it seems that this temporal pattern for Relationships and Community is consistent with the social psychological theory that has been discussed in relation to the kinds of conditions conducive to fostering social capital.

Two of the other domains that could reasonably be linked with social capital, also follow the PWI quite closely. These are Safety and Future security. Their survey mean scores also correlate highly with the PWI ($r = 0.66$, $p < 0.01$ and $r = 0.82$, $p < 0.001$ respectively) and with one another ($r = 0.80$, $p < 0.001$). Thus, this group of four domains averages to give the PWI its general shape over time.

The domain of safety is also interesting because it might be imagined that this would be the domain most responsive to the threat of a terrorist attack. In fact, while this association can be demonstrated, it is weak (see section on terrorist attacks).

There is another domain that follows the PWI very closely, but which is not easily linked with social capital. The pattern for satisfaction with Standard of Living is shown in Fig. 4.

Satisfaction with this domain rose significantly immediately following S1. Moreover, this rise has been sustained despite various economic setbacks such as a sharp rise in petrol prices just prior to Survey 14 and a rise of 0.25 points in interest rates just prior to Survey 15. The range of scores is 4.7% between April 2001 (S1:74.5) and August 2004 (S12:Olympics: 79.2).




**Fig. 4** Satisfaction with standard of living

The reason for the sudden increase in this domain and its continued elevation is uncertain. While the Australian economy has remained strong throughout this entire period, with low interest rates and low unemployment, these factors cannot explain the strong initial rise following September 11.

The remaining two domains behave quite differently from the other five, and from the PWI. Their patterns are shown in Fig. 5.

Neither Health nor Achieving in life follow the pattern of the PWI to a reliable degree. Satisfaction with health has really not changed from its level at Survey 1. While the overall ANOVA for Health between surveys is very




**Fig. 5** Satisfaction with Health

marginally significant ($p = 0.03$), this difference refers only to Survey 6 which is marginally higher than S1 ($p = 0.02$). However, a Bonferroni correction renders this non-significant and it may reflect a random fluctuation. The range of scores is only 2.4 points between April 2001 (S1:73.6) and March 2003 (S6:Pre-Iraq war:76.0).

Analysing changes in the domain ‘Achieving in life’ is contaminated by a change in its wording. From Survey 1 to Survey 10, the question asked ‘How satisfied are you with *what you achieve in life*’ and the mean scores barely changed over these surveys. Then, in Survey 11, the wording changed to ‘How satisfied are you with *what you are currently achieving in life*?’. This change was made to ensure that the question referred to the present rather than to a perception of past achievements.

The effect of this word change has been to significantly reduce the score for this domain. The average value over Survey 1 to Survey 10 is 74.47 (SD $=$ 0.45). The average value over Survey 11-Survey 17 is 72.87 (SD $=$ 0.53). So it appears to remain a highly reliable measure that has stabilised about 1.5 points below the original and no different from Survey 1.

However, within each of these grouping (surveys 1–10, and surveys 11–17) it can be seen that the domain is very stable. Over the surveys 1–10 it was marginally higher at Survey 6 (Pre-Iraq war) with the range of just 1.8 points between April 2001 (S1:73.2) and March 2003 (S6:Pre-Iraq war:75.0). The range of scores is even less over the surveys 11–17, being just 1.3 points, from 72.2 (Survey 13) to 73.5 points (Survey 12).

It is evident that satisfaction with personal health and achieving in life are little influenced by world events. This is interesting for a couple of reasons. First it adds validity to the other changes that have been recorded. It is clear that the domains within the PWI have not simply fluctuated as a block, as would be expected if some general method effect was responsible for these changes.

Secondly, the lack of significant change in health satisfaction presumably indicates that this domain is under tighter control than the domains that have changed. Maybe in a threat situation, it is adaptive to have a heightened sense of one’s own physical powers, and this may cause satisfaction with health to be maintained. Alternatively, perceived health may be more under more chronic threat than the other domains. Practically everybody has some source of health concern and, thus, the homeostatic devices that maintain health satisfaction are already working overtime, such that another source of external threat has little additional impact. Further research is needed to address these speculations.

## Summary of the Changes in Personal Wellbeing

Attributing the cause of change is impossible to do with certainty using cross-sectional data. However the following general ideas gain some support from the data patterns that have been shown as:

1. The SWB of the Australian population does show significant variation over time. However, the total extent of this variation is only about 3 percentage points, so detection of significance is dependent on large sample sizes.
2. While this small degree of variation is consistent with homeostatic theory, the meaning of this variation in terms of broader societal functioning is unknown. It is important to understand that, if the homeostatic theory is correct, a 3 point variation may be very meaningful. As an analogy, a three point variation in body temperature is the difference between life and death. While SWB is clearly not maintained within such a narrow range as body temperature, the nature of homeostatic systems are such that variation is opposed and so sustained change is generally meaningful.
3. While most of the domains have changed over the 17 surveys, and have collectively given shape to the PWI, it is very interesting that the domains of Health and Achieving have shown virtually no change through the entire survey sequence. This indicates that the overall changes that have been shown are not the result of some blanket method effect but are caused by the selective changes in just some domains.
4. It is important to state that the entire period of these surveys has been one of political stability and continued prosperity, with solid economic growth and low unemployment. The terrorist threat has not materialised as any major event within Australia. The continued high levels of satisfaction with safety and security may be a function of the American alliance, but may also be fuelled by perceptions of competence in the military and the police to deal with difficult situations. In terms of the military, Australian troops are playing an increasingly active role as peacekeepers within the Pacific region, with troops deployed in New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and East Timor. The Australian police have uncovered terrorist threats and, working with other authorities, successfully prevented a recurrence of the Sydney ‘race riots’ of November 2005. There is also increasing evidence of Islamic integration within Australia and, perhaps therefore, a sense that potential threats are being effectively managed.

In summary, systematic and significant changes in personal wellbeing have been demonstrated in both the PWI and in some of its constituent domains. Perceptions of national wellbeing have followed a similar pattern over the same period.

## National Wellbeing Index

The NWI comprises 6 domains, each one using the same question format as for the PWI, that is 'How satisfied are you with — in Australia'. In the first survey only three domains were used: Economic situation, State of the Natural Environment, and Government. Subsequent surveys have included an additional three domains: Business, National security and Social conditions. Because of this change, tests of significance for the NWI only involve comparisons between surveys 2–17. Individual domains are analysed according to the number of surveys they include.

Figure 6 below shows the NWI (thin line) in comparison to the PWI (thick line).

The theory of SWB homeostasis predicts that the NWI will show more variation than the PWI. This is because the PWI is held under tighter homeostatic control due to its being more personal (see Cummins et al., 2003c). This is confirmed by the results. Using the 16 survey mean scores in which the NWI is in its complete form (S2–S17), the Standard Deviation (SD) for the NWI is 0.99 points compared with the 0.59 points for the PWI. The overall correlation between the NWI and the PWI is significant as might be expected. However, they only share 34.8% variance, so they also show some




**Fig. 6** National Wellbeing Index vs the Personal Wellbeing Index

independent movement, as can be seen. In particular, the NWI has shown a stronger tendency to remain higher than it was at S1.

The theory also predicts that the mean of the NWI will be less than that of the PWI. This is because the PWI is more personal and so will be more influenced by the positive cognitive bias, imparted by homeostasis, on semi-abstract perceptions of the self (Cummins & Nistico, 2002; Cummins et al., 2007a). The more distal perceptions of the NWI will be processed more veridically and under more cognitive control. This prediction is also clearly confirmed with the mean of the NWI across surveys (61.1 points) being 13.9 points lower than that of the PWI (75.0: Cummins et al., 2007a).

The theory also predicts that the standard deviation within each survey sample should be more closely related to that survey's mean score for the PWI than for the NWI. The reason is the power of homeostatic influence over each type of measure. Homeostatic influence should be higher for the PWI since the items are more highly personal. This implies that the set-point range for SWB will be more strongly applied to the responses and an upper-ceiling more strongly enforced. As evidence, no demographic sub-group has been found to have a reliable level of SWB that is higher than 82 points (see Cummins et al., 2007b).

A result of this is that variations in the survey mean scores will reflect changes in the proportion of low scores in the data distribution. An increased proportion will cause the mean to fall and the standard deviation to increase. While this effect will also be expected in the NWI, the effect will be attenuated due to the more cognitive processing of the more distal rating targets (Cummins et al., 2007b).

This prediction is confirmed by the data. The correlation between the surveys means and the standard deviations for the PWI is −.79 while for the NWI it is −.30. In summary these results are quite consistent with the predictions arising from the Theory of SWB homeostasis.

## National Wellbeing Domains

Some of national domains have been more volatile than those of the PWI, as expected from theory. Some of the more interesting domain changes are discussed below:

### *Economic Situation*

This domain rose significantly from its baseline (S1) immediately following September 11 (S2) and again six months later (S3) (Fig. 7). This has been


**Fig. 7** Satisfaction with the Economic Situation in Australia

followed by a continued gradual rise ever since. This is the most volatile domain and it shows a strong correlation with the PWI (r = .71, $p < 0.001$). The range of values is 14.9 points, being between April 2001 (S1:53.6) and August 2004 (S12:Olympics:68.5). The reason for this continued rise is not entirely clear but may be linked to the fact that Australia has enjoyed a period of sustained economic growth during the whole of this study period. Weekly household income, adjusted for Consumer Price Index, was $455 in 1994–5 (ABS, 2005). In the following year it actually decreased to $450, a fall of −1.1%. Then it started to rise with the following figures representing two-year blocks, showing the annual rise since the previous block: 1997–8 ($477, +2.8%), 2000–1 ($510, +3.2%) and 2003–4 ($549, +3.6%). While more contemporary figures are not available it seems likely that this trend has continued through to the present. It is thus possible that this increasing household wealth, in terms of disposable income, has caused satisfaction with the economic situation to display this sustained rise.

## *Natural Environment*

This is one of the most interesting domains. Over the first 15 surveys it showed little systematic change. Its range of variation over this period is 5.1 points and while it has on occasion risen above survey 1, it has not followed either the PWI (r = .29, ns) or world events in any systematic way. Indeed, over surveys 1–15 the domain was one of the most stable, fluctuating by only 3.0 points (Fig. 8).




**Fig. 8** Satisfaction with the State of the Natural Environment in Australia

Then, between Survey 15 to Survey 16, this domain fell by a dramatic 3.1 points and has remained low. It is now a significant 1.9 points *below* its value at Survey 1 (58.0 points).

This is the only domain to have fallen below the level of Survey 1 values in any survey. Moreover, in the context of such prior stability, the fall of 3.1 points at Survey 16 is apparently attributable. In the period between surveys 15 and 16, Al Gore's film 'An Inconvenient Truth' had been released and widely discussed in Australia. Additionally, in the few months prior to Survey 16 the media had repeatedly featured 'global warming', one of the longest droughts on record, very low levels of potable water reserves in eastern states, and various doomsday scenarios. Thus it appears that this negative publicity has changed people's perception of the degree to which they feel satisfied with the natural environment.

This decreased level of satisfaction is interesting for two reasons. First, it is one of the few times we have been able to link a change in a particular domain to a national phenomenon (negative publicity). Second, it reinforces the separate performance of objective and subjective variables. The actual state of the natural environment had not changed discernibly between Survey 15 and Survey 16.

## *Government*

Satisfaction with Government (Fig. 9) was not measured during the first survey. But at the time of the second survey, immediately following September 11, it was at its highest point yet recorded. The range of values is 6.1




**Fig. 9** Satisfaction with Government in Australia

points between October 2006 (S16:52.6) and September 2001 (S2:58.7). The 2.7 point fall over the 18 month period from Survey 13 to Survey 16 is significant.

The changes in satisfaction with Government are not significantly linked with the PWI ($r = 0.20$, ns) but satisfaction does appear to rise in times of national threat. If this attribution is correct, it explains the elevated satisfaction with Government in September 2001 (S2) as a direct result of the September 11 attacks. A similar, but more muted rise is evident in the Bali bombing (S5) survey, and again following the overthrow of Hussein (S7). The most obvious explanation for the September 11 (S2) and Bali (S5) rise is that the perception of external threat causes satisfaction with Government actions (authority) to increase. However the pre-Iraq war situation (S6) was different. While it constituted a threat to Australia in so far as there were fears of Weapons of Mass Destruction being unleashed in Iraq and perhaps elsewhere, Australian troops were committed to fight in the front-line. This involvement divided the nation, with 23% in favour and 53% opposed to the war (Cummins et al., 2003b). Perhaps because of this division, the rise in satisfaction with Government did not materialise. Moreover, the subsequent rise at S7 may represent an increased satisfaction for a quite different set of reasons, which involve relief at no deaths among the Australian troops and the bolstered American alliance. It is interesting that none of these rises are sustained over more than three months and that the substantial rise in national wellbeing occasioned by the Olympics was not reflected in Satisfaction with Government. The range of values is 6.1 points between October 2006 (S16:52.6) and September 2001 (S2:58.7).

### *Other National Domains*

All three of the other national domains as Security, Social conditions and Business have followed a general rise. While they will not be discussed here, they can be viewed in Cummins et al. (2007b).

## Australian Wellbeing Summary

Over the course of the Australian Unity Wellbeing surveys, changes have occurred in both the Personal Wellbeing Index and National Wellbeing Index. While, for the most part, the cause of these changes is unclear, they are not occurring at random. This is evidenced by those domains that do not change, such as the personal domains of Health and Achieving. Other domains seem to change in a manner which shows at least the possibility of causality and it is interesting that all of these are NWI domains. Satisfaction with the Economic situation may be tied to increasing household disposable income, satisfaction with Government appears to rise at times of perceived national threat, while satisfaction with the Natural Environment seems to have fallen with the public perception of climate change as a reality.

The fact that National domains are more readily tied to external causes is consistent with homeostatic theory. Personal wellbeing is strongly maintained in the defence of Core Affect (Davern et al., 2007). Thus, the influence of public events on SWB is muted. National wellbeing, on the other hand, is less personal and so more under the control of the cognitive evaluation of the particular situation (Cummins et al., 2003c). While causation can not be determined from data such as these, it is interesting to examine the relationship between another set of major events and SWB, this time in the form of terrorist attacks.

## Likelihood of a Terrorist Attack

The world changed following the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center in many ways. One was to spawn two terrorist attacks close to Australia. The first of these occurred on October 12, 2003 when two nightclubs were bombed in the tourist district of Kuta on the Indonesian island of Bali. The bombs killed 202 people, 88 of whom were Australian, and a further 209 people were injured (Wikipedia, 2007a). Our data collection for S5 commenced some three weeks following the attacks. There was intense media coverage during this whole data-collection period, including the mourning, funerals, biographies of the victims and continued speculation regarding the probability of an attack on Australian soil. Security arrangements for major events and at airports were strengthened, guards were placed to protect national monuments, and the general tone of the media was sombre, dark with imagined menace.

The Second Bali bombings occurred two years later, on October 1, 2005. Terrorist bombs exploded at two sites in Jimbaran and Kuta, both in south Bali. Twenty people died, including 4 Australians, and 129 people were injured (Wikipedia, 2007b)

Since November 2003 (survey 9) we have asked the following two questions:

"Do you think a terrorist attack is likely in Australia in the near future?"

[If 'yes']

"On a scale from 0 to 10, how likely would you rate such an attack?"

As can be seen from Fig. 10, there has been considerable variation in the percentage of the sample who think an attack is likely. Survey 9 was conducted about a year after the First Bali Bombing and 6 months after Hussein was deposed. The percentage of Australians who thought an attack likely appeared to be decreasing 18 months later (Survey 13). Then the Second Bali Bombing was followed by a rise to the highest proportion yet recorded (73.4%) and over the following 18 months it has been trending-down once again.

It seems reasonable to suggest that these changes do reflect the influence of the two bombings. While other attacks have occurred in other countries, most notably in Madrid (March 11, 2004) and London (July 7, 2005), these are rather distant from Australia. It is also notable that there has been little evidence of terrorist activity within Australia itself. It is true that one group of people was arrested for related activities but appeared not to have concrete plans or a specific target in mind.




