

PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON LIFELONG LEARNING

Lifelong Learning Book Series

VOLUME 11

Series Editors

David N. Aspin, *Faculty of Education, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia*

Judith D. Chapman, *Centre for Lifelong Learning, Australian Catholic University, Melbourne, Australia*

Editorial Board

William L. Boyd, *Department of Education Policy Studies, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA*

Karen Evans, *Institute of Education, University of London, UK*

Malcolm Skilbeck, *Drysdale, Victoria, Australia*

Yukiko Sawano, *Department for Lifelong Learning Policies, National Institute for Educational Policy Research (NIER), Tokyo, Japan*

Kaoru Okamoto, *Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Government of Japan, Tokyo, Japan*

Denis W. Ralph, *Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia*

Aims & Scope

“Lifelong Learning” has become a central theme in education and community development. Both international and national agencies, governments and educational institutions have adopted the idea of lifelong learning as their major theme for address and attention over the next ten years. They realize that it is only by getting people committed to the idea of education both life-wide and lifelong that the goals of economic advancement, social emancipation and personal growth will be attained.

The *Lifelong Learning Book Series* aims to keep scholars and professionals informed about and abreast of current developments and to advance research and scholarship in the domain of Lifelong Learning. It further aims to provide learning and teaching materials, serve as a forum for scholarly and professional debate and offer a rich fund of resources for researchers, policy-makers, scholars, professionals and practitioners in the field.

The volumes in this international Series are multi-disciplinary in orientation, polymathic in origin, range and reach, and variegated in range and complexity. They are written by researchers, professionals and practitioners working widely across the international arena in lifelong learning and are orientated towards policy improvement and educational betterment throughout the life cycle.

Philosophical Perspectives on Lifelong Learning

Edited by

DAVID N. ASPIN

Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

 Springer

A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISBN 978-1-4020-6192-9 (HB)
ISBN 978-1-4020-6193-6 (e-book)

Published by Springer,
P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands.

www.springer.com

Printed on acid-free paper

All Rights Reserved

© 2007 Springer

No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work.

IN MEMORIAM

Joseph Bright Skemp

Walter Reid Chalmers

Abraham Wasserstein

-

'... haec olim meminisse iuvabit'

VADE MECUM

The challenge facing every country is

How to become a learning society and to ensure its citizens are equipped with the knowledge, skills, and qualifications they will need for the twenty-first century. Economies and societies are increasingly knowledge-based. Education and skills are indispensable to achieving economic success, civic responsibility, and social cohesion.¹

¹ *The Cologne Charter – Aims and Ambitions for Lifelong Learning (1999)*

Acknowledgements

I should like to begin by acknowledging the part played in the conception and production of this work by my friend and colleague Professor Mal Leicester. It was she who did a considerable amount of the preliminary ‘trail-blazing’ that has provided so much help in exploring and laying out the ground for this volume. Rightly speaking, she is the principal author of the ideas and inspiration for this volume, for it was she who originally approached our publishers with a first proposal. It was a great sadness to Professor Judith Chapman and me, General Editors of the Springer Series on Lifelong Learning, that family commitments led Mal in 2003 to tell us that she felt she had to ‘bow out gracefully’ from continuing with this project. But it was also a great joy to me that she asked me to take it over from her. I hope that what I have done meets with her approval. Evidence of the importance of her original project and an indication of how much she has been of help can be seen not only in the ‘disjecta membra’ she left me for the Introduction, but also in her willingness to write a chapter for the book, with two academic colleagues, seeking to show how the concept of ‘lifelong learning’ might be operationalised in the field of education.

I should like to thank Judith Chapman, Joint Editor of the Springer Series on Lifelong Learning and Director of the Centre for Lifelong Learning at Australian Catholic University, for her constant support and ready advice and guidance. I should also like to thank my colleagues at Springer, who have been with me since this project first originated: Tamara Welschot, Cathelijne van Herwaarden, and recently Maria Jonckheere, together with the ever helpful and cheerful Astrid Noordermeer. Without their continuing advice, ready accessibility, encouragement, and real practical help – instantly available at the touch of an email button – the volume would never have been brought to conclusion.

I should also like to express my deep appreciation to my friends and colleagues, the authors whose work appears in this volume, which has been produced almost entirely by communication through electronic means. In spite of their being almost constantly overwhelmed with institutional obligations, academic commitments, and teaching and supervisory responsibilities, they have been assiduous in responding to requests for submissions, changes, adjustments, and all the last-minute *minutiae* of contributing to a symposium such as this. It has been a pleasure to work with them and to engage in what was, for all of us, an exercise in ‘lifelong learning’ of a major kind.

I am grateful to Taylor & Francis, publishers of the *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, and to Professor Peter Jarvis, Editor of that journal, for their kindness in permitting Judith Chapman and myself to republish, as Chapter One in this collection, a paper which first appeared in their Special Issue Edition, Volume 19, Issue no 1, 2001 (*The Philosophy of Lifelong Education* pp.2–19).

Finally I should like to offer my warmest thanks to my friend and colleague, Heather Phillips, of the Faculty of Education at Monash University. As usual Heather has been willing to act as adviser and assistant – ready recipient of all the hard copy material that has been sent to us, and instant in the preparation of all the electronic software that has made its publication possible. Her help and cooperation have been singularly important in assisting me to put together that final MS for the publishers. I cannot speak too highly of her professional competence, helpfulness, and cheerfulness in what has been a major undertaking for both of us. I can only hope that the outcome will pay proper tribute to the efforts and collegial cooperation of all those who have participated in it.

David N. Aspin
28 April 2007

Preface

The aim of this book is to provide an easily accessible, practical, yet scholarly source of information about the international concern for the philosophy, theory categories, and concepts of lifelong learning. The book is designed to follow the same pattern evident in other books in this series, that of examining in depth the range of philosophical perspectives in the field of Lifelong Learning theory, practice, and applied scholarship, extending the scale and scope of the substantive contribution made by philosophical and theoretical approaches to our understanding of education. The book seeks to make an important contribution to shaping, developing, and understanding the direction of future developments in educational institutions of all kinds preparing for providing and delivering lifelong learning in all kinds of formal, informal, and alternative education institutions, agencies, and organizations, and their various approaches, practices, and processes in the twenty-first century.

Each chapter in this book is written in an accessible style by an international expert in the field. Contributions from all philosophical approaches and traditions are to be found in this volume, and there is an emphasis on the implications of the philosophical accounts of lifelong learning for a synthesis of theory and good practice. Authors tackle the task of identifying, analysing, and addressing the key problems, topics, and issues relevant to Lifelong Learning that are internationally generalizable and, in times of rapid change, of permanent interest to the scholar and practitioner.

The general intention is to make this book available to a broad spectrum of users among lecturers and students in all kinds of academic institution; policy-makers, academics, administrators, and practitioners in the education profession and related professions; and a broad range of community and private agencies and institutions with a concern for lifelong learning and for extending learning opportunities across the lifespan to all their members, stakeholders, and clients. The book forms a part of the existing book series on Lifelong Learning, currently being published by Springer.

Foreword

D.P. Gilroy

Professor and Pro-Vice-Chancellor (Research)
Manchester Metropolitan University

Policy-makers are notorious for seizing on a concept and sloganizing the term, in effect transforming it from one that has a clear meaning to one which is systematically ambiguous. Of course, if the term itself starts out as meeting most of Gallie's criteria for essential contestedness, policy-makers are given a definite steer towards ambiguity. The fact that if one inserts 'Lifelong learning' into the Google search engine close to 83 million sites are identified is perhaps a warning in itself that here is a concept which should be approached with some caution.

Despite the need for caution, government agencies in the UK at least are happy to make sweeping statements about lifelong learning. Thus, the Sector Skills Development Agency states:

The strategic significance of Lifelong Learning UK cannot be underestimated. It is the cornerstone of UK-wide policy to widen participation in education and training, to promote social inclusion and to increase prosperity. An increased participation in lifelong learning has the potential to enhance economic productivity and global competitiveness.¹

In so doing the Agency appears, as many do, to have confused lifelong learning with the concept of vocational education and simply ignored a number of other possible interpretations of the term, whilst at the same time asserting that lifelong learning will be a panacea for both social and economic ills, leading to some future utopia.

The opening chapter of *Philosophical Perspectives on Lifelong Learning* should be required reading for all policy-makers and their agencies who believe that the term has a unitary meaning. By setting out as it does the contested nature of the concept and the complex interrelationship of its possible meanings it leads inevitably to a 'pragmatic approach' to how learning is to be understood as lifelong. The pragmatic approach it advocates requires issues concerning politics, values, epistemology, and power to be addressed, and the book sets out effective and innovative responses to the issues which cluster around the concept of lifelong learning. Moreover, *qua* 'pragmatic', the Popperian principles underpinning the book, require also that practical issues be identified and, as best they may, resolved, with these initial resolutions being offered up, as is the book as a whole, for falsification.

¹ www.ssda.org.uk/ (accessed 2 July 2006)

Thus, the readers interested in understanding one of the most pervasive concepts of the twenty-first century will find that the structure of this innovative text leads them from conceptual confusion to clarity, from an apparent value vacuum to a value-rich analysis, from an instrumental to a social/democratic understanding of lifelong learning, with the whole approach being firmly rooted in practice. As a scholarly guide to the journey from concepts to practice it represents a fine example of practical philosophy, and will certainly establish itself as a key text for those interested in understanding the nature of lifelong learning.

Contents

Acknowledgements	ix
Preface	xi
Foreword D.P. Gilroy	xiii
Introduction David N. Aspin	1
Section I: Conceptual Frameworks	
1 Lifelong Learning: Concepts and Conceptions David N. Aspin and Judith D. Chapman	19
2 Lifelong Learning and the Politics of the Learning Society Kenneth Wain	39
3 Lifelong Learning and Vocational Education and Training: Values, Social Capital, and Caring in Work-Based Learning Provision Terry Hyland	57
4 From Adult Education to Lifelong Learning and Back Again Richard G. Edwards	70
5 ‘Framing’ Lifelong Learning in the Twenty-First Century: Towards a Way of Thinking Kevin J. Flint and David Needham	85

Section II: Values Dimension

6 Lifelong Learning: Conceptual and Ethical Issues 109
Kenneth Lawson

7 Lifelong Learning: Beyond Neo-Liberal Imaginary 114
Fazal Rizvi

8 Widening Participation in Higher Education: Lifelong Learning as Capability 131
Melanie Walker

**9 Lifelong Learning: Exploring Learning, Equity and Redress, and Access
An African Discourse on Lifelong Learning:
A South African Case Study 148**
Philip Higgs and Berte van Wyk

10 Lifelong Learning and Democratic Citizenship Education in South Africa 158
Yusef Waghid

Section III: Epistemological Questions

11 Lifelong Learning and Knowledge: Towards a General Theory of Professional Inquiry 173
Colin W. Evers

12 The Nature of Knowledge and Lifelong Learning 189
Jean Barr and Morwenna Griffiths

13 Reading Lifelong Learning Through a Postmodern Lens 211
Robin Usher

Section IV: Lifelong Learning in Practice

14 Good Practice in Lifelong Learning 237
Richard G. Bagnall

15 Philosophical Perspectives on Lifelong Learning: Insights from Education, Engineering, and Economics 258
Mal Leicester, Roger Twelvetrees, and Peter Bowbrick

16 Building a Learning Region: Whose Framework of Lifelong Learning Matters? 275
Shirley Walters

Contents	xvii
17 Changing Ideas and Beliefs in Lifelong Learning?	293
Jane Thompson	
List of Authors: Biographical Details	310
Author Index	316
Subject Index	320

Introduction

David N. Aspin

One of the authors whose work is included in this work asked me, during his writing of a chapter for this book, what I understood by the term ‘symposium’. It would perhaps be helpful to refer such enquirers to the account of the meaning of the term offered by the *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*:

1. A drinking party; a convivial meeting for drinking, conversation and intellectual engagement;
 - b. an account of such a meeting or the conversation at it.
2. A meeting or conference for discussion of some subject; hence, a collection of opinions delivered, or a series of articles contributed, by a number of persons on some special topic.

The second meaning would certainly accord with our present-day understanding of the term ‘Symposium’: we are all familiar with calls to present a paper or participate in a special meeting or series of meetings, devoted to one particular or a related group of topics in a selected theme. Even at ordinary meetings of such aggregated gatherings of groups such as those of The Aristotelian Society, or the Philosophy of Education Societies of Great Britain, the United States, or Australasia, there are often special sessions given over to the analyses and exploration of one particular problem, topic, or issue, or special interest groups providing participants with opportunities to investigate matters of joint mutual interest or current special concern.

The model for the first of the above interpretations may be found in the classical dialogue of Plato’s *The Symposium*. Here a group of friends joined together for an evening meal and entertainment, which developed into a series of explorations on the nature of, and search for, love. The highlights of the dialogue are generally agreed to be the hilarious presentation of Alcibiades and the thoughtful memoranda of Socrates; its tone, content, style, sophistication, good humour, and deep thoughtfulness are such that many classical scholars believe this to be Plato’s most stylistically outstanding dialogue and the finest and best expression of his philosophy.

Certainly one of its key features is that the stories, myths, and arguments are conducted between friends, who know and like each other, and are put forward and developed in the most friendly manner, with little if any of the negative criticisms, backbiting, and aggressiveness that have been believed sometimes to have characterized recent versions of the idea – not least in the world of philosophy of education. At the same time, however, and by contrast, many in the world of philosophy and philosophy of education endeavour to reproduce the atmosphere of the *Symposium*

in their friendly, meandering, informal exchanges, and upstairs late-night kitchen drinks and conversations with each other, which often go on until dawn. They represent the spirit much to be preferred at such conferences and are widely sought after and highly valued, after their conclusion.

It is in such a spirit that this Symposium is conceived and developed: a (printed) gathering between friends and colleagues, drawn together from widely disparate backgrounds and provenances, taken by, and interested in, one of the principal ideas in the chief education discourses of the present – the idea of ‘lifelong learning’. Its composition, spirit, and orientation are that of the ‘Oberseminar’ in German universities: a small group of able people invited to gather together to explore and examine ideas on this common theme and see whether they can come up with any worthwhile and plausible conclusions, which they might then offer to other theoreticians, educators, policy-makers, and people of all kinds involved in the activities and process of teaching and learning, in the service of education more generally. At the end of our enquiry we offer our musings and conclusions on this subject to all those who have a mind and a responsibility to contemplate, consider, and criticize them in the pursuit of their own educational agenda and goals.

The Symposium offered in this volume presents its readers with a range of philosophical perspectives and points of view on which they may base their investigations, explorations, and analyses of the concept and philosophy of lifelong learning. For the editor and the person who first proposed the idea of such a Symposium – Mal Leicester – it constitutes a much needed exploration of concepts and values in post-compulsory and post-formal education in the context of the contemporary emphasis on lifelong learning. Or, to put things in another way, from a philosophical analysis of concepts and values in the current movement towards lifelong learning, some new conceptualizations of continuing and adult education may be seen to emerge.

In 1975 there was a notable addition to, and innovation in, the philosophy of education: an original work was published devoted to the philosophy of lifelong education under the title *Concepts and Values in Adult Education*. Mal Leicester reminded me that this work, first put out by the Department of Adult and Continuing Education in the University of Nottingham, was written by Kenneth Lawson, at that time a lecturer in that department; now in retirement, Kenneth has written some work that is given further appearance in this volume. That book advanced accounts of the concept and values of adult education, and advocated that all educators needed to develop a philosophical approach to issues, topics, and problems in the concept of ‘lifelong education’ that had first been articulated and developed in the Fauré Report for UNESCO in 1972. In 1979 the Open University Press published a revised edition of that earlier publication. Lawson’s original book was influential with adult educators and with students of adult education, partly because his was one of the first books to take ‘philosophy of education’ into the post-school and post-compulsory phase of educational provision.

In those days of the 1970s and 1980s, thinkers such as R.S. Peters, Paul Hirst, and Robert Dearden had shown that philosophical perspectives and philosophical

skills (such as conceptual analysis) could illuminate educational issues, clarify educational aims and objectives, reveal the implicit values and underpinning assumptions in educational theory and practice, and analyse key concepts, such as that of 'education' itself. Such thinkers, however, and indeed *most* writers in the philosophy of education since that time have, in general, directed their attention solely to issues concerning schooling. Indeed, Dearden focused specifically on primary education. Lawson's book, in attending to the concept of 'adult education', and associated concepts and values in the theory and practice of the ideas of *education permanente* and 'lifelong education', had filled an important disciplinary gap in the literature and was meeting a real professional and student need. We believe that, since the time of Lawson's book, there have been no other similar introductions to the philosophy of continuing and adult education, and certainly no volume devoted entirely to the philosophy of the important new realm of lifelong learning. There have been some relevant interdisciplinary, reflective texts, such as those of Paterson's *Values, Education and the Adult*, Williamson's *Lifeworlds and Learning*, and Peter Jarvis's *Ethics and Education for Adults*. However, there has been no text in which, as in Lawson's, the main focus is that of philosophical analysis, exploration, and criticism within the framework of traditional, fundamental philosophical questions.

Of course it could be argued that, since philosophical problems are unsolvable and, therefore, remain unchanged, there can be no need for another such volume. However, philosophical analysis, particularly in a field of practice such as education, is affected by social change, since concepts evolve with a changing social context, as do aims, values, and priorities. Therefore, a new charting, something of a revisiting and a series of attempts to come up with some valid and valuable examination of categories, concepts, and values in lifelong learning for the new millennium may be thought to be long overdue.

One ground for such an examination may be thought to consist of, in particular, the contemporary movement for, stress on, and expansion of, the field of lifelong learning which has influenced our conceptions of post-compulsory education; the movement to mass higher education has substantially influenced and altered our idea of 'The University' and tertiary institutions, their nature, function, and purpose, more generally. Moreover, some philosophers may have also come to believe that current preoccupations with teaching quality and teaching and learning audits demand that we re-examine the concept of teaching and learning quality and the values implicit in approaches to quality assurance. Similarly, contemporary emphasis in the University domain on research assessment raises new research and curriculum-related ethical and epistemological questions. For such philosophers there is the further consideration that, at a theoretical level, the influence of postmodernism has brought traditional philosophical concerns with, and reservations about, epistemological and ethical relativism into the educational arena and has done so sometimes in a somewhat unhelpful and haphazard manner. So, for a number of reasons, we may conclude that engaging in some important 'ground clearing' – clarification through philosophical analysis – in all these and in many other related areas would be timely and helpful.

Lifelong Learning

'Lifelong learning', as Kunzel and others have recognized (Kunzel 2000), is a 'slippery term' (Johnson 2000) meaning different things not only in different contexts but also in the same context to different people. It might even be counted as one of those 'essentially contested concepts' about which Gallie wrote so long ago (Gallie 1956) of which one could only be sure of one thing – that people's analyses and accounts of such terms ('democracy', 'religion', and 'art' were his examples, to which others added 'education') would be a site for the contestation of differing views of their meaning and applicability.

Nevertheless, the term 'lifelong learning' nowadays is almost always used with approval, signifying 'worthwhile' learning, and thus, like 'education', in the context of 'lifelong learning', 'learning' becomes a normative concept (Leicester 2000). However, though 'lifelong learning' has a traditional 'cradle to grave' connotation, it tends to highlight post-school and alternative forms of learning and thus has influenced thinking, policy, and practice in post-compulsory education. Although on some versions of lifelong learning policy its use tends to emphasize vocational education, the UK Government and a number of other bodies and writers – national and international – have urged a 'triadic' conception, embracing personal and political development as well as vocational training. For example, in the UK Government Green Paper on Education of 1998 we read:

As well as securing our economic future, learning has a wider contribution. It helps make ours a civilized society, develops the spiritual side of our lives and promotes active citizenship. (DfEE 1998)

Thompson has argued that apparent agreement about this may in practice mask considerable ideological disagreements (Thompson 2000) and in her reservations about this she finds a ready echo in the contributions of some of the authors in this volume. However, the conceptual analysis and philosophical reflection in the current volume will, we hope, demonstrate that it is logically possible to connect and interrelate the personal, political, and vocational aspects of lifelong learning. This triadic conception is articulated and supported by philosophical argument. Its (adult) educational implications are articulated and explored here, including attention to issues related to widening participation access and equity for post-school learners.

This book seeks to provide a rigorous conceptual analysis of 'formal' and 'informal learning' and of the relationship of 'lifelong learning' to other relevant concepts – 'informal learning', 'post-compulsory learning', 'adult and community education', and so on. It also explores concepts and values in some current accounts, theories, and projects coming under the rubric of 'lifelong learning' and attempts to assess their potential for 'widening participation' in post-compulsory, further, continuing, and adult education.

The audience which this volume seeks to reach is widely varied. Among many others, it includes:

- All those teachers of continuing and adult education who have found Lawson's book helpful but now becoming somewhat dated
- All academics and students in University Continuing Education Departments who want an accessible and up-to-date introduction to some of the key categories, concepts, and values in contemporary programmes of lifelong learning
- Educators, policy-makers, and members of national or local Departments of Education and Tertiary Education with particular interests in lifelong learning
- Educators, officers, and agents of national and international government institutions, departments, and organizations (both governmental and non-governmental), who wish to develop, deliberate, and deliver courses, curricula, and programmes founded on, and incorporating, the ideas and agenda of lifelong learning as a prelude and part of their developing of principles, policies, and plans that they will provide, offer, or make available to all those seeking access to courses and programmes coming under the rubric of lifelong learning
- Higher education academics concerned with teaching quality assurance or research assessment
- Students who find philosophical approaches to such topics in their educational studies complicated and somewhat difficult, for whom this book seeks to provide a comprehensive and easily accessible up-to-date text with which they may develop their interest in an increasingly important topic, and reference to its various controversies and difficulties, in their pre-service, in-service, and postgraduate courses
- Students and teachers in the field of the philosophy of education who have academic and scholarly interests in the field of lifelong education (i.e. interests which go beyond the schooling sector)

The proffered exploration and analysis of categories, concepts, and values in the context of current theories, versions, and schemes of 'Lifelong Learning' use the same philosophical tools as those earlier employed by Lawson and others – a philosophical analysis of concepts and values but in particular economic and sociocultural contexts. The conceptual analysis, philosophical reflection and argument, and the general principles for practice which emerge are all of *international* interest, provenance, relevance, and current concern.

The chapters in this volume are organized into four sections:

- (1) Conceptual Frameworks – conceptual issues towards sketching out some reconceptualization of lifelong learning
- (2) Values Dimension – ethical issues
- (3) Epistemological Questions – epistemological issues (including implications for research and curriculum development)
- (4) Lifelong Learning in Practice – pedagogical issues (the more practical implications including attention to policy issues, widening participation, teaching quality, and family learning)

The chapters may be summarized as follows.

In Chapter One 'Lifelong Learning: Concepts and Conceptions', David Aspin and Judith Chapman begin by noting that, although the term 'lifelong learning' is

used in a wide variety of contexts and has a wide currency, its meaning is often unclear. It is perhaps for that reason that its operationalization and implementation has not been widely practised or achieved and such application as it has had, has been achieved primarily on a piecemeal basis. They show that the topic of 'Lifelong Learning' has been the subject of a range of various attempts at analysis, exploration, and justification for some time now – since the publication of the UNESCO 1972 Report of the Fauré Committee, to further analysis and exploration in the Report of the UNESCO Delors Committee in 1996; and the Reports of the OECD, the European Parliament, and the Nordic Council in the later 1990s. Since the time of such publications policy-makers in countries, agencies, and institutions widely have been urging that a 'lifelong learning' approach is an idea to be promoted in education policies as providing a strong foundation to underpin education, social inclusion, and individual opportunities for personal growth and emancipation. Yet there is a dearth of information as to the meanings and values implied by policy-makers' use of, and commitment to, such ideas and values of 'lifelong learning'.

In this chapter David and Judith review some versions of lifelong learning, set out some conceptions of education they imply, and seek to show in what ways those concepts may be partial, faulty, misleading, or mistaken. In place of deficient and restricted versions of the idea, their suggestion is to take a pragmatic look at the problems that policy-makers are addressing when urging that learning be lifelong and open to, and engaged in, by all people. This may help us accept that, just as there is a myriad of such problems, some of them unique to particular countries, educational systems, or institutions, some much more general and widespread, so there will be differences, not only in kind but also in degree of complexity and sophistication, in the type and scale of the solutions proffered to them. They end by advocating adopting a pragmatic approach as one of the principal modes of operation in the examination and attempted solution of one of the more serious problems facing education today: what departments, systems, and countries, what national and international institutions, agencies, and organizations of learning, ought to do about the various challenges posed for us by the need for our policies of education to be 'lifelong'.

In Chapter Two 'Lifelong Learning and the Politics of the Learning Society', Kenneth Wain shares his thinking formed over the long time since he first researched the concept of lifelong learning. He reminds us that a central notion in the UNESCO literature of lifelong education in the 1970s and after was that of the learning society. The notion, he maintains, had strategic pedagogical implications and emerged from two considerations: (1) the idea that we should consider all kinds of learning, not just the formal but the non-formal and informal also as educationally relevant; and (2) the idea intrinsic to lifelong education that education transcends schooling, that its concerns infiltrate the whole of society, in short, that it is not just lifelong but also lifewide. He refers to the idea of the learning society, proposed in the Fauré Report of 1972, as a utopian aspiration waiting to be realized; the question the Report raised was what *kind* of learning society is desirable, politically and socially. In other words, the Fauré Report *theorized* a learning society with a particular ideological core. Since then, postmodern thinking seems to have

proclaimed the end of theory, an end which seems to have been reflected also in a discourse that, with the new millennium, has seen the ascendancy of lifelong learning over lifelong education. This discourse suggests a different way of approaching the idea of a learning society; not as a theory to be constructed but as a concrete reality that awaits deconstruction. Wain suggests that neither approach need be rejected, that both may be needed for different purposes, and that the latter points to the need to rehabilitate education.

In Chapter Three ‘Lifelong Learning and Vocational Education and Training: Values, Social Capital, and Caring in Work-Based Learning Provision’, Terry Hyland points to the two main objectives of lifelong learning policy, theory, and practice in Britain – and also to a large extent in Europe and Australasia. These, he shows, are concerned with the development of vocational skills to enhance economic productivity, and the fostering of social inclusion and civic cohesion. Direct links are made between inclusion and economic prosperity in the UK government’s White Paper, where it is argued that education policy must be driven by a ‘vision of a society where high skills, high rewards, and access to education and training are open to everyone’. Although this policy does, to some degree, represent a change from the rampant neo-liberalism of the 1980s and 1990s in Britain, the promotion of economic capital always has pride of place and there is a real danger that the social capital objectives of contemporary vocational education and training (VET) may be neglected in the obsession with economic competitiveness. Since work-based learning (WBL) is now a central element in most current VET policy initiatives in Britain, Hyland ends by suggesting that attention to the systematic management and support of learning on WBL programmes – with due emphasis given to the important social values dimension of vocationalism – can go some way to achieving the crucial social objectives of lifelong learning. To these, other important non-vocational and personal values might well be attached.

In Chapter Four ‘From Adult Education to Lifelong Learning and Back Again’, Richard Edwards notes that, over the last 10–15 years, there has been an increasing ordering of the practices of post-school education and training within a discourse of lifelong learning. This is particularly the case in the OECD countries and in transnational organizations such as the OECD and EU. While this discourse itself is not new, the significance of its uptake and by whom, has resulted in a challenge to some of the traditional conceptions of adult education. Here there is an attempt to reframe the educational discourse through policy-led approaches, which also appeal to those who have long supported learning that takes place outside of educational institutions. This challenge has had various and varying effects around the globe, dependent in part on the nature of those established traditions and the relative strength of different interest groups and their educational starting points and priorities. Richard draws upon aspects of poststructuralism and actor network theory to discuss the ways in which adult education is reordered – both brought forth and regulated – through the discourses of lifelong learning. In the process, he discusses the ways in which discourses of learning ambiguously both reinforce the power of educational institutions as the authorisers of worthwhile learning through assessment and challenge that authority by positioning learning as part of all social

practices. He concludes by arguing that there is a need to reinvigorate an educational discourse around curriculum and pedagogy in response to current emphases on learning.

Finally in Chapter Five 'A Question Concerning Lifelong Learning', the last in Section One, Kevin Flint and David Needham look at such concerns from a Heideggerian perspective. They note that, in England and Wales, an orthodoxy seems to have emerged in all parts of the political spectrum in which lifelong learning in its many different guises is used as the means of enabling people within the workplace to keep up with the juggernaut of knowledge transfer that is changing the nature of competition within the modern world. As a result, governments and their various agencies have no other choice than to continually argue for an up-skilling of the workforce by developing strategies under the guise of lifelong learning. In following this doctrine both practitioners and workers are obliged to develop strategies within the frame of lifelong learning. They ask whether the up-skilling of the 'workforce' used by decision-makers represents a crude form of human capital theory with lifelong learning as the plaster to put upon the ills created by an inexorable process of change. In a similar vein, academics are also faced, and perhaps phased, with stakeholder expectations as they attempt to master what lifelong learning is. They query whether organizations both within and outside the education system have become focused upon the idea of lifelong learning as a means of coming to terms with change. These two questions are at the heart of this chapter. Using Heidegger's approach to questioning, Kevin and David seek to uncover and explore the silent force of Being which structures the means by which practitioners and academics attempt to come to terms with what lifelong learning 'is'. They seek to uncover and explore the extent to which 'enframing' comes to stand as the driving force behind the means by which stakeholders continually attempt to make sense of the meaning of lifelong learning.

Section Two begins with a contribution from one of the earliest writers in the philosophy of lifelong learning, Kenneth Lawson. In Chapter Six 'Ethical Issues in Lifelong Learning', Kenneth attempts to identify issues raised by, or involved in, the theory and practice of lifelong learning. 'Learning how' and 'learning that': ability to learn in both senses, he maintains, is a characteristic of human beings. In a general sense, we learn from the processes of everyday life. We 'learn' from newspapers, journals relevant to work, and leisure. Typically we 'learn' the state of 'trouble spots' in the world from a daily newspaper. We 'learn' from local gossip and from the theatre. The ethical issues Kenneth raises here are mainly concerned with the accuracy of what is learned. This is most important when one is reading the daily newspaper or using other media. Public trust and a capacity for scepticism are required. Aids to learning and putative instruments of social control have been, and to some extent still are, embodied in the family of organizations, which include (in English) 'Adult Education', 'Adult Learning', 'Continuing Education', and 'Further education'. Central ethical issues include 'accuracy and trustworthiness of learning resources'. In this last area of enquiry and activity, political influence may present some risks or dangers. Kenneth points to the critical importance of the role of learning in the ideas and matters of political control – democratic citizenship

being a central value in the whole tradition of adult education and now of lifelong learning. Ethical issues are also central here: he points out that much of the agenda of vocationally based learning generally addresses the needs and interests of industry and commerce rather than maintaining the interests of the learner as a primary orientation, except insofar as they may be characterized as social capital. He draws attention to the possible biases and vested interests that might influence direct, and distort lifelong learning these days. He notes especially the bias towards economic efficiency and ‘national interests’ implicit in much (maybe even most) lifelong learning. Throughout the chapter Kenneth argues that, in these latter respects, the central ethical issues centre on trust, professional ethics, and the availability of reliable materials and organizations to aid and promote lifelong learning. He concludes by advocating that lifelong learning should therefore include the development of critical resources and a good deal of scepticism in learners. He points to the need for the development of attitudes and values of scepticism and the powers of critical capacity in all learners as central areas for development, especially in and through lifelong learning.

In Chapter Seven ‘Global Economy and the Constructions of Lifelong Learning’, Fazal Rizvi argues that the current notions of lifelong learning are located within a social imaginary about how the world of work and social relations is becoming transformed by globalization, and how, in such a world, the function of education must be re-conceptualized, to meet the needs of the global economy characterized as informational, knowledge-based, post-industrial, and service-orientated. Such an economy demands not only the development of ‘post-Fordist’ regimes of labour management but also systems of education that produce new kinds of workers who are motivated by concerns of industrial productivity and are ‘self-regulating’ and ‘self-capitalizing’. Fazal maintains that this imaginary is based on a human capital theory of education, which views all education largely as a matter of economic exchange. He contends that ultimately this view is based on a set of assumptions not only about the nature of economic activity but also about the nature of citizenship itself – about what it means to learn, work, and live in human communities.

He argues that there is nothing inevitable about this world view and that it is possible to imagine alternatives to the hegemonic neo-liberal construction of lifelong learning, including those that highlight the importance of building critical, reflective, and democratic communities in which learners are encouraged to understand, throughout their lives, the constantly changing nature of the relationship between the local and the global.

In Chapter Eight ‘Widening Participation in Higher Education: Towards Lifelong Learning as Capability’, Melanie Walker seeks to make a contribution to the development and extension of the theoretical frameworks and understandings of good practice for a social justice approach to lifelong learning. She focuses on the concepts and values of widening participation and higher education as a process of interwoven critical engagement with knowledge of identity formation, and of agency development, which she maintains are key issues for learning that is lifelong and that enables us to make informed choices about our lives and the societies in which we live. She draws philosophically on the ‘capability’ approach, as developed

in particular by Martha Nussbaum, for her emphasis on human flourishing and the ethical importance of each and every person as an end in themselves. But she also draws from Amartya Sen's philosophical approach to capability as the freedom for diverse people to choose a life they have reason to value. Crucially, she argues, educational development should focus on what people are actually able to be and do, personally and in comparison with others. The capability approach, she reminds us, focuses on people's own reflective, informed choice of ways of living that they deem important and valuable, and their self-determination of ends and values in life. This she contrasts with human capital approaches which measure the value of higher education in terms of its national economic returns and impact on gross domestic product (GDP). In this argument, agency is a central idea, closely connected to human well-being. The capability approach contributes, in Melanie's view, to a conceptualization and practice of justice in higher education and a robust challenge to dominant human capital approaches to lifelong learning. Melanie's conclusion is that the capability approach as a philosophical and practical framework promotes better and fairer outcomes, judged by social justice criteria, while also providing a critique of current higher education and social structures of inequality.

In Chapter Nine 'Lifelong Learning: Exploring Learning, Equity and Redress, and Access', Philip Higgs and Berte van Wyk bring to bear some considerations for the values dimension of lifelong learning policies, by exploring current approaches to ideas and policies of lifelong learning in South Africa. This they categorize as accountable according to three basic principles in education. Firstly, they explore the idea of learning as central to both economic and social cohesion. This dual emphasis suggests to them that lifelong learning cannot simply be driven by a need to secure economic prosperity but has also to focus on the 'capacity of citizens to exercise and enforce democratic rights and participate effectively in decision making', as the South African National Plan for Higher Education indicates. Secondly, they explore learning in relation to developing in citizens the capacity to face challenges centring round issues of equity and redress. Thirdly, Philip and Berte focus on the notion and value of access to, and in, higher education. They contend that particular groups such as Africans, women, non-traditional learners, students from working class and rural backgrounds, the disabled and adults are not as yet equitably represented in the higher education system in South Africa. There are doubtless many other countries where the same could be said of such key concepts and values as equity, access, right of entry, and securing opportunities for participation in gaining admittance to programmes that come under the rubric of lifelong learning.

The democratic and social aims and values of lifelong learning are further elaborated upon in Chapter Ten 'Lifelong Learning and Democratic Citizenship in South Africa' by Yusef Waghid. Yusef reports that, since the demise of apartheid education in South Africa in 1994, the idea of 'transformation' has become synonymous with the democratization of education institutions. Lifelong learning – whether formal, non-formal, or informal – seen as learning throughout a person's life is considered by many policy-makers, researchers, and educationists as that mode of learning which ought to guide education transformation and which can contribute to the 'educatedness' of every citizen in the country, in particular seeking

to cultivate in citizens the capacity for enhancing their economic, political, and social responsiveness to a society whose democracy is constantly in the making. His contribution takes as an example a snapshot look at lifelong learning in relation to university education, with specific emphasis on the transformative potential of democratic citizenship education in opening up possibilities to engender more critical, deliberative, and responsible citizens. Yusef seeks to present a case for lifelong learning to be connected to achieving a democratic citizenship agenda. He then examines the notion of what university education in South Africa ought to be like, in relation to a democratic citizenship agenda for lifelong learning. Putting this a little differently, he explores and concludes by showing how criticism, deliberation, and responsibility, as instances of democratic citizenship education, can contribute towards lifelong learning and, hence, a defensible form of university education.

Section Three is taken up with some epistemological and methodological issues. In Chapter Eleven 'The Nature of Knowledge and Inquiry', Colin Evers adumbrates the idea that our knowledge is like a map by which we steer our way through the natural (and therefore the social) world. Such maps are better or worse, he argues, to the extent that they enable us to do better than chance in both formulating good goals and attaining them. The case for lifelong learning, he maintains, resides largely in the fact that, in important respects, our knowledge goes out of date more rapidly nowadays, either because the world changes in ways that render the map less useful for navigation, or because inquiry leads to new knowledge that renders the old obsolete. Drawing on work in the tradition of naturalistic epistemology, in general, and cognitive neuroscience, in particular, Colin attempts to cash out 'the map' metaphor by defending a view of both the representation and the dynamics of knowledge. Arguing from this perspective, he proposes a more general thesis about epistemically progressive inquiry across the lifespan. This has the following features: it is holistic in that it applies in the same way to a range of different areas of inquiry; it is empirical in that it takes into account feedback from experience; it is coherent in that knowledge is justified by appeal to coherence criteria of justification; and it is naturalistic in that models of cognitive biological mechanisms are proposed that realize this view of the nature of knowledge, representation, and inquiry. Thus, Colin provides us with an account and a research agenda that helps place lifelong learning with recent work in epistemology pointing to the 'Webs of Belief' that each individual develops, possesses, and puts to work in attempting to make sense of reality.

A slightly different perspective is set out for us in Chapter Twelve 'The Nature of Knowledge and Lifelong Learning' by Jean Barr and Morwenna Griffiths. They start from the position that lifelong learning is more than is assumed in current policy rhetoric. They refer to the use of that rhetoric, which focuses on training for a 'knowledge economy' in which all citizens play their part. They argue that this rhetoric depends on a view of knowledge as instrumental, individual, and disembodied. Against this Jean and Morwenna propose a notion of knowledge as social, embodied, and reflexive about its own roots in time and space. It is this notion that underpins the richer, more democratic notion of lifelong learning that they explore, using examples drawn from diverse sites, especially museum and art education 'from cradle to grave'.

Yet a third point of view informs the approach to a question concerning lifelong learning raised in Chapter Thirteen 'Reading Lifelong Learning through a Postmodern Lens' by Robin Usher. Robin places lifelong learning as discursive policy and practice under a postmodern lens, even whilst recognizing from the outset that there is no such single lens but rather a multiplicity. Nonetheless, he believes that certain common themes can be detected and he hopes that these may emerge in the course of examining lifelong learning in this way. He draws upon two philosophers who perhaps more than any others exemplify the postmodern turn in scholarly discourses and do so in perhaps the most extreme form. The first is Baudrillard, whose notions of *simulation* and *hyper-reality* Robin employs to read lifelong learning in the context of a society of signs where lifelong learning is located in lifestyle practices based on the consumption of signs. The second is Deleuze with his notions of *strata* and *rhizomes*. Lifelong learning can be read both as being trapped in the repressive and homogenizing strata of contemporary capitalism whilst also being a rhizomatic practice that is lifewide as well as lifelong, surfacing in a variety of spaces and entwined in other practices. Robin concedes that his reading may seem to some to be something of an extreme but he says that he has adopted, undertaken, and engaged in this approach deliberately, in order that he may draw out the philosophical underpinnings of the postmodern and then through that to *critique* some of the assumptions that undergird dominant understandings of lifelong learning.

Section Four tackles the question of the delineation and possible realization of some of the approaches to the provision of, and policies for, securing access to, and participation in, both formal and alternative models and programmes of lifelong learning. In Chapter Fourteen 'Good Practice in Lifelong Learning', Richard Bagnall warns us that the translation of lifelong learning theory into educational practice raises a number of important issues. Although these issues are, to some extent at least, immanent to the theory, Richard points out that our experience of them is heightened in periods of educational reform associated with the implementation of lifelong learning theory. He examines what are arguably the more important of these issues – those arising from the focus in lifelong learning theory on learning outcomes and on the existential realities of individual learners. He notes that some of these positions have led to charges of value relativism, of the privatization of educational responsibility, and of miseducation through a wide range of effects, including the loss of curricular coherence, a preoccupation with training, a focus on learning in non-educational contexts, the commodification of education, an erosion of important conceptual distinctions, and a focus on issues of immediate interest or concern. He argues that while the claim or experience of value relativism is a serious and potentially disabling misreading of lifelong learning theory, the privatization of educational responsibility is an inherent feature in more welfare-driven contexts of reform. However, charges of miseducation are sustainable only from educational perspectives that are significantly divergent from that of lifelong learning theory. From a lifelong learning perspective, he suggests, educational reform in such oppositional contexts may be resisted and subverted, but its quality should fall short of its theoretical potential only to the extent that its implementation

is denied, diminished, or subverted. It seems to Richard that these issues would seem to be likely to affect adversely the quality of lifelong learning practice and to generate opposition and resistance to it. To understand the issues and how they may be managed could be important in minimizing their adverse effects. Richard's argument is directed to furthering that understanding.

After this highly important setting of the scene, and with its warnings in mind, we may go on to examine some significant examples. In Chapter Fifteen 'Practical Philosophy, Education, and Lifelong Learning', Mal Leicester, Roger Twelvetrees, and Peter Bowbrick show some of the ways in which approaches to lifelong learning have been, and are being, developed in some professional settings, as instances of what might be done to realize some of the aims of lifelong learning. In the first part of their chapter they explore traditional tools of philosophy (conceptual analysis, ethical reflection, and epistemological critique) applied to education (the philosophy of education) in the context of lifelong learning. Their analysis of 'lifelong learning' seeks to demonstrate how conceptual analysis increases clarity and yields ethical and epistemological questions worthy of exploration. In the second, less traditional, part of the chapter, they take seriously the pragmatism at the heart of the movement to, and concept of, lifelong learning. They apply and develop a notion of practical philosophy, drawing on Wittgensteinian ideas ('Look and See'). They illustrate their notion of 'practical philosophy' by reference to the use of narrative in educational research and the practices of pragmatic disciplines such as engineering. Practical philosophy, they find, makes possible a new kind of synthesis of educational theory and practice. In conclusion, they seek to show how practical philosophy, though practical, remains nonetheless genuinely philosophical.

In Chapter Sixteen 'Lifelong Learning and Learning Regions', we encounter a version of lifelong learning that ties it in with notions of geographical distribution and availability. Shirley Walters reminds us of the notion of 'contested concepts'. She notes that lifelong learning, like democracy, is a highly contested term with its meanings closely tied to theories of socio-economic development. As with democracy, she maintains that lifelong learning can stay at the symbolic or rhetorical level. Moving it from this realization to considered policies and practices Shirley reveals that we quickly realize how complex and contextually enmeshed the concept of lifelong learning turns out to be. A particular example of such conceptual contestability may be found in the idea of 'learning regions', an idea that is being strongly applied and developed in certain environments and countries across the international arena. The development of 'learning regions' in various parts of the world provides fertile ground for understanding how lifelong learning is enmeshed in the socio-economic and political approaches in a region. Shirley refers to, and employs, the development of indicators in one learning region as a vehicle for highlighting how complex and contested lifelong learning is. This notion is also used to identify a range of paradoxes, which are at the heart of lifelong learning. Shirley briefly describes a research project in assessing approaches to the formulation and implementation of a policy for 'Learning Regions' in South Africa. She describes the research methodology and present background to the idea of 'learning regions' and their characteristics, and then discusses the Learning Cape Indicators Project

located within the debates on development within South Africa. This enables her to identify, analyse, and discuss some of the pertinent issues for researching indicators and for undertaking related lifelong learning programmes and projects – a most interesting and worthwhile undertaking for any of our readers attempting to realize lifelong learning policies on the ground, so to speak.

In Chapter Seventeen ‘Changing Ideas and Beliefs in Lifelong Learning’, the final contribution from one of our colleagues working in this area, we seem to bring the circle of philosophical analyses, explorations, and criticisms of ideas and theories of lifelong learning to full circle. Jane Thompson addresses the question of what currently counts as lifelong learning in the context of changing political, economic, and educational trends in advanced capitalist societies and advances an argument as to why it is necessary to interrogate and challenge particular interpretations that are currently dominant and fashionable. Her animadversions on such questions are in line with much of the thinking that has informed and characterized many of the chapters in this volume. For her part, she concludes with the parting comment that, when the current state of lifelong learning gets written about by future historians, it will no doubt illustrate at least two well-known clichés of the age – those to do with rearranging deckchairs and fiddling whilst Rome burns. In writing on lifelong learning in this way Jane delineates and finds fellow feeling, in a trenchant form, with some of the criticisms that have been articulated in some of the previous chapters in this book. For there is no doubt that some of our philosophical colleagues’ presentations and arguments tend to be expressions or illustrations of the standpoint that much of the agenda, purpose, and ideals of the idea of lifelong learning have been suborned and accommodated to the values and ideology of approaches that concentrate upon the economic aspect of the notion of ‘lifelong learning’, to the diminution or even the exclusion of those other aspects to which some others would ascribe equal, if not greater, importance. These will include the ideas and ideals of social emancipation and inclusion, democratic empowerment and participation, and personal growth and improvement.

These are ideas that find equal place in key policy documents advancing or exploring policies of lifelong learning, published by, or emanating from, such key international bodies, organizations, and agencies as the OECD, UNESCO, the European Parliament, and the Nordic Council of Scandinavian Governments. Indeed it was in the directorates of international agencies and institutions, such as those instanced above, that the urgency of underlining the function of lifelong learning as a means of social improvement and personal growth, and the critical importance of narrowing the gap between citizens based on access (or lack of it) to increased opportunities for learning and personal development was first raised and drawn attention to. Maybe equal attention ought to be paid again to the conclusions of the deliberations and publications of the reports of such bodies on these matters, to see whether or not the situation for lifelong learners is as negative as some people suppose.

This Symposium will, I believe, have the useful function of helping those seriously interested in the concept of ‘lifelong learning’ to draw much of this kind of thinking together, sketching out a summary of some of the main lines of theory and policy analysis, assessment, principles, and values that have been explored and

elaborated upon in this volume. Of course, this view is only a *mélange* of contributions from a different range of philosophical perspectives, and it is restricted in the sense that we have a very limited number of such perspectives presented in this book. There could have been many others and I am aware of the volume's shortcomings in that respect. Be that as it may, it seems to me that some lines of argument have been set out and developed, some concepts analysed, theories criticized, and innovations attempted, all of which have added much material for further reflection, criticism, and creation to the body of philosophical literature developing from, and associated with, the idea of 'lifelong learning'. It is hoped that all those colleagues in educational theory and practice – philosophers or not – who are interested or involved in analysing, examining, and developing new conceptions, accounts, and versions of 'lifelong learning', new theories and values for exploration, implementation, and assessment, will find material in this Symposium of assistance to them in their studies, research, and writing of analyses, policies, and programmes of activities that may, however loosely or peripherally, be seen under the heading of 'lifelong learning'. It is for their use that the colleagues whose views are set out in this volume have been working.

References

- Aspin, D.N. and Chapman, J.D. (2001) Lifelong learning: concepts and conceptions, *International Journal of Lifelong Education*.
- CEP (2000) *A Memorandum on Lifelong Learning*. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities. SE2 (2000) 1832.
- Dearden, R.F. (1968) *The Philosophy of Primary Education*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Delors, J. (1996) *Learning. The Treasure Within*. Paris: UNESCO.
- European Parliament – Commission of the European Communities (1995) *Amended Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Decision Establishing a European Year of Lifelong Learning*. Brussels: European Parliament.
- Fauré, E. et al. (1972) *Learning to Be: The World of Education Today and Tomorrow*. Paris: UNESCO.
- Field, J. and Leicester, M. (2000) (Eds) *Lifelong Learning. Education Across the Lifespan*. London: Routledge Falmer.
- Gallie, W.B. (1964) *Philosophy and the Historical Understanding*. London: Chatto & Windus.
- Gallie, W.B. (1956) Essentially contested concepts. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, LVI.
- Hirst, P.H. and Peters, R.S. (1970) *The Logic of Education*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Hyland, T. (1999) *Vocational Studies, Lifelong Learning and Social Values*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
- Hyland, T. (2002) Third way values and post-school education policy, *Journal of Education Policy*, 17(2), 245–258.
- Jarvis, P. (Ed) (1991) *Twentieth Century Thinkers in Adult Education*. London: Croom Helm.
- Johnston, R. (2000) Community education and lifelong learning: local spice for global fare? In: Field, J. and Leicester, M. (Eds) *Perspectives on Lifelong Learning. Education Across the Lifespan*. London: Falmer Press.
- Kunzel, K. (2000) Europe and lifelong learning: investigating the political and educational rationale of expansionism. In: Field, J. and Leicester, M. (Eds) *Perspectives on Lifelong Learning. Education Across the Lifespan*. London: Falmer Press.
- Lawson, K. (1974) *Concepts and Values in Adult Education*. Nottingham, UK: University Press.

- Leicester, M. (2000) Post postmodernism and continuing education, *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 19(1) (January–February), 73–81.
- Locke, J. (1924) *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nordic Council of Ministers, The (1995) *The Golden Riches in the Grass – Lifelong Learning for All*. Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers.
- OECD (1996) *Learning. Realising a Lifelong Approach for All*. Paris: OECD.
- Paterson, R.W.K. (1979) *Values, Education and the Adult* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Peters, R.S. (1966) *Ethics and Education*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Smith, A. (1776) *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. Edinburgh, UK.
- UK Government Department for Education and Employment (1998) *The Learning Age: A Renaissance for a New Britain* (Green Paper) CH3790. London: HMSO.
- UK Government Department for Education and Skills (2001) *Opportunity and Skills in the Knowledge-Driven Economy*. London: HMSO Department for Education and Skills (DfES), p.6.
- UK Government Department of Trade and Industry (1998) *Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge Driven Economy*. London: HMSO.
- Williamson, B. (1998). *Lifeworlds and Learning*. Leicester, UK: NIACE.

Section I
Conceptual Frameworks

Chapter 1

Lifelong Learning: Concepts and Conceptions

David N. Aspin and Judith D. Chapman

The Concept of ‘Lifelong Learning’ for All

Although the term ‘lifelong learning’ is used in a wide variety of contexts and has a wide currency, its meaning is often unclear. One of the early writers on the topic Gelpi (1984) bemoaned the lack of conceptual clarity and argued that there was a need for a clear definition of the term. The problem, he maintained, was that, while one could be reasonably clear about the meaning and applicability of such terms as ‘vocational education’, ‘technical education’, and ‘nurse education’, no such clarity could be found in the case of terms with much less specific points of application, such as ‘lifelong education’, particularly when a range of other apparently similar terms – *education permanente*, ‘further education’, ‘continuing education’, and so on – were often used interchangeably with it and with each other.

Other writers on the topic have maintained that there is no point in trying to apply the term ‘lifelong education’. They claim that such a term seeks to generalize the reference of the notion of ‘education’ to such a wide set of parameters as virtually to empty it of all meaning. Still others have acted as though the term ‘lifelong education’ were simply another way of alluding to those educational endeavours and opportunities that were offered after the end of formal schooling and thus was interchangeable and synonymous with terms that had wider currency, such as ‘adult education’, ‘careers education’, or ‘recurrent education’ (Stock 1979).

Yet another group have commented that, while there may be enough examples around in the history of educational philosophy of such key ideas as ‘liberal education’ or ‘moral education’ to offer discussants a reasonably firm point of purchase, there is so little said about ‘lifelong education’ in the educational philosophy literature, and discourse that there is almost nothing on which we can get a grip in our attempts to give a clear account of those elements that we may discern as being cardinal to or indicative of its meaning and application.

Richard Bagnall usefully highlighted the various differences between approaches to understanding the concept (Bagnall 1990). He noted that at least four main functions for the notion of ‘lifelong education’ have been assigned to the term in the literature:

- The preparation of individuals *for* the management of their adult lives (White 1982, p.132)
- The distribution of education *throughout* an individual's lifespan (Kulich 1982)
- The educative function *of* the whole of one's life experience (Peña-Borrero 1984)
- The identification of education *with* the whole of life (Lengrand 1979)

Furthermore, Bagnall identified another interpretation as constituting what he calls 'the Programme' of 'Lifelong Education':

that particular programmatic use of the term which has been developed through and in association with the UNESCO Lifelong Education Unit, and which Cropley (1979a, p.105) terms the 'maximalist position'. This position is that which sees lifelong education as involving a fundamental transformation of society, so that the whole society becomes a learning resource for each individual. (Cropley 1979a, p.105)

Exploring Alternative Approaches to Conceptualising Lifelong Learning

In this chapter we review some of the more robust versions of the concept of lifelong learning, set out the main lines of the conceptions of education articulated in them, show in what ways those conceptions might be partial, deficient, or fallacious, and then go on to suggest an alternative. Our analysis begins with a scrutiny of the notion that an agreed 'essential' definition of 'lifelong education' can be achieved, moves on to the search for such a definition, and then embarks on an examination of two of the most widely held views of 'lifelong education': one that is termed the 'maximalist' position; and the other that sees lifelong learning as an extension of the deliberate and planned interventions characteristic of 'education proper'. Operating from a post-empiricist standpoint, we argue that such searches are misconceived and rest on a false view of the nature of sciences and of concepts. We challenge the essentialism of the definitional approach and the claims to objectivity of the 'liberal education extended' account of lifelong education; and we reject the relativism of the maximalist position. In their place we proffer a pragmatic, problem-solving approach.

The Vain Quest for Definitions

There is an important point to be made when one is considering the positions that have been taken in the past in respect to the concept of lifelong learning and the arguments that have been put forward by various proponents of these positions. It seems to us that differences in and between various versions of 'lifelong education' are functions, not only of particular educational, moral, or political commitments, but also of a particular meta-theory at work in the philosophy of lifelong education.

In some versions of the term, and in various attempts to produce a clear account of it, we may discern the presence and operation of a particular preconception. In many writers' work on lifelong education, there seems to be an implicit acceptance of the notion that it is possible to arrive at some uniform descriptive definition of the term 'lifelong education', which all could then accept and take as a kind of *primum datum*; and that, if there were not such a definition already available, then there ought to be. The common postulate shared by many writers – particularly the earlier ones – seems to be that unambiguous agreement on the meaning and applicability of the term is conceivable, possible, and attainable. In this tacit assumption we see evidence that these writers on lifelong education appear to be operating according to the logic and dictates of an empiricist approach to concepts and meaning (see Dave 1975; Cropley 1979; Gelpi 1985; Lengrand 1975, 1986; and Richmond and Stock 1979).

The main feature observable in the work of such writers is their holding of preconceptions about definition that may be described as 'essentialist'. This is the notion that it is possible, and indeed philosophically proper, for participants in discussion about any such term in educational discourse to employ the methods of etymological derivation, dictionary definition, or the sharp-cutting tools of conceptual analysis (looking for those cases that all can agree to be 'central' or 'peripheral' to allowable utterance employing the terms in question), in order to arrive at some kind of agreement about the separately 'necessary' and conjointly 'sufficient' conditions that will underpin and define the direction of discourse employing this term.

That this presumption and *modus operandi* encapsulate a mistaken view of meaning and intelligibility has been common coinage for some time now (see arguments and sources cited in Aspin 1996a, b). It has been subjected to the formidable *elenchus* of the criticisms advanced against it by such powerful antilocutors as Popper, Wittgenstein, and Quine, to say nothing of more modern writers such as Rorty (1979) or Bernstein (1983). As a result of this *critique* we may now accept their point that this particular view can be called seriously into question if not decisively refuted. Instead of falling into the fallacy of seeking to achieve clarity about or understanding of the 'essential', 'basic', or 'central' meaning of the term 'lifelong education' according to such rubrics, we believe it is time to start on the search for other expedients.

The notion that the quest for 'essential' definitions was legitimate was held in an earlier era where students of education accepted the academic tenability and conformed to the dictates of the empiricist paradigm, tending only to engage in activities of conceptual analysis, pursuing philosophical enquiries, and developing and applying research designs and instruments exclusively based upon it. Recently, however, researchers in education and the social sciences have moved towards an approach based on advances in epistemology and methodology, that arise from post-empiricist work in philosophy and the philosophy of science, such as that of Popper (1943, 1949, 1960, 1972), Lakatos (1976, 1978), and Quine (1951, 1953, 1974).

In opposition to the thesis of empiricism, the main burden of the counter-arguments has been to show that there is no such distinction as that supposed to subsist between philosophy and empirical science, fact and value, or, come to that, between

policy analysis and policy formation. For Quine, Popper, and many others, all language and all enquiries are inescapably and *ab initio* theory-laden, far from value-free, and a mixture of both descriptive and normative elements. Indeed, says Kovesi (1967), in all discourse and enquiry, there is an unbroken continuum, at one end of which lies ‘fact’ and at the other end lies ‘value’. Description, for such thinkers, is a way of evaluating reality; evaluation is a way of describing states of affairs.

Such arguments are used powerfully by such post-empiricist thinkers in education as Evers and Lakomski (1991) to develop a new approach to the elucidation of problems in educational discourse and policy. On this view all our talk on these matters is conceived of as being in itself a ‘theory’, embodying a complex ‘web of belief’ (see Quine and Ullian 1970), shot through differentially with descriptive and evaluative elements, according to the contexts and purposes of which our theories of education, policy, and administration are brought to bear and applied in our world.

For such reasons it can be argued that there is a need, in philosophical activities devoted to a thorough-going, intellectually responsible enquiry into such matters as lifelong education, to fuse description–evaluation, fact–value, quantitative–qualitative methods in new forms of enquiry, that are valuable both for the researcher and the policy-maker in educational matters. Such an approach would involve both groups in a common enterprise – what Lakatos (1976, 1982) might have seen as a ‘progressive research programme’ – of seeking to gain understanding and promote policy generation about lifelong education. On this account future work in the philosophy of education would be well advised to consider the adoption of approaches of this kind (see, e.g. Wain 1985).

In this enterprise, we do not attempt to reduce everything to some absolute foundations of ‘fact’ and ‘value’, ‘theory’ and ‘practice’, or ‘policy’ and ‘implementation’, in the (vain) attempt to educe some ‘analyses’ of concepts and theories, that can be completely ‘correct’ or ‘true’; or to produce some fundamental matters of indisputable research ‘findings’, about the objectivity and existence of which there can be no dispute. Against this notion we tentatively contend that another approach is to be preferred. What is important, when we endeavour to identify the nature, aims, and purposes of all kinds of educating institutions, activities, and processes – formal and informal, fixed-term and lifelong – and to promote excellence, effectiveness, and quality in them, particularly when we wish to get clear about the contribution of such activities to programmes of lifelong learning, is, we believe, *to adopt some such pragmatic method as the following:*

- To seek to understand the questions, the problems, the categories, and criteria with which researchers, policy-makers, and practitioners in the field of lifelong learning are currently concerned and are working
- To identify the theories with which researchers, policy-makers, and practitioners in the field are operating
- To seek to understand the causes of success or failure in the conception and application of such theories, policies, and practices, as a necessary prelude to attenuating or eliminating dysfunctions and establishing or ameliorating structures and procedures that would conduce towards improvement

It is by looking at the various attempts that have been made to give form, content, and direction to the idea of 'lifelong education' that we may begin to develop and articulate a theory that will bear application to the problems that those who place so much emphasis upon the idea of 'lifelong education' are seeking to address and to solve. Of course, we cannot assume that all these problems are the same or even similar: different countries, different educational systems, different agencies of education will be preoccupied with some similar but many different quandaries. Such differences will not be only those of degree of complexity or difficulty; the problems they address will also be different in kind. This is something of which anyone attempting to give some account of 'lifelong education' will rapidly become uncomfortably aware.

The reason for this is not far to seek. Like 'Art', 'Religion', and 'Democracy', 'Education' (and *a fortiori* 'lifelong education') is an example of what W.B. Gallie (1956, 1964) called an 'essentially contested concept' (see Hartnett and Naish 1976). To think that one can find an 'essential', 'basic', or uncontested definition of 'lifelong education' is to embark upon a search for a chimaera. So, rather than engaging in a futile search for the real meaning or an uncontested definition of lifelong education, we would suggest that the best one can do is to follow Wittgenstein's advice (Wittgenstein 1953, 1958) and 'look at the use' of this term in the discourse of those who employ it. This will enable us to note the increasing frequency and growing importance of the idea of 'lifelong education' in international discussions of educational policy, planning, and administration at the present time. We may then look carefully at the wide range of examples of the ways the topic appears in the discourse of education professionals and members of the broader community at the current time and see if we can discern any 'family resemblances' that may help us to move intelligently from the scrutiny of one set of uses to another centring on and employing reference to this topic.

A Consideration of Different Understandings: The Maximalist Position

The post-empiricist approach to understanding the various types and shades of meaning given to 'lifelong education' in educationists' talk sits well, on the surface at least, with the position that might be adopted towards *lifelong learning* by Kenneth Wain, one of the main writers on the philosophy of lifelong education in recent times (Wain 1984, 1985, 1987, 1993a, b). Wain accepts the point, by now widely agreed among philosophers of education, that, for good philosophical reasons, no one absolute and clearly agreed definition of 'education' can be found. He finds proof of this in the numerous accounts of activities or programmes falling under the heading of lifelong education. Some of these are synonymous, some overlapping, some contiguous, some distinct, some divergent, some conflicting, some opposing.

But Wain has another explanation for this. His rejection of essentialism and absolutism and the kind of normative conceptual analysis practised by proponents of *liberal education* such as Peters, Hirst, and White (see Harris 1979, Chapter 1) lead him to look to another account of differences in understanding and intelligibility. He finds this in Kuhnian paradigm theory (Kuhn 1973): for Wain the intelligibility and normative force of a number of different theories or programmes of lifelong education may be best explained as functions of different paradigms.

The paradigm from which Wain develops his own account thus makes of educational theory what some people have called a 'site of contestation': 'an area of competing programmes adherence to which constitutes the basis of agreement or disagreement between philosophers and educationalists who support one or the other' (Wain 1987, p.29). In Wain's view, such different theories of lifelong education are not only incommensurable with but also competing against each other for acceptance, support, and implementation. The resolution of these conflicts and the attempt to secure some sort of inter-paradigm intelligibility can only be achieved by reference to a 'touchstone' of rationality. 'Touchstone' in this sense suggests an area of inter-paradigm agreement, constituted not only by appropriate algorithms of coherence, logic, and semantics but also by areas of common interest, problems, and potential agreement.

Reference to 'touchstone' indicates that Wain has adopted a Lakatosian approach (see Lakatos 1976, 1978) to the question of the multiplicity, variety, and difference between theories of lifelong education. He says as much:

[T]he idea of using Lakatos' model to describe an 'education programme' came from reading Harris (1979). ... I regard the concept of education as one which is both contestable and liable to different interpretations ... the decision as to which interpretation is the best one depends on nothing extrinsic to the power of the 'programme' each concept translates into. ... There is nothing that lies beyond the programme ... that can be appealed to to decide between competing interpretations of the concept. This view implies ... a plurality of competing interpretations of education ... that instead of one 'education' there are several 'educations' ... that the world of educational theory should be permanently regarded as one of competing interpretations of what education should mean, competing ... for the allegiance or commitment of practitioners and policy-makers. (Wain 1993a, p.60)

Wain adopts, as his preferred version of the 'progressive research programme' of lifelong education, the 'maximalist notion' incorporated in the UNESCO 'Programme'. He adopts and advocates this maximalist notion as the various writers on, and proponents of, this term (see Dave, Cropley, Gelpi, Lengrand, Suchodolski in Wain 1987) have delivered it:

'[L]ifelong education' stands for a programme to reconceptualise education totally according to the principle that education is a lifelong process. ... for a complete overhaul of our way of thinking about education, for a new philosophy of education and ... for a programme of action (Fauré 1972; Lengrand 1975; Dave 1976; Cropley 1975) ... as the 'master concept' for all educational planning, policy-making, and practice. Their ambition was that the word education would eventually become synonymous with lifelong education in people's minds ... (today's) world ... requires a lifelong education which is a 'constant reorganising or reconstructing of experience'. (Dewey 1966, p.76)

Wain claims Dewey, with *his* emphasis upon education as 'conceived as a continuous process of "reorganisation and readjustment" of experience and the pragmatic concerns of lifelong education', as the intellectual forebear of the UNESCO

programme and of the maximalist position. He points out (Wain 1993a, pp.59–62 *passim*) the large-scale social implications of this conception of lifelong education:

Dewey's declaration that "to learn from life itself and to make the conditions of life such that all will learn in the process of living" (Dewey 1966, p.51) lays the seed for the movement's conception of the "learning society" ... one which is participatory, democratic and bent towards realising humane educational practice. (See Fauré 1972; Suchodolski 1976).

According to Wain this does *not* mean that the whole of one's life is to be taken as educational. It is not the case that all activities we engage in, all the experiences we have, all the growth that occurs is, in and of itself, the education we receive. If it were, there would be nothing to distinguish between 'life' and 'education', between maturational and developmental growth *simpliciter* and 'growth' as a species of lifelong educatedness. Furthermore Wain is at pains to argue that Dewey's concept of 'growth' did not mean that all our life's experiences are educational; he distinguishes these from those that are educationally relevant (Wain 1987, pp.170–171). This, Wain maintains, gives us a principle of discrimination and choice between experiences. In order to make the necessary demarcation of what experience is to be regarded as educationally relevant in this way Wain brings in Dewey's criterion of learning as *directed* growth:

Dewey ... is interested in learning as "that reconstruction or reorganisation of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience" (Dewey 1966, p.76), to be distinguished from learning "as preparation for a remote future, as unfolding, as external formation, and as recapitulation of the past" (Dewey 1966, p.80) and include informal learning. (See Dewey 1966, Chapter 2)

Dewey ... does not forego adopting operational criteria to distinguish what learning is technically "educative" from what is not. Making experience subject to criteria ... effectively means bringing it under the control of the learner, researcher, or educator ... the learning context signifies for Dewey "a specially selected environment, the selection being made on the basis of materials and method specifically promoting growth in the desired direction" (Dewey 1966, p.38). Dewey ... specified that *educational* growth should involve the direction of experience in certain ways. (See Dewey 1966, Chapter 3)

This, argues Wain, should absolve Dewey from any charge of 'having proposed an anarchic definition of education as growth'.

Wain also points out the importance of the notion of direction and conscious ordering in the reconstruction and reorganisation of experience in desired directions as the manifestation of a concern on the part of proponents of the maximalist position to show that educators are leaders of the 'learning society':

The programme's proposal that lifelong education ... should be institutionalised in a "learning society" clearly shows that ... it wants to make education more central to society, not deprive people of the right to it. (Wain 1993, p.67)

Wain expands upon what a 'maximalist' conception of a 'learning society' might mean:

There is no 'model' learning society, there are different forms a learning society could take, just as there are different forms the lifelong education programme could take. What distinguishes one learning society from the other is precisely the kind of programme it institutionalises within its particular socio-cultural and political context. The political characteristics of the movement's learning society are ... democratic ... a shared, pluralistic and participatory 'form of life' in Dewey's sense.

This means reassessing the role of the school and of childhood learning ... and prioritising adult learning on the same level. A fundamental strategy with regard to the latter is to sensitise social institutions, the family, the church, political party, trade union, place of employment, etc., to their educational potential ... with respect to their members. To encourage these institutions to regard themselves as potential educative agencies for their members and for the wider society. (Wain 1993a, p.68)

[T]he learning society is one that is exceedingly self-conscious about education in its total sense; that is conscious of the educational relevance and potential of its own institutions and of the general social environment that is its way of life, and is determined to maximise its resources in these respects, to the maximum. (Wain 1987, pp.202–203)

A better summation of the ‘maximalist’ position could hardly be found.

ANOTHER VIEW:

Lifelong Education as Education ‘Proper’ – the Extension of ‘Liberal’ Education

The maximalist position is severely criticised and firmly rejected by Richard Bagnall (1990). He argues against the relativism clearly apparent in the adoption of Kuhn’s account of incommensurable and competing paradigms as an explanation for the different versions of lifelong education, many of them at odds with each other, and implicit in the idea of ‘research programmes’ proposed by Wain as a way of bringing them all within the same purview. Insofar as the idea of ‘research programme’ has any applicability to or utility for seeking to get clear about ‘lifelong education’, Bagnall maintains that this particular approach is ‘regressive’ (a term he employs in preference to Lakatos’ ‘degenerating’; for Bagnall, so wide is the ambit of the maximalist use of the term ‘lifelong education’ that he considers it to have no high point from which to decline). He also claims that the ‘maximalist’ view is also ‘illiberal’ insofar as, in Wain’s version at any rate, it incorporates a species of epistemological and ethical relativism. This, he claims, encourages ‘both intolerance ... and a ... lack of humility’ (see Paterson 1984; Trigg 1973, pp.135–137). In Bagnall’s view, Wain’s analysis of the Lifelong Education programme, which Wain claims is strongly relativist, is a good illustration of this point:

Through [its] neo-Lakatosian analytical framework ... “knowledge” and “ideology” are viewed as being bundled into epistemically and ethically competitive and incommensurable programmes. Such a view must encourage ... protagonists to reject, wholesale, all bundles and knowledge and ideology that are perceived to be in conflict with those of one’s contemporary commitments. Consistently, ... Wain reject(s) whole systems of educational thought (liberal, humanist and existentialist), in which he perceives some conflict with the tenets of the ... Programme. ... One of the features of programmatic hard cores is, of course, that they are immune to modification.

Bagnall returns to the four semantic interpretations of ‘lifelong education’. The first – ‘education as a preparation *for* the rest of a person’s life’ – he says

may be identified with the traditional view of schooling ... as comprising ... an educational foundation for adult life (e.g. Peters 1966; White 1982, p.132) ... such a view of education is inadequate for adult participation in modern, technologically sophisticated, liberal democratic societies. (see Evans 1985; Long 1983; Wedermeyer 1981)

The second – ‘Lifelong education as education to be distributed *throughout* the whole of the lifespan’ – remarks Bagnall,

accords ... with the ... conception of lifelong education as “recurrent education” (Davis, Wood and Smith 1986; Kallen 1979) and with the principles of “continuing education” (Titmus 1985 and Za’roun 1984). ... While further development of educational systems along the lines of “recurrent” education would clearly entail major changes in educational provision and participation, these changes at least would appear to be a constructive development of present educational provision and understanding.

The third – ‘lifelong education as education *from* the whole of life’s experiences’ – reduces, in Bagnall’s view, to the fourth version of ‘lifelong education’ – that ‘All events in which one is consciously involved throughout one’s lifespan constitute education (as process) and contribute to and are part of one’s education (as outcome). Education is the process and the on-going learning product of living.’ On this view there is no need to engage in careful planning, research or evaluation of programmes we pick out for educational endeavour: since education is coterminous with the whole of life’s experience there is no particular reason for doing this rather than that, for selecting one set of activities over another. This makes the notion of ‘education’ vacuous: there is nothing we could possibly want or need to provide for, since, on this account, everything educative is already there.

This view – a view which Wain denies either Dewey or he himself holds – Bagnall finds espoused in the work of many writings on lifelong education. He believes that it should be rejected, for it fails to accord any intelligibility to the notion of ‘education proper’ or of formal and active as opposed to informal and unintentional learning. On Bagnall’s account, education proper consists in making distinctions between knowledge and ideology, between educative learning and the simple accumulation of experience, between offering a contingent plurality of programmes and simply following one undifferentiated path of cognitive growth, between activities that conduce to worthwhile ends and experiences that are just simply ‘had’, between ends that may be epistemically difficult and challenging, but are morally defensible, laudable, and commendatory for all people, and outcomes which just simply come about after undifferentiated and unselected experiences and not as a result of informed and clearly differentiated choices of various kinds.

Bagnall maintains that ‘There is a desperate need for concrete educational expression to be given to many of the liberal and humanitarian ideals of lifelong education theorists such as Gelpi (Ireland 1978)’. This is a view with which Charles Bailey would be in strong sympathy, and for reasons that have to do with the stress he lays on the importance of developing, maintaining and applying the powers of rational autonomy throughout the whole of people’s lives (Bailey 1988). Bailey cites the work of Kant (1964), Hirst (1965), and Peters (1966) in support:

If ... Hirst claims that a genuinely liberal education must involve the development of rational mind ... then it is difficult to see why this should be a process that terminates at 16 or 18. ... Hirst's well-known transcendental justificatory argument ... does bear on individuals asking questions like: How should I live? How ought I to develop myself? Persons asking these kinds of questions would clearly be adults rather than children. ...

Similarly ... Peters' ... conception of education as involving worthwhile developments in knowledge and understanding is clearly not something that is in any essential way limited to schooling ... there is the clear implication that the rational person will have a duty, or at least might reasonably want, to continue their liberal education throughout life. ...

There is every reason, on this account, for seeing education as a series of deliberate undertakings to choose some activities rather than others and to make them available as programmes in educational settings, on grounds that they will introduce individuals to a range of activities and experiences that will enable them to make informed judgments about the options open to them, to choose rationally between them, and consciously to accept the consequences and obligations that may arise from them. On this account it is not the case that the undifferentiated flow of life itself will guide us to make such judgments and choices; the presuppositions of human autonomy and community render it a matter of necessity for the enterprise of education to be a conscious, deliberate and discriminating series of distinctions, values and decisions.

These considerations in turn require that *education proper* must be based on some more deliberate, objective, and interpersonal ground than those accretions of experience that come about as mere increments of growth. That ground is provided, on these arguments, by the presupposition of individual autonomy and the moral obligations towards other autonomous agents constituting the human community and their welfare and progress, that arise from it.

Faults and Virtues of Alternative Views

The consequences of adopting the arguments of Kant, Peters, and Bailey bear substantially on the idea of lifelong education and of the role of educators as leaders of a learning community. Those arguments carry considerable implications regarding the necessity of committing oneself to the correlative educational imperative of planning and seeking educational opportunities, activities, and experiences and making them available for ourselves and others throughout our lives. It would be a pity if we were distracted from taking the moral commendations implicit in and arising from the arguments of Kant in the presuppositions of personal autonomy in all moral enterprises, and their implications for endeavours such as those of education (see Daveney 1973), by pausing too long over such differences between protagonists of lifelong education as those outlined above. For, after all, we can find faults and virtues on both sides.

In the case of the maximalist position outlined by Wain, for example, we can find much that is noteworthy and commendable. Wain's proposal for making 'lifelong education' a 'progressive research programme', as Lakatos conceived, it is worthy of the most serious consideration. His emphasis on the importance of and the need for a move towards inclusiveness and lack of limitation in educational provision gives point and direction to the idea of a 'learning society'. Finally his notion that lifelong education subsumes both formal and informal models of learning, and places the

main burden of the control and direction on learners themselves, accords well with recent developments and advances in both pedagogy and andragogy arising from research into meta-cognition and student-centred learning (Knowles et al. 1984).

Wain's position does have its problems, however. The notion of internal coherence as a criterion of progressiveness in a research programme is open to all the criticisms which anti-relativists have deployed against it. Again, Wain's statements on the status of ideologies are a clear rejection of transcendental arguments but his appeal to 'touchstone' as somehow enabling inter-paradigm comparisons to be made and understood suggests that Wain's account of theory does, after all, presuppose some extra- or supra-paradigm criteria of intelligibility and corrigibility. He cannot have it both ways. Further again, as Bailey trenchantly shows, Wain has problems with his concept of 'relevance' as constituting one criterion of progressiveness. As Bailey comments:

Saying that a particular programme must satisfy criteria of relevance to historical, social and technological circumstances is saying very little. What requires justifying is why we are being asked to respond to those particular circumstances in one way rather than in other, equally relevant, different ways. (Bailey 1988, p.122)

Finally, one might have some reservations about the almost totalitarian character of the position envisaged by advocates of the maximalist programme. Not only might some critical comment be made on the unitary character and personification of 'Society' evident in Wain's summary statement set out above – how can a learning society be 'conscious of' and sensitive to the educational potential of all its institutions and individuals? – but one might also be justified in sensing in the views of the proponents of that idea a vision and a sense of mission that detractors might describe as utopian and Popperian critics might characterise as millenarian. Certainly the way in which Wain describes the views of the 'Movement' might seem to expose them to the *elenchus* advanced against such thinking in Popper's discussion of such matters in his *Conjectures and Refutations* and *The Poverty of Historicism*. These considerations should caution us against a too ready acceptance of maximalist rubrics for the idea of lifelong education as Wain adumbrates it.

On their side, Bagnall and Bailey have properly drawn attention to some important questions to be asked of those advocating programmes of lifelong education. It is good that they have underlined the need for concepts of lifelong education to be analysed in such a way that they make clear the underlying value judgements at work in them. It is good too that they make it clear that education, however we conceive it, is not something to which artificial barriers can be drawn and that, properly conceived, it is an enterprise that lasts over the whole of a lifetime. Perhaps, however, they have committed themselves too much, within the empiricist and 'essentialist' approach of Peters and Hirst, to the pre-eminent importance they both assign to the idea of active discrimination in a formal institutional sense. As Wain rightly remarks they give too little attention and scope to the idea and functioning of informal education, too much to the place of the centrality of the idea and the force of particular conceptions of liberal education in debates about the meaning and content of lifelong education programmes.

A great deal has been written in criticism of that view of liberal education and its justification (see Langford 1973; Harris 1979; and Evers and Walker 1983 for

references to the plethora of criticisms against the Peters–Hirst view of liberal education, the use of transcendental arguments, and the status and justifiability of analytic philosophy of education generally). The apparent espousal by Bagnall and Bailey of a similar view of the concept of lifelong education – though they do say many wise things about it – should perhaps caution us against a too ready acceptance of their rejection of arguments based on ‘relevance’ and ‘coherence’ and of their plea for lifelong education to be seen as a species of liberal education generally.

A Suggested Way Forward: A Pragmatic Approach

Rather than getting bogged down in this debate, we should like to suggest a different expedient. We believe that Bagnall’s and Bailey’s adherence to a conception of philosophy of education that is both empiricist and normative can no longer sustain the weight of all the critical arguments marshalled against it. At the same time we are clear that the relativism implicit in Wain’s case may be reduced finally to the kind of incorrigible solipsism into which all such arguments ultimately fall, if they are not, that is, to seek to make some tacit appeal to some kind of overarching criteria of intelligibility and adjudication and thus either fall into contradiction or betray an underlying predilection for transcendental arguments.

As against these positions, there is, we believe, something to be said for trying a different expedient. There is not much point in attempting to achieve some kind of resolution between the different accounts of the term, especially when we accept the view that there can be as many different conceptions of the concept of lifelong education as there are philosophers to put them forward and communities willing to put their own versions of lifelong education programmes into effect. Rather than participating in an exercise of interpretation that might in the end prove self-defeating or inconclusive, it might, in our view, be better to look, not so much at the various interpretations and accounts of lifelong education, but rather more at the circumstances in which various theories and policies of lifelong education have been articulated, developed, and applied.

In other words, we are suggesting, an objective referent may be found: it lies in the *problems* to the settlement of which lifelong education programmes are addressed. There is, we believe, more sense to be gained by looking at the difficulties, issues and predicaments, the attempted solution of which different policies of lifelong learning have been conceived to tackle. In that way we might attempt to see how, why, and in response to what pressures and quandaries the various versions of lifelong education have been developed or are in play and can be seen to be at work in the attention educational policy-makers devote to them, before attempting to assess how far those policies and practices have succeeded in addressing the problems that policy-makers are attempting to address.

One resolution that might be suggested, then, is to take a pragmatic look at the problems that policy-makers are addressing when urging that learning be lifelong and open to and engaged in by all people. This will help us accept that, just as there is a myriad of such problems, some of them unique to particular countries, educa-

tional systems or institutions, some much more general and widespread, so there will be a large difference, not only in kind but also in degree of complexity and sophistication, in the type and scale of the solutions proffered to them. There will be small- and large-scale differences too in the particular terms of significance in those solutions, the tests for efficacy, the standards of success, and the criteria and arguments that make certain approaches more fruitful than others, for the particular times and circumstances in which they are brought to bear and applied.

Examples of such problems may be readily found, though our examination of them is likely to start closer to home than further away. Perhaps we may begin to make ground by examining some of the versions of the need for undertaking education and learning across the lifespan, currently under consideration by governments and policy-makers around the world, and the arguments put forward for them. Clearly the main versions of lifelong education delineated above may be associated with attempts to respond by educational means to problems of a very large scale and widespread international presence. These may be listed as follows:

- The need for countries to have an economy sufficiently flexible, adaptable, and forward-looking to enable it to feed its citizens and give them a reasonable quality of life
- The need for people to be made aware of the rights and duties open to them in the most widely preferred modern form of government, to be shown how to act in accordance with those rights and duties, and to become committed to the preservation and promotion of that particular form of political arrangement and set of political, social, and community institutions
- The desirability of individuals having an informed awareness of a range of options of activities from which they can construct and continually reconstruct satisfying and personally uplifting patterns of life for themselves

There is no shortage of problems, issues, and questions which individual countries, institutions, and individuals have to address in attempting to work out what will best conduce to their individual and communal welfare, how they should act, what choices they need to make, in what directions they may try to shape their futures, and for what reasons, as matters of ongoing educational endeavour and self-discerning and deliberate concern. For their facing the kinds of problems instanced above will enable them consciously and purposefully to work out ways in which they might bring about an improvement in their own lives and that of all members of their community and hand it on to their successors in coming generations. And that, in the eyes of Mary Warnock (1978), is the end of all education.

A Pragmatic Approach to Realising Lifelong Learning for All

The criteria for determining improvement and advance in their respective accounts, policies, and undertakings of lifelong learning will require philosophers, researchers, educators, and policy-makers to attend to the interplay of both function and form with respect to the purposes of the institution in which they are all

interested and – albeit in different ways and for different purposes – actively engaged. This area of common ground in which agreed interests are enmeshed provides both sets of researchers with a ‘criterion’ and a standard against which the success or failure – the progression or degeneration of their ongoing research programmes or political initiatives – can be measured.

This area of engagement – what we have elsewhere called ‘enmeshment’ (Aspin and Chapman 1994) – is where the activities of philosophers, educators, researchers, and policy-makers coincide. Their common interests provide the area of overlap that Lakatos named the ‘touchstone’ area (Lakatos 1976; see Evers and Walker 1983) against which the theories of one and the policy enterprises of the other – and indeed of all other workers in the field – may be tested. It is this that we may call the new ‘science’ of educational philosophy, policy construction, and educational management – and it is to the application, extension, elaboration, and refinement of this new scientific way of looking at and dealing with the problems of philosophy and education that we believe that those concerned with lifelong learning may now be well advised to consider turning.

Perhaps the most plausible account of the way in which this approach may best work is to be found in the Quinean notion that knowledge in matters of educational policy, curriculum construction, and the management and administration of schools and school systems is, like any other cognitive enterprise, a complex web of belief, formed of different elements that interweave and form, in their separate parts, a coherent whole (see Quine and Ullian 1976). Conceived of in this way educational discourse and policy analysis and construction becomes like any scientific endeavour – an unending quest to comprehend clearly the theories with which we are working, to compare them with the theoretical efforts and productions of others faced with similar problems, to subject them to positive criticism, and to attempt to improve them and make them fit for their educational purpose: the advancement of efficiency and excellence in all forms of educating institutions, for the benefit of all individuals, for society and for our nations.

The analogy which is most helpful, and the one frequently employed by Quine, is that of Otto Neurath (1932): the theory that we work out in our educational endeavours is like a boat crossing the sea. Because of the continuing stresses and strains upon it, the craft that is our best theory has continually to be repaired and rebuilt even as it crosses the ocean, while it is still on the move, so to speak – and in a way that will, while still giving overall coherence to the whole, make for a vessel that, at the end of the enterprise of theory building, is fairly radically different from that ‘theoretical vessel’ upon which the journey began. For human beings that ‘end’ comes when they die: it is part of the human cognitive condition that we are *always* rebuilding our theories. It is the end of our lives that marks the end of theory–change. Only then shall we come to the end of our learning.

What is critical to this enterprise of theory/vessel building and repairing – the pragmatic criteria with which we work – will be the need continuously to look at all plans, theories, and forms of cognitive transport, drawn up both by ourselves and others, in the attempt to see how well they manage to fulfil their function of conveying their passengers and their intellectual *impedimenta* across what might

be seen as an as yet uncharted 'sea of learning' (see also Cupitt 1985). This will be the criterion of success in any cognitive endeavour of learning across the lifespan: has our thinking efficiently fulfilled its function and secured the end towards which it was striving? This will be achieved by subjecting our theories, beliefs, policies, and solutions to critical scrutiny, appraisal, and comparison. This will enable us to assess their functional utility, fecundity, and felicity in meeting the challenges of the problem situations in which we have devised and applied them.

This then is the nature of our enterprise. Neither logical empiricism, positivism, nor ordinary language analysis will serve as single or 'would be' comprehensive theories to account for all the phenomena constituting the bases and interstices of our subject of the soundness and comprehensiveness of our educational policies or the effectiveness of our provision of lifelong learning. What we need to adopt, rather, is a pragmatic 'evolutionary epistemology', an approach that goes, as Richard Bernstein (1983) puts it, 'beyond objectivism and relativism' and enhances and facilitates discriminatory theory construction and comparison and so makes our own theories meet for application, modification, and repair at every stage of our intellectual journey.

Perhaps the best model for us in this enquiry, therefore, is to adopt a pragmatic approach as one of our principal modes of operation in the examination and attempted solution of one of the more serious problems facing education today: what we ought to do about the various challenges posed for us by the need for our policies of education to be 'lifelong'. To conceive of our enterprise as an activity of problem-solving is to propose, in the best Popperian tradition, that, in our desire to solve the problems that face us, we should be concerned to proffer our solutions on the basis that they are put up as tentative hypotheses to be, if possible, knocked down. We should seek widely after all possible sources of criticism and potential refutation and, if we find one powerful enough to falsify our proposed solutions, then, from whatever quarter it might come, we should be open-minded enough to admit it and treat it on its merits as a source, not only of criticism and further clarification but, in the novelty of its contribution, as an imaginative essay in the attempt to provide answers, solutions, and best provisional theories for application to the difficulties that beset us and the predicaments that perplex us on the road to finding policies that will best address the imperatives of the need for education and learning to be lifelong.

Conclusion

Given many governments' concerns for the multi-faceted character of lifelong learning and its relationship to a broader and more diverse set of goals, it may well be that, in setting the agenda for education for the twenty-first century, a more comprehensive analysis of all the various dimensions and features of the nature, aims, and purposes of policies for 'realising a lifelong approach to learning for all' will have to be tackled, and a more wide-ranging set of justifications addressing

the differences in those aims and purposes more clearly articulated and provided. In this way policies pertaining to lifelong learning endeavours are more likely to be developed and articulated, not merely with respect to providing arguments to vindicate a country's concern for its economic self-sufficiency, but also to reinforce its appreciation of the need for a multiplicity of initiatives that will increase the emancipation and participation of all citizens in its various political, social, and cultural institutions, and open further avenues of personal advancement to them.

For the time being, however, we suggest that the pragmatic, problem-based approach, which we have put forward, will be sufficient to tackle the questions with which so many governments, authorities, and agencies are currently preoccupied.

We believe we have provided here some answers to the question: to what problems, topics, and issues are proposals for lifelong learning deemed to provide solutions? We hope to have made it clear that governments in many countries are now concerned to increase their economic potential, to make their political arrangements more equitable, just and inclusive, and to offer a greater range of avenues for self-improvement and personal development to all their citizens.

We realise, of course, that none of these aims and undertakings for lifelong learning can really be separated from the other: all three elements interact and cross-fertilise each other. A more competent and highly skilled agent in the workforce has more of an interest in and responsibility for contributing to the improvement of institutions and their point in a set of democratic political arrangements; both are in turn enhanced by the affective satisfaction experienced and achieved by those who have expanded their life horizons in cognitive content and skills in complex forms of intellectual operation on which, upon reflection, they now prefer to spend their time.

There is a complex interplay between all three, that makes education for a more highly skilled workforce and *at the same time* an education for better democracy *and* a more rewarding life. That is why the whole notion and value of 'lifelong learning for all' might be usefully seen as a complex and multifaceted process, that begins in pre-school, is carried on through compulsory and post-compulsory periods of formal education and training, and is then continued throughout life, through provision of such learning experiences, activities, and enjoyment in the home, in the workplace, in universities and colleges, and in other educational, social, and cultural agencies, institutions, and settings – both formal and informal – within the community.

In respect to the development of policy, this approach requires a far greater, more coherent and consistent, better coordinated and integrated, more multifaceted approach to learning and to realising a 'lifelong learning' approach *for all* than has hitherto been the case.

The central elements in what we have described (Chapman and Aspin 1997) as the 'triadic' nature of lifelong learning –

- For economic progress and development
- For personal development and fulfilment
- For social inclusiveness and democratic understanding and activity

– are now seen as fundamental to bringing about a more democratic polity and set of social institutions, in which the principles and ideals of social inclusiveness, justice, and equity are present, practised, and promoted; an economy which is strong, adaptable, and competitive; and a richer range of provision of those activities on which individual members of society are able to choose to spend their time and energy, for the personal rewards and satisfactions that they confer.

To bring this about – to move towards the achievement of a ‘learning society’ – nothing less than a substantial reappraisal of the provision, resourcing, and goals of education and training, and a major reorientation of its direction towards the availability and the value of opportunities for all to secure access to ‘learning throughout life’ is required. Therein lies the major challenge for governments, policy-makers, and educators as they continue to grapple with ways of conceptualising lifelong learning and realising the aim of ‘lifelong learning for all’.

-o0o-

This chapter is a revised version of a paper published in the *International Journal for Lifelong Education* (Special Issue 2001 Vol 19 No 1: The Philosophy of Lifelong Education pp.2–19). We express our appreciation for permission to reproduce this revised version in this book.

References

- Aspin, D.N. (1996a) Logical empiricism and post-empiricism. Chapter Two. In: Higgs, P. (Ed) *Meta-Theories in Philosophy of Education*. London: Butterworth.
- Aspin, D.N. (Ed) (1996b) *Logical Empiricism and Post-Empiricism in Philosophy of Education*. London: Heinemann.
- Aspin, D.N. and Chapman, J.D. with Wilkinson, V.R. (1994) *Quality Schooling: A Pragmatic Approach to Some Current Problems, Topics and Issues*. London: Cassell.
- Bagnall, R.J. (1990) Lifelong education: the institutionalisation of an illiberal and regressive ideology? *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 22, 1–7.
- Bailey, C. (1988) Lifelong education and liberal education, *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 22(1), 121–126.
- Bailey, C. (1984) *Beyond the Present and the Particular: a Theory of Liberal Education*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Belanger, P. and Gelpi, E. (Eds) (1995) *Lifelong Education*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Bernstein, R.J. (1983) *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Bridges, D. and McLaughlin, T.H. (Eds) (1994) *Education and the Market Place*. London: Falmer Press.
- Chapman, J.D. and Aspin D.N. (1995) *Securing the Future*. Paris: OECD.
- Chapman, J.D. and Aspin D.N. (1995) *Learning: Realizing a Lifelong Approach for All: A Review of OECD Work 1990–95*. Paris: OECD.
- Commission on Non-Traditional Study (1973) *Diversity by Design*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Cropley, A.J. (Ed) (1979) *Lifelong Education: A Stocktaking*. Hamburg: VIE Monograph No 8.
- Cropley, A.J. and Knapper, C.K. (1983) Higher education and the promotion of lifelong learning, *Studies in Higher Education*, 8(1), 15–21.
- Cupitt, D. (1985) *The Sea of Faith*. London: BBC Publishing Company.
- Dave, R.H. (1975) *Reflections on Lifelong Education and the School*. Hamburg: UIE Monograph.

- Daveney, T.F. (1973) Education – a moral concept. In: Langford, G. and O'Connor, D.J. (Eds) *New Essays in Philosophy of Education*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Davis, E., Wood, J.M., and Smith, B.W. (1986) *Recurrent Education: A Revived Agenda*. Sydney: Croom Helm.
- Delors, J. (Ed) (1996) *Learning: The Treasure Within*. Paris: UNESCO.
- Dewey, J. (1966) *Democracy and Education*. New York: Free Press.
- European Parliament – Commission of the European Communities (1995) Amended Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Decision Establishing a European Year of Lifelong Learning. Brussels: European Parliament.
- Evans, K. (1994) Change and prospects in education for young adults, *Comparative Education*, 30(1), 39–47.
- Evans, N. (1985) *Post-Education Society: Recognising Adults as Learners*. London: Croom Helm.
- Evers, C.W. and Lakomski, G. (1991) *Knowing Educational Administration*. Oxford: Pergamon.
- Evers, C.W. and Walker, J.C. (1983) Knowledge, partitioned sets and extensionality, *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 17(2), 55–70.
- Fauré, E. et al. (1972) *Learning to Be: The World of Education Today and Tomorrow*. Paris: UNESCO.
- Gallie, W.B. (1964) *Philosophy and the Historical Understanding*. London: Chatto & Windus.
- Gallie, W.B. (1956) Essentially Contested Concepts. In: *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, LVI. pp.167–198.
- Gelpi, R.E. (1985) Lifelong education and international relations. In: Wain, K. (Ed) *Lifelong Education and Participation*. Msida, Malta: Malta University Press.
- Gelpi, E. (1984) Lifelong education: opportunities and obstacles, *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 3(2), 79–87.
- Grace, G.R. (1994) Education is a public good: on the need to resist the domination of economic science. In: Bridges, D. and McLaughlin, T.H. (Eds) *Education and the Market Place*. London: Falmer Press.
- Harris, C.K. (1979) *Education and Knowledge*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Hartnett, A. and Naish, M. (Eds) (1976) *Theory and the Practice of Education* (Two Vols). London: Heinemann.
- Hirst, P.H. (1965) Liberal education and the nature of knowledge. In: Archambault, R.D. (Ed) *Philosophical Analysis and Education*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Ireland, T.D. (1978) *Gelpi's View of Lifelong Education*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Kallen, D. (1979) Recurrent education and lifelong learning: definitions and distinctions. In: Schuller, T. and Megary, J. (Eds) *World Yearbook of Education 1979: Recurrent Education and Lifelong Learning*. London: Kogan Page.
- Kant, I. (1964) *The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue* (trans. Ellington, J.). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Library of Liberal Arts.
- Knowles, M.S. and Associates (1984) *Andragogy in Action: Applying Modern Principles of Adult Learning*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Knox, A.B. (1977) *Adult Development and Learning*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Kovesi, J. (1967) *Moral Notions*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Kuhn, T.S. (1973) *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Kulich, J. (1982) Lifelong education and the universities: a Canadian perspective, *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 1(2), 123–142.
- Lakatos, I. (1978) *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lakatos I. (1976) Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programs. In: Lakatos, I. and Musgrave, A.W. (Eds) *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Langford, G. (1973) The concept of education. In: O'Connor, D.J. and Langford, G. (Eds) *New Essays in Philosophy of Education*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

- Lengrand, P. (1979) Prospects of lifelong education. In: Cropley, A.J. (Ed) *Lifelong Education: A Stocktaking*. Hamburg: VIE Monograph, No 8.
- Lengrand, P. (1975) *An Introduction to Lifelong Education*. London: Croom Helm.
- Long, H.B. (1983) *Adult and Continuing Education: Responding to Change*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- McLaughlin, T.H. (1994) Politics, markets and schools: the central issues. In: Bridges, D. and McLaughlin, T.H. (Eds) *Education and the Market Place*. London: Falmer Press.
- Neurath, O. (1932) Protokollsätze, *Erkenntnis*, 3, 204–214.
- OECD (1993) *An Introduction to Learning: Re-Defining the Curriculum in a Life-long Perspective*. Paris: OECD/CERI Study (A5).
- OECD (1994) *Jobs Study: Facts, Analysis, Strategies*. Paris: OECD.
- OECD (1994) *OECD Societies in Transition: the Future of Work and Leisure*. Paris: OECD.
- OECD (1994) *Learning Beyond Schooling – New Forms of Supply and Demand: Background Report*. Paris: OECD. December.
- OECD (1994) *The Curriculum Re-Defined: Education for the Twenty-First Century*. Paris: OECD.
- OECD (1996) *Making Lifelong Learning a Reality for All*. Paris: OECD.
- Paterson, R.W.K. (1979) *Values, Education and the Adult*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Paterson, R.W.K. (1984) Objectivity as an educational imperative, *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 3(1), 17–29.
- Peña-Borrero, M. (1984) Lifelong educational and social change, *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 3(1), 1–15.
- Peters, R.S. (1966) *Ethics and Education*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Peters, R.S. (1965) Education as Initiation. Inaugural Lecture in the University of London 1963 repr. in *Authority, Responsibility and Education*. London: Allen & Unwin revised edition, 1973; also in Archambault, R.D. (Ed) (1965) *Philosophical Analysis and Education*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Popper, K.R. (1943) *The Open Society and its Enemies*, Vol I, Plato, Vol II: Hegel and Marx. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Popper, K.R. (1949) *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. London: Hutchinson.
- Popper, K.R. (1972) *Objective Knowledge*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Popper, K.R. (1960) *The Poverty of Historicism*, 2nd Edition. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Quine, W.V. (1953) *From a Logical Point of View*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Quine, W.V. (1974) *The Roots of Reference*. LaSalle: Open Court.
- Quine, W.V. (1951) Two dogmas of empiricism, *Philosophical Review*, 60, 20–45.
- Quine, W.V. and Ullian, J.S. (1970) *The Web of Belief*. New York: Random House.
- Richmond, R.K. (1979) The concept of continuous education. In: Cropley, A.J. (Ed) *Lifelong Education: A Stocktaking*. Hamburg: VIE Monograph, No 8.
- Rorty, R. (1979) *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Stock, A. (1993) *Lifelong Learning: Thirty Years of Educational Change*. Nottingham, England: Association for Lifelong Learning.
- Stock, A.K. (1979) Developing lifelong education: developing post-school perspectives. In: Cropley, A.J. (Ed) *Lifelong Education: A Stocktaking*. Hamburg: VIE Monograph, No 8.
- Suchodolski, B. (1979) Lifelong education at the cross-roads. In: Cropley, A.J. (Ed) *Lifelong Education: A Stocktaking*. Hamburg: VIE Monograph, No 8.
- The Nordic Council of Ministers (1995) *The Golden Riches in the Grass – Lifelong Learning for All*. Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers.
- Titmus, C.J. (Ed) (1989) *Lifelong Education for Adults: An International Handbook*. Oxford: Pergamon.
- Trigg, R. (1973) *Reason and Commitment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- UNESCO (1996) *Learning: The Treasure Within* Paris: UNESCO.
- Wain, K. (1985) Lifelong education and philosophy of education, *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 4(2).
- Wain, K. (1984) Lifelong education: a deweyan challenge, *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 18(2), 257–263.