**Fig. 10** Percentage who think a terrorist attack is likely

The second set of data has been derived from those people who responded 'yes, an attack is likely'. This concerns the level of likelihood they gave to an attack taking place. The results are presented below.

Among the people who said 'Yes', the strength of belief that such an attack will occur (Fig. 11) shows much less variation than in Fig. 10. This is not surprising since the results all come from people who rate such an attack likely, at least to some degree. However, much the same trends are evident as for the percentages of people shown in the previous figure. The correlation between the percentage of people and the mean strength of belief in each survey is −.42 which is not significant due to the small numbers of values being correlated (N = 9) but it is in the expected direction. As the percentage falls, the people in the sub-sample saying 'yes' are those with the stronger beliefs that such an attack is likely.

An important issue, therefore, is the extent to which the perception of terrorist attacks influences the SWB of the people concerned. Figure 12 has been prepared from the accumulated data from individual respondents over the nine surveys that have carried these items.

Figure 12 plots the perceived likelihood of a terrorist attack against personal wellbeing. The normative range for group mean scores is indicated by the margins of the horizontal bar. The value for the PWI that corresponds with a likelihood of zero has not been calculated since a response here is antithetical to the 'yes' response that led the respondent to this rating. The correlation between the PWI and likelihood is −.77 ($p < 0.01$).

As can be seen, those people with the lowest rating of likelihood (1/10) have a level of SWB that lies slightly above the normal range. Then, as the perceived likelihood increases, over the range from 2/10 to 8/10 the PWI remains within its normal range, varying by just 2.1 points. At a rating of 9/10, however, the PWI drops below the normal range. A total 15.7% of the people who say 'Yes' fall into these two extreme response categories.




**Fig. 11** Likelihood of a terrorist attack




**Fig. 12** Likelihood of terrorist attack × Personal Wellbeing Index (combined surveys 9–17)

This pattern of data is consistent with homeostasis. That is, the relationship between the PWI and perceived probability of an attack is clearly non-linear. Over the range of attack probability from 2/10 to 8/10 personal wellbeing is being effectively managed, so it does not reliably change and remains within the normal range. Thus, for most of the probability range, believing there is a probability of a terrorist attack has no measurable effect on wellbeing.

This exemplifies the false assumptions that can be drawn by the application of linear statistics to such data. That is, the conventional interpretation of such a strong −.77 correlation would be to assume that belief in a terrorist attack is inherently damaging to wellbeing. However, Fig. 12 shows this is not the case. Only the 15.7% who regard the probability as 9/10 or 10/10 have lower than normal wellbeing. Moreover, the direction of causation is uncertain. It is quite possible that normally highly anxious people regard the probability of bad events as high.

## Conclusions

The application of the Personal Wellbeing Index to the Australian population has produced some novel results. However, it is clear that much remains to be done in terms of understanding the forces that act to change the Index and its constituent domains.

In some ways Australia has been a good test-bed for this technology since the country has been so stable over the whole period of this data collection. Very little change has occurred at a national level. The Liberal (Conservative) Government has remained in power throughout, the economy has remained strong and stable, and no significant terrorist activities or disease pandemics have occurred. So, in the face of such constancy it may seem reasonable that some domains (health and achieving in life) have not reliably changed. On the other hand, some domains have shown quite substantial variation during this period and so causal factors must be at work.

What these causal factors might be remains generally speculative. Strong contenders appear to be changing levels of disposable income, national events both negative and positive, and concern for the environment. However, much work needs to be done in order to reliably predict the nature and the strength of factors that influence population wellbeing in this country.

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# The Material and Political Bases of Lived Poverty in Africa: Insights from the Afrobarometer

**Robert Mattes**

**Abstract** The Afrobarometer has developed an experiential measure of lived poverty (how frequently people go without basic necessities during the course of a year) that measures a portion of the central core of the concept of poverty not captured by existing objective or subjective measures. Empirically, the measure has strong individual level construct validity and reliability within any cross national round of surveys. Yet it also displays inconsistent levels of external validity as a measure of aggregate level poverty when compared to other objective, material measures of poverty or well being. Surprisingly, however, we find that lived poverty is very strongly related to country level measures of political freedom. This finding simultaneously supports Sen's (1999) arguments about development as freedom, corroborates Halperin et al's (2005) arguments about the "democracy advantage" in development, and increases our confidence that we are indeed measuring the experiential core of poverty.

## Introduction

The Afrobarometer's central concern has been to describe and explain Africans' understanding of and commitment to political and economic reform. Given the prominence of scholarly hypotheses about the central impact of poverty and destitution on the prospects of democratization and liberalization, it was vital that the Afrobarometer contained a valid, reliable and efficient measure of poverty with which to test these propositions. Thus, we developed the Lived Poverty Index (LPI) in order to produce an individual

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level measure of poverty that was both valid and reliable, but that could also be easily administered without extensive questioning about household income, assets, expenditure or access to services.

## The Afrobarometer

The Afrobarometer is a systematic, cross-national survey of public attitudes in sub-Saharan Africa. It is a scientific project dedicated to accurate and precise measurement of the attitudes of nationally representative samples of African populaces. Given its substantive focus on attitudes about democracy, markets and civil society, it is also a policy relevant project that attempts to insert results into national and global policy discussions through proactive dissemination and outreach. The project has been run as a network comprising three core partners (the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa), the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) and Michigan State University) and 18 African national research partners from universities, non-governmental organizations and private research firms.[1]

The Afrobarometer is conducted in "reforming" African countries: generally, multi-party regimes that have had a founding democratic election, or a re-democratizing election. Round 1 surveys were conducted in 12 countries between mid-1999 and mid-2001 in West Africa (Ghana, Mali, Nigeria), East Africa (Uganda and Tanzania) and Southern Africa (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe). Round 2 was done in 16 countries between mid 2002 and late 2003, repeating the original 12 (Zimbabwe could only be done in early 2004 due to political tensions) and adding Cape Verde, Kenya, Mozambique, and Senegal. Round 3 was conducted in 18 countries between February 2005 and February 2006, adding Madagascar and Benin (Appendix).

All Afrobarometer surveys are conducted through personal, face-to-face interviews of random, clustered, stratified and proportionate samples of citizens 18 years of age and older. Samples are drawn based on the most recent census data through a four stage process that randomly samples (1) census enumerator areas, (2) interviewer start points, (3) households, and (4) respondents. Sampling frames are constructed in the first stages from the most up-to-date census figures or projections available, and thereafter from census maps, systematic walk patterns, and project-generated lists of household members. The minimum sample size of 1,200 provides an average margin of sampling error of approximately $+/-3$ percentage points (2.8 points). Larger samples of at least 2,400 are regularly drawn in more diverse societies like South Africa and Nigeria in order to obtain more precise estimates of sub-national variations. Disproportionate sampling is sometimes used for the purposes of drawing over-samples amongst numerically small but politically important groups like Indian and Coloured respondents in South Africa, or the residents of Zanzibar in Tanzania. Because interviews are conducted in the language of the respondents' choice, the questionnaire is translated into all local languages covered by the drawn sample, interviewers are selected based on their fluency in local languages, and a strong emphasis is placed on interviewer training.

A caveat is in order about our ability to generalise. Not only is each country sample drawn independently, but many sub-Saharan countries are not represented. Thus, the findings reported here may not be able to be extended to large parts of Francophone Africa, to the continent's remaining authoritarian regimes, or to "fragile states" that are imploding through civil war. If I occasionally refer to "Africans" I have a more limited populace in mind.

## Poverty and Democracy

As suggested at the outset to this article, political scientists have widely regarded the prospects for successful political democratization and economic liberalization in Africa as remote, due principally to the impact of widespread poverty and destitution (Ake, 1996). In fact, one of the clearest findings of empirical political science is that the prospects of sustaining democratic government in a poor society are far lower than in a relatively wealthy one (Lipset, 1959; Bollen and Jackman, 1989; Przeworki et al, 2000). Precisely why poverty undermines democracy, however, has been much less clear.

Some scholars locate the linkage primarily at the macro level, arguing that poor societies constitute particularly infertile soil in which to consolidate democracy. They usually lack a sizable middle class, and may be less able to ameliorate clashes over resources by distributing wealth more widely and equitably (Huntington, 1991). The lack of modernization, particularly in terms of schools and news media, may also create insufficient cultural support for basic principles such as tolerance and self-expression (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). And poorer societies may also simply be less able to provide the resources necessary for effective political institutions, ranging from legislatures, to electoral administration commissions, to policy planning staff.

Others locate the problem at the micro level. Some scholars have argued that poor Africans focus on, and prioritize substantive policy outcomes, rather than decision-making procedures (Ake, 1996), or that they have unrealistic expectations of democracy (Johnson and Schlemmer, 1996). Poor people might also have less reason to care about, or more simply less time to devote to the types of activities that give life to democracy, such as voting, joining with others to voice their preferences to government, or contacting elected representatives themselves.

Still others have completely reversed the causal arrow, arguing that democracy and freedom breed development. Przeworki et al's (2000) major study of the linkages of development and democracy between 1950 and 1990 failed to find any difference between the subsequent development trajectories of democracies and autocracies. But by extending the scope of analysis to the end of the 1990s, and by using a more precise measure of democracy, Halperin et al (2005) have produced important evidence of a "democracy advantage" whereby democracies, at all levels of material wealth, are more likely to increase quality of life (e.g. growth, as well as better health, education and food production), and more democratic countries are better able to do so than less democratic countries.

## Measuring Lived Poverty

Economists usually measure poverty with data collected from national accounts (such as Gross Domestic Product), or through population surveys of whole societies (national censuses) or dedicated surveys of representative samples of households. The typical demographic or socio-economic household survey usually contacts a relatively large sample (often 10,000 or more) and interviews an informant who provides objective information about the economic conditions and behaviours of the household. They generally devote an extensive questionnaire to measuring household income, assets, expenditure and access to services. The range of subjects covered by such questionnaires has expanded gradually over the past two decades, in step with the burgeoning conceptualization of poverty, a process that has often been spurred by researchers working in developing country contexts dissatisfied with a narrow focus on money metric measures. Researchers have attempted to develop a more multi-faceted definition that includes many aspects of well-being and inequality that better reflects the lived experiences of people, especially the poor. The best expression of this trend can be seen in the definition used by the 1995 World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen.

> Poverty has various manifestations, including lack of income and productive resources sufficient to ensure sustainable livelihoods; hunger and malnutrition; ill health; limited or lack of access to education and other basic services; increased

> morbidity and mortality from illnesses; homelessness and inadequate housing; unsafe environments and social discrimination and exclusion. It is also characterised by a lack of participation in decision-making and in civil, social and cultural life . . . Absolute poverty is a condition characterised by severe deprivation of basic human needs, including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and information. It depends not only on income but also on access to services.

Accordingly, researchers have built various indices that add to, or substitute for income data by measuring aspects such as life expectancy, caloric intake, height and weight, formal education, literacy, employment, quality of housing, and access to services. Others have developed more subjective measures of exclusion and deprivation. Yet many of the things measured in the name of a broader, more multi-dimensional notion of poverty, are in fact, not poverty, but closely related antecedents or consequences of poverty (Mattes et al, 2002).

However, it is very difficult to accommodate either the broader or the narrower approaches to poverty measurement in a typical social science attitude survey. While there are, of course, many commonalities between the usual socio-economic and demographic household survey and an attitude survey like the Afrobarometer, there are also many important differences. Public opinion surveys usually contact a relatively small sample of households (generally between 1,200 and 2,400), interview a randomly selected member of a household, and focus on subjective preferences, beliefs and values. And because public opinion surveys devote most of their questionnaire space to measuring attitudes, it is not possible to devote the kind of time to measuring the extensive range of economic conditions and activities included in socio-economic surveys.

Thus the Afrobarometer needed to develop a measure of poverty that could be gathered from the sampled respondent (rather than generated from a household informant through a roster of items about household activities). Respecting the central tenet of modern economics, that people are the best judges of their own interest, we assumed that respondents were best placed to tell us about their quality of life, though they might not be able to provide the kind of precision economists desire. We also needed a measure that focussed efficiently and directly on the central, core aspect of poverty, namely the rate at which people actually go without the basic necessities of life. Thus we adopted and developed a small experiential battery of items first asked in the New Russia Barometer (Rose, 1998) that did exactly this.

The root of the Afrobarometer battery of questions reads: "Over the past year, how often, if ever have you or your family gone without _____?" The interviewer then repeats the question for each of the following basic necessities: "Enough food to eat?" "Enough clean water for home use?" "Medicines or medical treatment?" "Enough fuel to cook your food?" "A cash income?" And "School expenses for your children (like fees, uniforms or books)?" However, while people may be the best judges of their own well-being and quality of life, survey researchers need to avoid forcing respondents to report their recalled experiences at an inappropriately fine level of precision. Thus, rather than asking people to provide us some ratio level answer, such as the number of days out of 365, or the number of weeks out of 52, we simply provide an ordinal level response scale with the options: "Never," "Just Once or Twice," "Several Times," "Many Times," or "Always"?

The responses to these items in Round 3 surveys demonstrate that "Lived Poverty" is extensive across the 18 African countries surveyed between February 2005 and February 2006. In every country, the most commonly reported shortage (as measured by those who had gone without at least once) was a cash income. This aspect of poverty was followed by shortages of medical care, food, school expenses, clean water, and cooking fuel, in that order (Fig. 1). While the average (median) African went without a cash income "several times" over the previous year, the typical experience with food, medical treatment and school expenses (among those with children in the family) was to have experienced "just one or two" shortages. The average (median) African said she "never" went without clean water, or home cooking fuel.

However, these items also find substantial cross national variation across each basic necessity. For example, while three quarters of all respondents




**Fig. 1** Lived poverty across 18 African countries (2005–2006)




**Fig. 2** Lived poverty, 2005–2006 (cash income)

say they experienced at least one shortfall in cash income over the past year, the figure ranges from a low of one half (50 percent) of South Africans to virtually all (94 percent) Zimbabweans (Fig. 2).

## Validity and Reliability

Yet it is possible to elicit responses to a set of just about any survey items. The important question is whether the combined responses tap a common underlying concept that we can call "lived poverty." There are several different logical and empirical criteria for establishing this. First of all, we believe that the index has a high degree of *face validity* (or the extent to which an indicator measures the concept for which it is intended). If Amartya Sen (1999) is right and the value of one's standard of living lies in the living itself, an experiential measure of shortages of basic necessities of life takes us directly to the central core of what the concept of poverty is all about. We also believe that by tapping a range of necessities, our measure offers an acceptable level of *content validity* (the extent to which a measure taps the full breadth of a concept).

But beyond these logical criteria, there is impressive empirical evidence of the internal *construct validity* of our battery of items. Previous research established the validity and reliability of the scale in Round 1 surveys in seven (Mattes et al, 2002; Bratton and Mattes, 2003) and eleven countries

(Bratton et al, 2005), and Round 2 surveys in 15 countries (Bratton, 2006). Turning to the Round 3 data for 18 countries, factor analysis (which measures the extent to which the components of an index appear to tap a common underlying theoretical concept) extracts a single unrotated factor from the 25,359 responses to the five items that explains 53.5 percent of the common variance across all items.[2] Shortages in medical treatment most strongly define this factor (as expressed by the factor loadings, or the correlation between each variable and the extracted factor), and shortages of clean water the least. However, the range between the two is relatively small. Taken together, these results strongly suggest that all items tap a single underlying concept of "lived poverty," and that they tap a reasonably diverse spread of experiences within that concept. The responses also demonstrate a high degree of *reliability* or internal consistency. Cronbach's Alpha, which expresses the average inter-item correlation, is quite high at 0.78 (with 0.6 usually being the minimal cut off point in large surveys of diverse populations) (Table 1).

Not only are validity and reliability measures quite strong for the total 18 country sample in Round 3, they are very consistent *across all country samples* (Table 1). Factor analysis extracted a single, unrotated factor within each country sample, and the percentage of common variance explained by the extracted factor ranged from a low of 42.3 percent in Mozambique to a high of 64.5 percent in Nigeria. While the rank-ordering of the factor loadings shows more cross national variance, this simply demonstrates that lived poverty manifests itself in slightly different ways in differing national contexts.

Furthermore, the factor analysis and reliability analysis results appear quite stable *across rounds of surveys*. A factor analysis of these same items included in the Round 2 also extracted a single unrotated factor, with the exact same rank ordering in the factor loadings of each of the five items as in Round 3 (Table 2a). Because there were some differences in the content and wording of Round 1 questionnaires across countries, it is not possible to conduct a similar analysis of the five item scale. I thus recalculated a three item scale (water, food and medical treatment) that could be compared for 11 countries across the three rounds (Table 2b) as well as a 5 item scale that could be compared for seven countries across all three rounds (Table 2c). All scales produce a single unrotated factor, have relatively similar factor loadings of the various components, and have a sufficiently high level of reliability (with the possible exception of the three item scale in Round 1, which is due largely to the fact that some of the countries used differing numbers of response categories).

Based on this knowledge, we can then safely create a Lived Poverty Index (LPI) and calculate an index score for each individual and for each country

**Table 1** Validity and reliability of Lived Poverty Index (Afrobarometer Round 3 surveys, Circa, 2005)

| | Total | Ben | Bot | CV | Gha | Ken | Les | Mad | Mlw | Mal | Moz | Nam | Nig | Sen | SAfr | Tan | Uga | Zam | Zim |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eigenvalue | 2.67 | 2.25 | 2.53 | 3.02 | 2.70 | 2.75 | 2.30 | 2.25 | 2.25 | 2.18 | 2.11 | 2.98 | 3.22 | 2.90 | 3.12 | 2.17 | 2.74 | 2.76 | 2.39 |
| % Variance explained | 53.4 | 45.0 | 50.5 | 60.3 | 53.9 | 55.0 | 46.1 | 45.0 | 45.1 | 43.6 | 42.3 | 59.6 | 64.5 | 58.0 | 62.5 | 43.4 | 54.7 | 55.1 | 47.8 |
| Factor loadings | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Health care | 0.74 | 0.77 | 0.61 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.76 | 0.69 | 0.60 | 0.58 | 0.72 | 0.63 | 0.72 | 0.79 | 0.80 | 0.73 | 0.65 | 0.77 | 0.70 | 0.55 |
| Cash | 0.67 | 0.58 | 0.53 | 0.74 | 0.60 | 0.63 | 0.72 | 0.70 | 0.64 | 0.60 | 0.43 | 0.61 | 0.70 | 0.62 | 0.76 | 0.64 | 0.64 | 0.65 | 0.67 |
| Food | 0.66 | 0.65 | 0.61 | 0.60 | 0.59 | 0.68 | 0.60 | 0.65 | 0.55 | 0.56 | 0.47 | 0.70 | 0.71 | 0.71 | 0.71 | 0.54 | 0.69 | 0.74 | 0.79 |
| Fuel | 0.60 | 0.40 | 0.71 | 0.81 | 0.62 | 0.59 | 0.53 | 0.39 | 0.49 | 0.48 | 0.46 | 0.73 | 0.77 | 0.71 | 0.79 | 0.42 | 0.66 | 0.61 | 0.32 |
| Water | 0.57 | 0.36 | 0.63 | 0.65 | 0.70 | 0.65 | 0.27 | 0.42 | 0.54 | 0.33 | 0.64 | 0.77 | 0.75 | 0.62 | 0.65 | 0.45 | 0.54 | 0.61 | 0.585 |
| Reliability | 0.78 | 0.67 | 0.74 | 0.83 | 0.78 | 0.79 | 0.68 | 0.69 | 0.69 | 0.66 | 0.66 | 0.83 | 0.86 | 0.82 | 0.85 | 0.66 | 0.79 | 0.79 | 0.72 |
| N | 25,359 | 1,182 | 1,200 | 1,256 | 1,195 | 1,275 | 1,157 | 1,349 | 1,197 | 1,244 | 1,197 | 1,198 | 2,363 | 1,195 | 2,400 | 1,303 | 2,400 | 1,200 | 1,048 |

All tests extracted a single unrotated dimension Reliability measured with Cronbach's Alpha.

**Table 2** Over time validity and reliability of Lived Poverty Index. (a) Five item scale over time for 16 countries; (b) Three item scale over time for 11 countries; (c) Five item scale over time for seven countries

| | Round 1 | Round 2 | Round 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| (a) | | | |
| Eigenvalue | X | 2.43 | 2.73 |
| Variance explained | – | 48.7% | 54.6% |
| Factor loadings | | | |
| Health care | – | 0.714 | 0.738 |
| Cash income | – | 0.635 | 0.670 |
| Food | – | 0.631 | 0.664 |
| Home fuel | – | 0.514 | 0.619 |
| Water | – | 0.494 | 0.594 |
| Reliability | – | 0.73 | 0.79 |
| N | – | 23,787 | 22,828 |
| (b) | | | |
| Eigenvalue | 1.66 | 1.76 | 1.87 |
| % Variance explained | 55.2% | 58.8% | 62.5% |
| Factor loadings | | | |
| Health care | 0.631 | 0.790 | 0.750 |
| Food | 0.658 | 0.565 | 0.633 |
| Water | 0.438 | 0.511 | 0.604 |
| Reliability | 0.59 | | 0.698 |
| N | 19,067 | 15,224 | 15,510 |
| (c) | | | |
| Eigenvalue | 2.45 | 2.57 | 2.77 |
| % Variance explained | 49.1% | 51.4% | 55.5% |
| Factor loadings | | | |
| Cash income | 0.713 | 0.707 | 0.726 |
| Food | 0.667 | 0.733 | 0.708 |
| Health care | 0.612 | 0.665 | 0.700 |
| Water | 0.496 | 0.487 | 0.600 |
| Fuel | 0.515 | 0.525 | 0.593 |
| Reliability | 0.74 | 0.76 | 0.80 |
| N | 8,949 | 9,373 | 9,400 |

on a five point scale that runs from 0 (which can be thought of as no lived poverty) to 4 (which would be complete lived poverty, or constant absence of basic necessities). The mean level of Lived Poverty across all 18 countries is 1.3 with a substantial cross national variation around that mean that ranges from 1.96 in Zimbabwe to 0.82 in South Africa (Fig. 3).[3]

We have thus far shown that people who report shortages on one aspect tend to go without other aspects. But to what extent does the data produced by the LPI predict, or correlate with other widely used indicators of poverty or other theoretically associated concepts (what is referred to as "*criterion*




**Fig. 3** Average lived poverty, 2005–2006 (5 point scale, 5 dimensions)

*validity*")? Previous research demonstrates important linkages at both the micro- and macro-levels. At the micro level, respondents' levels of lived poverty decrease predictably with increasing levels of formal education, employment (Mattes et al, 2002; Bratton and Mattes, 2003) or income (Bratton, 2006). Respondents' subjective self-placement on a ladder of well-being also increases as their lived poverty decreases (Bratton, 2006).

Controlling for the simultaneous impact of other relevant variables, lived poverty shapes a range of political preferences. It increases respondent's sense of relative deprivation (Bratton and Mattes, 2003), and decreases their approval of government management of the economy (Bratton and Mattes, 2003), their support for private provision of development services (Bratton and Mattes, 2003), and their support for economic reform (Bratton and Mattes, 2003; Bratton et al, 2005). However, it has little impact on their policy priorities (Mattes et al, 2002), and no impact on whether they hold a procedural (e.g. free speech) or substantive understanding (e.g. a small income gap) of democracy (Mattes et al, 2002), or on their commitment to democratic reform (Bratton et al, 2005; Mattes and Bratton, 2007).

However, lived poverty has a range of less predictable consequences for democratic citizenship. Unsurprisingly, it decreases people's use of the news media (Mattes et al, 2002), but it has little impact on their interest in politics, sense of political efficacy or trust in other citizens (Mattes et al, 2002; Bratton, 2006). In fact, the poor are more likely to take part in community affairs, contact officials and informal leaders, and vote (Mattes et al, 2002; Bratton, 2006).

Across seven Round 1 Southern African countries, the poor are more likely to protest (Mattes et al, 2002), but there was no visible impact across all Round 1 surveys (Bratton et al, 2005). Country studies have found conflicting results reflecting differing national political circumstances. In South Africa, poverty is a strong indicator of participation in local community politics and protest (Mattes, 2008). In Zimbabwe, however, the poor are some of the least likely to take part in protest (Mpani, 2007).

At the macro level, previous studies have found very strong relationships across seven Southern African countries between national lived poverty and GDP Per Capita, but less so with other indicators such as the World Bank's estimate of the proportions of people living on less than $1 a day, the United Nation Development Programme's Human Development Index, infant mortality or under-5 mortality (Mattes et al, 2002). There are also strong relationships within South Africa between provincial levels of lived poverty and per capita monthly household income as well as a Household Circumstances Index (which combines three measures of household employment and composition) and a Household Infrastructure Index (which combines 8 measures of access to services) developed by Statistics South Africa (Mattes et al, 2002).

To examine this question with Round 3 data, I collected data on the Human Development Index (HDI), Gross National Product Per Capita (GDP), and World Bank estimates of the proportions of people living on less than US$1 a day for 2005. The results show that the association between national levels of lived poverty and HDI runs in the right direction (as national levels of lived poverty increase, human development decreases) but the macro-level correlation is very weak for 18 cases (Pearson's $r = -0.389$). And the empirical link between lived poverty and the World Bank's estimate of the proportion of people living on less than US1$ a day (and one of the two key indicators of Millennium Development Goal 1), is virtually non-existent ($r = 0.191$ for 15 countries: Lesotho, Cape Verde and Uganda have no recent data).

At the same time, we find a much stronger correlation between the LPI and GDP Per Capita ($r = -0.652^{**}$) (the association is slightly stronger using GDP Purchasing Power Parity ($-0.693^{***}$). Yet the association is not so strong as to conclude that they are measuring the same thing. While countries with greater levels of national wealth per capita have lower levels of lived poverty, the relationship is not linear. As we see in Fig. 4, lived poverty drops precipitously once a country moves over the $1,000 per capita level. Out of 14 countries with GDP Per Capita less than $1,000, only Ghana has a level of lived poverty comparable to the four wealthiest countries in the Afrobarometer (Cape Verde, Namibia, South Africa and Botswana).




**Fig. 4** Gross domestic product per capita and lived poverty, 2005

A final way to examine validity and reliability is to examine how the LPI functions over time, and whether temporal changes in lived poverty are associated with changes in other related indicators, such as national wealth? In the only existing research that has addressed this question, Johnson (2006) has found that the level democracy of ten countries in 1999–2000 was a strong predictor of subsequent changes in poverty, with higher levels of democracy predictive of poverty reduction.

In order to generate comparable results across the three Afrobarometer rounds of surveys, I restrict this analysis to only those 11 countries where at least three of the Lived Poverty items (food, medical treatment, cash income) were asked in each round (the Uganda questionnaire did not carry this scale in Round 1). Across these 11 countries, lived poverty increased significantly between Round 1 and Round 2 (0.68–0.73 on a three point scale running from 0 to 2), but leveled off between Round 2 and Round 3 (0.73–0.74) (Fig. 5).[4]

However, this masks important differences between countries. We witnessed sharp reductions in lived poverty between Round 1 (circa 2000) and Round 3 (circa 2005) in Lesotho (0.97–0.76, though the real drop occurred




**Fig. 5** Changes in lived poverty (2000–2005) (3 point scale, 3 dimensions: water, medical treatment, cash income)

only after 2003) and Namibia (0.81–0.63), less so in Zambia (0.99–0.90) and very slightly in South Africa (0.58–0.50) and Ghana (0.53–0.51) (Fig. 6). However, we observe sharp increases in lived poverty in Zimbabwe (0.90–1.21), Nigeria (0.59–0.74), Malawi (0.81–0.92) and Tanzania (0.71–0.81), and very slightly in Botswana (0.44–0.50) and Mali (0.61–0.63) (Fig. 7).




**Fig. 6** Decreasing lived poverty (2000–2005) (3 point scale, 3 dimensions: water, medical treatment, cash income)




**Fig. 7** Increasing lived poverty (2000–2005) (3 point scale, 3 dimensions: water, medical treatment, cash income)

The trends we have observed in lived poverty across 11 countries differ from recent conclusions drawn by the World Bank about sub-Saharan Africa, where they claim that strong growth has cut the estimated proportions who live in extreme poverty (living on less than 1$US a day) by 4.7 percentage points (from 45.8 to 41.1 percent) between 1999 and 2004 (World Bank, 2007). These differences could, of course, simply be a function of differing country samples. But there are also important variances within specific countries. While the specific country data does not appear to be publicly available, the World Bank (2006) claims that Cape Verde, Ghana, Mozambique, Senegal and Uganda have all "lifted significant percentages of their citizens above the poverty line" (2006: 1). Yet as seen above, the LPI shows significant decreases in lived poverty in Cape Verde (−0.11) and Ghana (−0.02), but registers increases in Mozambique (+0.14), Uganda (+0.09) and Senegal (+0.05) (Fig. 8).

In fact, while we have demonstrated a fairly substantial link between national wealth and lived poverty, there is virtually no association between changes in national wealth (or GDP growth) and changes in poverty. Across all 18 Afrobarometer countries, there does appear initially to be at least a weak case to be made that higher levels of growth (as measured by the average growth rate between 2000 and 2005) led to lower levels of lived poverty in 2005 ($r = -0.445$), and that this growth also produced poverty reduction (as measured by changes in the LPI score between Round 1 and Round 3 for 11 countries that had measures in all three rounds ($r = 0.439$). However, a visual inspection of the scatterplot suggests that this relationship was




**Fig. 8** Changes in lived poverty in 5 countries with reductions in percentage of people living on < \$1 a day (3 point scale, 3 dimensions: water, medical treatment, cash income)

driven completely by the combination of very high levels of negative growth and very high levels of poverty increases in Zimbabwe. Once Zimbabwe is removed from the calculation, the association between average growth and poverty in 2005 disappears ($r = 0.058$) and the relationship between growth and poverty reduction actually changes direction ($r = -0.593$). Among the 10 Afrobarometer countries that have LPI index scores for both Rounds 1 and 3, excluding Zimbabwe, GDP growth is actually accompanied by *increases* in lived poverty.[5] In fact, the four countries that enjoyed an average growth rate of over 5.5 percent during this period (Nigeria, Tanzania, Mali and Botswana) all experienced significant increases in lived poverty. Precisely why growth has not reduced poverty in these countries is a subject too broad to be addressed in this article (Fig. 9).

To sum up what we have found thus far, we have strong internal, micro-level support for the validity and reliability of the LPI. But the LPI exhibits only moderate external validity when compared with absolute measures of national wealth, and weak relationships with measures of human development or income poverty. Moreover, its overtime relationship with GDP growth stands in stark contrast to the typical economic consensus. Does this mean that the Afrobarometer LPI is not measuring poverty? Or does it mean that we are tapping crucial, experiential aspects of the "business end" of poverty often missed by other objective metric measures?

In order to reconcile this apparent paradox, I take another look at the external validity of the LPI from an altogether different perspective on




**Fig. 9** GDP growth (2000–2005) and changes in lived poverty (Round 1 to Round 3)

development and poverty which proceeds from the position developed by Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen (1999: 152–154) who emphasizes the crucial importance of freedom and democracy for development, especially through the freedom of choice. "[F]reedoms are not only the primary ends of development, they are also among its primary means" (1999: 10).

Given this logic, I ask whether lived poverty might be more a function of political freedom and democracy, rather than, or in addition to national material wealth. The first piece of evidence that this might be true can be seen in the fact that lived poverty has a significantly higher correlation with indicators of political freedom (as measured by the combined reversed Freedom House measures of political rights and political liberties) than with national wealth. For all 18 countries, a country's level of lived poverty in 2005 is very strongly, and negatively correlated with its level of political freedom in the same year ($r = -0.832^{***}$). Moreover, the link between freedom and lived poverty is independent of any simultaneous influence of wealth on both factors (Table 3).