- Wain, K. (1987) *Philosophy of Lifelong Education*. London: Croom Helm.
- Wain, K. (1993a) Lifelong education: illiberal and regressive? *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 25(1), 58–70.
- Wain, K. (1993b) Lifelong education and adult education – the state of the theory, *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 12(2), 85–95.
- Wain, K. (1985) *Lifelong Education and Participation*. Msida, Malta: University of Malta Press.
- Wedermeyer, C.A. (1981) *Learning at the Back Door: Reflections on Non-Traditional Learning in the Lifespan*. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.
- White, J.P. (1982) *The Aims of Education Re-Stated*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1953) *Philosophical Investigations* (trans. Anscombe, G.E.M.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1958) *Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations* (also known as *The Blue and Brown Books*). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Za’rou, G.I. (1984) Continuing education: a challenge and a commitment. *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 3(1), 31–39.

Chapter 2

Lifelong Learning and the Politics of the Learning Society

Kenneth Wain

The Learning Society: Early Politics

A White Paper published by the European Union in 1995 was named *Teaching and Learning: Towards the Learning Society*. The notion of the learning society was being invoked again after many years of abandonment in an important document on education – those who were already in education in the 1970s and who were familiar with the UNESCO report on lifelong education *Learning to Be* (Fauré et al. 1972) would certainly have heard of it before since that report concluded with a large section on the ‘learning society’. Subsequently, in the decade or so that followed, the expression became part of the jargon of the lifelong education movement housed by UNESCO, though it fell into decline somewhat in the later years of the movement, when the movement became more pragmatic in its outlook. The approach of the Fauré report to the learning society and of the literature that emanated from it could be described as utopian and ‘philosophical’ in the broad sense of the word. The theoretical approach to lifelong education of the post-Fauré pragmatists, on the other hand, was mainly by way of historical and comparative analysis and critique and omitted the notion of the learning society.

The preamble to the Fauré report reflects UNESCO’s concern to ‘internationalise’ education and its humanistic outlook in the sense of regarding education as a concept within a world conceived of as one which the whole of humanity share and hold in common, with common aspirations and destiny (Fauré et al. 1972, p.vi); a humanity striving for a global justice, which it regards as threatened:

The great changes of our time are imperilling the unity and the future of the species, and man’s own identity as well. What is to be feared is not only the painful prospect of grievous inequalities, privations and suffering, but also that we may be heading for a veritable dichotomy within the human race, which risks being split into superior and inferior groups, into masters and slaves, supermen and submen. (Fauré et al. 1972, p.xxi)

It warns. The contemporary situation which ‘is entirely new and has no discoverable precedent’, threatens conflict and disasters, especially if weapons of mass destruction, it says, fall into the hands of ‘destitute and rebellious groups’. But there is a more ‘fundamental’ risk, it says, more fundamental even than that of inequality. This is that of a new ‘dehumanization, affecting privileged and oppressed alike, for

all men share one world and the harm done to man's nature would harm all men' (Fauré et al. 1972, p.xxi). This entirely new situation with 'no discoverable precedent', it continues, has been brought on by the scientific-technological revolution of our times, which has 'simultaneously conquered the mental world, with its immediate transmission of information over any distance and its invention of increasingly perfected, rationalized, calculating machines', and which 'necessarily affects all of humanity ... giving man entirely new possibilities of thought and action' (Fauré et al. 1972, p.xxiii). But also creating entirely new possibilities of inequality and conflict in a world where people are no longer ready to resign themselves so easily to the existence of deprivation and underdevelopment 'as an arrangement by the Almighty of the natural order of things', where they have been led to believe that 'the universalization of education' would become the 'absolute weapon' that would help them gain ground, and to aspire to 'a different kind of democracy from the one they have been accustomed to'. The Fauré report speaks of the ambivalence of the mass-communication media with respect to its impact on the individual as citizen and consumer. It concludes from all this that at this point in time, 'it becomes indispensable for the individual to be able to solve his own problems, make his own decisions and shoulder his own responsibilities, in his own particular, irreducible field of action' (Fauré et al. 1972, p.xxiv). The notion of the self-directed learner, as one capable of maximizing the resources of the learning society for her own benefit and according to her own plan of life, emerges from this consideration, and it becomes the thrust of the movement's political thinking.

Its claim that citizens demand a new democracy probably stems from the popularity of theories of participatory democracy at the time the report was published, with the rhetoric and the experiments in workplace democracy being particularly powerful in Western Europe. The report is, in fact, critical of what it calls 'formal democracy'. It says that although we need to acknowledge the achievements of formal democracy in 'protecting the citizen from the arbitrary exercise of power and (in) providing him with the minimum of juridical guarantees', it has now become 'obsolete', and a different kind of democracy is demanded (Fauré et al. 1972, p.xxv). From a different perspective it refers to the scientists who are currently warning us of a variety of dangers facing our world through a number of threatening conditions; an unsustainable population growth, the uncontrolled devastation of soil and land, the overpopulation of cities, power and food exhaustion, global warming, pollution, and so on. A litany of ills (including the danger of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists mentioned earlier) we acknowledge even more urgently today perhaps. Before these realities, the report demands the education of the 'new man ... capable of understanding the global consequences of individual behaviour, of conceiving priorities and shouldering his share of the responsibility involved in the destiny of the human race' (Fauré et al. 1972, p.xxv). This 'new man' of the future, it continues, must be able to use 'his' voice to create a public opinion that will grow incrementally into a 'world opinion' that will put pressure on governments to renounce the creation of weapons of mass destruction and to re-channel substantial portions of their investment in war-related actions to projects that enhance life. The report is confident that people everywhere

are capable of this action if they become self-conscious, conscious of their aspirations and strengths, shed their fatalism and become more self-assured, and this self-assurance can only come from education and democracy. An education into responsible self-direction and a truly participatory democracy alone can help ‘*man avoid becoming enslaved to machines,*’ and is ‘*the only condition compatible with the dignity which the intellectual achievements of the human race require.*’ There can, the report continues, be no ‘*democratic and egalitarian relationship between classes divided by excessive inequality in education*’ (Fauré et al. 1972, p.xxvi, original italics). A participatory democracy inspired by a culture of ‘scientific humanism’; a culture that is humanistic in its being ‘mainly concerned with man and his welfare as an end in itself’, and scientific ‘to the extent that its humanistic content remains defined – and thereby enriched – by the continuing new contributions of science to the field of knowledge about man and the world’ (Fauré et al. 1972, p.xxvi). Imbued with a vision of education that aims *to enable man to be himself, to ‘become himself’* (Fauré et al. 1972, p.xxxi, original italics). This was to be the ideological core of the learning society defined by the Fauré report which argues that:

If learning involves all of one’s life, in the sense of both time-span and diversity, and all of society, including its social and economic as well as its educational resources, then we must go even further than the necessary overhaul of ‘educational systems’ until we reach the stage of a learning society. (Fauré et al. 1972, p.xxxiii, original italics)

This was the final operational or strategic ambition of the early Fauré-inspired utopian strand of the lifelong education movement, overhauling our educational systems gradually until the stage of a learning society is reached. Until, that is, the whole of society, all its human and material resources and not just its formal learning institutions is mobilised for learning. The probable reason why the words ‘educational systems’ is put within inverted commas in the quotation is because the report did not contemplate that the learning society itself should be a ‘system’. Its intention for the learning society was not that formal educational systems should be conceived of in the broadest way possible to include the whole of society as a learning society, the creation of what Verne and Illich (1976) scornfully referred to as a ‘global classroom’. But that learning be promoted *lifewide*, i.e. outside formal systems to include the wider context of the home, the neighbourhood, the parish, the workplace, in short every social space, as well as lifelong, and to include not only its formal dimension (under the direction of teachers, through instruction, and in special settings) but its non-formal and informal also. And that these latter dimensions of learning be recognised as dimensions of the learning society and accorded their relative importance. This sort of mobilisation of learning, which would involve the state as major partner with other agencies and stake holders, economic, social, and cultural, was regarded by the Fauré report as the strategic vehicle of the learning society motored by the humanistic/democratic political and cultural agenda just described.

What I have said so far, and what follows in this section, is amplified in my recent book *The Learning Society in a Postmodern World* (Wain 2004) where

my narrative describes the subsequent rejection of the utopian thrust of the Fauré report and a turn in the lifelong education literature of the time by pragmatists like Ettore Gelpi. Apart from the changing international mood of the times, what concerned the pragmatists most was the impression the report gave that what was being offered was a universal model of lifelong education and of the learning society as defined by the West and imposed on everyone. Gelpi responded to it by reaffirming the Fauré report's own statement that lifelong education 'fundamentally belongs to the history of education of all countries' and is, therefore, not a new idea or one particular to any specific culture. That we need, therefore, to eradicate the impression that it is and that it belongs to the developed and highly industrialized societies. Or even that it has any 'intrinsic moral value'. Its policies and activities, he affirms, are 'liable to negative as well as positive normative outcomes in the sense that these can be used to strengthen social injustices through the educational system as well as to resolve them' (Gelpi 1985, p.18). What he is saying, in short, is that lifelong education is a normatively neutral expression. But this is a piece of semantic confusion on his part, for it is not the notion of lifelong *education* that is normatively neutral but that of lifelong *learning*. Education is a normatively charged and contested notion. It was not, however, unusual to mix the two expressions together at the time and the same is true, though less frequently so perhaps, today. Nor must it be thought that Gelpi himself was politically neutral; quite the contrary, he subscribed broadly to the undoubtedly leftist political sympathies of the Fauré report.

What Gelpi is showing here are two general concerns. One is that the notion of lifelong education is represented as something belonging to the developed part of the world, the West, which renders its programme suspicious in the eyes of many in the developing societies, who tend to regard it as an attempt to smuggle in an 'imported' model from the outside, and who thereby associate it with a hegemonic neo-colonialist agenda. 'Some of the best people' in these societies, Gelpi notes, notably in Latin America, are 'reacting against the idea of lifelong education because it is being promoted as a form of vocational training related to different sectors of advanced industrial work', rather than as an emancipatory programme for the poor and hopeless (Gelpi 1985, pp.17–18). The other is that it is represented uncritically, as something good in itself, without any consideration of the political agenda that may be directing it and that could have the oppression of people rather than their emancipation in its sights. Gelpi himself had no interest in the notion of the learning society which was uncongenial to an academic temperament more inclined towards historical analysis and comparative work on education policies and practices, and to his political temperament which was more inclined towards spontaneity and specific action, than towards theoretic construction. Besides, because of the way it was represented in the Fauré report, he probably saw no emancipatory potential in the notion. Unlike his predecessors of the utopian strand of the lifelong education movement, in fact, Gelpi was more inclined to put his hope for social and individual progress in 'progressive' individual educators 'doing interesting things' who need not necessarily be, and quite often were not, professional teachers, and who were more likely to be encountered in the field of non-formal adult learning settings where their freedom to be

innovative and pragmatic was vastly greater than that possible in formal institutional settings (Gelpi 1985, p.18).

The next time that the notion of the learning society returns to prominence is over two decades after the Fauré report in the 1995 EU White Paper on lifelong learning referred to at the beginning. The White Paper looks to the future like the Fauré report before it and adopts similar utopian tones. On the first pages that constitute its summary it declares that 'Tomorrow's society will be a society which invests in knowledge, a society of teaching and learning, in which each individual will build up his or her own qualifications. In other words, a learning society' (EU Commission 1995, p.5). One already notes in this statement, in its reference to 'qualifications', a different agenda for the learning society from that of the Fauré report. The White Paper continues, again like the Fauré report, to identify 'factors of upheaval' affecting our contemporary European society, three in number: 'the internationalization of trade, the dawning of the information society, and the relentless march of science and technology' (EU Commission 1995, p.5). These factors of upheaval, it says, and there is *some* overlap with those mentioned in the Fauré report, need the response of lifelong learning policies. But the White Paper's subsequent elaboration of the three factors all concern their impact on the world of work and production, and the responses to them carry the heading 'broad-based knowledge and employability', indicating what the goals of the policies should be, though the summary retracts a bit on this orientation at the end with the following coda, a short paragraph that starts, however, with the word 'lastly', indicating an order of priority implicit throughout the document: 'Europe has to place as much emphasis on the personal fulfilment of its citizens, men and women alike, as it has up to now placed on economic and monetary issues. This is how Europe will prove that it is not merely a free trade area, but a coherent political whole capable of coming successfully to terms with internationalization instead of being dominated by it' (EU Commission 1995, p.11).

Ten years later, in 2005, that same Europe failed to adopt a common constitution after this was rejected by the citizens of a number of countries in various referenda. This fact throws more than a little doubt on this last claim for it – that it is 'a coherent political whole'. And though the argument has not, to my knowledge, been advanced elsewhere or studied, it is more than hypothetical, in my view, that the subsequent discourse of lifelong learning in the EU was tied mainly to an economic rather than a social and political agenda, towards vocational training rather than education, the subsequent reorientation of EU priorities away from the more general concern for the creation of a learning society (with a socio-political and cultural agenda) expressed in the title of the White Paper at least, towards a more sustained concern for lifelong learning policies and initiatives with the promotion of a knowledge society and economy, played some part in that failure. I say '*more* sustained concern' because, as I indicated at the start of the previous paragraph, the economic concerns were already strongly present in the 1995 White Paper and because the relegation of the 'personal fulfilment of citizens' to a coda in the summary already made the White Paper's policy-making priorities clear.

Later on the document says the following:

To examine education and training in the context of employment does not mean reducing them simply to a means of obtaining qualifications. The essential aim of education and training has always been personal development and the successful integration of Europeans into society through the sharing of common values, the passing on of cultural heritage and the teaching of self-reliance. (EU Commission 1995, p.18)

What the disastrous adventure with the EU constitution a decade on shows is that this 'essential aim' is just what was *not* achieved. And at least part of the reason, it could be argued, is the subsequent neglect of adult *education* in terms of investment and its practical relegation to an aspect of the leisure industry as against a growing investment in vocational training and 'human resource development' in EU policy-making and in the countries of Europe in general (Raggat et al. 1996). This prioritisation of training is already in the White Paper which justifies its strong emphasis on the world of work and employment with the argument that social integration depends on people having jobs. 'This White Paper takes the view', it says, 'that in modern Europe the three essential requirements of social integration, the enhancement of employability and personal fulfilment, are not incompatible', and 'should not be brought into conflict' (EU Commission 1995, p.18). To the contrary, it says, they should be closely linked. Granted. But nowhere does it indicate strategically how the linkage should occur. To the contrary it seems to assume that if one takes care of the employability factor, the rest, social integration and personal fulfilment, will take care of themselves. Moreover, despite the rhetoric about equality of opportunity, and even about 'emancipation', that one finds in the Introduction, the nearly inevitable impression conveyed in the pages of the White Paper is that its concern is for the fullest and most effective mobilisation of human resources in the interest not of education but of the economy, and that 'emancipation' is understood purely as a matter of taking charge of and responsibility for, one's own learning, a matter of 'self-reliance and occupational capacity', and that the strategy to achieve this is 'to give everyone access to a broad base of knowledge and to build up their abilities for employment and economic life' (EU Commission 1995, p.26). The Fauré report also refers to employment and economic life, but its interest goes far.

Self-reliance is defined in the White Paper as 'the ability to grasp the meaning of things, to comprehend and to make judgements', and valued as 'the first factor in adapting to economic and labour market change', and nothing beyond this, no link with education (EU Commission 1995, p.27). Literature and philosophy are included in the learning package required for this self-reliance. Their job in the future information society, the White Paper says, which will itself be crucial in providing the broad base of knowledge the economy requires, will be to protect people from 'the indiscriminate bombardment of information from the mass media and, in the near future, from the large informatics networks'. This they will do by 'arm(ing) the individual with powers of discernment and a critical sense', the qualities that 'can provide the best protection against manipulation, enabling people to interpret and understand the information they receive' (EU Commission 1995, p.28). The White Paper gives creativity

and the desire to experiment and innovate importance too, but again not as aspects of self-fulfilment but as ‘the qualities which will enable us to train inventors rather than mere technology managers’ (EU Commission 1995, p.29). Again, while the document emphasises that schools should encourage ‘critical faculties to be developed at all levels, among both pupils and teachers’, and, more generally, fulfil their ‘main function . . . which is to guide the young people in (their) care in their personal and social development’, it is careful to counterweigh this with the emphasis that ‘this is not incompatible with the duty to prepare them for employment’; indeed it demands that ‘these two demands will be even more compatible than at present’ (EU Commission 1995, p.30). One could continue with further examples of this kind nearly indefinitely. The point I am seeking to make is that the economic agenda is the underpinning motivating factor everywhere in the White Paper, even where mention is made of those factors we would broadly refer to as ‘educational’.

There is a section of the White Paper, titled ‘Directions for the future’, which has as its first subtitle (A) ‘The End of Debate on Educational Principles’. Years of ‘heated debate’, it says, now appear to have come to an end and a consensus has been reached on how the common ‘educational principles’ should be defined for Europe. It proceeds to list them. The first is to consider ‘a broad knowledge base and training for employment’ as ‘no longer two contradictory or separate things, with the increasing recognition for the importance of general knowledge in using vocational skills’. The second is about building bridges between the school and the business sector, breaking down the ‘ideological and cultural barriers’, it says, that have hitherto ‘separated education and enterprise’. The third is ‘the principle of equal rights in education’, to be ‘applied in the context of equality of opportunity’, and which includes the principle of positive discrimination in favour of the disadvantaged ‘in order to prevent under-achievement at school’. Finally, the fourth and last principle refers to what the White Paper refers to as the common acknowledgement of the reality of the information society which has persuaded teachers of the need to renew teaching approaches and permitted more contact and links between European educational institutions (European Commission 1995, p.42). An immediate reaction to this list is that these are not so much educational principles as operational targets – a kind of mission statement for lifelong learning and the learning society as the White Paper conceives it. The section continues to identify the central operational questions they raise more concretely; how the education and training institutions can respond flexibly to the needs of different groups. How they can be made accessible to more people, and to a wider spectrum of them. How they can respond to the variety of demands and needs of people without sacrificing standards? How the quality of teachers and trainers can be improved and their status preserved while motivating them to meet the manifold needs of the learning society? And how the conditions of lifelong learning, the ongoing access to new skills and knowledge, can be created? All of them are operational questions demanding strategic answers while the normative questions are set aside before this new consensus on the ‘principles’ that is supposed to have been achieved.

The Knowledge-Based Society and Economy

Comparison between the two policy documents reveals a marked distinction between the two approaches to the learning society in the two most significant policy documents that refer to the concept. The UNESCO document is marked by a strong, explicitly stated, humanistic ideology, a political programme, and a philosophy of education in which the ideals and language of the European Enlightenment can be clearly read, with its global aspirations, its humanistic concerns, its emphasis on solidarity, and its faith in science and technology working together with education and democracy as tools for the global improvement and progress of humanity. Important features it shares with the EU approach are: its emphasis on responsible individual self-directed learning, and its reference to the learning society as an open resource for lifelong learning opportunities, with the difference in the latter case that the state is given a more pronounced role in the mobilisation and maintenance of the learning society in the UNESCO conception than it is in the EU, which gives a more pronounced role to business working in partnership with the state and with local authorities. On the ideological level the two approaches could not be wider apart; the first is driven by an interest in education and by an agenda whose ingredients are mainly political and cultural, the second by an interest in vocational training and by an agenda driven mainly by the needs of employment and the economy. The first is concerned to present itself as a philosophy of education and pronounces itself as such in broadly progressivist humanistic tones; the second neutralises any debate about educational principles by taking them as given and, therefore, no longer on the agenda. The White Paper's argument, we saw, is simple: the debate has been heated and long, now it needs to stop so that we can get on with the business of delivering lifelong learning efficiently. How is what the so-called principles tell us.

Elsewhere I have argued that the managerialist/vocationalist agenda that underpins the EU thinking, typical of the mentality that has taken over the Western world since the beginning of the 1990s, is reflected in the tendency to replace the old expression 'lifelong education' with the expression 'lifelong learning', and that this move signals a general decision to abandon the normative dimension of meaning that the former expression carries with it through the presence of the word 'education'. (Wain 2001, 2004). I have interpreted this shift to signify that the EU Commission considers the normative debate on education substantially closed following the collapse of socialism as a significant political and economic political agenda in Europe in the early 1990s and the trend for politics since then to move beyond the traditional ideological divide between left and right towards definitions of a centre that acknowledges capitalism and liberal democracy as given. The White Paper's explicit recommendation to shelve the debate on 'educational principles' and turn it towards strategies for lifelong learning, and the nature of the 'principles' it represents as given and agreed on, considerably strengthens this interpretation. The need for the 'general accord' it refers to may also be what *determined* the quality of the principles it identifies. Their bland nature more than probably reflects a

political sensitivity to the fact that European societies are growing ever more pluralistic and heterogeneous, their character and profile increasingly multicultural, multi-ethnic, and multiracial. This reality militates against a common normative resolution of education, a common definition of the values it incorporates, and encourages neutrality on the subject as the safest and most prudent course of action. A more mundane reason for the EU Commission's impatience with education could lie in the fact that the Commission is, after all, a technical and executive body entrusted with the job of getting things done, of carrying out the general policies of the Council of Ministers or following them through. In other words, in the fact that it is itself a technocracy unwilling to waste its time on 'fruitless' debate about education or about normative principles.

Perhaps another, more interesting, reason for abandoning 'education' may be that to do so is in tune with the contemporary postmodern *ethos* of Western societies as Lyotard (1999) has described it; as one of incredulity towards the metanarratives of modernity. These metanarratives link education with emancipation and moral/political progress, the kind of metanarratives which, to repeat an earlier reflection, underpins the deliberations, and recommendations of the Fauré report. Lyotard argues that the postmodern *ethos* has produced a performativist culture, one based instead on 'the optimization of the global relationship between input and output' (Lyotard 1999, p.11), a culture which prioritises the criteria of effectiveness and efficiency, of what, therefore, can be reduced to measurable outcomes, and which reduces the value of learning to the promotion of skills and competencies. In other words, 'performativism' is another word for the managerialist/vocationalist culture I referred to earlier. Its value in respect to what I have just said about the growing pluralism of European societies, could be that it carries a deceptive aura of ideological neutrality that renders it particular suitable for societies of that sort. The assumption, whether conscious or not, would be that a normatively neutral, non-ideological, approach to policies of lifelong learning (what could be more ideologically neutral than the management of knowledge and the pursuit of effective and efficient outcomes) will obtain consensus on all sides of the political, cultural, and ethnic spectrum. To put the matter more simply and directly, the fear of an interminable conflict-ridden, divisive, ideological debate about education may make performativity seem attractive to the policy-makers. For even if performativist-driven policies do not obtain a universal or broad consensus they are likely to provoke less passionate disagreement in an incurably pluralistic society than the more explicit ideological agendas of liberalism, socialism, humanism, and the like, all inspired by the political culture of Western modernity. This is not because performativity has no ethical/political agenda but because its agenda is hidden and delivered in subtle ways; it is tied in with the culture of business and profitability and with the economic management of human and material resources, an agenda that seems overtly non-ideological but obviously is not. Social theorists tie it in with the rise of modern bureaucratic institutions that embody a technocratic culture, and identify positivism as its intellectual progenitor. This goes along with the creeping rationalisation of everything, including the lifeworld, that Max Weber referred to as an invisible 'iron cage' spun on society, and that his Frankfurt School successors

referred to as the 'total administration' of the institutional and social space. Performativity is its postmodern name.

It is more than plausible to argue that education could be a victim of the success of performativity. The postmodern ethos not only rules education out of the debate: it also rules out a Fauré report type of approach to the learning society; one driven by a vision or by a political metanarrative other than the performativist. One that has at its core a philosophy of education other than the performativist. Indeed, the crucial point here is that performativity, however disguised, is itself a metanarrative, *the* metanarrative of the postmodern world (Wain 2004). Lifelong learning, with its emphasis on training and instruction, is its strategic embodiment in the world of what used at one time to be called 'education'. Its progress begins with the pragmatic argument that the postmodern world as a fast-changing world forces the conclusion on us, first acknowledged by the Fauré report and the lifelong education theorists of the 1960s and 1970s, that there is no alternative to its policies and practices, and gathers momentum with the perception that employability and economic survival are at stake. As Blake et al. remark, the acceptance of the arguments usually leads to considerations about how change can be managed, and these, in turn, lead to one of 'the nostrums' of our times, which is that since 'all is in flux substance can be ignored and more power given to the managers immediately' (Blake et al. 2000, p.2). That 'substance', of course, is the normative agenda that carries the name education. Economic survival in a postmodern world of constant and fast moving flux, both on a personal and a social level, we are told, depends on the successful management of that flux and the ability to produce new knowledge. It therefore requires lifelong learning guided by a culture of effectiveness and efficiency, the core values of performativity.

I need to note here that, not long after the publication of the 1995 White Paper, the notion of the learning society, which was never tackled there in the comprehensive way that it was in the early lifelong education literature anyway, was virtually abandoned by the EU policy-makers and replaced by the notion of a *knowledge society and economy* which, as I pointed out earlier, was already mentioned in the White Paper also. The winning combination of a performativist culture and the lifelong learning strategies to embody it, with the strategic 'principles' identified in the White Paper, target the creation of a postmodern society and economy whose point of reference is the accelerated rate of speed in the creation, accumulation, and depreciation of knowledge (the new capital) interactive with the intensified rate of scientific and technological development over the past decades, not a learning society with a socio-political agenda. In the process it makes education redundant. It also needs to be noted at this point that the learning society was still, at the time of the White Paper, regarded by its proponents as a myth, something yet to come, an utopia to be aspired to and worked for (Hughes and Tight 1995). The same is true for the knowledge society today. It also is usually regarded as still a myth but one that is on the way to realisation, the assumption being that 'society as a whole is shifting to knowledge-intensive activities', and that innovation is growing in speed and intensity, in tune with a revolution in technology (David and Foray 2001, p.2).

The industrial world has created the notion of the *knowledge-based community* to stand to the notion of a knowledge society and economy in the same way as the *learning organisation* was created to stand to the notion of the learning society at the time when the working policy discourse of lifelong learning addressed itself towards the latter notion (Wain 2004). The learning organisation is one that 'brings the strategy, structure and culture of the enterprise itself into a learning system' (Bradshaw 1995, p.108). The knowledge-based community, however, works differently and in more indirect ways. It acts like a parasite infiltrating conventional organisations that already exist and that in its perception are already thriving as a valuable asset in the industrial landscape. It develops its corrective expertise within these organisations, towards which it has no special loyalty, so that these become agents of change for the economy as a whole. The knowledge-based community is described as the new kind of entity spearheading the advent of the knowledge society. Its members are researchers and innovators. In short, knowledge-based communities are 'networks of individuals striving, first and foremost, to produce and circulate new knowledge'. They could be 'working for different, even rival, organisations' (David and Foray 2001, p.1). They depend on three logistical elements: (a) that a significant number of a community combine to produce and reproduce knowledge; (b) that the community creates a 'public' space for exchanging and circulating the knowledge; (c) that new information and communication technologies are intensively used to codify and transmit the new knowledge (David and Foray 2001, p.5). In this way, the innovator, the creator of new knowledge, rather than the self-directed learner, is the hero of the knowledge-based society and economy, and networks of innovators, obviously aided with the new information and communication technologies, are the force that will bring it into being.

One consequence of this is that self-directed learning, the ability to learn, to seek out, use, and assess knowledge, becomes a second-level aim indispensable for all but not the optimum required. The optimum is to be creative and to be able to network with others in the creation of knowledge. The success of the knowledge-based society and economy depends on its ability to produce reasonably large numbers of innovators and their ability to network together as communities in virtual public space. The virtues of the knowledge-based community can be summarised in its ability to produce, manage, and share knowledge in an efficient and productive way because it can create new synergies, codifies its knowledge base, guarantees quality control, avoids duplication, enhances learning to learn, and is cost-effective (since it is less expensive to move knowledge than it is to move people) (David and Foray 2001, p.5). There is no optimum size for it: 'The potential for producing and reproducing knowledge will become greater as a community expands; but then so will the costs of data search, the risk of congestion and anonymity amongst members, which can, in turn, represent a source of acute problems of trust'. All the same, it is always 'a fragile structure' in that it is based on informal rules (reciprocity, disclosure). So it can 'rapidly disintegrate when (its) members lose the ability or the dedication to follow those rules, and, instead seek to further their individual interests through non-cooperative action in the realm of markets' (David and

Foray 2001, p.8). The political conditions for the flourishing of these knowledge-based communities would evidently be a state that is committed to its own withdrawal from the economy and that guarantees the liberal freedoms.

Postmodern Politics

There are features of this description of the performativist politics of a knowledge-based community that resonate strangely (or maybe not so strangely), with the politics of poststructuralism, of philosophers like Foucault, Derrida, and Rorty. This is not, I think, surprising since the poststructuralist *ethos* is, like the performativist, reflective of the postmodernist, with the difference that it takes the postmodernist distrust of the metanarratives of modernity a crucial step further and extends that distrust to all metanarratives in general, including the metanarratives of performativity. To put it a bit differently, poststructuralism does its politics without reference to any metanarratives or criteria, modernist or otherwise. Let me identify some of the convergences. The emphasis on creativity and innovation to begin with, on the creation of new knowledge and new discourses, echoes the Lyotard (1999) who, in the place where he described the *ethos* of performativity to us with its clear positivistic antecedents, also suggested his antidote to it in the shape of what he calls paralogy. In his book, in fact, Lyotard distinguished two ways of being creative, of producing new knowledge; one within an already existing and established framework or paradigm, where one plays *within* the rules of a game that is already ongoing, the other when one invents *new* rules and plays an entirely new game. The second kind of creativity is what he calls *paralogical*, and a rather similar distinction is advanced by Richard Rorty (1980) too between 'normal' and 'abnormal' discourse, the latter being his name, roughly speaking, for the paralogical. Rorty, however, makes the important point that abnormal language, whether in its revolutionary form or in its radical, or poetic, is always a rereading of the normal, and is always parasitic on it. Elsewhere he goes on to describe a liberal utopia that places its hopes for progress in the liberal ironist, the radical innovator, and where he describes the self as a seamless network of experiences, which is how the knowledge-based community is described in the literature. But the shying away from creating stable centres that one detects in the thinking of the knowledge-based community and the politics of temporary alliances and reactive tactics that it promotes as against enduring alliances and comprehensive, constructive, strategies, is also typical of poststructuralist thinking generally but most especially Foucault's. Though Foucault is distrustful of performativist metanarratives, whose disciplinary technologies he unmask in his genealogies, effectiveness is, without doubt, a consideration behind his politics of specific engagement which are aimed at concrete, identifiable, outcomes rather than abstract and universal causes. Foucault even contrasts a role for the 'specific intellectual' in society in contrast with that of the modernist universal intellectual, and advocates the politics of temporary alliances that dissolve rapidly as against the more enduring alliances constituted, for example, by social movements

(Foucault 1995, pp.126–133). Not, however for the reason described by David and Foray but because the alliance will have fulfilled its purpose or lost its point.

Poststructuralist politics evidently have a broader socio-political reach than the industrial; Foucault talks about the capillaries of society. But what kind of approach to the learning society do these politics imply? It is tempting to argue that the difference of reach, the abandonment of the broader focus on the learning society for the more contained focus on the knowledge society and economy reflects the same thinking as the abandonment of lifelong education for the normatively free lifelong learning; namely that, in this case, the political understanding of the learning society can be assumed just as can the normative understanding of learning. This argument would be supported by the fact that there is a general political commitment in the EU today, at least at the level of governments, to a politics of democracy, liberal freedoms, and human rights that the aborted constitution tried to enframe. A consensus that has its flip-side in a deepening concern over the fragility of the 'social cohesion' in the countries of the EU; over political apathy and disaffection and a declining rate of democratic participation among young people; especially but not only, over radical Islamic politics and xenophobia; and over the debacle of the constitution. That failure, I suggested earlier, should have signalled a need to rethink; to reconsider the politics of abandoning the civic-based notion of the learning society with a political agenda such as was proposed by the first, utopian, strain of the lifelong education movement. In short, to consider installing the articles of the new European Constitution as the political metanarrative for a reconstituted notion of lifelong education and the learning society in the Union's member countries. But the problem here may be, as I have also suggested, that one reason why the people of Europe, or at least a good part of them, have rejected the constitution, even if they are unable to articulate their thoughts and feelings in this way, is that metanarratives of this kind are growing increasingly alien to them; another is the fact that, with a number of them at least, notwithstanding their technical citizenship, their native culture is alien to the European.

Here, one is reminded of the criticism brought against the poststructuralists by their critics, particularly on the Left, that political metanarratives are necessary to sustain rational action. That metanarratives such as those of social justice and emancipation are necessary to create, justify, and sustain solidarity and social cohesion. So that we either affirm these criteria or the criteria of a Rightist or some other ideology, or we are lost. In sum, without criteria provided by metanarratives, politics turn irrationalist. This holds true whether we are after reform or revolution, or radical political change where we are dissatisfied with the status quo. Even when we struggle politically, the critics argue, we need to struggle *for*, or in the name of, something, some higher or better conception of things; of justice, for instance, or goodness, or truth, otherwise our struggle is aimless and irresponsible. The major advantage of performativity in this respect, to repeat the point, is the illusion it gives of functioning as a metanarrative without appearing to be one. This is because, like liberalism, it can represent itself as being non-ideological, and therefore as not being a metanarrative, while furnishing universal criteria against which to plan and measure action nonetheless. But performativity, as we have seen, though it will

offer a way into creating efficient and effective action in the management of a competitive economy, of knowledge, and of human and other resources, will offer no account of or justification for social cohesion or democracy. It stops short at the point where the request is made for efficiency and effectiveness to be elaborated in response to some further social end like justice, solidarity, democracy, and so on. In short, at the point where some metanarrative other than the technician is demanded. Turned into an end in itself, it encourages an individualist meritocracy instead and the culture of the expert. At this stage the Left will argue we need to work *against* the postmodern tide; against both the dominant culture of performativity and the ironist outlook of the poststructuralist. We need, it will say, to reaffirm the old Left values of emancipation, social justice, and solidarity, recast them as the political objects of a learning society, and use them to redefine the aims of education.

This will, indeed, be the only option for those who still believe in the metanarratives of the Left or believe that such a programme is possible. At this point it needs to be affirmed, however, that performativity and irony are not the only postmodern (again defined as one distrustful of metanarratives) alternative to this conclusion. Much space has been devoted to the task of defining the proper aims of education in philosophy of education. Against this approach John Dewey (1966) famously argued that it is not education but people who have aims, so that the aims of education are not really those of education at all but of those who define them. This is an argument I find convincing. Dewey, as is well known, proposed to regard education in the blandest way possible as 'growth' instead, drawing on himself the criticism of being vacuous and not serious in the process. Dewey's critics demanded a target for growth, something for which growth should aim and in terms of which to define it, which Dewey refused to give, much as Foucault, under pressure from Chomsky, refused to define justice or even to specify criteria to which the notion should correspond (Davidson 1997). Dewey and Foucault, in fact, faced the same kind of question from their critics; how does one recognise justice/education without proper criteria? Without criteria, without knowing what we are to understand by justice/education, how do we know what we should or should not be doing in their name? Dewey answered that educational growth could only be distinguished by the fact that it created conditions for further growth, Foucault's that defining justice did not correspond with his interests or with the way he wanted to do politics. Dewey could have made the same answer as Foucault, namely that his interest in education was different from that of his critics and that he wanted to do education differently. Foucault wanted to approach politics not from the angle of justice but from that of power, and the distinction he wanted to make was between power relations that flow openly between the parties concerned and those that solidify into the domination of one party over the other blocking the flow. In a sense Dewey's democratic politics wanted to do the same thing. Foucault's politics addressed themselves towards tactics to unblock power where it solidifies and becomes oppressive, and the same was true of Dewey. Dewey distinguished a growth that is open (that leads to more growth) from blocked growth that is congealed at a point, identifying the former with education. The difference between them was that where Dewey sought out the conditions that promote growth, and

therefore education, individual and social, in an ethics of communication (to borrow from Habermas) understood as open democratic exchange in an uninhibited public sphere, Foucault's sceptical attitude towards modern Western institutions led him to seek freedom, one could say identify education, in a transgressive ethics of self-constitution. It is interesting, in this context, that Dewey defines growth differently from Foucault, not as self-constitution but as an ongoing reconstruction, a continuous remaking of the self on the basis of experiences that are essentially social rather than ethical and aesthetic. While disdaining a definition of education in terms of aims, Dewey suggested that what educators should focus on is creating learning environments where learners are encouraged and enabled to grow in their own individual way. Such learning environments, which would be democratic in his understanding of the term, would be so constituted that communication circulates freely within them and with other environments, and that experimentation and change are possible and encouraged. In short, Dewey conceived of education as growth in fluid, centreless, democratic learning communities.

Dewey or Foucault?

As we saw earlier, the standard definition of the learning society within the lifelong education literature was as a society mobilised for learning which could be any kind of society politically; one mobilised for freedom or one mobilised for repression. In other words it was purely an *operational* or, to use Dewey's own term, *technical*, definition, and a very general one, to which the writers of the movement proceeded to theorise a normative core in the shape of an ideological statement. Dewey's learning society, like that of the Fauré report, would be mobilised as a democracy, as a form of life marked by the characteristics just described. But Dewey's (1966, p.76) definition of democracy as a form of life marked by communication, is itself purely operational or technical as is, in fact, his definition of education as growth. From this point of view his critics were right: Dewey's definition of both democracy and education are 'incomplete' since a complete definition presupposes the statement of some explicit normative content, and this is a statement he declines to make (he could thus, in this sense, be described as guilty of the same semantic confusion as Gelpi). In Dewey we thus get a learning society which is marked by open communication, in which the business of growing in communication is left to the individual and which is postmodern in that it dispenses with any metanarratives of democracy or education. What would make it different from today's reality is that it would exchange the managerialist ethos of performativity with a democratic ethos that would set the tune for the whole environment of policy-making and practice in the learning society within which efficiency and effectiveness are redefined to support that *ethos* instead of being considered as their own ends.

Against this Foucault suggests a very different approach to the learning society. Dewey's politics are reconstructive and liberal, a politics of reform, Foucault's are deconstructive, a politics of resistance suspicious of liberal institutions. Foucault

presents us with a dystopian sociology of modern/postmodern societies that are *already* learning societies and in which *education is impossible*, even on Dewey's terms. Or at least this is what he suggests in *Discipline and Punish* (1991) where he contends that modern societies are mobilised not for education or open-ended and free growth but for discipline and surveillance, for the successful containment of their members. In the same book Foucault contends that the circle of containment is a vicious one, that we escape one form of domination only to enter another. This being the case the mere reconstruction of experience would leave one within the same circle of domination without that possibility of escape with which education has been linked since Plato. Later on he retracted from this position to concede that freedom is always, in principle, possible. Indeed, without such a retraction it would have been vacuous for him to speak of education as self-constitution, which, as I noted earlier, is how he sees it. But self-constitution is not, for a Foucault inspired not by liberal institutions and democracy but by a Nietzschean suspicion of both, something one obtains through growth within a community but through resistance to the various technologies of power that turn one into a 'subject' in different ways. In other words, it is something obtained through the rejection rather than the affirmation of what one is, and through the project to create oneself anew. This is the outlook of what Rorty (1989) calls the ironist.

In short, the two, Dewey and Foucault, indicate very different postmodern (to the extent that they both dispense with master narratives) approaches to education and to the learning society that challenge the currently dominant performativist model, corresponding not only with their different ways of doing politics but also with their different political attitudes towards modern Western societies. Dewey's approach, to be sure, falls within the conventional approach where the object is to define the conditions which make such a society possible. Stipulating that it must be democratic signifies, of course, a political commitment on his part, but he refrains from giving us a *theory* of democracy confining himself to the conditions that make it possible, and these are the very same conditions that characterise a learning society in his terms, one mobilised for open communication. A Deweyan approach, with its restriction to technical definitions, distinguishes the term lifelong education for lifelong learning in terms of growth within a democratic environment. Foucault's approach, on the other hand, is to uncover the power technologies underpinning modern society conceived *de facto* as a learning society, and it turns up an archipelago of pedagogical institutions and practices at the heart of which lies a powerful managerialist agenda of domestication and containment. In *Discipline and Punish* he describes the architecture of the modern learning society as that of a panopticon; a society for which the subtle but efficient surveillance of its members is a priority. His politics are, therefore, very different from Dewey's: revolutionary early on when he spoke of being interested in subverting the society at its fundamentals (Davidson 1997), more moderate later when he opted instead for a politics of tactical resistance at specific sites where it is warranted, namely where power is blocked and has hardened into oppression or manipulation. Education, on the other hand, corresponds with a personal project (rather than social), ethical, and aesthetic, of individual self-constitution which requires us, in Nietzsche's way, to be original.

As Rorty (1989) tells us, the major political difference between the two is that, while Dewey is a liberal social democrat who believes that the basic institutions of modern liberal democracies are fundamentally the right ones and, therefore, require no more than piecemeal reform, Foucault is highly suspicious of them. And though, as I have just said, in his later work he abandons his earlier revolutionary attitude towards them, his thinking remains anarchic. Their different ways of thinking about education reflect their different political thinking, Dewey referring to it as reconstruction, Foucault as reconstitution, or redefinition. Rorty (1989), with some justice, puts Foucault's suspicion of liberalism and of liberal institutions, his generally hostile attitude towards them, down to the Nietzschean influences on his thinking. Nietzsche's negative attitude towards modern political and moral culture and towards the modern state led him to put his faith in an individualist *ethics* of self-creation, which is the way he understands education. Self-creation starts by refusing who and what one is and is something formed through one's relationship with a master (who is an exemplar to be learnt from initially then abandoned and disowned), rather than something created socially, in communication with others. Rorty believes that cultivating a culture of self-creation should be the task of non-vocational universities. Foucault's reference to self-reconstitution rather than self-creation, because he uses a language for it that suggests the latter, probably reflects an awareness of the pitfalls of the latter term, as well as his strong representation of the self as, at the same time, socially constructed. Self-reconstitution, in his terms, follows his genealogical deconstruction of the modern/postmodern self as learner, as a subjectivised self, which is what leads to the self-refusal Nietzsche speaks of. Foucault is as unwilling to define self-reconstitution in substantive terms as Dewey is to define self-restructuring. In this sense, reconstruction is also a technical definition of education. The two offer, as I said earlier, alternative 'postmodern' approaches to the learning society and to our thinking of education from the performativist approach that currently dominates the policy discourse of lifelong learning. The latter dispenses with education, Dewey and Foucault offer ways of redefining it, in line with the postmodern mood, without any recourse to metanarratives. Dewey would describe his project for the learning society, as he does for the school, as one of social reconstruction and democratic growth, Foucault would describe his as one of deconstruction and resistance against domination.

References

- Blake, N., Smeyers, P., Smith, R., and Standish, P. (2000) *Education in an Age of Nihilism*. London, New York: Routledge Falmer.
- Bradshaw, D. (1995) (Ed) *Bringing Learning to Life: The Learning Revolution, the Economy, and the Individual*. London, Washington DC: Falmer Press.
- David, P.A. and Foray, D. (2001) An introduction to the economy of the knowledge society. *MERIT-Infonomics Research Memorandum Series*, December.
- Davidson, A. (1998) *Foucault and His Interlocutors*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Dewey, J. (1966) *Democracy and Education*. London: Macmillan.

- EU Commission White Paper (1995) *Teaching and Learning: Towards the Learning Society*. Brussels: European Union.
- Foucault, M. (1991) *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison*. London: Penguin Books.
- Foucault, M. (1995) Truth and power. In: Faubion, J.D. (Ed) *Michel Foucault: The Essential Works 3, Power*. London: Allen Lane, London: Penguin Press, pp.111–133.
- Gelpi, E. (1984) Lifelong education and international relations. In: Wain, K. (Ed) *Lifelong Education and Participation*. Msida, Malta: University of Malta, pp.16–29.
- Hughes, C. and Tight, M. (1995) The myth of the learning society, *British Journal of Educational Studies*, 43(September), 290–304.
- Illich, I. and Verne, E. (1976) *Imprisoned in the Global Classroom*. Montreal: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative Society.
- Lyotard, J.F. (1999) *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Ragatt, P., Edwards, R., and Small, N. (1996) *The Learning Society: Challenges and Trends*. London: Routledge in association with The Open University.
- Rorty, R. (1980) *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Rorty, R. (1989) *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press.
- Wain, K. (2001) Lifelong learning: small adjustment or paradigm shift? In: Aspin, D., Chapman, J., Hatton, M., and Sawano, Y. (Eds) *The International Handbook of Lifelong Learning* [Part One]. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic.
- Wain, K. (2004) *The Learning Society in a Postmodern World*. New York: Peter Lang.

Chapter 3

Lifelong Learning and Vocational Education and Training: Values, Social Capital, and Caring in Work-Based Learning Provision

Terry Hyland

Introduction

In the halcyon early years of the New Labour government in Britain, the slogan ‘lifelong learning’ was chosen to characterise and publicise the values and policies for education and training under the new administration (DfEE 1998). Similar concepts informed the reform programmes of other European countries, particularly those influenced by ‘third way’ politics (Hyland 2002a). The concept of lifelong learning was, however, by no means a 1990s construction. Like its popular predecessor – the ‘learning society’ – it had been appropriated from the adult education tradition (Edwards 1997) in order to prescribe a conception of learning from the cradle to the grave or, as Henry Morris once put it, with the aim of ‘raising the school leaving age to 90’ (Kellner 1998, p.15). All this was meant to replace the ineffective and outdated mainstream school-centred or ‘front-loading’ model of educational provision.

However, apart from this opposition to the traditional schooling model, contemporary versions of lifelong learning are rather different from those associated with the older adult education traditions of *education permanente* and ‘recurrent education’. In an editorial celebrating its 17th year of publication the *International Journal of Lifelong Education* rejoiced in the fact that ‘lifelong education has really come to the fore in the educational vocabulary in recent years’ (IJLE 1995, p.69). The editors went on, however, to deplore the fact that this conception is ‘increasingly being equated with continuing education and related rather specifically to vocational updating’ (ibid.).

Such comments reflect the policy trends of the past few decades which have produced a ‘vocationalisation’ (Hyland 1999) of all educational provision from school to university to the extent that the ‘economistic’ (Avis et al. 1996) purposes of learning are given pride of place to the detriment of the broader intellectual, social, and cultural functions of state systems (Skilbeck et al. 1994).

Tight (1998) offers the view that the concept has become part of a trinity – lifelong learning, the learning organisation and the learning society – aimed at ‘articulating the importance of continuing learning for survival and development at the levels of the individual, the organisation and society as a whole’ (p.254). Although

providing useful insights, this conception does raise some problematic issues. There is, for example, some legitimacy in the economic versions of learning when applied to industry and commerce, but there is no explanation as to why this vocationalist/ economic thrust has also come to predominate individualist and societal perspectives. Although lifelong learning is increasingly linked in government policy documents with skills training and global economic competitiveness, the concept does not, as Strain (1998) points out, normally carry such technician and utilitarian connotations.

In addition to noting these important shifts of emphasis in policy discourse, it is also worth marking the subtle shift of emphasis from lifelong *education* (used in the older adult education tradition) and lifelong *learning* (the preferred term in the current lexicon). As Field (2000) has observed, education implies a formal system of provision supplied and funded by the state whereas learning suggests something more informal and less dependent upon government organisation and finance. This is why the key vision of fostering a new culture of learning and aspiration may be described as a 'soft objective', which places most of the responsibility for its achievement on individuals and communities. Indeed, the primary economic thrust of lifelong learning policy is directly derived from the 'new governance' strategy which 'places the responsibility on citizens to plan and develop their capacity for earning a living' (pp.222–223).

Perspectives on Lifelong Learning

The policy slogan dominating discourse throughout the 1980s and early 1990s just prior to the lifelong learning era was that of the 'learning society', and its evolution serves to illustrate clearly how economic perspectives transformed educational language, policy, and practice in state provision. Barnett (1998, pp.14–15) examined four different interpretations of the learning society in his critical analysis of the 1997 Dearing Report on higher education:

- (1) The continuing replenishment of human capital so as to maintain and strengthen society's economic capital
- (2) The maintenance of cultural capital and the quality of life of individuals and the collective
- (3) The inculcation of democratic citizenship
- (4) An emancipatory conception aimed at fostering self-reflexive learners who can respond to change in a rational and creative manner

His conclusion about these prescriptions was that the

Dearing conception of the learning society is the *economic* conception . . . but with a human face. Individual learning and development are to be welcomed but principally for their contribution to the growth of economic capital (ibid., p.15, original italics).

Dearing's (1997, para. 34) preference for an economic model – on the grounds that 'in the future, competitive advantage for advanced societies will lie in the

quality, effectiveness and relevance of their provision for education and training' – though some way short of the most extreme utilitarian conceptions of the learning society, accurately reflects the culture shift in educational aims and values that has occurred in Britain over the past few decades (typically dated from the then Prime Minister, James Callaghan's, Ruskin College speech in 1976; see Hyland 1994, pp.3ff). Indeed, as Field (2000b) has argued, there is now a 'global consensus' on the need to embed lifelong learning in modern industrial states, and this new emphasis can be seen as the 'natural outcome of the dramatic economic and technological changes that have overwhelmed the world system since the 1960s' (pp.2–3).

In earlier times the economic function of education was merely one – and not necessarily the principal one – of a number of aims and objectives of national systems. The Robbins Report (1963) on higher education, for example – though mentioning vocational preparation – was concerned chiefly with the intellectual, cultural and social purposes of education. Similar values informed the Russell report (DES 1973) on adult education and, going further back, were predominant in the post-First World War report of the Ministry of Reconstruction (1919) which saw adult education as a 'permanent necessity, an inseparable aspect of citizenship, [which] therefore should be universal and lifelong' (p.5). All this is a long way from current conceptions of lifelong learning neatly summed up in the then Secretary of State's comments on the 1998 Green paper *The Learning Age* in which it was observed that

the ability to manage and use information is becoming the key to the competitive strength of advanced economies. With increasing globalisation, the best way of getting and keeping a job will be to have the skills needed by employers. For individuals who want security in employment and a nation that must compete worldwide, learning is the key. (Blunkett 1998, p.18)

Similar sentiments have informed New Labour policy throughout subsequent DfEE policy documents since then and, of course, are reflected in the obsession with employability skills in contemporary discourse about education and training, including the change of the DfEE name to the Department of Education and Skills (DfES). Once the Secretary of State becomes officially responsible for 'skills' as well as 'education', there can be little doubt what the priorities are going to be (and, indeed, these are clearly reflected in the work of the National Skills Task Force, DfEE, 2000a, b). This emphasis is also present in the recent Foster Report (2005) on English further education (FE) colleges which recommends a 'core focus on skills and employability' with the aim of "increasing the pool of employable people and sharing with other providers the role of enhancing business productivity' (Foster Report 2005, p.2).

Myths and Ideologies in Lifelong Learning

Although a number of commentators have described the idea of lifelong learning and the learning society as, on the one hand, a 'myth' which has 'no real prospect of coming into existence in the foreseeable future' (Hughes and Tight 1998, p.188)

or, on the other, a spectacular example of ‘idealist educational discourse’ (Rikowski, 1998, p.223), which is unhistorical and indeterminate, there is now sufficient policy documentation and analysis around to allow for the identification of distinctive models of VET associated with the principal themes and conceptions. Young (1998) is surely correct to suggest that the different versions of the learning society are ‘essentially contested’, reflecting ‘different interests’ and ‘different visions for the future’ (p.193).

In earlier work (Hyland, 2000) I analysed various leading ‘contestants’ (Edwards 1997; Young 1998) in the learning society policy field, and made use of Ranson’s (1998, pp.2–10) work which identified the following components:

- (1) A society in which learning is a means of coping with structural, social, economic, and political change so as to ensure stability and continuity
- (2) A society which utilises learning to support educational changes linked to increased expectations and participation and to keep pace with technological, communication, and epistemological transformations
- (3) A comprehensive system of continuing education which unites all forms of school and post-school learning through the idea that learning and wider aspects of social life are part of an integrated whole
- (4) A final stage in which learning supports a democratic community which incorporates genuine equality of opportunity and parity of esteem for all forms of education and training

Such a typology offers us a kind of stage-development model of how a learning society – or a society committed to lifelong learning – might emerge. Until the conditions of one stage are met, it is not feasible to deal with the criteria and requirements of any subsequent stage. This may be illustrated by the diagram below:

INDIVIDUAL: basic minimum curriculum – employment skills – utilitarian ends
[Self]
Updating skills – VET for global competition – broad vocationalism
[Society]
COMMUNITY: learning culture – vocational/academic unity – educative
learning

The general developmental direction of policy and practice is from narrow skills training for individuals (basic skills, occupationally specific national vocational qualifications (NVQs)) towards a broader vocationalism (general NVQs, vocational A-levels) to wider social, cultural, and moral objectives linked to a socially just community. This latter is what Young (1998) calls the ‘educative’ model, and may be linked to Winch’s (2000) discussion of social values in relation to VET in which social capital is seen as being:

Constituted through the social relationships that people have with each other, through the collective knowledge of a group, and the moral, cognitive, and social supervision that the

group exercises over its members. ... Social capital in this sense has a strongly moral dimension ... often described as the norms of trust prevalent within a society. (Winch 2000, p.5)

Such a vision – what I have described as a ‘social theory of lifelong learning’ (Hyland 2000, pp.127ff) – can be identified in official government policy documents in the field. However, such notions of broad, inclusive learning tend to be submerged beneath the welter of material on skills training and the economic aims of education and training. Recent developments in work-based learning (WBL) do, however, offer some scope and opportunity to reassert the importance and value of the moral and social dimension of VET.

Work-Based Learning

WBL has always been an essential ingredient of VET programmes though, arguably, it has never been accorded the prominence it now has in both Europe and Australasia (Symes and McIntyre 2000). In Britain, high quality ‘work-based training is at the heart of the Government’s 14–19 agenda’ (DfES 2001, p.2), and WBL is central to a whole host of current policy initiatives including new vocational qualifications for schools and further education, Foundation Degrees and newly reconstructed Modern Apprenticeships (LSC 2001). At the tertiary level universities are being asked to ‘build bridges between the campus and employers’ to achieve the ‘ambitious goal of vocational excellence for all’ (DfEE 2001, pp.9–10).

Described by Boud and Symes (2000) as ‘an idea whose time has come’ and an ‘acknowledgement that work ... is imbued with learning opportunities’ (pp.14–15), WBL has emerged as one of the key features of VET reform as national systems of education respond to the demands of the global competition and the so-called knowledge economy. Its essential features are derived from a number of sources connected with the notion of the learning organisation, the integration of theory and practice in workplace knowledge and skills, and the need to respond positively to the challenges of knowledge creation in the light of the information technology revolution global economic developments. The fundamental theoretical educational premise is that ‘the workplace is a crucially important site for learning and for access to learning’ (Evans et al. 2002, p.1).

In the study of WBL by Seagraves (1996) distinctions were made between learning *for* work (general VET courses), learning *at* work (in-house training, work experience, continuing professional development), and learning *through* work (the application of job-related knowledge and skills to work tasks, traineeships, and apprenticeships of various kinds). As Brennan and Little (1996) suggest, in ‘higher education terms, learning for work may well incorporate elements of learning at work and learning through work’ (p.5), all of which are included in ‘policies that have fostered more ‘realistic’ forms of university curricula designed to meet the needs of the changing workforce’ and the ‘fulfilment of career aspiration’ (Boud and Symes 2000, p.15) for students in FE and HE. In investigating these new

perspectives, Barnett (2002) reminds us that, although ‘work and learning are not synonymous’, the ‘two concepts overlap’ since:

Work can and should offer learning opportunities; much learning is demanding calling on the learner to yield to certain standards, and contains the character of work . . . the challenge here is that of bringing about the greatest overlap between work and learning. (Barnett 2002, p.19)

This idealistic and positive vision needs, however, to be qualified by the realities of the contemporary workplace which – as research by the National Skills Taskforce (DfEE 2000) and the large-scale Learning Society Project (Coffield 2000) has indicated – typically provide few opportunities for meaningful employee learning. Although many of the larger UK firms do encourage and support employee development of various kinds, it is still the case that – as Ashton et al. (2000) report – ‘something like two-thirds of the work force do not work in such organisations’; (p.222). Similar findings in relation to the appallingly low level of employee training apply especially to small businesses which account for 95% of British firms and around 35% of total employment (Hyland and Matlay 1998). The renewed emphasis on WBL at all levels of the system may serve to address some of these issues.

Social and Economic Capital

Research on the way in which people acquire knowledge, skills, and values in new settings – particularly in workplaces in which novice learners are negotiating entry into communities of practice and culture – have confirmed the central importance of social as opposed to individualised learning, even in the sphere of information technology in which individualised strategies have predominated (Guile and Hayton 1999). The development of vocational knowledge and skill in particular seems to require attention – not just to formal knowledge and disciplines – but to the ‘social and cultural context in which cognitive activity occurs’ (Billett 1996, p.150).

Drawing on the ‘activity theory’ of psychologists such as Vygotsky and Luria, a conception of ‘work as practical action’ (Jackson 1993, p.171) developed in the 1980s, and the new perspectives have been utilised extensively in recent years as a way of acknowledging and analysing learning in a variety of diverse social contexts.

Wenger (2002) usefully reminds us that

Since the beginning of history, human beings have formed communities that share cultural practices reflecting their collective learning: from a tribe round a cave fire, to a medieval guild . . . to a community of engineers . . . Participating in these ‘communities of practice; is essential to our learning. (Wenger 2002, p.163)

What Lave and Wenger (2002) call ‘legitimate peripheral participation’ concerns the ways in which newcomers or novices in various fields – and, interestingly, workplace learning through forms of apprenticeship is cited as a paradigm case here – come to acquire the knowledge, culture, and values that enable them to progress from being outsiders to insiders. It is argued that ‘newcomers participate in a community of practitioners as well as in productive activity’ and that it is

important to view 'learning as part of a social practice' (pp.121–122). They go on to observe that:

The social relations of apprentices within a community change their direct involvement in activities; in the process, the apprentices' understanding and knowledgeable skills develop . . . newcomers' legitimate peripherality provides them with more than an 'observational' lookout post: it crucially involves *participation* as a way of learning – of both absorbing and being absorbed – in the culture of practice'. (Lave and Wenger 2002, p.113, original italics)

Moreover as Guile and Young (2002) have suggested, the concept of apprenticeship development has significant implications for the content and contexts as well as the processes of learning. They point to the serious limitations of the traditional learning approaches in this sphere – based upon the 'transmission model' – which need to be supplemented by strategies which concentrate on the 'processes of work-based learning and the skill development that take place within the institution of apprenticeship' (pp.149–150). Similar points have been made by, for example, Ranson (1998) who suggests that all learning is 'inescapably a social creation' (p.20). and also by Harkin et al. (2001) who argue that 'effective learning is facilitated by social interaction' and 'has its basis in the relationships which exist between people' (pp.52–53). There are important continuities between formal (school, college) and informal (workplace) learning and knowledge which need to be emphasised here to develop models of what Bloomer and Hodgkinson (1997) have termed 'studentship' and learning careers'. Hager (2000) makes similar proposals in arguing for a conception of workplace knowledge which moves away from formal, disciplinary forms towards a model of WBL based upon 'people learning to make judgements' (p.60) across a range of different contexts.

Developing Social Capital on WBL Programmes

It could be argued that WBL strategies – in addition to fostering the occupational knowledge and skills which underpin economic capital – can also facilitate the development of that valuable social capital which is, for Schuller and Field (1998), located in the 'kinds of contexts and culture that promote communication and mutual learning as part of the fabric of everyday life' (p.234). The interdependence of economic and social capital can also be discerned in the social practices of successful learning organisations in which group and team work helps to produce a 'synthesis of members' interests' (Zuboff 1988, p.394) in addition to that 'collective intelligence' (Brown and Lauder 1995, p.28) essential for survival and renewal. Moreover, since the development of vocational knowledge and skills requires grounding in the 'social sources' and 'communities of practice' in which it is 'acquired and deployed' (Billett 1996, p.151), WBL serves as an ideal vehicle for the personal and social development of learners that helps to foster those broader skills, values, and attitudes required for working life.

In terms of these broader ‘soft skills’ – particularly those which constitute the interpersonal dimension of key skills such as ‘working with others’ which also feature in many other post-16 vocational courses reflecting the renewed interest in citizenship education (OCR/RSA 2001) – there is evidence that WBL processes are well equipped to facilitate the group and team working required in this sphere. The work of Engestrom (1996), for instance, describes how the social transformation of work by project teams can serve to produce new collective understandings of tasks and processes and, hence, new knowledge. Similar benefits were noted in projects seeking to incorporate team working through work placements on undergraduate programmes (Rossin and Hyland 2003). The organic integration of social and economic goals in VET is well illustrated in projects managed by the Centre for Research and Learning in Regional Australia (Kilpatrick et al. 1999). Concerned with small farming businesses which combine as collectives – learning organisations called *Executive Link* – the aim of the project was to facilitate non-formal training and business development as farmers tried to cope with innovation and new technology.

The results demonstrated that not only were the training objectives of the collective boards more easily realised through group activity but that such shared planning and development also achieved important social capital aims in furthering trust and identification with the local community. As the researchers conclude:

The learning processes that occur in the Executive Link community are oiled by the social capital of the community. Executive Link has been set up as a learning community, and a deliberate effort has been made to build networks, commitment and shared values. These elements of social capital have been built through the development of shared language, shared experiences, trust, self-development and fostering an identification with the community. (Kilpatrick et al. 1999, pp.142–143)

Values, Caring, and VET Provision

Notwithstanding new emphases on citizenship and social values in contemporary UK educational policy, VET is still overly influenced by the ‘new vocationalist’ thrust of the 1990s which has resulted in a one-dimensional, technicist approach – reflected in the obsession with skills and competences (Hyland and Merrill 2003) – which marginalises broader educational aims and values. Correctly described as ‘morally impoverished’ (Fish 1993, p.10), this approach to VET – if it allows for the discussion of values at all – tends to generate a largely uncritical and mechanistic approach in which something called ‘moral competence’ (Wright 1989; Hyland 1992) is recommended as a means of ensuring that young workers develop the values, attitudes, and personal qualities required by employers. Indeed. It is remarkable that – in spite of radical and dramatic changes which transformed education and training in general and the post-school sector in particular in recent years – there has been very little discussion of the overarching values framework in which all this hectic development has taken place.

However, in spite of the predominance of the economic model – which has left largely unexamined ideological conceptions of learning as a commodity to be competed for by self-interested consumers in search of employability skills (Avis et al.

1996) – we have also been asked to believe that such an ethos was in some sense ‘value-neutral’ (Halliday 1996) and that educational judgements consisted in simply deciding upon the most costefficient means of achieving universally agreed ends concerned with enhancing economic competitiveness both for individuals and for society. Such notions are both morally and pragmatically bankrupt. Conceptions of work, employment, and VET cannot be separated from value conceptions about what constitutes a just or good society. As Harkin et al. (2001) argue, ‘education systems reflect the nature of the society in which they exist . . . a fundamental link between the nature of society and the nature of its education provision is therefore demonstrable’ (p.139). Moreover, in purely pragmatic terms, the struggle to forge links between visions of the ‘good’ (socially just, inclusive) society and educational ‘goods’ which might foster this are evident in the constant changes of policy by government over the last decade or so, culminating in the most recent DfES (2005) White Paper which effectively rejected a consensus surrounding ways of bridging the vocational/academic divide, which has bedevilled VET in Britain for over a century (Hyland 2002b).

To ensure that the social dimension of lifelong learning and VET is given due emphasis we can do no better than start with Coffield’s (1997) definition of a ‘social theory of learning’ which can help to ‘build a Britain worth living in and for, a prosperous, just and cohesive society for all age groups and all sections of the population’ (p.20). In the pursuit of this goal VET policies need to be informed by the idea examined by Ranson (1994) that the development of a ‘learning society will depend upon the creation of a more strenuous social order’ since the ‘values of learning . . . are actually moral values that express a set of virtues required of the self but also of others in relationship with the self’ (p.109).

In relation to VET in particular such a project will look to the ‘shared values’, which underpin our common ‘understanding of why productive work is a fundamental condition of human life’ (Skilbeck, et al. 1994, p.50), or, indeed, of the wider quality of social life, including work, which we want to cultivate and support. Taking Dewey’s (1966) broad conception of vocational education as a process which seeks to break down the ‘antithesis of vocational and cultural education’ informed by the false dualisms of ‘labour and leisure, theory and practice, body and mind’ (p.307) so as to ‘acknowledge the full intellectual and social meaning of a vocation’ (p.318), I have elsewhere (Hyland 1998, 1999) developed an outline for a VET programme which gives due emphasis to the values dimension. In relation to lifelong learning it is worth identifying two elements in particular: the importance of studentship/learning careers on VET programmes, and the need to link VET with the values associated with caring and community.

Studentship and Learning Careers

The importance of WBL as a way of introducing students to communities of practice was mentioned earlier in relation to social capital conceptions of lifelong learning. Unfortunately research studies on the management and organisation of

WBL on modern apprenticeships (Unwin and Wellington 2001) and on Welfare to Work schemes (Hyland and Musson 2001) have indicated that this aspect of post-school VET is often badly coordinated and poorly managed. If lifelong learning goals are to be achieved through WBL and VET programmes, models of student learning based on what Bloomer (1996) has called a person's 'learning career' which often follows – not the neat and tidy linear pathway assumed by career guidance conceptions of rational planning – but one which is able to respond creatively and pragmatically to the diversity of factors facing post-16 learners of all kinds. To deal with such real-world contingencies, Bloomer suggests a concept of 'studentship' which, in general terms, refers to the 'variety of ways in which students can exert influence over the curriculum in the creation and confirmation of their own personal learning careers' (p.140). Such a conception allows – in ways similar to Young's (1999) notion of curriculum 'connectivity' designed to forge links between all forms of learning, knowledge and experience – for that continuity of achievement and progress which is vital to both the social and economic dimensions of lifelong learning.

Caring and Community Values

The social theory of lifelong learning outlined above incorporated a movement from an individualist to a communitarian conception of education and society. In spite of the social inclusion agenda which has featured in lifelong learning policy since the late 1990s, the individualist legacy – linked with monocultural nation state economic liberalism of the 1980s and early 1990s – still exerts too much of an influence on VET policy and practice. Although Fairclough (2000) has identified the influence of 'communitarian discourse' (p.37) on New Labour policy, there is little evidence of this in recent educational policy. If all aspects of the lifelong learning agenda are to be realised, this strand of thinking needs to be reinforced. Arthur (1998) has explained the principal features of communitarian philosophy in the belief that:

Neither human existence nor individual liberty can be sustained for long outside the interdependent and overlapping communities to which we all belong. Nor can any community survive for long unless its members dedicate some of their attention, energy and resources to shared projects. The exclusive pursuit of private interest erodes the network of social environments on which we all depend (pp.358–359).

Exploring similar issues, Rozema (2001) has explained how different conceptions of human economy lead to different perspectives on the nature and purpose of education. On the one hand there is the 'economy of profit' with 'information as the commodity which education provides . . . as a means to profit and power' and which views the 'student as consumer' (p.238). Against this there is the 'economy of community' which seeks to

foster persons who will maintain and preserve the essential characteristics of community [and] will inevitably gravitate towards the practice and personification of proper care: for one's family, friends, neighbours and countrymen . . . What gets taught and

how it gets taught will be determined and shaped by the idea that an education – like friendship, citizenship or marriage – cannot be bought or sold, only given and received. (Rozema 2001, p.252)

The concept of caring is crucial here to the cultivation of values relevant to social capital. In her examination of post-school education and training since the post-1944 settlement in the UK, Cripps (2002) usefully distinguished between the ‘market’ (consumer/commodity/commercial emphases) and ‘caring’ (equality/diversity/service concerns) codes which have characterised the sector over the past few decades, and concludes with an expression of regret at the dominance of the former which has created a ‘parity of difference’, (p.87) which has devalued vocational learning by hierarchically differentiating between types of student achievement. She argues that ‘placing further education colleges in a competitive market appears to serve neither the individual, employers, nor national need’ (p.269). Recently, Tuckett (2005) has suggested that the government’s rejection of the Tomlinson proposals for 14–19 reform ‘marks a low point in Labour’s journey towards a lifelong learning culture’ (p.23). In making a recovery from such a low point, there has never been a more important time to reassert the traditional ‘caring’ functions of education and training at all levels. A social theory of lifelong learning using the vehicle of WBL can provide the means to achieve this in the crucial area of VET.

References

- Adult Education Committee of the Ministry of Reconstruction (1919) *Final Report*. London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office.
- Arthur, J. (1998) Communitarianism: what are the implications for education? *Educational Studies*, 24(3), 3352–3368.
- Ashton, D., Felstead, A., and Green, F. (2000) Skills in the British workplace. In: Coffield, F. (Ed) *Differing Visions of the Learning Society*, Vol. 2, Research Findings. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Avis, J., Bloomer, M., Esland, G., Gleeson, D., and Hodkinson, P. (1996) *Knowledge and Nationhood*. London: Cassell.
- Barnett, R. (2002) Learning to work and working to learn. In: Reeve, F., Cartwright, M., and Edwards, R. (Eds) *Supporting Lifelong Learning*, Vol.2, *Organizing Learning*. London: Routledge Falmer/Open University.
- Billett, S. (1996) Constructing vocational knowledge: history, communities and ontology, *Journal of Vocational Education and Training*, 48(2), 141–154.
- Bloomer, M. (1996) Education for studentship. In: Avis, J., et al. (Eds) *Knowledge and Nationhood*. London: Cassell.
- Bloomer, M. and Hodkinson, P. (1997) *Moving into FE: The Voice of the Learner*. London: Further Education Development Agency.
- Blunkett, D. (1998) Opportunities to live and learn, *Times Educational Supplement*, 27 February.
- Boud, D. and Symes, C. (2000) Learning for real: work-based education in universities. In: Symes, C. and McIntyre, J. (Eds) *Working Knowledge*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Brennan, J. and Little, B. (1996) *A Review of Work-based Learning in Higher Education*. London: Department for Education and Employment.
- Brown, P. and Lauder, H. (1995) Post-fordist possibilities: education, training and national development. In: Bash, L. and Green, A. (Eds) *Youth, Education and Work*. London: Kogan Page.
- Coffield, F. (1997) The value of one daring question, *Times Educational Supplement*, 31 January.

- Coffield, F. (Ed) (2000) *Differing Visions of the Learning Society*, Vol. 2, Research Findings. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Cripps, S. (2002) *Further Education, Government's Discourse, Policy and Practice*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
- Dewey, J. (1966) *Democracy and Education*. New York: Free Press.
- DfEE (1998) *The Learning Age: A Renaissance for a New Britain*. London: Department for Education and Employment.
- DfEE (2000a) *Skills for All: Research Report from the National Skills Task Force*. London: Department for Education and Employment.
- DfEE (2000b) *Opportunity for All: Skills for the New Century*. London: Department for Education and Employment.
- DfES (2001) *Opportunity and Skills in the Knowledge-Driven Economy*. London: Department for Education and Skills.
- DfES (2005) *14–19 Education and Skills Summary*. London: Department for Education and Skills.
- Edwards, R. (1997) *Changing Places? Flexibility, Lifelong learning and a Learning Society*. London: Routledge.
- Engestrom, Y. (1996) *Innovative Learning in Work Teams*. Helsinki: Centre for Activity Theory and Developmental Work Research.
- Evans, K., Hodkinson, P., and Unwin, L. (Eds) (2002) *Working to Learn: Transforming Learning in the Workplace*. London: Kogan Page.
- Fairclough, N. (2000) *New Labour, New Language?* London: Routledge.
- Field, J. (2000a) Learning in the Isles. In: Field, J. and Leicester, M. (Eds) *Lifelong Learning: Education Across the Lifespan*. London: Routledge Falmer.
- Field, J. (2000b) *Lifelong Learning and the New Educational Order*. Stoke-on-Trent; Trentham.
- Foster, A. (2005) *Realising the Potential: A Review of the Future Role of Further Education Colleges – Summary*. London: Department for Education and Skills.
- Guile, D. and Hayton, A. (1999) Information and learning technology: the implications for teaching and learning in further education. In: Green, A. and Lucas, N. (Eds) *FE and Lifelong Learning: Re-aligning the Sector for the Twenty-first Century*. London: London Institute of Education.
- Guile, D. and Young, M. (2002) Beyond the institution of apprenticeship. In: Harrison, R., Reeves, F., Hanson, A. and Clarke, J. (Eds) *Supporting Lifelong Learning*, Vol. 1, *Perspectives on Learning*. London: Routledge Falmer/Open University.
- Hager, P. (2000) Knowledge that works. In: Symes, C. and McIntyre, J. (Eds) *Working Knowledge*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Halliday, J. (1996) Values and further education, *British Journal of Educational Studies*, 44(1), 66–81.
- Harkin, J., Turner, G., and Dawn, T. (2001) *Teaching Young Adults*. London: Routledge Falmer.
- Hughes, C. and Tight, M. (1998) The myth of the learning society. In: Ranson, S. (Ed) *Inside the Learning Society*. London: Cassell.
- Hyland, T. (1992) Moral vocationalism, *Journal of Moral Education*, 21(2), 139–150.
- Hyland, T. (1994) *Competence, Education and NVQs: Dissenting Perspectives*. London: Cassell.
- Hyland, T. (1998) Morality and further education: towards a critical values foundation for the post-compulsory sector in Britain, *Journal of Moral Education*, 27(3), 333–344.
- Hyland, T. (1999) *Vocational Studies, Lifelong Learning and Social Values*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
- Hyland, T. (2000) Learning, work and community. In: Field, J. and Leicester, M. (Eds) *Lifelong Learning: Education Across the Lifespan*. London: Routledge Falmer.
- Hyland, T. (2002a) Third way values and post-school educational policy, *Journal of Education Policy*, 17(2), 245–258.
- Hyland, T. (2002b) On the upgrading of vocational studies, *Educational Review*, 54(3), 287–296.
- Hyland, T. and Matlay, H. (1998) Lifelong learning and new deal vocationalism, *British Journal of Educational Studies*, 46(3), 394–414.
- Hyland, T. and Musson, D. (2001) Unpacking the new deal for young people: promise and problems, *Educational Studies*, 27(1), 55–67.

- Hyland, T. and Merrill, B. (2003) *The Changing Face of Further Education: Lifelong Learning, Inclusion and Community Values in Further Education*. London: Routledge Falmer.
- IJLE (1998) Editorial, *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 17(2), 69.
- Jackson, N.S. (1993) Rethinking vocational learning. In: Coulter, R.P. and Goodson, I.F. (Eds) *Rethinking Vocationalism: Whose Work/Life Is It?* Toronto, Canada: Our Schools/Our Selves Education Foundation.
- Kellner, P. (1998) Our mutual friends, *Times Educational Supplement*, 19 June.
- Kilpatrick, S., Bell, R., and Falk, I. (1999) The role of group learning in building social capital, *Journal of Vocational Education and Training*, 51(2), 129–144.
- Lave, J. and Wenger, E. (2002) Legitimate peripheral participation in communities of practice. In: Reeve, F., Cartwright, M., and Edwards, R. (Eds) *Supporting Lifelong Learning*, Vol.2, *Organizing Learning*. London: Routledge Falmer/Open University.
- LSC (2001) *Strategic Framework to 2004 – Corporate Plan*. Coventry, UK: Learning and Skills Council.
- Ranson, S. (1994) *Towards the Learning Society*. London: Cassell.
- Ranson, S. (Ed.) (1998) *Inside the Learning Society*. London: Cassell.
- Reeve, F., Cartwright, M., and Edwards, R. (Eds) (2002) *Supporting Lifelong Learning*, Vol.2, *Organizing Learning*. London: Routledge Falmer/Open University.
- Rikowski, G. (1998) Only Charybdis: the learning society through idealism. In: Ranson, S. (Ed.) *Inside the Learning Society*. London: Cassell.
- Robbins, L. (1963) *Higher Education: Report of the Committee*. London: HMSO.
- Rossin, D. and Hyland, T. (2003) Group work-based learning within higher education, *Mentoring and Tutoring*, 11(2), 153–162.
- Rozema, D. (2001) The polemics of education, *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 35(2), 237–254.
- Russell, L. (1973) *Adult Education: A Plan for Development*. London: HMSO.
- Schuller, T. and Field, J. (1998) Social capital, human capital and the learning society, *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 17(2), 226–235.
- Seagraves, L. (1996) *Learning in Smaller Companies*. Stirling, Scotland, UK: University of Stirling.
- Skilbeck, M., Connell, H., Lowe, N., and Tait, K. (1994) *The Vocational Quest*. London: Routledge.
- Strain, M. (1998) Towards an economy of lifelong learning: reconceptualising relations between learning and life, *British Journal of Educational Studies*, 46(3), 264–277.
- Symes, C. and McIntyre, J. (Eds) (2000) *Working Knowledge*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Tight, M. (1998) Lifelong learning: opportunity or compulsion? *British Journal of Educational Studies*, 46(3), 251–263.
- Tuckett, A. (2005) Never knowingly outflanked on the right, *Adults Learning*, 16(8), 23.
- Unwin, L. and Wellington, J. (2001) *Young People's Perspectives on Education, Training and Employment*. London: Kogan Page.
- Wenger, E. (2002) Communities of practice and social learning systems. In: Reeve, F., Cartwright, M., and Edwards, R. (Eds) *Supporting Lifelong Learning*, Vol.2, *Organizing Learning*. London: Routledge Falmer/Open University.
- Winch, C. (2000) *Education, Work and Social Capital*. London: Routledge.
- Wright, D. (1989) *Moral Competence*. London: Further Education Unit.
- Young, M. (1998) Post-compulsory education for a learning society. In: Ranson, S. (Ed) *Inside the Learning Society*. London: Cassell.
- Young, M. (1999) *The Curriculum of the Future*. London: Falmer Press.
- Zuboff, S. (1988) *In the Age of the Smart Machine*. New York: Basic Books.

Chapter 4

From Adult Education to Lifelong Learning and Back Again

Richard G. Edwards

Introduction

Over the last 10–15 years, there has been an increasing ordering of the practices of post-school education and training within a discourse of lifelong learning. This is particularly the case in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and in transnational organisations, such as the OECD and European Union (EU). While this discourse itself is not new, the significance of its uptake and by whom has resulted in a challenge to some of the traditional conceptions of adult education. Here there has been an attempt to reframe the educational discourse through policy-led approaches, which also appeal to those who have long supported learning that takes place outside of educational institutions. This challenge has had various and varying effects around the globe, dependent in part on the nature of those established traditions and the relative strength of different interest groups and their educational starting points and priorities.

However, central to the effects of discourses of lifelong learning has been a de-differentiation or breaking-down, blurring, and increasing permeability of traditional boundaries and norms. Whilst demarcations and their normative prescriptions have always been subject to challenge, the extent and nature of the challenge to the differentiation which has hitherto been central to the governance of the modern nation state leads many to argue that not only are boundaries shifting and becoming more permeable but all the structuring metaphors of boundedness have themselves become questionable. Within adult education, assumptions about what constitutes the field, its values and purposes, have all been questioned and the bounding metaphor of field itself has become problematic (Edwards 1997).

When any activity in any context can be said to involve learning, as seems to be increasingly the case (Chaiklin and Lave 1996), the boundaries between adult education as a field of study and other cognate fields begin to break down. The very term learning, now increasingly favoured in many texts over education, affirms the significant place of learners as against the institutional form and thus positions educational activity in an open and multi-vocal framing of lifelong learning rather than as a bounded and univocal field of education. Where education binds, learning fragments. Adult education then is increasingly displaced by lifelong learning as

the locus of study, practice, and policy. Here, discourses of lifelong learning can be seen as both a response and a contribution to processes of de-differentiation.

This chapter will draw upon aspects of poststructuralism and actor network theory to discuss the ways in which adult education is being reordered – both brought forth and regulated – through the discourses of lifelong learning. In the process, it will discuss the ways in which discourses of learning ambiguously both reinforce the power of educational institutions as the authorisers of worthwhile learning through assessment and challenge that authority by positioning learning as part of all social practices. It will argue that there is a need to reinvigorate a specifically educational discourse around curriculum and pedagogy in response to current emphasis on learning.

The chapter is in four sections. It is not linear but iterative. Each section signifies an (en)counter with lifelong learning. First, I will argue that lifelong learning is a discourse that attempts to refashion the adult education as a field of practice, research, and policy. Adult education has never been tightly bounded as a discourse, embracing great diversity and signifying different arenas in different parts of the globe. However, I shall argue that and illustrate how it has been de-differentiated through the discourse of lifelong learning. Second, I shall argue that the policy-led discourse of lifelong learning is implicated in the changing exercises of power associated with globalisation and neo-liberalism. In itself, this is a common enough argument. However, I want to position this shift in relation to Foucault's notions of discourse, discipline, and governmentality, in order that lifelong learning is considered in its own right and not simply as an epiphenomenon of globalisation. Third, I shall explore the ways in which lifelong learning are manifested in the widespread discourses of learning and teaching and the decentring of the authority of education. Here I shall argue that, while perhaps more ambivalent than previously, education does have an authoritative role to play in the social order, even if we may be less sure of what authority or how to exercise it. Finally, I shall argue for the importance of a notion of adult education to continue to inform our practices. However, following Biesta (1999), I shall argue that this is an impossible task. This might seem a strange conclusion but the notion of impossibility is a particular one.

De-differentiation: Breaking Down the Walls

Adult educational forms are increasingly becoming more diverse in terms of goals, processes, organisational structures, curricula, pedagogy and participants despite, or because of, the increased emphasis on lifelong learning. This both reflects and contributes to the increasing impact of de-differentiation. The foregrounding of the notion of lifelong learning involves a reconceptualisation that signifies the simultaneous boundlessness (i.e. not confined to formal institutions) and the socio-cultural polycontextuality of learning (Tuomi-Grohn and Engestrom 2003). In the process, questions arise about what adult education signifies and who can claim the role and maybe identity of adult educator.

Discourses of lifelong learning and its many corollaries of learning society, learning organisations, learning cities, learning regions, and learning communities, are both a symptom of the impact of the de-differentiation. They mark a shift from a bounded field centred on certain institutional arrangements to an arena decentred around the structured heterogeneity of networks of learners, artefacts, and learning. It is marked in the educational research community by the rise in interest of learning theory over curriculum theory. However, it is not simply a symptom, for, as a discourse, it provides the basis for action. It therefore contributes to the very processes of de-differentiation that it represents. Such discourses contribute to a questioning of educational forms whose dominant rationale is to service the modernist project and, in principle, and give legitimacy to social practices as learning that previously might not have been valued. Some of this is welcomed by adult educators, particularly those who work in areas outwith the academy, but some of this is decried, insofar as a consuming passion to learn has tended to place greater emphasis on the passion than the consumption, whereas lifelong learning is often associated with marketised views of adult education.

The discourse of lifelong learning both embraces and erodes more traditional liberal and radical forms of adult education. These traditional forms can and do still exist as part of the lifelong learning landscape, but they may not have such a central positioning, if adult education can be said to be central given its historically marginal positioning. Adult education is thus positioned paradoxically through the de-differentiations of lifelong learning. On the one hand, there is an erosion of the liberal curricula and an accompanying emphasis on the provision of learning opportunities, which optimise the efficiency of the economic system. On the other hand, there is a valuing of different sources and forms of knowledge and a devaluing of specialisation, educational blue-prints, and universalistic expertise. This has provided spaces for rising social groups such as the new middle classes, new social movements, and hitherto oppressed and marginalised groups such as women, blacks, gays, and minority ethnic groups, to find a voice through resistance to the dominance of white, Western patriarchy, to challenge universal theorising, to articulate their own subjugated or subaltern knowledges and construct different knowledges, and to engage generally, although not unproblematically, in a variety of critical practices. Thus, even as there are attempts to reassert it, adult education has become less and less of a univocal reality and consequently, it no longer makes sense to speak of it simply as either functioning to reproduce the social order or as implicit social engineering, whether this be for domestication or liberation. By undermining the certainty surrounding canons of knowledge, universal messages, and the efficacy of enlightened pedagogues, uncertainty and ambivalence become more prominent. At the same time, however, opportunities are presented for diversity and for new and innovative practices, which switch the emphasis from provision to learning opportunities, from the student to the learner, from adult education to lifelong learning.

The de-differentiation of adult education has had effects on its practices and the roles and identities of those now seen to be contributing to lifelong learning. In a period where the public domain was more clearly discernible, where the 'good life' could be defined, and where the state had a clear and accepted intervention role in

the service of social progress, the adult educator was able to carve out a position in this domain with an associated area of expertise. This was a position within which could be accommodated, despite their differences, the various liberal, pragmatic, and radical tendencies in adult education. Everyone had a role to play and an end in view, even though there was very often serious disagreement about both. Furthermore, the bringing together of a policy orientation with a need for academic knowledge and pedagogic expertise enabled the development of adult education as a field of study, its mission to provide for the formation of those now identified as adult educators, and to generate and disseminate knowledge in the service of policy formulation and programmatic intervention.

Paradoxical trends can be discerned here. First, the criterion of optimising the efficient performance or performativity of the system comes to the fore. It is the instrumental usefulness of knowledge which is emphasised rather than its contribution to the epic progress of truth and humanity. In educational institutions, it is skills, constituted as competencies, rather than ideals that are increasingly valued. As Lyotard (1984, p.51) points out this creates 'a vast market for competence in operational skills'. This suggests a necessary challenge to the modernist boundary maintained between liberal and vocational education. For Lyotard, systemic efficiency is linked to the technological and cultural changes in the social order wherein lifelong learning is constructed as one of the keys to economic competitiveness in the global marketplace. Performativity thereby entails the increasing vocationalisation of the curriculum and an increased emphasis on vocational practices such as work-based learning.

Alongside, and as part of this, the individualising processes embedded in notions of a consumer society although presupposing the existence of a market in learning opportunities means that this is a market not confined to the purely vocational. It can be argued that adult education has become more oriented to the needs of globalised capital, and to that extent, is becoming more utilitarian and economically instrumental. However, it also becomes increasingly based on specific cultural contexts, on localised and particularised knowledges, on the needs of consumption and the cultivation of desire. As Leitch (1996, p.153) argues it is possible at one and the same time to discern trends that make education institutions both knowledge factories seeking profits and as 'open to scholarship on everyday existence, interested in creating new knowledge and critical of the status quo'.

It is also worth pointing out that the growth of a consumer society need not be seen as merely having the effect of increasing instrumentalism, individualism, and the economic rationality of market relations. As Featherstone (1995, p.24) points out 'consumption is eminently social, relational and active rather than private, atomic or passive'. There is a tendency to be imprisoned by paradigms of consumption such as the Marxist where consumption is seen as simply a reflex of production, and of the Frankfurt School where it is seen as alienated consciousness, the source of manipulation and passivity (Usher et al. 1997). However, it could be argued that rather than being victims and dupes of consumer culture 'consumers can resist the dominant economic order, even as they consume its outputs, its commodities and its images' (Gabriel and Lang 1995, p.139). De Certeau (1984)

argues that in the practices of everyday life people can transgress economic rationality and subvert the existing order by using consumer objects for purposes different to those intended for them by their producers – in effect, resisting through consuming.

What constitutes a learning opportunity and who legitimately provides such opportunities has been problematised and reconfigured therefore. Equally, the trend is becoming one where educational forms are seen as expressing difference and providing spaces for a diversity of voices. Here vocationalism and consumption are not simply impositions upon passive learners, but contradictory processes in which individuals and groups play an active role that can invoke counter-memories and the return of the repressed as well as being part of disciplinary and pastoral power. This is not to downplay the power of corporate-based performativity, the dangers of reconstituting the formal provision of adult education purely as a business whose main task is marketing or the continued strengths of disciplinary practices. Nor would I claim that the educational aspect of lifestyle practices in the consumer market are always oppositional and liberatory, or that all voices do or should have equal weight. However, it is equally important not to downplay the significance of the increasing diversity, multiplicity, and de-differentiation, which characterises and contributes to the landscape of lifelong learning.

Developments in technology, particularly communications and information technology, play a significant part in these trends. Lyotard (1984) argues that through its impact on redefining knowledge – where for example, the logic of computers commodifies knowledge into information – information technology provides new opportunities for learning. He suggests that technologically mediated knowledge-circulation provides the basis for individualising learning in a more complex and active way. For instance, individuals through computers, CD-ROMs, the Internet, and email can access information, interact with it and with others, without having to attend conventional centres of learning, in the process breaking institutional and geographical boundaries and the forms of discipline traditionally associated with education (Nicol and Edwards 1997). One consequence of this individualising is that educative processes are displaced and reconstituted as a relationship between producer and consumer where knowledge is exchanged on the basis of the value it has to the consumer-as-learner and the learner-as-consumer.

However, it is also the case that new forms of sociality and new communities are constituted by information technology. The formation of virtual communities means that in addition to its individualising tendencies, new technologies offer different opportunities to bring people together in new forms of ‘tribal’ gatherings (Maffesoli 1995). Shields (1996, p.8) argues that ‘the virtual communities produced by the Internet extends beyond it into local communities and struggles’. Similarly, the view of critics that interaction with information technology is a form of passive consumption is challenged by the increasing levels of interactivity involved. Different subjectivities may result, raising challenges for the contemporary world, including generational differences. Plant points out that ‘there is more to cyberspace than meets the male gaze’ (Plant 1996, p.170) and Shields (1996, p.9) argues that ‘notions of authenticity, of essential femininity and the self are displaced in

favour of multiple roles, alternative personae and a matrix of potentialities which allows people to recode themselves ahead of disciplinary technologies'. The Internet model, given its decentralised, open access, and more direct mode of information exchange, could be said to encourage a greater degree of participative democracy and critical thinking (Poster 1995). However, many would disagree with this, pointing out that access is likely to remain limited and that information does not necessarily equate to knowledge.

It certainly seems that the trading of information and knowledge is spreading increasingly from the commercial realm to the realm of adult education, with institutions reconstructing themselves as enterprises to compete in the knowledge and skills business. The impact upon universities is particularly significant. What seems to be happening is a loss by universities of their privileged status as primary producers of knowledge as they become part of a wider knowledge market within which they are forced to compete. Knowledge becomes a commodity and universities are forced out of the ivory tower and into the marketplace. Here, their competitors include research and development departments of large companies, consultancies and think-tanks. As Plant (1995) points out, universities are therefore less able to control access to knowledge when it increasingly takes the form of information circulating through networks which evade the control of educational institutions and when its value as a product of 'knowledgeable minds' is challenged.

A large part of the anxiety and confusion which adult educators seem to be experiencing now then is due to the relative de-legitimation of education as institutionally constituted. There is the general scepticism towards the aspirations of the modern state. The state itself is increasingly taking itself out of the public domain. Dedicated social institutions no longer seem to have the legitimacy and purpose they once had, with efficiency and accountability being key signifiers of contributing to the common good. A wider range of settings are constituted as the legitimate terrain of lifelong learning, including the workplace and the consumer market. Adult educators thus no longer seem to have the roles and authority they once had, even as their numbers expand given the bigger umbrella of lifelong learning. The processes of de-differentiation erode boundaries through which roles and identities have been maintained. Different people start turning up.

Discourse, Discipline, and Governmentality

Field (2000) has argued that there are changes taking place in the practices of governing within nation states that have significant implications for lifelong learning. In relation to the UK, he (2000, p.250) suggests this is part of the government's 'active attempts to mobilise civil society – including education and training providers'. The argument is that the practices of governing are now less concerned with providing services for populations than in mobilising those concerned to help themselves. He argues that this is part of a reconfiguration of the welfare state. This is a view also shared in part by Griffin (2002) who argues that welfare state

policies to provide education are being displaced by consumerist strategies where the state enables rather than provides. However, unlike Field, Griffin positions these reconfigurations in governing as part of a neo-liberal assault on the welfare state. For Griffin, the policy discourse of lifelong learning precisely signifies this shift, displacing, as it does, welfare state concerns for the provision of adult education. Despite their differences, both Field and Griffin are reflecting on the changing forms of governing within the UK, but their arguments can be viewed as a basis for comparability, as the strategies they identify can be examined in a range of contexts taking various forms. Theirs is part of a range of contributions that attempt to locate the significance of discourses of lifelong learning in relation to politics and political economy. Many such contributions identify lifelong learning as emerging with the advance of globalising processes and the associated policy processes to support it. Here lifelong learning can be positioned as an epiphenomenon of deeper structural changes in the relations of production and form of capital accumulation. It might also be considered an ideology mystifying the continuation of capitalism, despite the discourses of inclusion and widening participation.

However, neither of these critiques addresses how discourses of lifelong learning take on such functions. They do not examine the work that the discourses of lifelong learning might be said to do. I want to draw upon Foucault to try and illuminate this somewhat. For Foucault, a discourse is a structuring of meaning-making whose major characteristic is its disciplinary and hence regulatory power. Foucault's argument is that in every social order the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised, and redistributed according to certain rules. A social order requires that people are not free to say or do anything, whenever and wherever they like. A Foucauldian discourse therefore defines what can be included and what is prohibited. It covers objects that can be known and spoken about, rituals that must be carried out, the right to speak of a particular subject, who can speak, from what institutional base and about what. These prohibitions interrelate, reinforce, and complement each other, forming a complex web, continually subject to modification and challenge. Discourse constitutes subjects in terms of social positioning and subjectivity (who we are), and who can speak.

A discourse is a unit of human action, interaction, communication, and cognition, and not simply a unit of language. It is not simply a way of expressing a pre-existing reality, nor a reference to things that pre-exist statements about them. Discourse is constitutive of knowledge, rather than simply the neutral expression or representation of something outside language or representation. It fashions representations and shapes actions, making possible different ways of knowing the world and of acting within it. Foucault points to an interrelational process at work whereby reality is fashioned into a domain of thought (representation) and thought is fashioned into a domain of reality (action) through discourse. A discourse is a way of representing knowledge about a particular domain at a particular historical moment, for example, madness at the beginning of the nineteenth century, sexuality at its end and, for us, lifelong learning at the turn of the twentieth century. Discourse defines the domain and produces the objects of knowledge within that domain. It also influences how ideas are put into practice and used to regulate conduct.

Discursive practices render particular aspects of existence meaningful in particular ways, which then become thinkable and calculable and thus amenable to intervention and regulation, with documentation, computation, and evaluation the main instruments or technologies for achieving this. This is as much the case with discourses of lifelong learning, as it is with those of health or social work. It is through these practices that power is exercised and where it takes particular forms. In relation to the institutions emerging with the modern nation state, the dominant form of power is discipline, displacing the coercive power of sovereign monarchies.

Foucault's focus is on how some discourses have shaped and created meaning systems that have gained the status and currency of 'truth', and as a consequence have come to dominate how we define and order both ourselves and our social world. He is interested in the practices of truth-telling more than establishing an epistemological basis for truth. Discourses establish and are supported by regimes of truth. Pedagogic practices have always been associated with the incorporation of individuals into such discursive regimes of truth. People are governed through these regimes but also through their actions support their reproduction. And because Foucault views knowledge co-emerging with power, the authority of 'the truth' also entails the power to make itself true. All knowledge, once co-implicated with action, has real effects, and in that sense becomes 'true', or more accurately counts as true. Thus a truth, whatever the period or context, is always a discursive formation sustaining a regime of truth.

Given this analysis, for lifelong learning to be mobilised it is necessary that disciplinary practices emerge in correlative power/knowledge formations embedded in discourses that define truth. Such practices operate through the exigence of globalisation and economic competition and practices that signify a mind/body dualism, inscribing the 'educated'/'uneducated', the 'trained'/'untrained', the 'skilled'/'unskilled', the 'competent'/'incompetent'. Through these inscriptions practices emerge, allowing the construction of standards and the deployment of normalizing judgement. Here we see the means that realise the performance of what Foucault refers to as the disciplinary practices of training and reshaping 'docile bodies'.

However, these docile bodies must also become active subjects because discipline does not turn people simply into passive objects. Indeed, discipline as a form through which power is exercised cannot work unless subjects are capable of action, even if this capacity is not the same as that signified by those who insist on human free will. It is through mobilisation into discursive regimes of truth that people become active subjects inscribed with certain capacities to act. Here the meaning of human agency does not entail an escape from power, as liberal humanism would have it, but consists rather of a specific exercise of power. One is empowered in particular ways through becoming the subject of, and subjected to, power. Thus lifelong learning is not simply a humanistic aspiration or capitalist ideology. Capacities are brought forth and evaluated through the disciplinary technologies of observation, normalisation, judgement, and examination, the extent, criteria and methods for which are provided by the discourses of lifelong learning in play. As knowledge changes, so do the practices that frame behaviour and likewise, as practices change, so too does knowledge. While the relationship between discipline, subjectivity, and docile bodies is not a

stable one in Foucault's work, it is this sense that I wish to take forward here in considering the discourse of lifelong learning within the matrix of power.

Discourses allow subjects to speak the truth about themselves, a truth that fashions subjectivity and identity. We cannot be outside discourse. We are subjected to discourse, existing within the knowledge produced by discourses. Thus the latter are not therefore just passive media for conveying the pre-given but rather also active producers of both meaning and self. Meaning and subjectivity co-emerge through discourse. We are simultaneously speaking (active) subjects but also subjects subjected to meaning generated through discourses. Individuals regardless of their class, gender or racial background will not be able to take up meaning until they have identified with those positions fashioned by the discourse(s), subjected themselves to its rules, and hence become the subjects of its power/knowledge.

The relationship between lifelong learning as a discursive regime of truth, with an associated set of disciplinary practices, and other regimes and associated practices is of interest here. I suggested earlier that learning is now identified as part of all social practices. The latter themselves entail a range of often implicit pedagogical practices in order to effectively do the work they do. For instance, the academic discipline of social work provides a regime of truth for induction into the practice of social work and in defining what it means to be a social worker. Implicit within this is a range of pedagogical practices that in part are explicitly educational. The discursive regime of social work thereby has an implicit pedagogy which traditionally is either not itself an explicit part of the discourse of that (academic) subject or sits at the margins of disciplinary discourses. What this means is that for Foucault, the modern disciplined, normalised social order is underpinned by a set of pedagogical practices, which at one and the same time are explicitly the concern of educational discourse, but which are practised in *all* social organisations and institutions. In part, this is fashioned through the discourses of lifelong learning. However, educational discourse usually signifies the practices of education as an institution. This wider understanding of pedagogy across the social order is denoted through the emergence of the discourse of lifelong learning. In this sense, discourses of lifelong learning can fashion and mobilise a range of embodied subjectivities within and through the wider disciplines. These subjectivities are not a natural given, but are themselves effects of discursive practices. It is partly the extent to which these come to be mobilised that lifelong learning itself becomes a site for explicit pedagogic debate and practice. The discourses of lifelong learning therefore provide the possibility for disturbing the pedagogical practices that form and maintain other discursive regimes and, with that, the subjectivities of individuals and in the case of lifelong learning, their subjectivity precisely *as learners*.

What are we to make of the ever more extensive knowledge generated in and about lifelong learning, signifying further dimensions of the learner to be framed for pedagogical intervention? Disciplinary practices seem to be ever more intrusive. In Foucault's terms, wherever and when learning takes place, those learning are required to bring forth their subjectivities for disciplining so that they can become a particular type of person. Yet discipline was not the only form of power explored by Foucault and as well as discipline, the discourses of lifelong learning can also

be positioned in relation to contemporary forms of governmentality. It is to an examination of governmentality that I now turn.

In addition to disciplinary power invested in nation states, which has as its object the regulation of individuals within a territory, there is also sovereign power invested in the monarch; and biopower which involves a governmentality that regulates populations as resources to be used and optimised. The legitimacy of governmentality derives from its capacity to nurture life by integrating bodies, capacities, and pleasures into a productive force. Discourse comprises an ensemble of practices indispensable to governmentality, in the sense of governing that is not confined to the state and its institutions but is spread throughout the social order. Here, governmentality, the combining of a certain rationality with associated forms of action, is about the maximisation of the productive forces, activities, and relations of each and all. What is signified here is that governing is about increasing productivity or capacities rather than simply training to be docile. To achieve this, subjects again need to be known, a knowledge that forms the basis of efficient management and the maximisation of productive capacity in all parts and levels of the social order. Thus with governmentality, it is essential that subjects become empowered in the sense of their capacities being maximised. Here we can clearly see links between the policy-led discourses of lifelong learning and their focus on the development of human capital and Foucault's concept of governmental power.

On this reading, the policy discourses of lifelong learning are not only exercises of power but also signal a change in the ways in which power is being exercised and the social form thus ordered. For Foucault (2003, p.253), discipline and regulation signify the ways in which the exercise of power in life has become a matter of self-care. With governmentality subjects are still fashioned within power/knowledge relations but this is now brought about by inciting people to talk about their desire and to signify themselves as subjects of desire, a desire which in the context of this discussion includes a desire for learning. Reflecting on oneself signifies the uncovering of a hidden truth about self. Subjectivity is fashioned around this uncovering which reveals and enables the fulfilment of desires.

For Foucault, governmentality is concerned with the conduct of conduct and this involves regarding 'the forces and capacities of living individuals, as members of a population, as resources to be fostered, to be used, to be optimised' (Dean 1999, p.20). Thus, as Dean suggests, 'to analyse government is to analyse those practices that try and shape, sculpt, mobilise and work through the choices, desires, aspirations, needs, wants and lifestyles of individuals and groups' (Dean 1999, p.12). Governmentality therefore involves a non-coercive pastoral power that works through infiltrating regulation into the very interior of the experience of subjects. Subjects 'educate' or fashion themselves through lifelong learning.

The changing exercises of power are coded by changing discourses, with greater emphasis placed on the fashioning of reflective spaces through which to do the work required in the care of the self. What this suggests is that the regulation of populations combines with the disciplining of individuals to mobilise subjects who may combine differing aspects and combinations of docile bodies and active

subjectivities, and where notions of reflection become more the order of the day. Here reflection is not simply a more humane or empowering form of pedagogic practice. It is still a form of regulation but one that is more subtle and apparently less intrusive, enabling individuals to have more space so that they can act upon themselves and express desires.

So we can argue that the shift in discourse from adult education to lifelong learning itself signifies changes in the exercise of power, wherein governmental practices take greater hold alongside and entwined with disciplinary practices.

Learning, not Education

The discourse of lifelong learning foregrounds learning as the centre of educational discourse. And it is learning and teaching that have come to the fore as objects of knowledge as a result. In particular, discourses of learning, given that in lifelong learning, a teacher and teaching is held not necessarily to be present. This has not been without contestation. The principal critique of discourses of learning and teaching is that they position these activities as a set of techniques and skills that can be utilised across multiple contexts. They therefore remove questions of context and power from discussions of curriculum and pedagogy and indeed displace the very discussion of curriculum and pedagogy themselves. In other words, the adult educational discourse becomes reconfigured. Learning and teaching are fashioned as disembodied and disembedded techniques to be articulated across subject domains and institutional contexts in the mobilising of learning as a lifelong activity. The paradox is perhaps that this has developed even as more situated and contextually sensitive understandings of learning have become popular in many parts of the academic domain, precisely identifying learning as part of everyday practices (e.g. Lave and Wenger 1991).

As Nicoll and Harrison (2003) argue, in certain discourses of learning and teaching, teaching is positioned as a universalised and decontextualised set of process skills that can be adapted and applied as appropriate. There is the assumption that teaching can be defined by a set of generally accepted rules for pedagogic practice, often embedded in concepts of standards to be achieved by teachers. Learning is constituted as the activity of the individual that can and is to be regulated and controlled by the teacher through the application of pragmatically relevant ideas drawn from evidence and indeed reflection on evidence. For Zukas and Malcolm (2000, p.7), this produces a separation of disciplinary and pedagogic knowledge that 'enables pedagogy to be analysed simply in terms of 'teaching and learning' rather than as an aspect of knowledge production, and in effect creates a superfluous community of (decontextualised) pedagogues'. Pedagogic practice becomes a technical and atheoretical activity, focusing on methods and lacking a reflexive understanding of the generation of knowledge. The fact that adult educators are 'teachers of' is lost through such discourses, where the 'of' signifies the subject to be taught, which for many is their primary identifications. We are philosophers first and educators second. We identify as philosophers and have a role as educators.

Like Zukas and Malcolm, McWilliam (1996) is highly critical of the separation of the learner from the teacher, of learning from teaching, and the emphasis on the individual learner in educational discourse. 'Within the framework of education as an academic discipline, current literature usually interrogates educational practices through the binary formulation of 'learning and/as *distinct from* teaching' (McWilliam 1996, p.2). For McWilliam, this separation has been constituted by and reinforced through the primacy of certain psychological theories of the individual and a philosophy of liberal humanism. In the process, she argues that teaching has been partially erased as a focus of research and developmental practice. Therefore, as Malcolm and Zukas (2003) suggest, '“earning” thus becomes a highly effective perlocutionary device for implying that any discussion of the purposes and social relations of educational practice (rather than its facilitative techniques) is so much teacherly self-indulgence, akin to spending too much time in front of the mirror'.

Although positing a different argument to Zukas and Malcolm, McWilliam nonetheless reaches some similar conclusions. With the multiplication of forms of resource-based learning, teaching is increasingly divided into techniques of 'design' and 'delivery'. This further depletes the emphasis on teaching and the teacher. Ball (1997, p.241) has gone so far as to argue that 'the teacher is increasingly an absent presence in the discourse of education policy'. The learner and lifelong learning becomes a core of discourse. McWilliam (1996) argues that these separations and elisions tend to reinforce contemporary views of pedagogy as knowledge dissemination and consumption, and take attention away from notions of pedagogy as relational practices of cultural exchange and exercises of power. In other words, the focus on learning displaces and impoverishes the discourses of education, in our case, adult education.

This suggests a need for refocusing on pedagogy as a relational socio-cultural process and curriculum as an enactment of knowledge, values, and skills production, which does not separate the learner from teacher. In their later paper, Malcolm and Zukas (2003) argue for a 'revitalised understanding and reclaiming of pedagogy', as, for them, the notion of pedagogy, when used at all, has been collapsed into a concern for didactics, in other words, the techniques of teaching. 'This is linked with the dominance of psychologistic explanations of learning, and encourages a technicist view of the processes of 'effective' teaching' (Malcolm and Zukas 2003). The argument for a refocusing of discourse is also to be found in Lingard et al. (2003, p.401) who argue that 'pedagogy should be re-centred' and that there is a need for a sociology of pedagogy. This generates a different discourse to that of lifelong learning.

Back to the Future

I have argued that discourses of lifelong learning both reflect and give rise to significant challenges for the field of adult education. Lifelong learning has resulted in a de-differentiation of what was already a diverse field. It is developing as a regime of truth that signifies changes in the exercise of power in the social order. And it is

resulting in technicist and decontextualised practices of teaching and learning that marginalise central questions of pedagogy and curriculum in adult education discourse. While these challenges are significant, it is important not to overplay them, nor to contrast lifelong learning as the dark side of what was previously a clear field of adult education. The latter has always been murky. And discourses of lifelong learning are only a small part of the circulating discourses through which change is being fashioned. Nor are those changes uncontested and there are many who would rightly argue for the value of a specifically educational discourse, in this case adult educational. However, what forms and shapes those would take remain unclear.

Is it possible for the traditional discourses of adult education to continue or be revitalised unamended? Reading the relevant journals, this certainly is the case. Many discourses drawing on radical traditions rightly position themselves as having a history and forms of continuity are important. However, there are also those who may seek to elaborate different discourses to (en)counter lifelong learning.

Biesta (1998, 2004) is one such person. Biesta (2004, p.71) argues that ‘something has been lost in the shift from the language of education to the language of learning’. He views this shift as arising from a range of contradictory trends. The four he identifies are new theories of learning, postmodernism, the rise of the consumer market, and the decline of the welfare state, all of which I have addressed to greater or lesser extent in the above discussion. Biesta is discussing education generically, but his argument is still germane. He suggests that questions of learning are educational questions and that there is a requirement to revitalise a language for education, and the ‘for’ is significant as he is positioning this discourse as a form of action. He bases his argument on three interlocking principles: ‘trust without ground, transcendental violence and responsibility without knowledge’ (Biesta 2004, p.76). With regard to the first, his suggestion is that learning involves the unexpected and that entails trust because there is risk involved. His second principle involves challenging and confronting students – and note he does not use the notion of learners – with otherness and difference, what he refers to as coming into presence. This entails transcendental violence as it creates difficult situations, but it is only through these that coming into presence is possible. The third principle, responsibility without knowledge, is based on the notion that educators have unlimited responsibility for the subjectivities of students, but this is not based on calculation as we have knowledge of what we take responsibility for.

Biesta’s argument draws heavily upon Derrida and is challenging for educators in general and adult educators in particular. It seeks to recentre education and to reposition learners as students. For many adult educators with a commitment to participative approaches, this might be seen as problematic. Indeed the discourses of lifelong learning have precisely been taken up by some because of its apparently more democratic ethos. However, the view that adult education should – and this is prescriptive – be about providing possibilities based on risk and trust, challenging and confronting students, and that this entails taking responsibility is a reasonable place to start. However, these principles can be read in different ways and Biesta’s specific location of his principles in relation to Derridian philosophy needs to be recognised to avoid superficial uptakes.

Other responses would suggest we need to take ourselves and each other less seriously. This is not a call for frivolity but rather a call to take reflexivity more seriously and to recognise the place of desire in education (McWilliam 1996). The role of adult education in contributing to personal development and progressive social change has always been constructed as a serious business and this is probably why such discomfort is expressed about shifts towards consumerism in education. What this does is devalue a range of educational practices which are not invested with the missionary project of the adult educator. This would allow adult educators to take pleasure, albeit a troubled pleasure, in 're-writing' adult education. In the main, this is construed simply as troubles devoid of pleasure. Undoubtedly, this troubled state is part of a breakdown in the sense of a fixed and settled identity. But it also makes possible the failure to address the inscription of adult education in practices which perpetuate the very inequalities and oppressions which it has often understood itself to be challenging.

So even as we might want to revitalise the discourses of adult education, they fragment and become an arena of contestation. Risk, trust, responsibility, otherness, difference, and pleasure. These reflect notions that are a far cry from any modernist certainty about the teleological goals of adult education. They are based upon processes rather than ultimate purposes as ends, and perhaps this is as it needs to be. In his critique of critical pedagogy's desire for a language of possibility Biesta (1998) draws upon a comment by Freud that education, like government and psychoanalysis, is an impossible profession. It is impossible because one cannot mandate the results of educational endeavours, despite the regulatory framings that assume that such a fantasy is possible. Biesta extends this idea to all human interactions and suggests, drawing on Derrida and Foucault, that practices need to be developed around an 'emancipatory ignorance'. Here:

It just is an ignorance that does not claim to know how the future will be or will have to be. It is an ignorance that does not show the way, but only issues an invitation to set out on the journey. It is an ignorance that does not say what to think of it, but only asks, 'What do you think about it?' In short it is an ignorance that makes room for the possibility of disclosure. (Biesta 1998, p.505)

Biesta's argument is related specifically to critical pedagogy, but it is relevant to the reformulation of a discourse of adult education at two levels. First, in formulating an adult education practice around ignorance. But secondly, in pointing to the impossibility of my own argument, as reflexively I can only end up asking, 'what do you think about it?'

Formulating an adult education discourse around impossibility and ignorance may seem absurd in these performative times. When outcomes and outputs are to the fore, what spaces are there for adult educational discourses around unending process? And indeed, does not this fit in with a certain discourse of lifelong learning, itself an unending process? So maybe a revitalised discourse of adult education precisely entails a changing discourse of lifelong learning. Rather than rejecting the notion of lifelong learning, we may need to inscribe it with different meanings, recognising, once again, that this might be impossible and we are certainly ignorant of where we might end up. What do you think of that?

References

- Ball, S. (1990) *Politics and Policy Making in Education*. London: Routledge.
- Biesta, G. (1998) Say you want a revolution . . . suggestions for the impossible future of critical pedagogy, *Educational Theory*, 48(4), 499–510.
- Biesta, G. (2004) Against learning, *Nordisk Pedagogik*, 24, 70–82.
- de Certeau, M. (1984) *The Practice of Everyday Life*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Edwards, R. (1997) *Changing Places? Flexibility, Lifelong Learning and a Learning Society*. London: Routledge.
- Featherstone, M. (1991) *Consumer Culture and Postmodernism*. London: Sage.
- Featherstone, M. (1995) *Undoing Culture*. London: Sage.
- Foucault M. (1986) What is enlightenment? In: Rabinow, P. (Ed) *The Foucault Reader*. Harmondsworth: Peregrine Books.
- Gabriel, Y. and Lang, T. (1995) *The Unmanageable Consumer*. London: Sage.
- Lash, S. (1990) *Sociology of Postmodernism*. London: Sage.
- Lyotard, J-F. (1984) *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- McWilliam, E. (1996) Touchy subjects: a risky inquiry into pedagogical pleasure, *British Educational Research Journal*, 22(3), 305–317.
- Poster, M. (1995) Postmodern virtualities. In: Featherstone, M. and Burrows, R. (Eds) *Cyberspace/Cyberbodies/Cyberpunk: Cultures of Technological Embodiment*. London: Sage.
- Shields, R. (1996) Introduction: virtual spaces, real histories, and living bodies. In: Shields, R. (Ed) *Cultures of Internet*. London: Sage.
- Urry, J. (1990) *The Tourist Gaze: Leisure and Travel in Contemporary Societies*. London: Sage.
- Usher, R., Bryant, I., and Johnston, R. (1997) *Adult Education and the Postmodern Challenge*. London: Routledge.

Chapter 5

'Framing' Lifelong Learning in the Twenty-First Century: Towards a Way of Thinking

Kevin J. Flint and David Needham

Abstract Two contrasting 'humanist' and inter-related forms of discourse of lifelong learning are evident in the literature: the first, dominated by politicians and employers, appears to interpret lifelong learning as a means to improve competitiveness and productivity regarding what is done in practice within a global economy; the other, led mainly by academics, are represented as the very means to continually resolve the conflicts and contradictions posed by the first.

In this chapter we draw on a 'way of thinking' that is deconstructive in its intent that attempts to move beyond the confines of 'humanist thinking'. Such thinking makes clear the vicious circularity of the argument for the improvement of ourselves as human beings, wherein lifelong learning valorised by leaders in discourses of lifelong learning provides not only a rationalisation for our improvement but the very means of achieving such possibilities.

On reading Heidegger's '... Question Concerning Technology' and its closely related text, 'The Principle of Reason', we sought to stand outside systematic attempts to represent this vicious circle of improvement. In so doing this chapter explores such a vicious circle in its relationship with Being, in which such means-ends driven technology of lifelong learning, rather than continuing to reproduce the illusion of something under our control and at our disposal, only reveals the real to us as human beings in accordance with the principles of reason, and of lifelong learning.

As grounds for the 'framing', such principles, it is argued, rank and order the 'on-going activity' of perfecting and making sufficient the objective self, 'the learner' for the global economy, rather than opening the possibility of the identity of human beings belonging together with the movement of difference.

So, it would appear that the improvement of, and education of, ourselves as human beings in and through lifelong learning, which, in becoming normative and binding for practices on grounds of the principle of lifelong learning, renders agents of education as functionaries of 'the framing'.

Living with Orthodoxy

Change in all its representations in our modern world would appear to carry with it the imperative to learn about new developments whether in our schools, our hospitals, in the workplace or in prisons, in a myriad of specialist fields where the frequency and diversity of change appears to be escalating in our contemporary world. Increasingly, schools are seen as foundation stones for learning that extends throughout life. So, in developed economies around the globe it is perhaps no surprise that orthodoxy has emerged in which lifelong learning in its many different guises is viewed as a *means* of enabling people within the workplace to keep up with what Giddens (1990, p.139) calls the ‘juggernaut of change.’¹

Whereas education not so long ago was arguably the preserve of the elite – the sons of the ruling classes – today in Western countries and across a wide spectrum of society there are growing expectations which in their turn create an ongoing need for lifelong learning from different generations and socio-economic groups. It would seem there has grown an almost insatiable appetite for ‘lifelong learning’.

This type of ‘learning’ in England can be seen as two interrelated and contrasting gatherings: the systems responsible for the production of such orthodoxy. Politicians, employers, various specialised forms of labour, and their political representatives, appear to see lifelong learning as a means to improve competitiveness and productivity regarding *what is done in practice* in a range of economies on a global stage. This *system* is concerned with lifelong learning in the production of more efficient forms of labour. On the other hand, on the same stage, academics from the field of lifelong learning continue to produce discourses which aim *to understand and to resolve* the many contradictions and conflicts of interests among agencies, including their own, and thereby to develop a theoretical vision of *what is done in practice* in the name of lifelong learning in the economy. This is the continually evolving *system* of lifelong learning reproduced by academics.

Standing outside these two endlessly changing systems, and their complex interrelationship in time, it would seem that in their production ‘lifelong learning’ is perceived as a means to an end; that is, as a means of dealing with and attempting to gain some control over ‘change’. This chapter will use and develop the work of Martin Heidegger (1962, 1977a, 1991) as a way of thinking that may go beyond what he had originally envisaged. It will consider systems of lifelong learning as technologies, in which learning is perceived as a means of gaining some kind of mastery and control over change. In questioning lifelong learning and, in the light of a reading of Heidegger’s texts, this chapter argues that, far from enabling us to gain control over change, lifelong learning may be in danger of ‘framing’ us so that we become servants of our own technologies.

This philosophical argument begins by distinguishing between humanism as the backdrop to the current systems of lifelong learning and post-humanism in which the authors find themselves. It introduces a ‘way of thinking’ about the relationship between what Heidegger calls the horizon of ‘Being’ and the possibility of ‘beings’ within discourses of learning that may possibly extend over a lifetime. This way of

thinking is in turn contrasted with the thinking that tends to dominate systems of lifelong learning which can be seen to be grounded in reason. The argument will endeavour to show that these same systems which dominate lifelong learning are also driven by the relationship of means to an end. Heidegger's (1968, 1977a, 1991) work identifies such a relationship as 'technological enframing' or simply 'framing'.² In the final stages of the argument the authors will consider the implications of 'framing' which promises to deliver us into the 'iron cage of technical rationality'.³ So, for the purpose of this chapter, and in viewing the end as a beginning, the authors would like to pose a rhetorical question that asks where we take lifelong learning from here?

Beyond Humanism – Towards a Way of Thinking

It is difficult to find any explicit reference to a humanist backdrop on the stage set by discourses of lifelong learning, and, historically in Europe, modern humanism⁴ takes many different forms. But, despite such difficulties, what seems one particularly powerful way in which such humanism asserts itself culturally, is through the production of 'lifelong learning'. Here in the big picture of the production of this modernist meta-narrative⁵ the motives of 'mastery and control, abstraction and universalisation'⁶ (Bonnett 2004) are capable of reaching new levels that increasingly dominate the whole of people's lives. Here, the human being represented as 'the learner' is placed at the heart of many lead interpretations of 'lifelong learning' (*vide* Coffield 1999; Hager 2004; Finlay et al. 2005) and, despite critiques from the academics involved, transmuted into the immediacy of 'capital' being available for use within the economy. The motivation which is reinforced by the meta-narrative of 'lifelong learning', can be seen as antithetical to the highest celebration of human being in which humans preserve their own dignity and essence.

Such celebration has its roots in the philosophy of Aristotle and, in this chapter, in the work of Martin Heidegger, one of the twentieth century's leading and highly controversial thinkers, who was profoundly influenced by Aristotle.

For Heidegger (1988):

Humanism is opposed because it does not set the humanitas of the human being high enough. (ibid., p.252)

In English translation Heidegger's magnum opus *Being and Time* (1962) presents its own challenges, not least with the 'ontological difference' which Heidegger was the first to distinguish between entities or things themselves,⁷ for example, human 'beings' (*Seiendes*) and 'Being'⁸ (*Sein*), the 'is', as the horizon from which he saw that beings arise from out of themselves. Although in the original German these words in parenthesis make associations through compound verbs and nouns that grammatically cannot be made in English, one possible understanding of the 'ontological difference' between Being and beings, in discourses of 'lifelong learning' can be seen by looking at how a student of lifelong learning perceives themselves.

The ontological difference can be seen through a deconstruction⁹ of what is meant by Being in connection with lifelong learning.

Being and the Reproduction of Discourses of ‘Lifelong Learning’

We do not have to be a philosopher to understand Being but, of course, we do have to be human, as we all have at the very least, a tacit (*unausgesprochen*)¹⁰ understanding of Being (Heidegger 1962). One of the many *possibilities* at work open to human beings is that of being a student in the workplace. An organisation such as the university in which these authors work, boasts about the number of participants on training courses and provides staff with a Personal Development File as part of a continuous process of lifelong learning (NTU 2000). Perhaps put yourself in the position of a learner within such a large organisation on an in-house training course. *In being* a student, albeit a staff member, there is the *possibility* you may be in a room with around a dozen other people as well as a course leader you have just met with for the first time. *In being* a student there is the *possibility* you may have all the associated paraphernalia such as a course guide, handouts, workbook, pens, and other reading materials or you may prefer to attend without any of these. It is possibly helpful to distinguish between the ‘student’ as a label or representation and what they do as students. *In being* a student the *possibility* is manifest in particular and characteristic forms of behaviour or what we refer to as agency. The student, as this *being*, is represented in this *possibility* otherwise she or he would not *be* a student.

So, a thing is in this *possibility* for the moment a ‘student’. The difficulty Heidegger recognised had been encountered by all previous ontologists. Philosophers who had revisited Aristotle’s original question – *ti to on, what is Being?* – simply arrived at descriptions of other beings, as if the answer was in some way hiding.¹¹ To get around this problem, Heidegger’s writings are littered with reference to an entity he called *Dasein*. Literally translated this signifies our human understanding of ‘being there’, and this is pertinent to the stage set by discourses of lifelong learning. So, in this way of thinking it is possible to talk of the *Dasein* of the modern societies in developed economies around the globe, increasingly absorbed by discourses of ‘lifelong learning’. As an entity, *Dasein*, human being, always understands its own Being. However, as Heidegger (1962) attempted to uncover in *Being and Time*, unlike *Dasein*, in the production of discourses of ‘lifelong learning’ people are ‘thrown’¹² from birth into a world in which they are forever ‘falling’ from a sense of Being. And in such production, which is always necessarily rendered as *reproduction*, there is a profound tendency for humans, therefore, to forget a sense of Being.

In the language of lifelong learning Being always loves to hide; in both the reproduction and repetition of possible statements in the name of ‘lifelong learning’ which may take the form of: ‘lifelong learning *is* ...’, the ‘is’, namely, *Being*, can never be found, only leaving a ‘trace’¹³ in such discourses. This sense

of *Being* comes to be, albeit hidden, in every noun and verb used in the name of lifelong learning.

Being and Time and the Reproduction of Discourses of Lifelong Learning

The other distinct insight and way of thinking that is gained from *Being and Time* concerns our relationship with time itself. In terms of a person recognising themselves as being a student, their projection of actually 'Being' a student is always ahead of the entity which has been identified as *Dasein*. According to Heidegger (1962, p.252) this is because *Dasein* already 'understands itself by its own capacity to be'. This relation between beings and Being involving time, Heidegger saw as 'temporal'. The authors will attempt to argue that a fresh understanding of the temporal relationship between *Being and Time*, in the reproduction, reiteration and repetition of discourses of lifelong learning, is the key to making sense of the 'framing' of such discourses.

Through his rereading of Aristotle, who had conceived of time as a sequence of 'nows', Heidegger (1962, pp.387–388) uncovered the 'temporal' relationship in which beings in their *possibilities* become manifest in production from out of a 'horizon of Being'. He saw this as a relationship in time, not of chronometers but a temporal relationship, in which *Dasein's* presence is always orientated to the future on the basis what has been; that is, lifelong learners are in some ways prisoners of history.¹⁴ In Heidegger's (1962, p.401) words from *Being and Time*, 'temporality' in the world of *Dasein* 'temporalises as a future, which makes present in the process of having been.

In his more mature work, *Time and Being*, first published in 1972, Heidegger explored the temporal character of Being itself, which for him 'structures occurrence'. So, for the authors, significantly, such 'temporalising' applies as much to the unique world of each student of lifelong learning as to the reproduction of *systems*¹⁵ of lifelong learning themselves. Hence, proximally for *Dasein* this way of thinking makes it possible to speak of the movement of human beings into subjects and objects. We can also distinguish the movement of Being in time structuring the occurrence of the reproduction of discourses of modern humanism and, significantly for this chapter, recently systems of 'lifelong learning'.¹⁶

It is from his understanding of temporality that Heidegger tends to interpret the presence of every 'thing' in terms of movement in time using the German noun, *Wesen*, translated as 'essence' (Heidegger 1977a, pp.1–2), which in German forms the root of *Anwesen* – coming to presence – as the basic sense of Being (*Sein*). This was part of his attempt to rewrite the philosophical tradition which had regarded the property of a thing, its *quidditas*, or 'whatness', as providing the answer to the question concerning essence (from the Latin, *quid*). In fact, as Krell points out in a footnote to Heidegger's (1991a) reading of *Nietzsche*:

As early as *Being and Time* (1927) Heidegger had stressed the verbal character of *Wesen*; for instance, in the phrase "The essence of *Dasein* lies in existence" (p.42 of the German edition). Here "essence" suggests the radically temporalising projection of *Dasein* as such, rather than some property or even *quiddity* of being. (ibid., pp.140–141)

Again in their recent translation of Heidegger's (2000, p.244) lecture course *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Gregory Fried and Richard Polt suggest *Wesen* 'evokes a sense of essence that is not a what, an *idea*, but rather an aspect of Being: a happening, a process, an unfolding'. In this way of thinking about lifelong learning, it is possible to speak of the way in which lifelong learning essentially (*Wesen*) unfolds over time and currently holds sway, in its many current forms of administration.

The question then remains of the relationship of 'temporalising'; that is of the historical unfolding of lifelong learning, to the possibilities gathered together within *systems* of lifelong learning. In doing this, the authors will attempt to uncover some of the deeply ingrained philosophical influences on lifelong learning from the earlier Enlightenment Thinkers such as Leibniz and Kant.

Being in the Possibilities of Systems of Lifelong Learning

Many people tend to put quite a mathematical, rational, and even scientific gloss on the term, 'possibility' where we can still hear echoes of the philosophical tradition in our phrase, '*what* is possible'. Statisticians now calculate the possible outcomes of a range of complex social phenomena including not least, the possible impact of lifelong learning on the economy. It seems to the authors that it is important to clarify the distinction between *possible* in this mathematical sense and what Heidegger (1998) meant by 'the possible'.¹⁷ He says,

When I speak of the "quiet power of the possible" I mean Being itself, which in its favouring presides over thinking and hence over the essence of humanity, and that means over its relation to Being. (*ibid.*, p.242).^{18,19}

Concerns over 'the quiet power of the possible'²⁰ are foregrounded in much great literature and philosophy and at this point it is perhaps pertinent to look at how writers at other times have viewed this.²¹ Wordsworth, in *Lines Written a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey* in 1798, reflects on learning from nature:

I have felt
A presence that disturbs me with a joy
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused
...
Well pleased to recognise
In nature and the language of the sense,
The anchor of my purest thoughts, the nurse,
The guide, the guardian of my heart, and soul
Of all my moral being. (Gill 2000, p.134)

What seems to be clear in the above extract is the complete lack of any calculation: it is as if *the awareness that Wordsworth has* of 'a presence' of the natural world and an 'anchor' which would appear to make secure his thoughts of what has been, *almost arises from itself*, from what he calls his 'soul'. This seems to be a direct

expression of what Heidegger (1977a, p.10)²² saw in the Ancient Greek word, *phusis*,²³ the self-arising of beings, as the celebration of the dignity of the poet himself and of human being more generally.

Of course, amidst the seemingly cosmopolitan chatter and ongoing activity about progress made in connecting lifelong learning with the global economy, such romantic and possibly provincial language as Wordsworth's stands unfavourable comparison with the forward, outward looking and elevated discourses of lifelong learning vested with the full authority of government policy and research. But such comparison is in danger of missing a key question concerning the motives for the chatter and ongoing activity in the name of lifelong learning around the globe. At stake arguably are not just developments in the economy, but the humanistic and anthropocentric motive of rendering the sufficiency of the modern self as perfectible which can be found at the centre of models of lifelong learning. Tacitly in the discourses of lifelong learning the authors believe that *there is a deeply held 'metaphysical dissatisfaction' with ourselves as human beings that goes to the heart of improvements in the state apparatus of education and the continual drive for lifelong learning* in all of the developed nations around the globe.

Some measure of the gulf between Heidegger's (1962) thinking in *Being and Time* and *the reality* produced in *the modern world* by discourses of 'lifelong learning' can be seen from looking back at the literature where beings, in this case, students of lifelong learning, are *represented* in terms of the inter-relationship of subjects and objects (*vide* Coffield 1999; Finlay et al. 2005; Holmes 2004).

On such a stage the unique world of each human being is already glossed as an external object by virtue of the definite article, *the* world of lifelong learning; a calculated and purposefully erected world readily accessible through a course or specific training to meet the purported 'needs' of the 'individual'; the active 'subject' who is possibly ready to learn, or *the* 'object' who can be counted within the economy of lifelong learning. In the meta-narrative of late modern *Dasein*, the calculated reality of lifelong learning is *represented* as one in which investments in human capital are directly and wilfully linked with the economy, but says little about the unique ways in which each of us come to view or to experience the world of lifelong learning.

For Heidegger, in contrast, according to one of his former students, Joan Stambaugh, the relationship of temporality provides an interpretation of the 'coming about of reality itself' (Stambaugh 1986, p.93). In her words 'temporality is instrumental in pulling the rug from under the concept of man as subject' (*ibid.*, p.93); not least, for example, *the* 'individual', *the* 'learner', *the* 'student', *the* 'knowledgeable agent' ... each of which have been rendered as possible objects and subjects.

Perhaps, on the late modern stage set by discourses of 'lifelong learning', there may have been no such 'rugs' in evidence; certainly the representation of subjects and objects in such discourses still reigns supreme. It is this very supremacy that this chapter aims to question.

Attempting, in the next step of the argument, to uncover the basis or grounds for such a dominant order for ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ will lead the way to uncovering the grounds for the means – ends logical ordering of beings in ‘framing’ international systems of lifelong learning.

‘Being’ in Current Systems of Lifelong Learning on Grounds of the Principle of Reason

Earlier in the chapter it was emphasised that on the international stage set by developed countries, in addition to putting their particular vision on what is done in practice in the name of lifelong learning, academic systems are primarily orientated towards attempting to understand and to resolve the many conflicts and contradictions in the reality produced by lifelong learning. In part, the passion with which the social science is pursued in the ‘academic system’ is a measure of attempts to eliminate contradictions in, and observations about, and theories of, lifelong learning and in the production of the ‘system of labour’ used.

In this instance, the ‘system’ of lifelong learning is being used to refer to the gatherings of things – people and resources – in the name of lifelong learning which are free from contradictions. But just how are such gatherings safeguarded from contradiction? The ‘principle’ of contradiction has already been seen as the driving force behind the social science. For Heidegger (1991, p.19), principles, ‘are the sort of things that occupy the first place, that stand first in line’. In Latin, ‘*Principia* refers to a ranking and ordering’ of beings. For example, in proximal terms, the student of lifelong learning we met earlier is most likely to have been ordered by a set of principles concerning the timing, duration, and location of his experience and also ranked in some way for the course depending upon his age, qualifications, and experience. Equally, the student’s unconscious reproduction of meta-narratives of lifelong learning was quite possibly based, tacitly not only upon the ‘principle of contradiction’ but at least one other higher order principle that ranks and orders being.

It is difficult to find any explicit reference to such a principle in the literature but some clues regarding its identity have already been given in the observation made earlier concerning the interrelationship of ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ which reign supreme in discourses of lifelong learning. ‘Subject’, which derives from classical roots²⁴ means that which is at the basis, that which lies present as the ground or reason for statements about something (Heidegger 1977a).²⁵

But reason is so ubiquitous, as the ground for the international stage set by lifelong learning; people hardly seem to notice it. For Heidegger (1991; Caputo 1987) it was not reason *per se* but the mighty ‘principle of reason’ which remained a serious concern throughout his life. Leibniz’ principle of reason, that ‘nothing is without reason’ (*est nihil sine ratione*), came to assume the position of an axiom almost without limits according to Heidegger’s (1991) account, which is now recognised as the precise locus for the ground on which modern humanist systems of ‘lifelong learning’ are staged.

The rationality of modern systems of lifelong learning owes much to Kant's (2002, 2004, 2005) critical philosophy which contributed a significant intellectual vision for the Enlightenment, or The Age of Reason in maturity. The Enlightenment clearly means more than one thing. According to Sebastian Gardner (1999, p.9) Kant 'provided the Enlightenment with a definite articulation. . . making explicit the underlying conception that it had had of itself all along'. Gardner's (1999, p.2) point that Kant's thought in turn had been significantly influenced by Leibniz' rationalism, and by Hume's empiricism is used as a backdrop to a not altogether favourable response from German idealists. Despite attempts to remedy the apparent deficiencies in Kant's ideas by such idealists as Fichte, Schelling, and J.S. Beck, it has still been argued by Mautner (1996, p.294) that Kant's 'epistemology and his ethics provided the best model for philosophising in a scientific age.'

This too, perhaps misses the point of reason as the ground for such science, which Heidegger never lost sight of. In this matter Heidegger kept in his sights not only Kant (1896, 2002, 2005), for whom the motto of the Enlightenment was *Sapere aude!* (Have courage to use your own reason!), but also Leibniz (Jolly 2005) who had been so influential.

The academic systems concerned with the production of reliable knowledge about lifelong learning and those systems of labour concerned with improving competitiveness are both subject to the mighty 'principle of reason'. The basis for this is simple: Heidegger (1991, p.23) makes the claim that it is not confined to cognition alone, 'in its ordinary formulation' the principle 'is valid for everything which in any manner is'.

This can be illustrated by uncovering the principle of reason's *modus operandi* as the ground for systems of lifelong learning, and this is glossed here in translation by Caputo (1987, p.223), as follows:

The 'subject' demands a 'reason' be brought forward for the 'object' only because the subject has long ceased to let the being be in its own ground. (Heidegger 1991, pp.26-27)

And if no reasoned account is rendered 'the being is declared null and void, no being at all, a mere phantom of the subject'. Reason demands back only reasons²⁵.

So, on reflection, on the stage created for the production of lifelong learning on grounds of the 'principle of reason' and from a vantage point created by Heidegger's thinking about the temporal movements of Being and beings, we can now see how this mighty principle ranks and orders the movements of beings as subjects and objects, in time measured not by the uncertain lives of human beings involved, but by the exactitude of chronometers. And so, the authors suggest that the sovereign subject of lifelong learning is rendered in logical relation to the object on grounds of reason, representing the dominant possibility *in*²⁶ being there.

But, precisely how does the mighty 'principle of reason' rank and order beings found in lifelong learning into subjects and objects? It is perhaps helpful, as Heidegger (1999, pp.40, 44, 89) suggests, to distinguish two different 'tonalities' in speaking about the principle. In the first dominant 'tonality', *nothing is without* reason, where emphasis is placed on the double negative, nothing without, seen earlier in the text, it suggests that reason *projected by humans* is the basis or ground for

everything that 'is'. But, if the principle is replayed in a second 'tonality', nothing is without *reason*, in which 'unison of Being and reason resound': then, according to this principle, 'Being and reason are the same' in the sense that 'ground/reason belongs together with Being'. And, 'the principle of reason is no longer the supreme principle of all beings' but a statement of Being.

There is, as Wordsworth had recognised in his words cited earlier, something that always remains beyond our grasp; namely, for Heidegger, our relationship with Being. For him, it is in the gift of time not of chronometers, *in* our relationship with Being which has no ground, that beings come 'to be beings' (Heidegger 1991, p.129). So, consciously or unconsciously, it is suggested that insofar as the rational metaphysics of the 'principle of reason' is taken as the ground *upon which*²⁷ discourses of lifelong learning are staged, it is this principle that is the line of force in the temporal relationship of Being as a whole with our projected understanding of beings which orders beings into subjects and objects and not our grammar *per se*.

Whereas modern humanist thought has tended to place humans at the relational centre of the world, the authors suggest that in Heideggerian (1977a, pp.115–154) and other post-humanist²⁸ thought such a position is untenable. As Kant (2004) was first to recognise, Being has no predicate (for Heidegger, no ground/reason) and therefore in terms of 'pure reason' remained beyond analysis but, as the authors have attempted to show, not beyond the realms of the deconstruction of lifelong learning explored in this chapter, where there is a need to go back to the beginning. It is a step in which an uncovering of the precise nature of 'the framing' of 'lifelong learning' is attempted. Or, to put it another way, the possible disclosure that as they currently stand the various discourses of 'labour' and of 'academia', identified in the introduction, and reproduced in the name of lifelong learning are, in essence, technology.

The Framing of Lifelong Learning as an Essential Technology

This links in with the fact that for Heidegger, following the publication of *Sein und Zeit*²⁹ in 1927, between the 1930s and 1950s the question of Being³⁰ became increasingly entangled with questions concerning the essence of technology.³¹

Heidegger's *The Question Concerning Technology* (1977a) introduces a way of thinking that seeks to consider the relations between Being and what he saw as the essence of technology that has come to dominate the modern world.

Heidegger's deconstruction of modern technology attempts to preserve a more original sense of *techne*, not as a 'craft' in the modern sense, but first and foremost as a way of revealing beings. *Revealing is conceived of as a temporal movement or 'bringing-to-presence'* of particular beings within a horizon of Being.

In this chapter it is claimed that modern technology in its essence has become the dominant mode of revealing³² what is real in the reproduction of discourses of 'lifelong learning'. But as Heidegger (1977a, p.4) cryptically notes, 'the essence of technology is by no means anything technological'. Indeed, as mentioned earlier,

'the essence of a thing is considered to be *what* the thing is'. But, such *whatness*, arguably amounts to metaphysician's attempts to represent the essence of some *thing*, namely, what the technology of lifelong learning *is*; its essence, on grounds of reason. So, in Heidegger's (1977a) questioning of what technology is as 'a means to an end' and as 'a human activity' he suggested to the authors that, paradoxically, the more people are seduced by the technology of lifelong learning as a means to an end into gaining mastery and control, the more all of us tend to become its servants and marionettes. This is not to adopt the possible reactionary position of modern day 'Luddites' who somehow demonise technology, but rather, an attempt to begin to open ways of questioning and thinking about the essential technology of lifelong learning as much more than a means to an end, which has begun to be revealed through the deconstruction.

This chapter attempts to uncover that there have come to stand ongoing drives based on modernist assumptions concerning the sufficiency and perfectibility of the self. It is suggested that such drives lie behind the discourses and rhetoric on the stage set by lifelong learning as a means of mastering and controlling change in the economy. For the authors such ongoing activity is shaped by the force of ground/reason *upon which* the reproduction and representation of modernist forms of lifelong learning continue to be staged.³³

As such a mode of revealing, the authors believe that as an essential form of technology, lifelong learning comes to stand in the realm of truth, but, significantly, not of Being in which beings come to stand. Instead, the argument has attempted to uncover and to make clear that modern lifelong learning is in its essence an adaptation of Being in this age of technology, where Being 'belongs *together* with reason' according to the dominant logic of mathematics and science. For the authors it is such logic that permeates the very fabric of our reproduction of lifelong learning. On this modern stage, not only beings come to stand as subjects and objects – the individual, the learner, the knowledgeable agent, the student, the trainer. . . . – but that as human beings the energy stored in all of those possibilities in Being continue to stand in reserve within the 'framing' of lifelong learning. That is, in accord with the 'principle of reason' such 'framing' *orders* and ranks beings in consonance with the rigour and logic of the underlying social science. But equally, beings that stand in reserve in the name of lifelong learning constitute their own as yet unrealised potential for exploitation that remains 'available for use'.³⁴

'The framing' arises from the dominant logic of reason and Being belonging *together* in the 'principle of reason' as the ground *upon which* modern learning is staged and reproduced: extending the mighty principle's corporation⁴⁵ throughout our lives. So, the 'principle of reason' as the ground for modern discourses of lifelong learning *renders* (*zustellen*) a measure of the sufficiency and perfectibility of the self at the heart of such humanism as a 'necessary element in the determination of how things are'; not least of course, *represented* (*Vorstellen*) in terms of our adaptations to change and improving the competitiveness of the economy.³⁵ In this way of thinking and revealing the real, nearly everything, more or less, comes to stand in reserve.⁴⁴

To the extent that people stand on such a stage our relationship with Being, which, as Heidegger (1962) recognised as humans the tendency to forget, is here further blocked from view by the almost perfect *disguise* created by the science of lifelong learning. Contrary to conventional opinion which sees technology as the application of science, from a reading of Heidegger (1977a, pp.155–182) it is suggested that science is just another brand of technology in its essence. So, ideas and theories that are wilfully represented within discourses of lifelong learning can be seen to necessarily delimit the production of specialised objects by the boundaries they create as a condition of the rigour and correctness of such categorisations. For example, in lifelong learning the manifold forms of specialised theories, each attracting their own discourses, delimit the representation of objects; for example, theories of ‘skills’, ‘learners’, ‘training’ . . . are connected with the objects of empirical performance data and the identities of skilled learners and professionals.

But the power with which such social science disguises our relationship with Being arises not just from the production of objects and subjects, but from the very nature of science itself. As Heidegger (1977a, p.177) argues, ‘it is entirely denied to science scientifically to arrive at its own essence; namely, ‘the sciences are utterly incapable of gaining access to that which cannot be gotten around holding sway in their essence’. That is the temporal relationship of beings to Being has no part in the conjecture, refutation and ongoing evolution of theories that admit only objects. Theories of science are always circumscribed and specialised as the foundation of rigorous and correct research into lifelong learning. The sequestration of questions concerning Being as a whole is therefore a logical necessity.

Being in ‘The Framing’ of the Language of Lifelong Learning

Heidegger’s master term, *das Gestell*, (framing) which emerges from his deconstruction of modern technology, takes on a particular significance for this argument, which is easy to lose in translation. The significance of *das Gestell*, a composite word of Heidegger’s own making, is its relation to the question of human agency and our relationship with Being. Its translation as either ‘framing’ or ‘the enframing’ does not make the connections possible in German.

Perhaps, on reflection, it is useful to make some of those connections of *das Gestell* with a number of terms used in this chapter. Behind all of these terms lies the everyday German verb *Stellen*, which translates as to place, or to set. Of course *das Gestell*, the framing, of lifelong learning is grounded (*Feststellen*) in the ‘principle of reason’ upon which the ongoing reproduction of lifelong learning is possibly staged and made secure (*Sicherstellen*).

Such grounding, that has been uncovered in this chapter, amounts to an ordering (*Bestellung*) and ranking of beings, in accord with the principle of reason, which the will represents (*Vorstellen*) and sets in place (*Stellen*) as objects and subjects. So, within dominant forms of *das Gestell*, ‘framing’, our relationship with Being

and the challenging of beings is not only disguised (*Verstellen*) but also rendered (*Zustellen*) as uncircumventable.

In lifelong learning, rather than allowing for the possibility in beings, which was briefly explored earlier with the student, in the omnipresent setting in place of beings as objects, driven by the 'on-going activity', 'sufficiency' and 'perfectibility' of the self, the question of our relationship with Being does not even arise.

One of the dangers for Peim and Flint (2006) is that:

Within *das Ge-stell*, . . . there is little possibility for the realisation that there is something uncanny, Being, to forget. In '*das Ge-stell*', it should be clear that the everyday ordering of things that we inhabit as subjects of knowledge, is in fact a particular framing of Being.

By recourse to the work and language of a discourse that has been dominated by Heidegger, in this chapter the authors have attempted to introduce and move on from Heidegger's original ideas to begin some questioning and thinking about the possible dangers of 'framing' learning for life.

Towards a Way of Thinking

The argument has attempted to show that our profoundly forgotten relationship with Being is always in danger of rendering humans enslaved to 'framing'. One significant way this relationship might be revealed is to talk about it, rather than continuing in our largely unconscious attempts to overcome or to oppose it with our science of lifelong learning. Throughout the modern period, stemming from the Enlightenment, *the will* to overcome and to oppose 'framing' has been almost insatiable. For Giddens it is manifest in the phenomenology of the 'juggernaut' (Giddens 1990, p.139), 'a runaway engine of enormous power, which collectively as human beings' some people delude themselves into believing they 'can drive to some extent but which threatens to run out of control and which could rend itself asunder'. Such will to power simply reproduces and reiterates dominant forms of 'framing' that have come to infect the modern world with ever greater depth and breadth.

The danger of not speaking of 'framing' is that, as Ludwig Wittgenstein (1961, p.74) indicated, 'what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence'; we are always in danger of rendering thoughts in the 'hurly burly' background of 'on-going activity' in the 'framing' with our own silence. As Lev Vygotsky (1986, p.218) suggested, 'thought is not merely expressed in words; it comes into existence through them'. Is it possible for discourses of lifelong learning to open themselves to questions and thought concerning our very relationship with Being?

So, the question for learning, which may well extend for more than a lifetime of any one generation, is whether it is possible to explore and open such questioning and thinking about 'framing'.

From Heidegger's writings it would seem that is possible. However, we do this understanding that the evolution of such thinking and questioning in the literature,

for much of the modern period, has long been expropriated into specialist domains of philosophy. The question is not, therefore, about Heidegger's writings, it concerns no less than the possibility of a shared language of lifelong learning, which opens questioning and thinking about our relationship with Being that goes to the heart of our very existence on this planet.

In this chapter the authors have tried to point to the real danger that much of our language has already been significantly branded by the metaphysics of 'framing'. It has been suggested that 'academic' discourses and those involving the 'labour' of lifelong learning are currently delimited by the specialisation of modern social 'science as research', which it would appear, as a condition of their very own existence, cannot even ask questions concerning any relationship with Being.³⁶

Despite such obvious difficulties there remains one significant fact. Tacitly, at least, we all have a sense of Being. Its relation to us is the very condition of our humanity. Is it not time to open further discussion and a way of thinking, which is no longer confined to specialist discourses of philosophy?

In considering a way of thinking about 'lifelong learning', the authors believe, there is the need for a celebration of difference in that most essential relationship of Being and identity.

Postscript: Towards a Way of Thinking about Policy

Nowhere is such a revealing of this relationship between Being and identity more prominent in the modern world of education than in policy. It is, perhaps, no surprise then, that many people might possibly be concerned about the question that has not yet been addressed; namely, *what are some of the implications of our deconstruction of lifelong learning as 'framing' for policy?*

In the spirit of deconstruction at the closing stages of this chapter, we can offer only an initial twofold response in the form of pointers which we hope will open further discussion regarding the 'framing' and our relationship with Being.

Firstly, although the matter of the question concerning the implications of the deconstruction of lifelong learning as 'framing' for policy is consonant with the many drives in the modern world to push forward standards in every walk of life, the very existence of the question itself is determined by the 'framing'.³⁷ The form of the question is predicated on the assumption of a cause and effect relationship between what has been written in this particular chapter and its possible effect upon policy.³⁸ For Heidegger (1991, p.21) such cause and effect logic has its origins in Leibniz' principle of reason: 'Nothing is without reason, or no effect is without a cause', which has already been shown to be grounds for the 'framing'.

The form of the question concerning the implications of this deconstruction for lifelong learning policy also reveals other such grounds. 'Policy', as a course or *principle* of action (Heidegger 1991, p.22) involves the 'ranking and ordering of beings'. So, as a specialist and delimited science in the modern world, policy attracts its own wide-ranging sociologies; that is, compartmentalised sciences

which again point to the existence of the 'framing' as grounds for such a delineated world.³⁹

Finally, but by no means least, in relation to the 'framing', the original question was posed in the form: '*what* are the implications of this text for policy'? In the opening 'what are' there is already a 'starting point of being present', a subject capable of 'being something, a guiding force, or power in the world'. But, such a metaphysical gathering of policy at the hands of Being, amounting to an ordering of beings as standing reserve in which Being leaves only its 'trace', is once again recognised as the 'framing'.⁴⁰

More starkly Heidegger saw in our forgetfulness of Being the completion of metaphysics and the possible 'abandonment' (Heidegger 1973, p.66) or the 'oblivion' of Being (Heidegger 1972, p.64). This brings us to the question of our relationship with Being when faced with the possibility of 'lifelong learning'.

One possibility; the 'framing', which now dominates the stage on which the institution of lifelong learning continues to be played out in the modern world, here takes the form of the 'on-going activity'⁴¹ of science as research into an ever expanding array and modalities of learning that some would like to see extended throughout our lives. Such research, which provides the basis for the development of lifelong learning policy, is grounded in the 'projection of object-spheres' according to the methodological principle that with help of its findings 'it adapts itself for a new procedure'. On this basis the continued reflexivity⁴² of our modern institutions, such as lifelong learning; manifest in the phenomenology of the 'juggernaut', is necessary because 'science intrinsically as research has the character of 'on-going activity'⁴³. For Heidegger (2002b, p.72) here is to be found the 'rule of metaphysics', which tacitly grounds such 'on-going activity', which may 'entrench itself, in the shape of modern technology' – the framing – 'with its developments running around boundlessly'.

Paradoxically, such boundless ongoing activity, which places both policy-makers and research into lifelong learning as means of overcoming our own limitations, can be seen as the very machinations of Being (Heidegger 1991, 2002b). And, as such an identity, lifelong learning belongs *together* as a unified system mediated by the authority vested in research that continually seeks to develop new syntheses. 'To belong' to lifelong learning in this sense, 'means to be assigned and placed in the order of a *together* in the 'manifold' system of lifelong learning found in all of the developed economies around the globe as a manifestation of the 'framing'⁴⁴ (Heidegger 2002b, p.29).

But, rather than 'failing to hear the claim of Being which speaks in the essence of technology' concealed in the framing, there remains the possibility of thinking what the 'identity' of 'lifelong learning' as a *belonging* together means, where the 'together' is now determined by the belonging⁴⁵ (ibid., p.29). Returning to Parmenides, Heidegger argues that such *belonging* together concerns 'man and Being' (ibid., p.30). So, to belong here in the identity of lifelong learning still means to be in the order of Being. For Heidegger, 'man is essentially only this relationship of responding to Being, and he is only this'. This 'only' does not signify a 'limitation, but an excess' in which 'man and Being are appropriated to each other' (ibid., p.31).

However, in *Identity and Difference* (Heidegger 2002b) the unique ‘event of Appropriation’ in which man and Being can reach each other in their nature and lose those qualities with which metaphysics has endowed them, is seen as something that has not yet arrived; indeed as something which may not come at all. What is suggested from Heidegger’s texts in terms of policy regarding lifelong learning is no less than ‘a step back in thinking’ in an attempt to remove the shackles of representational and calculative thinking perpetuated by the metaphysical framing of lifelong learning.

However, regarding the questions of how this ‘event of Appropriation’ might be achieved, when and where it might occur, Heidegger remained uncharacteristically silent. Except it was clear to him from the ‘principle of identity’ there is an essential ambiguity in the framing of lifelong learning. Framing is simultaneously both ‘the completion of and fulfilment of metaphysics’ and ‘the revealing preparations of Appropriation’ (Heidegger 1977b, pp.108–109). In this sense the ‘framing’ of learning throughout life could be seen as the ‘photographic negative of Appropriation’.

So, the question remains in terms of lifelong learning policy as to whether we can step back in our thinking and rid our language of such metaphysical branding. Indeed, is it possible to find a way of thinking that lets this photographic negative finally develop in the Appropriation of human beings and Being?

Endnotes

¹ Anthony Giddens (1990, p.139) ‘juggernaut’ derives from the Hindi, *Jagannath*, ‘lord of the world’, and is a title of Krishna; an idol of this deity was taken each year through the streets on a huge car, which followers are said to have thrown themselves under, to be crushed beneath the wheels.

² Following discussions with Martin Heidegger concerning translation, Joan Stambaugh (1992) uses *Framing* to translate his idiomatic expression, *das Gestell*, whilst others before her, including William Lovitt, who translated *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays* (Heidegger 1977), have used ‘technological enframing’ or ‘the enframing’.

³ The dystopian metaphor of the ‘iron cage of technical rationality’ originates from Talcott Parsons. Evocation of the ‘iron cage’ was developed with Weber’s metaphor of a ‘shell as hard as steel’ suggesting, with reference to an alloy, steel, that somehow such dystopia was of humankind’s own making (*vide*, Baehr 2001). The argument developed in this chapter challenges the view that somehow technology is of man’s own making.

⁴ In the Macmillan *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Volume 4, in a historical perspective on the philosophy of humanism, Nicola Abbagnano (1967, pp.69–72) defines humanism as any philosophy which recognises the value and dignity of man, and makes him the measure of all things, or somehow takes human nature, its limits, or its interests as its theme. She attributes ‘renaissance humanism’ as one of the conditions that contributed to the ‘birth of modern science’. In a similar vein, Thomas Mautner (1996, p.256) in the *Penguin Book of Philosophy* sees that from the nineteenth century ‘humanism in the English speaking world has come to designate a non-religious or anti-religious world view, based on the belief in man’s capacity for self cultivation and self-improvement and in the progress of mankind’. Heidegger’s (1977, pp.128–133) discussion of ‘man’ at the ‘relational centre’ of the modern world can be found in his lecture, *The Age of the World Picture*.

⁵ Jean-François Lyotard (1979) identifies modernism in terms of its characteristic ‘meta-narratives’, which as a ‘post-modernist’ he famously viewed with ‘incredulity’.

⁶ 'Universalisation' is a tendency wrought by Enlightenment thinking, manifold, for example, in the 'principle of reason' and the 'principle of contradiction' as the ground for the modern world. For Heidegger (1991, p.28) the principle of reason is the 'upon which' everything depends in the modern world. Working within a contrasting tradition of ethics Alisdair MacIntyre's (1984) account of *After Virtue* similarly views reason as grounds for virtue. Anthony Giddens' (1993) *New Rules of Sociological Method* provides an unequivocal message of reason as 'the grounding principles of action' (ibid., p.90).

⁷ The verdict reached by the *Critique of Pure Reason* (Kant 2004) is simple, 'reason is competent to know things lying within the bounds of experience, but not to know anything lying outside them' (Gardner 1999, p.24; emphasis added). But, though knowledge of the 'thing-in-itself', *noumenon*, has been the source of some controversy, for others it has been interpreted as a source of epistemic humility (Langton 1998). For Gardner (1999, p.281) 'our knowledge of things in themselves does not determine any object: we know things in themselves only insofar as we know that something not constituted by forms of our sensibility must occupy the conceptual space outside our experience'.

⁸ In this chapter we have adopted the convention of distinguishing between Being (capitalised) and beings (presented in lower case) throughout the text. This does not in anyway suggest or imply that somehow Being has been designated a special or higher status. It is simply an attempt to clarify and to make explicit a difficult distinction.

⁹ Here we are using the term 'deconstruction' in relation to Heidegger's original concept of *Ab-bau*: that seeks to expose sedimented layers of thinking that have covered over relations with Being.

¹⁰ Literally translated, *unausgesprochen* means 'not spoken out'.

¹¹ As Heraclitus (Fragment 123, cited by Heidegger 1991, p.64), being another distinct influence upon Heidegger's work, had once remarked, *phusis kruptesthai philei*, 'nature loves to hide', and Being remains steadfastly concealed.

¹² In an existential sense 'thrownness' is disclosed in 'how one is'. It signifies finding oneself in one state of mind (Heidegger 1962, p.389).

¹³ Jacques Derrida (1974) explores the 'trace' (of Being) as a 'possibility common to all signification', where 'possibility' has the same signification as that explored on the basis of Heidegger's writings, in this chapter.

¹⁴ In *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon* Karl Marx (1852) indicated cryptically:

¹⁵ 'Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past'.

¹⁶ Two possible 'systems' of lifelong learning are identified earlier in the text. Technically, the use of 'system' in the chapter refers to an organisation of principles free of contradiction on grounds of the 'principle of reason'. In practice, of course, it is extremely difficult to find any explicit reference to such a principle in any of the international discourses of lifelong learning.

¹⁷ Jacques Derrida's (1973, pp.129–160) deconstructive reading of Heidegger, which he explores in his essay concerning 'Difference', suggests that the heart of existence does not come down to how we might choose to represent *essence*, but the 'movement of play' that produces *différance*; that is, for Derrida in the 'difference' in space and deferred in time between the signifier, e.g. words, sounds, signs, and what is signified. In our systems of language, *différance* provides Derrida with the basis for an exploration of Heidegger's (1962, p.401) talk of 'temporality temporalising as a future which makes present in the process of having been'.

¹⁸ In his *Letter on Humanism* published in *Pathmarks* (Heidegger 1998) the full text reads:

¹⁹ When I speak of the 'quiet power of the possible' I do not mean the *possibile* of a merely represented *possibilitas*, nor *potentia* as the *essentia* of an *actus* of existential, rather I mean Being itself, which in its favouring presides over thinking and hence over the essence of humanity, and that means over its relationship to Being.

²⁰ For Heidegger (1968), the complex relationship between Being and thinking is explored more fully in *What is Called Thinking*.

²¹ In philosophy there are many such studies including, Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, Kant, Nietzsche, and Heidegger and in literature such writers as Keats, Wordsworth, Tennyson, T.S. Eliot, Kundera, Ondaatje, and Heaney.

²² In reflecting upon Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes Heidegger (1977 p.10) speaks of a 'bringing forth'. In this context he distinguishes as *poiesis*, 'handicraft manufacture' together with artistic and poetical bringing into appearance and concrete imagery. In this context *phusis* is seen by Heidegger as '*poiesis* in the highest sense'; i.e. 'what presences by means of *phusis* has the bursting open belonging to bringing-forth, e.g., the bursting of a blossom into bloom, in itself (*en heautoi*)'.

²³ In the text *phusis* is translated as a 'self-arising'.

²⁴ Leibniz (*Philosophische Schriften*, (Ed) Gerhardt, 1:138, No. 23, cited by Heidegger 1991, p.32) writes:

²⁵ *id quod dicere soleo, nihil existere nisi cuius redit potest ratio existentiae sufficiens*: '(The Principle) that I usually say (in the form): Nothing exists whose sufficient reason for existing cannot be found.'

²⁶ In other words, it is suggested that satisfactory reason be found for the self in question, which carries with it in the full face of the perfection of the self questions concerning its adequacy.

²⁷ Michel Foucault (1977), who was profoundly influenced by Heidegger's work, saw the self directed subject within the 'regimes of truth' of a 'Panopticon', namely the modern disciplinary society with its panoply of 'surveillance' measures. In sociology Anthony Giddens (1991) writings regarding the 'reflexive self' work from the pre-supposition of knowledgeable agency. In some ways, perhaps, Nietzsche's (*vide* Siegel 2005) *Übermensch* or *Overman* captured the spirit of knowing a life different from ourselves, which carries with it the possible burden of ongoing dissatisfaction.

²⁸ This term is taken from Michael Bonnett's (2004) account of *Education for a Post-Humanist Age*, which has influenced the structure of the argument developed in this chapter.

²⁹ According to Heidegger (1991, p.17) in opening his '*Third Lecture*' regarding *The Principle of Reason* (*Satz von Grund*), it was made clear that the principle of contradiction: 'Whatever implies a contradiction cannot be, *esse non potest, quod implicat contradictionem*' means that 'whenever and wherever we want to get at what can be and actually is, we must avoid contradictions, which means we must adhere to the fundamental principle of contradiction'.

³⁰ In his lecture, *The Age of the World Picture*, Heidegger (1977, pp.115–154) takes up his philosophical interest in the origins of the word 'subject' in relation to the 'essence of man', that is, our relationship with Being, which he traces back to the Latin, *subjectum*. He points out:

³¹ The word *subjectum*, however, is a translation of the Greek *hypokeimenon*. The word names that-which-lies-before, which, as ground, gathers everything onto itself. This metaphysical meaning of the concept of subject has first of all no special relationship to man and none at all to the I (*ibid.*, p.128)

³² Caputo's (1987, p.223) original account and indeed that of Heidegger (1991, pp.26–27) brings to attention connections made with the original Latin and German texts. The word 'account' is used to translate the Latin, *ratio*, reason. 'To render an account', *rationem reddere*, as Heidegger (1991, p.100) points out *reddere* necessarily belongs to *ratio* insofar as the *means* and *ends* with which some matter of action is reckoned are presented in the reckoning and the account. The means-to-ends relationship makes direct connections with Heidegger's (1977) thesis concerning framing, *das Gestell*.

³³ The English word 'rendered' is a translation of the German *zu-stellen*, which makes connections with *das Gestell*, 'framing' (Heidegger 1977), in the final section of the chapter and with the Latin, *reddere*. This Latin term appears in the full title of Leibniz', *principium rationis*, 'principle of reason' which reads, '*principium reddendae rationis*, the fundamental principle of rendering reasons', which means reason demands to be given back as reasons.

³⁴ Finally, 'no being at all' is a translation of the Latin, *nihil*, which appears in Heidegger's (1991 p.26) citation of one of Leibniz 'later more difficult articles', which begins: *Ratio est Natura cur aliquid potius existat quam nihil*, 'There is a reason in Nature why something exists rather than nothing'. In capitalised 'Nature' for Leibniz gathers together to totality of beings in nature and history. For Heidegger (ibid., 26): 'It is used in the sense we think of when we speak of the nature of things'.

³⁵ On some occasions in the English language 'in' carries with it the subtext of containment. Here it is used to connote a temporal movement of temporality, namely 'the primordial outside-of-itself in and for itself' (Heidegger 1962, p.377).

³⁶ The 'upon which', *das Woraufhin*, is sometimes overlooked in readings of *Being and Time* (Heidegger 1962) where Heidegger's question concerning the 'meaning of Being' is addressed without recourse to a conventional interpretation of meaning. In the first place, Heidegger says, the being, which is to be understood, is projected upon its Being, which provides its horizontal frame and is its preliminary or primary projection. And, meaning is that which 'constitutes' what is understood, 'giving it an axis around which understandability can organise itself'. Thus 'meaning' signifies the 'upon which' (*das Woraufhin*) of a primary projection in terms of which something can be conceived in its possibility as that which it is' (ibid., p.371). So, enquiries about 'framing' are asking about that which determines the lines of force in that projection, the tacit *upon which*, the 'meaning maker' that constitutes and sustains it; namely, in this chapter the 'principle of reason' is featured as such a 'line of force' upon things coming to be.

³⁷ Post-humanist thought includes the works of Michel Foucault (1977, 2002a, b) and Jacques Derrida (1973, 1974, 2001) who were both influenced by Heidegger and, perhaps closer to the philosophy of lifelong learning, recently there is the work of Michael Bonnett (2004) and a collection of essays brought together until the aegis of *Heidegger, Education, and Modernity*, edited by Michael Peters (2002).

³⁸ *Sein und Zeit* is a translation of the title of Heidegger's (1962) magnum opus, *Being and Time*.

³⁹ Michael Zimmerman (1990) provides an authoritative account of the history of development of Heidegger's ideas concerning technology in the context of his involvement with National Socialism.

⁴⁰ *Techné* is often translated as 'craft', but as Heidegger (1977, pp.12–13) makes clear such a translation is misleading.

⁴¹ Revealing translates the German noun, *Entbergung* and the related verb, to reveal, *entbergen*, but the English words convey little of the active meaning signified in the German language where these words derive from the verb, *bergen*, meaning to rescue, to recover, to harbour, to conceal. The prefix 'ent' in German is used to connote a change that is negating a former condition. For Heidegger (2001) in *Building, Dwelling and Thinking*, it is only as protected and preserved that anything is set free to endure as it is, i.e. to be.

⁴² *Entbergen* and *Entbergung* also join a family of words that connect with Heidegger's translation of Aristotle's *aletheia* as 'unconcealment', *Unverborgenheit*, which contains within its self *Verborgenheit*, concealment. These are explored in a readable translation of Heidegger's (2002) *The Essence of Truth*.

⁴³ 'On-going activity' translates, *Betrieb*, which in German connotes a business, factory or works and forms a number of compound nouns that connote forms of calculation associated with 'framing', *das Gestell*, and the management of the economy, including, *Betriebsbegehung* – round of inspection, *Betriebsergebnis*, trading results, *Betriebsbereitschaft*, operational readiness, *Betriebsgemeinschaft*, staff and management, and so on.

⁴⁴ Heidegger (1977) uses the term *Bestand* which has been translated as 'standing reserve'.

⁴⁵ 'Corporation' is used to connect with the ongoing activity of modern business in ways that still echo with the Latin, *corporare*, meaning 'form into a body' on grounds of the principle of reason.

References

- Abbagnano, N. (1967) Humanism. In: Edwards, P. (Ed) (Editor in Chief) *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Vol. 4. New York: Macmillan, New York: Free Press, pp.69–72.
- Baehr, P. (2001) The iron case and the shell as hard as steel: Parsons, Weber and Stalhartes Gehäuse metaphor in the professional ethic and spirit of capitalism, *History and Theory*, 40(2), 153–169.
- Bonnett, M. (2004) *Retrieving Nature: Education for a Post-Humanist Age*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Bourdieu, P. (2000) *Pascalian Meditations* (trans. Nice, R.). Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Caputo, J. (1987) *Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and the Hermeneutic Project*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Coffield, F. (1999) *Breaking the Consensus: Lifelong Learning as Social Control*, Inaugural Lecture by Frank Coffield, Professor of Education, 2 February. University of Newcastle.
- Derrida, J. (1973) *Speech and Phenomena and other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Derrida, J. (1973) *Speech and Phenomena* (trans. Allison, D.B.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Derrida, J. (1974) *Of Grammatology*. Baltimore, MA: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Derrida, J. (2001) *Writing and Difference* (trans. with an introduction and additional notes by Bass, A.). London: Routledge Classics.
- Finlay, I., Gregson, M., Spours, K., and Coffield, F. (2005) *The Heart of What We Do: Policies in Teaching, Learning and Assessment in the New Learning and Skills Sector*. Draft paper presented at the British Education Research Association Conference, Glamorgan, Wales, 15–17 September.
- Foucault, M. (1977) *Discipline & Punish: The Birth of a Prison* (trans. Sheridan, A.). New York: Vintage Books.
- Foucault, M. (2002a) *Archaeology of Knowledge* (trans. Sheridan Smith, A.M.). London: Routledge Classics.
- Foucault, M. (2002b) *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*. London: Routledge Classics.
- Gardner, S. (1999) *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason*. London: Routledge.
- Giddens, A. (1990) *The Consequences of Modernity*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press
- Giddens, A. (1991) *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Giddens, A. (1993) *New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretative Sociologies*, 2nd Edition. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hager, P. (2004) Lifelong learning in the workplace? challenges and issues, *Journal of Workplace Learning*, 16(1), 22–23.
- Gill, S. (Ed.) (2000) *William Wordsworth: The Major Works*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Heidegger, M. (1962) *Being and Time* (trans. Robinson, J. and MacQuarrie, E.). London: Harper & Row.
- Heidegger, M. (1968) *What is Called Thinking* (trans. with an introduction by Glenn Gray, J.). New York: Harper & Row.
- Heidegger, M. (1972), *On Time and Being* (trans. with an introduction by Stambaugh, J.). London: Harper & Row.
- Heidegger, M. (1973) *The End of Philosophy* (trans. Stambaugh, J.). New York: Harper and Row.
- Heidegger, M. (1977a) *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays* (trans. with an introduction by Lovitt, W.). New York: Harper & Row.
- Heidegger, M. (1977b) *Vier Seminar*. Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Mein.
- Heidegger, M. (1982) *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (trans. with an introduction and lexicon by Hofstadter, A.). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Heidegger, M. (1991) *The Principle of Reason* (trans. Lilly, R.). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Heidegger, M. (1988) *Pathmarks*. In: Mc Neill, W. (Ed) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Heidegger, M. (2000) *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (trans. Mannheim, R.). Mitchigan: Doubleday.
- Heidegger, M. (2001), Building, dwelling and thinking. In: Heidegger, M. *Poetry, Language and Thought* (trans. Hofstadter, A.). New York: Perennial Classics.
- Heidegger, M. (2002a) *The Essence of Truth: On Plato's Cave Allegory and Theaetetus* (trans. Sadler, T.). London: Continuum.
- Heidegger, M. (2002b) *Identity and Difference* (trans. with an introduction by Stambaugh, J.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Holmes, L. (2004) Challenging the learning turn in education and training, *Journal of European Industrial Training*, 28(8/9), 625–638.
- Jolly, N. (2005) *Leibniz*. New York: Routledge.
- Kant, I. (2002) *Critique of Practical Reason* (trans. Pluhar, W.S.). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
- Kant, I. (2004) *Critique of pure reason* (trans. Meiklejohn, J.M.). New York: Dover Publications.
- Kant, I. (2005) *Critique of Judgement* (trans. Bernard, J.H.). New York: Dover Publications.
- Langton, R. (1998) *Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Liotard, J-F. (1979) *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (trans. Bennington, G., Massumi, B., and Forword by Jameson, F.). Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- MacIntyre, A. (1984) *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 2nd Edition. Indiana: University of Notre Dame.
- Marx, K. (1852) *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon* (trans. Padover, S.K. from the German edition of 1869 originally published in the first issue of *Die Revolution*.). New York. <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/index.htm>, Accessed 30 May 2006.
- Mautner, T. (Ed) (1996) *The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy*. London: Penguin Books.
- Mulhall, S. (2003) *Inheritance and Originality. Wittgenstein, Heidegger & Kierkegaard*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- NTU (2000), *Personal Development File*. Nottingham: Nottingham Trent University.
- Peim, N. and Flint, K.J. (2006) *Assessment: Towards a Deconstruction*. (unpublished), England: University of Birmingham.
- Peters, M. (Ed.) (2002) *Heidegger, Education and Modernity*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Seigel, J. (2005) Will, reflection, and self-overcoming: Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. In: Seigel, J. (Ed) *The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe Since the Seventeenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stambaugh, J. (1992) *The Finitude of Being*. New York: State of New York Press.
- Vygotsky, L. (1986) *Thought and Language* (trans. revised and edited by Kozulin, A.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Walsh, W.H. (1967), Kant, Immanuel. In: Edwards, P. (Ed) (Editor in Chief), *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Vol. 4. New York: Macmillan Publishing and Free Press, pp.69–72
- Wittgenstein, L. (1961) *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus* (trans. Pears, D. and McGuinness, B.). London: Routledge.
- Zimmerman, M.E. (1990), *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Section II

Values Dimension

Chapter 6

Lifelong Learning: Conceptual and Ethical Issues

Kenneth Lawson

In broad terms, an ability to learn in complex ways is a characteristic of the human race; and although we learn as individuals, how and what we learn can have profound effects on other human beings and upon life on our planet in general. A supreme example is the invention of nuclear weapons, but less dramatic examples can be almost equally important from an ethical point of view. One such issue is our depletion of the natural resources of our planet.

There are examples of learning to do things. It is 'learning how' but this facility is related to our understanding the world in which we live. We learn what is the case and how to use what we know for our own purposes and this is the point at which ethical issues arise. We do not always recognise or fully understand the consequences of our learning and their impact upon the world.

It is significant that we learn from a variety of sources other than the organised and approved systems of education and training. We learn in a general sense from the processes of everyday life. We learn from what has come to be called 'the media', which include newspapers, journals relevant to leisure and to work, and in a sense we are in touch with the whole world. In another sense 'the world' is an abstraction. It is remote despite the development of modes of communication, but 'the world' cannot be ignored and one of the most significant ethical issues is that we should try to understand and that we should learn to understand its progressively deeper levels.

The main ethical issues which arise from this brief analysis are (1) that we should attempt to learn at all stages throughout our lives, and (2) that our sources should be accurate and trustworthy. This is the brief for sources from which we learn literally from the cradle to the grave.

Nevertheless, it is a very demanding brief. It equates 'learning' with 'living'. We are morally obliged to be lifelong learners. We have a duty to learn but also a corresponding right to do so, and these are a consequence of citizenship. More importantly however they are a condition of citizenship. Learning is a necessary process for the promotion of a corporate and ethical form of life. It is not simply an optional extra; it is also a political act.

Some Sources of Learning

When taken in a literal sense ‘lifelong learning’ extends from the cradle to the grave. We learn cognitively and we learn motor skills. In the early stages of life, we learn from parents and other adults until we progress to formal ‘schooling’ and other forms of activity subsumed under the categories of ‘education’.

As we develop we learn in the world of work either through processes of ‘training’ or less formally in the activities of work itself. Various forms of learning in later life are subsumed within what (in Britain) are called ‘further’ and ‘adult education’ or ‘higher’ education.

We learn informally from newspapers, journals, magazines, radio, and television, either from programmes explicitly designed to encourage learning or from programmes designed as entertainment. It might be argued that the latter are ethically suspect because they conceal the fact that we are learning while listening or viewing. This might be seen as an important ethical issue because learning is not explicit. It might be described as ‘subliminal learning’ or ‘passive learning’.

What Are the Ethical Issues?

Some of the major issues arising from the concept of lifelong learning are contained in *The Mumbai Statement on Lifelong Learning, Active Citizenship and the Reform of Higher Education*. There it is declared unambiguously that what is called ‘adult education’

is more than a right, it is a key to the twenty-first century. It is both a consequence of active citizenship and a condition for full participation in society.

A significant phrase with ethical implications is that ‘Lifelong Learning’ can be based both on instrumental values such as the need to maintain professional currency and to have an internationally competitive workforce and more liberal and humane considerations such as the enrichment of society and people’s fulfilment as individual citizens.

For anyone immersed in the traditions of adult education this is not altogether a welcome view but it raises questions which must be faced. Section 5 of the *Mumbai Declaration* notes:

The Long Tradition in adult education of supporting learning opportunities for excluded groups of men and women in our societies ... so a full understanding of lifelong learning calls on us to examine many of our assumptions about what is taught and why.

I have underlined the word taught because it appears to shift the emphasis from ‘learning’ to teaching and this suggests or implies that there is a conceptual and ethical shift from ‘learning’ as a personal responsibility to ‘instruction’ given by teachers.

If our concern is with ‘learning’, which is unique to the learner or an individual with rights, ‘teaching’ switches the emphasis. Learners learn what they are taught.

In contrast 'lifelong learning' implies that learners learn what they choose to learn. This is an attractive ideal but it ignores the fact that even if we read from a newspaper that certain things are the case, we learn what journalists, editors, and newspaper owners want us to learn. We learn on their terms.

By focussing upon 'learning' and especially on 'learning' as the acquisition of cognitive knowledge rather than upon skills, issues are raised about the concept of 'knowledge'. This term has a dual meaning. It is quite legitimate to use the term in a personal sense. My stock of 'knowledge' consists of what I have acquired or learned, and some of what I have learned may be false. Nevertheless it is part of my stock of information. It is what I know but it is not necessarily validated as 'knowledge' as certainly embedded in a public stock of knowledge. Such knowledge is validated publicly according to agreed criteria.

Much of what each of us learns might on strict epistemological terms be false, or at least untested and unverified. This issue from the point of view of lifelong learning is critical. How reliable are the sources from which we learn, at least in terms of cognition rather than the development of skills of various kinds?

These issues are addressed explicitly in Section 6 of the *Mumbai Statement*: where it is stated that

Taking the ideals of learning throughout life seriously has broad implications for our understanding of what knowledge is, what teaching is, what research is and what community engagement is. It has sometimes been suggested that dominant bodies of knowledge within our institutions of higher education represent a partial and in a historical sense, a 'colonised' body of knowledge.

Then follows the significant suggestion that '*lifelong learning supports the decolonisation of the mind* (my underlining) by encouraging the re-examination of relationships between scientific, often understood as 'official knowledge', and the specific diverse knowledges of local communities, cultures and contexts'. Section 7 then continues:

Lifelong learning has profound implications Some of the principles of lifelong learning . . . include the acknowledgement of the lived experience of all learners, women and men, respect for differences and diversity, flexibility of provision, recognising the complex nature of adults' lives, sensitivity to both cognitive and affective outcomes, awareness that knowledge exists in all parts of society and of all women and men.

Nevertheless, Section 7 does not explicitly say why there ought to be lifelong learning. Who is to benefit, individuals or society as a whole? Without some convincing answers to this question, the ethics of lifelong learning appear to be suspect. Considerable demands are being made on individual learners but their rewards, apart from wages, appear to be long term and indirect. This is inevitable because any societal gains are subject to 'filter down' effects and individual benefits are difficult to identify.

These issues are discussed in Section 2 of the *Mumbai Statement* where it is stated that 'Lifelong learning has become a key concept in the thinking about education and training worldwide'. It has become 'a national part of the lives of all women and men throughout the world . . . it happens through many . . . types

of institutions such as the workplace, community based location, libraries, trade unions and other social movements'. Lifelong learning can be based on both instrumental values such as the need to maintain professional currency and to have an internationally competitive workforce and a more liberal and human consideration such as the enrichment of society and people's fulfilment as individual citizens'.

Such thinking justifies instrumental learning, and in Section 3 of the *Mumbai Statement* it is stated: '*The act of learning, lying as it does at the heart of all educational activity, changes human beings from being objects at the mercy of events to subjects who create their own history*' (original italics).

This lengthy preamble concludes with the claim that 'institutions of higher education (should) be transformed into institutions of lifelong learning both within themselves and as they relate to wider society'.

Such views are not directly ethical but their instrumentality gives them an ethical underpinning.

Similar views were replicated in South Africa to deal with growing skill shortages but they were accompanied by more liberal views. Lifelong learning was seen as a comprehensive and visionary concept which included formal and informal learning throughout the lifespan of individuals, and which included formal and formal learning. The initial purpose was to attain the fullest possible development in personal, social, and professional life. This included 'learning that occurs in the home, school, community and workplace'. (Aitcheson 2004).

A major feature of the South African policies is the almost total instrumentality of lifelong learning. The learners were not perceived as individuals but as economic units in industry.

Similar examples of instrumental approaches to lifelong learning may be seen elsewhere. For example Prem Kumar (2004) writing on the approach in Singapore refers to 'human capital'. He also notes that lifelong learning is interpreted by various stakeholders in many different ways, but the main emphasis is upon instrumental learning for economic purposes. Robert Tobias (2004) writing from New Zealand describes similar approaches. There the emphasis is on the 'needs of the labour market and the pressure on people to retrain or upskill and change their direction throughout their working lives'. The emphasis is once more on work and the work ethic.

In none of the countries which have policies on lifelong learning is there any significant sign of learning for leisure or for personal development. The liberal tradition is absent, and this might be seen as an implicit rejection of the ethic contained in the *Mumbai Statement*. In fact the omission of any liberal element might be seen as a significant ethical weakness of the idea of lifelong learning as it is currently interpreted.

Conclusion

There appears to be very little criticism of 'lifelong learning' and most writing on the subject welcomes the concept although it began as 'lifelong education'. Suchodolski (1976) writing on behalf of UNESCO specified three goals. It could

provide ‘the foundation for a happy and dignified life for every individual and overcome three basic types of alienation. It also had an economic function to improve the prospects for man in a society centred on production and consumption. It had instrumental values’.

It is difficult for the liberally inclined to fault these aims, but there is little evidence of public consultation or of public support for lifelong learning. This is not surprising considering that there is little evidence of political mandate being sought on a worldwide basis.

One important feature which appears to be overlooked or positively ignored is the fact that the processes of learning and teaching should be appropriate to specific age groups. Lifelong learning is not a unitary process. It is for many purposes over the lifespan and there can be no single curriculum, mode of organisation or of teaching. The emphasis is upon learning in many ways and in many contexts. What is required is a meeting of many minds in the processes of planning and learning.

Within student centred adult education there is or should be a meeting of minds between teachers and learners and it is, or should be seen, as significant that ‘lifelong learning’ appears to have taken over from ‘lifelong education’. This might be seen as the most significant ethical principle behind or embodied in the concept of lifelong learning.

How the process is to be organised, conducted, monitored, and financed must be the subject of further discussion and debate. Many people have not yet heard of lifelong learning. They might not wish to accept it.

References

- Aitcheson, J. (2004) *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 23(6), 2004.
Fauré et al. (1972) *Learning to be* (the Fauré Report). Paris: UNESCO.
Kumar Prem, (2004) *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 23(6), 2004.
Tobias, R. (2004) *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 23(6), 2004.

Chapter 7

Lifelong Learning: Beyond Neo-Liberal Imaginary

Fazal Rizvi

Introduction

Lifelong learning is an eminently sensible idea. Since learning is inherently human, and since we never really stop learning, how can anyone object to policy attempts designed to provide everyone opportunities to learn throughout their life? At the most general level, then, the idea of lifelong learning appears self-evident. It is however a highly contested concept interpreted in a number of different ways. It has been possible, for example, to provide humanistic, social democratic, pragmatist, and neo-liberal definitions of lifelong learning (Aspin and Chapman 2000). In this chapter, I want to suggest that amid this diversity of definitions, it has been the neo-liberal conception of lifelong learning that has, in recent years, become dominant, even hegemonic. I want to argue that this conception is largely a construction of international organizations (IGOs), such as the OECD, the European Union, the World Bank, APEC, and UNESCO, who have been highly successful in attaching a particular meaning to the idea of lifelong learning. This meaning is based on a distinctive understanding the IGOs have of the educational requirements of globalization in general and of the global economy in particular. Working closely with national systems of education, they have developed a particular discourse of lifelong learning that suggests that the globalizing knowledge economy needs mobile and flexible workers who have certain cultural sensibilities and who are able to deal effectively with endemic change and innovation, and who regard learning as continuous, essential for their professional security and advancement.

This conception of lifelong learning is located within a social imaginary about how the world of work and social relations is becoming transformed by globalization, and how, in such a world, the function of education must be re-conceptualized, to meet the needs of the global economy characterized as informational, knowledge-based, post-industrial and service-orientated. Such an economy demands not only the development of 'post-Fordist' regimes of labour management but also systems of education that produce new kind of workers who are motivated by concerns of industrial productivity and are 'self-regulating' and 'self-capitalizing' (Rose 1989). I argue that this imaginary is based on a human capital theory of education, which views all education largely as a matter of economic exchange. Ultimately, I contend

that this view is based not only on a set of assumptions about the nature of economic activity but about the nature of citizenship itself – about what it means to learn, work, and live in human communities. In the final part of the chapter, I argue that there is nothing inevitable about this world view and that it is possible to imagine alternatives to the hegemonic neo-liberal construction of lifelong learning, including those that highlight the importance of building critical, reflective, and democratic communities in which learners are encouraged to understand, throughout their lives, the constantly changing nature of the relationship between the local and the global.

Lifelong Education: A Historical Note

The idea of lifelong education is not new. It is a notion central to European modernity, associated with a range of ideas including the release of the individual from the bonds of tradition and what is often referred to as the ‘age of reason’, leading to the emergence of the notions of civil society, social equality, and social progress and, with these, the processes of industrialization, secularization, urbanization, and rationalization. Based on the philosophy of Enlightenment, European modernity, developed during the eighteenth century, embraced a particular image of the natural and social world and a way of thinking about it. The idea of developing reason featured prominently in this image, with the suggestion that human progress was only possible through the application of reason and science, and that this required not only formal education but also education that was ongoing and shaped the ways in which people thought about and lived their daily lives. Knowledge was thus considered crucial for both individual advancement and social progress. In the nineteenth century, industrialization required workers to be trained for the new technologies of work and have dispositions for lifelong education. For example, Mechanics’ Institutes were established by various industrialists, first in Scotland and then throughout the world, to provide *adult education*, particularly in technical subjects, to working people, so that industrialists could ultimately benefit from having more knowledgeable and skilled employees (Candy and Laurent 1994).

Inspired by the ideas of French Enlightenment in particular, the notion of ‘lifelong self-education’ became central to Thomas Jefferson’s political theory in the United States. As early as 1776, Jefferson proposed a *Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge*, which sought to establish public libraries so that the general population could develop knowledge and skills he considered necessary not only for a republican society but also for the general pursuit of happiness (Boyd 1950). According to Tozer and his colleagues (2002), most American educational theorists since Jefferson have agreed that a fundamental purpose of education is to prepare the student for lifelong learning. In his *Democracy and Education*, John Dewey (1918), for example, viewed lifelong education as a key component in his instrumentalist theory of democracy.

One of Dewey's British contemporaries, Yeaxlee (1929, p.28) saw education as inseparable from life itself, and argued that for life to be vivid, strong and creative, it demanded 'constant reflection upon experience, so that action may be guided by wisdom, and service be the other aspect of self-expression, while work and leisure are blended in perfect exercise of body, mind and spirit, personality attaining completion in society'.

After the Second World War, the popularity of the notion of lifelong education proliferated, as states and civil society alike sought to find a new vision for a more democratic and socially just society. Initiatives in workers' education, informal education, radical education, adult education, community education and the like involved attempts to transform education in radically different ways, away from the formal rigid and authoritarian traditions to more informal approaches that highlighted the importance of experiential and informal learning. According to Raymond Williams (1989), adult education was crucial for an 'organically grounded struggle' towards a genuine democracy and a socialist vision of society. Without lifelong education, he argued, resources of hope and struggle could not be sustained. In the USA, a similar progressive tradition in community education developed around a distinctive set of educational values and historical social purpose. In South America, a parallel tradition surrounded the philosophy of Paulo Freire (1972). Freire's emphasis on dialogue struck a very strong chord with those concerned with the popular struggle against exploitative capitalism. He believed that education should not involve one person acting on another, but rather people working and learning with each other. His concern with conscientization – 'developing consciousness, but consciousness that is understood to have the power to transform reality' – formed a core element in his philosophy of the 'pedagogy of the oppressed' and the 'pedagogy of hope'. In the 1960s and 1970s, the idea of lifelong learning also found favour among feminist, civil rights, and other social movements.

Beyond these socialist visions, however, the notion of lifelong education was also attractive to policy-makers interested in expanding educational provision and in providing greater access to remote and regional communities. The rhetoric of lifelong education complemented attempts to establish initiatives in correspondence, distance and extra-mural studies. In the Third World, lifelong education was viewed as a solution to the problems of educational under-investment, providing a cheaper alternative to the expensive infrastructure of formal education. Many of these and other similar initiatives were associated with a view of lifelong education as a fundamental human right. A UNESCO report in 1972, prepared by Fauré and his associates, argued that the idea of education as age-bound had to be abandoned and replaced with the notion that 'all that has to be learned must be continually re-invented and renewed'. They added that: 'If learning involves all of one's life, in the sense of both time-span and diversity, and all of society, including its social and economic as well as its educational resources, then we must go even further than the necessary overhaul of 'educational systems' until we reach the stage of a learning society' (UNESCO 1972, p.xxxiii).

From Recurrent Education to Lifelong Learning

Even this brief historical account is enough to show that the concept of lifelong education has been used in a number of different ways to suggest that time and stage-bound notions of education are fundamentally flawed, and that the discourses surrounding lifelong learning have changed over the years to reflect not only the particular historical conditions in which they were articulated but also the particular visions they expressed about how education might better serve the changing social, political and economic priorities. Jefferson's view of lifelong education was thus linked to his conception of the republican society he envisaged for America, just as Freire saw his pedagogy as a way of transforming power relations, and just as in the 1970s the educational technocrats and policy-makers saw lifelong education as a way of keeping educational expenditure down and yet still expand educational access to meet the increasing and changing human resource needs of the economy hit by inflationary pressures and decline in productivity. But common to most calls for lifelong education has been the belief that if education is to serve broader social purposes and effect transformation then it needs to be continuing.

It is clear, then, that we cannot understand particular discourses of lifelong education without paying due attention to the political interests they serve and the social imaginary within which they are located. This can be demonstrated by examining an early OECD report *Recurrent Education: A Strategy for Lifelong learning* (OECD 1973). In this report, the OECD sought to tackle two policy problems: how to deal with the issue of persistent social inequalities and how to adequately meet the changing needs of the economy. Its solution lay in the idea of recurrent education, which encouraged firms, trade unions, and public administrators to develop more flexible procedures for acquiring professional qualifications and for updating them (Duke 1974). The then director of the OECD, Ron Gass, claimed that recurrent education would be 'the individual's liberation from the strict sequence of education-work-leisure-retirement and his freedom to mix and alternate these phases of life within the limit of what is socially possible, to the satisfaction of his own desires and needs' (quoted in Cantor 1974, Preface). The notion of recurrent education thus embraced the twin objectives of promoting individual development and of providing full-time education for adults as a strategy to promote inter-generational equality of opportunity (McKenzie 1983, p.12). It sought to synthesize views of those who saw recurrent education as a possible means of overcoming the 'dominantly selective function of education systems . . . and overcoming socially-determined educational inequalities' (Papadopoulos 1994, p.112) and those who viewed it in human resource terms, linked to the needs of the economy.

From the perspective of both, however, recurrent education was very much a policy of the 1970s. It was developed during a period of steep economic decline and rising levels of unemployment after years of prosperity and great social optimism. Not surprisingly therefore it attended to the social democratic ideals of equality of educational opportunities, but it also sought to broaden the notion of education, linking it to the demands of the corporate sector for a better articulation between

education and training and employment. It highlighted the wasted human resources that were incurred in the ways education had been traditionally provided, and called for learning to take place in an ongoing fashion, linked to the changing labour market requirements. In the process, however, it shifted the policy focus away from education to learning, distributing the responsibility of education across the whole community, including the learners themselves.

Following a long period of gestation through the 1980s, a new discourse emerged in the early 1990s that was much more about the contribution of education to personal, social and economic development, about a 'learning society', and about flexible pathways encouraging equitable access and participation in education, now understood as extending beyond formal institutions. Underpinning this discourse was an almost unquestioned belief in education as a means of not only providing the changing skills required for an information-based economy but, more broadly, of thus promoting social cohesion and personal development. As the OECD (1996, p.15) suggested: 'A new focus for education and training policies is needed now, to develop capacities to realize the potential of the "global information economy" and to contribute to employment, culture, democracy and, above all, social cohesion.'

While this new discourse of lifelong learning is highly varied and diffuse, some of its key features nonetheless stand out. First, the idea of lifelong learning stresses the need to acquire and update all kinds of abilities, interests, knowledge, and qualifications from the pre-school years to post-retirement. Second, it places emphasis on all forms of learning, including: formal learning, such as a degree course followed at university and non-formal learning, such as vocational skills acquired at the workplace. Third, it stresses the benefits of informal learning, such as inter-generational learning, for example where parents learn to use the new information and technologies through their children, or where learning takes place in informal settings such as work or leisure. Fourth, it holds individuals responsible for their own education, viewing it as an economic investment. Fifth, it prescribes a system-wide network of 'learning pathways' extending from early childhood through to all stages of adulthood in both formal and informal educational settings, fulfilling social and economic objectives simultaneously by providing long-term benefits for the individual, the enterprise, the economy, and the society more generally. And finally, it promotes the development of knowledge and competencies that enable each citizen to adapt to the knowledge-based society and actively participate in all spheres of social and economic life, increasingly shaped by globalization.

The Role of International Organizations

The idea of lifelong learning underpinned by these principles has now become ubiquitous. It has been widely embraced by policy-makers around the world, both within the First World and the Third World. How has this happened? As a policy discourse, one of the key reasons for its hegemonic dominance globally would appear to be its symbol character and lack of specificity, and its ability to capture a

whole variety of diverse educational policy agendas relating to issues of access, of learning, of developing human resources for economic recovery, the skilling and reskilling of society, organizational development, and so on. But beyond this, it has become a part of the accelerating transnational dynamics of globalization that has contributed to policy shifts around the world in seemingly convergent ways (Rizvi 2004). As Schugurensky (1999, p.284) has pointed out, similar pressures, procedures, and organizational patterns appear to govern educational systems around the world. He has added that over the past decade or so there has been an 'unprecedented scope and depth of changes taking place as well as the similarity of changes occurring in a wide variety of nations having different social, historical and economic characteristics'. Steiner-Khamsi (2004) has similarly pointed to some of the new ways in which educational policy knowledge is now disseminated and adapted across national boundaries.

While there is considerable debate about the extent to which policy ideas are globally converging (see, for example, Green 1999), there is little doubt that through major advances in information and communication technologies, ideas, and ideologies now circulate around the world at a more rapid rate than ever before, resulting in global educational policy networks that are often more influential than local political actors. It is in this context that international organizations like the OECD, EU, and the World Bank have played an increasingly more decisive role in the promotion of a particular conception of education. This role has involved disseminating policy ideas, but also negotiating consensus and conventions (such as the *Bologna Declaration*) in order to ensure coordinated policy action across national systems, as well as supporting international cooperation in educational policy action through the development of global indicators of performance and quality, such as PISA. In a study of the OECD, for example, Henry, Lingard, Rizvi, and Taylor (2000) have shown how it is no longer simply a forum for policy deliberation among its member nations, but an international mediator of knowledge, implicated as a policy actor alongside, often on a stronger footing than, national representatives, in the development, prioritization and evaluation of policy options.

The current discourse of lifelong learning seems to have been produced by this multilateralism (Mundy 1998). Most international organizations appear to have worked in consort in articulating a common vision of its core principles. The European Union (2006) has, for example, argued that 'the scale of current economic and social change, the rapid transition to a knowledge-based society and demographic pressures resulting from an ageing population in Europe are all challenges which demand a new approach to education and training, within the framework of Lifelong learning'. Through its communiqués at Lisbon and Stockholm, it has sought to develop a common framework which gives lifelong learning a high priority, suggesting that 'all learning activity be undertaken throughout life, with the aim of improving knowledge, skills and competence, within a personal, civic, social and/or employment-related perspective'. But the role of the EU in steering national educational system has not been confined to such symbolic definitions. Its memorandum of understanding prescribes a set of coherent and comprehensive strategies, the building blocks, that include recommending 'partnership working'

between public authorities and private education service providers, analysing foreseeable labour market trends, monitoring adequate resourcing of programmes, facilitating access to learning opportunities as a way of creating 'learning cultures' and rewarding excellence. Beyond these principles, the EU has proposed specific 'priorities for action', such as information, guidance, and counselling, investing time and money in learning that bring together learners and learning opportunities. It suggests benchmarking exercises to monitor the progress made by member nations towards particular objectives.

In promoting this agenda for lifelong learning, the EU works closely with other international organizations, ensuring that the lifelong learning agenda is not restricted to European countries but extends across the world through the work of such organizations as the OECD, UNESCO, and the World Bank. For example, the EU recognizes the OECD's 'very considerable and valuable contribution to Lifelong learning' through the OECD's research reports, surveys, and statistical publications, not least relating to the financing of Lifelong learning. Through the *World Education Indicators Project*, the EU, the World Bank, and the OECD collaborate in the collection of educational statistics relating to comparative levels of investment and performance of a number of countries around the world. But this work is done within the policy framework of lifelong learning, against a common understanding of its rationale and objectives. In its report *Lifelong learning in the Global Knowledge Economy: Challenges for Developing Countries* (2005) the World Bank insists that 'the global knowledge economy is transforming the demands of the labour market in economies worldwide. It is placing new demands on citizens, who need more skills and knowledge to function in their day-to-day lives than can be acquired in formal education systems alone'; and that '[L]ifelong learning – from early childhood to retirement – is education for the knowledge economy, and it is as crucial in transition and developing economies as it is in the developed world'.

The Social Imaginary of Globalization

What this discussion of international organizations suggests is that they have now become major policy players in the 'making of the contemporary world' (Iriye 2002) and in the general articulation of policies. Their role in regional and global policy coordination and evaluation is now unprecedented. Accordingly, while the specific plans international organizations prescribe for lifelong learning might vary, they all seem to embrace a common understanding of the role that education must now play in meeting the demands of globalization and the knowledge economy. This understanding sees globalization as a major driver for change. It views globalization as a set of social processes that relate to the rapid movement of ideas, goods, and people around the globe, radically transforming relations among people and communities across national borders, as well as the manner in which people now work and learn. Globalization is driven largely by developments in information and

communication technologies, giving rise to new forms of transnational interconnectivity and interdependence, and to new patterns of economic activity, requiring new skills and dispositions among workers. While people continue to live and work in local realities, these realities are increasingly integrated into larger systems of global networks. People now have to deal on a daily basis with the realities of transnational economic relations, technological, and media innovations, and cultural flows that cut across national borders, with ever-greater speed and intensity. The lifelong learning agenda elaborates a view of education through which everyone is supposedly able to participate more fully in this new globalized world.

However, despite this gesture towards equality, the dominant social view of globalization, promoted by the IGOs and national governments alike, is a 'neo-liberal' one. It consists in a range of images, precepts and generalizations about how the world is becoming increasingly interconnected and interdependent, giving rise to a set of social processes that imply 'inexorable integration of markets, nation states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations and nation states to reach round the world farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before'. (Friedman 2000, p.14) Such integration is of course variously described and is far from entirely complete or coherent. As Wendy Lerner (2000, p.12) has pointed out, the neo-liberal view of globalization can be interpreted simultaneously as policy, ideology, and governmentality – 'a system of meaning that constitutes institutions, practices and identities in contradictory and disjunctive ways' (p.12). But in the development of education policies at the national level, international organizations and transnational corporations have worked very hard to popularize and secure legitimacy for a common understanding of globalization and its supposed implications for rethinking education. Considerable efforts have been made to organize policy knowledge about education and create a cajoling discourse around the 'imperatives of the global economy' for education.