A second piece of evidence can be found in the fact that while lived poverty has weak if not perverse linkages with GDP growth, it has moderately

**Table 3** The impact[1] of wealth vs. freedom on national lived poverty[2]

| | Pearson's r | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (Constant) | | 1.466*** | .769*** | .954*** |
| GDP Per Capita, 2005 | −.652** | −.652** | | −.353* |
| Freedom House combined score, 2005 | −.832*** | | −.832*** | −.676*** |
| Adj. $R^2$ | | .389 | .673 | .793 |
| N | | 18 | 18 | 18 |

[1] Standardized Regression Coefficients.

[2] The dependent variable is the Round 3 national mean Lived Poverty Index score (composed of reported shortages of health care, cash income, food, home fuel and water).

strong and predictable linkages with democratization. That is, current levels of national lived poverty across the 18 countries are clearly associated with past changes in political freedom: that is, the more a country expanded political liberties and political rights between 2003 and 2005, the lower its level of lived poverty in 2005 ($r = -625^{**}$). And amongst the 11 countries that have lived poverty scores for both Rounds 1 and 3, I find that the more a country democratized between 1999 and 2005, the more it reduced its levels of poverty over the same time period ($r = -0.710^{*}$) (Fig. 10). Moreover, democratization is a better explanation of poverty reduction than GDP growth (Table 4).

A fourth and final piece of evidence of the political bases of lived poverty can be found at the micro-level. Using Round 3 data, I regressed a range of individual level variables on respondents' LPI scores. The variables measure the level of wealth of the country in which they reside (GDP Per Capita) as

**Table 4** The impact[1] of growth vs. democratization on changes in national lived poverty[2]

| | Pearson's r | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (Constant) | | 0.091 | 0.049 | 0.071 |
| GDP growth, 2000–2005 | −0.439 | −0.439 | | −0.148 |
| Democratization, 1999–2005 | −0.710** | | −0.710* | −0.644* |
| Adj. $R^2$ | | 0.103 | 0.450 | 0.402 |
| N | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 |

[1] Standardized Regression Coefficients.

[2] The dependent variable is the difference between the Round 1 and Round 3 national mean Lived Poverty Index score (composed of reported shortages of health care, food, and water).




**Fig. 10** Democratization (1999–2005) and changes in lived poverty (Round 1 to Round 3)

well as the level of political freedom (the Freedom House combined political rights and political liberties score). But I also compare the impact of these national effects to that of a series of contextual, local level measures observed by Afrobarometer fieldworkers and field supervisors in the primary sampling unit in which the interview was conducted. When factor analyzed these breakdown into three separate measures of the extent of local development infrastructure (whether or not there is an electricity, piped water and sewage grid), state infrastructure (whether or not there is a post office, police station and health clinics) and community infrastructure (whether or not there are schools, market stalls, and buildings or facilities for community meetings, religious worship and recreation). Finally, I test the relative impact of a series of individual level characteristics captured by the Afrobarometer, namely the respondent's level of formal education, age, gender, employment status, occupational class, and whether or not they live in a rural or urban area.

As theoretically guided blocks of variables (Models 1 thru 4 in Table 5), the density of development, community and state infrastructure and the collection of individual level characteristics account for the greatest proportion

**Table 5** Personal lived poverty: explanatory factors compared[1],[2]

| | Pearson's r | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Constant | | 1.344*** | 1.548*** | 1.556*** | 1.905*** | 2.430 |
| National wealth | −0.080*** | −0.080*** | | | | 0.079*** |
| Development infrastructure | −0.130*** | | −0.297*** | | | −0.153*** |
| State infrastructure | −0.299*** | | −0.030*** | | | −0.005 |
| Community infrastructure | −0.069*** | | 0.034*** | | | 0.019* |
| Formal education | −0.268*** | | | −0.194*** | | −0.219*** |
| Rural | 0.244*** | | | 0.166*** | | 0.055*** |
| Female | 0.010 | | | −0.027*** | | −0.022*** |
| Age | 0.066*** | | | −0.005 | | 0.021*** |
| Employment | −0.149*** | | | −0.092*** | | −0.076*** |
| Under class | −0.031*** | | | −0.041*** | | −0.015* |
| Working class | −0.070*** | | | −0.032*** | | 0.002 |
| Middle class | −0.110*** | | | −0.026*** | | −0.013* |
| Political freedom | −0.206*** | | | | −0.206*** | −0.245*** |
| Adj. $R^2$ | | 0.006 | 0.091 | 0.111 | 0.043 | 0.175 |
| N | | 25,359 | 25,344 | 25,051 | 25,359 | 25,036 |

[1] Standardized Regression Coefficients.

[2] The dependent variable is the Round 3 Lived Poverty Index score (composed of reported shortages of health care, cash income, food, home fuel and water).

of variance in respondents' LPI scores (9 percent and 11 percent respectively). Political freedom accounts for 5 percent and national wealth accounts for just 1 percent. Altogether, these variables can account for 18 percent of the variance in respondents' levels of lived poverty. And once the simultaneous impact of all other variables is taken into account (in Model 5 in Table 5), the national context of political freedom has the single strongest impact on a respondent's level of lived poverty (Beta, the standardized regression coefficient = $-0.245^{***}$), outpacing the respondent's level of formal education ($-0.219^{***}$) and the level of development infrastructure (sewage, water and electricity grids) in the immediate locality ($-0.153^{***}$).

## Conclusion

The cost of large scale demographic or socio-economic household surveys of income, expenditure, infrastructure and life circumstances means that they are undertaken relatively infrequently in developing countries. In contrast, because the Afrobarometer's Lived Poverty Index takes up relatively little questionnaire space, it can be used more frequently on a range of different types of surveys with relatively smaller samples. This would enable policy makers to track national and sub-national trends in the overall extent of lived poverty or of its subcomponents such as hunger with confidence. The LPI has strong cross-sectional individual level construct validity and reliability within any national sample, as well as cross-national validity and reliability across country samples. Moreover, it displays strong overtime internal integrity across rounds of surveys. Yet it also displays inconsistent levels of external validity as a measure of aggregate level poverty when compared to other objective, materialist measures of poverty such as national wealth, income poverty, or human development. However, its external validity is quite strong if poverty is viewed as much a function of political freedom as material wealth. Lived poverty is very strongly related to country level measures of political freedom, and changes in poverty are related to changes in freedom.

This finding supports Sen's (1999) arguments about the crucial importance of freedom for development as freedom. Yet using different measures of both development and democracy, it also corroborates Halperin et al's (2005) findings about a "democracy advantage" for well being and prosperity. Finally, it also increases our confidence that we are indeed measuring the experiential core of poverty, and capturing it in a way that other widely used international development indicators do not.

# Appendix Afrobarometer Surveys, 1999–2006

| | Round 1 | | Round 2 | | Round 3 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Fieldwork dates | Sample size | Fieldwork dates | Sample size | Fieldwork dates | Sample size |
| Botswana | November–December 1999 | 1,200 | July–August 2003 | 1,200 | May–June 2005 | 1,200 |
| Ghana | July–August 1999 | 2,004 | August–September 2002 | 1,200 | March 2005 | 1,197 |
| Lesotho | April–June 2000 | 1,177 | February–April 2003 | 1,200 | July–August 2005 | 1,161 |
| Malawi | November–December 1999 | 1,208 | April–May 2003 | 1,200 | June–July 2005 | 1,200 |
| Mali | January–February 2001 | 2,089 | October–November 2002 | 1,283 | June–July 2005 | 1,244 |
| Namibia | September–October 1999 | 1,183 | August–September 2003 | 1,200 | February–March 2006 | 1,200 |
| Nigeria | January–February 2000 | 3,603 | September–October 2003 | 2,400 | August–December 2005 | 2,363 |
| SouthAfrica | July–August 2000 | 2,200 | September–October 2002 | 2,400 | February 2006 | 2,400 |
| Uganda | May–June 2000 | 2,271 | August–September 2002 | 2,400 | April–May 2005 | 2,400 |
| Tanzania | March–May 2000 | 2,198 | July–August 2003 | 1,200 | July–August 2005 | 1,304 |
| Zambia | October–November 1999 | 1,198 | June–July 2003 | 1,200 | July–August 2005 | 1,200 |

Appendix (continued)

| | Round 1 | | Round 2 | | Round 3 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Fieldwork dates | Sample size | Fieldwork dates | Sample size | Fieldwork dates | Sample size |
| Zimbabwe | September–October 1999 | 1,200 | April–May 2004 | 1,200 | October 2005 | 1,048 |
| Cabo Verde | | | May–June 2002 | 1,268 | March-April 2005 | 1,256 |
| Mozambique | | | August–October 2002 | 1,400 | June 2005 | 1,198 |
| Kenya | | | August–September 2003 | 2,400 | September 2005 | 1,278 |
| Senegal | | | November–December 2002 | 1,200 | September–October 2005 | 1,200 |
| Madagascar | | | | | May–June 2005 | 1,350 |
| Benin | | | | | April–May 2005 | 1,198 |

## Notes

1. The first three rounds of research, analysis and dissemination have been supported by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, United States Agency for International Development, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, World Bank, United Kingdom Department for International Development, Danish Governance Trust Fund at the World Bank, Royal Dutch Embassy in Namibia, Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, Trocaire Regional Office for Eastern Africa, Michigan State University, African Development Bank, U.S. National Science Foundation and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
2. The item on school expenses was excluded since 18 percent of all respondents could not answer because they either had no children or there were none in the family.
3. National differences account for 0.095 percent of the variance in Lived Poverty (Eta = 308).
4. The difference between the Round 1 and Round 2 11 country mean index score is far larger than the twice the standard error of either mean. However, the 95 percent confidence intervals of the Round 2 and Round 3 mean scores overlap.
5. This finding also holds when we measure poverty reduction only between Round 2 and Round 3 for 14 countries ($r = -0.505$).

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# The AsiaBarometer: Its Aim, Its Scope and Its Development

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**Abstract** The AsiaBarometer is the public opinion survey project for Asia with the focus on the daily lives of ordinary people. From its commencement in 2002 to date, the AsiaBarometer project has conducted four consecutive annual surveys encompassing 27 countries and two areas of Asia. It intends to raise the standards of empirical research in social sciences in Asia to the levels comparable to those in the United States and Western countries. The growing literature based on the AsiaBarometer survey data and research outcomes indicates that the AsiaBarometer has been achieving its original goals. It has been successful in building solid empirical multi-country data bases in Asia for deeper and sharper analyses of Asia's developmental, democratizing and regionalizing potentials.

**Keywords** Daily lives of ordinary people · AsiaBarometer · bottom-up perspective · regional opinion survey · cross-national analysis

## Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to introduce the AsiaBarometer project headed by Takashi Inoguchi at Chuo University in Japan, focusing on its developments and achievements from its commencement in 2002 up to May, 2007. The AsiaBarometer is a regional opinion survey project regularly conducted in a broader East Asia encompassing East, Southeast, South and Central Asia with a focus on the daily lives of ordinary people.[1] It was launched in 2002 in the article by Takashi Inoguchi (2002) in the monthly magazine *Chuo Koron* (Central Review). Different from other regional opinion surveys in

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Asia that originated from the Third Wave democratization of the last quarter of the last century in such countries as the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan, the most pronounced feature of the AsiaBarometer Survey is that the AsiaBarometer originates from the genuinely academic interests in the daily lives, views, and sentiments of ordinary people in Asia. Their values, life styles, and the physical, psychological, and sociological aspects of their life are highlighted throughout. This project is the direct and extended successor to the Asia-Europe Survey also headed by Takashi Inoguchi conducted in 2000 which covered nine East and Southeast Asian countries and nine European countries (Blondel and Inoguchi, 2006; Inoguchi and Blondel, 2008). On the basis of the predecessor's success, experience and knowledge, the shift in focus is from norms and values in the Eurasian Continent to the daily lives of ordinary people in Asia.

In this essay we discuss the aim and scope of the AsiaBarometer in the next section, focusing on both business and academic benefits. Section "Principles" goes over eight principles for formulating the questionnaire and analyzing the survey data. Section "Questionnaire" classifies the questionnaire of the AsiaBarometer 2006 Survey. The core modules include living conditions, patterns of daily and economic life, value priorities, subjective quality of life, quality of society, identities, political consciousness, views on social issues and demographics. It is one of the few surveys to regularly ask a variety of questions on aspects of quality of life or a related basis. After a brief explanation of the sampling methodology, Section "Achievement and Development" discusses the achievement and development of the project since inception, focusing on the literature using the AsiaBarometer survey results and data. The literature is classified along with above categories. Section "Conclusion" will conclude. The list of the literature about the AsiaBarometer is in Section "Bibliography".

## Aim and Scope

The first AsiaBarometer Survey was conducted in summer 2003 in ten Asian societies. So far, five annual surveys were conducted in every consecutive year. Appendix 1 shows the countries with the years when the survey was conducted. In other words, after the 2003 survey covered ten countries of Asia, the 2004 survey focused attention on thirteen countries of East and Southeast Asia, that is ASEAN Plus Three. The 2005 survey included seven South Asian countries and seven Central Asian countries. The 2006 survey covered seven East Asian societies, and the 2007 survey covers six Southeast Asian countries. To our knowledge, it was the first time in survey history that an opinion survey was conducted in Turkmenistan and Bhutan in 2005 (Inoguchi, 2007c).

The AsiaBarometer is the largest and the most comprehensive survey project ever as far as the region of Asia is concerned, in which data accumulation and service have long remained until recently improved. It fills a void of empirical social science and cross-national survey data in this demographically vast, developmentally dynamic, technologically increasingly proficient, and politically steadily democratizing region. Because of the wealth and ready availability of a large pool of academic research data, there has been an overwhelming tendency to use data originating from Western countries. The AsiaBarometer intends to correct this gap. This would be the first way in which the AsiaBarometer could contribute to scholarship. The AsiaBarometer makes the survey data accessible to researchers all around the world. The survey data is available through the AsiaBarometer website (https://www.asiabarometer.org) and through the data archives such as Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) in the University of Michigan and the Social Science Japan Data Archive in the Institute of Social Science of the University of Tokyo.[2] It is also our policy to bring out (1) the questionnaire, field reports, other basic information and selective tables and figures and (2) country profile analyses and (3) thematic cross-national analyses in one annual volume in English.

As a result, a vast range of Asian social phenomena would become objects of comparative research. Such research up to now has focused on Western countries because of the ready availability of a large pool of data which is necessary for empirical research in the social sciences. In addition, an increase in scholarly research based on a shared awareness of issues would result in a fuller body of scientific knowledge. It is comparative surveys with each Asian country that are likely to produce propositions that can be generalized across the entire region of Asia.

During the process of doing such research, scholars from each country could cooperate and interact with each other. The connection among scholars and research organizations would be strengthened, which in turn contributes to an improvement of Asian study and a development of the academic community of Asia. Moreover, since research outcomes obtained from local studies should ideally be returned to and shared by the local citizens, cooperative schemes built at each local area could be used to improve the skills and abilities of the scholars.

Not only could the Asiabarometer raise the standards of social scientific research in Asia to levels comparable to those in the United States and Western Europe, but it would also make some contributions to indirectly helping to bring about economic prosperity and regional stability in Asia (Inoguchi, 2004d). A regional survey of public opinion would benefit businesses. Like other opinion polls, the AsiaBarometer Survey gathers information such as socioeconomic backgrounds and demographic characteristics along with people's values and norms about their society, politics, science and technology, gender and international affairs. Knowing better under certain circumstances develops trust and social capital, which in turn becomes a foundation of wealth accumulation (Fukuyama, 1992). Companies can assemble basic data on income levels, consumer preferences, and life styles with which to formulate strategies for product development, manufacturing, and marketing and to identify the scale and location of target markets. Such an informational infrastructure would surely be a boon to business companies in East and Southeast Asia, many of which have been frustrated by the sluggish domestic economy and yet remain stuck in it because they do not have a good grasp of markets elsewhere in Asia.