Multivocal and often contradictory though this discourse is, there has emerged, around the idea of lifelong learning, a common social imaginary, with which governments and international organizations alike have sought to drive an agenda of educational reform. I have borrowed the idea of 'social imaginary' from the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor (2004). For Taylor, a social imaginary involves a complex, unstructured and contingent mix of the empirical and the affective; not a 'fully articulated understanding of our whole situation within which particular features of our world become evident' (Taylor 2004, p.21). In this sense, his idea of social imaginary is akin to Pierre Bourdieu's notion of 'habitus', or Raymond Williams's idea of 'structures of feeling', or what Wittgenstein called the 'background'. A social imaginary is a way of thinking shared in a society by ordinary people, the common understandings that make everyday practices possible, giving them sense and legitimacy. In this way, a social imaginary is both implicit and normative: it is embedded in ideas and practices and events, and carries within it deeper normative notions and images, constitutive of a society. It involves 'something much broader and deeper than the intellectual schemes people may entertain when they think about social reality in a disengaged mode'. Taylor (2004, p.23) adds: 'I am thinking, rather, of the ways in which people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how

things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations.'

It is important to stress then that a social imaginary is not simply inherited and already determined for us; it is rather in a constant state of flux. It thus represents an enabling concept that describes the ways people act as world-making collective agents within a given symbolic matrix that refuses to assume an 'ontology of determinism' (Castoriadis 1987). It is a creative force in the making of social-historical worlds, a force that has to be attentive to the 'signs of the time' and interpret all those particular, rather uneven and emotionally charged, events that make up everyday life (Maffesoli 1993). A social imaginary thus represents a collective social configuration that is not only specific to time and space but is also always multiple and highly contested within particular and across communities. It is through the collective sense of imagination that a society is created, given coherence and identity, but is also subjected to social change, both mundane and radical. In this way, communities are created differently, subsist differently, and are transformed differently through the exercise of collective political agency. It follows then that communities interpret and engage with the world outside their borders differently, but always within their always-emerging social imaginary, which in its current form is often described as 'neo-liberal'.

The neo-liberal imaginary of globalization represents a range of loosely connected ideas concerning new forms of politico-economic governance based on the extension of market relationships. It replaces an earlier imaginary which regarded the state provision of goods and services as a way of ensuing social well-being of a national population. In contrast, the neo-liberal imaginary is associated with a preference for a minimalist state, concerned to promote the instrumental values of competition, economic efficiency, and choice, to deregulate and privatize state functions. As Peck and Tickle (2002, p.394) maintain, neo-liberalism promotes and normalizes a 'growth-first approach' to policy, making social welfare concerns secondary. It rests on a pervasive naturalization of market logics, justifying them on the grounds of efficiency and even 'fairness'. It promotes an ideology of choice and privileges 'lean' government, privatization, deregulation, and competitive regimes of resource allocation'. It preaches the principle of global 'free trade', applying it to both goods and services, even to services such as health and education that were traditionally marked by their highly national character. It is within the framework of this social imaginary that the dominant idea of lifelong learning is embedded; and if my analysis above is valid then it does not so much represent an ideology or even a consistent policy framework as a set of ideas embedded within a social imaginary about globalization and knowledge economy and their implications for rethinking about education.

Lifelong Learning and the Knowledge Economy

When education is re-articulated in terms of the neo-liberal imaginary, it necessarily implies the need to increase the amount of formal education young people are now required to have, to align this education to the requirements of the knowledge

economy and to encourage people to learn throughout life to cope with the rapidity and intensity of change. It involves shifting the policy focus from education provided by the state to learning for which the ultimate responsibility resides with the individual. This emphasis on the individual lines up nicely not only with the attempts by international organizations to promote vocationalization, privatization, and mercerization of education but also with their implicit acceptance of the key tenets of the new human capital theory. The new human capital theory postulates, as the old theory did (Becker 1964), that expenditure on training and education is costly, but should be considered an economic investment since it is undertaken with a view to increasing personal incomes, and can be used to explain occupational wage differentials.

The new human capital theory extends this claim to the requirements of the global economy, and to the competitive advantage of individuals, corporations, and nations within the transnational context. Of course, the new human capital theory is technically complex and has been the subject of much debate (see for example, Marginson 1999), as there are a number of strands to its claims. However, in its popular form, it imagines all human behaviour to be based on the economic self-interest of individuals operating within free competitive markets. It assumes economic growth and competitive advantage to be a direct outcome of the levels of investment in developing human capital. It suggests that, in a global economy, performance is increasingly linked to people's knowledge stock, skills level, learning capabilities, and cultural adaptability. It therefore demands policy frameworks that enhance labour flexibility not only through the deregulation of the market but also through reform to systems of education and training, designed to align them to the changing nature of economic activity.

In its most radical form, the new human capital theory does not only require reform of systems of educational governance, it also demands a re-conceptualization of the very purposes of education. In line with this imperative, the OECD (1996) has suggested, for example, that the advances in information and communication technologies have so transformed the nature of knowledge production and utilization, the organization of work and labour relations, modes of consumption and trade, and patterns of cultural exchange that education now needs to produce different kinds of people who are better able to work creatively with knowledge; who are flexible, adaptable and mobile; who are globally minded and inter-culturally confident; and who are lifelong learners. What this view implies is that learning for learning's sake is no longer sufficient, and that education does not have any intrinsic ends as such, but must always be linked to the instrumental purposes of human capital development and economic self-maximization. This should not be taken to mean that ethical and cultural issues are no longer relevant to education; but that they should be interpreted within the broader framework of education's economic ends. In this way, the neo-liberal imaginary rests on what George Soros (1998) has called 'economic fundamentalism', a kind of conceptual scheme through which even such moral notions as diversity and equity are re-articulated.

Within this imaginary, the idea of the knowledge economy features prominently. It suggests that globalization has fundamentally altered the relationship between

the production of knowledge and its economic application; and that the emergence of knowledge-intensive activities and the production and diffusion of information technologies have led to the development of new models of work organization (Paul 2002). It is assumed that the knowledge economy will require a larger proportion of workers to be prepared for highly skilled jobs, workers who have competencies linked to both their ability to use new technologies and their cultural attitudes towards change, even if most of new jobs are in low-paid and highly casualized service industries. In a rapidly changing world, it is believed, these competencies must involve certain behavioural features such as adaptability, organizational loyalty, and the ability to work in culturally diverse contexts and provide leadership. This conception of education involves a new approach to human capital development, grounded not so much in the amount of schooling individuals have but in the learning attributes they are able to develop, with which to deal effectively and creatively with unfamiliar and constantly changing conditions of work. It emphasizes the development of broad generic skills such as communication skills, problem-solving, the ability to work independently and under pressure, take responsibility for decisions and quickly and efficiently obtain field-specific knowledge and spot its commercial potential.

In the knowledge economy, hence, knowing about facts and theories is less important than an understanding of the world of social relations and the networks through which knowledge is converted into innovation and commercially viable products. The principles of flexibility and dynamism imply knowing how to find out the relevant information and how to use it commercially. This is considered more important than formal, codified, structured, and explicit knowledge. Against these assumptions, it is suggested by new growth theorists, such as Foray and Lundvall (1996) for example, that a nation's capacity to take advantage of the knowledge economy depends on how quickly it can become a 'learning economy'. Learning, Foray and Lundvall argue, should not only involve the ability to use new technologies to access global knowledge, but it should also mean using technology to communicate with other people about how to improve productivity. They maintain that, in the knowledge economy, individuals, corporations, and nations will create wealth in proportion to their capacity to learn and share innovation. If this is so then learning must be continuous and not restricted to formal schooling, and must involve individuals whose learning is self-directed.

The idea of lifelong learning has been an important component in the neo-liberal imaginary. Of course, at one level, the idea of lifelong learning appears perfectly reasonable. How could any one object to learning new knowledge and gaining new skills on an ongoing basis? But the concept of lifelong learning promoted by international organizations has been somewhat more specific, and is located within a broader discourse of economic growth and competitiveness. As Field and Leicester (2000, p.xvii) point out, this discourse has arisen primarily from changes in the economy, including such developments as 'the rapid diffusion of information and communication technologies, the constant application of science and technology, and the globalization in trade of goods and services'. This observation mirrors the OECD's contention (1996) that the 'increased pace of globalization and technological change,

the changing nature of work and the labour market, and the ageing of populations are among the forces emphasizing the need for continuing upgrading of work and life skills throughout life'. These developments, the OECD suggests, have made constant investment in education necessary both for both individuals and nations. They have also shifted the focus of learning from 'knowing that' to 'knowing how', giving rise to new conceptions of the ways in which learning is defined, arranged, valued, utilized, and promoted.

Limitations of the Neo-Liberal Approach

The neo-liberal approach to lifelong learning is thus located within a social imaginary, the dominance of which has been secured through a range of political strategies, employed by international organizations and national governments alike. In some countries, it is embraced as a matter of policy preference while in others it is imposed. However, in all countries it is reshaping educational priorities, making them subservient to economic goals. Education is now increasingly viewed as a private good, providing benefits to the individual consumer. This should be a matter of concern for all of us who see in education the potential to benefit the entire community, as a public good. It is important to note however that it is not the conditions of globalization *per se* that have increasingly linked education to the logic of the market, but a particular neo-liberal imaginary of globalization. This imaginary redefines the way in which education's role in society should be conceptualized. As a private good, education is viewed as a commodity that can provide an individual advantage over others, which can differentiate people in terms of their economic value. As a public good, on the other hand, education can be shared by all, contributing to the general welfare of society, even if it does not bring any direct benefits to the individual. Of course, arguments can be made in support of viewing education as contributing to both kinds of goods. However, an emphasis on one or the other can make a huge difference to the constitution of social and pedagogic relations. It can determine how educational institutions operate in society, and how they serve to frame economic relations.

When education is seen as a private good, then, the policy focus shifts to matters of social efficiency, rather than to issues of social equity or social harmony (see Laberee 2000). It is assumed that social and economic 'progress' can only be achieved through systems of education more geared towards fulfilling the needs of the market. Educational systems that do not meet explicit functional economic goals are dismissed as inefficient and ineffective. Indeed, popular media and corporations have in particular propagated this opinion, and have called on governments to pursue reforms that are not only more socially and economically efficient but are also cognizant of the new 'realities' of the knowledge economy in an increasingly globalized world. This has required the purposes of education to be more instrumentally defined, in terms of its capacity to produce workers who have grounding in basic literacy and numeracy and who are flexible, creative, and

multi-skilled, have good knowledge of new information and communication technologies, and are able to work in culturally diverse environments (Edwards 1997). More specifically, an education system that produces self-directed, self-capitalizing, and self-sufficient learners is now considered more productive than that which directs learning itself, and assumes institutional responsibility for education.

Of course, this account of educational purposes does not imply that the focus on social efficiency entirely displaces concerns for democratic equality and social mobility. In fact, both democratic equity and social mobility have been incorporated within the broader discourse of social efficiency. For example, it has been argued by the OECD that a focus on efficiency can in fact lead to greater equality and opportunities for social mobility. It is suggested that, without workers who are able to perform effectively in the global labour market, the potential for social mobility is severely reduced; and that since the global economy requires appropriate social conditions for capital accumulation and economic growth, equity concerns cannot be overlooked by policy-makers committed to social efficiency. As the OECD (1996) has noted: 'A new focus for education and training policies is needed now, to develop capacities to realize the potential of the "global information economy" and to contribute to employment, culture, democracy and, above all, social cohesion. Such policies will need to support the transition to "learning societies" in which equal opportunities are available to all, access is open, and all individuals are encouraged and motivated to learn, in formal education as well as throughout life'. Ultimately, what this synthetic discourse suggests is that social efficiency must now be regarded as a 'meta-value', subsuming within its scope educational aspirations such as social equality, mobility, and even cohesion.

This much is evident in the current attempts to link lifelong learning to the idea of social capital. Lifelong learning, it is suggested, has the potential to fulfil 'social and economic objectives simultaneously by providing long-term benefits for the individual, the enterprise, the economy and the society more generally.' (OECD 1996) In this account, social development becomes a functional outcome of economic efficiency, and the egalitarian impulse is also largely collapsed. However, and in light of changing economic circumstances and the need to ensure community legitimation, there is also a determination to rework and re-articulate the traditional notion of equality, adding it the overriding goal relating to the development of human resources for the changing global economy.

The concept of social capital displays similar political logic. The concept has received a good deal of attention in recent years. Thomson (1999), for example, suggests that the interest in social capital stems from three impulses: a response to the dominant individualism underpinning the development of human capital for purposes of national competitiveness; a recognition that economic success requires a certain level of social cohesion, stability and trust; and a growing recognition that many people are de-coupling economic success from sense of well-being. In this way, social capital appears as a policy for managing economic marginalization, social exclusion, and heightening levels of cultural differences within societies in order to enhance social cohesion. But such a view of social cohesion is couched within the social efficiency paradigm of economic liberalism

and growth. It effectively represents a residual framing for social cohesion, not as a good in itself but essential for economic productivity. Educational purposes are thus assumed to be as one of the strategic tools for the management of change, in as much as exclusion is interpreted as a matter of failure to engage with the global economy, either through lack of appropriate skills or disposition or through lack of effective governance.

What this discussion suggests is that the current discourse of lifelong learning is motivated more by a political agenda of social control (see Coffield 1999) than with issues of social transformation through education. It is based on a view of human society as necessarily competitive, linked to new forms of capitalism (Castells 1996), which is intensifying the divide between valuable and non-valuable people and places. It assumes a moral economy in which people are believed to be motivated largely by self-interest, with little capacity for forms of altruism and co-operation other than those linked to self-capitalization, as a way of maximizing return on capital. Education itself is assumed to be a form of capital, exchanged in the market place largely for personal benefit. Lifelong learning is considered necessary not as a way of creating an informed and self-reflexive community but as an investment with which to increase levels of productivity both of the individual and the corporation.

Beyond Neo-Liberal Imaginary?

In this chapter, I have argued that the current conception of lifelong learning is located within a neo-liberal social imaginary, which interprets the educational implications of globalization and knowledge economy in a particular fashion. This imaginary has, in recent years, reconfigured the discursive terrain within which educational policy is developed, articulated, and enacted in countries around the world. I have argued that this imaginary has redefined educational purposes in largely economic terms, linked to the concerns of social efficiency and the production of a 'self-capitalizing' worker. It has emphasized the importance of market dynamics in the organization of education around a view of education as a private good. It has linked the purposes of education to the requirements of the global economy. However, there is nothing inevitable or necessary about locating globalization within this imaginary. It is indeed possible to understand the facts of global interconnectivity and interdependence in a radically different way, with implications for imagining lifelong learning beyond its current neo-liberal construction. But this requires us not simply to recognize the limitations of the current discourses of lifelong learning and hark back to some romantic social democratic past, and to understand how the profound transformations that we encounter everyday need to be interpreted in a critical fashion in order to develop new alternatives to the neo-liberal imaginary.

Arjun Appadurai (1996) has analysed the role of social imaginary in the formation of subjectivities within the globalizing context in which we now live, a context

that is characterized by diffusion of social images, ideas, and ideologies across communities around the world. This diffusion is facilitated by electronic media, mass migration, and the mobility of capital and labour, creating conditions through which most societies around the world have become culturally diverse and hybrid, and cannot avoid, in a fundamental sense, engaging with social relations transnationally. We live in a world in which ideas and ideologies, people, and capital and images and messages are constantly in motion, transforming the vectors of our social imaginaries. At the same time, it needs to be recognized that no matter how globally dominant the neo-liberal imaginary, it is not the only game in town. We now live amid many social imaginaries, each with its own point of origin and axis, each travelling through different routes and becoming constituted by different relationships to institutional structures in different communities and nations. Any attempt to rethink lifelong learning in such a context can no longer overlook how our social imaginaries are being shaped by global and local processes simultaneously, in ways that do not only redefine our communities but our subjectivities as well.

This recognition gives rise to a fundamental dilemma: if our subjectivities are formed by the global processes and our social vocabulary shaped by the neo-liberal imaginary then how is it possible for us to escape that interpretive framework? A way out of this dilemma would appear to involve working with the neo-liberal vocabulary in ways that are at once critical and creative, recognizing its major achievements in naming fundamental changes but seeking to articulate its limitations and offering alternatives that suggest new ways of working with the processes of globalization. Indeed, as Appadurai (2001, p.14) has pointed out, imagination as a collective social fact in the era of globalization has a split character: 'On the one hand, it is in and through imagination that modern citizens are disciplined and controlled, by states, markets and other powerful interests. On the other hand, it is also the faculty through which collective patterns of dissent and new designs for collective life emerge.' This suggests that competing social imaginaries now exist side by side in a constant state of political struggle. There must therefore be different and competing ways of interpreting the contemporary realities of global interconnectivity and interdependence, and of deriving educational implications from them.

Critically, this requires us to recognize that the neo-liberal imaginary of globalization within which the current notions of lifelong learning are embedded prioritize the economic over all other human concerns; and that this has greatly benefited some countries and groups of people, and individuals, while it has had disastrous consequences for others. As a result, inequalities across the world have increased, and the economic prospects of many countries have declined and their cultural traditions been eroded. The neo-liberal imaginary of globalization in education has given rise to a range of contradictions that can no longer be ignored. For example, the policy shift towards privatization has compromised the goals of access and equality and has widened inequalities not only across nations but also within the same communities. Its emphasis on efficiency, embodied in the regimes of new public administration of education, has resulted in greater focus on the operational requirements of the systems rather than upon the actual lives of the human beings and their communities. It has sought to produce a new kind of worker who is multi-skilled, service-orientated, can

easily adapt to changes in both the nature of work and the changing labour conditions, and can work in the global environment characterized by cultural diversity. The ability to work with new information and communication technologies has been highlighted. Yet, it has failed to take into account the declining levels of support that educators now have to implement such reforms.

I began this chapter by saying that lifelong learning is an eminently sensible idea. In conclusion, I agree with Field (2000, p.ix) that it is important to retain some of its aspirations. It is clear that there is no turning back from global processes driven partially by various developments in technology and partially by the new institutions of global economics and politics. But it must be possible to imagine and work with an alternative form of globalization, rooted much more in democratic traditions: a form that does not rely entirely on the logic of the market, and is able to tame its excesses. Such a view of globalization demands not ready-made technocratic solutions to problems of education but focuses instead on open dialogue about the new requirements of education. It must be possible to develop a new language of lifelong learning which is not trapped within the neo-liberal imaginary, and which does not become a mechanism for exclusion and control, which does not shift the responsibility for learning from the state to individual, and places emphasis instead on collective, critical, and reflective learning, as well as learning from experience.

References

- Appudurai, A. (1996) *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Appudurai, A. (Ed) (2001) *Globalization*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Aspin, D. and Chapman, J. (2000) Lifelong learning: concepts and conceptions, *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 19(1), 2–19.
- Becker, G. (1964) *Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Boyd, J.P. (Ed) (1950) *The Chapters of Thomas Jefferson*, Vol. 10. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp.244–245.
- Candy, P. and Laurent, J. (Ed) (1994) *Pioneering Culture: Mechanics' Institutes and Schools of Arts in Australia* Adelaide, South Australia: Auslib Press.
- Cantor, L. (1974) *Recurrent Education. Policy and Development in OECD Member Countries. United Kingdom*. Paris: OECD/CERI.
- Castells, M. (1996) *The Rise of the Network Society*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Castoriadis, C. (1987) *The Imaginary Institution of Society* (trans. Blamey, K.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Coffield, F. (1999) Breaking the consensus: lifelong learning as social control, *British Educational Research Journal*, 25(4), 279–300.
- Dewey, J. (1918) *Democracy and Education*. London: Macmillan.
- Duke, C. (1974) *Recurrent Education: Policy and Development in OECD Member Countries – Australia*. Paris: OECD/CERI.
- Edwards, R. (1997) *Changing Places? Flexibility, Lifelong Learning and a Learning Society*. London: Routledge.
- European Union (2006) *What are the Commission and Other Organisations Doing to Support Lifelong Learning?* http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/policies/lil/life/supportlil_en.html#11 Retrieved: April 2006.

- European Union (2006) *What is Lifelong Learning?* http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/policies/life/what_islife_en.html, Retrieved: April 2006.
- Freire, P. (1972) *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. London: Penguin.
- Field, J. (2000) *Lifelong learning and the New Educational Order*. Stoke-on-Trent: Trentham Press.
- Field, J. and Leicester, M. (2000) *Lifelong learning: Education Across the Lifespan*. London: Routledge Falmer.
- Friedman, T. (2000) *Lexus and the Olive Tree*. New York: First Anchor Press.
- Green, A. (1999) Education and globalization in Europe and East Asia: convergent and divergent trends, *Journal of Education Policy*, 14(1), 55–72.
- Henry, M., Lingard, B., Rizvi, F., and Taylor, S. (2001) *The OECD, Globalization and Education Policy*. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
- Iriye, A. (2002) *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World*. Berkley, CA: University of California Press.
- Labaree, D. (1997) *How to Succeed in School Without Really Learning*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Larner, W. (2000) Neoliberalism: policy, ideology and Governmentality, *Studies in Political Economy*, 63, pp.5–25.
- Maffesoli, M. (1993) Introduction: the social imaginary, *Current Sociology*, 41(2), 1–7.
- Marginson, S. (1999) *Markets in Education*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
- McKenzie, P. (1983) *Recurrent Education: Economic and Equity Issues in Australia*. Melbourne: ACER.
- Mundy, K. (1998) Educational multilateralism and world (dis)order, *Comparative Education Review*, 42(4), 1998.
- OECD (1973) *Recurrent Education: A Strategy for Lifelong Learning*. CERI, Paris: OECD.
- OECD (1996) *Making Lifelong Learning a Reality for All*. Paris: OECD.
- OECD (2004) *Innovation in the Knowledge Economy: Implications for Education and Learning*. CERI, Paris: OECD.
- Papadopoulos, G. (1994) *Education 1960–1990. The OECD Perspective*. Paris: OECD.
- Paul, J. (2002) University and the knowledge-based economy. In: Enders, J. and Fulton, O. (Eds) *Higher Education in a Globalizing World*. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic.
- Peck, J. and Tickell, A. (2002) Neoliberalizing space, *Antipode*, 34(3), 380–404.
- Rose, N. (1989) *Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self*. London: Routledge.
- Schugurensky, D. (1999) Higher education restructuring in the era of globalization: toward a heteronomous model? In: Arno, R. and Torres, C. (Eds) *Comparative Education: The Dialectic of the Global and the Local*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp.283–304.
- Soros, G. (1998) *The Crisis of Global Capitalism*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
- Steiner-Khamsi, G. (2004) *The Global Politics Of Educational Borrowing And Lending*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Taylor, C. (2004) *Modern Social Imaginaries*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Thomson, P. (1999) *Towards a Just Future: Schools working in Partnership with Neighborhoods made Poor*. Paper presented at UNESCO Conference on Reforming Learning, Bangkok, Thailand, December 1999.
- Tozer, S., Violas, P., and Senese, G. (2002) *School and Society: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, 4th Edition. Boston, MA: McGraw Hill.
- Williams, R. (1989) *Resources of Hope: Culture, Democracy, Socialism*. Robin G.(Ed) London: New York: Verso.
- UNESCO (1972) *Learning To Be: The World of Education Today and Tomorrow* (The Faure Report) Paris: UNESCO.
- UNESCO (1996) *Learning: The Treasure Within* (The Delors Report). Paris: UNESCO.
- World Bank (2005) *Lifelong learning in the Global Knowledge Economy: Challenges for Developing Countries*. Washington: The World Bank.
- Yeaxlee, B. (1929) *Lifelong Education*. London: Cassell.

Chapter 8

Widening Participation in Higher Education: Lifelong Learning as Capability

Melanie Walker

This chapter explores economist Amartya Sen's (1992, 1999) and philosopher Martha Nussbaum's (2000) capability approach to generate a critical conceptual and empirically informed approach to widening participation in higher education for and by working-class students. Widening participation is considered as a matter of each student's capability formation as lifelong learners able to choose a life they have reason to value. This involves more than access, and includes participation and success and positive learner identity formation. While the focus is on working-class students in England, who currently comprise only 20% of higher education students (Archer et al. 2003), the argument for capability could be applied to marginalised students in general. There is the assumption in the chapter that how a society distributes the resources, opportunities, and freedoms of and in higher education, to whom, and for what purposes is a matter of equality and justice. Equality is therefore taken to involve at the most basic level the idea 'that all human beings have equal worth and importance, and are therefore equally worthy of concern and respect' (Baker et al. 2004, p.23). Equality is added here to social justice because the latter, in higher education, is more vulnerable to being co-opted by inclusion agendas which are really about something else, such as economic development.

Equality is here a normative ideal, worth aspiring to, even if we know we cannot fully attain it. It is important to ask what a more equal higher education might look like, and how we might act to bring it about by at the very least improving higher education from where we stand in it as teachers and researchers. This matters as a widening participation issue, given that social class, even if rather more opaque than 20 or 30 years ago, continues to shape social identities and to influence actions and attitudes across British society (Archer et al. 2003).

My claim is that taking up 'equality of what' (Sen 1992) in lifelong learning puts each students' 'capabilities to function' (Sen 1992, 1999) in the informational space to evaluate advantage and equality. What matters is not only the average amount of financial, material, and human resources allocated to universities, or educational outcomes, such as first or second class degrees, but how education as capability is distributed, and to whom. The capability approach is advanced as an alternative lifelong learning 'thoughtscape' (Hogan 2002, p.226) in which learning is seen as the equalisation of each and every individual's ongoing capability

(freedom) to choose and lead the kinds of lives they value. This is a temporal transformation project of biography and situated learning, of being and becoming agents, and of how higher learning in universities bears on this.

Following Aspin and Chapman's (2001) explication of a triangle of lifelong learning purposes, higher education as a key site for lifelong learning is similarly understood here to comprise a three-dimensional triad, contributing to rich personal development and fulfilment, vocational preparation, and economic opportunities, and with a democratic dimension of an educated citizenry. As Biesta (2005) points out, at any one time, one or other of these purposes might receive greater emphasis than the others; in current times it is the economic function which is the main driver of higher education policy. Neo-liberal education policies have seen the emergence and embedding of a culture of performativity, the commodification of knowledge, the instrumentalisation of (higher) education and impression management (Ball 2001). The effect has been to generate 'thin' conceptions of inclusion in lifelong learning discourses, and a vigorous educational policy pursuit of the economic dimension of higher education. But, as Nussbaum (2002, p.291) says, 'If our institutions of higher education do not build a richer network of human connections it is likely that our dealings with one another will be mediated by the defective norms of market exchange'. The point is to ask whether a university is enabling diverse students *both* to gain the knowledge, skills, and understandings required by them to maximise their freedom as job-seekers *and* for their development as individual personalities, as confident citizens of their own countries, and as informed global citizens (Singh 2003). Lifelong learning in and through higher education should then have intrinsic and instrumental value for all students. But having said that the capability approach does not assume that the goods of higher education are equally available to all; it requires that we consider diversity, opportunities, and outcomes.

I draw on the capability approach therefore as a framework and criterion for equality and social justice in lifelong learning in higher education, arguing that the capability approach would require both redistribution of resources and opportunities, and recognition and equal valuing of diversity. It involves equality, i.e. it argues for each and every person having the prospect of a good life, that they have reason to value, by enabling each of us to make real choices among alternatives of similar worth. We should, every one of us, have both rationality and freedom in our life choices. Each person is seen as an end in themselves and not as a means to some other end, such as economic productivity.

The Significance of Higher Education as a Site of Lifelong Learning

Higher education is understood as a capability in itself, and constitutive of other capabilities now and in the future, for example, having good health, civic participation, and economic opportunities (Schuller et al. 2002). Such wider benefits of

learning are a matter for higher education as a social good. Jonathan (2001) explains that, while higher education is not a wholly public good in the same way, say, that a stable monetary system is, nor is it a wholly private enterprise in that higher education is not produced and distributed solely by individuals without cooperation with others. Higher education, she argues, is a *social* good: it is not universally accessible; it conveys public and private benefits; its private benefits give rise to a broad range of other goods which are public, private, and social. For example, not everyone will be able to study medicine (or indeed wish to) and qualify to work as a general practitioner. This qualification certainly confers financial and status benefits on the individual, but also public and social benefits in being required to work in the public sector in the UK. Thus argues Jonathan, ‘any social practice which is basic both to the future development of society and to the individual life-chances of its citizens is the proper business of the democratic state’ (p.31). It is then a matter for public policy, debate and contestation.

It matters also that higher education contributes to the production of new subjectivities in our globalised, economised world. We learn how to be at university, as much as we learn physics or history. It is, in particular, a period when students might develop the maps, tools, and resources for the lifelong journeys which follow; their preparations can directly shape the course of their subsequent journey. As Colby et al. explain:

Maps direct the travellers towards one set of paths rather than another. Available tools dispose explorers to seek out particular kinds of terrain. Their choice of comrades also opens up some options while foreclosing others. And the knowledge and values they acquire equip them to respond effectively to the unpredictable challenges and opportunities that will inevitably confront them in their travels. (Colby et al. 2003, p.viii)

Experiences in higher education for all students – positive and life enhancing, or narrowing horizons and self-belief – will shape lifelong learner identities.

Higher education is, moreover, with schooling, a major site of cultural practice and the recognition or devaluing of personal and social identities, values, and abilities (Baker et al. 2004). All education is a site of symbolic control. As Bernstein (2001, p.23) explains, this means how ‘consciousness, dispositions and desire are shaped and distributed through norms of communication which relay and legitimate a distribution of power and cultural categories’, that is through the message systems of curriculum, pedagogy and assessment. It is of particular importance, he argues, because it is here that ‘agents of symbolic control specialise in dominant discursive codes’ (2001, p.23). Similarly, Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977) has pointed out how higher education tacitly requires students to learn with and through middle-class language codes and socially constituted dispositions which they are assumed already to possess, and which are not made explicit or taught in a systematic way in higher education. In this way higher education reproduces inequalities and privilege through the means of a ‘racism of intelligence’ (Bourdieu 1993, p.177).

Working-class students are less likely to enter higher education equipped with the cultural and linguistic capital, which traditional higher education pedagogies

take for granted, and are then less well equipped to decode the pedagogic messages. But higher education not only takes for granted that students have the required linguistic and cultural capital, it further assumes that they also have ‘the capacity to invest it profitably – which the system presupposes and consecrates without ever expressly demanding it and without methodically transmitting it’ (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977, p.99). The working-class girl who aspires to higher education against the odds and wins a place enters an institution in which her cultural values may not be valued or respected, and this will impact on her identity as a learner. Or she may simply lack the required academic discourse codes. This is captured in this statement from a black working-class student in Archer et al.’s (2003 p.133) study, who says about her move into higher education that it is, ‘another culture shock in a sense, the language. It is a different language from being at college, from being at school; it is a totally different language’.

Nonetheless, Bernstein (2001) also argues that higher education, unlike schooling, has a productive, as well as a reproductive effect; it is a potential site of ‘disturbance’ and hence of transformation or at least moments of equity that reconfigure relations of power and privilege. As Barr (2002, p.322) argues, what we therefore need is a system of higher education ‘which is not an apprenticeship into a hierarchy of power’, operating exclusions against what counts as knowledge and who may be counted as knowers.

The Capability Approach

How then might the capability approach contribute to producing and evaluating equality and just educational purposes in universities and indeed other sites, such as further education colleges, where higher education is provided? Sen (1992) argues for a capability-based assessment of justice, that is that we ought to focus on the expansion of human freedom instead of focusing on economic progress as the primary end of human development. Resources such as bursaries for students, teaching facilities, books and journals, computers, the staff-student ratio, academic scholarship, and so on, might be considered capability inputs. These are certainly necessary. But educational development involves the expansion of human capability, that is, ‘the freedoms they [students] actually enjoy to choose the lives that they have reason to value’ (1992, p.81). People should be able to make choices that matter to them for a valuable life. The notion of capability ‘is essentially one of freedom – the range of options a person has in deciding what kind of life to lead’ (Dreze and Sen 1995, p.11). Capabilities might then also be explained as ‘actions one values doing or approaches to living one’s values’ (Unterhalter 2003, p.666). Sen (1992) argues that a person’s capability to achieve functionings that he or she has reason to value provides a general approach to the evaluation of social (educational) arrangements. If there is capability disadvantage we might then raise questions about whether and how our teaching and learning has contributed to this.

A capability is a potential functioning – what one actually manages to achieve or do – ‘the various things a person may value doing or being’ (Sen 1999, p.75); it is the practical realisation of one’s chosen way of life. It might include quite basic functionings such as being well nourished and more complex functioning like taking part in discussions with *one’s* peers or being scientifically literate. The difference between a capability and functioning is like one between an opportunity to achieve and the actual achievement, between potential and outcome. For example, the capability to be critically literate compared to actually reading the media critically. This distinction between capability and functioning is important. For example, here is an apparently equitable educational outcome. Two young women both complete a degree in English literature at the same English university. For one, from a middle class, reasonably affluent background and a good school, a major reason was her decision to experience university before entering her father’s business as a trainee manager. Thus an outstanding degree result was not required, although she coped well and confidently with the academic demands having been suitably prepared by teaching approaches at her schooling. She enjoyed the academic challenges of contesting ideas in seminars and voicing her opinions. She chose to spend her time socialising and pursuing her leisure interests of cycling and music. The second young woman from a working-class background and a struggling inner city state school, despite significant academic ability, struggled to fit in or make friends among her middle-class peers. Teaching methods at her school had not prepared her well for higher education pedagogies and academic codes. Contestation over ideas in class undermined her confidence and made her anxious and unwilling to advance an opinion. She nonetheless worked hard, desperate to get excellent grades, but her lack of confidence meant she blamed herself for her struggles and was reluctant to approach her tutors for help with work. Both students obtained second-class passes.

Can we then say that the inclusion goal has been met for the working-class student, who apparently did as well as her middle-class counterpart? Can we say that this example demonstrates equality? On the surface, if we look only at functioning we might say it does, but the capability approach requires that we look beneath at the real freedom or opportunities each student had to achieve what she valued. Our evaluation of equality must then take account of freedom in opportunities as much as observed choices. The middle-class student had rationality and freedom in her choices; the working-class student had rationality but not freedom. But both count for a fully human life. The capability approach therefore offers a method to evaluate real educational advantage. In this approach individual capabilities to undertake valued and valuable activities constitute an indispensable and central part of the relevant informational base of any evaluation of advantage and disadvantage.

For Sen, then, it is not so much the achieved functionings that matter, as the real opportunities (freedoms) that one has to achieve those functionings. But in education it also makes sense to consider people’s functionings (what we manage to achieve) and not just capabilities. For example, what if we are focusing on the capability of confidence in learning? We might plausibly assume that no one freely chooses to be

an unconfident learner in higher education. If a student is then functioning as an unconfident learner, then this is a signal that their capability has not developed as they and we might wish. Similarly, we need to know if students are acquiring knowledge and other important skills. We might argue that during the course of their degree studies, universities, and university teachers need to know if and how capability is being developed, by whom, and under what conditions. At issue is that capabilities are counter-factual, and in the matter of learning we may need to evaluate functioning (confidence, voice, knowledge, etc.) as a proxy for capability.

What of the enduring concern in educational studies with the relationship between educational and social inequalities, and with how this can be explained by attention to differences between and among learners, and what of critical and progressive pedagogies' concerns with integrating learner, identity and social context? Sen's metric of equality includes both personal evaluation and interpersonal variation, and individual and social arrangements. The capability approach foregrounds the basic heterogeneity of human beings as a fundamental aspect of educational equality, and connects individual biographies and social arrangements in two ways. Firstly, Sen conceptualises the idea of conversion. Learners differ along intersecting dimensions of difference: personal (e.g. gender, race, class), environmental (country, wealth, climate, etc.), and social (inter-individual). Therefore, he argues, equalising the ownership of resources, 'need not equalise the substantive freedoms enjoyed by different persons, since there can be significant variations in the conversion of resources and primary goods into freedoms' (1992, p.33). But there is nothing inherently unequal about difference, for example, being female or working class or disabled; these are not absolute disadvantages. The three-dimension shape when such a difference becomes an inequality (Terzi 2005). As Terzi (2005) explains, differences are relational, and become inequalities of functioning achievements in and through education according to the particular design of educational institutions. We need suitable external conditions, including suitably designed educational institutions, to enable the exercise of valued beings and doings. For example, a learner might value the capability for voice for herself, but finds herself silenced in a university classroom through particular social and indeed national (environmental) arrangements of power and privilege.

Nussbaum (2000) tackles the issue of individual capability and social arrangements by her concept of 'combined capabilities'. These comprise our 'internal capabilities', which Nussbaum explains as the 'developed states of the individual herself that are, so far as the person herself is concerned, sufficient conditions for the exercise of the requisite functions' (p.84). Suitable external conditions will enable the exercise of the function, she explains. A hard-of-hearing student might have the internal capability to engage critically, but finds herself excluded from functioning in group seminars where a hearing loop has not been provided. In Nussbaum's conceptualisation, this student has the internal capabilities to handle academic work – but the (external) conditions in the institution to enhance their capabilities are missing or constrained.

But we must also be careful. In the examples above the students have the requisite internal capability but are unable to function as they wish and are able. With

regard to difference-based diversity in higher education this may not be the case for working-class students who find themselves biographically (personally) without the requisite academic and cultural capital. Here, assuming that the student is willing and disposed to engage it, it is for her university teachers and the institution to address unequal external conditions, whether of pedagogy, assessment or curriculum, or institutional policy and ethos. The lifelong learning lesson is that difference-based advantage is relational and requires both enabling conditions on the part of the university and its teachers for learning, as well as individual effort on the part of each student. It is not to argue that all the effort is to be made by the institution and its teachers, but it is to underline that particular educational arrangements might enable or diminish learner capability.

Secondly, Sen integrates the personal and the macro-social (individual agency and social arrangements) in securing and expanding intrapersonal and interpersonal freedoms so that there is ‘a deep complementarity between individual agency and social arrangements’ (Sen 1999, pp.xi–xii). A learner’s opportunities may be significantly helped by the choices of others – good teachers, productive peer relationships, enabling public policy, and so on. Individual functionings are influenced by a person’s relative advantages in society and teaching and learning may only be able to address this partially; it further requires enabling public policy, for example an equal access or disability discrimination policy. Nonetheless, at issue is still Sen’s emphasis that ‘Being free to live the way one would like may be enormously helped by the choices of others’ (1993, p.44) – university teaching and a university’s arrangement to support equality of capabilities for all students. Thus, while the idea of choice is central in the capability approach, the individual is not viewed as a freely choosing subject as in neo-liberal thinking; social constraints on choice are acknowledged.

Selecting Lifelong Learning Capabilities for an Equality Evaluation Metric

The point to be emphasised is that learning is shaped by the institutional and social, and agency development includes both individual and social dimensions. Beverley Skeggs explains about her UK university education:

I was identified in a seminar group as ‘Oh, you must be one of those working class people we hear so much about.’ I was absolutely mortified. I knew what this meant - I had been recognised as common, authentic and without much cultural value. The noisy, bolshy, outspoken me was silenced. . . . I did not want to be judged and found wanting. (Skeggs, B. 1997, p.130)

As she points out, it is middle-class social norms and members of the middle class who instigate these judgements. Similarly, Louise Morley (1997) writes of her own university experiences, that for working-class women ‘becoming ‘educated’ is a complex combination of achievement, struggle, and betrayal. It means that wherever we are, there are vast reservoirs of experience and insights we must not speak’ (1997, p.114).

Teaching and learning shapes student identities in ways which inflect towards or away from equality of capabilities (valuable beings and doings and choices), building temporally into inter-subjective patterns and shaping what kind of persons we recognise ourselves to be and what we believe ourselves able to do. Because agency is central to Sen's ideas of the freedom to make choices, a lack of agency or a constrained agency equates to disadvantage – if an individual (or group, see Robeyns 2003) faces barriers to genuine choice and a life of reflective choices. In higher education learning this may well build from apparently unimportant micro-instances – the tutor's comments in a seminar, a dismissive comment by a fellow student, or scribbled feedback on an essay assignment – that build to diminish a learning self and self belief and when repeated over time constitute a pattern of agency disadvantage. We tend also to come to terms with our respective predicaments – we adapt our preferences, say Sen (1992) and Nussbaum (2000), in ways which do not necessarily serve the best interests of the chooser. For example working-class students might adapt their ambitions in a culture where being middle and upper class has more prestige and cultural power.

At issue is how or if higher education then works to expand student opportunities – their valued beings and doings – to be and become good choosers in ways which provide maps for confident and hopeful navigations of risk and the futures. Unlike Sen, who does not specify a list of capabilities, Nussbaum offers a list of *ten* universal human capabilities¹ which she claims have 'broad cross-cultural resonance and intuitive power' (2000, p.72). Notwithstanding the contestation in the capability approach over lists (see Walker 2005), I now turn to Nussbaum as a place to start in the identification of some lifelong learning capabilities. She points to 'practical reason' and 'affiliation' as being architectonic, organising, and suffusing all other capabilities and fundamental to a fully human life. Practical reason she describes as 'Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about planning one's life' (2000, p.79). Affiliation involves social relations, respect, recognition, and equal valuing of difference, and includes:

Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another and to have compassion for that situation; to have the capability for both justice and friendship. . . . having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. (Nussbaum 2000, p.79–80)

If just these two capabilities were to shape higher education processes and cultures and equality evaluations they would foster lifelong learning for working-class students along all three of Aspin and Chapman's (2001) dimensions, and require a richer and fuller engagement by more privileged students as well.

I wish now to map selected capabilities from Nussbaum's list, that have relevance for lifelong learning, against what a cohort of widening participation students² themselves say about their experiences in higher education in order to extrapolate what capabilities they value in learning and in choosing a good life; let us call this lifelong learning.

Practical Reason and Learning

Firstly students identified higher education as a place where they had the opportunity (freedom) for practical reasoning – to plan their lives, to consider their hopes and aspirations for a better life, and to develop their own views of what for them would be a good life. For example, Katie explained, ‘I want [to] avoid being stuck in a shop for the rest of my life, being unhappy in my job, just dreading going to work. . . . It’s [university] making it clearer what I actually want to do with my life . . . learning the law, yeah I want to do this, this is really interesting’ (interview 10/05/02). Matt who had switched from engineering to biology said that he had ‘matured since I’ve come to university. I’ve met new people, done new things; I’ve been in control of my life a bit more’ (interview 14/05/02). In the final year of her degree, Narinder said that her choices had become ‘more open-ended’ and ‘you start to think about all the things you can do’, whereas before she thought she had stayed within ‘safe’ boundaries of home and neighbourhood, but university has ‘sort of pushed my potential’ (interview 20/05/03). Rosie commented that ‘I realise now how much I was an extension really of my mum and my sister and now I just feel completely separate from them and different . . . so I think I’ve got the independence and the freedom and the confidence to do different things’ (interview 20/05/03). For all the troubles they might have encountered during their studies – and evidence was uneven across the 14 individuals – they were all clear that being at university had expanded their life opportunities and choices.

Affiliation and Learning

In higher education, affiliation – social relations, equal recognition, and valuing – are arguably central to the robust confidence which underpins learning and positive learner identities. Thomas (2002) cites working-class students who say that tutors who care about students’ learning foster their self-confidence and the disposition to learn and make an effort. But equally misrecognition and lack of equal valuing might not foster learning and functioning capability. Moreover, in the course of her ‘learning career’ (Bloomer and Hodkinson 2000) a student’s capability may be both enhanced and diminished. We cannot assume an automatic trajectory of progress, learning, and capability achievement. Students identified the value of affiliation by pointing to processes they experience as uncomfortable or diminishing of who they are and what they are capable of achieving.

Janet explained that in one of her Sociology seminar students had been asked about their backgrounds and how they had got to university. She recounted, ‘I just say that I am [working class] but when other people are saying “Oh I don’t think I’m working class”, as if there’s something really negative about that, as if you’re like someone different or something, it makes you feel a bit uneasy at times’. Janet located the problem of not achieving well in herself, saying: ‘Perhaps I won’t do as

well as everyone else, even though I have done in the past. I don't know why, I just seem to lack that confidence.' On another occasion she had emailed a lecturer for advice about the mismatch between the marker's comments on an essay she had written and the actual essay, but the response was unhelpful, 'she just sort of sent it back saying: 'Well, I haven't seen the work, I didn't mark the essay . . . I can't really comment', and said that perhaps it's more my problem and that I'm finding it difficult to adjust to university work.' Although Janet felt she was coping as well as others on her course, because the lecturer seemed to think she was 'struggling' with the work, Janet in turn began to feel that maybe she was not fitting in as well as she had thought, or coping as well as she thought (interview 18/05/02). In her final year, Janet described herself losing confidence. She was struggling with her course work and had 'lost a little bit [of confidence] in the last six months'. She explained:

We had to choose between a dissertation and an extended essay and I've chosen the essay because I don't think I could cope with doing a big long piece of research and then after I'd chosen the essay, everyone else on my course was doing the dissertation and I felt kind of inferior . . . I just kind of felt maybe I was taking the easy option, but . . . I've done it because I don't handle long pieces of research very well and I think I'd lost interest. (Interview 18/05/03)

What is interesting here is how learner identities are formed and their capabilities fostered or diminished in everyday interactions, which if not interrupted build into patterns, over time, of diminished academic confidence. Rao and Walton (2004, p.15) use the concept of 'constraining preferences', by which they mean an internalisation of the possibility of success or failure which then becomes transformed into individualised aspirations or expectations and come to be seen as an objective structure of chances in life. For example, the culturally marginal place of working-class students in higher education might result in self-evaluations of inadequacy that distort what they believe themselves capable of, so that they come to locate the problem in themselves and the belief that they are not capable of thinking intelligently, or that what they have to say is not important. So when Matt plucked up courage to go and talk to one of his lecturers 'he made me feel really small and insignificant'. This is a subtle process such that students come to believe that they are to blame. Thus Narinder wrote in her diary that: 'If I had a problem I really would think twice before approaching someone, everyone seems so busy and at a distance, asking for help comes across as being a failure'. This affects her sense of agency so that she has to remind herself, 'I know I'm intelligent . . . but it doesn't seem enough, maybe it is just me but everyone seems a lot cleverer than me' (diary entry 28/05/02).

If one is failing as a learner, or believes oneself to be failing (or stupid) in higher education, one's disposition to learn is damaged, learning becomes out of reach and without support one turns away from the shame and humiliation of higher learning, of 'never wanting that sick feeling in my stomach again' (Janice quoted in Reay 2004, p.37). At issue is that our dispositions to learn are shaped through social relations (affiliation), and while all students arguably have to decode how higher education works and what is expected of them, this is harder for working-class students who lack the familial and schooling codes which might assist successful transitions.

This is well captured by Katie as she discusses her early experiences at university and trying to decode the academic ‘rules’:

The first couple of seminars . . . it’s a bit confusing because you’re not told what you’re expected to read or how much you’re expected to write. You’re just given this list with a problem question at the end. . . . I think well am I doing enough work or have I done too much work or is it about right . . . some people when they did their A levels they were . . . like university. So they’re all right they know what to do. (Interview 10/05/02)

Affiliation also plays itself out more positively in student friendships and social networks forged at university. Nussbaum reminds us of the importance of friendship in our becoming ‘good perceivers’ (learners), i.e. being able to read a situation and single out what is relevant for thought and action. We need to trust in the guidance offered and allow ourselves to feel engaged with a friend’s life and choices, to share a form of life with them. Thomas (2002) argues that friendship is one of the keys to persistence and success among working-class students. It generates opportunity or freedom to pursue our goals, and a process to support this pursuit. Students in my project placed great emphasis on their friendships at university. Its significance in relation to learning in particular is in generating a feeling of belonging on your course and being able to get along with your peers, so that Rosie says of her middle-class peers, ‘I wouldn’t say I’d like to socialise with them and talk about, you know, personal things, but when we’re talking about work or we’re doing work, then it’s fine’ (interview 7/05/02). Janet said she had liked working in a smaller group for a seminar, ‘we all know each other and we’d talked before and stuff so we’d just get on with it and then we did the presentation. It was easier that we all knew each other’ (interview 18 May 2002). But, while Janet gets on with those in her class, she still feels closest to Kay, a mature student from a working-class background.

Friendships out of class provide what Wedekind (2002) calls ‘identity capital’, which he defines as ‘information one acquires that tells one that one is wanted, loved, or recognised as being a member of a group’ (p.198), and hence new forms of social capital and norms of reciprocity in these new learning communities. Rosie’s working-class friends at university were central to her shoring up her working-class identity; all her housemates shared similar class backgrounds. Friends also offer someone to turn to, to discuss difficulties with the work, and often working-class students will prefer this to approaching their tutors. For example, Norah recounted that when she does not know what is going on in her literature class, she feels stupid, and remains silent. But she then tries to sort things out for herself by asking a close friend what she makes of the work, or seeing if she can find help on the Internet. But she says, ‘I’d rarely go and see a tutor if I had a problem’ (interview 29/05/02). Friends of this kind are arguably more important to working-class students, whose parents are not familiar with higher education and restricted thus in what advice they are able to offer in decoding how higher education works, beyond generally encouraging their children to study and supporting them in their decisions. In other words, it is generally harder for working-class students to seek help and to build networks with ‘institutional agents’ who have ‘the capacity and commitment to transmit directly, or negotiate the transmission of, institutional resources and opportunities’ (Stanton-Salazar 1997, p.6). But this also highlights

the deep problem if students are alienated from each other because they do not feel comfortable in middle-class higher education. Reay (2004, p.35) cites a mature working class student, Janice, who says, 'I don't see the point of spending my time with people who are not going to be able to relate to me and I'm not going to be able to relate to them'.

Thomas (2002) argues that institutions can facilitate the development of social networks and that this illustrates the close interrelationship between the academic and social experience of working-class students. Crucially, functionings depend on individual circumstances, the relations a person has with others, and social conditions, and contexts within which potential options (freedom) can be achieved. Stewart (2004) has argued that we need also to go beyond the capability approach's emphasis on the individual (albeit socially located) and consider what she describes as 'group capabilities'. She argues that groups and group membership are a direct source of well-being. While she is arguing for the importance of groups for the poor, we might argue that groups are crucial to working-class and other non-traditional students in higher education and that we need to consider how groups promote values and preferences which then foster valuable capabilities. Whether one can convincingly argue that group capabilities are anything more than the sum of their individual capabilities could be contested. Nonetheless from a policy point of view the importance of those institutional factors which foster cooperation and communication within and between diverse groups is at issue. Such group formation and affiliation is a source of power, and Stewart (2004) argues that we should support groups which encourage valuable capabilities as against those which do the opposite. Such groups would, she says, also teach tolerance of multiple cultural identities coexisting. This further underlines the social nature of learning and the argument made by Thomas (2002) and borne out in my own work of the importance of inclusive approaches which respect and value differences amongst students, and put in place institutional measures to support such approaches. At issue here is that the capability of affiliation, as outlined by Nussbaum, would be a demanding criterion for evaluating good practice in higher education.

Emotions, Imagination, and Learning

Nussbaum lists emotions and imagination as two more of her central capabilities; in lifelong learning they are key to engaging students in learning and meaning making, and developing a love of the subject they are studying. Widening participation students in my study spoke about the rich pleasures of intellectual work and the gaining of knowledge. Jackie commented that 'It was like something clicked inside, something suddenly got switched on ... and suddenly I could write these essays, and I was actually enjoying writing them'. She discussed an oral presentation which the tutor had described as 'very well researched'. 'That kept me smiling all day' she said (interview 15/05/02). Norah explained that 'I just get a buzz out of it. I actually get a thrill out of sitting there and working something out, like

if you get a really good ideas especially with English because there's like no answers, it's all sort of what you interpret and if you have a strong idea you apply it . . . I really do enjoy seminars a lot'. Even though she procrastinates in getting reading and written work done, 'when I actually start doing it I think, my god this is what I love doing, why haven't I been doing it' (interview 29/05/02). Rosie talked about completing an essay on Shakespeare where she had really enjoyed going to the library and 'churning through the critics' and reading the Shakespeare, 'taking it to pieces and seeing the professor and seeing what he said about it and writing it and having to think really really hard, what do I actually believe and having to order my ideas. I really enjoyed writing it. I got a first for it as well' (interview 17/05/02). In these moments a love of knowledge is developed, and capability is enhanced.

On the other hand, fear is a barrier to learning and to confidence in our ability to learn. When we feel resentful, upset, frightened, hostile, nervous, humiliated, alienated, we do not learn well. These kinds of emotions generate alienation and disengagement, working as a form of social control to uphold existing relations of power and intellectual valuing in higher education pedagogies. Nussbaum therefore emphasises that supporting the capability of emotions involves supporting the associational forms that are crucial to this capability. This includes pedagogical forms in higher education. Jackie, who continued to struggle through her first year, described battling with a course on literary theory, saying, 'I thought I really don't understand this and I got myself in such a state it made me feel really depressed all term . . . there was no reason to be here anymore' (interview 15/05/02). This is not to eschew dissonance and confusion which is part of the challenge of higher learning. Rather it is to say that some students will need support in recognising this confusion as part of learning, and not as a sign of failing. At issue is how students who are unfamiliar with the rules of the academic knowledge game and the way ideas are contested and challenged are supported in acquiring such codes and in finding their own voices and confidence to participate, such that dissonance moves their learning on, rather than crippling their sense of self.

We have then four intersecting 'educational capabilities', none of which can be reduced to one of the others: (i) practical reason; (ii) affiliation; (iii) emotions; and (iv) imagination. They comprise a multidimensional evaluation map in which all four count and all are constitutive of the others in some way. All are arguably important in widening participation as a matter of lifelong learning. Nussbaum further argues persuasively for the combined importance of reason, affiliation, and imagination, saying that, 'People who have never learned to use reason and imagination to enter a broader world of cultures, groups and ideas are impoverished personally and politically, however successful their vocational preparation' (1997, p.297). Pedagogically, the capabilities of practical reason and affiliation in particular are a more subtle and complex working out of teaching methods of 'group' or 'teamwork' to include values of empathy and mutual recognition, compassion, respect, dignity, active voices, and meaningful relationships with peers.

Nussbaum's capabilities approach, if taken up pedagogically, should enable both critical knowledge making and collective problem solving through processes of

critical dialogue, respect, inclusion of diverse perspectives and 'reasonableness', that is the willingness to listen to others whose views, histories, and experiences differ from one's own. Practising affiliation as part of higher education pedagogy would tend towards deliberation which opens out a transformative space in which, through democratic dialogue with others different from oneself, we gain new ideas which enable our critical reflection on our own positions, prejudices or ignorance as women and men, working class and middle class, black and white. At issue here also is that at school or university we do not just learn mathematics, or philosophy, or history; we also learn ways of being, whether to be open minded or fair or generous spirited, or none of these things. We might learn in higher education how to do gender or race or social class differently. Thus middle-class students need to learn how their own privilege works, as much as working-class students need equal valuing and support to acquire the cultural and social capital of the university, on their own terms. This would further require the recognition of diverse cultural modes of expression and ways of life, not only the communicative practices of the socially privileged (Hooks 1994). It would mean seeing diverse experiences as an important knowledge resource so that being working class is not just about being 'deprived' (Tett 2000, p.189).

Power and Participation

The capabilities of practical reason, affiliation, emotions, and imagination offer a guide to what information we need to evaluate how well widening participation students are doing in developing their agency and well being in and through higher education. But we also need to 'add in' other social theories to the capability approach. If combined with neo-liberal ideas, we might arrive at a different understanding of choice, severing it from Sen's choice/freedom nexus. It is therefore important to consider sociological theories which analyse the social structural constraints on choice, with the capability approach (Unterhalter 2003). But this is not incompatible with the approach which does not lay claim to being a theory of social justice or equality but a framework requiring additional theories for specific contexts, such as applications in higher education.

In my view Sen and Nussbaum offer a thin view of power, and a focus on power would have to be integrated with lifelong learning capabilities for equality and justice. It certainly bears remembering that equality of capability involves equality of power, for power is itself an enabling capacity. Baumann (1990) reminds us that the more power we have, the wider the range of our genuine choices, and the expansion of decisions which are realistic and reasonably certain for us to achieve. Thus, says Baumann, 'to have power is to act more freely; but having no power, or less power than others have, means having one's own freedom of choice limited by decisions made by others' (p.113). Higher education can constrain students who have less power or no power in exercising their reasoned agency, and for their full

capability development the sources of unfreedom – social and institutional – should be removed. Because agency is central to Sen's ideas of the freedom to make choices, a lack of agency or a constrained agency equates to disadvantage – if an individual (or group, see Robeyns 2003) faces barriers to genuine choice and a life of reflective choices.

Moreover, some form of participatory and inclusive dialogue, however conceptualised, should be included into the process of selecting capabilities, beyond the theoretical, if only so that students whom we say we wish to take responsibility for their own learning, should then also have some influence on the purposes of that learning. Put another way, students should have a thick autonomy of power plus self assertion. Sen is right to argue that there is a real social justice need for people to be able to take part in social decisions if they so choose, and that public discussion and reasoning can lead to a better understanding of the role, reach and significance of particular capabilities (Sen 1992, 1999). But we still need to be mindful of power in such public dialogues. As Young (2000) argues in her explication of deliberative democracy, we need explicit attention to connectedness and the inclusion of the dependent and vulnerable to enable collective problem solving by all those significantly involved in or affected by a decision, and under conditions of dialogue which allow diverse perspectives and opinions to be voiced. She further argues that deliberative democratic processes are a form of practical reasoning and hence one might suggest entirely compatible with Nussbaum's capability list the overall concern with agency.

Conclusion

Fostering capabilities in higher education is a way to create change, to make futures and to strengthen agency. It is to reiterate the argument that higher education provides maps and knowledge for new ways of understanding self and the world for graduates' life patterns and occupations beyond university. I am suggesting that it is capability that we set out to assess in higher education, rather than how much money each university is allocated or how much is spent on each student, as these do not tell us about how the resources are distributed and to whom, or how this bundle of resource is converted by each student into valued capabilities and functioning. They are certainly important capability inputs, but are still only a partial picture of quality and well-being in higher education. They are the means but not the ends of well-being, justice or educational development.

The capability approach can address both processes and outcomes of learning which is lifelong. It robustly challenges the narrowness of human capital theory in which human lives are viewed as the means to economic gain. It raises the importance of a participatory and deliberative development of higher education practice and policy. It requires not only that we talk about and theorise change but that we are able to point to and *do* change through its focus on fostering valuable beings and doings in and through higher education.

Endnotes

¹ Nussbaum's list: Life, Bodily health, Bodily integrity, Senses, Imagination and thought, Emotions, Practical reason, Affiliation, Other species, Play, Control over one's environment.

² The Widening Participation project involved working with 14 volunteer first-generation undergraduate students in 2002–2003. Each student was interviewed individually three times; they were interviewed twice in focus groups, and met twice in whole group workshops. They also acted as student researchers, collecting data from fellow students, and kept a diary of significant teaching and learning experiences over 1 week.

References

- Archer, L., Hutchings, M., and Ross, A. (2003) *Higher Education and Social Class: Issues of Exclusion and Inclusion*. London: Routledge Falmer.
- Aspin, D.N. and Chapman, J.D. (2001) Lifelong learning: concepts, theories and values in Proceedings of the 31st annual conference of SCUTREA, University of East London.
- Baker, J., Lynch, K., Cantillon, S., and Walsh, J. (2004) *Equality: From Theory to Action*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Barr, J. (2002) Universities after postmodernism, *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 21(4), 321–333.
- Baumann, Z. (1990) *Thinking Sociologically*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Bernstein, B. (2001) Symbolic control: issues of empirical description of agencies and agents, *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 4(1), 21–33.
- Biesta, G. (2005) What's the point of lifelong learning if lifelong learning has no point? Invited presentation at the conference Bildung and Larande, Orebro University, Sweden, 16 August.
- Bloomer, M. and Hodkinson, P. (2000) Learning careers: continuity and change in young people's dispositions to learning, *British Educational Research Journal*, 26(5), 583–598.
- Bourdieu, P. (1993) *Sociology in Question*. London: Sage.
- Bourdieu, P. and Passeron, J-C. (1977) *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*, 2nd Edition. London: Sage.
- Colby, A., Ehrlich, T., Beaumont, E., and Stephens, J. (2003) *Educating Citizens. Preparing America's Undergraduates For Lives of Moral And Civic Responsibility*. Menlo Park, CA: The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.
- Dreze, J. and Sen, A. (1995) *India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hogan, P. (2002) Learning as leavetaking and as homecoming. In: Peters, M. (Ed) *Heidegger, Modernity and Education*. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield, pp.211–228.
- Hooks, B. (2004) *Teaching to Transgress. Education as the Practice of Freedom*. New York: Routledge.
- Jonathan, R. (2001) Higher education transformation and the public good, *Kagisano Higher Education Discussion Series*, 1, 28–63.
- Morley, L. (1997) A class of one's own. In: Mahony, P. and Zmroczek, C. (Eds) *Class Matters. 'Working-Class' Women's Perspectives on Social Class*. London: Taylor & Francis, pp.109–122.
- Nussbaum, M. (1997) *Cultivating Humanity. A Classical Defence of Reform in Liberal Education*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Nussbaum, M. (2000) *Women and Human Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nussbaum, M. (2002) Education for citizenship in an era of global connection, *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, 21, 289–303.

- Rao, V. and Walton, M. (2004) Culture and public action: relationality, equality of agency and development. In: Rao, V. and Walton, M. (Eds) *Culture and Public Action*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Reay, D. (2004) Finding or losing yourself? working class relationships to education. In: Ball, S. (Ed) *The Routledge Falmer Reader in Sociology of Education*. London: Routledge Falmer.
- Robeyns, I. (2003) Sen's capability approach and gender inequality: selecting relevant capabilities, *Feminist Economics*, 9(2–3), 61–91.
- Schuller, T., Brasett-Grundy, A., Green, A., Hammond, C., and Preston, J. (2002) *Learning, Continuity and Change in Adult Life*. London: Institute of Education.
- Sen, A. (1992) *Inequality Re-examined*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sen, A. (1999) *Development as Freedom*. New York: A. Knopf.
- Singh, M. (2003) Universities and society: whose terms of engagement? In: Bjarnason, S. and Coldstream, P. (Eds) *The Idea of Engagement: Universities in Society*. London: Association of Commonwealth Universities, pp.272–308.
- Skeggs, B. (1997) Classifying practices. In: Mahony, P. and Zmroczek, C. (Eds) *Class Matters. 'Working-Class' Women's Perspectives on Social Class*. London: Taylor & Francis, pp.123–139.
- Stanton-Salazar, R.D. (1997) A social capital framework for understanding the socialization of racial minority children and youths, *Harvard Educational Review*, 67(1), 1–36.
- Stewart, F. (2004) *Groups and Capabilities*. Plenary paper presented at the Fourth International Conference on the Capability Approach, University of Pavia, Italy, September 2004.
- Tett, L. (2000) I'm working class and proud of it – gendered experiences of non-traditional participants in higher education, *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 21(4), 183–194.
- Terzi, L. (2005) Beyond the dilemma of difference: the capability approach to disability and special educational needs, *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 39(3), 443–460.
- Thomas, L. (2002) Student retention in higher education: the role of institutional habitus, *Journal of Education Policy*, 17(4), 423–442.
- Unterhalter, E. (2003) Crossing disciplinary boundaries: the potential of Sen's capability approach for sociologists of education, *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 24(5), 665–670.
- Walker, M. (2005) *Higher Education Pedagogies. A Capabilities Approach*. Maidenhead: SRHE-Open University Press.
- Wedekind, V.R. (2001) *A Figurational Analysis of the Lives and Careers of Some South African Teachers*. Unpublished thesis, Faculty of Social Science and Law University of Manchester.
- Young, I.M. (2000) *Inclusion and Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 9

Lifelong Learning: Exploring Learning, Equity and Redress, and Access

An African Discourse on Lifelong Learning: A South African Case Study

Philip Higgs and Berte Van Wyk

Introduction

Adult education in South Africa has traditionally been concerned more with social, political, personal, and cultural development than with economic development. A key initiative in the movement towards a new adult education and training system in South Africa came from the formal economic sector and more particularly from the trade union movement. The unions realized that even radical improvement of the existing industrial training system would still leave their members in a second-class position. They needed to improve their skills and knowledge to get better jobs. They needed to improve educational and development opportunities in their communities to obtain a better life for their families and neighbours (Amutabi et al. 1997, p.3). The emphasis on lifelong or adult learning in South Africa should, therefore, be viewed within the context of the apartheid period (and in many respects today still), when schooling did not adequately prepare people for the job market; hence the need for improvement of skills and lifelong learning.

Lifelong learning has thus become a feature of education policy in democratic South Africa. This has been brought about by the democratization of the country, and the impact on higher education systems worldwide by changes associated with globalization. The three basic principles of education (learning, equity and redress, and access) which are discussed in this essay should, therefore, be seen within this national project of democratization, and the impact of global economic imperatives.

There is, however, a need to contextualize lifelong learning in South Africa in terms of a distinctive African discourse on lifelong learning, as opposed to Western perspectives on lifelong learning. Simply put, we think that Western perspectives are driven more by economic and market-related considerations, whereas an African perspective on lifelong learning is not primarily concerned with economic and market-related factors, but rather is concerned with human and social issues of development and empowerment. We next discuss an African discourse on lifelong learning.

An African Discourse on Lifelong Learning

In this essay we argue for an African discourse on lifelong learning in South Africa. In dealing with lifelong learning in South Africa we refer to an African discourse on lifelong learning as distinct from Western perspectives on lifelong learning, and this was dealt with briefly in the introduction.

The reason for an African discourse can be found in the unique way which characterized South Africa's smooth transition from apartheid to democracy. This transition was based on an African approach to reconciliation typified by *ubuntu* (meaning humanness). This gave momentum to the transformation of South African society, which in turn led to renewed debates on an African discourse on the nature of the social transformation that was required post 1994 in South Africa. In this regard, lifelong learning is regarded as important for social transformation.

An African discourse on lifelong learning takes cognisance of various cultural identities in South Africa, and their role in societal transformation. We contend that there are unique historical and economic challenges facing lifelong learners in South African, and that these can best be understood by analysing the African philosophical underpinnings of actions dealing with these challenges. An African discourse on lifelong learning, therefore, holds that African experiences, concerns, aspirations, and how Africans construct knowledge, are critical in an analysis of lifelong learning in South Africa.

Such a discourse will have reference to that spoken tradition and body of literature referred to as African philosophy. The role of this philosophical corpus is seen by many, for example, Diop (1996, 2000), as creating a new foundation and social fabric with the capacity to harness an ethos and intellectual production among African people as agents of their own humanity and collective progress.

Masolo (in Chukwu 2002, p.251) suggests three aspects of the philosophical task of articulating and clarifying Africans' experiences which are truly typical of philosophizing. These are the quest for genuine knowledge and the integration of African experiences into a unified and coherent view of the nature of human existence, including education, so that African philosophy should be able to respond to the problems and human conditions in modern Africa. It should also clarify the concepts, beliefs, and values which Africans hold, use and live by, through sustained discussion and dialogue. Masolo's African perspective is remarkably similar to that of Barnett (1992, p.1897), who posits that philosophy can help us to clarify our thinking about the beliefs, presuppositions, and values on which education as a social practice is founded. It follows that an African philosophical perspective on the nature of human existence, and education, can assist us in clarifying concepts and beliefs associated with an African discourse on lifelong learning. For instance, an analysis of education within an African context has to shed light on how Africans learn and construct knowledge, and also has to focus on the underlying beliefs and values that constitute education within an African context.

These underlying beliefs and values inherent in an African philosophy of education are based on two general themes in African philosophy, namely, communalism and the

notion of *ubuntu*. These two themes can be said to be pervasive to African philosophical thought in a socio-ethical sense in that they transcend the cultural, linguistic, and ethnic diversity of African peoples. In the light of this, it might be proposed that educating for communal life and *ubuntu* would be crucial to traditional African educational thought and practice, and especially to an African discourse on lifelong learning.

Educating for life, that is, lifelong learning, in the community would be rooted in, as Mkabela and Luthuli (1997, p.18) note, a welfare concern, where the basis of communalism is giving priority to the community and respect for the person. It also involves sharing with and helping persons. An African discourse on lifelong learning within this African frame of reference would help African people function in relation to one another in their communal tradition. Such a functioning would promote a collective effort directed ultimately at the good of the community. This collective effort, in turn, would be characterized by a spirit of 'ubuntu' which sees human needs, interests, and dignity as fundamental importance and concern. For an African discourse on lifelong learning this would mean that traditional African educational thought and practice would be directed at fostering humane people endowed with moral norms and virtues such as kindness, generosity, compassion, benevolence, courtesy, and respect and concern for others. In short, an African discourse on lifelong learning would be fundamentally concerned with 'ubuntu' in the service of the community and personal well-being.

What this would mean for an African discourse on lifelong learning is that the human needs, interests, and dignity of adult learners should be considered. Lifelong learning should, therefore, seek to perpetuate the norms and virtues (kindness, generosity, compassion, benevolence, courtesy, respect and concern for others) that are prevalent in African communities. If that happens, lifelong learning would be embedded in the two general themes of African philosophy, namely communalism and 'ubuntu'.

Having spelt out what is meant by an African discourse on lifelong learning; we next discuss how such a discourse on lifelong learning *should* impact upon lifelong learning and education policy in South Africa, and the education principles relating to the nature of learning, equity and redress, and access in higher education. Our observation is that, while, education policy in South Africa on lifelong learning reflect an African discourse on lifelong learning (in terms of communalism and 'ubuntu'), education policy in South Africa also reflect a Western perspective on lifelong learning. Our argument is that lifelong learning and education policy in South Africa, and the education principles relating to the nature of learning, equity and redress, and access in higher education, *should* be viewed in the context of an African discourse on lifelong learning.

Lifelong Learning and Education Policy in South Africa

In subjecting education policy in South Africa to critical scrutiny, the question arises: Do they reflect an African discourse on lifelong learning or do they pay lip service to a Western perspective on lifelong learning? In other words, what is the

intent of these policy statements – do they stand in the service of the marketplace, or do they stand in the service of the creation of a more humane society, or both?

In response to the above question, we consider several education policy pronouncements in South Africa in the post-apartheid era.

The Education White Paper 3 (1997, p.10) stresses the imperative of human resource development by the mobilization of human talent and potential through lifelong learning to contribute to the social, economic, cultural, and intellectual life of a rapidly changing society. We consider *human resource development* as a key metaphor (impersonal at that, a more humane metaphor would be *resourceful human beings*) in Western perspectives on lifelong learning, where human beings are seen to be resources to be developed for market-related purposes in serving the economy). In an African discourse on lifelong learning, we prefer to speak of *resourceful human beings* which is a more humane metaphor emphasizing the social imperative of such a discourse.

Another key policy document, namely the National Plan for Higher Education (2001), discusses lifelong learning as an outcome to broaden the social base of students. Extending the vision of the Education White Paper 3, the Ministry of Education (2001, p.28) believes that an important avenue for increasing the potential pool of recruits to higher education is to recruit non-traditional students, i.e. workers, mature learners, in particular women, and the disabled. The provision of higher education to workers, mature learners and the disabled, aside from the equity and redress imperatives, are seen to play a significant role in addressing the shortage of high-level skills in the short to medium term, especially as there is a large potential pool of recruits. The Ministry of Education, therefore, emphasizes that increasing the access of workers, mature learners, and the disabled to higher education is an important policy goal in its own right and should be approached as such rather than be regarded as an attempt to shore up falling enrolments.

However, the focus of lifelong learning on both the learner and the process of learning call for a reappraisal of concepts such as 'non-traditional' students and 'non-traditional' ways of learning. In this new context, lifelong learning means the provision of 'opportunities for higher learning and for learning throughout life, giving to learners an optimal range of choice and a flexibility of entry and exit points within the system (UNESCO 1996, in Schuetze and Slowey 2000:12). Thus, to accommodate the needs of lifelong learners it is now normally accepted that institutions of higher education have to become more open, flexible and responsive to the different circumstances and motivations of a much more heterogeneous student body in South African society.

The above sentiments are echoed by the Council on Higher Education (2004, p.18):

Rapid knowledge production and technological development as the underpinnings of international competitiveness demand educational capacity for lifelong learning: i.e. continual opportunities to expand upgrade and refresh skills acquired on the basis of prior learning. Skills acquired flexibly in this model can enable graduates to operate in diverse social settings and to develop complex notions of identity and citizenship. Giving effect to lifelong learning demands concentrated effort from higher education: the development of flexible and continuing programmes, and support and resources for such work.

In response to our question, we conclude that these policy pronouncements address the essence of an African discourse on lifelong learning, namely:

- The development of resourceful human beings
- The mobilization of human talent and potential through lifelong learning to contribute to the social, economic, cultural, and intellectual life of a rapidly changing African society

However, while we conclude that these policy pronouncements address the essence of an African discourse on lifelong learning concerned with the creation of a more humane society, it is also evident that these pronouncements also lean towards a market approach to lifelong learning. There is thus a tension between lifelong learning geared towards a more humane society and market concerns.

The Nature of Learning and Lifelong Learning

Lifelong learning in South Africa is central to economic and social cohesion. This suggests that lifelong learning cannot simply be driven by a need to secure economic prosperity but has to focus on the capacity of citizens to exercise and enforce democratic rights and participate effectively in decision-making (Ministry of Education 2001, p.7).

As stated earlier, an African discourse on lifelong learning contends that the human needs, interests, and dignity of adult learners should be considered. Lifelong learning should, therefore, seek to perpetuate the norms and virtues prevalent in African communities.

An important consideration of whether the human needs, interests, and dignity of adult learners was considered is to see what was taught during apartheid, that is, to explore the nature of the curriculum. According to Makgoba and Seepe (2004) the apartheid curriculum was used effectively as a tool not only to reproduce and promote the values, cultural norms, and beliefs of apartheid society but also as an instrument to maintain and legitimize the unequal social, economic, and political power relations. This type of learning led to the enslavement rather than the development of learners. This is exactly what lifelong learning in a democratic South Africa should prevent. Instead, prominence should be given to the type of society envisioned, the kind of knowledge, skills, and values required for cultural, social, and economic development, as Makgoba and Seepe suggests. This supports our view of an African discourse on learning which emphasizes the creation of a more humane society.

The nature of lifelong learners is equally important for determining whether lifelong learning in South Africa follows an African discourse or leans more towards the market. Barnett (1992) observes that students in higher education are adults, attending voluntarily, having undergone and demonstrated their success in earlier educational experiences. They have already been 'educated' and have minds of their own. In other words, they are knowledgeable on the needs of communities.

This knowledge should be developed and utilized to deepen democracy. Here a basic aim of higher education, namely that the student should attain a high level of intellectual powers such that he or she is able to take up a stance and defend it in a reasonable and informed way, is applicable. The attainment of a high level of intellectual powers and the ability to argue in reasonable and informed ways is an intention of an African perspective on lifelong learning. We realize that this is not necessarily the primary thrust of a Western market driven perspective on lifelong learning.

The above sentiments are succinctly captured by the Council on Higher Education (CHE) in South Africa, which describes the challenges of teaching and learning in South Africa as complex and wide-ranging (CHE 2004, p.241). The CHE suggests that teaching and learning, and research programmes, need to be conceptualized, designed, and planned for a diverse student body in the interests of social transformation and economic development. Opportunities need to be presented so that students can develop and succeed as intellectuals, professionals, and researchers; can think theoretically, can analyse with rigour, and can gather and process empirical data; and, finally, can do all this with a deep social conscience and sensitivity to the development challenges and cultures that are safe, secure, and respectful, intellectually nurturing, and engage them as partners. Once again we need to ask, is this true of an African discourse on lifelong learning? Rather than responding directly to this question, we would suggest that this highlights the tension between an African discourse on lifelong learning and a market approach to lifelong learning.

Finally, critical questions with respect to the transformation of teaching and learning and the curriculum, and the discourse of responsiveness prevailing in higher education institutions today, must be continuously posed and answered. In other words, what needs to be interrogated is, the orientation of learning programmes by asking whether they are narrowly directed at technical mastery in a discipline or field for purposes of providing skilled labour for the market place, or whether they also address issues of critical citizenship, and the context and needs of a transforming society in which knowledge must be applied.

The nature of learning associated with lifelong learning in a democratic South Africa is thus very different from that of apartheid education. The reason being, as because it focuses on human needs, interests, and the dignity of adult learners, and seeks to perpetuate the norms and virtues that are prevalent in African communities. But it is also directed at advancing skilled labour for purposes of ensuring the economic well-being of the nation in a free market capitalist society. In short, learning in lifelong learning in South Africa seems to emphasize an African discourse on lifelong learning, but also seems to be subject to market pressures.

Equity and Redress, and Lifelong Learning

An African discourse on lifelong learning stresses the importance of the development of resourceful human beings rather than human resource development. In keeping with an African discourse on lifelong learning, this section explores the

question of equity and redress. During the apartheid era the system of higher education was profoundly inequitable (CHE 2004). It was inequitable in terms of enrolments, success rates, funding, resources made available, staffing, and research outputs. In the light of this, it obviously did not serve the human needs, interests, and dignity of adult learners, and thus the need in post-apartheid South Africa for equity and redress in relation to lifelong learning.

Equity was the pre-eminent transformation demand during the first policy phase which lasted from the National Education Policy Investigation (NEPI, 1992) to the Education White Paper 3 (1997). The redress problematic is succinctly captured by Badat, Barends, and Wolpe (in Cloete 2002, p.415):

The demand is for both the enrolments and staffing of post-secondary education to begin to reflect the social composition of the broader society; for resources to be made available to historically disadvantaged groups; and for increased funding and qualitative development to support the historically black institutions.

Equity has been a cornerstone of educational policy since the inception of publicly funded mass education systems during the nineteenth century (Paquette 1998, p.41). Equity means fairness, but fairness is a two-edged word. Being fair involves both giving to each according to the common lot (horizontal equity) and giving to each according to need and merit (vertical equity). Equity raises questions of redistribution, of reshaping the way in which resources are allocated, of tampering with the existing economic pie.

The achievement of equity in relation to the composition of the student and staff bodies is one of the Education White Paper 3's central goals for the transformation of the higher education system. The goal of equity in the White Paper is linked to the imperative to address the inequalities of the past and to eradicate all forms of unfair discrimination in relation to access of opportunity within higher education for historically and socially disadvantaged groups (Ministry of Education 2001, p.36).

With respect to student equity in enrolments, opportunities and outcomes, and associated responsive objectives, it appears that HEIs have responded with relative success to policy directions, to the extent that a positive trend has been achieved in (CHE 2004, p.90):

- Overall enrolments (increased by more than 200,000 between 1993 and 2002)
- Overall graduate outputs (rising above 100,000 for the first time in 2002)
- 'Racial' composition of the student body (African enrolments increased from 40% in 1993 to 60% in 2002)
- 'Racial' profile of graduates (African graduates comprised 53% in 2002)
- Gender profile of the student body (women increased from 42% in 1993 to 54% in 2002)
- The ratio of HSS (Humanities and Social Sciences)/BC (Business and Commerce)/SET (Science, Engineering and Technology) (reached 44:30:26 in 2002)
- The ratio of HSS/BC/SET graduations (reached 49:25:26 in 2002)
- Overall university postgraduate enrolments (rose from 19% in 1993 to 23% in 2002)

- Increased master's graduations in universities and technikons
- Institutional reconfigurations to support student equity (merged HEIs are likely to achieve a student profile more in line with the population)

It is therefore evident that there is considerable movement towards a more equitable higher education system, as the above statistics indicate. And in this regard, with respect to the main argument of this essay, it would seem that endeavours to bring about equity and redress in terms of the creation of a more humane society, reflect the primary ethos of an African discourse on lifelong learning in providing an opportunity for all citizens to become resourceful human beings.

Access to Higher Education and Lifelong Learning

Access is a key consideration in an African discourse on lifelong learning, and the imperative of the development of resourceful human beings (which is so important in an African discourse on lifelong learning) is also evident in debates around access. The CHE (2004, p.17) posits that the value and legitimacy of higher education in South Africa must also be judged by the extent to which it provides access and opportunities for all South Africans. In particular, higher education must provide evidence of opening the way to black South Africans (especially Africans); to women and other socially disadvantaged groups; and to non-traditional learners, including students from working class and rural backgrounds and adults who possess work-related knowledge. In terms of the overall South African demography, Africans form 79% of the population, Coloureds 9%, Indians 2%, and Whites 10%. In terms of higher education in 2001, African students form 48% of total enrolments, Coloureds 6%, Indians 9%, and Whites 37% (CHE 2004). These figures show that Africans are still under-represented, and Whites remain strongly represented.

But is mere access sufficient? Boshier (1998, p.10) considers it naïve to think that merely facilitating access (as in distributed learning) will overcome the historic tendency for formal education to reproduce unequal power relations. He further argues that access, by itself, is not enough because it fails to overcome adverse psycho-cultural factors that impede participation.

To overcome this challenge, we identify 'epistemological accesses as a need of students'. One of the difficulties around epistemological access is the task of enabling students to become participants in and users of a shared disciplinary practice that is initially beyond their reach (Bak 1998, p.207). The challenge is that students need to acquire the language (the grammar, images, rules, and logic) of the specialist practice. We contend that access to higher education will be more meaningful if the issue of epistemological access is addressed; this will eliminate the undesirable phenomenon of mass failures by students from previously disadvantaged communities.

The above sentiment is succinctly captured by the University of the Western Cape (UWC 2000, p.11) when it states that the state wishes both to broaden access as an

equity measure and to expand access to meet human resources needs. UWC argues that neither goal is easily attained. Institutions cannot afford to carry students who do not pay their fees, so, unless there is a major expansion of student financial aid, the vast majority of students from disadvantaged communities will have no chance of obtaining a higher education qualification. There is a further issue here: to admit students from poorer schooling backgrounds is one thing; putting them in a position to succeed – giving them epistemological access – is quite another.

Another dilemma that adult learners face is that many educators (school teachers) who would wish to improve their qualifications are discouraged to do so because there are not enough financial incentives. Currently, those who make the sacrifice in time and resources to achieve a better qualification only receive a once-off taxable payment, meaning that they do not receive a salary increase. Many educators regard this compensation as totally insufficient, and hence do not regard further studies as a viable option. The result is that there is not enough skills improvement, and this impacts negatively on the quality of education and the goals of lifelong learning.

A particular challenge for lifelong learning is the provision of access to rural women. Their options are very limited, and many of them attend adult classes, mostly in the evenings. Customs such as male domination, coupled with lack of employment and social issues such as poverty make it very difficult for them to enter the formal education and training sector.

An African discourse on access in lifelong learning acknowledges that access and opportunities for Africans, women, socially disadvantaged groups, and non-traditional learners is necessary for the development of resourceful human beings. We argue that epistemological access is a key concern to achieve this objective. However, a lack of financial incentives for adult educators and challenges (male domination, poverty, etc.) which rural women face could hamper the development of resourceful human beings in South Africa.

Concluding Remarks

In this essay we argue for a distinctively African discourse on lifelong learning and we pursued this argument by way of providing a working description of an African discourse on lifelong learning, and then subjected educational policy and practice on lifelong learning in South Africa to critical examination in order to determine whether such policies and practices reflect an African discourse on lifelong learning.

Our conclusion is that there is a tension in educational policy on, and practice in lifelong learning in South Africa. While education policy seems to reflect an African discourse on lifelong learning there are clear indications that it has been corrupted by a Western perspective on lifelong learning which is driven by the demands and requirements of the market place, and this could potentially lead to the demise of a more human society which lies at the heart of an African discourse on lifelong learning.

References

- Amutabi, M., Jackson, K., Korsgaard, O., Murphy, P., Martin, Q., and Walters, S. (1997) Introduction. In: Walters, S. (Ed.) *Globalization, Adult Education and Training: Impacts and Issues*. London: Zed Books.
- Bak, N. (1998) Organizing learning in large group teaching. In: Morrow, W. and King, K. (Eds) *Vision and Reality. Changing Education and Training in South Africa*. Cape Town, South Africa: University of Cape Town Press, pp.204–213.
- Barnett, R. (1992) Philosophy. In: Clark, B.R. and Neave, G. (Eds) *The Encyclopaedia of Higher Education. Vol. 3, Analytical Perspectives*. Oxford: Pergamon, pp.1896–1907.
- Boshier, R. (1998) Edgar Fauré after 25 years: down but not out. In: Holford, J., Jarvis, P., and Griffin, C. (Eds) *International Perspectives on Lifelong Learning*. London: Kogan Page, pp.3–20.
- Chukwu, C.N. (2002) African philosophy: the task of addressing contemporary social problems. In: Presbey, G.M., Smith, D., Abuya, P.A., and Nyarwath, O. (Eds) *Thought and Practice in African Philosophy*. Nairobi: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, pp.247–254.
- Cloete, N. (2002) New South African Realities. In: Cloete, N., Fehnel, R., Maassen, P., Moja, T., Perold, H., and Gibbon, T. (Eds) *Transformation in Higher Education: Global Pressures and Local Realities in South Africa*. Lansdowne, Uttaranchal, India: Juta, pp.414–446.
- Council on Higher Education (CHE) (2004) *South African Higher Education in the First Decade of Democracy*. Pretoria, South Africa: CHE.
- Department of Education (1997) *Education White Paper 3: A Programme for the Transformation of Higher Education*. General Notice 1196 of 1997, Pretoria, South Africa: Department of Education.
- Diop, C.A. (1996) *Towards the African Renaissance: Essays in African Culture and Development*. London: Karnak House.
- Diop, B. (2000) African education: mirror of humanity. In: Higgs, P., Vakalisa, N.C.G., Mda, T.V., and Assie-Lumumba, N.T. (Eds) *African Voices in Education*. Cape Town, South Africa: Juta.
- Makgoba, M. and Seepe, S. (2004) Knowledge and identity: an African vision of higher education transformation. In: Seepe, S. (Ed.) *Towards an African Identity of Higher Education*. Pretoria, South Africa: Vista University and Skotaville Media.
- Ministry of Education (2001) *National Plan for Higher Education*. Pretoria, South Africa: Ministry of Education.
- Mkabela, N.Q. and Luthuli, P.C. (1997) *Towards an African Philosophy of Education*. Pretoria, South Africa: Kagiso.
- Paquette, J. (1998) Equity in educational policy: a priority in transformation or in trouble? *Journal of Education Policy*, 13(1), 41–61.
- Read, B., Archer, L., and Leathwood, C. (2003) Challenging cultures? Student conceptions of ‘belonging’ and ‘isolation’ at a post-1992 university. *Studies in Higher Education*, 28(3), 261–276.
- Schuetze, H.G. and Slowey, M. (2000) Traditions and new directions in higher education. A comparative perspective on non-traditional students and lifelong learners. In: Schuetze, H.G. and Slowey, M. (Eds) *Higher Education and Lifelong Learners: International Perspectives on Change*. London: Routledge Falmer, pp.3–24.
- University of the Western Cape (UWC) (21 November 2000) *Strategic Plan 2001–2005*. Bellville, TX: University of the Western Cape.

Chapter 10

Lifelong Learning and Democratic Citizenship Education in South Africa

Yusef Waghid

Why should lifelong learning be linked to democratic citizenship education?

Since the 1960s debates about the notion of lifelong learning, a term used interchangeably with lifelong education, have been very prominent in particular about the way that it relates to formal, non-formal, and informal education (Tuijnman and Boström 2002, p.93). Like Aspin and Chapman (2000, p.6), I do not wish to come up with some essentialist notion of the concept but rather, in a Wittgensteinian sense, to look at meanings of the concept in relation to its use – more specifically how the concept is used in the South African higher education system. For the purposes of this essay, however, a viable conception of lifelong learning which can assist with uncovering ways in which the concept is used is one which ‘embraces all learning that takes place from infancy throughout adult life, in families, schools, vocational training institutions, universities, the work place, and at large in the community’ (Tuijnman and Boström 2002, p.103). This view of lifelong learning finds expression in the pragmatic problem-solving approach to the concept suggested by Aspin and Chapman (2000, p.16):

[T]he whole notion and value of ‘lifelong learning for all’ might be usefully seen as a complex and multifaceted process, that begins in pre-school, is carried on through compulsory and post-compulsory periods of formal education and training, and is then continued throughout life, through provision of such learning experiences, activities and enjoyment in home, in the work-place, in universities and colleges, and in other educational, social and cultural agencies, institutions and settings – both formal and informal – within the community.

In this essay my focus will be on learning in the higher education sector. To begin with, the National Plan for Higher Education in South Africa (NPHE 2001) addresses five key strategic goals, which in the Ministry’s view are central to deliver on the transformation of higher education: (1) to provide increased access to higher education to all, irrespective of race, gender, age, creed, class, or disability and to produce graduates with the skills and competencies necessary to meet the human resource needs of the country; (2) to promote equity of access and to redress past inequalities through ensuring that the staff and student profiles in higher education progressively reflect the demographic realities of South African society; (3) to ensure diversity in the organisational form and institutional landscape of the higher education system through mission and programme differentiation, thus

enabling the addressing of regional and national needs in social and economic development; (4) to build high-level research capacity to address the research and knowledge needs of South Africa; and (5) to build new institutional and organisational forms and new institutional identities through regional collaboration between institutions (NPHE 2001, pp.16–17). These goals of the NPHE are based on the policy framework outlined in the Education White Paper (EWP) of 1997, which includes policies intended to develop a higher education system that will: (1) promote equity of access and fair chances of success to all who are seeking to realise their potential through higher education, while eradicating all forms of unfair discrimination and advancing redress of past inequalities; (2) meet, through well-planned and coordinated teaching, learning and research programmes, national development needs, including the high-skilled employment needs presented by a growing economy operating in a global environment; (3) support a democratic ethos and a culture of human rights through educational programmes and practices conducive to critical discourse and creative thinking, cultural tolerance, and a commitment to a humane, non-racist, and non-sexist social order; and (4) contribute to the advancement of all forms of knowledge and scholarship, and in particular address the diverse problems and demands of the local, national, southern African and African contexts, and uphold rigorous standards of academic quality (EWP 1997: 1.14). In short, while the EWP provides the policy framework for higher education transformation in South Africa, the NPHE focuses on key goals and strategies to be implemented to realise the central policy goals of the EWP. In 87 pages and organised in seven major sections, the NPHE announces 16 outcomes described as ‘system-wide targets and goals’ to be achieved through ‘steering mechanisms’ or ‘levers’ such as setting ‘benchmarks’ to increase graduate outputs, establishing a student financial aid scheme to ensure that academically able students who do not have the financial resources are not prevented from pursuing higher education studies, and providing postgraduate scholarships targeted at black, women and disabled students.

Moreover, one of the key outcomes specifically related to learning is that which is aimed at enhancing the cognitive skills of graduates. This involves equipping all graduates with the skills and qualities required for participation as citizens in a democratic society and as workers and professionals in the economy. In addition to technical skills graduates should also demonstrate knowledge management and organisational skills which include: computer literacy, knowledge reconfiguration skills, information management, problem-solving in the context of application, team building, networking, negotiation/mediation competences, and social sensitivity (NPHE 2001). At face value, such a notion of learning envisaged for the higher education sector seems to have in mind what Aspin and Chapman (2000, p.17) refer to as the ‘triadic’ nature of lifelong learning, namely economic progress and development, personal development and fulfilment, and social inclusiveness and democratic understanding and activity – all aspects necessary to enhance personal growth, economic labour market competitiveness, and the achievement of equitable redress, social and political justice, and democracy. Although it seems plausible that graduates could be equipped with technical, knowledge management and organisational

skills, the NPHE (as a strategy policy document) seems to be silent on strategies as to how team-building, networking, negotiation/mediation and socially sensitising competences ought to be developed. I wonder, for instance, how the NPHE hopes to equip students with team-building skills, considering that many universities in the country seem to function within institutional cultures which continue to exclude previously marginalised voices.¹ Also, how does one begin to equip university students with networking, negotiating, or mediating skills if many historically disadvantaged students seem to be inarticulate and ineloquent in relation to the hegemonic language discourses which continue to dominate universities, namely English and Afrikaans? Likewise, I am highly sceptical of sensitising efforts intended to make people aware of our diversity of cultures, especially when these activities do not necessarily engender possibilities whereby others are recognised and respected for their differences and, more importantly how these efforts could engender possibilities for civic reconciliation in the country. Therefore, if the NPHE hopes to achieve some of its strategic objectives, particularly enhancing the cognitive skills of graduates and, hence, establish more possibilities for lifelong learning, my contention is that students ought to be initiated into a democratic citizenship education agenda.

Why? This brings me to a discussion of some of the merits of a democratic citizenship education agenda, in particular why criticism, deliberation, and responsibility – constitutive meanings of democratic citizenship education – can contribute towards a reconceptualised notion of lifelong learning through university education. In another essay I give an account of democratic citizenship education which is constituted of three facets. The first is narrative, which I argue creates opportunities for students who might be less eloquent and articulate to tell their individual stories, but which are now shared collectively amongst participants as socially situated knowledge not available from just one position. Narrative offers rich possibilities for deliberative argumentation in university classrooms, since it creates conditions for students and teachers to listen and appreciate the points of view of others. It is this capacity on the part of students and teachers to value different viewpoints which helps to advance ‘deliberative argumentation’ in university classrooms. Second, universities should become seedbeds for cultivating forgiveness, if societies are to deal more meaningfully with the unintended and unpredictable outcomes of deliberative actions. If students are taught to forgive one another, the possibility of some students exposing their inner voices in deliberation, albeit controversial, provocative or threatening, would make the disclosures of their selves ‘never come to an end’. The third entails cultivating democratic citizenship in universities, which cannot just focus on teaching students deliberative argumentation and the recognition of difference and otherness. I suggest that students should also be taught what it means to act with compassion and imagination because the latter (imaginative action) seems to be desirable in promoting civic reconciliation – a practice necessary to build relations of care, justice, and trust in university dialogical actions (Waghid 2005, pp.332, 335–337). Implicit in the achievement of such a democratic citizenship education agenda is the cultivation of three interrelated practices: criticism, deliberation, and responsibility. It is to a discussion of this that I now turn, in particular the promise these practices hold for lifelong learning.

Harnessing Lifelong Learning Through Criticism

When is a person ‘critical’? To be critical does not in the first place simply mean that a person passively receives predigested information without actively engaging with such information. Someone can receive information, but fail to engage actively with it – or, as Greene puts it, to reach out for meanings (1995, p.57). In such a case, a person cannot be said to be critical, because criticism requires of a person to construct meanings, to reach beyond where she is or to transcend the given (1995, p.111). And when a person has gone beyond the given, constructed meanings and found her own voice, she has demonstrated criticism in her learning. In other words, people are critical when they do not just look at themselves as passive receivers of information, but rather when they demonstrate a willingness ‘to tell their stories, to pose their own questions, to be present – from their own perspectives – to the common world’ (Greene 1995, p.34). When a person becomes concerned to go beyond the given, she invariably wants to respond to other and different challenges which she might encounter. Put differently, she has become a lifelong learner. For example, a person who learns about the suffering of others not only imagines what others experience, but also how she might find ways to alleviate the vulnerabilities of others – to respond to others’ suffering. In this way, being critical involves wanting to look beyond the given and to search for meanings which would be responsive to the experiences of vulnerability of others – a matter of being a lifelong learner. Here I specifically think of many South African university students who claim to have learnt something, yet do not even begin to wonder how their education could respond to what must be done for those who remain tragically in need, who suffer deprivations such as family deterioration, neighbourhood decline, joblessness, illnesses such as HIV/AIDS and addictions. Hence, these students have not demonstrated criticism – that is, the ability to respond to the some of the conditions of those who might suffer vulnerabilities.

In turn, teachers are critical when they can take the initiative. Taking the initiative happens when teachers explore possibilities whereby they connect with students – that is, opening students’ worlds to critical judgements (Greene 1995, p.56). And when teachers connect with students, they set out to provoke students to break through the limits of what is taken for granted, a process Greene refers to as arousing students to ‘break loose’ and ‘to couch some of their stories’ (1995, p.110–115). If this happens, criticism on the part of teachers is already in the making, for opening students’ worlds to critical judgements is already some way of responding to what our South African higher education system so desperately seeks to achieve – university teachers who can take the initiative and who have the ability to carve a space for others whereby they can undertake responsible tasks, protest injustices, and overcome dependencies. For instance, many South African university teachers seem to uncritically teach themes related to globalisation, standards, assessment, outcomes and achievement, but they seldom provoke students to challenge or undermine these concepts. On learning outcomes, I often hear pre-service teachers at my own institution perpetuate the guarantees that outcomes can secure,

but their teachers seldom provoke them to look at outcomes as if they could be something other than what encourages critical thinking and active learning. Some university teachers seem to ignore the possibility that prescribed outcomes can undermine inventiveness, imagination, and surprise; furthermore, for many university teachers the idea that teaching outcomes can lend itself to pedagogical trickery seems to be an unlikely challenge that very few want to confront or interrogate. These university teachers (and there are many) are not critical, since their teaching does not engender a kind of disruptiveness whereby students could perceive things as they could be otherwise. Therefore these teachers act passively – they act uncritically and do not show any promise of being lifelong learners. Their teaching does not show any promise to be responsive – how could it, if they fail to break with what is supposedly fixed and finished?

Lifelong Learning Through Deliberation

Lifelong learning in the Aristotelian sense is a form of doing action – action aimed at achieving some worthwhile end. So, lifelong learning involves activities which connect with and open up students' worlds whereby they find their voices or construct their own meanings. Likewise, lifelong learning creates possibilities for learners to bring into question existing understandings and to produce meanings perhaps not thought of before. In these ways lifelong learning is said to be a form of doing action with potentially worthwhile ends in mind. But lifelong learning is not only doing morally worthwhile actions, but also actions which rely on the relationships between teachers and learners – activities which depend on people coming together 'in speech and action' (Arendt 1958, p.19). They act through dialogical relations. When university professors teach, they communicate meanings to students; but at the same time students are expected to make sense of such meanings. As aptly referred to by MacIntyre (1999, p.102), people are dependent rational animals who act in relation to one another – they share 'sets of social relationships'.

How do these dialogical relations come into being? In the first place, teachers and learners talk to one another or at least have an opportunity to do so. In this sense, the premium in cultivating dialogue is put on speech. Speech can take several forms. First, people can have a discussion whereby they exchange ideas or views without challenging one another; second, speech can take the form of debate, whereby one person attempts to produce a better argument; third, speech can take the form of questioning such as when people raise issues and expect others to respond to their questions. All these modes of 'speech' can at different times be associated with dialogue, because people have to be co-participants when they engage in such an action – they are active participants who reason together (MacIntyre 1999, p.105). Put differently, one gives to others an intelligible account of one's reasoning, and shows 'the ability and the willingness to evaluate the reasons for action advanced to one by others, so that one makes oneself accountable for one's endorsements of the practical conclusions of others as well as for one's

own conclusions'. Thus, when teachers offer an intelligent account of their reasons, they teach; when learners demonstrate the capacity to evaluate the reasons advanced by teachers – perhaps finding the reasons convincing, or incorporating the reasons into systematic controversy, or attempting to modify and adjust the reasons – they learn. Consequently, teaching and learning only take place through dialogical action. Moreover, in dialogical relations teachers and learners not only disclose their inner voices through speech, but also drive themselves towards listening and responding to others without being inhibited in doing so. They recognise that their audience has a right to be heard and listened to. According to Fay (1996, p.237), dialogical action refers 'both to the capacity to elicit another's regard in you and your capacity to become invested in the lives of others. . . . [It is] an enhanced ability to listen and respond to others; a deepened appreciation of the ways others contribute to our own self-knowledge; and an enlargement of our moral imaginations.' Enhancing our ability to 'listen and respond to others' implies that teachers and students have to be willing to hear and be open to accept what others have to say. They have to interact with others who are different, and they should mutually explore and share with others alternatives as a way to develop their own and others' understanding.