A region-wide social survey is necessary and desirable in Asia – East, Southeast, South and Central Asia in that, in an era of globalization, a national economy is too small for dynamic and forward-looking business firms. They must become truly global and monitor the global market. That is why they spend an enormous amount of money on deciphering and predicting coming market trends one step ahead of the rest. Integration of the financial market has gone very far on a global scale. Money flies rapidly around the globe, scrambling into the space where profits are regarded as a great possibility in the near future and receding from the space where profits are least likely to be generated. A space must be created which is both competitive in quality and massive in quantity. One of the ways to create such as space is a regional free trade agreement. To constitute a component of such a competitive and massive economic space is positive, because that attracts money from all over the world. That is why regional free trade agreements flourish and deepen in many regions of the world. To facilitate and accelerate the generation of such a regional space, one must become truly regional continuously monitoring regional market and non-market forces. Such monitoring exercises must include the monitoring of the hearts and minds of people on the street. Not only economic and financial but also social, psychological and political forces unfolding in each country must be grasped systematically on a regional scale. When Asia has been on the road of dynamic economic expansion, a regional survey grasps its complex and dynamic realities at the grassroots level systematically in the form of data generated through survey research. To carry it out, its institutionalization is a prerequisite to any next step of regional economic cooperation, coordination and further integration.

In addition to economic prosperity, the knowledge obtained from such a survey would also serve as the foundation for greater regional stability. A shared perception about how the world is changing would facilitate adaptation to such changes, which could minimize social upheaval and disintegration. A common perception could also gradually generate a sense of Asian identity, promoting sentiments of belonging and of attachment to the region. In addition, regularly gathered survey results serve as a disarming instrument because they help eliminate the suspicions that states are liable to hold about other countries. In order for global governance to function properly, there must be healthy arrangements for the disclosure of information. The AsiaBarometer Survey would be a tool for gathering and disclosing information on key topics such as the extent to which the rule of law is working to prevent crime and corruption and the objectives and policies according to which business, governments, and other socially significant organizations are operating (Inoguchi, 2004d).

The prospect for the AsiaBarometer Survey is bright. First, because it enlightens us. We should be able to know more about ourselves. The AsiaBarometer survey helps us immensely by collecting data on the daily lives of ordinary people, by analyzing them and by making data and research products available to those interested the world over. Second, the AsiaBarometer survey benefits its users – academics, business leaders, political leaders and journalists. In other words, those who benefit are not only users but also supporters of the AsiaBarometer survey (Inoguchi, 2004d).

## Principles

The principles of the AsiaBarometer are expressed in eight precepts: (1) minimize obtrusiveness in asking questions; (2) try to be as clear and concrete as possible in formulating questions; (3) be culturally and linguistically sensitive; (4) analyze data from the bottom up rather than top down; (5) analyze data on the basis of knowledge of the environments surrounding respondents; (6) formulate a questionnaire with maximum input from local experts; (7) analyze survey data jointly with local experts; and (8) seek truth with optimism and an open mind.

(1) Unobtrusivess – Survey research is inherently obtrusive. It attempts to penetrate the minds of people. It sometimes asks questions that many people do not like to be asked. Minimizing obtrusiveness should be a fundamental principle when doing cross-cultural survey research in such a diverse region as Asia where there is diversity both within and across nations.

(2) Clarity and Concreteness – Social scientists tend to use jargon when discussing abstract and often vague concepts. This vocabulary should be used minimally. We must reach out to the minds of people. Therefore, we must be utterly plain and clear. One of the inherent difficulties of cross-national survey research is that in an effort to ask the same questions in as many nations as possible, some questions violate this principle. This is particularly true of a number of questions that originate from America and Europe and that are asked in widely diversified regions.

(3) Cultural and Linguistic Sensitivity – In North America and Western Europe as well as in the Indo-European-language-speaking areas, this is not so much a problem as it is in Asia. Nor is it a critically difficult problem in Latin America and Africa thanks in part to the influence of colonial heritage. In Asia it is. We must appreciate this cultural and linguistic distinction. Out of the five largest religions, Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam have the largest number of believers – all of them in Asia. Linguistic diversity is immense, sometimes even in one nation. The problem is aggravated at times by the peculiarities of the English language. For instance, English allows the use of the double negative to express subtle nuances to discerning users. The following question is a very good example:

> "Generally, do you think people can be trusted or do you think that one cannot be too careful about dealing with other people (that it pays to be wary of people)?"

– Most people can be trusted
– One can't be too careful in dealing with people

(4) From the Bottom Up – One of the problems with mainstream American positivistic social science is that it tends to analyze from the top down. This means that with a fairly abstract general hypothesis, it tends to avoid what it regards as specific parochial realities. On this issue, given the expected and real diversities and peculiarities in Asia, we would do best to emphasize the from-the-bottom-up approach. Instead of focusing the whole effort of hypothesis-testing on cross-cultural generalization, we must pay attention to individual response patterns as if this were a case study. Even if we do not reach the bottom of the individual level data, it should be emphasized here that it is essential to obtain a good country profile based on the survey data that the AsiaBarometer produces regularly.

(5) Attention to the Organic Whole – One can argue that the myth of the organic whole has forever disappeared with the advent of globalization. Globalization has been deepening its penetration. It has been

fragmenting the largely nationally demarcated organic whole while linking fragmented parts together globally and regionally so that deeper global and regional integration might emerge. Globalization does not necessarily wipe out the organic whole completely. Attention to reconfigured organic wholes in various places is most important to better understand the beliefs, values and practices that people hold onto amid the turmoil of fast and rapid moving globalization.

(6) Formulation of the Questionnaire with the Support of Local Experts – The participation of local experts from each country is very important, for they can help to fine-tune questions that recognize local realities. Such exercises are carried out during annual workshops. Not only are country profile and cross-cultural analyses placed on the table each year, but also the questionnaire is meticulously revised as we eye the AsiaBarometer the following year. The thrust of a question may not be fully or accurately translated into local languages until culturally and linguistically proficient experts make significant inputs in this process.

(7) Data Analysis Conversations and Discussions with Local Experts – Hints and hunches often come from conversations and discussions with local experts. More operationally, outliers, or odd cases, must be examined with the help of local academics who know the local scene. The AsiaBarometer workshop is held each year so that both local experts and cross-national generalized proposition testers may confront each other in order to generate more contextually-related and sounder knowledge in designing the research project, in forming and revising the questionnaire, and in analyzing data and discussing the research outcomes. The AsiaBarometer project seeks the most active participation of local experts from each country.

(8) Seek Truth with Optimism and an Open Mind – When the idea of the AsiaBarometer was launched, many friends of Inoguchi gently opposed the project by stating that some Asian countries would not allow such surveys to be executed: Myanmar, Uzbekistan, Vietnam and China, to name but a few. The project was carried out regardless of this opposition. The 2003 survey volume has since received acclaim from world-renowned scholars like Professor Ronald Inglehart, Professor Lucian W. Pye and Professor Jean Blondel, foremost experts on cross-cultural survey research, comparative political cultures in Asia, and comparative political institutions respectively. The 2004 annual volume has received similar acclaim from Professor Peter Katzenstein, Professor Hans-Dieter Klingman, Professor Russell Dalton, Professor Doh Cull Shin, foremost experts on international studies, comparative politics, political behavior, and democratization respectively. It is very important

to be optimistic and open-minded when you launch an original idea and an innovative scheme. It is indeed the case with the AsiaBarometer. Pessimism, parochialism and protectionism of all kinds must be curtailed.

## Questionnaire

Questions in the survey are focused on "Daily lives of ordinary people in Asia." In order to carry out any comparative and cross-national analysis in Asia, the questions must be able to be answered in the first place. Things like economic conditions, political institutions and public policy do not constitute the core of their life for ordinary people. Matters of daily life are more important and easier to answer than those secondary questions. Asia is the region of fast changing diversity. There is no other region in the world that is more diverse and fast changing (Inoguchi, 2004d). Building on the daily lives of ordinary people brings the perception and assessment of their concerns and relations to the larger social entities such as patriotism and confidence in government performance (Inoguchi, 2003).

The questionnaire has nine clusters: (1) *Living conditions*, (2) *Patterns of daily and economic life*, (3) *Value priorities*, (4) *Subjective quality of life*, (5) *Quality of society*, (6) *Identities*, (7) *Political consciousness*, (8) *Views on social issues*, and (9) *Demographics*. These questions require roughly 45–60 minutes for response and constitute the common core of the questionnaire. They do not vary very much across years or countries surveyed. Each year some questions are dropped whereas others are brought in. The common core questions are all in English. Some 37 local languages in total are used in interviews. The comparability of the questionnaires is assured although those numbers attached to questions sometimes differ from year to year.

In the following we attempt to classify questions according to the above clusters using the questionnaire of the 2006 survey. See Appendix 2 for the actual phrasing of the question.

(1) *Living conditions*: This category consists of the questions about public utilities the respondents' households have (Q1), the level of their living standard (Q8) and the types of residence the respondents reside in (Q42). The questions about family members also belong to this category (Q43 and F7).
(2) *Patterns of daily and economic life*: The questions in this category are about how frequently the respondents use the Internet and mobile phones (Q2), view Internet web pages (Q2-1), read or write e-mails on computers (Q2-2), and read or write messages on mobile phones (Q2-3). Question 3 asks how internationally the respondents lead their lives.

Another question classified in this category is about one's source of income in case the main breadwinner becomes unable to work (Q16). Another question asks how often the respondents pray or meditate (Q23). Question 35 asks the respondents about what kind of media influences the way they form their opinions about social and political issues. Question 40 asks for the eating patterns of breakfast and evening meals, and Question 41 asks for favorite foods of the respondents.

(3) *Value priorities*: Question 9 asks about the types of resources and activities the respondents value highly. Question 10 asks what the respondents wish their children to be in the future. Question 15 asks which the respondents value more, fairness or kinship. Question 27 asks the respondents to rate the importance of some kinds of inequality, and Question 28 asks them to rate various benefits of education. Question 32 asks about government spending policy in several areas. Question 44 asks the respondents about the qualities and virtues that children learn at home. Question 45 asks the respondents to rate the importance of some social issues.

(4) *Subjective quality of life*: The questions that fall in this category ask the extent to which the respondents experience feelings of happiness (Q4), enjoyment (Q5) and achievement (Q6) and ask the extent to which the respondents feel satisfied or dissatisfied with specific aspects of life (Q7).

(5) *Quality of society*: The kinds of question which belong to this category are about sense of trust in general (Q11, Q12) and sense of community (Q13). Question 14 asks whether the respondents would adopt a child in order to continue their family line. Another question which falls in this category is about how strongly respondents trust several institutions such as the central and local governments, the legal system, the political party, NGOs, the World Trade Organisation and the United Nations (Q29). Question 37 asks about the action the respondents take to speed up a government permission.

(6) *Identities*: The questions belonging to this category ask about the national identity of the respondents (Q17), – how proud they are of their nationality (Q18), and whether they feel they belong to a transnational group such as Asia (Q19). Question 20 asks the respondents whether they can recite the national anthem by heart. Question 21 is about the identity of social circles or groups such as political parties and religions. A further question asks to which particular religion the respondents belong to (F9).

(7) *Political consciousness*: A question which falls in this category asks about the respondents' perceptions regarding the influence of some

foreign countries on their own country (Q26). Question 30 asks whether the respondents think a particular policy such as peacekeeping should be decided by domestic governments, by regional organizations such as ASEAN or by the United Nations. Another question in this category asks the respondents about how well they think the national government is dealing with particular issues such as corruption, crime, the economy and the environment (Q31). Question 33 and 34 ask about the voting behavior and the political attitude of the respondents, respectively. Question 38 asks about the types of political system the respondents prefer. Question 39 is about the extent to which the respondents feel satisfied or dissatisfied with several rights. Question 47 asks about some political actions and asks whether the respondents would take them.

(8) *Views on social issues*: A question in this category asks about gender inequality (Q22). Another question (Q24) asks about the involvement of a religious institution or a religious profession in particular social events. Question 25 asks whether the respondents worry about various issues such as terrorism, crime and economic recession. Question 36 is about normative aspects of economic policy. Question 46 asks how the respondents think about the development of technology and the respect for traditional authority. Question 48 asks whether the respondents think many things happen for no particular reason at all or whether everything happens for a reason. Question 49 asks whether the respondents believe in an unseen spiritual world that can influence events in the world. Question 50 is about corruption, homosexuality and abortion.

(9) *Demographics*: The questions in this category are about the demographic profile of the respondents such as gender (F1), age (F2), educational attainment (F3), English fluency (F4), marital status (F5), occupation (F6), and household income (F8).

## Sampling Methodology

Speaking of the sampling methodology, the AsiaBarometer survey primarily employs the multistage stratified random sampling technique. The sample sizes are approximately 800 until the 2005 survey but 1,000 after the 2006 survey. The 2008 survey is planning to cover six major countries of, and adjacent to, Asia with a sample size of 1,000, i.e., Japan, China, India, the United States, the Russia Federation, and Australia. The sample size for China is 1,000 in 2004 and 2,000 in 2006. In 2005, the sample sizes of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan were over 1,000. Targeted population was all adults aged 20–59 in 2003 and 2004 and all adults aged 20–69 in 2005 and 2006. An exception is in Bangladesh where all aged from 20 to 59 in 2005 are covered. The survey method is the face-to-face interview except in Japan where the placement method was used in 2003. If interested in the sampling methodology of the AsiaBarometer, the reader is strongly recommended to refer to the field reports in the AsiaBarometer annual survey volumes or the website: https://www.asiabarometer.org/for more details.

The surveys are headquartered in Japan and operated by Japanese research companies, Nippon Research Center in 2003, 2006 and 2007 and Shin Joho Center in 2004 and 2005. Then the surveys are commissioned to the domestic research companies in each country, which know more about local languages, culture, custom, tradition and other circumstances in conducting opinion polls.[3] These domestic companies put in tremendous efforts to obtain randomness of sampling and mainly apply multistage (two-stage or more) stratified random sampling. This method can minimize the costs of survey and sampling errors compared to other methods. The method is typically carried out as follows:[4] In stage 1, all municipalities are stratified into several categories based on the size of population. Then, the primary sampling units are allocated proportionate to the population sizes of each category. In stage 2, within each category, the sampling units are randomly chosen with probabilities proportionate to size. In stage 3, a certain number of individuals are systematically chosen. For example, every tenth individual is selected from the resident registration ledger. In stage 4, when such a resident registration ledger is not available, quota sampling is applied. In this method, households are systematically selected, for example, every fifth house is chosen. After that, individuals are randomly or systematically chosen. For example, among the family members, the interviewee is picked up randomly using the Kish Grid or selected systematically using the birthday method in which the person whose birthday comes first after the day of the interview is chosen. The individuals' traits such as gender and age are controlled according to the demographics of the population.

However, some exceptions are inevitable due to limited information, political, time and budget constraints, developing academic research infrastructure and other conditions in some countries. In order to follow the procedure of the multistage stratified random sampling, census information on the population is necessary, but the information may sometimes be unavailable. Alternatively, in China in 2003, eight metropolises – Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chongqing, Xian, Nanjing, Dalian and Qingtao – were chosen in the first stage without stratification. In South Korea, seven metropolitan cities and five provinces were chosen out of sixteen administrative districts. Similarly, a certain number of major municipalities were chosen in the first stage in India, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Myanmar and Sri Lanka in the 2003 survey. In the 2004 survey in China the survey was conducted in the same way. In Vietnam in 2004 only urban samples were used. This is because the TNS Vietnam applied simple multistage random sampling without stratification, and so the sample drawn may have consisted only of urban or rural areas, although the sampling is random. The same argument holds for Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos where the same company conducted the survey and Malaysia and Brunei where the TNS Malaysia used the same method.

Looking at the 2005 survey, the TNS India conducted the survey only in the capital Thimphu in Bhutan and the capital Kathmandu in Nepal. The TNS Lanka selected 20 districts out of 25 based on statistics and the availability of the urban population. Seven main cities of Uzbekistan were chosen by the RAI Consultants Services Ltd. The capital Male was only surveyed in the Maldives.

As to the 2006 survey, all areas in each country were covered except Korea and Taiwan with only minor exceptions and Vietnam. The sample is thus generally nationwide. The multistage stratified random sampling method was applied in all the countries surveyed except Vietnam.