But when teachers and learners engage dialogically, all have the same chances to initiate speech acts, to question, to interrogate, and to open debate; all have the right to question the assigned topics of conversation; and all have the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the very rules of the discourse procedure and the way in which they are applied or carried out (Benhabib 1996, p.70). Such dialogical action, which involves interrelated actions such as debate, questioning, discussion, and argumentation, constitutes deliberation. Now in many South African university classrooms learners do not always have the same chances as teachers do to initiate speech acts, since teachers mostly conduct their teaching by telling learners what they need to know. Likewise, many learners do not see it as their right to question what they are being taught, since often university teachers treat academic texts as encyclopaedic and canonical material which cannot be questioned. In the main encyclopaedic inquiry is constituted of three interrelated functions. Firstly, inquiry is fragmented into a series of independent, specialised and professional activities (unrelated to a whole), whereby facts have been 'collected' and pragmatically ordered for convenience of reference. Secondly, inquiry advances a determinate account of how a list of 'Great Books' is to be read, interpreted, and elucidated. And thirdly, inquiry conclusively leads to agreement, albeit constrained (enforced) or unconstrained (MacIntyre 1990, p.216). If I relate such an account of encyclopaedic inquiry to the academic discipline of philosophy of education (with which I happen to work), then it follows that philosophy of education comprises a body of knowledge (definitions, descriptions, and explanations), which has been somewhat neutrally (objectively) 'collected' and which can be used as the point of reference to give an account of meaning. For instance, for encyclopaedists there would not be a problem in defining philosophy of education as a collection of rationally justifiable facts about events in the world. But such a definition of philosophy of education as a collection of neutral facts would itself be at odds with

other competing and rival adjudications, for example, that philosophy of education represents 'shared (intersubjective) standards of rational argumentation' or 'transcultural modes of critical engagement' or 'incommensurable paradigms' of/about events in the world. The point I am making is that an encyclopaedic account of philosophy of education would be blind to conflicting, incommensurable, and contending viewpoints on the subject. Of course, I am by no means suggesting that 'Great Books' are not worth talking about, but rather that space ought to be created for learners to interrogate – as opposed to only assimilate – the content of these texts. Failing to do so would undermine the rights of learners to offer (counter-) arguments. Hence, as a consequence of a lack of deliberation in some (or perhaps most) university classrooms, teaching and learning seem to be unjust activities, because justice is intrinsically connected to dialogical action.

When one considers that deliberative action is a necessary condition for a democracy to flourish, it seems unlikely that South Africa's higher education policy frameworks would easily achieve their intended outcomes. It is for this reason that I agree with Walzer (1983, p.304), who makes the point that democracy puts a premium on deliberation – offering persuasive arguments and listening to arguments. Teaching and learning which do not happen through dialogue with others would truncate our democracy, which should always be in the making. And, if this happens, we cannot begin to make a case for lifelong learning, since the latter has the potential to flourish within the context dialogical relations.

Lifelong Learning Through Responsibility

Undoubtedly, the higher education policy frameworks also aim to produce students who, in the words of Foucault (1988, p.152), 'are grown up enough to make up their own minds' – to be responsible citizens. Such citizens are not just obedient to the state, but also people who work with government, that is, they do not simply subject themselves to government or totally accept what government has to offer – but are resistant (Foucault 1988, p.154). And when citizens act restively, the potential exists for them to exercise their critical judgements responsibly. Even at my own institution I hear and observe how colleagues are bracing themselves to 'have everything ready' for the Higher Education Quality Committee Audit (HEQC) this year without seriously engaging with some of the potential implications such an audit can have for our institutional autonomy. Similarly, other colleagues remain forever hypercritical about the state's transformative agendas, because they cannot look beyond the entrenched privileges bequeathed them by racist, apartheid education. In a Foucauldian sense, these groups of academics are not responsible at all. Responsibility does not merely involve saying that things are not right as they are. 'It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, uncontested modes of thought the practices that we accept rest' (Foucault 1998, p.154). In essence, these people act irresponsibly – they have not yet become lifelong learners, because lifelong learning is constituted by a sense of responsibility.

This apparent lack of responsibility on the part of some university staff and their students (particularly in and through their teaching and learning) would make it extremely difficult to achieve the desired goals of transformation (as is evident at my own institution), because the exercise of responsibility is indispensable for any transformation (Foucault 1988, p.155). Bourdieu (1992, p.40) makes the point that higher education discourse seems to be dominated by ‘ready-made thoughts’, which do not sit well with any sort of responsible intervention – many universities seem to be guilty of such injustices, which further deepen the crisis of a lack of transformation. As Foucault (1988, p.155) aptly puts it: ‘[T]he work of deep transformation can only be carried out in a free atmosphere, one constantly agitated by a permanent criticism [I would say sense of responsibility as well].’

Thus far, I have shown that criticism, deliberation, and responsibility are practices which ought to constitute lifelong learning. In other words, university teachers and students cannot be said to be lifelong learners if they do not demonstrate the capacity to deal critically, deliberatively, and responsibly with educational matters – more specifically, issues related to the transformation of education in South African universities. I shall now make a case for civic reconciliation as an enabling condition for the achievement of lifelong learning in universities. The point I am making is that, if the achievement of civic reconciliation is not part of the teaching and learning at universities, it is very unlikely that these institutions could claim to engender lifelong learning.

Cultivating Civic Reconciliation: Making an Argument for Lifelong Learning

I shall now explore some of the implications of teaching and learning (framed within the concept of lifelong learning developed thus far) for civic reconciliation in South Africa. Put differently, I shall attempt to show how a responsible, deliberative, and critical disposition on the part of individuals can offer hope for enhancing civic reconciliation after decades of apartheid rule.

The achievement of civic reconciliation should always be like a narrative in the making, i.e. civic reconciliation should not be subjected to conclusiveness because that would spell the end of reconciliation. I say this because to reconcile is an act which always implies forgiveness, that is, to initiate action that can move us beyond our own feelings of hurt and resentment, and which alienate us from those who are other and different. And we can never really say at what stage in our lives and interactions with people we have actually transcended our feelings of discomfort, anger, and alienation towards the other. Simply put, reconciliation means to undo what was done, since it is ‘always an eminently personal (though not necessarily individual or private) affair in which *what* was done is forgiven for the sake of *who* did it’ (Arendt 1998, p.241). Many South Africans are faced with feelings of revenge for past injustices perpetrated against them by the apartheid rulers, and retaliation and vengeance could only provoke further revenge and political instability. Recent

efforts to reconcile and forgive on the part of many victims of past apartheid wrongs broke the chain of further revenge. Arendt (1998, pp.240–241) notes that no one person can forgive by herself: only the unpredictable cooperation of others can break the chain of unintended consequences set off by action:

Forgiveness is the exact opposite of vengeance, which acts in the form of re-acting against an original trespassing, whereby far from putting an end to the consequences of the first misdeed. . . . Forgiving, in other words, is the only reaction which does not merely re-act but acts anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act which provoked and therefore freeing from its consequences both the one who forgives and the one who is forgiven.

For me the question remains: how does one begin to reconcile? What prompts one to forgive? My contention is that people ought to be responsible, deliberative, and critical, because these acts of virtue have the potential to engender compassion, deliberation, and restiveness – all those enabling conditions which can enhance civic reconciliation and which connect with a democratic citizenship education agenda of lifelong learning. How can this happen?

Firstly, to forgive implies that one should have some regard for the other person, that is, have compassion for the other person. Nussbaum's (2001, p.299) main argument in defence of compassion is that it ought to be the emotion which should be most frequently cultivated when people embark upon just *action* in public as well as private life. For her, responsibility ought to be occasioned by the emotional response to treat others justly and humanely – with compassion. Certainly in South African universities, where diverse students from advantaged and disadvantaged backgrounds (Black and White) are beginning to deliberate (or ought to be doing so) about matters of public concern – such as crime, victimisation, homelessness, job discrimination, unemployment, domestic violence and abuse of women, poverty and lack of food, political alienation, alcoholism and drug abuse, and the absence of good prospects – certain practical judgements have to be made by students about these variants of their public and personal lives. Invariably judgements to be made will be based on students' perceptions of others' distress, undeserved misfortune, suffering, injustice, plight, disability, and disease. It is in this regard that compassion becomes a necessary condition to act and deliberate about such matters. Why? Compassion not only prompts in people an awareness of the misfortune or suffering of others, but also 'pushes the boundaries of the self' outward by focusing on others' suffering, which might be the result of no fault of their own. Only then can one be said to be acting with responsibility. This situation in turn can enhance civic reconciliation, because forgiveness and having compassion for the other are inextricably connected – they are linked to a democratic citizenship education agenda of lifelong learning.

Secondly, to forgive implies some form of intimacy and closeness that one needs to establish; it entails engaging deliberatively with others. One cannot begin to understand the feelings of others, neither can others comprehend how one feels, if deliberation does not occur among us. Reconciliatory action is a 'coming together' whereby, in this instance, teachers and students 'engage in dialogues' (Greene 1994, p.25). When teachers and students engage in dialogue they 'speak with others as passionately and eloquently as we can about justice and caring and love and trust; all we can do is to look into each other's eyes and squeeze each other's hands'

(Greene 1994, p.25). To act deliberately and justly would go a long way towards promoting civic reconciliation, because reconciliation requires that we do not enter the dialogue with set and preconceived ideas about the past and present, but rather what grows out of the dialogue offers possibilities for people to reconcile. For instance, a university student does not enter into dialogue with others to run them down for the injustices that her parents might have experienced. Rather, she enters the dialogue in order to look for possibilities as to how the past injustices can be avoided and how the future can be imagined. I remember a White undergraduate student becoming agitated in class about a Black student's presentation regarding the racial prejudice experienced by her elder sister during her years of study at a White Afrikaans-speaking university. This seemed to have been a deliberate attempt on the part of the Black student to provoke her classmates without considering that the current White students in her class were not responsible for discriminating against the Black student's sibling in the past. In such a situation possibilities for the future could not have been imagined, since the Black student's intent was to blame her classmates unjustly for an act they could not have been responsible for.

Thirdly, those who are serious about forgiveness ought to become critical, because criticism requires of one not just to express oneself freely, but also responsibly. This means free expression should not become what Gutmann (2003, p.200) calls 'an unconstrained licence to discriminate' – only then does one act responsibly, i.e. justly. In other words, the right to free and unconstrained expression ends when injustice to others begins. One can no longer lay claim to being critical and therefore being a lifelong learner if one advocates a particular point of view that cannot be separated from excluding certain individuals – that is, discriminating invidiously against others (particularly those individuals in society most vulnerable and who lack the same expressive freedom as those who are excluding them) on grounds such as gender, race, sexual orientation, ethnicity, and religion (Gutmann 2003, p.200). For example, if the Dan Roodts² of this world continue to express themselves with unhindered freedom, making unsubstantiated claims about the supposed aggression and murderous instincts of (South African) Blacks (all in the name of criticism), the possibilities for civic reconciliation would seriously be thwarted. The point I am making is that such unconstrained and irresponsible expressions are in fact uncritical utterances which do not offer possibilities for civic reconciliation to be achieved in our 10-year-old democracy, where many wounds still need to be healed. Yes, becoming critical would also entail constraining our irresponsible speech. Only then would we enter a field of more possibilities – of connecting with all South Africans in the quest to achieve civic reconciliation through lifelong learning.

LifeLong Learning, Democratic Justice, and Criticality

So what is it about democratic justice lifelong learners ought to acquire, in order for their learning to be more critical? Amy Gutmann (2003) gives a compelling account of democratic justice which can make learning more critical. For Gutmann (2003, p.26–27) democratic justice involves three interrelated aspects: the capacity

to live one's own life as one sees fit consistent with respecting equal freedoms of others – 'to treat all individuals as equal agents'; the capacity to contribute to the justice of one's society and one's world; and the capacity of individuals to live a decent life with a fair chance to choose among their preferred ways of life. Firstly, if one learns to respect the liberties of others as equally important as one's own, then one recognises that others have similar freedoms to live their lives according to what they see fit. So, when South African lifelong learners are taught to respect the freedoms of others (say from their neighbouring countries or from different communities from their own) they do not become agitated when others present points of view perhaps different from theirs – they respect the views of others. However, this does not mean that they necessarily agree with everything others have to say. They also have the right to question, undermine, and refute the judgements of others. At least the possibility of learning is there when lifelong learners begin to critically scrutinise one another's views in an atmosphere of mutual respect for one another's different or at times conflicting judgements. When lifelong learners respect one another equally, they are said to be critical because criticality demands that we give due consideration to the views of others. A group of students once came to me to express their lack of grasping some of the key concepts in philosophy of education. When I told the other students about this in the classroom they became agitated with the group (not necessarily homogenous in terms of race and culture) because they claimed that these students had no legitimate grounds to claim ignorance of the subject. I felt the majority of students were wrong to be dismissive of the group because one aspect of critical learning is that we begin to connect with students who might encounter some difficulty in getting to understand aspects of the course. In this regard, equally respecting the rights of others in order to gain some understanding of what appears to be difficult concepts to grasp, amounts to recognising that others have a legitimate voice which needs to be heard. Only then, the possibility of critical learning would be enhanced. In this way, learning to recognise different and often conflicting judgements of others seems to be a way in which to maximise critical learning. This is so because critical learning has some connection with considering the merit of others' conflicting views – that is, whether these views make sense, what MacIntyre (1990) refers to as taking others' views into 'systematic controversy'.

Secondly, to learn how to contribute to the justice of one's society and the world has some connection with critical learning. I remember a student who remarked that living in poverty is a choice which some people prefer to exercise. (This student specifically referred to the majority of Blacks who live in squalor and abject poverty in informal settlements, better known as squatter camps in South Africa.) If the student means that some people are poor and therefore have little choice to determine where they live, then I agree with him. And, if he means (and I presume this is the case) that some people are poor and cannot afford to improve their living conditions, I also agree. But if he means that we should not be doing something (whether through protests) about improving their precarious living conditions, then I disagree. In other words, one cannot claim to be a critical learner if one's learning does not result in some form of action which can potentially contribute towards

the achievement of democratic justice. I cannot imagine how students could be critical if their learning does not cause them to act anew – they need to act with a sense of justice to others. Likewise, lifelong learners cannot be critical if their learning does not contribute towards their advocating for a just world – for instance, the reduction of extreme and unacceptable levels of poverty on the African continent.

Finally, to learn what it means to be decent or civil (to be democratically just) has some connection to being critical. To show civility involves demonstrating what Stephen Macedo (1990) refers to as a sense of ‘public-spiritedness’ – that is, demonstrating a conscious awareness of others and recognising that they have to be respected on account of their difference. In South African university classrooms there are students from various cultural backgrounds and, when these students demonstrate civility they connect with one another’s stories. They are acutely aware of one another’s differences and through their ‘public-spiritedness’ collectively share the stories of their lives. That is, they are critical. However, encountering one another’s difference does not mean that one merely listens what someone else has to say without subjecting someone else’s truth claims to critical scrutiny. These students also question one another’s stories with the aim to gain a deeper understanding of the texts of their lived experiences. I recall one student in my philosophy of education class who questioned another student’s biases towards Muslims in general. One student claimed that Muslims are bigots whereas another student disagreed with this view on the basis that she lived in a Muslim country and her experience was that Muslims are generally moderate and respectful towards others (like herself) who have different cultural backgrounds. The point I am making is that questioning and undermining the views of others does not necessarily mean that one is disrespectful towards others. Rather, when one critically questions people’s unjustifiable assumptions about others is to treat them with honour, that is, not considering the unjustifiable views of others as ‘beyond the pale of critical judgement’ (Fay 1996). In this way, one demonstrates a sense of decency (civility) – one is democratically just and therefore critical.

In essence, when lifelong learners learn about democratic justice they learn to recognise equally the freedoms of others, to contribute towards private and public justice and, to be decent. In this way, they learn to be critical because criticality is linked to the realisation of a democratically just society on the grounds of having been exposed beforehand to texts which may enhance the possibility of achieving democratic justice.

Endnotes

¹ At my own institution, at the time of writing this essay, the majority of Black students (there are about 20% of them) held a protest march to highlight the prevailing racist and exclusionary measures they encounter at the institution long after the demise of apartheid education.

² Dan Roodt is an Afrikaner academic who champions the cause of White exclusiveness and Afrikaans in South Africa.

References

- Arendt, H. (1998) *The Human Condition*, 2nd Edition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Aspin, D. and Chapman, J. (2000) Lifelong learning: concepts and conceptions, *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 19(1), 2–19.
- Benhabib, S. (Ed.) (1996) *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1992) Thinking about limits, *Theory, Culture and Society*, 9(1), 37–49.
- Department of Education RSA (1997) *White Paper Three on the Transformation of Higher Education*. Pretoria: RSA Government Printer. (1.14).
- Fay, B. (1996) *Contemporary Philosophy of Science*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Foucault, M. (1988) The dangerous individual. In: Kritzman, D. (Ed.) *Politics, Philosophy and Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977–1984*. New York: Routledge.
- Greene, M. (1994) Teaching for openings: pedagogy as dialectic. In: Sullivan, P.A. and Qually, D.J. (Eds) *Pedagogy in the Age of Politics*. Urbana, IL: NCTE, pp.20–32.
- Greene, M. (1995) *Releasing the Imagination: Articles on Education, the Arts and Social Change*. New York: Jossey-Bass.
- Gutmann, A. (2003) *Identity in Democracy*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- MacIntyre, A. (1990) *Three Rival Versions of Modern Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition*. London: Duckworth.
- MacIntyre, A. (1999) *Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues*. Peru, IL: Open Court.
- National Plan for Higher Education (NPHE) (2001) Ministry of Education, Pretoria, South Africa, February.
- Nussbaum, M.C. (2001) *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tuijnman, A. and Boström, A. (2002) Changing notions of lifelong education and lifelong learning, *International Review of Education*, 48(1–2), 93–110.
- Waghid, Y. (2005) Action as an educational virtue: towards a different understanding of democratic citizenship education, *Educational Theory*, 55(3), 323–342.
- Walzer, M. (1983) *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*. New York: Basic Books.

Section III
Epistemological Questions

Chapter 11

Lifelong Learning and Knowledge: Towards a General Theory of Professional Inquiry

Colin W. Evers

Introduction

The study of lifelong learning constitutes a field of research with many disciplines and perspectives enjoying relevance owing to the wide variety of questions that can be addressed. Thus, current patterns of learning across the lifespan have their various historical antecedents, policy determinants, economic circumstances, cultural conditions, and factors to do with the beliefs, values, and practices of individuals and organizations (Jarvis 2004, pp.1–38). Within this field, the discipline of philosophy can make significant contributions. For example, in moving beyond accounts of what is the case to what ought to be the direction of lifelong learning provision, ethics and political philosophy are relevant. Philosophical perspectives on social science play a broad coordinating role in shaping the nature of empirical research in the field. And epistemology has much to say that articulates with ideas on adult learning, curriculum, and structure of theories of lifelong learning (Aspin and Chapman 2001, pp.3–33).

The focus of this chapter is on the use of epistemology to develop a general perspective on how individuals and organizations might employ continuous learning strategies in order to do better than chance in creating successful trajectories for decision and action in the context of uncertainty or limited knowledge. More narrowly, the chapter is concerned with those individuals for whom professional knowledge development requires an emphasis on autonomous self-learning. For organizations, the key question addressed concerns the tension between individual autonomy in learning and collective decision-making, and whether there is a balance that is most likely to achieve epistemically progressive group inquiry. Although the discussion is pitched at a fairly high level of generality, realistic constraints on proposed epistemically progressive practices will allow the discussion to articulate with a range of models and theories in the literature, and to result in a number of specific normative proposals.

The line of argument that I shall adopt is as follows. First, I shall attempt to identify a number of influential arguments that aim to show the theoretical limits to knowledge in some key areas of social life. Next, I shall then seek to identify the sorts of knowledge and epistemic procedures that may be invoked in responding to

these conditions of uncertainty and the character of cognitive processing that constrains these procedures. From this discussion, an argument for a common strategy for inquiry will be proposed. Finally, it shall be suggested that this strategy forms an essential element in a broader philosophy of lifelong learning.

Theoretical Approaches to Uncertainty

Uncertainty in Social Prediction

If, in the thirteenth century, someone had speculated on what kind of learning would be appropriate for alchemists in a more advanced age, it would be unlikely that they would have come up with the correct answer: none. Unlikely, because the theoretical framework informing this social forecast would have included a belief in the possibility of transforming base metals into gold. Of course, if there were some way of predicting the future growth of scientific knowledge, the forecast could have been made more accurate. Unfortunately, no such prediction is possible.

That social forecasting is fraught with hazards is well known, even among its most eminent practitioners. Over 30 years ago, Daniel Bell, in his classic book *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting* (1974), offered a view of what a society would be like with over 50% of its employees as knowledge workers:

The concept of a 'post-industrial society' emphasizes the centrality of theoretical knowledge as the axis around which new technology, economic growth and the stratification of society will be organized. (Bell 1974, p.112)

On reading it now, for all its merits, the results of the venture are mixed. For example, the large proportion of space given over to engaging Marx, and Marxist ideas, will strike today's reader as odd. But then not a lot of people in the early 1970s were predicting the collapse of the Soviet Union. Equating of the power of scientists and 'Research men' [sic] in a post-industrial society with the power of businessmen and landowners in industrial and pre-industrial societies respectively, fares better – spectacularly so in the case of Microsoft – though misses, among other factors, changes in education that produced a ready supply of highly specialized knowledge workers who fitted into the familiar roles associated with being employees, and changes in knowledge diffusion, such as the Internet, that made knowledge relatively inexpensive.

There are two theoretical arguments that I want to consider for why social forecasting has its limits. The first is due to Karl Popper. Let us suppose that theoretical knowledge (which includes scientific knowledge) does indeed shape social life in important ways. Suppose further that we have a body of such scientific knowledge formulated as rigorously as we please, together with complete knowledge of all relevant current states of affairs. Then, in its most precise form, a prediction concerning what will be future knowledge is a deduction made from all of that prior

knowledge – a deduction about what will be known in the future. However, it was Popper (1950) who noticed that not all new knowledge can be derived from what is currently known. His argument is not that the calculation is too difficult or complex. Rather, his argument is that the task is theoretically impossible. Deductions from our current knowledge will always incompletely capture future knowledge for the same reason that we cannot derive every true claim in mathematics from a set of axioms, no matter how we axiomatize mathematics. The incompleteness of axiomatized systems of mathematics, that is, their failure to capture every true mathematical statement, was first proved by Godel (1931). We now know that the same consequence applies to scientific knowledge.

Using Godel's incompleteness theorem, Popper (1950) went on to argue that a society cannot predict all of its own future states, no matter how comprehensive its knowledge is, if those future states depend on the growth of scientific knowledge (for more detail, see Evers and Lakomski 1991, pp.206–209).

Of course, no social forecaster ever pretends to have anything like comprehensive knowledge of even an aspect of the present. Instead, the talk is, quite properly, about discerning trends. But if comprehensive theory can miss significant future developments in knowledge that have society-changing consequences, then surely a resource that can sustain no better than an analysis of trends will miss even more. The upshot is that predicting the nature of something like the future knowledge requirements of the workforce, the nature of jobs, the dynamics of a population's interests, or any of a multitude of knowledge requirements for further learning in a society one of whose hypothesized forces for social change is the growth of scientific knowledge, would seem, on first consideration, to be risky at best and unachievable at worst.

Popper used this argument for the principled unpredictability of social life to apply his model of the growth of scientific knowledge to social science. Roughly speaking, scientific knowledge is said to grow by a coherent ongoing use of trial and error, or better, by an epistemically progressive process of conjecture and refutation. Begin with problems (P_1), propose solutions or tentative theories (TT_1), test the solutions for errors (EE_1) and move on to a new or more refined problem (P_2). This can be expressed by Popper's (1979, p.121) schema:

$$P_1 \Rightarrow TT_1 \Rightarrow EE_1 \Rightarrow P_2$$

Notice that it is an iterative cycle. Although the schema is simplified, and was not formulated by Popper to capture cognitive processes, it can also function as the starting point of an analysis that can be extended to include a realistic model of cognition (see Chitpin and Evers 2005; Evers and Lakomski 1991, pp.35–37; Evers and Lakomski 2000, pp.22–24; Evers 2000a).

The challenge, when applying this approach to knowledge of social science, is to ensure that the tentative theories can be tested adequately against empirical evidence. Because events in the social world are highly sensitive to contextual factors, the tentative theories under test will be comprised of many hypotheses that are potentially relevant to the observed outcome. Success in using this methodology to

learn about the social world will thus depend on the extent to which a small number of relevant explanatory hypotheses can be identified. Without being able to do this, it is hard to tell which hypothesis, or cluster of hypotheses, is responsible for an observed error in the theory's expected outcome. When it comes to testing knowledge in the social world Popper's (1957, pp.64–70) advice, therefore, is to engage in small scale, or piecemeal, change. Improving one's knowledge of social phenomena by the process of theoretically guided testing of conjectures requires modest interventions, on pain of not knowing which conjecture is most responsible for an outcome. It also requires learners to somehow recognize which features of the world are relevant and which are irrelevant for testing conjectures. This latter issue is known as the frame problem and will be discussed later.

Much professional lifelong learning that is based on extending knowledge through experience occurs in this way (Chitpin and Evers 2005). Here is an example (Figure 1) of how a relatively inexperienced teacher uses this methodology to improve his professional knowledge of classroom control in order to achieve the pedagogical objective of trying to stop his Hong Kong secondary four (F4) students (about age 16) from falling to sleep in his class. Notice how the continuous learning cycles of problem, tentative theory, and error elimination – known as Popper Cycles – link together in an epistemically progressive way.

One problem with learning about the social that has increasingly attracted the attention of theorists has been the issue of chaos. The worry, which is our second theoretical argument for placing restrictions on social forecasting, is that even relatively tiny epistemic interventions of the sort favoured in piecemeal social change can set in chain quite significant changes. This is sometimes referred to as the butterfly effect, the idea being that a butterfly flapping its wings in Tokyo can trigger a chain of events that leads to a hurricane striking North America. To see how this idea works, consider a simple n -step process where the next state of a system, X_1 (say, part of a wider social system) is some function, f , of the previous, initial state of the system, X_0 . Thus:

$$X_1 = f(X_0).$$

Now, since the process specified above is iterative, we have

$$X_2 = f(X_1) = f(f(X_0)) = f^2(X_0).$$

And for the general case we have

$$X_n = f(X_{n-1}) = f^n(X_0)$$

It is easy to see how sensitivity to initial conditions can arise with even simple functions. Let f be a function that squares initial values for X . Thus:

$$X_1 = X_0^2.$$

Popper Cycle 1	Popper Cycle 2	Popper Cycle 3	Popper Cycle 4	Popper Cycle 5	Popper Cycle 6
P1: How can I stop Form 4 students sleeping in my English class?	P2: How to stop students sleeping in class and maintain a warm classroom atmosphere?	P3: How to motivate students to learn English?	P4: How to motivate students to learn English in the local school setting?	P5: How to make the materials easier for students?	P6: How to find time to adapt more authentic materials?
TT1: This is achieved by waking up the students and giving punishment to them.	TT2: This is achieved by giving more written tasks to keep students busy and awake.	TT3: This is achieved by using games and activities in class.	TT4: This is achieved by replacing some course-book materials with more authentic materials.	TT5: This is achieved by adaptation and design of guiding activities for the authentic materials.	TT6: This is not totally under my own control. I have to seek support from the school authority.
EE1: There are too many interruptions in class and the class atmosphere becomes tense.	EE2: Situation is improved in the sense that fewer students fall asleep but students are still not learning as they just do the worksheets in a mechanical way.	EE3: Students enjoy the games but create noise and disturb other classes in the crowded school setting.	EE4: Students are more active in class discussion but rely a lot on L1 (Chinese) as translation is frequently asked for with the authentic materials which are far too difficult for them.	EE5: The adapted materials are well-received by students and students rely less on L1. But it all takes a lot of time.	EE6: Two lessons each cycle are cut off from my teaching timetable. I have more time to tailor materials for students and higher passing rate in HKCEE is recorded from students who are taught with the adapted materials.

Figure 1. PGDE Student: My building of knowledge as successive Popper Cycles

But iterating this n times gives

$$X_n = X_0^{2^n}.$$

These iterations would result in an extraordinary magnification of even the smallest error in X_0 , although the function is not equally sensitive for all chosen initial

conditions, and so is therefore not technically chaotic (Banks, Dragan, and Jones 2003, pp.150–153). A non-linear function that does have chaotic behaviour is

$$f = 4X(1 - X)$$

since all succeeding iterates change quite sharply over very small variations in earlier values of X . It also meets two other technical conditions for chaotic behaviour: transitivity and density (see Banks, Dragan and Jones 2003, pp.157–177 for details). Systems obeying this formula are unpredictable in the presence of even tiny errors.

These considerations still leave open the question of whether some social phenomena are really the result of chaotic system behaviour, or at least sensitivity at certain points in the system's dynamics, for we need to know how to model the system with appropriate formulas. Unfortunately, even if it were theoretically possible to do so, social systems are too complex to lend themselves to this sort of modelling. Some writers have used the above formalism of iterated functions to try to establish general conditions for social stability and instability, and hence predictability (see Saperstein 1999, on predicting the outbreak of wars). Why, for example, did the 'murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in the Balkans in 1914' lead to the mass slaughter of World War I, but 'the downing of a Korean Boeing 747 by Soviet warplanes did not escalate into a major armed conflict'? (Geeraerts 1998, pp.5–6). Such examples of tipping points suggest the plausibility of supposing some system sensitivity even if there is insufficient modelling to prove it formally.

Whether unpredictability due to chaos is known or unknown, the hedge against it is the familiar one of attending to feedback and adjusting theoretically motivated expectations.

As odd as it may seem, the presence of chaos may be an advantage in control systems, if rapid responses are required. Chaotic systems would seem to be utterly unreliable, given their extreme sensitivity to initial conditions. Yet . . . [t]hat same sensitivity allows a control mechanism to control the system with very small corrective signals, provided the developing chaos can be analysed rapidly, i.e. proper feedback is available. (Wilkinson 1999, p.116)

What this means in the case of social science is that outcomes of iterated previous states of affairs need to fall within certain measurable boundaries linked to the goals of the system. A school, for example, however sensitive to a particular configuration of conditions that it passes through, will have its goals mediated by the parameter settings of its main variables: budgets, staffing levels, job requirements, student performance, and the like. And as these will most likely be both internally and externally monitored, our knowledge of the operation of the school will be procedurally incremental.

Again, a more appropriate approach to doing better than chance in dealing with uncertainty in a complex, changing, social world is to engage in continuous learning from experience. All experience is, of course, interpreted from the vantage point of knowledge built up from a variety of sources. But the need for a continuous taking stock of the passing show seems an imperative when it comes to social knowledge.

Uncertainty and Prior Knowledge

One way in which it might be thought possible to bypass the need for a person to learn continuously from monitoring and critically reflecting on experience is by making use of records of other people's experience. Written accounts of theories, which may compress and organize knowledge, or case studies, are often used in professional education programmes. The core idea is that reading about, or listening to, other people's relevantly similar experiences can function as a useful guide for our own decision and implementation practices. And so it can. A school principal, wishing to develop an effective response to the problem of falling enrolments in an environment of demographic decline, may learn valuable lessons from another school's effective response. Whether this occurs by accident or not will turn on whether the teaching example is in fact known to be relevantly similar.

Granted the importance of context, the determination of relevance is a tricky matter. Presumably, learning from others requires becoming clearer about what is involved in understanding claims of the following form:

Under conditions, *C*, doing *X* will result in *Y* occurring.

The matter of learning something useful from other sources and contexts therefore requires that 'conditions *C*' be unpacked into two types: those that are background, and those that are essential or required for the outcome to occur. Situations that are relevantly similar would be those in which the essential conditions were present.

It is easy to see how this sort of framework can be applied. For example, we can say that someone can learn how to fix a car that won't start, by some mixture of tuition, reading the manuals, and practical experience, because the essential conditions are duplicated in an identifiable way across almost all automobiles. That is, the causal structure of the process is relatively well defined and knowable. Such is the case with much scientific inquiry that proceeds by controlled laboratory experiments that involve the testing of hypotheses by permuting the influence of a defined set of causal agents. Thus Pasteur was able to test claims about the spontaneous generation of maggots in a nutrient as against their airborne introduction, by fitting a gauze top to nutrient containers (Fodor 1990, p.151). The experimental set-up helped to specify the distinction between background conditions and essential conditions.

Unfortunately, when it comes to understanding the social world, the background/essential distinction is not always known or easy to draw. This is because the structure and dynamics of social causation is very complex. Worse still, what is essential in one context may not be essential in another. Take, for example, relational social properties such as leadership. The reason why the quest for essential traits of leadership failed was because leadership is also contingent upon followership. Thus the sort of leadership required to run an organization characterized by hierarchical relations of authority could be expected to be different to what is required to run a more collegial and democratic organization (Evers 2000b). Under these conditions, it is best to treat the knowledge derived from other sources and

contexts as provisional and a basis for hypotheses about what might be the case beyond those sources and contexts. That is, the borrowing and application of knowledge is itself the starting point of a further cycle of continuous lifelong learning rather than an endpoint.

Notice that it's in dealing with the dynamical aspects of the social world that limitations on knowledge become most apparent. Suppose that without a set of known social laws and their conditions of applicability, we have the next best thing: a valid representation of the statistical structure of the social world. Consider, now, what happens when we act on this representation in a way that changes that reality. In other words, we engage in knowledge-driven interventions. But because the representation is not known to capture law-like features of the social world that will sustain counterfactual reasoning, a change to the reality on which the representation is based will undermine evidence for the validity of the representation (see Evers 2001, pp.104–105). Paradoxically, such interventions will risk diminishing the case for making them. Once again, even when our most statistically valid accounts of the social world are available, when it comes to their use in interventions, we must treat them as the beginning of a learning cycle and not an epistemic given.

Uncertainty about Values, Goals and Purposes

Much of the previous discussion on uncertainty has focused on what might be called means: knowledge required in order to achieve some end. The argument has been that principled uncertainty invests our knowledge of the social world in which we live, make our decisions and work out and act upon our life plans. What is more, this uncertainty spills over into estimating our future knowledge needs for work and for solving the problems that we face. In the face of this uncertainty, I have proposed a pragmatic, experimental approach that involves continuous learning, with each present moment of knowledge and circumstance as the start of a new cycle of ongoing learning.

I now want to argue that a principled uncertainty invests the larger question of ends. This conclusion is not implausible because, for a variety of reasons, many regard normative issues as controversial, contested, or difficult to determine. Nevertheless, I shall attempt to offer an account of exactly why this is so. The first step consists in acknowledging that the justification for the sorts of ethical, cultural, aesthetic, and other norms that figure in the determination of human goals and purposes is evidentially complex. Many considerations come into play. For example, in determining a stance on the level of reductions in the use of fossil fuels to slow global warming, a number of theories that purport to describe empirical consequences of producing greenhouse gases comport with alternative scenarios of consequences for different levels of reduction, and some valuation of each of the options that is related to further theories of value, reason, human well-being or flourishing, metaphysical and theological views of ultimate purposes, and so on.

The resulting body of theory that is invoked for setting our beliefs about ends is both isotropic and Quinean, to use Fodor's (1981, pp.104–119) terminology. It is isotropic in the sense that evidence or theory relevant for justifying our normative beliefs can come from anywhere in our system of thought. Confirming evidence can turn up from surprisingly diverse sources. And it is Quinean in the sense that the global properties of the whole system are relevant to the determination of the epistemic strength of a piece of evidence. For example, does the displacement of people in low-lying islands have consequences that fail to cohere with the value we place on the abundance of cheap fossil fuel energy?

Roughly speaking, dealing with questions of justification in an isotropic and Quinean system of thought is a matter of trying to find the 'best fit' between evidence and theory, where this requires reference to global, or holistic, considerations of theory excellence. So far, so good. Epistemic justification must look at more than empirical data. The bad news is that the implementation of claim adjudication by appeal to the global merits of a large-scale theory looks to be computationally intractable for even a modestly sized system. For example, in commenting on one of the best known models (Thagard 1992) for calculating global coherence as constraint satisfaction, Millgram (2000, p.87) remarks that 'there are reasonably sized inputs for which you will not be able to solve the problem – at any rate, not before the universe freezes over'. Once again, the solution to the problem of critical learning and engagement with values seems to involve some kind of piecemeal epistemic approach that extends over the lifetime of the learner.

Responding to Uncertainty

Individual Learning

There are many theories about how adults learn that are relevant to the study of lifelong learning (for a recent survey, see Jarvis 2004). Here is a distillation of views proposed by Jarvis (2004, pp.125–126) that is in keeping with our emphasis on lifelong learners who are primarily engaged in autonomous self-learning:

- Experience regarded as a problem
- Observations and reflections during which relevant data, thoughts, ideas about the problem are assimilated
- Formulate possible solutions, i.e. hypotheses
- Test each hypothesis by action/research until a solution is discovered
- Assimilate solution
- Experience no longer a problem

This broad framework is compatible with a range of philosophical stances towards lifelong learning. Processes of reflection and hypothesis testing can be found in critical thinking programmes (Splitter and Sharp 1995). Ideas on education for

democratic citizenship comport well with it (Gutmann 1999) as do various positions on liberal education (Evans 2003, pp.95–127) and the development of self identity (Chappell et al. 2003, pp.71–87). The challenge is to spell out some of the detail of these processes in a way that displays how their use can get us around in a complex world doing better than tossing a coin to make decisions. We saw earlier how a model of continuous learning based on Popper Cycles (Figure 1) could be epistemically progressive in the complex social situation of a classroom. I now want to elaborate and add to this model in a number of directions so that it can be strengthened to provide more explanatory detail and to deal with some of the difficulties stemming from uncertainty.

Consider the learning process as portrayed in Figure 2.

A person’s expectations are driven by a preferred theory, T_1 , which also drives decision choices that lead to resultant patterns of feedback. Matches between feedforward expectation and feedback experience confirm T_1 . Mismatches function as disconfirmations and require adjustments to be made. Because of theoretical and practical limitations to theory and the complex dynamics of the world, mismatches will always occur. Because of theoretical and practical limits to epistemic processes, only a relatively restricted range of alternatives for theory revision can be considered. If the revisions can be made within the framework of T_1 , fine. Otherwise, we move to consider the next best theory, T_1^* .

In the light of these limitations, this learning process needs to deal with two instantiations of what is known as the frame problem. The external version of the problem amounts to choosing what parts of the environment we can safely ignore as unchanged, or unaffected, or irrelevant when we act or plan to act. It is ‘the




Figure 2. Theory and evidence: expectation and experience

problem of finding adequate collections of laws of motion' that will provide this information (Dietrich and Fields 1996, p.14). Such knowledge is important for implementing the kind of Popperian piecemeal, or small-scale, change that is essential for learning from a complex world.

The internal version of the frame problem amounts to the task of knowing what beliefs we can safely hold constant in an isotropic and Quinean system while applying global criteria to the relatively small number of beliefs than may be implicated in mismatches between expectation and experience. As Fodor (1983, p.114) puts it in relation to a discussion of the problem in the domain of artificial intelligence: 'How, then, does the machine's programme determine which beliefs the robot ought to re-evaluate given that it has embarked upon some or other course of action?'

For lifelong learners faced with the task of growing their own knowledge to deal with problems in a constantly changing social landscape of ideas and circumstances, I want to propose three relevant perspectives that may help to ameliorate the effects of the frame problem. The first is simply natural science. When we, as pedestrians, cross a busy road, we can focus on our relative position to moving vehicles without worrying about whether the road will turn into marshmallow, or boulders will suddenly materialize before us, because of a vast number of accepted scientific regularities about the natural world. We assume people depart rooms via doors rather than passing through walls, and that the coins in our pockets do not turn into sawdust. To be sure, nature has its surprises, but these are not constantly before our mind until they actually occur.

A further source of stability and predictability is the institutional nature of much of our social life (see Searle 1995; Engel 2005). For example, what mostly distinguishes teachers from non-teachers as employees in schools and school systems is not that teachers teach and non-teachers do not, but rather the nature of employment contracts. Teaching roles, insofar as they are employment related, are constitutively defined by these sorts of contracts in ways analogous to the roles of bowlers and batsmen in a game of cricket. For purposes of knowing what to regard as stable, or for making predictions, we do not even have to know the details of the constitutive rules. We merely need to believe that some such rules exist. And the same applies to the regulation of pre-existing activities too. Thus, when we cross that busy road, we expect cars travelling in the same direction to all be driving on the same side of the road. This is because successful sharing of the roads requires that the basic traffic coordination problem be solved. Regulative rules implement the solution and no one is allowed to drive unless they have demonstrated satisfactory knowledge of these rules (Evers and Wu, 2006).

It is worth emphasizing that institutional change is not necessarily connected to technological change or to the growth of scientific knowledge and that even the social impact of such growth of scientific knowledge is of differential relevance to many issues and tasks. Students of land transport will observe that not much changed on the theme of axles, wheels, and horsepower for a few millennia. Even today's system of roads and horseless carriages would not be unintelligible to a visitor from the first century in terms of function and purpose. An aeroplane, by contrast, is another matter entirely. Excepting birds, there is no familiar design

principle to extrapolate backwards in time because the internal combustion engine, upon which the concept of an aeroplane's propulsion and flight crucially depends, did not exist until the nineteenth century. Technological knowledge can indeed lead to surprising applications.

But the same argument fails to go through for key social practices. Take concepts of social governance. The dominant form in history has been non-representative leadership, typified by an assortment of pharaohs, chiefs, kings, queens, popes, etc., drawing their authority from special knowledge, from God, from inheritance, or whatever. But if the practice of multiparty representative democracy is seen as an improvement, or even as an ideal solution to the problem of governing nation states, it's not the solution to a technological problem or one requiring scientific knowledge, and the solution is unlikely to be improved by advances in technology, except at the margins. Indeed, some have even argued that arrival at representative democracy heralds a kind of end of history.

This suggests that for practical purposes, in deciding what can be learned from experience, the stability of institutional arrangements is worth accepting, at least provisionally, pending evidence to the contrary.

The third perspective that is helpful in strengthening ongoing processes of autonomous self-learning from experience, especially experience that is theorized to admit of chaos, is control theory. For learners, this involves attending to possible feedback loops in social systems. In classical control theory, the desired output of a system – say an air conditioner operating in a room – would be the temperature of the room. The temperature, called the reference variable, is monitored so that the inputs to the air conditioner, in this case electricity, are controlled so that the room reaches the desired temperature (Eliasmith 2003, pp.507–509). The system is self-regulating and free from the conditions that lead to chaotic behaviour.

Unfortunately, social systems are never as simple as this example suggests. There are many overlapping components with nested feedback loops and a variety of interlocking reference variables, inputs, and control mechanisms. Understanding the causal structure of such complex arrangements would appear to be a daunting task, certainly if analysed using the resources of traditional control theory. However, recent developments are more promising. As Eliasmith (2003, p.499) notes: 'Modern control theory introduced the notion of an "internal system description" . . . [which] is one that includes *system state variables* (that is, variables describing the state of the system itself) as part of the description.' Now what I want to suggest is that descriptions of significant aspects of organizational life and its goings-on are relatively semantically transparent when viewed through the eyes of institutional theory. That is, instead of relying on hypothesized causal accounts of nested cycles of feedback loops that process inputs and outputs, we can make use of the whole fine-grained descriptive apparatus of constitutive and regulative definition to give us the details. Much of what social systems can do is constrained by these definitions and learners can use this knowledge to be more discriminating in selecting what is unquestioned background and what is revisable foreground in adjusting their conceptual schemes in response to the exigencies of experience.

The view I am thus proposing is that a useful framework for individuals to engage in continuous learning about social life and its contexts is one that involves the coherent adjustment of one's theory of the world in the light of experience. But to answer the question of which adjustments to make, we need to have principles for selecting the bulk of our theory that is reasonable to hold constant, in the face of the isotropic and Quinean nature of our theory. These principles are (1) appeals to natural science, (2) appeals to the constitutive and regulative rules that specify much organizational and social life, and (3) attention to feedback and self-regulation properties of systems as revealed by the operation of the first two principles.

Collective Learning

In responding in an epistemically progressively way to uncertainty in the face of complexity and the limitations of knowledge, it is important to consider the cases where it is the group that learns and not just the individual. This is an enormous research topic, with much work being devoted to organizational learning as well as social epistemology. I shall therefore confine my remarks to a small, but relatively general, aspect of the matter.

When it comes to group learning, it is useful to deal with the question of how a group may be organized so as to more effectively revise its beliefs in the light of experience. One significant way in which problems over learning can occur is when the collective is organized in such a way that it suffers from what is known as confirmation bias, namely, where it construes all evidence, come what may, as supporting its current beliefs. Edwin Hutchins (1995, pp.243–261) provides an interesting computer simulation of group confirmation bias, the conditions that give rise to it and how these might be ameliorated. He constructs the case of a group that contains four individuals, with each individual being able to hold one of two theories. Each theory is comprised of just three hypotheses. So each individual can choose between Theory 1, made up of hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, or Theory 2, made up of hypotheses 4, 5, and 6. Let us suppose further that the evidence for each theory contains some ambiguity, and that the individuals can communicate with each other in some preferred way, either supporting particular hypotheses to varying degrees or opposing particular hypotheses. (See Figure 3 for features of this setup. The heavy lines between individuals indicate strong support, the light lines, weak support and the dotted lines indicate opposition.)

Although the details of the simulation need not concern us, the conclusion is both striking and commonsense. The group needs to avoid confirmation bias and, at the same time, reach agreement about which theory everyone can accept. In this kind of arrangement, Hutchins found a fundamental trade-off between the need to make decisions and the need to avoid error. If one of the members of the group functioned as a leader in the sense that their views helped shape the views of others, then the group was much more efficient at decision-making. Unfortunately, the




Figure 3. Modeling an organization of individuals. Each individual is able to choose among two interpretation, or sets of hypotheses. Not all nodes representing hypotheses are shown for each individual (Adapted from Hutchins, 1995. p. 251.)

Leadership versus Learning

	<u>Confirmation bias</u>	<u>Decision-making capacity</u>
<u>No leader</u>	Low	Low
<u>Leader</u>	High	High

Figure 4. The decision-making/confirmation bias trade-off

price paid was a rise in confirmation bias, with the group reluctant to change its mind even as contrary evidence accumulated. On the other hand, in the absence of a leader, the group was more readily able to assess evidence contrary to expectation and eventually change its mind, but it was less decisive in the time it took to make decisions. The resulting trade-off is expressed in Figure 4.

This is an issue for precisely the area of inquiry for which we are seeking an approach to lifelong learning, namely the growth of professional knowledge within the context of complex organizational and institutional arrangements where social theory is of relatively limited value in prescribing courses of action. Under these conditions, evidence will be ambiguous, and theory choice will be difficult. Where the trade-off between decision-making and error reduction should be made will depend on the nature and purpose of the organizations that shape the learning contexts. There is no one point on the continuum that will apply to all organizations, although as a first approximation we may assume that professional knowledge workers will require fairly high levels of epistemic autonomy. This means that individual learning, even from an organizational learning perspective, will probably

look much like the kind of individual learning discussed earlier. In any case, we should note as a minimum constraint that models of organization and management structures drawn from one context cannot be uncritically applied to other contexts, particularly in relation to flat versus steep management designs, and staff autonomy versus managerial control.

Conclusion

Central to a philosophy of lifelong learning should be a view of epistemic practices that can assist in overcoming both the practical and the principled uncertainties that conspire to thwart the ready solution of problems and the making of good decisions. The process of testing our theorized conjectures against experience, informed by a demand to satisfy as many agreed constraints as possible in the most coherent way we can, though fallible, has the immense virtue of being self-correcting over the longer term and leads to knowledge building that is of use despite the particularities, contingencies, and dynamics of the learner's circumstances. Learners utilizing the best prior knowledge available will find this a suitable framework for navigating their way through the world, at better than chance, even given the presence of complexities, uncertainties and ambiguities.

References

- Aspin, D. and Chapman, J. (2001) Towards a philosophy of lifelong learning. In: Aspin, D., Chapman, J., Hatton, M., and Sawano, Y. (Eds) *International Handbook of Lifelong Learning, Part One*. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer, pp.3–33.
- Banks, J., Dragan, V., and Jones, A. (2003) *Chaos: A Mathematical Introduction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bell, D. (1974) *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting*. London: Heinemann.
- Chappell, C., Rhodes, C., Solomon, N., Tennant, M., and Yates, L. (2003) *Reconstructing the Lifelong Learner: Pedagogy and Identity in Individual, Organisational and Social Change*. London: Routledge Falmer.
- Chitpin, S. and Evers, C.W. (2005) Teacher professional development as knowledge building: a Popperian analysis, *Teachers and Teaching: Theory and Practice*, 11(4), 419–433.
- Dietrich, E. and Fields, C. (1996) The role of the frame problem in Fodor's modularity thesis: a case study of rationalist cognitive science. In: Ford, K.M. and Pylyshyn, Z.W. (Eds) *The Robot's Dilemma Revisited: The Frame Problem in Artificial Intelligence*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex, pp.9–24.
- Eliasmith, C. (2003) Moving beyond metaphors: understanding the mind for what it is, *Journal of Philosophy*, 100(10), 493–520.
- Engel, C. (2005) *Generating Predictability: Institutional Analysis and Institutional Design*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Evans, N. (2003) *Making Sense of Lifelong Learning: Respecting the Needs of All*. London: Routledge Falmer.

- Evers, C.W. (2000a) Connectionist modeling and education, *Australian Journal of Education*, 44(3), 209–225.
- Evers, C.W. (2000b) Leading and learning in organizational contexts: a contribution from the new cognitive science, *International Journal of Leadership in Education*, 3(3), 239–254.
- Evers, C.W. (2001) Knowing how to lead: theoretical reflections on inference to the best training. In: Wong, K.C. and Evers, C.W. (Eds) *Leadership for Quality Schooling: International Perspectives*. London: Falmer Press, pp.103–115.
- Evers, C.W. and Lakomski, G. (1991) *Knowing Educational Administration*. Oxford: Pergamon.
- Evers, C.W. and Lakomski, G. (2006) *Exploring Educational Administration*. Oxford: Pergamon.
- Evers, C.W. and Wu, E.H. (2006) On generalizing from single case studies: epistemological reflections, *Journal of Philosophy of Education*. 40(4), 511–526.
- Fodor, J.A. (1983) *The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Fodor, J.A. (1990) *A Theory of Content and Other Essays*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Geeraerts, G. (1998) Non-linear dynamics and the prediction of war, *POLE Paper Series*, 4(1), <http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/pole-papers/pole0401.htm>
- Godel, K. (1931). *On formally undecidable propositions of principia mathematica and related systems* (trans. Meltzer, B. with Introduction by Braithwaite, R.B. (1962) Edinburgh, UK: Oliver & Boyd.
- Gutmann, A. (1999) *Democratic Education*. Princeton, NJ.
- Hutchins, E. (1995) *Cognition in the Wild*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Jarvis, P. (2004) *Adult Education and Lifelong Learning*. London: Routledge Falmer.
- Millgram, E. (2000) Coherence: the price of the ticket, *Journal of Philosophy*, 97(2), 82–93.
- Popper, K.R. (1950) Indeterminism in quantum physics and in classical physics: Part II, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 1(3), 179–188.
- Popper, K.R. (1957) *The Poverty of Historicism*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Popper, K.R. (1979) *Objective Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Saperstein, A.M. (1999) *Dynamical Modeling of the Onset of War*. Singapore: World Scientific.
- Searle, J. (1995) *The Construction of Social Reality*. New York: Free Press.
- Splitter, L. and Sharpe, A. (1995) *Teaching for Better Thinking*. Melbourne: ACER.
- Thagard, P. (1992) *Conceptual Revolutions*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Wilkinson, M.H.F. (1999) Non-linear dynamics, chaos-theory, and the ‘sciences of complexity’: their relevance to the study of the interaction between Host and Microflora, http://old-herborn-university.de/literature/books/OHUni_book_10_article_11.pdf, pp.111–130.

Chapter 12

The Nature of Knowledge and Lifelong Learning

Jean Barr and Morwenna Griffiths

Introduction

Lifelong learning is more than is assumed in current policy rhetoric. This rhetoric focuses on training for a 'knowledge economy' in which all citizens play their part. The position as articulated by the Council of the European Union exemplifies this rhetoric and how it is understood in policy terms. Their conception of lifelong learning is narrow but not solely focused on the knowledge economy and employability. Citizenship and personal fulfilment are also mentioned. The Council's resolution on lifelong learning begins as follows (CEU 2002, para. 1):

Education and training are an indispensable means of promoting social cohesion, active citizenship, personal and professional fulfilment, adaptability and employability. Lifelong learning facilitates free mobility for European citizens and allows the achievement of the goals and aspirations of European Union countries (i.e. to become more prosperous, competitive, tolerant and democratic). It should enable all persons to acquire the necessary knowledge to take part as active citizens in the knowledge society and the labour market.

The resolution continues by summarising actions taken by the Council since the European year of lifelong learning in 1996. The summary demonstrates how European policy on lifelong learning became sharply curtailed from the start, focusing almost exclusively on employability. The first of these actions is typical of the ones that follow (CEU 2002, para. 4):

The November 1997 extraordinary Luxembourg European Council introduced increased employability and ability for adaptation through training, as priority issues within its employment guidelines and lifelong learning has since then become a horizontal objective of the European employment strategy.

Such statements contrast with those to be found in organisations taking a wider view of the kind of learning needed for 'active citizenship' and 'personal and professional fulfilment'. Compare, for instance, the following two statements from the Charter of Principles of the World Social Forum (2001):

The World Social Forum is an open meeting place for reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free exchange of experiences and interlinking for effective action, by groups and movements of civil society that are opposed to neo-liberalism and to domination of the world by capital and any form of imperialism, and are committed

to building a planetary society directed towards fruitful relationships among Mankind and between it and the Earth.

As a forum for debate the World Social Forum is a movement of ideas that prompts reflection, and the transparent circulation of the results of that reflection, on the mechanisms and instruments of domination by capital, on means and actions to resist and overcome that domination, and on the alternatives proposed to solve the problems of exclusion and social inequality that the process of capitalist globalisation with its racist, sexist and environmentally destructive dimensions is creating internationally and within countries.

In these principles are found an assumption that learning is lifelong, and that it will be directed towards the socially cohesive, tolerant and democratic world that the Council of Europe mentioned. However the language is richer, referring to fruitful relationships and the resistance of domination. It clearly takes a stand.

Governmental policy statements also contrast with the kind of personal and professional learning held to be significant by many individuals. Here is one example of such learning in the context of informal groups, which are socially and politically oriented. Robert was talking about his own commitment as an educator working for social justice:

Two, three years ago I would have found it difficult even to say the g. a. y. word, such was my own discomfort around that for me personally. In the last two weeks I've been reflecting on my own personal and professional shift. This was triggered by thoughts around World Aids Day which is coming up. I thought about what I've done on World Aids Days in the past, then began to reflect on, well, OK, what did it mean though, for me? I think the main one would have to be recognition of sexual orientation. I think the shift in me has gone from feeling very vulnerable, very unsure, to something which is more empowered. I really do need to give myself a big tick for doing some assertiveness training. I'm proud to be one of the founding members of Swan which is a gay and bisexual men's assertiveness training association. I think that personal work has helped me a lot professionally.

It is clear from this extract that Robert is describing a process of learning which was personally, professionally, politically, and socially significant for him. His reflections have little resonance with the rhetoric of the Council of Europe, and far more with that of the World Social Forum whose Charter commits it to pluralism and whose *modus operandi* are those social movements which

take shape while trying out practices; their participants' identity is not pre-set but rather is shaped through action . . . : to change the world and to change life are co-existing aims. (Ruggiero 2004, pp.46–49)

The assimilation of 'lifelong learning' to vocational training in the interests of national employment policies is, in our view, damaging. It is damaging because it affects the capacity of the society to generate an 'educated public'. It has been claimed that an educated public emerged in eighteenth century Enlightenment Scotland around the universities (MacIntyre 1989). This 'educated public' was of course small and narrowly constituted: it was centrally that of the male professional classes. Nevertheless, the existence of this public meant that discussion in society (in the many clubs and societies in existence at the time, for example) over the best way its members should live, reflected and exchanged with academic debate conducted in the universities. In such discussion, return to first principles made differences sharper but it also made real agreement possible. It enabled thinking

for oneself to be done in a public non-specialised context in which general social interest and concern for the common good might be freely expressed.

Then, according to Alasdair MacIntyre, came 'The Fall': within the century, the educated public was replaced by many specialised publics and the universities fragmented into specialised disciplines which reflected the needs of an increasingly diverse group of professionals. The rise and fall of the educated public of the Scottish Enlightenment, says MacIntyre, coincided with the rise and fall of the 'philosophy of common sense' taught in the universities, a coincidence which he takes as evidence for his belief that the existence of an educated public requires a widespread shared philosophical education. This philosophy emphasised 'democratic intellect' rather than doctrinal authority (Davie 1961).

But we do not have to agree with MacIntyre. There are conceptions of the 'educated public' and 'democratic intellect' which are realisable today. Myron J. Frankman is a Canadian academic who also believes in the need for a shared 'philosophical' education. He argues for the 'un-disciplined mind: imagination unbound' and that (Frankman 1999, p.8):

We must remove controls from learners and learning. The perilous times in which we live demand that imagination be unbound and that neither disciplines nor externally imposed discipline immobilize the young from being able and eager to shape the society in which they shall live.

Frankman makes a plea for interdisciplinarity. He points out that the message from modern science is that the world is an unbroken whole, or an unbroken web: as the British sociologist/philosopher of science, Steven Fuller, would have it, 'reality is interdisciplinary'. Yet universities still insist on carving up knowledge into discrete disciplinary 'slices'. According to Fuller, solutions to problems of significant intellectual and social impact can be easily ignored in this context because they do not relate to what academics are trained and rewarded to *see*. Fuller refers to Donald Swanson, a library scientist at the University of Chicago who, almost 20 years ago coined the phrase, 'undiscovered public knowledge'. Swanson's idea was that long-standing problems in medical research may be solved simply by systematically surveying the scientific literature, by reading across specialities, rather than commissioning more research. He did this himself in the case of Raynaud's syndrome, a disease that causes the fingers to go numb. And his finding happened in the ever-expanding biomedical sciences (see Fuller 2005, p.90). Swanson simply supposed that to solve a real life problem it might be more worthwhile to read old research across several fields than to conduct 'cutting edge' research in a single field. Fuller (2005, p.3) comments:

Re-examining what the thundering herd has left behind is a time-honoured strategy for cultivating the independent-mindedness that marks a true intellectual. Too bad there are no academic grants for it.

An educated public conceived more widely would not simply be one in which academic interdisciplinarity is reinstated. It would also be one which acknowledged the diversity within that public: differences of gender, race, class, sexuality, religion, nationality, and many others. These differences have always been present, but they have become impossible to ignore due to large-scale recent migration, ease of movement

across the world and an explosion of electronic communications. All of the differences contribute to the existence of (various kinds of) communities within society. The differences overlap and interact with each other and are often defined in relation to or even against one another. Some of them take on a high significance locally, nationally and/or globally. All this matters for education and lifelong learning because education and learning are inevitably, inescapably, a matter of interacting with other people. It also matters because education and lifelong learning contribute to how a society constitutes itself politically. We say more about this in the final section.

In this chapter we look at lifelong learning through three frames: firstly, in the rhetoric of policy-makers, secondly, as it really is, and, thirdly, as it might be. We do not intend to make a thorough critique of the current state of lifelong learning according to the policy-makers. Other chapters in this book do that (Rizvi, Chapter 7 and Thompson, Chapter 17, this volume). Our concern is to draw on the critique and recast it in epistemological terms. In each of the three frames we will consider what kinds of knowledge are in use, in order to draw out the implications for the proper direction for lifelong learning.

Methodology

The methodology that we use is both highly abstract and highly specific. It is highly abstract in that we use philosophical theories related to epistemology, ethics, and identity. It is highly specific in that we illuminate the argument by recounting ‘little stories’. (The term is taken from Lyotard’s (1984) *‘petits récits’*, but the use we make of it is not identical with his.) These stories are not the fictional, exemplary ones of much philosophy. They are not thought experiments dreamt up in an arm-chair. Instead, the stories are told as perceptions of real experience. We are posing no simple realism in using the term ‘experience’. Of course, individual perspectives, human error, and the rhetoric used in the telling will affect the representation of experience. Moreover, no account could encapsulate the complexities of individual perception. Doris Lessing puts it clearly (2002, 13):

How little I have managed to say of the truth, how little I have caught of all that complexity; how can this small neat thing be true when what I experienced was so rough and apparently formless and unshaped.

In using this methodology we are acknowledging the significance of experience in shaping particular philosophical positions. We are trying to encapsulate some of that experience in the form of particular accounts of events in specific, context-dependent detail. The methodology can be thought of as a kind of practical philosophy (Griffiths 2003; Griffiths and Cotton 2005; Leicester, Chapter 15, this volume). Such ‘practical philosophy’ should be distinguished from ‘philosophy of practice’, which is concerned with understanding and explaining practical knowledge and actions. Confusingly, ‘philosophy of practice’ is sometimes called ‘practical philosophy’: e.g. in Dunne (1993), Hogan and Smith (2003), and in some English translations of

Gadamer (Dunne 1993, pp.156ff). The term as it is used here should be understood as follows:

Practical philosophy aims at being a philosophy that engages with the conditions of all people, women and men, poor and rich, Others and us. It is a kind of philosophy that is interested in the empirical world as a way of grounding its conclusions in interaction between thinking and acting. (Griffiths 2003, p.21)

Practical philosophy then is a collaborative philosophy. It aims to develop questions, arguments, and conclusions in specific contexts: a ‘philosophy as, with and for...’. It can be distinguished from the more orthodox applied philosophy which sees itself as independent of context but usefully applicable to a range of contexts. Practical philosophy acknowledges its own roots in the social and political context in which it arose: a philosophy in, of, and from human practices. It begins from the understanding that philosophy is rooted in social practice, with philosophy in educational practices rooted in educational practice.

Most lifelong learning literature is written by policy-makers, academics, and practitioners for professional purposes and this chapter is no exception. It seldom gives the floor to those on the receiving end of its many initiatives and strategies. A recently launched series of publications from NIACE is exceptional in this respect. *Between Women* is the first in the series. In it, learners write about their lives and concerns in their own words, telling stories that reveal learning as experienced first hand in family, workplace, and community. The series is based on the notion that adults learn best when they start from the knowledge and authority of their own experience and that discussing shared and different experiences together, making connections and seeking explanations, are the stuff of good adult learning in all sorts of settings (NIACE 2005). This notion also informs our chapter.

The methodology of the chapter is coherent with its argument. This kind of approach to philosophy is a move towards a more democratic knowledge making of the kind we argue for in the last section of this chapter. Practical philosophy arose from putting into question the universality of orthodox philosophy. Similarly, it acknowledges the significance of context-dependent knowledge, of sharing different experiences and making connections. We are constructing an argument about lifelong learning and knowledge. The main thread of the argument is interrupted by four ‘little stories’ of the kind we have had in mind in constructing our arguments. These ‘little stories’ are of various kinds, including personal experience and also diverse perspectives. They are intended to both illuminate and illustrate the argument. They appear in italics and can be read independently of the main argument.

‘Little Story’ One: ‘Everyone Learning from Everyone’

Lifelong learning can be found in many kinds of pedagogical relationships. The account that follows comes from a Creative Partnerships initiative in Nottingham. Creative Partnerships is a national initiative funded by the government which encourages schools and ‘creative practitioners’ to find new ways of working

together. The initiative may well lead to a contribution to the national knowledge economy: creativity, in the eyes of the government, boosts the economy. However, this was not training in the usual sense found within the rhetoric of lifelong learning. In Nottingham, extended, informal interviews with the participants showed that adults were learning from children as well as children learning from adults. Further, they showed both adults and children learning in relationships which were not hierarchical nor were they focused on narrow economic outcomes. They were intensely social and personal as well as professional. Furthermore, nobody gained accreditation for their learning.

Pedagogical relationships were very different from those found in most training models. This was valued by the participants. Artists of various kinds (painters, sculptors, dancers, storytellers, potters, and others) came into school to work with the children. This situation could have been constructed as an expert delivering knowledge. Instead a mutual learning relationship was set up. As it was expressed by both teachers and artists, 'everyone learns from everyone' – including children and adults of various ages and levels of expertise. One primary headteacher described it as follows:

Well, it's learning alongside, isn't it? I mean, in a way they are working alongside [the artist], who has the skills and the expertise to help them develop their artistic skills. It is also in terms of one child supporting another child. It is one child helping another child, in terms of it cascading down, isn't it? In terms of skills and working and doing it alongside somebody with expertise and that can be from one child to another, as well as from teacher to child, as well as from art specialist to teacher to cohort group of children, but also to teaching assistants, to other staff. Last week we had a staff training INSET which was our staff meeting and tonight there are parents coming with their children for a parents' workshop, so it is involving the whole community, isn't it? (Primary headteacher).

A sculptor explained enthusiastically what he was learning from the 4- and 5-year-old children he was working with.

It all started a long time ago. Ann [the head teacher] approached me and said that she wanted to do some sort of sculptural kind of tree. The idea was that it was a mutual learning process. We had a vision that we wanted to make a tree but to be as loose in that as possible. We'd run a series of workshops and we'd learn from them. The children would come up with ideas and we would teach them to use some of our artistic techniques. But we've learnt from the children. The stuff they produce is so inspirational. They all get involved, they are not inhibited by anything. Beautiful free pictures. So expressive. When you go to art college you have to try and forget all that stuff you have learned at school to draw like a child again. They draw a person or a tree how they feel a person or a tree looks like, rather than trying to copy it. And it is the way they use line and colour. It's great. Our initial idea about this tree was probably going to be a lot tighter, probably a lot more traditional for a want of a better word. Now it is a lot looser, a lot more abstract and that's really come from looking at the drawings of the children. Hopefully, it's got that Paul Klee? You know when he takes a line for a walk? It is like that. Almost like scribbles in air. So we trying to capture that.

The sculptor also reflected on the social and political dimension of working with the small children. He pointed out that they were obviously conscious of his difference from their other teachers.

I suppose when I first came in – a six foot skinhead, you know, called Wolf!

He felt he was helping children of a similar background to himself see that making art could be for children like them too. This consciousness was echoed across the schools in the project. A secondary teacher commented, for instance:

There is the role model of the artist practitioner themselves. There is the demystification of that role. These are working people who come in. They are ordinary people who work with paint or with dance or with drama, so I think that is very powerful and it shows that they are approachable. There is the idea that perhaps our students might want to do something like that themselves somewhere along the line. (Secondary teacher)

Lifelong Learning as Policy-Makers Think It Is

Policies for lifelong learning promote competitiveness through skills, and access to learning opportunities for hitherto ‘excluded’ groups, including working class people ‘deficient’ in basic skills, ethnic minorities, older people, parents, employees, asylum seekers, those in prison, and so on. Individual attitudes and behaviour lie at the heart of the rise of the concept of lifelong learning, argues John Field, at a time when the ‘values of autonomy and independence are deeply embedded in our culture’ (Field 2001, p.11). There is a powerful consensus and international support for these policies (e.g. in the OECD and European Union) and many educational managers, including university and college principals, headteachers, and leaders of community and skills agencies espouse the principles of lifelong learning.

Behind the consensus is a reading of the needs of future society that is rarely put in question or even debated. Briefly stated, this posits the necessity and desirability of competing effectively within the global economy. This, in turn, demands a strong basis in skills and an equal opportunity agenda because this promotes personal development and employability. The threat is that if we do not develop our policies and practices in this way, our living standards will fall and the whole fabric of civil society will be eroded. Educators are complicit in this ideology. They speak and act as if they and their institutions (universities, schools, etc.) *can* deliver this agenda which *will* deliver economic success and personal fulfilment, and that it is through *lifelong learning* that democratic and responsible citizenship will be built.

Bill Williamson points out that this view is totally blind to the absurdities of the kind of society it seeks to build. The ‘global economy’ does *not* thrive on educated, engaged citizens; it thrives on ignorance and the ruthless exercise of power. This is because, first, success in the global economy does *not* demand the development of a knowledge society; it actually demands a flexible labour market, low welfare, indifference to the environment and to the plight of the world’s poor, and trade rules that defend the rich and destroy the societies of the poor (evidenced by the two greatest economic success stories of the modern age: corporate America and the Chinese state). Second, prosperity does *not* grow from widening educational opportunities. *Individuals* do indeed gain higher earnings if they invest in education and training but such individual mobility leaves the structures of inequality intact

and the idea of mobility may even help legitimise continuing social inequality. Third, reform of existing educational institutions – universities, colleges, and schools – is unlikely to promote the wider opportunities individuals hope for, at least in their present form. Research shows that after over a decade of expansion in higher education there has been little impact on entrenched inequalities; the social profiles of educational attainment continue to reflect the social divisions of society (see Williamson 2005; see also Taylor, Barr, and Steele, 2002).

In Britain, New Labour speaks in terms of ‘active citizenship’ using a moralistic language of participation and responsibility which is a far cry from what Jane Thompson (2005, p.11) refers to as:

Those formerly radical terms that used to be associated with audacious grass roots energy, participatory democracy and progressive social change.

This was before the conceptual shift from adult *education* to adult or lifelong *learning* when, that is (p.11):

Adult education was considered to be ‘a movement’ with organic links to some of the most influential social movements of recent times, such as the labour and trade union movement, the women’s movement, the civil rights movement and the peace movement still.

Now, ‘active citizenship’ has become a (p.11):

Happy clappy soundbite – like ‘empowerment’, ‘participation’, ‘social inclusion’ and, more recently, ‘respect’.

The current rhetoric of lifelong learning is oriented to the knowledge economy, to the individualisation of learners, and to increasing competitiveness in global markets. This is a powerful rhetoric. Academics teaching in higher education and those of us who care deeply about lifelong learning find themselves complicit in this agenda even while we criticise it.

None of this is inevitable.

What might refusing such complicity mean? For a start, instead of asking how to develop the global economy and our competitive position within it we might ask: what kinds of economic goals might provide the opportunity of a more equal distribution of the world’s resources, a reduction of global poverty, and a sustainable environment for all? And what kinds of new learning and institutions might help us answer this sort of question? We know after years of discussing citizenship education that *demos* cannot be taught: it has to be lived and experienced (Williamson 2005, p.27):

We need to discover together in an open-ended manner new ways to escape absurdity. Real lifelong learning is what we need, a way of being with others and learning that is open-ended, creative and critical, that searches for truth and understanding and is engaged with the great issues of the times.

In order to answer these questions we need to notice that underpinning the policy-makers’ rhetoric is a view of knowledge. They assume an epistemological position. It is this position that we wish to uncover and to question. We ask: what kind of knowledge is found in the knowledge economy? What kind of knowledge is possible in individualised learning? And how is knowledge related to competitiveness in global markets on the one hand and to increased wisdom and understanding on the other?

Knowledge as conceived within the ‘knowledge economy’ and as practised by ‘knowledge workers’ is concerned with information and skill. Dorbolo puts it succinctly (1997):

A knowledge-based economy is distinct from one based in physical and financial capital. Intellectual capital (knowledge or information) is a commodity that can be replicated at no cost and distributed everywhere instantly.

Similarly, according to Anne M. Mulcahy, chairman and chief executive officer of Xerox (cited in Spira 2005): (see Jonathan 2006).

In every enterprise, there are workers who are thinking up better ways to capture, manage and deliver information and knowledge. These knowledge workers hold the key to growth and productivity in today’s information-driven business world. Now more than ever, they need solutions and services that streamline the way knowledge flows through the workplace.

That there can be any other kind of knowledge is rarely acknowledged within this rhetoric. It is more usual to conflate ‘knowledge’ with ‘information’. This tendency was first noted by Lyotard many years ago in *The Postmodern Condition*. He points out the logic behind it (1984, p.4):

The nature of knowledge cannot survive unchanged within this context of general [technological] transformation. It can fit into the new channels, and become operational, only if learning is translated into quantities of information. We can predict that anything in the constituted body of knowledge that is not translatable in this way will be abandoned and that the direction of new research will be dictated by the possibility of its eventual results being translatable into computer language. The ‘producers’ and users of knowledge must now, and will have to, possess the means of translating into these languages whatever they want to invent or learn. . . . Along with the hegemony of computers comes a certain logic, and therefore a certain set of prescriptions determining which statements are accepted as ‘knowledge’ statements. We may thus expect a thorough exteriorization of knowledge with respect to the ‘knower,’ at whatever point he or she may occupy in the knowledge process.

This statement was made over 25 years ago and has proved to be remarkably prescient.

The conflation of knowledge with information is a mistake. As someone once said, information is to knowledge as a pile of bricks is to a skyscraper (see Bown 2004). The amassing of accurate information is characteristic of only one kind of knowledge.

Aristotle’s tripartite distinction of different kinds of knowledge is useful here. Aristotle drew a distinction between *episteme*, usually translated as theoretical knowledge, on the one hand, and *phronesis*, any knowledge that might have a practical import, on the other. He then drew a second distinction between two kinds of practical activity. The first, *poiesis*, is productive and has to do with making. The second, *praxis*, has to do with how one lives as a citizen and human being and has no outcome separable from its practice. *Poiesis* requires the technical knowledge possessed by an expert. Aristotle calls this kind of knowledge, *techne*. Dunne’s (1993, p.9) characterisation of this is helpful:

Techne then is the kind of knowledge possessed by an expert maker: it gives him a clear conception of the why and wherefore, the how and with-what of the making process and enables him, through the capacity to offer a rational account of it, to preside over his activity with secure mastery.

Praxis, on the other hand, requires personal wisdom and understanding. Aristotle calls this kind of knowledge *phronesis*. It is possessed by a *phronimos*, a person possessed of wisdom and understanding. The point is well summarised by Dunne, who explains (1993, p.10):

[*Praxis*] is conduct in a public space with others in which a person, without ulterior purpose and with a view to no object detachable from himself, acts in such a way as to realise excellences that he has come to appreciate in his community as constitutive of a worthwhile way of life. . . . [*P*]raxis required for its regulation a kind of knowledge that was more personal and experiential, more supple and less formulable, than the knowledge conferred by *techné*.

In Aristotelian terms, then, the knowledge of the knowledge economy is a form of craft knowledge: *techné*. It is productive. It can be mastered. It can be codified. It can be delivered from those few experts who have it to those many who do not. This is individualised knowledge. To be sure, it will flow through a workplace, if the managers so decide. Equally it can be controlled in order to be sold as a commodity. Once codified, as bytes of information, it can be distributed without the expensive intervention of human beings. In the section 'Lifelong learning as it is', we show how unrealistic and narrow this conception is. We then go on in the section 'Lifelong learning as it might be' to put forward a different model of lifelong learning based on a conception of knowledge which includes *praxis* and which is personal, embodied, social, and political.

'Little Story' Two: Museums in Glasgow

Most of the learning people do is done informally and without the help of educational institutions. Learning occurs throughout life in a host of networks, from books, television, the Internet, film, visiting galleries, and museums. European lifelong learning policy has tended to emphasis formal educational institutions such as schools, colleges, and universities and has seen museums as marginal. This is changing along with awareness that because visiting galleries and museums is not associated in the public's mind with education their potential contribution to the expansion of learning opportunities is huge. Yet a model of learning based on dissemination of knowledge by experts is the one which is prevalent even here.

*David Anderson, current Director of Learning and Interpretation at the Victoria and Albert Museum draws on George Davie's **The Democratic Intellect** for an educational philosophy to better inform museum education (Anderson 2000; Davie 1961). Expert knowledge in this view must be illuminated and made accountable to the understanding of the public. 'Common sense' is the key idea and its roots lie in cultural traditions which emphasise 'democratic intellect' rather than rule by experts and intellectual elites. The role of museums in this model is to foster skills, creativity, and learning and to provide a space for exchange and debate with and by the wider public (see Barr 2005).*

I (Jean) come from Glasgow, where a major transformation of its museums and galleries has been going on for over a decade. When I was a girl my dad would

take me most Sundays either to the People's Palace or to Kelvingrove Art Gallery and Museum which, when it opened in 1902, was perhaps the greatest achievement of the British municipal movement. There are 3 million visits to Glasgow's seven civic museums and galleries each year (including half a million from working class communities). Consultation with non-visitors reveals that most are potentially interested but find them unwelcoming and 'not for the likes of us' whilst many said they were too dear, which is interesting because all are free and always have been.

Since the 1990s a radical restructuring of Glasgow galleries and museums has been underway using a process that attempts to reach out to local residents. For example, the planning of the redisplay of Kelvingrove Art Gallery and Museum has involved consultation with an Education Forum and a Community Advisory Panel with members drawn from alliances built up over years through the city's Open Museum, the name for its community outreach department. Every decision taken about the new gallery and museum, including approaches to and themes selected for display, as well as the style of interpretation, has been shaped by such participation. The approach taken is based explicitly on a notion of democratic ownership of cultural wealth which is quite inconsistent with the idea of adding on education as an optional extra. In the words of Mark O'Neill, the Head of Glasgow Museums (O'Neill 2002, p.42):

We are committed to ensuring that every citizen has access, as a matter of right, to their collections, not only through outreach but by making the museums themselves more accessible.

*O'Neill has written about the press's hostile reaction to experimental exhibitions held in galleries in the city throughout the 1990s. These were experimental with the content, display, and interpretation of art. The 'Birth of Impressionism' Exhibition of 1997 which included a reconstruction of the boat from which Monet did much of his painting was deemed by **Scotland on Sunday** to be a positive danger to the general public. Yet whilst the critics were very angry indeed with the curators their most vitriolic attack was really directed at the intended audience, says O'Neill (2001, p.7):*

All the critics strongly imply that anyone who enjoyed the exhibitions is somehow not a good enough person to be in an art gallery. If they liked the videos and the costume and the theatricality of the Birth of Impressionism, if they thought the shipyard sets were evocative, if they found St Mungo's inspiring, if they thought the eclectic mix in Glasgow's Gallery of Modern Art exciting, then they were punters, they can't take their art neat, they are shoppers or voyeurs in a pornography shop, they have a mental age of four, and are so weak-minded that they might be damaged by the exhibition; they are the kind of ghouls who would enjoy public executions. This kind of exhibition, the critics say, is no longer for us, who belong here, but for them, who don't.

These views resonate with current criticisms of art galleries and universities that attempt to be more socially inclusive that they are 'dumbing down', pretending that everything can be made easy. Yet, on the contrary, the experiment underway in Glasgow can be viewed as one practical attempt to introduce new rules. Cultural growth, says Raymond Williams (1993), needs 'full space' for difficulty and 'full time' for originality so that it is not just a continuation of the old rules.

Lifelong Learning as It Is

The dominant rhetoric of lifelong learning as it is embedded in current policy documents and promoted in practice embodies a very partial view of knowledge and, therefore, an equally narrow one of learning. The rhetoric does not describe lifelong learning as it really is, as the previous two ‘little stories’ show. As Le Doueff (2003, p.78) says, ‘some men pontificate while some women and men act.’

At the heart of the rhetoric is a conception of knowledge as disembodied and without subjectivity and feelings. This conception is reinforced by a prevailing orthodoxy related to theoretical knowledge, *episteme*, as well as to technical mastery, *techne*. This is itself a story, and usually unexamined. Steven Shapin is interested in the stories about knowledge and knowers which circulate in our culture. His focus is on stories featuring philosophers. In ‘The Philosopher and the Chicken’, he recounts a fable (Shapin 1998, p.21):

Whilst Isaac Newton was living in London a friend called at his house. He was shown into his host’s dining room where his dinner had been served up some time before. The friend waited for some time and then impatiently removed the cover and ate the chicken, replacing the bones under the cover. Sir Isaac comes in, removes the cover and says: ‘How absent we philosophers are. I really thought that I had not dined’.

The moral of the story is not that those who love truth do not love chicken. The chicken in question, says Shapin, is epistemological chicken and the story stipulates that the truth seeker is someone who attains truth by denying the demands of the stomach and the body.

Philosophers sometimes claim they are interested in knowledge *per se* rather than its embodied production, maintenance and reproduction, seen as the province of sociologists of knowledge. Yet, asks Shapin, have you ever seen a disembodied idea? What you have seen are embodied people *portraying* the disembodiment of their knowledge, in order to display the truth and objectivity of our culture’s most highly prized knowledge. Thus Newton’s contemporaries reported that he let his dinners stand for hours and that his cat grew fat. Such stories about Newton persisted despite manuscript evidence that he had delivered to his home two turkeys, one goose, two rabbits, and one chicken in one week and that he (not his cat) grew very fat. Such stories and their persistence are interesting since they represent norms for philosophical knowledge and knowers which could and did coexist with messier evidence that the ideal might not (always or usually) be realised in fact.

Battersby’s feminist metaphysics is useful here. She uses a Kantian rather than an Aristotelian tradition of metaphysics. She argues that this ‘metaphysics of flesh and fluidity’ (Battersby 1998, p.14) shows both men and women that their subject-position (p.10)

[i]s linked to fleshy continuity, rather than to an autonomous individualised ‘soul’ or ‘mind’ that merely inhabits the flesh.

Knowers are not just minds. Rather, as embodied they are embedded in their relationships, some personal, some professional, some political. There are not ‘rational

men', independent of their bodies and circumstances, wondering if they are brains in vats (Dennett 1978). They are particular persons in a specific place and time. Battersby puts forward a view of bodies and relationships as fluid rather than fixed; multiple rather than unitary (1998, p.53):

It is not that all identity disappears on this model; but rather that identity has to be understood not in terms of an inner mind or self controlling a body, but as emerging out of patterns of potentialities and flow.

Practices of teaching and learning are marked by embodiment. Embodiment is itself social and political, socialised and politicised. Learning is intensely corporeal (Martin 1994; Weber and Mitchell 1995; McWilliam 1996a, b). So it is also intensely social and political. Think of Robert mentioned in the introduction. His sexuality and his practices as an educator influence each other. Equally, think of Wolf, the sculptor whose identity as a working class, six-foot skinhead was relevant to his practices of teaching and learning sculpture. And think of Jean, as a child with her father, learning to visit museums – and of the many working class people in Glasgow who have learnt museums are not for the likes of them. As the 'little stories' in this chapter show, learning happens for particular individuals in specific personal, social and political pedagogical relationships. So the practices associated with particular bodies leak into the practices of teaching and learning, and vice versa. The 'little story' at the end of this section, 'Freirean principles in a black supplementary school', shows the salience of race in the education of both children and adults.

Michele le Doeuff is also interested in stories which demonstrate the links between knowledge and embodied knowers. She believes that the major philosophical problem of our time is the lack of fit between 'cutting edge' theoretical work and the progressive aims of practical action. In her view, the major task facing the contemporary philosopher is (1989, p.179):

[r]adically to resolve the contradiction between the loss of language among the learned and our need to articulate urgent problems with people other than academics.

Le Doeuff explains she learned this lesson from her involvement in the Women's Movement in the 1970s. She learned that impressionistic stories and openly subjective viewpoints can lead to an understanding of the most important things. Le Doeuff imbibed this lesson 'philosophically' (Le Doeuff 1989, p.221):

[b]y avoiding the easy rationalization which was on offer of thinking that women are destined to be impressionistic, while men have access to rigorous thought.

And she insists (p.221):

When everything conspires to stop people from becoming aware of what they are experiencing, it is essential that they give voice together to little perceptions and intuitions, no matter how faltering.

Thus she learned a more adventurous notion of rigour, where everything must be brought in to undo a world of commonplaces (1989, p.222):

At the forefront of the project is the demand for rigour: a tonic rigour, full of juice and very different from the safe rigorism, the self-censored (and always ready to censor) Puritanism that we have learned.

The ‘everyone learning from everyone’ happens too. As Mary Louise Pratt has pointed out (1992), the dominant culture is itself transformed by contact with those who are not part of it, through a process of what she calls ‘transculturation’, especially in sites which she calls ‘contact zones’. For example, it has been suggested (in relation to the subject of English) that such dialectical processes of transculturation make what gets taught and learned in *marginal* courses and institutions *central* to the ongoing development of that discipline. This notion is the organising idea of a book on disciplinary history by Thomas Miller (1997). He believes that it is as unsurprising as it is important that it was *Scottish* universities that first introduced the formal study of English literature, composition, and rhetoric into Higher Education, since, as ‘provincials’ (after the union with England in 1707) they had to teach *themselves* English taste and usage (Miller 1997, p.25):

Those at the boundaries of the dominant culture tend to be intensely aware of the differences marked by these boundaries.

Most histories of the discipline, however, begin in the nineteenth rather than the eighteenth century. What gets left out are the (p.25)

[d]ialectical forces that were contested and contained at the boundaries of the field as it became a well demarcated area of study. In short, what gets left out of these histories are students.

This dialectic is important because in the process of ‘transculturation’, subordinated or marginal groups incorporate elements from the dominant culture but it in turn is changed through contact with those who do not accept it (the dominant culture) as natural and unproblematic.

Praxis involves ethics, politics, and experience. It is inevitably social learning. Whatever the fantasy of a disembodied knowledge, whether of *episteme* or *techne*, it inevitably has implications for *praxis* because of social learning.

‘Little Story’ Three: Freirean Principles in a Black Supplementary School.

This is a story of a collective effort to make a Saturday school work well, not just in terms of increased achievement in accredited tests – though of course that is important – but to work in terms of a wider understanding of the purposes of education. And of how that meant that everyone learnt: adults and children, teachers and parents – everyone. It involved an interrogation of taken-for-granted power relations and social relations within the school. And of course it meant mobilising the embodied knowledge of black people of different cultural heritages. It is told by Flossie Kainja, who was an agriculture extension worker, and who is now studying for her doctorate in England.

Training methods for farmers in Malawi have changed over the years. After some years, I and eight training officers formed our own forum because we had got so annoyed that we’d been put through all these different types of methods – and each one did not recognise the contributions of the previous ones. There was

a lack of recognition that learning is a continuous process. Even the farm managers were questioning, 'Now what else are they going to give us?' I said, 'Well, do you have to be given? Don't you have a choice to say, "No we don't want this?" I think it is time we sat down and looked at our own previous contributions and how they have affected our present, and focus into the future and maybe plan into the future to see what we could do differently in the future to make things work for ourselves.' I can remember my programme manager told me, 'You are Margaret Thatcher!'

'Why?'

'Because you seem to be empowered now!'

'Is that what you call empowerment?'

'Yes.'

'That's what Freire says,' I said.

All along we've been convinced that we have always involved farmers, but when I look back on the type of involvement we've given to farmers we have really given it to farmers, and sometimes made them believe that they were participating when in actual fact they were being forced into the movement. I wanted to try and see if it is possible for the farmers themselves to have conscious participation: a participation which they want, that comes from within. If people come and encourage them they should be able to find out why, and how they themselves could contribute to make it better. That is my position. I have come from far and this is a process of lifelong education, continuing education.

Then I came to England to learn more about Freire. A friend told me there was a Saturday school at Shiefton. I said, 'Why? Why do you go to Shiefton?'

He said, 'You know in this country black people struggle. And we have decided voluntarily to set up a school at Shiefton to help our children so they can build their confidence and be able to struggle through their education and achieve just like other children.'

'I want to join.'

I taught black studies. I taught the roots of people and why they are who they are – how they can survive the way they are in an environment where people understood them differently: there is no reason for them to change to what they do not want to be just because they want to please somebody. This is what I was teaching. But when I went around the other classes, I thought it wasn't different from the approach in the mainstream. In other words it was just another school, like having an extra tutor. But I thought, should Shiefton be used for that?

When I was at university I'd gone through a lot of experiences which had empowered me to take this understanding that I have now to Shiefton. I had been looking for a population I could work with, to apply whatever I had learnt. I had to look at the relationships, the learning relationships, that I would be able to transform into a different sort of learning relationship. So having read Freire and made up my mind to continue to work on a Freirean approach, I made up a proposal.

I decided to design a proposal to work with Shiefton to see if we could work better. I felt the ideas were good, and we needed to continue with the ideas; but can Shiefton

work better? The best way of finding out whether Shiefton can work better is by involving the participants at Shiefton for them to find out for themselves rather than just telling them, 'This is the way to make it work better.' Because it might not be.

The proposal was Freirean. To work out a Freirean method is not an easy thing. It is not something you can memorise or go and tell people. It is something you work through together. In the process both of you become changed. The teachers and the students and everyone involved sit down and say, 'Is this what we are trying to do?' You might hear a lot of questions. And you may have thought of a lot of answers, but you're not sure. Then you work through it. You start asking each other questions. And then you say, 'Oh, I didn't think this would have been like this. But, oh! It's like this.' Then in the end: 'Oh! This is where we arrived! Oh! Is this where we wanted to be? We thought we would be somewhere else, but this is even better.'

All of that is a process. It is not something that you have predetermined. You have been engaged in the search, and when we say search, it means a true search: not something that you have hidden and know where it is. You do not know what the possibilities are, and then you engage and it becomes a very active search. It becomes a movement. You all get moved into it. You have all the excitement of doing it. And in the end you say, 'Wow!'

Lifelong Learning as It Might Be

We have been showing that the rhetoric of lifelong learning has an overly narrow conception of knowledge. Knowledge is, we have argued, embodied, social and political. So, we argue, this needs to be acknowledged and built on rather than ignored. We have also argued that *praxis*, understood as practical wisdom and understanding is indispensable, although of course there is a place for *techne* and *episteme*. Indeed these two arguments are linked because *praxis* draws on *techne* and *episteme*. Inevitably so, because both of these forms of knowledge contribute to the experience and identity of a *phronimos* – a person of wisdom engaged in *praxis*. (This complex argument is simply asserted here because a proper discussion is impossible within the scope of this chapter.) In this section, we consider how knowledge is created in a community, and then go on to discuss how different communities can learn from each other. Finally we consider the effect this might have, both in terms of cultural life, such as is found in museums and the arts (which is itself political,) and also in terms of political structures (which are themselves cultural).

We want to draw attention to two kinds of social learning. In one, the learner begins from the periphery of the learning community and moves towards the centre where mastery is to be found. In the other, as soon as the learner leaves the periphery, he or she begins to help to create the knowledge along with all the others in the community. The second of these is a more democratic epistemology of the kind we propose. In this second kind, the experience of everybody is brought into creative play with the experience of everybody else, creating a community of learners rather than a set of novices seeking to emulate their master. This provides a less

hierarchical model for learning within a community. If there is enough diversity within a community there is room for a variety of sub-communities to develop within it. Therefore, diversity makes it possible for the community itself to be more flexible and non-hierarchical. We may think of such a community as more like an archipelago and less like a single, solitary island. Therefore, the more diverse a community, the more chance there is that its members can negotiate a kind of learning which does not compromise their (developing, changing, fluid) identities. Thus the identities of the members of a community may help define the kinds of knowledge that are developed within it.

The next stage on the way to a democratic epistemology, to an educated public, is to bring different communities together. They need to compare, discuss, and resolve differences and learn from each other. Immediately, a difficulty presents itself. Knowledge is being constructed differently in different communities precisely because of systematic, structural differences in perspective often stemming from differences in power and status. Therefore differences and structural inequalities need to be recognised if there is to be a possibility of establishing fair and equitable ways of co-constructing knowledge across different communities. As Melanie Walker says (1997, p.139):

The notion of collaboration from different spaces and across different discourses [is] a collaboration recognizably criss-crossed by lines of power rather than some patronizing notion of 'equality'.

Such differences cannot be resolved simply through 'open and honest' debate, which privileges the more confident and articulate members (Barr and Griffiths 2003). As described elsewhere, a number of strategies can be used, including ways of working out positions away from the wider group, the creative use of silence and different forms of communication (Johnston 1997; Barr 1999; Griffiths, 2003).

Different communities are linked in a complex set of interconnections. Consider the groups we have mentioned in this chapter: women, working class Glaswegians, gays, black people, museum visitors, artists, and teachers. One person could belong to most – or none – of these groups. When members of different communities come together a new one is formed. The new one both takes from, and contributes to, all the others.

There are implications for the kinds of knowledge that may be constructed. Inevitably such knowledge is provisional and contested. It may be very context dependent. Some of it will remain contested. So the process of knowledge construction is certainly not a question of just leaving everything as it is. Rather, it is a process of critique and contestation; it is a process of stretching the imagination and acceptance of difference. In this we need to go beyond Aristotle and the kinds of *praxis* suitable for the monoculture that Aristotle believed constituted his *polis*. We find Arendt helpful here. As we have pointed out elsewhere (Barr and Griffiths 2003, p.88):

Being critical, for Arendt, does not call for disinterest, detachment or withdrawal from political commitment. Instead, it requires 'training the imagination to go visiting'. . . . By means of taking the imagination visiting I am both distanced from the familiar and taken

to unfamiliar standpoints. Serious heartfelt differences remain even where they do not preclude a useful degree of mutual understanding.

We also pointed out Iris Marion Young's useful concept of 'differentiated solidarity'. This relies on understanding of solidarity in which (Young 2000, p.222)

[t]he norms of solidarity hold among strangers and those who in many ways remain strange to one another.

This democratic epistemology is one in which all perspectives can be represented, not in some central forum, but rather as part of a web of collective knowledge in which formal institutions of learning, for instance universities, supplementary schools, or museums share. If this epistemology were fully realised, it would represent a kind of democratic intellect, an educated public.

This is an epistemology of hope. Michele Le Doeuff uses the useful concept of what seafarers used to call the 'kenning', the furthest visible point. She suggests that the kenning we need to give ourselves in politics is that of a generation. Rather than arguing in terms of the ultimate solution, an infinitely distant point, we should ask (Le Doeuff 1989, p.303):

What should I be, do, demand, imagine today, so that those who are now being born will from their earliest years discover an adult world in which some questions are being settled, so that they can see different ones?

This has epistemological implications. Consider if we took seriously le Doeuff's exhortation that we learn to talk to each other, and that we use everyone's partial knowledge for kenning, using imagination, rather than trying to impart fixed bodies of knowledge, developed by a small minority. David Anderson believes, for example, that more investment needs to be put into the development of museums as participatory public spaces, especially in the digital age. As creative artists, educators, and the public generally become more technologically literate there are huge opportunities to bring into museums the wealth of ideas and learning being generated in the society that surrounds them. This is far greater than what museums themselves can contribute (see Anderson 2000). From this point of view, there is a huge potential for learning through museums to be developed through the informed 'common sense' of the public. And consider if we could make sure today that all decision-making bodies were composed of equal numbers of men and women. We cannot currently imagine what a generation brought up in such a context could then think, understand and make happen – it is beyond our kenning. It is beyond the limits of current imaginings. But such concrete steps are needed now so that the next generation's political imagination can take flight.

'Little Story' Four: Horizontals and Verticals

We end where we began, with the World Social Forum, and with one of its offspring, the European Social Forum. It is a story of optimism but also of caution. It is not easy or cosy, trying to do lifelong learning as it might be. We present different perspectives on the WSF and how it trying to be more open – more horizontal in organisation,

less vertical. They exemplify the angry passions but also the energy generated in producing new ways of doing things, new ideas, new solutions to new problems.

High Hopes

From Hilary Wainwright writing in Red Pepper on the Mumbai WSF in 2004:

*Coordinating linkages that are horizontal rather than vertical, that function across popular movements rather than up from the masses to the party leadership, was the original vision of the social forum founders. Chico Whitaker, an activist intellectual from Brazil with a history of involvement with the Workers' Party and radical movements associated with the Catholic Church, was one of those who formulated that vision. A modest man, now in his 60s, Whitaker believes that the forum idea draws on the most important political discovery of recent times – 'the power of open, free horizontal structures'. He told **Red Pepper**: 'It is this idea that explains the success of the first three WSFs in Porto Alegre as well as of Seattle and the 15 February demonstrations [against the war in Iraq] and now Mumbai.'*

Troubles with the Vertical and Horizontal

From Les Levidow writing in Radical Philosophy on the ESF in London:

The WSF inspired the first European Social Forum, held in November 2002 in Florence, which drew 60,000 people – more than twice the number the organizers had expected. . . . As a process, the first ESF had considerable scope for activists to shape the event. The city council and trade unions committed resources early on, seeking no major influence over the content. However, partly because of its lecture format and enormous turnout, the ESF felt like a 'three-day rally', some commented. The second ESF, held the next year in Paris, was more controlled by party cadres. When a French network of local social forums requested a meeting space, for example, their request was denied, though eventually they found a defunct church and expanded a Europe-wide network of such forums. The main opportunity for coordinating actions, the Assembly of Social Movements, on the Sunday morning, centred on statements which bore little relation to strategic debates during the overall event. Indeed, the final declaration was largely written beforehand by an invitation-only small working group. Also beforehand, a secret group had formulated a bid to host the 2004 ESF in London. This bid generated suspicion and even hostility in Britain, for several reasons: failure to consult the movement set a bad precedent for any democratic and transparent procedures. The bid was led by party cadres – Socialist Workers Party (SWP) members masquerading as Globalize Resistance and Socialist Action members in the leadership of CND. . . . These methods and agendas contradicted WSF principles.

From Eva Cruells writing in Les Pénélopes:

The blockade of the feminist movement was one of the unfortunate constants of the organisation of the London ESF. Women's rights were marginalised and reduced to insignificance within the entire framework of the forum. Last year's massive Women's Assembly in Bobigny-Paris, which brought together more than 3,000 women and lasted a whole day, was replaced in London by a mere three hours session in a small space with the participation of only 300 women.

And what sweat and tears it cost! Days before the celebration of the ESF, the event was not confirmed yet, and even worse, it had disappeared on the programme. 'At the end we got it after a hard struggle' said Nelly Martin from Women's World March. But at what price?

They had to accept the cancellation of several women's seminars – on women and globalisation, women and poverty, etc. – in order to obtain the three-hour Assembly. The result was not very encouraging. The Assembly was organised as a series of consecutive presentations on a wide variety of subject matters, without engaging more deeply with any of them, without any common aim and without any space to participate and debate among feminists.