## Achievement and Development

The AsiaBarometer has published research products primarily in academic books and journals in English. It also intends to produce books, articles and TV programs in such Asian languages as Russian (Kazakhstan), Sinhalese (Sri Lanka), Korean, Chinese and Malaysian as well as Japanese. Its first major academic product came out early in 2005. It contains not only country profiles and cross-cultural analyses using the 2003 AsiaBarometer survey data but also tabulated data tables and figures, field report and coding schemes and the raw individual data of all the respondents plus all the English and local language questionnaires contained in CD-ROM.

The idea of publishing the annual survey volume was first suggested in 2003 by Professor Ronald Inglehart of the University of Michigan in Nishinomiya, Japan, where Professor Kazufumi Manabe of Kwansei Gakuin University was leading a symposium on cross-national survey research methodology at that time. Inoguchi gladly picked up this idea and contacted Professor Miguel Basanez, Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico and former President of WAPOR (World Association of Public Opinion Research). A discussion was made about the feasibility of placing research products as well as individual and tabulated survey data into a single volume. Professor Basanez together with Siglo XXI Editores, a Mexican publisher, courageously undertook the task.[5]

The second 2004 AsiaBarometer survey volume has already been published. It focuses on East and Southeast Asia, including Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, China, South Korea and Japan. The rich experiences of these first and second surveys successively done in 2003 and in 2004 indeed enabled us to conduct AsiaBarometer surveys in each sub-region, East, Southeast, South and Central, one by one, with larger sample sizes, with a broader nation-wide coverage and with a significantly improved questionnaire in subsequent years. The Japanese version of the 2004 annual volume was published in September, 2007.

An increasing number of country profiles and cross-national studies have been conducted referring to the AsiaBarometer surveys. Using the same classification as in Section "Questionnaire," the journal articles and newspaper articles based on AsiaBarometer survey data and research products are presented in this section. The numbers of questions listed here are the ones used in the 2006 survey questionnaire.[6] Although the numbers may differ from survey to survey across years or across countries, the content is basically the same. See again Appendix 2 for the actual phrasing of the questions.

(1) *Living conditions*: Newspaper articles (Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun) in 2003 and 2004 introduce the survey results of Question 8 about the respondents' standard of living. About thirty percent of Japanese respondents think their living standard is low or relatively low, which is the highest percentage in the 2003 survey.[7] Inoguchi (2004c) and Sonoda (2004) look at the question which asks about the consumption plan of the respondents for durable goods such as cars and air conditioners in the 2003 survey.[8] Referring also to Question 9 in the third category of the 2006 survey and the question from the 2003 survey, which is about the usage plan of several services,[9] Sonoda (2004) discusses the different ways of thinking between the young Chinese and Japanese people.

(2) *Patterns of daily and economic life*: Newspaper articles (Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun) in 2003 and 2004 report the survey results for Question 3 and state that the percentages of the respondents who have foreign friends are higher in Vietnam and Sri Lanka, which are about 20%, than Japan, which is about 10%.[10] In China and Vietnam, the respondents more frequently communicate with foreign people via the Internet or e-mail than in Japan which scores the ninth out of ten countries. Sonoda (2005a) states that the 2004 AsiaBarometer Survey data uncover two different images about urban new middle classes in East Asia.[11] Sonoda shows that the urban new middle classes tend to bond or connect, referring to questions 2 and 3. Urban new middle classes are more exposed and connected to international scenes than working

classes.[12] However, once looking into values each individual has, heterogeneity between countries or separation rather than homogeneity between classes immediately comes out. What he thinks of as important for the future of the AsiaBarometer project is to examine how these two different images of connection and separation change over time by accumulating time series data.

Inoguchi (2007a) analyzes the clash of values at the individual level across civilizations on such topics as religion, regional identity, social capital, globalization and happiness and cites the seminal work on religiousity using the AsiaBarometer survey data done by Reed in 2006.[13] Reed used Question 23 and Question 24 about religion.[14] What is important is that these questions are free from Western and Christian biases, which is an indispensable prerequisite for cross-cultural analysis for Asia. Reed found that traditions are not so different that they cannot be fruitfully compared, which makes these neutral questions even more attractive. Reed also found that religiosity is not a unidimensional phenomenon. Since Asia is diverse and contains many civilizations, the clash of values across civilizations may appear.

(3) *Value priorities*: Dadabaev (2005) looks at Question 9 which asks about the types of resources and activities the respondents value highly and Question 21 which asks the respondents about what social circles and groups are important to them.[15] Generally speaking, there are some similarities about social units that people think are important and desire among Asian countries. Asian citizens seem to value health higher than job and family.

Inoguchi (2007d) introduces the survey results for Question 10 which asks the respondents what they wish their children to be. In Myanmar, India, China and Uzbekistan, parents would tend to wish their children to be a great scholar, very wealthy or a loving and charitable person, while the Japanese parents wish their children, especially their daughter, to be a person who cares about family. The parents of other Asian countries also wish their children to be a great scholar, while in Japan such parents would be rare. Inoguchi (2007d) states that Japanese parents seem not to care whether their children are ambitious or whether they have dreams to become a great figure.

(4) *Subjective quality of life*: Newspaper articles (Yomiuri Shimbun) in 2003 report the 2003 survey results for Question 7 about satisfaction.[16] It seems that the Japanese people tend to be more dissatisfied with several aspects of life such as jobs, education and the democratic system than other countries. A chapter in the 2004 AsiaBarometer Survey annual volume about satisfaction from the perspective of social capital by

Inoguchi and Hotta shows that the higher the level of religiosity, the higher the satisfaction and that the higher the per capita income level, the lower the level of satisfaction. Inoguchi (2007a) states that it seems that the impact of income on happiness declines as gross national product per capita increases. Beyond a certain threshold of economic development, lifestyle seems to determine the degree of happiness.

Regarding the relationship between income and happiness, Dadabaev (2005) uses the AsiaBarometer 2003 Survey and states that the extent to which people feel happy is not congruent with modernization. That is, the extent to which people feel happy is not so high in modernized and post-modernized countries in Asia. On the contrary, the extent to which people feel satisfied and happy is high in developing countries in Asia. Saravanamuttu (2006) says overall personal satisfaction is clearly higher in the less developed democracies, referring to Question 7. Some argue that economic development improves people's standard of living in a society, which raises the level of happiness people feel and stabilizes their livelihood. However, Dadabaev (2005) states that the AsiaBarometer Survey 2003 proves such an argument does not hold. Economic development doesn't necessarily enrich human lives because economic development may cause inflation and increase the burden on citizens. As income increases along with the development of the economy, people may seek and desire for an even better life. A rapid development of the economy may change the human beliefs and values and even damage human relationships or morals.

The chapter in the 2004 Asiabarometer Survey volume by Manabe found that the notion that "satisfaction is cognitive" is not necessarily valid, while "intricacies of mind" in the form of "affect based on cognitive" or "cognition directed by mind" would rather hold. In this chapter he considers the methodological aspects of measuring the level of happiness and satisfaction. He showed some hypotheses developed in previous studies based on observations or surveys conducted primarily in Europe and the United States are also applicable in Asia, but others are not. "Socioeconomic factors" and "cultural factors" in each country may account for those cases in which hypotheses were not supported by the Asian data. In addition, various hypotheses have already been developed regarding the cultural differences in the meaning of happiness and satisfaction, and his analyses made several important suggestions based on those hypotheses. The greatest challenge for the future is how the mechanisms governing the involvement of those factors can be tested and how those various hypotheses can be tested (Manabe; Chapter 15 in the 2004 AsiaBarometer Survey volume).

(5) *Quality of society*: Inoguchi (2004a) analyzes questions 11, 12 and 13 about trust, and questions 14, 15 and 16 that measure the width of trust, and Question 22 which measures the breadth of trust in terms of gender, applying principle component analysis and hierarchical cluster analysis.[17] Using the factor analysis of the pooled data, Inoguchi (2004a) found the three dimensions: (1) general trust in interpersonal relations, (2) trust in meritocracy and mutual utility, and (3) trust in the society/system. Asian countries are shown clustered along these three dimensions, which indicate that the three dimensions are highly flavored by cultural heritage. His findings are also consistent with other research papers. Inoguchi (2004a) then argues that these three dimensions would be proxy for the three major dimensions of social capital: fairness, utility and institutions.

Dadabaev (2005), on the other hand, points out that there is a relationship between mistrust of politics and distrust of society. When citizens do not trust each other, there is a high mistrust in politics in that society. And in most of the Asian societies, people tend not to trust each other and not to rely on social systems. As economic conditions improve, social relationships tend to become poorer in Asia. Dadabaev (2005) argues that a rapid process of development sometimes changes values and ways of thinking of citizens. It may ruin the traditional social structure and strengthen individualism. As a result, mutual trust in families and societies becomes weak, and belief and reliance on other members of the society, state, and politicians vanish. Economic development brings about the improvement of income level, but it does not enhance social stability and sense of security. The AsiaBarometer projects that reveal and uncover these points are necessary for creating policies to achieve both economic development and stability of society in order to improve peoples' lives (Dadabaev 2005).

A Korean newspaper in 2003 reports that 21% of Korean respondents and 15% of the Japanese respondents trust the central governments, while the figures are higher in China (91%), in Malaysia (88%), in Thailand (84%) and in India (75%). Hosono (2006) considers why the Japanese and Korean people tend not to trust their central and local governments. He argues that when regulation and system of law do not play sufficient roles as the market develops to a very sophisticated level, people tend to distrust the government. The fact that macroeconomic policies do not perform well in these two countries would be another reason.

Inoguchi (2007b) worries about the Japanese society causing such problems as violence in schools and assault in trains, looking at the research findings of Question 13, which show that the percentage of the Japanese respondents who would stop to help if they saw somebody on the street looking lost is the lowest in the 2003 survey.[18] A newspaper article (Yomiuri Shimbun) in 2003 reports the same result. Inoguchi (2006a, b) argues that the Japanese people may be losing the law-abiding spirit, sense of morality, justice, and community, referring to the survey results of Question 13 and Question 37.

Newton (2006) examines political support in Finland, Sweden, New Zealand and Japan and cites the research outcome for Question 29, which is about the level of trust of citizens for such institutions as domestic governments, the legal system, the police and international organizations such as the United Nations and the WTO. Examining Question 29 about the degree of trust for the United Nations and IMF, Fukushima (2005a, b) argues that East Asian countries have some confidence in these international institutions, but it would not be high enough to lead to the East Asian Community.

Kawato (2005) points out that as industrialized societies, the four East Asian countries – Japan, South Korea, China and Vietnam – share some common features in lifestyles and mindsets of their citizens. However, it is also true that they are somewhat suspicious of each other and have a different outlook since they have experienced different paces of development. Kawato (2005) looks at the survey results of Question 8 (Q6 in 2003), Question 11 (Q9 in 2003), Question 19 (Q16 in 2003), Question 21 (Q17 in 2003), Question 26 (Q20 in 2003), and Question 29 (Q21 in 2003).[19]

(6) *Identities*: Inoguchi (2004b) talks about the research outcomes of Question 17 and Question 19 and the identities of the Chinese and the Japanese people when he discusses the future roles the two countries can play in the world. An Australian newspaper in 2006 reports the survey results of Question 18 concerning the pride respondents take in their nationality and the fact that Japanese (26%) and South Koreans (15%) are least proud of their nationality, compared to the Thais (95%), Indonesians (85%) and Malaysians (72%).[20] Some other newspapers in Japan in 2003 cite the survey results of the same question from a different year's survey, which shows that 65% of the Japanese respondents are proud of being Japanese citizens, which is the lowest score of the surveyed countries in that year.

Speaking of the regional identity, a newspaper in 2003 reported the 2003 survey result for Question 19 that the Japanese (26.9%) and especially the Chinese (6%) tend not to see themselves as Asian.[21] Inoguchi (2007a) refers to the AsiaBarometer Survey results in 2003 and 2004 showing that some strong regional identity in Asia exists such as in Cambodia and the Philippines. Moderate regional identity appears in Indonesia and Malaysia. The Japanese tend to think of themselves first as an industrial democracy of the G8 and a good ally of the United States and only secondarily as a country of Asia, while the Chinese may envisage their traditional tributary system as restored. The Indians (15%) may think that regional governance is India's task along with some regional organizations such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Yamamoto (2007) observes that while the Vietnamese have a strong national identity, they also have a regional/local identity and a transnational identity of being Asian.

(7) *Political consciousness*: Saravanamuttu (2006) considers the paradox in which modernization comes much earlier than democratization in Asia, although historically speaking the two have developed concurrently as in Europe and North America. There is no necessary automatic correspondence between modernization and the development of a vibrant civil society. But he argues that democratization rests with developing a vibrant civil society and finds that a couple of survey research outcomes show an affective and lively appetite for democracy on the part of citizens in Asia, indicating that modernization may have become the midwife of democratization. The chapters by Saravanamuttu, Kumar and Abeyratne in the 2003 AsiaBarometer Survey annual volume argue that many of newly developing South and Southeast Asian countries show high affective orientation towards democratic norms, while the chapters written by T. Dadabaev and M. Shin argue that Japan and Korea reveal a level of lower affective orientation. In the latter countries, there seems to be a high level of belief that political actions are meaningful and a high trust in electoral mechanisms and procedural aspects of democracy.

A question Saravanamuttu (2006) cites is Question 38 about respondents' sentiments toward a political system.[22] The research outcome shows highest support for a democratic political system in Malaysia, Sri Lanka, China and Thailand in this order. The research findings for Question 33 about voting behavior reveal that the highest positive responses towards voting in national elections are found in Sri Lanka (82%), Thailand (78%), India (72%), Vietnam (65%) and Malaysia (62%). Japan (43%) scores lower than Korea (53%).[23] Another question he refers to is Question 29 about trust in institutions.[24] Respondents in the more developed countries (Japan and South Korea) tend to show a distinctly low level of trust in public institutions while in the more authoritarian states (Malaysia), trust levels are rather high. A higher preference for a powerful leader without restriction is found in South Korea and Japan compared with other Asian countries in the AsiaBarometer survey. Saravanamuttu then states that the less mature democracies of Southeast Asia along with established political authoritarian structures have produced citizens who are less critical of established political institutions. Political awareness and political sophistication become less important with the rise of the middle class with its strong consumerist tendencies.

Using the survey result of Question 26, Inoguchi (2007c) considers how Japan, China and India think about the influences of the other countries and the United States upon their own country. India sees the influences of these countries most positively, while the percentages of the Japanese and the Chinese respondents who see a positive influence of the United States and the others are much smaller. A similar analysis done by Tanaka (2007a, b) argues that one of the major problems facing the Japanese foreign policy is how to improve the relationship with its immediate neighbors since the percentage of respondents who think that Japan has a good influence on their countries is the lowest in China and South Korea in that order. The difference between the percentages of respondents who think that Japan has a good influence and the respondents who think it has a bad influence is also low and sometimes negative in those countries. Within Japan, the rankings of China, South Korea, North Korea and Russia are low. On the other hand, he found that the percentages of the respondents who value Japan highly are larger in Southeast and South Asian countries such as Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, Afghanistan and Nepal. Based on these findings, Kinoshita (2005) suggests that Japan can have more confidence and aim for a simultaneous pursuit of a Japan-US Security Treaty and the East Asian Community as the Japanese foreign policy.

Tanaka (2006b) also finds the Chinese people who live inland and with low income do not think that Japan has a good influence on them compared to the Chinese people who live on the coast and with high income and suggests that the Japanese government set foreign policy which appeals to the former group. Inoguchi (2007e) raises the issue about the difference between the view towards the US at the grassroots level and the government level. Anti-American sentiment among the Japanese people lies with a widespread perception of the negative effect of the United States on the Japanese economy. Japan is building on the independent view of avoiding the traditional hierarchical relations within the Asian region while Japan continues to nurture close relationships with the United States and Europe, which illustrates pursuing cooperation among Japan, China, India and other major players in Asia in an era of globalization.

Sonoda (2005b) claims that we should not think that the young Chinese people have more of an anti-Japan sentiment than the other groups in China due to education strengthening nationalism. The survey results of Question 26 show that 29.7% of the Chinese respondents think Japan has a good or a rather good influence on China, 38.9% of the respondents think Japan has a bad or a rather bad influence, and 30.4% replied don't know, which might mean many Chinese people are thinking Japan has a bad influence.[25] However, the results are based on the entire sample of the Chinese respondents, and by using only the sample of the young respondents, the results reverse. The percentages become 31.7%, 27.2% and 26.5% respectively. It would not follow that patriotism education forms the anti-Japan sentiment among the young. Sonoda argues that we should not easily generalize that China doesn't value Japan when we see an anti-Japan demonstration in China. Tanaka (2006a) confirms this point. Tanaka argues that age groups do not matter greatly when discussing the good or bad influence of Japan on China. The effect of age on the respondents' perception is not statistically significant.

Yamamoto (2007) states that the Vietnamese have good images of countries such as Russia, Japan, China, and South Korea, that they have a bad image of the United States, and that they have both good and bad images of China, reflecting probably the history between Vietnam and the other countries. Yamamoto also shows that the Vietnamese have remarkably higher concern about environmental pollution.

(8) *Views on social issues*: Citing results for Question 22 in the same year as the 2003 survey, a newspaper reports that 78 percent of the Japanese respondents think men are treated more favorably than women, which is above the overall average (48%).[26]

Useful caveats in conducting the future AsiaBarometer surveys come from Sonoda's chapter in the 2003 AsiaBarometer annual volume, Kawato (2006a, b) and Dadabaev (2005). Sonoda states that questions which ask whether the respondent is functionary need to be included when the survey analyzes the problems of Socialism or single-party dictatorship. Kawato considers the situation in which the respondents may answer differently depending on whether they have political, economic and cultural aspects in mind when they reply to the question of the influence of other countries on their own country. While others suggest using the same questions from survey to survey, Kawato thinks it interesting to ask different questions from year to year because Asia is changing fast. Dadabaev points out the problem about the sampling for the 2003 survey, which covers sufficient urban areas but insufficient rural areas. Dadabaev also points out a difficulty associated with questions that ask if the respondents have friends or relatives in foreign countries. Since some people in Central Asia or the former Soviet Union do not recognize others as foreigners, there needs to be clear definition of "foreigner," which may variously refer to a person who lives outside the country or to a person who lives inside the country but belongs to a minor ethnic group.

Inoguchi (2007d) suggests that any social survey should keep in mind that the respondents are more likely to answer that they trust their own government in an authoritarian regime since the respondents simply cannot criticize the government in such a country. Analyzing the opinion survey data needs to take into account social and political circumstances, standards of living and level of education of the respondents. Inoguchi (2007a) states that the questions about happiness and satisfaction to indicate the respondents' satisfaction with the regime must be played safe. It is important to note that the response of happiness and satisfaction has a lot to do with the degree of freedom the regime accords to the society. Sonoda (2006) suggests inviting questions from the public both domestically and internationally. Sonoda also points out that there seems to be a lack of capacity to analyze data such as the AsiaBarometer survey data using sophisticated techniques in Asia, and that some action is needed to remedy this problem.

Not only in an academic arena, but also in daily life ordinary Japanese people have talked about the AsiaBarometer survey results reported in newspapers. Several dialogues and comments on the survey results appear on electronic bulletin board systems and weblogs through the Internet.

In addition, the AsiaBarometer survey results are discussed in the legislature of Japan and used as a reference for the government decision making. The AsiaBarometer project has been conducting empirical analyses systematically based on the collected survey data on the daily lives of ordinary people in Asia, their dreams, their ambitions, their worries and their complaints. However, the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program, the Asia Development Bank and ODA donor countries have not designed development plans based on such analyses and left it completely to the recipient countries. As a result, the subsidy is spent in vain without paying any attention to what local citizens really need (Inoguchi, 2007f).

The annual publications of the AsiaBarometer project are as follows:

Inoguchi, Takashi, Miguel Basanez, Akihiko Tanaka and Timur Dadabaev, eds., *Values and Life Styles in Urban Asia: A Cross-Cultural Analysis and Sourcebook Based on the AsiaBarometer Survey of 2003*, with Foreword by Ronald Inglehart, Mexico City: Siglo XXI Editors, 2005.

Inoguchi, Takashi, Miguel Basanez, Akihiko Tanaka and Timur Dadabaev, eds., *Values and Life Styles in Urban Asia: A Cross-Cultural Analysis and Sourcebook Based on the AsiaBarometer Survey of*

*2003*, with Foreword by Ronald Inglehart, (Translated in Japanese), Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2005.

Inoguchi, Takashi, Akihiko Tanaka and Shigeto Sonoda and Timur Dadabaev, eds., Human Beliefs and Values in Striding Asia: East Asia in Focus: Country Profiles, Thematic Analyses and Sourcebook based on the AsiaBarometer Survey of 2004, with Foreword by Peter Katzenstein, Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2006.

The 2003 AsiaBarometer Survey Annual Volume consists of eleven country-profile chapters followed by a cross-cultural analysis and the source book (see Table 1).

**Table 1** Contents of the 2003 AsiaBarometer survey annual volume

| Chapter | Author | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Introduction | Takashi Inoguchi | AsiaBarometer: Its Aim, Its Scope and Its Strength. |
| 1 | Takashi Inoguchi and Timur Dadabaev | Measuring Social Capital and Household Welfare in Asia: An Introduction to the Problems and Issues. |
| Regional Case Studies: East Asia | | |
| 2 | Timur Dadabaev | **Japan**: Family, Values and Interest. |
| 3 | Dingping Guo | **China**: Rising Expectations, Incremental Reforms and Good Governance. |
| 4 | Myungsun Shin | **Korea**: Citizens' Trust in Public Institutions. |
| Regional Case Studies: Southeast Asia | | |
| 5 | Chaiwat Khamchoo and Aaron Stern | **Thailand**: Primacy of Prosperity in Democracy. |
| 6 | Johan Saravanamuttu | **Malaysia**: The Middle Class Identity in a Multicultural Democracy. |
| 7 | Shigeto Sonoda | **Vietnam**: Social Life under Development and Globalization. |
| 8 | Myat Thein | **Myanmar**: Living Conditions Today. |
| Regional Case Studies: South Asia | | |
| 9 | Sanjay Kumar | **India**: The Middle Class in Urban India. |
| 10 | Sirimal Abeyratne | **Sri Lanka**: Urban Life and Living Conditions. |
| 11 | Timur Dadabaev | **Uzbekistan**: Post-Soviet Realities. |
| Cross-Cultural Observations | | |
| 12 | Takashi Inoguchi | Social Capital in Ten Asian Societies: Is Social Capital a Good Concept to Gauge Democratic, Developmental and Regionalizing Trends in Asia? |

Source Book: Field report, Questionnaire, Tables and figures, Links, and Index of Questionnaire.

**Table 2** Contents of the 2004 AsiaBarometer survey annual volume

| Chapter | Author | Title |
|---|---|---|
| | Peter Katzenstein | Foreword |
| | Takashi Inoguchi | Preface |
| **PART I Country Profile Analysis** | | |
| Introduction | Takashi Inoguchi | Human Beliefs and Values in Striding Asia: The AsiaBarometer Survey of 2004. |
| 1 | Timur Dadabaev and Akihiko Tanaka | **Japan**: Urban Values and Life Styles. |
| 2 | Daesong Hyun | **Korea**: Lives and Civic Virtue in Transition. |
| 3 | Dingping Guo | **China**: The Evaluation of the Material and Mental Foundations for a Harmonious Society. |
| 4 | Do Manh Hong | **Vietnam**: Economic Development and Improvement of Living Standard. |
| 5 | Myat Thein | **Myanmar**: Life and Well-Being from a Comparative Sociocultural Perspective. |
| 6 | Boulouance Douangngeune | **Laos**: Lao Society As It Is. |
| 7 | Kheang Un | **Cambodia**: Beliefs and Perceptions in a Postconflict Society. |
| 8 | Chaiwat Khamchoo and Aaron Stern | **Thailand**: Democracy and the Power of a Popular Leader. |
| 9 | Johan Saravanamuttu | **Malaysia**: High Satisfaction and Political Conservatism. |
| 10 | Shigeto Sonoda | **Singapore**: A Globalized Social Life under Soft Authoritarian Rule. |
| 11 | Pratikno and I Ketut Putra Erawan | **Indonesia**: The Paradox of Change. |
| 12 | Lydia N. Yu-Jose | **Philippines**: Political Mood and Socioeconomic Timbre. |
| 13 | Hj Hamzah Sulaiman and Zen-U Lucian Hotta | **Brunei**: The Living Conditions, Preferences and Concerns. |
| **PART II Cross-Cultural Thematic Analysis** | | |
| 14 | Takashi Inoguchi and Zen-U Lucian Hotta | Quantifying Satisfaction: The Case of Urban ASEAN+3 in AsiaBarometer 2004. |
| 15 | Kazufumi Manabe | The Culture of Happiness and Satisfaction in Asia. |
| 16 | Takashi Inoguchi and Kensuke Okada | How Would You Like to See Your Son and Daughter Grow Up? |
| 17 | Matthew Carlson | Citizens' Evaluations of Political Rights in Asia. |
| 18 | Akiko Fukushima and Misa Okabe | Finding a Path toward Regional Integration in East Asia. |
| **PART III AsiaBarometer Sourcebook** | | |
| Field Reports, Questionnaire, Tables and Figures, and Index of Questionnaire. | | |

**Table 3** Contents of the forthcoming 2005 AsiaBarometer survey annual volume

| Chapter | Country report on | Author | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Takashi Inoguchi | Introduction |
| 1 | Bangladesh | Imtiaz Ahmed | From "International Basket Case" to a Basketful of Hope and Desire. |
| 2 | Bhutan | Dorji Penjore | Swimming in the Tide of Globalization: Bhutan as Seen Through the Life of a Bhutanese in Thimphu. |
| 3 | India | Sanjay Kumar | Change and Continuity among Urban Indian Families. |
| 4 | Pakistan | Faisal Bari | Institutional Underdevelopment Underperformance and Reliance on Private Trust Networks: Pakistan Through the AsiaBarometer Survey. |
| 5 | Maldives | Purnendra Jain | Maldives at a Political and Economic Crossroad. |
| 6 | Nepal | Krishna Hachhethu | Nepali Society and Politics: Conflict and Change. |
| 7 | Sri Lanka | Sirimal Abeyratne | Regional Discontent of Development Disparities. |
| 8 | Afghanistan | Mohammad Jamshed Khan | The Lives of Ordinary Afghans. |
| 9 | Kazakhstan | Nargis Kassenova | Rich in Natural Resources, Poor in Social Capital. |
| 10 | Kyrgyzstan | Temirlan Moldogaziez | Making Difficult Choices: Nation-State Building or Democratization? Conflicting Logics in Kyrgyz's Transition. |
| 11 | Mongolia | Turtoghtoh Janar | Daily Lifestyle and Political Attitudes of Ordinary Mongolians. |
| 12 | Tajikistan | Muzaffardjon Khudoikulov | Bridge Between North and South. |
| 13 | Turkmenistan | Timur Dadabaev | Trajectories and Public Choices of Political, Economic, and Social Development in Turkmenistan. |
| 14 | Uzbekistan | Timur Dadabaev | How Does Transition Work in Central Asia? Coping with Ideological, Economic and Value System Changes in Uzbekistan. |

Chen (2006) states that this book makes an important contribution to the comparative scholarship on Asia. It would be the first time that scholars and students of individual Asian countries have access to a set of largely comparative statistical profiles of daily lives and values of ten societies in one volume, especially the less quantitatively studied societies like Myanmar and Uzbekistan. This book largely succeeds in bringing together a team of researchers, most of whom are indigenous to the countries studied, who have put together a wealth of information from a timely source on a diverse group of Asian countries.

The 2004 AsiaBarometer Survey Annual Volume consists of three parts: Country profile analysis is presented in chapters 1 through 13, cross-cultural thematic analysis in chapters 14 through 18, followed by the source book (see Table 2).

The forthcoming 2005 AsiaBarometer Survey Annual Volume will consist of fourteen chapters. The first eight chapters deal with South Asia. Further chapters report on Central Asia. The authors and titles of the various chapters are shown in Table 3.

This section has examined mainly published research papers and newspaper articles using the AsiaBarometer survey results and data. Section "Bibliography" below also lists journal articles, newspaper articles and the other types of publications based on the AsiaBarometer survey results and data or referring to the survey. As we saw, a large number of research papers concerning cross-national analysis discuss and analyze the questions of the survey thoroughly and substantially and suggest useful policy implications, although those studies tend to concentrate on the questions in the categories of values and norms associated with social behavior, identities, and views on social and political issues and institutions. Questions about sense of trust and perceptions of the influence of other countries are especially widely analyzed. Researchers also provide suggestions to improve the research methods of the AsiaBarometer survey. The AsiaBarometer research outcomes are also discussed in the daily lives by ordinary people and in the Japanese parliament by politicians.

## Conclusion

This paper describes the research design, aim, scope, rationale, development and achievement of the AsiaBarometer opinion survey project for the region of Asia from its birth in 2002 to date. Although analyses tend to center around some of the questions, deep and thoughtful analyses of Asia's developmental, democratizing and regionalizing potentials have emerged using the AsiaBarometer's solid empirical multi-country data bases in Asia. Some of the research papers suggest fruitful policy implications, and the fact that the AsiaBarometer survey results are referred to in the legislature in Japan is noteworthy and makes the project even more promising. In addition, we have noticed that the ordinary Japanese people talk about the survey results reported in newspaper articles on the Internet. This is what Inoguchi and his colleagues had expected to see when further developing the AsiaBarometer project. With the significant amount of literature published on the AsiaBarometer and the usage and applications of its survey results and data, the authors are convinced that the AsiaBarometer is on a promising track to fulfill its aims.

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## Appendix 1: Societies and Year(s) in which the AsiaBarometer Survey was Conducted

| | Society | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Afghanistan | | | O | | |
| 2 | Bangladesh | | | O | | |
| 3 | Bhutan | | | O | | |
| 4 | Brunei | | O | | | |
| 5 | Cambodia | | O | | | O |
| 6 | China | O | O | | O | |
| 7 | Hong Kong | | | | O | |
| 8 | India | O | | O | | |
| 9 | Indonesia | | O | | | O |
| 10 | Japan | O | O | | O | |
| 11 | Kazakhstan | | | O | | |
| 12 | Kyrgyzstan | | | O | | |
| 13 | Korea (South) | O | O | | O | |
| 14 | Laos | | O | | | O |
| 15 | Malaysia | O | O | | | O |
| 16 | Maldives | | | O | | |
| 17 | Mongolia | | | O | | |
| 18 | Myanmar | O | O | | | O |

**Appendix 1:** (continued)

| | Society | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19 | Nepal | | | O | | |
| 20 | Pakistan | | | O | | |
| 21 | The Philippines | | O | | | O |
| 22 | Singapore | | O | | O | |
| 23 | Sri Lanka | O | | O | | |
| 24 | Taiwan | | | | O | |
| 25 | Tajikistan | | | O | | |
| 26 | Thailand | O | O | | | O |
| 27 | Turkmenistan | | | O | | |
| 28 | Uzbekistan | O | | O | | |
| 29 | Vietnam | O | O | | O | |

## Appendix 2: Condensed Questionnaire from the 2006 AsiaBarometer Survey[27]

**Q1**: Which of the following public utilities does your household have?
**Q2**: Please indicate how frequently you use the Internet and mobile phones.
**Q2-1**: How often do you view Internet web pages by computer?
**Q2-2**: How often do you read or write e-mails by computer?
**Q2-3**: How often do you read or write messages by mobile phone?
**Q3**: Which, if any, of the following statements apply to you? Choices are: A member of my family or a relative lives in another country; I have traveled abroad at least three times in the past three years, on holiday or for business purposes; I have friends from another country who are in [YOUR COUNTRY]; I often watch foreign-produced programs on TV; I often communicate with people in other countries via the Internet or email; My job involves contact with organizations or people in other countries; None of the above.
**Q4**: All things considered, would you say that you are happy these days?
**Q5**: How often do you feel you are really enjoying life these days?
**Q6**: How much do you feel you are accomplishing what you want out of your life?
**Q7**: Please tell me how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with the following aspects of your life? Housing; Friendship; Marriage; Standard of living; Household income; Health; Education; Job; Neighbors; Public safety; The condition of the environment; Social welfare system; The democratic system; Family life; Leisure; Spiritual life.