New Ideas, New Practices, New Hope

From Les Levidow writing in Radical Philosophy on the ESF in London:

Recognizing such limitations early on, by spring 2004 numerous activists had decided to create self-organized, autonomous spaces in which the WSF principles could be more readily implemented. No registration fees were charged at some venues. These initiatives adopted various slogans: 'Alternative ESF', 'Beyond ESF', 'Life Despite Capitalism'. The latter title was consciously contrasted to 'Life After Capitalism', with its stereotypical dichotomy of before/after. In parallel with these initiatives, some horizontals persevered in attending the official ESF meetings, to pursue opportunities for alternative methods.

From Eva Cruells writing in Les Pénélopes:

Thousands of people, organisations and networks decided to move away from the tedious vertical debates dominated by some media stars at the official ESF, and organised alternative and autonomous spaces to the ESF. Were these trenches of survival or real alternatives? Their common denominator was the space created for horizontal debate and confrontation, in which activists questioned methodologies, analysis and political positions that could lead to making the global slogan of 'Another world is possible' into reality. The problem consists now in how to go forward and make these goals tangible. The experience of the ESF continues to be a field of construction and consolidation of relations, personal and political, that contribute to a wide spectrum of collective experience and knowledge from which we can invent new forms of resistance, confrontation and social transformation.

Conclusion

In contrast with the current rhetoric of lifelong learning we have proposed a richer, more democratic understanding of lifelong learning in which *praxis* (as well as *techne*) is recognised and honoured. The particular form of *praxis* on which we have focused is the knowledge and wisdom that must be learnt if human beings are to learn to live together politically in a world marked by plurality and global injustice. We have explored the question of how to achieve some kind of an 'educated public' (or publics) in the context of large scale economies, of mass populations differentiated by class, gender, culture, sexuality, belief, age and ability and of globalised, digitalised culture. There can be no return to the educated public of the eighteenth century, centred on the universities. It may well be that it is through dialogue between 'intellectuals' and wider publics that some of the ideas that really matter develop. But a notion of an educated public is needed that acknowledges the many sided and criss-crossing rather than one way nature of that dialogue. It needs also to recognise that knowledge is embodied, social and takes place in a diverse,

conflicted world and that there are no easy answers. We have no alternative but to learn to live together.

The agenda for this kind of lifelong learning is set outside as well as inside formal educational institutions, in everyday life and in the many groups and movements of civil society where new ways of knowing and being are sought and practised. There are many openings in the present for new spaces of critical debate and alternative vision, as in the World Social Forum, in Glasgow's approach to museums, in links between artists and teachers, and in community-led institutions. The most critical and creative projects which connect 'life' with formal institutions of art and education develop slowly, fostering 'slow learning' (like slow food). They develop collaboratively – not without conflict – over time, with no pre-determined script, but as a form of practice which is experimental and open to new possibilities.

References

- Anderson, D. (2000) Conceptual framework. In: Chadwick, A. and Stannett, A. (Eds) *Museums and Adults Learning: Perspectives from Europe*. Leicester: NIACE.
- Arendt, H. *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy* edited and with an interpretive essay by Ronald Beiner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
- Barr, J. (1999) *Liberating Knowledge: Research, Feminism and Adult Education*. Leicester: NIACE.
- Barr, J. (2005) Dumbing down intellectual culture: Frank Furedi, lifelong learning and museums, *Museum and Society*, 3(2), 98–114.
- Barr, J. and Griffiths, M. (2003) Training the imagination to 'go visiting'. In: Walker, M. and Nixon, J. (Eds) *Reclaiming Universities*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Battersby, C. (1998) *The Phenomenal Woman: Feminist Metaphysics and the Patterns of Identity*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Bown, L. (2004) 'Charge to the graduates', Graduation Ceremony, University of Glasgow, July 2004.
- Council of the European Union (2002) *Council Resolution of 27 June 2002 on lifelong learning*, 2002/C 163/01, <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/index.html>, Accessed January 2006.
- Davie, G. (1961) *The Democratic Intellect*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Dennett, D.C. (1978) *Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology*. Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books.
- Le Doeuff, M. (2003) *The Sex of Knowing*. London: Routledge.
- Le Doeuff, M. (1989) *Hipparchia's Choice, An Essay Concerning Women, Philosophy, etc.* Oxford: Blackwell.
- Dorbolo, J. (1997) Economics epistemology, *Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers*, 97, 1(Fall), <http://www.apa.udel.edu/apa/archive/newsletters/v97n1/computers/econ.asp>, Accessed 25 January, 2006.
- Dunne, J. (1997) *Back to the Rough Ground: Practical Judgement and the Lure of Technique*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Field, J. (2001) Lifelong education, *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 20, 3–15.
- Frankman, M. (1999) The un-disciplined mind: imagination unbound, chapter presented at the Centre for Developing Area Studies, McGill University, Montreal, September 25.
- Fuller, S. (2005) You call yourself an intellectual? *Times Higher Educational Supplement*, 18 February, p.2.
- Griffiths, M. (2003) *Action for Social Justice in Education: Fairly Different*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

- Griffiths M. and Cotton T. (2005) *Action Research, Stories and Practical Philosophy*. Milton Keynes UK: Open University.
- Haraway, D. (1991) *Simians, Cyborgs and Women*. London: Free Association Books.
- Haraway (2000) *How Like a Leaf*. New York: Routledge.
- Hogan, P. and Smith, R. (2003) The activity of philosophy and practice of education. In: Blake, N., Smeyers, P., Smith, R., and Standish, P. (Eds) *The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Johnston, M. (1997) *Contradictions in Collaboration: New Thinking on School/University Partnerships*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Jonathan, B. (2006) Spira in praise of knowledge workers KM World Posted, February 1, www.kmworld.com/Chapters/ReadChapter.aspx?ChapterID = 9605, Accessed 25 January, 2006.
- Lessing, D. (2002) *The Golden Notebook*. London: Harper Collins.
- Lyotard, J.F. (1984) *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- MacIntyre, A. (1989) The idea of an educated public. In: Hirst, P. (Ed.) *Education and Values, The Richard Peters Lectures*. Institute of Education: University of London, pp.15–36.
- Martin, J.R. (1994) *Changing the Educational Landscape*. London: Routledge.
- McWilliam, E. (1996) Touchy subjects: a risky inquiry into pedagogical pleasure, *British Educational Research Journal*, 22(3), 305–317.
- McWilliam, E. (1996) Admitting impediments: or things to do with bodies in the classroom, *Cambridge Journal of Education*, 26(3), 367–378.
- Miller, T.P. (1997) What is Literature? In *Eighteenth Century Life*. 21(1).
- NIACE (2005) *Between Women*, 2006.
- Shapin, S. (1998) *The Scientific Revolution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Taylor, D., Barr, J., and Steele, T. (2002) *For a Radical Higher Education: After Postmodernism*. Buckingham: SRHE and Open University Press.
- Thompson, J. (2005) Learning and doing, *Adults Learning*, 16(10), 11–12.
- Walker, M. (1997) Transgressing boundaries: everyday/academic discourses. In: Hollingsworth, S. (Ed.) *International Action Research*. London: Falmer Press.
- Weber, S. and Mitchell, C. (1995) *That's Funny You Don't Look Like a Teacher!* London: Falmer Press.
- Williams, R. (1993) Culture is ordinary. In: McIlroy, J. and Westwood, S. (Eds) *Border Country: Raymond Williams in Adult Education*. Leicester: NIACE.
- Williamson, B. (2005) Escape from absurdity, *Adults Learning*, 16(10), 26–27.
- World Social Forum (2001). See *Economic Justice News* (2000) (September 2000) 3(3).
- Young, I.M. (2000) *Inclusion and Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 13

Reading Lifelong Learning Through a Postmodern Lens

Robin Usher

In this chapter I examine what has elsewhere been referred to as a ‘society of signs’, a term that was used to denote one of the most significant characteristics of the contemporary social order (Edwards and Usher 1999). It was argued there that in a society of signs social relations and the materiality of the world become so intensely mediated through semiotic exchanges, through the production, circulation and reception of signifying practices, that signs are no longer simply representational but acquire value and meaning in their own right. This process has been hastened by the impact of electronic communication and information technologies (ICTs) where the world is increasingly signified as one of infinitely extended flows of information and images, a world of all inclusive interconnectivity.

All this has important implications for how learning and lifelong learning is signified in the ‘texts’¹ of the social order. I am arguing that learning is embedded and distributed in everyday social practices,² and so what learning ‘means’ will be shaped and signified by and through those practices. However in saying this I am not referring specifically to the conceptualisation of learning as socially situated (e.g. in Chaiklin and Lave 1996). Whilst learning is there understood as embedded in everyday practices, it is taken to denote only certain things, such as a change in understanding. In other words, learning is given a particular and univalent meaning. I am going to argue on the contrary that learning is not invariant in its significations but since it is embedded in the space-time of social practices and the social order which co-emerge through these practices, it therefore has many connotations.

Fast Capitalism, Fast Culture

In the coding of the social order that has emerged over the last 15 years, the myths³ of the knowledge economy, globalisation, the new work order and fast capitalism have been repeated constantly as the exigence for lifelong learning. What has emerged is a powerful world view, both for those who support and those who oppose it.

In the early 1990s writers of popular management texts coined the term ‘fast capitalism’ or ‘new capitalism’ to signify the ‘new work order’ consequent on the

growth of a hyper-competitive, global market for goods and services. They argued that fast anticipatory action and quick responses were needed for 'just in time' or speedy ways of managing and doing things. There was a need to harness the information or 'knowledge' embedded in the work process itself (Lash and Urry 1994) and for the new 'knowledge worker' demanded by fast capitalism to be flexible enough to engage in a continual process of up-skilling and re-skilling. These developments in this advanced form of capitalism shaped the emergence of a discourse focused on lifelong learning – a discourse with significant implications for policies and practice.

This discourse with its new signifiers was not just about how businesses should be organised – knowledge and innovation are now everywhere seen as critical to business success – but also about what kinds of subjectivity workers need to have in the new work order – empowered, flexible, productive, able to think critically, and work collaboratively. In effect, the identity of the worker in the workplaces of fast capitalism has been fashioned, or more precisely re-fashioned, through such signifiers (Gee et al. 1996). In re-signifying knowledge this discourse of fast capitalism also re-signified learning where it became re-fashioned as 'lifelong' reflecting the need for 'knowledge workers' to keep up with the pace and intensity of a change that became signified as never ending.

In *The Postmodern Condition of Knowledge*, Lyotard (1984) argued that the social order generally is becoming structured as a system of signs where social relations are extended, free-ranging, in constant process, and reflexive. One of the most significant characteristics of fast capitalism is its deterritorialising thrust that both mirrors and reinforces the system of signs. There is a clear movement from fixed structures – traditions, work practices, place, and nation states – to more fluid ones. The reordering and recoding of social life as a system of signs is then one effect of the discourses of so-called fast capitalism. Signs, it is argued, flow freely and promiscuously with no clear connection to a subject or a concrete referent. As the society of signs takes hold, the lifeworld becomes semiotically textured with social life becoming more *virtual*.

This is the basis of the argument that the outcome is a postmodern world without moorings, free-floating, weightless decontextualised signifiers proliferating in search of meaning. Signs become decontextualised, plundered from a variety of referent systems – nature, history, literature, exotic cultures, and projections of the future (Waters 1995). There are no longer coherent maps, no ultimate authority to anchor meaning, only a cultural world in a permanent state of flux. As Lash (2002) suggests, at one level, since their meaning cannot be grounded, signs have become emptied out, but they still need to be situated as part of the signifying practices within which they occur. It is their very emptiness that enables a play of connotation.

The increased role and significance of electronic media underpins this contemporary society of signs. Baudrillard (1988a) sees the phenomenon of the spread of electronic communication networks both as a symbol and an aspect of the changes taking place in the social order. There seems to be considerable agreement about what electronic media signify and their effect of compressing

space and time, which has enabled the exponential growth of globalising processes and fast capitalism. Alongside this, there has occurred a culturalisation and de-differentiation of public and private spheres, work and civil society, the growth in importance of culture and lifestyle practices in the aestheticisation of life and the cultivation of identity. The culture industry spreading out from the realm of production to the realm of culture commodifies the latter. The boundaries between high culture, popular culture, the market, and everyday life become blurred (Lash 1990; Featherstone 1991; Harvey 1989). With the proliferation and accelerated circulation of signs, which I will consider in more detail shortly, there is a hyper-commodification and ‘mediatisation’ of culture. Thus, as fast capitalism grows ever more competitive, culture is turned into commodity signs. The production of signs and signifying practices come to the fore, particularly signs which have primarily an aesthetic content:

The development of the latter [aesthetic signs] can be seen in the proliferation of objects which possess a substantial aesthetic component ... but also in the increasing component of sign-value or image embodied *in* material objects. (Lash and Urry 1994, p.4, original italics)

Thus culture too becomes ‘fast’.

These developments have been signified as a culturalisation of the material world of goods and products that goes alongside a materialisation of the world of culture where, in effect, everything becomes ‘culture’. It is this that is often referred to as a postmodern condition. Images and information – signifiers as cultural artefacts – become pre-eminent hallmarks of economic growth and innovation. At the same time, within the social order centres flourish where lifestyle concerns are manifested through consumption rather than production. The influence of fashion, image, and taste pervade an increasingly all-embracing consumer culture that affects all social groups:

We thus live in increasingly individuated and symbol-saturated societies, in which the advanced-services middle class plays an increasing role in the accumulation process. This class assumes a critical mass in the present restructuration: as symbol-processing producers *and* as consumers of processed symbols (Lash and Urry 1994, p.222, original italics).

Both reflecting and reinforcing these trends are developments in social theory:

from the analysis of social reality as such to the analysis of signs, languages, discourse, and talk – the media through which social reality comes into being and disperses itself across and through a body politic. (Lemert 1997, p.74)

As the significance of the one grows, it adds to the tellingness or significance of the other as a way of signifying social practices. Here it is not the materiality of the world that is denied, but rather there is a foregrounding of the articulation of *worlds* mediated through signifying practices, which are themselves material and whose workings – their production, circulation, reception – become the focus for analysis (Kellner 1995). Signifying practices, the production and re-production of meaning through communicative media, whether via the word/symbolic, the visual/iconic or via contiguity/indexicality, have now become central to fast

capitalism and fast culture, critical to the process of generating and reproducing value in the global economic system.

Policy-makers at national and supranational levels are incorporating lifelong learning into the discourse and practices of economic rationalism where the needs and interests of the economy, markets, and globalised capital are to the fore. Lifelong learning becomes dominantly signified within the codes and genres of policy as an instrument to address trends such as globalisation and increased economic competition. These have become the dominant mythic codes of lifelong learning and are deployed in the fashioning of powerful signs of learning. In this context, then, lifelong learning is articulated as essential to the development of fast capitalism and the knowledge economy. Lifelong learning on the part of individuals, organisations, and social orders is discoursed into being as a necessary adaptive strategy through which to respond to change, and through which a knowledge economy can be brought into being and maintained.

Of course, the significance of this essentially economic discourse of lifelong learning has to be recognised but equally there is also a need to go further if the full complexity and multiple significations of lifelong learning are to be understood. As a counter to this economic discourse, therefore, I want to argue that a postmodern lens foregrounding semiosis provides a way of understanding lifelong learning as located in a variety of meaning-making contemporary practices – social, cultural, political – all of which are integral to, but not overdetermined by, fast capitalism. These practices are to do with positioning in relation to the market but also include other social practices such as those to do with lifestyle, which are also to do with positioning but in the wider sphere of the everyday. They all require theorisation in the context of a social order shaped by globalising processes, where the growth of the media of various kinds and, more generally, the mediation of meaning are becoming ever more critical. Distributed across these practices, lifelong learning therefore has multiple significations, and it is this very notion of multiple significations that is enabled more clearly and explicitly by adopting a postmodern lens. Thus my argument is that lifelong learning is now a significant way in which learning is signified in the contemporary situation of fast capitalism and fast culture. It is signified in a variety of contemporary discourses, and in a variety of spaces and places.

In what follows therefore, deploying a postmodern lens,⁴ I will first draw on the work of Baudrillard to ask what is the place of ‘lifelong learning’, both as conceptualisation and practice, in the sign economy that now plays so significant a part in the operation of the social order? I will suggest that lifelong learning is located in contemporary lifestyle practices that involve a consumption of signs energised by a communicative or signifying desire that is endless. Following that, and drawing upon the work of Deleuze and Guattari, I will argue that lifelong learning has a dual aspect in that on the one hand it can function as part of the repressive order of capitalist assemblages and totalizing theory, whilst on the other, it can be framed as a rhizomatic practice, popping up all over the place and becoming entwined in other practices both lifelong and lifewide, critical, creative, and often subversive.

Hyperreality: Hype or Reality?

It is in the work of Baudrillard that we witness the most provocative rendition of a society of signs. His work is undoubtedly extremely controversial in his, at times, apparent fatalism in the face of a revitalised consumer capitalism with all its associated pleasures and oppressions (Plant 1992; Poster 1996). Undoubtedly, Baudrillard pushes arguments to their extremes in order to disrupt established common sense and what he takes to be oppressive approaches to reading, writing, and meaning.

For Baudrillard, denotation, reference with stable meaning, has become increasingly problematic with electronic media playing a significant part in this development. The proliferation of signs has the paradoxical effect of accelerating the production of the real, but in the process fixed and definitive meanings slip away amidst a ‘confusion of signs, images, simulations and appearances’ (Plant 1992, p.194). Representations have always signified as standing for the real, the true, the authentic, the meaningful, but their very proliferation and intensity as signs now results in a situation where ‘ubiquitous images, simulations, and reproductions no longer distort or conceal the real; reality has slipped away into the free-floating chaos of the hyper-real’ (Plant 1992, p.155). In this situation, the real and that which purports to represent it become inseparable. Representations become media-*ted* to the point where they become more real than the real. This is what Baudrillard means by *simulacra*, copies or models that nonetheless no longer have referents, that are reproduced as hyperreal and where, although not without meaning, that meaning, given that it is not anchored to an external object or referent, becomes multiple and even undecidable – simulacra then are weightless, decontextualised signifiers.⁵

Thus Baudrillard claims, we now live in a culture of the hyperreal:

Today abstraction is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror or the concept. Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyper-real. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is nevertheless the map that precedes the territory – a precession of simulacra – that engenders the territory. (Baudrillard 1995, p.1)

As lives become shaped by signs that function without reference to objects, identities, or needs, simulacra – the copies of a lost reality – combine and recombine in an apparent free play. This society of signs that is shaping a new social order, where the ground for the real has disappeared, is then itself a simulation of reality rather than the reality itself of that order, with the real that which is always already reproduced (Baudrillard 1996). In other words, the real comes to us as always already media-*ted* and therefore always already interpreted and re-interpreted. What lies ‘behind’ is not the authentic or true referent but simply another mediation, even though it is signed as authentic or true.

In this hyperreal condition, binaries such as contextualised–decontextualised, authentic–inauthentic, etc. lose their grip. There is nothing outside of simulation in the sense that to articulate the real can only be done through some kind of system that makes articulation, and therefore meaning, possible. The important point here

is that the deployment of any system immediately opens the door to simulation.⁶ Furthermore with the proliferation and accelerated circulation of images, hyperreality is now no longer a limited experience but rather the major condition of contemporary life. Baudrillard (1988b) argues that we now only engage with the simulation that has supplanted the real.

All this undoubtedly sounds strange and in itself 'unreal'. Baudrillard appears to be saying that there is no reality any more, that all is unreal. Is he then claiming then that he himself is unreal, a mere simulacrum? Another way of reading Baudrillard however is that, contrary to appearances, he is not actually trying to *abolish* reality, let alone himself! He himself has claimed – 'I hold no position on reality ... it remains an unshakeable postulate towards which you can only maintain a relation of adversity or of reconciliation' (Baudrillard 1993, p.122). Baudrillard's world of simulation is not 'unreal' in some science fiction sense, nor is it the realm of the illusional or irrational. It is hyperreal, very real, in fact more real than the real, thus not unreal in the sense of not existing, or that the materiality of the world has disappeared so that all is illusion. Rather, for him what the hyperreal signifies is a cultural *code* that is a structural force in fast capitalism.

What he is pointing to is that the real that is fashioned by *any* cultural system or code is one where the real is fashioned by making the world over in its image. An example of this is the real as fashioned by the code of the natural sciences – 'the realising of the world through science and technology is precisely what simulation is' (Gane 1993, p.184). In other words, any system *codes* the world or the real in its own way and thereby fashions a simulation of the world, or the real that whilst it is a simulation is nonetheless real.⁷ Simulation is thus both connotative and mythic.

Simulation then is the signification of the real through copies or models that have no originals and thus are not connected to the 'reality' of the originals. The world as it is can only be grasped on the basis of codes of simulation. The copies are nonetheless material because they shape the way reality is perceived or to put it another way, they generate meanings in all spheres of everyday life. Hence, everything becomes culturalised.

One of the things I find particularly convincing in Baudrillard's position is the notion that the contemporary social order is characterised by a material *virtuality* and by this is signified not only images in cyberspace but also the intensity, autonomy, and mobility of images in everyday life that simulate the real and themselves become the real. So we can ask what does 'society' signify when we engage with the practices of consuming the signifying images of culture – the hyper-commodification of culture noted earlier.

You Are What You Consume

'We can't let terrorists stop us from shopping.'⁸

Consumption is a difficult and controversial topic in education and many other social science disciplines because, whilst there is a reluctant acceptance that consumption figures importantly in people's lives, its significance is often

accounted for in terms of the language of manipulation and false consciousness. I would argue however that, although not all can consume equally, it is also the case that all are in some way affected by consumer culture and consumerist discourse and images, and not necessarily always in a manipulative or mystifying way. I prefer to see consumerism as a common 'language' through which cultural significations can be read or interpreted. In fast culture, consuming is a principal mode of self-expression and the experience of social participation is often contingent on consumption. Furthermore, this is not to be accounted for simply by pointing to manipulation and the inducing of false consciousness, since it neglects the dimension of desire that is manifested in consumption and to which even oppressed groups are not immune. In the practices of everyday life, people can transgress economic rationality and subvert the existing order by using consumer objects for purposes different to those intended for them by their producers – in effect, resisting through consuming – and this is itself a mode of self-expression (De Certeau 1984).

Writers who draw on postmodern theory (for example, Featherstone 1991; Urry 1994; Usher et al. 1997) have highlighted the significance of consumption in the social order and how identities are increasingly developed through consumption. They argue that, for many, experience is now more rooted in processes of consumption than production. Consumption shapes identities where what is consumed functions as a *sign* of identity to differentiate (signifying particular difference from others) and to show solidarity (signifying the same as particular others). In contrast to earlier ways of shaping identity – for example, through production or occupation – consumption is flexible and more dynamic. There exists greater fluidity in a cultural 'supermarket' where choice and variety are multiple. I mentioned earlier the hyper-commodification of culture by signs and simulations, where lifestyle choices are themselves hyper-differentiating, i.e. constantly and rapidly changing. In providing opportunities for self-expression, these choices stimulate a desire for further consumption. Thus identities can be changed more often, can be experimented with, and therefore there is less commitment than before to any singular fixed identity. This is what is signified by the argument that there is an *aestheticisation* of life, a whole range of practices that revolve around the aesthetic where the emphasis is on lifestyle and its enhancement. Many sites have become centres of aesthetic consumption – urban areas, redeveloped and gentrified, shopping malls, museums, theme and heritage parks – and all of these sites furthermore are hyperreal. These sites *signify*, providing spaces for new experiences and the (re)formation of identities. This is why many argue that lifestyle has now replaced other forms of hierarchical social categorisation and become more significant than, for example, work or occupation in shaping many people's subjectivity and through that their sense of identity.

However, consumption is now no longer simply about consuming *goods*. Following Baudrillard, in a hyperreal situation, consumption is more about the signs and significations with which the consumption of goods is indelibly imbued. Consumption in other words is a *meaningful* activity where goods, objects, or images become *signs* that communicate something to someone where that

which is consumed generates markers of similarity and difference that code behaviour and *bring forth* individuals as the same or different. Consumer culture is therefore semiotic, an economy of signs, where individuals and groups through what and how they consume communicate messages about position and worth and where consumption is articulated within specific meaningful ways of life.

Consumption then always involves the taking and conveying of meaning, and is therefore cultural. If all consumption is culturally meaningful, this implies that nothing is consumed purely and simply on a functional basis. Looked at this way, objects are not taken up just for their use or function or because of need but primarily to *communicate* and through communication, there is a structuring of actions and interactions. Consumption is thus a signifying mechanism and a process for the cultural production, reproduction, and communication of social relations and social order. As such it is a material and semiotic process carried out through the practices of everyday life.

Consumer objects then have an exchange or sign value, meaning that they signify something about the consumer in the context of a social system that is based on a sign economy. In the advanced economy of fast capitalism, it is meaning then that is positioned as prior, with meaning generated and distributed through consumer objects. In effect, individuals 'buy' their identity or 'being' with each act of consumption. Baudrillard therefore sees consumption, not as a passive 'using up' of produced items, but as a framework that enables active relationships within a cultural system (Baudrillard 1996). This semiotic 'system of objects', a structural and differential logic of signs, defines the social order where consumption is a signifying substance. Everything exists within this logic, he argues, a logic that constitutes the *signifying fabric* of our everyday existence.

The difference between fast and classical capitalism is not only economic and political, but cultural also, because whilst classical capitalism fostered an ethic of production, fast capitalism fosters and indeed requires an ethic and also an aesthetic of consumption. For Marxists, labour was the source of creativity and fulfilment, but now this is the role assumed by consumption. In the process, what Baudrillard (1988a, p.11) refers to as 'images circulating as true value', images that signify the real, has become the most significant tendency in fast capitalism.

Earlier I referred to Baudrillard's 'code', the mythic code that structures the social order for the sustaining of fast capitalism. He articulates this as *consumativity* (an amalgam of consumption and hyperreality signifying the impossibility of separating these). This code or structural force links together hyperreality, consumer culture, and fast capitalism. Consumerism, the motor of sign values, is the contributing factor in creating hyperreality, with hyperreality in its turn reinforcing consumption as a sign economy. As we have seen, the hyperreal is a world of constantly proliferating images or simulacra. Extending the argument, we can now say it is these that are *consumed* as a desirable reality. With the consumption of images, thoughts and feelings intertwine with the desire induced by images. For Baudrillard, the code of consumativity marks a ceaseless movement such that the consumption of images is never satisfied – there is always a *lack*, an endless

desire to possess the *image* of the real (Baudrillard 1988). Furthermore, as capitalism puts people in a competitive position with one another, it is not so much that each desires a *specific* object or image, but that each desires what the other desires. To put it another way, people desire the desires of the other.⁹ When *fulfilment* can only be found through a world of simulation, there will always be more images to be consumed and more desires to be attended to, with fulfilment indefinitely postponed. Thus the dispersion and fragmentation of meaning as processes of cultural commodification feed an accelerating circulation of signs in the sphere of culture.

The consumption of signs in a hyperreal condition must inevitably involve a constant yet unstable repositioning of subjectivity and a consequent re-forming of identity. As a result, human subjectivity becomes a *task*, a performance, rather than a given – always in process. Becoming rather than being becomes the ontological priority. Experience becomes contingent and flow-like rather than coherent and determinate. New forms of experience proliferate. Experience generates further experience. Sensibilities are attuned to the pleasure of constant and new experiencing, where the flow of experiencing becomes its own end rather than a means to an end, part of a constant making and re-making of a lifestyle. The unified, coherent and sovereign self of modernity, the firm ground for the fixing of identity, becomes a multiple discontinuous self traversed by multiple meanings and whose identity is continually in a process of re-formation. The play of images experienced in the virtuality of the hyperreal shapes subjectivity with virtuality becoming a significant mode of personal experience.

What Does All This Mean for Learning?

What indeed does all this mean for learning and how do fast capitalism, hyperreality, and signifying consumption impact on the contemporary significations of lifelong learning? For me, what Baudrillard is pointing to is the loss of finalities, or to put it another way, the loss of the foundations of knowledge. The consequence of this is a decentering of knowledge and a valorisation of multiple forms of knowledge and ways of knowing. With this loss comes a re-signification of learning. With simulation, finalities lose their meaning because they assume the existence of an unmediated real. Baudrillard's argument is precisely that there is no unmediated real. There is a real, but it is a hyperreal and with the hyperreal there can be no finalities. Thus learning takes off in a variety directions rather than being bound by the pre-defined goals of modernity's educational project.

In this condition, rather than the search for truth or deep meaning, the pursuit of *a* truth, learning becomes instead the response to desire in the pursuit and consumption of a range of truths and an involvement in truth-making practices. If representations become images with a meaning detached from what they purportedly represent, the question shifts from – what is true? – and is this a faithful representation of reality? – to how is truth fashioned? – who is to be trusted and what makes

reality real? In this situation, experience comes to be seen ‘not as an unmediated guide to “truth” but as a practice of making sense, both symbolically and narratively, as a struggle over material conditions and meaning’ (Brah 1996, p.116). Given the proliferation of signs and meaning-making possibilities, it is little wonder that practices of signification, such as those to do with lifestyle, have enfolded and displaced traditional questions of representation, particularly now that the latter is itself seen as a signifying practice.

None of this need be understood as a *refusal* of knowledge, even though it may not signify ‘learning’ as conventionally understood. It is perhaps better seen as ‘a reformulation of what the desire for knowledge might be about’ (Game 1991, p.18). These reformulations may include a desire for truth as revelation, truth as advocacy, truth as resonance as well as truth as correspondence and even for truth as the renewed search for foundations.¹⁰ Increasingly no one of these truths can claim to speak the *whole* truth, and it is recognised that they cannot, even though many would still wish them to do so and indeed actively pursue the search for such a truth as a lifestyle practice. This possibility and recognition of many truths may for some be disturbing whilst for others it may be a pleasure, as are the multiple possibilities for the re-formation of identity that underpins the desire to seek out multiple forms and sites of knowledge.

In his influential characterisation of late modernity, Giddens (1990, 1991) argues that matters of identity, of who and what one is, become urgent questions in need of an answer rather than answers that can be drawn from meanings that are already available in a pre-given sociocultural order. The greater the range of decisions that people have to make, an existentially and semiotically troubling situation arises where the very uncertainty and ambivalence which give rise to the need to make decisions actually makes such decision-making less secure and therefore troubled. Here Giddens fashions contemporary times as entailing a troubling ‘risk’ and consequent stress of coping with this risk but where the need to cope is the source of learning which since risk is always present is therefore lifelong. However in my argument about lifestyle practices risk is signified differently. Here the proliferation and consumption of signs, far from being simply existentially troubling, can also be existentially pleasurable, as is the need to continually remake identity. There is risk but it is one of not being able to signify oneself in desirable ways, of not being able to respond to lack and desire – the pursuit of which involves learning that never reaches an end. Lifelong learning here can be about pleasure and creativity, and whilst it is needed it is not simply as a means of better making troubling decisions, or trying to maintain some stability of identity in troubled times.

What all this signifies is an openness rather than a closure, the desire to assert a definitive truth even though many still seek such a truth. This bears significantly on a point made earlier about the aesthetics of the sign value economy and culture. In this social order, lifelong learning is learning energised by desire which can follow many paths, rather than learning governed solely by the pursuit of universal truth (science), unproblematic democracy (citizenship), self-realisation (personal development), spirituality (faith and religion), or even the more obvious learning demands of the market. It is not so much that these latter disappear, far from it,

rather it is that they no longer constitute quite the dominant and exclusive significations of learning that is foregrounded as 'worthwhile' and valuable. They become just a part of the desire to learn which can take many other forms.

Given this, it is perhaps not coincidental that the current scene is marked by the increasing ubiquity and multidirectionality of learning and a lessening of the centrality of institutional education. Everyday practices, the quotidian, are themselves foregrounded as learning activities. There is an increasing diversity, multiplicity, and de-differentiation characterising the landscape of learning, and a reconfiguring of learning opportunities away from what educators think is good for learners to what learners themselves consider valuable and value-adding:

Educational practitioners rather than being the source/producers of knowledge/taste become facilitators helping to interpret everybody's knowledge and helping to open up possibilities for further experience. They become part of the 'culture' industry, vendors in the educational hypermarket. In a reversal of modernist education, the consumer (the learner) rather than the producer (educator) is articulated as having greater significance and power. (Usher et al. 1997, pp.107–108)

Thus as people become increasingly positioned as consumers, they also become signified as consumers of learning. My argument then is that participation in learning activities, coupled with the increased significance of non-institutional learning, cannot be understood without reference to consumption. Following Baudrillard, learning is now coded by consumption – learning is consuming. Linked to this is the widespread and continuing impact of electronic media which at one and the same time are becoming increasingly sophisticated and increasingly accessible. In practical terms, one consequence of this is the availability of a range of learning options, catering to all tastes and interests and previously unavailable, now waiting to be consumed. Learning activities have become consumer goods in themselves, purchased as the result of choice within a marketplace where learning products compete with those of leisure and entertainment and are often indistinguishable from these.

Unlike the mass consumption of modernity, consumption now signifies a choice for difference and difference as choice, the different and distinctive within a signifying culture that stimulates dreams, desires, and fantasies in developing the life project of the self. It is in this sense that learning comes to be signified in terms of lifestyle practices:

[K]nowledge becomes important: knowledge of new goods, their social and cultural value, and how to use them appropriately. This is particularly the case with aspiring groups who adopt a learning mode towards consumption and the cultivation of a lifestyle. It is for groups such as the new middle class, the new working class and the new rich or upper class, that the consumer culture of magazines, newspapers, books television and radio programmes which stress self-improvement, self-development, personal transformation, how to manage property, relationships and ambitions, how to construct a fulfilling lifestyle, are most relevant. (Featherstone 1991, p.19)

Knowledge (what is learnt) has itself become a sign, a commodity, a product in its own right that can be purchased and consumed for its economic and cultural value – capital which can confer competitive advantage and /or status or at least alleviate

the fear of falling behind, either economically or culturally. The implication of this is that knowledge must be made consumable by, for example, pricing, marketing, and packaging it attractively. To put this another way, knowledge must have the appropriate signifiers for learners, and what constitutes 'appropriate' will vary with the practices concerned.

Learning then is integral to lifestyle practices and within these practices works connotatively through an expressive mode. It is individuated with an emphasis on self-expression and marked by a stylistic self-consciousness. Aestheticisation, the self-referential concern with image and the constant and pleasurable remaking of identity, necessitates a learning stance towards life as a means of self-expression. In the process individuals are themselves positioned as meaning-makers, as 'designers' (Cope and Kalantzis 2000; Kress 2003). From this perspective, the semiotic view of people as makers of meaning recodes the cognitive view of people as mentalistic learners.

With lifestyle practices, every aspect of life, like every commodity, is imbued with self-referential meaning; every choice an emblem of identity, each one a message to ourselves and to others of the sort of person we are. A good case in point is the contemporary emphasis on the body as a focus for identity. The body is itself now a commodity to be consumed, the youthful, fit body an image that signifies (Watson 1998). Here, consumption is a signifier of the need to make oneself different and to identify with those aspired to, where everything consumed signifies an aspect of an aspiration. Related to this, we witness also the growth of activities related to the fashioning of a new identity – assertiveness training, slimming, bodily well-being, creative writing, interpersonal skills, counselling, re-birthing, makeovers, and spiritual quests. All of these can now be seen to be embedded in practices that are signified as 'learning'. These lifestyle practices then are practices of signifying consumption and moreover of a consumption which is potentially unending, since, although deniable, desire, based on lack, is never satisfied. There is always the need for new experiences and hence more learning. It is the very openness or multiple significations of experience, rather than its potential for classification and hence closure or fixed signification into pre-defined learning, which provides the vehicle for the fuelling of desire. There is an endlessness to learning therefore, lifelong and life-wide.

Lifestyle practices are not confined to any one particular social or age group, nor are they purely a matter of economic determination. Economic capital certainly plays a part in influencing the capacity of individuals to be more or less active in their lifestyle practices but cultural capital is just as significant. Furthermore, these practices are themselves a way of acquiring and enhancing cultural capital. The significant characteristic of lifestyle practices is a self-conscious and reflexive adoption of what can be termed a learning mode, a disposition or *stance*, towards life, a lifelong learning integral to the sensibilities, values and assumptions embedded in these practices that provide the means of expressing identity. Thus, while the focus is often on the economic imperative for lifelong learning, I am arguing that there are other equally significant aspects of its emergence as a discourse for the governing of life, where the 'conduct of conduct' entails the adoption of a design sensibility to one's life.

Relating learning to consumption means locating learning in a cultural economy of signs where consumer choices are communicative practices and where learning becomes a marker, an expressive means of self-development. In this sense, learning does not necessarily signify education. With the play of desire and learning as the fulfilment of desire, learning becomes oriented to specific learner-defined ends, rather than being tied to the educational project's search for enlightenment, truth, deep meanings, or some end pre-defined by the educational system. Equally, education need not necessarily signify learning, unless being signified an 'educated person', usually through credentials, is considered desirable, an important aspect of identity formation, or if it acts as a means of distinguishing self from others and a means of desirably identifying with other educated/credentialed persons.

So lifelong learning does not simply signify skills for operating new technologies or for knowledge economy type work, as is often articulated in the texts of fast capitalism and the critiques arising thereof. Lifestyle practices involve different semiotic or meaning-making possibilities which themselves are embedded in the culture of fast capitalism. Making sense, giving meaning and interpreting that which is available, both multiple and changing, becomes ever more necessary even whilst becoming more complex. Furthermore, the globalised engagement with the other, exotic or otherwise, made possible by global forms of communication and flows of information itself signifies a transformation in any fixed and bounded sense of self, space and place.

What a Difference 'and' Can Make . . .

Unlike Foucault, Derrida and Lyotard, the work of Deleuze and Guattari has had until recently relatively little influence on educational research, although perhaps it is becoming more influential in educational theorizing. Their best known work *A Thousand Plateaux* (1988) is not an easy read because it is itself written as a complex rhizome. Yet, like those other writers, their work attempts to re-fashion our understanding of, and therefore our practices, in relation to the dominant history and discourses of Western modernity. Central to their work is an effort to undermine foundational and fixed views of language and meaning that are associated with pervasive arboreal metaphors such as the 'tree of knowledge'. This foundationalism signifies knowledge as something that can grow and be secure and located, where language can truly represent that which is. The arboreal metaphor signifies a logical hierarchy of root, trunk, branch, twig, and bud. All is ordered, all is in its place, all is rooted. Their concept of the rhizome on the contrary signifies opposition to the tree of hierarchical structures, stratification, and linear thinking, even though it can also infiltrate a tree creating 'strange new uses' for it (Deleuze and Guattari 1988, p.15). Knowledge therefore is understood as a becoming, constantly created and re-created not something pre-formed and waiting to be mastered.

Deleuze and Guattari describe their work as a ‘philosophy of immanence’ in order to distinguish it from the dominant logocentric tradition of Western philosophy. They argue that knowledge is always ‘in’ rather than ‘of’ the world. As Deleuze said in his interview with Foucault (1997, pp.206–207), ‘representation no longer exists; there’s only action – theoretical action and practical action which serve as relays and form networks’. The key question is not *what does it mean* but always *how does it work?* This is not a statement of pragmatic philosophy but an argument for learning as a social activity, the making and re-making of connections out of which knowledge is created and re-created through the action of connecting.

Thus the dualist conjoining of world and word through representation is taken apart to be displaced by actions that result in the circulation of meaning. In contrast to the arboreal metaphor, therefore, Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome displaces roots with *routes*, introducing unexpected eruptions (and irruptions) rather than steady growth into language and meaning, where desire plays a role in reason, and logic is not privileged over interpretation:

We’re tired of trees. We should stop believing in trees, roots, radicles. They’ve made us suffer too much. All of arborescent culture is founded on them, from biology to linguistics. Nothing is beautiful or loving or political aside from underground stems and aerial roots, adventitious growths and rhizomes. (Deleuze and Guattari 1988, p.17)

Deleuze and Guattari argue that we are connected in rhizomatic networks that encourage a constant state of movement, continuously trying to avoid/evoke being bound or enclosed. Here movement and flow are introduced into the framing of language and meaning; things are metaphorically and literally ‘up-rooted’. Movements and flow are multi-directional, enabling a multiplicity of entwinements:

Unlike trees or their roots, the rhizome connects any point to any other point, and its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature; it brings into play very different regimes of signs, and even non-sign states. (Deleuze and Guattari 1988, p.21)

For Deleuze and Guattari semiosis then is not structured by some underlying rules of language, but through the production of flows performed by both signs and desire, themselves semiotically promiscuous. Through these flows, different and multiple meanings emerge. In challenging the arboreal metaphor, they are therefore challenging the centrality of ‘to be’ as the fashioning through which the world is represented and the associated view that everything has to be structured in terms of either–or. As Doel suggests (1996, p.434),

whereas an arboreal system works through branching and hierarchical organization (a genealogy), a rhizome comprises an entanglement of contingent (dis)connections (an anti-genealogy). A tree or root fixes a central point, and thus an order, from which there emerges a pre-programmed, irreversible, and essentially hierarchical series of bifurcations. By contrast, everything on a rhizome is connectable and disconnectable, everything is reversible and displaceable, and everything can be broken-off or set in play; it is a multiplicity and a becoming, with a consistency all of its own – its does not lead, or refer back, to a being subject, object, unity, or totality.

As with Baudrillard, no explication of Deleuze and Guattari’s work can succeed without highlighting their understanding of contemporary capitalism. It is a nuanced and subtle understanding. They argue that capitalism has two faces. At one

level, it is the abstract machine, the rationalising and rationalistic network of modernity. This ‘machine’ is manifested as assemblages in *strata* or levels of organisation. Strata influence:

significance (what and how we speak), subjectivity (who we are), the organism (the constitution of bodies), and faciality (expression) ... the power of the capitalist machine works through organizing our politico-ethical space in a manner that articulates what we say and who we are. (Fleming 2002, pp.201–202)

The other face of capitalism is what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the ‘plane of consistency’, a latent surface of non-organisation that recognises no difference or hierarchy. It is named as consistency because upon this plane everything is made the same.

Deleuze and Guattari articulate capitalism as being solely concerned with individuals and their profits. It combines anything with anything into assemblages whose only function is to maximise profits for individuals. As a consequence it must subvert all territorial groupings such as the church, the family, the group, indeed any social arrangement, by rendering everything the same or, to put it another way, into the nothing of the plane of consistency. It is in this sense that capitalism *de-territorialises*. But at the same time, capitalism’s paradox is that it needs social groupings in order to function effectively and therefore it must enable *re-territorialisations*, or new social groupings such as new forms of the state or the family, or the group. In this sense therefore strata are always with us:

If one had to summarise the crucial elements of Deleuze and Guattari’s dynamic ontology one might say that from time to time various forms of particles and energies form themselves into strata of limited duration that eventually de-stratify. This, for Deleuze and Guattari is what is. (Taylor 1998)¹¹

These de- and re-territorialisations are not sequential movements but happen simultaneously. Hence, the life of any culture is always in the process of both structuring and being restructured, of simultaneously de-territorialising and re-territorialising.

What then marks the significance of the rhizome?

The tree imposes the verb ‘to be’, but the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, ‘and . . . and . . . and’. This conjunction carries enough force to shake and uproot the verb ‘to be’. (Deleuze and Guattari 1988, p.25)

It is important to bear in mind the play of words here. In French ‘is’ (*est*) and ‘and’ (*et*) are homophones, pronounced in the same way. There is thus a playfulness present in the argument, which is nonetheless serious in its intent. The conjunctive ‘and’ here becomes integral to rhizomatic approaches that metaphorically shake the tree of knowledge, disrupting arboreal meaning. In this disruption, meaning is mobilised rather than grounded:

It is odd how the tree has dominated Western reality and all of Western thought . . . : the root-foundation, *Grund, racine, fondement* . . . Thought is however, not arborescent, . . . unlike trees or their roots, the rhizome *connects any point to any other point* . . . In contrast to centred (even polycentric) systems with hierarchical modes of communication and pre-established paths, the rhizome is an a-centred, non-hierarchical, non-signifying system without a General . . . directions in motion . . . *no beginning or end*; . . . the rhizome is alliance, uniquely alliance. (Deleuze and Guattari 1988, p.21)

Here an essentialist ontology of being and a logic of either–or is displaced with one of becoming, of flux, of movement and flow – the ‘and’ of connections and alliances. Their aim is ‘to establish a logic of the AND, overthrow ontology, do away with foundations, nullify endings and beginnings’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988, p.25). Perhaps their most radical re-rendering is in what they refer to as ‘lines of flight’. These can be understood as a metaphor for everyday resistance (Fleming 2000), but there is perhaps more to it than that. For Deleuze and Guattari, they are the means of escape from repressive orders – orders which for them are everywhere and only through which can individuals affirm their desire.

It is the rhizomatic that engenders lines of flight, reopening flows that tree-like structures have shut down. The rhizome with its capacity for endless connectivity has the potential to generate virtually boundless lines of flight. In this sense therefore, a line of flight is a *bridge* to a new formation. Whereas the tree builds no bridges, the *rhizome* is constituted by an endless series of interconnecting bridges.¹² There is thus no beginning and no ending, rather an endlessness and multiplicity in rhizomatic meaning that is coded in significations of lifelong learning where it is itself endless within the span of one’s life. This is an endlessness that both contributes to, and arises from, the ‘logic’ of the rhizome.

A line of flight then is a de-territorialisation. In a sense it is a liberating move but not as understood within a grand narrative of modernity. For Deleuze and Guattari, any notion of a subject with agency is highly problematic, if not impossible, and especially problematic when subjects are locked into the grand narratives of capitalism’s abstract machine. So whilst a line of flight can be ‘liberating’, it is so without the benefit of such discursive formations. These latter are yet another instance of the normalisations of a repressive or homogenising order, whereas a line of flight is precisely a move away from such totalities. But as I have noted any territoriality or strata has *immanently* within it a movement towards de-territorialisation – ‘territorialities are shot through with lines of flight testifying to the presence within them of movements of de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988, p.55).

Deleuze and Guattari present an account of a subject that is body-oriented, but not in a conventional way; they refer to a ‘body without organs’ (BwO). There is no mind–body dualism in Deleuze and Guattari. The body is material through and through, and affective. The material/affective body or BwO is the subject as a body that is a desiring machine,¹³ where desire is a force or energy, an energy fuelled by the endless resources of signs and cultural codes. Desire is always potentially creative energy – ‘desiring-production’. Parts of the body are linked to other objects, signs, energy flows in endless patterns of productive activity. The connections which can be made, the channels which can be formed are, in theory, infinite, with subjects potentially capable of endless creativity and change.

The body they speak of then is not simply governed by reason but one that is capable of affect, of having feelings, passions, sensations – all located in the body and all of which are pure flows of desiring energy seeking connections.

The energy states of the material body are linked through connective flows between the body, and to other bodies and objects. These connected flows take the form of signs which are themselves material objects with the same state as other material elements in assemblages. To put it another way, signs too have energy, they are connectors ‘grooving’ the body into affective states that are sourced in linguistically ‘grooved’ material assemblages (Jowers and Watson 1995). Desiring production never reaches an end. Individuals are always moving between on the one hand, a desire which is creative but antisocial in the sense of unstratified (nomadic, rhizomatic) and on the other a desire which is social in the sense of stratified.

For Deleuze and Guattari, the subject, like capitalism, has two faces. On the one hand, it has a nomadic potential for endlessly migrating on lines of flight across the networks constituted by assemblages and other desiring subjects. In this sense subjectivity is distributed, the subject is enacted through the cultural practices that constitute the social order¹⁴. The subject can be ‘frozen’ by immersion in the strata of the abstract machine. The repetitive, habituated, and compulsive channelling of bodily energies ‘freeze’ the body into a stasis and an affective parasitism, or to put it another way, where its effect is no longer its own. For Deleuze and Guattari, as with Baudrillard, the contemporary social order produces a sense of lack at the heart of the subject – a lack that is artificially created by the abstract machine of capitalism. What fashions the subject therefore, and indeed the social order, is the limiting of connectivity and nomadism, the elimination of lines of desiring-production through re-territorialisation and re-forming of strata. Nomadism, on the other hand, is de-territorialisation, taking off on creative lines of flight. As nomads, subjects randomly connect signs, energy flows, data, knowledge, fantasy, objects, and other bodies in new flows of desiring production.

At the heart of the contemporary subject therefore are to be found both desire and lack. This itself is the product of the capitalist socio-economic order, the bureaucratic state, and the Oedipal family, out of which homogenising and repressive strata are formed. But even the most solid strata, as we have noted earlier, carry lines of flight within themselves. The rhizome de-territorialises strata, subverts hierarchies and restores desiring production. It follows the flight of nomadic heterogeneity, with a multiplicity of learning, other ways of knowing, as connections are made and unmade.

My argument then, drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts, is that lifelong learning can be considered both as stratum and as rhizomatic. As the former it is a vital component in contemporary governmentality. As rhizomatic, as lines of flight, it links and conjoins in all sorts of unexpected ways, and that therefore it cannot be totally fixed and regulated by totalising significations of strata where it assumes one dominant and definitive meaning. As stratum, lifelong learning is located in an economy of the same. But lifelong learning is also located in an economy of difference, connoting itself as different to the dominant discourses of lifelong learning as strata. Lifelong learning as sign therefore is opened up to difference.

Stammering ...

What there is, then, is a signifying of the multifarious connections, the lines of flight that are possible, which in relation to discourses of lifelong learning, points to the play of difference that contrasts with, and contests, the abstract machine of the governmental. Paradoxically, what emerges now is a more tentative form of discourse, generally and also in particular about lifelong learning. Rather than simply being able to say what is the case, the assertion of an authoritative stance on the nature of the world and the meaning of things, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the 'and ... and ... and' of rhizomatic lines of flight result in a certain tentativeness, a stammering:

It's easy to stammer, but making language itself stammer is a different affair, it involves placing all linguistic, and even non-linguistic, elements in variation, both variables of expression and variables of content. A new form of redundancy. AND ... AND ... AND ... (Deleuze and Guattari 1988, p.98)

Making language stammer may seem perverse in an era where plain speech, communication skills, and being articulate are valued, and their lack correspondingly decried. But even in articulate speech language can stammer in the multiple conjunctions and connections that are possible though the desiring production signified by 'and'. As there are always additions, indeed infinite possible connections, it is language, not necessarily the speaker of language that stammers. Herein lie the lines of flight, the creative possibilities for meaning-making, not least because more is being said than might be immediately apparent, and where any one person is only one point of connection in a network. 'And' is the mark of the never ending movement of desiring production.

This suggests a different understanding of conjunction – 'AND is less a conjunction than the atypical expression of all the possible conjunctions it places in continuous variation' (Deleuze and Guattari 1988, p.99). Thus, while attempts continue to root the meaning of lifelong learning, on this understanding of the 'and' it is nonetheless ceaselessly de-territorialized, given that rhizomatic variation is always in play:

'And' is not simply a connective, joint, hinge between two things, it also implies progression (better and better), causation (and then), great duration (on and on), great numbers (more and more), addition (this and that equals those), differentiation (there are writers and there are writers), variety (X and Y), and succession (walking two and two). (Doel 1996, p.422)

Thus 'and' does all sorts of supplementing work and as Derrida reminds us a supplement both completes and *adds to*. Lifelong learning cannot therefore be signified within strata as meaning one thing and one thing alone. 'And' mediates, mobilises, completes, and radicalises. It involves power in de-territorialising and re-territorialising. It can be the glue between assemblages but one could easily end up with sticky fingers by taking it for granted, stratifying it, and thus not seeing the multiple forms to which it points. And given the possibility that it should not be replaced by an alternative discourse but should be radicalised by further additions,

more connections, we would be brave in this situation to try and answer the question of what 'is' lifelong learning. Indeed the point becomes less one of examining what is the case and more of finding what sticks, or in other words, we are back to the contingency and multiplicity that characterise the postmodern.

As we have seen, with every de-territorialisation, there is a re-territorialisation. At an early point in their discussion Deleuze and Guattari (1988, p.20) argue that

the important point is that the root-tree and canal-rhizome are not two opposed models: the first operates as a transcendent model and tracing, even as it engenders its own escapes; the second operates as an immanent process that overturns the model and outlines a map, even if it constitutes its own hierarchies

The arboreal and the rhizome do different work, which suggests that rhizomatically we could argue for trees and rhizomes, roots and routes, foundationalism and anti-foundationalism. Would these conjoinings hold firm? For Deleuze and Guattari the answer is that they would because for them the central problem is not one of apparently contradictory conjoinings. Rather the danger that is continually signified in their work is the phenomenon of *totalising theory*, a theory or philosophy (or perhaps a coding) that becomes monolithic, and whose effects can be ubiquitous and destructive (Taylor 1998). A totalising theory is a *stratum* in the sense that it functions like one. By articulating structured and structuring form, it territorialises and controls. Everything is seen through its own lens that then, in turn, fashions the world according to that lens. Here we see similarities with Baudrillard's critique of systems that code the world in their own image producing a condition of hyperreality.

What then does it mean to articulate lifelong learning as a rhizome? It could be argued that learning escaped on a line of flight from the stratum of institutionalised education into the rhizome of lifelong learning only to find that it had become lodged in yet another stratum. The abstract machine of the contemporary socio-economic and -cultural order always attempts to stratify learning, to code what is as one thing and one thing alone, to fix it in place definitively, and to do so for its own purposes. But the rhizomatic disrupts systems that attempt to impose the final and the definitive, so stratified learning is always in tension with the learning involved in desiring production – desiring production as learning, energy driven and affect laden, always potentially able to take off on a line of flight away from all the stratified signifiers of lifelong learning – including effective technique, flexible skilling, good citizenship and happy, self-fulfilled people. Thus it could be argued that lifelong learning is not any one thing – 'the mere acquisition of any new skill or bit of information, but instead the accession to a new way of perceiving and understanding the world' (Bogue 2004, p.328). There are always many possible creative practices producing alternative and critical ways of thinking and acting. Since we can never fully predict how someone will learn, there is always a 'mystery' to learning (Bogue 2004, p.338).

Strathern (1997) argues that learning is something which cannot be evaluated immediately, as it takes time to absorb and reformulate things. The mobilising of 'and' is consistent with this view. Learning takes time, engendering the very lifelong dimension, which the lifelong learning discourse attempts to make sense of but

often fails. Learning stretches, bends and conjoins, making all sorts of intended and unintended senses, stretched across time and space in unexpected rhizomatic ways. Our learning is through the connections we make rhizomatically, as well as those that are allowed and valued by the abstract machine. Thus the discourse of lifelong learning both gives expression, and is subject to, the logic of 'and'. There is always more and the more can be and often is very different.

The 'and' therefore becomes the constant lament within lifelong learning, the endlessness, the evermore, immanent within it, even as it is rooted in specific and definitive meanings. Thus it is the very stammering of language that undermines any firm assertions about what lifelong learning 'really' *is* and about how it can be best enabled. Inferences may be drawn from particular contexts, but manifestations elsewhere, as lines of flight, are inherently unpredictable. Indeed if we were to follow Deleuze and Guattari, there is always learning as the energy of the desiring body and it is always lifelong because this desire never ends.

... to an End

The writers whose work I have chosen are not meant to be representative of the post-modern nor was the conjoining of Baudrillard with Deleuze and Guattari meant to imply that they are saying the same things in their respective work. Equally, the conjoining was not motivated by a desire to present a comparative study of their concepts and arguments. I chose rather to very selectively explicate aspects of their work in order to illuminate and exemplify what lifelong learning might signify through a postmodern lens because I strongly believe that not only have they interesting things to say in an interesting way but also because what they have to say appears to have nothing to do with learning let alone education. My assumption here is clear – if the object is to understand learning then the last place one should go to is those who write *explicitly* about learning. All that would be gained in this way would be yet more finalities ... more 'this is what the world (of lifelong learning) *really* is'.

Going to those, such as Baudrillard, and Deleuze and Guattari, in order to develop a different understanding of learning inevitably involves an off-centre reading, considerable interpretive work, and no definitive understandings at the end of this process. But this is as it should be because both Baudrillard, and Deleuze and Guattari argue that although there is an impulsion to do so, we should not strive for such understandings. They show what it means to have an 'aversion to the universal' and this is probably one of the most distinguishing features of seeing with a postmodern lens.

This aversion to the universal inevitably leads to a position where a loss of finalities is something to be celebrated rather than mourned. Along with this comes a tolerance of the apparently contradictory and paradoxical. For Baudrillard, the hyperreal is simulation but it is also more real than the real. The heightening of reality leads to the loss of reality. Equally, an individualistic consumer

culture can live with learning as a social activity because the social is now a society of signs. For Deleuze and Guattari, things can be located in strata and still take off on lines of flight. It is lines of flight that engender strata and vice versa. The seeming opposites, rhizomes and trees, the nomadic and the stratified, can still nonetheless coexist.

So if there is a message, it is this – let's not try to universalise lifelong learning. Let's not strive to give it a single definitive meaning and let's resist the temptation to think and act that way. Let's just accept that lifelong learning has many significations, many of which are contradictory but all of which are mappable – and that is what this chapter has tried to show.

Endnotes

¹ Text in the sense that 'lifelong learning' has to be 'read' and interpreted and texts in the sense that these meanings are articulated in written texts of various kinds.

² Of course, for some education is an everyday practice

³ 'Myths' in the semiotic sense of extended metaphors that enable sense to be made of experiences within a culture. They express and serve to organise shared ways of fashioning something within a culture. They serve to naturalise the cultural.

⁴ 'Lens' in the sense of focusing on certain things whilst inevitably not focusing on others.

⁵ A copy of a copy which has been so dissipated in its relation to the original that it can no longer be said to be a copy. The *simulacrum*, therefore, stands on its own as a copy without a model.

⁶ The 1999 cult movie *The Matrix* explores the relationship between people and simulacra. The Matrix of the title is a simulation created by sentient machines to control the human population. In this world all is simulation. The lead character in the movie, Neo, in a self-referential move uses a hollowed out copy of Baudrillard's *Simulacra and Simulation* as a secret store – a simulacrum of *Simulacra and Simulation*!

⁷ Everything articulable in language must be a simulation because language systematically creates the world and in doing so makes everything a simulation . . . that which is not a simulation is all that which cannot be articulated in the systematicity of language.

⁸ George Bush, September 2001.

⁹ Baudrillard has also argued that ultimately people desire and seek to consume the myth of consumption.

¹⁰ It could be argued that fundamentalists of all religions are embarked on such a renewed search.

¹¹ [http://www.uta.edu/english/apt/mus\(e\)ings/d&g.html](http://www.uta.edu/english/apt/mus(e)ings/d&g.html), Accessed 10 September 2005.

¹² Or as Deleuze and Guattari playfully put it: *pas les points, mais les ponts*.

¹³ By 'body without organs', Deleuze and Guattari do not literally mean a body with *no* organs. What they are pointing to is that the subject does not look inward to its biology or mind but outward to its connections. It is the unstratified body, the body without an organisation imposed by the abstract machine of capitalism.

¹⁴ In an interesting and unusual articulation of Deleuze and Guattari's subject, Everard suggests that the subject can be thought of as sculpted from stone, carved out from the 'slop and flow' of social intercourse. See Jerry Everard (1996) *The Anti-Oedipal Subject of Cyberspace*, http://lost-biro.com/papers/Anti_Oedipal_Subject.html, Accessed 01 October 2005.

References

- Baudrillard, J. (1988a) *The Ecstasy of Communication*. New York: Semiotext(e).
- Baudrillard, J. (1988b) The system of objects. In: Poster, M. (Ed.) *Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Baudrillard, J. (1993) *The Transparency of Evil*. New York: Verso.
- Baudrillard, J. (1995) *Simulacra and Simulation*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Baudrillard, J. (1996) *The System of Objects*. London: Verso.
- Bogue, R. (2004) Search, swim and see: Deleuze's apprenticeship in signs and pedagogy of images, *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 36(3), 327–342.
- Brah, A. (1996) *Cartographies of Diaspora: Contesting Identities*. London: Routledge.
- Chaiklin, S. and Lave, J. (Eds) (1996) *Understanding Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cope, B. and Kalantzis, M. (Eds) (2000) *Multiliteracies*. London: Routledge Falmer.
- De Certeau, M. (1984) *The Practices of Everyday Life*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Deleuze, G. and Foucault, M. (1977) Intellectuals and power. In: Bouchard, D. (Ed.) *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1988) *A Thousand Plateaux*. London: Athlone Press.
- Doel, M. (1996) A hundred thousand lines of flight: a machinic introduction to the nomad thought and scrumpled geography of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Environment and Planning D: Space and Society*, 14, 421–439.
- Edwards, R. and Usher, R. (1999) A society of signs? mediating a learning society, *British Journal of Educational Studies*, 47(3), 261–274.
- Featherstone, M. (1991) *Consumer Culture and Postmodernism*. London: Sage.
- Fleming, P. (2002), 'Lines of flight': a history of resistance and the thematic of ethics, death and animality, *Ephemera: Critical Dialogues on Organization*, 2(3), 193–208.
- Game, A. (1991) *Undoing the Social*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Gane, M. (Ed.) (1993) *Baudrillard Live: Selected Interviews* London: Routledge.
- Gee, J., Hull, G., and Lankshear, C. (1996) *The New Work Order: Behind the Language of the New Capitalism*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Giddens, A. (1990) *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Giddens, A. (1991) *Modernity and Self-identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Harvey, D. (1989) *The Condition of Postmodernity*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Jowers, P. and Watson, S. (1995) Somatology: politics and the visceral, *Proceedings of the Politics Studies Association Conference 'Politics and Opposition'*, www.psa.ac.uk/cps/1995%5Cwats.pdf, Accessed 10 September 2005, pp.707–716.
- Kellner, D. (1995) *Media Culture: Cultural Studies, Identity and Politics Between the Modern and Postmodern*. London: Routledge.
- Kress, G. (2003) *Literacy in the New Media Age*. London: Routledge.
- Lash, S. (1990) *Sociology of Postmodernism*. London: Routledge.
- Lash, S. (2002) *Critique of Information*. London: Sage.
- Lash, S. and Urry, J. (1994) *Economies of Signs and Space*. London: Routledge.
- Lemert, C. (1997) *Postmodernism is not What You Think*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Lyotard, J.-F. (1984) *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Plant, S. (1992) *The Most Radical Gesture: The Situationist International in a Postmodern Age*. London: Routledge.
- Poster, M. (1996) *Introduction in Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Strathern, M. (1997) 'Improving ratings': audit in the British university system, *European Review*, 5(3), 305–321.

- Taylor, A. (1998) *Mus(e) ings on Deleuze and Guattari: Wanderings and Reflections*, [http://www.uta.edu/english/apt/mus\(e\)ings/d&g.html](http://www.uta.edu/english/apt/mus(e)ings/d&g.html), Accessed 01 August 2005.
- Urry, J. (1995) *Consuming Places*. London: Routledge.
- Usher, R., Bryant, I., and Johnston, R. (1997) *Adult Education and the Postmodern Challenge*. London: Routledge.
- Waters, M. (1995) *Globalization*. London: Routledge.
- Watson, N. (1998) Postmodernism and lifestyles. In: Sim, S. (Ed.) *Icon Critical Dictionary of Postmodern Thought*. Cambridge: Icon Books.

Section IV
Lifelong Learning in Practice

Chapter 14

Good Practice in Lifelong Learning

Richard G. Bagnall

Attempts to translate lifelong learning theory into effective policy and practice have given rise to a diversity of issues. The issues may be seen as arising from tensions immanent to common tendencies or trends in educational policy and practice in those attempts. A number of the common trends have been drawn together in the first volume of this series, where the issues are examined from an ethical perspective through fables and accompanying critiques (Bagnall 2004). The issues examined in that volume are those arising from the common trends to learner-centredness in education, to the privatisation of educational responsibility, to outcome-driven education, to the embedding of education within other life engagements, to the vocation-alisation of education, to erosion of the distinction between education and training, to the construction of educational attainments as literacies, to the formalisation of educational accountabilities, to the specification of educational standards, to the construction of educational provision and engagement as the technical management of learning contexts, to expanding learner choice of educational engagements, to the marketisation of education, to the contractualisation of educational provision, to the fragmentation of education into discrete projects, to managerialism in educational provision, to the internationalisation of educational provision, to making education a conditional requirement for an increasing number and range of life engagements and situations, to educational presentism, to educational partisanship, to educational commodification, and to discriminative justice in education. Through the fables, that volume focused strongly on the existential experience of the issues. In the present chapter, the focus is more on the question of whether that experience indicates a serious problem or weakness in the theory, or whether it is more a matter of implementation. Should the issues be more matters of implementation, they may be seen as being subject to refined or different approaches to or techniques in that process. Should they reflect a serious problem or weakness in the theory, there is indicated a need to modify or qualify the theory, if not to reject it.

From a critical perspective, the issues may be conceptualised collectively as what I am terming the 'lifelong-learning-as-lifelong-dependency thesis' (or, more simply, the 'dependency thesis'). This thesis presents the lifelong learning movement as being hegemonically exploitative, engendering a deficit discourse of constraining regulation through which individuals and cultural identities develop self-constructs of inadequacy and dependency requiring remediation through lifelong learning.

Conceptualising the issues in this way provides a coherent focus for criticism of the way in which lifelong learning is being translated into policy and practice.

The purpose of this chapter, then, is to provide an overview and review of that thesis, as capturing a wide diversity of the issues arising in the practice of lifelong learning. This is done by first outlining the thesis, drawing upon critical literature in lifelong learning. I then look critically at the thesis itself, in an attempt to identify the extent to which it is a fair representation of lifelong learning theory. To the extent that it *is* thus a fair representation, it challenges the adequacy of the theory. To the extent that it is *not* thus a fair representation, I then seek to draw out suggestions for better representing lifelong theory in policy and practice.

The Dependency Thesis

Four interrelated arguments may be recognised in the dependency thesis – what I am terming here the ‘privatisation’, ‘codification’, ‘de-differentiation’, and ‘discontinuity’ arguments. These arguments cohere in constructing dependency as pervading sectoral discourses and as constraining and being internalised by individuals as part of their identities and cultural realities. They are outlined in the following subsections.

The Privatisation Argument

The privatisation argument is at the heart of the dependency thesis. It sees lifelong learning discourse as being complicit in the capitalist, neo-liberal agenda of corporatizing learning (Crowther 2004). In that agenda, citizens are redefined as private consumers of learning opportunities in the lifelong learning marketplace, rather than as political actors in the public arena. The individual privatisation of educational responsibility, benefit and cost involves the learner in becoming the volitional centre of *what* is to be learned, *how* it is to be learned, the *costs* incurred in the learning engagement, and the *benefits* that the learning provides (Muller 1998). That individualisation of learning is seen as placing responsibility for any learning failure on the learner and as reducing the role of the state for educational policy and provision. It is seen, in other words, as creating a deficit discourse of personal responsibility for learning, in which the ‘victim’ of learning failure is blamed for that failure (Griffin 1999a).

Learning thus becomes a commodity, effectively to be bought and sold competitively (Limb 1999). Educational provision and engagement are marketed as part of that commodification, with providers competing for market share and surplus revenue with which to further enhance their share or to provide returns to shareholders (Griffin 1999a). Under the influence of the contemporary globalisation of culture, educational provision becomes internationally competitive (Currie and Newson 1998).

The commodification and marketisation of educational provision also force providers into managerialist styles of educational governance, leadership, policy, and management (Gleeson and Shain 1999).

The power differentials between and among the players in the marketised field of education thus lead to social injustice being inflicted against the less powerful – commonly the socially, physically, and educationally disadvantaged (Wilson 1999). Persons in this position are exposed to pressures, inducements, and incentives to participate in learning engagements selected from a range of learning opportunities of apparent short-term, but limited long-term value to them. Such engagements are more likely to benefit employer or other interests in providing immediately needed vocational capability. Those learners who are better placed will inevitably have access to better choices and to better advice in the making of choices. Resources available to support educational provision and engagement inevitably also tend to follow the distribution of power and influence in marketised systems. In the absence of educational constraints to the contrary, those power differentials and the social injustices that they fuel are thus further enhanced through educational provision and engagement (Wilson 1999).

The valorising of individual choice also heightens educational disadvantage through the problem of negative freedom. Here, any choices made in the absence of positive freedom – the knowledge required to make wise educational choices that maximise one's self-interest in this case – lead to greater educational disadvantage for those already so afflicted (Blokland 1997; Paterson 1979). Through lack of understanding of the proffered educational alternatives and of their likely impact on the future welfare and interests of the individual, educational choices are likely to be based on limited past experience and on emotive responses to educational marketing.

Within the privatisation argument, the flexible specialisation demanded of contemporary workers (such specialisation being seen as an important driver of lifelong learning) is effectively a cover for what is the flexible exploitation of workers. Lifelong learning therein reveals a 'hidden agenda of creating malleable, disconnected, transient, disciplined workers and citizens' (Crowther 2004, pp.127). Lifelong learning is argued increasingly to be economically and technologically determined by the inevitability of technical change and its requirements for learning in adapting to the changed social conditions. Educational policy is seen, then, as being redundant, since policy is directed to constraining individuals and organisations to engage in that which is now empirically inevitable. Educational policy is, accordingly, eschewed and replaced by a focus on strategies or techniques for facilitating learning (Griffin 1999b). A culture of inadequacy is internalised by individuals as part of their individual identities, through what Edwards (1997) terms 'pastoral power'. Drawing on Foucault's notion of 'constitutive power', the concept here of pastoral power is that of internalised 'confessional practices', through which the individual becomes the agent and the object of his/her own self-surveillance and self-regulation. As Crowther (2004, p.131) argues, lifelong learning discourse is thus 'part of a hegemonic project to internalize compliance'.

The Codification Argument

The codification argument is closely linked to the privatisation argument. It sees lifelong learning as leading to the externally codified regulation and compulsion of learning engagement and assessment – to lifelong schooling – which itself engenders and reinforces identities and cultural realities of childlike dependency (Illich and Verne 1976; Ohliger 1974). Codification is a form of ‘disciplinary power’ (Edwards 1997) used to coerce individuals into learning. Codified conditionals are used to make access to other cultural goods – such as welfare support, the right to continue professional practice, and avoidance of incarceration following a misdemeanour – dependent upon engagement in certain prescribed learning activities (Coffield 2002). Social relationships are seen as being increasingly regulated, through social contracts, partnerships, mutual obligation relationships and such like, undermining the potential of communities as contexts of radical education and cultural change (Martin 2003). Educational provision and engagement thus become increasingly subject to contractual agreement between providers and learners (Pounds 1999). Educational professionalism and expertise are replaced by frameworks of accountability criteria and standards that regulate minimum acceptable standards of behaviour, but which erode the commitment to educational expertise (Clark, Johnson, and Caldon 1997). Teaching and assessing learning gains become matters of technique with an emphasis on the techniques of managing learning contexts and measuring learning outcomes (Edwards 1991). Education thus becomes irremediably outcome-based (Simonds 1994), with a tendency to construct educational outcomes as literacies (Brookfield 1998). Education thus loses its openness to achieving learning outcomes other than those predetermined, just as it loses the likelihood of achieving educational attainments higher than those required in the predetermined outcome specifications and levels of technical literacy. Educational efficiency is maximised in terms of resources committed to achieving pre-specified educational outcomes at pre-specified levels of attainment, but any other personal, interpersonal, and cultural development through educational engagement is unresourced and discouraged.

The De-Differentiation Argument

The de-differentiation argument sees lifelong learning as eroding the distinctiveness and value of educational provision, engagement, and attainments (Bagnall 1990). Education is increasingly seen as an engagement that is contextualised within other life tasks, its purpose being to enhance instrumentally the performance of those tasks (Watson 1995). Traditional distinctions between education and training are eroded (Raffe, Howieson and Spours 1998), with a tendency towards the general vocationalisation of education (Tight 1998). Educational provision and engagement increasingly become fragmented into distinct projects, each defined by its temporal, political, and purposeful context (Poell, Van der Krogh, and Warmerdam 1998).

Educational attention is contracted in time and scope to the immediate present context (Smart 1992). Those fragmented, contextualised projects become centres of ideological partisanship, in which competing projects and alternative ideological positions are diminished as ill-informed, misplaced, or unsound (Maffesoli 1988). Educational practice thus becomes essentially flexible in response to the particular contingent contexts and prevailing ideological positions under which each project is conceptualised and implemented (Crowther 2004; Edwards 1997). The contextualisation of educational provision and engagement drains education of common or universal values. Value-relativism thus characterises education, in which no values are excluded except contingently, and any values – no matter how unethical – are empirically possible (Paterson 1984). Social justice in education thus becomes a matter of contextualised and value-partial discrimination, wherein what constitutes a socially just act is a matter that can only be decided in the light of the particularities of any given situation (Bagnall 1995).

The Discontinuity Argument

The discontinuity argument refines the first three. It sees an important discontinuity between the historically prior and foundational lifelong education and the more recent and contemporary lifelong learning discourse (*sensu stricto*), such that the privatisation, codification and de-differentiation arguments, while applying to lifelong learning discourse (*sensu stricto*), do not apply to that of lifelong education (Boshier 1998; Crowther 2004; Griffin 1999b).

Crowther (2004) presents lifelong education discourse as historically a part of the progressive educational debate of the 1960s and 1970s. It is presented as being holistic and humanistic in nature, seeking lifelong education in the service of creating a society in which individuals would flourish through personal growth grounded in lifelong education, in and for the common good and through policies of social welfare. It is what Griffin (1999a, p.329) terms ‘the progressive social democratic approach’ to education. It is captured in what Edwards (1997, Chapter 6) articulates as the ‘educated society’ conception of the learning society.

Lifelong learning (*sensu stricto*), on the other hand, is seen as a discourse grounded firmly in contemporary neo-liberal political theory and practice and as lacking the progressive humanism of lifelong education – what Griffin (1999a, p.329) terms the ‘neo-liberal welfare reform approach’ to education. It is what Edwards (1997, Chapter 6) articulates as the ‘learning market’ conception of the learning society.

On what I am here terming the discontinuity argument, Griffin (1999b, p.432) suggests:

The distinction lies between an approach to lifelong learning which reflects the continuing and redistributive role of the state, and one which envisages a minimal role for the state and a view of lifelong learning which has more to do with lifestyle, culture, consumption and civil society.

For Gustavsson (2002, p.14), focussing on the vocabulary used to talk and write about lifelong learning: ‘This ideological turn meant that the humanistic and democratic vocabulary, which had earlier dominated the rhetoric in educational politics, came to be transformed into an economic vocabulary.’

While acknowledging that the terms lifelong learning and lifelong education have been used interchangeably, Crowther (2004) argues that lifelong learning (*sensu stricto*) has falsely acquired the progressive mantle of lifelong education. Lifelong learning (*sensu stricto*), then, should be understood as ‘a mode of power . . . aimed at reproducing wider inequalities’ (Crowther 2004, p.128).

Evaluation of the Dependency Thesis

The aim of this section is to evaluate the dependency thesis to ascertain the extent to which it either weighs against lifelong learning theory or identifies issues of concern for the *implementation* of that theory. In attempting this task, I will follow the structure presented by the four arguments identified in the previous section as capturing the thesis.

Assessment of the Privatisation Argument

The main point that should be made clear in evaluating the privatisation argument is that lifelong learning theory – that body of normative scholarship directed to explicating the programmatic nature of lifelong learning – presents lifelong learning overwhelmingly as emancipatory (Bagnall 2001). Lifelong learning (*sensu stricto*) and lifelong education theory are both grounded strongly in progressive education philosophy – a normative philosophical movement that has sought to engender liberal and social democratic values in education through radical educational reform. Drawing on that philosophical tradition, modern lifelong education and learning theory have sought to reform education in directions that take it away from what have been seen as the illiberal, non-progressive, and undemocratic aspects of contemporary educational policy, provision, and engagement. Those counter-emancipatory aspects have been seen importantly as including the following (in no particular order here): (1) a focus on educational *provision*; (2) a concern with the *taught* curriculum; (3) a focus on the learning of disciplinary *content*; (4) a preoccupation with education for *children and youth*; (5) a preoccupation with *constraining* and *policing* learning; (6) a structure of learning assessment that has progressively *excluded* students from access to further education on the grounds of their having reached the limits of their educational potential; (7) approaches to learning assessment and credentialing that have seen them as *inseparable* from educational engagement; (8) a *hierarchy of segregated* types of knowledge and learning, in which the most

highly valued knowledge has been *propositional*; (9) the *differentiation* of education from other cultural institutions and realities; (10) a focus on *societal* learning needs; (11) a presumption that students may best be taught as members of *idealised developmental categories*; and (12) educational systems and approaches that are framed by *tradition, ideology, and policy* (Fauré et al. 1972; Wain 1987).

In response to these counter-emancipatory tendencies of traditional education, lifelong education theory, building upon a pragmatic and progressive philosophical foundation, sought, *inter alia* (and paralleling the foregoing list), to focus educational attention on: (1) the learning engagement (rather than on educational provision); (2) learning outcomes (rather than what is taught); (3) learning capabilities for managing one's own learning (rather than on the learning of disciplinary content); (4) learning throughout life (rather than just in childhood and adolescence); (5) the facilitation of learning (rather than the constraining and policing of learning); (6) educational inclusion and re-engagement on an as-needs basis (in contrast to educational participation to the point at which a student has reached the identified limits of their evidenced learning potential); (7) the separation of learning from its assessment and credentialing (rather than the tying of learning assessment and credentialing to episodes of teaching); (8) practical knowledge and learning (rather than hierarchically-structured disciplinary knowledge in which propositional knowledge is most highly valued); (9) the embedding of learning in other life tasks and events (rather than the differentiation of education from other institutions and realities); (10) individual (rather than societal) learning needs; (11) the individual learner in his or her cultural context (rather than the individual as a member of a developmental category); and (12) empirical experience, practical utility and secular knowledge (rather than tradition, ideology and policy) in the framing of educational interventions.

That progressive emancipatory responsiveness of lifelong education theory is also captured in what I have argued elsewhere is its presupposition of an aretaic ethic with a teleology of optimising universal human flourishing through learning (Bagnall 2004/2005). In that ethic, individuals, cultural identities and ethical action are seen as being characterised by a particular set of informed humane commitments or virtues. The informed commitments involved here are particularly those of: commitment to constructive engagement in learning, to oneself and one's cultural inheritance, to others and their cultural differences, to the human condition and its potential for progress, to practical reason and its contribution to bettering the human condition, to individual and collective autonomy, to social justice, to the non-violent resolution of conflicts, and to democratic governance.

These informed commitments are overwhelmingly progressive and social-democratic. They are internalised values impelling human action towards humane achievement and liberation, within a social context, for the greater good. They cannot sensibly be construed as indicating a developmental disadvantage of the sort argued in the inadequacy thesis. They are taken as goods in themselves – as qualities that define what it is to be a good person, organisation, community, city, society, or other social entity – and as interdependent instrumental means to the end of attaining and sustaining the good individual or social entity. And they indicate, derivatively, what it is to do the right thing.

Having said all that, it must nevertheless be reiterated that lifelong learning theory is, indeed, committed to encouraging individual choice and responsibility in education and to evidence-based and scientifically informed approaches to educational provision and engagement. The tendencies captured in the privatisation argument towards the devolution of choice and responsibility to learners and an emphasis on educational strategies and techniques are true to lifelong learning theory. Responsibility for educational failure will therein be devolved no less than responsibility for educational success. The consequential tendencies towards managerialism and the commodification, marketisation, and internationalisation of education may also be expected to flow from implementation of the theory. However, it is less clear that these tendencies argue against the theory, rather than for appropriate programmatic responses in its implementation. Similarly, the negative freedom problem, in which learners are left to make educational choices uninformed by an understanding of the consequences of those choices for their continued self-interest is a clear implication of the theory. It may be suggested that these tendencies call for appropriate educational responses – along the lines suggested in the first volume in this series – rather than a rejection of the theory.

The points of compatibility between lifelong learning theory and neo-liberal values must also be acknowledged here, including their shared commitment to individualising learning and responsibility, individual freedom and rights, recognising prior learning, prioritising practical (including vocational) learning, responsiveness to practical contingencies, and focusing on learning outcomes. Those shared commitments have undoubtedly made it easier for contemporary neo-liberal agendas to adopt and adapt lifelong learning theory to their own ends. In so far as there are educationally negative consequences – including that of the flexible exploitation of learners – arising from such adoption and adaptation, they certainly present challenges for educational policy and practice.

Lifelong learning theory certainly does not endorse in any sense the engendering of a culture of inadequacy among less advantaged learners and the heightening of educational disparities among learners. It argues, indeed, for the very opposite. Were such a culture to be unavoidably generated through the implementation of lifelong learning theory, it would present a serious challenge to the adequacy of the theory. It could suggest that the theory may be inadequate in its addressing of power differentials in marketised systems, as proponents of the dependency thesis argue. However, I would argue that this ‘argument from power’ is misplaced in the following ways. Firstly, experience shows clearly that individual freedom and power are enhanced by and in cultural contexts that value applied knowledge and learning and that maximise the opportunities for such learning for the widest encompass of their members (Berlin 2002; Toulmin 1990). These are central qualities of lifelong learning cultural realities. Secondly, the argument is based on a misplaced, idealised, neo-Marxist construction of social reality. Modern history shows us that such constructions are much more likely to be used by authorities *against* the interests of educational disadvantaged and culturally oppressed persons than *for* them (Bauman 1987; Popper 1977). And thirdly, in so far as the argument has any validity, it expects far too much of education. It expects far too much in the way of the just redistribution

of power and wealth to flow from learning. History suggests that educational reform tends to follow political and economic reform, rather than to lead it (Bernstein 1970). In this respect, lifelong learning theory is clearly a much closer response to the dominant elements of contemporary cultural changes than is a neo-Marxist perspective on which the argument from power draws.

However, it should also be recognised that the progressive emancipatory responsiveness of lifelong education theory has been argued elsewhere as being captured in a number of common dimensions (Bagnall 2004). One of the crucial thrusts of these common dimensions is the recognition that knowledge is socially constructed and that learning is culturally embedded. Knowledge and learning, in other words, are constrained by the cultural constructs in which they are generated, interpreted, and made meaningful. They are meaningful in virtue of that embeddedness and they are limited by it. Any learning that is liberating from cultural constraints (including that from ignorance and from ‘false consciousness’) is thus simultaneously and irreducibly constraining. Whether our learning serves to deepen our knowledge within existing knowledge frameworks or discourses, or whether it takes us into existentially new frameworks or discourses, it unavoidably deepens our dependence on that or those frameworks or discourses. Any educational theory, movement or programme – in so far as it is influential and to the extent that it is so – may thus rightly be accused of leading to the creation of dependency relationships.

While certainly not all knowledge and learning is *equally* constraining, all knowledge and learning *is* constraining to some extent. Emancipation through learning is a relative matter – relative, not just to empirical reality, but also to the frameworks of meaning in which it is understood. The relative potential of social welfare and neo-liberal knowledge frameworks to create dependency is a point of difference between those frameworks, since they understand and construct emancipatory potential somewhat differently and in such a way as to favour their own particular construction in each case. Arguing against the dependency thesis, then, is its failure to recognise and take account of the point that all learning is both liberating and enslaving, both diminishing of dependency and enhancing of it. The privatisation argument of the dependency thesis misses this point and, in so doing, focuses singular attention on what it constructs as the counter-emancipatory aspects of lifelong learning theory and practice. Those aspects may not be, or may not be as seriously, counter-emancipatory from the perspective of other frameworks of meaning.

Assessment of the Codification Argument

In evaluating the codification argument of the dependency thesis, I note firstly that ethical action informed by the sort of aretaic ethic outlined above as presupposed by lifelong learning theory stands opposed to the codification of conduct and to the sort of rule-governed behaviour that is presumed in the dependency thesis. What I term the lifelong learning ethic constructs ethical knowledge as evidenced in action that is characterised by the skilled and situationally sensitive application of particular

informed commitments. Such an ethic recognises clearly the contextualised nature of ethical knowledge and action. It understands knowledge as being constructed in particular cultural contexts. It values cultural difference and responding to the diverse empirical contingencies of lived experience. It recognises the value of sharing and negotiating meaning. And it recognises the value of individual aspiration, situation, and attainment through learning. That ethic also constructs ethical knowledge as progressive – developmental throughout and across life’s situations, both life-long and lifewide. It sees the extent to which ethical knowledge is evidenced in action as a (variable) matter of degree, as well as of kind. It understands ethical knowledge as being knowable – learned – primarily through contextualised guided practice, critical reflection on that practice and the modelling of good practice. It recognises ethical action as a situated outcome of what a good person is and aspires to be (or what a good society or other social entity is and aspires to be) – encouraging the development of a life lived according to the humane commitments. Ethical action is thus both evaluated and justified on that basis.

Codification, in contrast to such an ethic, constructs ethical knowledge: (1) as universally applicable within a community of practice for which it is intended (rather than as situationally responsive); (2) as absolute and invariable (rather than as progressive and a matter of degree); (3) as imperative knowledge to be applied in practical contexts (rather than as the situationally skilled application of humane commitments); (4) as knowable through study of the precepts and brought from them to individual practice (rather than as knowable, developed, and learned through guided and reflective practice); (5) as evidenced in action that is justified with respect to the precepts (rather than with respect to the good); and (6) as encouraging commitment to the precepts (rather than to a life lived according to the humane commitments). As an applied ethic, lifelong learning theory is thus strongly opposed to the codification of lived realities (Bagnall 2004/2005).

To the extent that lifelong learning discourse does, then, evidence codification of the sort argued in the dependency thesis, it does so in contradiction to its informing theory. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that, perhaps contradictorily, there are aspects of lifelong learning theory that tend inevitably to lead in their implementation to some codification. I note here the focus on lifelong learning theory on evidence-based and scientifically informed educational action, which encourages an emphasis on technique and its formulation. Also in this regard is the emphasis on the assessment, credentialing and transfer of learning attainments or outcomes – both from informal learning and from non-formal and more formal educational engagements. The emphasis in lifelong learning theory on the skilled management of contextualised educational events and the assessment of learning outcomes also encourages an emphasis on the articulation of accountability criteria and standards pertinent to particular situations. Inevitably, this process will lead also to increased use of educational or learning contracts. The emphasis in lifelong learning theory on individual freedom, choice, and responsibility also inevitably leads to the constraining of individual choice to protect the public interest from its excesses. It will also encourage the use of codified conditionals requiring educational engagement in response to antisocial behaviour and to provide some assurance of continuing

vocational competence. Thus, for example, avoiding a period of imprisonment for a criminal conviction may be made conditional on engagement in an appropriate programme of rehabilitative education. Likewise, continued professional licensure may be made conditional on engagement in not less than a regulated minimal quantum of appropriate continuing professional education. Such codifications of educational requirements are increasingly common in lifelong learning policy frameworks (Guinsburg 1996).

In all these ways, there are evident codifying tendencies in the implementation of lifelong learning theory. To that extent, there is tension within the theory between these precepts and the aretaic ethic underlying the theory. Such tensions, though, are an irremediable feature of social theory (Bagnall 1999). Their recognition represents, not a ground for rejecting the theory, but the need for action to manage the effects of the tensions in the best ways possible.

Through these tendencies to codification, lifelong learning policy and practice may be seen as embodying forms of overt and covert disciplinary power, as is argued in the dependency thesis. To an extent, then, such regulation and compulsion of learning may be seen as an unavoidable consequence of the above-noted precepts in lifelong learning theory. The formulation of lifelong learning policy, its implementation in practice, and the evaluation of that policy and practice, should, then, be mindful of the need to ensure that such codification is limited and not excessive. However, it might sensibly be seen as calling for rejection of the theory only if its miseducative effects were either intolerable or there were available a better alternative.

Assessment of the De-Differentiation Argument

Turning now to an evaluation of the de-differentiation argument in the dependency thesis, it must be acknowledged that lifelong learning and lifelong education theory have sought to shift quite radically the nature and use of key concepts in educational theory, policy, and practice. True to its pragmatic and progressive philosophical foundations, lifelong learning theory has sought to promulgate a more contextualised recognition of concepts and use of terminology than that which has prevailed in contemporary educational theory. *A priori*, theory-based distinctions between concepts have been eschewed in pragmatic epistemology and progressive social theory. At the level of general theory, concepts are thus deliberately defined both broadly (inclusively) and somewhat vaguely, to ensure that they have the potential to encompass a wide range of more particular educational contexts or distinctions. Lifelong learning theory has sought deliberately to be more inclusive also in the sense of bringing into the purview of educational theory learning engagements and outcomes that were commonly excluded by traditional educational theorisations. It has sought also to embrace recognition of the contextualised nature of learning and the appropriateness of that being recognised in teaching.

Conceptual and terminological precision is thus seen pragmatically as being contingent to particular contexts or discourses of practice. Distinctions – such as those between education and learning, between education and training, and between education and other life engagements – are thus eschewed in lifelong learning theory as being unjustifiably constraining. Particular contexts of practice will nevertheless have their appropriately particular and more precisely definitive uses of terms, conceptual borders, and relationships between concepts. Lifelong learning theory thus does not argue against conceptual distinctions, but rather against their promulgation as *a priori* and context-free.

The tendency for education to become more vocationally oriented is a clear consequence of the emphasis in lifelong learning theory – as in progressivism – on practical knowledge. With work being generally of major importance in defining individual identity within contemporary society, vocational learning will inevitably occupy an important position in curricula. That importance is also, though, a function of the contemporary cultural emphasis on the rapidly changing nature of work and the imperative that it places on individuals to change career or occupation – often several times in the course of a working life (Bauman 1998).

Responding to the importance of work to individual identity and well-being, educational provision within a lifelong learning framework will properly emphasise learning that equips individuals to respond constructively to the imperative to be flexible and adaptable in response to the changing demands for and means of production. This and the preceding features of lifelong learning policy and practice flow directly from lifelong learning theory.

The tendency for the fragmentation of educational provision into distinct projects may also be seen as a consequence of lifelong learning theory. Contextualising educational provision and engagement will inevitably shift the curricular emphasis to appropriately situated, bounded responses to the contexts involved. Attention will become focused on responding to the present learning needs of that context in the best possible way within the constraints of the available resources. Such a focus may well diminish or marginalise potentially pertinent knowledge and experience from other times and situations. To the extent that it does so, lifelong learning theory is being distorted in its implementation, since the commitment in that theory to research-based and evidence-based practice is clear. An important part of the context of any educational project must also be seen to be other impacting projects, initiatives, and programmes. To the extent that this is not the case, then lifelong learning theory is not being followed appropriately.

The vocationalisation of education and its focus on situationally flexible responsiveness and on educational projects are thus important features of educational practice flowing directly from lifelong learning theory. However, like probably any other feature of educational practice, taken too far, they will become counter-educative. These aspects of the de-differentiation argument in the dependency thesis are thus important points about lifelong learning theory. They do not, though, weigh significantly against the theory, unless they are rejected entirely as miseducative – a position that would surely be quite ludicrous.

The charge in the de-differentiation argument that the contextualisation of educational value in lifelong learning practice leads to educational partisanship and value relativism, with social justice becoming a matter of value-partial discrimination, is a significant one. Much has been written about the negative consequences of value relativism (e.g. Lawson 2000; Paterson 1984; Trigg 1973) and the experience of lifelong learning practice has clearly been one that points to these tendencies (Bagnall 2004, Chapters 22 and 23). The charge of value relativism in the theory is, though, no less clearly *misplaced*. As noted above the aretaic ethic presupposed by lifelong learning theory involves a recognition of the contextualised nature of human action, focusing strongly on ethical sensitivity and responsiveness to individual, collective, and situational differences. It involves the recognition also of ethical knowledge as progressive – developmental throughout and across life's situations, and potentially into what we would consider to be ethical expertise. The extent to which ethical knowledge is evidenced in action is seen as a variable matter of both degree and kind. Ethical action is understood as a situated outcome of what a good person or social entity is and aspires to be. Ethical action is thus both evaluated and justified on that basis. Ethical knowledge is thus seen as being learned primarily through contextualised guided practice and critical reflection on that practice and through the modelling of good practice (Dreyfus, Dreyfus and Athanasiou 1986).

Lifelong learning theory thus presupposes a strong framework of universal ethical values, captured in what I have termed the informed humane commitments. That those values enjoin a situationally sensitive approach to their implementation reflects a reality about the nature of ethical values in human action and experience. It does not enjoin or lead to value relativism of the sort that would weigh against the theory. The informed commitments ensure that lifelong learning theory is counter-relativistic in the strong sense of cultural relativism as either subjective idealism or F.C. White's (1982) notion of total cultural relativism (Bagnall 1991). If we are to label the situationally sensitive application of these universal values of lifelong learning theory as ethical relativism, then it is only in the trivially weak sense of ethical relativism that we may do so. In that sense, the argued counter-educational consequences of relativism do not apply. It is, in other words, an educationally benign form of relativism, if it is to be regarded as one at all.

That counter-argument applies also to the two related aspects of this tendency noted in the foregoing outline of the de-differentiation argument: those of the tendency to educational partisanship and to value-partial discriminative justice. To the extent that educational partisanship is a feature of lifelong learning policy and practice, it is a distortion of lifelong learning theory, which calls for situational responsiveness to be based strongly both on empirical experience and research and on the universal values embodied in lifelong learning ethics. Social justice is to be informed in the same way. What that means in practice is that decisions as to what is socially just in any given event will depend on the situation prevailing in that event within the framework of the universal informed commitments. The decisions and actions taken in any two formally similar events may thus well be different, based on importantly different contingencies in the two events. Such an approach to social justice certainly differs from those enjoined by more formulaic, rule-governed, duties-based,

or principles-guided approaches to social justice traditionally associated with applied ethics. That is not, though, an argument against lifelong learning theory, except from the respective perspectives of those more formal approaches.

Assessment of the Discontinuity Argument

Turning now to evaluate the discontinuity argument of the dependency thesis, it should be observed that the substantive features articulated in the more traditional lifelong *education* theory and in the more contemporary lifelong *learning* theory (*sensu stricto*) are essentially the same. However these substantive features are perceived – as, for example, the informing emancipatory thrusts of the theory (noted above), or the informed commitments of the presupposed ethic (Bagnall 2004/2005) – they are common to both bodies of theory. Major theoretical works in lifelong education (such as those of Fauré et al. 1972; Gelpi 1985; Lengrand 1975; Wain 1987) and major theoretical works in lifelong learning theory (*sensu stricto*) (such as those of Chapman and Aspin 1997; Delors 1996; Longworth 2003; OECD 1996) reveal the same sets of substantive features. The differing political contexts prevailing at the respective times of their writing, mean that those features are given different emphases, are articulated in different ways and are described with different terminology, but their meanings and interrelationships remain essentially constant. The cultural context of the work also influences the articulation of the common features. For example, in the global context of the UNESCO's concerns, the commitment to the non-violent resolution of conflict calls for specific mention (Delors 1996, p.95), but in the highly regulated context of formal organisations, it tends largely to be presumed (e.g. Senge 1990). In all cases, though, the listed features are recognisably present.

While the same normative values underpin both traditional lifelong education and its lifelong learning (*sensu stricto*) successor, it is also the case that their expression in policy and practice will inevitably (and properly) articulate different emphases through different particular arrangements in different cultural contexts. Only at the most general levels of policy articulation (especially at the global level – expressed in this case in the policy directives of the UNESCO) are they at all likely to be accorded a balanced response and a generality of expression that is a recognisable mirror of the informing normative theory. Even then, though, the policy response will be constrained by the dominant contemporary cultural context of the responsible organisation. Lifelong learning theory (*sensu lato*), in so far as it is taken up in policy and practice, will inevitably thus be selective and in different ways and to different degrees in different contexts. The contemporary cultural context will inevitably constrain the form and extent of its adoption.

The neo-liberal dominance of the contemporary cultural formation will inevitably give neo-liberal values dominant expression in educational or other initiatives that are influenced by lifelong learning theory – a point made strongly by Field (2001). While this represents a shift away from social welfare to neo-liberal

values, it represents also a shift in the nature of learned dependencies – inviting selective attention, from a traditional critical perspective, to the new dependencies. The rejection of lifelong learning theory (*sensu stricto*) on the grounds of its incorporation into neo-liberal educational stands, then, as a misjudgement of what is actually happening.

Contrary to the argument informing the dependency thesis, the shift from the notion of ‘lifelong education’ to that of ‘lifelong learning’ may be seen as a recognition of the emancipatory thrust of traditional lifelong education theory, not as a cancerous transmogrification of it, as is argued in the dependency thesis. All of the matters of concern raised in the dependency thesis that may correctly be attributed to lifelong learning theory (*sensu stricto*) are evident developments of the progressive, liberal, social-democratic, emancipatory features of lifelong education theory: its focus on learning, on learning outcomes, on learning how to manage one’s own learning, on the facilitation of learning, on learning in response to cultural contingencies and remedial learning needs; its focus on practical learning; its separation of learning from the assessment and credentialing of learning; its individualisation and contextualisation of learning need, engagement and responsibility; and its focus on techniques and processes evidenced in empirical experience. That these features are also compatible with neo-liberal social theory is a reality that undoubtedly serves to facilitate the incorporation of lifelong learning theory into contemporary neo-liberal educational reforms. It is also evidently the case that, on these features at least, lifelong learning theory (*sensu lato*) has at best a limited compatibility with social welfare theory – as is clear from the plethora of criticism of lifelong learning theory from that perspective. The general and predominant neo-liberal nature of the contemporary cultural context may be expected to sharpen the points of difference between social welfare theory and these educational reforms being instituted under the banner of lifelong learning theory. And this is reflected in the apparent erosion of the emancipatory thrust of lifelong learning policy and practice from a social-democratic viewpoint.

The change in popular and programmatic nomenclature from lifelong ‘education’ to lifelong ‘learning’ is a clear reflection of these emancipatory thrusts and of the lifelong education movement’s success in influencing cultural change. It is thus quite wrong-headed to construct lifelong learning (*sensu stricto*) as a distinctively different and distorting transmogrification of lifelong education theory. Contemporary lifelong learning theory is more a development of lifelong education theory in recognition both of the changing cultural context and of the success of lifelong education theory in impacting constructively on social policy.

Contrary to the discontinuity argument, it is thus, I suggest, not the case that the privatisation, codification, and de-differentiation arguments apply selectively to lifelong learning theory and policy initiatives, as distinct from those of lifelong education. Rather, in so far as they have any purchase on lifelong learning theory (*sensu stricto*), they apply no less to lifelong education theory in its historical articulation spearheaded by the work of the UNESCO Institute for Education. While the contemporary cultural context undoubtedly selectively highlights those features of lifelong learning theory that are seen as being problematic from a social welfare

perspective, there has been no radical shift in the substance of the theory. Lifelong learning theory (*sensu stricto*) has not falsely acquired the progressive mantle of lifelong education theory. It is its rebranding.

Implications for Lifelong Learning Theory and Practice

The analysis in this chapter was constructed on the argument that the dependency thesis should be seen as challenging the adequacy of lifelong learning theory to the extent that it is a fair representation of that theory. The extent, then, to which it does *not* emerge as a fair representation of lifelong learning theory suggests the need for attention to the experiences of lifelong learning theory in policy and practice that have informed the criticisms captured by the dependency thesis. I turn now to that task.