**Q8**: How would you describe your standard of living?

**Q9**: Of the following lifestyle aspects or life circumstances, please select five that are important to you: Having enough to eat; Having a comfortable home; Being healthy; Having access to good medical care if required; Being able to live without fear of crime; Having a job, Having access to higher education (beyond compulsory education); Owning lots of nice things; Earning a high income; Spending time with your family; Being on good terms with others; Being successful at work; Being famous; Enjoying a pastime; Appreciating art and culture; Dressing up; Winning over others; Expressing your personality or using your talents; Contributing to your local community or to society; Being devout; Raising children; Freedom of expression and association; Living in a country with a good government; Pleasant community to live in; Safe and clean environment; None of the above.

**Q10**: How would you like to see your son(s) and daughter(s) grow up? Of the following accomplishments, please select what you would wish for a daughter, and what you would wish for a son: Become a great scholar; Become a powerful political leader; Become very wealthy; Become a loving and charitable person; Become a person respected by the masses; Become more proficient in a profession than I am; Follow in my footsteps; Become a person who cares about family; Find a good marriage partner; Become fulfilled spiritually; None of the above.

**Q11**: Generally, do you think people can be trusted or do you think that you can't be too careful in dealing with people (that it pays to be wary of people)?

**Q12**: Do you think that people generally try to be helpful or do you think that they mostly look out for themselves?

**Q13**: If you saw somebody on the street looking lost, would you stop to help?

**Q14**: If you had no descendants, would you think it desirable to adopt somebody in order to continue the family line, even if there were no blood relationship? Or do you think this would be unnecessary?

**Q15**: Suppose that you are the president of a company. In the company's employment examination, a relative of yours got the second highest grade, scoring only marginally less than the candidate with the highest grade. In such a case, which person would you employ?

**Q16**: If the main breadwinner of your household should die or become unable to work due to illness, how would your household maintain the household budget? The choices are: Another adult member of the family would become the main breadwinner; Would send one or more of the children out to work; Would get support from relatives; Would get support from neighbors; Would get support from members of my religious group; Would get social welfare payments; Depend on retirement allowance; Have an insurance policy to cover such a situation; Other.

**Q17**: Throughout the world many people identify themselves by their nationality. For example, Korean, Indian, Chinese, etc. Do you think of yourself as being [YOUR COUNTRY'S PEOPLE], or do you not think of yourself in this way?

**Q18**: How proud are you of being [YOUR COUNTRY'S PEOPLE]?

**Q19**: Throughout the world, some people also see themselves as belonging to a transnational group (such as Asian, people of Chinese ethnicity, people who speak the same language or practise the same religion). Do you identify with any transnational group? The choices are: Asia; Ethnic group that has common genealogy or ancestry; Language group that I speak; Religious group that I believe in and practise; Other transnational identity (Please specify); No, I don't identify particularly with any transnational group.

**Q20**: Can you recite the national anthem by heart?

**Q21**: Which of the following social circles or groups are important to you? Of those, which one is the most important to you? The choices are: Family; Relatives; Place of work; Club, hobby circle, etc.; The school/university you attended; The area where you grew up; People who speak the same language or dialect as you; Neighbors; Agricultural cooperative, commercial cooperative or industry group; Labour union; Political party; Religion; Other (Please specify).

**Q22**: Do you think that on the whole men and women are treated equally in your country?

**Q23**: How often do you pray or meditate?

**Q24**: For each of the following events, please rate the importance of having a religious institution (such as mosque, church, temple, and shrine) or a religious professional (such as imam, priest, and monk) involved. The choices are: Births; Weddings; Festivals or holidays; Funerals.

**Q25**: Which, if any, of the following issues cause you great worry? The choices are: Poverty; Economic inequality in your society; Fair world trade; Terrorism; Environmental destruction/pollution/problems relating to natural resources; Wars and conflicts; Natural disasters; Nuclear disasters; Globalization of human economic activities; Health issues; Economic problems in your country; Global recession; Crime; Human rights; Corruption; Lack of democracy; Illegal drugs and drug addiction; Refugee and asylum problems; Unemployment; Education; The socio-welfare system in your country; Ethics of scientists (ethics in science); The aging of society (growing relative weight of senior citizens); The decline in birthrate; The fast pace of change/technology is advancing too quickly; The threat of corporate power dominates human activities; Religious fundamentalism; Overpopulation; Moral decline/spiritual decadence; Other (Please specify).

**Q26**: Do you think the following countries – China, Japan, India, USA, UK, Russia, Pakistan, South Korea, North Korea, Iran, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Indonesia and Australia – have a good influence or a bad influence on your country?

**Q27**: Any society has some kinds of inequality. In which of the following areas do you think equality should be most eagerly promoted in your society. The choices are: Gender; Age; Education; Occupation; Income/Wealth; Religion; Descent; Ethnicity; Other (Please specify).

**Q28**: In your opinion, what are benefits of education? Develops your humanity; Enables you to obtain a job of your choice; Enables you to earn more money; Enables you to live in another country; Enables you to gain higher social status; Contributes to the development and prosperity of your country; Enables you to contribute to your society; Enables you to work internationally; Other (Please specify).

**Q29**: Please indicate to what extent you trust the following institutions to operate in the best interests of society: The central government; Your local government; The army; The legal system; The police; Parliament, Congress; The political party; The public education system; The public health system; Large domestic companies; Multinational companies operating in [YOUR COUNTRY]; Trade unions/labor unions; The media; Non-government organizations (e.g. environmental, social advocacy groups or other non-profit organizations); Religious organizations; The United Nations; The World Trade Organization; The World Bank; The International Monetary Fund.

**Q30**: Of the following issues – Peacekeeping, Protection of the environment, Aid to developing countries, Refugees and Human rights, would you tell me whether you think that policies in this area should be decided by the national governments, by regional organizations (such as ASEAN and APEC), or the United Nations?

**Q31**: How well do you think the [YOUR COUNTRY'S] government is dealing with the following issues? The economy; Political corruption; Human rights; Unemployment; Crime; The quality of public services; Increase of immigrants; Ethnic conflict; Religious conflict; Environmental problems.

**Q32**: Please indicate whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each of the following areas. Please bear in mind that more spending may require a tax increase. The environment; Health; Policing and law enforcement; Education; The military and defense; Old-age pensions; Unemployment benefits; Public transport, telecommunications infrastructure; Culture and the arts; Improvement of the social status of women.

**Q33**: How often do you vote in each of the national elections and local elections?

**Q34**: Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement: Citizens have a duty to vote in elections; There is widespread corruption among those who govern the country; Generally speaking, people like me don't have the power to influence government policy or actions; Politics and government are so complicated that sometimes I don't understand what's happening; Since so many people vote in elections, it really doesn't matter whether I vote or not; Generally speaking, the people who are elected to the [NATIONAL PARLIAMENT] stop thinking about the public once they're elected; Government officials pay little attention to what citizens like me think; [YOUR COUNTRY'S] traditional culture is superior to that of other countries; [YOUR COUNTRY'S] government should emphasize patriotic education to breed patriotism.

**Q35**: When you shape your opinions about social and political issues, which of the following media influence your opinions most? TV programs; TV advertisements; Radio programs; Radio advertisements; Newspaper articles; Newspaper advertisements; Magazine articles; Magazine advertisements; Books; Internet news; Internet bulletin boards/Mailing news; Internet advertisements; Leaflets/Brochures; Conversation with friends and neighbors; Conversation with campaigners; Meetings/Conferences; Other.

**Q36**: Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement: Central government should restrict the inflow of foreign workforce to protect domestic people's interests; Women's employment should be promoted to attain gender equality; It is desirable that the people are equal, even if the economy is stagnant, rather than unequal but developing; It is natural that those who work harder get more money.

**Q37**: What should a person who needs a government permit do if the response of the official handling the application is: "just be patient and wait"? Use connections to obtain permit; Nothing can be done; Wait and hope that things will work out; Write a letter; Act without a permit; Bribe an official; Don't know.

**Q38**: Please indicate for each system whether you think it would be very good, fairly good or bad for this country: Governance by a powerful leader without the restriction of parliament or elections; A system whereby decisions affecting the country are made by experts (such as bureaucrats with expertise in a particular field) according to what they think is best for the country; Military government; A domestic political system.

**Q39**: How satisfied are you with the current scope of the following rights in [YOUR COUNTRY]? The right to vote; The right to gather and demonstrate; The right to be informed about the work and functions of government; Freedom of speech; The right to criticize the government.

**Q40**: Please indicate your usual eating patterns for breakfast and the evening meal of the following eating styles: I eat food cooked at home; I buy ready meals in a shop, or food cooked in a restaurant or at an outdoor stall; I eat instant food at home; I eat out in restaurants; I eat out at food stalls and such like; Other; Usually do not eat this meal.

**Q41**: Which of the following foods do you like to eat? Beijing duck; Kimuchi; Sushi; Hamburger; Curry; Pizza; Tom-Yum-Goong; Dim Sum; Pho; Sandwich; Instant Noodle; None of the above.

**Q42**: Which category does your current residence fall in? Owner- occupied detached or semi-detached (duplex) house; Owner-occupied terraced house or unit in an apartment or condominium complex; Rented detached or semi-detached (duplex) house; Rented terraced house or unit in an apartment or condominium complex; Other (a room in a relative's home, etc).

**Q43-1**: How many members of your family, including yourself, live in your household?

**Q43-2**: Which of the following describes your family structure? Single-person household; Married couple only; A parent(s) and child(ren) who are not married (two-generation household); A parent(s) and child(ren) who is/are married (two-generation household)(Select this item even if only one child is married and the other unmarried children also live in the household.); Grandparent(s), parent(s), and child(ren) (three-generation household); Other.

**Q43-3**: How many, if any, members of your family who live with you are in need of special care due to illness, old age or handicap?

**Q44**: Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Please select what you consider to be most important: Independence; Diligence; Honesty; Sincerity; Mindfulness; Humbleness; Religiosity; Patience; Competitiveness; Respect for senior persons; Deference for teachers; Don't know.

**Q45**: If you have to choose, which one of the following would you say is the most important and the second most important? Maintaining order in nation; Giving people more say in important government decisions; Fighting rising prices; Protecting freedom of speech; Don't know.

**Q46**: I'm going to read out a list of various changes in our way of life that might take place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don't you mind? More emphasis on the development of technology; Greater respect for traditional authority.

**Q47**: I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do or would never, under any circumstances, do it. Signing a petition to improve conditions; Joining in boycotts; Attending lawful demonstrations.

**Q48**: There are two opinions about the role of chance in the world. In your opinion, which of the following two positions is more correct? Many things happen for no particular reason at all. It is just a matter of chance; Everything happens for a reason. Even events that look like accidents have a hidden purpose.

**Q49**: Do you believe in an unseen spiritual world that can influence events in the world we see around us?

**Q50**: Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never justified, or something in between: Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties; Homosexuality; Abortion.

## Notes

1. For 2003 the AsiaBarometer was based on donations from some dozen business firms. For 2004 it was funded by the Policy Division in the Asia-Pacific Ocean Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. It is a multiyear funding project from April 2005 to March 2009 and is funded by the Japanese Ministry of Education and Science for a scientific research grant scheme. No conditions are attached to any one of these funds.
2. It takes approximately 18 months after field work. Only after those AsiaBarometer annual volumes are published, do we upload our survey data onto the above three schemes.
3. These companies are as follows: In 2003, Taylor Nelson Sofres Korea (South Korea), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Research Center (China), Taylor Nelson Sofres Malaysia (Malaysia), CNS & Associates Company Limited (Thailand), TNS Vietnam (Vietnam, Myanmar), TNS MODE (India, Sri Lanka), RAI Uzbekistan (Uzbekistan); In 2004, Gallup Korea (South Korea), Market Survey Research Corporation, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (China), TNS Vietnam (Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos), TNS Philippines (the Philippines), TNS Indonesia (Indonesia), TNS Malaysia

(Malaysia and Brunei), ACNielsen (Thailand), Media Research Consultants Pte Ltd. (Singapore); In 2005, ACSOR-Survey (Afghanistan), SIRIUS Marketing and Social Research Ltd. (Bangladesh), TNS India (Bhutan, India, Nepal and Maldives), BISAM Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan), SIAR-Bishkek (Mongolia), Gallup Pakistan (Pakistan), TNS Lanka (Sri Lanka), RAI Consultants Services Ltd. (Uzbekistan); In 2006, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Research Center, Marketing Decision Research (Pacific) Ltd. (Hong Kong), Gallup Korea (South Korea), Media Research Consultants Pte Ltd. (Singapore), Opinion Research Taiwan (Taiwan), TNS Vietnam (Vietnam).

4. Note that exact procedures of sampling do differ from country to country because of different structures.
5. Needless to say, special gratitude goes to President Professor Takeshi Sasaki, Director Professor Akihiko Tanaka and Professor Timur Dadabaev and Professor Ikuo Kabashima, as well as to all the participants of the AsiaBarometer workshop in January 2004, who invariably helped this project to move forward.
6. The authors have been conducting another project to present an overview of the content and features of all the questionnaires the AsiaBarometer uses year by year and to integrate the data obtained from all the AsiaBarometer surveys.
7. Q8 in the 2006 survey was Q6 in the 2003 survey.
8. This is Q35-2 in the 2003 survey which reads: “Which, if any, of these 26 products (such as car, boat, air conditioner, etc.) does your household (you or your family) plan to buy within the next 1–2 years?”
9. This is Q36-2: “Which of the following 16 services (such as domestic travel, foreign-language school, internet connection, etc.) would you personally like to use or continue to use over the next 1–2 years?”
10. Q 3 in the 2006 survey was Q2 in the 2003 annual survey volume.
11. By urban new middle class, Sonoda means the respondents belong to items 7 and 8 of Question F6. For the questions about background of the respondents from F1 to F9, see the AsiaBarometer survey annual volumes.
12. By working class, Sonoda means the respondents who belong to items 11, 12 and 13 in F6.
13. This is a conference report not available online and not included in the references in Section “References”: Reed, Steven, “Religiosity in Asia: A Preliminary Analysis of the AsiaBarometer 2005,” presentation at the annual AsiaBarometer Workshop, February 22, 23 and 24, 2006, Chuo University, Tokyo.
14. Q24 is in category 8.
15. Dadabaev talks about the 2003 survey results, and Q21 in the 2006 survey was Q17 in that survey. Q9 was Q7 in the 2003 survey.
16. Q7 in the 2006 Survey was Q5 in the 2003 Survey.
17. Q16 falls in the second category, and Q22 belongs to the eighth category. Inoguchi used the 2003 survey data, and the numbers of those questions differ, although the contents are the same.
18. Q13 in the 2006 survey appeared as Q11 in the 2003 survey volume.
19. The 2006 Survey doesn’t have an equivalent question to Q16-2 in 2003.
20. Q18 in the 2006 survey appeared as Q16 in the 2004 survey, and these figures are from the 2004 survey.
21. Q19 was Q16-1 in the 2003 survey volume.
22. Q38 in the 2006 Survey appeared as Q27 in the 2003 Survey.
23. Q33 in the 2006 survey was Q24 in the 2003 survey and these figures are from the 2003 survey.

24. Q29 in the 2006 survey was Q21 in the 2003 survey volume.
25. Q26 in the 2006 survey was listed as Q20 in the 2003 survey annual volume.
26. This question appeared as Q18 in the 2003 survey volume.
27. Questions are somewhat altered and shortened due to the limited space. The reader is advised to refer to the AsiaBarometer annual survey volumes and the website: https://www.asiabarometer.org/

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