Firstly, though, we should be clear about the extent to which and the ways in which the foregoing analysis suggests that the dependency thesis does challenge lifelong learning theory. The dependency thesis is focused on experiences of implementing lifelong learning theory in educational policy and practice. Understandably, then, the descriptive features upon which its evaluative critique of lifelong learning is based are essentially accurate. Features such as the privatisation of educational responsibility and its devolution to individual learners, its focus on techniques of facilitating learning, the fragmentation of education activity into separate technical specialisations, its *a priori* de-differentiation of education from the institutions and activities of its cultural context and from other forms of learning, its emphasis on practical knowledge and learning and its flexible, contextualised responsiveness to learners' interests are all important features of lifelong learning in practice. Similarly, practical consequences of the implementation of lifelong learning theory, such as the tendency to managerialism, contractualism, and codification in education, the commodification, marketisation, internationalisation, and vocationalisation of education and its fragmentation into projects, and its focus on outcomes and on accountability criteria and standards are all seemingly accurate descriptions of lifelong learning theory in practice. The negative freedom problem, in which learners are left to make educational choices uninformed or under-informed by an understanding of the consequences of those choices for their future self-interest is also an important feature of lifelong learning systems that are highly marketised.

Of these features and tendencies, those that are part of the codification of educational provision and engagement do clearly weigh against lifelong learning theory, which stands opposed to codification. They would seem to be unavoidable consequences of other, progressive, features of the theory. As such, they certainly call for awareness of their presence and effects. And they invite practical measures in educational policy and practice to limit their adverse effects. However, it is not evident that they are of sufficient magnitude to warrant the rejection or the modification of lifelong learning theory, although judgements on that point may differ.

Other educationally negative consequences of lifelong learning theory emerge as clear misreadings of the theory. The tendency to educational partisanship and to

partiality in discriminative justice are clearly effects of this sort and they call for better informed lifelong learning policy and practice. The discontinuity argument of the dependency thesis would seem to be based on a misunderstanding of the consequences of implementing lifelong education theory. In that misunderstanding, lifelong education theory has developed an ideal and unblemished social-welfare aura, divorced from the harsher practical realities of its exposure in more contemporary lifelong learning policy and practice.

The remaining educationally negative consequences of lifelong learning theory captured in the dependency thesis would seem to depend upon the adoption of a theoretical perspective that is contrary to that of lifelong learning theory. The value relativism argument only has purchase from a view of ethics as requiring the context-free application of universal values. From the pragmatic progressive perspective of lifelong learning theory, such an approach to ethical practice would be judged as seriously misguided and inevitably unethical in its consequences. The situationally sensitive implementation of universal values that characterises lifelong learning theory is not value-relativist in any meaningfully negative sense from a progressive social philosophical perspective. Similarly, while the general compatibility of lifelong learning theory with contemporary neo-liberal values is a broadly accurate observation of the dependency thesis, the negative evaluation of that compatibility only makes sense from the strongly and strictly social welfare perspective that is used or assumed by proponents of the dependency thesis. To an important extent, lifelong learning policy and practice may indeed be seen as complicit with the contemporary neo-liberal political agenda – as proponents of the dependency thesis have argued. However, the very notion of complicity connotes a singular and unalloyed negative assessment, and that assessment of lifelong learning theory in practice is found wanting in this analysis.

We are left, then, with lifelong learning theory exposed for what it is – a normative theory of education as strongly humanistic, pragmatic, individualistic, participatively democratic, contextualised, and universal in its promulgation of education and learning as lifelong and lifewide imperatives for a better future for all humankind. None of those features of lifelong learning theory is without potentially negative consequences in educational policy and practice. An alertness to those potentialities may be used to inform educational policy and practice and to direct it in ways that will better manage and minimise those consequences within the value framework of lifelong learning theory. Mention is made in the first volume of this series (Bagnall 2004) of a number of ways of managing those consequences. This remains, though, an important field for experimentation and research in lifelong learning.

What is less clear from this analysis is whether and in what ways lifelong learning theory might sensibly be modified to address any of the negative consequences of its implementation. Its particular form is, of course, a consequence of the cultural context of its formation. The sort of perceived limitations of the then prevailing educational context (articulated here in the assessment of the privatisation argument) were important influences in the particular form and emphases that it has taken. Those impelling contextual features of educational practice may well not be so prominent today, although that is not a topic that can reasonably be explored in

this chapter. On the other hand, it is clear that the contemporary importance of liberal-democratic theory in the contemporary cultural formation, and the compatibility of that theory with lifelong learning theory, indicate the continuing relevance of the latter in its present form and with its present emphases.

Conclusion

Perhaps the first point that should be made in conclusion is that the analysis here does not challenge the experiential reality of the issues captured in the dependency thesis as raising concerns about the social justice of lifelong learning theory in policy and practice. The existential experience of those issues has been documented elsewhere and is common throughout educational sectors affected by lifelong learning policy. What *is* challenged in this analysis is the evaluation of those issues in the dependency thesis and hence also the implied import of those evaluations.

In general, the strongly negative evaluations of the issues in the dependency thesis are dependent upon social philosophical perspectives that are not congruent with the progressiveness of lifelong learning theory. In its own lights, lifelong learning theory, and its expression in policy and practice, by and large withstand the critical thrust of the dependency thesis. The extent to which it fails to do so is found largely in the extent to which its implementation leads inevitably to the codification of educational realities through, for example, the introduction of constraints to learning, the heightened importance of accountability criteria and standards and the outcomes focus of lifelong learning. The codification arising from such tendencies is contrary to the aretaic ethic underpinning lifelong learning theory. Their presence remains, it would seem, an unavoidable consequence of the implementation of the theory. It represents a tension within the theory and one which calls for meaningful management and moderation in accordance with the values of that theory.

The same implication for educational practice may be suggested for other practical consequences of implementing lifelong learning theory, particularly tendencies to excessive vocationalism and educational fragmentation encompassed by the de-differentiation argument and to the commodification, marketisation, managerialism, internationalisation, and de-professionalisation encompassed by the privatisation argument. The negative impacts of these tendencies call for informed educational action, rather than rejection of the informing theory. Overall, the de-differentiation argument in the dependency thesis fails because it misconstrues the *a priori* and context-free eschewing of conceptual distinctions and value limits in lifelong learning theory as a denial of the necessity and utility of conceptual distinctions and universal values.

The discontinuity argument of the dependency thesis, which constructs lifelong learning (*sensu stricto*) as having falsely acquired the progressive mantle of lifelong *education* theory, emerges here as misguided. The valid criticisms levelled against contemporary lifelong learning theory are no less applicable to its earlier realisation as lifelong education. What seems to be happening here is that the issues

arising in recent years from the now widespread implementation of lifelong learning theory in policy and practice are exposing the realities and tensions immanent to lifelong learning and education theory – realities and tensions that tended to remain obscured by the heady flush of theorisation and the then very limited application in the earlier days of its theorisation as lifelong ‘education’.

Lifelong learning theory (*sensu lato*) stands as a normative theory of education that is strongly emancipatory from a progressive social philosophical perspective. Its implied aretaic ethic of universal humane commitments is irreducibly directed to constructing social realities that further the good life for all humanity in a socially just manner. It may indeed be hopelessly unrealistic in its utopianism. It may be raising expectations of the instrumental utility of lifelong that cannot possibly be achieved through learning alone. In so doing, its contemporary success in influencing educational policy and practice may well be the progenitors of its own eventual and inevitable failure. Its contemporary association with the prevailing political mood of neo-liberalism in social philosophy may in future contribute to its demise – as proponents of the dependency thesis might well wish upon it. However, the unjust and non-progressive tendencies which are levelled against it in the dependency thesis are mischaracterisations.

References

- Bagnall, R.G. (2004/2005) The ethics of lifelong learning, *International Journal of Learning*, 11, 1453–1460.
- Bagnall, R.G. (2004) *Cautionary Tales in the Ethics of Lifelong Learning Policy and Management: A Book of Fables*. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic.
- Bagnall, R.G. (2001) Locating lifelong learning and education in contemporary currents of thought and culture. In: Aspin, D., Chapman, J., Hatton, M., and Sawano, Y. (Eds) *International Handbook of Lifelong Learning*. (Part 1). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer, pp.35–52.
- Bagnall, R.G. (1999) *Discovering Radical Contingency: Building a Postmodern Agenda in Adult Education*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Bagnall, R.G. (1995) Discriminative justice and responsibility in postmodernist adult education, *Adult Education Quarterly*, 45(2), 79–94.
- Bagnall, R.G. (1991) Relativism, objectivity, liberal adult education and multiculturalism, *Studies in the Education of Adults*, 23(1), 61–84.
- Bagnall, R.G. (1990) Lifelong education: the institutionalisation of an illiberal and regressive ideology? in *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 22(1), 1–7.
- Bauman, Z. (1998) *Work, Consumerism and the New Poor*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Bauman, Z. (1987) *Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Post-Modernity and Intellectuals*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Berlin, I. (2002) *Liberty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bernstein, B. (1970) Education cannot compensate for society, *New Society*, 26 (February), 344–347.
- Blokland, H. (1997) *Freedom and Culture in Western Society* (trans. O’Loughlin, M.). London: Routledge.
- Boshier, R. (1998) Edgar Fauré after 25 years: down but not out. In: Holford, J., Jarvis, P., and Griffin, C. (Eds) *International Perspectives on Lifelong Learning*. London: Kogan Page, pp.3–20.

- Brookfield, S.D. (1998) Understanding and facilitating moral learning in adults, *Journal of Moral Education*, 27(3), 283–300.
- Chapman, J.D. and Aspin, D.N. (1997). *The School, the Community and Lifelong Learning*. London: Cassell.
- Clark, G.L., Jonson, E.P., and Caldon, W. (1997) *Accountability and Corruption: Public Sector Ethics*. St. Leonards, New South Wales: Allen & Unwin.
- Coffield, F. (2002) Breaking the consensus: lifelong learning as social control. In: Harrison, R. (Ed.) *Supporting Lifelong Learning*. London: Routledge Falmer, pp.174–200.
- Crowther, J. (2004) ‘In and against’ lifelong learning: flexibility and the corrosion of character, *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 23(2), 125–136.
- Currie, J. and Newson, J. (1998) *Universities and Globalization: Critical Perspectives*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Delors, J. (1996) *Learning: The Treasure Within*. Paris: UNESCO.
- Dreyfus, H.I., Dreyfus, S.E., and Athanasiou, T. (1986) *Mind over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer*. New York: Free Press.
- Edwards, R. (1997) *Changing Places? Flexibility, Lifelong Learning and a Learning Society*. London: Routledge.
- Edwards, R. (1991) The politics of meeting learner needs: power, subject, subjection, *Studies in the Education of Adults*, 23(1), 85–97.
- Fauré, E., Herrera, F., Kaddoura, A.-R., Lopes, H., Petrovsky, A.V., Rahnema, M., and Ward, F.C. (1972) *Learning to Be: The World of Education Today and Tomorrow*. Paris: UNESCO.
- Field, J. (2001) Lifelong education, *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 20(1/2), 3–15.
- Gelpi, E. (1985) *Lifelong Education and International Relations*. London: Croom Helm.
- Gleeson, D. and Shain, F. (1999) By appointment: governance, markets and managerialism in further education, *British Educational Research Journal*, 25(3), 545–561.
- Griffin, C. (1999a), Lifelong learning and social democracy, *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 18(5), 329–342.
- Griffin, C. (1999b) Lifelong learning and welfare reform, *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 18(6), 431–452.
- Guinsburg, T.N. (1996) Efficient, effective, and ethical practice in lifelong learning, *Canadian Journal of University Continuing Education*, 22(1), 67–75.
- Gustavsson, B. (2002) What do we mean by lifelong learning and knowledge? *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 21(1), 13–23.
- Illich, I. and Verne, E. (1976) *Imprisoned in the Global Classroom*. London: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative.
- Lawson, K.H. (2000) The Semantics of ‘Truth’: a counter-argument to some postmodern theories, *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 19(1), 82–92.
- Lengrand, P. (1975) *An Introduction to Lifelong Education*. London: Croom Helm.
- Limb, A. (1999) Further education under new labour: translating the language of aspiration into a springboard for achievement, *Cambridge Journal of Education*, 29(2), 219–228.
- Longworth, N. (2003) *Lifelong Learning in Action: Transforming Education in the 21st Century*. London: Kogan Page.
- Maffesoli, M. (1988) Jeux de masques: postmodern tribalism, *Design Issues*, 4(1/2), 141–151.
- Martin, I. (2003) Adult education, lifelong learning and citizenship: some ifs and buts, *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 22(6), 566–579.
- Muller, J. (1998) The well-tempered learner: self-regulation, pedagogical models and teacher education policy, *Comparative Education*, 34(2), 77–193.
- OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (1996) *Lifelong Learning for All: Meeting of the Education Committee at Ministerial Level*, 16–17 January 1996. Paris: OECD.
- Ohliger, J. (1974) Is lifelong education a guarantee of permanent inadequacy?, *Convergence*, 7(2), 47–58.
- Paterson, R.W.K. (1984) Objectivity as an educational imperative, *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 1(3), 17–29.
- Paterson, R.W.K. (1979) *Values, Education and the Adult*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

- Poell, R.F., Van der Kroght, F.J., and Warmerdam, J.H.M. (1998) Project-based learning in professional organisations, *Adult Education Quarterly*, 49(1), 28–43.
- Popper, K.R. (1977) *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (12th impression). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Pounds, B.R. (1999) *Student-created Contracts: Building Responsibility from the Bottom up*. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Conference on College Composition and Communication, Atlanta, GA.
- Raffe, D., Howieson, C., and Spours, K. (1998) The unification of post-compulsory education: towards a conceptual framework, *British Journal of Educational Studies*, 46(2), 169–187.
- Senge, P.M. (1990) *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization*, New York: Doubleday.
- Simonds, R.L. (1994) A dangerous experiment, *Vocational Education Journal*, 69(8), 40–43.
- Smart, B. (1992) *Modern Conditions, Postmodern Controversies*. New York: Routledge.
- Tight, M. (1998) Lifelong learning: opportunity or compulsion? *British Journal of Educational Studies*, 46(3), 251–263.
- Toulmin, S. (1990) *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity*, New York: Free Press.
- Trigg, R. (1973) *Reason and Commitment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Watson, B.S. (1995) The new training edge, *Management Review*, 84(5), 49–52.
- White, F.C. (1982) Knowledge and relativism I, *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 14(1), 1–13.
- Wilson, A.L. (1999) Creating identities of dependency: adult education as a knowledge-power regime, *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 18(2), 85–93.

Chapter 15

Philosophical Perspectives on Lifelong Learning: Insights from Education, Engineering, and Economics

Mal Leicester, Roger Twelvetrees, and Peter Bowbrick

Introduction

The papers in this collection provide philosophical perspectives on lifelong learning. This particular paper, however, is less concerned with providing a philosophical perspective than with examining how we approach the provision of a philosophical perspective. How do we approach educational practice philosophically? Of course one can have a philosophy of lifelong learning, in the sense of a more or less developed theory about what it is and how it should be done. However, this paper is not concerned with a substantive philosophy of lifelong learning but with exploring how the traditional tools of analytical philosophy (conceptual analysis, ethical reflection, epistemological, and ontological critique) can contribute to our understanding of lifelong learning. (The application of philosophical tools and the raising of philosophical questions in the field of education has, of course, been known as *the philosophy of education*.)

In the first more traditional part of the paper we briefly describe these philosophical tools and apply them to lifelong learning. (This application could be seen as a conventional example of the philosophy of education.)

We go on to suggest that analysis of ‘lifelong learning’, a pragmatic and a ‘family resemblance’ concept (Wittgenstein 1953), suggests that a more pragmatic philosophical approach might be fruitful – *a practical philosophy*. In the second (less traditional) part of the paper we describe this approach. We illustrate it (in application to lifelong learning) by reference to the use of narrative in educational research and to the practices of pragmatic disciplines such as engineering and economics. Engineering and economics, as disciplines which must work in the real world, might provide useful models for the lifelong educator and insights in relation to the notion of a practical philosophy.

Finally, drawing on Wittgenstein’s injunction to ‘look and see’ we hope to show that practical philosophy finds a new kind of synthesis of educational theory and practice and that, though this approach is practical, it remains genuinely philosophical. In other words, we indicate, how we can ‘look’ at the empirical world from a philosophical perspective.

The Philosophy of Education

Conceptual Analysis

Philosophers of education have used ‘conceptual analysis’ as a key tool in their exploration of aspects of education. The assumption has been that in getting clearer about key concepts such as ‘education’, ‘teaching’, ‘learning’, ‘training’ (or in the present case, ‘lifelong learning’) we contribute to a better general understanding of education, and thus to a better policy, provision, and practice of it.

Of course, what we mean by ‘conceptual analysis’ is itself a philosophical question, which touches on what we say about the relationship between the concept (idea) and things and between concept and word. However, running through differing positions on such questions, is a common understanding of philosophy as a non-empirical inquiry, concerned with a host of questions that cannot be answered by the scientific method of observation and experiment on the empirical world. In order to answer their questions, philosophers have not traditionally looked at the real world in any detailed or systematic way.

Most philosophy of education has been implicitly concerned with the education of children, with compulsory schooling. This has been called a front-end model of education. Lawson (1975) was one of the first to use the philosophy of education explicitly in connection with adult education (e.g. see his *Concepts and Values in Adult Education*). Thus until the relatively recent movement to lifelong learning, conceptual analysis has not been explicitly orientated to educational concepts in lifelong perspective.

With this reorientation has come a number of conceptual insights. We have recognised that ‘lifelong learning’ and ‘lifelong education’ are often used as synonyms, and thus blur the traditional distinction between learning and education (see Field and Leicester 2000; Leicester and Twelvetrees 2005). The concept of lifelong learning has also been recognised as a pragmatic concept based on our desire to solve the problems faced by governments across the world (Aspin and Chapman 2001). It is a slippery term, lending itself to multiple variations of purpose and content, relying on its remarkable potential to mean different things to different people (Kunzel 2000). It is a chameleon, Wittgenstenian ‘family resemblance’ concept (Leicester 2006).

Lifelong learning has also been seen as a triadic concept, seeking to relate the vocational, the liberal, and the political (Chapman and Aspin 1997). (Key questions arising here are whether such a triadic concept of education is ideologically coherent and whether it is possible to achieve it in practice.)

Traditional Philosophical Questions

Philosophy of education has also raised traditional philosophical questions, in relation to education. For example, the question of ‘free will’ is obviously relevant to the idea of moral education, for the very possibility of such education seems to rest

on the coherence of the notion of personal responsibility. We are only responsible for action we freely choose to do. Questions central to philosophy of mind are also clearly relevant to the notion of human learning, i.e. questions about the relationship between mind and body and between mind and learning (Leicester and Twelvetrees 2005). Such philosophical questions, it might be supposed, will be increasingly asked with a lifelong learning orientation.

Epistemology

Since, traditionally, education has been taken to involve the development of knowledge and understanding, Epistemological questions have been recognised as having importance for the educator. This branch of philosophy has contributed much to philosophical educational investigation.

In these postmodern times, many have argued that the forms of knowledge (see Hirst 1963) are not immutable and fixed. There are alternative forms of knowledge – context-dependent knowledge.

This position need not lead to an incoherent, full-blooded, relativism since there are constraints on what counts as knowledge, constraints that nevertheless allow for alternatives, for a multiplicity of voices and perspectives.

Ethics

Another key philosophical strand in our thinking about education has been an ethical one. Again, this is not surprising. The enormously influential philosopher RS Peters (1966) recognised education as a normative concept and ‘lifelong learning’ itself, blurred as it is with ‘education’, carries this normative charge. Moreover, one of the motivating forces behind the movement to lifelong learning, has been the desire to widen participation in it (Taylor 1998). Here the objective is an ethical concern to provide lifelong learning opportunities to all social groups, including those currently under-represented in post-school formal learning and its accreditations.

This Collection

This collection *Philosophical Perspectives on Lifelong Learning* could be seen as moving on from a philosophical perspective which, at least implicitly, equates education with schooling. It also moves on from a philosophical perspective which explicitly seeks to redress this bias, with a focus only on adult education. It is a move from the philosophy of education to the philosophy of lifelong learning.

A philosophical perspective on lifelong learning raises the familiar philosophical questions, and uses the familiar tool of conceptual analysis, but in the context of lifelong learning. Indeed, this collection as a whole could be seen as just such an enterprise, and as an extended engagement with the terrain of the philosophy of lifelong learning which has been briefly indicated in this first half of the present paper. It contains analysis of the concepts of ‘lifelong learning’ and ‘teaching quality’, and reconceptualises ‘adult education’. It pays attention to ethical values and epistemological questions. It applies these philosophical reflections in the context of policy and practice.

Practical Philosophy and Lifelong Learning

Not only could the focus of a philosophical approach to education shift from ‘education’ to ‘lifelong learning’; in what follows we want to suggest that it may be timely to shift the philosophical approach itself. It seems to us that postmodern blurring of boundaries discernible in the literature on lifelong learning, and the epistemological shift to a more postmodernist approach to knowledge and the curriculum, support the notion of greater fluidity and plurality in our notion of what ‘taking a philosophical perspective’ means. It is in tune with postmodernist thinking to recognise that since concepts are not ahistorical, timeless, culture-free concepts, analysis of them may require taking greater account both of a social context and of the purpose of the analysis; greater account that is than philosophers have tended to take hitherto. However, how can we do this and yet remain with a conceptual rather than a sociological analysis? What follows is a preliminary attempt to answer this question, but there is much more work still to be done. This preliminary attempt pays attention to Wittgenstein’s notion of a family resemblance concept. Some of the significant ideas about concepts, which were suggested by Wittgenstein, have, it seems to us, implications for thus moving to a more practical philosophy.

Wittgenstein introduced the notion of a family resemblance concept (1953), and with it the notion that we should look (in exploring concepts) at the real world. It is not only that such a shift in our conception of a philosophical approach to lifelong learning, seems in tune with contemporary thought of which ‘lifelong learning’ provides an example; it is also that the very fluidity and context shifting, chameleon nature of this concept seems to require greater attention to this real-world slippery imprecision. How can conceptual analysis of ‘lifelong learning’ provide us with genuinely useful insights if attention is not given to the multi-stranded shifting usage of the word in a range of real-life contexts?

Wittgenstein introduced the idea of ‘family resemblance’ concepts through the concept of ‘games’ (Wittgenstein 1953):

Consider, for example, the proceeding that we call games. I mean board games, card games, ball games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? – Don’t say ‘there must be something common, or they would not be called games.’ – but look and see whether there is anything common to all – For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.

And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities; sometimes similarities of detail. I can think of no better expression to characterise these similarities than ‘family resemblances’, for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc., overlap and criss-cross in the same way-And shall I say ‘games’ form a family.

Wittgenstein’s insight that (some) words do not label common features or essences is an illuminating one. The table below illustrates how a variety of common (frequent) characteristics of games may, indeed, produce no ‘common’ (shared) characteristics.

	Rule following	Recreational	Skilful	Competitive	Physical exercise
Professional football	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Chess	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Patience (cards)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>			
Child’s make believe game		<input type="checkbox"/>			<input type="checkbox"/>

Since there are no necessary or sufficient conditions for the use of the term ‘game’ we must ‘look and see’ how it is used and come to understand the ‘family resemblances’ – the common but shifting characteristics. The question is: how should the philosopher, *qua* philosopher, approach this ‘looking and seeing?’

Firstly, the philosopher looking for the broad family resemblance characteristics of the use of any complex term, will bring an awareness of the complexity of the real world to the task.

Looking at and Seeing Complexity

This practical, pragmatic approach to conceptual analysis surely encourages a recognition of the cultural, social differences and similarities in our usage of ‘life-long learning’. Morwenna Griffiths, recognising this fluidity in the concept of justice, has incorporated a plurality of voices (stories) in her exploration of this concept and developed her own notion of ‘practical philosophy’ (Griffiths 2003). She distinguishes practical philosophy from applied philosophy. It is not about taking already worked out philosophical theories and applying them to the real world. Rather, practical philosophy ‘begins from an understanding that philosophy is rooted in the social practices with philosophy on educational practices rooted in educational practice.’ Because her thinking was influenced by feminist philosophy, this practical philosophy was seen as engaging with the conditions of all people (‘women and men, poor and rich’). There is a political dimension. The intention is to ‘reconceptualise the world’ so that philosophy becomes more inclusive of the interests of women. ‘This practical philosophy is “philosophy as, with and for . . .” rather than philosophy about or applied to . . .’ ‘She uses stories as a way into the “diversity of significant particularities’ (Griffiths and Cotton 2005).

Our notion of ‘practical philosophy’, in encouraging attention to the diversity of voices and experiences in the real world, also has this political tendency. Postmodernist epistemology recognises that knowledge is validly constructed from the intersubjective agreement in the experiences of oppressed groups and not just from that of the educated group (the group which writes papers) which has tended to exclude these voices hitherto. However, in this chapter we are also suggesting that practical philosophy, recognising that meaning is rooted in the (complex and context dependent) uses of a word, has implications for conceptual analysis regardless of any political commitments or implications.

Nevertheless, the use of a plurality of stories, illustrative of a variety of perspectives on an abstract concept such as justice, is one possible answer to the injunction to *look and see* how words are actually used in the real world. (In keeping with the presupposition of our suggestions for a more postmodernist practical philosophy, there will, of course, be *more than one possible* way of approaching the idea of combining a philosophical investigation with the need to pay more attention to the contexts of a concept/word in the empirical world.)

As a small preliminary contribution to the development of a philosophical looking and seeing, in what follows, we explore how two other pragmatic disciplines (engineering and economics), both of which use that which works in the empirical world as the test for their theory based practice, might provide insight; insight, that is, into the practice of lifelong learning and into how *practical philosophy* can ‘look and see’ what works in practice, while remaining distinctively philosophical, true to its own conceptual concerns.

Engineering and Lifelong Learning

In what follows we explore engineering as a species of lifelong learning, show that the engineering process can provide useful models for the development of new courses in lifelong learning and finally see if the insights about the interaction of culture with engineering might throw light on our notion of practical philosophy.

Engineers as Lifelong Learners

The process of engineering is a species of lifelong learning. The process is as follows:

1. The engineer is presented with a challenge, often of the form: ‘Use new technology, design a functional item such as a TV or computer that will cost less to make than the competition’s offerings and also have better performance than our existing model.’
2. Now this new technology will be provided with data sheets etc., to specify the design parameters, but the manufacturers will not have experience of the application of this new material or device in your product. The engineer reads up on

the new technology, hopes that he has sufficient understanding of the benefits and pitfalls new technology and produces his design.

3. As part of the process he will write a test specification, which when carried out will demonstrate that the new functional item is safe and performs its functions as required by the customers.
4. In a factory somewhere the first examples of his new designs will be manufactured, and the costs will be added up to see whether the items can be manufactured cheaply enough to be sold at the market price.
5. Eventually, the actual cost and performance will be known, and the engineer will now have learnt just how the new technology works in this instance.
6. If he was successful, the march of technology is such that he will immediately be required to produce an enhanced design that wrings the last ounce of performance out of the current design by taking out all the slack of the first foray into new technology. That process is just as demanding, requiring as it does a full understanding of the design parameters in that particular application. If he has failed to learn any lessons from the Mk.1 item then he will fail in ignominy.

Lifelong learning is therefore an essential activity for an engineer, and the desire to continue learning is part of what drives engineers to produce more and more radical solutions to the world's problems. The engineering community continually learn more about the world and disseminate that information to each other. Each engineer in his own field reads publications and learns from his peers' experiences. Engineering giants such as Brunel and Whittle make their mark on the world not just by what they design themselves, but also by the learning passed on to other engineers to be embodied in their new designs.

Engineering and Lifelong Learning – the Engineering Process can be a Useful Model

The systematic method that engineers ensure that their design meets the customer's requirements may be used in the service of lifelong learning. The method is as follows:

Firstly the customer's requirements are translated into the top-level engineering requirements. For instance, if the target customer wants a car that can out accelerate a VW Golf then the designer will look up the 0–60 mph time for the Golf (let's assume 10 s) and derive the new requirement as, 'the elapsed time zero to 60 mph shall be less than 10 seconds'. Once all the engineering requirements have been 'captured' they will flow down into the requirements for each element (in this case the engine and bodywork of the car will be two of the elements). In our example, that requirement would flow down as a horsepower requirement for the engine, and a weight restriction for the bodywork. The engineer who has to design the engine knows how much power it has to produce, and will use that (and other requirements) to design the engine. He will produce drawings for the hundreds of parts in the engine, and as discussed above, each one will use the best technology available,

and be made to work just as hard as possible without breaking. Along with the drawings will be the test specifications for each part, and the assembly instruction. The bodywork designer will be working to use aluminium as much as possible to reduce the weight of the car.

As the parts are manufactured each one is tested on its own, before assembly into a functional unit such as the engine. When complete, the engine will be tested against the power requirement, and the body will be weighed. Hence by the time that the process is over, and the finished car is ready for testing, the attainment of the customer's requirements is guaranteed.

Engineering – devising and evaluating an engineering design	Education – devising and evaluating lifelong learning provision
<i>Devising Phase</i>	
Customer's requirements (in his own words)	Potential learner's (client groups') learning needs in their own words
Statement of Engineering Requirements (performance needed to meet the customer's requirements)	Educator's assessment of the teaching required to meet the learning needs
Separation of overall performance requirements into requirements for each module of the whole design	Separation of overall teaching/learning requirements into requirements for each specialist module or session
Design specification for each module	Design curriculum for each specialism
Design specification for each sub-module in each element	Design each module or session to cover the requirements for that specialism
<i>Evaluation Phase</i>	
State the test requirement for each sub-module	State what we expect the learner to do or know for each element in the specialist module or session
State the test requirement for each module	State what we expect the learner to do or know for each specialism.
State what tests should be performed to prove that the module have been successfully integrated into a whole system	State how we can test that the learner has successfully understood how each specialism relates to each other
Factory acceptance specification (engineers prove to themselves that the system does what the customer requires)	State how we can satisfy ourselves that the learner has reached a satisfactory level of learning for the course as a whole
Customer acceptance specification (how the engineers prove to the customer that it meets his requirements at his own premises)	Show the learner how much he has learnt in the area in which he wished to learn

Engineering and Lifelong Learning – Interaction of Culture and Engineering

It is interesting to see how cultural differences over time and between societies such the USA and Western Europe impact on the way that engineering problems are solved. There is often a *family of best solutions* rather than a single best design. In

the USA the emphasis is often on simplicity, reliability, and cost-effectiveness. It was in the USA that the idea of a single water tap in the middle of the sink for both hot and cold water first came into being. In Western Europe the emphasis tends to be on the product being elegant and a pleasure to use. This is very apparent in the recent spate of new designs of elaborate and expensive cork removers for wine bottles that are appearing in our shops.

The difference between 'Shaker' and Victorian furniture illustrate that these differences have existed for many years. To illustrate our point we have used furnishings that everyone is familiar with, and it could be argued that such things are merely the fashion of the day, trivial frippery and nothing to do with engineering design. However, we will show that engineering design is influenced by the same cultural forces that shape the fashion of the day. Consider some engineering that the user rarely if ever sees. Inside the average American car is a large simple, reliable engine, with bland (and boring) characteristics. Inside the average European car is a small highly tuned and responsive engine that delights the driver by its responsiveness. The number of broken down vehicles to be seen on European motorway hard shoulders is a testament to the resulting lack of reliability, but we have seen no trend at all for Europeans to change their preferences, or European manufacturers to change their engineering direction. We conclude that something in the European culture leads engineers and users to choose a 'best solution' that is less reliable than it could be because of the pleasure derived from its use.

Even in an apparently hard-edged practice like engineering we see that there is not just one solution, but a family of best solutions, and which of these we prefer will be partly conditioned by cultural factors.

In arriving at any one of the best engineering solutions, we can take various approaches. They range between first creating a mathematical model of the system and verifying its validity by comparison with the real world, to building a working laboratory model of the real system and by altering it in various ways to attempt to discover the limits of its performance. The former tends to be used for conservatively designed systems such as nuclear reactors or bridges, whereas the latter is used for innovative (and difficult to model) aspects of consumer items such as washing machines.

Applying this to philosophical enquiry, we can begin with an armchair conceptual analysis (e.g. of 'lifelong learning') and perhaps qualify this a little when we consider the real world! (The traditional approach of the philosophy of education.) Alternatively, we can begin by looking directly at the real world (for example the many different uses of the term lifelong learning) and draw out the several general characteristics of these uses. We would see that uses of the term tend to carry normative implications. We would see that the term tends to be used in liberal educational and political educational contexts, as well as in vocational ones, but that the vocational dominate. (This approach could be described as practical philosophy, but we need to find systematic, fruitful methods of looking directly at the uses of a term in the real world; i.e. fruitful in term of its conceptual/discriminating function.)

Practical Economics

This section describes the methodological approach of some people in one group of practical economics. These are consultants, who differ from other economists in that typically they are employed on discrete jobs lasting from 2 weeks to a year, that they may not work for the same client more than once, that they are paid on results, and that their employability depends on how previous clients assess their performance. They are rather like doctors, in that they diagnose the problem and make recommendations for remedying it. They do not work on training or implementation. Bowbrick (1988) discusses this and other practical economics.

Terms of Reference

The economist is given written terms of reference at the beginning of the project. There is usually a hidden agenda of things that the client does not care to have put in writing. The true agenda will also change during the consulting process, as the economist's questions raise new possibilities. The agenda usually changes again as the client reads the final report, getting a different view of what economic analysis can achieve.

The economist also has to address the concerns of other stakeholders. In public sector economics, the 'client' may be one official in a Department. The economist owes a duty to the Department, the Ministry, other Departments, the government of the day, taxpayers, consumers, producers, etc. The economist also has his own personal agenda which will change during the consultancy. Frequently the duty to the client who pays the fee and writes the terms of reference is drowned by the duties to other stakeholders.

Methodology

The methodology used is one of applying logic (theory) to facts, to produce a model of a specific situation, from which recommendations for change are made. Many different theories are incorporated into any model. This is not the favoured methodology of academic economists but it is necessary for practical economics, for several reasons.

Academic theory uses arbitrary, unrealistic, or very simplified assumptions. It is 'shorn of all irrelevant postulates, so that it stands as an example of how to extract the minimum of results from the minimum of assumptions' (Lancaster 1976). It is common to introduce *ad hoc* assumptions during the analysis, when analysis based on the original arbitrary assumptions comes to a dead end. Curiously, it is not considered necessary to rework all the analysis taking into account the new *ad hoc*

assumptions. In one of the most cited theoretical approaches, more than a hundred explicit *ad hoc* assumptions and thousands of implicit ones are introduced during the analysis (Bowbrick 1994). The introduction of explicit *ad hoc* assumptions makes it likely that the implicit assumptions necessarily introduced at the same time are contradictory, in which case the theory must be logically false.

Practical models, on the other hand, must be based on the facts of the particular situation, the structure of the market, the type of product, consumer preferences, information, the sociology of the producer, etc. It is impractical to have one variable in the model for every variable in the market, so it is necessary to simplify, but the simplification should still reflect the facts. A model or theory taken from a textbook will be a very poor predictor in any real market, because it has too few assumptions and these are unrealistic. Equally important, non-economist clients may not be able to criticise the economics in the report, but they can and will reject it if the facts are wrong. This means that it is neither acted on nor paid for.

The methodological approach of practical economists is that if the assumptions are realistic and the logic sound, the predictions will be correct. This is not the dominant academic view. The Popperian view is, oddly, that the logical theory, as opposed to the model, is falsifiable. The logical theory is thought to have some predictive value. The Friedmanite view is that it does not matter whether the assumptions or the theory are correct, as long as the theory is a good predictor. Neither makes a clear distinction between theory which is a string of logic, and a model of a real life situation. Neither is useful if the model is to be used for a one-off decision such as ensuring next year's food supply.

Determining the Facts

Determining the facts is the next task. Statistics provide simple facts. However most statistics have been collected for other purposes, to inappropriate definitions. All statistics are wrong, and some are very wrong indeed. There are gaps in the statistics, usually on key issues. Complex facts may be found out by interview. These include policy, marketing strategy, competition or collaboration, consumer preferences, sociology, etc. Many of these deal with the relationships between the facts measurable by statistics. The interviewer may be faced with gaps, falsehoods, and misperceptions.

Previous consultancy reports are a source of practical economic theory and of information. A previous report on the same topic – the market for the same product in the same country for example, presents a model which, if good, may be used as a first approximation, and adjusted as new information becomes available. A report on cotton marketing in Zambia is very useful in writing a report on cotton marketing in the Ivory Coast or Sudan – there is a family resemblance in the technology, the product, and the economic analysis. A report on cabbage marketing in the UK, on the other hand, is irrelevant to most of Africa.

Theory Used

To build their complex models, practical economists have to have a sound grasp of theory, as they have to build up complex models describing particular situations. They cannot just borrow theory in academic journals as it is typically a long complex chain of theory based on a small number of assumptions. If any of the assumptions are changed to bring in a breath of reality, the whole theoretical structure collapses. This means that very little theory in academic journals can be applied directly to practical economics. It is not unusual to find a high status, mainstream economics journal that has no theory that could conceivably be applied to the real world. Practical economists tend to read more practically oriented journals like the *Journal of Agricultural Economics*, and to write for them. When they write theory, they are not looking for the response, 'I cannot understand it. He must be very clever', but rather, 'That's interesting. I wonder if something like that could be happening in the market I am working on. I will adapt the theory to fit into my model'. The readers are looking for a family resemblance.

Testing the Model

As one acquires this information, one builds up a complex model. This should explain all information already collected, and all new information gained is tested to see if it fits the model. If it does not, either the information or the model is incorrect. The information must then be cross-checked against other sources. This is the only way to deal with missing or wrong information. The result should be a large, complex, interlinked model which explains the phenomena of the real world. There is a constant process of testing the model against new information. The model can also be tested by seeing if it explains historical phenomena which were not included in the model. This is the only realistic way to deal with missing or wrong information.

Short-term consultants do not have the luxury of being able to test their models by predicting the future, nor can they fine-tune them by trial and error over the years. It follows that they must have some way of refuting their own models if wrong, and of refuting the many previous consultancy reports which are contradictory, or which do not apply to this situation. Individual academic economists have criteria for rejecting papers for publication, but once the papers are published, there are no accepted criteria for saying a model or theory is refuted, and nothing vanishes from the canon except on the grounds that it is unfashionable. Incorrect assumptions, contradictory assumptions, incorrect logic, lack of testing, false predictions, or all of these are not accepted as a refutation. Refutation is not being taught, even though it is a fundamental skill for the practical economist.

Practical economists refute by testing the assumptions, testing the logic, testing whether the model explains all the facts included in it and testing whether the model predicts new facts not already included in it.

Predictions and Recommendations

Using this model it is possible to make predictions of what would happen if various adjustments were made, changes in prices or regulations for instance. Recommendations or options are then passed to the client.

Optimising Techniques

Economists seldom use their toolbox of optimising techniques. Often it would take so long that the decision had already been taken before the report was produced. In fact, consultancies seldom last long enough to produce an optimal solution.

Where optimising techniques are feasible, as in farm management economics, they may be rejected by the client. In Ireland, it was found that the optimum production plan was producing celery or strawberries. However, in Ireland real men keep cattle, so the advice was rejected. There is also a risk in producing strawberries rather than milk, with its guaranteed price.

Even if one were to produce an optimal solution that was based on realistic assumptions it is quite possible that variables in the model like the strawberry yield, or ones outside the model like the world oil price, will not be as assumed. All the information going into the model is subject to error anyway. This means that there is a very high risk that the outcome will not be exactly as predicted. In some cases, the likely return is much the same even if the assumptions turn out to be wrong, so the cost of risk is small. In other cases, the cost of risk is high, and the client may prefer to go for a solution which is markedly suboptimal in expected profit, but is low risk.

Practical economists also recognise that there is a risk their model may be wrong, as well as that the assumptions may be wrong. To reduce this risk, a stable model is constructed – a broad foundation of realistic assumptions with a low edifice of logical theory on top of it – complex and interlocking. This may be contrasted with the publishable academic model of a long chain of theory based on a foundation of a few assumptions. If there is any change at all in the assumptions or any flaw in the theory, the whole edifice collapses – rather like balancing a pencil on its point.

Practical economists are also reluctant to base any of their recommendations on a long chain of theory or weak assumptions: that there is an honest and efficient civil service or that farmers will read the newspaper and believe its price predictions.

Dissemination

Finally, practical economists recognise that their work is wasted if their report is not read, believed and acted on. They would also like to see it paid for, and to get more jobs from the same client.

Economics – examining a situation and making recommendations for use of resources	Education – devising and evaluating lifelong learning provision for better use of resources (the self)
<i>Objectives</i>	
Customer's stated objectives	Potential learner's (client groups') learning needs in their own words
Finding out unstated objectives (this continues throughout study)	Lifelong learning is discovering one's real objectives
Identifying other stakeholders and finding out their objectives (This continues throughout study)	Identifying the objectives of other stakeholders, who may include the state, the employer, the family, and society
Identifying the economist's own objectives	Identifying the educationalist's own objectives
<i>Diagnosis</i>	
Find out the facts of the situation	
Note how stakeholders and others have different perceptions of the facts	
Construct an economic model which explains the facts	
Test whether the economic model explains all the facts – the assumptions used to make the model, other facts that come to light and historical facts	
Note how this model differs from those of the people who have to be convinced	
$f = 4X(1 - X)$ Identify remedies	
Using the model, determine how the situation can be changed to situations more acceptable to some combination of stakeholders (someone will suffer).	
Assess the outcomes, e.g. by size of effect, long term or short term, social justice, gender impact, environmental impact, sociological impact, political and other importance of stakeholders most affected	
Assess the methods of achieving outcomes: e.g. by probability of them working, risk, cost, political acceptability, micro-political acceptability, availability of finance	
Decide on one or two options to recommend	
The prescription:	
Write recommendations that are acceptable to the client and other key stakeholders	
Mention or not the impact on other stakeholders	
Get key stakeholders to read the report, believe it, act on it	
Get paid	

(continued)

Economics – examining a situation and making recommendations for use of resources	Education – devising and evaluating lifelong learning provision for better use of resources (the self)
Evaluation:	
Evaluation is not usually an option open to the short-term consultant. Trial and error is only a possibility for long-term employees	
The key evaluation of the model for logic and consistency with the facts is done at an early stage	
It is always possible to explain away a failure: e.g. ‘It was not implemented properly’, ‘The world oil price changed’. Nobody involved with the project wants to examine its failure	

Conclusion

This is a many stranded paper with two distinct parts. In part one we set out very briefly what we mean by taking a philosophical perspective on lifelong learning. This account is in tune with approaches established in the traditional philosophy of education. In part two we attempted to develop a notion of a more ‘practical’ philosophy. This approach requires us to ‘look and see’ how a word such as ‘lifelong learning’ is used in a complex, dynamic variety of contexts in order to establish broad characteristics of the use of the term, rather than to work out a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for its application. We suggested that there is work to be done in finding ways to ‘look and see’ philosophically. As a preliminary attempt at this work, we made reference to Griffith’s use of stories in her attempt to explore the concept of justice through the significant particularities in the experiences of an inclusive range of people. Could not this be usefully undertaken in relation to the concept of lifelong learning?

Both part one and part two of the paper carry implications for educational policy and provision: implications that suggest the need for a perspective shift in the thinking of policy-makers and providers. Part one suggests the need to conceive education not as two distinct sectors (schooling and adult education) but as a process of lifelong learning. Conceptual analysis and ethical considerations emphasise the importance of seeking to ensure that participation in this process is equitable and socially inclusive and ‘triadic’ in scope. Part two suggests that, since concepts are rooted in social practices (practical philosophy), philosophical research will, henceforth, have more significant funding implications. This is because the practical philosopher, no longer confined to her armchair, will need to engage with the real world and this will have financial/budgetary requirements.

We suggested that (as in the practice of engineering and economics) philosophers must look at the real world in some detail before beginning their analysis and then move between the analysis of a term and actual uses of it in an ongoing qualification of any over simplification of that analysis.

There were also useful insights from the ‘practical economist’. While it may be easy to churn out publishable theoretical papers based on arbitrary, unrealistic, or very simplified assumptions, these do not refer to the real world, and are unlikely to be accepted, acted on, or paid for. Practical economists must use assumptions and analysis that reflect the complexity of the real world, and of the situations they are examining.

These cross curricular insights suggest that learning from each others’ models, perspectives, approaches, and processes across the established divide between the ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ disciplines should be encouraged by policy-makers, since it is likely to be mutually enriching.

However, we are also reminded that determining the facts is complex and theory laden. Conceptual analysis must be provisional – increasingly complex and qualified. Indeed, perhaps conceptual analysis, particularly of complex terms, would be more manageable if conceived as an investigation into one aspect of the concept (e.g. an analysis of modern, non-vocational uses of the term lifelong learning).

Perhaps not all concepts are ‘family resemblance’ concepts, or, at least, perhaps some have less ‘criss-crossing’ similarities and differences. ‘Lifelong learning’ is, we suggest, particularly chameleon and contestable. It holds apparently oppositional ideas in creative tension:

- Cradle-to-grave *and* continuing adult education
- Triadic *but* with a vocational emphasis
- Idealistic *but* pragmatic

Our concluding suggestion is that to similarly hold in creative tension both arm-chair reflection and looking at the world will enrich our understanding of any term which has such historical, social, and cultural complexity.

References

- Aspin, D.N. and Chapman, J.D. (2001) Lifelong learning: concept and conceptions in *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, Special Issue Edition, Vol. 19, No. 1 (The Philosophy of Lifelong Education), pp.2–19.
- Bowbrick, P. (1988) *Practical Economics for the Real Economist*. London: Graham and Trotman. ISBN 1-85333-076-0.
- Bowbrick, P. (1994) *Limitations of Lancaster’s theory of Consumer Demand*. Ph.D. Thesis, Henley Management College.
- Chapman, J.D. and Aspin, D.N. (1997) *Lifelong Learning, the School and the Community*. London: Cassell.
- Field, J. and Leicester, M. (Eds) (2000) *Lifelong Learning: Education Across the Lifespan*. London: Routledge Falmer.
- Griffiths, M. (2003) *Action for Social Justice in Education*. London: Open University.
- Griffiths, M. and Cotton, T. (2005) *Action Research, Stories and Practical Philosophy*. Milton Keynes, UK: Open University.
- Hirst P.H. (1963) Liberal education and the nature of knowledge. In: Archambault, R.D. (Ed.) *Philosophical Analysis and Education*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

- Hirst, P.H. (Ed.) (1989) *Education and Values – The Richard Peters Lectures*. Institute of Education: University of London, pp.15–36.
- Kunzel, K. (2000) Europe and lifelong learning: investigating the political and educational rationale of expansionism. In: Field, J. and Leicester, M. (Eds) (2000) *Lifelong Learning: Education Across the Lifespan*. London: Routledge Falmer.
- Lancaster, K.J. (1976) Socially optimal product differentiation, *American Economic Review*, 57, 132.
- Lawson, K. (1975) *Concepts and Values in Adult Education*. Nottingham: Department of Adult Education (later republished (1979) in expanded form, by London: Open University Press).
- Leicester, M. (2006) Lifelong learning, family learning and equity. In: Chapter 15: Chapman, J.D., Cartwright, P., and McGilp, J.E. (2006) *Lifelong Learning: Participation and Equity*. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, pp.303–315.
- Leicester, M. and Twelvetrees, A.R. (2005) Morality and human learning. In: Jarvis, P. and Parker, S. (Eds) *Human Learning. An Holistic Approach*. London: Routledge.
- Peters, R.S. (1966) *Ethics and Education*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Taylor, R. (1998) Lifelong learning in the ‘liberal tradition’, *Journal of Moral Education*, 27(3), 301–312.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1953) *Philosophical Investigations* (trans. Anscombe, G.E.M.) Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Chapter 16

Building a Learning Region: Whose Framework of Lifelong Learning Matters?

Shirley Walters

Introduction

Lifelong learning, like democracy, is a highly contested term with its meanings closely tied to theories of socio-economic development. As with democracy, lifelong learning can stay at the symbolic or rhetorical levels. Moving it from this to considered policies and practices reveals how complex and contextually enmeshed it is.

Coffield (2000) argues that lifelong learning is going through three overlapping stages, namely those of 'romance', 'evidence', and 'implementation'. As he says, many of the materials on lifelong learning are almost theological in their zeal and remain at the romantic levels, claiming learning as a panacea. Fortunately, in some instances lifelong learning is entering the next phase that begins to challenge the vacuous rhetoric of the stage of romance and begins to provide evidence rather than political conviction on which to base policies and practices.

The development of 'learning regions' in various parts of the world provides fertile ground for understanding how lifelong learning is enmeshed in the socio-economic and political approaches in a region. In this chapter, the development of indicators in one learning region is used as a vehicle for highlighting how complex and contested lifelong learning is. It is also used to identify a range of paradoxes, which are at the heart of lifelong learning.

A preliminary research project was undertaken to identify indicators for a learning region in the Western Cape Province, South Africa. The Indicators Project raised many questions beyond the indicators themselves and their use. One of the key questions is, whose framework of lifelong learning matters?

In the chapter, I will briefly describe the research methodology, present background to learning regions and their characteristics, and then discuss the Learning Cape Indicators Project located within the debates on development within South Africa. This will lead to identification and discussion of the pertinent issues for researching indicators and for undertaking related lifelong learning programmes and projects.

Methodology

The study adopts a case study approach. This was deemed to be appropriate as a case study is able to locate the action most suitably within its historical and social contexts. A 4-month project was undertaken to develop a framework for indicators for the learning region (ODA and DLL 2005). This included analysis of indicators in the literature internationally; investigating relevant data sources; interacting with informants in key sectors; and reporting on it. This follows another research project which was an in depth analysis of a month long mini-festival which is imbedded within the Learning Cape Festival (LCF), which is now in its fifth year (Walters and Etkind 2004).

A Learning Region and Its Characteristics

There is not one understanding of a 'learning region'. Linquist (2005), who has been facilitating a website for those involved in learning regions, identifies a continuum of interpretations from seeing 'the learning region as an entity that is learning' to its being a 'geographical area in which lifelong learning takes place'. He argues that the learning region as an entity implies a societal change perspective with 'community development and learning as a societal change mechanism'. He sees the 'learning region as a geographical area' as a reflection of the aggregate of lifelong learning, which is taking place.

In his analysis he highlights the overall purpose of the learning region as relating either to a strategy for change or a reflection of the status quo. This he sees as connected to whom or where the concepts originated. He argues that if educators are involved then the majority of attention, resources and efforts, are mainly concerned with facilitating, supporting, and developing learning service provision. There is concentration on the supply side of learning. This seems to be confirmed in case studies of Bulgaria (Illieva 2005) and Korea where the Ministry of Education supports 19 learning cities (Byun and Chae 2005).

The 'learning region' clearly does not have one meaning as the notion is imbedded within different understandings of economic and social development and the role of learning regions within them (Coffield 2000; Duke, Osborne, and Wilson 2005). At the one end a neo-liberal view could encourage an extreme form of competitive individualism within a limited state; at the other end there could be emphasis on social solidarity with an interventionist and developmental state. These in turn refer to various theories of democracy and citizenship.

These differences are also reflected in the different understandings of social capital, which is a key concept in learning regions. For example, some may be highlighting the importance of social capital within a neo-liberal framework. As Mowbray (2004) pointed out, in this scenario people are being urged to volunteer, and to take on more and more community work while the government reduces its

public spending in the social sector. There is a new type of social contract in the 'risk society' where individuals are being told to invest in education throughout their lives. If they fall by the wayside it is their fault. Others, who support a participatory democratic view of development, would be urging strengthening of social capital in communities, families and workplaces, for building of capacity amongst the citizenry broadly, to engage in governance at all levels in the society.

Within this political range, amongst some city planners, the learning city is linked to the goal of the 'sustainable city'. Candy (2003) argues that the ability to move in more sustainable directions is fundamentally linked to the society's ability to learn. She sees learning for the sustainable city as operating at the level of social learning, which is at a higher level than that of the individual. The goal of sustainability is also promoted by Faris (2001). He argues that building sustainable communities is linked to creating learning communities. He states that in learning communities both formal and non-formal lifelong learning of individuals and communities is systematically fostered in order to enhance social, economic, cultural, and environmental conditions of their community. He argues for a bottom-up approach, which is 'to build a learning nation community by community'. Both he and Candy link the building of learning communities to more participatory democratic forms of development. Others who are arguing for a bottom-up approach by working through local government structures are Africa and Nicol (2005) who describe 'peer review' mechanisms amongst ten municipalities in South Africa as powerful instruments for building learning networks to assist members 'to make sense of hard experiences and to strengthen democratic structures'.

Regardless of the different political orientations, there seem to be certain essential characteristics of a learning region. The first is to have a new understanding of the centrality for economic and social development of all forms of learning – informal, non-formal, and formal – for people of all ages and in all sectors and spheres of family, community, and work life. The second is to prioritise excellent education and training systems at all levels. The third is to provide frequently updated, easily accessible information and counselling services to enable citizens to maximise their learning opportunities. The fourth is to have world-class systems for collection, analysis, management, and dissemination of information in order to monitor progress towards being a learning region. The fifth is the creation of social capital through partnerships and networks. This is summarised as follows:

Education: World-class education and training systems at all levels, with high participation rates.

Partnerships and networking: High levels of collaboration, networking and clustering within and across economic and knowledge sectors, especially around areas of innovation.

Information: World-class systems for collection, analysis, management, and dissemination of information.

Out of the silos: A constant challenging of traditional knowledge categories to suit rapidly changing social and economic realities.

Accessibility: Providing frequently updated, easily accessible information and counselling services to enable citizens to maximise their learning opportunities.

Lifelong learning valued: High value placed on formal, non-formal, and informal learning throughout life; that value is expressed in tangible improvements in the learner's employment and community situations.

Social cohesion: Learning supports high levels of social cohesion (across social class, ethnicity, gender, ability, geography, and age) within a society of limited social polarities

In brief, there is an understanding that a learning region is a geographical area, which could be small or big, for example, a city, village, or province, which links lifelong learning with economic development to compete globally. It is a response to economic globalisation where informal, non-formal, and formal learning are recognised as important, for people of all ages, to assist the processes of innovation that can lead to economic distinctiveness. The concept 'learning region' is related to that of the 'knowledge economy', 'learning society', and 'information society'. There is an assumption that countries will not be able to move to competitive knowledge economies if there is not sufficient social cohesion. The concept of a 'learning region' focuses attention on the interconnectedness and interdependence of the local and the global. While it focuses attention on a local region, it can encourage understanding of the world as a single space.

Most of the countries developing the concept of learning regions are high-income countries. However, in middle-income countries like Brazil, India, and South Africa, the challenge is to interpret and develop the notion in contexts of widespread poverty and social polarisation. A legitimate question is whether this is possible (Walters 2005).

South African Case Study: The Learning Cape

Situating the 'Learning Cape' within National Debates

The importance of the concept of the learning region within the Western Cape Province arose at a time when a new economic policy was being developed and the Provincial Government was wanting to position the province to participate in the 'global knowledge economy'. The introduction to the White Paper of the Provincial Government Western Cape (PAWC 2001) 'Preparing the Western Cape for the Knowledge Economy of the 21st Century', points succinctly to key political and economic debates in South Africa at the time:

In today's world no country or region is untouched by the forces of globalisation and the rise of the knowledge economy. Such forces present obvious opportunities for wealth creation and the betterment of the human condition in those countries and regions that are well equipped to take advantage of them. But for those who are less well equipped, particularly

in the developing world, globalisation can just as easily lead to growing poverty, inequality, and marginalisation. The challenge facing countries such as South Africa ... is therefore how to channel the forces of globalisation for the elimination of poverty and the empowerment of people to lead fulfilling lives.

There is a considerable degree of contestation around the meaning of the 'knowledge economy' and how it relates to South Africa. The debates on economic development, and the notion of the knowledge economy, most commonly relate to the tensions between globally dictated conditions for economic development on the one hand and achievement of equity and redress on the other. An essential aspect of this is how far the South African state can act autonomously, outside the framework of globalisation, to ensure redistribution and development.

Redistribution, development, growth, and reconstruction are potent phrases in South African political debate. The central and defining policies of the government elected in 1994 have been the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of 1994, followed, and partly superseded, by the Growth, Employment and Reconstruction Policy (GEAR) of 1996. The RDP was the popular, populist and somewhat socialist social contract that the African National Congress (ANC) brought to the 1994 elections. The far more stringent GEAR was, in part, a recognition of the need to move South Africa from an inward looking, heavily protected economy to one that is able to compete efficiently in rapidly globalising markets. The government shifted to more conservative social and economic policies, for example, limited social spending to cut national debt, privatising state enterprises like telecommunications and transport, and cutting the number of state employees. Most analysts across the ideological spectrum recognise the neo-liberal character of the post-apartheid government's economic trajectory (Daniel et al. 2003; Mare 2003). In a government document (SA Government 2003), 'Towards a 10-Year Review', however, there is the assertion that the harsh, early GEAR years of 1997–2000, were a necessary route to stabilise resources for social support and redistributive policies and programmes.

In the course of the past decade, the analytical conception of South Africa has discernibly shifted from nation building to global positioning. There have been few changes brought about by the transition from apartheid to democracy more dramatic than those to South Africa's international position. Apartheid South Africa was pilloried, and economically excluded, as the polecat of the world. Following the move to democracy, South Africa has rejoined the international state system as a full member.

More radical challengers argue against the need to accept the inevitability of South Africa's ways of engaging with the global economy through current neo-liberal government policy and close collaboration with the Bretton Woods institutions. For example, Bond (2000) and Saul (1997) are very critical of South Africa's trajectory of development since 1994. They argue that the South African government has succumbed to a form of technological determinism where 'there is no alternative' but to try to engage the global economy on the terms set by others. Their arguments relate to the imperative to find alternatives that channel the forces of globalisation for the elimination of poverty and the empowerment of people to lead fulfilling lives.

From the government's viewpoint, the logic of the linkage between a mitigated market economy, global engagement on its own terms, and deeper political and economic

engagement with the rest of Africa are inextricably linked (Mbeki 1998, 2003). The market economy is mitigated in the sense that fiscal stringency before 2000 has since then enabled rising social expenditure on services and grants to the most impoverished, in addition to an ambitious programme of public works in the coming decade.

Unemployment is indeed the central problem in both lived experience of South Africans, and in the analyses of economists at between 30% and 40%. The challenges for economic growth are varied, but one of the single greatest inhibitors, consistently advanced by analysts and economists of all political persuasions, is the central problem of 'capacity' or 'skills deficit'. Therefore, the questions of human resource development and the potential role of information and communication technology (ICT) to increase South Africa's global competitiveness are key to the various understandings of South Africa in the knowledge economy and interpretations of the 'knowledge society'.

South African debates about the 'knowledge society' were injected by the visit of the Castells and Carnoy in 2000 (Kraak 2001). The debates were located within those of globalisation and the role of the State. They were highly politicised as is to be expected in a newly democratised society like South Africa.

From 1994, there was considerable rhetoric about the 'information revolution', and something of a naïve hope that technology would enable shortcuts in HRD. Initiatives across the public sector were somewhat scattered and incoherent. The role of ICT in enabling South Africa to 'leapfrog' development was one of the scenarios discussed within the Castells seminars. But also the importance of information was argued as the foundation of sustainable development to assist decision-making and monitoring of the environment (Schwabe 2002).

The importance of HRD and technology for South Africa to meet the new conditions for global competitiveness are captured within emerging HRD strategies. HRD is seen as a cross-sectoral policy issue that is shaped by, and impacts on a multitude of government policy domains including education and training, the labour market and macroeconomic, industrial and foreign trade policies. When combined or 'joined up' in an interlocking and self-reinforcing way, the basket of government policies yields the appropriate human and technological capability necessary for future national economic success (Kraak 2003).

In summary, underpinning the explicit or implicit debates and discussions on the 'knowledge society' and 'knowledge economy' are the bigger questions of highly contested theories and approaches to economic and social development locally and globally. Amongst the economists, politicians, sociologists, the concept of the 'learning society' is barely used. They refer rather to 'knowledge society' or 'information age'. For some, the knowledge society refers only to human capital formation at the high-end with some implied 'trickle down' effect through economic growth. For others, this is inadequate as the needs of the majority of people who are poor are primary and it is redistribution not growth that is required. They would challenge the notion that economic growth necessarily alleviates poverty for the majority. The different political positions and inevitable tensions are central to the debates on both the 'knowledge' and 'learning' societies and provide the context within which the Learning Cape is situated.

The Learning Cape

The Western Cape is the second wealthiest of the nine provinces in South Africa. It has a population of about 4.5 million. On the one hand, certain parts of the economy are fairly buoyant, like tourism, services for film, media, and IT, and the fruit and wine industry. On the other hand, 65% of people earn below US \$200 per month, there is 24% unemployment, 30% of adults are 'illiterate', 75% of pre-schoolers do not have access to early childhood development opportunities, and the number of tuberculosis and HIV/Aids infected people is increasing rapidly. The disparities between rich and poor are among the most extreme in the world.

In terms of party politics the Western Cape is one of two provinces in the country, which does not reflect a clear majority for the African National Congress (ANC), the party in power nationally. Although this makes for vibrant party politics, the ANC is itself a 'broad church' in which tendencies from liberal, to social democratic, to socialist coexist.

As mentioned above, in 2001 the Provincial Government, after lengthy consultative processes, adopted an economic development White Paper (PAWC 2001) that argued for an intimate relationship between economic development and learning within a learning region framework, coining the term Learning Cape, as one of four key pillars for economic and social development (Walters 2005). The same political tensions relating to different views on development at national level existed within the province. Also, it is one thing to create a policy framework and an entirely different matter to implement it.

Indicators of Success for the Learning Cape?

The provincial Department of Economic Development (DED) set up a preliminary research and development project 'to develop Learning Cape Indicators'. This project was one, which was being used potentially to help to flesh out the meaning of the Learning Cape and to build on the work done through the LCF, which has run annually since 2002 (Walters and Etkind 2004).

The research team undertook a limited, 4-month project. Several key questions were posed through the research, which relate to understandings of lifelong learning.

What are Indicators and What is their Purpose?

We worked with the understanding that an indicator is a measure requiring data that help quantify the achievement of a desired result. Indicators help answer the question how we would know a result if we achieved it. Taken further, indicators can play a key role in policy development:

At their most noble, civic indicators are used as measuring systems to assist societies and communities towards a desired course, to clarify key issues and challenges, and to prioritise resources, especially spending. They do not just monitor progress; they help make it happen. (ODA, DLL 2005 citing Reed 2000)

We saw these indicators as primarily a tool for development to ‘help make things happen’ rather than as a measurement instrument alone.

What is a Learning Indicator?

The task was to develop *learning* indicators, not indicators of *education and training*. This expresses the broad lifelong learning focus of the exercise, away from an emphasis on formal education and towards the informal and non-formal.

To capture the centrality of the relationship of learning to economic and social development, we drew on Belanger’s (1994) work, which circumscribed three broad areas that are interlinked and represent the life cycle and the learning contexts. They are:

Initial Learning including non-formal learning of children from birth, and schooling at general and further educational levels;

Adult Learning including ABET and higher and continuing education throughout adult life until death;

Diffuse Learning Environments which are enhanced through the educational quality of libraries, the media, cultural activities, learning cultures in families, voluntary associations, and so on.

The approach was to start with the characteristics, as described earlier. We accepted that in order to have learning regions there is need of ‘an excellent education and training system’, without subscribing to the view that there is a linear process whereby the existence of an excellent formal system must precede any attempt to develop a broader learning culture. There is ample evidence that an excellent formal system is not possible without facilitative learning cultures in families, in workplaces and in communities. This led us to identify the formal education system as part of the bedrock of a learning region, and a set of *bedrock indicators* for which different parts of the formal education system are responsible. These act as a backdrop to the more specific Learning Cape indicators.

We also recognised that development of learning indicators was not a politically neutral process and would inevitably reflect different political positions and understandings of a learning region. As Duke (2004) points out, in the international literature on learning neighbourhoods, communities, cities, and regions, there are important differences of purpose and priority, as well as different ways of going about policy interventions. He identifies the commonest tensions as between economic and social dimensions and between the individual and the collective. Some stress the importance of social indicators like those of health and social welfare, while others will highlight specifically economic indicators. In most cases the intention is to create a sufficient upward spiral to enable economic and social development.

Background research highlighted the fact that indicator construction is a social process. It requires consultation and is therefore slow. The process was seen as being able to be used to win supporters for the Learning Cape initiative and to spread the discussion within the province on how to promote a learning region and learning communities.

Envisaged Sites for Developing Indicators of the Learning Cape

We developed a matrix to draw together chronological and locational aspects of learning (Figure 1):

Since every sector potentially has its own form of indicators and measures to evaluate progress, we operated on the assumption that what makes the Learning

Categories for indicators	Formal	Informal	Non-formal
Initial Learning	General Education Further Education	Family, friends, communities	Early Childhood Development
Adult Learning	ABET Workplace learning Higher Ed Trade union education	Family & friends, work colleagues, community organisations	Workplace Parenting Literacy Language Trade unions Government
Diffuse Learning Environments		Community events Media Libraries Arts & culture Internet	Civil society organisations - Faith - based - Environmental - Health

Figure 1. Aspects of learning

Cape indicators unique is the combination of indicators across the sectors, and how they relate to the characteristics of a Learning Province. Our methodology deliberately left open the possibility for other parts of the provincial government, other spheres of government, or organisations of civil society to sponsor ‘data baskets’.

Foundation (Bedrock) Indicators

Using the three organising categories of initial, adult, and diffuse, a cluster of indicators was identified from the initial and adult categories that form the foundation of a learning region. As the bedrock of learning, a positive assessment of these indicators is essential to the development of lifelong learning in the region. These indicators are mainly but not solely the responsibility of the Education Departments. An illustrative sample of these is Figures 2 and 3:

Sources of data for the bedrock indicators are mostly available through statistics within the Department of Education.

The bigger challenge was to imagine the indicators that would be more specific to the Learning Cape and less reflective of mainstream education.

- | |
|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Proportion of children 0 – 4 attending Early Childhood Development (ECD) 2 Proportion of Grade 3, 6 and 9 learners who score above the target level for numeracy and literacy 3 Number of computers per learner in public schools |
|---|

Figure 2. Initial learning

- | |
|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Improvement in the throughput rate in Further Education and Training (FET) colleges 2 Improvement in the level of enrolment of ABET learners in Level 1–4 exams |
|--|

Figure 3. Adult learning

Proposed Learning Cape Indicators

In order to decide on these indicators, the ‘essential characteristics of a learning region’ were used, with the three lifelong learning categories. Thirty-four indicators were developed and reflected against the characteristics. A sample of the indicators is given below (Figures 4–6).

Attempting to decide on Learning Cape indicators opens a host of difficult issues. One of the challenges is to work with people coming out of different traditions and

Indicator
1 Effective functioning of ECD inter-sectoral group in province
2 Proportion of children recognised as vulnerable
3 Use of school facilities for public events related to learning

Figure 4. Initial learning

Indicator
1 Proportion of learners in FET colleges over 24 years
2 Increase in resourcing of ABET by province and workplaces
3 Extent to which HEIs help to stimulate innovation and knowledge transfer between researchers and industry

Figure 5. Adult learning

Indicator
1 Number of municipalities that actively promote involvement in the annual Learning Cape Festival
2 The number of computers, in working order, that are in libraries and linked to the internet or searchable databases per citizen
3 Percentage of educational programmes on local radio

Figure 6. Diffuse learning environments

professional fields, with different and competing understandings. For example, working with city planners who may emphasise ‘social learning for sustainability’ (Candy 2003) or educationists who may emphasise individual attainment within a formal schooling context, is part of the challenge. In the process of mediating the indicators, it is not necessarily clear what are professional or political differences. To illustrate this I use a brief example of children under the age of 5.

The proposed indicators were:

1. Proportion of children 0–4 attending an early childhood facility
2. Proportion of children recognised as vulnerable in terms of their weight, cognitive, and physical development, HIV/Aids status or poverty level.

Given the scenario that less than 22% of the under 5 population currently attend an early childhood facility, that 42% of the households in the Western Cape have an annual income below US \$3,000, and that there is an important relationship between nutrition and ability to learn, these seemed to be potentially useful indicators. The researchers argued that there was in all likelihood a relationship between improving socio-economic conditions and improving educational opportunities.

The initial response from one economist was that ‘five-year-old children had nothing to do with the economy’. Another response was from the marginal early childhood sector, which was thrilled to have the connection between early childhood facilities and the socio-economic conditions recognised. Yet another was from a person in the Department of Social Services who stressed how important it was for the government to see the ‘whole child’ when developing policies. Supporters of lifelong learning continually stressed the importance of early learning experiences in terms of developing lifelong learners for socio-economic development more broadly. It was a working mother who most clearly pointed out the real benefit, in her view, of good early childhood education. It was to free her up to rejoin the workforce. The economists were persuaded on hearing this. The indicator was retained for the time being.

Another major concern related to the processes of development of the indicators. There had been an initial intention to produce the preliminary indicators through participatory processes, but this was short-circuited because of unfolding economic policy developments. In the midst of the process, there was pressure to make the indicators more obviously connected to the emerging micro-economic development strategy.

Certain economists began to ask for more conventional, internationally comparable, economic and human development data. Others could see the importance of trying to cover new developmental ground. The researchers began also to see more clearly the vastness of the project, which needed to establish legitimacy for new indicators for which there were no ready data. The leadership in the DED, quite reasonably, did not see their role as leading innovative thinking about the learning region and the role of lifelong learning in it. This prompts the question, where should a cross-cutting project like this be housed? The indicators project has now stalled and it is not clear if the work done will ever see the light of day.

Discussion

The issues that were raised in this project, beyond the specific indicators themselves and their use, are of direct relevance for many lifelong learning projects or programmes.

Social Purposes

The literature on lifelong learning reflects very different understandings of its social purposes. It is a contested term (Crowther 2004). The conception of a learning region, which has lifelong learning tied to socio-economic development strategies, is equally contested. The social purposes imagined for the learning region will certainly shape the indicators. However, in most contexts where the learning region will

want to include divergent views, there are competing development strategies, or at least competing emphases. Field (2006, p.3) poses the issue clearly when he asks, 'if we place sustainability and justice at the heart of our approach' what policies might be adopted? The starting point then for understanding the relationship between lifelong learning and society is the development framework, which is implied.

In the South African case, there is a continuum of development discourses which jostle for position from socialist, to social democratic, to neo-liberal, which are mobilised by different constituencies within government, civil society, business, and labour. There is an ongoing contest for hegemony of one development approach over another. There is no reason to believe that these same political contestations would not also be present in processes towards building a learning region and within understandings of lifelong learning.

Ownership

Linked to the above, who initiates the development of indicators and for what purpose, is critical. For some, the primary purpose of a learning region may mainly be a marketing opportunity to profile the region; or it may be to widen access to learning opportunities for a broader range of citizens; or it may be a deliberate intervention to bring about changes in the socio-political and economic relationships within a region. The question of ownership is equally pertinent for lifelong learning generally.

In some situations the Department of Education is the key agency. The limits may be that the project is seen narrowly in terms of conventional educational concerns. It might also be that the learning region is seen as the aggregate of lifelong learning opportunities as reflected by Linquist (2005). If the lead agency is an Economics Department, there may be other constraints, which could reflect a very narrow economic orientation and an instrumentalist view of lifelong learning. If it were driven by social welfare, perhaps the economists and educators would not see it as 'their' concern. This raises the question, where in government should the learning region project be located? Who should drive lifelong learning?

The 'learning region', as with lifelong learning itself, is trying to break out of silos, to promote 'joined up' ways of working. Therefore, the question of who drives it or how, is very pertinent. Is the answer, where there is strongest political will and influence?

In the case study, the oversight of the Learning Cape initiative has now moved to the Premier's Office, which sends a positive signal in terms of political leadership. However, if the vision of the learning region is to be a lever for change then more than political buy-in is required. It needs translation into budgets and programmes which challenge government departments, at local, provincial, and national levels, to move 'out of their silos', and engage in the 'border skirmishes' which may follow. As different tiers of government, also have their own relationships to the state and the economy with their own rules, legislative or regulatory changes may be required. In some instances local government is promoted as the best place to promote learning

communities as they are closest to the ground and in the best situations respond to immediate needs of citizens. This may in fact be right for some places, but in South Africa, this would be a mixed blessing as local government in many places is extremely weak while also showing promise in others (Africa and Nicol 2005).

The Lifelong Learning Framework

In reading about learning regions, which have lifelong learning as a centrepiece, there are few who set out what framework of lifelong learning they are using. Given that lifelong learning is so contested, this is surprising. Because lifelong learning so often is translated to mean adult learning, or formal education and training, we deliberately chose a framework, which is holistic.

Belanger's framework challenges the conventional boundaries between formal and informal learning and includes learning that is lifelong, lifewide, and life deep. However, its all inclusive nature also made it difficult to operationalise in the indicators project. It is a framework that was not well known amongst the key constituencies, was difficult for those not familiar with lifelong learning to understand, and empirical data was not readily available within the categories. Because conceptually it did cut across sectoral boundaries, it made political and bureaucratic ownership of the project difficult. Its power conceptually made it difficult to use organisationally.

The question is, what framework could be used to develop indicators for lifelong learning within a learning region, which do not reinforce the formal, narrow notions of education and training? What conceptions of lifelong learning are able to be mobilised which can be integrated, both in terms of policy and practice, into all aspects of economic and social life, and which can be monitored in some way?

Indicators – Product or Process

'Indicators' can be used for multiple purposes, e.g. accountability, feedback, evaluation, or development. Their construction can either be seen as a product or a process. If the primary purpose is for monitoring and for accountability they need to be fairly stable and reference, for example, to international instruments like the Human Development Index is an advantage. However, if they are being used in developmental ways as a lever to promote change, then the issues become more difficult. In the case study, the data was not readily available to measure the lifelong learning indicators. New resources would be required to generate the data against the indicators. This in turn requires the political will to provide the resources. A question is whether it is necessary and possible to measure lifelong learning in contexts that are resource constrained? Perhaps the notion of 'indicators' is not appropriate – it may well be advisable not to talk about 'indicators' but rather, 'pledges', 'evaluation criteria' or 'benchmarks'.

Indicators – Content

The unique aspect of learning communities or regions is the new relationships that they are forging. In the case study the indicators specifically tried to target the areas relating to relationships, like partnerships, networks, or intersectoral functioning. However, the indicators were quite inward looking. They focused on the province. They did not especially look for connections with other provinces, nationally, the African region, or globally. This highlights a key paradox within lifelong learning and the learning region.

A learning region requires to be both inward and outward looking. It needs strong social capital to be built both at home locally and with others globally. It needs to develop sufficient social cohesion amongst communities, while at the same time it must be forging new relationships and connections. It needs to be oriented both locally and globally. However, in some situations, where the notion of the learning region is a defensive one, where the ‘learning region’ idea is being used to help an embattled, depressed community to have a new sense of themselves, the emphasis on social cohesion can have conservative outcomes (Field 2006). It is similar in institutions or learning communities which focus their attention on the micro teaching and learning contexts and neglect the importance of the new connections, partnerships, and interdisciplinary possibilities with social movements, workplaces, or other communities both at home and abroad.

Forging new partnerships, working across different sectors, breaking ‘out of silos’, are inevitably political acts. They transgress various boundaries. The challenge for lifelong learning is that it too challenges boundaries, trespasses on others’ turf, as it strives for a holistic, integrated view of human development.

Whose Framework of Lifelong Learning Matters?

Discussions of lifelong learning within a learning region force the conversation to the relationships between lifelong learning and socio-economic development. This is highly political. Identifying indicators for a learning region makes the connections between teaching and learning issues at the microlevel, to organisational issues at the meso level, to the developmental issues at the macrolevel. As the indicator project demonstrated, which indicators are chosen reflect understandings of lifelong learning which in turn reflect views on human development. For example an indicator that is ‘whether people can build their own house’ will signal value of people being multi-skilled to undertake a project for the collective social good, as opposed to another one, which highlights the number of individuals who attain particular qualifications.

The debates about development cover a wide range of political opinion, which generate a great deal of heat. The debates about indicators for the learning region will therefore likely do the same.

The building of a learning region, which has a transformational agenda in support of poor people, is clearly complex, will be contested, and requires very long-term time horizons. Political leadership often comes and goes within 5 years or less. The question then is who holds the vision and pursues the transformational agenda that is required for it to come about. What are the roles of civil society, business, labour, and government? Over an extended time there will always be contests for the hegemony of particular views of the learning region, and within it lifelong learning. Building a learning region is no doubt in the end a political project.

Those involved in conceptualizing and building the learning region are implicated in some way at both the intellectual and the political levels. They are inevitably advocates for some 'indicators' rather than others, for some conceptual frameworks rather than others, therefore, for particular understandings of the 'learning region'. However, the nature of the project is to open up possibilities and spaces for innovative ways of thinking and acting, to allow new connections to be made, to challenge 'silo' thinking. This, as Field (2006) suggests, requires particular capacities. If political views are held dogmatically they will work against finding new ways to think and act. The actors need themselves to be accomplished lifelong learners and to have the capabilities to be 'boundary spanners'.

A learning region, like that in South Africa, is a geographical space that includes great polarities of economic, social, and human need, with unequal and uneven forms of development. To translate learning region policy into reality, where the degrees of polarity are to be lessened, where social conditions are dramatically improved, serious and sustained political will is required at every level of government, also within civil society, and amongst businesses. It is a very ambitious project. This then raises or poses the question, whether there can be one basket of indicators with one purpose. Whether there can be one lifelong learning framework? Is there an argument for a learning region to accept its fragmented and contested nature, and that there may need to be several different baskets of 'indicators' or 'pledges' used for different accounting or developmental purposes?

Building the learning region, like creating lifelong learning institutions at all levels, is very much about organisation, pedagogy, and politics. It requires a combination of 'top-down' policies and organisational frameworks which create conducive environments in which 'successful actor strategies' (Bourgeois et al. 1999) can be implemented to achieve their social purposes of building, in Faris' terms, 'a learning nation community by community'.

I started this chapter by likening 'lifelong learning' to that of 'democracy' – both are highly contested and intimately linked to theories of development. I have argued that lifelong learning within a learning region is explicitly implicated in the social and economic policies and practices within particular contexts. Therefore, whose lifelong learning framework matters, within a particular context, is not a given. It will be the result of ongoing contestation within and between communities and learning activists at both local and global levels.

References

- Africa, Z. and Nicol, M. (2006) *The Power of Peer Reviews in Building a Learning Network for Local Government in South Africa*. Cape Town, South Africa: Organisation Development Africa (ODA).
- Belanger, P. (1994) Lifelong learning: the dialectics of 'Lifelong education', *International Review of Education*, 41, 353–381.
- Bond, P. (2000) *Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa*. London: Pluto Press, Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press.
- Bourgeois, E.C., Duke, J., Guyot, B., and Merrill (1999) *The Adult University*. Buckingham, London: SRHE and Open University Press, London.
- Byun, J. and Chae, J. (2005) An evaluation of the lifelong learning cities in Korea. In: *Making knowledge work, Conference Proceedings*. Scotland: University of Stirling.
- Candy, J. (2003) Planning learning cities: addressing globalisation locally, http://www.isocarp.net/data/case_studies/251.pdf
- Coffield, F. (Ed.) (2000) *Differing Visions of a Learning Society. Research Findings*, Vol. 2. Bristol, UK: Policy Press.
- Crowth, J. (2004) In and against lifelong learning: flexibility and the corrosion of character, *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 23(2), 123–136.
- Daniel, J., Habib, A. and Southall, R. (2003) *2003: State of the Nation: South Africa 2003–2004*. Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press.
- Duke, C. (2004) *Learning Communities: Signposts from International Experience*. Leicester: NIACE.
- Duke, C., Osborne, M., and Wilson, B. (2005) *Rebalancing the Social and Economic. Learning, Partnerships and Place*. Leicester: NIACE.
- Faris, R. (2001) *The Way Forward: Building a Learning Nation Community by Community*. Canada: Working Paper.
- Field, J. (2006) Social networks, innovation and learning: can policies of social capital promote both economic dynamism and social justice? Pascal Hot Topic, <http://www.obs-pascal.com/hottopic.php>
- Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) (2003) *Human Resource Development Review 2003*. Michigan State, South Africa: HSRC Press.
- Illieva, K. (2005) Lifelong learning – institutionalisation and regulating mechanisms. Bulgarian case lost in translation in *Making Knowledge Work. Conference Proceedings*. Scotland: University of Stirling.
- Kraak, A. (2001) Debating castells and carnyon on the network society: the gauteng seminars, www.anc.org.za.
- Kraak, A. (2003) *HRD and Joined up Policy*. Pretoria, South Africa: HSRC Press.
- Linguist, K. (2005) Lifelong learning as a mechanism for change. In: *Making Knowledge Work, Conference Proceedings*. Scotland: University of Stirling.
- Mare, G. (2003) The state of the state: contestation and race re-assertion in neoliberal terrain, in Daniel, Habib and Southall. *2003: State of the Nation: South Africa 2003–2004*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
- Mbeki, T. (1998) *President's State of the Nation Address*. Pretoria, South Africa: South African Government.
- Mbeki, T. (2003) *President's State of the Nation Address*. Pretoria, South Africa: South African Government.
- Mowbray, M. (2004) 'Beyond community capacity building: the effect of government on social capital' Pascal Hot Topic, <http://www.obs-pascal.com/resources/mowbray2004>
- ODA and DLL (2005) *Learning Cape Indicators Final Report*, ODA/ DLL, Cape Town, South Africa.
- PAWC (2001) *Preparing the Western Cape for the Knowledge Economy of the 21st Century (White Paper)*. Cape Town, South Africa: PAWC.

- Saul, J. (1997) Liberal democracy vs popular democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa, *Review of African Political Economy*, 24(73), 339–352.
- Schwabe, C. (2003) *Information: The Foundation of Sustainable Development*. Pretoria, South Africa: HSRC Press Occasional Papers.
- South African Government (2003) *Toward Ten Years of Freedom: Progress in the First Decade and Challenges of the Second Decade*, <http://gov.za>
- Walters, S. and Etkind, R. (2004) *Developing a Learning Region: What can Learning Festivals Contribute?* Paper presented at the AERC Conference, Victoria, Canada.
- Walters, S. (2005) South Africa's Learning Cape aspirations: the idea of a learning region and the use of indicators in a middle income country. In: Duke C., Osborne, M., and Wilson, B. (Eds). *Rebalancing the Social and Economic: Learning, Partnership and Place*. Leicester: NIACE.
- Walters, S. (2007) 'Knowledge/learning society' in South African debates. A literature review. In: Kuhn, M. and Sultana, R. *The Learning Society in Europe and Abroad*. New York: Peter Lang.

Chapter 17

Changing Ideas and Beliefs in Lifelong Learning?

Jane Thompson

The Times We are Living In

The grey haired woman on the bus from the National Pensioners' Convention was carrying a peace flag and wearing a Greenpeace T-shirt. Her rucksack was scattered with badges supporting the Anti-War Coalition and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Around her arm she wore white and red wristbands wanting to make capitalism, as well as poverty, history.¹ She was bending the ear of the young man sitting next to her: 'Why do politicians suddenly become stupid once they get elected? It always happens. Those G8 has-beens are the worst. Forget about forming a ring around the city, I'd put a ring around their necks!'

You could see him trying to escape her onslaught, until she finally pushed the right button. 'How many hours a week do you work?' 'I can't get a job', the young man said, 'I come from Sudan. I want to work here but your government wants to send me home'. This was a public service bus, taking tourists to the Royal Mile and locals into town. Not one of the hundreds of charter busses carrying thousands of protesters from every corner of Britain to Edinburgh for the biggest demonstration in that country's history. The asylum seeker from Sudan got off the bus with the grey haired woman and they joined the march together.

You could tell that incidents and episodes like this were taking shape all over the place. The thing about a mass demonstration, with an urgent and progressive design, is that it is bigger than the self-interests of the individuals involved. It brings together lots of people from different walks of life, emboldened by the occasion and inspired by their mutual commitment, in the celebration of common purpose. For everyone that actually joined the march in Edinburgh there were a dozen others from their various networks and associations cheering them on.

Planning for the demonstration had begun 6 months earlier by the North South coalition of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), social movements, community based organisations (CBOs), charities, churches, pressure groups, and social justice campaigns that make up the Global Call to Action Against Poverty (GCAP). Similar public demonstrations were taking place across Britain and the wider world as G8 leaders made their way to Gleneagles in Scotland for a meeting in which world poverty and climate change were, for the first time, top of the agenda.

In 72 countries, from Korea to Kenya and Australia to Peru, people dressed in white gathered in the streets, wearing white wristbands and demanding the elimination of extreme poverty.²

Earlier in the same year, whilst the powerful, the charismatic, and the wealthy were rubbing shoulders with the global media at the World Economic Forum in Davos, another, very different, less publicised, gathering was marching through the dusty Brazilian streets of Porto Alegre. Almost 200,000 representatives of civil society movements from the North and South travelled across continents to insist that 'another world is possible'.

For 5 days of self-managed discussions and workshops, energetic public meetings and rallies, inspired cultural action and spirited internationalism, the World Social Forum made its vision of social justice and dignity for all seem like a reality. Indigenous activists from Paraguay and Venezuela exchanged flags with Palestinians. Africans danced in the street. Trade Unionists marched for human rights and women from across the globe spoke unreservedly in the language of feminist priorities. The rainbow banners of the peace movement and of lesbian and gay liberation fluttered beside those of the international youth camp, HIV/AIDs campaigners and education and health activists. Their common purpose to condemn an ill-divided new world order that rests too much power in the organisations of global capitalism (the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO)) and in the neo-liberal practices of western governments – particularly, but not exclusively, the USA.³

Localised but interconnected actions like these across the world concerned with poverty and climate change, and meetings like the World Social Forum give some indication that global networks and social movements are gathering widespread public involvement. By the time the G8 leaders met together in Edinburgh, 10 million Britons had signed up to the Make Poverty History Campaign. One sixth of the British population knew that during the 4 days of deliberations in Scotland 120,000 children in Africa alone would die because of poverty. Television companies had cleared their schedules to report in detail what would transpire. An entertaining, and not unproblematic, alliance between political activists and artists lent their energy and celebrity to the occasion. Some gave the mistaken impression that the whole thing was invented and made possible because of the insistence and persistence of Bob Geldof.

But the sheer breadth and energy of this kind of engagement was already well established before the media made it fashionable. According to the World Development Movement, European and North American protests and pop concerts 'were only one element of a much larger movement rooted in developing countries – showing that the fiercest critics of the IMF and World Bank policies were the people most affected by them'.⁴ Reflecting on its millennium campaign to cancel Third World debt, Jubilee 2000 argued that 'the world will never be the same again' as a result of huge numbers of people from civil society movements in both North and South mobilising to challenge the negative effects of globalisation, through citizen action, in solidarity beyond the nation state, to transform global agendas⁵ Through the activities of NGOs, CBOs, social movements, issue campaigns, and policy advocacy, citizens have been increasingly finding ways to make their voices heard

and to influence the decisions and practices of larger institutions that affect their lives – both locally and globally.⁶

In the event, one of the most effective mobilisations of recent times, rooted in the struggles of those with least power and security in the world community, was denied its moment of absolute attention on the world stage. The detonating of four terrorist bombs in London, timed to coincide with the opening of the Summit at Gleneagles, shifted attention dramatically to a rather different kind of protest, which was equally well planned. Actions that spring from civil society associations and from ‘the set of relational networks – formed for the sake of the family, faith, interests and ideology’⁷ do not necessarily lead to the same conclusions.

It was never likely that the G8 leaders would fulfil the hopes and commitments demanded by GCAP. Despite all the populist hype in the media – about the one room and the eight men with the capacity to make history – activists knew that the real decisions were being made elsewhere. They knew that some – but not much – debt would be cancelled. They knew that an announcement was to be made that would exaggerate an increase in aid. They knew there was to be some warm words about the importance of education and the fight against HIV/AIDs and malaria. Without the mass mobilisation there would have been none of this. It is unlikely that poverty and climate change would have even been on the agenda. But activists knew that nothing deriving from the deliberations in Gleneagles would stem the lucrative flow of arms from the G8 to Africa and beyond. That no one would do anything to save the three and a half million people starving in Niger. That discussions about trade tariffs would be shelved until the WTO meeting in December. That the decision to stand side by side with George Bush would require those holding more enlightened views on climate change to remain silent. And that when everyone went home, the backtracking would begin. Those involved in GCAP were already planning what to do next to keep up the pressure.

Because of the London bombings, however, attention shifted back to the war on terror. The G8 leaders were able to slip away without much adverse comment on how little they had conceded to the poor and the planet. George Bush was able to return to the rhetoric of ‘western freedom and democracy’ ranged against ‘evil doers’ and Tony Blair’s opinion poll ratings recovered considerably from their all-time low less than 2 months previously.

As I write this, a second, failed, attack on London dominates the news. Those responsible have now been arrested. They come originally from Eritrea, Somalia, and Ethiopia and much is being made of their asylum and refugee status. A Brazilian man, living and working in London, with no connection whatsoever to what happened, has been shot in the head eight times by the police whilst sitting on the Tube, just yards away from fellow travellers. The Home Office has been quick to point out that he had overstayed his student visa. Government officials are drafting new anti-terrorist legislation. Cherie Blair, making a speech in Malaysia in her capacity as a human rights lawyer, is warning about the erosion of civil liberties. The tabloid press is doing its best to conflate the war on terror with the war on asylum. It is fuelling the kind of racism which, according to Sivanandan, ‘cannot tell a settler from an immigrant, an immigrant from an asylum seeker, an asylum seeker from a

Muslim, a Muslim from a terrorist.’⁸ Revenge attacks on olive skinned people have increased by 600% in the last 4 weeks. The unresolved and uneasy settlement that is British race relations is now facing its biggest challenge.

Meanwhile, back at the office, a discussion is taking place on email about the new Foundation Learning Tier.

Current developments are taking forward the Foundation Learning Tier (FLT) which will bring cohesion and clarity to all provision that sits below level 2

‘Is this a neologism or have I just been asleep/on holiday/not paying attention?’

‘Developments in what?’

‘Why is sub-level 2 provision sitting rather than supporting or uplifting, for example?’

‘Wakey wakey! The “Tier” describes a programme, not a qualification . . . and there will be elements that are non-accredited as well as things that do lead to awards within the new Framework for Achievement’

‘From a mandarin perspective [sic] . . .’

‘The Foundation Learning Tier reproduces many of the design features of the proposed new Diplomas and on the way it will subsume current E2E provision thus becoming a stepping stone to both new Diplomas and Apprenticeships or to GCSEs in due course . . .’

‘The Foundation Learning Tier has moved from a tentative description, through ministerial blessing, to become part of the furniture of the sector . . .’

‘I hadn’t realised that it had already become part of the furniture’

‘Can one spend one’s learning life in the Tier?’

‘Will there be enough to keep one interested, stimulated, motivated?’

Good question. I am already wondering about the furniture on the Titanic and fiddling whilst Rome burns as I struggle to make any sense of this all too familiar exchange. At a time when a quarter of a million ordinary members of civil society in Britain marched around Edinburgh and the consequence of terrorist suicide bombers now threatens to destroy the uneasy settlement that is British race relations, the dominant discourse in adult learning – as is reflected in this discussion – appears *disengaged* from social and political action.

And yet the ideas and beliefs that interpret the world and inform the provision of lifelong learning are quintessentially political in their stance and purpose. The debate between practitioners is preoccupied with fetishised frameworks for quality and accreditation, instrumentalism in relation to skills, the creation and measurement of individualised notions of achievement and a sickly rhetoric about confidence and self-esteem that represents adult education as a form of therapy concerned with self-improvement. In this context adult education has become a largely remedial activity rather than a resource for the whole community whilst lifelong learning for the poor has everywhere become a condition of benefit, employment or citizenship, designed to keep people busy.

Globaloney⁹

Since the 1990s the term globalisation has increasingly been used to describe the latest, and most advanced, development of international capitalism, made possible by the spread of new technologies. It is defined by War on Want as ‘the way

that world trade, culture and technologies have become rapidly integrated over the last 20 years, as geographic distance and cultural difference no longer pose an obstacle to trade. New technologies have increased the ease of global communication, allowing money to change hands in the blink of an eye'.¹⁰ It has become the organising framework within which considerable wealth is created and trade is facilitated. The national economies of the rich world and the poor world are now interconnected as never before. According to Zygmunt Bauman, we live in a globalising world characterised by increasing mutual interdependence but increasing polarisation between rich and poor within and between nations and regions. When the world's poor are asked what aspects of their existence are most demeaning and painful, two themes 'crop up with amazing regularity – insecurity and powerlessness'.¹¹

Globalisation is also the organising framework within which current ideas and beliefs about lifelong learning are given value and priority by politicians. At an earlier meeting of G8 leaders in 1999 those present issued a Charter of Aims and Ambitions for Lifelong Learning.¹² The text faithfully reflects the emerging orthodoxy about skills and jobs that was already taking shape across Europe and North America, whilst laying bare the various common sense assumptions and apparently reasonable preoccupations – concerned with civic responsibility and social cohesion – that have enabled an all-too-easy political and professional consensus to be achieved.

In the words of the Cologne Charter, the challenge facing every country is

how to become a learning society and to ensure its citizens are equipped with the knowledge, skills and qualifications they will need for the twenty first century. Economies and societies are increasingly knowledge based. Education and skills are indispensable to achieving economic success, civic responsibility and social cohesion.¹³

The thinking reflects a strategic vision in which government increasingly looks to business and the private sector to help shape appropriate educational policy and provision. The notion of a learning society is one in which individuals are to be encouraged, persuaded, and cajoled into taking part in learning, in order to enhance their human, cultural, and social capital as the route to future employability, economic growth, mobility, and cohesion. Whilst governments must expect to expand their investment in education and training – especially in response to the needs of business and the economy – it is the responsibility of individuals to develop 'their own abilities and careers' on the basis of 'self generated learning' and by means of 'modern and effective ICT networks' and 'distance learning'.¹⁴

The Charter concentrates on the 'entrepreneurial role' of education to ensure 'ready opportunities' for adult 're-skilling throughout life' as a 'passport to mobility', 'increased flexibility' and the changes taking place 'in the modern economy'. It recommends the 'continued development and improvement of internationally recognised tests to benchmark achievement . . . to establish clear targets in terms of higher standards and levels of achievement . . . and to enhance mobility in a globalised world'.¹⁵ Increasingly the role of adult education, now described as lifelong learning, becomes that of preparing flexible workers for risk and uncertainty. Competitive advantage in the global economy apparently requires skills and training rather than curiosity, creativity, and critical thinking.

None of which makes any recognition of the political tension that has shaped competing ideas and beliefs about the proper purpose of adult education in the recent past. In Britain, for example, the roots of radical adult education lie in the real interests and struggles of ordinary people, in education that is overtly political and critical of the status quo and which is committed to progressive social and political change. Like popular education in parts of Africa and Latin America, its curriculum is derived from the lived experience and material interests of people in communities of resistance and struggle. Its pedagogy is collective, focused primarily on group, as distinct from individual, learning and development. It attempts wherever possible to forge a direct link between education and social action.¹⁶ It is absolutely concerned to reach beyond government and business interests in order to articulate urgent problems and pressing concerns with people other than professional politicians, employers, and educational providers. Its natural home, you might think, is to be found alongside those social movements campaigning to end extreme poverty in the belief that another world is possible.

However, the legacy of Cologne and the policy developments that have flowed from it now mean that as collective welfare systems are being dismantled, the provision of lifelong learning has become the means by which the behaviour of individuals is attuned to the brave new world of entrepreneurial citizenship. The onus is firmly on individuals to take personal responsibility for their own self-improvement, in economic and social circumstances over which they have very little control.

In Britain, whilst government figures reveal the limited success of piecemeal initiatives concerned to create greater equality of opportunity, less poverty and more social justice, rhetorical conviction still attaches to schemes that are designed to counter social exclusion via personal growth and social development. A report produced by the Downing Street Strategy Unit in 2004 confirms that during the past 20 years, the incomes of better-off Britons have risen faster than those of other groups, the poorest fifth pay more of their income in taxes than the richest fifth, and the gap between the two has actually increased since New Labour came to power.¹⁷ A middle class child is currently 15 times more likely to stay middle class than a working class child is likely to move up into the middle class. A baby's fate is fixed at 22 months: school comes too late. Only the USA among western nations has less upward social mobility than the UK. This is a challenging analysis given that other similar countries – e.g. Finland, France, and Sweden – are doing much better.¹⁸ But although the social and economic gap between those who thrive, and those who merely survive or go to the wall, is well documented, this does little to detract from the conventional wisdom that individuals must be encouraged to defy structural inequalities and constraints through their active demonstration of educational motivation and personal determination.

New Labour, New Learning

When I first began teaching in adult education I knew that its radical roots lay in its collaboration with progressive social movements. The kind of adult education which I became involved in stood for justice, equality, independence, and socialism. In the

1970s it also acted as the educational ally of the Women's Liberation Movement, the Peace Movement, the Anti-Racist Movement, and the Trades Union Movement in support of progressive social change.¹⁹ These days it is increasingly difficult to find anyone working in adult education that still actively champions these concerns. It has become – with some exceptions – the state-sponsored agency that helps to conform people to the alleged logic of the prevailing social and economic system.²⁰ In the space of the last 25 years, civil society has lost its dedicated resource for emancipatory learning, in exchange for a professional agency mandated by government to deliver a centralised vision of planned social engineering. The dependence on funding from government departments and government agencies, in the context of government initiatives and targets, ensures that modern day managers and practitioners now routinely toe the line.

The changing nature of modern capitalism lies at the root of these changes. Just as the IMF and the World Bank force indigenous governments in the Global South to give up radical and popular education policies, intended to help those dying from starvation, in return for aid, so too, the dismantling of state welfare systems in the more affluent North, in favour of privatised and deregulated alternatives, is forcing education providers in all countries to operate according to capitalist economic principles and as instruments of social engineering.

In Britain the lifelong learning agenda is closely associated with the economic requirements that derive from globalisation. In 1997, when New Labour took office, its vision for lifelong learning was already in preparation. *The Learning Age* promised an expansive agenda shaped by the requirements of a knowledge-based economy.²¹ Its emerging policy ideas on the domestic front promised 'Education, Education, Education', the reduction of poverty and the need for greater social cohesion in the interests of economic prosperity.

By 2001, the establishment of the Learning and Skills Council was intended to achieve a 'cultural revolution' in (English) attitudes to post-16 education. In its remit letter dated 9 November 2000, David Blunkett reinforced his view that, 'we must ensure that lifelong learning becomes a battering ram against exclusion as well as a motor for economic regeneration'. In 2003 the White Paper *21st Century Skills* set out the long-term goals for raising skill levels across the nation and the strategies intended to achieve these ambitions.²²

Increasingly then – some would say, relentlessly – the notion of adult education, rooted in broader definitions of learning to do with curiosity and passion, the development of critical intelligence, social justice, and active citizenship has given way to an increasingly narrow, instrumental, and economic concentration on skills and knowledge for the labour market. 'When subjected to closer inspection, much of the policy interest in lifelong learning is in fact preoccupied with the development of a more productive and efficient workforce.'²³

However education for employment is only half the story. What happens to those who do not benefit from increasing prosperity? The Cologne Charter addresses itself briefly to 'the needs of the disadvantaged', 'civic responsibility', and 'social cohesion' in ways that assume consensus but without any recognition of the considerable ideological and actual disagreement about the meanings of these terms and the values underpinning their realisation. The 'socially excluded' are labelled collectively but approached individually. The attention is directed to first rung,

self-help and individual responsibilities, all of which underestimate the impact of structural constraints and overlook the huge disparity in resources available to different social groups – both of which affect their capacities to change their circumstances on an individual basis.

When he was Secretary of State for Education and Employment, David Blunkett became convinced that ‘lifelong learning is essential to sustaining a civilised and cohesive society, in which people can develop as active citizens, where creativity is fostered and communities can be given practical support to overcome generations of disadvantage.’²⁴ Tony Blair has been keen to endorse this view. In the run up to the 2001 election he insisted that it was ‘the duty’ of individuals ‘to make the most of the chances they get’ and declared ‘individual responsibility’ to be ‘the key to social order’.²⁵ He also took the view that what individuals cannot be persuaded to do voluntarily, they must be obliged to do as a condition of benefit, employment, and citizenship.

The increasingly coercive tendency of government interventions are evident in the latest Skills White Paper which contains proposals to compel welfare benefit claimants to have their basic skills needs assessed and, if they are judged inadequate, to be forced into mandatory training at the risk of losing their income. In the same vein the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act has determined that anyone applying for naturalisation must be assessed in terms of their language skills, required to take part in citizenship classes and to pass a citizenship test which demonstrates their knowledge of British history, traditions, politics, and social structure.

At the same time family learning becomes even more sinister with the prospect of compulsory parent education classes for those – mothers, usually – whose children are found to be playing truant. For a growing number of people, particularly those who are in paid employment (because of regulatory frameworks, statutory requirements, contract compliance, and customer or client expectations) or who are unemployed (because of Benefit and New Deal requirements) much that we aspire to in terms of ‘individual and social development’ and/or ‘opportunity and knowledge’ when it comes to learning is no longer voluntary but is now obligatory.²⁶

This is a very different version of active citizenship to the one independently articulated on the streets of Edinburgh during the G8 Summit. For those working in adult education, active citizenship is one of the formerly radical terms that also used to be associated with audacious grass roots energy, participatory democracy and social change. It has now become a meaningless sound bite – like empowerment, participation, social inclusion, and most recently, respect – that New Labour routinely appropriates to pretend a radical sounding approach to an otherwise authoritarian preoccupation with micromanaging the potentially troublesome attitudes of the lower orders.

Used by government ministers it usually attaches to a populist refrain, pitched at the prejudices of middle England, about the responsibilities of those being offered the opportunity to improve themselves by their own endeavours. It is predicated on the presumption of disorderly communities, in need of some kind of behaviour modification (parenting classes, citizenship tests, healthy exercise, orange jumpsuits) to

become 'more like us'. It is backed up with Antisocial Behaviour Orders, the biggest prison population in Europe, 45 separate Bills brought before Parliament between 1997 and 2003 by the Home Office to create 661 new criminal offences. It is a context in which young Black Britons are more likely to go to jail than go to university.

Policies such as these are never used to coerce the middle classes into learning. No one wonders whether those who live next door to me eat a healthy diet, put their children to bed at a reasonable hour, drink to excess or suffer from low self-esteem. In my neighbourhood we do not have to participate in local meetings to prove that we are good citizens. We pay our taxes and expect those whose job it is to sort out the street lighting, the rubbish collections, and the road repairs to get on with it.

There are two dangers in this modernising – and somewhat moralising – tendency, which seems to regard society as an aggregation of individuals, who are invariably referred to individually as solitary rather than social agents. Not only does it relegate discussions about common struggles and common interests to the dustbin of history, but it also translates aspirations for democratic renewal and critical engagement with political processes into issues of self-fulfilment, confidence building, consumer choice, employability, and volunteering.²⁷ It also appears to require participation in ways that are determined to adjust the socially excluded to the norms and values of white middle-class society – through education, retraining, volunteering, voting – in ways that rely on more than a little coercion and which tolerate few excuses from those who do not want to participate in this way. The danger here is that the blame for social exclusion and poverty is placed on apathetic or wilful non-participating individuals rather than on wider structural and societal trends and influences.

But it's a strategy that does little to win hearts and minds. The latest NIACE survey of participation in adult learning²⁸ reveals that fewer people are currently engaged in learning than when the present government came to power. However prescriptive and instrumental the learning agenda has become, we can draw some comfort from the fact that its actual grip on most peoples lived reality is minimal. In this kind of policy climate, with this kind of professional compliance, the sort of adult education that once called itself a movement, that in the words of Raymond Williams should be a resource to ordinary people for a journey of hope, has been cut off at its roots.

If You Cannot Change the World, Change Yourself

Marx was right when he insisted that the ruling ideas of any age are the ideas of the ruling class. He also made it clear that the purpose of education is not simply to understand the world but to change it. In a recent poll conducted by BBC Radio 4's *In Our Time* programme, one half of those taking part thought that Karl Marx was the most important philosopher of all time. But his popularity with the chattering classes has done little to establish the significance of his insights in contemporary discussions about lifelong learning.

For the most part lifelong learning has given up on teaching an understanding of the world, let alone trying to change it. And with corporate capitalism in charge on a global scale, supported by sympathetic governments from the North, it is not so surprising – if you go along with Marx – that free market consumerism, new managerialism, militarism, and competitive individualism have become the big ideas that help to keep the masses in their place. In this kind of climate, there is little official room – in the West, at any rate – for grand narratives, and every encouragement for the belief that because you cannot change the world, you must strive to change yourself.

The idea that adult learning can help feckless and potentially disruptive individuals to change their ways is not new. Writing in *Adult Education for a Change* 25 years ago, Nell Keddie pointed out that educational ‘provision for the disadvantaged . . . conspicuously avoids any mention of social class and . . . is contexted . . . within a social pathology which separates the problems presented by individuals from the social and political order which creates these problems’.²⁹ In the same publication, writing about disadvantage, I drew attention to the ways in which ‘the language of “personal deficit”, “affliction” and the need for “treatment” to “rehabilitate” the “malfunctioning” adult into “normal” society (ran) like a medical checklist through the literature of adult education’.³⁰ It was a view that saturated the writing of influential pundits of the time such as Peter Clyne³¹ and Henry Arthur Jones³² and which formed the basis of their advice to the Russell Committee³³ in what subsequently became known as ‘Russell category work’.

The ideology of disadvantage served to hold large sections of the working class personally responsible for their own misfortunes by making it seem as though unemployment, poverty, poor education, and slum conditions were *the consequence* of individual deficiencies, family breakdown, and cultural deprivation. To sustain the ideology, victims were discovered all over the place but especially among ‘the isolated’ and ‘apathetic’ residents of vast council estates, prisoners’ wives, ethnic minorities and single parents, all identified by their ‘obvious inadequacy’ and beloved by those involved in basic education and Russell category work.³⁴

Because most adult educators – then, just as now – were liberal in their disposition, ideas about disadvantage connected to the belief that education could lead its victims towards ‘spiritual fulfilment’, ‘personhood’, and ‘social integration’.³⁵ The ideas of Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow lent dubious psychological credibility to notions of ‘self-actualisation’³⁶ and ‘becoming a person’.³⁷ But despite the veneration of liberalism, Maslow constantly contrasted ordinary people ‘who need others’ with self-actualising people who do not. He identified human needs hierarchically, with food and shelter at the bottom, and self-actualisation – defined as autonomy and not needing others – at the top. Self-actualising people were those who could ‘make up their own minds, come to their own decisions . . . (be) responsible for themselves and their own destinies’.³⁸ They were obviously superior to those ‘who have their minds made up for them’ and who were ‘apt to feel helpless, weak and totally determined’, those who were ‘the prey for predators, flabby whiners, rather than self determining persons’.³⁹

What Maslow described as 'self-actualising' Rogers called 'becoming a person'. He meant by it the capacity to achieve emotional self-sufficiency and the determination to pursue one's own individually defined goals. The implication was that a process of personal change and individual effort could lead to individual liberation and fulfilment – and ultimately – the abolition of nasty things like poverty or sexual and racial oppression, because having become a person, individuals would not let themselves be anymore affected by such concerns. On one occasion he claimed that the troubles in Northern Ireland could be solved if only sufficient trained humanistic counsellors would go there and hold encounter groups on every street corner.⁴⁰ It is not only history that has called into question the naivety of such views.

It may seem surprising that ideas of this kind were so inspirational to adult educators in the 1970s. They are certainly illuminating about the intellectual and ideological climate in which stereotypical descriptions contributed to pathological definitions of disadvantage, leading to arguments in favour of behaviour modification through education, rather than wealth and educational redistribution, for example, in favour of the poor. In her excellent study of class and gender Beverley Skeggs is sceptical about what she calls the 'psy' professions, whose prominence she sees as directly related to the lack of attention given to social class over the last 20 years and to the emergence of 'an authorising narrative of personal trauma in which singular difficult experiences come to account for the whole personality' in ways that do not constitute a liberating ideology.⁴¹

In similar vein, a recent article in *Adults Learning* by Kathryn Ecclestone⁴² revisits some familiar territory in the light of more recent trends and emerging orthodoxies. She is worried that the growing popularity of psycho-therapeutic notions such as self-esteem and emotional intelligence – beloved by women's magazines, reality television and self-help manuals – have now gone mainstream, 'leading to new professional activities in emotional management, life coaching, mentoring, counselling and interventions to build self-esteem and make people feel good emotionally in the pursuit of motivation, educational achievement and social inclusion'.⁴³ She is right to be concerned.

In the popular wisdom of adult education practice it is certainly the case that ideas about confidence, emotional intelligence, and self-esteem are commonplace. The literature of funding applications, project reports, and evaluation exercises are full of claims by policy-makers and practitioners alike that interventions targeted at so-called non-traditional learners and socially excluded groups give rise to increased confidence and self-esteem.⁴⁴ I had thought that this was an essentially western phenomenon until I read recently in Sierra Leone – a small West African country emerging from 11 years of civil war with a ranking of last in the world in the Human Development Index – that 'the experience of social exclusion from decision-making bodies and processes, the lack of educational opportunities, early marriage and the demands of childbearing and rearing causes many women and young people to *suffer from low self-esteem and a lack of confidence* in their judgement' (my emphasis).⁴⁵ This must surely be the language of the writer rather than the assessment of the women and young people in question but indicates just how

pervasive – even in the context of extreme poverty and genocide – this spurious discourse has become.

Back in Britain it is no coincidence that the language of self-esteem and emotional literacy resonate with broader cultural and political preoccupations. According to Ecclestone, ‘there is a growing tone in policy circles that managing one’s emotions, having good self-esteem and being emotionally literate . . . are part of the responsibilities of being a good citizen’.⁴⁶ According to Nick Emler, on the basis of his substantial review of the theoretical and empirical evidence for self-esteem, so strong is this new orthodoxy in political and educational circles, you would think ‘low self-esteem is the cause of all the problems in all the world’.⁴⁷

It is easy to see why educational practitioners are attracted to ideas that seem to focus on students’ personal and emotional development in an apparently supportive and benign way, despite the fact that there is little agreement about what self-esteem actually is and virtually no convincing evidence about its effects or whether interventions designed to ‘raise it’ actually work.⁴⁸ As a form of professional responsibility it no doubt helps to counter the overly bureaucratic, instrumental, and target driven culture that adult learning has become. The government regards it as both the cause and effect of social exclusion and welcomes any amount of short-term interventions designed to counter the dysfunctional and negative behaviour of those who do not have enough of it. The belief that developing confidence and self-esteem can remedy a wide range of personal and social problems helps to distract attention from the structural causes of inequality, institutional, and actual racism and from the widening gap between rich and poor more generally. And of course, it plays to the prejudices of a profession that is already well used to labelling and stereotyping its students.

What is to be Done?

When the current state of lifelong learning gets written about by future historians you have to wonder what they will make of it all. Debates in the recent past might well have been contentious and fiercely contested but at least they involved political discussion – at all levels – about ideas and purpose. And they led to a lively mix of liberal and radical education in both formal and non-formal contexts. Whatever else, education was a resource that people in communities of interest could use to both enrich and change their lives.

These days, instead of specialist teachers and enthusiasts teaching an extensive range of subjects, to a relatively wide range of people, the day job for most of us entails enticing and cajoling the poor and other minorities into remedial activities designed to make them healthier, more socially competent and more likely to get a job. Either that or processing the blizzard of paperwork routinely required to prove that the latest short-term initiative has been delivered on time, on budget, and in line with government targets. Either way, we know that large numbers of potential learners are voting with their feet.

What counts as adult learning has come to rely on project workers, mentors, and cheer leaders, drumming up support for the new managerialist desire for well-behaved, gainfully employed and respectful people; with learning goals that are said to be good for them and good for society expressed in the language of skills and self-esteem. It's a model that reduces teaching to the role of life coach and is based on the implicit presumption that if you cannot change the world, better change yourself to make the best of it. It does not leave much room for dissent or wondering what to do about climate change and world poverty.

What is really good for society, of course, is that despite all the dumbing down and bossing about and 'rolling out of strategies', ordinary people are increasingly making their voices heard on their own terms in other ways. The sheer breadth and energy of civil society movements, as we have seen, are a powerful and optimistic recognition of the belief in citizen action and solidarity beyond national boundaries. But the issues involved are complex and contested. As capital has gone global it has served to undermine the sovereignty of the nation state, whilst putting pressure on rich countries and poor countries alike to maximise profit and cut back on public expenditure. The same processes are at work that get called modernisation in the rich world and structural adjustment in the poor world – the costs of which, in both contexts, are more likely to be borne by those who can afford them least. Questions and legitimate grievances abound but solutions are in short supply. Social movements may pursue regressive as well as progressive goals, just as they may lead to the incorporation of dissent by the state rather than the challenging of inequality and social justice.

Lifelong learning is central to these concerns whether we like it or not. As employees of the state, we still have political choices to make about being part of the problem or part of the solution. This means engaging with ideas and purpose, not simply process and management.

In my view it is time to get back in touch with the energy, commitment, and creative anger that fuels civil society in its quest for global justice and which rediscovers the educational potential and significance of popular social movements. We know that knowledge grows best when it is created through dialogue and social interaction, and when it is spread around.⁴⁹ Sharing a common purpose with others about issues that matter, and which are national and international in their repercussions, is both exhilarating and socially responsible, in ways that the individualised quest for self-improvement is not. Taking action makes you think. It makes you challenge what is usually taken for granted. Acquiring insight leads to more questions. Finding answers is the stuff of reason, investigation, communication, inspiration, and social change.

The search for answers might be artistic, practical, theoretical. The expression of critical thinking does not need esoteric language or the proliferation of qualifications but it does need dedicated teachers who can make relevant and practical connections in imaginative and democratic ways. The kinds of knowledge that education can help to produce and contribute to better understanding is the essential ingredient a democracy needs if it is to flourish and continually reinvent itself from one generation to the next. The popular creation of knowledge, linked to social action, makes sense in a troubled world because supporting a campaign or

joining a movement is a powerful way of learning through experience and making history, rather than simply enduring it. It is precisely this kind of informal learning that fuels the desire for more knowledge-making and more actively democratic societies.⁵⁰

And as a result, well-informed and more knowledgeable citizens are better equipped to take responsible and effective action on their own behalf. They are more likely to hold their leaders to account for the policies and actions they take – including their response to global poverty. When the current state of adult learning gets written about by future historians, it is hard to imagine a more important contribution we could have made.

Endnotes

¹ Make Poverty History is one of the larger campaigns associated with the Global Call to Action Against Poverty. Its symbol is a white wristband. Make Capitalism History is a campaigning slogan of the Scottish Socialist Party. Its symbol is a red wristband.

² Kumi Naidoo, Secretary General of CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, personal communication.

³ Thompson, J. (2005) Acting to end poverty. In: *Adults Learning*, Vol. 16, No. 7, March 2005 (Leicester: NIACE).

⁴ World Development Movement (2002) cited in *Global Citizens: Social Movements and the Challenge of Globalisation* (2005) Mayo, M. (London: Zed Books).

⁵ Jubilee 2000 Coalition (2000) *The World Will Never be the Same Again* (London: Jubilee 2000 Coalition).

⁶ Thompson, J. (2005) Learning and doing. In: *Adults Learning*, Vol. 16, No. 10, June 2005 (Leicester: NIACE).

⁷ Waltzer, M. (1992) The civil society argument. In: Mouffe, C. (Ed.) *Dimensions of Radical Democracy* (London: Verso), pp. 89–107.

⁸ Sivanandan, A. (2004) *Racism in the Age of Globalisation*, Third Claudia Jones Memorial Lecture, 29 October, Institute of Race Relations.

⁹ Some argue that globalisation is an ideological term that represents the victory of neo-liberal capitalism at the expense of state socialism and communism. It is seen by those who take this view as both inevitable and beneficial for humankind. Those who start from a more critical perspective and prefer to focus on resistance to neo-liberalism and the transformation of social relationships in the interests of greater equality, refer to the former position as globaloney.

¹⁰ <http://www.globalworkplace.com>.

¹¹ Bauman, Z. (2001) Quality and inequality, *Guardian Saturday Review*, 29 December.

¹² *Cologne Charter – Aims and Ambitions for Lifelong Learning* (1999) adopted by the G8 at their 25th Economic Summit held in Cologne, 18–20 June.

¹³ Cologne Charter, op. cit.

¹⁴ ibid.

¹⁵ ibid.

¹⁶ See, for example Crowther, J., Gallaway, V., and Martin, I. (Ed.) (2005) *Popular Education: Engaging the Academy: International Perspectives* (Leicester: NIACE).

¹⁷ Aldridge, S. (2004) *Life Chances and Social Mobility – An Overview of the Evidence*. Government Strategy Unit Report.

¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁹ See, for example Thompson, J. (1980) *Adult Education for a Change* (London: Hutchinson, 1983), *Learning Liberation: Women's Response to men's Education* (London: Croom Helm, 1989), *Learning the Hard Way: Women's Oppression in Men's Education* (London: Macmillan).

²⁰ According to Freire in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, 'there is no such thing as a neutral education process. Education either functions as an instrument which is used to facilitate the integration of generations into the logic of the present system and bring about conformity to it, or it becomes the practice of freedom, the means by which men and women deal critically and creatively with reality and discover how to participate in the transformation of their world' (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972).

²¹ Department for Education and Employment (1998) *The Learning Age: A Renaissance for a New Britain* (London: HMSO).

²² Department for Education and Skills (2003b) *21st Century Skills: Realising Our Potential*, Cm 5810. (London: The Stationery Office).

²³ Field, J. (2000) *Lifelong Learning and the New Education Order* (Stoke-on-Trent: Trentham).

²⁴ Blunkett, D. (1999) *The Learning and Skills Council Prospectus: Learning to Succeed* (London: HMSO).

²⁵ Tony Blair, 8 February 2001.

²⁶ Field, J. (2001) 'Lifelong Learning and Social Inclusion'. In: *What Progress are We Making with Lifelong Learning? – The Evidence from Research*, Coffield, F. (Ed.) (Newcastle: University of Newcastle).

²⁷ See, for example David Blunkett, *From Strength to Strength: Rebuilding the Community Through Voluntary Action*, Speech to the Annual Conference of the National Council for Voluntary Organisations, 7 February 2001.

²⁸ Aldridge, F. and Tuckett, A. (2005) *Better News This Time?* (Leicester: NIACE).

²⁹ Keddie, N. (1980) Adult education: an ideology of individualism. In: Thompson, J. (Ed.) *Adult Education for a Change* (London: Hutchinson).

³⁰ Thompson, J. (1980) Adult education and the disadvantaged. In: Thompson, J. (Ed.) *Adult Education for a Change*, *ibid.*

³¹ Clyne, P. (1972) *The Disadvantaged Adult* (London: Longman).

³² Jones, H.A. (1972) Foreword to *The Disadvantaged Adult*, *ibid.* and (1979) *A Strategy for the Basic Education of Adults*, ACACE.

³³ *Adult Education: A Plan for Development*, The Russell Report (1973) HMSO.

³⁴ Thompson, J. (1980) *Adult Education for a Change* (London: Hutchinson).

³⁵ Paterson, R.W.K. (1979) *Values, Education and the Adult* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).

³⁶ Maslow, A. (1968) *Towards a Psychology of Being* (Princetown: Van Nostrand) and (1970) *Motivation and Personality* (New York: Harper-Row).

³⁷ Rogers, C. (1961) *On Being a Person* (London: Constable)

³⁸ Maslow, A. (1968) *op. cit.*

³⁹ Maslow, A. (1968) *ibid.*

⁴⁰ Grimshaw, J. (1986) *Feminist Philosophers: Women's Perspectives on Philosophical Traditions* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf).

⁴¹ Skeggs, B. (1997) *Formations of Class and Gender* (London: Sage).

⁴² Ecclestone, K. (2004) Developing self esteem and emotional well-being – inclusion or intrusion? In: *Adults Learning*, Vol. 16, No. 3, November (Leicester: NIACE).

⁴³ *ibid.*

⁴⁴ See, for example Eldred, J. et al. (2005) Catching confidence. In: *Adults Learning*, Vol. 16. No. 8, April (Leicester: NIACE).

⁴⁵ Von Kotze, A. (2005) Are we all together? In: *Adults Learning*, Vol. 16, No. 10 June (Leicester: NIACE).

⁴⁶ Ecclestone, op. cit.

⁴⁷ Emler, N. (2001) *Self-Esteem: The Costs and Causes of Low Self Worth* (New York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation).

⁴⁸ Ecclestone, op. cit. and Emler, *ibid*.

⁴⁹ Crowther, J., Galloway, V., and Martin, I. (2005) op. cit.

⁵⁰ McGivney, V. (1999) *Informal Learning in the Community: A Trigger for Change and Development* (Leicester: NIACE).

PAULO MAJORA CANAMUS

“ . . . lifelong learning is essential to sustaining a civilised and cohesive society, in which people can develop as active citizens, where creativity is fostered and communities can be given practical support to overcome generations of disadvantage. . . . ”

List of Authors: Biographical Details

Short Biographical Notes

Biographical Details of Contributors to this Volume

The editor of this book, **David N. Aspin**, is Emeritus Professor of Education, School of Graduate Studies, and formerly Dean of the Faculty of Education, Monash University, Australia. Prior to this he was Professor of Philosophy of Education at King's College London and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Philosophy of Education in the Institute of Education, both in the University of London. With Judith Chapman he is co-author of the publication *The School, the Community and Lifelong Learning* (London: Cassell, 1997) and, with Judith Chapman, Michael Hatton, and Yukiko Sawano, co-editor of the *International Handbook on Lifelong Learning* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001). His current research centres on lifelong learning, principally its epistemological, mental, and methodological aspects; and on values and values education, principally their normative conclusions and meta-ethical aspects.

Richard G. Bagnall is a Professor in Adult and Vocational Education in the Hong Kong Institute of Education. His work lies chiefly in the social philosophy of adult and lifelong education, with particular emphasis on the ethics of educational theory, advocacy, and policy. He has published over 80 books and papers in that field. Recent publications include *Cautionary Tales in the Ethics of Lifelong Learning Policy and Management: A Book of Fables* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2004), 'Locating lifelong learning and education in contemporary currents of thought and culture' (In D. Aspin, J. Chapman, M. Hatton, and Y. Sawano (Eds), *International Handbook of Lifelong Learning*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2001) and *Discovering Radical Contingency: Building a Postmodern Agenda in Adult Education* (New York: Peter Lang, 1999). His teaching is centred on the philosophy of adult and lifelong learning.

Jean Barr is Professor of Adult and Continuing Education in the Department of Adult and Continuing Education at the University of Glasgow and also Associate Dean (Graduate School) of the Faculty of Education. She has worked in the WEA, the Open University and the Universities of Warwick and Stirling. She has published three books: *Liberating Knowledge* (1999), *For a Radical Higher Education* (2003) (with Tom Steele and Richard Taylor), and *Common Science* (1996) with Lynda Birke.

Peter Bowbrick did research on marketing economics at Cambridge before moving to a research institute in Ireland for 8 years. He then moved to consultancy, advising at all levels from national sectoral policy to the economics of the firm. He has worked in 30 countries around the world, and his clients include the United Nations, the World Bank, and many national governments. He continued to publish theory even after becoming a consultant, and has produced some 50 books and papers, particularly in the areas of the economics of markets, quality as a marketing tool, and the economics of famine. He believes that consultancy which is not based on hard theory is a waste of time as is theory that cannot be applied to the real world.

Judith Chapman is currently Professor of Education and Director of the Centre for Lifelong Learning at Australian Catholic University, where she was Dean of the Faculty of Education from 1998–2003. Before that she was Professor of Education at the University of Western Australia from 1992–1998; prior to that she had been Director of the School Decision – Making and Management Centre in the Faculty of Education at Monash University. In 1999 she was awarded an Order of Australia for services to tertiary education as a teacher and researcher. In 1999 she was also awarded a Visiting Fellowship at the International Studies Center of the Rockefeller Foundation in Bellagio, Como, Italy; in 2004 she was appointed a Visiting Professor at the Nottingham University; and for 2007 she has been elected a Visiting Fellow at St Edmund's College, Cambridge. She is currently working in the area of values education in association with the implementation of the Values Framework for Australian Schools of the Australian Commonwealth Government.

Richard Edwards is Professor of Education and head of the Institute of Education at the University of Stirling, Scotland. He has researched and written extensively in the area of adult education and lifelong learning, in particular drawing on post-structuralist and postmodernist perspectives. His most recent work is, with Robin Usher, *Signs of Learning* (Springer) and, with Kathy Nicoll, Nicky Solomon, and Robin Usher, *Rhetoric and Educational Discourse* (Routledge).

Colin W. Evers is a Professor in the Faculty of Education at The University of Hong Kong. His research interests are in educational administration, philosophy of education, and research methodology. He has written many papers and is an author and editor of seven books including *Knowing Educational Administration* (Pergamon 1991), *Exploring Educational Administration* (Pergamon 1996), and *Doing Educational Administration* (Pergamon 2000), all co-authored with Gabriele Lakomski, and *Leadership for Quality Schooling* (Routledge Falmer 2001), co-edited with K.C. Wong, and is currently co-editor of the journal *International Studies in Educational Administration*.

Kevin J. Flint is a Senior Lecturer in Education and Professional Studies at Nottingham Trent University, England. His particular interest is in making connections between the work of Martin Heidegger and the modern world of education.

After many years in teaching, Kevin received his Doctorate of Education in 2003 from the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne. His dissertation concerned the framing of institutional systems; relations of power in which Being leaves its trace in fields of education, and in the possibilities of powerlessness and empowerment. His main areas of publication and research include teacher identity and reflexivity, along with deconstruction, both of case study research in education, and of assessment in the world of improvement.

Morwenna Griffiths is Professor of Classroom Learning at Edinburgh University. Her research interests are in social justice, philosophy, and the interaction of educational theory and practice. She has previously taught in primary schools in Bristol, and at the University of Isfahan in Iran, at Christ Church College of Higher Education at Canterbury, and at Oxford Brookes, Nottingham, and Nottingham Trent Universities. Her books include *Action for Social Justice in Education: Fairly Different* (Open University, 2003), *Educational Research for Social Justice: Getting Off the Fence* (Open University, 1998), *Feminisms and the Self: The Web of Identity* (Routledge 1995), and with Carol Davies *In Fairness to Children* (David Fulton 1995).

Philip Higgs is Professor in Philosophy of Education in the Department of Educational Studies at the University of South Africa. He is a nationally rated social scientist and his research focuses on educational transformation with special reference to educational theory, and African discourses on education. His most recent publications include: *African Voices in Education* (2001); *Rethinking Our World* (2006); *Rethinking Truth* (2006); and *Towards an African Philosophy of Higher Education*, in the *South African Journal of Higher Education* (2005). He is a past President of the South African Association for Research and Development in Higher Education, and Editor-in-Chief of the *South African Journal of Higher Education*.

Terry Hyland qualified as a teacher in 1971 and after completing B.Ed., MA, and Ph.D. degrees at the University of Lancaster, taught successively in schools, further, adult and higher education. After a 2-year secondment at the University of Sokoto, Nigeria, he worked in teacher education at the University of the West of England, before moving to the University of Warwick as lecturer in continuing education from 1991 to 2000. He has been Professor of Post-Compulsory Education and Training at the University of Bolton since September 2000 and was appointed Honorary Visiting Professor at the University of Huddersfield in 2006. His main research interests are in post-school vocational and professional studies and his publications include *Vocational Studies, Lifelong Learning and Social Values* (Ashgate, 1999) and *The Changing Face of Further Education* (London: Routledge Falmer, 2003)

Kenneth Lawson began his working career at the age of 14 in 1942, as a junior clerk. One year later he became an apprentice aircraft fitter and rigger. He subsequently served in the same trade in the Royal Air Force for a period of 2 years.

Service in war-ravaged Germany had a great effect on him and, on return to England, he began to seek further educational opportunities. These he found in Adult Education classes, which in turn led him to the University of Oxford. Then followed a career in Adult Education. He has published several books and many articles on philosophical issues and themes in Adult Education. On his retirement the University of Nottingham conferred on him the title of Special Professor.

Mal Leicester's career in education has encompassed teaching in schools, teacher education, community education in inner city Birmingham, being adviser for multicultural education for the Avon Education authority and most recently Professor of Adult Learning and Teaching at Nottingham University. She is a long-serving member of the editorial board of the *Journal of Moral Education*. Her research interests include moral education, values in education, lifelong learning, family learning, and social justice in education. She has published widely in education journals, undertaken considerable editorial work, and authored books on both ethnicity and disability in education. Recently (with Routledge and Jessica Kingsley) she has written collections of original, themed stories with associated educational activities for the foundation level and at key stages one and two. She is Emeritus Professor at Nottingham University and visiting professor at the Universities of Derby and Nottingham Trent.

David Needham, formerly at the University of Stirling in Scotland, has a background in business and economics education. He has written more than 50 texts for use both within the curriculum as well as for teachers, and has published widely in national and international journals. His teaching involves a substantial amount of dissertation supervision and his research interests focus upon learning within a work and vocational context where he has developed a keen interest in philosophy.

Fazal Rizvi has been a Professor in the Department of Educational Policy Studies at the University of Illinois since 2001, having previously held academic and administrative appointment at a number of universities in Australia, including as Pro Vice Chancellor (International) at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology and as the founding Director of the Monash Center for Research in International Education. From 1993 to 2000, Dr. Rizvi edited *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education*, and in 1996 was the President of the Australian Association for Research in Education. He has written extensively on issues of globalisation, postcoloniality, international higher education, and the shifting dynamics of educational policy processes. He is currently researching issues of identity, culture, and transnational education. At Illinois, he directs a programme in Global Studies in Education (see gse.ed.uiuc.edu).

Jane Thompson is Principal Research Officer of NIACE. She has worked in Adult Education for many years and has considerable experience of teaching and writing about educational ideas, policy, and practice – especially in relation to women's education, social exclusion, and education for social change. Before

joining NIACE in 2000 she worked at Ruskin College Oxford and the University of Southampton. At NIACE she is working on projects concerned with cultural action and most immediately on a collection of interconnected essays about the changing context, character, and purpose of adult education over the last 30 years, viewed from the trenches, and entitled *The Road to Hell*. Her recent publications include: *Women, Class and Education* (Routledge, 2000), *Stretching the Academy: The Politics and Practice of Widening Participation in Higher Education* (NIACE, 2000), and *Bread and Roses: Arts, Culture and Lifelong Learning* (NIACE, 2002).

Roger Twelvetrees After completing postgraduate research in electrical engineering at Nottingham University Roger Twelvetrees worked in defence electronics, concentrating on the development of a new family of magnetic field sensors. This work led into the engineering of sensors for fixing to the seabed, to measure the magnetic and electric influence of warships. To develop the analysis side of the technology further he formed a research group to perform the magnetic and electric field studies. In recent years, the research group has become the acknowledged world leader in the analysis and reduction of the magnetic and electric disturbances associated with warships. Roger is also interested in the medical and the educational applications of magnetic and electric field studies. He is Chief Engineer at Ultra Electronics PMES Ltd.

Robin Usher is Professor of Research Education and Coordinator of Research Training at RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia. He is the author of *Postmodernism and Education: Different Voices, Different Worlds* (Routledge, 1994) with Edwards, R., *Adult Education and the Postmodern Challenge* (Routledge, 1997) with Bryant, I. and Johnston, R., *Researching Education: Data, Methods and Theory in Educational Inquiry* (Cassell, 1999) with Scott, D., and *Understanding Social Research: Perspectives on Methodology and Practice* (Falmer Press, 1998) with McKenzie, G. and Powell, J. He has completed writing a monograph with Richard Edwards on lifelong learning.

Melanie Walker: Dr. Melanie Walker is Professor in the School of Education, University of Nottingham. She is Director of the School's Education Doctorate in Higher Education and Lifelong Learning. Her research interests focus on higher education, in particular, theories and practices of equality and social justice, identity formation, and learning, agency and gender equity, and capability pedagogies.

Yusef Waghid is Professor of Philosophy of Education and Chair of the Department of Educational Policy Studies at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. His research focuses on analytical enquiry vis-à-vis higher education transformation and democratic citizenship education. He is the author of *Community and Democracy in South Africa: Liberal Versus Communitarian Perspectives* (Peter Lang).

Kenneth Wain is Professor of Education at the University of Malta where he has served as Head of the Department of Foundations in Education and as Dean of the

Faculty of Education. He currently teaches philosophy of education in the Faculty's B.Ed. (Hons.) and M.Ed. courses, as well as moral and political philosophy to Art students. Before taking up his first appointment at the University as lecturer he taught in state primary and secondary schools for several years. He received his PhD from the University of London. Over the years he has published numerous articles in academic journals as well as chapters in books. He has also authored the following books: *Philosophy of Lifelong Education* (1987), *The Maltese National Curriculum: A Critical Evaluation* (1991), *Theories of Teaching* (1992), *The Value Crisis: An Introduction to Ethics* (1995), and recently, *The Learning Society in a Postmodern World* (2004).

Shirley Walters is Professor of Adult and Continuing Education at the University of Western Cape, South Africa. She is the founding director of the Division for Lifelong Learning, which is concerned with helping the university realise its lifelong learning mission. She is presently Chair of the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA).

Berte Van Wyk is a lecturer in the department of Education Policy Studies at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. He is a nationally rated social scientist, and his research focuses on higher education transformation, with particular interests in 'institutional culture' and 'African philosophy'. He co-edited the book *Africana Philosophy of Education: Reconstructions and Deconstructions* (2005) with Yusef Waghid, and published a book chapter entitled 'University Teaching in South Africa: An African Philosophical Perspective' in the *New Directions for Higher Education* series with Philip Higgs (2006). He has published in several journals such as *Interchange*, *South African Journal of Higher Education*, and *Education as Change*.

David N. Aspin
17 July 2006

Author Index

A

Abbagnano, N., 100
Africa, Z., 277, 288
Aitcheson, J., 112
Anderson, D., 198, 206
Arendt, H., 162, 165, 166, 205
Aristotle, 87–89, 102, 103, 197, 198, 205
Arthur, J., 66
Ashton, D., 62
Aspin, D.N., 5, 21, 32, 34, 114, 132, 138,
158, 159, 173, 250, 259, 310
Avis, J., 57, 64

B

Baehr, P., 100
Bagnall, R.G., 237, 240–243, 245–247, 249,
250, 253
Bagnall, R.J., 12, 19, 20, 26, 27, 29, 30
Bailey, C., 27–30
Ball, S., 81, 132
Banks, J., 178
Barnett, R., 58, 62, 149, 152
Barr, J., 134, 196, 198, 205
Battersby, C., 200, 201
Baudrillard, J., 12, 212, 214–219, 221, 224,
227, 229, 230
Bauman, Z., 144, 244, 248, 297
Beck, J.S., 93
Belanger, P., 282, 288
Bell, D., 174
Benhabib, S., 163
Berlin, I., 244
Bernstein, B., 133, 134, 245
Bernstein, R.J., 21, 33
Biesta, G., 71, 82, 83, 132
Billett, S., 62, 63
Bloomer, M., 63, 66, 139
Bogue, R., 229
Bond, P., 279

Bonnett, M., 87, 102, 103
Boud, D., 61
Bourdieu, P., 121, 133, 134, 165
Bourgeois, E.C., 290
Bown, L., 197
Brah, A., 220
Brennan, J., 61
Brookfield, S.D., 240
Brown, P., 63
Brunel, 264
Byun, J., 276

C

Candy, J., 277, 285
Candy, P., 115
Caputo, J., 92, 93, 102
Carnoy, 280
Castells, M., 127, 280
Chae, J., 276
Chaiklin, S., 70, 211
Chapman, J.D., 5, 32, 34, 114, 158, 159,
173, 250, 259, 310
Chappell, C., 182
Chitpin, S., 175, 176
Coffield, F., 62, 87, 91, 127, 240, 275, 276
Cope, B., 222
Cotton T., 192, 262
Cripps, S., 67
Cropley, A.J., 20, 21, 24
Crowther, J., 238, 239, 241, 242, 286
Cruells, E., 207, 208
Cupitt, D., 33

D

Daniel, J., 279
Dave, R.H., 21, 24
Daveney, T.F., 28
Davie, G., 191, 198
De Certeau, M., 73, 217

Dean, 79
 Dearden, R., 2
 Deleuze, G., 12, 214, 223–231
 Delors, J., 6, 250
 Dennett, D.C., 201
 Derrida, J., 50, 82, 83, 101, 103, 223, 228
 Dewey, J., 24, 25, 27, 52–55, 115
 Dietrich, E., 183
 Diop, B., 149
 Diop, C.A., 149
 Doel, M., 224, 228
 Dorbolo, J., 197
 Dragan, V., 178
 Dreyfus, H.I., 249
 Dreyfus, S.E., 249
 Dreze, J., 134
 Duke, C., 117
 Dunne, J., 192, 193, 197, 198

E
 Ecclestone, K., 303, 304
 Edwards, R., 57, 60, 70, 74, 126, 211, 239–241
 Eliasmith, C., 184
 Eliot, T.S., 102
 Engel, C., 183
 Engestrom, Y., 64, 71
 Etkind, R., 276, 281
 Evans, K., 61
 Evans, N., 27, 182
 Evers, C.W., 11, 22, 175, 176, 179, 180, 183, 331

F
 Fairclough, N., 66
 Faris, R., 277, 290
 Fauré, E., 2, 6, 24, 25, 39–41, 43, 44, 47, 48, 53, 116, 243, 250
 Featherstone, M., 73, 213, 217, 221
 Fichte, 93
 Field, J., 58, 59, 63, 75, 76, 124, 129, 195, 250, 259, 287, 289, 290
 Fields, C., 183
 Finlay, I., 87, 91
 Fish, 64
 Fleming, P., 225, 226
 Flint, K.J., 97
 Fodor, J.A., 179, 181, 183
 Foucault, M., 50–55, 71, 76–79, 102, 103, 164, 165, 223, 224, 239
 Frankman, M., 191
 Freire, P., 116, 117, 201, 203, 307
 Freud, 83
 Fuller, S., 191

G
 Gabriel, Y., 73
 Gadamer, 193
 Gallie, W.B., 4, 23
 Game, A., 220
 Gane, M., 216
 Gardner, S., 93, 101
 Geeraerts, G., 178
 Gelpi, E., 19, 42, 43, 53, 250
 Gelpi, R.E., 21
 Giddens, A., 86, 97, 101, 102, 220
 Godel, K., 175
 Greene, M., 161, 166, 167
 Griffin, C., 75, 76, 238, 239, 241
 Griffiths, M., 11, 192, 193, 205, 262, 312
 Guattari, F., 214, 223–231
 Guile, D., 62, 63
 Gutmann, A., 167, 182

H
 Hager, P., 63, 87
 Halliday, J., 65
 Harkin, J., 63, 65
 Harris, C.K., 24, 29
 Harrison, R., 80
 Hartnett, A., 23
 Harvey, D., 213
 Hayton, A., 62
 Heaney, 102
 Heidegger, M., 8, 85–103
 Heraclitus, 101
 Hirst, P.H., 2, 24, 27–30, 260
 Hodgkinson, P., 63, 139
 Hogan, P., 131, 192
 Holmes, L., 91
 Hutchins, E., 185, 186
 Hyland, T., 7, 57, 59–62, 64–66, 312

I
 Illich, I., 41, 240
 Illieva, K., 276

J
 Jackson, N.S., 62
 Jane, T., 14, 196, 313
 Jarvis, P., 3, 173, 181
 Johnston, M., 205
 Jolly, N., 93
 Jonathan, R., 133
 Jones, A., 178
 Jowers, P., 227

K
 Kalantzis, M., 222
 Kant, I., 27, 28, 90, 93, 94, 101, 102

Keats, 102
 Keddie, N., 302
 Kellner, D., 213
 Kellner, P., 57
 Kilpatrick, S., 64
 Knowles, M.S., 29
 Kovesi, J., 22
 Kraak, A., 280
 Krell, D.F., 89
 Kress, G., 222
 Kuhn, T.S., 24
 Kulich, J., 20
 Kumar, P., 112
 Kundera, 102

L

Lakatos, I., 21, 22, 24, 26, 28, 32
 Lakomski, G., 22, 175, 311
 Lang, T., 73
 Langford, G., 29
 Lash, S., 212, 213
 Lauder, H., 63
 Lave, J., 62, 63, 70, 80, 211
 Lawson, K., 2, 5, 8, 259, 312
 Lawson, K.H., 249
 Le Doeuff, M., 201, 206
 Leibniz, 90, 92, 93, 98, 102, 103
 Leicester, M., 2, 4, 13, 124, 192, 259,
 260, 313
 Leitch, 73
 Lemert, C., 213
 Lengrand, P., 20, 21, 24, 250
 Lessing, D., 192
 Levidow, L., 207, 208
 Lingard, B., 81, 119
 Linquist, K., 276, 287
 Little, B., 61
 Longworth, N., 250
 Luria, 62
 Lyotard, J.F., 47, 50, 73, 74, 192, 197,
 212, 223

M

Macedo, S., 169
 MacIntyre, A., 101, 162, 163, 168, 190, 191
 Maffesoli, M., 74, 122, 241
 Malcolm, 80, 81
 Mare, G., 279
 Martin, I., 240
 Martin, J.R., 201
 Marx, K., 101, 301
 Maslow, A., 302
 Masolo, 149
 Matlay, H., 62

Mautner, T., 93, 100
 Mbeki, T., 280
 McIntyre, J., 61, 191
 McWilliam, E., 81, 83, 201
 Merrill, B., 64
 Miller, T.P., 202
 Millgram, E., 181
 Mitchell, C., 201
 Morris, H., 57
 Mowbray, M., 276
 Mulcahy, A. M., 197
 Musson, D., 66

N

Naish, M., 23
 Neurath, O., 32
 Nicol, M., 277, 288
 Nicoll, K., 74, 80
 Nietzsche, 55, 102
 Nussbaum, M., 10, 131, 132, 136, 138,
 141–145
 Nussbaum, M.C., 166

O

O'Neill, M., 199
 Ondaatje, 102
 Osborne, M., 276

P

Passeron, J-C., 133, 134
 Pasteur, 179
 Paterson, R.W.K., 3, 26, 239, 241, 249
 Peim, N., 97
 Peña-Borrero, M., 20
 Peters, M., 103
 Peters, R.S., 2, 27, 28, 29, 30
 Plant, S., 74, 75, 215
 Popper, K.R., 21, 22, 29, 174,
 175, 244
 Poster, M., 75, 215
 Pratt, M. L., 202

Q

Quine, W.V., 21, 22, 32

R

Ranson, S., 60, 63, 65
 Richmond, R.K., 21
 Rizvi, F., 9, 119, 192, 313
 Robbins, L., 59
 Robeyns, I., 138, 145
 Rogers, C., 302
 Rorty, R., 21, 50, 54, 55
 Rossin, D., 64

Rozema, D., 66, 67
 Ruggiero, 190
 Russell, L., 59, 302

S

Saul, J., 279
 Schelling, 93
 Schuller, T., 63, 132
 Schwabe, C., 280
 Seagraves, L., 61
 Searle, J., 183
 Sen, A., 131, 134–138, 144, 145
 Senge, P.M., 250
 Shapin, S., 200
 Sharpe, A., 181
 Shields, R., 74
 Skeggs, B., 137, 303
 Skilbeck, M., 57, 65
 Smith, B.W., 27
 Smith, R., 192
 Splitter, L., 181
 Stambaugh, J., 91, 100
 Steele, T., 196, 310
 Steiner-Khamsi, G., 119
 Stock, A.K., 19, 21
 Strain, M., 58
 Strathern, M., 229
 Suchodolski, B., 24, 25, 112
 Swanson, D., 191
 Symes, C., 61

T

Taylor, A., 225, 229
 Taylor, C., 121
 Taylor, D., 196
 Taylor, R., 260, 310
 Tennyson, 102
 Thagard, P., 181
 Thompson, J., 4, 14, 192, 196,
 307, 313
 Tight, M., 48, 57, 59, 240
 Tobias, R., 112, 190, 201
 Toulmin, S., 244
 Trigg, R., 26, 249
 Tuckett, A., 67
 Tuomi-Grohn, T., 71

U

Ullian, J.S., 22, 32
 Unwin, L., 66
 Urry, J., 212, 213, 217
 Usher, R., 73, 211, 217, 221, 311, 314

V

Vygotsky, L., 97

W

Wain, K., 6, 7, 22, 24–30, 41, 46, 49, 243,
 250, 314
 Wainwright, H., 207
 Walker, M., 9, 29, 32, 138, 205, 314
 Walters, S., 13, 276, 278, 281, 315
 Walzer, M., 164
 Warnock, M., 31
 Waters, M., 212
 Watson, S., 227
 Weber, M., 47, 100
 Weber, S., 201
 Wellington, J., 66
 Wenger, E., 62, 63, 80
 Whitaker, C., 207
 White, F.C., 249
 White, J.P., 20, 24, 27
 Whittle, 264
 Wilkinson, M.H.F., 178
 Williams, R., 116, 121, 199, 301
 Williamson, B., 195, 196
 Wilson, A.L., 239
 Wilson, B., 276
 Winch, C., 61
 Wittgenstein, L., 21, 23, 97, 121, 258, 261
 Wolf, 201
 Wordsworth, W., 90, 91, 94, 102
 Wright, D., 64
 Wu, E.H., 183

Y

Young, I.M., 145, 206
 Young, M., 60, 63

Z

Zimmerman, M., 103
 Zuboff, S., 63
 Zukas, 80, 81

Subject Index

A

Ab-bau, 101
Absolute foundations, 22
Absolutism, 24
Access, 4, 5, 10, 35, 75, 96, 117–120, 128, 148, 154, 155, 158, 199, 201
Accountabilities, 237
Accreditation, 194, 260, 296
Acknowledged, 48, 137, 191, 197, 204, 244, 246, 314
Active citizens, 189, 300
Active citizenship, 4, 110, 196, 299, 300
Actor network theory, 7, 71
Actor strategies, 290
Acts of virtue, 166
Adapt our preferences, 138
Adult education, 2–5, 7–9, 19, 44, 57–59, 70–76, 80
Adult Learning, 8, 26, 42, 148, 173, 193, 282–285, 301
Aesthetic of consumption, 218
Aestheticisation, 213, 217, 222
Affective satisfaction, 34
Affiliation and learning, 139–142
Affiliation, 139–144
Age of the World Picture and Science and Reflection
The age of the world picture, 4*n*, 100, 30*n*, 102
Agency development, individual and social dimensions in, 137
Agency, 10, 77, 88, 96, 102, 122
Ambivalence, 40, 72, 220
Analytic philosophy of education, 30
Analytical Philosophy, 258
Andragogy, 29
Anti-racist movement, 299
Apartheid, 148, 149, 152–154, 164, 166, 279
Apartheid education, 10, 153, 164, 169

Aretaic ethic, 243, 245, 247, 249, 255
'Argument from power', 244, 245
Aristotelian, 162, 198, 200
The art and thought of Heraclitus
Assessment, 3, 5, 7, 14, 134, 147, 161, 242, 245, 247, 250, 265, 284, 303
Assumptions, 9, 12, 70, 95, 124, 164, 267–271, 297
Autonomous self-learning, 173, 181, 184
Axioms, 175

B

Background conditions, 179
Basic functionings, 135
Basic heterogeneity of human beings
as fundamental aspect of educational equality, 136
Being and the re-production of discourses of 'lifelong learning', 88
Being and time and the re-production of discourses of lifelong learning, 89
Being and Time, 87–89, 91, 103
Being in 'the framing' of the language of lifelong learning, 96
'Being' in current systems of lifelong learning on grounds of the principle of reason, 92–94
Beings, 86, 87, 89, 91–95
Benchmarks, 159, 288
Best fit, 181
Bestand, 44*n*, 103
Betrieb, 43*n*, 103
Between Women, 193
Beyond humanism—towards a way of thinking, 87
Binary formulation, 81
Body as a focus for identity, 222
Body of theory, 181
'Body without organs' or bwo, 226, 13*n*, 231

- Border skirmishes, 287
 Boundaries and norms, 70
 Boundaries, 70, 74, 96, 139, 166, 178, 213, 261, 288
 Boundary spanners, 290
 Boundlessness, 71
 Building our theories, 32
 Building, dwelling and thinking, 41*n*, 103
 Business, 45–47, 59, 64, 75, 83, 135, 154, 174, 212, 43*n*, 103
- C**
- Capabilities, 134–138, 140, 142–144
 Capabilities are counterfactual, 136
 Capability approach, 9, 131, 134, 145
 Capability disadvantage, 134
 Capability-based assessment of justice, 134
 Capacities, 77, 79, 118, 290, 300
 Capitalism, 46, 76, 116, 127, 211–216, 223, 226, 294, 299
 Capitalist, 14, 77, 153, 190, 214, 238, 299
 Care of the self, 79
 Careers education, 19
 Caring, 64, 66, 67, 166
 CEU, 189
 Challenge, 10, 14, 20, 35, 54, 62, 72, 76, 82, 87, 133
 Change, 44, 48, 49, 53, 60, 63, 79, 82, 86, 95, 112, 114, 119
 Chaos, 176, 178, 184, 215
 Characteristics, 13, 53, 66, 119, 212, 262, 272, 276, 284
 Chinese state, 195
 Choice, 8, 10, 25, 27, 28, 31, 79, 122, 132–135, 137–139, 141, 144, 145, 151, 168, 182, 186, 203, 217, 221–223, 237, 239, 244, 246, 252, 301, 305
 Citizens, 10, 11, 14, 31, 40, 58, 112, 128, 132, 159, 164, 189, 238, 278, 287, 297
 Citizenship, 8–11, 51, 110, 151, 158–161, 182, 195, 220, 299, 300
 Civic reconciliation, 165, 167
 Civil society, 75, 115, 195, 209, 284, 290, 294–296, 305
 Civil society movements, 294, 305
 Clarity, 13, 19, 21, 296
 Class, 10, 78, 131, 134–142, 144, 158, 167, 195, 199, 213, 278, 301, 303
 Classical capitalism, 218
 Climate change, 293–295
 Code, 216, 218, 229
 Codification, 238, 240, 245, 247, 252, 254
 The codification argument, 240, 245–247
 Codifying, 247
- Cohesion, 7, 10, 52, 118, 127, 152, 278, 296, 297, 299
 Collective decision-making, 173
 Collective, 58, 62, 122, 128, 185, 208, 243, 289
 Collegial and democratic organization, 179
 ‘Combined capabilities’, 136
 Commodification, 12, 32, 216, 217, 219, 239, 244, 252
 Commodifies, 74, 213
 Commodity, 64, 66, 75, 125, 197, 213, 221, 238
 Common dimensions, 245
 Common ground, 32
 Communalism, 149, 150
 Communitarian, 66
 Community of practitioners, 62
 Community, 23, 28, 32, 49, 50, 54, 62–64, 66, 111, 116, 118, 125
 Compassion, 138, 143, 166
 Competences, 64, 159, 160
 Complex functioning, 135
 Complex web, 32, 76
 Conceptual analysis, 3–5, 13, 21, 24, 258, 259, 261–263, 266, 272, 273
 Conceptual schemes, 184
 Conceptual shift, 196
 Confirmation bias, 185, 186
 Conjectures and refutations, 29
 Connectivity, 66, 226, 227
 Connects any point to any other point, 224, 225
 Conscientization, 116
 Constitutive meanings, 160
 Constitutive rules, 183
 ‘Constraining preferences’, 140
 Consultancy, 267–269, 311
 Consumativity, 218
 Consumer society, 73
 Consumerism, 83, 217, 218, 302
 Consumerist strategies, 76
 Consumption of signs, 12
 Consumption, 12, 72–74, 81, 113, 214, 217–223
 ‘Contact zones’, 202
 Contest(s), 228, 287, 290
 Contestable, 24, 273
 Contestation, 4, 80, 83, 133, 138, 279, 290
 Context-dependent knowledge, 193, 260
 Contextualised guided practice, 246, 249
 Contextualised responsiveness, 252
 Contextualising, 248
 Contextualization, 241, 249, 251
 Contextualized, 215, 241, 246, 247, 249, 252, 253

- Continuing education, 2, 5, 8, 19, 27, 57, 60, 203, 282, 310, 312, 315
- Contracts, 183, 240, 246
- Contractual, 240
- Contractualisation, 237
- Contractualism, 252
- Control theory, 184
- Conventional centres of learning, 74
- Conversion, 136
- Corporate America, 195
- Council of Europe, 190
- Council of the European Union, 189
- Council on higher education, 151, 153
- Counterfactual reasoning, 180
- Creative partnerships*, 193
- Creative tension, 273
- Credentialing, 242, 243, 246, 251
- Criteria of intelligibility, 29, 30
- Criterion of progressiveness, 29
- Critical intelligence, 299
- Critical learning, 168, 181
- Critical pedagogy, 83
- Critical reflection, 138, 144, 246, 249
- Critical scrutiny, 33, 150, 169
- Critical thinking, 75, 162, 297, 305
- Critical thinking programmes, 181
- Critically, 128, 136, 165, 169, 179, 212, 238
- Criticism, 3, 15, 30, 51, 52, 160, 161, 165, 238
- Critique and contestation, 205
- Critique of pure reason, *7n*, 101
- Cross-cutting, 286
- Cultural and linguistic capital, 133
- Cultural exchange, 81, 123
- Cultural relativism 249
- Culture, 41, 42, 47–49, 52, 55, 58, 59, 63, 67, 118, 132, 134, 138
- Culture of human rights, 159
- Culture of inadequacy, 239, 244
- Curriculum theory, 72
- Cycle of ongoing learning, 180
- D**
- Das Ge-stell, 97
- Das woraufhin, *36n*, 103
- Dasein*, 88, 89, 91
- Data baskets, 284
- Dearing report, 58
- Decency (civility), 169
- Decision-making, 152, 173, 185, 186, 206, 280
- The decline of the welfare state, 82
- Deconstruction, 7, 55, 94–96, 98, *9n*, 101
- Decontextualised, 80, 82, 212
- De-differentiation, 71–75, 240
- De-differentiation argument, 240, 241, 247–250, 254
- De-legitimation, 75
- Deliberative argumentation, 160
- Deliberative democracy, 145
- Demarcations, 70
- Democracy, 34, 40, 41, 46, 51–54, 115, 145, 159, 184, 220, 279, 295
- Democrat, 55
- Democratic, 25, 27, 34, 51, 53–55, 60, 114–116
- Democratic citizenship education, 58, 158, 160, 166, 182
- Democratic epistemology, 204–206
- Democratic ethos, 53, 82, 159
- Democratic justice, 167–169
- Democratic polity, 35
- Demographic realities, 158
- Denotation, 215
- Density, 178
- Dependency thesis, 237, 238, 240, 242, 244–248, 250–255
- De-professionalisation, 254
- Derridian philosophy, 82
- Descriptive definition, 21
- Design, 81, 136, 183, 222, 263–266, 286
- De-territorialisation, 226, 227, 229
- Development, 5, 7, 9, 10, 14, 27, 34, 44, 48, 57
- Development discourses, 287
- Developmental state, 276
- DfEE, 4, 57, 59, 61, 62
- DfES, 59, 61, 65
- Dialectic, 202
- Dialogical relations, 162–164
- Dialogue, 1, 116, 129, 144, 145, 149, 164, 167, 208, 305
- Dictionary definition, 21
- Didactics, 81
- Difference-based advantage is relational, 137
- Differences are relational, 136
- Different conceptions of, 30, 66
- ‘Differentiated solidarity’, 206
- Diffuse learning environments, 282, 283, 285
- Discipline, 54, 62, 74, 75, 77, 81, 128, 153, 173, 191, 202
- Discontinuity argument, 241, 242, 250, 253, 254
- Discourse, 19, 21–23, 32, 49, 50, 58, 60
- Discourse procedure, 163
- Discourses of learning, 71, 80, 86
- Discourses of lifelong learning, 70–72, 76–79, 81, 88, 89, 91, 92, 94, 96, 127, 227, 16n, 101

- Discriminative justice in education, 237
 Discursive practices, 77, 78
 Disembodied, 80, 200, 202
 Disguise, 96
 Disposition to learn, 139, 140
 'Distance learning', 297
 Diversity, 41, 66, 67, 74, 86, 111, 150, 160, 191, 205, 237, 263
 Domain of reality, 76
 Domain of thought, 76
- E**
- Economic capital, 58, 62
 Economic competition, 77, 214
 Economic competitiveness, in the global marketplace, 73
 Economic development, 118, 131, 148, 159, 278, 279, 281, 286, 289
 Economic dimension of higher education, 132
 Economic opportunities, 132
 Economic policy, 278, 286
 Economic rationality, 73, 74, 217
 Economics, 129, 258, 267–272, 287, 311, 313
 Economic self-sufficiency, 34
 Economic system, 72, 214, 299
 Economistic, 57, 58, 61, 64, 287
 Economy, 31, 35, 43, 44, 48–52
 Economy of difference, 227
 Economy of signs, 218, 223
 Economy of the same, 227
 Educated citizenry, 132
 'Educated person', 223
 Educated public, 190, 191, 205, 206, 208
 Education for a Post-Humanist Age, 28n, 102
 Education is a site of symbolic control, 133
 Education permanente, 19, 57
 Education proper, 20, 27, 28
 Education white paper, 159
 Education white paper 3, 151, 154
 'Educational capabilities', 143
 Educational development, and human capability, 134
 Educational discourse, 7, 8, 21, 22, 60, 71, 80, 81
 Educational inclusion, 243
 Educational management, 32
 Educational philosophy, 19, 32
 Educational research, 13, 72, 223, 258
 Educational research community, 72
 Educational theorizing, 223
 Efficiency, 9, 32, 48, 52, 72, 75, 122, 125–127, 240
 The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, 14n, 101
 Emancipation, 3, 14, 34, 44, 47, 52, 245
 Emancipatory, 42, 58, 83, 242–245, 251, 255, 299
 Embedding, 132, 237
 Embedding of learning, 243
 Embodied, 8, 11, 78, 113, 128, 198, 200–202
 Embodied subjectivities, 78
 Emotions, 142–143
 Empiricist, 20–23, 29, 30
 approach of, 21
 Employability, 43, 44, 48, 59, 64, 189, 195, 267, 301
 Employability skills, 59, 64
 Empower, 14, 79, 148, 190, 203, 212, 279, 300, 312
 Enabling conditions, 137, 166
 Encyclopedia of philosophy, 4n, 100
 End of all education, 31
 Enframing, 87, 96, 2n, 100
 Engineering, 13, 72, 154, 258, 263–266, 272, 314
 Enlightenment, 46, 90, 93, 115, 191, 223, 6n, 101
 Enmeshment, 32
Entbergung, 41n–42n, 103
 Entrepreneurial citizenship, 298
 Epiphenomenon, 71, 76
Episteme, 197, 200, 202, 204
 Epistemic autonomy, 186
 Epistemic given, 180
 Epistemic interventions, 176
 Epistemic justification, 181
 Epistemic practices, 187
 Epistemically progressive group inquiry, 173
 Epistemologi, 13, 26, 60, 77, 111, 156, 192, 196, 200, 206, 258, 261
 Epistemological access, 155, 156
 Epistemological and ethical relativism, 26
 Epistemological basis for truth, 77
 Epistemology, 21, 33, 93, 185, 206, 260
 'Equality of what', 131
 Equity, 10, 35, 125, 134, 151, 153–156, 159, 279
 Equity and redress, 148, 150, 153–155
 Equity of access, 158, 159
 Error elimination, 176
 Error reduction, 186
 Errors, 175, 178
 ESF, 207, 208
 Essence, 87, 90, 94–96, 152, 164, 262, 17n, 101
 The Essence of Truth, 42n, 103
 Essential conditions, 179
 Essential definition, 20, 21

- Essentialism, 20, 24
 Essentialist ontology, 226
 'Essentialist' approach, 29
 Essentially contested concept, 4, 23
 Ethical expertise, 249
 Ethical form of life, 109
 Ethical issues, 109, 110
 Ethical relativism, 26, 249
 Ethical values, 249, 261
 Ethics, 53, 55, 93, 111, 173, 202, 253, 260, 6n, 101
 Etymological derivation, 21
European Social Forum, 206, 207
 European Union (EU), 39, 70, 114, 119, 189, 195
 European year of lifelong learning, 189
 Evaluation, 22, 119, 135, 137, 140, 242, 247, 253, 272, 288
 Evaluation criteria, 288
 Evaluation of equality, 135
 Evolutionary epistemology, 33
 'Excluded' groups, 195
 Exclusion, 129, 134, 190, 298, 301, 304, 313
 Exercises of power, 71, 79, 81
 Existence, 40, 59, 66, 73, 77, 89, 98, 149, 190–192, 219
 Experience, 20, 25, 27, 28, 50, 53, 91, 111, 116, 129, 133, 135, 137
 External conditions, 136, 137
 Extreme poverty, 294, 298, 304
- F**
- Fables, 237, 310
 Facilitating learning, 239, 252
 Facilitation of learning, 243, 251
 Fallacy, 21
 'False consciousness', 217, 245
 Family resemblance, 23, 258, 261, 262, 268, 269, 273
 Fast capitalism, 211–214, 218, 219, 223
 Fast culture, 211, 214, 217
 Fear is a barrier to learning, 143
 Fecundity, 33
 Feedback loops, 184
 Felicity, 33
 Feminist, 116, 200, 207, 208, 262, 294
 Feststellen, 96
 Flexible, 31, 114, 117, 118, 123, 125, 151, 195, 205, 212, 217, 229, 241, 244, 248, 252, 297
 Flexible specialization, 239
 Foregrounded, 90, 221
 Forms of continuity, 82
 Forms of intellectual operation, 34
 Forms of knowledge, 72, 159, 204, 219, 260
 Fostering capabilities in higher education, 145
 Foucauldian discourse, 76
 Foundational knowledge, 223, 241
 Foundationalism, 223, 229
 Fragmentation, 219, 237, 248, 252, 254
 Fragmented, 163, 191, 240, 241, 290
 Frame problem, 176, 182, 183
 Framework, 3, 5, 9, 10, 26, 50, 81, 119, 120, 122, 123, 128, 132
 Framework of lifelong learning, 119, 120, 253, 275, 288, 289
 Framing, 70, 85–87, 89, 92, 94–99, 127, 224, 243, 312, 2n, 100, 32n–33n, 102, 36n, 43n, 103
 'The Framing', 85, 94–97
 'Framing' for policy, 98
 'Framing' lifelong learning in the twenty first century, 85–105
 Frankfurt school, 47, 73
 Freedom, 10, 42, 50, 51, 53, 54, 117, 131, 132, 134–139, 141, 142, 144, 145, 167–169, 239, 244, 246, 252, 295, 20n, 307
 Friendship, 67, 138
 Friendships at university, 141
 Friendships out of class, 141
 Function and form, 31
 Functional utility, 33
 Functionings, 134, 135, 137, 142
 Further education (FE), 8, 19, 59, 61, 67, 134, 242, 282–284, 312, 313
- G**
- Games, 177, 261, 262
 Gender, 78, 136, 144, 154, 158, 167, 191, 208, 271, 278, 303, 314, 41n, 307
 Glasgow, 198, 199, 201, 209, 310
 Global, 9, 39, 40, 41, 46, 47, 58–61, 73, 85, 86, 91, 114, 115, 118
 Global economic imperatives, 148
 Global economy, 9, 85, 91, 114, 121, 123, 126, 127, 195, 196, 279, 297
 Global injustice, 208
 Globalisation, 9, 59, 71, 77, 114, 118–125, 127–129, 148, 161, 190, 208, 211, 214, 238, 278–280, 294, 296, 297, 299, 313, 8n–9n, 306
 Goals, 2, 11, 33, 35, 43, 64, 66, 71, 83, 112, 125, 128, 154, 156, 158, 159, 165, 178, 180, 189, 196, 208, 219, 299, 303, 305
 Government, 4, 5, 31, 57, 58, 61, 65, 79, 83, 91, 122, 164, 193, 194, 267, 276

- Governmental power, 79
 Governmentality, 71, 75, 79, 121, 227
 Grand narrative, 226, 302
 “Great Books”, 163, 164
 Ground, 3, 13, 14, 28, 31, 32, 40, 82, 92–95, 215, 219, 247, 275, 286, 288, 6*n*, 101, 31*n*, 102
 Grounded, 87, 96, 99, 116, 124, 212, 225, 241, 242
 ‘Group capabilities’, 142
 Growth of scientific knowledge, 174, 175, 183
 Guided practice, 246, 249
- H**
- Higher education, 3, 5, 9, 10, 58, 59, 61, 110–112, 131–145
 Higher education pedagogy, 144
 Higher Education Quality Committee Audit (HEQC), 164
 Higher education should then have intrinsic and instrumental value, 132
 Higher education, affiliation, 139
 Higher education, she argues, is a *social* good, 133
 HIV/AIDSs, 161, 281, 285, 294, 295
 Horizon of ‘Being’, 86, 89, 94
 Human agency, 77, 96
 Human capital, 8–10, 58, 79, 91, 112, 114, 123, 124, 126, 145, 280
 Human community, 28
 Human freedom, 134
 Human resource development, 44, 151, 153, 280
 Humane commitments, 243, 246, 249, 255
 Humanism, 41, 47, 77, 81, 86, 87, 89, 95, 241, 4*n*, 100, 18*n*, 101
 Humanistic, 39, 41, 46, 77, 91, 114, 241, 242, 253, 303
 Hyper-commodification of culture, 216, 217
 Hyper-real, 215
 Hyper-reality, 12
- I**
- ICT, 280, 297
 Identity, 9, 39, 71, 78, 83, 85, 92, 98–100, 122, 131, 134, 136, 141, 151, 182, 190
 Ideological, 4, 6, 41, 45, 46, 47, 53, 64, 241, 242, 279, 299, 303, 9*n*, 306
 Ideology, 14, 26, 27, 46, 51, 76, 77, 121, 122, 195, 243, 295, 302, 303, 29*n*, 307
 IJLE 1995, 57
 Imagination, 122, 128, 142, 143, 144, 160, 162, 191, 205, 206, 1*n*, 146
 Imaginative action, 160
 Inclusion, 6, 7, 14, 66, 76, 131, 132, 135, 144, 145, 196, 243, 300, 303, 26*n*, 42*n*, 307
 Inclusiveness, 28, 34, 35, 159
 Incommensurable, 24, 26, 164
 Incommensurable and competing paradigms, 26
 Incommensurable paradigms, 164
 Incompleteness theorem, 175
 Increased access, 158
 Indicators, 13, 14, 119, 120, 275, 276, 281–290
 Individual, 6, 11, 12, 20, 28, 31, 35, 40, 42–46, 49, 53, 54, 57, 58, 60, 66
 Individual autonomy, 28, 173
 Individual choice, 239, 244, 246
 Individual freedom, 244, 246
 Individual identity, 248
 Individual learner, 12, 81, 111, 243, 252
 Individualisation, 196, 238, 251
 Individualising learning, 74, 244
 Individualist, 52, 55, 58, 66, 230, 253
 Individualistic, 230, 253
 Inequalities, 39, 83, 117, 128, 133, 136, 154, 158, 159, 196, 205, 242, 298
 Inequality and marginalization, 279
 Informal, non-formal and formal, 277, 278
 Information, 6, 40, 43–45, 49, 59, 61, 62, 66, 74, 75, 111, 118–120, 123
 Information revolution, 280
 Informed awareness, 31
 Informed commitments, 243, 246, 249, 250
 Informed humane commitments, 243, 249
 Initial learning, 282–285
 Institutional change, 183
 Institutional education, 221
 Institutional nature of much of our social life, 183
 Institutionalised education, 229
 Instrumental, 11, 73, 91, 110, 112, 113, 122, 123, 132, 243, 255, 299, 301, 304
 Instrumental usefulness of knowledge, 73
 Instrumental values, 110, 112, 113, 122
 Instrumentally, 125, 240
 Integrates the personal and the macro-social, 137
 Interdisciplinary, 3, 289
 Interdisciplinarity, 191
 ‘Internal capabilities’, 136
 Internal coherence, 29
 Internationalisation, 237, 244, 252, 254
 Inter-paradigm agreement, 24
 Inter-paradigm intelligibility, 24
 Intersectoral, 289
 Intersubjective agreement, 263

- Introduction to Metaphysics, 90
 Iris Marion Young's, 206
 'Iron cage of technical rationality', 87, 3*n*, 100
 Isotropic, 181, 183, 185
- J**
 'Joined up', 280, 287
 'Juggernaut', 97, 99, 1*n*, 100
 Juggernaut of change, 86
 Justice, 9, 10, 35, 39, 51, 52, 55, 131, 132, 134, 138, 144
- K**
 Kelvingrove Art Gallery, 199
 Kenning, 206
 Knowledge, 180, 183–187, 189, 191–198, 200–202, 204
 Knowledge building, 187
 Knowledge construction, 205
 Knowledge dissemination and consumption, 81
 Knowledge driven interventions, 180
 'Knowledge economy', 11, 120, 122–125, 127, 189, 194, 196–198, 211, 214, 279, 280
 Knowledge factories, 73
 Knowledge market, 75
 Knowledge society, 43, 48, 49, 51, 189, 195, 280
 'Knowledgeable minds', 75
 Knowledge-based economy, 197, 299
- L**
 Labour, 9, 44, 57, 59, 65–67, 86, 92–94, 98, 112, 114, 118, 120, 123, 125, 126, 128, 129, 153, 159, 189, 195, 196, 218, 280, 287, 290, 298–300
 Lack of agency, 138, 145
 Lack of employment, 156
 Law-like features, 180
 Learner choice, 237
 Learner identities, 133, 139, 140
 Learner-centredness, 237
 Learning, 2–22
The Learning Age, 59, 299, 301, 21*n*, 307
 Learning Cape, 13, 275, 276, 278, 280–285, 287
 'Learning careers', 63, 66
 Learning cities, 72, 276
 Learning communities, 53, 72, 141, 277, 283, 289
 Learning cycle, 176, 180
 Learning engagement, 238–240, 243, 247
 Learning indicator, 282
 Learning is consuming, 221
 Learning is shaped by the institutional and social, 137
 Learning nation, 277, 290
 Learning opportunity, 74
 Learning organizations, 63, 64, 72
 Learning outcomes, 12, 161, 240, 243, 244, 246, 251
 Learning regions, 13, 72, 275, 276, 278, 282, 288
 Learning society, 6, 7, 25, 26, 28, 29, 35, 39–43, 45, 46, 48
 Learning throughout life, 35, 100, 111, 151, 243, 278
 Les pénélopes, 207, 208
 Letter on humanism, 18*n*, 101
 Levers, 159
 Liberal, 9, 19, 20, 24, 26–30, 46, 50, 51, 53–55, 72, 73, 76
 Liberal education, 19, 20, 24, 26, 28–30, 132, 182
 Liberal humanism, 77, 81
 Liberal-democratic, 254
 Life-deep, 288
 Life-long, 37
 Lifelong education, 2, 3, 5–7, 19–31
 Lifelong education theory, 242, 243, 245, 247, 250–254
 Life-long journeys, 133
 Lifelong learner identities, 133
 Lifelong learners, 14, 89, 109, 123, 131, 149, 151, 152, 162, 164, 165, 167–169, 181, 183, 263, 286, 290
 Lifelong learning, 2–15
 Lifelong learning as a rhizome, 229
 Lifelong learning capabilities for equality and justice, 144
 Lifelong learning ethic, 9, 245, 249
 Lifelong learning for all, 31, 34, 35, 158
 Lifelong learning institutions, 290
 Lifelong learning is a discourse, 71
 Lifelong learning theory, 12, 237, 238, 242, 244–255
 Lifelong schooling, 240
 Life-wide, 222
 Limited knowledge, 173
 'Lines of flight', 226
 Linguistic and cultural capital, 134
 Literacies, 237, 240
 Living with orthodoxy, 86
 Local and global, 290
 Locally and globally, 280, 289, 295
 Logic (theory), 267
 Logical empiricism, 33
 Logocentric, 224

- Long tradition, 110
 Look and see, 13, 258, 261–263, 272
 ‘Look at the use’, 23
 LSC 2001, 61
 Luddites, 95
- M**
- Malawi, 202
 Male domination, 156
 Managerial control, 187
 Managerialism, 237, 244, 252, 254, 302
 Managerialist, 46, 47, 53, 54, 239, 305
 Managing one’s own learning, 243
 Marginalised voices, 160
 Market, 67, 73, 74, 75, 82, 118, 120, 122, 123, 125, 127, 129, 151–153, 156, 213, 220, 238, 268, 269, 280
 Market approach, 152, 153
 Market price, 264
 Marketisation, 237, 239, 244, 252, 254
 Marketised, 72, 239, 244, 252
 Marketised views, 72
 Marxist ideas, 174
 Marxist, 73, 245
 Mass consumption, 221
 Mathematical model, 266
 Maximalist notion, 24
 ‘Maximalist’ conception, 25
 ‘Maximalist’ position, 20, 23–26, 28
 Meaning, 6, 8, 19, 21, 23, 25, 46, 65, 77, 78, 111, 114, 142
 Meaning and subjectivity, 78
 Meaning systems, 77
 Meaning-making, 214, 220, 223, 228
 Measurable boundaries, 178
 Meta-cognition, 29
 Meta-theory, 20
 Methodology, 13, 21, 175, 176, 192, 193, 267, 268, 276
 Microsoft, 174
 Middle-income countries, 278
 Mind/body dualism, 77
 Ministry of education, 151, 152, 276
 Misrecognition, 139
 Model, 1, 25, 33, 42, 54, 57, 60, 63, 64, 75, 93, 175, 178, 182, 198, 205, 263, 267, 269–272
 Modelling, 178, 246, 249
 Modern apprenticeships, 61, 66
 Modernist project, 72
 Modernist, 50, 72, 73, 83, 87, 95
 Modernity, 47, 50, 115, 219, 220, 225, 226
 Modes of speech, 162
 Moral education, 19, 259, 313
 Moral norms and virtues, 150
 Multi-faceted approach to learning, 34
 Multi-faceted character of lifelong learning, 33
 Mumbai declaration, 110
 Mumbai statement, 110–112
The Mumbai WSF in 2004, 207
 Museum(s), 11, 198, 199, 201, 206, 209, 217
- N**
- Narrative, 13, 42, 160, 165, 226, 258, 303
 Narrowness of human capital theory, 145
 National plan for higher education in South Africa (NPHE, 2001), 158
 National plan for higher education, 10, 151
 National skills task force, 59
 National vocational qualifications (NVQs), 60
 Natural science, 183, 185, 216
 Navigating, 187
 Negative freedom, 239, 244, 252
 Neo-liberal, 9, 76, 114, 115, 121–123, 125, 127–129, 132, 137, 144
 Neo-liberal education policies, 132
 Neo-liberalism, 7, 71, 122, 189, 255
 Neo-Marxist, 244, 245
 Networks, 44, 49, 64, 72, 79, 119, 121, 124, 141, 142, 198
 Networks of learners, 72
 New labour, 57, 59, 66, 196, 298–300
 New Rules of Sociological Method, 6*n*, 101
 New technology (ies), 64, 74, 115, 124, 174, 223, 263, 264, 296, 297
 Newton, 200
 The new work order, 211, 212
 New Zealand, 112
 NGOs, 293, 294
 NIACE, 193, 301, 313, 314, 3*n*, 306, 6*n*, 306, 16*n*, 306, 28*n*, 307, 42*n*, 307, 44*n*, 307, 45*n*, 308, 50*n*, 308
 NIACE 2005, 193
 No beginning or end, 225
 Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), social movements, 293
 Non-institutional learning, 221
 Nottingham, 2, 193, 194, 311–314
 NTU, 88
 Nurse education, 19
 Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, if taken up pedagogically, 143
- O**
- Observed error, 176
 OCR/RSA, 2001, 64

- OECD, 6, 7, 14, 70, 114, 117–120, 123–126, 195, 250
 OECD 1996, 126, 250
 On-going activity, 97, 99, 43*n*, 103
 Ontological priority, 219
 Opportunities, 1, 6, 10, 14, 19, 28, 35, 46, 61, 62, 72–74
 Ordinary language analysis, 33
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 6, 7, 14, 70, 114, 117–120, 123–126, 195, 250
 Organization, 5–9, 14, 114, 118–121, 123–125, 127
 Organizational learning, 185, 186
 Orthodox philosophy, 193
 Out of silos, 277, 287, 289
 Outcomes, 10, 12, 27, 42, 47, 50, 83, 90, 111, 131, 132, 145
 Overman, 27*n*, 102
 Ownership, 136, 199, 287, 288
- P**
- Paradigm theory, 24
 Paradox(s), 13, 80, 225, 275, 289
 Parameters, 19, 263, 264
 Parmenides, 99
 Partiality in discriminative justice, 253
 Participation, 4, 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 27, 34, 51, 60, 62, 63
 Participative democracy, 75
 Participatory and inclusive dialogue, 145
 Participatory democratic, 25, 227
 Participatory democratic forms of development, 277
 Participatory processes, 286
 Partisanship(s), 193, 237, 240, 241, 249, 252, 277, 289
 Partnerships and networking, 277
 Pathmarks, 18*n*, 101
 Peace movement, 196, 294, 299
 Pedagogical practices, 78
 Pedagogy, 8, 29, 71, 78, 80–83, 116, 117, 133, 137, 144, 290, 298, 20*n*, 307
 Penguin Book of Philosophy, 4*n*, 100
 Perfectibility, 95, 97
 Performative, 83
 Performativity, 47, 48, 50–53, 73, 74, 132
 Permeability, 70
 Personal, 4, 6, 7, 10, 14, 28, 31, 34, 35, 43–45, 48, 54
 Personal advancement, 34
 Personal autonomy, 28
 Personal development, 14, 34, 44, 83, 88, 112, 118, 132, 159, 195, 200
 Personal experience, 193, 219
 Personal wisdom, 198
 Phenomenon of totalizing theory, 229
 Philosophical Schriften, 24*n*, 102
 Philosophy of education, 1, 2, 3, 5, 13, 22, 30, 34, 46, 48, 52, 149, 163
 Philosophy of mind, 260
 Phronesis, 197, 198
 Phronimos, 198, 204
 Piecemeal epistemic approach, 181
 Piecemeal social change, 176
 Piecemeal, change, 176
 Plane of consistency, 225
 Pledges, 288, 290
 Plurality, 24, 27, 208, 261–263
 Poiesis, 197, 22*n*, 102
 Policy, 2, 4–7, 10–14, 22–24, 30–32, 34, 35, 43, 44, 46
 Policy construction, 32
 Political, 4, 6, 8, 11, 13, 14, 20, 25, 26, 31, 32, 34, 40
 Political will, 287, 288, 290
 Politically, 6, 42, 51, 53, 143, 190, 192, 208, 282
 Politicised, 201, 280
 Politics, 6, 46, 50–54, 57, 76, 129, 202, 206, 213, 242, 281, 290, 300, 313, 314
 Polycontextuality, 71
 Popper cycles, 176, 177, 182
 Popperian, 29, 33, 183, 268
 Popperian tradition, 33
 Positive freedom, 239
 Positive learner identities, 139
 Positivism, 33, 47
 Possibility, 54, 78, 83, 85, 86, 88, 90, 93, 97–99, 140, 160, 162, 168, 169, 174, 197, 205, 220, 228, 259, 272, 284, 13*n*, 101, 36*n*, 103
 Post-empiricist approach, 23
 Post-empiricist standpoint, 20
 Post-empiricist thinkers, 22
 Post-empiricist work, 21
 Post-humanism, 86
 Postmodern, 6, 12, 41, 47, 48, 50, 52–55, 197, 212
 Postmodernism, 3, 82, 314
 Postscript: Towards a way of thinking about policy, 98–100
 Poststructuralism, 7, 50, 71
 Poverty, 29, 156, 166, 168, 169, 196, 208, 278–280, 285, 293–295, 298, 299, 301–305, 1*n*, 3*n*, 306
 The Poverty of Historicism, 29

- Power, 7, 24, 40, 48, 52, 54, 66, 71, 74, 76, 77
 Power and participation, 144, 145
 Power in such public dialogues, 145
 Power relations, 52, 117, 152, 155, 202
 Power we have, the wider the range of our genuine choices, 144
 Power-knowledge formations, 77
 Practical, 5, 10, 13, 44, 62, 135, 138, 139, 143–145
 Practical judgements, 166
 Practical knowledge, 192, 243, 248, 252
 Practical learning, 251
 Practical philosophy, 13, 192, 193, 258, 261–263, 266, 272
 Practical reason, 138, 139, 143–145, 243, 1*n*, 146
 Practical reason and learning, 139
 Practical reasoning, 139, 145
 Practice, 3–5, 7–10, 12, 13, 15, 22, 24, 25, 30, 42
 Pragmatic, 6, 13, 20, 22, 24, 30–34, 39, 43, 48, 65, 66, 73, 80, 158, 163, 180, 224, 243, 247, 248, 253, 258, 259, 262, 263, 273
 Pragmatic criteria, 32
 Pragmatic method, 22
 Pragmatic progressive, 253
 Praxis, 197, 198, 202, 204, 205, 208
 Predictions, 183, 268–270
 Presentism, 237
 Primary producers of knowledge, 75
 ‘Principle of reason’, 85, 92–96, 6*n*, 101, 16*n*, 101, 33*n*, 102, 36*n*, 103
 The Principle of Reason (Satz von Grund), 29*n*, 102
 Privatisation, 237–242, 244, 245, 251–254
 The privatisation argument, 238–240, 242–245, 253, 254
 Privatisation argument, 238–240, 242, 244, 245, 253, 254
 Problem, 1, 19, 20, 33, 34, 51, 88, 139–143, 145
 Problem situations, 33
 Problem-based approach, 34
 Problem-solving, 20, 33, 158, 159
 Production, 43, 73, 76, 80, 81, 86–89, 92, 93, 96
 Professional, 3, 9, 13, 23, 42, 61, 96, 110, 112, 114, 117
 Professional class, 190
 Professional knowledge development, 173
 Professional or political differences, 285
 Programme, 5, 7, 10, 12, 14, 15, 20, 22–30, 32, 42
 Progressive, 11, 22, 24, 28, 42, 83, 116, 136, 173, 175, 176, 182, 196
 Progressive research programme, 22, 24, 28
 Progressiveness, 29, 254
 Progressivism, 248
 Projects, 4, 14, 40, 64, 66, 209, 237, 240, 241, 248, 252, 275, 286, 314
- Q**
 The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 2*n*, 100
 Quinean, 32, 181, 183, 185
- R**
 Race, 39–41, 109, 136, 144, 158, 167, 168, 191, 201, 296, 8*n*, 306
 Race relations, 296, 8*n*, 306
 Racism, 133, 295, 304, 8*n*, 306
 ‘Racism of intelligence’, 133
 Racist, 159, 164, 190, 1*n*, 169
 Radical philosophy, 207, 208
 Radical solutions, 264
 Range of options, 31, 134
 Range of provision, 35
 Rational autonomy, 27
 Real meaning, 23, 225
 Re-branding, 252
 Recognising prior learning, 244
 Recurrent education, 19, 27, 57, 117
 Red Pepper, 207
 Redistribution, 132, 154, 244, 279, 280, 303
 Redress, 10, 148, 150, 151, 153–155, 158, 159, 260, 279
 Redress past inequalities, 158
 Reference, 5, 13, 15, 19, 23, 24, 26, 30, 35, 43, 46, 48, 50
 Reference variable, 184
 Reflexivity, 83, 99, 312
 Refocusing on pedagogy, 81
 Refutation, 29, 33, 96, 175, 269
 Regulative rules, 183, 185
 Relationship between educational and social inequalities, 136
 Relationships, 60, 63, 111, 122, 128, 137, 143, 162, 190, 193, 194, 200, 201, 203, 218, 221, 240, 245, 248, 250, 261, 268, 287, 289, 9*n*, 306
 Relativism, 3, 12, 20, 26, 30, 33, 241, 249, 253, 260
 Rendered, 88, 91, 93, 97, 33*n*, 102
 Rendering, 91, 97, 225, 226, 33*n*, 102
 Representation, 11, 55, 76, 86, 88, 91, 95, 96, 100, 180, 192, 211, 215, 219, 220, 224, 238, 252

- Representative democracy, 184
 Represented, 10, 42, 85, 87, 88, 91, 95, 96,
 155, 206, 224, 260, 19*n*, 101
 Re-production, 213
 Requirement, 44, 60, 82, 114, 118, 122, 123,
 127–129, 156, 175, 178
 Research and development, 75, 81, 281, 312
 Research and developmental practice, 81
 Research capacity, 159
 Research programme, 22, 24, 26, 28, 29, 32,
 153, 159
 Resource-based learning, 81
 Resourceful human beings, 151–153, 155, 156
 Responsibility, 2, 11, 12, 34, 40, 44, 58, 82,
 83, 110, 118
 Responsiveness, 11, 153, 243–245, 248, 249,
 252, 266
 Re-territorialization, 225–229
 Revealing, 94, 95, 98, 100, 41*n*, 103
 Rhetoric, 11, 40, 44, 95, 116, 189, 190, 192,
 194, 196, 197, 200, 202, 204, 208, 242,
 275, 280, 295, 296, 311
 Rhizomatic, 12, 214, 224–230
 Rhizomatic practice, 12, 214
 Rhizome, 12, 223–227, 229, 231
 Rights, 10, 31, 45, 51, 110, 116, 152, 159,
 164, 168, 196, 207, 244, 294, 295
 The rise of the consumer market, 82
 Risk, 8, 39, 49, 82, 83, 138, 175, 180, 220,
 270, 271, 277, 297, 300
 Romantic levels, 275
 Rule-governed, 245, 249
 Rule-governed behaviour, 245
 Russell Committee, 302
- S**
 Science, 11, 20, 21, 32, 41, 43, 46, 92, 93,
 95–99, 115, 124, 153, 4*n*, 100
 Scientific inquiry, 179
 Scottish Enlightenment, 191
 Sea of learning, 33
 Secure, 10, 24, 33, 35, 90, 96, 121, 125, 152,
 153, 161, 197, 220, 223
Sein und Zeit, 94, 38*n*, 103
 Self, 9, 10, 26, 30, 31, 34, 40, 41, 44–46,
 49, 50
 Self identity, 182
 Self-esteem, 296, 301, 303–305
 Self-referential meaning, 222
 Semiosis, 214, 224
 Semiotic exchanges, 211
 Sets of social relationships, 162
 Sexuality, 76, 191, 201, 208
 Shaping identity, 217
 ‘Shared (intersubjective) standards of rational
 argumentation’, 164
 Shiefton, 203, 204
 Sicherstellen, 96
 Sign economy, 214, 218
 Signifying fabric, 218
 Silos, 277, 287, 289
 Simulacra, 215, 218, 6*n*, 231
 Simulation of reality, 215
 Situationally, 245, 246, 248, 249, 253
 Situationally sensitive, 245, 249, 253
 Skill, 62, 63, 112, 197, 229, 269, 299
 Skilled, 34, 77, 96, 115, 124, 126, 128, 153,
 159, 245, 246, 289
 Skills, 3, 7, 34, 45, 47, 58–64, 73, 75, 80, 81,
 96, 110, 111, 115
 Slow learning, 209
 Social, 3, 6–11, 14, 21, 25, 26, 29, 31, 34, 35
 Social (educational) arrangements, 134
 Social capital, 7, 9, 60, 61, 63–65, 67, 126,
 141, 144, 276, 277, 289, 297
 Social causation, 179
 Social class, 131, 144, 278, 302, 303
 Social cohesion, 10, 51, 52, 118, 126, 127,
 152, 189, 278, 289, 297, 299
 Social constraints on choice, 137
 Social epistemology, 185
 Social exclusion, 126, 298, 301, 303, 304, 313
 Social forecasting, 174, 176
 Social governance, 184
 Social identities, 131, 133
 Social inclusion, 6, 7, 66, 196, 300, 303,
 26*n*, 307
 Social inclusiveness, 34, 35, 159
 Social inequality, 190, 196
 Social injustice, 42, 239
 Social institutions, 26, 35, 75
 Social issues, 148, 156
 Social justice, 9, 10, 51, 52, 131, 132, 144,
 145, 190, 241, 243, 249, 250, 254, 271,
 293, 294, 298, 299, 305, 312–314
 Social justice campaigns, 293
 Social learning, 202, 204, 277, 285
 Social movements, 50, 72, 112, 116, 190, 196,
 207, 289, 293, 294, 298, 305, 4*n*, 306
 Social order, 65, 71–73, 76, 78, 79, 81, 159,
 211–218, 220, 227, 300
 Social positioning, 76
 Social progress, 73, 115
 Social purposes, 59, 117, 286, 290
 ‘Social theory of learning’, 65
 Social transformation, 64, 127, 149, 153, 208
 Social values, 7, 60, 64, 312
 Social-democratic, 251

- Socialism, 46, 47, 298, 9*n*, 306, 39*n*, 103
 Sociality, 74
 Socially excluded, 299, 301, 303
 Socially just, 60, 65, 116, 241, 249, 255
 Social-welfare, 253
 'Society of signs', 211, 215, 231
 Socio-economic, 13, 86, 227, 285
 Socio-economic development, 13, 275, 286, 289
 Sociological theories, 144
 Sociology of pedagogy, 81
 Solipsism, 30
 South Africa, 10, 11, 13, 14, 112, 148–156, 158, 159, 165, 275, 277–281, 288, 290, 315, 2*n*, 169
 Specialist practice, 155
 Spira 2005, 197
 Stability and predictability, 183
 Stable meaning, 215
 Staff autonomy, 187
 Stand in reserve, 95
 Standards, 45, 62, 77, 80, 98, 159, 164, 195, 237, 240, 252, 297
 Standards of success, 31
 Standing reserve, 99, 44*n*, 103
 Steering mechanisms, 159
 Stellen, 96, 33*n*, 102
 Strata, 12, 225–228, 231
 Structures of inequality, 10, 195, 196
 Student identities, 138
 Student-centred learning, 29
 'Studentship', 63, 65, 66
 Subject, 2, 6, 32, 33, 47, 54, 70, 76–78, 80, 92, 93, 99, 112, 113, 123, 153, 168, 226, 227, 240, 31*n*, 102, 13*n*, 231
 Subjective idealism, 249
 Subjectivities, 74, 78, 80, 82, 127, 128, 133
 Subjectivity and identity, 78
 Subjectivity, 76–79, 200, 212, 219, 227
 Sustainability, 277, 285, 287
 Symbolic or rhetorical, 13, 275
 'System of objects', 218
 System of signs, 212
 System-wide targets and goals, 159
- T**
- Techne, 94, 197, 198, 200, 204, 40*n*, 103
 Technical, 47, 51, 53, 55, 80, 87, 115, 153, 159, 178, 197, 200, 239, 240, 252
 Technical education, 19
 Technician and decontextualised practices, 82
 Technician view, 81
 Technique (s), 80, 81, 229, 239, 240, 244, 251, 252, 270
- Technology, 43, 46, 48, 61, 64, 74, 85, 94–96, 99, 124, 129, 184, 216, 264, 268, 280, 314, 39*n*, 103,
 Teleological goals, 83
 Temporal, 89, 93, 94, 96, 132, 240
 Temporalises, 89
 Temporalising, 89, 90, 17*n*, 101
 Temporality, 89, 35*n*, 103
 Tension(s), 152, 153, 156, 173, 229, 237, 247, 255, 273, 279, 281, 282, 298
 Tentative hypotheses, 33
 Tentative theory(ies), 175, 176
 Term, 1, 4, 5, 13, 19, 21–23, 26, 53, 55, 70, 90, 96, 111
 Terms of reference, 267
 Terms of significance, 31
 Test specification, 264, 265
 Tests for efficacy, 31
 Theoretical vessel, 32
 Theories of development, 290
 Theories of learning, 82
 Theory choice, 182, 186
 Theory construction and comparison, 33
 Theory excellence, 181
 Theory of the world, 185
 Theory revision, 182
 Theory/vessel building and repairing, 32
 Theory-laden, 22
 Thick autonomy, 145
 Thin view of power, 144
 'Third way' politics, 57
 Time and being, 89
 Tomlinson, 67
 Touchstone, 24, 29, 32
 Towards a way of thinking, 97–100
 Trades union movement, 299
 Training, 4, 7, 11, 12, 34, 35, 42–46, 48, 58–62, 64, 67
 Transcendental arguments, 29, 30
 Transcendental violence, 82
 Transcultural modes of critical engagement, 164
 Transculturation, 202
 Transitivity, 178
 Trends, 14, 57, 73, 74, 82, 120, 175, 213, 214, 237, 303
 Triadic concept, 4, 259
 'Triadic' nature of lifelong learning, 34, 159
 Truth-making practices, 219
- U**
- Übermensch, 27*n*, 102
 Ubuntu, 149, 150
 Uncertainty, 72, 173–185, 220, 297

Uncontested definition, 23
 Unemployment, 117, 166, 280, 281, 302
 Unending quest, 32
 UNESCO, 2, 6, 14, 24, 25, 39, 46, 112, 114,
 120, 250, 251
 Universal, 42, 47, 50, 59, 72, 220, 241, 243,
 249, 253–255
 Universal human capabilities, 138
 Universalisation, 87, 6*n*, 101
 Universality, 193
 University, 5, 11, 57, 61, 88, 118, 132, 133,
 135–137, 139–141, 144, 154, 160, 161,
 163, 167, 203, 301
 University of Chicago, 191
 Unpredictability, 175, 178
 Upon which, 6*n*, 32, 36*n*, 94, 95, 101, 103,
 184, 252, 6*n*, 101, 36*n*, 103
 Utopianism, 255

V

Valuable, 3, 10, 22, 49, 63, 120, 127, 134,
 135, 142, 179, 221
 Value relativism, 12, 241, 249, 253
 Value-free, 22
 Value-judgments, 29
 Value-partial discriminative justice, 249
 Value-relativism, 241
 Value-relativist, 253
 Virtual communities, 74
 Virtuality, 216, 219
 Virtues, 28, 49, 65, 150, 152, 153, 243
 Vocational, 4, 45, 57, 59, 61, 62, 64, 65, 67,
 73, 118, 132, 239, 259, 266, 312, 313
 Vocational education, 4, 19, 65, 73

Vocational education and training (VET), 7,
 57–67
 Vocationalisation, 57, 73, 237, 240,
 248, 252
 Vocationalism, 7, 60, 74, 254
 Vocationally, 9, 248
 Vorstellen, 95, 96

W

Web of belief, 22, 32
 Welfare, 28, 31, 41, 75, 76, 82, 125, 150, 195,
 239, 241, 245, 251, 282, 298, 300
 Welfare reform, 241
 Western perspective on lifelong learning,
 150, 156
 What is called thinking, 20*n*, 101
 White paper (EWP) of 1997, 159
 Widening participation, 4, 5, 76, 131–146
 Widening participation students, 138, 142, 144
 Wider benefits of learning, 132, 133
 Wisdom, 116, 196, 198, 204, 208,
 298, 303
 Women's liberation movement, 299
 Work-based learning (WBL), 61–67, 73
 Working and learning, 116
 Working class students, 131, 133, 137–142, 144
 World social forum (2001), 189, 190, 206,
 209, 294
 World's problems, 264
 Worthwhile, 2, 4, 7, 14, 27, 71, 162, 221
 WSF, 206–208

Z

Zustellen, 95, 97

Lifelong Learning Book Series

1. R.G. Bagnall: *Cautionary Tales in the Ethics of Lifelong Learning Policy and Management*. A Book of Fables. 2004 ISBN 1-4020-2214-X
2. K. Evans and B. Niemeyer (eds.): *Reconnection*. Countering Social Exclusion through Situated Learning. 2004 ISBN 1-4020-2520-3
3. S. Jackson: *Differently Academic?* Developing Lifelong Learning for Women in Higher Education. 2004 ISBN 1-4020-2731-1
4. L. de Botton, L. Puigvert and M. Sánchez-Aroca: *The Inclusion of Other Women*. Breaking the Silence through Dialogic Learning. 2005 ISBN 1-4020-3537-3
5. J. Chapman, P. Cartwright and E.J. McGilp (eds.): *Lifelong Learning, Participation and Equity*. 2006 ISBN 1-4020-5321-5
6. P. Hager and S. Holland (eds.): *Graduate Attributes, Learning and Employability*. 2006 ISBN 1-4020-5341-X
7. P. Hager and J. Halliday: *Recovering Informal Learning. Wisdom, Judgement and Community*. 2006 ISBN 1-4020-5345-2
8. R. Usher and R. Edwards: *Lifelong Learning – Signs, Discourses, Practices*. 2007 ISBN 978-1-4020-5576-8
9. P. Cotterill, S. Jackson, G. Letherby (eds.): *Challenges and Negotiations for Women in Higher Education*. 2007 ISBN 978-1-4020-6109-7
10. D.N. Aspin, J.D. Chapman (eds.): *Values Education and Lifelong Learning*. Principles, Policies Programmes. 2007 ISBN 978-1-4020-6183-7
11. D.N. Aspin (ed.): *Philosophical Perspectives on Lifelong Learning*. ISBN 978-1-4020-6192-9